New Developments in Spanish Federalism

L’Europe en formation nº 363 Printemps 2012 - Spring 2012

L’Europe en formation

Printemps 2012 - Spring 2012n° 363

DossierA New Era of Federalism – Une nouvelle ère de fédéralismeEditors - Coordinateurs : Francesco Palermo & Elisabeth Alber (Eurac)

Introduction p. 7

Conceptual Framework - Cadre ConceptuelSimona PiattoniFederalism and Its Competitors: Which Template for Contemporary Europe?

p. 11

Frédéric LépineA journey through the History of FederalismIs Multilevel Governance a Form of Federalism?

p. 21

Pathé DiopLa souveraineté, pierre d’achoppement pour une fédération politique européenne

p. 63

James R. RogersDemocracy and Necessity: Rightly Dividing Political Power

p. 73

Sean MuellerFederalism and the Concept of Political Territoriality

p. 95

Jorge Cagiao y CondeAutorité et confl it d’autorités en droit fédératif

p. 121

Geographic Context - Contexte géographiqueNicolas SchmittLe fédéralisme : plus fragile et plus nécessaire que jamaisQuelques réfl exions illustrées par la Suisse et les pays d’Afrique

p. 145

Francesco PalermoThe “F” Factor in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern EuropeWhy is the international community afraid of federalism and why it should not be

p. 169

L'Europe en formation – Electronic complimentary copy for authors


Xabier ArzozNew Developments in Spanish Federalism

p. 179

Jens WoelkIdentity-Diversity and the Territorial Dimension in the Western Bal-kans

p. 189

Soeren KeilFederalism as a Tool of Confl ict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

p. 205

Senka Neuman StanivukovicTerritoriality is in the Eyes of the BeholderUntangling The Nation-State from Below with a Little Help from Above

p. 219

Elvira NurievaEffective or Appropriated Federalism?The Case Study of the Republic of Mari El in the Russian Federation

p. 235

Arshi KhanContesting Democratic Polities in the Interest of Federalism

p. 251

Yonatan Tesfaye FesshaFederalism, Territorial Autonomy and the Management of Ethnic Diversity in Africa: Reading the Balance Sheet

p. 265

Specifi c Policies - Politiques spécifi ques

Mariachiara AlbertonEnvironmental Protection in the EU Member States: Changing Insti-tutional Scenarios and Trends

p. 289

Giorgio GrimaldiProspects for Ecological Federalism

p. 301

Elisabeth Alber & Alice ValdescaliciReforming Fiscal Federalism in Europe: Where Does the Pendulum Swing?

p. 325

Karl KösslerImmigration and Migrant Integration in Multicultural Societies.New Playgrounds for Subnational Governments?

p. 367

Giovanni PoggeschiL’évolution des droits linguistiques en Europe: Structures territoriales décentralisées et impact de l’immigration en Italie

p. 391

Elisabeth AlberSouth Tyrol’s Education System: Plurilingual Answers for Monolin-guistic Spheres?

p. 399



Christian LeuprechtPublic Safety in Federal Systems: A Primer

p. 417

In memoriamJan Westenbroek & André Thiéry p.437

ChroniqueJean-Pierre GouzyLa vie politique en Europe et dans le monde

p. 443

Lectures p. 471



Dossier

A New Era of Federalism

Une nouvelle ère defédéralisme



A New Era of FederalismUne nouvelle ère de fédéralisme

Introduction

Francesco Palermo & Elisabeth Alber

EURAC-Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism, Bolzano/Bozen.

Editors’ preface

Th is issue of the Journal originates from the wish to engage in a pluri-discipli-nary dialogue among federal scholars who are studying the emerging and evident trend towards a new multi-sphere structure of government and integrated forms of territorial management. It also investigates the new trends towards a more pluralistic and inclusive, but yet democratic governance that emerge from a com-parative analysis.

Several calls are recently made to advocating a simplifi ed form of govern-ment and over-emphasizing alleged links between federalism and threats to the territorial and/or economic integrity of states. Against this background the issue “A New Era of Federalism” analyses the relevance of federalism and decentralized government techniques in Europe and worldwide. It does so by off ering both short opinions and more articulated articles. Federal scholars of diff erent disci-plines point out issues at stake by applying a comparative and critical perspective.

Th e goal of the issue is threefold: fi rst, it contributes to the study of new forms of governance, thus following the most modern trends in federal studies; sec-ondly, it provides for an analysis of federalism developments by geographic areas and third, it intends to have a practical impact in disseminating best practices, thus contributing to the “toolbox” for a new era of federalism.


Francesco Palermo & Elisabeth Alber8


Th e contributions try to shed light on various questions, which are of rel-evance for scholars of comparative federalism and regionalism. Th ey address questions such as “What are the conceptual challenges to the federal idea and what the most recurrent conceptual mistakes in dealing with federalism?”, “Is federalism in the 21st century still an important governance tool for a mean-ingful integrated cohabitation of peoples, or is it rather becoming obsolete?”, and, “What is and ought to be the contribution of federalism – both as an ideal and as an instrument of government – for future political developments and the rise of new techniques for decision-making processes in Europe?” More precisely, the issue is subdivided into thematic blocs and deals with specifi c aspects of the conceptual framework of federalism today (part one), the geo-graphic context of federalism with particular regard to Europe (part two), and the federal approaches to specifi c policies (part three).

While revisiting the conceptual framework of federalism today, the authors of part one look for explanations and innovative defi nitional frameworks, which try to accommodate the new techniques of inclusive multilevel government, ranging from regionalism to devolution and supranational integration.

Part two is dedicated to the geographic context. It particularly analyses fed-eral and regional issues in Europe. It does so by providing various case studies in a comparative perspective and by evaluating how federalism is developing in Europe. Additionally, this part hosts an outlook on extra-European federalism, shedding light on how federalism is evolving in Africa and Asia.

Th e issue concludes with part three, which comparatively analyses complex policies such as immigration, environment, fi nancial relations etc.. Th is part aims at demonstrating the importance of federalism not only as a political idea, but also (and even more so) as a very concrete tool of government. A tool that be-comes indispensable in order to manage complex policy fi elds.

We hope to encounter the interest of a wide range of scholars, researchers, policy-makers, civil servants and more generally of those who study and manage complex multi-sphere governmental structures.

A special thanks goes to the Centre international de formation européenne who invited us to be part of this project, its staff as well as the staff of the EURAC-Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism.

Bolzano/Bozen, April 2012




Conceptual Framework

Cadre Conceptuel



Federalism and Its Competitors: Which Template for Contemporary Europe?

Simona Piattoni

Professor at the University of Trento and the University of Innsbruck.

Introduction

Federalism is a deceivingly simple concept: we think we know what it is be-cause we know its general constitutional contours. We know that in federal sys-tems there are two signifi cant levels of government: the federal (national) and the federated (state). States have their own legislatures, which are represented in the second federal chamber of a bicameral parliamentary system and through which they infl uence decisions made at the centre. Th ere is, moreover, a Consti-tutional Court that decides on the confl icts of attribution that may arise between federal government and state governments. Finally, the division of competences and powers is enshrined in a written Constitution, which can be modifi ed only with the consent of both chambers and with the approval of particularly elevated majorities from all representative assemblies (and perhaps validated by a refer-endum). But even more than all of these constitutional details, people that live in federations know why it is important that certain matters are decided at the federal level and others at the state level and why it is good to preserve such a division of labour between the two levels. Feelings of belonging, specifi c values and distinct political traditions are embedded in the two levels of this peculiar constitutional format.


Simona Piattoni12


Because federations are particular constructs, so tightly wed to specifi c con-stitutional settlements, we may be tempted to believe that the formal provisions contain all that is worth knowing. In other words, we tend to reify federalism more than we even tend to reify democracy. In the latter case, we know that there are as many types of democracy as there are real democracies, each striking a par-ticular balance between the many institutional safeguards that make a democracy as such and each dependent on the particular political culture and party system within which it is located. In the case of federalism, the temptation to assume that the word ‘federalism’ says it all is strong. Comparative research1 has revealed that federalism also comes in many diff erent types that work in profoundly dif-ferent ways. Yet even the existing typologies of federalism (i.e. cooperative v. com-petitive and dual v. nested) do not capture the range of variation that real federal systems can accommodate.2

Even more detailed classifi cations inevitably fail to capture the character of each specifi c federation. Political parties can hold together or disrupt the political unity of a federation depending on whether similar or diff erent political majori-ties prevail at the two levels of government.3 Federations are ‘compound’ systems in which decisions are slow and complicated and require the articulation of par-ticular “coordinative discourses”.4 For this reason they are prone to incrementalism and tend to produce ‘joint decision traps’ because the complicated equilibriums needed to reach any decision are quickly superseded by new circumstances to which, it is too diffi cult to adapt.5 But what is even less generally acknowledged is the inherently dynamic nature of federations. Contrary to the conventional vi-sion of federalism as a constitutionally sealed political format, I wish to propose an alternative vision of federalism as political project and as continuous work-in-progress.6

In the second section of this contribution, I will justify this statement by pointing at the inherently dynamic nature of existing federations under the pres-sure of external and internal forces. For this reason, federalism is becoming a leading term and a major research agenda in political science. Because of their growing interdependence, formally independent states are creating regional in-tegration areas that need to strike some institutional balance between autonomy

1. E.g. Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987).2. Although they belong to the same type, German and Austrian federalism work rather diff erently. Th e Aus-trian system is much more centralized than the German one and, in its daily functioning, more similar to a unitary system than to a federal one.3. Dietmar Braun, “Multi-level governance in Germany and Switzerland,” in Handbook on Multi-Level Govern-ance, eds H. Enderlein, S. Wälti and M. Zürn (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2010), 168-183.4. Vivien Schmidt, Democracy in Europe. Th e EU and National Polities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).5. Fritz W. Scharpf, Community and Autonomy. Institutions, Policies and Legitimacy in Multilevel Europe (Frank-furt: Campus Verlag, 2010).6. Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Th eory and Practice (London/New York: Routledge, 2006).


Federalism and Its Competitors: Which Template for Contemporary Europe? 13


and cooperation. Th e very notion of state sovereignty is consequently also being challenged, and all states now increasingly appear to be “semi-sovereign states”.7 If that is the case, then federalism can no longer be thought of as a fi xed constitu-tional settlement, but as a structure in which ‘constitutional dialogues’ continu-ously occur. For this reason, in the third and concluding section and with particu-lar reference to the European Union, I will argue that current federalist thinking comes surprisingly close to competing concepts such as multi-level governance, compound democracy and directly deliberative polyarchy.

Th e inherently dynamic nature of federations

Federalism is an old term, which terminologically dates back to Roman times, but is conceptually much older. Foedus was the Roman term given to the compact through which diff erent (political) entities decided to carry out some functions together while retaining their autonomy in other.8 Th is type of agreement helped to hold together fl exibly a vast polity like the Roman Empire without imposing standard solutions on all its provinces. But even before Roman times, communi-ties are known to have sealed similar compacts of mutual assistance in some areas (mainly trade and external defence) while retaining their fundamental independ-ence in others. Federalism, at its core, indicates a mix of shared rule and self-rule, of unity and diversity.9 In ancient times, when the role of political authorities was mainly limited to external defence, administration of justice and defi nition of property rights, the amount of sovereignty surrendered through federalist pacts was rather minimal and the constraining eff ect of this compact on the sovereignty of each partner was, therefore, not a big concern.

In more recent times, particularly after the Bodinian turn to a strong notion of state, federalism has started to indicate a particular constitutional confi gura-tion whereby sovereign states decide to share some tasks in common while agree-ing to reserve some tasks for their own autonomous rule and to take the decisions that aff ect the federation with the necessary participation of all federated units. Vis-à-vis ancient polities, modern states are much more encompassing entities, which regulate many functions and deeply aff ect the lives of their citizens. Also, contrary to ancient times, modern federations are (normally) democratic federa-tions: both levels of government, the national centre and the state units, are fully representative democracies. No concession of sovereignty can be obtained with-out the explicit consent of the federated units, and no consent of the federated

7. Bulmer, Simon, Charlie Jeff ery and Stephen Padgett, Rethinking Germany and Europe. Democracy and Diplo-macy in a semi-Sovereign State (Houndmills, Bsingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2010).8. Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Our European Demoi-cracy,” in Whose Europe? National Models and Constitution of the European Union, eds S. Weatherill and K. Nicolaidis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).9. Burgess, Comparative Federalism.


Simona Piattoni14


units can be obtained without the democratic participation of all citizens within them. Modern federations, therefore, can be made and transformed only with the consent of all its citizens, in their dual role of citizens of the individual states and citizens of the current or future federation. So, while in the past federations were a matter for the governing elites, today they involve in their making and functioning every citizen.

Because today states elicit a whole range of politically salient feelings about identities, values, traditions, and destinies, their transformation is the object of political debate and heated political discussions. Expansions on the spheres of government, extensions on the scope of public rule, inclusions of new subjects, and adoptions of new decision-making styles10 are all matters for political debate. Federations are founded on an initial compact that strikes a balance among each of these issues, but they are also constantly subject to tensions and transforma-tions that force them to adapt and redefi ne the original compact. As anyone liv-ing in a federation knows, even apparently minor issues can quickly acquire the relevance of constitutional issues calling into question the level at which certain decisions can or must be made, the depth of state reach into private decisions (which may be assessed diff erently in diff erent federated units), the defi nition of the ins and outs of each unit and of the federated whole, and the ways in which policy decisions should be made. Because of the delicate nature and po-litical signifi cance of sometimes even the smallest policy decisions, federations are complex systems that require emphasis on accommodation and coordinative discourses. Nor can these decisions be kept at the level of governmental elites, lest the system masks a shift towards governmental elitism (‘executive federalism’). Federations are, consequently, not just inherently dynamic, but also continuously subject to ‘constitutional dialogues’ within political and civil society.

Federations come under particular stress not only during periods of great con-textual changes, but also during ‘normal’ times when they are subjected to con-tinuous pressures that tend to strain the terms of the constitutional settlement. Pressures stemming from the increasing interdependency of our economies often force executives to respond quickly, de facto sidestepping the sovereign powers of parliamentary assemblies. External issues (such as international trade negotia-tions, security issues, foreign emergencies, etc.) naturally shift decision-making powers towards the executive level. Th e very process of European integration has notoriously caused a major shift of decision-making powers to the executive level.11 Many fundamental policy decisions are made in Brussels through the co-

10. Bellamy, Richard and Dario Castiglione, “Legitimizing the Euro-‘polity’ and its ‘Regime’: Th e Normative Turn in EU Studies,” European Journal of Political Th eory, 2(1) (2003): 7-34. 11. Tapio Raunio, “From the Margins of European Integration to the Guardians of the Treaties? Th e Role of National Parliaments in the EU,” in Th e Challenge of Democratic Representation in the European Union, ed. S. Kröger and D. Friedrich (Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2010), 175-191.




decision procedure by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. While the former is representative of national constituencies (but in reality of national executives), the latter is, in theory, representative of all EU citizens. Th is causes a disempowerment of national assemblies (despite the existence of Euro-pean Aff airs committees in all member states’ parliaments and despite the new safeguards introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon) and even more, a disempower-ment of state assemblies in those members that are federal systems. For all these reasons, federations (and particularly European federations) are subjected to what scholars describe as an inherent ‘drift’ of policy-making powers towards the na-tional centre.12

Attempts by the federated units to nationally recoup the decision-making powers that they lost because of European integration—and more generally their attempt to oppose such ‘drift’ of policy-making powers towards the centre—normally take place through procedural agreements that are not enshrined in the constitutions. Alternatively, when redress is sought through constitutional reforms, these tend to increase the safeguards for the federated units, thus making federations less capable of responding to these pressures. To describe this phenom-enon and its negative consequences on the decision-making capacity of federa-tions, EU included, Fritz Scharpf coined the phrase of “joint-decision trap”, which was in turn suggested by the particular confi guration of German federalism (Poli-tikverfl echtung). And yet, federations are uniquely capable of adapting to these changes provided that the federated units are willing to engage in continuous debates about the constitutional equilibrium that holds them together. In other words, federations are viable solutions to the problem of balancing autonomy and interdependence, self-rule and shared rule that aff ects all nation-states today (but particularly the members states of the European Union), only if they are not considered as stable constitutional settlements, but rather as frameworks for discussing the allocation of competences.

In economic terms, federations are by their very nature incomplete contracts, which parties enter without being able to fully calculate the costs and benefi ts that can be expected from them. As such, strong motivations are required to enter the contract. Any one of the following would do: either a strong mutual trust (an already existing cultural identity of sorts that holds the federation together, such as in the German version of ‘romantic federalism’), or a strong common fear (a common enemy that threatens the existence of each unit unless they federate, as in the US version of ‘defensive federalism’) or, again, a strong belief in a common destiny and an equally strong belief that the best way to create all other common

12. Brunetta Baldi, Stato e territorio. Federalismo e decentramento nelle democrazie contemporanee (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2003).


Simona Piattoni16


feelings is engaging in ‘constitutional dialogues’ (a self-evident path leading to an ever closer union, such as in the EU version of ‘progressive federalism’).

Federalism and its competitors

When discussing comparatively alternative institutional architectures such as multi-level governance, compound democracy and/or directly deliberative pol-yarchy, the question is inevitably raised about whether we are really talking about federalism. All of these institutional architectures do indeed address some of the same concerns—fi rst and foremost, how to reconcile unity and diversity—though they are not wholly equivalent or mutually replaceable. While a full discussion of these architectures is beyond the scope of this contribution, I will indicate in what ways they can be compared and contrasted.

Federalism

Th e appeal of federalism is that it promises to reconcile several potentially divisive dichotomies: unity and diversity, self-rule and shared rule, territory and function. According to the ‘standard’ theory, federalism is based on a division of competences between the federal centre and the federated units. Th e federal centre is normally in charge of those tasks whose scope coincides with the entire national territory and which require swiftness and unity of action (i.e., external defence, law and order, international trade, national and international transport, monetary and fi scal policy). Federated units are, in turn, normally in charge of those tasks for which the preferences of local societies matter (i.e. education, ag-riculture, industry, tourism, local transportation, etc.). Dual (horizontal) federal systems attempt to separate competences as much as possible and, where overlap is inevitable, provide for ways in which reasonable collaboration can be attained (‘layer cake federalism’). Cooperative (vertical) federal systems intertwine compe-tences between levels both because the same function spans across both levels and/or because the federal state does not have a federal bureaucracy of its own and rather has to rely on state bureaucracies in order to implement even its own policies (‘marble cake federalism’). Moreover, federal systems diff er according to the degree to which federated states must necessarily give their assent in policy-making and, therefore, have veto power over ordinary legislation.

Th e general expectation is that whenever the representatives of the citizens of the constituent states sit in the federal chamber they tend to focus more on the specifi c merit of the policy at hand and reach a compromise more easily, while when the representatives of the executives of the constituent states sit in the federal chamber they tend to defend the prerogatives of the federated units and policy issues, which quickly become ‘constitutional’ issues and get bogged down in joint-deci-sion traps. Also in the current institutional architecture of the European Union,




policy-making requires prolonged and complex negotiations among representa-tives of the executives of the member states who produce decisions that tend to stick even when they become ineff ective. As Scharpfnoted,13 “the territorial distribution of societal interests is emphasized at the expense of other dimensions of multidimen-sional interests”. Th erefore, “the policy output of joint decisions systems[…] will be less responsive to constituency interests and more oriented to the institutional self-interest of governments”.14

Th e values that federalism is supposed to uphold—such as unity in diversity or self-rule with shared rule—thus run the risk of being forfeited. For Scharpf, the solution to this conundrum lies in the development of a ‘we-feeling’ among national European constituencies that would solve these tensions at the base root of it all. In the absence of this feeling, federalism runs aground. If federalism were understood as an architecture that favour continuous ‘dialogues’ about diff erent democratic models and citizenship packages, rather than as an institutionalized division of competences, then this risk could be avoided. Th en federalism would not be so diff erent from multi-level governance, compound democracy or di-rectly deliberative polyarchy. At the EU level, federalism could be “a civilizing strategy of dealing with the other without trying to assimilate it, making integration an endlessly renewed, autonomous, voluntary act of subordination to this European order”. Th is might be the recipe to achieve “emancipation through internalizing mutual constraints”.15

Multi-level governance

Scharpf ’s dire conclusion that the EU is prone to running into joint-decision traps is not shared by everyone. By looking at the ways in which decisions are made, Piattoni16 argues that the EU multi-level system of governance promises to overcome bottlenecks and stalemates that would derive from a purely formal-istic understanding of inter-governmental relations. Supranational, national and subnational representatives of governments and civil societies are encouraged to interact in ways that go beyond and supersede their formal attribution of com-petences. Also Benz17 argues that despite institutional similarities with German

13. Fritz W. Scharpf, “Th e Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” Public Administration, 66(3) (1988): 254.14. Ibid.15. Nicolaidis Kalypso, and Robert Howse, Th e Federal Vision. Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1116. Simona Piattoni, “Th e Problematic Coexistence of Functional and Territorial Representation in the EU,” Journal of European Integration, 33(4) (2011): 369-84.17. Arthur Benz, “Two Types of Multi-Level Governance: Intergovernmental Relations in German and EU Regional Policy,” Regional & Federal Studies, 10(3) (2000): 21-44. Arthur Benz, “Accountable Multilevel Governance by the Open Method of Coordination?” European Law Journal (special issue), 13(4) (2007): 505-522.


Simona Piattoni18


cooperative federalism, the EU is a “loosely-coupled” multi-level system of govern-ance. In a series of contributions, Benz clarifi es that decisions in the EU are the outcome of “an interlocking of European, national and subnational levels. Conse-quently, the transfer of powers to the EU should no longer be considered a zero-sum game”.18 Th is implies a new type of competence sharing among diff erent levels and a new type of behaviour on the part of governmental actors.

In this type of architecture, lower levels of government no longer threaten to veto decisions, but use their power to better tailor the proposed legislation to the needs of their own constituency. In this way, it is not the institutional interests of the representatives of the lower levels of government that are represented, but those of their constituencies. Moreover, as social partners and civil society organizations are necessarily invited to participate in decision making processes and to implement policy decisions, both territorial and functional claims are represented within multi-level governance systems in ways that improve the eff ectiveness of EU gov-ernance rather than detract from it. Flexible solutions may be fashioned by repre-sentatives of both territorial and functional interests because no one can derail the decision-making and implementation processes by withholding assent.19

Compound Democracy

Compound democracy points to a fundamentally diff erent way of reconcil-ing some of the same tensions highlighted in the previous section. Compound democracy is not just an architectural structure. Th e US cannot be categorized simply as ‘dual federalism’, as if identifying the institutional layout would say it all. “Th e precise content of the federal bargain will necessarily be incomplete. Th e authors cannot foresee all the contingencies that an eff ective system of governance must confront.[…] Federalism and constitution therefore present a common diffi -culty: they must remain beyond ordinary politics and yet they stand in steady need of completion”.20 Compound democracy draws attention to the logic of function-ing of a particular institutional architecture that generates a distinct democratic model.21 Th e US Senate, for example, does not so much represent the territorial —or institutional—interest of the states, like the Bundesrat tends to do, but the interests of the people within these states. When these coincide, territorial politics

18. Arthur Benz and Christina Zimmer, “Th e EU’s Competences: Th e ‘vertical’ perspective on the multilayered system”, Living Review on European Governance, 3(3) (2008): 17.Available at:<http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2008-3>19. Piattoni, Th e Problematic Coexistence of Functional and Territorial Representation in the EU. 201120. Daniel Halberstam,“Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary,” in Th e Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, ed.K.E. Whittington, R.D. Kelemen and G.A. Caldeira (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 142-64.21. Sergio Fabbrini, Compound Democracies. Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming Similar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.




in the US may approximate the type of politics that develops in the German case. But when these do not coincide, then functional interests tend to prevail and functional alliances can be built across states. Th is is one of the distinctive features of compound democracy: that when functional and territorial interests criss-cross one another, they must somehow be balanced within each institutional compo-nent and then also be balanced among diff erent institutions. Indeed, compound polities are “multiple separation of powers systems, in which the powers are separated not only vertically (as in federal systems), but also horizontally (between the centre’s governmental institutions)”.22

According to Fabbrini, the EU works in a similar manner. Th e peculiar nature of the EU polity is not determined by an unconventional allocation of com-petences between federal centre and federated units, as some argue, but by the fact that the EU could never work according to a strict ‘fusion of powers’ logic because territorial interests would always try to trump functional interests and decision-making would constantly run into stalemates and joint-decision traps. For this reason, each institution must contain a mix of territorial and functional pulls that forces them to fi nd a working compromise for every decision and guar-antees against the tyranny of the territorial minority as well as the tyranny of the functional majority, thus making the EU similar in function to the US.

Directly Deliberative Polyarchy

Much like Fabbrini, Sabel and Zeitlin23 also argue that all too easily the “un-derlying architecture of public rule-making in the EU” is overlooked if attention is focused solely on the conventional coupling of function to structure that we would expect from traditional systems of rule. Similarly, the democratic quality of this governance architecture is missed if we look for a conventional division of labour between diff erent forms of representation as that which is ‘normally’ found in national states. “Experimentalist governance should be understood in func-tional rather than structural or institutional terms”.24 Experimentalist governance is characterized by three traits: deliberation, informalism and multi-level deci-sion-making. Formalism is particularly interesting because the main characteristic of experimentalist governance institutions is to “expose and clarify diff erence so as to destabilize and disentrench settled approaches and solutions that are typically highly formalized.[...] it is the search for ever better ways of meeting this objective

22. Ibid, 4.23. Fabbrini, Compound DemocraciesCharles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Learning from Diff erence: Th e New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union”, European Governance Papers (EUROGOV), No. C-07-02, (2007): 6. <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf>24. Sabel and Zeitlin, “Learning from Diff erence” 7.


Simona Piattoni20


which explains the continuous institutional revision that creates the impression of informalism”.25

Directly deliberative polyarchy (DDP) is a ‘destabilization regime’, “a ma-chine for learning from diversity, thereby transforming an obstacle to closer integration into an asset for achieving it”.26 Th e dialogues that it stimulates in order to make decision-making possible in the highly diversifi ed and segmented context of the European Union are necessarily deliberative, which means that everything must be liable to discussion and disclosure, from fi rst principles to empirical evidence to the logical and factual chains that link the ones to the others. Th is is, at the pol-icy-making level, the embodiment of the idea that the institutional architecture of the EU must fi rst and foremost allow for continuous ‘constitutional dialogues’.

25. Ibid.26. Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Learning from Diff erence: Th e New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union”, European Governance Papers (EUROGOV), No. C-07-02, (2007): 9. < http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf >



A Journey through the History of FederalismIs Multilevel Governance a Form of Federalism?

Frédéric Lépine

Chief editor of L’Europe en formation, lecturer of ‘Federalism and Governance’ at the Centre international de formation européenne.

Th e general thematic of this issue of L’Europe en formation is about the rel-evance of federalism in the twenty-fi rst century. Indeed, there is nowadays, a revival in federalist studies. Beyond the classic tradition of comparative studies, this discursive revival addresses mostly the nature of the ‘federal phenomenon’, trying to defi ne new meanings, or to organise the phenomenon into a coherent framework.

Th at revival may be traced from the beginning of the 1990s. It has its origins in many reasons, that coincide with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet system. Although all the reasons are not all directly linked to that series of events, the implosion of the communist world and of the bipolar order—and its specifi c ways to control confl icts—opened politics to new confi gurations, fea-turing at the same time integration and devolution and a process of globalisa-tion—and the weakening of the modern state—as well as the emergence of new values.1

Th ese new confi gurations can be followed through the development of con-temporary integrative and diff erentiative political processes: a growing decentrali-sation in industrialised states; the development of new international organisations coordinating or integrating nation-states—the most prominent case being the European Union—; the use of federal instruments to manage domestic confl icts or, more broadly, to accommodate multinational states; and last but not least, the attempts to solve the current fi nancial crisis with supranational tools.

1. Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Th ird Edition, Th ird Edition ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008). 1-7. Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman, “Th e Revival of Federal-ism in Normative Political theory,” in Th eories of Federalism: A Reader, ed. Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Nor-man (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2-5. Daniel J. Elazar, “From Statism To Federalism: A Paradigm Shift,” Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 25, no. 2 Spring (1995).


Frédéric Lépine22


Eventually, this renewed interest in federalism may be traced trough recent publications, from the beginning of the 2000s. Besides numerous scientifi c arti-cles on the issue, some important monographs or edited books have been pub-lished. Th ey can be classifi ed in three types. Th e fi rst type considers surveys of comparative federalism, and emphasises theoretical developments on the study of federal states.2 A second type is composed of collections of articles attempting to encompass the diversity of the federalist phenomenon, through original papers or selected classical passages.3 Eventually, a third category clusters monographs especially devoted to new developments of federalism.4 Whatever is the specifi -city of each approach, all these works aim at studying federalism in a renewed perspective.

However, they seem more to address the polymorphous nature of federal-ism than setting out a renewed conceptual framework, and raise more questions than they give answers. Th ey record the contemporary division of federal studies in several branches: normative and analytical, domestic and international, com-parative, regional integration, fi scal federalism, multinational federalism, confl ict management, regulatory federalism… In other words, they refl ect the diffi culty to organise a general federalist conceptual framework from systematic studies of federalist theories and practices.

Th erefore, a general question addressed by Rufus Davis—and still unan-swered by this author—can be raised again: “How do we capture all this teeming and changing variety in any generality that would serve federal theory, let alone any theory at all? ”5

Th e aim of this article is to come up with an attempt to fi nd a way to a general coherence of federalism, a prolegomena to further research on the specifi city of federalism in political thoughts.

2. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Th ird Edition. Th omas Hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Enquiry (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006). A Global Dialogue on Federalism, a collec-tion of seven edited books on the federal comparative studies of states, published by the Forum of federations, IACFS, and McGill-Queen’s University Press.3. Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens and Fabien Gélinas, eds., Th e States and Moods of Federalism: Governance, Identity and Methodology - Le fédéralisme dans tous ses états : gouvernance, identité et méthodologie (Cowansville (Quebec): Éditions Yvon Blais [co-published by Bruylant], 2005). Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman, eds., Th eories of Federalism: A Reader (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Ann Ward and Lee Ward, eds., Th e Ash-gate Research Companion to Federalism, Ashgate Research Companion (Farnham (Surrey): Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009). John Kincaid, ed. Federalism, 4 vols., Sage Library of Political science (London & Th ousand Oaks (Ca): Sage Publications, 2011).4. Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Th eory and Practice (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Olivier Beaud, Th éorie de la Fédération, Léviathan (Paris: Presses universitaire de France, 2007). And we have to refer as well to the pioneer and most infl uential book of that approach, although much older: Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa (AL): Th e University of Alabama Press, 1987).5. S. Rufus Davis, Th e Federal Principle: A Journey Th rough Time in Quest of Meaning (Berkeley & Los Angeles (Ca): University of California Press, 1978). 155.


A Journey through the History of Federalism 23


Requisites and axioms

In the search for this general coherence, there is a need to defi ne a method composed of requisites and axioms.

At fi rst, that research is concerned primarily with the discursive approaches of federalism: thoughts and theories that lead to an intellectual formalisation of the federalist practices and values, that is to say an abstract representation of it.

As this article considers itself as a contribution to the evolution of political thoughts in the fi eld of federalism, it aims at paving the way to include the his-tory of federalist thoughts in “a conceptual framework and a theory at a suffi ciently abstract level to cross-cut diff erences in terminology. At the same time, that theory shall be sensible enough to grasp semantic history.”6

Th e reasoning should include an historical dimension, and encompass all discourses which, in the history of thoughts, have been related to federalism, either by its semantics or by the type of content. Th us, the prolegomena research should determine how discourses on federalism have infl uenced each other. We would call it the ‘genealogy’ of federalism, as the tracing of lineages between these thoughts, ending up with the building of a discrete ‘family tree’ in the path of its evolution.

In the scope of this article, we will concentrate only on the Western political thoughts, as signifi cative linkages can be made between political Western schools of thoughts through history, and we will take English and American studies as the main axis, as there can be attested a continuity in the succession of approaches.

By ‘schools of thoughts’, we mean the key approaches considering federalism as an object of studies. It includes the main acknowledged authors on the the-matic, as well as scholars connected to each other in a common way to deal with political issues, within ‘scientifi c disciplines’ or ‘programmes of research’. Th e meaning ‘paradigm’ can be used as well. In its more general perception, the para-digm refers to the basic postulates and concepts that frame a specifi c method of research. It constitutes a ‘pre-analytical’ approach, “a system composed of primary propositions, from which are derived secondary propositions, third propositions and so on; the derivation being done according to logical and variable processes: deduction, dialectics, analogy, subsumption, etc.”7

In the framework of this research, we will rather consider schools of thoughts in a sociological way, as groups of thinkers or scholars who share the same way to take into account an object of studies and are connected to each other. Marks and Hooghe refer to it as ‘islands’, as considering that “the density of communication

6. Gorm Harste, “Society’s War. Th e evolution of a self-referential military system.,” in Observing International Relations. Niklas Luhmann and World Politics., ed. Mathias Albert and Lena Hilkermeier, Th e New International Relations Series (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2004), 158.7. Daniel-Louis Seiler, La méthode comparative en science politique (Paris: Dalloz, Armand Colin, 2004). 48.




within each of [these groups of scholars] is much higher than that among them”.8 In the same spirit, Th omas Kuhn had considered that a paradigm has to be found at fi rst through the existence of a specifi c scientifi c community: the defi nition of paradigms and scientifi c communities are “intrinsically circular. A paradigm is what the members of a scientifi c community share, and, conversely, a scientifi c com-munity consists of men who share a paradigm.”9 Th is sociological defi nition leaves opened the possibility to consider that some schools may share common elements to the same approach, consciously or unconsciously, although they do not com-municate much with each other, as it will be shown in the article.

Eventually, any formal approach is rooted in the time and place of its elabora-tion, and it is true as well for this article. Th us, the quest for that general coher-ence must be relevant for the contemporary context, as it is made hic et nunc.

In a second part, in order to begin the reasoning, some axioms are required as a starting point.

Th e fi rst axiom states that federalism can be considered as a specifi c object of political studies. Th e study will be focusing on federalism as a political phenom-enon taking into account the organisation of polities. Th erefore, it is about public aff airs and the distribution of power and authority. On the other hand, federal structure is often used to shape organisations of civil society, such as trade unions and grass root movements. In many cases, they can be considered as expressions of the federal phenomenon. However, as regard to the extent of this article, they will be taken into account only if they are to contribute, in the perception of some authors, to the organisation of the public sphere.

Th e second axiom considers that federalism can be studied as a sphere of its own. Th e research tries to grasp the historical discursive evolution of the federal-ist idea through its basic acknowledged features and its semantics. Th erefore, it allows observation, comparison and linkages between schools of thoughts that usually ignore each other. We argue that in creating a discrete genealogy of the school of thoughts, we can focus on the development and the process of diff erentia-tion of the federalist fi eld.

Very often, federalism is embodied in the classical fi elds of studies—legal, political (domestic and international), economic, sociological or cultural—and is considered at best as a subfi eld of studies, or as a single item of a typology de-veloped within each fi eld. Th e fi rst case can be illustrated by federal comparative studies, which consider federal states—and the European Union since recently—to compare them from a political or a legal approach. Th e second one appears,

8. Lisbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Govern-ance,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003): 234.9. Th omas S. Kuhn, Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions, Th ird edition ed. (Chicago & London: Th e University of Chicago Press, 1996). 176.




for instance, when the federal state is considered as a specifi c case of the state in general. At the opposite, this article postulates that the federalist idea—often called the ‘federalist principle’—can be studied by itself, cross-cutting the diff er-ent classical fi elds of studies of the society.

‘Federalist’ or ‘federal’?

Before going further on, a point of terminology has to be clarifi ed, about the adjective to use as regards to the substantive ‘federalism’. Despite the fact that the suffi x of the substantive in ‘-ism’ could have limited the use of the word to some normative approaches, the word ‘federalism’ has been generally accepted for all kinds of presentation of the phenomenon, being descriptive, analytical or norma-tive. However, this acceptance has not been extended to the adjective, and the choice between ‘federalist’ and ‘federal’ brings back the importance of the suffi x ‘-ist’. In this research, the adjective ‘federalist’ has been chosen, because the suf-fi x might refl ect more the reference to discursive approaches, including thoughts and ideas, and integrate the normative dimension, which is usually not the case of ‘federal’, which relates more to a descriptive approach. It has to be said that this choice is purely arbitrary, in order to keep a formal coherence to the writing. It deliberately does not take into account the possible evolution of the semantics of ‘federal’ and ‘federalist’, that have to be left for latter studies.

Th e article starts by addressing the question of the diffi culty to defi ne federal-ism. After that, it presents the evolution of the history of the federalist thought in three chapters. Th e fi rst one takes into account the thoughts previous to the American experience, or developed out of its infl uence. Th e second chapter considers the consequences of the American experience on federalist thoughts. Eventually, the last chapter is devoted to the latest developments of the federalist thoughts, in the age of the weakening of the modern state.

THE QUEST FOR THE MEANING

Taking preferably recent defi nitions of federalism, in order to take into con-sideration the last evolutions of the fi eld, we get to consider federalism of a type of organisation between diff erent levels of communities.

In its most general sense, federalism is an arrangement in which two or more self-governing communities share the same political space.10

Th us, federalism is a fi eld of studies diffi cult to defi ne, as regards to its poly-morphism. As it appears at this stage, it seems that federalism embraces all forms

10. Karmis and Norman, “Th e Revival of Federalism in Normative Political theory,” 3.




of political organisations that do not fi t within the centralised state. It focuses on the diff usion of power, rather than on its centralisation.

Ronald Watts, inspired by a classical defi nition of Daniel Elazar, proposes another general defi nition of federalism, more precise, as:

A broad category of political systems in which […] there are two (or more) levels of government, combining elements of shared-rule (collaborative partnership) through a common government and regional self-rule (constituent unit autonomy) for the gov-ernment of constituent units.11

Th us, Watts includes an overarching ‘common government’, reducing the per-ception of federalism to a closed polity, as a modern state, in order to conceptu-alise federalism for comparative state studies.

Although that defi nition may seem more operational that the former one, it may reduce federalism to one of its components. Th e defi nition of Elazar himself simply considers federalism as a combination of self-rule and shared rule,12 which opens the federalist perspective to broader combinations. It may be illustrated by one of the last books edited by Elazar, Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements.13 In this survey of federal ar-rangements, Elazar encompasses all the political combinations that he does con-sider relevant to self-rule and shared rule, cross-cutting the distinction between domestic and international. Th us, he takes in his survey, besides classical federal states, a broad spectrum of political arrangements, from China, as can be seen there some decentralisation, to the monetary union between France and Monaco. In such an extreme extent of cases, one can address the nature of federalism, and even if there is one. Th is example assesses the diffi culty to defi ne federalism, moreover whether it is to identify an operational concept.

Actually, the federalist idea seems diffi cult to conceptualise, as it is not an ob-ject clearly identifi ed. A federalist arrangement is very often a complex political construct, as the result of an attempt to fi nd a solution between antagonist con-cepts, such as ‘unity vs. diversity’, ‘independence vs. dependency’, ‘coordination vs. subordination’...

Th is opened ‘dialectic of antinomies’ had been formulated by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon on the basic distinction of ‘liberty vs. authority’.14 In the same meth-odological perspective, Denis de Rougemont wrote one century latter:

11. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Th ird Edition: 8.12. Elazar, Exploring Federalism: 12.13. Daniel J. Elazar, ed. Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrange-ments, 2nd Edition ed. (Harlow, Essex: Longman Current Aff airs, 1994).Elazar, Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements.14. Bernard Voyenne, Le Fédéralisme de P.J. Proudhon, vol. 2, Histoire de l’idée fédéraliste (Paris-Nice: Presses d’Europe, 1973). 57-71.




I suggest to call ‘federalist problem’ any situation where two antinomic human realities, but equally valid and vital, confront each other, in such way that the solu-tion could not be found in the reduction of one of the terms, nor in the subordination of one to the other, but only in a creation which encompass, satisfy and transcend the requirements of both.15

Th erefore, it appears that the federalist idea can refer to numerous idiosyn-cratic and pragmatic attempts to solve a political—or even societal—problem. Moreover, in the history of political thoughts, it led to the creation of many school of thoughts referring themselves to federalism, and considering a diversity of theories not related to each other. Moreover a specifi c understanding of fed-eralism has emerged in each country with a legal or political federalist tradition.

Th erefore, it seems diffi cult to choose an elaborate operational concept with-out taking the risk of loosing a large part of the federal experience. To state again Denis de Rougemont,

Federalism, like all great ideas, is very simple, but not easy to defi ne in a few words or a concise formula. Th at is because it is organic rather than rational, and dialectic rather than simply logical. It eludes the geometrical categories of vulgar rationalism, but cor-responds well enough to the ways of thought introduced by relativist science.16

Or Kenneth Wheare, at the same time:

[…] this defi nition of the federal principle is not accepted as valid by all students on the subject. Some authorities fi nd the essence of federalism in some diff erent prin-ciples.17

Eventually, taking more recent observations:

Any attempt to confi ne such a complex and dynamic concept as federalism to a single authoritative defi nition is deeply problematic.18

Th ere is as yet no fully fl edged theory of federalism.19

In this context of polymorphous and multicellular nature of federalism, can be addressed the possibility to use properly the federalist idea in political sciences. Four positions can be considered.

15. Denis de Rougemont, Lettre aux Européens (Paris: Albin Michel, 1976). 118.16. Denis de Rougemont, “L’attitude fédéraliste” (paper presented at the Rapport du premier congrès annuel de l’Union européenne des Fédéralistes à Montreux, août 1947, Genève, 1947), 10.17. Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government, Fourth edition ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). 11.18. Ann Ward and Lee Ward, “Introduction to the volume,” in Th e Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism, ed. Ann Ward and Lee Ward (Farnham (Surrey): Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 1.19. Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Th eory and Practice: 3.




Th e fi rst position is that federalism cannot be considered as an autonomous political concept. It is rather a pragmatic attempt to reconcile theories with the reality.

As Rufus Davis states, the only common feature to all individuals theorising federalism is the general idea that, “in life, not all is black and white, that political theory never squares with reality…”20

[As] we pick at the federal idea we become clearly aware that we are exposing not on single idea but a whole intricate and varied network of interrelated ideas and concepts – of contract, of partnership, of equity, of trusts, of sovereignty, of constitution, of state, of international law. And as we pick at these in turn we fi nd that each of these concepts is in fact a multicellular constellation, a molecular compound of its own ideas and concepts.21

Eventually, for Davis, there is no use to continue to compress multicellular and idiosyncratic—and we would add pragmatic—experiences into one theory.

A second position is to reduce deliberately the scope of federalism in order to defi ne an operational concept.

One exemplary case may be taken from Ronald Watts, in Comparing federal systems.22 Th e author defi nes ‘federalism’ as a normative idea advocating multi-tiered government combining shared-rule and self-rule.23 However, he empha-sises the defi nition of one specifi c category, that he calls ‘federation’.

Within the broad genus of federal political systems, “federations” represent a par-ticular species in which neither the federal nor the constituent units are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign powers derived fr om the constitution rather than fr om another level of government, each is empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing powers, and each is di-rectly elected by its citizens.24

[…] Th is book focuses primarily on analysing the design and operation of these as a form of government which at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century is proving to be so widespread.25

Th us, although Ronald Watts acknowledges the pluralistic approach to feder-alism, considering in particular the distinction between normative and descrip-tive dimensions, he focuses mainly on one specifi c form of organisation, where among others: (a) powers are derived from the constitution, and (b) each level is directly elected by its citizens.

20. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 156.21. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 5.22. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Th ird Edition.23. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Th ird Edition: 8.24. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Th ird Edition: 9.25. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Th ird Edition: 9.




It has to bee said that the distinction between federalism and federation had been implicit for a very long time in federalist literature, it is only in 1982 that Preston King’s, in Federalism and Federation, established explicitly a conceptual distinction between both.26

A third position takes into account the fact that federalism covers all political bodies in between the unitary state and the constellation of independent states. Any kind of cooperation between political units that does not lead to the con-stitution of a new single centralised state can be considered as a federal arrange-ment. Th at could be derived from a literal reading of the last broad defi nition of federalism given by Daniel Elazar. As it has been said later by Murray Forsyth: “with suffi cient eff ort, [federalism] can be detected almost everywhere”.27 However, this position hardly leads to an operational formalisation of the fi eld.

Eventually, a fourth position would be to consider that, whatever the diffi cul-ties, federalism, in its diversity and fl exibility, may constitute a proper fi eld of studies. Although clustering many theories, or being “by its very nature a ‘cloak of many colors’”,28 federalism deserves a specifi c attention because all theories and concepts are linked by a common core of matrix combination of values, theories and practices, that one can call an idea, a principle, or a phenomenon.29

Th is latest position has been chosen as the basic assumption of this article, considering that there is an way to go beyond ‘epistemological obstacle’ to the unifi cation of the fi eld, through a discursive approach. It claims that, despite the numerous political perceptions of federalism in various geographical areas, and the diff erent methodological approaches from discipline to discipline, there is a way to fi nd a unity in the federalist thoughts—at least in their evolution—in-cluding political thoughts clearly labelled as ‘federal’ or ‘federalist’, and other ones that follow the same principle.

ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

In order to defi ne the scope of the federalist phenomenon, there is a need to go through the evolution of the history of federalist thoughts, and to take into ac-count what could be their main sources and their most important developments.

Many authors consider that the history of federalism starts with the American experience, as it created the fi rst stable federal republic, which was used as a arche-type model for federalist studies, as well as a reference for further federal states.

26. Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Th eory and Practice: 47.27. Cited by Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Th eory and Practice: 47.28. Ward and Ward, “Introduction to the volume,” 1.29. Bruno Th éret, “Du principe fédéral à une typologie des fédérations : quelques propositions,” in Th e States and Moods of Federalism : Governance, Identity and Methodology - Le fédéralisme dans tous ses états : gouvernance, identité et méthodologie, ed. Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens and Fabien Gélinas (Cowansville (Quebec): Éditions Yvon Blais [co-published by Bruylant], 2005), 100.




In the attempt to encompass federalism in its historical developments, though, it has to be taken into account that the intellectual dimension of the American federalism had been shaped by earlier thinkings. Moreover, other fed-eralist thoughts have been developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, without being linked to the American federalism.

Th e aim of this section is to present these specifi c thoughts, as well as the early evolution of the federalist semantics.

Montesquieu

Montesquieu is considered as the starting point of this enquiry through fed-eralism, as he was the fi rst to introduce the idea and semantics of federalism in modern political thinkings. Th us, Montesquieu presented in Th e Spirit of Laws30 (1748) the fi rst attempt to conceptualise federalism in the modern political era.

In politics, modernity can be defi ned as the development of the modern state. From the French and English experiments as well as from the thoughts of the Enlightenment—with Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau as prominent authors—po-litical modernity refers to the building of the ‘modern state’ after feudalism, uni-fi ed in terms of territory, population and administrative apparatus, under the overarching concept of sovereignty. It is in this context that Montesquieu writes Th e Spirit of Laws, in order to present a systematic study of the diff erent forms of governments and regimes, as well as to promote political liberalism, on the model of the English parliamentarism. His approach is clearly descriptive and norma-tive, and not yet analytical.

Considering three political regimes, republic, monarchy and despotism, Mon-tesquieu develops in the case of republics the fact that they have to be small, in order to maintain themselves. Growing too much, they would be destroyed from the inside by corruption. Th us, large states could be maintained only through a monarchic regime, and the largest through despotism. In this perspective, he de-velops the idea of ‘federative republics’, as unions of republics through a contract that would allow them to be large and strong enough to resist to monarchies. At the same time, the mutual control of the republics of the union on each other ensures that all would keep the same regime.

A specifi city of Montesquieu is his excellent knowledge of classic history, mostly Greek and Roman governments of the Antiquity, from where he takes his most striking examples. Although the Ancient Greek did not know the world ‘federalism’ and its derivatives, Montesquieu labels the idiosyncratic unions of Greek city-states as ‘federative’. He was the fi rst to refer to federalism for historical examples that did not use such semantic, and then gave a systematic meaning to

30. Montesquieu, De L’Esprit des lois, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1979 [1748]).




it, as a union of polities. Montesquieu is the fi rst to use federalism-related terms, such as ‘federative republic’ and ‘confederation’ in a way of scientifi c generalisa-tion, that will be used afterwards by many authors, in order to refer to that phe-nomenon. It is notably the case of Daniel Elazar, who sees seeds of federalism in in the Hebrew term brit, meaning ‘covenant’ and referring to true peace.31Among may other references, on could consider a form of proto-federalism in the British empire, as it as been noticed by Michael Burgess.32

In Th e Spirit of Laws, the part devoted to federalism is very limited, as it is the main subject of only the three fi rst chapters of Book IX. However, Th e Spirit of Laws, as well as its historic references, had an important legacy. Firstly because it gave a theoretical content to the word. Moreover, it took an important place in further debates on federalism in modern times: Th e debates about the American constitution (1776-1989) will take into account the history of Greek city-states experiments; furthermore, Montesquieu will be largely quoted in the Federalist Papers;33 and eventually, until the end of the nineteenth century, the reference to the Greek city-states will continue to play an important role for the understand-ing of federalism, notably with the book of Freeman History of Federal Govern-ment in Greece and Italy.34

Th erefore, Th e Spirit of Laws constitutes an interesting ground of departure from a theoretical approach as well as from a genealogical approach.

However, the semantics of federalism have an history of their own, that start long before the works of Montesquieu. Moreover, other important federalist thinkers have emerged in modern history, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, who cannot be directly linked to Montesquieu’s genealogy. Th ese are go-ing to be presented now.

Th e history of federalist semantics

A fi rst semantical attempt to defi ne federalism can be made through etymol-ogy. Federalism comes from a late Latin word, foedus, meaning ‘treaty’, ‘compact’ or ‘contract’. Foedus comes itself from an older Latin word, fi des, meaning ‘trust’.

Foedus has been used from the Ancient Roman Republic and Empire; when it was referring mostly to treaties with populations in other parts of the Italian peninsula at the times of the Republic; and with ‘barbarians’ not romanised, liv-

31. Elazar, Exploring Federalism: 5.32. Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Th eory and Practice: 51.33. Th e most important references are in the Federalist No. 9, No. 43 and no. 47.34. Edward A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, ed. J.B. Bury, Second Edition ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1893). Freeman was expecting to carry on with a second volume on the federal history of Germany, but he did not live long enough to reach his goal.




ing at the Marches at the time of the Empire, in order to protect the limes of this ever-growing political body.

Foedus has been present as well in the Middle Ages, meaning a treaty of alli-ance between ‘political’ entities, and referring mostly to peace treaties. St Isidore of Seville, in the sixth century, was mentioning foedera pacis for peace treaties. Martinus Garatus Laudensis wrote in the fi fteenth century a syllabus on Tractatus de confederatione, pace et conventionobus principum.35 As it can be seen, the lin-guistic switch had been made from foedus to confederatio, as well as the distinction between feodus (alliance) and pax (treaty) within the respublica christiana.36

And the adjective ‘feudal’ itself, as it was created afterwards to refer to some parts of the Medieval period, might fi nd its origins as well on foedus, and its set of oaths.

It is therefore not surprising that the confoederatio has been commonly used to refer to alliances. Th e most striking example is from now of course the creation of the Confederatio Helvetica (or Switzerland, from earlier than 1291), when there has been a need to translate Eidgenossenschaft (or oath fellowship) in latin. But it was also the case for numerous leagues of the Middle Ages, among them the Germanic Holy Roman Empire.

A specifi c attention must be drawn to this last case, as it created a long tradi-tion of studies of federalism in the Germanic cultural world, followed for instance by Puff endorf, von Gierke or Jelinek. A decisive moment might be seen in this tradition at the times of the Westphalian treaties. As presented by Ronald Asch, the Westphalian treaties did not have the same meaning for Germany and for the rest of Europe. While Westphalia is considered as the beginning of international relations in Europe, shaping it into divided sovereign and independent states, it is not been the case for Germany (or Central Europe, as it appeared at the time). As Asch points out:37

In Western Europe mere noblemen and princes […] lost the ability to take part in international European politics; the sovereign states which enjoyed both full ius foederis and ius belli et pacis were the sole actors left on the European state. Not so, however, in Central Europe, where the Westphalian Peace gave the German territorial princes a status not altogether dissimilar from that of the sovereign rulers, in spite of the fact that in theory at least, they remained the Emperor’s liegemen and subjects.

35. See Karl-Heinz Ziegler, “Th e Infl uence of medieval Rioman law on Peace Treaties,” in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, ed. Randall Lesaff er (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).36. Ziegler, “Th e Infl uence of medieval Rioman law on Peace Treaties,” 147. Randall Lesaff er, “Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia,” in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, ed. Randall Lesaff er (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).37. Ronald G. Asch, “Th e ius foederis re-examined: the Peace of Wesphalia and the Consitution of the Holy Roman Empire,” in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, ed. Randall Lesaff er (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).




And Asch concludes:

[…]Lawyers and political theorists in the Holy Roman Empire continued to use ideas and categories of thought in the latter seventeenth century which had largely become obsolete in Western Europe, where the idea of undivided sovereignty as articu-lated fi rst by Bodin and latter by Hobbes became much more infl uential. To the extent that political discussions in the Empire were rooted in older traditions of thought, it remained a political system sui generis, that was separated from the modern states of Western Europe by a widening gulf.

Th is conclusion explains why Germany kept on maintaining a very specifi c approach of federalism—however quite closed to the contemporary international political science—with the exception of the elements brought to the American political science by Carl Friedrich (see below), and of the principle of subsidiarity, brought into the European integration approach.

Other founding thinkers

Th is brief presentation of the word foedus in the Middle Ages helps to explain the problematic of the genealogy of the federalist idea. Although Montesquieu can be considered a the fi rst to promote the idea of federalism in modern politics, it cannot be seen as the origin of all federalist thoughts in modern history. Th ree approaches of federalism, acknowledged as such by federalist scholars, take their origin in the early modern and modern political history, without direct link to Montesquieu. Th ese three approaches have been developed by Johannes Althu-sius, Immanuel Kant and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.

Althusius

It is in the context of the Germanic tradition described above that Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) brought a specifi c model of organisation of society form his book Politica Methodice Digesta, in 1603. Althusius was a Calvinist political practitioner in the city of Emden in Germany, at the border with Th e Nether-lands).

In Politica, he proposes a new organisation of society, in accordance with the Protestant revolts against Catholicism, and in the necessity to reform the organi-sation of society while the old Germanic system of the Holy Roman Empire was collapsing during the Th irty Years War.38

38. Th is section on Althusius was mostly inspired by Th omas O. Hueglin, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism (Waterloo (Ontario): Wilfried Laurier University Press, 1999)., Hueglin and Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Enquiry. and Th omas O. Hueglin, “Le fédéralisme d’Althusius dans un monde post-westphalien,” L’Europe en formation, no. 312 (1999).




Althusius proposed a bottom-up organisation of society, that he called ‘conso-ciation’, in tiers including families and guilds, cities and provinces and a universal commonwealth, with indirect representation at the higher levels. Th e consocia-tions, as organic bodies, should be working on a self-governing base, and the whole system should allow people to live together, resolving confl icts through consensus.

Th e idea of self-governing consociations, as well as the rule of consensus among them, were going against the development of the modern centralised state that had already started in Western Europe. Clearly, Althusius was against Bo-din’s approach of absolute sovereignty, and he declared that there was no right for someone to govern on a perpetual and supreme basis, nor above the laws.39 Th erefore, he would rather be considered as a potential alternative to the latter.

Although his book was very popular at the time, it has been latter censored and totally forgotten, until it was rediscovered by von Gierke by the end of the nineteenth century. Th erefore, it is very diffi cult to integrate him in an interna-tional genealogy of federalism, before it was brought to the united States by Carl Friedrich in 1938. Still, it is worthy to mention it as some have considered its consociation as the fi rst modern theory of federalism.40

Althusius has its own approach of consociational society, based in his specifi c political and religious thoughts, in a specifi c context of war, and earlier than the classical federalist thinkers. As such, he did not use the federalist terminology and could hardly be related to it.

Nevertheless, once he was brought back in the main streams of political sci-ence in the twentieth century, he had some legacy through Carl Friedrich, and the consociational pluralistic democratic theory of Arend Lijphart, who took the name of his theory from Althusius.41

Th e position of Th omas Hueglin is also that the Althusian concepts could be useful to study federalism nowadays. In a globalised world where the sovereign state is hollowing out, the ‘early modern’ concepts of Althusius might fi nd a new interest in the ‘late modern world’. Such assessment follows the line of this article, that in a world featuring at the same time fragmentation and integration, and particularism and universalism, new concepts should be developed for the politi-cal organisation and new forms of democracy.

39. Hueglin and Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Enquiry: 90.40. Hueglin and Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Enquiry: 90.41. For instance, Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Th irty-Six Coun-tries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).




Kant

Still in the Germanic world, but later, and with every diff erent perspective, philosopher Immanuel Kant developed his own approach of a ‘federation of free states’. In his “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, Kant aims at establishing a state of peace.42 Considering that wars are made mostly by authoritarian sov-ereigns, at the expense of the people, his approach is grounded on the respect of laws, as it is created by republics constitutions, and as it does implement freedom for citizens and equality among them, which are embodied in the idea of justice. As the state of nature leads to wars, legislation, or civil constitution, must be im-posed and respected in order to achieve that aim.

In the fi rst section of his essay, Kant presents six rules to be respected among states in order to prevent war, focusing mostly on preventing the domination of some states by other, and enforcing disarmament. Moreover, he is reluctant to treaties, as they can contain provisions for future wars.

In section II, more interesting from our concern, Kant establishes the three defi nitive articles for perpetual peace.

Th e fi rst article states that “Th e civil constitution of every state should be republi-can”: for Kant, republics are more pacifi c than other forms of states, as they have to ask for the consent of their citizens through the means of the separation of the executive and the legislative. Still, these republics might not be confused with democracies, that Kant present as a form of despotism in a philosophical classic Greek tradition.

In the second article, “Th e law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.” As long as the state of nature is ruling the relations between states, Kant advocates the republics—sharing the same civil law—should unite within a fed-eration, that could be extended further on, for a durable peace through interna-tional law. He insists on the fact that the association should be a foedus pacifi cum rather than a pactum pacis, as the former is the only one able create an organic legal organisation able to end all wars forever.

In his last article, Kant advocates the creation of a world citizenship, limited to the “universal hospitality”, where legal freedom and equality would spread among the whole human kind, and would reenforce the perpetual peace.

In Kant’s approach, peace is a moral imperative, and it has to be build through domestic and international laws.

At this stage, the federalist nature of Kant’s project should be addressed. Kant is dealing mostly with peace, international law and rights of the citizens, but not with the structure of the state. Moreover, his reference to the federation seems to be closer to the classical use of the terms in the Medieval law (foedus pacifi cum)

42. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” (1795), http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm.




that to the unions promoted by Montesquieu or the American experiment. Even-tually, the authors he is referring to, are more related the Jus gentium than to the internal organisation of the state.

On the other hand, some elements are common to the federalist approach. First is the idea of a contract between entities (republics) respecting each other. Second, by preferring the foedus to the pactus, Kant seems to refer to more organic form of organisation than a simple treaty that could be denounced. Eventually, Kant acknowledges implicitly, through the limitation of world citizenship, that the implementation of peace through a large state goes against the diversity of the people, and that a federation is the only way to regulate peace.

Kant deals mostly with the moral imperative, and not with a form of organi-sation that he does not describe precisely. In fact, the idea of Kant might have been an attempt to relaunch a form of christiana respublica from the Middle Ages. However, he shows the path to a enforcement of a public international law that might be considered as a form of confederation.

Proudhon

Th e work of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) presents a specifi c position in this section, as Proudhon has been writing his federalist theory by the middle of the nineteenth century, long after the fi rst development of the modern politi-cal ideas. However, it appears that it cannot fall within the federalist genealogy of Montesquieu.

Living in France, and mostly in Paris, Proudhon knew about Montesquieu, and was contemporary of Tocqueville, both being opposed the Constituent As-sembly of 1848. However, Proudhon does not take into account Montesquieu’s thoughts, nor his reference the Greek city-states. Neither he talks about Kant or Tocqueville.43It may seem surprising that Proudhon does not make any mention of these authors when developing his own approach of federalism. For Dimitrios Karmis, the reason might be found in a “pretension to innovation” of Proudhon, an attitude rejecting the works of his predecessors to emphasise the importance of its own.44

We do not follow that assumption, and do consider the proper originality of Proudhon’s federalism.

First of all, Proudhon cannot follow the works of Montesquieu and Toc-queville, as, in his nineteenth century socialist perception, he opposes the po-

43. Dimitrios Karmis, “Pourquoi lire Proudhon aujourd’hui? Le fé dé ralisme et le dé fi de la solidarité dans les socié té s divisé es,” Politique et Sociétés 21, no. 1 (2002): 46.44. Karmis, “Pourquoi lire Proudhon aujourd’hui? Le fé dé ralisme et le dé fi de la solidarité dans les socié té s divisé es,” 46.Th is assumption of Karmis follows the suggestion of Pierre Larousse, author of the Grand dictionnaire universel du xixe siècle.




litical and the social approaches, considering that the political approach leads to despotism—even under the name of liberalism—and the social approach to liberty. Th erefore, there would be no reason for him to study them, as the modern state appears as a tool for political alienation.

Moreover, the federalist semantic appears lately in Proudhon’s works, and is used to name a complex theory developed under the names of anarchism and mutualism. Th us, the ‘federative principle’ appears as the achievement of an orig-inal work, rather the evolution of ideas that were actually independent.

According to Pierre Ansart, Proudhon’s thoughts can be divided in two peri-ods. A period of criticism of the society, featuring a deep socialist criticism of the society of his time, using mostly the semantics of anarchism, and a period more mature and moderate, from 1850-60 until his death, developing a federalist lexi-cal choice.45

In the fi rst period, Proudhon analyse the economic property and the capital (“Property is theft!”), as the opposition of social classes and the State. He goes to the conclusion that the State protects the private property and the capital against the working class, and leads to despotism. In this ‘anarchist’ period, Proudhon focuses mostly on economic structures, and considers the political ones as de-pendant of the former.

In the second period, Proudhon is seeking to fi nd out ways of organising a society of liberty. In this new gradual approach, he takes into account other ele-ments that the ones directly linked to the economic structures. In the complexity of the Proudhonian thought, based on the dynamics of antinomies, very evolu-tive, sometimes contradictory, nurtured by passions and intuitions, it is diffi cult to draw a line between the periods. One can consider that it starts by the end of the 1840s, and fi nds its accomplishment in the 1960s, with the clear introduc-tion of the federalist semantics.

One of the elements that drive the evolution of Proudhon is his interest for international politics, stimulated by the European events around 1848. He de-duces from them the necessity to introduce a specifi c fi eld of politics aside from the economic one, considering the dichotomy of war and peace and the principle of nationalities.

Th is will introduce a perception of federalism. Proudhon must have been aware of the general idea of the federation as a political regime. However, it is mostly through Switzerland and the events of the Sonderbund that he takes it into consideration. Proudhon was aware of the Swiss Confederation and its fed-

45. Pierre Ansart, “Proudhon : Anarchisme ou Fédéralisme ?,” Les cahiers Psychologie politique, no. 16, jan-vier (2010), http://lodel.irevues.inist.fr/cahierspsychologiepolitique/index.php?id=1412, (Last accessed on 08/04/2012).Th e following lines are taken mostly of this recent article where Ansart—renowned specialist of Proudhon—ad-dresses the use of the federalist terminology in Proudhon’s writings.




eral terminology: he had spent the fi rst thirty years of is life in the neighbouring French region of Jura, and he makes reference to it in writings from 1847.

Eventually, and may be mostly, it is in the use of federalist semantics in and af-ter the French revolution that he fi nds his inspiration and intuitions. Th e federa-tion refers to the association of French cities to present Registers of grievances to the king just before the revolution, which will end up symbolically with the ‘Fête de la fédération’ in 1790. It refers also to the position of the Girondins against the Jacobins. On the other hand, ‘federated’ referred also to some military troops of the Emperor. According to Ansart, this contradictory approach might have led Proudhon to refrain using the federalist semantics before the 1860s.46

Proudhon kept from this period a general sense of federation as a ‘fraternisa-tion’, the natural collective movement of unity, a “spontaneous harmony of inter-ests” that would appear necessarily to replace despotism.47 Th us, the federative principle takes his roots from a Proudhonian intuition of a social tendency, and cannot be located in a federalist genealogy taking its roots in Montesquieu. And the consideration of Karmis seeing the Proudhonian federalism as a mixture of Proudhonian imagination, the new type of federalism (“federation”) and the old type of federalism (“confederation”)48 appears as a contemporary analysis that does not take into account the genesis of the Proudhonian idea.

With this federative principle, 49 Proudhon presents a normative theory of the social organisation of liberty. Th e “Industrial agricultural federation” would be organised bottom-up through “synallagmatic and commutative contracts” in which “contracting parties always keep a part of sovereignty and action greater that the one they give up”.50 Proudhon uses federation to oppose it to the top-dow approach of the Jacobine organisation of the French State, and to promote the individual and collective freedom. As such, Proudhon follows the general approach of federal-ism at the time, as a way to protect the individual and collective rights against the potential oppression of the sovereign state. However, in this new framework, Proudhon contemplate a new vision of the state, saying that it could be released from its despotic feature once it is not centralised anymore, but subordinated to the confederated governments.

A presentation of the legacy of Proudhon would be out of the scope of this ar-ticle. However, it can be said that it strongly infl uenced the anarchist movement,

46. Ansart, “Proudhon : Anarchisme ou Fédéralisme ?”.47. Ansart, “Proudhon : Anarchisme ou Fédéralisme ?”.48. Karmis, “Pourquoi lire Proudhon aujourdʼhui? Le fe deralisme et le defi de la solidarite dans les socie tes divisees,” 49.49. Mostly developed in “La Guerre et la Paix, recherches sur le principe et la constitution du droit des gens” (1861) and “Du principe fédératif et de la nécessité de reconstituer le parti de la révolution” (1863).50. Karmis, “Pourquoi lire Proudhon aujourd’hui? Le fé dé ralisme et le dé fi de la solidarité dans les socié té s divisé es,” 47.




as well the early organisation of trade unions in France. His work played also an important role in the creation of the Spanish federal republic in 1873. Eventually, it infl uenced the federalist perception of some parts of the Federalist European activism after World War II, namely the personalist and ‘integral’ federalism of Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont.

Provisional Conclusion

Th e development of the federalist idea before the American revolution, or in parallel to it, in the eighteenth and nineteenth has been signifi cant. However, this set of thoughts is so plural that it seems diffi cult to fi nd out a common ground to it.

It follows diverse idiosyncratic and pragmatic experiences of unions of poli-ties, that can be seen from the Antique world, and have not called themselves federal, or called themselves federal following a semantic developed in the Middle Ages.

It is only in modern times, after the beginning of the conceptualisation of the ‘federative republic’ by Montesquieu, that the development of federalist thoughts really began, with Kant, with Proudhon, and with the Federalist Papers, as it will be shown in the next section.

Although these early federalist thoughts are very diff erent in their nature, they share a common feature: a bottom-up organisation of political entities based on a cooperative contract. Moreover, all these federalist thoughts share elements of a common normative approach, as they are all seeking freedom and justice for the citizens. In diff erent ways, they are all opposed to the centralisation of power and authority developed with the modern state, either to denounce the ‘reasons of the state’ or to balance it with a higher autority.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERALIST IDEA IN THE MODERN ERA

Th e American experiment and the Federalist Papers

Th e most important achievement of federalism in the modern era has cer-tainly been the innovative constitutional model developed by the American con-stitution of 1787. Its founding fathers were men nurtured by the philosophy of the Enlightenment, as well as by political experiences of the past and of their times. Eventually, the fi rst American experience of the ‘Articles of Confederation’, written in 1777 and implemented form 1781, paved the way to the writing of the Constitution.

It is only after the Constitution that the elements of the debate were formal-ised into articles gathered into on book, Th e Federalist, or the Federalist Papers, in




1788, written under the common pen name ‘Publius’, by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. Th is collection of papers, written at fi rst to infl u-ence the vote of New York State in favour of the ratifi cation and to prepare to fu-ture interpretations of the Constitution, notably through the fi rst amendments. Considering the interest of the argumentation presented, it became quickly a theoretical reference to the Constitution and shaped further theoretical develop-ments to what can be referred to as the ‘American federalism’.

A strong literature has already been written on the American constitutional experience and on the Federalist Papers. Such article does not want to make an-other survey of it, but to insist on the major theoretical developments brought for further federalist studies.

An interpretation of the Federalist Papers suggests that the most striking in-novations are not about federalism: Th e Founding Fathers of the Constitution, and mostly the two main authors of Th e Federalist—Hamilton and Madison—, would have been mostly concerned by the creation of the fi rst modern Repub-lic, considering as dominant features democracy and liberal thoughts. Somehow, they would have tried to achieve the democratic liberal project included into Brit-ish parliamentarism, but impossible to complete in London, due to aristocratic structural lockings.

Such interpretation seems valid, as a comparative approach of the ‘three revo-lutions’—English, American and French—could be done without taking into account thoroughly the question of federalism. Th erefore, it might be said that modern federalism appeared ‘by accident’, as the American republic was built in a political environment structured by an idiosyncratic federal-related practice.51

However, from a federalist approach, it appears that the federalist thoughts were highly modifi ed by this new American perception, as they were deeply linked to the new defi nitions of the American republic and democracy. Moreover, the achievement of the American political project and the growing importance of the United States in world politics led it to become a reference. Th us, this new perception of federalism framed the most important part of modern federalist thoughts.

Th e fi rst major change, from our concern, is taken from Th e Federalist No. 15, where Hamilton writes, while criticising leagues of states,

If we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as form-ing the characteristic diff erence between a league and a government; we must extend

51. For more developments on the antecedents of American federalism, see Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Th eory and Practice: 51-54.




the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, --the only proper objects of government.

In such way, Hamilton advocates the Union to be a state by itself, and not only a league of states. Th us he starts to frame the federation as a modern sover-eign state. Th ere will be resistance to such conception in the Union itself, mostly illustrated by the controversy on nullifi cation developed by John Calhoun. Th e debate about nullifi cation and the secession of the Southern American states ended dramatically with the Civil War (1861-1865), reinforcing the role of the federal government. It is interesting to notice that the clear distinction between federation and confederation appears in the English -speaking literature at the end of the nineteenth century, once solved that controversy.

Another element of the federalist debate that could be added to this brief pres-entation has been presented by Madison in Th e Federalist No. 51.

In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is fi rst divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. Th e diff erent governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

Th is argument, already touched by Montesquieu, shows the importance of federalism in the mechanisms of checks and balance of the American constitu-tion, and the reinforcement of the democracy in an anti-Hobbesian and anti-Rousseauist perspective.

Eventually, Stein synthetize the aim of the Federalist Papers in the following way:

[…] to create an institutional device designed to divide sovereignty and prevent the concentration of authority and power in a single decision-making locus. Its chief objective was to promote political pluralism and maximize liberty.52

Many other thinkers have been writing after the Federalist papers about the American federal system—although it was not still clearly labelled this way. Among them are Tocqueville—in a sociologic approach of the American society53 and on conclusions for a French liberal system—, Bryce and Dicey. However, as

52. Michael Stein and Lisa Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” in 2008 International Political Science Association (IPSA) International Conference; International Political Science: New Th eoretical and Regional Perspectives (Concordia University, Montré al, Qué bec, Canada2008), 4.53. Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Paris: GF-Flammarion, 1981 [1835]).




regards to the theory of federalism, there a lot of refi nements but not substantial change. Th ey all kept in the same methodology, descriptive and normative. We have to wait for the middle of twentieth century to fi nd out a new theoretical approach.

Th e analytical approach

An important shift in the American federalist approach takes place by the middle of the twentieth century, when the normative approach (democratic and liberal) is gradually replaced by an analytical approach, aimed at systematic em-pirical studies. Th at approach aimed at defi ning a conceptual approach of fed-eralism, in order to use it as a basis for systematic comparative federalism. Th e founder of the approach is Kenneth Wheare, in 1946,54 who developed a legal institutional concept of federalism.55 He is followed by other scholars, that Rufus Davis calls “the twentieth-centry ‘doctors’” or “the inspectors of federal systems”,56 and it leads to a growing corpus of theoretical federal studies, apparently coherent, but plural in the types of approach.

In the presentation of the analytical scholars of federalism, which are mostly identifi ed in the English-speaking—mostly American—world, Rufus Davis iden-tifi es four diff erent approaches, identifi ed with some founding scholars: Kenneth Wheare for “Federalism [as] a matter of degree”, William Livingston for “Fed-eralism as a quality of society”, Carl Friedrich for “Federalism as a process”, and Daniel Elazar for “Federalism as sharing”. 57 Eventually, we would add Richard Musgrave and Wallace Oates for “fi scal federalism”.

In the scope of this article, the works of Carl Friedrich are of a particular inter-est, as their approach crosscut the distinction between domestic and international fi elds.

Carl Friedrich: Federalism as a process

Th e work of the German-American lawyer and political scientist Carl Frie-drich (1901-1984) has gone through forty years and, as rightly noticed by Davis, has been mostly about “refi nement and restatements in numerous sources”.58 As

54. Wheare, Federal Government.55. Michael B. Stein, “Changing concepts of federalism since World War II: Anglo-American and continental European traditions,” (Berlin: XVIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, 1994), 2.56. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 155,163.57. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 155-203.58. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 173.




federalism is concerned, the core of his thought can be found in his major book on the subject: Trends of Federalism in Th eory and Practice, published in 1968.59

Th e main originality of Friedrich in American political sciences to consider federalism as a process, more than as a design. Trying to broaden the “theoretical scope of federalism”, he seizes it as a “process of federalizing”, as dynamics rather than a pattern, a structure or a design.

Federalism is also and perhaps primarily the process of federalizing a political com-munity, that is to say, the process by which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for working out solutions […] on joint problems, and con-versely, also the process by which a unitary political community becomes diff erentiated into a federally organized whole. Federal relations are fl uctuating relations in the very nature of things.60

In this approach, Friedrich gets out of the constitutional theory, dominant in these times, and takes into account the dynamics of changes in political organisa-tions through the lens of federalism. He applies it to the United States, and as well to the Holly Roman Empire, the colonial organisations, and any kind of alli-ance and decentralisation. Th erefore, he crosses over the traditional constitutional border of sovereignty, considering domestic and international political dynamics as phenomenons of the same nature.

We do consider that the work of Friedrich holds a specifi c place in the studies of federalism in the history of federalist thoughts. Firstly because his theory of dynamics of federalism brings into the American studies of federalism concepts and theories developed in Europe before World War II. Secondly because he is the fi rst one to leave opened a connection between political phenomenons of the domestic fi eld and of the international fi eld.

Firstly, Friedrich, born in Germany and speaking fl uently German and French, has been able to consider and refi ne federalist theories coming from the old con-tinent. Th e hypothesis of the author of this article—hypothesis that has yet to be confi rmed—is that Friedrich has been a bridge between the German and French federalist traditions before World War II and the American political science.

From the German tradition, he brought in 1932 into the American political science the work of Althusius, rediscovered by historian Otto von Gierke in Ger-many by the end of the nineteenth century.61

59. Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Th eory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. preaeger, Publishers, 1968).60. Carl J. Friedrich, “Th e Th eory of Federalism as a Process,” in Trends of Federalism in Th eory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. preaeger, Publishers, 1968), 7.61. See i.e. Otto von Gierke, Political Th eories of the Middle Ages, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900).




More important in our concern, he brought also parts of the legal studies tra-ditions from Germany and France. Th us, he had been infl uenced by the German tradition of Gierke and Georg Jellinek, and their attempt to comprehend the le-gal organisation of German States, from the Holy Roman Empire and the West-phalian Treaties. As well, the studies of Léon Duguit, Louis Le Fur and Georges Scelle in France infl uenced his approach. Among others, Proudhon was an im-portant infl uence for French legal scholars. In both cases, the debates were on the sovereignty of the State, on monism and dualism in international law, and on the specifi c place of political federalism, attaching a specifi c importance to historical and sociological dimension. A specifi c attention might be brought to Georges Scelle: his idealistic approach of law based on an ‘integral monism’ addressing sovereignty; his perception of the ‘federal phenomenon’ lying beyond and outside the State; his conception of a ‘federalism by segregation’, going against the clas-sical approach of federalism by integration; all these concepts paved the way of Friedrich federalist approach.62

A second important dimension of Friedrich thoughts in federalism is that he is the fi rst to consider openly the necessity to remove the concept of sovereignty to understand federalism. He considers his dynamic approach as “the beginning of the end of the traditional juristic notions, preoccupied with problems of sovereignty, of the distribution of competencies, and of the structure of the institutions.”63

No sovereign can exist in federal system; autonomy and sovereignty exclude each other in such a political order […] No one has the ‘last word.’ Th e idea of a compact is inherent in federalism, and the ‘constituent power,’ which makes the compact, takes the place of the sovereign.64

However, although Friedrich was a very active scholar in his times, he did not leave a specifi c school of thoughts after him. Some could consider that the reason was that his concept of federalizing process was not enough defi ned and too subjective, and therefore unable to reach a high degree of specifi c theoretical refi nements. For instance, it is diffi cult to defi ne how far a specifi c policy can be considered as an element of the process of changes.65 It may be the reason why William Riker discredited Trends of Federalism in Th eory and Practice.66 More seriously, Davis argues that the process leaves unanswered the question of the

62. Hubert Th ierry, “Th e Th ought of Georges Scelle,” European Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 (1990). Georges Scelle, Manuel élémentaire de droit international public (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1943).63. Friedrich, “Th e Th eory of Federalism as a Process.”64. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Th eory and Practice: 6, 8.65. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 178.66. “Since Friedrich’s book consists of snippets of papers written for various other publications, mostly governmentally sponsored reports, we can ignore his book as a survey of conventional ideas.” William Riker, “Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It Matter?,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 1 (1969): 137.




‘pattern’ of theses associations, as the process leaves opened the form a federal organisation should have.67

Some of these criticisms are to be taken very seriously. For instance, the too general approach of Friedrich does not leave the place for detailed explanatory refi nements, but is it the role of macroscopic approach to include all mesoscopic or microscopic developments?

Our position would be that Friedrich’s demonstration came too early, in the framework of a scientifi c community focusing mostly on the patterns of federal-ism, in a world where the distinction between domestic and international fi elds was not yet challenged.

Taking into account the main federalists thoughts developed in Europe before World War II, Carl Friedrich paved the way for new developments of federalism into the European integration, and for new developments of federalism in the context of globalisation.

Daniel Elazar

Daniel Elazar (1934-1999) is one of the major author on federalism of the end of the twentieth century. Interested in normative as well as in analytical federal-ism, his thoughts evolved from the fi fties to the nineties. Elazar was fi rst known for his defi nition of the federalism as a ‘covenant’, as a public and moral contract:

A morally informed agreement or pact between people or parties having an inde-pendent and suffi ciently equal status, based upon voluntary consent, and established by mutual oaths or promises witnessed by the relevant higher authority.68

However, he developed also a larger vision of federalism based on a non-cen-tric model, from the American experience, as it is presented in the next section. It led him to a very extensive vision of federalism as self-rule and shared rule, even-tually cross-cutting the distinction between domestic and international fi elds.

Considered as self-rule and shared rule, “federalism […] involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanent character that (1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and (3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist.”69

In the same way, Elazar perceived that the evolution of the idea of the sov-ereign state of political interactions of the post-modern epoch, and the interest to go beyond that idea. Th ese elements will be extensively developed in the next section.

67. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 180.68. Daniel Elazar “Th e political Th eory of Covenant”, Publius, 10:4, 1980.69. Elazar, Exploring Federalism: 12.




Th e failure of the holistic analytical approach

Michael Stein has identifi ed an historical decrease in the study of federalism in the 1970s in the Anglo-American scientifi c tradition.70 Th e analytical approach, after “a period of theoretical growth and fl owering”,71 was challenged as a theoreti-cal and empirical fi eld of studies by strong criticism. According to Stein, the two most important attacks went from William Riker, in 1969, and Rufus Davis, in 1978.72

In an essay published in Comparative Politics in 1969, William Riker, after evaluating recent contributions to federalism research, challenged the capacity of federalism to be considered as a specifi c political system.

Nine years later, in 1978, the Australian S. Rufus Davis went even further, in his book Th e federal Principle. After a historical and conceptual analysis of feder-alism, he concludes that federalism as a concept is hardly able to be defi ned and applied systematically, as federalism is “not on single idea but a whole intricate and varied network of interrelated ideas and concepts”. 73

Stein concludes by saying that:

It is diffi cult to assess the impact which these strong critiques of federal theory may have had on subsequent theoretical aspirants in this fi eld. What one may note, however, […] is a decided trend away from general attempts to theorize about federalism among Anglo-American and English-language writers on federalism by the mid-1970s, and a skepticism or pessimism about the value or potential of such theorizing. 74

Th us, Stein considers that a trend at least doubtful about general theories of federalism has probably been present in the Anglo-American tradition from the 1970s, with the major exception of Daniel Elazar. It explains the development on the other hand of “individual or comparative case studies of established federal systems”. Th is led to a fragmentation of the approach.

It is only in from 2000s that new theoretical developments will start again, with new developments in plural federalism and liberal nationalism, through the

70. Stein, “Changing concepts of federalism since World War II: Anglo-American and continental European traditions.”71. Stein, “Changing concepts of federalism since World War II: Anglo-American and continental European traditions,” 2. Th e major authors considered in that period by Stein are K. Wheare, W.S. Livingston, W. Riker, C. Friedrish and D. Elazar. Stein, “Changing concepts of federalism since World War II: Anglo-American and continental European traditions,” 2-3.72. About the analysis of these two authors, see Stein, “Changing concepts of federalism since World War II: Anglo-American and continental European traditions,” 6-9.73. Davis, Th e Federal Principle: 5.74. Stein, “Changing concepts of federalism since World War II: Anglo-American and continental European traditions,” 9.




work of Will Kymlicka, as well as with new connections between federalism and European studies.

FEDERALISM AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

Beyond the modern approach

Governance beyond the state

Th e contemporary processes of globalisation and interdependence are ad-dressing federalism with new challenges and potential developments. Daniel Ela-zar saw it as an opportunity for a federalist revival.

In his article “From statism to federalism: a paradigm shift”,75 Elazar records a change from “a world of states” to a “world of diminished sovereignty and increased interstate linkages”, through the development of world interdependence and glo-balisation. Th is change, that could have been perceived from the end of Word War II, becomes decisive after the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Elazar take as a proof of this change the increasing number of federal states, of processes of decentralisation, as well as of confederal arrangements. He consid-ers it as a way to tackle with the weakening of the state, and advocates a radical change in political paradigm, shifting from statism to federalism, as the goes by the ‘modern epoch’ to the ‘post-modern epoch’.

Th e expression of the shift from statism to federalism expresses fully a new vi-sion of federalism. Federalism could free itself form the straightjacket of modern state, and express itself fully with the globalisation in what Elazar calls the ‘post-modern’ epoch.

Elazar gives only a few hints about the defi nition of the new political para-digm, considering that goes through the development of self-rule and shared rule, and that he uses the term ‘federal’ “in its larger historical sense, not simply to describe modern federation but all the various arrangements including federations, confederations and other confederal arrangements, federacies, associated states, special joint authorities with constitutional standing, and others.”76

While Elazar is thinking about the development of the federalist development of the ‘postmodern epoch’, another American scholar, James Rosenau, is thinking as well about the challenge of the weakening of the sovereign states in globalisa-tion, and labelled this new organisation according to the title of his fi rst book on the matter Governance without government (1992). By ‘governance’, Rosenau means the regulation of interdependent political bodies, without the overarching

75. Elazar, “From Statism To Federalism: A Paradigm Shift.”76. Elazar, Exploring Federalism.




control of a political authority.77 Although Rosenau himself is mostly concerned by the international level, further models are developed afterwards to integrate the idea of governance into a model cross-cutting the sovereignty and including domestic and international federalism, or federation and confederation.

Eventually, to assess the evolution of politics, one quotation can be taken from Francis Fukuyama:

Th e End of History was never linked to a specifi cally American model of social or political organisation. Following, the Russian-French philosopher who inspired my original argument, I believe that the European Union more accurately refl ects what the world will look like at the end of history than the contemporary United States. Th e EU’s attempt to transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law is much more in line with a “post-historical” world than the Americans’ continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their military.78

Federalism and European studies

As regards to European studies, they included federalism as a main compo-nent of their approach only from the beginning of the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century. Before that, following Ernst Haas (1958)and the neofunctionalist approach of European integration, the European Communities and the Euro-pean Union was mostly seen as a sui generis supranational body. Or, following Moravcsik and the liberal intergovernmentalism, it was considered as a part of the international regimes’ two-level game. Th e researches applying federalism to Europe were about comparative federalism, and remained quite uncommon, as the main scholars did not address the nature of the European institutional body.79

It is only when European studies scholars assessed to possibility to free federal-ism from stathood, by the end of the 1990s, that federalism was eventually taken into account into European studies.80

In these regards, a specifi c attention must be drawn to of Fritz Sharpf. In 1988, his article on “Th e Joint-Decision Trap”81 investigates the comparison between the decision making-process in the German two-level system, and in the Euro-

77. James N. Rosenau, “A Transformed Observer in a Transforming World,” Studia Diplomatica LII, no. 1-2 (1999).78. Francis Fukuyama, “Th e history at the end of history,” Th e Guardian (2007).79. A brief description of this period can be seen in: R. Daniel Kelemen and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Bringing Federalism Back In,” in Handbook of European Union Politics, ed. Knud Erik Jorgensen, Pollack, Mark A., Ro-samond, Ben (London: Sage Publication, 2007), 301.80. For more details, see Kelemen and Nicolaidis, “Bringing Federalism Back In,” and Michael Burgess, Federal-ism and the European Union: Th e Building of Europe, 1950-2000 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).81. Fritz W. Sharpf, “Th e Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” Public Administration 66, no. 3 (1988).




pean one. As such, he is considered by some scholars as the fi rst author taking into account multi-level governance, though he does not use this terminology.82

Eventually, as described below, some theoretical normative developments can be found within the European activism,83 but quite isolated from the mainstream of European studies.

Multilevel governance as an approach of federalism

Th e position of this article is to consider that the only approach that could reconcile the diff erent dimensions of federal arrangements is the multilevel gov-ernance, and that it has the potential for a renewal of the federalist theory in the ‘post-modern epoch’.

Th e seminal article creating the semantics of multilevel governance has been written in 1993 by Gary Marks, in the context of the fi rst developments of the Maastricht treaty, but also in a political context favouring the vision of ‘Europe of the regions’.84 Th rough the implementation of new structural policy proce-dures—namely the Cohesion fund—and the creation of the Committee of Re-gions, Gary Marks perceived the European Union to integrate the sub-national regions as new actors of the decision-making process. Th is was challenging the traditional two-level game approach of the European integration and could lead to new functional perspectives, at least in low politics.

I suggest that we are seeing the emergence of multilevel governance, a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supra-national, national, regional and local—as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized func-tions of the state up to the supranational level, and some down to the local/regional level.85

To put it more speculatively, the experience of structural funds suggests that it might be fruitful to describe the process of decisional reallocation to European community in-stitutions merely as one aspect of a centrifugal process in which some decisional powers are shifted down to municipal, local and regional governments, some are transferred from states to the EC, and (as in the case of structural policy) some are shifted in both directions simultaneously.86

82. See for instance Stein and Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” 3.83. For instance, the ‘integral federalism’ of Alexandre Marc.84. Gary Marks, “Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC,” in Th e State of the European Com-munity: Th e Maastricht Debate and Beyond, ed. Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal, State of the European Community ; vol. 2 (Boulder (Colorado), Harlow (England): Lynne Rienner Publishers, Longman, 1993).85. Marks, “Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC,” 392.86. Marks, “Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC,” 407.




Going beyond intergovernmentalism as well as neofunctionalism, Marks is suggesting a new approach to European integration, switching from the strategic and explanatory perspectives to a systemic approach, emphasising the dynamics of the creation of a structured and functional polity.

Moreover, many hints in his presentation could lead to think about multi-level governance in a federalist perspective. Firstly, linkages can me made with the ‘process of federalisation’ of Friedrich. Secondly, he is considering the whole European Union as a multi-tiers polity. Th irdly, in a long term perspective of fed-eralism, he is freeing his European model from the sovereign distinction between domestic and international. Eventually, he is referring explicitly to a distribution of competencies within the EU, a programme that will be developed much latter in the context of the White paper of the European Commission on “European Governance” (2001) and of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2001-2004).

In the framework of this article, on could wonder why Marks did not consider his multilevel governance approach as a form of federalism.

A possible answer could be that federalism—the “F-word”—was not popular at the time of his fi rst article on the topic. In the political context, the reference to the ‘federal objective’ (‘fi nalité fédérale’) of the European integration, proposed by the French government to be included in the Mastricht treaty, had just been strongly rejected by the British government.87

In the scientifi c context, the European fi eld of studies had no yet integrated the idea of federalism in its main stream. Federalism was associated with statehood, which was missing from the European institutional body. Th erefore, a federalist approach of the European Union was considered as a “semantic distraction”.88 Us-ing the semantic of ‘federalism’ would have raised once again the question of the nature of the European polity and the debate about the defi nition of federalism.

As stated by Kelemen and Nikolaidis, “some associate federalism with state-hood and emphasize that because the EU lacks key elements of statehood, it cannot be studied as a federation. Such scholars have developed a new conceptual vocabulary associated with ‘multi-level governance.”89

Eventually, it must be stressed that in the European context, federalism was mostly considered as a political fi nalité, a strategy for European integration, rath-er than a principle or a pattern for the present analysis. After World War II, the leaders of the European activism, most notably Altiero Spinelli and Alexandre Marc, had shaped a vision of federalism as the ultimate objective of European

87. See, for instance, Gilles Andreani, “Le fédéralisme et la réforme des institutions européennes,” in Annuaire français des relations internationales: Volume 2 (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2001), 168.88. Kelemen and Nicolaidis, “Bringing Federalism Back In,” 301.89. Kelemen and Nicolaidis, “Bringing Federalism Back In,” 301.




integration, in the project of the ‘United states of Europe’. However, they were hiding strong divergences about what the fi nal nature of the polity should be, between a rather pragmatic Spinelli and the ideological Marc.

It has to be noticed that a close fellow of Alexandre Marc, Swiss Denis de Rougemont, following the same trend of personalist federalism, has from its part developed the vision of ‘variable-geometric regions’: functional regions ignoring the administrative and political borders, and whose size would change according to the problematic to solve.90

Th is general activist approach lost its political strenght by the end of the 1970s. A new attempt to develop a federalist vision of European integration will be presented later, in the 1990s by Jacques Delors, through the oxymoron of “federation of nation-states”.

At this stage, the question of the federalist nature of the multi-level govern-ance an be raised, as it received refi nements form the original article. Is it still pos-sible to consider the multilevel governance as a federalist approach? Th e answer depends upon the perception of federalism. However, to follow the common theme of this article, the historical evolution of the semantic might be as well of interest.

Th e link between federalism and multilevel Governance: the matrix model of Elazar

As it has been said already, the classical American approach of federalism kept itself in the framework of the statehood, with the major exception of Friedrich and Elazar. However, from then, some theories could be taken into account to create a genealogy between the analytical studies of federalism that have emerged after World War II, and the multilevel governance. Such connection could re-inforce the link between the general federalist idea and the theory of multilevel governance.

One connection can be found in the works of Daniel Elazar, and mostly his ‘matrix model’, conceived as a non centralised form of federalism.

Th at matrix model has gone through many refi nements, from when it was fi rst stated by Elazar in 1976 91 and refi ned in 198792, to its last developments in 1994.93Before this last refi nement, Elazar had already talked about the shift to the “post-modern epoch”, and he could then introduce the new approach by free-

90. François Saint-Ouen, “Denis de Rougemont,” L’Europe en formation, no. 296 (1995): 14.91. Daniel J. Elazar, “Federalism vs. Decentralization: Th e Drift from Authenticity,” Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 6, no. 4 Fall (1976).92. Elazar, Exploring Federalism.93. Daniel J. Elazar, “Introduction,” in Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Au-tonomy Arrangements, ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Harlow, Essex: Longman Current Aff airs, 1994).




ing himself from the idea of statehood, as the matrix model of 1976 was mostly linked to the United States, and the last one of 1994 could be perceived in an domestic and international perspective.

In his theory, in order to give an appropriate understanding of federalism, Elazar develops a new theory of political relationships, which “is challenging the dominant Jacobin-Marxian view on a number of fronts”.94

Elazar fi rstly defi nes the centre-periphery model of development of polities, where the sovereign power is concentrated in a single centre, and refl ects the idea of the Jacobin nation-state. A second model is the one of the pyramid, strictly hierarchical, developed through the empires, and focusing on an authoritarian administrative state.

Th ese two models, according to Elazar, are leading inevitably to the centralisa-tion of the state, would it be authoritarian or democratic.

A last model of Elazar, which constitutes the basis of development of a new perception of federalism, is the matrix model. In this model, the relations be-tween political bodies are not concentrated in one arena of political relationship. In this case, “authority and power are dispersed among a network of arenas” within a common framework. Th eir “organisational expression is non-centralisation”, and lead to a polity composed of entities preserving their own integrity.95

According to the author, the matrix model could fi nd a new dimension in the era of globalisation, as the occurrences of federalism in domestic and interna-tional frameworks could be reunifi ed in a common matrix. Th e arenas of political debates could cross-cut the borders of sovereignty, as more international treaties constitutionally binding for the internal domestic levels are developed.

Th is matrix model, non centralised, can be considered as a model of develop-ment of political communication nowadays, through the globalisation of com-munication and of economic matters.

If we accept to follow Elazar to this stage we disagree on the origin of this model. Elazar refers mostly, through the main authors and currents of liberal-ism in the modern era, to the expression of the matrix model in the American experience. However, as it as already been said, we would rather argue that it is embodied within all perception of federalism, as a combination of self rule and shared rule.

Moreover, one can consider that the intuition of Elazar was too much linked to to the state model to realise that the development of the matrix model, in its complexity, and out of the sovereign nation-state, would raise the problem of representativity of the people, through a network composed of a multiplicity of decision arenas.

94. Elazar, “Introduction,” xii.95. Elazar, Federal Systems of the World, Longman, 1994, xiii




Th e question to be raised now is to see whether the non centralised model of multi-level governance can be considered as a new expression of federalism.

Multi-level governance studies mostly authorities or governments interacting with each other and crosscutting the distinction between domestic and interna-tional levels. Although this theory has been specifi cally developed in the context of the European integration, the matrix of interaction between diff erent actors at diff erent levels and the global connections between the domestic and interna-tional levels seem to make it quite close to some federalist organisation.

General defi nition of multilevel governance

Th e model of multilevel governance, as it has been developed from the fi rst defi nition of Gary Marks, is basically framed into European studies.

It is obvious that in the process of complexifi cation of a globalised world, through ongoing processes of integration and fragmentation, it is in the Euro-pean union that this double process has received the most elaborate institutional answer. Th e reallocation of decision making upwards and downwards asserts the weakening of the modern sovereign state.

However, this “turn in the governance” 96is expected by its authors to be used at a larger scale, as a general model of understanding the evolution of politics. Hooghe and Marks show examples in political relations still encapsulated within the modern state, as in the United States and Switzerland.97 And other examples can be given in the international arena, with the enforcement of new competen-cies for supranational and transnational actors,98 without excepting the role of subnational actors in the international and supranational spheres, as for Belgium or Switzerland.

Th e main features of multilevel governance include the multi-tiered govern-ance including domestic as well as international fi eld, the functional approach, the cooperative dimension and the role of non-state actors.

Th e main object of multilevel governance is to identify and study the diff erent decision making locus in a global approach, bypassing the modern state, through a structure of multiple layers of political entities interconnected through their functions. Th us, the aim of multilevel governance is to propose a new model of political relations, encompassing domestic as well as international relations.

In one of their fundamental articles on theoretical refi nements of the multi-level governance, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance”, Hooghe and Marks defi ne two types of multilevel governance.

96. Stein and Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” 8.97. Hooghe and Marks, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance.”98. See, for instance, Th omas Hale and David Held, eds., Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).




MLG type I describes a model based on multi-level structure of a limited number of general purpose jurisdictions, non intersecting, in a durable architecture, and quite diffi cult to reform. MLG type II is more task-oriented, with task-specifi c jurisdictions with intersecting memberships, and a fl exible design with no limita-tion to the number of levels.99

Th e multiplicity of overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions leads to a com-plex pattern. In the same spirit than Elazar, the multilevel governance scholars describe a polycentric non hierarchical model where decisions in one locus can be infl uenced by interdependence. Like in the latest version of the matrix model, the model is not encapsulated anymore into a ‘state framework’ but crosscut the borders of the state to cover the domestic as well as the international framework.

In a short term perspective, multilevel governance is mostly interested to ex-plain why some decisions are taken in some locus, and how have to be taken into account the interdependence with other decision making processes. However, in a middle term perspective, are scrutinised the transfer of competencies from one jurisdiction to another, as well as the creation of MLG Type II institutions.

Following the federalist path, contractualism can be considered as the basic instrument organising the multilevel governance, as constitutions and interna-tional treaties can be considered as a specifi c form of contracts. It is through contractualism that competencies are settled and new institutions created.

A specifi c attention may be driven to constitutions as ‘social contracts’. Th e multilevel governance approach can be considered mostly as functional, or task-oriented, as it deals mostly with processes and outcomes, and not so much with the structure. A large part of the structure is given for granted, as it is the case for most ‘historical general jurisdictions’, and the interest focus mainly in a function-al approach. However, these historical jurisdictions—modern states and state-pattern organised entities—are not only dealing with the functional dimension of the state, but also with its legitimacy and its democratic accountability.

Th is lack of interest to the nature of the general jurisdiction may explain also why multilevel governance is perceived mostly as co-operative, and not so much in the opposition ‘confl ict vs. cooperation’, or ‘competition vs. cooperation’, as it is the case in federalist studies. In fact, the aspect of ‘confl ict’ or ‘competition’ is already embodied within the general jurisdictions. Seeking new outcomes, mul-tilevel governance scholars give more emphasis to the solution of the ‘federalist problematic’, as the new task-oriented jurisdictions are about fi nding solutions to contingent problems.

Eventually, following the general meaning of ‘governance’, multilevel govern-ance integrates non-state non-public actors in the decision making processes in

99. Hooghe and Marks, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance,” 236-239.




each locus. It includes within decision makers: corporation, NGOs, social actors, international organisations, and supranational institutions.

Links with federalism

Many linkages can be made between federalism and multilevel governance. At fi rst because multilevel governance can appear as a ‘broadening of the clas-sical concept of federalism’100 with more than two tiers of government. In such perspective, multilevel governance can be related to the matrix model of Daniel Elazar.

Th is can be reinforced by the presentation of the early article from Fritz Sharpf, “exploring the similarities between joint decision making (‘Politikverfl ech-tung’) in German federalism and decision-making in the European Community”,101 leading to the conclusion that, in some areas, the similarities “are so obvious as to be trivial”102 and considering that “these cases may be instances of a universal deci-sion logic inherent in particular ‘patterns’ […] of institutional arrangements”.103

Searching for connections between federalism and multilevel governance, Stein and Turkewitsch went to the conclusion that “the causal arrow between [fed-eralism and multilevel governance] is more correctly viewed as a two-way interaction process which operates in both directions. In the initial phase of ‘multi-level govern-ance’ studies in political sciences, from the mid -1980s until the mid-1990, there was a strong historical and analytical infl uence that theories of federalism had on the defi nition and evolution of ‘multi-level governance’. But in the more recent period from the mid-1990s to the present, the insights of ‘multi-level governance’ theorists have begun to impact signifi cantly on theories of federalism.”104

In the approach of this article, such assertion must receive some criticisms. Th e fi rst one is that Stein and Turkewitsch consider federalism and multilevel governance as two distinct concepts, which is not the position of this article. Th is is due to the fact that they defi ne federalism as derived directly from the Ameri-can constitution105 and is close to a pattern-approach of it, talking in terms of comparative studies. Furthermore, in their research, they compare both concepts in the framework of European studies. Nevertheless, their argument enforce a strong connection between both ideas.

100. Stein and Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” 7.101. Sharpf, “Th e Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” 239.102. Sharpf, “Th e Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” 251.103. Sharpf, “Th e Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” 271.104. Stein and Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” 3.105. Stein and Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” 4.




More strikingly, Hooghe and Marks state clearly that “the intellectual founda-tion for Type I governance is federalism”. 106 Such assumption reinforce the possible federalist genealogy of multilevel governance. However, the defi nition they give to federalism refers clearly to a pattern-approach of federalism: “Federalism is concerned chiefl y with the relationship between central government and a tier of non-intersecting subnational governments”.107

Moreover, in the framework of this article, MLG type II could refer as well to federalism. It holds the main feature of contractualism to create the new body, the autonomy of the body, and a large application of the principle of subsidiarity to defi ne the appropriate level for each task. Stein and Turkewitsch talks about a ‘shared federalism’. Th e main diff erence is that the jurisdictions are not based an-ymore on general ‘political’ entities, but on adapting the form of to the effi ciency.

Th erefore, can one consider MLG type II as a part of the ‘federalist phenom-enon’?’ Certainly not on the basis of a state-like federal pattern. However, in a larger vision of federalism, as a principle rather than a pattern, it can fi t in the general evolution of federalism. It has to be said that the question of effi cien-cy—as a form of ‘functional federalism’—is not so far away form the federalist interests. Th e fi scal federalism studies devote a large part of their concern to the adaptation of political structures to effi ciency. Th e non territorial federalism, at-tached to some personal rights of individual citizens, could be related as well to that question. Eventually, the Rougemont’s vision of variable-geometry regions fi ts in that approach, and has been sometime used as a reference to some admin-istrative organisations.108

Interest of Multilevel Governance in a Federalist Approach

Now that the relation between federalism and multilevel governance has been established, one could address the federalist nature of multilevel governance.

In this new model, there is clearly a semantic shift, although it does not refer directly to federalism, or doesn’t dare to do so. Th e reasons of this semantic shift has been explained earlier, considering the connotations of the use of federalism in European studies.

However, as it has been showed in the historical evolution, we can fi nd in multilevel governance the main features of the federalist idea. Multilevel govern-ance is based on a multiplicity of voluntary contracts by self-governed entities. Th e cooperation between the entities is stimulated through contractualism, and

106. Hooghe and Marks, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance,” 236.107. Hooghe and Marks, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance,” 236.108. See, for instance, Christophe Koller, “La fonction publique en Suisse : analyse géopolitique d’un fédéral-isme à géométrie variable,” Pyramides: revue du Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches en Administration publique, no. 15 (2008).




the distribution of competencies is made through these contracts, allowing in particular the creation of task-oriented organisations.

To refer once again to the rhetoric of Elazar, the improvement of multilevel governance is in the ‘paradigm shift’ of the distribution of power. Th e multilevel governance model presents an approach taking into consideration the weakening of the modern state and the fact the sovereignty is not anymore the basic norm of the distribution of power.

Th erefore, it can be argued as an hypothesis that multilevel governance fol-lows the last refi nement of the federalist idea, considering the weakening of the sovereign state, and that politics are freeing from the concept of state, which could lead to some ‘post-modernity’. Moreover, the multiple refi nements of the multilevel governance might integrate the various developments of federalism through complexifi cation of modern societies.

However, in the perspectives of this article, the interest of multilevel govern-ance is not so much the one of the explanatory theory, but a new framework—or a new general paradigm—encompassing all political relations. Th is is why the term ‘model’ is used rather than ‘theory’ throughout this article. Multilevel gov-ernance appears more as a descriptive model than an explanatory theory.109 In order to understand the interest of multilevel governance for further federalist studies, it has to be considered multilevel as a meta-theory, a new conceptual approach of a federalist nature to think out politics in the ‘post-modern epoch’. Multilevel governance does not create anything new, but shape an overarching model on the basis of the federalist approach to consider a post-state world.

As regards to this article, the most important feature of multilevel govern-ance is the task-oriented, of functional, dimension. It gives the plasticity of the multilevel governance model, as a task-oriented approach can be considered as an holistic one: it can encompass and re-interpret theories and concepts, regardless of their structures and values. It can be the base of the interconnections between diff erent fi elds of studies, and shows an overarching interdisciplinary framework for diff erent studies on federalism, as an omnibus overall model.

Th e plasticity of the multilevel governance model allows the integration into one framework of many political science thoughts and theories. Th e diff erent fi elds of research of multi-level governance encompass the diff erent subfi elds of studies covered by the diff erent branches of federalism studies (political, eco-nomic, sociological, domestic and international), considering them all in their unity. In fact, in can reconcile all school of studies that go against the centrali-sation of power, from the international as well as the domestic approach, or to quote Hooghe and Marks, that share the postulate that: “dispersion of governance

109. Stein and Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” 10.




across multiple jurisdictions is more fl exible than concentration of governance in one jurisdiction”.110

For Hooghe and Marks, it does reconcile all ‘islands’ of studies that share the idea of diff usion of authority. Th ey identify fi ve of these: European Union Stud-ies, International Relation Scholars, Federalism, Local and metropolitan govern-ance, and Public policy.

Eventually, the multilevel governance approach appears as a potential synthe-sis of most of the approaches of federalism in this article, and mostly the diff erent schools of studies of the analytical approach: it does consider federations and federal states (general jurisdictions) as well as federal institutions created for a specifi c purpose (task-oriented jurisdictions); it is able to reconcile domestic and international fi elds; and, eventually, it sets federalism free from the archetype American model and its inherited values.

As such, it can be considered as a model for ‘a new era of federalism’.Its main limit is normative, and has to be found in its functional approach.

It does not take into account the values and principles that are at the basis of the ‘general purpose jurisdictions’, nor the prior organic ties of the historical entities structured in multilevel governance. Moreover, the functional and non hierarchi-cal structure proposed by multilevel governance does not favour the development of a normative overarching set of values. Th erefore, it does not take into account the general interest and misses a societal ontology.

Considering the modern state in its functional dimension, it appears clearly that it looses the origin of the nation-state, as the democratic component of the modern state. Th erefore, it does not consider the democratic legitimacy and ac-countability of the institutions created. Th e concept of demos in its modern way has been linked to the modern defi nition of nation, as it is defi ned by the bound-aries of the modern state. In the multilevel governance functional approach, the polycentric approach, out of the frame of the state, looses that dimension. Th us the normative question to whom a jurisdiction is accountable for, can be ad-dressed. However, it might be enlarged to the normative problems related to the demos, as political legitimacy, participation and representation, social and fi scal solidarity, new defi nition of territory… Elements of answers to these questions can be found within multilevel governance studies in the book of Simona Piat-toni, Th e Th eory of Multi-Level Governance.111 Outside that fi eld of studies have been raised the question of cosmopolitan citizenship and democracy on the glo-

110. Hooghe and Marks, “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance,” 235.111. Simona Piattoni, Th e Th eory of Multi-level Governance: Conceptual, Empirical and Normative Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).




balised word, and the possibility of a democratic system beyond the state, follow-ing the path of Kant.112

Without going into a broader debate, which would exceed the size of this article, some simple comments might be taken into account. Peters and Pierre have talked about a “Faustian bargain” as regards to multilevel governance and democracy, considering that “the core values of democratic governments are traded for accommodation, consensus and effi ciency in governance”.113 Th is comment seems to underestimate the role of consociational democratic theories, which consider that in divided societies, where majoritarian electoral systems are not applicable, accommodation and consensus are essential components of the system, and ‘core values’ of the democratic system. Th us, that need for accommodation and con-sensus could be extended to multilevel governance.

Another limit of the multilevel governance model is more factual: although the power of the modern states has weakened, the state has not disappeared. Ela-zar rightly stated that the model of governance in the postmodern epoch is not about the disappearance of the sovereign state, but about its integration in a new dimension.

In the development of biding contracts between the diff erent actors of the multilevel governance, the central government of the states—that is to say the one where relies legal sovereignty in its international dimension—still plays a signifi cant role. In this new perception of federalism, and as we are dealing with metaphoric models, the matrix model of Elazar, developed in the framework of the federal state, should be replaced by a sandglass model, or a matrix with a nar-row bottleneck in the middle, through the sovereign state, which is coordinating more than ruling.

CONCLUSION

From time to time, theories and models have to be revised, in order to take into account the evolution of the topic and, as far as social sciences are concerned, the growing complexity of the world.

In particular, there has been in the past decade a revival in federalism studies, addressing not only the federal state, but the whole nature of federalism, in a political world featuring two opposite trends of globalisation and fragmentation. However, so far, this revival has not led to a clear new answer and a new percep-tion of federalism.

112. For instance the works of David Held and Jürgen Habermas. See also: Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A review,” European journal of International Relations 10, no. 3 (2004).113. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, “Multi-level Governance and Democracy. A Faustian Bargain?”, cited by Stein and Turkewitsch, “Th e Concept of Multi-level Governance in Studies of Federalism,” 10-11.




In the context of this article, we argue that federalism cannot be seen in a new perspective as long as it is attached to the archetype pattern of the American pat-tern, developed form the Constitution of 1787 and the Federalist Papers.

Th is model has framed the development of federalist studies for two cen-turies with reference to the modern state—and to the nation-state—featuring sovereignty and the values of democracy and liberalism. Confederations and non democratic federal states are considered in this framework as unachieved forms of federalism.

In the past decade, world politics has known new developments, distinguished by a growing interdependence, the development of the European Union, as well as the increase of federalist solutions in confl ict management studies, taking into account non homogeneous states and international guarantees.

In order to be able to free federalism out of the straightjacket of the American experience, this article considers that federalism must be studied in the long range historical perspective, considering earlier developments than the American one, as well as parallel historical developments. Our position is that, in order to be able the understand federalism in the ‘post-modern era’, where the sovereign state has been weakening, one should consider the evolution of federalism in ‘pre- or early- modern era’, as well as the alternative to the American experiment. Th at approach postulates federalism as an autonomous fi eld of studies, in its concepts as well as in its semantics.

Analysing what are the constant features of federalism, it cannot be seen as a concept or a theory, as the formalisation of federalism in concepts and theories reduce the scope of study of the fi eld. Th e historical presentation has shown the plasticity of federalism and the diffi culty to encompass all developments of feder-alism into one concept or one theory.

Th erefore, federalism must be seen in a meta-theoretical perspective, as a gen-eral approach of politics, or a paradigm considered in its more general sense. Th is is what can be called the ‘federalist idea’ or the ‘federalist principle’.

Th e basic features of the federalist idea are made up of some general norms:

1. Federalism is based on a voluntary contract between collective entities (would it be called treaty, constitution, covenant, compact…).

2. Th us, it considers the self-governance—or autonomy—of the entities in each level of a two or muti-tier organisation.

3. Eventually, federalism considers that the diff usion of power is prefer-able to its centralisation.

All other aspects of a federalist organisation are left to the adaptation of the principle to the specifi c contingencies of the environment where it take place. By




‘contingencies’, we understand the context in which the ‘contract’ takes place or is amended. Th e word ‘contingencies’ might appear as excessive, as it does include elements that have structured federalism for decades or centuries . We can think in particular of territoriality, sovereignty or democracy. However, if federalism has to be taken in a large historical perspective, these ‘contingencies’ are elements that appear and/or disappear in the evolution of the federalist thoughts.

Eventually, in such perspective, there is no historical teleology in the feder-alist approach. Political societies do not necessarily evolve towards a federalist organisation. Rather, federalism has to be considered as a method, a specifi c way to organise plurality in a non-centralised way.

In this general approach, the historical evolution of the federalist idea refl ects the changes of its perspectives, in a growing complexity.

Before the modern era, most of the federalist unions where idiosyncratic and pragmatic experiences, mostly task-oriented towards defensive measures.

A fi rst attempt to formalise these experiences was made by Montesquieu in a descriptive approach by 1748 in L’Esprit des lois. It infl uenced the American con-stitution and the next major work of the federalist idea, the Federalist Papers, in 1788. Th e work of Hamilton and Madison presented a descriptive and normative vision of federalism, embodied into a liberal and democratic republic.

In the same period, two other federalist normative projects were proposed by Kant and Proudhon. However, it is in the American context that was developed a tradition of federalist studies, which led to the development of analytical studies, from World War II, beginning with Kenneth Wheare. Although mostly analytic, these studies keep a normative infl uence, through their perception of the Ameri-can pattern as the archetype.

Eventually, the collapse of the communist world led to a new perception of world politics. We argue the innovative federalist model developed afterwards is multilevel governance, as the latest attempt to formalise the federalist idea, or the fi rst attempt in the post-modern era.

In this historical perspective, the evolution of the federalist schools of thought can be seen as a ‘genealogy’ of the federalist thoughts, and this path has to be interpreted.

A fi rst phase can ben seen with Montesquieu, in a descriptive approach of federalism and the fi rst introduction of federalism into a systematic typology of political systems, in a historical survey of the political organisations. Although the work of Montesquieu is highly normative, the part considering federalism is mostly descriptive. Th e normative approach appears afterwards, in the thoughts of the Federalist Papers, Kant and Proudhon. Th is normative approach remains until the 1940, when is starting the analytical approach. Th e analytical approach




itself will be maintained, through some misfortunes, until a new meta-theoretical model of multilevel governance appears at the turn of the century.

In a world of growing complexity, it seems the evolution of federalist thoughts have followed that complexity in their interpretation of federalism. From a de-scriptive approach, it went on with a normative approach, followed by an ana-lytical one, and ending up with a paradigmatic model perspective nowadays. In the agenda for future research, it would be interesting to compare the main steps of evolution of federalism with other political science fi elds of studies, in order to compare their speed of evolution and see if federalism has been ahead or late.

Another conclusion to draw is that the evolution of federalism has come from a value-oriented approach, aimed at defi ning the social ontology of politics, to a function-oriented or task-oriented approach. In that evolutionary process from a holistic approach to a functional one, one could consider that federalism has lost its soul in a Faustian bargain, in an attempt to encompass all forms of federalism in a general model. However, a task-oriented is as well an holistic one, as it can encompass and re-interpret theories and concepts, regardless of their structures and values.

To study federalism is to scrutinise an idea, and the idea of federalism fi nds its coherence in the process of its evolution, rather than in a single theory or concept. In each step of its evolution, federalism has adapted itself, with a strong plasticity, to the political environment it had to perform in. In the ‘post-modern epoch’, it seems that there is a place for a revival in federalism. Th rough a seman-tic shift, it seems that multilevel governance gives the model where an adapted version of federalism should grow. Some could see there a risk for federalism, as it would loose the spirit that has been developed from the American revolution. However, the federalist idea is older than the American experience, and the con-stant attempt of federalism to balance unity and diversity is a principle of its own, diff erent from democracy and liberalism. Federalism must be seen as a method rather than a structure, a set of values or a fi nalité.

AbstractThe aim of this article is to fi nd out a general coherence to the federalist idea, through a study of the

evolution of federalist thoughts. It comes to the conclusion that federalism have to stay an idea or a prin-ciple, and not a concept nor a theory, in order to be able to encompass all federalist discursive approaches. Moreover, it assesses that the latest development of the federalist idea is multi-level governance.

RésuméL’objectif de cet article est de rechercher la cohérence générale de l’idée fédéraliste, au travers de

l’évolution des pensées fédéralistes. Il arrive à la conclusion que le fédéralisme doit rester une idée ou un principe, et non un concept ou une théorie, afi n de pouvoir prendre en compte toutes les approches discursives du fédéralisme. En outre, il considère que le développement le plus récent de l’idée fédéraliste est la gouvernance multi-niveau.



La souveraineté, pierre d’achoppement pour une fédération politique européenne

Pathé Diop

Doctorant en Science politique, Université Paris 3 Sorbonne-Nouvelle.

Introduction

Dans le champ académique, diverses approches théoriques ou conceptuelles sont convoquées afi n de penser l’intégration européenne. Parmi ces approches, nous pouvons citer le néofonctionnalisme (Ernst B. Haas), l’intergouvernemen-talisme (Stanley Hoff man), l’intergouvernementalisme libéral (Andrew Moravc-sik), le fédéralisme. Malgré les diff érences gisant au fond de ces diff érentes ap-proches, elles ont tout de même en commun, d’une part, le fait de situer leurs approches dans le domaine des relations internationales, et d’autre part, se dé-terminent à apporter des réponses à la question suivante : pourquoi des États, considérés comme les acteurs de la scène interétatique, acceptent-ils d’intégrer ou de bâtir un ou des ensembles régionaux susceptibles de limiter leur souveraineté ?

Notre but, ici, n’est pas de discuter des divergences entre ces diff érentes ap-proches de la construction européenne, mais de retenir celle qui nous semble le moins éluder la question de la souveraineté dans l’intégration européenne. Et ce, parce que l’intégration européenne s’établit dans un cadre international et est avant tout déterminée par des réalités relevant de considérations internationales : la paix ou la sécurité. Ainsi, parmi ces diff érentes approches, l’approche fédéraliste nous semble celle qui répond le mieux à cette exigence, du fait qu’elle part de considérations géopolitiques cadrant avec les principes théoriques du paradigme


Pathé Diop64


réaliste des relations internationales. C’est pourquoi nous pensons que le fédéra-lisme ne peut être considéré à sa juste valeur que s’il est pris dans les limites de ce paradigme.

Si la question de la souveraineté occupe une place centrale dans l’intégration régionale en général, elle ne bénéfi cie pas, en revanche, du même traitement au sein des diff érentes approches théoriques ci-dessus mentionnées. Le néofonction-nalisme l’élude complètement tandis que le fédéralisme l’aff ronte et l’intègre dans son cadre théorique comme donnée essentielle à l’intégration politique.

Nous allons dans un premier temps, considérer l’intégration européenne à travers l’approche néofonctionnaliste, servant dès le départ de cadre théorique et empirique permettant l’esquive de la question sensible de la souveraineté et du fédéralisme. Dans un second temps, nous tenterons d’extirper le fédéralisme de ce que nous appelons le paradigme juridique du fédéralisme afi n de le penser dans le paradigme réaliste des relations internationales, qui prend en compte le problème de la souveraineté.

Ainsi, ces comparaisons nous amèneront à l’idée selon laquelle la souveraineté constitue « la » pierre d’achoppement empêchant l’infl échissement de l’intégra-tion économique européenne dans une fédération politique.

Le néofonctionnalisme : un fédéralisme en puissance

À la question relative au motif incitant les États à intégrer un ensemble régio-nal, Ernst B. Haas et Allen S. Whiting soutiennent ceci :

States consent to participation in larger organizations because they recognize that certain of their policy aspirations are so dependent upon similar aims in other countries as to make common action essential if the aspirations of any single group are to be realized.1

Les domaines dans lesquels les États consentent à s’associer sont, suivant Ernst B. Haas et Allen S. Whiting, celui des « communication, drugs, and river, fi nance, tariff s, and agriculture, welfare, culture, peace, and security. » Ainsi, les États s’unis-sent pour des raisons d’aisance (ease) et de commodité (convenience), mais éga-lement pour ne pas engager leur souveraineté, c’est-à-dire ce qui leur sert à as-surer « the preservation of their uniqueness 2 ». Cette approche fonctionnaliste de l’intégration régionale en général, porte sur des « relations particulières régies par un traité pour servir des buts particuliers de l’État 3 », et elle préfi gure l’approche

1. B. Ernst Haas and S. Allen Whiting, Dynamic of International Relations, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956, p. 430.2. Ibid.3. Carl Schmitt, Th éorie de la Constitution, Traduit de l’allemand par Lilyane Deroche, Préface d’Olivier Beaud, Paris, PUF, « Quadrige », 2008, p. 511.


La souveraineté, pierre d’achoppement pour une fédération politique européenne 65


néofonctionnaliste de l’intégration européenne inaugurée par le même Ernst B. Haas, deux ans plus tard, en 1958, dans son ouvrage : Th e Uniting of Europe, Po-litical Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957.

L’approche néofonctionnaliste propose une analyse de l’intégration euro-péenne reposant sur deux idées fondamentales, lesquelles infl uenceront les pères fondateurs de la construction européenne tels que Jean Monnet4 et Robert Schuman. La première idée est celle d’engrenage (spillover) de secteurs, non pas politiques mais techniques, tels l’économie. La seconde est l’idée selon laquelle l’intégration progressive de l’Europe par le biais de ces secteurs techniques abou-tira plus tard à une union politique, c’est-à-dire une fédération (politique) euro-péenne5 à travers un engrenage de loyauté, partant des élites, acteurs principaux de l’intégration, vers les peuples.

Si les pères fondateurs de l’Europe avaient en vue l’institution d’une fédéra-tion politique européenne, ils avaient également conscience des limites pratiques à l’institution d’un tel ordre politique. Et ce, en raison des défi nitions équivoques attribuées à la notion de souveraineté, ainsi qu’à la confusion généralement faite entre fédération et État fédéral. Les principes de l’approche néofonctionnaliste auxquels les pères fondateurs ont eu recours afi n de construire l’Europe sont pour eux un compromis effi cace pour éluder l’usage ou la référence au fédéralisme, bien qu’ils eussent en vue ce dernier. Mais la communautarisation technique de la méthode néofonctionnaliste (spillover), en esquivant la souveraineté propre au nationalisme, bute sur un écueil qui laisse l’union politique en vue dans une in-détermination absolue et un processus chaotique. Car, comme le constate Ernst B. Haas et Allen S. Whiting, se référant au fonctionnalisme, précurseur du néo-fonctionnalisme6, on ne peut assurer que la voie technique de la communauta-risation (spillover), censée rencontrer la politique en son terme, ne rencontrera pas celle-ci bien avant, au cours de débats touchant à l’économie ou à l’agricul-ture, et aboutissant à des confl its politiques. En eff et, « [a] change in the nature of

4. Ben Rosamond ne parle pas d’infl uence du néofonctionnalisme sur la méthode Jean Monnet, mais plutôt de ressemblance, « obvious resemblance », voir Th eories of European Integration, New York, 2000, p. 50.5. Voir Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Paris, Éditions Fayard, 1976, p. 350Robert Schuman, « Déclaration du 9 mai 1950 », dans <ww.robert-schuman.eu/declaration_9mai.php>.Patrick Rambaud, « Europe occidentale - Institutions eurowpéennes », dans Encyclopaedia Universalis, 1990, p. 68,Voir Francis Delpérée, Le fédéralisme en Europe, « Que sais-je ? », Paris, PUF, 2000, p. 3.Voir également B. Ernst Haas, Th e Uniting of Europe, Political Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Indiana, Th e University of Notre Dame Press, [1958], 2004, p. 32.6. Le néofonctionnalisme, comme le soulignent A. James Caporaso et John. T. S. Keeler, « did not constitute a radical break with fonctionalism », mais dépasse ce dernier sur trois points. Sur la diff érence entre fonctionna-lisme et néofonctionnalisme, voir A. James Caporaso and John. T. S. Keeler, « Th e European Community and Regional Integration Th eory », Paper prepared for delivery as a plenary address at the Th ird Biennial Interna-tional Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Washington, D. C., May 27-29, 1993.


Pathé Diop66


the groups constituting the government may invest any issue with a new signifi cance which pushes realm of political controversy 7. »

Par exemple, les crises survenues tout au long de la construction européenne, la crise de la « chaise vide » suscitée par le général de Gaulle en 1965, la crise de 1979 provoquée par la Grande-Bretagne, celles relatives à l’élargissement et au renforcement de l’Union en 1992, 2000 et 2005, ainsi que la crise de la dette de 2011, en révélant le caractère politique du processus de l’intégration euro-péenne, ont sapé en profondeur les thèses du néofonctionnalisme qui excluent la rencontre de l’économie et de la politique. De ce fait, les crises de 1965, 1979 et 2000 ont montré le rôle primordial des États, « matérialisé par la “crise de la chaise vide” », « la politique d’obstruction du gouvernement britannique à l’égard du budget communautaire 8 ». Les crises de 1992 et de 2005 ont quant à elles mon-tré le rôle de la loyauté des peuples européens dans la construction européenne. Mais ce rôle primordial des États et de la loyauté des peuples, a été négligé par le néofonctionnalisme au profi t des élites (acteurs non étatiques). C’est pourquoi nous pouvons affi rmer avec James A. Caporaso que quand Ernst B. Haas parlait, en 1975, de l’obsolescence de la théorie de l’intégration régionale9, « he had the irrelevance of neofonctionalist theory in mind 10.»

Ce qui fait défaut à l’approche néofonctionnaliste dans sa tentative de rendre compte de l’intégration européenne nous semble donc être son manque de réa-lisme, ainsi que sa confi ance absolue au libéralisme économique comme source de stabilité et de sécurité. Si l’on tient compte de la prétention fédérale originelle des pères fondateurs de l’Europe, autrement dit, pour employer la phraséologie de la sociologie wébérienne, du sens investi par ces derniers dans leur projet de « faire l’Europe », force est de reconnaître que les préceptes néofonctionnalistes auxquels ils ont eu recours n’étaient qu’un compromis stratégique pour éviter d’avoir aff aire à des notions sensibles à même de compromettre leur projet : les notions de sou-veraineté et de fédéralisme. Ainsi, en dépit de leur ambition d’instituer d’emblée une fédération politique européenne garantissant immédiatement la paix et la sécurité européenne, les pères fondateurs ont fait preuve d’un certain réalisme en ayant fi nalement recours à la méthode d’intégration néofonctionnaliste, devant permettre à terme l’union politique (la fédération politique), par le processus du spillover. Mais celui-ci ne produira l’eff et politique escompté que lorsque d’une

7. B. Ernst Haas and S. Allen Whiting, Dynamic of International Relations, p. 455.8. Christian Lequesne et Andy Smith, « Union européenne et science politique : où en est le débat théorique ? », in Culture et Confl its [En ligne], Tous les numéros, Interpréter l’Europe, mis en ligne le 16 mars 2006. URL : http://confl its.revues.org/index377.html9. B. Ernst Haas, Th e Obsolescence of Regional Integration Th eory, Berkley, California, Institute for International Studies, 1975.10. A. James Caporaso, « Regional Integration Th eory : Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Fu-ture », dans European Integration and Supranational Governance, edited by Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 340.




part, le spillover aura suffi samment et mécaniquement intégré et renforcé la soli-darité économique des diff érents secteurs de l’économie européenne, et d’autre part, lorsque la loyauté des élites aux institutions européennes sera, à son tour, mécaniquement et intégralement répercutée, sur les peuples européens.

Au regard de la fi n politique qui ressort de l’approche néofonctionnaliste de l’intégration en général et l’intégration européenne en particulier, nous pouvons ainsi soutenir l’idée selon laquelle le néofonctionnalisme est un « fédéralisme à l’envers11 » ou, mieux, un fédéralisme en puissance. Les analyses de natures technique et économique que l’approche néofonctionnaliste privilégie dans sa tentative de rendre compte de l’intégration européenne, semble esquiver la ques-tion stratégique beaucoup plus fondamentale, de la sécurité. Cette dernière est d’autant plus importante qu’elle est la raison première de l’union selon les pères fondateurs, comme ce fut au demeurant le cas des colonies américaines en 1775. Si le fédéralisme est avant tout une posture stratégique déterminée avant tout par le problème de la guerre et de la paix, de la présence éventuelle ou eff ective d’une menace extérieure12 (donc de la stabilité), alors la prétention fédérale des pères fondateurs de l’Europe ne peut être comprise et analysée qu’à travers la problématique de la sécurité européenne. De ce fait, une analyse de l’intégration politique de l’Europe, ainsi qu’un infl échissement de l’Europe dans une fédération politique ne peuvent être possibles que si, et seulement si, d’une part, l’on tient compte, de la cause première déterminant la prétention d’union des dirigeants européens, à savoir les lourdes conséquences des deux grandes guerres et le besoin d’une sécurité qui rendrait toute guerre intra et intereuropéenne impossible ; et d’autre part, si l’on tient compte de l’éventualité d’une guerre entre les États com-posant l’échiquier interétatique mondial.

Dans ces conditions, le paradigme réaliste des relations internationales semble celui qui rend compte le plus pertinemment des causes de la guerre, ainsi que des conditions qui rendent possible la stabilité.

11. Anne-Cécile Robert, « Un modèle original : le fédéralisme à l’envers » [En ligne], Le Monde Diplomatique, 27 octobre 2004, disponible sur <www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/europe/federalisme>12. Sur ce point, voir, Samuel Pufendorf , Le droit de la nature et des Gens ou Système général des principes les plus importants de la morale, de la jurisprudence, et de la politique, Liv. VII, chap. V, § XVIII, Traduit du latin par Jean Barbeyrac, Londres, Jean Nours, 1740, p. 176,Montesquieu , De l’Esprit des lois, Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1995, p. 288sq,Craig Volden, « Origin, Operating, and Signifi cance: the federalism of William H. Riker », dans Publius, Th e Journal of Federalism, 34:4 (Fall 2004), p. 91Jennifer Smith, Federalism, Vancouver, Th e University of British Columbia Press, 2004, p. 11.Pierre Moscovici ne soulignait-il pas la menace de la guerre et le besoin de sécurité, autrement dit la paix, comme la prétention originelle de l’intégration politique européenne quand il dit : « [a]vec le Kosovo, on redécouvre pour-quoi l’Europe a été construite. Elle n’a pas été bâtie pour supprimer les frontières internes à l’Europe ou établir un tarif douanier commun ; elle a été faite pour la paix, la démocratie, la sécurité. » ? « Le fédéralisme n’est pas la solution », dans Libération, 18 mai 1999.


Pathé Diop68


Le fédéralisme dans le paradigme réaliste des relations internationales

En partant d’un des présupposés du paradigme réaliste des relations interna-tionales, selon lequel l’anarchie constitue la structure a-historique des relations internationales, que la guerre est constitutive de cette dernière, que la scène in-ternationale est caractérisée par l’absence de toute autorité détenant, comme au niveau national, le monopole de la violence physique légitime13, alors, force est de reconnaître que, d’une part, la sécurité demeure la priorité de chacune des unités politiques se trouvant sur cette scène (les États), et que d’autre part, la raison qui détermine l’engagement d’une unité politique dans un ensemble fédéral se rap-porte à la sécurité, c’est-à-dire à la présence d’une menace extérieure. Par consé-quent, l’intégration politique européenne, dont la prétention fédérale est affi rmée dès ses débuts par les pères fondateurs tels que Jean Monnet et Robert Schuman, nous semble réaliste, dans sa détermination primordiale, dans la mesure où elle avait en vue la paix et la sécurité.

Cette prétention fédérale est par conséquent déterminée par des raisons es-sentiellement politiques, car les États se réunissent afi n d’éliminer le risque de guerre entre eux. Autrement dit, ils veulent substituer à l’espace anarchique qui les tenait les uns à côté des autres et rendait une menace de guerre potentielle, un ordre isotopique national placé sous l’autorité d’une entité supraétatique et à laquelle revient le rôle d’assurer la permanence de l’ordre ainsi établi, et la sécurité de chacun des États engagés. C’est pourquoi le rapport qui lie les États au sein d’une fédération ne relève pas d’une coexistence fondée sur le droit international, ni d’une ligue transitoire relevant d’un simple traité, lesquelles « n’engagent pas l’existence politique de l’État en tant que telle dans sa totalité 14. » Ce rapport relève plutôt, comme le souligne Carl Schmitt, d’un pacte spécial qui « embrasse chaque État membre dans la totalité de son existence comme unité politique et l’intègre tout entier à une association qui a une existence politique.15 »

L’engagement dans une fédération suppose ainsi la délégation, par les États, non pas de la totalité de leurs souverainetés, mais de la marque de leur souve-raineté relative à la guerre et à la paix, autrement dit à la vie et à la mort. Car, si la fédération élimine le risque de guerre entre les États la constituant, il n’en demeure pas moins que, étant située à côté d’autres États, sur la scène anarchique interétatique exempte de toute autorité suprême détenant le jus belli, elle s’expose de ce fait, ainsi que les États la constituant, à la menace éventuelle de guerre.

13. Pour une énumération exhaustive des présupposés théoriques du paradigme réaliste des relations interna-tionales, voir Dario Battistella, Th éories des relations internationales, 3e édition mise à jour et augmentée, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2009, p. 123-125.14. Carl Schmitt, Th éorie de la Constitution, p. 511.15. Ibid., p. 513.




S’il est vrai que l’approche fédéraliste de l’intégration politique n’esquive pas le problème de la souveraineté, contrairement à l’approche néofonctionnaliste, il n’en demeure pas moins que le paradigme juridique du fédéralisme, dominant par ailleurs dans l’étude du fédéralisme, considère alors la souveraineté sous un angle problématique. En eff et, d’une part, du fait qu’il appréhende la souverai-neté dans une perspective exclusivement juridique sans tenir compte de son ca-ractère primordialement politique16, d’autre part, du fait qu’il opère une summa divisio dans la théorie du fédéralisme, celle-ci étant écartelée entre l’État fédéral (État unitaire) et la confédération d’États17, au détriment de la seule forme géné-rique de fédération18. Ainsi, le paradigme juridique du fédéralisme constitue un obstacle épistémologique empêchant de rendre intelligible la notion de fédéra-tion. Qui plus est, même s’il faut reconnaître à Olivier Beaud le mérite d’avoir à juste titre restauré la notion de fédération, longtemps délaissée par la littérature consacrée, et tenté de mener une théorie constitutionnelle de la notion, dépassant ainsi le paradigme juridique du fédéralisme trop enfermé dans la théorie de l’État, toutefois, sa théorie constitutionnelle de la fédération, donnant lieu à une tenta-tive d’esquiver la notion de souveraineté, semble malgré tout, charrier avec elle, la vision exclusivement juridique de la souveraineté propre au paradigme juridique. Aussi déclare-t-il « éviter les termes de “souveraineté” ou de “souverain” 19 » dans sa construction d’une théorie (constitutionnelle) de la fédération.

La notion de souveraineté est, faut-il le reconnaître, avant d’être subsumée dans un cadre strictement juridique, une notion foncièrement politique. Et si la souveraineté est le propre, non pas seulement de l’État, qui du reste ne détient

16. Sur le caractère primordialement politique de la souveraineté, voir Robert Lansing, « A Defi nition of Sove-reignty », Th e American Political Science Review, Vol. 8, no 1, Supplement: Proceeding of the American Political Science Association at Its Tenth Annual Meeting, February 1914, pp. 61-75 ou « Notes on Sovereignty in a State », dans Th e American Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, no 1, Jan-Apr 1907, pp. 105-128.Ces deux articles de 1907 et de 1914 sont repris dans un ouvrage : Robert Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty. From the standpoint Of Th e State and Of Th e World, Washington, Published by Th e Endowment, 1921, p. 17.17. Dans la théorie générale de l’État, ainsi que dans la littérature juridique, la plupart des auteurs établit une classifi cation triptyque des formes politiques constituée de l’État unitaire, l’État fédéral et de la confédération d’États. Cette classifi cation est faite selon le degré de coalescence de la souveraineté au sein de ces formes poli-tiques. John Calhoun, au nom de la non-divisibilité de la souveraineté, refuse cette classifi cation triptyque et la réduit à un diptyque, l’État unitaire et la confédération d’États. Il considère que l’État fédéral n’est rien d’autre qu’un État unitaire. Voir John Calhoun, John Calhoun , Union and liberty. Th e political philosophy of John C. Calhoun, edited by Ross M. Lence, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1992, p. 105.18. Olivier Beaud est un des rares juristes à avoir, d’une part, délaissé la summa division établie par le paradigme juridique du fédéralisme, en considérant la seule forme générique de fédération ; et, d’autre part, à avoir tenté de développer une théorie constitutionnelle de la fédération prenant son autonomie vis-à-vis du paradigme juri-dique du fédéralisme. Voir son ouvrage, Th éorie de la fédération, Paris, PUF, 2007. Cet ouvrage d’Olivier Beaud, réédité en 2009, est sans doute le parachèvement des chapitres 29 et 30 de la Th éorie de la Constitution de Carl Schmitt intitulés, respectivement, « Notions fondamentales d’une théorie constitutionnelle de la fédération » et « Conséquences des notions fondamentales de la théorie constitutionnelle de la fédération », voir Carl Schmitt, Th éorie de la Constitution, Traduit de l’allemand par Lilyane Deroche, Préface d’Olivier Beaud, Paris, PUF, « Quadrige », 2008, pp. 509-540.19. Olivier Beaud, Th éorie de la fédération, p. 64.


Pathé Diop70


pas le monopole de la capacité politique, mais de toute unité politique ayant les moyens d’opérer une discrimination entre ami et ennemi afi n de garantir la perpétuité de son ordre, alors la fédération, qui est un ordre politique avant tout, doit nécessairement disposer de la souveraineté afi n d’assurer, elle aussi, son exis-tence politique et celle des États membres. Car les États qui s’engagent dans une fédération politique engagent la marque de leur souveraineté relative à la guerre et à la sécurité.

D’un côté, si les États gardaient intacte cette dernière et que la fédération en était dépourvue, il serait absurde dans ce cas de parler de fédération, puisqu’elle perdrait tout simplement sa raison d’être. D’un autre côté, si les États membres et la fédération disposaient chacun de cette marque de la souveraineté, l’engagement des États dans une fédération serait dépourvu de sens, puisque ceux-ci seraient capables de garantir eux-mêmes leur existence politique et de faire face à toute menace que représenterait un autre État.

La délégation à la fédération de la marque de la souveraineté relative à la guerre et à la sécurité ne signifi e pas pour les État membres la perte totale de leur souveraineté. Ces derniers gardent en eff et leur souveraineté relative au maintien de l’ordre étatique, autrement dit la souveraineté suspendue à l’autorité policière. En revanche, la marque souveraine relative au maintien de l’ordre sur la scène anarchique interétatique, à l’action militaire, doit nécessairement être du ressort de la fédération. De ce fait, nous pouvons parler d’une double localisation de la souveraineté au sein d’une fédération politique et, par là même, sauver le carac-tère politique de la souveraineté négligé par le paradigme juridique du fédéra-lisme, c’est-à-dire son caractère décisionniste.

Si l’Europe s’est construite suivant une logique néofonctionnaliste, force est d’admettre que les crises qui sont survenues tout au long de l’intégration éco-nomique ont soulevé des questions à propos de la nature et de la fi nalité encore indéterminées20 de la communauté. Un infl échissement de l’Europe dans une perspective fédérale, qui fut d’ailleurs l’intention des pères fondateurs, est invo-qué aussi bien dans le milieu universitaire que politique. Mais cet appel à une fédération politique européenne reste problématique en raison de l’arrimage des notions fédérales au paradigme juridique du fédéralisme, mobilisées avant tout par les acteurs politiques. Ce faisant, les partisans d’une consolidation politique, les fédéralistes, et ceux défendant une Europe lâche, les souverainistes, se divisent

20. Sur la nature indéterminée, voir Antonin Cohen, « La Constitution européenne. Ordre politique, utopie juridique et guerre froide », dans Critique internationale, no 26, janvier 2005, p. 123, où il qualifi e l’Union européenne de « nébuleuse européenne ».Voir également Philippe Manin, L’Union européenne, Institutions, ordre juridique, contentieux, Paris, Pedone, 2005, cité par Anne Levade, « Identité constitutionnelle et exigence existentielle. Comment concilier l’incon-ciliable », dans L’Union européenne, union de droit, union des droits. Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Philippe Manin, Paris, Pedone, 2010, p. 109. Philippe Manin assimile l’Union européenne à un « objet politique non identifi é », expression qu’il emprunte à Jacques Delors qui désignait ainsi la Communauté européenne.




en se référant au cadre très rigide de la classifi cation établie par le paradigme juri-dique du fédéralisme entre l’État fédéral et la confédération d’États. La référence à ce cadre, ainsi qu’à sa classifi cation, non seulement obstrue la référence à la notion plus féconde et moins problématique de fédération, mais rigidifi e de sur-croît la notion de souveraineté, au point que cette dernière constitue « la » pierre d’achoppement pour une fédéralisation politique de l’Europe.

Résumé L’intégration européenne constitue un objet d’étude qui intéresse de plus en plus divers champs de la

science politique. Les approches théoriques fondées sur les relations internationales sont des plus usitées pour investir cet objet. Parmi elles, le néofonctionnalisme occupe une place importante en tant qu’ap-proche à la fois théorique et pratique de l’intégration européenne. Cependant, avoir éludé la notion de souveraineté, qui caractérise le néofonctionnalisme dans la perspective du fédéralisme, est remis en cause par le surgissement de crises qui révèlent la ténacité de la souveraineté. Le paradigme juridique du fédéra-lisme, en réifi ant la notion de souveraineté, ne rend pas intelligible le caractère politique de cette dernière. De ce fait, cette conception réifi ée de la souveraineté constitue un obstacle à l’infl échissement de l’Europe dans une fédération politique. Considérer le fédéralisme sous l’angle du paradigme réaliste des relations internationales semble alors prévenir ce travers.

AbstractEuropean integration is an object of studies receiving a growing interest from different fi elds of political

science. Theoretical approaches based on international relations are the more often used to investigate that object. Among them, neofunctionalism plays an important role, as a theoretical as well as practical approach of the European integration. However, evading the notion of sovereignty, as it is the case with neofunctionalism in the perspective of federalism, is called into question through the uprising of crises which prove the persistence of sovereignty. The federalist legal paradigm has reifi ed the notion of soverei-gnty, and thus makes its political dimension unintelligible. Therefore, a reifi ed conception of sovereignty is an obstacle to the reorientation of Europe into a political federation. Eventually, the best way to prevent that obstacle is to consider federalism within the international relations realist paradigm.



Democracy and Necessity: Rightly Dividing Political PowerUsing Simple Game Theory to Identify When Policy Decisions Should be Centralized and When Decisions Should be Decentralized

James R. Rogers

James R. Rogers is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science, College of Liberal Arts, Texas A&M University. He is also editor of the Journal of Th eoretical Politics. Dr. Rogers is currently working on a book, Democracy & Necessity: Rightly Dividing Po-litical Authority.

Introduction*

Dividing policy jurisdictions between a central government and two or more local governments is often viewed as a zero-sum game;1 what authority the central government exercises it exercises at the expense of the local government, and what authority the local government exercises it exercises at the expense of the central government. Th is is often enough true. But this leaves two puzzles: why would the voters or offi cials of local government ever voluntarily cede jurisdiction over one or more policy areas to a centralized authority, and why would a centralized authority ever voluntarily cede jurisdiction over one or more policy areas to de-centralized authorities? Th e answer must be that it is in the interest of majorities of local voters and/or of local offi cials sometimes to cede jurisdiction upward to a centralized authority, and it is sometimes in the interest of national majorities to cede jurisdiction downward to decentralized authorities. Centralization therefore can be a democracy-enhancing move. Understanding this aspect of federalism is

* Earlier versions of this article was presented at the Centre international de formation européenne, Nice, France. January 23, 2012 and at the 2007 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.1. “Zero-sum” games are more accurately designated as “constant-sum” games, as additively scaling payoff s up or down from zero does not aff ect the game’s equilibrium outcomes or their effi ciency. Nonetheless, the “zero-sum” terminology has entered the popular vocabulary, and so I adopt it with a nod to the more-accurate designation.


James R. Rogers74


critical to understanding the creation of the U.S. Constitution in which some po-licy areas are delegated to the jurisdiction of the national government and other policies areas remain subject to local jurisdictions. My analysis explains the puzzle of why state-level majorities wanted to cede jurisdiction over a set of policies to a stronger, more-centralized national government, and it also explains why they did not want authority over all policy areas to be placed under centralized control.2

Th is article answers two questions. First, what types of policies should be de-cided at the national level and which should be at the state level? Secondly, should courts enforce the answer to the fi rst question? Th e answer to the fi rst question is this rule: policy areas should be nationalized when the interaction of state legis-latures creates pathological incentive structures to undersupply policies that state voters want. Policy areas without these pathological incentive structures should be implemented in a decentralized fashion. Th e answer to the second question is: it depends. I identify intuitively reasonable conditions under which judicial enforcement of federalism requirements generate more benefi ts than costs.

Th e contribution of my analysis is setting at front and centre of our unders-tanding of the federal structures is that when centralization occurs in response to the identifi ed interstate pathologies, the centralization is a democracy-enhancing move rather than a democracy-detracting move—nationalizing policy decisions in these cases leaves local majorities better than when the policy decision remain at the local level. Th is outcome, however, is limited to cases in which the identi-fi ed interstate pathologies exist.

Absent these pathologies, centralization inhibits local self-government. So-metimes this inhibition is by design—for example, the amendments in the U.S. Constitution forbidding slavery and granting national-level courts jurisdiction over state-level rights and liberties are examples in which national-level majorities expressly aim to override the policy preferences of local majorities in a subset of local jurisdictions. (In these cases, majoritarian democracy is the cause of the pathological behaviour rather than its solution, and so requires a diff erent insti-tutional solution.)3

Because I write in the context of U.S. constitutional law, the examples I consi-der are taken from that context. Nonetheless, the theoretical argument is generic to federal structures in any context.

2. Keep in mind that the adoption of the U.S. Constitution required the unanimous endorsement of the states entering that new system of national and state governance. Any individual state could choose to reject the pro-posed Constitution and remain outside of the new system. In this initial move, there was no overawing of any state majority that did not perceive benefi ts to joining the proposed union.3. See, e.g. James R. Rogers, “Legislative Incentives and Two-Tiered Judicial Review,” American Journal of Poli-tical Science, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 1999): 1096-1121.


Democracy and Necessity: Rightly Dividing Political Power 75


I. Th e local-level presumption

Th e argument over the U.S. Constitution of 1787 was an argument over the need for a stronger, more centralized national government, but only in certain areas. Contrary to scholars who claim that the Constitution was really about na-tionalism4 or really about preserving individual rights 1960 5 or really about res-training the democratic forces unleashed by the 1776 Revolution,6 or really about creating a European-style fi scal-military state.7 I argue that the Constitution was really about what its writers and supporters largely claimed it was about: Giving power to a new national government when necessary, and leaving state power alone when national-level power wasn’t necessary to eff ect some good.

Th e major arguments for the Constitution do not treat federalism as a po-litical concession to powerful state interests. Rather, they treat federalism as an instrument that maximizes the ‘political happiness’ of the people. Th e argument of Th e Federalist is one of identifying special reasons why powers in specifi c policy areas should be delegated to the national government rather than remain with the states. Th e rhetorical strategy was fi rst to identify a problem area, explain why the states could not or would not remedy the problem, then identify how delegating authority in that area to a national government would likely solve that problem. Th e authors of Th e Federalist also recognized a positive case for leaving powers in the hands of state governments. Given that these powers were already in state hands, and the proposed Constitution would leave these powers undisturbed, the writers of Th e Federalist did not devote much attention to this side of the argu-ment. We should not conclude from the relative absence of authorial attention, however, that these authors did not think that there was a strong positive case for leaving large sets of authority in state hands. We often forget that Madison, Hamilton and Jay wrote Th e Federalist in the heat of a highly contested political battle over the then-proposed Constitution. Th ey had no intention of writing an abstract consideration of benefi ts of federalism (and other features of the Consti-tution.) Th ey necessarily focused their attention on elements of the proposed Constitution that would change the status quo, hence, a larger focus on the new powers of the national government relative to the residuum of power that states already held and would be unchanged by the adoption of the new Constitution.

4. E.g. Edward Millican, One United People (University of Kentucky Press, 1990).5. Gottfried Dietze, Th e Federalist: A Classic on Federalism and Free Government (John Hopkins University Press, 1960).6. Merrill Jensen, Th e Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the Ame-rican Revolution, 1774-1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).Gordon S. Wood, Th e Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1969).7. Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003).


James R. Rogers76


Nonetheless, these writers were not wholly silent on the subject of the bene-fi ts of leaving certain policy areas to local determination. Before considering the special conditions that qualify a subject for commitment to the national govern-ment, it might be useful to underscore that the Constitution’s supporters looked upon state administration not simply as a concession to parochial interests, but as the proper venue for ordinary policies (i.e., policies unaff ected by pathologi-cal interstate incentive structures). In Th e Federalist No. 10, for example, James Madison noted that “Th e federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests, being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures.”8 Alexander Hamilton, also writing as ‘Publius,’ refers to “the utility and necessity of local administration, for local purposes”.9 Ear-lier he had listed subjects “which are proper to be provided for by local legislation.” Th ese include “the administration of private justice between the citizens of the same state; the supervision of agriculture, and of other concerns of a similar nature.”10 Th e presumption in favour of state-level jurisdiction can also be seen in the effi cien-cy-rationale Publius articulates for delegating the initial authority to administer national elections to state governments, subject to the intervention of Congress.11 An underlying effi ciency rationale for state-level administration of ‘ordinary’poli-cies is also suggested by the way in which the Constitution’s supporters argue for the increase in national power. For example, Madison writes:

[T] he public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever, has any other value, than as it may be fi tted for the attainment of this object… [A]s far as the sovereignty of the states cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, let the former be sacrifi ced to the latter.12

As above, the criterion by which power is divided between the national-level and state-level government is whether it achieves the ‘real welfare’ or ‘happiness’ of the people.

Tables 1 and 2 provide a simple example of this. In one game states choose their own policies (or, if preferred, representative voters in each state vote over intrastate policies). In the other game, states use majority rule to choose a single, national-level policy.

To motivate the payoff s in Tables 1 and 2, consider the unidimensional policy space in Figure 1. It shows the confi guration of ideal points for the voters in each

8. Th e Federalist No. 10, 479. Th e Federalist No. 32, 15410. Th e Federalist No. 17, 80-81, see also No. 23, 11511. Th e Federalist No. 61. Art 32, sec. 412. Th e Federalist No. 45, 238




of the states (or, more accurately, for the median or representative voter in each state). Each of the three states chooses between three policies, policy A, policy B, and policy C. Because these points are arrayed along a single dimension, they can be thought of as spending levels on a public good or regulatory levels, etc. Th e voters in state 1 would choose policy A over policy B over policy C. Th e voters in state 2 prefer policy B over policies A and C, and the voters in state 3 prefer policy C over policy B over policy A.

Figure 1

Th e fi rst game is trivial. I develop it only as a baseline of ‘ordinary’ state-level policies with which to compare the ‘pathological’ cases. So bear with me here. In the fi rst game the states are entirely free to choose their individually most-preferred policy. Given the arrangement of preferences, state 1 will choose to implement policy A, state 2 will choose to implement policy B, and state 3 will choose to implement policy C. With state 1’s policy listed fi rst, the states choose the policy set (A,B,C). Given each state’s choice, in equilibrium the residents of each state receive a payoff of 2, or a payoff tuple of (2, 2, 2).

Table 1. Decentralized Outcomes in a ‘Tiebout’ Game

State 3

A B C

State 2 A B C A B C A B C

State 1

A 2,1,0 2,2,0 2,1,0 2,1,1 2,2,1 2,1,1 2,1,2 2,2,2 2,1,2

B 1,1,0 1,2,0 1,1,0 1,1,1 1,2,1 1,1,1 1,1,2 1,2,2 1,1,2

C 0,1,0 0,2,0 0,1,0 0,1,1 0,2,1 0,1,1 0,1,2 0,2,2 0,1,2

Equilibrium: (A, B, C) with payoff (2, 2, 2).

Now let’s nationalize the decision. Instead of each state implementing a policy for itself, the three states vote over which single policy to implement for the na-


James R. Rogers78


tion as a whole. In order to rule out cases in which voters vote in equilibrium for policies they do not prefer, we rule out the play of weakly-dominated strategies and apply the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Th ere are two equili-bria, one in which voters in the three states vote (A, B, B) and one in which they vote (B, B, C). In either case, the median policy, B, wins, and provides a payoff to the states of (1, 2, 1).

Table 2. Centralized, Majoritarian Outcomes in the ‘Tiebout’ Game

State 3

A B C

State 2 A B C A B C A B C

State 1

A 2,1,0 2,1,0 2,1,0 2,1,0 1,2,1 0,0,0 2,1,0 0,0,0 0,1,2

B 2,1,0 1,2,1 0,0,0 1,2,1 1,2,1 1,2,1 0,0,0 1,2,1 0,1,2

C 0,0,0 0,1,2 0,0,0 1,2,1 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2

Weakly-dominating, coalition-proof Nash equilibria: (A, B, B), (B, B, C).

Figure 2 then illustrates the simple choice for a constitutional designer given this ordinary, or nonpathological, incentive structure among the states. In this case, diff erent policy choices among the states do not generate spillovers or ex-ternalities in interaction with the choices of other states, so policy heterogeneity among the states generates a payoff of (2, 2, 2). Th is Pareto dominates the (1, 2, 1) payoff of nationalizing the set of policies with this type of interstate incentive structure. In this case, a constitutional designer would want to federalize (i.e., decentralize) rather than nationalize decision-making over these types of policies.

Figure 2(1, 2, 1)

(2, 2, 2)

Th e outcome to this game is uninteresting because state decisions do not inte-ract with the decisions of other states. Each state legislates with an eye to its own welfare and need not consider how the policies the other states adopt might aff ect the policy that it wants to adopt.




While the games in Tables 1 and 2 are not theoretically interesting, they are substantively interesting. Th ey provide a specifi c account of the type of policy with which the national government should not interfere. Th e illustration put a game-theoretic gloss on the discussion Chief Justice Marshall provided in Gib-bons v. Ogden regarding the policy areas over which the national government does not jurisdiction under its commerce authority. In considering the extent of national power over intrastate activities in, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:

Th e genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which aff ect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not aff ect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.13

Th e sentence needs to be taken altogether. It is to be immediately conceded that the national (‘whole’) government’s power covers treating with other nations. Th e question is what internal concerns the national power includes. What fol-lows after the semi-colon defi nes the national power over those “internal concerns which aff ect the States generally.”14 To wit, fi rst, national power does not extend to activities that occur within particular states (compare the steam-boat operation considered in Gibbons in which the ship moves between states). Secondly, even if the activity occurs within a particular state, the concern must not aff ect other states. Both of these parts of the defi nition work to extend national power. Th e third part of the defi nition then restricts the domain of national power to those issues for which it is ‘necessary’ for the national government ‘to interfere’ in order to execute one or more of its general powers. Th e ‘Tiebout’ games in Tables 1 and 2 describe ‘internal’ state concerns “which are completely within a particular state, which do not aff ect other States, and with which it is not necessary [for the national government] to interfere” in order to execute delegated powers of the national government.15

II. Delegating decisions to the national level in response to interstate patho-logies

Policy choices and outcomes, however, are not always as ordinary as those illustrated in Table 1. State policies sometimes interact in pathological ways. State

13. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824): 195.14. Th e text after the semi-colon modifi es the sentence prior to the semi-colon. If not, then “internal concerns which aff ect the States generally” would include any policy topic that states faced in common—this would sweep up almost the entirety of family law, criminal & etc. Issues that all states face in common yet which it is not necessary for the national government to interfere.15. Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Th eory of Local Expenditures,” Th e Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, No. 5 (Oct., 1956): 416-424.


James R. Rogers80


legislators sometimes face incentives that induce them not only to ignore the preferences of people in other states, but also induce them to behave in ways that do not optimally provide for the interests of their own states. In these situations, nationalizing a policy choice can help the people in all states to implement the policies that leave them better off than if the policy choices were left at the state level. Th e argument of the broader project of which this paper is a part is that the Constitution aimed to identify these policy areas and delegate authority over these policies to the national government; the choice over ‘ordinary’ policies, like those identifi ed in Table 1, was to remain with the states.

Th e various delegations of power to the national government all stem from a relatively narrow set of problems that states faced as a result of their interaction with each other. Incentive structures that state legislators faced prevented their eff ective coordination in some areas, and invited mutually debilitating competi-tion in others. Th at state interaction induced the problems that the new national government aimed to remedy is the focus of arguments by the Constitution’s proponents. Th e language suff uses the argument, as Hamilton’s argument in Th e Federalist No. 22 shows. He refers to “the want of concert” among the states “ari-sing from the want of a general authority”.16 He refers to “obstacles to an uniformity of measures” among the states and to “competition between the states”.17 He refers to how the eff ect of state actions “embarrass the administration” of the national government and “destroy the energy of government”.18

Interstate interaction can create pathologies both because state legislatures face competitive pressures that can debilitate their own voters as well as voters in other states. Also, insuffi cient incentives sometimes exist to induce states to coordinate policies even when coordination would generate benefi ts across all states. While aspects of these two pathologies are related, they represent concep-tually distinct incentives structures. From the discussion here, along with the ‘Tiebout’ game discussed above, I’ll posit a ‘rule’ that a constitutional designer would choose in promote the general welfare. I’ll then consider whether courts should enforce this rule.

Table 3 presents a simple, 3-state ‘prisoners dilemma’. Each state has the choice of enacting a policy that implements a policy that ‘cooperates’ with the policy enacted by the other states or that ‘defects’ from a cooperative strategy with the other states. Examples of this sort of interaction could include, state-level tariff policies with foreign nations, internal tariff s among the states, state-level bounties off ered for volunteers during the Revolutionary War, ‘race-to-the-bot-

16. Th e Federalist No. 22. 10517. Ibid18. Th e Federalist No. 22. 108




tom’ regulations, etc. As in the 2´2 prisoners’ dilemma, each state ‘defects’ in equilibrium. Th e payoff for universal defection, (D, D, D), is (½, ½, ½).

Table 3. Multi-State ‘Prisoners Dilemma’

State 3

C D

State 2 C D C D

State 1C 2,2,2 0,3,0 0,0,3 -1,1,1

D 3,0,0 1,1,-1 1,-1,1 ½, ½, ½

Equilibrium: (D, D, D), with payoff of (½, ½, ½)

Th e constitutional designer has the simple choice illustrated in Figure 3. Lea-ving policy choice at the state level means voters receive a payoff of (½, ½, ½); nationalizing this policy choice results in the Pareto-dominating payoff of (2, 2, 2).19 Hence, a constitutional designer will propose to nationalize authority over this policy area, a move the voters of each state would prefer because nationalizing this policy area leaves them better off .

Figure 3

Th is example provides some insight into one line of argument over the crea-tion of the Constitution of 1787. It is often argued that one important motiva-tion for the 1787 Constitution was to check the excess of democracy among the states. Th ere is some truth in that, as witness the constraints in Art. I, section 10

19. It is of course possible that the constitutional designer could propose to constrain only one or two states to “cooperate,” leaving the other state(s) to defect. Th e cooperating states would not accept such a constitution, so the constitutional designer necessarily needs to propose a constitution that, at least on average, generates higher payoff s for each individual state—i.e., the constitution must provide for the “general” welfare.


James R. Rogers82


of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the argument cannot be pushed too far. To the extent that the powers in Art. I, section 8 of the Constitution sought to solve coordination and competition problems resulting from the absence of national authority under the Articles of Confederation, then those provisions actually seek to eff ectuate democratic preferences for policies that interstate incentive struc-tures prevented state legislatures from eff ectuating. In this sense, the Constitu-tion was a democracy-enhancing rather democracy-limiting mechanism in that it allowed achievement of the policy preferences of state-level majorities that state-level legislative action could not achieve.

But the problems with state interaction under the Articles of Confederation extend beyond PD-like incentive structures. States faced non-PD incentive struc-tures that decreased their welfare as well. Th e Constitution delegated powers to the national government to remedy these problems as well. Specifi cally, the limi-ted scope of authority of the national government under the Articles of Confede-ration also induced welfare losses because individual states were unable to unite and coordinate their actions and policies to the same extent as a national govern-ment with jurisdiction over areas of national policy-making.

Th ese ‘non-coordination’ losses are conceptually distinct from the ‘non-coo-peration’ losses of PD-like incentive structures. Losses from the lack of coordi-nation among the states can be illustrated by use of two coordination games, the so-called ‘Battle-of-the-sexes’ game and a ‘trust’ game called ‘stag hunt.’ (Tables 4 and 5.) Each of these games has two pure-strategy equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium. Without an authorized referee, the players risk playing the suboptimal pure-and mixed-strategy equilibrium strategies.

Table 4. Th e ‘Battle-of-the-Sexes’

Player B

L R

Player AU (10,5) (1,1)

D (-1,-1) (5,10)

Th e equilibrium strategy combinations for the ‘battle-of-the-sexes’ game in Table 4 are the pure-strategy combinations (U, L), (D, R), and the mixed strategy combination, ([11/15]U,[4/15]D; [4/15]L, [11/15]R). Th e pure-strategy equili-brium payoff s to players A and B are UA(U, L) = 10; UB(U, L) = 5 and UA(D, R) = 5; UB(U, L) = 10. Th e mixed-strategy equilibrium payoff s to both players are: Ui([11/15]U,[4/15]D; [4/15]L, [11/15]R) = 4 6

15 ,

A

i ∈ {A, B}.

Note that the payoff in the mixed equilibrium 4 615 is less than the lowest

payoff (5) a player can receive in anyone of the pure-strategy equilibria. Facing




this sort of an incentive structure, players (states) would want an authority that would help them coordinate on the (U,D) or (D,R) strategy combinations. Ac-tions of the coordinating authority, however, may prove controversial, as player A wants to coordinate on the (U, L) strategy combination while player B wants to coordinate on the (D, R) strategy combination.

Table 5. Stag Hunt

Player B

L R

Player AU (10,10) (0,1)

D (1,0) (1,1)

Th e equilibrium strategy combinations for the ‘Stag-hunt’ game in Table 5 are the pure-strategy combinations, (U, L), (D, R), and the mixed-strategy com-bination ([1/10]U,[9/10]D; [1/10]L, [9/10]R). Th e pure-strategy equilibrium payoff s to players A and B are UA(U, L) = 10; UB(U, L) = 10 and UA(D, R) = 10; UB(U, L) = 10. Th e mixed = strategy equilibrium payoff s to both players are: Ui([1/10]U,[9/10]D; [1/10]L, [9/10]R) = 1.

A

i ∈ {A, B}.Note that the payoff in the pure strategy equilibrium, (D, R), and in the

mixed-strategy equilibrium is less than the payoff s the players would receive in the (U,L) equilibrium. Facing these sorts of payoff s, players (states) would want an authority to help them coordinate on the (U,L) strategy combination.

Th e need for national-level policy making to avoid losses due to the inability of states suffi ciently to coordinate their policies also plays a large role in the ar-gument for the 1787 Constitution. Provisions delegating authority to Congress to create ‘uniform’ rules for naturalization and bankruptcies explicitly reference coordination goals, as does reference to authority to fi x ‘the standard’ for weights and measures. But other powers also seek to secure gains from national-level coor-dination. Congress was delegated authority to create a national postal system, a national copyright and patent system, to provide a single defi nition of sea-going crimes, exclusive authority to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and call forth and regulate the militia. All of these were areas in which states could not suffi ciently coordinate their activities in matters of national concern. And not least important was the need for a national judiciary that could provide unifi ed interpretation of national laws and agreements. In these areas, too, the 1787 Constitution did not seek to deter implementation of policies preferred by republican majorities. Rather, they sought to eff ectuate the preferred policy out-comes of national-level and only to a slightly less extent than with the prisoners’ dilemma, of state-level majorities as well.


James R. Rogers84


As sketched above, and developed more fully elsewhere, supporters of the Constitution underscored repeatedly the losses states incurred as a result of their uncoordinated policies in matters where unifi ed, national policies could produce gains.

Th e upshot of this brief argument can be summarized this way: Th e 1787 Constitution delegated power to the national government in those areas, and only in those areas, in which state legislatures faced interstate incentive structures—incentives that a national legislature would not face—that would induce state legislatures to underprovide benefi cial outcomes preferred by their constituents. Th e problematic incentives were those that induced state legislatures to compete away state pos-sible state gains due to prisoners’ dilemma-like incentive structures, as well as incentives that would result in coordination failures similar to those represented in the battle-of-the-sexes and stag-hunt games.

Th is, then, is the touchstone that determined the inclusion delegated powers in the 1787 Constitution. If the interstate incentive structure prevented state legislatures from implementing policies that would provide for the common wel-fare, then authority over that area was delegated to the national government. If, on the other hand, state legislatures did not face interstate incentive structures to underprovide benefi cial policies to their constituents in an area, then that power remained in state hands and was not delegated to the national government.

Th is provides not merely an account of the decision criteria used to decide which powers would be delegated to the national government in the 1787 Consti-tution. It also suggests a criterion by which to judge the evolution of national power over time, and provides a criterion by which to judge the national-powers jurisprudence in cases of constitutional ambiguity from diff erent Supreme Court eras.

Th is criterion does not substitute one formalism for another. Th at is, the ar-gument is not simply of the form, “Th e 1787 Constitution recognizes delegations to the national government that have quality Q, therefore those are the powers that the national government ought to have.” Rather, the argument is that the Constitu-tion delegated powers to the national government where exercise of those powers would enhance welfare (or would be ‘effi cient’). Where power would be most effi ciently exercised in state hands, those powers were reserved to the states. Th e criterion provides a positive rationale both for those powers that are delegated to the national government as well as for the powers that are reserved to the states. We have already seen that the desire to promote the common welfare prompted the delegation of specifi c powers to the national government. Th ese also exists a welfare or effi ciency rationale for state reserve power where the ‘nationalist cri-terion’ is not met. To wit, we expect policy preferences generally to vary across the states. Some state majorities may, for example, generally prefer low-tax, low-




service policy regimes, majorities in other states may prefer high-tax, high service policy regimes. Th e ability of the states to refl ect heterogeneous preferences in heterogeneous policy outcomes means that welfare will be maximized in those policy areas relative to the welfare gains that would tem from a single homoge-neous national policy. Supporters of the Constitution recognized the common sense of this claim in their arguments in support of the two-level government proposed by the 1787 Constitution.

Th is is the usefulness of the intuition formalized by Tiebout in his seminal 1956 article as discussed above: with free movement among political jurisdic-tions, people can sort themselves among the jurisdictions (i.e., states). Th at is, people can leave one state and move to another state that better refl ects their preferred policy mix. Unless facing the pathological incentive structures discussed above, policy heterogeneity at the state level is generally a good thing, and welfare is enhanced when power remains in state hands.

Th is also gives bounded content in considering the extent of national power over intrastate activities in Gibbons v. Ogden. As discussed above, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the national government can regulate only those intrastate activities over which it is ‘necessary’ for the national government to act. While Marshall’s ‘necessary’ action need, and probably should, not be taken in the sense of strict necessity, it suggests an analytical presumption against national action over intrastate activities in this sense: Th e national government is not delegated power to act unless (among other things) it is ‘necessary’ for the national govern-ment to act vis-à-vis the states. (Recall that there is a substantive reason for this presumption motivated by the Tiebout hypothesis.) I argue that the existence of the pathological incentive structures identifi ed above—incentive structures that prevent states from securing the common good—provides an historically anchored, yet analytical substantive means for judging the Marshallian ‘necessity’ for the national government to assert its commerce authority over intrastate ac-tivities.

III. Judicial Enforcement of the Rule

‘Ordinary’ state-level policies don’t aff ect the incentives legislators in other states have to supply policies that the voters of the other states prefer. Because vo-ters in diff erent states may prefer diff erent policies, decentralizing legislative deci-sions over those sorts of policies leaves the representative voter in most states bet-ter off and none worse off . So this accounts for a presumption that policies should be implemented at the state level. Nonetheless, as we have seen, in some policy areas, pathological interstate incentive structures exist that induce legislators to undersupply those policies that state voters prefer. In these cases, nationalizing the decision-making process in those policy areas better secures those preferences


James R. Rogers86


than does state-level decision making. Th us we have seen that a constitutional designer would allocate decisions over ordinary policies to state legislatures and allocate decisions over policies with pathological interstate incentive structures to the national legislature.

An important constitutional puzzle remains: If decentralized policy-making over ordinary matters leaves everyone better off , then it might be reasonable to expect that ordinary national-level electoral processes would provide suffi cient in-centives to national legislators to implement the federalism rule without interfe-rence from the judiciary. After all, Representatives and Senators are elected by vo-ters in their states. Th ese voters want legislators who implement the policies they prefer. Since the federalism rule identifi ed above would allocate decision-making between national and state legislators based on which level of government can best supply the policies preferred by voters, then national-level legislators could be expected to respect the constitutional boundaries between national and state policies without oversight by the courts. Th at is, a constitution’s federalism rule, at least one that accords with my version of it, would be congressionally self-en-forcing and, hence, would not require judicial supervision.

Th e analysis below does not rule out the possibility that constitutional boun-daries in this matter could be self-enforcing under some parameters that seem reasonable. Nonetheless, fully recognizing the contingency of the matter, I deve-lop an argument that provides a reasonable justifi cation for judicial enforcement of federalism boundaries. Th ere are two parts to the argument. First, judicial review can correct congressional policies that mistakenly nationalized a policy that should remain for state-level determination. Secondly, judicial review can mitigate the ineffi ciencies of congressional policies implemented by an ideologi-cally nationalist Congress.

Th is second argument sounds more straight-forward than it is. I do not want to assume that judges dwell above the fray of politics and dispassionately correct congressional overreach. Instead I assume that both judges and legislators are political creatures who can be ideologically motivated. So while Congress engages in nationalist overreach with some probability (i.e., it enacts national policies ir-respective of the need for national-level decision making in that policy area), the Court also pushes an ideologically motivated states-rights agenda with a certain probability (i.e., it strikes down national-level policies irrespective of the need for a national-level decision in that policy area).

Just as importantly, I do not assume that ideological motivation is the only source of congressional misapplication of the federalism rule. Congress can make an honest mistake, in the sense of incorrectly determining, as an empirical matter, that a pathological incentive structure exists among the states when it in fact does not exist. Judicial review provides a redundant institutional check on this type of




empirical misjudgment. Courts have access both to more empirical information and to diff erent information about the state of the world than legislators have access to when they enact a law. Th ey have more information because they act later in time,20 and they have diff erent information because of the diff erent fact-fi nding process of trials relative to legislative hearings (e.g., the standing require-ments of actual harm and etc. generate information uncorrelated with legislative information). Th is empirical aspect of judicial review uses courts as a redundant information-generating institution. Courts are of course not unique in serving in this role,21 but the whole point to institutional redundancy is to create institu-tions that overlap in certain domains. Nonetheless, while intentionally creating redundant institutions means that we do not want them to be unique, at least in specifi ed domains, they can be distinguished along other dimensions that allow them to bring attributes not shared by the other institution. For example, while Congress itself can revisit a policy area to correct policy errors, legislative juris-diction is voluntary, so there is no guarantee that a legislature will take up the issue again even if a need becomes evident. In contrast, jurisdiction among lower courts is mandatory, which means that a review of changed or new facts under-lying legislation might be easier to obtain through the judiciary than through a legislature.22

A. Th e Baseline: Policy Outcomes without Judicial Review

First consider congressional policy decisions without judicial review. Th e mo-del is shown in Figure 4. Th ere are two sets of policy areas, one in which states play a ‘prisoners dilemma’ game among themselves and one in which the ordinary ‘Tiebout’ results apply. Congress knows which is the likely incentive structure, but does not know so with certainty. Th is is represented by a probability distri-bution over the two possibilities. Congress can range from being very sure that a policy area is a prisoner’s dilemma (say, p = 0.9), to being relative unsure (p = 0.5), to being pretty sure the policy area refl ects a ‘Tiebout’ scenario best left to the states (p = 0.1). Th at Congress might have some ideological commitment to national-level policies is modelled by the metaphor of identifying two ‘types’ of Congress. One type of Congress seeks only to implement the rule-based federa-lism discussed above in Part II—this Congress exists with probability qc—the other type of Congress is a ‘nationalist’ Congress that seeks to assert national authority over every policy area. Th is is only a modelling trick that allows us to

20. Robert W. Bennett, “‘Mere’ Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Th eory,” California Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 5 (1979 September): 1049-1103.21. James R. Rogers, “An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicameralism,” Journal of Th eoretical Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April 2001): 129-157.22. James R. Rogers, “Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2001): 84-99.


James R. Rogers88


Figure 4. Policy Outcomes without Judicial Review

Problem Type PD Tiebout p

CongressionalRule-Based Rule-Based

Type

q qcc 1-qc

Congressional

Action E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E

Congressional Payoffs 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 0

Voter Payoffs 2 0 2 0 2 0 2

1-p

1-qc

0

Nationalist Nationalist

Figure 5. Policy Outcomes with Judicial Review

Problem Type PD Tiebout p 1-p

CongressionalType

Rule-Based Nationalist Rule-Based Nationalist qc 1-qc qc 1-qc

JudicialType

R SR R SR R SR R SR qJ 1-qJ qJ 1-qJ

qJ 1-qJ

Congressional Action E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E

V ~V V ~V V ~V V ~V V ~V V ~V V ~V V ~V

1-qJ qJ

Juridicial action

represent ‘one’ Congress that seeks to implement nationalist policies with some positive probability.

Since the only actor in this model is Congress, it is a decision-theoretic model in which Congress trivially ‘games’ only against the uncertainty it faces.23 Table 5 summarizes the respective (equilibrium) enactment decisions for each type of Congress, and reports the total expected payoff s for each type of Congress over a range of probabilities p, as well as for the total expected payoff s for a ‘mixed’ Congress that sometimes seeks only to implement the federalism rule but some-times overreaches (I assume a value of qc = 0.8 for illustrative purposes only).24

23. Voter payoff s are reported in Figure 4 because they are who we are really concerned about. Nonetheless, they are not strategic actors in the very simple model presented in Figure 4. Th ey might tolerate non-rule-based nationalist actions on the part of Congress because rational ignorance creates some agency slack on the part of legislators. Th ey cannot, of course, do anything about honest congressional mistakes.24. Th e payoff numbers are used only to simplify the illustration. Th e general results do not depend on their cardinal values, but only serve to illustrate ordinal relationships.




Table 6. Congressional Decisions & Payoff s without Judicial Review

Probabi-lity of PD Interstate Incentive

Stricture (p)

Rule-Based Congress’s Enactment Decision

for National Law

Expected Payoff of

Equilibrium Decision for Rule-Based Congress

Naional Congress’s Enactment Decision

for National Law

Expected Payoff of

Equilibrium Decision for Nationalist Congress

Expected Payoff for “Mixed

Congress”(qc=0.8)

1.0 E 2 E 2 2

0.9 E 1.8 E 1.8 1.8

0.8 E 1.6 E 1.6 1.6

0.7 E 1.4 E 1.4 1.4

0.6 E 1.2 E 1.2 1.2

0.5 E,~E 1.0 E 1.0 1.0

0.4 ~E 1.2 E 0.8 1.12

0.3 ~E 1.4 E 0.6 1.24

0.2 ~E 1.6 E 0.4 1.36

0.1 ~E 1.8 E 0.2 1.48

0 ~E 2.0 E 0 1.6

Total: 17 Total : 11 Total : 15.8

B. Policy Outcomes with Judicial Review

Having solved for the baseline of congressional action without judicial review, we now add a judicial review stage. Th is model is illustrated in Figure 6. As I mentioned above, the Court can also be ideologically motivated, so the Court is also modelled as having two ‘types.’ One type of the Court seeks to implement the federalism rule identifi ed in Part II, with probability qJ. Th e other type of the Court seeks to implement an ideological states-rights position, with probability 1-qJ. I assume that the Court knows the true state of the world—whether it is a PD or a Tiebout policy—with certainty. I do this because it is the simplest way to model the informational asymmetry discussed above. Results similar to those derived here could be shown even if the Court only had a better probabilistic as-sessment of the true state of the world, but at a steeper price in the tractability of the model. For convenience, I also assume that both the Court and Congress are equally ideological, with qc = qJ = 0.8. Th e equilibrium results depend on the rela-tive ideologically commitments of the two institutions. For example, if Congress is ‘enough’ more rule based than the Court (i.e., if qc is ‘enough’ larger than qJ) then congressional action with judicial review will generate higher payoff s than


James R. Rogers90


congressional action with judicial review. Nonetheless, there is some slack here. Th at is, the Court can be somewhat more ‘ideological’ than the Congress, and still the addition of judicial review would generate net positive payoff s.

Figure 6. Payoff s over Various Probabilities for Congressional actions with and without Judicial Review

Table 7 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes of the game with judicial re-view. In this case, because the Court serves in a redundant informational role, Congress enacts legislation for every value of p > 0. It does so because the Court will strike down the national law if it turns out that the congressional policy is nationalizing an ‘ordinary’ policy area (i.e., one that can be most effi ciently dealt with at the state level).

Th e third and fourth columns in Table 7 compare the expected payoff s with and without judicial review under varying values of the parameter p. Th e total expected value with judicial review (19.8) is greater than the total expected value without judicial review (15.8) even though both institutions are equally ideolo-gical. Th e reason is that judicial review provides a redundant institutional check both when Congress indulges its nationalist sentiments as well as when it makes an honest mistake in a nationalist direction. (Th e Court can only correct mista-ken judgement that lead Congress to enact a law. Judicial review cannot correct mistaken judgement that lead Congress not to enact a law.)




Table 7. Congressional Decisions & Payoff s with Judicial Review

Probabiliy of PD interstate

Incentive Struc-ture (p)

Rule-Based Congress’s Enactment

Decision for National Law

Nationalist Congress’s Enactment

Decision for National Law

Expected Payoff of

Equilibrium Decision

for “Mixed Congress”

and “Mixed Judiciary”(qc = 0.8, qj=0.8)

For compara-tive purposes:

Expected Payoff for “Mixed

Congress” wi-thout Juridicial Review (qc=0.8)

1.0 E E 1.6 2

0.9 E E 1.64 1.8

0.8 E E 1.68 1.6

0.7 E E 1.72 1.4

0.6 E E 1.76 1.2

0.5 E E 1.80 1.0

0.4 E E 1.84 1.12

0.3 E E 1.88 1.24

0.2 E E 1.92 1.36

0.1 E E 1.96 1.48

0 E,~E E 2.0 1.6

TOTAL: 19.8 TOTAL 15.8

Figure 6 graphs the relationship between payoff s with and without judicial review. Net expected utility would be the total area under each curve. It is easy enough to see from the graph that should the Court become ‘too’ ideological relative to Congress that voters would at some point become better off if the judiciary did not review national laws enacted by Congress. Nonetheless, there is no reason to assume that the Court will persistently be so much more ideologi-cal than Congress that it should not be allowed to review federalism challenges. Further, when assuming that Congress and the Court are ‘equally’ ideological, the addition of judicial review improves the general welfare, there is even some wiggle room for the Court to be more ideological than Congress and yet still increase public welfare. Given this extra margin that judicial review can make to public welfare, it seems reasonable to allow the judiciary to review federalism issues unless the inclination of a court makes it abundantly clear that it is much more ideological than the legislature and that the ideological asymmetry will per-


James R. Rogers92


sist. Absent that, however, there seems to be little reason to forbid courts from adjudicating federalism claims, even though the electoral process will typically induce a Congress that generally would want to implement policies consistent with the Constitution’s federalism commitment.

Conclusion

Th is article developed a rule that identifi es the boundary between what set of policies should be implemented at the state level and which policies should be de-legated to a national government. I then showed that under intuitively reasonable parameters, judicial enforcement of that rule is better than leaving the rule to congressional self-enforcement (although it is possible to conceive of cases when self-enforcement would be better than judicial enforcement).

While a lot can and should be said about specifi c Art. 1, section 8 powers, I can apply the ‘federalism rule’ identifi ed in Part II to evaluate Lopez 25 and Morrison 26, as well as other Supreme Court decisions. In the case of Lopez, we can ask the question: Do state legislators face incentives that national legislators do not face that would cause them to underregulate gun possession near schools relative to the national legislature? Similarly, in Morrison: Do state legislators face incentives that national legislators do not face that would cause them to underregulate sexual assault relative to the national legislature? If they do not, then national-level action is not necessary—indeed, it is welfare reducing—and the national government has no reason to involve itself in these matters relative to leaving regulation up to the states. Th e analysis further reasonably justifi es a return of the judiciary to enforce federalism limits on the national government.

Note that the analysis above suggests that the national government should not impose national policies merely because the behaviour in question might ‘subs-tantially’ aff ect interstate commerce. To be sure, almost everything, when sub-jected to the Wickard aggregation test, could substantially aff ect interstate com-merce. Nonetheless, rather than insisting, as the Court did in Morrison, that only ‘economic’ behaviour can substantially aff ect interstate commerce, the approach suggested here would link the legal inquiry to a substantive understanding of how federalism increases public welfare. Th e rule identifi ed above is derives from a simple, coherent, and substantive rationale for the division of policy subjects between national and state government jurisdictions. Diverse, state-level action is effi cient for ordinary policies. Nonetheless, in some subject areas, state interac-tion creates incentive structures that debilitate the eff ectiveness of state actions, and even renders states incompetent to eff ect legislation that state-level majorities

25. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).26. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).




desire. Delegating authority over these subject areas allows popular majorities to better realize their preferences, and allows the attainment of effi ciencies that can-not be attained by independent state action. And, fi nally, I showed that judicial enforcement of this boundary can assist the polity’s ability to realize the promised welfare gains.

AbstractThis paper uses very simple models to identify the set of policies that should be implemented at the state

level and identifi es conditions under which other policies should be delegated to a national government. I then show that under intuitively reasonable parameters, judicial enforcement of that boundary is better than leaving it to congressional self-enforcement (although reasonable parameters exist when self-enfor-cement would increase public welfare more than judicial enforcement). When applied as necessary, fede-ral structures—i.e., the combination of centralized government in some areas and decentralized struc-tures in other areas—is a democracy-enhancing institution as well as an effi ciency-enhancing institution.

RésuméCet article utilise des modèles simples afi n d’identifi er l’ensemble des politiques qui devraient être mises

en œuvre au niveau de l’Etat et repère les conditions dans lesquelles d’autres politiques devraient être déléguées à un gouvernement national. L’auteur nous montre alors que selon des paramètres intuitifs, couplés à des paramètres logiques, l’exécution judiciaire de cette limite décisionelle vaut mieux que de laisser son auto-application au Congrès (bien que des paramètres raisonnables existent dans le cas ou l’auto-application augmenterait le bien-être public au dela de son exécution juridique). Lorsqu’elles sont appliquées selon les besoins, les structures fédérales — à savoir la combinaison de gouvernement cen-tralisé dans certaines régions et des structures décentralisées dans d’autres domaines — peuvent devenir des institutions et outils d’amélioration démocratique aussi bien qu’une facon d’améliorer l’éffi cience ins-titutionnelle.



Federalism and the Concept of Political TerritorialityTowards an Analytical Framework for Comparative Territorial Politics

Sean Mueller

Sean Mueller, lic. Phil., Assistant Lecturer & Ph.D. student, School of Politics and IR, Univer-sity of Kent (Canterbury UK), Centre for Swiss Politics & Centre for Federal Studies, School of Politics and IR, University of Kent (Canterbury UK), Sessional Lecturer in European Union Politics at Canterbury Christ Church University (Canterbury UK), Secretary of “Federalism & Territorial Politics”, a Swiss PSA working group.

Introduction

Territory as a variable of scholarly interest is on the rise again. Th e integra-tion process of nation-states into the European Union (EU), three centuries after their “mystical ” birth in the Westphalia region,1 questions the hitherto dominant “disciplinary nationalism” of political science.2 As much as the nation-state had both absorbed lower-level polities and rendered higher entities—the Holy Ro-man Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom, three socialist federations etc.—superfl uous, so the main task of analysts was perceived to be to focus on the po-litical system at the ‘national’ level. So persistent was this obsession with that level of government that even federal studies, by defi nition the most concerned with sub-national autonomy and its individual or collective interplay with the higher level, rarely opted for any other than a top-down perspective and cross-national comparisons. It is only in the 1960s that a “View from the States” is proposed.3 No wonder, then, that this branch of political science has had to catch up more than any other sub-fi eld, while at the same time fi ght off the intrusion of related

1. Jeremy Larkins, From hierarchy to anarchy: territory and politics before Westphalia (New York: Palgrave Macmil-lan, 2009).2. Michael Keating, “Th irty Years of Territorial Politics,” West European Politics, 31:1 (2008): 60–81. 3. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A view from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966).


Sean Mueller96


but distinct research traditions. Th e goal of the second section of this paper is to show the complementarity of diff erent approaches to the same overall question: what is the role of territory for politics? Th e term ‘comparative territorial poli-tics’ is proposed to include all scholarship that touches upon that question in a particular way: by explicitly using territory as an intervening variable. Federalists have got company.

Apart from EU integration, the parallel developments of regionalization (e.g. in Italy), decentralisation (France), devolution (United Kingdom) and federalisa-tion (Belgium, Spain), over at least the last 40 years, have been no less dramatic. As is to be expected from empirically oriented research, these developments have sparked several avenues in political science: the travelling of concepts and theories developed at the national level ‘down’ to the regional level; the ‘horizontal’ com-parison of regional political systems within the same or across diff erent nation-states; the enquiry into a possible causal link between processes of regionalization and Europeanization; the development of new typologies to replace the no longer valid dichotomy of unitary and federal states; or the role of political parties as both the eff ect and the cause of such ‘multilevel’ developments. Federal studies have given away their ‘natural’ advantage in studying such questions too easily, at the expense of more dynamically evolving fi elds such as comparative government, party politics, election studies, political behaviour or ‘Europeanization’ studies. But as much as scholarship from these sub-fi elds contributes to their respective body of knowledge, thinking in overlapping circles (or ‘fuzzy sets’) does more: it serves to integrate them into the fi eld of comparative territorial politics (where the circles overlap) and enhances the overall conceptual clarity and usefulness. Th e core concept I wish to present, in the third section of this paper, is ‘political territoriality.’ It is a syncretic notion with roots in human geography that sub-sumes several of the assumptions made by the diff erent research perspectives on territorial politics. Its modest purpose is that of an ‘attention-directing device’: a heuristic tool that can guide a systematic enquire into territorial politics.4

Comparative Territorial Politics: A Federal Discipline?

Comparative territorial politics, as a discipline, combines three concerns. It is comparative in its method, political in its objects, and territorial in its focus. Its goal is to study either the territorial attributes of politics, e.g. the causes and eff ects of devolution,5 or the political attributes of territories, e.g. the distinc-

4. Johan P. Olsen, “Th e Many Faces of Europeanization,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002): 943.5. Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)


Federalism and the Concept of Political Territoriality 97


tiveness of regional identities.6 Its method is to compare over time and/or space because territory, by defi nition, is physically limited and meaningful only if put in context (see below). Th is section shows why federal and regional studies, Mul-tilevel Governance (MLG) and EU studies, and also local government research form the core of this discipline. It also discusses why and how contributions from other sub-fi elds of political science can be considered a part of that discipline, too.

Th e core…

Our starting point is the political system7 as summarising the rules, resources, actors and processes of society that together govern the creation, implementation and adjudication of collectively binding rules. Territory is not an explicit element of this defi nition. But any set of rules, operative range of actors, or implementa-tion of a certain policy is spatially bounded. For systems at the nation-state level, this happens through a defi nition of the state,8 by necessity (lack of resources, contested territories, occupation, civil war etc.), or—most often—through mu-tual agreement of nation-states recognising their respective sovereignty. But po-litical systems exist also at other levels than just the nation-state.

Any political system is “distinguished by the fact that its rules specify the areas of jurisdiction for other decision-making-units and provide methods for settling confl icts of jurisdiction. It is hierarchical in character and territorial in domain.”9 Decision-making and settling confl icts necessitate an ‘umpire’, not in the judicial but in the political sense: who governs for whom and how? Hix10 applied the idea of a political system to the EU, emphasising its institutional design, direct and ag-gregated citizen inputs, policy impact and the interaction (‘feedback’) between these political outputs, new demands on the system, new decisions and so on. But the principle of thinking in terms of ‘stratarchical’11 political systems can be taken even further.

If there really is a core to the study of politics, I believe it is with describ-ing and explaining political power understood in the Weberian, socio-relational

6. Klaus Detterbeck and Eve Hepburn, “Party Politics in Multi-level Systems: party responses to new challenges in European democracies,” in New Directions in Federalism Studies, ed. Jan Erk and Wilfried Swenden, (London and NY: Routledge, 2010).7. Gabriel Almond, “Comparative Political System,” Th e Journal of Politics 18:3 (1956): 391–409.David Easton, Th e Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc, 9thedition, 1968 [1953]).8. Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun, 1992 [1919]).9. Morton A Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics. (UK: ECPR Press, University of Essex in Col-chester, 2005 [1957]), 28.10. Simon Hix, Th e Political System of the European Union. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2005), 2.11. R. Kenneth Carty, “Parties as Franchise Systems: Th e Stratarchical Organizational Imperative,” Party Politics 10, (2004): 5–24.


Sean Mueller98


sense. As a corollary, describing and explaining the territorial dimension of poli-tics follows the same principles for political systems at any scale. Whether it is about the infl uence of the local periphery at the national centre,12 local autonomy from regional interference (confusingly labelled ‘state-local relations’ in the US),13 or yet again the position of nation-states within the EU—the systemic properties of institutional design, input, output and interaction remain the same. Th e only diff erence at the core of comparative territorial politics is the primary object of interest: local, regional, provincial, state, national or European.

However, there is yet no scholarly consensus on whether federal studies con-stitute a part of territorial politics or the other way round. Th e hierarchy is far from clear also for ‘federalism’ and ‘federal studies’—is the fi rst the ideological dimension and the second the empirical investigation, as King argued?14 Or are ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’ the same?15 And what about ‘federal government’16, ‘federal political systems’17 and ‘federality’?18 For the sake of both clarity and brev-ity, I follow Watt’s19 threefold distinction between ‘federalism’ as a normative term, ‘federal political system’ as the genus and ‘federations’ as a specifi c type of this genus. Federal studies are then that branch of political science concerned with the “origins, operation and signifi cance”20 of federalism, federal political sys-tems and/or federations.

Returning to ‘territorial politics’, we encounter a similar problem. Any politi-cal ‘phenomenon’ meaningfully related to territory (e.g. the veto-power of French prefects, second-order elections in the UK, federal reform in Germany) fi ts the category of territorial politics as a common-sense descriptor.21 But territorial poli-tics also denotes that branch of political science studying these processes. As disci-

12. Sidney Tarrow, “Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France.” Comparative Politics 7 (1979): 1-36.13. Ann O’M Bowman and Richard C. Kearney. “Second-Order Devolution: Data and Doubt,” Publius 41:4, (2011): 563–585.14. Preston King, Federalism and Federation (Baltimore, Maryland: Th e Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).15. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).William Riker, “Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does it Matter?” Comparative Politics 2:1 (1969): 135–46.16. Kenneth C Wheare, Federal Government (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963).17. Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1:1 (1998): 117–137.Ronald L Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 3rd edition, 2008).18. Henry Sidgwick, cit. in Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Th eory and Practice. (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), 21.19. Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1:1 (1998): 117–137.20. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance. (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).21. Michael Keating, “Th irty Years of Territorial Politics,” West European Politics 31:1 (2008): 60–81.




pline, it is the name given to studies of ‘federal political systems’,22 which however avoid the term ‘federalism’—but not its substance, which is territoriality. Clearly the meaning ascribed to these terms depends on context. If ‘territorial politics’ stands for ‘general’ studies of ‘the territorial dimension of politics’,23 then there is hardly any diff erence to federal studies. But if territorial politics summarises, for example, decentralisation of power in formerly unitary states like France,24 the UK25 or Italy,26 then observable phenomena are referred to. To distinguish more clearly, I call ‘comparative territorial politics’ the discipline, and territorial politics the group of phenomena under analytic scrutiny.

What, then, is the connection with regional studies? Th ree opinions exist. For ‘classic’ federalists such as Wheare,27 Elazar,28 Friedrich,29 and Riker,30 regions are simply—and only—coterminous with the constituent entities of a federal state. Riker speaks of “regional governments”31 as opposed to “the central govern-ment”—regional studies would then be focusing on just one side of the federal principle. Accordingly, all regional studies are also federal studies—but not all federal studies are regional studies, because there is more to federal inquiry than the regional governments and their relation to the ‘centre’. Regional studies as a separate line of inquiry lose their justifi cation, at worst, and confi ne federal stud-ies to a bottom-up perspective, at best.

For a second set of territorial politics scholars, regional governments are present in nonfederal states as well. While not denying the regional character of constituent units in a federation, regions (short for regional governments) are understood more broadly. Accordingly, all federal studies are also regional studies, but not all regional studies are federal studies, because regional studies cast their

22. Ronald L Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s Uni-versity Press, 3rd edition, 2008).23. Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: Th e Territorial Dimension of Politics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).24. John Loughlin, Subnational Government: Th e French Experience (Houndmills, Basingstoke, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).25. Jim Bulpitt, Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An interpretation (Manchester: Manchester Uni-versity Press, 1983).26. Benito Giordano, “Italian Regionalism or ‘Padanian’ Nationalism – the Political Project of the Lega Nord in Italian Politics,” Political Geography 19 (2000): 445–471.Benito Giordano, “Th e Contrasting Geographies of ‘Padania’: Th e Case of the Lega Nord in Northern Italy,” Area 33:1 (2001): 27–37.27. Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963).28. Daniel J Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987).29. Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Th eory and Practice (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).30. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).William Riker, “Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does it Matter?,” Comparative Politics 2:1 (1969): 135–46.31. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance


Sean Mueller100


net more widely.32 Th e ‘federalist’ criterion of constitutional entrenchment of regional power33 fades away as unduly obstructing this view. Regional studies in this sense came to life amidst the inadequacy of classic federal studies to capture new phenomena in Western Europe.34

A third perspective does justice to both previous opinions. It is the one adopt-ed here, acknowledging, on the one hand, that regional studies focus on entities other than federations. Politics and the analysis thereof can be guided, but need not to be defi ned by legal criteria. Th e constituent units of federations repre-sent something diff erent from regions in a formerly unitary state, no matter how ‘special’ (Italy) or ‘historic’ (Spain). Constitutional entrenchment does matter as defi niens, but need not exclude regional studies from territorial politics. Th ey coexist alongside, under the umbrella of comparative territorial politics. On the other hand, federal studies can apply regional studies to explicitly federal states (federations), and regional studies can discuss regions also in federations. But there remains a qualitative diff erence between constitutionally entrenched sub-national units and those “at the mercy of the centre”.35 Territorial politics is the family tree and federal and regional studies are separate branches thereof. Both are part of territorial politics (as discipline), which is then additionally made up of local government studies,36 more sociological urban development studies,37 and the more IR-inspired EU-studies and MLG.38

In sum, territorial politics (as observation) are an integral part of what federal studies theorise about, for they encompass the “origin and operation”39 of states, ‘federal societies’ in which societal diversity is “territorially grouped”,40 philoso-

32. Michael Keating, Th e New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998).33. Henry Sidgwick cit. in Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Th eory and Practice (London/New York: Routledge2006), 2.34. Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and Th ematic Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).35. Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987).36. Nelson Prosby, “Preface” to Decentralist trends in Western Democracies, ed. Laurence J. Sharpe (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), i-vii.Edward C Page, Localism and Centralism in Europe: Th e Political and Legal Bases of Local Self-Government (Ox-ford: Oxford University Press, 1991).Laurence J Sharpe, “Th e European Meso: An Appraisal,” in Th e Rise of Meso Government in Europe, ed. Laurence J. Sharpe (London and Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), 1–39.37. Neil Brenner, “Global cities, glocal states: global city formation and state territorial restructuring in contem-porary Europe,” Review of International Political Economy 5:1 (1998): 1–37.38. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integration (Lanham, MD, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2001).Arthur Benz, Politik in Mehrebenensystemen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009).Simona Piattoni, Th e Th eory of Multilevel Governance. Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).39. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).40. E.g. William S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).




phies on liberty and authority,41 manifestos on territorial restructuring by specifi c actors (the Federalist Papers, the Ventotene Manifesto etc.), and constitutional provisions such as those pertaining to second chambers, self-and shared rule.42 Th ey also include, with ‘fi scal federalism’,43 a universe on its own. In that sense, territorial politics constitute the specifi cally political part within federal stud-ies. Associating federalism and territorial politics, the focus is on a) the specifi -cally political dimensions within federalism: actors, power relations, input and throughput; as well as on b) the specifi cally territorial in politics: boundaries, jurisdictions, identity and ‘territorial justice’.44

So much for the core of comparative territorial politics; now to its margins where I locate some of the literature from party politics, electoral studies, and political behaviour that fi ts the disciplinary description.

… and its margins

At fi rst inspection, nothing relates party politics, electoral studies or political behaviour conceptually to territorial politics. Th ey focus neither on ‘the politi-cal’ within territories, nor on ‘the territorial’ within politics, but on questions of organised interest aggregation (e.g. Sartori);45 the translation of votes into seats;46 and satisfaction, participation, trust and social capital,47 respectively. But when studies from these fi elds end up discussing centralisation within parties,48 the

41. Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Du principe fédératif et de la nécessité de reconstituer le parti de la revolution (Paris: E. Dentu, 1863).Cf, Kyle Scott, Federalism: A Normative Th eory and its Practical Relevance (New York, London: continuum, 2011).42. Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987).43. Richard M. Bird and Andrey V. Tarasov, “Closing the gap: fi scal imbalances and intergovernmental transfers in developed federations,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 22 (2004): 77–102.Francesco Palermo, Elisabeth Alber and Sara Parolari, “Federalismo fi scale: una sfi da comparata,” Ius publicum europaeum (eds. Padova: Cedam. 2011), 7.44. Scott L. Greer, Introduction. In Territory, Democracy and Justice (ed. Scott L. Greer, Houndmills, Basing-stoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1–17.Scott L Greer, “Conclusion: Territorial Politics Today,” in Territory, Democracy and Justice, ed. Scott L. Greer (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 257–274.45. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (ECPR Press: University of Essex Print-ing Centre, 2005 [1976]).46. Andrew Reeve and Alan Ware, Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction (London, New York: Routledge, 1992).47. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Th e Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).48. Lori Th orlakson, “Patterns of Party Integration, Infl uence and Autonomy in Seven Federations,” Party Politics 15:2 (2009): 157–177.


Sean Mueller102


nature of second-order elections49 or the political culture of sub-national units,50 then the focus is at least implicitly shifted on territory. As a variable, it enters the analysis in the form of an intervening factor51 on parties, parliaments, and the identity and legitimacy of and within society.

To take the example of ‘federal political parties’:52 they are both infl uenced by the institutional set-up of the state and at least partially responsible for changes in it.53

Th is thought was developed in federal studies and taken further in party poli-tics. For Riker,54 a polity was federal to the extent that parties embodied federal-ism. He pioneered the ‘political’ approach to federalism with a focus on institu-tional bargaining by political actors, i.e., political parties. He saw in the structure of a party system the only reliable indicator of how centralised or ‘peripheralized’ a federal polity really was. Riker’s party-political approach to federalism reads as follows:

Th e federal relationship is centralized according to the degree to which the parties organized to operate the central [national] government control the parties organized to operate the constituent [regional] governments. […] the proximate cause of variations in the degree of centralization (or peripheralization) in the constitutional structure of a federalism is the variation in degree of party centralization.55

Later federal studies only occasionally treated political parties until, under the infl uence of ‘multilevel governance’,56 the territorial dimension of politics ac-quired prominence again—but this time within party politics.57 Political parties

49. Reif Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results,” European Journal of Political Research 8:1 (1980): 3–44. 50. J. Elkins Simeon, Richard and David, “Regional Political Cultures in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 7:3 (1974): 397–437.51. Michael Burgess, “Territoriality and Federalism in the Governance of the European Union,” in State Territo-riality and European Integration: Territoriality and Federalism in EU Governance, ed. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard (London: Routledge. 2006), 100–119.52. Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova, Designing federalism: a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).53. Jonathan Hopkin, Party Matters. “Devolution and Party Politics in Britain and Spain,” Party Politics 15:2 (2009): 179-198.54. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).55.William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance, 129.56. Bache, Ian, and Matthew Flinders, Multi-level Governance (eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).Arthur Benz, Politik in Mehrebenensystemen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009).57. Kris Deschouwer, “Political Parties in Multi-Layered Systems,” European Urban and Regional Studies 10 (2003): 213–26.Jonathan Hopkin, Party Matters, “Devolution and Party Politics in Britain and Spain,” Party Politics 15:2 (2009): 179-198. Hough, Dan and Charlie Jeff ery, Devolution and Electoral Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).




are discussed in a federal perspective by Chandler,58 Hrbek,59 Filippov et al.60 and Swenden,61 while federalism is treated from a party-perspective by Th orlakson62 and Deschouwer.63 MLG approaches equally tell us about the eff ect of territory on parties64 or the other way round.65 Th e key is that understanding the political view on federalism as a territorial view on politics entails concentrating on insti-tutional and actor-related characteristics. A concept that facilitates such concen-tration is political territoriality, to which we turn next.

Political Territoriality: A Federal Concept?

Th e origins of political territoriality lie with human66 and political geography,67 medieval history,68 state formation,69 and International Relations.70 It is however its use in human strategies (‘territoriality’) to which we limit our enquiry, and to its use in politics in particular. Th e aim of this section is to demonstrate how fed-eral studies might gain in conceptual clarity by using this notion as an ‘attention-directing device’.

58. William M. Chandler, “Federalism and Political Parties,” in Federalism and the Role of the State, ed. Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler (Toronto, London, Buff alo: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 149–170.59. Rudolph Hrbek, Political Parties and Federalism: An international comparison. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, ed. 2004).60. Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova, Designing federalism: a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).61. Wilfried Swenden, Ch 5, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and Th ematic Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).62. Lori Th orlakson, “An institutional explanation of party system congruence: evidence from six federations,” European Journal of Political Research 46 (2007): 69–95.Lori Th orlakson, “Patterns of Party Integration, Infl uence and Autonomy in Seven Federations,” Party Politics 15:2 (2009): 157–177.63. Kris Deschouwer, “Political Parties as Multilevel Organizations,” in Handbook of Party Politics, ed. Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty, (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 291–300.64. David S. Moon and Oivind Bratberg, “Conceptualising the Multilevel Party: Two Complementary Ap-proaches,” Politics 30:1 (2010): 52–60.65. Klaus Detterbeck and Eve Hepburn, “Party Politics in Multi-level Systems: party responses to new chal-lenges in European democracies,” in New Directions in Federalism Studies, ed. Jan Erk and Wilfried Swenden (London and NY: Routledge, 2010).66. Robert D. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Th eory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).67. John Agnew, Political Geography: A Reader (London: Arnold, ed. 1997).68. Charles Tilly, Th e Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ed. 1975).69. Michael Mann, “Th e Autonomous Power of the State,” in Political Geography: A Reader, ed. John Agnew (London: Arnold, 1997), 58–81. [Originally published in European Journal of Sociology 25 (1984): 185–213].70. John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” Inter-national Organization 47:1 (1993): 139–174.Jeremy Larkins, From hierarchy to anarchy: territory and politics before Westphalia (New York: Palgrave Macmil-lan, 2009).


Sean Mueller104


Origins and defi nition

To use political territoriality, two assumptions are made. Firstly, that in a po-litical world (still) dominated by nation-states,71 the sum of politically relevant phenomena can be divided into two groups: those taking place between states and those taking place within states.72 Geopolitics and territorial politics are the respective disciplines committed to academically studying the relation between territory and power; intergovernmental relations can relate to both inter73 and intrastate74 processes. Secondly, that there is a qualitative distinction between area and territory.75 Area is surface and extension, measured by spatial instru-ments such as maps.76 Territory, on the other hand, is socially constructed, with including-excluding boundaries. Human action alone is what can transform area into territory.

For the geographer Robert Sack,77 human territoriality is the intentional, stra-tegic behaviour whereby control over area is exerted through physical delimita-tion of access, the non-observance of which ensues in sanctions. Th e emergence of the territorial state can be read as the “prime example of the logic of territoriality”.78 Beginning not with Westphalia but with Augsburg, ‘cuius regio, eius religio’ paved the way for further territorial exclusiveness among, and increased inclusiveness within, political entities.79 Where the Holy Roman Empire as a “neither purely an-archical, nor purely hierarchical”80 entity disappeared, the EU eventually took cen-tre stage on territorially similar, yet of course democratically diff erent principles. EU decision-making is neither ‘de-’ nor ‘post’, but ‘re-territorialised’, because

71. Ron Johnston, “Out of the Moribund: Territory and Territoriality in Political Geography,” ed.Political Geography 20:6 (2001): 677–693. 72. John Agnew ed, Political Geography: A Reader (London: Arnold, 1997).73. Andrew Moravcsik, Th e Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Lon-don: UCL Press, 1999).74. Nicole Bolleyer, “Intergovernmental Arrangements in Spanish and Swiss Federalism: the Impact of Power-Concentrating and Power-Sharing Executives on Intergovernmental Institutionalization,” Regional & Federal Studies 16:4, (2006): 385–408. 75. Jean Gottmann, Th e Signifi cance of Territory (Charlottesvile: Th e University Press of Virginia, 1973).76., William D. Pattison, “Th e Four Traditions of Geography,” Journal of Geography 63:5 (1964): 211–216. 77. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Th eory and History.78. Hans Vollaard, “Political Territoriality in the European Union. Th e Challenging Boundaries of Security and Healthcare” (Ph.D. diss University of Leiden (NL), 2009), 70.79. Gianfranco Poggi, Th e Development of the Modern State. A Sociological Introduction (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd. 1978).Joseph R. Strayer, Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).80. Benno Teschke, “Th e metamorphoses of European territoriality. A historical reconstruction,” in State Ter-ritoriality and European Integration: Territoriality and Federalism in EU Governance, ed. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, London: Routledge, 37–67 (2006): 41.




[…] the supranational level of mobilising economic and political resources is just that—an elevated arena of public policy activities for the member states. Territorial in-terests have therefore merely been elevated to a diff erent arena that has the institutional capacity to accommodate sub-state local-regional, national, European and increasingly international dimensions of public policy.81

More generally, diff erent types of strategic alliances are possible between su-pranational, national, and local/regional actors in the EU.82 It is these phenom-ena that political territoriality assists in understanding, by directing attention to the multi-dimensionality of political systems and the implications this has for students of territorial politics. Political territoriality sums up the broad attempt to create, maintain, or otherwise modify political power by controlling area, thereby transforming it into territory. Th e two qualifi cations applied here to Sack’s defi ni-tion83 merit emphasizing:

– (Human) Territoriality is narrowed down to political. Politics, as stated above, operates within a system of rules, actors and policies. Any other ap-proach to territoriality—psychological,84 anthropological,85 ethological86 etc.—is irrelevant here.

– Th e focus of political territoriality is on (political) power, that is faculties potentially used to infl uence the “authoritative allocation of values for the whole society”.87

Political territoriality so defi ned can be included in accounts for the de facto break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, when various functions (e.g. guaranteeing religious peace) could not be fulfi lled on this very wide territory anymore, but also for state integration into the ‘political system of the EU’,88 where political territoriality points (mainly) in the reverse, ‘upward’ direction. It does not, by itself, explain anything, but serves as an analytical framework. It may for example help our understanding of why the construction of a European identity is ob-

81. Michael Burgess, “Territoriality and Federalism in the Governance of the European Union,” in State Territo-riality and European Integration: Territoriality and Federalism in EU Governance, ed. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard (London: Routledge, 2006): 109–110.82. Sidney Tarrow, “Centre-Periphery Alignments and Political Contention in Late-Modern Europe,” in Re-structuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared, ed. Christopher K. Ansell and Giuseppe Di Palma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 45–64.83. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Th eory and History84. Julian J. Edney, “Human Territoriality,” Psychological Bulletin 81 (1974): 959–75.85. Michael Saltman, Land and Territoriality (ed. Oxford: Berg, 2002).86. Robert Ardrey, Th e Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins. 7th ed 1975 [1966]).87. David Easton, Th e Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 9th ed 1968 [1953]), 129.88. Simon Hix, Th e Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2nd edition 2005).


Sean Mueller106


structed by nation-states, as liberal intergovernmentalists point out (because the electoral and hence legitimising dimension remains national),89 but furthered by other actors (such as Members of the European Parliament or political parties),90 as neo-functionalists are keen to emphasise. As an essentially federal concept, political territoriality relates the three dimensions to be taken into account when analysing political systems at any scale. To these dimensions we turn next.

Analytical framework

If political territoriality denotes a general strategy to modify the values au-thoritatively allocated in a political system, then territory is an intervening vari-able. Territory is used by political actors to build institutions and/or to (de-) centralise decision-making.91 Th ese actors are shaped by these structures, in turn: as agents of the diff erent levels of statehood they decide on policies, as competi-tors for political power on the diff erent levels they are guided by the respective institutional rules.92 Hence, political territoriality refers to all three dimensions of political systems: institutional design (polity), processes and actors (politics) and outputs (policy).

Polity-dimension

Political territoriality can be measured by operationalising the institutional set-up of a given ‘body politic.’93 For Duchacek,94 “[d]ividing and subdividing the world according to the territorial principle is probably as old as humanity.” Any division of governmental power is accomplished in either of two ways: power can be divided among institutions on the same level, or it can be divided among institutions on diff erent levels. Th e fi rst possibility we call a horizontal division of power, because authority remains on the same level—the European, the national, the regional, or the local level, as the case may be. Th e second possibility we call a vertical division of power, because here power is distributed among various lev-els—power is delegated ‘downwards’ or ‘upwards’. In practice, both methods are

89. Moravcsik, Th e Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht.90. Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and political parties,” Living Reviews in European Governance 4:1 (2009).http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2009-1 (accessed 14 February 2012).91. Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s Uni-versity Press. 3rd edition 2008).Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. 1992 [1919]).Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963).92. Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens, Introduction. “Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe: A Frame-work for Analysis,” in Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe, ed. Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 1–3093. Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987).94. Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: Th e Territorial Dimension of Politics. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 3.




applied at the same time; conceptually they are separable. Th e same categorisa-tion is undertaken by Maass95 when speaking about a “capital division of power”, meaning the division of power “at the capital city of a defi ned political community”, as opposed to an “areal division of power”, denoting a division “among areas or regions which exist or can be created within the political community”. But ‘capital division of power’ is an ambiguous term, and ‘areal division of power’, though technically correct, tends to obfuscate the fact that once power is accorded to spe-cifi c areas, these are precisely transformed into territories on their own. To speak of horizontal and vertical division of power is more accurate and has become academic standard.

Vertically dividing political power is territorial institution building par excel-lence. Th is is what federalism and regionalism, but also localism and European integration, are all about. In other words: territory is a variable taken into con-sideration for creating, maintaining or otherwise modifying European, national, regional, or local institutions. Maass referred to this process as a division of power by way of diff erent constituencies: “In a general way, it is axiomatic that an areal [i.e., territorial or vertical] division of powers assigns to the several levels of govern-ment representation of diverse constituencies.” However, the notion of ‘constituen-cy’ (which we reserve for electoral districts; cf. below) points to the fact that these levels need to be legitimate—or, to put it less normatively: governments strive for legitimacy, and although they may do so for various reasons, what matters here is that every government does. For Burgess and Vollaard,96 a fi rst of their “indicators designed to assess the political signifi cance of territory in all of its multifaceted dimen-sions” is the legitimacy of an institutional set-up. And this we can measure as the degree to which people’s “loyalties and identities” are conditioned by territory.97

Territory as such is either not important at all, or very important for people’s collective identity at any given level—or somewhere in the middle. Moreover, collective ‘emotional attachment to a particular territory’ may be higher to one than to another level, and/or compete with an aspiration to be identifi ed based on functional (what people do: their profession) or personal (what people are: their religion or race) diff erentiation.98 For example, in the Middle Ages, “[t]he scale of allegiance of most men would have gone something like this: I am fi rst of all Christian,

95. Arthur Maass, “Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis,” in Area and Power. A Th eory of Local Government, ed. Arthur Maass, (Glencoe, Illinois: Th e Free Press, 1959), 9–26.96. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, “Introduction: Analysing Westphalian States in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World” in State Territoriality and European Integration:Territoriality and Federalism in EU Governance, ed. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, (London: Routledge, 2006), 5.97. Ibid.98. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, “Introduction: Analysing Westphalian States in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World”, 6.


Sean Mueller108


second Burgundian, and only third a Frenchman.” 99Intuitively, a comparative use of the concepts of loyalty and identity makes more sense than treating them in abstract isolation.

Territory is at the same time the most powerful and the easiest way to obtain a community’s loyalty, which in turn renders its institutions legitimate. Territory is powerful because of its durability (or ‘geographical fi xity’), and easy to achieve because not more than a boundary, in essence a line on a map, needs to be drawn. Th e extremes of this mechanism, as Robert Sack100 has put it, are staked out by a “territorial defi nition of social relationships”, on the one hand, and a “social defi nition of territory”, on the other. It was, again, in the Middle Ages when “the defence of the faith came to be linked to the defence of a country”.101 “Th e formation of (European) states, in other words, meant that individuals […] now held land on the basis of a notion of territorial citizenship—that is, their inhabitance of a particular territory—rather than as a result of their relationship, whether real or fi ctitious, with the leader of their kin-group or tribe. […] a territory ordered through society became a society ordered through territory.”102

In this way, the “territorial strategy at national level […] led to the legal principle of territoriality”,103 to an extent that not only the (legal) principle supplanted the (political) strategy, but that henceforth the very idea of sovereignty could not be conceived of in nonterritorial terms anymore. Th e state, in this perspective, transformed itself from a functional into a territorial entity, in all its bounded durability supposedly the personifi cation of ‘modernity’.104 Seen from the point of view of political territoriality, the (territorial) state is the most extreme,105 but by far not the only example of territorial institution building.106

Explicitly relying on Robert Sack, Penrose in turn argues that ‘homeland’ is created in four stages. First, in delimiting a territory ‘natural boundaries’ are in-voked, as “an attempt to draw on the legitimacy and immutability that the concept

99. Joseph R. Strayer, Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 253.100. Robert D Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Th eory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 36.101. Jean Gottmann, Th e Signifi cance of Territory (Charlottesvile: Th e University Press of Virginia, 1973), 34.102. Rhys Jones, “Th e Mechanics of Medieval State Formation: Observations from Wales,” Space & Polity 3:1 (1999): 85–99.103. Hans Vollaard, “Political Territoriality in the European Union. Th e Challenging Boundaries of Security and Healthcare” (Ph.D. diss., University of Leiden (NL). 2009), 703 .104. Cf : Gianfranco Poggi, Th e Development of the Modern State. A Sociological Introduction (London: Hutch-inson & Co Ltd.1978), xiii105. Vollaard, “Political Territoriality in the European Union. Th e Challenging Boundaries of Security and Healthcare.”106. Michael Keating, “Th irty Years of Territorial Politics.” West European Politics, 31:1 (2008): 60–81.




of nature has come to bestow”.107 Next, through time, the “continuous occupation of a territory results in the literal merging of people with this territory”,108 to an extent that land and people become indistinguishable: France is where the French live, and French is spoken in (the ‘territory’ of ) France. In a third stage, people really feel ‘at home’ in ‘their’ territory: this in turn facilitates, indeed reifi es both the inclusionary (‘we’) and exclusionary (‘them’) side of nationalism. Finally, my-thologisation exalts the instrumental nature of territory into something sacred, intrinsic, eternal.109 What matters for our understanding is that we can now link territory as a variable in the process of nation building with the ideas of the ‘new regionalism’ and the ‘regional state’. Th us we can imagine not only regional nationalism as ‘regionalism’, but also local nationalism as ‘localism’—or ‘autono-mism’110 and ‘parochialism’,111 respectively.

Policy-dimension

Once the levels are defi ned and upheld as to the underlying loyalty, one needs to address the “distribution and circumscription of basic competences”.112 Equally, for Maass,113 the ‘areal division of power’ can be achieved by assigning “certain functions […] to the central government, others to state or provincial governments, and yet others to municipal and local governments”. Th e sum total of all govern-mental functions is imagined as a fi nite list of tasks,114 and from this list some functions are assigned to the national, some to the regional, some to the local, and some to supra-national levels. Th is has repercussions on the signifi cance of the respective level.

But framing competencies territorially is a gradual and at times contentious process. In the EU, the centralisation of economic competencies took place ear-lier than that of ‘classic’ nation-state functions such as external aff airs: the single market preceded the single ‘EU foreign minister’ (the High Representative of the

107. Jan Penrose, “Nations, states and homelands: territory and territoriality in nationalist thought,” Nations and Nationalism 8:3 (2002): 280-281.108. Ibid.109. Penrose, Nations and Nationalism, 282.110. Jaime Lluch, “Autonomism and Federalism,” Publius 42:1 (2012): 134–161.111. Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: Th e Territorial Dimension of Politics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).112. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, “Introduction: Analysing Westphalian States in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World,” in State Territoriality and European Integration: Territoriality and Federalism in EU Governance, ed. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard (London: Routledge, 2006), 6.113. Arthur Maass, “Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis,” in Area and Power. A Th eory of Local Government, ed. Arthur Maass (Glencoe, Illinois: Th e Free Press, 1959), 9–26.114. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), 52.


Sean Mueller110


Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy) by some 25 years.115 Also, there is (yet) no standing ‘EU army’, while the euro passes one solidarity test after the other. It is interesting to note in this regard how the EU rediscovered the princi-ple of subsidiarity (Art. 3b. 3 of the Lisbon Treaty). Th e Protocol on the Applica-tion of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, attached to the Lisbon Treaty, translates this idea into practice:

Any draft legislative act should contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. […] Th e reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators.116

Subsidiarity is the legal expression of the principle presumption “that public activities should be carried out at the lowest government level consistent with effi ciency considerations.” 117 For the EU, that it be better achieved by local, then by re-gional, then by national, and only then by EU-authorities. Conceptually, Burgess argues that:

[t]he key to understanding the link between subsidiarity and federalism, then, lies in the uniquely Christian democratic approach to power and authority. Th eirs is es-sentially a pluralist conception that favours the dispersion of power both territorially and functionally. Taking its cue from Catholic doctrine, man is a member of certain natural groups—the family, the craftsmen, the profession, the commune, the region, the neighbourhood—which are natural law entities whose autonomy should be protected by the state.118

More generally, the literatures on federalism,119 decentralisation,120 and re-gionalism121 conceive three sets of competencies, which can be vertically divid-ed: administrative, fi scal and legislative. Th e fi rst and least extensive option is to provide for administrative capacities among diff erent territorial layers. Th is includes the provision of paid employees, purchased cars, rented buildings etc.

115. Simon Hix, Th e Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2005).116. Art. 5 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.117. David J Collins, “Th e 2000 Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements in Australia”. Paper pre-pared for the International Symposium organised by the Commission sur le déséquilibre fi scal, Québec, 13–14 September. 2001 31118. Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Th eory and Practice, 175119. Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems.120. Tulia Falleti, “A Sequential Th eory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective,” Th e American Political Science Review 99:3 (2005), 327–346. 121. Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Arjan Schakel, “Regional Authority in 42 Democracies, 1950–2006 : A Measure and Five Hypotheses,” Regional and Federal Studies 18:2-3 (double special issue), (2008): 111–302.




“[A]dministrative decentralization”, for Watts,122 equals the “allocation of admin-istrative responsibilities assigned by the constitution or developed through delegation or intergovernmental agreements”. Th e extent of such administrative control can be approximated by looking at the “relative sizes of the public services of each level of government”.123 Th is would give an idea of the relative importance of a certain territorial layer. Th e agency implementing public goods, or delivering the services to the citizens, can thus be analysed territorially. Th is refers to “the way in which rulers provide their services and allocate values and benefi ts”.124 Is it the local offi cers implementing national functions, national offi cers charged with local tasks—or both, but for diff erent policy sectors? Answering this question in general, and even more so for every sector, is impossible, reminding us of Grodzins’ ‘marble-cake’ metaphor.125 But that a complete answer is impossible does not mean that one should not investigate.

A second possibility of vertically sharing powers is to empower territorial units on another level through fi scal instruments. It is then defi ned which territorial level can levy what kind of taxes or fees, who is to pay for and receive grants or shares of what kind, and how much of all that. Fiscal federalism, as a disci-pline, has prominently argued some basic principles. Most importantly, citizens have territorially varying ‘preferences’. Th is is expressed in the ‘decentralization theorem’.126 Otherwise, that is if territorial preferences are either not accounted for, or only wrongly, then the polity risks ‘externalities’, referring to a mismatch between mentioned ‘daily practices’ and governmental services. Th e positive side of such territorial-fi nancial matching are economies of scale.127 Attempts in net-work governance studies have tried to account for the eff ect of this on people’s perceptions through the concepts of ‘output legitimacy’.128

Th e third and ultimate option involves delegation of legislative powers, un-derstood as the competency to frame collectively binding norms, rules, and con-ventions into positive law. For Watts, ‘legislative decentralization’ is composed of “the formal allocation by the constitution of legislative powers to each level of govern-ment” as well as “the degree of autonomy with which a government may exercise the

122. Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 67.123. Ibid.124. Burgess and Vollaard, “Introduction: Analysing Westphalian States in an Integrating Europe and a Glo-balising World,” 6.125. Martin Grodzins, Th e American System. A New View of Government in the United States, Ed. Daniel J. Elazar (New Brunswik & London: Transaction Books, 1984 [1966]).126. Robert D Ebel and Serdar Yilmaz, Concept of Fiscal Decentralization and Worldwide Overview. World Bank Institute 2002, 3. http://www.desequilibrefi scal.gouv.qc.ca/en/pdf/ebel.pdf (last accessed: Feb 2011).127. Bochsler, Daniel, “Neighbours or Friends? When Swiss Cantonal Governments Co-operate with Each Other,” Regional & Federal Studies 19:3 (2009): 355.128. E.g. Fritz W Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Eff ective and democratic? (Oxford: OUP. 2002[1999]).


Sean Mueller112


legislative jurisdiction assigned to it”.129 Unlike subsidiarity, which is a fundamental principle, legislative competencies frequently change from exclusive to shared to concurrent and back. Exclusive powers mean that normative decisions in a spe-cifi c policy fi eld are taken by one governmental entity only: foreign aff airs and defence are usually regarded as exclusive national competencies. However, with the emerging of the European Union, foreign aff airs increasingly came to be de-cided in intergovernmental forums.130

Politics-dimension

Political territoriality also refers to the actors aspiring for power. Political ac-tors negotiate and decide, they bargain and publicly defend, and they compete and strive for occupying the places in governmental institutions at any level. Political parties in particular aggregate (material) demands, recruit (personnel) support, and, as ‘throughput’, participate in transforming inputs into outputs. With regard to such aggregated inputs into decision-making processes,131 concep-tualise the exact “composition, policy aims and operation of interest groups, political parties and social movements” as regards territory. However, they rightly caution that as long as territory as such does not determine a particular organisational structure or mobilisation strategy, the “patterns of geographical [i.e., vertical or ter-ritorial] distribution of certain political groupings and sectors should not be viewed as political territoriality per se”.132 Th is is to say that we need to analyse carefully as to whether political parties—the most important agents between society and government—consider territory an asset enhancing their internal structure, or whether they nolens volens accept that they have to mirror a certain state structure. I simplify the roles of political parties into electoral participants, coordinative organisations, and parliamentary decision-makers.

A fi rst way to look at the territorial character of political parties is via the elec-toral system. Riker133 spells out the underlying assumption:

[T]he essence of local autonomy has little to do with whether or not the central con-stitution grants particular rights to local offi cials but has very much to do with whether or not local offi cials are elected by or are in some other way responsive to local citizens.

129. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 66.130. Simon Hix, Th e Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2005).131. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, “Introduction: Analysing Westphalian States in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World” in State Territoriality and European Integration: Territoriality and Federalism in EU Governance, ed. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard (London: Routledge, 2006), 7.132. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, “Introduction: Analysing Westphalian States in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World”, 7.133. William Riker, “Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does it Matter?” Compara-tive Politics 2:1 (1969): 139.




Any governmental level with such a popularly elected council performing leg-islative or quasi-legislative functions is accompanied by (formalised) rules and (social) conventions guiding its election. One way or the other, the territorial variable is always used to design the number and type of electoral districts, the ‘constituencies’. Two extremes are possible. In proportional systems the whole ter-ritory for which a representative council is to be elected can be formed into a sin-gle multi-member constituency. On the national level, Israel, Moldova, Monaco, Serbia, Slovakia, Timor Leste, and Ukraine elect their only, Kazakhstan (House of Representatives), Paraguay (Senate), Palau (Senate), Russia (State Duma), and Uruguay (Senate) one of their two chambers in this way.134 Th e other extreme is displayed by the electoral system of the United Kingdom, where the whole ter-ritory is partitioned into n single-member constituencies, with n corresponding to the number of seats in the House of Commons; currently 649. While the UK practises plurality vote (or First-Past-Th e-Post, FPTP), France for example with its 577 single-member constituencies for the Assemblée nationale has opted for majority vote (or Two-Round-System, TRS).135

Th e result in terms of territorial representation is the same for FPTP and TRS: UK Members of Parliament (MPs) and French députés remain, for the entire duration of the legislature, attributable and thus accountable to ‘their’ constitu-ency. Th e opposite counts for a single, nationwide multi-member district, which “provides no formal scope for representation of local or regional interests.” 136 Infor-mally, parties may provide for territorial representation on their lists, but such a provision is not mandatory by way of the electoral system stricto sensu. Territorial representation is (also) a function of the electoral system.

Secondly, political parties’ internal territorial organisation is revealing as well. Organisation may take place primarily along national or along regional/local lines. As Hutchcroft137 states it: “National political parties, particularly if they are cohesive and well disciplined, will have the potential to serve as a centralising force and curb localist tendencies.” In this context, Th orlakson measures the territorial organisation of parties in federal systems by assessing the following three vari-ables:

134. PARLINE “Parliaments Online” database of the International Parliamentary Union.http://www.ipu.org/parline.135. Ibid.136. Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and Politics: Assessing Ter-ritorial Dimensions of Authority and Power,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 14:1 (2001): 35.137. Paul D.Hutchcroft, “Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and Politics: Assessing Ter-ritorial Dimensions of Authority and Power,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 14:1 (2001), 36.


Sean Mueller114


Vertical integration refers to the extent and strength of formal and informal link-ages between state and federal parties. […] Infl uence refers to the extent to which the state party organizations exercise control in the governance of the federal party, while autonomy tells us whether these integrative linkages result in control over another party level.138

Clearly, infl uence and autonomy are two sides of the same coin, the former referring to a bottom-up (regional branches infl uencing national party decisions), the latter referring to a top-down mechanism (autonomy as regional freedom from national interference). Vertical integration, in turn, is associated with “for-mal organisational linkages such as a common party membership, shared fi nances and a common governance structure”.139 A ‘nonintegrated’ political party is one that “organizes and competes at both the state and federal levels but shares neither a common governance nor membership structure”.140 However, a party may be re-gionalized to an extent that there is not even a national formation at all; examples include the Catalan Convergència i Unió (CiU), the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU), the Italian Lega Nord, or the Swiss Lega dei Ticinesi. Th ese parties are ‘multilevel’ only to the extent that they participate in national and regional elections.141

A third aspect of territoriality in the politics-dimension is the territorial charac-ter of legislatures themselves. Th e possible trade-off s between ‘one man, one vote’ and ‘one area, one vote’ are ranked on a continuum by Rodden.142 Th ere are three criteria that infl uence a political system’s location. Th e fi rst relates to who the MPs are. In town meetings and the Swiss Landsgemeinde (the open-air assembly still practised in two cantons), individuals directly decide, and there is no scope for territorial representation other than of the system-level itself. In the UK, MPs are accountable to constituencies which do not correspond to sub-national gov-ernments, while for the Italian and the US-Senate they do. Th is has potentially a diff erent impact on both direct territorial representation parties as important resources. Finally, the German Bundesrat and the EU Council of Ministers con-sist of members appointed by lower-level governments. Lower-level governments partake in the exercise of shared-rule qua territorial polities. Second, are the votes weighted? Th e basic democratic principle of ‘one man, one vote’ is applied only

138. Lori Th orlakson, “Patterns of Party Integration, Infl uence and Autonomy in Seven Federations,” Party Politics 15:2 (2009): 160, emphasis added.139. Th orlakson, “Patterns of Party Integration, Infl uence and Autonomy in Seven Federations,” 161140. Ibid.141. Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens, “Introduction. Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe: A Framework for Analysis,” in Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe, ed. Wilfried Swenden and Bart Mad-dens, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.) 1–30 (2009): 9.142. Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,” Comparative Politics 36:4, (2004) 485.




in unitary systems. All federal and confederal systems apply some form of malap-portionment: two votes per one State in the US Senate, weighed voting in Ger-many and the EU Council of Ministers. Th ird, what majority is needed for policy change? Simple majorities are generally required throughout the examples used by Rodden;143 only the EU Council of Ministers votes by double, on request even triple majority.144 When unanimity is required, as in the European Council, each polity has an absolute veto.

Th e Territoriality of national political systems

Table 1: Political territoriality at the national level

Criteria Type of National Political System

Centralised Unitary

Unitary De-centralised Regionalised Federal Confederal

Territorial loyalty mainly N N > L N = R N = R (= L) R (> L ) > N

Political symbolism

N with sovereignty

N sover-eignty, L

autonomy

N sover-eignty, R

autonomy

N and R shared

sovereignty

R with sovereignty

Represen-tation

MPs elected as indi-viduals

MPs elected based on L

MPs elected based on R

MPs elected based on

(and in) R

MPs ap-pointed

by R

Political Parties

monolevel (N)

monolevel (N) multilevel multilevel monolevel

(R)

Legislation exclu-sively N

exclu-sively N N and R N and R

(and L) mainly R

Financing mainly N mainly N N and R N and R (and L) exclusively R

Adminis-tration N and L N and L N, R, and L N, R, and L exclusively R

Examples

Greece, Ireland,Portugal,

LUX

Scandinavi-an countries,

France

Spain,UK,Italy

Germany, Canada, Austria, USA, B

NL (1579-1795),USA

(1781-89)

Source: Own compilation based on Loughlin (2000), Rodden (2004), Swenden (2006), Watts (2008)Key: N = National, R = Regional, L = Local Governments

143. Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,” Comparative Politics 36:4 (2004).144. Simon Hix, Th e Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2005).


Sean Mueller116


For illustration purposes, I now apply this conceptual framework to nation-states. Th e rows in Table 1 represent the dimensions and sub-dimensions of po-litical territoriality, the columns the ideal-types so defi ned.

At one extreme, only the national level is ‘sovereign’ and loyalty is undivid-ed.145 At the other extreme, the ‘regions’ really are fully-fl edged states.146 Mem-bers of Parliament (MPs) are elected as individuals and political parties function as monolevel organisation147 in centralised unitary states, whereas MPs are ap-pointed by member states to represent their interest, in confederal systems. Th is pattern is present also in the allocation of competencies. More interesting are the cases between the extremes. For all these systems, diff erent institutions ‘rule’ over territories of diff erent extent, most functions are shared or concurrent, and each layer corresponds to a separate arena of ‘multilevel’ political competition.148 Matching these inductive patterns of political territoriality with types of terri-torial state confi gurations deduced from the literature on territorial politics149 reveals that there is more to it than a simple continuum, let alone a dichotomy of unitary/federal states. Rather, there are separate continua for each of the seven aspects political territoriality has directed our attention to.

Th is means that in discussing the specifi cally territorial elements of (federal) political systems, analysing only one or two of the three dimensions is incomplete and thus likely to lead to false conclusions. Th ree possible fallacies exist. First of all, both institution building through territorial loyalty and the formal sharing (or not) of competencies need to be taken into account. Legally ‘objective’ provi-sions, such as the Treaty basis of the EU, matter as much as individually subjec-tive perceptions, for example Union wide solidarity while accepting economic diff erences. Autonomy and sovereignty are often mere symbols in the political

145. Daniel Treisman, Th e Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2007).Bjørna, Hilde, and Synnøve Jenssen, “Prefectoral systems and central-local government relations in Scandina-via,” Scandinavian Political Studies 29:4 (2006): 308–332.146. Murray G. Forsyth, “Unions of States: Th e Th eory and Practice of Confederation,” (Leicester: Leicester Uni-versity Press, 1981).147. Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,” Comparative Politics 36:4 (2004): 481-500.148. Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integration (Lanham, MD, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefi eld. 2001)149. John Loughlin, “Regional Autonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western Europe,” Regional and Federal Studies 10:2 (2000): 10–34.Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement” Compara-tive Politics 36:4 (2004): 481-500.Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and Th ematic Analysis (Basing-stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s Univer-sity Press, 3rd edition, 2008).




discourse, but politics being highly symbolic, these can prove powerful.150 Ne-glecting the one can mean overstating the other. Secondly, political parties or-ganise along institutional structures, e.g. they compete for the new offi ces in the Italian regions;151 they call for further devolution, e.g. the SNP in Scotland;152 or they place territorial identity at the core of their manifestos, e.g. the Lega Nord as a ‘regionalist populist party’.153 In all three situations, parties are multilevel organisations, inserting themselves into and/or arguing for more (meaningful) “arenas for political struggle”.154 Analytically, they can only be separated from their competitive environment at the expense of external validity. Th irdly, the (de-) centralisation of decision-making aff ects legislative, fi scal and administrative au-thority at the same time.155 Legislative functions are least likely to be decentral-ised, while administrative functions are most readily delegated to another ter-ritorial layer of government.156 But this varies across time, space and policy area.

Th e fi gure below models the four elements of political systems:157 polity, politics, policy and the interaction between them. Whether the centre always ‘overawes’ the periphery (as in centralised unitary systems), or the whether the periphery always ‘overawes’ the centre (as in confederal systems)158 is then deter-mined by the interplay of actors, processes, institutions and policy outputs. For example, minority parties may gain experience by coming to power in regional governments, which enhances their recruitment possibilities and strengthens their overall legitimacy; naturally, once in power, they will ask for more policy competencies, which in turn may aff ect people’s loyalty to this now ‘meaning-ful’ level of government. Th e “slippery-slope”159 argument similarly predicts that through devolution, the costs for fi nal secession are lowered. A similar circular-

150. David Delaney, Territory: A Short Introduction (Malden, Oxford and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005).151. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1993), 60.152. Paolo Dardanelli, “Europeanization as Heresthetics: Party Competition over Self-Government for Scot-land, 1974–97,” Party Politics 15:1 (2009): 49–68.153. Duncan McDonnell, “A Weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord,” Politics 26:2 (2006): 126–132.154. William M Chandler, “Federalism and Political Parties,” in Federalism and the Role of the State, ed. Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler. (Toronto, London, Buff alo: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 149–170.155. Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Arjan Schakel, “Regional Authority in 42 Democracies, 1950–2006 : A Measure and Five Hypotheses.”156. Ronald L. Watts, Ch 12, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 3rd edition, 2008).157. Simon Hix, Th e Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2005).158. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi cance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).159. Erk, Jan, and Wilfried Swenden, “Th e new wave of federalism studies,” in New Directions in Federalism Studies, ed. Jan Erk and Wilfried Swenden (London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 1–15.


Sean Mueller118


ity is argued to exist for political parties in the EU by Ladrech.160 Studying one aspect of territoriality in the context of political systems contributes to a better understanding of its dynamics, reasons and impacts on other aspects.

Conclusion

In this article, the discipline of comparative territorial politics has been defi ned as concerned with both the territorial in politics and the political in territories. As an essentially federal discipline, it has been linked to several related research tra-ditions, the most prominent being regional and local government studies, MLG and other EU studies. Analyses from more distant branches of political science (electoral studies, party politics and political behaviour) are included only insofar as they use territory as an intervening variable. Th e notion of political territorial-ity has then been elaborated to conceptualise the multi-dimensionality of territo-rial politics. Political territoriality was defi ned as that form of strategic behaviour with the potential to infl uence all three dimensions of political systems. As an attention-directing device, it points to seven indicators:

All polities are grounded constitutionally, by statute or contract.161 Territo-rial loyalty ensures legitimacy, stylised into ‘autonomy’ or ‘sovereignty’.162 Insti-tution building through 1) areal loyalty and 2) political symbolism are the two

160. Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and political parties,” Living Reviews in European Governance 4:1 (2009). http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2009-1 (accessed 14 February 2012).161. Mény, Yves and Vincent Wright, “General Introduction. in Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe,” ed. Yves Mény and Vincent Wright (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 1–9.162. John Loughlin, “Regional Autonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western Europe,” Regional and Federal Studies 10:2 (2000): 10–34.

Interaction

Institutions/Polity

Territorial loyalty (“people”)Political symbolism

(“autonomy”, “sovereignty”)

Policy Competencies

Administative powersFiscal powers (taxes!)Legislative powers

Political Actors

Multi-level organisationTerritorial representation

(personal <=> governmental)




related aspects in the polity-dimension of political territoriality:163 “territory as homeland”.164

Th e territoriality of politics points to the need for indicators of 3) processes (elections and representation; 165 and 4) political actors (e.g. the ‘vertical integra-tion’ of political parties); territory as constituency.166

In the policy dimension, territory serves as a structural device for allocating specifi c, inherently local, regional or national functions.167 Each can be divided into a 5) legislative, 6) fi nancing and 7) implementation stage.168 In each stage area, through territorial boundaries, is made equivalent to certain rights and responsi-bilities: territory as jurisdiction.169

In applying the conceptual framework to nation-states, it has been shown that to speak of a single federal-unitary dichotomy is inadequate. Decentralisation is a) a continuum that b) relates to each (sub) dimension of a political system separately. Revisiting or ‘recalibrating’ the federal framework of analysis as one of political territoriality contributes to a better, because more fi ne-grained under-standing of institutions, processes, actors and interactions between them.

Th e importance of studying the territorial aspects of politics has long been emphasised by federal studies. But reframing this enquiry in a way both narrower (only politics) and wider (anything territorial) fulfi ls two essential purposes: it creates a disciplinary unity around the core of territorial politics, which is federal studies; and it allows for a variety of entry points into that core, for example mul-tilevel parties, local elections, network governance, Europeanization, or sub-state loyalty.

AbstractThe core issues comparative territorial politics addresses are how and why territory is used to delimit,

maintain, or create political power; and with what kind of consequences for effi ciency (output) and legiti-macy (input). The aim of this article is to integrate various research strands into the comparative study of territorial politics, with federal studies at its core. As an example of a conceptual payoff, ‘political territo-riality’ refers the observer to three dimensions of the strategic use of areal boundaries for political power.

163. Nicole Töpperwien, “Defi ning Local Government – Political Constraints and the Question of Bounda-ries,” (Paper presented at the VIth World Congress of the IACL in Santiago de Chile, 2004).164. Jan Penrose, “Nations, states and homelands: territory and territoriality in nationalist thought,” Nations and Nationalism 8:3 (2002): 277–297.165. Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,” Comparative Politics 36:4 (2004): 481-500.166. Lori Th orlakson, “Patterns of Party Integration, Infl uence and Autonomy in Seven Federations,” Party Politics 15:2 (2009): 157–177.167. James W. Fesler, “Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization,” Th e Journal of Politics 27:3 (1965): 536–566168. Maass Arthur, “Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis,” in Area and Power. A Th eory of Local Government, ed. Arthur Maass (Glencoe, Illinois: Th e Free Press, 1959), 9-26.169. Chris Skelcher, “Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance,” Gov-ernance 18:1 (2005) : 89–110.


Sean Mueller120


By focusing on territory as a key variable of political systems, the actors, processes and institutions are fi rst analytically separated and continuously measured, enhancing internal validity, and then theoretically integrated, which allows more valid external inferences than classic, legal-institutionalist federal studies. After discussing the boundaries and substance of comparative territorial politics as a federal discipline, po-litical territoriality is developed towards an analytical framework applicable to politics at any governmen-tal level. The claims are modest: political territoriality does not serve so much as an explanatory concept as rather an ‘attention-directing device’ for federal studies.

RésuméLes questions fondamentales abordées par la politique territoriale comparée étudient pourquoi et com-

ment le territoire est utilisé pour délimiter, maintenir et créer du pouvoir politique ; et quelles en sont les conséquences pour l’effi cacité (output) et la légitimité (input). L’objet de cet article est d’intégrer diffé-rentes formes de recherche dans l’étude comparée de la politique territoriale, en considérant en son cœur les études fédérales. La « territorialité politique », conçue comme une résolution conceptuelle, renvoie l’observateur aux trois dimensions de l’utilisation stratégique des frontières terrestres dans la recherche de pouvoir politique. En se concentrant sur le territoire comme variable clé des systèmes politiques, les acteurs, processus et institutions sont tout d’abord distingués analytiquement et mesurés continuelle-ment, pour accroître leur validité interne, et ensuite intégrés dans la théorie. Ceci permet une meilleure validation des variables externes qu’avec une approche classique, fondée sur les études fédérales légales-institutionnelles. Après avoir considéré les frontières et la substance de la politique fédérale comparée comme discipline fédérale, on développe la territorialité politique comme cadre analytique applicable à l’étude de la politique à quelque niveau gouvernemental que ce soit. Les propositions en sont modestes : la territorialité politique ne doit pas tant être utilisée comme concept explicatif des études fédérales que comme un outil visant à attirer l’attention du chercheur sur ces problématiques.



Autorité et confl it d’autorités en droit fédératif

Jorge Cagiao y Conde

Maître de conférence à l’Université de Tours (laboratoire Interaction culturelle et discursives - ICD).

Introduction

Longtemps dominés par la lecture juridique et institutionnelle privilégiée par la doctrine dominante (verticalité des rapports fédératifs, la notion de souverai-neté, l’acte fondateur de la fédération compris comme une constitution-loi, etc.), les débats académiques portant sur le fédéralisme ont vu ces dernières années émerger avec force une lecture politique des rapports fédératifs qui met davantage l’accent sur la nature confl ictuelle de la relation fédérale. Cette lecture plaide en faveur de l’adoption de mesures techniques susceptibles de donner une traduc-tion institutionnelle plus juste des rapports fédératifs et plus soucieuse à la fois de défendre les valeurs de base du fédéralisme (pluralisme, paix, etc.) et de promou-voir une véritable culture fédérale dans la fédération1.

1. Par exemple : W. Norman, Negotiating Nationalism. Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multina-tional State, Oxford University Press, 2006. O. Beaud, Th éorie de la Fédération, Paris, PUF, 2007. R. Máiz, La frontera interior. El lugar de la nación en la teoría de la democracia y el federalismo, Murcia, Tres Fronteras, 2008.A.-G. Gagnon, Au-delà de la nation unifi catrice : Plaidoyer pour le fédéralisme multinational, Institut d’Estudis Autinòmics, 2007. id., L’âge des incertitudes. Essais sur le fédéralisme et la diversité nationale, Presses de l’Uni-versité de Laval, 2011. F. Requejo, Fédéralisme multinational et pluralisme de valeurs. Le cas espagnol, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2009. C. Parent, Le concept d’État fédéral multinational. Essai sur l’union des peuples, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2011.


Jorge Cagiao Y Conde122


L’expérience démocratique dans plusieurs contextes fédératifs des 20 ou 30 dernières années, avec le développement et la consolidation à l’échelle régionale de majorités territoriales nationalistes désireuses d’une reconnaissance politique et, porteuses d’un projet concurrent de state-building et/ou nation-building (Qué-bec, Catalogne, Pays Basque, Écosse, etc.), semble confi rmer la nature politique et confl ictuelle des rapports entre les diff érents ordres juridiques dans les contextes fédératifs, et en conséquence la pertinence, dans les études spécialisées en la ma-tière, de l’approche politique du fédéralisme. En eff et, compte tenu de l’impasse dans laquelle se trouvent çà et là les discussions autour du fédéralisme, tantôt comprises comme tendant naturellement vers une plus grande centralisation et homogénéisation, tantôt accusées de pousser vers la sécession, et compte tenu aussi des doutes surgis sur sa capacité à concilier les attentes des diff érents acteurs, lesdites expériences montrent à la fois les limites des solutions proposées par la théorie classique du fédéralisme et la nécessité de repenser et de redéfi nir le lien fédératif en prenant en considération deux facteurs politiques importants : 1) la légitimité démocratique dont jouissent les unités fédérées, qui les autorise à cher-cher un dialogue avec la fédération ou l’État d’égal à égal ; 2) le dialogue comme seul moyen d’introduire les réformes légales et constitutionnelles nécessaires afi n de satisfaire les diff érents acteurs et d’établir ainsi un climat propice à la confi ance et à la loyauté fédérales.

Dans cette tentative de redéfi nition du fédéralisme, nous pouvons nous de-mander quel peut être l’intérêt de la notion d’autorité. Dans la mesure où le confl it a souvent été présenté par les représentants des minorités nationales ou des unités fédérées comme un problème de légitimité, plutôt que de droit ou de stricte légalité (voir les confl its Canada-Québec, Espagne-Catalogne, ´, etc.)2, on peut penser que la notion d’autorité, à la diff érence de la notion de souveraineté, dont la rigidité toute bodinienne la rend peu sensible au dialogue entre égaux précité3, peut avoir l’avantage de décrire de manière plus réaliste et éclairée le confl it politique caractéristique en contexte fédératif (confl it d’autorités), nous permettant dès lors de mieux penser la traduction juridique et institutionnelle

2. Les relations entre la Catalogne et l’État espagnol se sont encore dégradées ces dernières années. La décision du Tribunal constitutionnel en 2010 invalidant 14 articles et modifi ant par voie interprétative 27 autres articles ou dispositions additionnelles du Statut d’autonomie de la Catalogne, voté en 2005 à une très large majorité des élus catalans (120 pour, 15 contre), puis ratifi é en référendum populaire en 2006 (avec 72,9 % des voix exprimées et une abstention de 50 %) a été perçue en Catalogne comme une entrave illégitime à la volonté du peuple catalan d’accroître son autonomie. On rappelle aussi l’annonce, à l’heure où nous écrivons, du gouver-nement écossais concernant la tenue d’un référendum sur l’indépendance de l’Écosse probablement pour 2014.3. La notion de souveraineté pose problème dans la mesure où elle est généralement perçue comme étant une et indivisible. Qu’elle le soit ou non n’est pas d’ailleurs le plus important. Le fait en revanche qu’on la tienne pour une et indivisible est ce qui pose problème pour une bonne compréhension du fédéralisme. D’ailleurs, les travaux d’Elizabeth Zoller sur le fédéralisme américain sont une démonstration convaincante, s’il en fallait une, que fédéralisme et souveraineté sont compatibles, à la seule condition d’assouplir la notion de souveraineté. Cf. E. Zoller, « Aspects internationaux du droit constitutionnel. Contribution à la théorie de la fédération d’États », dans Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de La Haye, t. 294, 2002, pp. 41-166.


Autorité et confl it d’autorités en droit fédératif 123


dont a besoin la fédération pour pouvoir être à son tour perçue comme une véri-table autorité (légitime).

Notre réfl exion portera sur la logique juridique et politique du fédéralisme. En d’autres mots, elle tentera de montrer quelles sont les conclusions à tirer de la lecture juridique et de la lecture politique du fédéralisme. Il importe de noter que ces deux logiques sont très diff érentes ; on peut même les présenter comme antagonistes. La logique politique appliquerait à son objet (fédéralisme) ce qu’on pourrait appeler avec Kelsen une « conception subjectiviste de la connaissance », alors que la logique juridique, appliquée au droit fédératif, serait à rapprocher d’une « conception objectiviste de la connaissance 4. » Cette précision importe à un double titre : d’abord, dans la mesure où cet article tentera d’expliquer que l’équilibre proprement fédératif passe par la conciliation de l’antagonisme entre la lecture politique du lien fédératif (autant d’interprétations possibles et même divergentes que d’acteurs politiques dans la fédération) et sa lecture juridique (ce que le lien fédératif peut signifi er, indépendamment de la lecture politique égoïste que chaque acteur pourrait en faire) ; puis, dans la mesure où le lien fédé-ratif sera décrit comme étant un rapport politique régi et coordonné par le droit, autrement dit, comme étant un accord de volontés (subjectives) acceptant de se soumettre à une autorité tierce qui, tout en ayant une certaine existence politique, serait défi nie par sa nature objective ou sa raison juridique. Il importera, bien sûr, d’expliquer en quoi consiste cette nature juridique et quelles sont les conditions auxquelles cette raison peut être perçue essentiellement comme juridique ou ob-jective.

Nous procéderons en trois temps. Dans la première partie, nous nous inté-resserons aux fondements théoriques et aux sources de légitimation de l’autorité fédérée dans la fédération, tant dans sa phase constituante (son acte fondateur) que dans son fonctionnement ultérieur. La deuxième partie de l’article sera consa-crée à l’autorité fédérale et au rôle fondamental de l’autorité interprétative du juge dans le processus d’autonomisation de l’ordre juridique fédéral, préalable indis-pensable à la création et au développement d’une autorité fédérale. Les cas des États-Unis et de l’UE serviront d’illustration. Après les niveaux fédérés et fédéral, nous discuterons de la place de la justice constitutionnelle (instance ou niveau tiers) dans une fédération ainsi que des garanties et des conditions d’impartialité qui doivent entourer son activité afi n de pouvoir être perçue comme une véritable autorité dans la gestion et la résolution des confl its entre niveau fédéré et niveau fédéral.

4. H. Kelsen, Th éorie pure du droit, Bruylant-L.G.D.J., 1999, pp. 332-334. La détermination des « limites » de chaque ordre juridique, comme détermination de la compétence de l’ordre juridique fédéral et de l’ordre juri-dique fédéré, porte toujours sur la signifi cation (interprétation) d’une norme de répartition de la compétence, norme qui pourra être appliquée ou interprétée, comme on le verra, en suivant une conception objectiviste de la connaissance ou une conception subjectiviste.




1. L’autorité fédérée : une autorité assurée par la logique politique du pacte fédératif ?

La doctrine dominante en droit public défi nit la fédération comme étant un rapport hiérarchique ou de subordination entre l’État fédéral et les États fédérés. L’idée d’une souveraineté partagée ou plurielle serait ainsi rejetée comme étant une absurdité juridique car seul l’État fédéral pourrait être considéré comme sou-verain. Dans le cadre de cet article, nous ne pouvons pas discuter en profondeur cette thèse, mais l’étude de la notion d’autorité en droit fédératif nous oblige à formuler au moins la question suivante : la thèse de la souveraineté une et in-divisible, en contexte fédératif, ne revient-elle pas à remettre en question l’idée que les unités fédérées puissent avoir quelque autorité, et ainsi la possibilité d’un véritable confl it d’autorités entre le niveau fédéré et le niveau fédéral ? Telle est en eff et la question qu’on peut se poser, car, à suivre la doctrine dominante, seul le niveau fédéral aurait la capacité d’imposer sa volonté en dernier ressort, ce qui est, comme le rappelle Olivier Beaud, le trait caractéristique de l’autorité en droit public : « l’autorité qui limite une autre autorité qui se prétend souveraine, devient elle-même souveraine, et brise la souveraineté de cette dernière5 ».

Aujourd’hui, fortement contestées par les études spécialisées en la matière, il suffi ra de dire ici que les conclusions de la doctrine dominante semblent réfutées à la fois par la logique politique du fédéralisme (1) et par le droit positif (2).

1.1. Ce que le pacte nous dit à propos de l’autorité des parties fédérées et du lien fédératif

La littérature spécialisée distingue un fédéralisme dit « par association » et un fédéralisme « par dissociation ». Si le dernier modèle est désormais bien connu et a mérité une attention spéciale ces dernières années dans les sciences politiques et juridiques, notamment en Espagne, en Belgique et en Grande-Bretagne, nous ne nous intéresserons ici qu’au fédéralisme par association. La raison de ce choix est simple : quel que puisse être l’intérêt (certain) du modèle dissociatif pour l’étude du fédéralisme, on peut considérer que sa logique initiale n’est pas celle du fédé-ralisme. Là où le fédéralisme cherche à unir des unités ou corps politiques ayant une liberté d’action pleine, le modèle dévolutif cherche simplement à décentrali-ser l’État en donnant un pouvoir décisionnel plus ou moins large à des territoires qui, jusque-là, n’en avaient pas ou en avaient très peu6. Autrement dit, bien que la volonté des unités sous-étatiques puisse être pour quelque chose dans le processus de décentralisation mis en place (comme réponse de l’État, par exemple, à une série de revendications d’autonomie territoriale), et bien qu’à un moment donné

5. O. Beaud, Th éorie…, p. 323.6. Le cas de la Belgique, après sa réforme constitutionnelle de 1993, est un cas tout à fait à part.




ce processus de décentralisation puisse rivaliser en termes d’approfondissement de l’autonomie avec un système fédératif (voir l’exemple espagnol), ce n’est pas la volonté des parties qui peut être considérée comme volonté constituante d’une réforme de cette nature. Or c’est justement l’élément volontariste ou démocra-tique qui nous intéresse dans la mesure où il est appelé à traduire dans le pacte fédératif les aspirations, les projets et les craintes des parties fédérées.

L’affi rmation précédente est importante car elle tient à bien distinguer fédéra-lisme et décentralisation, la logique du fédéralisme et celle de la décentralisation. À la diff érence de la décentralisation, processus vertical qui obéit à une seule vo-lonté politique, le pacte fédératif nous permettrait de bien comprendre le sens et la fi nalité du fédéralisme (la fi n particulariste des diff érents peuples et la fi n com-mune de la fédération, selon Beaud7), ainsi que la manière dont cette diversité de corps politiques peut s’organiser dans une fédération. En d’autres mots, il nous permettrait de comprendre pourquoi les parties fédérées veulent s’unir, à quelles conditions elles acceptent de s’unir, et dans quel but et pourquoi elles ont, à cette fi n, recours au principe du fédéralisme (étant entendu que, en vue de leur union, les parties pourraient avoir recours à un autre principe que le fédéraliste).

Le pacte fédératif peut être défi ni comme l’acte par lequel plusieurs États ou corps politiques distincts acceptent de s’unir d’une manière durable à des fi ns déterminées dans l’acte fondateur (constitution ou traité). À ce stade initial, des questions importantes, comme la répartition des compétences (le noyau dur du fédéralisme selon Kelsen : « la répartition des compétences est le noyau politique de l’idée fédéraliste8 ») ou l’arrangement institutionnel choisi ne se posent pas encore. Ce qui importe, au commencement, c’est la volonté de vivre et créer ensemble, volonté qui peut être précédée ou accompagnée, naturellement, de négociations portant sur des questions d’ordre technique et institutionnel. Comme l’a expliqué Hans Kelsen, le fédéralisme porterait ainsi en lui une marque d’internationalité indéniable qui rappelle l’acte de création de la fédération, similaire en tout point, selon l’Autrichien, à la signature d’un traité entre États souverains : « Normaly, a federal State comes into existence through an international treaty concluded by inde-pendent States9 ».

Le pacte implique nécessairement que les États contractants, devenus ensuite États membres de la fédération, aient au moment de la signature du pacte fédé-ratif une autorité pour ainsi dire parfaite. Pas de fédération donc sans la volonté

7. O. Beaud, Th éorie…, p. 273 et ss8. H. Kelsen, « La garantie juridictionnelle de la Constitution », RDP, 1928, cité par O. Beaud, « Hans Kelsen, théoricien constitutionnel de la Fédération », dans C. M. Herrera, (dir.), Actualité de Kelsen en France, Bruylant - L.G.D.J., 2001, p. 66.9. H. Kelsen, General Th eory of Law and State, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2007, p. 318.Les travaux d’Elisabeth Zoller insistent aussi sur le caractère international, à mi-chemin entre le droit public interne et le droit international, du fédéralisme : « Une fédération d’États est une structure composée d’États qui se situe entre le droit constitutionnel et le droit international » (E. Zoller, op. cit., p. 73).




préalable des États fondateurs. Les actes fondateurs des fédérations historiques classiques (États-Unis, Suisse, etc.), auxquels s’est intéressé Olivier Beaud, ou en-core, plus près de nous, de l’UE, montrent bien que c’est le pacte qui met en place le lien fédératif entre les parties, créant des droits et des obligations jusque-là inexistants.

Partant de cette prémisse, la déduction à tirer de la nature pactiste du fédéra-lisme est simple et pourrait se résumer ainsi : corps politiques indépendants, dotés d’une existence politique propre avant le pacte, il est raisonnable de penser que les contractants tiennent à conserver cette capacité à disposer d’eux-mêmes une fois le pacte signé. C’est ce que Beaud appelle la « fi n particulariste » du fédéra-lisme10, qui prend chez Carl Schmitt le nom de « volonté d’autoconservation11 », ou chez Kelsen « la liberté d’action de l’État 12 ». Seule une menace capable de faire craindre aux États fondateurs pour leur survie pourrait les pousser à céder, au profi t d’un plus grand corps politique, tout ce qui est censé assurer leur au-toconservation. Autrement dit, il est déraisonnable de penser qu’un être libre et indépendant puisse entrer dans une union avec d’autres êtres libres et indépen-dants sans vouloir conserver son existence politique et les moyens nécessaires à sa conservation. On peut ainsi conclure que c’est de sa condition de membre fondateur de la fédération et des moyens politiques qu’il doit vouloir conserver que le niveau fédéré tire son autorité.

Ce premier élément ayant été expliqué, il nous faut maintenant voir ce que devient l’autorité des États fondateurs dans la fédération, question sans doute plus controversée que la première.

1.2. L’autorité des parties fédérées : confi rmation par le droit positif

Les États qui fondent la fédération sont nécessairement souverains. L’une des diff érences que la doctrine dominante voit entre l’État fédéral et la confédération est que dans l’État fédéral il y aurait un transfert de souveraineté des États fonda-teurs en son profi t, dès lors seul souverain, tandis que dans la confédération, seuls les États fondateurs seraient souverains. L’explication semble aujourd’hui devoir être nuancée13.

Il faudrait distinguer ici de manière très claire la lecture politique du fédéra-lisme (et de la souveraineté), d’une part, et la lecture juridique, d’autre part14.

10. O. Beaud, Th éorie…, 273 et ss.11. C. Schmitt. Th éorie de la Constitution, Paris, Quadrige/PUF, 2008, p. 515.12. H. Kelsen, Th éorie pure…, pp. 330-331.13. Pour une critique de cette théorie, cf. O. Beaud, Th éorie…, pp. 67-97.14. On peut faire ici un rapprochement avec les explications de Kelsen au sujet de la souveraineté étatique et du droit international. La primauté du droit international n’implique pas selon Kelsen la perte de la liberté d’action de l’État, mais seulement le transfert d’un certain nombre de compétences à l’ordre juridique supérieur. Le fait que l’ordre juridique supérieur prime l’ordre étatique dans les domaines laissés sous sa compétence n’entraîne




La lecture politique du fédéralisme met en évidence un choc de puissances qui sont, de par la souveraineté parfaite que l’une et l’autre prétendent avoir, appelées à ce que Carl Schmitt nomme « un confl it existentiel 15 ». Les pères fondateurs des États-Unis avaient déjà mis cette épineuse question sur la table avant que la constitution de 1787 ne fût ratifi ée, les uns, les anti-fédéralistes, considérant que les États fondateurs conserveraient leur souveraineté intacte, les autres, les Fédéralistes, rétorquant que les États ne pourraient être que des « residuary autho-rities16 ». Loin d’être apaisé par la création de la judicial review, œuvre de génie du président de la Cour suprême en 1803 (Marbury v. Madison), John Marshall, ce confl it d’autorités ne fut que plus intense. Affi rmer la suprématie de la constitu-tion était aussi d’une certaine manière affi rmer la supériorité politique du fédéral sur le fédéré. Les choses furent néanmoins beaucoup moins simples qu’on aurait pu le penser après Marbury, car les États opposèrent une résistance qui aboutit, comme l’on sait, à la guerre de Sécession en 1861. C’est bien la preuve que l’auto-rité fédérale n’était pas reconnue comme telle et que les États du Sud entendaient bien conserver leur souveraineté. La suite fut comme l’un de ces combats de boxe qui se décide fi nalement aux points, par décision arbitrale, après une lutte achar-née : chaque pas en avant, permettant de renforcer l’autorité fédérale, était suivi d’un pas en arrière, confortant l’autorité des États, tant et si bien qu’on pourrait bien se demander si, au bout du compte, on n’aurait pas eu un match nul17.

Même si les commentateurs s’accordent à voir aujourd’hui les États-Unis comme un État-nation consolidé, et par conséquent à accorder la victoire de la bataille fédéraliste aux federalist, il est important de retenir de l’expérience améri-caine – beaucoup trop simplifi ée ici –, que la résistance des États face aux tenta-tives de centralisation du système a toujours été menée, paradoxalement, au nom du fédéralisme, sous-entendant par là que le fédéralisme justifi erait l’existence d’autorités étatiques fortes en face du gouvernement fédéral. Cette conclusion

nullement la perte de la souveraineté de l’État, qui demeure en réalité entière. Cf. H. Kelsen, Th éorie pure…, pp. 311 et ss.15. Kelsen, Th éorie pure…, 518.16. L. Robel, E. Zoller, Les états des Noirs. Fédéralisme et question raciale aux États-Unis, Paris, PUF, 2000, pp. 7-8Pour une synthèse : F. Vergniole de Chantal, Fédéralisme et antifédéralisme, Paris, PUF, 2005.Pour suivre ce débat : A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay, (Th e Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, New York, Classics Books America, 2009.R. Ketcham, (ed.), Th e anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Debates, Signet Classic, 2003.17. Cf. J.-Ph Feldman, La bataille américaine du fédéralisme. C. John Calhoun et l’annulation (1828-1833), Paris, PUF, 2004.F. Vergniolle de Chantal, Le Fédéralisme américain en question : de 1964 à nos jours, Dijon, EUD, 2006. E. Zol-ler, « Le pluralisme, fondement de la conception américaine de l’État », Archives de philosophie du droit, 49, 2005, pp. 109-122.id. « Les revirements de jurisprudence de la Cour suprême des États-Unis », Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, n° 20, juin 2006, pp. 104-109.




a été validée à plusieurs reprises par la Cour suprême, y compris dans le célèbre arrêt McCulloch v. Maryland, en 1819 :

En Amérique, les pouvoirs de souveraineté sont divisés entre le gouvernement de l’Union et ceux des États. Ils sont chacun souverains en ce qui concerne les buts confi és à l’un et jamais souverains en ce qui concerne les buts confi és à l’autre18.

L’histoire des États-Unis illustre bien la tension politique entre le fédéral et le fédéré qui caractérise les contextes fédératifs. Si la lecture politique du fédéralisme met en évidence un confl it d’autorités, c’est plutôt sous la forme du confl it de lois – davantage « coordination » que « confl it » – que pourrait se laisser appréhender le mieux la lecture juridique du fédéralisme. Et en ce sens, si la face politique du fédéralisme semble dévoiler une autorité que l’on peut considérer comme intran-sigeante, au sens où la souveraineté que chacune des forces en présence possède est considérée comme devant s’imposer en dernière instance, la face juridique nous off re une image plus souple et sans doute plus juste de l’autorité en droit : chaque acteur aurait, dans la fédération, une parcelle d’autorité qui lui reviendrait en propre, lui permettant ainsi, dans les domaines de compétence qui sont les siens, d’imposer sa norme en écartant celle des autres19. Les États-Unis seraient, selon Elisabeth Zoller, un parfait exemple de cette logique de la souveraineté éclatée :

Les États-Unis représentent un remarquable exemple de cet État à deux visages qu’est la fédération d’États, cet État dont la souveraineté est une lorsqu’elle regarde vers l’extérieur, mais plurielle lorsqu’elle est tournée vers l’intérieur 20.

De nombreux exemples montrent, en droit positif, la trace de cette souve-raineté des unités fédérées dans les systèmes fédératifs. C’est le cas, par exemple, de la répartition des compétences entre le niveau fédéré et le niveau fédéral. S’il arrive que le fédéral ait une compétence de droit commun (Canada), le fédéra-lisme tel que conçu à la lumière du pacte prévoit généralement une compétence de principe pour le niveau fédéré et une compétence d’attribution pour le niveau fédéral (États-Unis ou UE). En d’autres termes, le fédéral aurait les compétences énumérées dans la constitution, le fédéré ayant les restantes. Cette dernière so-

18. E. Zoller, Les grands arrêts de la Cour suprême des États-Unis, Paris, Dalloz, 2010, p. 34.19. Cf. par exemple l’arrêt Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (304 US 64 – 24 avril 1938) : « À l’exception des matières régies par la Constitution fédérale ou par les lois du Congrès, le droit applicable dans n’importe quelle aff aire est le droit de l’État. Et il n’est pas du ressort des autorités fédérales de dire si ce droit doit être énoncé par législateur de l’État dans une loi ou par la Cour suprême de cet État dans ce droit. Il n’existe pas de “droit commun” fédéral général. […] L’auto-rité, et la seule autorité, est l’État, et s’il en est ainsi, la voix choisie par l’État comme étant la sienne (que ce soit la voix de son législateur ou de sa Cour suprême) doit avoir le dernier mot » (in E. Zoller, Les grands arrêts…, pp. 253-254).20. E. Zoller, Droit constitutionnel, Paris, PUF, 1998, cité par Le Y.-E Bos, Renouvellement de la théorie du confl it de lois dans un contexte fédéral, Paris, Dalloz, 2010, pp. 55-56.




lution laisse une latitude tout à fait conséquente aux autorités fédérées, tant et si bien qu’on peut dire que dans un très grand nombre de domaines qui touchent directement les citoyens, c’est le fédéré qui décide de la politique à conduire. C’est bien ce que l’on appelle une autorité de dernier ressort, qu’aucune autre autorité ne peut écarter et vaincre par le droit21, tout empiétement sur son domaine de compétence pouvant être dénoncé comme étant une dérogation au pacte.

Quelles leçons peut-on tirer de cette lecture juridique ? Le seul exemple de la division de compétences montre que le niveau fédéré a a priori le dernier mot dans les domaines qui sont de son ressort.

2. L’autorité fédérale : le droit comme fondement d’une autorité discutée

Dans les pages précédentes, nous avons vu que si l’on suit la logique politique du fédéralisme, l’autorité fédérée semble assurée d’une légitimité et d’un soutien similaires à ceux que l’on trouve dans tout État. À la question : pourquoi les citoyens voient en leurs gouvernants une autorité légitime ? on pourra répondre de multiples façons, mais rien ne nous permet de penser que ces réponses pour-raient ne pas convenir pour expliquer ou justifi er l’autorité d’un État fédéré qui vient de cofonder une fédération. Mais il n’en va pas de même pour le niveau fédéral. Si l’autorité fédérée trouve sa légitimité dans l’existence politique de la communauté, dans son identité, sa culture et ses valeurs démocratiques, il en va tout autrement pour la fédération naissante, celle-ci manquant de tout ce que les États fondateurs ont, à savoir un peuple, une culture, etc. La fédération serait, à ce stade initial, une forme sans fond ni substance existentielle. En somme, le niveau fédéral, appelé à s’autonomiser, car non moins souverain que les États fé-dérés dans les domaines que la constitution laisse sous sa responsabilité, tient son autorité initialement de la seule volonté des États fédérés. D’où sa fragilité initiale et la nécessité d’user des armes que le droit met à sa disposition. Faute d’un gou-vernement et d’un pouvoir législatif forts, c’est dans la justice constitutionnelle que le niveau fédéral a toujours trouvé son meilleur allié.

Si l’exemple des États-Unis illustre bien le rôle de la justice constitutionnelle dans le processus d’autonomisation du fédéral (1), le cas de l’UE a ceci de par-ticulier que l’autonomisation (primauté) acquise par l’ordre juridique supérieur contraste avec un processus d’intégration politique faible, dans lequel on peut voir la logique politique à l’œuvre dans les processus de construction d’une struc-ture fédérative (federalism-building) (2).

21. Il faudra nuancer cette affi rmation plus loin. En attendant, il convient de retenir que cette conclusion est fondamentale pour l’équilibre fédératif tant la confi ance que les parties peuvent avoir dans le principe du fédéra-lisme comme moyen de régler et de coordonner les rapports entre fédéré et fédéral dépend justement du respect de la répartition de compétences par le niveau chargé de vider les diff érends entre le fédéré et le fédéral, qui n’est autre, comme nous le verrons, que le niveau fédéral.




2.1. L’interprétation du pacte fédératif comme source d’une autorité fédérale aux États-Unis

La création de la judicial review par la Cour suprême a été, de l’avis unanime des commentateurs, un coup de maître du juge Marshall22. En plaçant la consti-tution au sommet de l’ordre juridique de l’Union, la Cour suprême donnait satis-faction à ceux qui souhaitaient voir le gouvernement fédéral jouer un rôle central dans la conduite des aff aires publiques. Dès lors que la Cour suprême avait le pou-voir de contrôler la constitutionalité des lois votées par les législatures des États ou par le Congrès, le pouvoir des États se trouvait ainsi limité aussi bien par la Cour que par l’Union elle-même, celle-ci pouvant dès lors exploiter « les silences » de la constitution et les décisions de la Cour suprême en son propre profi t. C’est ce que les commentateurs et historiens de l’expérience fédérale américaine appellent le « fédéralisme nationaliste », qui marque une réelle volonté de la part du gouver-nement fédéral d’étendre ses compétences au détriment des États.

Si la première pierre de l’édifi ce des fédéralistes nationalistes est posée en 1803 avec Marbury v. Madison, c’est sans doute l’arrêt de 1819, McCulloch v. Ma-ryland, qui est le plus important en ce qui concerne le fédéralisme23. McCulloch v. Maryland pose le problème des pouvoirs respectifs de l’Union et des États fé-dérés dans un litige qui opposait le caissier d’une succursale de la Banque des États-Unis (la seconde, créée en 1816) à l’État du Maryland. McCulloch se plai-gnait des amendes que l’État fédéré lui avait infl igées pour avoir émis des billets sans s’être acquitté des taxes que la loi du Maryland imposait aux banques non enregistrées dans son État. Le gouvernement fédéral considérait qu’aucun État ne pouvait taxer un instrument monétaire fédéral, considérant cet acte comme une entrave à son action publique, alors que l’État fédéré considérait qu’il avait la compétence souverainement reconnue par la constitution de taxer qu’il vou-lait sur son territoire, et qu’en outre l’Union n’avait pas le droit de créer une banque fédérale, l’Union n’ayant pas une compétence d’attribution en la matière. La Cour suprême fut appelée à vider ce diff érend et à apporter une réponse aux deux questions suivantes : l’Union était-elle compétente pour créer une Banque fédérale ? Si oui, les États pouvaient-ils taxer les billets émis sur leur territoire par la Banque fédérale ? C’est dans cet arrêt que le juge Marshall élabore la théorie des pouvoirs impliqués (ou implicites) de l’Union (implied powers) en affi rmant que l’Union avait le droit de faire toutes les lois qui seraient nécessaires et convenables pour agir effi cacement dans les domaines que la constitution lui avait confi és24.

22. E. Zoller, (dir.), Marbury v. Madison : 1803-2003. Un dialogue franco-américain, Paris, Dalloz, 2003.id., Les grands arrêts…, pp. 1-28.23. O. Beaud, « De quelques particularités de la justice constitutionnelle dans un système fédéral », dans, La notion de « justice constitutionnelle », C. Grewe, O. Jouanjan, E. Moulin, P.Wachsmann, (dir.), Paris, Dalloz, 2005, p. 67.24. E. Zoller, « Les grands arrêts… » pp. 29-55.




Elle pouvait ainsi créer une Banque fédérale parce que les Pères fondateurs n’au-raient pas compris qu’on ne donne pas au Congrès les moyens des responsabilités que la constitution lui attribuait25, et cette banque ne pouvait pas être taxée par un État dans la mesure où ce serait là taxer le peuple américain (créateur des États-Unis), sur lequel « les États ne pouvaient prétendre à aucun contrôle 26 ». S’ils ont voulu l’Union, ils ne pouvaient pas lui refuser les pouvoirs (implicites) qu’ils lui avaient eux-mêmes accordés.

On pourrait penser qu’après deux défaites aussi lourdes (Marbury et McCul-loch), la souveraineté des États était défi nitivement compromise. Et pourtant, comme Elisabeth Zoller et Lauren Robel l’expliquent, l’histoire de la Cour su-prême et de sa jurisprudence est faite de revirements qui ne sont pas toujours faciles à comprendre si on laisse de côté le sens et la place centrale du fédéralisme aux États-Unis27. En eff et, si l’on pense par exemple à l’histoire de la ségrégation raciale (après la guerre de Sécession, validée par l’arrêt Plessy v. Ferguson en 1892), puis de la déségrégation (après le célèbre arrêt Brown v. Board Of Education of Topeka en 1954), on voit que le sort du fédéralisme aux États-Unis a évolué es-sentiellement au gré de la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême et de l’interprétation qu’elle donnait de la place du fédéralisme dans l’Union. Et si on assiste depuis les années 1980-1990 à un recul considérable des thèses désagrégationistes et de l’affi rmative action, c’est parce que la Cour suprême considère désormais qu’on est allé beaucoup trop loin dans la lecture centraliste de la constitution28. La volte-face « fédéraliste29 » de sa jurisprudence s’est inscrite si fermement en faux contre la jurisprudence du juge Marshall du début du xixe siècle ou de la période du New Deal que, comme le rappelle Elisabeth Zoller, la Cour suprême n’a pas hésité un instant à annuler récemment une loi fédérale qui interdisait de venir dans les écoles avec des armes à feu, considérant que c’était là une compétence des États, et que le fédéralisme interdisait de telles ingérences30.

2.2. L’autonomisation de l’ordre communautaire : vers une autorité politique ?

L’UE est une structure fédérative qui se démarque du modèle américain à la fois par sa reconnaissance des peuples fondateurs (la diversité nationale rendant pour l’instant impensable tout projet d’État-nation fédéral européen) et par son

25. ibid., p. 39 : « Que la fi n soit légitime, qu’elle se situe dans la portée de la Constitution, et tous les moyens qui sont appropriés, qui sont simplement adaptés à cette fi n et qui ne sont pas interdits, mais qui s’accordent avec la lettre et l’esprit de la Constitution, sont constitutionnels » (ibid., p. 39).26. Ibid., p. 45.27. E. Zoller, « Les grands arrêts… »28. E. Zoller, « Le réalisme dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle de la Cour suprême des États-Unis », Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, n° 22, juin 2007, p. 218.29. Cf. E. Zoller, « Les revirements… », cit dans Vergniolle, de F. Chantal, Le Fédéralisme…30. E. Zoller, « Le réalisme… » pp. 218-219.




silence calculé à propos du fédéralisme comme principe d’orientation et de fonc-tionnement de l’UE31. Ces deux facteurs (la logique particulariste et la « peur » du fédéralisme) permettent d’expliquer ce que certains seraient sans doute tentés de voir comme l’échec du fédéralisme européen (le défi cit démocratique, sa faible intégration politique, etc.), mais, selon une autre lecture, ils pourraient aussi être interprétés comme la singularité du fédéralisme pactiste dans un contexte démo-cratique : une intégration juridique sans intégration politique.

On peut en eff et noter dans l’UE un phénomène de fort décalage entre, d’une part, une intégration politique qui semble vouloir prendre son temps, en raison de la logique politique décrite plus haut, et, d’autre part, une intégration écono-mique et juridique de plus en plus poussée et consolidée, due notamment à l’ac-tivité de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes (CJCE), qui a su très tôt faire autorité en consacrant le principe de primauté du droit communautaire (Arrêt Costa c/ Enel en 1964), et de la Cour européenne des Droit de l’Homme (CEDH), dont les décisions ont eu ces dernières années une infl uence grandis-sante sur les droits nationaux des États membres et jouissent aujourd’hui d’une autorité largement démontrée. Pour ne donner qu’un exemple, peut-être l’un des plus signifi catifs, le pouvoir de pénétration et d’infl uence de la jurisprudence de la CJCE et de la CEDH est tel qu’elles ont réussi à faire ce que le droit anglais a toujours refusé à ses juridictions nationales, à savoir limiter la souveraineté du Parlement, désormais soumis au principe de primauté du droit communautaire. Comme l’explique Luc Heuschling :

La défi nition classique de la souveraineté telle qu’elle a été formulée par Dicey, et selon laquelle “aucune personne ou autorité n’est reconnue comme ayant le droit de passer outre ou d’écarter la législation du parlement”, n’est plus valable depuis l’intégration européenne, du moins dans les domaines touchés par le droit communau-taire32.

L’idée que l’ordre juridique communautaire prime l’ordre juridique fédéré est par conséquent aujourd’hui acquise. En eff et, même si les Cours supérieures au niveau étatique continuent d’affi rmer la suprématie de constitution sur le droit communautaire, on peut considérer que le processus d’autonomisation de l’ordre juridique communautaire a été accompli avec succès. D’ailleurs, il conviendrait de se demander si cette résistance des Cours étatiques supérieures ne répond pas davantage à une logique politique qu’à une logique juridique ou normative.

Par son contraste avec le processus d’intégration politique européenne, le processus d’autonomisation du niveau fédéral dans l’UE appelle au moins deux

31. Le fait que les fédérations historiques aient souvent tendu vers la centralisation du système et la confi scation de la souveraineté des États fédérés expliquerait cette peur du fédéralisme.32. L. Heuschling, État de droit, Rechsstaat, Rule of Law, Paris, Dalloz, 2002, p. 314.




interrogations : la première, qui sera abordée dans la partie suivante (3.2), concer-nant les limites de l’activité interprétative de la justice constitutionnelle (ici des Cours de justice européennes) face à l’éventuelle tentation ou volonté d’obtenir par la voie judiciaire ce que la voie politique pourrait refuser ; la seconde, que nous ne pouvons qu’esquisser ici, sur l’éclairage que le fédéralisme peut off rir justement sur la question de l’intégration politique de l’UE, et plus largement de toute structure fédérative. Dit en d’autres termes, le fédéralisme implique-t-il nécessairement qu’on pousse plus avant l’intégration politique de l’UE, ou bien commande-t-il, simplement, la conservation d’un cadre juridique non intégré politiquement ? Nous apportons un début de réponse à cette interrogation dans les pages suivantes, mais il nous semble en tout cas que toute réfl exion sur l’avenir de l’UE, y compris la question de l’intégration politique, gagnerait à accorder une plus grande attention au principe du fédéralisme, souvent le grand absent dans les débats. Pour ne donner qu’un exemple, une meilleure connaissance du fédéra-lisme pourrait montrer que si le modèle américain peut être un exemple à suivre en ce qui concerne la place centrale du fédéralisme comme principe régulateur de l’équilibre entre le fédéral et le fédéré – à supposer que l’équilibre entre fédéré et fédéral soit la fi n poursuivie –, le pluralisme national de l’UE inviterait en revanche à se tourner vers un modèle de fédéralisme multinational, plus adapté sans doute tant à la physionomie l’UE qu’à la volonté des États membres. Or ce modèle de fédéralisme multinational, que les États membres pratiquent déjà sans peut-être en être conscients, par l’importance qu’il attache à la conservation et à la protection des identités politiques des États et des peuples fondateurs (du niveau fédéré), rend diffi cile et peut-être même indésirable une intégration poli-tique plus poussée, ou ce qu’on pourrait appeler un processus de nation-building au niveau fédéral. Autrement dit, la question se pose de savoir si ce processus de federalism-building est compatible avec un processus de nation-building à l’échelle supra-étatique.

3. Les spécifi cités de la justice constitutionnelle dans les contextes fédéra-tifs : le principe du fédéralisme comme limite à l’autorité fédérale

Les expériences fédératives nous apprennent que l’autonomisation de l’auto-rité fédérale doit beaucoup à la justice constitutionnelle. Faute d’un législatif et d’un exécutif forts, le judiciaire permettrait d’étendre les compétences du fédéral au détriment du fédéré. La question qu’il faudrait donc se poser est celle des li-mites que la constitution elle-même pose à l’activité tant de l’autorité fédérale que de la justice constitutionnelle. La question soulève deux problèmes diff érents : (1) la place de la justice constitutionnelle dans la fédération : est-elle un organe du niveau fédéral ou bien une instance tierce et impartiale ? ; (2) Les limites que la




constitution pose nécessairement en contexte fédératif à l’activité interprétative des juges : comment doivent-ils interpréter une constitution fédérale ?

3.1. La place de la justice constitutionnelle : organe du niveau fédéral ?

La question de la place de la justice constitutionnelle dans la fédération est fondamentale pour l’équilibre fédératif. Le droit fédéral positif et la doctrine do-minante en droit public ont traditionnellement vu la justice constitutionnelle comme étant une compétence de l’État, donc du niveau fédéral. Pourtant, ce rapprochement entre justice constitutionnelle et niveau fédéral est probléma-tique et très discutable en droit fédératif, notamment dans les contextes fédératifs connaissant une certaine forme de pluralisme national. En eff et, ce rapproche-ment entre justice constitutionnelle et niveau fédéral aurait tendance à éroder la confi ance que les diff érentes parties doivent avoir en cette institution tierce, car elle pourrait alors être vue comme une agence du niveau fédéral chargée de mettre le droit au service de l’extension des compétences du niveau fédéral33.

Comme Kelsen a pu le noter, l’assimilation entre constitution et niveau fé-déral vient d’une association fallacieuse entre suprématie normative de la consti-tution et suprématie politique du niveau fédéral. La découverte de la supréma-tie constitutionnelle par une Cour suprême, même lorsqu’elle peut être décrite comme une décision politique (au sens où, véritablement, la signifi cation que le juge dégage de la norme interprétée est créée par lui), peut en réalité être justifi ée comme répondant à une logique normative. L’acte fondateur de l’Union serait l’acte de naissance de la fédération, moment historique qui doit tout à ses fonda-teurs. Or il ne faut pas confondre ce moment historique, nous dit Kelsen dans la Th éorie pure du droit, avec la logique normative (« on ne doit pas confondre relations historiques et relations de logique normative34 »). C’est cette logique normative qui permet de fonder et de justifi er la suprématie de la constitution et d’interpréter ainsi la volonté des États fondateurs comme voulant ladite suprématie, autrement dit comme voulant voir leur souveraineté limitée à la fois par la constitution et par le niveau fédéral. Lecture toute juridique dont le seul danger consisterait à reléguer trop vite à un second plan la logique politique du fédéralisme, ce que Kelsen d’ailleurs, théoricien de la « parité fédérative », se garde bien de faire. Sa critique de la doctrine allemande « droit fédéral brise droit fédéré », selon laquelle le fédéral aurait la compétence de sa propre compétence, met bien en évidence la

33. « Comment pourrions-nous attendre un arbitrage impartial entre le gouvernement fédéral, dont [les juges fédé-raux] constituent eux-mêmes une portion éminente, et un État pris individuellement, dont ils n’ont rien à espérer ni à craindre ? » (Th omas Jeff erson, cité par C. M. Pimentel, « La critique de Marbury v. Madison jusqu’à la guerre de Sécession », in Zoller, E. (dir.), op. cit., p. 84).34. H. Kelsen, Th éorie pure… p. 327.




lecture politique (subjective et contraire au droit) que la doctrine, au service ici des intérêts de l’État, fait du rapport entre les niveaux fédéral et fédéré :

C’est un des paradoxes de la théorie de l’État fédéral qu’elle présente le principe “droit d’empire brise droit de Province” comme répondant à l’essence de l’État fédéral et dissimule, par cela seul, la nécessité d’une juridiction constitutionnelle pour l’État fédéral. Il est facile de montrer que rien n’est si contraire à l’idée de l’État fédéral que le principe, qui fait dépendre l’existence politique et juridique des États membres du bon plaisir de la Confédération à laquelle il permet d’empiéter inconstitutionnellement par des lois ordinaires, et même par de simples règlements, sur leur compétence et de s’arroger ainsi, en contradiction avec la constitution générale de l’État, les compétences des États membres. Le respect véritable de l’idée fédéraliste qui a troublé son expression dans la constitution générale de l’État, exige que le droit d’État brise aussi peu le droit provincial que le droit provincial le droit d’État […]35.

En eff et, de ce que la constitution prime le droit fédéré, on ne peut pas dé-duire, en droit, la supériorité du fédéral sur le fédéré. On aurait deux autorités avec des compétences distinctes dont la répartition et la coordination seraient assurées par la constitution. Le fédéralisme impliquerait donc selon Kelsen : 1/ la reconnaissance de la lecture politique du fédéralisme : la parité fédérative est une parité entre corps politiques distincts, équilibre de puissances que le prin-cipe de suprématie de l’ordre juridique fédéral n’a pas vocation à modifi er ; 2/ le respect du pacte fédératif impliquerait nécessairement le respect de la répartition des compétences telle qu’elle a été faite initialement dans la constitution : « Toute violation des frontières ainsi tracées par la constitution est une violation de la loi fon-damentale de l’État fédéral 36 ».

On sait que c’est en partie la notion de « parité fédérative » qui conduit Kel-sen à penser la fédération comme une structure à trois niveaux : la fédération, le niveau fédéral, et le niveau fédéré. Cette structure tripartite se révèle fondamen-tale en ce qu’elle permet de surmonter les apories de la structure binaire, dans laquelle l’activité de l’organe juridictionnel appelé à vider les diff érends entre le niveau fédéral et le niveau fédéré, en tant qu’organe du niveau fédéral, serait à la fois juge et partie. En eff et, si la Cour est un organe du niveau fédéral, elle aura une tendance toute naturelle à trancher les litiges entre le fédéral et le fédéré en faveur du fédéral37. Que cette tendance se vérifi e ultérieurement ou non n’est

35. Cité par O. Beaud, « Hans Kelsen… », art. cit., p. 69.36. Ibid.37. Les mots du juge Olivier Wendell Holmes refl ètent cette tendance naturelle à favoriser l’extension des com-pétences du fédéral : « Je ne pense pas que les États-Unis courraient à leur perte si nous perdions le pouvoir de déclarer nul un acte du Congrès. Mais, je pense en revanche que l’Union serait en péril si nous ne pouvions pas déclarer une telle nullité pour les lois des diff érents États membres. Car quelqu’un qui est à la place que j’occupe voit bien combien la politique locale l’emporte souvent chez ceux qui ne se sont pas formés à des vues nationales. » (cité par O. Beaud, « De quelques particularités… », art. cit., p. 53, nous soulignons).




pas d’ailleurs le plus important. L’important est que l’activité de la Cour puisse être perçue comme impartiale par les diff érents acteurs, qu’il y ait donc une sorte de présomption d’impartialité. D’où, en eff et, l’importance d’arracher la justice constitutionnelle au niveau fédéral.

Si on peut penser que la structure tripartite kelsenienne n’est pas à l’abri de la critique38, elle a au moins le mérite d’attirer notre attention sur l’un des points fondamentaux dans les systèmes fédératifs : le rôle arbitral de la justice constitu-tionnelle. Quelles sont les conditions auxquelles la justice constitutionnelle pour-rait avoir l’impartialité requise en contexte fédératif ? On ne peut pas développer convenablement cette question dans cet article39, mais une analyse comparée des diff érents systèmes et contextes fédératifs traversés par un confl it politique exis-tentiel entre le niveau fédéral et le niveau fédéré montrerait l’importance de :

1. une composition de la cour représentative des diff érentes sensibilités politiques et de la diversité nationale, linguistique, etc. de la fédération ;

2. une procédure de désignation des juges ayant le souci de répartir cette lourde responsabilité de manière équitable entre les niveaux fédéral et fédéré ;

3. une protection accrue du principe du fédéralisme face à l’activité inter-prétative des juges. Nous développons le dernier point dans les pages suivantes.

3.2. L’interprétation d’une constitution fédérale

Nos systèmes démocratiques sont fondés sur la croyance de la soumission et de l’obéissance à la loi, celle-ci étant un produit de la souveraineté du peuple, par l’intermédiaire de nos représentants. Nous devons tous obéir à la loi, y compris les juges. L’idée que le juge soit créateur de la loi (du droit) alors qu’il n’est pas élu, à la diff érence de nos représentants, qu’il puisse ainsi contredire le souverain (nous, nos représentants), peut sembler eff rayante et même révoltante. On com-prend alors sans peine que la fi ction du juge comme machine à appliquer la loi l’ait emporté dans nos démocraties, au point que les décisions judiciaires sont le plus souvent justifi ées dans nos systèmes comme étant une simple application de la norme, dont le sens ne serait pas créé par le juge, mais simplement connu ou découvert (la norme aurait déjà un sens avant d’être appliquée et/ou interprétée). Pourtant, c’est le contraire qui est vrai. Rares sont en eff et les juristes qui ne voient

38. Par exemple : O. Beaud, Th éorie…, pp. 144-153.39. Le lecteur trouvera une très bonne synthèse dans l’article d’Eugénie Brouillet et d’Yves Tanguay : « La légi-timité de l’arbitrage constitutionnel en régime fédératif multinational. Le cas de la Cour suprême du Canada », in M. Seymour, G. Laforest, (dir.), Le fédéralisme multinational : un modèle viable ?, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 133-153.




pas aujourd’hui le juge comme un co-législateur ou un créateur de la loi40. Cela est surtout vrai pour les juridictions supérieures, qui décident en dernier ressort, sans possibilité de recours. Dans ce cas, comme le disait fort justement le Chief Justice Hugues : « Th e constitution is what the judges say it is 41 ». Qu’est-ce que cela implique dans les contextes fédératifs ?

D’abord, ce constat ne doit pas nous faire oublier que le recours au politique (au souverain) est toujours possible. C’est la thèse du lit de justice exposée par le Doyen Vedel42. Le juge peut certes dire en dernier ressort que la signifi cation d’une norme est incompatible avec la constitution, mais cette décision n’empê-chera pas l’intervention ultérieure du constituant qui pourra réhabiliter la loi en ayant recours à la procédure de révision constitutionnelle. Ce fut le procédé uti-lisé aux États-Unis par exemple lors de l’adoption du xie amendement :

Dès 1798, l’adoption du XIe amendement avait montré que la procédure de révi-sion pouvait être utilisée pour s’opposer à une décision de la Cour suprême […]. Dans l’aff aire Chisholm v. Georgia de 1793, La Cour suprême avait affi rmé qu’un État pou-vait être poursuivi devant la Cour suprême, contre son gré, par un citoyen d’un autre État. La Géorgie refusa de comparaître au procès et d’appliquer l’arrêt, et parvint à faire prévaloir son point de vue dans le XIe amendement, qui retirait à la Cour suprême la connaissance de « tout procès en droit ou en équité entamé ou poursuivi contre l’un des États-Unis par les citoyens d’un autre État 43 ».

L’exemple nuance considérablement le pouvoir du juge, en rappelant que le souverain peut toujours décider en dernier ressort. Mais le fameux lit de justice est à vrai dire plus intéressant pour notre propos en ce qu’il se pose comme limite à l’interprétation judiciaire qu’en tant qu’exemple du fonctionnement normal et souhaitable de la justice constitutionnelle dans une fédération. Cela pour plu-sieurs raisons : d’abord, en raison du caractère extraordinaire de la procédure de révision constitutionnelle, ainsi que de la diffi culté – extrême parfois – de sa mise en œuvre, ledit procédé ne pourrait être mis en application avec une certaine récurrence sans menacer de dissolution la fédération ; puis, notamment, dans la mesure où cette procédure agit plutôt comme contre-exemple de ce que doit être,

40. « Si, conformément à la célèbre défi nition de Hans Kelsen, une norme n’est pas autre chose que la signifi cation d’un acte humain et si l’activité de l’interprète consiste à déterminer la signifi cation d’un énoncé, c’est bien lui qui détermine la norme réputée contenue dans le texte qu’il interprète. L’interprète de la loi est législateur, et l’interprète de la constitution constituant » (M. Troper, Le droit et la nécessité, Paris, PUF, 2011, p. 165).41. Cité par M. Troper, Pour une théorie juridique de l’État, Paris, PUF, 1994, p. 309.42. « L’obstacle que la loi rencontre dans la constitution peut être levé par le peuple souverain ou ses représentants s’ils recourent au mode d’expression suprême : la révision constitutionnelle. Si les juges ne gouvernent pas, c’est parce que, à tout moment, le souverain, à la condition de paraître en majesté comme Constituant peut, dans une sorte de lit de justice, briser leurs arrêts » (Vedel, G., « Schengen et Maastricht : à propos de la décision n° 91-294 DC du Conseil constitutionnel du 25 juillet 1991 », Revue française de droit administratif, n° 8 (2), mars-avril 1992, pp. 173 et ss).43. C. M. Pimentel, « art. cit. », pp. 90-91.




idéalement, la résolution normale des confl its en contexte fédératif. Le règlement politique du confl it étant toujours possible (révision de la constitution, déclara-tion unilatérale de sécession, etc.), c’est l’interprétation judiciaire de la constitu-tion fédérale comme moyen de sauvegarder l’équilibre fédératif et la fédération qu’il importe d’examiner. La question à poser serait la suivante : comment les juges doivent-ils interpréter la constitution – l’équilibre fédératif – s’ils veulent éviter les confl its entre autorités politiques ? Comment doivent-ils interpréter la constitution s’ils veulent surtout éviter la solution politique – et la censure – pré-citée ?

La réponse à cette question doit distinguer deux niveaux. Le premier est sans doute le moins important. Il relève du constat cité plus haut : les juges pourront faire dire à la norme constitutionnelle ce qu’ils veulent qu’elle dise. Autrement dit, si l’on veut décrire la manière dont les juges appliquent et interprètent les normes juridiques, on ne peut pas la présenter autrement que comme une in-terprétation-volonté : la norme n’a pas de signifi cation qui préexiste à l’interpré-tation judiciaire, signifi cation que le juge aurait pour fonction de connaître ou découvrir. C’est en réalité le juge qui crée la signifi cation de la norme44.

Le deuxième niveau est celui qui nous importe le plus. Il s’intéresse plutôt, le constat initial étant fait, à la manière dont le juge va expliquer et justifi er son in-terprétation. C’est sur ce deuxième niveau que le principe du fédéralisme pourra agir, dans les systèmes fédératifs, comme une limite à une interprétation judiciaire susceptible de modifi er de manière substantielle l’équilibre fédératif.

La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême aux États-Unis est très intéressante sur ce point. Même si les États-Unis ont pu évoluer, comme il a été dit plus haut, dans le sens d’une centralisation progressive du système, on aurait pu s’attendre à ce que, au nom justement de l’intérêt général de cet État-nation consolidé, d’une certaine idée du bien commun du peuple américain, la centralisation fût beaucoup plus intense qu’elle ne l’est encore de nos jours. Si elle ne l’est pas plus, c’est grâce au principe du fédéralisme et à la culture fédérale qui s’est développée aux États-Unis. Nous avons vu les obstacles auxquels s’est heurté le gouverne-ment fédéral dans sa politique interventionniste, qui a été souvent freinée par la Cour suprême, parfois d’ailleurs en épousant une thèse que l’on pourrait consi-dérer comme contraire au bon sens, comme c’est le cas avec la décision de la Cour d’annuler une loi fédérale qui interdisait le port d’armes à l’école. On peut imaginer à quel point il aurait été facile pour la Cour, dans cette aff aire et dans

44. La liberté ou le pouvoir dont jouissent les juges ne fait que confi rmer qu’il est fondamental, en contexte fédératif, de créer pour la justice constitutionnelle les conditions d’impartialité requises dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Cela est encore plus nécessaire dans les contextes fédératifs traversés par une forme de pluralisme national, car dans ce cas la justice constitutionnelle pourrait tomber entre les mains d’une majorité nationale, ce qui pourrait entraîner une perte progressive des compétences des minorités nationales au profi t de la majorité nationale.




beaucoup d’autres (ce ne sont pas les exemples qui manquent !), de faire appel à des principes ou à des arguments susceptibles d’habiliter par voie interprétative l’intervention du gouvernement fédéral. Pourtant, c’est dans des aff aires comme celle susmentionnée que la Cour a pu avoir recours à une interprétation-connais-sance (au niveau 2 de la justifi cation), appelée aussi « originaliste », en vue de faire comprendre aux parties en confl it que le fédéralisme est un principe intangible car voulu ainsi par les pères fondateurs. Le message de la Cour est dans ce cas très clair : que les décisions plaisent plus ou moins, qu’on les trouve raisonnables ou déraisonnables, il n’appartient pas au juge de modifi er de manière substantielle la répartition des compétences entre le fédéral et le fédéré. Comme elle l’a rappelé encore récemment, c’est une partie du prix à payer quand on vit dans un système fédéral45.

En quoi cette justifi cation peut être considérée comme répondant à une raison juridique, objective et fédérale ? La justifi cation des décisions des juges ne fait ici en réalité que masquer un choix politique, car même lorsque la Cour décide que la constitution interdit au gouvernement fédéral d’empiéter sur les compétences des États, elle fait dire une chose à la constitution, alors qu’elle pourrait parfaite-ment lui faire dire le contraire. En d’autres mots, c’est la Cour qui décide de sau-vegarder l’équilibre fédératif, mais ici sa justifi cation, sa légitimité et son autorité rendent invisible le pouvoir qu’elle exerce46. En justifi ant ses décisions comme répondant à une simple application de la norme (ou interprétation-connaissance : la norme constitutionnelle créée par les pères fondateurs enjoint de respecter le fédéralisme et le fédéralisme signifi e qu’on respecte la répartition de compétences, etc.), la Cour suprême laisse aux diff érents niveaux politiques le choix et la res-ponsabilité d’une éventuelle modifi cation du principe.

La raison juridique trouverait ici sa meilleure expression en tant qu’arbitrage impartial des confl its fédératifs. En eff et, on peut penser que c’est la culture fé-dérale des États-Unis et de la Cour suprême qui permet, même dans un État-nation consolidé, d’écarter un choix qui peut être considéré comme souhaitable et bénéfi que pour l’intérêt général du peuple américain au motif que ledit choix serait contraire aux intérêts des États fédérés. Autrement dit, le peuple américain n’aurait pas systématiquement à l’emporter face aux peuples des diff érents États. On pourrait aussi voir cette raison comme une raison objective, aussi bien au sens de son impartialité que, surtout, de l’interprétation objective (connaissance) qu’elle donne de l’équilibre fédératif. Le fait de s’autocensurer, au lieu de déclarer la validité d’une loi fédérale que le juge peut considérer comme préférable ou moralement plus juste (on ne doit pas être armé dans les établissements scolaires), est la marque de l’objectivité du juge ici. Enfi n, ladite justifi cation pourrait aussi

45. Cf. Y.-E Le Bos, Renouvellement de la théorie du confl it de lois dans un contexte fédéral, pp. 171-172.46. M. Troper, Le droit et la nécessité, p. 55.




être vue comme répondant à une logique ou raison fédérale précisément en ce qu’elle cherche à sauvegarder l’autorité du niveau fédéré en empêchant le niveau fédéral d’empiéter sur ses compétences au nom d’un intérêt jugé supérieur (la na-tion, le marché commun, etc.). Mais ne nous trompons pas, ce faisant, la justice constitutionnelle ne fait pas que protéger l’autorité fédérée : elle œuvre aussi pour sa propre autorité.

Conclusion

Dans les systèmes fédératifs ayant fait le choix de l’État-nation, le respect du principe du fédéralisme (la répartition des compétences) par la fédération est fondamental. Sans le développement d’une culture fédérale au niveau fédéral, la culture nationale de la fédération aura tendance à appauvrir le fédéralisme au nom de l’intérêt général, de la souveraineté nationale, des Droits de l’Homme, etc. Tous ces principes, parmi beaucoup d’autres (la recherche d’une meilleure ef-fi cience du principe de subsidiarité, par exemple), appliqués à l’échelle territoriale de la fédération, œuvrent inévitablement contre la compétence des États fédérés. Mais dans ces cas, étant donné que le peuple des États fédérés peut se percevoir comme une partie d’un peuple plus grand et important (la grande nation), la perte des compétences du fédéré le plus souvent n’est pas suivie d’un confl it poli-tique existentiel entre le fédéré et le fédéral.

Les choses sont très diff érentes lorsque la fédération est composée de plusieurs peuples ou nations, qui considèrent souvent que leur propre peuple fédéré a la préséance sur le peuple de toute la fédération. Il arrive même que le peuple de la fédération ne soit pas vu comme étant un peuple. À la nationalité des États fédé-rés, charnelle et spirituelle en quelque sorte, serait ainsi opposée une citoyenneté commune, juridique et froide. Cela est-il normal, inévitable, souhaitable, etc. ? L’étude des systèmes et du droit fédératifs nous apprend que dans les contextes fédératifs multinationaux l’existence d’États fédérés ayant les moyens et le dé-sir de conserver leur identité politique rend extrêmement diffi cile tout projet de nation-building au niveau fédéral. Ces processus de construction nationale au niveau étatique ont pu réussir par le passé (États-Unis, Allemagne, etc.) en ayant recours à la force. Or dans des contextes démocratiques, comme ceux que nous connaissons aujourd’hui, le choix de la force n’est plus légitime quand il s’agit de construire une nation. Dès lors que le processus de création d’une nation au niveau fédéral dépend de la seule volonté des États fondateurs ou fédérés, et dans la mesure où ce processus de construction nationale est de manière inhérente un danger pour l’identité nationale et constitutionnelle des États fédérés, on peut penser qu’un tel projet, dans une fédération multinationale, est voué à l’échec. S’agit-il pour autant vraiment d’un échec du fédéralisme ? Nous ne le pensons pas. Le principe du fédéralisme a pour vocation de s’adapter à ces contextes de




pluralisme national et de réguler l’équilibre de forces à l’intérieur de la fédération. Or, c’est justement la recherche de cet équilibre qui peut nous incliner à penser que l’intégration politique ou l’unifi cation nationale n’est pas parmi les priorités du fédéralisme. À la culture nationale, le projet fédéraliste lui substituerait une culture fédérale dont le propre est l’impartialité et l’objectivité concernant aussi bien les fi ns de la fédération que celles des États. Ainsi, l’exemple de la justice constitutionnelle, non pas celle que nous connaissons dans les fédérations his-toriques (beaucoup trop partiale), mais l’exemple d’une justice constitutionnelle pensée comme surplombant les niveaux fédéré et fédéral est sans doute celui qui incarne le mieux l’autorité fédérale en droit fédératif. Une autorité juridique, sans autorité politique. On peut gager que la fédération aurait alors la confi ance des diff érentes parties, les outils et les conditions favorables au développement d’une culture fédérale, lui permettant ainsi de pousser plus avant l’intégration politique sans détruire le principe du fédéralisme.

RésuméCet article se propose d’interroger la logique politique et juridique du fédéralisme, en essayant de déga-

ger l’objet proprement fédéral. Seront analysés et comparés les systèmes fédératifs américain et européen à la lumière de la notion d’autorité, plus apte, selon l’auteur, à rendre compte des rapports fédératifs que celle, par exemple, de souveraineté. Les contributions fondamentales de Hans Kelsen et, plus récemment, d’Olivier Beaud ont pu mettre en évidence les problèmes qu’un lexique d’inspiration étatiste pose pour une bonne compréhension des phénomènes et des rapports fédératifs, comme l’exemple de la souveraine-té le montre bien (plus dans notre contexte européen qu’aux États-Unis, où la notion n’a pas le caractère absolu qu’on lui attribue dans notre tradition juridique). L’auteur s’intéresse dans un premier temps aux fondements théoriques et aux sources de légitimation de l’autorité fédérée dans la fédération, tant dans sa phase constituante (son acte fondateur) que dans son fonctionnement ultérieur. La deuxième partie de l’article est consacrée à l’autorité fédérale et au rôle fondamental de l’autorité interprétative du juge dans le processus d’autonomisation de l’ordre juridique fédéral, préalable indispensable à la création et au développement d’une véritable autorité fédérale. L’auteur discute ensuite de la place de la justice consti-tutionnelle dans une fédération ainsi que des garanties et conditions d’impartialité qui doivent entourer son activité afi n d’être perçue comme une véritable autorité dans la gestion et la résolution des confl its entre niveau fédéré et niveau fédéral caractéristiques du fédéralisme.

AbstractThis paper proposes a refl ection on the political and legal logic of federalism trying to characterize the

federal subject. Here, the American and European federal systems are analyzed and compared by means of the notion of authority, most suitable, in the opinion of the author to give an account of the federative relations than the notion of sovereignty. Hans Kelsen’s and, more recently, Olivier Beaud’s fundamental contributions have been able to highlight the problems of a lexicon of State inspiration for a full under-standing of the federative relations, as shown in the example of sovereignty (more in our European context than in the U.S., where the notion is not absolute granted the way it is in our legal culture). The author focuses fi rst on the theoretical foundations and sources of legitimacy of the federated authority in the fed-eral systems, both in its constituent phase (its founding act) and its subsequent operation. The second part of the article is dedicated to the federal authority and the central role of the judge in the process of au-tonomisation of the federal legal order, step necessary for the creation and development of a true federal




authority. The article closes with a refl ection on the place of the constitutional justice in federal systems and guarantees and conditions of impartiality which should guide its interpretative activity to be able to be perceived by the parties as real authority in the management and solution of characteristic confl icts of relations between the federated level and the federal in federalism.




Geographic Context

Contexte géographique



Le fédéralisme : plus fragile et plus nécessaire que jamaisQuelques réfl exions illustrées par la Suisse et les pays d’Afrique

Nicolas Schmitt

Dr. iur., Collaborateur scientifi que à l’Institut du Fédéralisme, Université de Fribourg (Suisse).

Introduction

Disserter sur l’obsolescence du fédéralisme est à la fois un luxe de nantis et la preuve de l’aspect éminemment démocratique du système, puisqu’il est ouvert à sa propre remise en cause. De fait, cette discussion est un peu absurde pour une raison fondamentale : le fédéralisme est un concept suffi samment vague pour faire preuve d’une grande adaptabilité. Ronald Watts parle de « l’énorme diversité d’ap-plication du concept de fédéralisme ». Les adeptes du fédéralisme comparé sont les premiers à le savoir : le fédéralisme présente une étonnante variété d’expressions à travers des pays aussi divers que les États-Unis, la Russie, les Émirats Arabes Unis, l’Espagne ou la Malaisie. C’est un peu comme la peinture : elle existe depuis fort longtemps et sous de multiples formes. Les grottes de Lascaux, les fresques des tombeaux égyptiens ou des églises byzantines, le Quattrocento italien, le Siècle d’Or hollandais, l’impressionnisme français, l’expressionnisme allemand ou le minimalisme américain, toutes ces œuvres n’ont rien de comparables, si ce n’est qu’elles témoignent d’une remarquable adaptation aux changements de circons-tances et à la mise en perspective des conditions politico-sociales qui les ont vus naître.

Il en va de même pour le fédéralisme. Dès lors, on ne saurait évoquer son obsolescence (la peinture est-elle devenue désuète en raison d’Internet ?), et l’on


Nicolas Schmitt146


ne devrait pas non plus recourir à des expressions telles que « plus » de fédéra-lisme ou « moins » de fédéralisme. Il n’y a que des variations dans la manière de concevoir et d’utiliser cet instrument, comme les artistes qui ont joué de leur palette très diff éremment au fi l du temps et des modes, alternant croûtes et chef-d’œuvre. En matière de fédéralisme, certains pays ont semble-t-il su mieux que d’autres se doter de structures qui correspondent aux canons du système, alors que d’autres galvaudent leurs chances, sans parler de ceux qui en sont aux pre-miers barbouillages de la décentralisation.

Mais au fond quelle est cette essence du système ? Pourquoi rend-elle le fédé-ralisme si fragile ? Que convient-il de faire pour améliorer le fonctionnement de celui-ci ? Et fi nalement, pourquoi est-ce tellement nécessaire de veiller au fédéra-lisme ?

Pour répondre à ces questions, cette réfl exion sera divisée en trois parties. Une première reviendra sur quelques considérations relatives à la défi nition du fédéralisme pour en rappeler toute la complexité. Une deuxième évoquera – en prenant pour exemple la Suisse – certains mécanismes que l’on peut utiliser pour prendre soin du fédéralisme. Une troisième évoquera – en prenant pour exemple l’Afrique – la source d’espoir que peut représenter le fédéralisme, à condition qu’il reste suffi samment vigoureux pour servir de modèle, dans un monde où l’hyper-centralisation conduit trop souvent à un cruel manque de démocratie.

Première partie : la fragilité du fédéralisme

Si le fédéralisme est désuet ou dépassé, alors par quoi le remplacer ? Le 2 mai 1989, Yasser Arafat avait fait sensation en déclarant que la Charte de l’OLP était désormais « caduque ». Mais peut-on rejeter le fédéralisme d’un revers de la main ou d’un trait de plume ? Quand on considère (cf. partie III.) à quel point le monde a besoin de démocratie, ce n’est pas le moment de dénigrer le fédéralisme qui a cette particularité rare d’être un système politique exigeant en termes de démocratie et de bonne gouvernance, et qui au surplus rapproche le pouvoir des populations.

S’il est vrai que le fédéralisme est parfois malmené, plutôt que de le considérer comme « has been », il serait plus sage de voler à son secours en tentant de revenir aux fondamentaux. Le fédéralisme a plus un problème de fragilité que d’obsoles-cence. Mais cette fragilité découle de ses sources.

Comme le dit George Anderson « Si tant est que l’on puisse défi nir une certaine essence du fédéralisme, on peut la trouver dans l’existence de deux ordres de gouver-nements instaurés par la constitution nationale, chacun d’eux disposant d’une auto-nomie originaire, et le fait que les autorités de chaque niveau soient en tout premier lieu responsables devant leurs électeurs respectifs. » (cit. trad.). Mais cette défi nition ne traduit pas l’élément émotionnel du fédéralisme, qu’Ivo Ducacek a mis en


Le fédéralisme : plus fragile et plus nécessaire que jamais 147


lumière : la clé de la distinction entre une fédération et une confédération (ou un État unitaire) tient dans la volonté de tisser entre les États membres des liens assez solides pour être qualifi és de formation d’une nation nouvelle, ou pour le moins d’un État nouveau. C’est ce que la constitution américaine de 1787 traduit en ces termes : « Pour créer une union plus parfaite »1.

Le fédéralisme représente donc un équilibre d’autant plus admirable qu’il est précaire (on parlerait en allemand de Gratwanderung) entre des États individuels et un État centralisé. Une fédération résulte d’un instant de grâce politique où ces deux visions arrivent à se conjuguer pour obtenir tout à la fois les avantages de l’autonomie et ceux de l’union. « Ensemble, nous défendons le droit d’être diff é-rents.2 » Mais pour que la magie opère, il convient de trouver le juste équilibre, ce qui n’est pas chose aisée et explique nombre d’échecs du fédéralisme. Comme pour l’énergie nucléaire, il faut atteindre une certaine masse critique de dévolu-tion qui permet d’enclencher le processus dialectique opposant centralisation et décentralisation. En deçà, rien ne se passe ; au-delà c’est l’explosion. Et le méca-nisme doit rester constamment sous contrôle pour ne pas déraper.

Quand on passe en revue la manière dont les grandes fédérations du monde ont été constituées, on prend conscience du fait que leur existence est un petit miracle quotidien, et on comprend plus aisément pourquoi des échecs émaillent cette histoire (cf. également la troisième partie).

Agrégation

Dans l’histoire moderne des institutions, le fédéralisme a émergé entre la fi n du xviiie et le début du xxe, essentiellement sous la forme d’un processus d’agré-gation. De nouveaux pays ont regroupé sous une forme fédérale des unités pré-cédemment indépendantes. Étape intermédiaire, les États-Unis et la Suisse ont préalablement formé des confédérations. L’expérience américaine en la matière n’a duré que six ans, de 1781 à 1787, lorsque les 13 anciennes colonies ont trouvé une parade à la faiblesse chronique du centre en formant la première fédération de l’époque moderne. De son côté, le développement de la Confédération suisse s’est étendu sur plus de cinq siècles, mais à l’issue d’une brève guerre civile elle a fi ni par adopter en 1 848 une constitution fédérale inspirée des États-Unis. La première constitution fédérale de l’Allemagne a été rédigée en 1871, succédant à des aménagements de nature confédérale extrêmement lâches (en 1667, Samuel Pufendorf décrivait le Saint Empire romain germanique comme « Irregulare Ali-quod Corpus Et Monstro Simile »). Quant aux six colonies d’Australie, c’est en 1901 qu’elles se sont réunies pour former une fédération. Plus récemment (la constitution transitoire de 1971 est devenue permanente en 1996), les Émirats

1. Défi nition élaborée par Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism, p. 192 (cit. trad.).2. Denis de Rougemont, La Suisse ou l’histoire d’un peuple heureux, L’Age d’Homme, Lausanne 1990, p. 18.


Nicolas Schmitt148


Arabes Unis ont off ert un nouvel exemple de réunion d’entités autrefois souve-raines.

Dans une fédération qui se crée par agrégation, aussi longtemps que les trans-ferts de compétences en direction du centre n’ont pas atteint une certaine masse critique, on reste au niveau interétatique, au mieux sous forme d’une confédéra-tion. Aux États-Unis et en Suisse, cette étape a clairement montré ses limites : les confédérations se sont révélées faibles et velléitaires. Aux États-Unis, le régime introduit par les « Articles de Confédération » a même risqué de faire imploser l’alliance forgée entre les anciennes colonies aux temps de la lutte pour l’indépen-dance contre la Grande-Bretagne. Il a fallu le génie visionnaire de personnalités comme Madison ou Jeff erson pour se rendre compte de la nécessité de faire un pas supplémentaire vers « une union plus parfaite ». En Suisse, l’absence de gou-vernance centrale a permis l’invasion du pays par Napoléon (1798), avant de compromettre son insertion dans une Europe marquée par la révolution indus-trielle.

L’Union européenne représente une bonne illustration des diffi cultés rencon-trées par une fédération agrégative. Institution politique unique en son genre, os-cillant entre confédéralisme et fédéralisme, elle peine à dépasser le stade d’OPNI (Objet politique non identifi é) que stigmatisait Jacques Delors. Voilà qui explique l’acharnement (incompris) des Européens à se doter d’une constitution qui aurait été indispensable pour tenter de faire entrer l’UE dans le cercle des fédérations. Faute de constitution et de gouvernance, notamment économique, l’Europe ne peut pas off rir au monde l’image d’un fédéralisme triomphant et doit se contenter de donner le spectacle attristant de la crise de l’euro. En dépit du fait que l’UE est probablement la plus extraordinaire construction politique de l’histoire, l’euros-cepticisme s’accroît, ce qui à la veille de célébrer le centenaire de la Guerre de 14 est vraiment un comble.

Mais les fédérations construites par agrégation doivent aff ronter un autre dan-ger. Si les transferts de compétence s’accroissent au point que le centre fi nit par accaparer presque tous les pouvoirs, alors le risque existe que la fédération soit dénaturée et se transforme en État unitaire (à peine) décentralisé. Ce fut le des-tin des fédérations communistes. L’URSS, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Yougoslavie disposaient toutes de constitutions prétendument fédérales, alors qu’il s’agissait en réalité de régimes centralisés contrôlés par un parti unique. Faute d’équilibre entre le centre et la périphérie, l’eff ondrement du premier a conduit à la désin-tégration de la fédération. Avec une expérience limitée en matière de démocratie et face aux énormes pressions de la transition, toutes ces fédérations ont fi ni par imploser. Néanmoins, outre la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Russie, qui formait elle-même une fédération au sein des anciennes structures soviétiques, a réussi à émer-




ger comme fédération post-communiste, dans laquelle subsistent cependant des tendances dangereusement centralisatrices de type « neo-poutinien ».

Système mixte

Les fédérations peuvent également résulter de mouvements plus complexes qu’une agrégation d’entités autrefois indépendantes. Plusieurs d’entre elles sont issues de la décolonisation. Dans de tels cas, les unités constitutives de la fédéra-tion n’ont pas forcément une grande identité ni une grande tradition démocra-tique. Dès lors, le bon fonctionnement de la nouvelle fédération dépend presque exclusivement du bon vouloir de ses dirigeants.

Alors qu’en 1867 le Canada a trouvé son origine dans la réunion de trois colonies de l’Amérique du Nord britannique (avant de s’étendre grâce à l’arrivée d’autres colonies), sa dimension fédérale s’est traduite par la scission de la plus vaste d’entre elles en en deux provinces distinctes – de sorte que ses origines comportent tout à la fois des éléments de centralisation et de dévolution. Par la suite, le Canada a fait partie des fédérations déployant des trésors d’ingénierie ins-titutionnelle pour préserver sa dimension fédérale et tenter de gérer (avec succès jusqu’à présent) les velléités indépendantistes du Québec.

En Amérique latine, le xixe siècle et le début du xxe ont vu naître pas moins de quatre fédérations. Toutes ont accédé à l’indépendance dans le contexte de la guerre d’Espagne (appelée guerre Péninsulaire par les Anglo-saxons), mais par la suite leurs histoires se sont révélées chaotiques, alternant troubles civils et dicta-tures. Leurs constitutions fédérales sont apparues au fi l du temps, parfois à la suite d’expériences mêlant des systèmes fédéraux et unitaires. Il a fallu attendre ces vingt dernières années pour que le passage à de véritables régimes démocratiques en Argentine, au Brésil et au Mexique donne un nouveau souffl e à la dimension fédérale de leurs constitutions respectives. Le Venezuela de son côté souff re d’un trouble appelé « hypertrophie chavézienne » qui en fait une des fédérations les plus centralisées du monde.

La chute des empires européens après la première Guerre mondiale a elle aussi entraîné dans son sillage, nonobstant quelques tentatives infructueuses, la création de plusieurs fédérations post-coloniales. Mentionnons en premier lieu l’Autriche, née sur les décombres de l’Empire austro-hongrois dépecé par les puis-sances victorieuses. Au Congrès de Vienne, à la question de savoir de quoi serait constituée l’Autriche nouvelle, Clemenceau méprisant répondit : « L’Autriche, c’est ce qui reste. » Mais paradoxalement, une fois la couronne impériale tombée dans le ruisseau, seuls les neuf anciens Länder disposaient encore d’une certaine légi-timité. Ils se sont réunis sous forme de fédération, ce qui a donné à celle-ci une base de départ très stable. Le même processus s’est déroulé après la deuxième


Nicolas Schmitt150


Guerre mondiale, et c’est grâce à ses neuf Länder que l’Autriche contemporaine a pu renaître de ses cendres.

Hors d’Europe, l’Inde, le Pakistan, la Malaisie et le Nigeria ont réussi à pé-renniser leur statut de fédérations. En Inde, la délimitation des États a donné lieu pendant des décennies à des discussions trop longues pour être rapportées, mais cet immense pays connaissait une longue tradition de royaumes et d’États indépendants. La Malaisie forme elle aussi une structure originale, à savoir une fédération comportant treize États dont neuf sont des sultanats, mais elle a été marquée par l’exclusion de Singapour en mai 1965. À son indépendance, le Ni-geria s’est vu doter d’une constitution fédérale par les Anglais, puisqu’il s’agissait de la réunion de trois colonies ; par la suite, le nombre de ses États membres n’a cessé d’augmenter pour atteindre 36. Quant au Pakistan, son fédéralisme est pour le moins chaotique. Né par nécessité du fait qu’il se composait de deux entités distantes de quelque 1 500 km, l’indépendance de sa partie orientale (devenue le Bangladesh) a rendu son fédéralisme très théorique. Au surplus, comme il est composé de quatre provinces dont une seule (le Penjab, 56 %) est plus grande que les trois autres réunies (44 %), les décisions majoritaires peuvent toujours minoriser les provinces.

En revanche, les eff orts déployés par les puissances coloniales pour réunir sous la bannière du fédéralisme des pays anciennement distincts ont échoué dans les Caraïbes, en Afrique (cf. partie III.), tout comme les tentatives d’introduire des aménagements de type fédéral en Indonésie. Les micro-fédérations que sont Pa-lau, les Comores (dont la situation reste chaotique), la Micronésie et Saint-Chris-tophe-et-Niévès ont également fait leur apparition dans le contexte de la décolo-nisation. Refl et de l’importance de la volonté politique, on trouve des situations très diverses (réussites, échecs, désintérêt) au sein de ces fédérations insulaires dont la décentralisation est pourtant imposée par la géographie.

Désagrégation

De nouvelles fédérations peuvent également naître de la « désagrégation » d’États unitaires. Avec l’adoption en 1993 d’une constitution formellement fé-dérale, la Belgique en représente l’exemple le plus abouti, faute d’être le plus prometteur. Quand l’Espagne, après la dictature du général Franco, a entamé un processus de décentralisation, elle a transféré à ses communautés autonomes des compétences signifi catives, au point de se transformer en une véritable fédération. Et lorsqu’elle s’est démocratisée à la fi n de l’apartheid, l’Afrique du Sud elle aussi s’est dotée d’une structure respectant les canons du fédéralisme (en prenant l’Alle-magne pour modèle). En 1994, lors des premières élections générales, la division du pays en neuf provinces a permis de retarder la monopolisation du pouvoir par l’ANC, celui-ci gagnant sept provinces, une restant aux Blancs du National Party




et une autre aux Zoulous de l’Inkatha Freedom Party. D’autres pays – l’Italie, l’Indonésie, le Pérou, le Royaume-Uni – ont également entrepris de transférer des pouvoirs non négligeables à leurs régions, mais on ne saurait pour autant les qualifi er de fédérations, même putatives.

On le voit dans ces exemples : la création d’une fédération par un processus de désagrégation est encore plus diffi cile que les autres. D’un côté, les États (pré-cédemment) centralisés répugnent à se dépouiller de leurs compétences pour les transférer à leurs régions. L’Espagne et surtout l’Afrique du Sud, des fédérations qui refusent par ailleurs de dire leur nom, sont engagées dans des processus de « recentralisation » qui mettent en danger leur nature fédérale. En Italie, le fédé-ralisme, et récemment le « fédéralisme fi scal », est agité comme un gri-gri dont personne ne sait vraiment ce qu’il signifi e. Cette pusillanimité dans la dévolution rend malheureusement un peu irréaliste (en dépit de sa désirabilité) le processus de fédéralisation de la grande majorité des États non démocratiques. Ce risque est rappelé par les auteurs d’une étude d’Afrimap (2010) sur la nouvelle constitution de la RDC de 20053:

Si le constituant congolais ne s’est pas trompé en estimant que la décentralisation était la seule voie institutionnelle susceptible de relever le défi de la gouvernance dans un pays tel que la RDC, il n’a peut-être pas mesuré à quel point la mise en œuvre de la décentralisation au départ des dépouilles d’une structure étatique unitaire représentait en elle-même un défi de gouvernance.

Mais d’un autre côté, il faut éviter que le processus de dévolution ne devienne incontrôlé et conduise à des sécessions et à l’éclatement de l’État. Ce fut le cas des fédérations postsoviétiques, et la Belgique pourrait à terme en représenter un nouvel exemple. Paradoxalement, même s’il n’est pas question d’y voir une ébauche de fédéralisme, le Royaume-Uni qui s’était engagé dans un intéressant processus de dévolution avec la création de parlements en Écosse, au Pays de Galles et en Irlande du Nord, doit désormais aff ronter la menace d’une sécession de l’Écosse4.

Situations post-confl ictuelles

Des situations encore plus délicates se rencontrent dans les nouvelles fédéra-tions émergeant de situations post-confl ictuelles. Ainsi, au terme des Accords de Dayton, la Bosnie-Herzégovine s’est vue instaurer un régime fédéral, mais elle reste soumise à une sorte de supervision internationale. L’Éthiopie, qui n’avait jamais pratiqué la démocratie de toute son histoire, a recouru au fédéralisme après

3. <http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Afrimap %20RDC %20low-res-Final.pdf>, 217.4. Le Parti nationaliste écossais – ou Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) en anglais – première force au Parlement écossais, a proposé un référendum sur l’indépendance qui se tiendra, probablement, en 2014.


Nicolas Schmitt152


que les rebelles eurent défait le président Mengistu. C’est à l’heure actuelle le seul pays d’Afrique à s’être doté d’une constitution explicitement fédérale et destinée à tenir compte de la grande diversité ethnique du pays. Espérons que le premier ministre Meles Zenawi échappera au syndrome despotique qui frappe le conti-nent noir. Quant aux électeurs d’Irak, ils ont approuvé en 2005 une constitution fédérale dont la mise en œuvre promet de se révéler extrêmement compliquée, tant les conditions de base semblent faire défaut dans ce pays sans tradition de décentralisation et en proie aux tensions interconfessionnelles. Dans d’autres cas, comme au Sri Lanka ou à Chypre, les eff orts visant à trouver une formule fédérale pour mettre un terme aux confl its et aux divisions se sont révélés infructueux, du moins jusqu’à présent. Le Népal, de son côté, étudie l’éventualité d’introduire le fédéralisme maintenant que l’insurrection maoïste est terminée. Le Soudan avait envisagé le fédéralisme mais n’a pu éviter la sécession au Sud, tandis que la Ré-publique démocratique du Congo peine à mettre en œuvre sa constitution de type fédéral (cf. partie III.). Toutes ces situations restent très précaires5.

Une structure intrinsèquement fragile

L’histoire de la création des fédérations « classiques » existant aujourd’hui (et les échecs que le fédéralisme a connus) montre à quel point il est diffi cile de trouver l’équilibre entre centralisation et décentralisation. Dans ce contexte, le colloque de l’IACFS6 organisé par la Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissens-chaften de Spire sous le thème « Governing from the Center » a permis à plusieurs experts de présenter des rapports nationaux décrivant en des termes assez sombres le fédéralisme dans leur pays7. Ainsi, Mercè Corretja Torrens a rappelé qu’en Es-pagne la crise ne faisait que renforcer Madrid ; pour Miguel Àngel Asensio en Ar-gentine, le terme « fédéralisme » pourrait n’être qu’une façon peu douloureuse de dire « centralisation » ; aux USA, en Russie et en Afrique du Sud, John Kincaid, Kira Baranova et Jan Erk se sont penchés sur le thème des obligations non pro-visionnées (unfunded mandates), qui trahissent une tendance à la centralisation. Même dans une fédération paraissant aussi stable que l’Allemagne, Hans Peter Schneider a parlé de « Federal State without Federalists », des récents sondages semblant démontrer un certain désintérêt des Allemands vis-à-vis de leurs Länder.

5. Au Népal, la route du fédéralisme est longue et semée d’embûches. En 2011, la création d’une énième Com-mission pour la Restructuration de l’État – qui devra débattre de la forme de fédéralisme à adopter – a contribué à débloquer le travail d’élaboration de la constitution et l’Assemblée a pu voter le 30 novembre la prorogation de son double mandat constitutionnel et parlementaire pour une dernière période de six mois allant jusqu’au 30 mai 2012. Mais la Commission sur le fédéralisme n’a pas réussi à trouver un consensus et a rendu le 13 fé-vrier 2012 un avis partagé, la majorité (maoïstes et madhésis) optant pour 11 états fédérés sur une base essen-tiellement ethnique, et la minorité (NC et UML) préférant 6 états fédérés. L’assemblée Constituante tranchera.6. Association internationale des centres d’étude du fédéralisme ; <www.iacfs.org>.7. Les « Actes » de la Conférence sortiront de presse dans quelques mois.




Dès lors, le fédéralisme se présente plus comme une victime de sa faiblesse congénitale que comme un bourreau des institutions et des peuples qu’il abrite. Mais pour que le fédéralisme continue de bien les servir, ceux-ci doivent prendre garde à sa bonne santé.

Deuxième partie : la complexité du fédéralisme

Comme une orchidée rare (par exemple Epidendrum ilense ou mieux encore Epiphyllum oxypetalum), le fédéralisme est une créature fragile qui réclame des soins attentifs. Il convient notamment de lutter contre les infestations de ces ra-vageurs que sont l’hypercentralisation ou la décentralisation à tendance sécession-niste, susceptibles de rompre l’équilibre intrinsèque du fédéralisme. Voyons à titre d’exemple quelques-unes des mesures prophylactiques mises sur pied en Suisse.

En tout premier lieu, il convient de signaler l’existence d’un « monitoring » régulier du fédéralisme. Le développement et la modernisation du fédéralisme sont une des aspirations fondamentales de la Fondation ch pour la collaboration confédérale8. C’est la raison pour laquelle, dès 2005, son Conseil de fondation lui a donné mandat d’établir tous les ans un rapport sur le fédéralisme. Ce monito-ring actif doit montrer dans quelle direction le fédéralisme suisse se développe et par quelles mesures il peut être renforcé.

À parcourir ces rapports, on se rend compte que même en Suisse le fédéra-lisme est sous pression. Ainsi, dans le rapport de monitoring Fédéralisme 20099, on apprend que le désenchevêtrement des tâches et les nouveaux principes consti-tutionnels de répartition des tâches entre Confédération et cantons10 n’empê-chent pas la pression centralisatrice de rester forte. Les tendances fondamentales n’ont pas changé au cours de la période examinée : si l’association des cantons au processus décisionnel de la Confédération fonctionne en général très bien, il persiste néanmoins une forte pression à la centralisation. La manière, positive ou négative, dont le fédéralisme est perçu dépend beaucoup de certains événements. Vérifi er l’application judicieuse des principes constitutionnels de la subsidiarité et de l’équivalence fi scale reste une tâche de longue haleine.

Le dernier rapport sur l’évolution de la situation (en 2010) a été publié le 18 mars 2011, et il confi rme que la situation n’est pas aussi sereine qu’on pourrait l’imaginer : « Le fédéralisme en soi a également fait couler passablement d’encre. Des réfl exions plutôt empreintes de pessimisme. La population s’intéresserait en priorité à

8. <http://www.chstiftung.ch/>.9. <http://www.vs.ch/Press/DS_3/ACC-2010-04-01-16864/fr/rapport_fr.pdf>.10. Il s’agit d’un vaste programme de réforme baptisé RPT, entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 2008 après une quinzaine d’années de travaux. Cf. Réforme sans précédent du fédéralisme suisse : la RPT est prête à entrer en vigueur : <http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformationen/00467/index.html?lang=fr&msg-id=15562>.


Nicolas Schmitt154


la politique fédérale et communale et délaisserait la politique cantonale. Les cantons en seraient de plus en plus réduits à être de simples organes d’exécution. En général, des tendances à la centralisation se feraient aussi jour dans l’importance croissante ac-cordée à la politique extérieure, dans l’accent mis sur la simplifi cation des tâches dans l’administration et dans l’évolution du paysage médiatique. Fort de ses compétences en politique extérieure, le Conseil fédéral serait habilité à ouvrir des négociations dans des domaines politiques qui ne lui sont pas attribués de par la loi. L’accent mis sur la simplifi cation des tâches dans l’administration soutiendrait l’idée de la nécessité d’un pilotage de plus en plus central aux fi ns d’éviter des divergences de mise en œuvre, et fi nalement la centralisation aurait également le vent en poupe à la faveur de l’évolu-tion du paysage médiatique. Pour un gros titre dans la presse, peu importerait, où se situent les compétences fédérales dans un cas concret.11 »

Autre baromètre du fédéralisme, la Suisse a pris l’habitude de mettre sur pied des Conférences nationales qui lui sont consacrées. L’idée d’organiser ce genre de manifestation remonte à la Conférence internationale sur le fédéralisme de 2002 à St. Gall12, quand la Conférence des gouvernements cantonaux (CdC)13 s’est demandée comment poursuivre le dialogue sur les questions fondamentales du fédéralisme suisse. La première s’est déroulée à Fribourg en 2005, la deuxième à Baden en 2008 et la troisième les 26 et 27 mai 2011 à Mendrisio sous le titre « Le fédéralisme face aux nouveaux enjeux territoriaux : institutions, économie et identité ». Tout l’establishment suisse s’y est retrouvé pour discuter des risques que les structures territoriales actuelles de la Suisse, et des menaces qu’elles font peser sur l’avenir du système fédéral dans son ensemble. De fait, les conditions socio-économiques ont tellement changé que les citoyens vivent dans des espaces « réels » qui ne correspondent plus aux espaces « politiques ». En d’autres termes, les frontières des cantons ont perdu de leur signifi cation, alors que les gens vivent dans de grandes agglomérations qui ne disposent d’aucune légitimité institution-nelle. Réformer les structures territoriales est un processus qui risque de s’étendre sur plusieurs générations, mais il est sage de ne pas passer sous silence un pro-blème qui touche une bonne partie de la population.

Cette constatation rend d’autant plus nécessaires les mesures prises au quoti-dien pour étudier et renforcer le fédéralisme suisse. On peut s’en faire une idée systématique en parcourant la bibliographie commentée du fédéralisme suisse publiée chaque année par l’Institut du fédéralisme dans le contexte du Moni-toring du fédéralisme. Le but de cette bibliographie consiste à collationner et synthétiser les travaux scientifi ques les plus importants consacrés au fédéralisme

11. Ces rapports sont accessibles sur Internet sur le site de la Fondation ch.12. Lors de la Vème Conférence internationale sur le fédéralisme d’Addis Abeba en 2010, la délégation suisse était la deuxième en nombre après celle du Brésil et hors pays africains.13. Cf. <www.kdk.ch>.




suisse publiés durant l’année écoulée, que ce soit sous forme de monographies, d’ouvrages collectifs, de recueils de mélanges ou d’articles dans des revues spécia-lisées. Ce ne sont pas seulement les travaux consacrés au fédéralisme au sens étroit qui sont pris en considération, mais également tous ceux qui présentent un lien plus ou moins substantiel avec l’organisation fédérale de l’État14.

Dans sa version 2011, l’étude montre à quel point la recherche sur le fédéra-lisme suisse est intense, à la fois pour maintenir la fl amme et pour coordonner la Confédération et les 26 cantons. On découvre dans cette bibliographie que les grands classiques de l’étude du fédéralisme sont constamment réédités, revus et améliorés pour les adapter constamment aux changements circonstanciels. On y découvre aussi la richesse des publications consacrées à certains cantons spéci-fi ques, mais également aux thèmes qui sont spécifi quement cantonaux, comme l’instruction publique, l’aménagement du territoire, la police ou la santé.

1. Des traités et autres manuels de droit constitutionnel (Staatsrecht) sont constamment écrits, réédités ou améliorés. Ils sont les témoins de la vigueur du système, puisqu’en Suisse le droit constitutionnel est tout empreint de fédéralisme. L’année 2011 a vu la parution d’un nouvel ouvrage de référence consacré au droit constitutionnel signé Giovanni Biaggini, Th omas Gächter et Regina Kiener, la deuxième édition du manuel de droit constitutionnel de Pascal Mahon ainsi que la troi-sième édition du « Staatsrecht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft » de Pierre Tschanen. De nombreuses études consacrées à des domaines spécifi ques sont également venues enrichir la discussion relative au fé-déralisme, par exemple pour ce qui touche la délimitation des compé-tences et la coopération dans le domaine des écoles et des hautes écoles, l’aménagement du territoire ou encore la question de la santé.

2. Il existe en Suisse une Base de données des cantons et des villes suisses appelée BADAC. Celle-ci est un portail d’information, de recherche et d’analyse comparative des administrations publiques et des autorités politiques en Suisse. Le projet est rattaché à l’Institut de hautes études en administration publique (IDHEAP) et est soutenu par les autorités cantonales et municipales. Les indicateurs BADAC mesurent le degré de développement des activités et des structures étatiques au niveau des cantons et des villes suisses. En 2011, la BADAC a déployé une acti-vité particulièrement riche, publiant notamment un « Monitoring des villes suisses (2000-2010) » et une étude sur les « Eff ets des réformes

14. Année après année, ces bibliographies commentées sont accessibles sur le site internet de l’Institut du Fédé-ralisme : < http://www.unifr.ch/federalism/assets/fi les/Home/Foederalismus_Monitoring_2010.pdf>.


Nicolas Schmitt156


sur l’organisation des administrations cantonales 1990-2010 »15. De la sorte, le fédéralisme est mesuré par rapport à quelque 60 indicateurs clé classés en 9 domaines thématiques. À titre d’exemple, le benchmarking de la collaboration intercantonale se mesure au nombre de concordats, ceux-ci étant répartis selon qu’ils prévoient ou pas une péréquation des charges. En 2011, la BADAC a également proposé, en première suisse, un nouvel Atlas interactif de l’État (AsTAT). Celui-ci permet d’une part de cartographier l’État aux niveaux des administrations et des autorités, et de l’autre de synthétiser la complexité du fédéralisme en suivant les modes d’organisation et les réformes administratives dans une optique comparative. Une version électronique existe déjà, et une version imprimée devrait voir le jour en 2012.

3. Toujours en 2011, la Commission fédérale pour les questions de migra-tion (CFM) a consacré un numéro spécial de sa revue Terra Cognita aux eff ets du fédéralisme sur la politique migratoire (N° 19). Sous le titre « Le fédéralisme, un bienfait ou un danger pour la politique de migra-tion ? » plusieurs auteurs représentant diverses sensibilités et courants de pensée et d’opinion se sont attaqués aux contradictions existant entre, d’une part, les nécessités d’harmonisation et d’égalité de traite-ment pour les migrants et les migrantes vivant en Suisse, et d’autre part les bienfaits de la diversité et de la liberté d’aménagement off ertes aux cantons et aux communes en termes de politique migratoire. Bien que les opinions des divers auteurs divergent quelque peu, personne ne ré-clame l’abandon pur et simple du fédéralisme, mais ils sont nombreux à espérer tout de même une adaptation de ses structures, et cela dans l’optique d’une meilleure intégration des nouvelles minorités nées de la migration au sein du modèle fédéral, tel qu’il avait été institutionnalisé en 1848, modèle qui a permis l’intégration des minorités indigènes au sein d’une constitution étatique nationale.

4. Par ailleurs, la juridiction constitutionnelle en Suisse est passée sous le microscope des chercheurs, elle qui est tellement limitée par l’art. 190 CF, selon lequel les lois fédérales s’imposent au Tribunal fédéral et aux autres autorités. Une édition spéciale de la revue électronique Jusletter du 12 septembre 2011 lui a été consacrée, rappelant notamment que la juridiction constitutionnelle ne protège pas seulement le citoyen contre les violations de la constitution et des droits de l’homme, mais qu’elle veille également au respect de la répartition constitutionnelle des com-pétences entre la Confédération et les cantons.

15. <http://www.badac.ch/fr/index.php>.




5. Enfi n, l’Institut du Fédéralisme lui-même a engagé tous ses collabora-teurs à inaugurer sous le titre « Fédéralisme 2.0 - Réfl exions et perspec-tives » le premier opus d’une nouvelle collection baptisée PIFF qui doit présenter, de manière plus « impressionniste » que dogmatique, toute une série de problèmes et de questions qui marquent actuellement la discussion sur le fédéralisme en Suisse ou risquent de l’infl uencer dans un proche avenir.

Outre ces grandes thématiques, l’année 2011 a été marquée par la publication d’un grand nombre d’ouvrages et d’articles consacrés aux aspects les plus divers du fédéralisme suisse16. On y découvre que là où les cantons ont une certaine marge de manœuvre, ils en profi tent au maximum, ce qui crée des situations par-fois complexes et nécessite des mesures d’harmonisation. En dépit de la tendance constatée à la centralisation, la lecture de cette bibliographie montre la manière très naturelle dont s’enclenche le processus dialectique propre au fédéralisme, avec d’un côté des cantons qui font usage de la marge de manœuvre qui leur est octroyée, et de l’autre des eff orts qui sont accomplis pour tenter d’harmoniser une situation dans laquelle la diversité des solutions peut devenir problématique. Ain-si la Société suisse des juristes s’est-elle attachée depuis 150 ans à l’harmonisation du droit. Elle a notamment joué un rôle majeur dans deux textes emblématiques de celle-ci : le Code civil suisse (qui a fêté son centenaire le 1er janvier 2012) et le Code de procédure civile (entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 2011).

Mais si certaines unifi cations ne créent pas de vagues, d’autres sont loin de faire l’unanimité. Ainsi en va-t-il du nouveau code de procédure pénal, dont les 457 articles sont entrés en vigueur le 1er janvier 201117. Comment mieux mon-trer, même à l’échelle d’un aussi petit pays que la Suisse, à quel point il est diffi -cile de trouver l’équilibre magique entre centralisation et décentralisation, raison pour laquelle des centaines d’études sont consacrées chaque année à cette quête du Graal qui ressemble de plus en plus au rocher de Sisyphe.

Troisième partie : la nécessité du fédéralisme

De la même manière que la Suisse est un exemple (et pas un modèle) de certaines activités que l’on peut exercer pour tenter de préserver le fédéralisme, l’Afrique illustre les carences démocratiques dont souff re trop souvent notre monde contemporain, et le rôle que pourrait jouer le fédéralisme pour y remédier.

16. Disponibles sur le site internet de l’Institut du fédéralisme : <www.federalism.ch>.17. RS 312.0 ; voir le bilan tiré par la responsable des questions de sécurité du canton de Vaud le 5 février 2012 : <http://www.lematin.ch/suisse/Ce-nest-pas-au-citoyen-dassurer-lordre-public/story/17852051>.


Nicolas Schmitt158


Le fédéralisme est porteur d’espoir pour les jeunes démocraties

À l’issue de la Conférence internationale sur le fédéralisme d’Addis Abeba18, le président du Forum des Fédérations, l’Indien Vijav Kelkar, a relevé à quel point le fédéralisme, en tant que cadre institutionnel de la structure étatique, était d’une importance primordiale en Afrique. Vu l’ampleur des enjeux, il ne serait pas inu-tile de « regarder plus loin que le bout de son nez » pour tirer des leçons des réussites – et des déboires – d’autres fédérations. De son côté, le premier ministre éthiopien Meles Zenawi a souligné l’importance que revêt le fédéralisme en Éthio-pie sous l’angle de la stabilité et de l’évolution vers la prospérité : « Le fédéralisme est le socle sur lequel nous serons à même de bâtir une nation jeune et dynamique dans l’un des États les plus vieux de la planète. » De manière générale, cette ve Confé-rence internationale sur le fédéralisme a été représentative de la place croissante que les travaux d’une organisation comme le Forum des Fédérations, sans oublier tous les experts qui gravitent dans son orbite, occupent pour les fédérations en devenir. À titre d’exemple, dans le cadre de programmes s’étendant sur plusieurs années, le Forum a été actif en Éthiopie, au Népal, au Pakistan, au Soudan et au Sri Lanka. Tous ces projets visent à apporter une contribution à la compréhension des décideurs et des multiplicateurs en déployant tout un éventail de possibilités concernant le fédéralisme et ses avantages et inconvénients potentiels. Ils visent en outre à instaurer un dialogue sur le fédéralisme impliquant la société civile19.

Les fédérations avortées en Afrique

La tâche qui attend les adeptes du fédéralisme s’annonce colossale, si l’on considère par exemple le nombre de fédérations qui ont échoué en Afrique. Nous l’avons vu, la chute des empires coloniaux après les deux Guerres mondiales a en-traîné la création de plusieurs fédérations postcoloniales (Inde, Pakistan, Malai-sie, Nigeria, ou encore les micro-fédérations que sont Palau, les Comores, la Mi-cronésie et Saint-Christophe-et-Niévès). Mais sur le continent noir, ces tentatives se sont presque toujours conclues par des échecs. Qu’il s’agisse de fédéralisme interne, de confédéralisme ou d’intégration régionale, on y dénombre au moins onze fédérations défuntes.

1. Improbable créature du colonialisme italien à la fi n du xixe siècle, l’Érythréen, après dix années passées sous mandat britannique, a été englobé dans une fédération avec l’Éthiopie en 1953. C’est pourtant

18. Rapport de monitoring de la Fondation ch :<http://www.chstiftung.ch/repository/proxy/oi-fi les/41238/documents/Rapportdemonitoring-2010.pdf>19. L’Institut du fédéralisme organise ainsi un « Practitioners Course on Decentralisation and Local Gover-nance » destiné aux professionnels qui entendent améliorer la gouvernance locale et renforcer la décentralisation dans leur pays.




l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies elle-même qui, par voie de ré-solution, avait adopté la loi fédérale qui l’assujettissait à la souveraineté de la couronne éthiopienne. La Résolution 390 (v) (a) de l’ONU, du 2 décembre 1950, comptait 15 articles. Les sept premiers réglemen-taient les relations entre l’Érythréen et l’Éthiopie. Le premier prévoyait que l’Érythréen constituerait une unité autonome fédérée avec l’Éthio-pie. Mais à partir du moment où des manifestations indépendantistes ont éclaté, Addis-Abeba a mis au fédéralisme en 1961 afi n de tenter de préserver l’unité du pays, déclenchant une guerre civile qui s’est achevée en 1991 par la victoire des troupes érythréennes. L’indépendance de l’Érythréen a été proclamée le 24 mai 1991.

2. De son côté, l’indépendance du Soudan a été proclamée en 1956, mais le gouvernement de Khartoum est revenu sur les promesses faites aux provinces du Sud de créer un État fédéral, ce qui a entraîné une muti-nerie menée par des offi ciers du Sud, qui s’est transformée à son tour en une guerre civile qui n’a pas duré moins de 17 ans (1955 – 1972), quand bien même les troubles avaient débuté comme une simple ré-bellion. Entre-temps un second coup d’État militaire du 25 mai 1969 a mis au pouvoir le colonel Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, et le nouveau régime a supprimé le parlement et interdit tous les partis politiques. La suite de l’histoire n’a été qu’une interminable période de troubles entre musulmans et milices chrétiennes. Il a fallu attendre le 9 janvier 2005 pour qu’un accord de paix soit signé à Nairobi, prévoyant un régime d’autonomie de 6 ans au Soudan du Sud suivie par un référendum d’autodétermination. Celui-ci a été organisé le 9 janvier 2011, et les électeurs se sont exprimés à 98.83 % en faveur de la sécession. Le pré-sident soudanais Omar al-Béchir a reconnu offi ciellement ce résultat le 8 février 2011 et, le 14 juin 2011, le Sud Soudan est devenu le 193e État de l’ONU. Cet échec est particulièrement désolant, non seule-ment parce que les luttes armées ont fait plus de deux millions de morts et quatre millions de déplacés, mais également parce que cette sécession s’inscrit à une époque où le fédéralisme a fait ses preuves dans le monde entier comme mode de gouvernement effi cace.

3. En 1891, les Britanniques ont fondé le protectorat de l’Afrique centrale britannique et, en 1907, celui du Nyassaland. En 1953, ce dernier a rejoint la Rhodésie du Nord et la Rhodésie du Sud dans une fédé-ration appelée Fédération de Rhodésie et du Nyassaland ou Fédération d’Afrique centrale. Celle-ci constituait une expérimentation coloniale mise au point par le Royaume-Uni pour développer économiquement cette région d’Afrique australe et retarder les volontés indépendantistes


Nicolas Schmitt160


des Africains. Elle a pris fi n dix ans après sa fondation sur un constat d’échec. En eff et, le fédéralisme suppose la volonté de partager le pou-voir. Or en 1958, le docteur Hastings Kamuzu Banda (il avait étudié la médecine aux USA) est retourné dans la région pour prendre la tête du NAC (Nyassaland African Congress), qu’il a transformé en MCP (Malawi Congress Party) dans le but d’accéder à la présidence. Lors des élections du 15 avril 1961, le MCP a remporté une victoire écrasante au Conseil législatif aussi bien qu’au Conseil exécutif du Nyassaland, auquel le gouvernement britannique accorda l’autodétermination en 1962. Kamuzu Banda est devenu premier ministre le 1er février 1963, alors que les Britanniques contrôlaient encore les fi nances, la sécurité et le système juridique du pays. La Fédération de Rhodésie et du Nyassa-land a été dissoute le 31 décembre 1963, et l’indépendance du Malawi proclamée le 6 juillet 1964. Deux ans après, le Malawi a adopté une nouvelle constitution prévoyant un parti unique, et Kamuzu Banda en est devenu le premier président. En 1970, il a été proclamé président à vie du MCP et en 1971, président à vie du Malawi, où il a maintenu un régime autoritaire jusqu’à son départ (forcé) à la retraite en 1994, à plus de 90 ans. Quant aux autres membres de la défunte fédération, son implosion a coïncidé avec l’indépendance de la Rhodésie du Nord, re-baptisée Zambie, qui a été dirigée jusqu’en 1991 par Kenneth Kaunda. Du côté de la Rhodésie du Sud, le gouvernement blanc dirigé par Ian Smith a proclamé unilatéralement son indépendance en 1965, sous le nom de Rhodésie.

4. Dans le domaine de l’intégration régionale, à l’instar de l’UE contem-poraine, la Communauté française (aussi appelé simplement Commu-nauté), successeur de l’Union française, devait off rir une structure rassemblant la France et ses anciennes possessions coloniales et pro-tectorats. Sa création découlait du mandat confi é au gouvernement de Charles de Gaulle par la loi constitutionnelle du 3 juin 1958, et qui consistait à établir un projet de constitution permettant « d’organiser les rapports de la République avec les peuples qui lui sont associés ». De nature fédérale, la Communauté était présidée par le Président de la République française, dirigée par un Conseil exécutif rassemblant les chefs des États membres et elle disposait d’un Sénat composé de délégués des parlements nationaux. Son existence s’est singularisée par sa brièveté. La Guinée a été la première à rejeter la constitution de la ve République et à devenir indépendante, dès 1958, suivie par tous les autres membres présomptifs de la Communauté. Par ailleurs, alors que la constitution imposait que l’éventuelle indépendance d’un État




membre de la Communauté résultat d’un référendum, aucun n’ait été organisé. Dès lors, le Premier ministre Michel Debré n’a pas eu d’autre solution que de constater, par un échange de lettres du 16 mars 1961 avec le président du Sénat de la Communauté, la caducité des disposi-tions constitutionnelles du titre XII.

5. En janvier 1959, le Soudan français (aujourd’hui le Mali) et le Séné-gal ont fusionné pour donner naissance à la Fédération du Mali, qui est devenue offi ciellement indépendante le 20 juin 1960, à la suite des accords signés en France le 4 avril 1960, date aujourd’hui considérée comme la plus marquante de l’histoire du Sénégal. À peine deux mois plus tard, le 20 août 1960, le Sénégal s’est retiré de cette très éphémère fédération pour proclamer son indépendance. Le 22 septembre 1960, sous la conduite de Modibo Keïta, le Soudan français a lui aussi pro-clamé son indépendance tout en conservant le nom de Mali.

6. Ahmed Sékou Touré a cherché à former une Union Africaine avec Kwame Nkrumah, l’apôtre du panafricanisme ; la Guinée et le Ghana ont même scellé une union le 1er mai 1959, rejoints le 24 décembre 1960 par le Mali, ce qui a donné naissance à l’Union des États africains (Guinée - Ghana - Mali). Mais l’union n’a duré que de 1960 à 1962 ; elle a été dissoute dès le moment où la Guinée a décidé (provisoire-ment) d’intensifi er ses relations avec les États-Unis au détriment de l’URSS.

7. Ancienne colonie allemande, le territoire camerounais a été placé sous la tutelle de la Société des Nations à la fi n de la première Guerre mondiale et confi é à l’administration conjointe de la France et du Royaume-Uni. L’ancien territoire administré par celle-là a conquis son indépendance sous l’appellation de République du Cameroun le 1er janvier 1960. En 1961, il a été rejoint par la partie méridionale du territoire sous ad-ministration britannique (appelée Cameroons, la partie septentrionale ayant préféré une union avec le Nigeria), pour former la République fédérale du Cameroun. Ahmadou Ahidjo a été élu à sa présidence en 1960, et c’est lui qui a organisé le 20 mai 1972 un référendum pour mettre fi n au fédéralisme et conduire à un État unitaire, la République unie du Cameroun, rebaptisée République du Cameroun depuis 1984.

8. Historiquement, la région aujourd’hui connue sous le nom d’Ouganda a vu se développer un certain nombre de royaumes marqués par une centralisation politique précoce, parmi lesquels le Bunyoro-Kitara qui dominait alors la région, l’Ankole, les Îles Sese et le Buganda. Le 9 oc-tobre 1962, date de l’indépendance du pays, la question de ses struc-tures politiques s’est posée avec acuité. Inscrite dans la première consti-


Nicolas Schmitt162


tution, la solution retenue était de type fédéral, associant les quatre anciens royaumes, quand bien même celui du Bouganda maintenait sa prépondérance, allant jusqu’à donner son nom au nouvel État, l’Ou-ganda, pays des Bagandas. Le Kabaka Mutesa II (de son vrai nom Ma-jor General Sir Edward Frederick William David Walugembe Mutebi Luwangula Mutesa II KBE, 1924-1969), en est devenu président à vie, alors que Milton Obote, fondateur en 1960 du Congrès du peuple ougandais (Uganda People’s Congress, UPC), en est devenu le premier ministre. L’UPC, à l’instar de son dirigeant, était le parti des popu-lations nilotiques du Nord, opposées à la domination économique et politique du Bouganda, et donc favorable à la centralisation. Dès lors, les tensions entre le Nord nilotique et le Sud bantou se sont exacerbées. En mai 1966, pour mieux imposer la centralisation, Milton Obote a dépêché l’armée au Bouganda, et il a déposé le Kabaka Mutesa II, avec l’appui de son chef d’état-major Idi Amin Dada, ressortissant d’une ethnie musulmane minoritaire du Nord-ouest. L’année suivante, Mil-ton Obote a fait promulguer une nouvelle constitution abolissant le fédéralisme des royaumes et instituant un régime présidentiel à parti unique.

9. Le Sénégal et la Gambie se sont unis en 1982 pour former la Confé-dération de Sénégambie, mais les noces n’ont jamais été consommées et l’alliance est demeurée purement théorique. Mort-née, elle a fi ni par être dissoute en 1989.

10. La Guinée équatoriale a formé une microfédération bicéphale dont l’existence éphémère est révélatrice du destin des fédérations africaines. En 1959, les territoires espagnols du golfe de Guinée ont acquis le sta-tut de province espagnole d’outre-mer, semblable à celui des provinces de la métropole. La loi du 30 juillet 1959 leur a donné la dénomination offi cielle de Région équatoriale espagnole, une région divisée en deux provinces : Fernando Poo (l’île désormais appelée Bioko et sur laquelle se trouve la capitale Malabo) et Río Muni (le territoire continental) ; elle était administrée par un gouverneur général qui exerçait tous les pouvoirs civils et militaires. Fédération bipolaire et insulaire occultant (à l’instar de l’Espagne contemporaine) son caractère fédéral, ce dernier se cachait à l’art. II.1 de la loi d’autonomie du 15 décembre 1963 : « Los nacionales naturales de Fernando Poo y Río Muni tienen los mismos derechos y deberes reconocidos a los demás españoles por las Leyes Funda-mentales. » Mais après l’indépendance, en 1973, le président Francisco Macías Nguema a promulgué une nouvelle constitution, créant un État




unitaire et mettant fi n au statut antérieur de « fédération » entre Fer-nando Poo et Río Muni.

11. Dès avant son indépendance le 30 juin 1960, l’ancien Congo belge, devenu Congo, puis Zaïre, puis République démocratique du Congo (RDC), a toujours rêvé de fédéralisme. L’ABAKO (Association des Bakongos, un parti important à l’heure de l’indépendance) prônait déjà le fédéralisme, qu’elle trouvait justifi é étant donné l’étendue du pays et la diversité des populations en présence. Le pays s’est vu comme une fédération (toutefois sans utiliser expressément ce terme dans sa constitution), mais il ne s’est jamais donné les moyens de concréti-ser ce postulat. Tout récemment, la constitution de 2005 a introduit le régionalisme politique comme forme de l’État intermédiaire entre l’État unitaire décentralisé et l’État fédéral « dont elle constitue l’anti-chambre ». L’article 2 de la constitution de 2005 de la RDC spécifi e un découpage du pays en 26 provinces, comprenant la ville-province de Kinshasa. Votée en février 2006, cette nouvelle organisation territoriale doit prendre eff et dans les trois ans qui suivront l’installation eff ective des institutions politiques prévues par la constitution (article 226). Elle aurait dû être eff ective en 2010, mais n’est pas encore en place.

Manque de démocratisation

Non seulement l’Afrique est un continent dans lequel les expériences fédérales ont échoué, mais, plus généralement, l’Afrique subsaharienne postcoloniale re-présente un désastre politique. Depuis une cinquantaine d’années, ce ne sont que coups d’État, assassinats, guerres tribales, confl its armés, guerres civiles, luttes de pouvoir, absence de démocratie Sur les 54 États indépendants d’Afrique, seuls 18 ont évité des coups d’État, et parmi ces derniers 6 au moins ont connu des tentatives. En République centrafricaine, tous les chefs de l’État sont arrivés au pouvoir par des coups d’État (sauf Ange-Felix Patassé) alors qu’au Burkina Faso, le président Compaoré est impliqué dans plusieurs assassinats, dont celui de son prédécesseur. Quant à la Mauritanie, on y trouve depuis 1960 une véritable col-lection de coups d’État. Ce constat est d’autant plus désespérant que la plupart des pays africains ont accédé à l’indépendance dans les années 1960, précisément à l’époque où l’Europe connaissait enfi n une paix et une prospérité inédites de-puis des siècles. Les vieux démons du Vieux Continent auraient-ils débarqué en Afrique, à commencer par ce goût immodéré des dirigeants pour le pouvoir, à n’importe quel prix ?


Nicolas Schmitt164


Une solution potentielle : fédéralisme et démocratie

La démocratie est exigeante, la démocratie fédérale encore plus. Or, dans la grande majorité des pays africains, on sent une conception trop étroite de la dé-mocratie, qui se limite pour l’essentiel à l’organisation des élections. Et encore, pour parler trivialement, celles-ci semblent se limiter à la possibilité pour les ci-toyens de mettre des papiers dans une boîte, et pour les candidats (surtout ceux qui sont déjà au pouvoir) de trouver la meilleure manière de remplir la boîte d’avance. En Afrique, cette crypto-démocratie a permis de mettre en place des oligarchies, voire des ploutocraties, qui monopolisent le pouvoir. Dans la plupart des pays africains hypercentralisés, la démocratie reste encore une utopie, voire un luxe comme l’avait rappelé Jacques Chirac à Yamoussoukro au grand dam des Africains eux-mêmes.

En eff et, une « véritable » démocratie va bien au-delà de la simple pratique des élections. Elle suppose un état d’esprit particulier. La démocratie, dans sa défi nition occidentale, n’a rien de culturellement spontané ni universel. Elle est une construction et une volonté. L’aspect formel, pour ne pas dire rituel, des élections peut précisément inciter à leur détournement par toutes sortes de pro-cédés servant à les truquer ou à en déformer les résultats, sans que cela paraisse important du moment qu’elles se sont tenues. Or, la démocratie au sens étymo-logique de « pouvoir du peuple » signifi e précisément que le pouvoir n’appartient qu’au peuple. C’est temporairement qu’il est confi é aux représentants du peuple, à charge pour ceux-ci de l’exercer pour le bien-être du peuple sans volonté de le détourner. De la sorte, la démocratie représente beaucoup plus qu’un simple exercice technique consistant à mettre sur pied un scrutin. Il s’agit surtout d’en respecter scrupuleusement les résultats, de veiller à l’alternance du pouvoir, qui ne saurait être confi squé par un parti, une personne ou une faction. Il convient que le pouvoir circule.

Un autre élément important est le respect de l’état de droit. Le déroulement sans faille des élections et le respect de la volonté du peuple impose un respect sourcilleux des règles qui sont mises au fonctionnement de l’État. Le respect de l’État de droit implique également celui des droits humains, économiques, so-ciaux et culturels. De telles exigences se situent bien entendu aux antipodes de l’aspiration des dictateurs à tout contrôler.

Dans ce contexte, il est clair que le fédéralisme impose des exigences encore plus grandes à la démocratie, ne serait-ce que par le nombre de règles de droit aff érentes au fonctionnement de l’État fédéral lui-même. La démocratie dans une fédération est en quelque sorte doublée, puisque le respect de l’État de droit, de l’alternance, des droits humains etc. s’impose au niveau central et à celui des États membres. Au surplus, il convient de gérer les relations entre l’État central et ses États membres de manière à laisser à ces derniers une marge de manœuvre




suffi sante, notion qui se situe au cœur même du fédéralisme. Le fédéralisme exige un subtil exercice de l’art du compromis pour satisfaire les multiples composantes de la fédération. En contrepartie, il rend plus facile l’exercice de la démocratie, puisque la décentralisation du pouvoir permet d’organiser plus facilement les élections, voire les scrutins de démocratie directe dans les pays qui les pratiquent.

On est fort loin de tout cela en Afrique : demandes sociales non satisfaites, crimes économiques, intimidations, menaces, assassinats, exil, etc. C’est le règne de l’exclusivité, mais pas du compromis. En fi n de compte, les moyens soi-disant consacrés à la démocratie servent plutôt à l’embourgeoisement de la classe au pou-voir par des stratégies basées notamment sur la fraude et l’achat des consciences, exercice d’autant plus facile que les masses populaires sont peu instruites. Alors qu’en Occident l’organisation des élections repose sur de nombreux bénévoles et des procédures bien huilées, en Afrique elles représentent un défi logistique presque insurmontable et de nombreuses occasions de corruption. Finalement, la démocratie hypercentralisée à l’africaine se traduit par des crises de leadership, le vol des urnes, la dilapidation des fonds ou le bourgeonnement des partis po-litiques. Sans oublier les rancunes à vie par refus de partager le « butin » (cf. l’interminable crise de succession en Côte d’Ivoire ou le fait que le gouvernement de Madagascar soit encore et toujours « en transition », sans oublier les manifes-tations à Dakar).

Le fédéralisme, dans la conception exigeante de la démocratie qu’il véhicule, du fait qu’il éloigne le pouvoir d’élites installées dans leur tour d’ivoire pour le rapprocher des populations, est un régime – théoriquement idéal – pour créer de nouveaux États démocratiques, pour autant bien sûr que les potentats en place acceptent de sacrifi er une partie de leurs prébendes, ce qui est loin d’être ga-ranti. L’attitude du président octogénaire du Sénégal qui s’accroche au pouvoir, au risque de dilapider l’héritage démocratique de ses sages prédécesseurs, en est un nouvel exemple désolant.

Fédéralisme et développement

Le lien existe entre fédéralisme et démocratie. Mais existe-t-il également entre fédéralisme et développement ou bien-être de la population ? De manière pure-ment empirique, il faut bien avouer que, pour ces pays d’Afrique subsaharienne auxquels nous nous intéressons, il existe une corrélation troublante entre l’anti-thèse du fédéralisme (hypercentralisation, parti unique, despotes éternellement au pouvoir, manque d’alternative, leaders pas forcément charismatiques mais in-délogeables etc.) et des indices de développement extrêmement peu favorables20.

20. Bien évidemment, ce n’est pas une malédiction propre à l’Afrique : l’Asie abrite deux des pires dictatures qui aff ament leurs peuples, la Birmanie et la Corée du Nord.


Nicolas Schmitt166


A contrario, quand on examine les grandes fédérations du monde, on y trouve nombre d’États prospères comme les États-Unis, le Canada, l’Allemagne, la Suisse, l’Autriche, la Belgique, l’Espagne, l’Afrique du Sud, la Malaisie, voire l’Inde qui reste la plus grande démocratie du monde.

Avec toutes les précautions nécessitées par ce genre d’indice, si l’on prend le PIB nominal21, on se rend compte que les fédérations sont souvent des puissances économiques de première grandeur, mais évidemment cette caractéristique tra-duit également le fait que le fédéralisme est un moyen de gouvernement permet-tant de gérer de grands États. Et pourtant, si l’on considère le PIB par habitant, la position des États africains devient encore moins avantageuse, les fédérations occupant toujours des rangs intéressants au classement. Et si l’on souhaite aban-donner des critères purement économiques pour utiliser l’indice de développe-ment humain, le résultat devient eff rayant : il n’y a pas un seul pays africain dans ceux qui ont un développement très élevé ou élevé. On en trouve six dans les pays à développement humain moyen (Gabon 93e et premier africain, Botswana, Namibie, Guinée équatoriale, Cap-Vert et République du Congo) et 33 pays afri-cains parmi les 42 ayant un développement humain faible. Pire, les pays africains squattent les 14 dernières places du classement, derrière l’Afghanistan qui traverse pourtant des vicissitudes que peu de pays au monde ont dû éprouver.

Conclusion

Le fédéralisme, ou à défaut une forme effi cace de décentralisation, pourrait représenter une bonne manière de briser le cercle vicieux de la centralisation, du despotisme et du sous-développement. Mais il n’y a qu’environ 25 fédérations dans le monde, soit environ un huitième des pays de l’ONU, même si la présence de l’Inde ou des États-Unis parmi elles signifi e qu’environ 40 % de la popula-tion mondiale vivent sous un régime fédéral. Ces fédérations comptent plusieurs pays importants, riches et puissants, ce qui témoigne des capacités du fédéralisme en termes de bonne gouvernance. Le fédéralisme n’est cependant pas la panacée permettant de résoudre tous les problèmes du monde, car les conditions mises à la formation des fédérations en font des structures plus fragiles qu’il n’y paraît. Dès lors, elles réclament des soins constants. La sollicitude des experts n’est pas un vain mot, d’autant plus que, malheureusement, les juristes et les politologues restent désarmés face aux pulsions humaines et politiciennes toujours avides de pouvoir.

Les eff orts constants entrepris par ses thuriféraires ont conduit à une certaine renaissance du fédéralisme à notre époque. Il ne manque cependant pas de voix

21. Tous ces classements se trouvent sur Internet, notamment grâce à Wikipedia qu’il faut remercier pour sa facilité d’utilisation.




critiques. Les scientifi ques américains critiquent le fédéralisme comme étant un concept chameleon-like, qui signifi e n’importe quoi à n’importe qui et qu’on peut utiliser pour n’importe quels buts politiques. Parfois, on reproche au fédéralisme d’être lourd, lent dans la prise de décisions et compliqué, bref, peu effi cace. Mais cette argumentation semble plutôt diffi cile à défendre quand on pense que des États fédéraux comme les États-Unis, le Canada, l’Allemagne et la Suisse occu-pent les premières places en compétitivité de presque tous les classements inter-nationaux (Arnold Koller).

Le fédéralisme a moins besoin d’autofl agellation que d’une bonne défense, car il doit rester comme une sorte de phare indiquant la voie pour les pays qui ont besoin de démocratie. Certes, il est illusoire de songer à transformer le monde en 190 fédérations, quand bien même il est essentiel que le pouvoir soit fragmenté et se rapproche du peuple, quel que soit le cadre politique dans lequel ce processus s’exerce, fut-ce une monarchie. Mais pour les pays en quête de décentralisation, les fédérations doivent rester des phares, des exemples, des modèles sur lesquels ils peuvent se guider.

À ce titre, il convient de rappeler sans cesse que le fédéralisme n’est pas dé-suet, tout au contraire. Quand on voit – à l’exemple de l’Afrique – à quel point le monde est en manque de démocratie, ravagé par la centralisation, alors on se rend compte du rôle incomparable que le fédéralisme – et son avatar la décentra-lisation – peuvent jouer pour améliorer l’avenir de la planète, en rapprochant le pouvoir des peuples. Mais pour que le fédéralisme puisse jouer le rôle de modèle qu’il mérite, il appartient à tous ceux qui ont le privilège de vivre dans un régime fédéral de veiller à ce que celui-ci reste conforme aux fondamentaux du système, à savoir le subtil équilibre entre self rule et shared rule, sans que cet équilibre ne soit rompu vers l’implosion ou – ce qui semble souvent le cas ces derniers temps – vers la centralisation honnie.

Bibliographie sommaire

George Anderson, Federalism : An Introduction, Forum of Federations/Oxford University Press 2008.

Jean-François Aubert, Traité de droit constitutionnel suisse, Éditions Ides et Calendes, Neu-châtel 1967, p. 195-204 (pour des réfl exions immortelles sur le fédéralisme).

Fondation ch pour la Collaboration confédérale, Monitoring du fédéralisme, disponible sur Internet : <http://www.chstiftung.ch/ch-dienstleistungen/foederalismusmonitoring>.

Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism : the Territorial Dimension of Politics, Holt, Rine-hart and Winston, New-York 1970.

Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, University of Alabama Press, 1987.Ann L. Griffi ths, Karl Nerenberg (coord.), Guide des pays fédérés : 2002, Forum des Fédé-

rations, Montréal/Kingston 2002.


Lukas Gschwend, Karin Ingber, Stefan Wehrle (Hrsg.), Jubiläumsschrift : 150 Jahre Schweizerischer Juristenverein, 1861-2011, RDS, Bâle 2011.

Arnold Koller, Le fédéralisme contribue-t-il à la paix ?, lundi 11 octobre 2010 dans le contexte du Fribourg Peace Forum : <http://www.fpforum.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82:le-federalisme-contribue-t-il-a-la-paix-&catid=46:traductions&Itemid=71>.

Kommentierte Bibliographie des Instituts für Föderalismus / Bibliographie commentée de l’Ins-titut du Fédéralisme, Jahrgang 2011 / Édition 2011 (1. Januar – 31. Dezember 2011 / 1er janvier - 31 décembre 2011) (disponible sur Internet).

Nicolas Schmitt, «Afrique et fédéralisme, le rendez-vous manqué (ou l’Afrique franco-phone, une vision très ambiguë de la démocratie)», dans Föderalismus 2.0 - Denkanstösse und Ausblicke, Fédéralisme 2.0 - Réfl exions et perspectives, Waldmann, Hänni, Belser (Hrsg.), PIFF Vol.1, Berne 2011, p. 351 – 409.

Ronald Watts, Comparaison des régimes fédéraux, Troisième édition, Kingston 2008.



The “F” Factor in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern EuropeWhy is the international community afraid of federalism and why it should not be

Francesco Palermo

Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at the University of Verona and Head of the EURAC-Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism.

1. Introduction

While the twentieth century has been the age of federalism, 1 very little deve-lopments took place in regard to vertical division of power over the last decade. Not a single major step has been made towards establishing or signifi cantly im-proving territorial arrangements worldwide, and this is especially true for Europe, where very little has changed in the (legislative framework of the) existing territo-rial regimes. Even more this has been the case in Central, Eastern and South-Eas-tern Europe, where the most signifi cant development has been the drastic reform in the Russian Federation in 2004, which de facto eradicated federalism from the country’s constitutional set-up.2

Th is paper investigates the reasons why the former communist countries are so cautious regarding the vertical division of political power (this is the general and functional way the term federalism is used in this paper, interchangeable with the term ‘territorial arrangements’). Th e essay also explores and criticizes the attitud of the international community in not promoting territorial division of power as well as the link between territorial set-up of the State and national

1. T. Hueglin, A. Fenna, Comparative Federalism. A Systematic Inquiry (Broadview Press, Toronto, 2006).2. C. Ross, “Putin’s federal reforms and the consolidation of federalism in Russia: one step forward, two steps back!,” in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 36, no. 1 (2003): 29-47.


Francesco Palermo170


minority issues which is always present in that area of Europe. It is argued that federalism and other territorial arrangements should not only be considered from a minority self-governance angle, but also from the perspective of the overall go-vernance of a territory, which has an important impact on minorities’ rights too.

2. International scepticism over territorial autonomy: a concurring opinion

Generally speaking, international law is not concerned with the constitutional organization of individual countries. Th e way a country divides the power inter-nally is a purely internal matter, since international subjectivity only belongs to the centre. As a consequence, international law and relations only look at the ter-ritorial set-up of a country when this impacts on issues of international concern. Th is is the case, in particular, of the rights of persons belonging to national mi-norities: quite often, in fact, forms of territorial division of power are in place in order to guarantee to some minority group self-government over ‘their’ territory. Territorial arrangements are thus seen in the light of the people inhabiting the territory, and as a means to protect the rights of national minorities.

Such a link between federalism and minority issues is especially taken for gran-ted in former communist countries, due to the heritage of communist federalism, which was designed as a tool to accommodate the nationalities’ question rather than as an instrument of governance. However, the suspicious attitud towards federalism in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe has been reinvigorated by being (albeit involuntarily) endorsed by the international community, which played a key role in accompanying the transition to democracy in these countries. It is not by chance, in fact, that the few federal or autonomy arrangements deve-loped in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after the collapse of commu-nist regimes have been devised with the exclusive goal to (try to) accommodate ethnic claims (such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Gagauzia, in Crimea) and that the geopolitical reconfi guration following the end of communism developed along ethnic divides (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union).

Th us, not only has the international community not challenged the implicit link between federalism and minority issues that was taken for granted in Cen-tral, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but it has —at least implicitly—reitera-ted and supported such attitud.

Against this background, a distinguished trend in literature challenges the approach to territorial arrangements followed by international actors. In parti-cular, Kymlicka questions why the international community is not advocating territorial autonomy for all minorities but only for some and only in exceptional circumstances. Th is epitomises, in Kymlicka’s view, the use of double standards,


Th e “F” Factor in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe 171


which ultimately leads to reward violent minorities more than those which are peaceful and law-abiding.3

Like most of the arguments based on the call for consistency, this line of rea-soning sounds convincing at fi rst glance, even though it is not persuasive after a deeper analysis. However, it undoubtedly raises an important point as it draws attention to the excessively prudent approach to territorial issues by international actors. Indeed, Kymlicka’s argument can be subscribed as to its outcome, not with regard to the reasoning.

First, there is nothing like ‘uniform standards’ when it comes to minority issues. Human, including minority rights, are universal, but their practical shape is naturally diff erent, depending on a wide range of legitimate criteria.4 A range of factors have to be taken into account, connected both to the specifi c situation of the minorities (absolute and relative numbers involved, historic context, de-mands, etc.) and to the overall societal conditions (social and economic needs, existing policies, etc.). While the right is undisputed, its implementation necessa-rily and legitimately takes very diff erent nuances.

Moreover, it is generally agreed that minority rights cannot follow an ‘all-or-nothing-approach’, as indicated by the Venice Commission,5 the Advisory Com-mittee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities6 and by the literature.7 Not only it is undisputed that the principle of equality implies that diff erent situations require diff erent responses at diff erent times, but it is generally accepted that given the criteria mentioned above there can also be to some extent diff erent forms of implementation of the same right in similar situations. In other words, there is nothing wrong if autonomy or federal arran-

3. W. Kymlicka, “Rights to Culture, Autonomy and Participation: Th e Evolving Basis of International Norms of Minority Rights,” in Nations, Minorities and European Integration eds J. McGarry, M. Keating (Routledge, London, 2006), 35–63.4. For example, the right to housing is a universal human right codifi ed inter alia in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Art. 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but its practical consequences and the ‘measurement’ of its correct implementation are quite diff erent in, say, sub-Saharan countries and in Northern Europe.5. Th e Venice Commission suggests to take into due account the position of a group (at State or sub-State level) in order to identify the groups to which the Framework Convention could be applied. (Opinion on possible groups of persons to which the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities could be applied in Belgium, (CDL-AD (2002) 1)).6. See inter alia Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of Natio-nal Minorities adopted on 14 September 2001 on Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation no. 1492 (2001) on the rights of national minorities, par. 17.7. Among others A. Eide, “Th e Rights of ‘Old’ versus ‘New’ Minorities,” European Yearbook on Minority Issues (2002/2003): 365–379.A. Eide, “Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities,” Final report of 16 July 1993, submitted by to the UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/, par. 28.




gements are recommended in some circumstances and not in others, even if the conditions are (or seem to be) rather similar. 8

Furthermore, the lack of consistency is even more inevitable in areas where international standards are lacking. Although the right to autonomy is being increasingly discussed in the literature,9 there is (at least so far) no internatio-nally recognised right to autonomy for minorities (nor for territories as such): the conferral and extent of territorial autonomy is rather a mere practice and it exclusively depends on the constitutional arrangements of each state. To question the State’s approach to its territorial setting is far more diffi cult in absence of standards and should fi nally rely more on political assessment than on legal ar-guments. And indeed international law arguments in this regard are particularly weak, as international law, in its traditional approach, dedicates much attention to the inviolability of borders and the integrity of territory of states, but does not want to encroach upon or to determine the territorial organisation of the states10 and pays little attention to constitutional issues, even though this attitude is gra-dually changing.11

Finally, the political meaning and even the perception of federalism or other territorial arrangements in each and every case must be taken in due consideration:12 it cannot be denied, for example, that a federation with the ‘en-emy’ State is not an appealing solution for the frozen confl icts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, nor was it, e.g., for Kosovo. And more generally it is not at all neutral, especially from the confl ict prevention point of view, if words like federalism and autonomy are ‘by default’ considered anathema in some contexts as it is the case in most former communist countries.

8. Th erefore, using Kymlicka’s examples, it should not be considered unjustifi ed as such to support territorial autonomy in Crimea and not for Hungarians in Romania or Slovakia – see W. Kymlicka, “National Minorities in Post-Communist Europe: Th e Role of International Norms and European Integration,” in, Ethnic Politics After Communism eds. Z. Barany and R. Moser (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2005), 208.9. See H. Hannum, “Th e Right to Autonomy: Chimera or Solution?,” in, Ethnicity and Power in the Contempo-rary World eds. K. Rupesinghe and V.A. Tishkov (United Nations University Press, Tokyo et al., 1996)available at http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee00.htmZ. A. Skurbaty ed., Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy? (Martinus Nijhoff , Lei-den, 2005). See also 15:2–3 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2008), almost entirely dedicated to autonomy issues.10. Th e German literature often speaks of Landesblindheit or Föderalismusblindheit. See already H.P. Ipsen, “Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft”, in AA.VV., Probleme des Europäischen Rechts. FS Walter Hallstein zum 65. Geburtstag, (Klostermann, Frankfurt/M 1966), 248–256.11. It is not by chance that the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, deals a lot more with autonomy issues than the other international mechanisms.See http://www.venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_Subject_ef.asp?T=9&L=E.Although indirectly, also other bodies play an important role in this regard, such as at Council of Europe’s level, the European Court of Human Rights and, in respect of territorial self-governments, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.12. See N. Sabanadze and V. de Graaf, “Are Some States and Minorities More Equal than Others? Double Stan-dards and the Work of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” in Double Standards Pertaining to Minority Protection ed. K. Henrard (Brill, Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden 2010), 117-143.




Th is approach might be wrong (and comparative analysis suggests it is) but it nevertheless matters. As a matter of fact, when there is strong and prejudiced re-sistance against any form of territorial division of power, arguing for it might have a negative impact on the stability of the country at stake and might negatively aff ect the minority groups that should benefi t from it.

In sum, international organisations cannot be asked to follow a ‘consistent’ approach on territorial arrangements, neither in general, nor with specifi c regard to national minorities. Not only this would be unrealistic, but it would be detri-mental in many circumstances. Even more than other available instruments for minority protection, territorial arrangements must be carefully considered and a case-by-case approach is mandated.

3. Th e case for more serious consideration of territorial arrangements, in-cluding as tools for minority protection

However, there is much evidence that too little attention has been dedicated so far by international actors to territorial arrangements, both in general and as instruments for eff ectively accommodating national minority issues. Th e problem is not the lack of a consistent approach; rather, it is the lack of any approach. Th is has to do primarily with an excessive deference to political sensitiveness in several countries (see 3.1.), and to a far too narrow attitude towards territorial division of power in the minority-rights discourse, which pays disproportionate attention to self-governance and too little to what really matters: good governance (see 3.2.).

3.1. Territorial arrangements and the ‘status quo syndrome’

Given the aforesaid, it is not surprising that international actors are handling territorial arrangements with great care. Indeed, it is necessary to do so. Such a prudent approach, however, cannot amount to de facto ignoring federalism and other territorial arrangements at least as an eff ective tool for accommodation of minority issues.

In all international organisations’ work, territorial arrangements, linked with minority rights, have usually been considered in a status quo perspective: where existing, they have been (usually moderately) endorsed; where not granted, they have been (not less moderately) discouraged. In most cases, they has been simply ignored or taken as a fact. For sure, little eff orts have been put on the territorial organization of the State, including as a possible tool to accommodate minority rights.

An example can be drawn from the work of the OSCE High Commissio-ner on National Minorities (HCNM). Th e only real engagement of the HCNM in territorial issues was in the early 1990s in Ukraine, where the High Com-missioner openly advocated for safeguarding the autonomy of Crimea and of-




fered practical assistance in developing it, with tangible results.13 Elsewhere, the HCNM has at best prudently supported autonomy for Gagauzia and for the ‘frozen confl icts’.14 But again this was done mildly and—as the mandate dic-tates—within the confl ict prevention perspective of safeguarding the status quo and the territorial integrity of the respective countries. In virtually all other cir-cumstances, the HCNM has been extremely prudent, avoided to directly address claims for territorial autonomy raised particularly by Hungarian minorities living in Hungary’s neighbouring States, and he has chosen priorities diff erent than assistance in setting up autonomous regions in areas such as Gagauzia, Latvia, Estonia, Macedonia, and more recently Kosovo. Th e prudent approach towards the territorial arrangements has been expressly stated by the HCNM, arguing that the very few cases when he engaged in autonomy issues were atypical and represent an exception from the rule.15

Th e border between paying the necessary deference to the States’ political attitudes (and sometimes even paranoia) and disregarding one potentially helpful confl ict prevention tool such as federalism and other territorial arrangements is very diffi cult to draw .16 In any event, the practice followed by the HCNM and other international organisations reveals an approach to this issue essentially in terms of mere preservation of the status quo and of concern for territorial integri-ty. Decentralization of power is supported when it is already in place and its de-privation could raise concerns for security (such as in Crimea) and it is advocated when it could help avoid disintegration of States (such as for the frozen confl icts). But even if disintegration takes place, a neutral (rather: silent) approach towards territorial autonomy is followed (such as in the case of Kosovo).

Th is approach, as contented above, not only is justifi ed, but is also mandated, at least if the narrow perspective of territorial division of powers as a small-scale nation-state building is followed. In this view—which is the view taken by seve-ral states especially in Central and Eastern Europe—creating a federation (along ethnic lines) or granting territorial autonomy to national minorities means to concede control over the territory to one group, with all connected fears of setting in motion a slippery slope towards secession. Th us, for the minority groups it is

13. See J. Packer, “Autonomy within the OSCE: Th e Case of Crimea,” in Autonomy: Applications and Implica-tions ed. M. Suksi (Kluwer, Th e Hague, 1998), 295–316.14. Kymlicka, supra note 8, p. 208.15. See R. Zaagman, Confl ict Prevention in the Baltic States: Th e OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (ECMI, Flensburg, 1999).16. One telling example is provided by the very fi rst sentence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement concluded in 2001 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: “there is no territorial solution to ethnic claims”. Th is statement is the clear outcome of an irrational approach, not least because the same Agreement provides for local self-government and its districting as one of the key elements for the accommodation of the requests of the Albanian community. On the law on local self-government in Macedonia see J. Marko, “Th e Referendum on Decentralization in Macedonia in 2004: A Litmus Test for Macedonia’s Interethnic Relations,” 4 European Yearbook for Minority Issues (2004/05): 695–721.




often seen as a means to eventually ‘rule their territory’ and for the State it is likely to be seen as a threat to territorial integrity.

In fact, such an understanding of federalism and autonomy is misleading. It is indisputable that (often violent) secession took place in several areas of the former communist world in the 1990s, but those times are largely over. Most important-ly, like the (nation-)states, sub-national units cannot be ethnically homogeneous. And even if the majority-minority ratio is reversed, making the national majority the regional minority, the problem is not resolved.17 Territorial self government as a small substitute for statehood is illusory. But as long as it is seen in this light by the states (and by the minorities), it will be inevitably regarded as related to issues of territorial integrity. Th erefore, it will carry a confl ict potential which induces the international organisations to neglect the very instrument and to focus on other aspects.

3.2. Good governance matters more than self-governance

Unfortunately, both in international practice and in literature, much of the federalism and autonomy debate is still trapped within the nation-state discourse, trying to mitigate in small-scaled territorial dimension the defi cits of minority participation. By seeing federalism exclusively from the narrow angle of minority rights and by not divorcing these two issues, territorial division of powers it is read thus in terms of who accommodates whom, and not suffi ciently in terms of good governance.

But even looking only at the minority-dimension, it cannot be forgotten that territorial arrangements can be instruments of minority participation in diff erent ways. In their direct dimension (which is the only one seen not only in post com-munist countries but also by the international community) they make it possible for territorially compact minorities to decide on their own matters by simply controlling (or having a greater infl uence on) the devolved institutions.18

Territorial arrangements have, however, also an indirect but not least im-portant meaning for minorities. Although it is not at all a recipe for success as there are several comparative examples of both successful and failed territorial

17. See the Venice Commission’s Opinion, supra note 9.18. See lastly M. Weller, K. Nobbs (ed.), Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Confl icts (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2010).See also A. Tarr, R. Williams, J. Marko, Federalism, Sub-National Constitutions and Minority Rights (Greenwood, Westport, 2004).Y. Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000).R. Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Confl icts (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996).For interesting refl ections see also S. Mancini, “Rethinking the boundaries of democratic secession: Liberalism, nationalism and the right of minorities to self-determination,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 6:3–4 (2008): 553–584, esp. 562–566.




power-sharing arrangements,19 territorial division of powers in whatever form (federalism, regionalism, devolution, autonomy) is in fact fi rst and foremost an instrument of good governance, targeting a territory as a whole and not only the dominant group within it. It was actually created for this purpose and this func-tion becomes even more relevant the more complex the society and thus more complex the administration. Th is is the main reason why the number of federal or quasi-federal countries has more than tripled over the last century: at present the majority of the world’s population lives under federal or quasi-federal rule.20

In other words, territorial arrangements are instruments for complexity mana-gement. And as all countries are increasingly diverse as to the population and in-creasingly complex as to the functions to be performed, territorial arrangements usually help address complexity, provoked including but not solely by minorities or ethno-cultural diff erences.21

Furthermore, federalism is a tool for democracy, as it is about shared and thus de-concentrated powers.22 Th erefore, it could prove particularly helpful in contexts in democratic transition and this is likely to be one of the reasons why it is not supported by political elites in most transition countries.

Minority issues are embedded in a larger context and cannot be disconnected from them. Th us, the more effi cient the overall governance, the least likely it is that minority rights are neglected and even less that minority issues can develop into confl icts. In fact, the bigger the problems in terms of territorial, democratic and economic development, the more likely the ethnic confl icts. In turn, effi cien-cy of the State structure is as such a powerful tool for providing the appropriate conditions for minority rights to be respected and for accommodating ethnic issues.

19. See for illustration and examples 8:1 Ethnopolitics (March 2009), with papers by G.K. Brown, “Federalism, Regional Autonomy and Confl ict: Introduction and Overview,” 1–4J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, “Must Pluri-national Federation s Fail?,” 5–25.S. Wolff , “Com plex Power-Sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Contemporary Confl ict Settlements”, (Routledge, University of Nottingham, UK, 2006), 27–45.20. See T. O. Hueglin and A. Fenna, Comparative Federalism, note 1, 3–19.21. See among others the Opinion of the EU Committee of Regions’ Commission for Constitutional Aff airs, European Governance and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice on the Committee of the Regions’ White Paper on Multilevel Governance, adopted 6 May 2009 (CONT-IV-020). Paragraph 1.9 of the Opinion states that “multilevel governance actually serves the fundamental political objectives of the European Union: a Europe of citizens, economic growth and social progress, sustainable development, and the role of the European Union as a global player. It reinforces the democratic dimension of the European Union and increases the effi ciency of its processes”.22. See among others M. Weller and S. Wolff , “Autonomy, Self-governance and Confl ict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to Institutional,” Design in Divided Societies (Routledge, London, 2005).




4. Concluding remarks: Pragmatism is the way forward

In sum, federalism does not have to be promoted in all cases, nor does it have to be approached ‘consistently’, overlooking the peculiarities of each case. It should, however, be properly considered, both in general terms—as an instru-ment for good governance—and in the narrower perspective of accommodating minority groups. Even more so, of course, when one of the involved parties ad-vocates it—be it the minorities, such as in the case of Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia or Serbia, or the State, such as in the case of the frozen confl icts. Fear from federalism is not helpful, nor is excessive deference to this fear. Looking at territorial arrangements from the perspective of good governance rather or at least in addition to that of self-governance might allow for making better use of the opportunities provided by this instrument. Territorial management can be extre-mely helpful for inter-ethnic management and confl ict prevention.

While federalism often raises irrational reactions ,23 both in terms of excessive enthusiasm or disproportionate concerns, it is important to deal with it in a non-ideological and non-emotional way. Th is implies on the one hand to re-ject the simplistic views of those who consider territorial division of power as a panacea and a model to be acritically exported. On the other hand, a rational consideration of territorial arrangements as one out of many instruments for the accommodation of minority issues requires that its benefi ts, if identifi ed in one particular context, are not disregarded simply because the concept upsets some interlocutors.

A neutral, case-by-case approach is needed, which includes governance-based considerations. Th is means that territorial arrangements can develop their mino-rity protection and participation potential the more they become (over time) de-politicised and even de-ethnicisised: instead of being reduced to a compensation for one group as a small, ‘quasi-nation State’ (which easily disappoints both the minorities who might want more and the State which legitimately fears for its in-tegrity), federalism could be more helpful the more it comes closer to its ‘original intent’ and to its general function as an instrument for territorial management. Th is means promoting it as an instrument for integration of a territory as a whole rather than of segregation for one minority group. Such a message is not alien to the international organisations and it is rather at the heart of the message they have consistently sent over the last decade at least: peaceful coexistence respecting

23. On a more theoretical level, it can be said that quantitative and qualitative elements to determine a minority status cannot but be referred to a specifi c territory in which specifi c numerical and power-relations exist (see also the Venice Commission Opinion, supra note 9). In principle, the whole world is a territory, and thus even a ‘universal’ approach to minorities is in the end territorial. Legally, a minority can only be identifi ed in relation to the scope of application of a law, which is necessarily territorial. See further F. Palermo, “Territorial Solutions for Managing Diversity and Th eir Changing Role,” in Th e Participation of Minorities in Public Life, ed. Venice Commission Study Collection no. 45 (Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg, 2008), 23–40.




human rights for all. Against this background, what is needed is simply a more proactive attitude by the international actors, if and when appropriate, stressing how territorial arrangements can help integration instead of fostering segrega-tion, within the framework of a better governance.

Both states and the international community have been either too dismis-sive or too prudent on this particular point. Taking federalism more seriously will be one of the key challenges in the years to come for Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and even more so for the international community. New and courageous thinking by the international bureaucracies and its spreading to national debates seems necessary to regain a central role for international actors. Such a role is all the more necessary especially in times when states are increasin-gly of hostage irrational fears.

AbstractVirtually nothing has changed as to territorial arrangements over the last decade, particularly in Cen-

tral, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where the role of the international community has been more prominent in constitutional assistance to democratic transitions. The paper investigates the reasons why it has been the case and argues that federalism (and regionalism) is handled with excessive caution, both by domestic and by international actors. A nonemotional, de-politicised approach to federalism is suggested, one that pays attention to good governance and not only to self-governance, divorcing the territorial question from minority issues. Federalism can better support minority participation the more it is used as an instrument for integration of a territory as a whole rather than of self-isolation of a minority group.

RésuméVirtuellement rien n’a changé durant la dernière décennie en ce qui concerne les accords territoriaux,

en particulier en Europe centrale, en Europe de l’Est et en Europe du Sud-Est, où le rôle de la communauté internationale a été très important dans l’assistance constitutionnelle aux transitions démocratiques. Cet article étudie les raisons qui en sont à l’origine et considère que la question du fédéralisme (et du régio-nalisme) a été gérée avec une prudence excessive à la fois par les acteurs nationaux et internationaux. L’article suggère une approche non émotionnelle, dépolitisée, du fédéralisme, une approche qui prendrait en compte la bonne gouvernance et pas seulement l’auto-gouvernance, séparant ainsi la question terri-toriale des problèmes de minorités. Mieux le fédéralisme prend en compte la participation des minorités, plutôt qu’en isolant les groupes minoritaires, plus il est utilisé comme l’instrument d’intégration d’un ter-ritoire comme un tout.



New Developments in Spanish Federalism

Xabier Arzoz

BA (Deusto), LL.M. (Saarbrücken), Ph.D. (University of the Basque Country). Associate Professor of Administrative and EU Law, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU). Legal Counsel at the Spanish Constitutional Court.Th e views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the institution for whom he currently works

Introduction

Spain may be defi ned as a “multinational quasi federal unitary state”.1 Th is characterization might appear contradictory, but it attempts to underline the unique Spanish model as it takes elements and characteristics from diff erent state models in a rather convoluted way. Th e Spanish Constitution of 1978 attempted to combine the traditional ideology of the nation-state with a limited recognition of territorial and cultural autonomy. Certainly two fundamental provisions rec-ognized collective identities: the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions (Art. 2) and the right to use the various regional languages (Art. 3). Nevertheless, at the same time, Art 2 stipulates that “the Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. Moreover, Spain has accorded territorial autonomy not only to the nationali-ties, but also to all ‘ordinary’ regions as well, giving rise to the establishment of 17 so-called ‘autonomous communities’ and two ‘autonomous cities’, Ceuta and Melilla.

1. See X. Arzoz, “Spanien: Die geschichtlichen Autonomien der Basken, Galizier und Katalanen als Beispiel eines multinationalen ‘Quasi-Föderalismus’ im Einheitsstaat,” in, Zur Entstehung des modernen Minderheitens-chutzes in Europa eds. Christoph Pan and Beate Sibyle Pfeil (Vienna: Springer 2006), 363-388.


Xabier Arzoz180


At the surface, it is the territorial rationale what appears to prevail in the Spanish decentralization model. In contrast, the national character of a territorial autonomy results indirectly from the ethnic self-identifi cation of the overwhelm-ing majority of its inhabitants, as well as from the concrete exercise of autonomy through the various powers and functions of the Autonomous Community in education, language policy, media etc. Most nationalities have also used their powers to defi ne their national symbols (anthem, fl ag, national festival days, etc.) and to emphasize their cultural specifi city.

Th erefore, Spanish federalism needs to be analysed from a triple perspective—the degree of decentralisation it has developed (the dilemma unitary state vs. au-tonomy), the degree of recognition and accommodation of ethnic and linguistic diversity it involves (the dilemma nation-state vs. multinational state) and the degree of asymmetry constitutionally entrenched and/or de facto implemented (the dilemma symmetrical vs. asymmetrical federalism).

Th e main development aff ecting Spanish federalism in the last few years consists of the elaboration, approval and review of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, a process that has lasted seven years (2003-2010). Th e new Catalan Autonomy Statute has been a historical test for the whole structure of the Span-ish ‘State of Autonomous Communities’. A second most important development concerns the consecration of the principle of budget stability. In both issues, the Constitutional Court has ruled on their compatibility with the Constitution, and its rulings are expected to create enormous consequences.

Th e statute of autonomy of Catalonia of 2006 as a constitutional experi-ment2

Origins

Th e three historical nationalities—Basques, Catalans and Galicians—were vested with an extended autonomy in 1979-80, but two decades later their au-tonomy statutes were widely deemed to have exhausted their original goals. After 25 years, most Catalan political forces agreed on the need for comprehensive reform of Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute of 1979 to meet new social and politi-cal challenges. Th ese eff orts to reform Catalan autonomy began with a diagnosis based on the degree of quality that Catalonia’s self-government had enjoyed up to then. Some observers commented that after 25 years under the fi rst Autonomy Statute, Catalonia only had a ‘broad autonomy of low quality’ because it was be-

2. See X. Arzoz, “Das Autonomiestatut für Katalonien von 2006 als erneuter Vorstoß für die Entwicklung des spanischen Autonomiestaates,” in Zeitschrift für ausländisches öff entliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 69:1 (2009): 155-193.


New Developments in Spanish Federalism 181


lieved that centrist tendencies in implementation and interpretation had increas-ingly eroded the scope of the autonomous self-government.

Moreover, after a moderately nationalist party held power in Barcelona for 20 years, in 2003 three new parties gained a majority in regional elections for Catalonia’s Assembly. Th e new left-nationalist coalition set a clear goal of amend-ing the Autonomy Statute of 2005. 90 percent of the members of the Catalan parliament approved the new draft statute, which was opposed only by the Par-tido Popular, the Spanish Conservative Party. Subsequently, negotiations to have the statute approved by Madrid, as required by the Constitution, were held be-tween a Catalan delegation and the constitutional commission of the Spanish Parliament. Finally, after two thirds of the original version were amended, a new version of the Statute was accepted. Th e signifi cant curtailment of the initial text approved by the Catalan political forces led Esquerra Republicana, a Catalan nationalist party that was a member of the government coalition in Barcelona, to reject the new statute, along with the Spanish Conservative Party, which op-posed it for completely diff erent reasons. On 30 March 2006, the Spanish Parlia-ment approved the new Autonomy Statute with 189 to 154 votes. Th e Catalan people immediately accepted the new statute in a popular referendum, but the turn-out of 49.41 percent was relatively low. 73.23 percent voted in favour of the new Autonomy Statute, while in 1979, 88.1 percent had voted for the previous Autonomy Statute. Th e new Autonomy Statute came into force on 20 July 2006 after a three year long amendment process, supported by widespread public at-tention. Catalonia’s new statute3 was completely reshaped in form and content, embracing 223 articles instead of 57.

Th e core of Catalan autonomy

Th e most important innovations concerned the introduction of new rights and duties for Catalan citizens and of new principles orienting the public policies of Catalan institutions. Th ese included, fi rstly, the establishment of new compe-tences and the controversial introduction of legal techniques to precisely defi ne and to protect Catalonia’s competences from erosion and centralisation by the state legislative and executive; new, hotly debated fi nance regulations; secondly, new instruments for cooperation with the State and for participation in State organs and in State decision processes that deal with European matters or aff ect Catalan interests; thirdly, the regulation of the offi cial status of the Catalan lan-guage and of the language rights and duties of Catalan citizens; and last but not

3. Th e full text of the new statute approved on 19 July 2006 is available in the languages that are offi cial in Catalonia (Spanish, Catalan and Occitan) or in other parts of Spain (Basque and Galician) and in fi ve major international languages (English, French, German, Italian and Russian) at: <http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/index.htm >


Xabier Arzoz182


least, some new provisions dealing with symbolic aspects concerning the identity of Catalonia as a sub-state nation. Below, we will comment briefl y about what can be considered as the core of Catalan autonomy, territorial and linguistic au-tonomy.

Catalonia’s autonomy, as enshrined in the new Statute of 2006, endows its institutions with legislative and executive powers in the regulation of its institu-tions, public infrastructure, transport and public mobility, agriculture and hus-bandry, fi shery and forestry, crafts, environmental protection, regional incentives for the regional economy, museums and libraries, protection of its national herit-age, tourism and sports, leisure activities, health and social services, education, cultural and language policy.

Based on the respective Autonomy Statute, Spanish Autonomous Communi-ties are allowed to assume all powers not explicitly attributed to the State by the Constitution (Art. 149 (3)). Th e two lists of powers, pertaining to the Autono-mous Communities and to the State respectively, did not set a clearly defi ned pattern of power sharing, but sometimes overlapped. Often the individual powers were of a concurrent type. Th is brought about major confl icts, as the real regula-tory power of the Autonomous Communities depended on how far the State ex-erted its own framework of legislative power. Moreover, the Constitutional Court was often called upon to solve such confl icts, and in most cases decided in favour of the State’s institutions.

As a result, Catalonia’s new Autonomy Statute tried a diff erent approach by defi ning with extreme precision every single section and subsection of the au-tonomous powers. 58 articles punctiliously demarcate and attribute every single power, regarding not only primary fi elds of public activity, but also secondary and tertiary fi elds. Th is system should prevent possible confl icts between government levels in the future and ensure maximum legal security in the division of powers between Barcelona and Madrid. For instance, agricultural powers are split into eleven single sub-activities, nine of which are under the exclusive legislation of Catalonia while the rest are shared with the State.

Th e new Autonomy Statute of 2006 further strengthened the legal position of the Catalan language. In the long run, Catalonia purports to make use of its autonomy to establish an asymmetric system of offi cial languages that benefi ts Catalan. Th e main principles of the Catalan language legislation have now been entrenched in the Autonomy Statute, which is a piece of legislation with a con-stitutional character. Catalan now is Catalonia’s ‘own language’; it is to be used preferably and prevailingly by all public institutions and public media and also as the regular medium for instruction in the educational system. Furthermore, Catalan is the offi cial language of Catalonia as Castilian is the offi cial language of the State. Everyone has the right to use both offi cial languages, and Catalonia’s




citizens, according to the new Statute, have the right and the duty to know both languages. Th is duty is a considerable innovation for Spain as a whole, as the Constitution prescribes that all citizens have the duty to know the state’s offi cial language, Castilian. Th us, all public authorities of Catalonia are called to take all necessary provisions to guarantee compliance with that duty.

Th e new Autonomy Statute puts special emphasis on the linguistic rights of the Catalan speaking citizens when interacting with the judiciary and other au-thorities of the State. All judicial public offi cials and employees must demonstrate suffi cient command of both offi cial languages to handle their specifi c responsibil-ities. Furthermore, the state administration based in Catalonia must ensure that its employees are suffi ciently fl uent in both languages. All Catalan citizens are also entitled to address many relevant organs of the state such as the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the High Court in Catalan in writing.

A further step in upgrading the status of the Catalan language requires ad-dressing its position on the international level. Catalonia and the Spanish State are required to perform all necessary steps to have Catalan offi cially recognized within the European Union and to ensure the usage of Catalan in international organisations and covenants referring to language and culture. In addition, Cata-lonia is called to foster contacts and collaboration with communities using Cata-lan within and outside of Spain.

End of the constitutional experiment: Judgement 31/2010 of the Constitutional Court

Th e accommodation of Catalonia within Spain, from a Catalonian point of view, had not yet been resolved in a satisfactory manner with the old autonomy statute of 1979. Th e new statute of 2006 set the goal of putting Catalonia within Spain and Europe in a better position. It certainly gave a new push toward the further development of the whole system of Spain’s regional autonomies. Initially disputed institutions and provisions have been incorporated into the reformed autonomy statutes of other Autonomous Communities, such as, the recogni-tion of civil rights and civil duties, the proclamation of programmatic princi-ples, references to historical rights, the enlargement of rights of the Autonomous Communities to participate in state-wide decisions on State institutions when-ever regional interests were concerned, the extension of the scope of autonomous powers, stricter fi nancial obligations of the State vis-à-vis the Autonomous Com-munities and the decentralization of the judiciary. All such provisions contrib-uted to enhance constitutional progress for the regional autonomies.

Nevertheless, Catalonia’s new Autonomy Statute was contested by the second largest political force in Spain. Although approved by 90 percent of the Catalan parliament and by 73 percent of Catalonia’s electorate in a subsequent referen-


Xabier Arzoz184


dum, the approval of Spain’s Conservative Party had not yet been ensured. Im-mediately after the proclamation of Catalonia’s new Autonomy Statute, the Con-servative Party lodged an appeal, on the grounds of unconstitutionality, against more than half of the text with over one hundred provisions. It was the fi rst time in Spain’s constitutional history that an autonomy statute was so massively appealed, and there was no precedent for squashing a single autonomy statute’s provision. Th e conservatives even appealed articles of Catalonia’s Statute that they had previously approved in the statutes of other Communities. More worryingly, in the following years, the Constitutional Court was the target of unprecedented manoeuvres to dominate the composition of the Court and to infl uence an even-tual ruling on the constitutionality of the Catalan Statute.

When the fi ve hundred page long Judgement 31/2010 of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the Catalan Autonomy Statute was fi nally de-livered on 28 June 2010 4—four years after the challenge had been brought—it disappointed many sectors, although for opposite reasons. Certainly, it only an-nulled 15 provisions, in most cases not completely but with regard to specifi c aspects. Th e majority of the contested provisions were declared to be compatible with the Constitution, but under two big caveats.

Th e fi rst one is that the declaration that the powers included in the Statute, part of which were intended to be exclusive powers, does not prevent action that even on the same subjects could be implemented by the state according to its own constitutional powers. Th e statutory attempts to defi ne and systematise regional competences in three big categories (exclusive, shared and executive competenc-es) were rejected. A statute of autonomy is inadequate to make those defi nitions because this is a function reserved for the Constitution and to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court. Th e defi nitions of the diff erent categories of powers must be regarded as a description of case-law only, without any legal value by themselves. One of the few provisions that have been annulled is Art. 111, which purported to entrench a legal concept of shared competence that was restrictive on behalf of state action.

Th e second caveat is the imposition of a consistent interpretation on 24 of the contested provisions: “[T]his provision is compatible with the constitutional text as long as it is interpreted in the following precise sense”. Th is has made Judgement 31/2010 into a huge repertoire of binding interpretative criteria on the scope of many statutory provisions dealing with competences, procedures and institu-tions.

Th e consistent interpretation approach has been applied to almost all inno-vations of the statute reform of 2006, including linguistic and socioeconomic rights. Th e Judgement upholds the constitutionality of all articles of the Statute

4. Published in Boletín Ofi cial del Estado [Ofi cial Journal of the State], Nr. 172 of 16 July 2010.




concerning language, except for the ‘preferential’ reference in Art 6 (1), which was annulled. However, almost without exception, language provisions have been the object of consistent interpretation. Similarly, the legitimacy of the inclusion and regulation of social rights as subjective rights in autonomy statutes, has been resolved negatively. Statutory rights have been downgraded to mere program-matic or guiding principles. Last but not least, the references included in the preamble to “Catalonia as a nation” and to “the national condition of Catalonia” were explicitly declared to lack “interpretative legal force”, paradoxically the provi-sion establishing the “national symbols of Catalonia” was declared to be consistent with the Constitution assuming that “the Spanish Constitution does not recognise other nations than the Spanish Nation”.

Th e imposed consistent interpretations eliminate a good part of the constitu-tional innovation purported by the Statute. Th e imposition of a consistent inter-pretation on many statute provisions may prove to be problematic if too many provisions are given a meaning that does not coincide with the one that was considered when political parties approved the statute reform in parliament and later the people accepted it in a referendum. For that reason, the consistent in-terpretation approach may also turn out to be more detrimental for the political aspirations of the electorate than the mere annulation of the relevant provisions.

It should be emphasized that the reinterpretation of the characteristics of the Spanish allocation of powers proposed by the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was rejected unanimously by all judges of the Constitutional Court. Neverthe-less, four of them held in four dissenting opinions that the Court should have declared void more provisions than it did—mainly because they rejected the con-sistent interpretation approach.

Th e constitutional consecration of the principle of budget stability

Another important Judgement for the development of the Spanish state mod-el was adopted by the Constitutional Court in July 2011. Judgement 134/20115 gives an answer to the constitutional challenge brought by the Parliament of Catalonia against various provisions on the two pieces of legislation on budgetary stability adopted in 20016 by the State legislature to comply with the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact. It may be recalled that this Pact encourages Member States to apply sound budgetary policies from the time they enter the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Th e abovementioned Judgement of the Constitutional Court ruled that the establishment of the sta-

5. Judgement 134/2011 of 20 July 2011; published in Boletín Ofi cial del Estado [Ofi cial Journal of the State], Nr. 197 of 17 August 2010.6. General Budgetary Stability Act (Ordinary Law 5/2001) and Complementary Budgetary Stability Act (Or-ganic Law 5/2001), of 12 and 13 December 2001.


Xabier Arzoz186


bility principle for the public sector and the defi nition of measures to guarantee it with regard to the regional budgetary laws do not violate the political and fi nancial autonomy of the Autonomous Communities. Th e Judgement accepted the constitutionality of the establishment of a State control on regional budgets, based on a broad interpretation of the State competence recognized by Art 149 (1) (13) concerning the general management of the economy.

Subsequently, on 27 September 2011 the Spanish Constitution was amended, for the second time in its life, in order to constitutionally entrench the principle of budgetary stability.7 Th is constitutional reform was agreed upon by the leaders of the two Spanish hegemonic national parties and carried out within a record period of two weeks.8 According to the new Art 135 (1) of the Constitution, “All Public Administrations shall adapt their actions to the principle of budgetary stabil-ity”.

Th e new constitutional provision does not defi ne the precise scope to be given to the principle of budgetary stability—a principle that should not necessarily be interpreted, for example, as requiring a total balance or zero defi cit. It simply stipulates that “The State and the Autonomous Communities shall not incur any structural defi cit exceeding the margins set, if any, by the European Union on its Members States” (Art. 135 (2)). Beyond that point, it is up to the state legislator to establish the precise scope of the principle. Art 135 (5) reads: “An organic law will establish the maximum structural defi cit allowed for the State and for the Autono-mous Communities, according to their gross domestic product”. Th at organic law will also regulate, among others, the distribution of the defi cit and debt thresholds between public administrations and the responsibility of each public administra-tion in case of noncompliance of budgetary stability goals. Th at organic law is ex-pected to pass before 30 June 2012 and its provisions concerning the maximum structural defi cit allowed for the State and the Autonomous Communities shall enter into force by 2020.

Th us, the legal framework of the principle of budgetary stability is laid down in Art 135 (2) of the Constitution. On the one hand, it consists of a constitu-tional ban on the State and the Autonomous Communities to incur any struc-tural defi cit exceeding the margins eventually set by the European Union. On the other hand, the Spanish Parliament is commissioned to set the maximum structural defi cit available to both the State and the Autonomous Communities, and to develop the legal framework of the budgetary stability applying to both. Local authorities are also bound by the budgetary stability principle.

7. “Reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, of 27 September 2011”. Published in Boletín Ofi cial del Estado [Offi cial Journal of the State], Nr. 233 of 27 September 2011.8. On 13 January 2012, the Constitutional Court did not admit the individual complaints brought by two Members of the Parliament against the constitutional reform, which were based on the infringement of the legislative procedure (Interlocutory Injunction 9/2012). Th ree dissenting opinions by three judges argued for the admission of the complaints and for an examination of their merits.




In addition, Art 135 (3) establishes that the amount of public debt of all the public administrations with regard to the State’s gross domestic product shall not exceed the benchmark set forth in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Th e abovementioned organic law shall also provide all necessary means to guarantee compliance with the limitation of public debt. In order to calm the fi nancial markets, the same article and paragraph stipulates that the payment on the interest and capital of the Administrations’ public debt “will be an absolute priority”, a rather bizarre constitutional obligation imposed on future genera-tions.

Conclusion

In all federal or decentralized states, the judicial institution responsible for the allocation of powers plays a key role in shaping the system of powers, since a degree of vagueness and imprecision with regard to the scope of powers reserved to the central level is inherent to constitutional provisions that deal with the dis-tribution of powers. Spain is not an exception in this regard. Certainly, the Con-stitutional Court’s Judgement 31/2010 does not give a solution to the question put forward by the Catalan statute reform, the ever narrower capacity of Autono-mous Communities to conceive and implement their own distinct policies. Th e solutions to prevent the further narrowing of autonomous communities’ political autonomy appear to be two: a more restrictive approach by the Constitutional Court to the State’s capacity to redefi ne the scope of regional powers assigned to Autonomous Communities and a constitutional reform. Both seem politically unlikely.

Judgement 31/2010 and 134/2011 of the Constitutional Court, together with the recent reform of Art 135 of the Constitution, confi rm the consolidation of a homogenous view of the Spanish decentralisation model. Judgement 31/2010 declares the development of autonomy as being closed to the contribution from Autonomous Communities, as autonomy statutes were denied a constitutional role in the process of developing the decentralisation model. Th e lesson from the constitutional experiment involved in the elaboration, approval and review of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 2006 is that constitutional reform is inevi-table in Spain both for the enhancement of political decentralisation and for the further accommodation of the two diff erentiated Autonomous Communities, Catalonia and the Basque Country.

AbstractThe main development affecting Spanish federalism in the last few years consist of the elaboration,

approval and review of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, a process that has lasted seven years (2003-2010). The new Catalan Autonomy Statute has been a historical test to the structure of the Spanish ‘State of Autonomous Communities’. Another development concerns the constitutional consecration of the prin-


Xabier Arzoz188


ciple of budget stability. In both issues, a homogenous view of the Spanish decentralisation model has prevailed.

RésuméLes principales évolutions du fédéralisme espagnol ces dernières années tiennent à l’élaboration, l’ap-

probation et la révision du Statut d’autonomie de la Catalogne, un processus qui a duré sept ans (2003-2010). Le nouveau Statut d’autonomie catalan a constitué un test historique de la structure de « l’État des communautés autonomes ». Une autre évolution concerne la consécration constitutionnelle du principe de stabilité budgétaire. Dans les deux cas, une vision homogène de la décentralisation espagnole a pré-valu.



Identity-Diversity and the Territorial Dimension in the Western Balkans

Jens Woelk

Associate Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law Faculty of Law, University of Trento (Italy) and Senior Researcher, Institute for Studies of Federalism and Regionalism at Eurac Bolzano-Bozen (Italy)

Introduction: Th e Western Balkans: Part of Europe?

After a millennium of byzantine domination, followed by 500 years of Turkish and, partly, Venetian and Habsburg domination, the Western Balkans are today, in fi rst place, a region which defi nitively wants to be(come) part of Europe. 100 years ago, in Sarajevo in June 1914, Europe entered a century of self-destruction; today, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole region of the Western Balkans are again the litmus-test for the Continent and for the integration capac-ity of the European pluralistic model. Th e main challenge is the accommodation of diversity and the organisation of togetherness, in many cases after the experi-ence of ethnic violence and confl ict.

After the wars in former Yugoslavia, the continuous ethnic, linguistic, reli-gious, historical and cultural heterogeneity throughout and within the coun-tries of South Eastern Europe requires the application and combination of the whole range of diff erent legal instruments apt to guarantee and to develop social and cultural pluralism. After two multinational Empires, the Ottoman and the Austrian-Hungarian ones, and the experience of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia have passed, the main challenge of today consists in fi nding the right ‘corrections’ to liberal democratic systems transforming the new independ-ent States into legal systems which are respectful to diversity and even actively


Jens Woelk190


promote social and cultural pluralism, in short legal systems of a ‘promotional’ nature.

Th e process of this constitutional, legal and societal transition is still under way. Within only one decade (1990-2000), the dissolution of the socialist system, tragic civil wars, transformation of the economic systems into market economies and a fast constitutional transition had to be managed by the new States in order to be admitted into international organisations, such as the Organisation of Secu-rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the Council of Europe (CoE). Membership in both is required for moving closer to membership in the Euro-pean Union (EU) which has become, in the dynamics of Eastern enlargement of the EU, a main goal for the Western Balkans States. However, the ‘rehabilitation’ of those States is conditioned by the respect of certain standards (conditionality), with the consequent adoption and absorption of foreign legal models and the monitoring of their implementation and of compliance with ‘European stand-ards’.

Studying the Western Balkans and their constitutional transition thus permits to identify and analyse various dimensions and elements of the European plu-ralistic model; however, like looking into a mirror, it also permits Europe itself, to refl ect over its own ‘values’ and ‘standards’, especially after the constitutional crisis and the abandonment of the European Union’s constitutional project. In this sense, the Balkans are both, a ‘Europe in small scale’, as well as a laboratory refl ecting new trends and developments of European constitutional law. Th e de-gree of success of the attracting forces of the European pluralistic model in the Balkans will thus be an important indicator for the state of this very model also within the EU.

Th e Yugoslav Experience: ‘Ethnic’ Federalism and Party Control

Th e pluralistic principle was not unknown in the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. On the contrary, its articulations were many. Diff erentiation was rec-ognized in territorial terms with a diff erentiated federal structure including Re-publics but also two Autonomous Provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo (both part of Serbia, but with a special status also represented at federal level). Diff erentiation was also recognized and practised in linguistic terms as besides ‘Serbo-Croatian’ with already two diff erent alphabets and scripts, Latin and Cyrillic, there were also Slovene, Macedonian and minority-languages, such as Albanian. Diff erentia-tion and pluralism was also the norm regarding the religious communities (Cath-olics, Muslims and Orthodox). Despite these pronounced internal asymmetries, the federal system of former Yugoslavia has not been able to resist the economic crisis in the 1980s and the subsequent rise of nationalist political forces.


Identity – Diversity and the Territorial Dimension in the Western Balkans 191


From the beginning, Yugoslav federalism lacked the political will to realise an eff ective federal union and a federal system in conformity with constitutional guarantees rule of law. Th e absence of these two elements can be identifi ed as the main reason of the later disintegration of the federal system of Yugoslavia. Instead, the two pillars on which the Yugoslav system had been built, were Com-munism and Nation. For this reason, the system has been effi ciently characterized as ‘federal ethno-Communism’ or ‘ethno-federal Communism’.

On the one hand, the supreme Communist principle of democratic central-ism, i.e. the concentration of power, emptied the main function of any federal system which is the separation of powers also in territorial terms. Th is prevented democratic reforms or those aimed at introducing elements of the rule of law. In a system which in practice was totally controlled by the Party, the federal sys-tem could not unfold or develop neither its democratic eff ects nor its integrative forces, as it found itself reduced to a mere facade. Even worse, it contributed to an ideological interpretation of the interethnic relations.

On the other hand, however, the management of interethnic relations has been considered from the start as the political ratio and as the very essence of setting up a Yugoslav State. In line with the Central European approach of con-sidering ‘Nation’ those groups who are defi ned by common linguistic, religious or ethnic features and only in a subordinate manner those who live together ac-cording to a civic concept of nationhood, the Republics as constituent units have immediately been understood as the ‘natural States’ of their majority populations (in the sense of titular nations). With the exception, of course, of multinational and multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By contrast with Switzerland, in its history Yugoslavia has never been a Un-ion of consolidated and developed political entities. Its foundations have rather been the Nations, i.e. groups defi ned by their ethnic features, and—later—the Communist party which made an instrumental use of federalism in order to legitimise its own programme of resolution of interethnic confl icts. From the beginning, equality and parity between the Nations (including the right to their ‘own’ Republics) have been preferred over individual rights or democracy. Th us, all constitutional reforms, in particular the one of 1974, strengthened the au-tonomy of the Republics (and of the two autonomous Provinces) producing an increasing identifi cation of the territories of the Republics with a specifi c titular group. For instance, a system of double citizenship has been applied with the (ethnic-territorial) one of the Republics complementary to the (multinational) Yugoslav citizenship.

For making the federal system work (and survive), this strong position of the Republics vis-à-vis the federal State would have required compensation by strong cooperative elements instead of the strong central powers and control by the


Jens Woelk192


Socialist Party. Th us, the crisis of the Party at the end of the 1980s had inevitable consequences for the federal system, too. Th e rapid deterioration of the economic situation added further speed to the disintegration process. In 1990, under the infl uence of the events in Central Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, also the Yugoslav Socialists lost their power in the fi rst free elections. In many Re-publics nationalist parties managed to gain power. Legitimacy in terms of ethnic affi liation demonstrated to be stronger than loyalty vis-à-vis the federal State: all attempts of controlling these centrifugal forces were doomed to fail, in particular as politicians used the sirenes of nationalism instrumentally thus opening the way to disintegration and war.

In Milošević’s Serbia, the peculiar status of the autonomous Provinces, Vojvo-dina and Kosovo, were perceived as an unsustainable cost and even as a threat to Serbia’s sovereignty. In the other Republics, which did not include autonomous Provinces, the secessionist drive against the central power in Belgrade prevailed which, in turn, became increasingly ‘Serbian’. Th e economically most advanced Yugoslav Republic, Slovenia, became the fi rst to declare its independence in June 1991 (despite some attempts of Slovenian academics to save the Federation by a further weakening of central power and more diff erentiation, according to a concept of ‘asymmetrical federalism’). Other Republics followed suit quasi im-mediately: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Th e diff erent politi-cal, social, economic and also ‘national’ situation within the diff erent Republics explain the strong diff erences in the course and the degree of—internal and ex-ternal—confl ict of the single Republics.

Transition and Diff erent Approaches in the Western Balkans Today

Today, none of the new States in the Western Balkans, created by secession, is homogenous in ethnic terms, despite ethnic violence or even attempts of ‘eth-nic cleansing’. As before, this raises the question of how to organize the inter-cultural living-together in multi-ethnic societies. However the legal context has profoundly changed due to the accession to international organizations and the ratifi cation of their Treaty instruments, especially in the fi elds of protection of Human and Minority Rights.

Th e open character of the new Constitutions in the Balkans is best demon-strated by the provision on direct application of some International Treaties. Th e Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does even go further not only provid-ing for the direct applicability of the fundamental freedoms of the European Convention of Human Rights, but also for their absolute supremacy over all other law (including the same Constitution): “International Standards. Th e rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and




Herzegovina. Th ese shall have priority over all other law.” (Art. II.2, Constitution 1995). Appendix I to the Constitution contains a list of 15 International Con-ventions regarding the protection of Human Rights and of national minorities, while Art. X.2 imposes an absolute prohibition of constitutional amendment regarding the rights and guarantees contained in Art. II.

In conformity with the liberal-democratic design characteristic for the new States, this change requires solutions based upon the pluralistic principle and upon the guarantees of the rights of all citizens, independently from their affi li-ation to one ethnic or religious group; i.e. a shift towards a more civic concept of the State. However, after an initial emphasis of the (new) borders as most visible signs expressing the sovereignty of the new States, the liberal-democratic approach of the fi rst phase of transition risked to contrast with the symbolic perception of the State in exclusive (and ethnic) terms, as a Nation-State of one group (only).

Th is symbolic and exclusive dimension has emerged with particular evidence in Croatia under the Tudjman Presidency (1991-2000), in the confl icts between and within the entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Macedonia and in Kosovo. Quite often, this emphasis on ethnic foundations can be found even in the Constitution. Th is is the case, for instance, of the preamble introduc-ing the Croatian Constitution (December 1990) which refers to the “millenarian identity of the Croatian nation and [to] the continuity of its statehood, confi rmed by the course of its entire historical experience within diff erent forms of states and by the preservation and growth of the idea of a national state, founded on the historical right of the Croatian nation to full sovereignty”; a long list of historical events underlin-ing a national Croat identity follows, starting in the VII century! Th e Preamble also proclaims the identity of State and Nation defi ning Croatia “as the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of autochthonous national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians and the others who are citizens”; the latter four groups have been added in 1997.

Th is strong emphasis on the sovereignty of a titular nation which is integrated by reference to ‘all other citizens’ or ‘the other citizens’ is quite frequent in the new systems of promotional nature established after the fi ght for independence. It can be seen as an attempt to combine the predominant and national charac-ter of a State with the inevitable presence of a wide array of possible of minor-ity groups. However, this attempt is often contradicted by the situation on the ground as well as by an underlying ideological approach according to which the State and its institutions are instead clearly the property of the dominant group.

Th is exclusivist claim based on the assumption of homogeneity within the population and on the identifi cation of territory with one group (only) does not


Jens Woelk194


correspond, however, with the factual situation. After the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, in fact, there are diff erent categories of minorities present in the suc-cessor States: there are ‘new’ national minorities (narodi), i.e. those groups which have lost their status as constituent peoples, e.g. Croats in Serbia or Serbs in Croatia. Th ere are also ‘old’ national minorities, which had been classifi ed as ‘nationalities’ (narodnosti) by the Yugoslav Constitution due to the existence of a kin-State, such as Hungarians, Italians, Bulgarians, Slovaks, Romanians, Turks, etc. A further category are ‘ethnic’ minorities which reside in compact settle-ments in some areas but do not have a State of reference, e.g. Muslims in Sandzak (between Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina) or the ‘Egyptians’ in Kosovo and in Macedonia. A similar category are those groups who also lack such a reference, but are not even concentrated but dispersed over the whole area, such as Roma people.

Th is already complex picture of minority groups in the Balkans is further complicated considering the peculiar cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ko-sovo due to the direct intervention by the International Community aimed at guaranteeing and promoting the re-establishment of the multi-ethnic societies which existed before the wars.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina this objective has led to giving particular im-portance to the distinction between the ‘constituent peoples’ (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) on one hand, and the ‘minorities’ (i.e. all other recognized ethnic groups), on the other. Th e privileged status of the former has led to the practi-cally total (institutional) exclusion of the latter which has provoked increasing criticism by international monitoring institutions. A diff erent case is the delicate issue of ‘minority returns’, as this term is referred to the right of refugees and internally displaced persons (belonging to the constituent peoples) to return to their pre-war homes in areas which are now occupied and dominated by a diff er-ent group. Th e most well-known case is the municipality of Srebrenica which is now situated in Republika Srpska, but used to be of Muslim majority: Bosniaks/Muslims face tremendous diffi culties in living there after their eventual return due to the conditions in a tendentially hostile environment which shall actually prevent them from returning. Th us, the returnees fi nd themselves in a situation similar typical of a minority, although they are members of a constituent people. Specifi c guarantees are provided by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) through the guarantee of restitution of property (Annex 7, Art. I.1) as well as through specifi c procedures and institutions for claiming this right, such as the Property Rights Claim Commission and the Human Rights Chamber (whose functions have been transferred to the Constitutional Court after it ceased to be an autono-mous institution in 2003).




Th e Variable: the Relationship between Territory and Ethnicity

In this context, the organisation of territory in federal or regional terms is of extreme importance for the reconstruction and stabilization of the new States in the Western Balkans. However, the application of the pluralistic principle in its territorial and sociocultural dimensions varies considerably in the diff erent situations. Already during the late and desperate attempts of the International Community to stop the ‘ethnic’ confl icts in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, two contrasting approaches could (and can still) be observed. In diff erent combi-nations, both have infl uenced State-building in the Western Balkans sometimes creating dichotomies diffi cult to harmonize: according to a ‘realistic’ approach, territorial division and institutional segregation are the (only) solution for the accommodation of ethnic diff erence accepting the consequence of ethnic homog-enisation of always smaller portions of territory; the ‘idealistic’ approach aims instead at the (re-)construction of multi-ethnic societies by means of the instru-ments of Democracy, the Rule of Law, and the guarantees of Human Rights including the rights of members of minority groups, as foundations for a lasting peaceful living-together. Th e common feature of both approaches lies in the rec-ognition of ethnic diversity as a basis for consequences in the normative sphere. Both also demonstrate an increasing interest in forms of autonomy, in particular territorial autonomy. But the two approaches diff er considerably in the legal so-lutions to be adopted in order to guarantee diversity and, at the same time, suf-fi cient integration of the diff erent groups residing in the same territory.

For the central question of how to organize the living-together, i.e. the re-lationship between territory and ethnicity, diff erent combinations of the legal instruments have been applied in the diff erent contexts. Th is has produced an enormous variety of solutions in the Western Balkans, which can be summarised as a scale between two extremes. On one end, there is the Macedonian case with the negation of any connection between territory and ethnicity; however, in order to prevent a devastating confl ict, this initial rigid approach has later on and in practice been modifi ed and partly overcome. On the other extreme end, there is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the territorial institutionalisation of ethnicity had been designed for creating stability through self-governance of the entities, but without the necessary attention and counterweights for guarantee suffi cient integration between the groups.

Th e current constitutional and legal system in Macedonia is the result of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) of 2001 and of its implementation. Due to the fear of the potential for disintegration a territorial autonomy might produce, any legal link between ethnicity and territory has expressly been denied with the famous and categorical formula: “Th ere are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues” (fundamental principles, Art. 1.2 OFA). However, it is immediately followed by


Jens Woelk196


a guarantee for the smaller Albanian community: “Th e multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved and refl ected in public life” (Art. 1.3. OFA). Th e implementation of the Framework Agreement is thus based on the inclusion of the smaller Albanian community at central level as well as on a strong diff er-entiation at local level.

Th e reform of the local government-system has been carried out by merging numerous small municipalities into bigger ones (a reduction from 123 to 84 mu-nicipalities) for strengthening the rights of smaller communities. In fact, impor-tant minority rights, such as use of a diff erent language and alphabet, proportion-al representation in the public administration and others, are guaranteed at local level and can be activated, if the number of members of other communities is higher than at least 20% of the total population of the municipality. Th e merger of municipalities and the following decentralisation in order to give more powers to the bigger municipalities has been supported by the majority of the population as well as by the International Community. Despite lively debates, at the end of 2004, a referendum against the Law on Territorial Organisation providing for the new local self-government structure has not reached the quorum confi rming the fundamentally positive attitude of the majority vis-à-vis the smaller communities and the strengthening of their rights.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina instead, an extremely complex system of territo-rial governance guarantees self-government of the three constituent peoples. An important decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina il-lustrates the symbolic dimension of the nexus between territory and ethnicity. Th e question brought in front of the constitutional judges was related to the legitimacy of decisions by authorities of Republika Srpska to offi cially name Srp-sko Sarajevo (Serbian Sarajevo) a quarter of the capital city situated in Republika Srpska. Simial issues arose regarding other place names in Bosnia which had been changed during or after the war by adding an ‘ethnic’ prefi x to historical names. Apart from symbols, the question that matters for a fundamental aspect of Bosnia’s territorial organisation is the process of reconstruction of a multi-ethnic society limited to the State level and to the central authorities or does it also comprise the two Entities and other levels of government, i.e. the whole territorial system? Th e Court opted for the second solution and obliged the two Entities to change the names of all municipalities which had been renamed during the war or received an ethnic connotation by adding prefi xes to their names, by contrast with some ‘historical’ prefi xes predating the war (Judgement of 27/02/2004, U 44/01). Th us Srpkso Sarajevo has become Eastern Sarajevo. Th e decision underlines that ethnic domination over a specifi c territory cannot be tolerated in a multinational system based on the equality of its constituent groups, not even in names. However, for overcoming obstructionism of politicians and for implementing the judgement,




the intervention by the High Representative of the International Community was necessary using his coercive powers of substitution (‘Bonn Powers’).

Th e opposite underlying approach regarding the relationship between territo-ry and ethnicity is evident: while any importance of that relationship is expressly denied in Macedonia, it is elevated, instead, to the very constituent foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the common feature of institutionalising eth-nicity is realized in both systems. It is guaranteed by instruments of power shar-ing or consociational democracy. Based on the assumption of elite-cooperation the instruments include, according to Arend Lijphard, a grand-coalition govern-ment inclusive of all groups, their representation in the institutions, a segmental autonomy for the groups, in particular in the fi elds of their primary interest, language, culture, education, religion etc., and, as ultima ratio, veto rights for the groups. Th ese instruments can be combined in many diff erent ways; their relationship with territorial government adds to the complexity resulting in the specifi c system.

Application Compared: Diff erent Combinations

Very similar questions regarding the way of reconciling territorial pluralism and sociocultural diversity had been raised in the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro. Th e State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SiM, 2002-2006) had been established in response to strong international pressures for a limited period of merely three years, but was never actually fully implemented. It is diffi cult to qualify and label this Union with the traditional concepts of ‘Federation’ or ‘Con-federation’. With Montenegro’s decision in favour of independence, approved by the referendum in June 2006, the Union has been dissolved. But even after dissolution, both new and sovereign States, Serbia as well as Montenegro, have maintained the guarantees in favour of minorities foreseen in the State Union’s Charter of Human and Minority Rights of 2003. In both States a rich variety of ethnic groups lives in very diff erent situations and conditions and correspond-ingly very diff erent legal solutions apply to accommodate these diff erences. Th e applied measures range from personal and cultural autonomy to territorial au-tonomy of Vojvodina with its 24 recognized ethnic groups.

Th e case of Vojvodina, a rich province in the North of Serbia bordering with Croatia, Hungary and Romania, is particularly interesting as its quest for au-tonomy is above all motivated by its relative economic wealth as well as by a strong regional identity (recalling the Scottish question). Only in 2009 could the new Autonomy Statute of the Province be adopted which raised the level of self-government to degree similar to the one the Autonomous Province had enjoyed before 1990. Th e new Statute may even become a catalyst for further regionalization of Serbia as a whole, as planning regions have also been cautiously


Jens Woelk198


introduced in 2009. Th is might, in future, contribute to gradually overcoming the ‘trauma’ of Kosovo’s independence. In fact, while the issue of regionalization seems to be driven by economic considerations and the search for administrative effi ciency, Kosovo remains a very delicate and symbolic issue. Reminding of the situation in divided Germany, where the preamble of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany obliged the institutions to strive for reunifi cation, the pre-amble of Serbia’s Constitution of 2006 affi rms Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo and establishes constitutional obligations for the institutions: “Th e Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia, […] it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign State of Serbia and […] from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations”.

Also the decentralisation process in Croatia is driven by the search for more administrative effi ciency rather than by the ethnic factor. During the Tudjman-era the country was strongly centralized, but after the nationalist leader’s death in 2000 a transformation into a regional State has begun. In 2002 a Constitutional law on minority-protection has been adopted which among various guarantees also includes forms of territorial autonomy. Th ese are particularly developed in Istria where it is possible to introduce bilingual place names and minority rights of the Italian community also where the threshold of at least 20% of minority-members within the population is not met.

Numerous and manifold instruments guarantee the promotional (and, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, multinational) vocation of the States in the Western Balkans; all of them are based to some extent on the power sharing model developed by Arend Lijphard and his successors and thus comprise the typical elements, such as autonomy of the groups, their proportional (or equal) representation, a grand coalition in the executive branch as well as veto rights and mechanisms for arbitration in case of controversies.

For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo, the participa-tion of all groups in government is guaranteed. While in Bosnia, as a multina-tional State this guarantee translates into parity between the three constituent peoples, in Kosovo the minority communities, Serbs and others, are guaranteed by quotas in the elected assemblies and in the administration. In both cases, how-ever, the over-institutionalisation of the ethnic factor has often caused a lack of political cooperation or even blockades and obstruction.

In all countries of the region, representation in Parliament is based on a pro-portional electoral system. In Macedonia a special design of the electoral districts has been used as an indirect means of promoting minority representation. In Kosovo minorities are proportionally over-represented through the mechanism




of guaranteed seats (in particular the Serb community): of the 120 seats in Parlia-ment, 20 are reserved for minority communities (10 for Serbs, 3 for Bosniaks, 2 for Turks and 1 seat each for Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians and for the last three groups together, Art. 64 Constitution of Kosovo, 2008). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a bicameral system exists at the State level as well as in the Entities, with the second Chamber (House of Peoples) representing the three constituent peoples. Th e total exclusion of ‘Others’, i.e. citizens not belonging to one of the constituent peoples, from the Houses of Peoples as well as from the Tripartite Presidency (reserved for a Bosniak, a Croat and a Serb) as a consequence of this constitutional reservation, has been judged as institutional discrimination by the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 (Sejdić and Finči-case).

Numerous guarantees of proportional representation of the groups are ap-plied in the public administration and, in particular, in the security forces and the police. Th e latter sector is of particular importance for re-establishing trust in the institutions, despite the many problems such a proportional representation raises in terms of guaranteeing professionalism, certain and impartial selection and admission procedures etc.

Political autonomy for subnational territorial units has only been established in Bosnia and Herzegovina creating an extreme complex and dysfunctional sys-tem in a small country (fourteen governments, Parliaments and Constitutional Courts at State level, in the Entities and Cantons plus the Brčko-district). As there is no will and no incentive for cooperation, obstruction and lack of imple-mentation have often been overcome by the use of the International Commu-nity’s extraordinary powers of substitution exercised by the High Representative; however, becoming more and more actively involved and being always less an impartial supervisor of the peace implementation process, the High Representa-tive has become part of the game (and of the problems). A diff erent approach has been chosen in Kosovo and Macedonia, where important institutional reforms have been adopted at local level, including the transfer of new powers from the centre to local self-government units, but without institutionalising intermediate levels of government.

Veto rights for minorities are used in Macedonia as a means of protection for communities against unilateral change in sensitive areas. Legislative change regarding local self-government and culture, but also constitutional amendments, the territorial design and organisation of the country as well as the school sys-tem, can only be adopted by a double majority cutting across the communities: in addition to the majority of all representatives in an assembly, a majority of the smaller communities is also necessary (Badinter majority). In Bosnia and Herzegovina the frequent use of the diff erent veto positions for obstructionist purposes (Entity vote and vital interest-veto in Parliament and in the Presidency)


Jens Woelk200


have often blocked the whole system and even decisions by the Constitutional Court had to be implemented by the International community making use of its coercive powers. In Kosovo, the minority veto is therefore only suspensory and, if activated, triggers a mediation procedure.

Th e International Community has exercised its infl uence in Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and Albania in an indirect way, setting conditions and standards and making compliance conditional for fi nancial and technical assistance as well as for membership in international organizations as well as, in future, for accession to the European Union. Evidently, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, change has been imposed or induced by direct intervention. Th is raises concern and even doubts regarding the sustainability of the systems shaped by strong and direct international intervention as well as the question whether and to which extent the operation of the International Community itself has to com-ply with its own standards.

Territorial ‘Ownership’ Conditioned by Minority Rights?

Th e institutionalisation of the ethnic factor in all legal systems of the West-ern Balkans (with the partial exception of Albania) can thus be considered as a necessary compromise between the affi rmation of ‘ownership’ of the new State’s territory by one Nation and the guarantee of ‘visible’ minority rights for smaller communities. Th e guarantee of the latter has, however, often been a result of international infl uence or even imposition due to the fact that all new States were in a situation to seek (substantive) recognition and accreditation by inter-national organizations. Th is institutionalisation of ethnicity bears, however, two opposite risks: on one hand, the risk of not being taken seriously where suffi cient international pressure is missing, e.g. limiting minority rights in their eff ective implementation (this has been the case, at least in part, in Croatia and Serbia); on the other hand, the risk of being taken too seriously and creating institutional segregation with consequent lack of cooperation and nationalist political parties only interested in maintaining the status quo (as has been clearly demonstrated in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo).

Unfortunately, there are not many alternatives. Any further fragmentation along ethnic lines should be excluded, although this option is always propagated by the ‘realists’, e.g. in the continuous debate on partition of Northern Kosovo with its Serb majority population (however, such a partition would not resolve the situation of the other Serbs in Kosovo who are even more numerous than those living concentrated in the municipalities in Northern Kosovo). Also the adoption of the liberal-democratic State in its pure, ethnically neutral form can-not be an alternative: based on the (implicit) majority paradigm it would only




provoke the discrimination of smaller and weaker groups and, by consequence, new ethnic mobilisation.

No solution can therefore be a radical one, but only the result of gradual change. Instruments are required which permit evolution and adaptation of the single local realities for avoiding new instability. Incentives are needed for change. Th is and the elimination of some dysfunctional elements will only be possible, if collective representation and individual liberties are balanced diff erently (this has been very effi ciently underlined in the ECtHR Judgement on the Sejdić-Finči case). However, territory must not be seen in exclusive terms, but as a resource for the whole population.

Th e Road to European Integration

After the political and constitutional changes in Croatia, Serbia and Montene-gro in the second half of the 1990s, the regional context off ers new opportunities for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for the whole area of the Western Balkans (this is symbolized by the visa-liberalisation process, approved in 2010, which facilitates travelling for individuals). For some years the perspective of European integration has become the focal point of the process of stabilization of the whole region opening new perspectives also for the management of diversity among diff erent groups.

In 2003, at the Th essaloniki summit the EU opened the perspective of acces-sion to all countries in South Eastern Europe. Since then, the countries in the region have made diff erent progress; today they are at diff erent stages in their preparations for EU integration. Albania returned the answers to the European Commission’s questionnaire in April 2010 and Serbia did so in the beginning of 2011. Macedonia is an offi cial candidate since 2005, has received recommenda-tion for opening negotiations (only) in 2009, but still waits for the date for open-ing negotiation talks to be assigned by the Council, while Montenegro received candidate status in December 2010, without accession talks been opened so far. Most advanced is Croatia which has completed its accession negotiations in 2011 and is now awaiting full membership for 2013. Facing specifi c problems, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as well as Kosovo are clearly lagging behind the other Western Balkans States in the accession process. While for BiH constitutional reform is widely considered necessary for overcoming international guarantees under the Dayton Peace Agreement and for making the State functional, but po-litical agreement does not seem possible, Kosovo is still not generally recognised as an independent State after its unilateral declaration of independence in Febru-ary 2008; to date, it has been recognised by 81 UN Member States, including 22 EU Member States.


Jens Woelk202


European integration has become the decisive perspectives for the States in the Western Balkans. In turn, the European Union is able to exercise a particu-lar force on the countries through the system of conditionality. Th e system of relations with the EU is very diff erentiated and asymmetrical according to the diff erent situation in the countries and thus varies in each case. But at the same time it is based on the respect of certain conditions which are applied in a gradual approach becoming progressively more detailed and stringent. In this way, the EU has become the pull factor for political and economic transition in the Bal-kans and European integration can be seen, at least in medium terms, as the only means for the integration among the communities. Clearly, the EU’s capacity of acting as a catalyst for reforms depends very much on its attractiveness. And in the last years the EU itself is not in good shape due to the consequences of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, of the ‘enlargement fatigue’ after the last two rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and of the economic and fi nancial crisis. Th is has serious and negative consequences for the progress made by the countries as reform eff orts depend on incentives and realistic perspectives.

It might seem a paradox in a context still strongly characterized by the mirage of State sovereignty, but for many States of the Western Balkans international pressure and monitoring regarding the adoption and implementation of crite-ria elaborated outside the sovereign sphere of the new States—the ‘international and European standards’—are actually much stronger than for the ‘old’ Member States. Th e Balkans on their way towards European integration are thus charac-terized by the internationalisation of their constitutional law and by the visible circulation of constitutional models.

European integration is founded upon the idea of sharing sovereignty and upon the conscience of converging constitutional values and principles. Like in a federal system, European integration requires a minimum of homogeneity: “united in diversity”, but as truly ‘integrated States’.

Literature (selection)

J. Batt (ed.), “Th e Western Balkans moving on,” Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers n. 70 (October 2004), online in [http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/]

F. Bieber, “Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. International-ly Driven Processes of Institutional (Re-)Design,” in Th e Global Review of Ethnopolitics (2003): 3 ss.

F. Bieber, “Recent Trends in Complex Power-Sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Euro-pean Yearbook of Minority Issues, vol. 1 2001/2 (Leiden/Boston, 2003), 269 ss.

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), “Opinion on the Constitutional Situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative,” CDL-AD 004, 11, (March 2005), online in [www.venice.coe.int]




European Commission for Democracy through Law, “Amicus Curiae Brief in the cases of Sejdić and V. Finci Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Opinion no. 483/2008, (22 October 2008) online in [www.venice.coe.int]

P. Hilpold, “Th e Kosovo Case and International Law: Looking for Applicable Th eories,” in Chinese Journal of International Law Vol. 8, No. 1 (2009): 47-61.

International Commission on the Balkans (chair Giuliano Amato), “Th e Balkans in Eu-rope’s Future,” (April 2005), online in [www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf ]

Kosovo in the ICJ - Th e Context and Kosovo in the ICJ - Th e Case, in German Law Journal GLJ, Vol. 11 (2010), Nos. 7/8, pp. 741-928, online in [http://www.germanlawjournal.com]

G. Knaus, F. Martin, “Travails of the European Raj, Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovi-na,” Journal of Democracy (July 2003): 60-74 [www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/KnausandMartin.pdf ]

J. Marko, “Post-confl ict Reconstruction through State- and Nation-building: Th e Case of Bos-nia and Herzegovina,” in European Autonomy and Diversity Papers (4/2005), online in [www.eurac.edu/edap]

J. Rupnik, “Th e Western Balkans and the EU: ‘Th e Hour of Europe’,” Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers n. 126 (June 2011), online at [http://www.iss.europa.eu/pub-lications/]

G. Schoepfl in, Th e Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, in eds. J. McGarry, B. O’Leary, Th e Politics of Ethnic Confl ict Regulation. Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Confl icts (London/New York, 1993 (reprint 1995 pp. 172 ss.

S. Smooha, Th e Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe (Budapest, 2005), 209 ss.

V. Vujacic, “Th e Challenges of Ethnic Federalism: Experiences and Lessons of the Former Yugoslavia,” in Federalism and Decentralization. Perspectives for the Transformation Proc-ess in Eastern and Central Europe eds. J. Rose, J. C. Traut (George Marshall European Centre for Security Studies vol. 2, Hamburg, 2001), 259 ss.

J. Woelk, “Federalism and Consociationalism as Tools for State-(Re)-Construction? Ex-periences from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Federalism, Sub-national Constitutions and the Protection of Minorities (a cura di) eds. J. Marko, G.A. Tarr, R.F. Williams (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, 2004), 177 ss.

J. Woelk, “Reforms of Local Government in SEE. Closer to Europe?” in Transformation and European Integration. Th e Local Dimension, ed. B. Dallago (Basingstoke, 2006), 85 ss.

M. Žagar, Th e Collapse of the Yugoslav Federation and the Viability of Asymmetrical Federal-ism, in Th e Changing Faces of Federalism, eds. S. Ortino, V. Mastny, M. Žagar (Man-chester 2004), 103 ss.

Abstract:The building of Nation-States in the Western Balkans (WB) after the break-up of Yugoslavia has led

to a greater demand for the accommodation of diversity. This paradox is explained by various factors: despite the tragedy of ethnic violence and attempts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the 1990s, homogeneity of the population could not be realised and diversity is still characteristic for most (new) States in the area. The need of guaranteeing regional stability for the States, but also the importance of peacefully living-together in diversity as indicator for a truly pluralistic democratic system led to different forms of interven-


Jens Woelk204


tions by the International Community followed by EU conditionality. The main variable emerging from a comparison is the use of territory for accommodating (ethnic) diversity. Following the Nation-State-model of Western and Central Europe, the identifi cation of groups with (control over) a specifi c territory has often led to exclusive nationalist aspirations and to ethnic violence; today’s challenge is to accommodate diversity, i.e. individual human rights and group claims, within a stable territorial framework.

RésuméLa création des États-nations dans les Balkans occidentaux après le démantèlement de la Yougoslavie a

donné lieu à une plus grande demande de prise en compte de la diversité. Ce paradoxe s’explique par divers facteurs : malgré la tragédie de la violence ethnique et les tentatives de « nettoyage ethnique » durant les années quatre-vingt-dix, il n’y a pas eu d’homogénéisation de la population et la diversité est toujours la caractéristique de la plupart des (nouveaux) États dans la région. La nécessité de garantir la stabilité régionale pour les États, mais également l’importance d’assurer un vivre-ensemble pacifi que dans la di-versité comme indicateur d’un système démocratique vraiment pluraliste, ont conduit à différentes formes d’intervention de la part de la communauté internationale, poursuivies par la conditionnalité européenne. La principale variable que l’on peut identifi er dans une étude comparée est l’utilisation du territoire pour accommoder la diversité (ethnique). En suivant le modèle d’État-nation d’Europe centrale et orientale, l’identifi cation des groupes avec un territoire spécifi que a souvent conduit à des aspirations nationalistes exclusives et à la violence ethnique ; le défi d’aujourd’hui est d’assurer la diversité, par exemple les droits de l’homme et les revendications des groupes, à l’intérieur d’un cadre territorial stable.



Federalism as a Tool of Confl ict-Resolution: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Soeren Keil

Lecturer in International Relations at the Canterbury Christ Church University.

Introduction

Federalism has become an important tool of confl ict-resolution in the past two decades. In countries that face violence between diff erent territorially con-centrated groups, federalism has been used to ensure autonomy for the diff erent groups on one side and their inclusion through power-sharing mechanisms in central government on the other. Examples include Bosnia, Nigeria, Iraq and Nepal. However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that federalism is a successful strategy, in particular in those societies where a general will to live together in the same state is missing.

Th is article, by studying the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which became federal as a result of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, argues that federalism might be successful in addressing some needs of diff erent opposing groups. How-ever, the main challenge for post-confl ict societies that adopt a federal system is to agree on the nature of the state. Bosnia off ers a particularly useful example because the federal system has been working for more than 15 years and heavy international involvement meant that it became a key case of international state-building and democratization after the end of the violent confl ict. Certainly, fu-ture federal experiences in post-confl ict societies from Cyprus to Somalia will use Bosnia and Herzegovina as a model, for better or for worse.


Soeren Keil206


After a short clarifi cation of term, this contribution will discuss the theoretical argument for federalism as a tool of confl ict-resolution. By combining federalism and consociationalism, it will be demonstrated how shared-rule and self-rule can be useful in addressing the demands of territorially concentrated ethnic groups for more autonomy and self-government, while at the same time preserving the territorial integrity of the state. Th e second part of the paper will briefl y describe the use of federalism as a tool of confl ict-resolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is important to highlight in this context is that the federal system was never voluntarily agreed upon by the confl icting parties; but instead it was imposed by international actors who later became very important actors in the political process in Bosnia. Th e third section will analyze the developments of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 and the conclusion will draw on some important lessons learnt in Bosnia.

Clarifi cation of terms

To assess the use of federalism as a tool of confl ict-resolution in BiH, it is important to clarify a number of key terms. Federalism as such has to be “taken philosophically or ideologically rather than institutionally, most frequently appeals for a marked degree of regional independence and autonomy”.1 In the words of Ronald Watts, one of the leading researchers in the fi eld, federalism

“refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule. It is based on the presumed value and validity of combining unity and diversity and of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identi-ties within a larger political union. Th e essence of federalism as a normative principle is the perpetuation of both union and non-centralization at the same time.”2

While federalism describes an ideology, a philosophical principle of shared-rule and autonomy at the same time, federation refers to a federal state. Watts describes a federation as a

“compound polity combining constituent units and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a signifi cant portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its citizens.”3

Surprisingly, the Bosnian Constitution does not describe the country as a

1. Preston King, Federalism and Federation (Beckenham: Croom Helm 1982), 74.2. Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2nd Edition, 1999), 6.3. Ronald Watts, “Federalism, Federal Political System, and Federation,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, (1998): 121.


Federalism as a Tool of Confl ict-Resolution: Th e Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 207


federal state or uses the term federalism. It uses the term ‘Federation’ to describe one of the two entities as the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), because this entity itself consists of ten constituent units, which are called cantons. However, while the American, the German and the Belgian Constitu-tions clearly point out the federal nature of these states, this is not the case in all federal countries. Besides Bosnia, the Indian Constitution abstains from using the word ‘federalism,’ and there is no reference to the federal principle in the Spanish Constitution either. While these Constitutions refer to regionalism and regions, Bosnia has to be characterised as a federal state because Art. 1 (3) of the Bosnian Constitution reads that “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska” (General Framework Agreement, 1995). At the same time Art. 3 points out clearly the competences between the federal level and the entity level. Institu-tions at both levels are directly elected by the citizens and the entities are also involved in decision-making at the central level through the House of Peoples and veto possibilities in the House of Representatives. Indeed, an ‘entity veto’ exists, because decisions taken in the House require the support of MPs from both entities (Art. 4 (3d)). While generally federal law prevails, the decision-making competences of the central government have been limited and have only evolved over time. Furthermore, the three Bosnian constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats play a key role in the political institutions at all levels. Th is is why Bosnia and Herzegovina can be qualifi ed as a multinational federation. Th e federal system aims at ensuring a fair division and share of powers among the three constituent peoples and the provision of autonomy for these nations in their territorial units. While neither the entities nor the cantons in the FBiH are defi ned as mononational,4 the political reality is that they are and understand and defi ne themselves as such.

Federalism as a tool of confl ict resolution

Confl ict resolution refers to a process of transforming violent confl icts “into more constructive relations between states, peoples and groups”.5 However, research-ers on confl ict resolution have pointed out that the resolution of a confl ict does not fi nish with the end of violence. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall6 for

4. Until 2002 the entities as well as the cantons were defi ned as mono-ethnic. Th e Constitution of the Repub-lika Srpska qualifi ed it as the “State of the Serbs.” Th is changed after the Constitutional Court decided in 2000 in the so-called “Constituent Peoples Decision” that Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs among Others are constitu-ent peoples throughout the whole territory of BiH. Consequently the entities and the cantons had to change their constitutions. See further F. Bieber, “Towards better Governance with more Complexity?,” in Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ed. C. Solioz and T. Vogel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004).5. Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Confl ict Resolution: War, Peace and the International System (New Delhi and Th ousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2nd edition, 2007), 3.6. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Confl ict Resolution (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2nd edition, 2007), 29.


Soeren Keil208


example distinguish between confl ict management, which they defi ne as “peace keeping and war limitation”. Confl ict resolution, however, refers to “a more com-prehensive term which implies that the deep-rooted sources of confl ict are addressed and transformed”. Th e question for the purpose of this paper therefore is to what extent federalism as a theory and federation as a practical solution can help not only to end the violence in a confl ict but also to address to root causes of this confl ict and transform the relationships between the former enemies into more constructive and cooperative forms of interactions. Federalism as a theory refers to the ideology of shared-rule and self-rule, to the connection of (territorial) autonomy and joined decision-making in central institutions at the same time. Its values focus on the celebration of diversity, mutual respect, reciprocity and a general will to cooperate and live together.7 Federalism can off er a solution to confl icts, in which territorially concentrated minority nations demand recog-nition, autonomy and representation in central institutions. Th ese confl icts usually evolve as a result of a history of neglect by the majority population and they can take many diff erent forms, either as a struggle for independence, as was the case in Kosovo in the 1990s, as a fi ght for recognition and autonomy, or as an asymmetrical form of warfare through terrorist and guerrilla acts. What all of these confl icts have in common is the clash of diff erent identities and indeed the clash of diff erent nation-building projects. While the nation-building project of Quebec in Canada never erupted into large-scale violence, it can nevertheless serve as an example to demonstrate the confl ictual nature of diff erent national identities within the borders of one state. Quebec’s quest for recognition and more autonomy is not about the independence of the French-speaking province from the rest of Canada. It is about the recognition of diversity, the recognition that Quebec is diff erent and that this diversity is worth protecting, celebrat-ing and indeed promoting. Only when English-speaking Canadians failed to understand this message and take appropriate actions to support the culture and identity of Quebec did the quest for recognition turn into a demand of inde-pendence from the rest of Canada.8

Federalism can be a tool of confl ict resolution, if the confl ict is about the recognition of diversity, territorial autonomy and power-sharing in central in-stitutions. Th is is why federalist theory and consociationalism, which focuses on power-sharing among diff erent nations within one state, are highly interlinked, as both focus on the combination of (territorial) autonomy and elite power-sharing

7. Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism (Th eory and Practice) (London: Routledge, 2006).8. M. Burgess, “Comparing national visions: Canada-Quebec relations in comparative perspective,” in Mul-tinational Democracies, ed. A. Gagnon and C.Taylor (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).Will Kymlicka, “Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2000): 207-224.




in central institutions.9 While federalism focuses more on a territorial solution to the confl ict between diff erent identities, consociationalism highlights the im-portant of elite cooperation, veto rights and proportional representation. Having said this, rather than favouring one over the other, societies in which diff erent groups have been in confl ict with each other over territory, autonomy, power in local and central institutions and over economic resources will require a complex institutional architecture to transform violence into new peaceful patterns of in-teraction. Th erefore, power-sharing approaches from all sides, as well as diff erent forms of territorial and nonterritorial autonomy need to be explored and applied to each case individually depending on the circumstances.10 In fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen as a major example of the combination of a federal po-litical system with consociational power-sharing institutions. Before looking at the federal system in Bosnia in depth, the attention shall focus on the origins of the federal idea and the implementation of a federal state in Bosnia.

Th e origins of federalism in Bosnia

It is important to point out that Bosnia and Herzegovina has never been or-ganised federally before 1995, when the Dayton Peace Agreement between Bos-nia, Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia ended the confl icts among these countries and reordered the political system of Bosnia. In fact, Bosnia has never even been an independent country before 1992, when it declared independence from Yugoslavia after Croatia and Slovenia had done so already months before. When Bosnia declared its independence in 1992, the leading politicians of the main parties agreed on elite power-sharing but abstained from implementing a federal system, because Bosnia’s population was intermixed and there was no ethnic homogeneity in larger parts of Bosnia’s territory. Already before Bosnia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs un-der the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and their leader Radovan Karadžić established autonomous municipalities, which were later connected to the autonomous Serb region in Bosnia. In the wake of Bosnia’s declaration of independence, the SDS announced the independence of all territories under its control from Bosnia and established the Republika Srpska (RS), which opted for staying in Yugoslavia and therefore seceded from Bosnia. Th e violent confl ict broke out shortly after Bosnia declared its independence in April 1992 and at the

9. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Arend Lijphart, “Non- Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Th eories,” in Publius: Th e Jour-nal of Federalism, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1985): 3-15. Daniel Elazar, “Federalism and Consociational Regimes,” Pub-lius: Th e Journal of Federalism, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1985): 17-34.10. Timothy Sisk, Power-Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Confl ict (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996). Stefan Wolff , “Complex Power-sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Contemporary Confl ict Settlements,” Ethnopolitics, Vol. 8, No. 1, (2009): 27-45.


Soeren Keil210


heart of the confl ict was the aim of the SDS to occupy as much territory of Bosnia as possible and simultaneously ethnically cleanse these territories of its non-Serb population. Th e Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the offi cial army of the government, but became more and more a Bosniak Army close to the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) of President Alija Izetbegović fought against the army of the RS and for the territorial integrity of Bosnia as a whole. During the confl ict from 1992 to 1995, there was also a fi ght between the army of the Bosnian Croats and the Army of Bosnia, because the Bosnian Croats, with sup-port from the Tudjman regime in Croatia also fought for the secession of Croat populated areas from Bosnia and their accession into Croatia.11 Essentially, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was about the right of the Serbian and to a lesser extent also the Croatian population of Bosnia to secede from the country and either establish independent statelets or join Serbia and Croatia respectively. Th e argument presented by the Bosnian Serbs particularly was one of suppression and discrimination. According to the SDS, the Serbs in Bosnia faced a continuous threat from a Bosniak-Croat alliance and were likely to end up in a permanent minority position. Furthermore, the agreement of the late communist years, that Bosnia is the country of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats alike had been broken, be-cause Bosniaks and Croats failed to take into account the opinion of the Serbs in Bosnia, who did not want to leave Yugoslavia. As a consequence, the Serbs of Bosnia decided to secede from Bosnia and form their own nation-state, which would remain in Yugoslavia and possibly eventually unite with Serbia proper.

Th e confl ict in Bosnia was also one about identity and the protection of di-versity. For the Bosnian Serbs, leaving Yugoslavia meant losing the direct contact to the kin-state of Serbia. For Bosniaks and Croats however, independence meant freedom from the rule of the Milošević regime in Belgrade. While the argument of the Bosnian Serbs about recognising their identity and their essential need to stay with the kin-state Serbia certainly is important, what can be examined in Bosnia is the confl ict of a number of nation-building projects and the develop-ment of ethno-nationalism in its worst form.12 Th e confl ict was essentially one about territorial control and the creation of ethnically homogenous regions.

What is striking about the war in Bosnia in the early 1990s is the involvement of many international actors right from the beginning, including the United Na-tions (UN), the European Community (EC, after 1993 European Union, EU), NATO, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), as well as the USA, European countries, Russia and even Turkey and countries of the Middle East. Th e Bosnian political scientist Mirko Pejanović has character-

11. Attila Hoare, How Bosnia Armed (London: Saqi Books, 2004).12. For the theory of ethnonationalism see; Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Th e Quest for Understanding) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).




ised this involvement of international actors as the “Internationalization of the Bosnian question”.13 It was also the policy of these international actors that fi rst mentioned the creation of a Bosnian federation. While the Carrington-Cutileiro plan of February 1992 focused on devolution and elite-power-sharing, it was the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which foresaw the ‘canonization’ of Bosnia. According to this plan, Bosnia was to be divided into ten cantons, each of these was to be ethnically defi ned. While the plan eventually failed, it fuelled the confl ict be-tween Bosniaks and Croats. Th e Owen-Stoltenberg Plan of August 1993 foresaw the division of Bosnia in three statelets, one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb. Th e plan can be qualifi ed as the ultimate confederalization, as the central govern-ment would have had only limited powers and the three statelets were the main carriers of sovereignty and decision-making powers. Finally, in 1994 the Contact Group developed a plan, which was to become the basis for the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995. Bosnia’s current federal model is based on the ideas of this Contact Group Plan, which foresaw that the FBiH, which was estab-lished in 1994 under American mediation, would control 51 percent of Bosnian territory and the RS would consist of 49 percent. Th e plan also foresaw the es-tablishment of strict power-sharing mechanisms at the central level to ensure the participation and protection of all three constituent peoples.14

Federalism as a solution to the confl ict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dis-tinct international idea. As Sumantra Bose has rightly formulated it, Bosnia is “a state by international design and of international design.”15 Steven Burg and Paul Shoup16 have also pointed out that the international involvement in the Bosnian confl ict has been remarkable and that it was due to international actors that eth-nic separation became the main approach to confl ict resolution. Th ere has been a lot of criticism of the involvement of the international community in the war and consequent peace negotiations in Bosnia. Th e main arguments claim that Bosnia has never been divided along ethno-national lines and that the interna-tional community, by accepting the division of Bosnia in two entities and three de-facto homogeneous areas accepted the ethno-national division of Bosnia and

13. Mirko, Pejanović, Th e Political Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Post-Dayton Period, (Sarajevo: Šahinpašić, 2007)14. F. Bieber, “Ethnicity and Territory in International Peace Proposals in the Former Yugoslavia” in: Consti-tutional Dimensions of Cultural and Territorial Pluralism in the Balkan, ed. J. Woelk, (Th e Hague: Martinus Nijhoff /Brill, 2010).15. Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton (Nationalist Partition and International Intervention) (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 60.16. Steven Burg, and Paul Shoup, Th e War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ethnic Confl ict and International Intervention) (Armonk and London: M.E.Sharpe, 1999).


Soeren Keil212


Herzegovina.17 Th is argument only holds true to a certain extent, as there is a lot of evidence that the Bosnian society has always been divided along religious and later ethnic and national lines. Th e fi rst parties that formed in Bosnia in the early 20th century defi ned themselves as Muslim, Croat and Serb.18 Th ereafter, there has always been a focus on party representation of the three main religious and ethnic groups, even within the communist parties, which focused on proportional representation of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats within the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina particularly after 1963, when the Bosniaks were offi -cially recognised as an ethnic group. What however is new in Bosnia after 1995 is the combination of ethno-national identity and territorial control. Th e territories in Bosnia, the entities and the cantons in the FBiH understand themselves as nation-states, as ethno-national homogeneous statelets, in which one dominant group prevails and all other groups are considered minorities. However, this again is not due to international action or inaction, but it is a distinct result of the Bosnian war. Ethnic cleansing led to the creation of homogenous areas and the international community has gone through great lengths to undo this and ensure a safe and complete return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Th e origins of the current federal system in Bosnia are many. Th ere is some resemblance of the Yugoslav model of federalism such as the focus on power-sharing between the diff erent national groups and the rotating Presidency. Th ere is also an element of the American Tradition of federalism in the Constitution, because there are no secession clauses and it is clearly pointed out that Bosnia is the creation of the entities. Furthermore, the results of the war played a key role in the establishment of the federal system. Ethnic cleansing led to homogeneous territories and federalism was to ensure autonomy and shared-rule simultane-ously, therefore providing the entities (and with them the national groups) with far-reaching autonomy, while at the same time ensuring the continued existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a united state by enforcing power-sharing in cen-tral institutions and avoiding all references to secession and indeed even federal-ism in the Constitution. Finally, the impact of the international negotiators on Bosnia’s federalism cannot be overestimated. As Richard Holbrooke,19 the chief US negotiator at Dayton pointed out himself, US offi cials have been heavily involved in redrawing the map of Bosnia, writing a Constitution and ensuring other important agreements to ensure the viability of the peace agreement and to ensure that it could be implemented on the ground.

17. Anton Bebler, “South-East European Federalism and Contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Acta Slavica Iaponica, 24 (2008): 1-23. Attila Hoare, Th e History of Bosnia - From the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Saqi Books, 2007).Noel Malcolm, Bosnia, a short history, (Basingstoke and Oxford: PanBooks, 2002).18. Attila Hoare, Th e History of Bosnia (From the Middle Ages to the Present Day) (London: Saqi Books, 2007), 80.19. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1999).




Because of these many diff erent historical sources and because of the distinct impact of both the recent war and the international engagement in Bosnia it is possible to qualify the federalism applied in Bosnia as a form of ‘imposed fed-eralism.’ Watts described federalism as an ideology of shared-rule and self-rule, of autonomy and power-sharing. In Bosnia this ideology was imposed upon the local elites by international actors as well as by the circumstances of the Bosnian war. Th e ethnic cleansing of the war made a federal system possible, while inter-national actors made it clear that they would not allow the secession attempts of the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats. Th e ideology of shared-rule and self-rule was imposed on Bosnia, because international actors, most importantly Holbrooke and his team came to the conclusion that the war in Bosnia was basi-cally about territory and identity preservation. Th erefore, federalism was to en-sure the territorial autonomy of Bosniaks, Croats and most importantly Serbs. Th is is why the Republika Srpska was allowed to continue to exist. At the same time, power-sharing and veto rights in central institutions ensured the protection of the identity of the three national groups through a complex consociational institutional design and ensured that no major decisions could be taken without consensus and cooperation. Th is was aimed at reducing the fears of the diff erent groups to become a minority in the state. In this way federalism would protect the Serbs from a Bosniak-Croat alliance but it would also ensure the political par-ticipation of the Bosnian-Croats, the smallest of the three groups. Finally, it was a mechanism of political protection for the Bosniaks as well, the group that has suff ered the most during the war. Th e imposed federalism applied in Bosnia was therefore a compromise based on the premise that territorial autonomy, not seces-sion would be allowed for Serbs and Croats and that Bosnia will continue to exist as a united country, a key demand of the Bosniaks. Finally, Bosnia’s federalism can be classifi ed as ‘imposed’ because none of the three national groups preferred a federal solution in 1995. Serbs and Croats wanted to secede and ultimately join their kin-states. Hence, territorial autonomy in a united Bosnian state was a de-feat of the main Serbian war aim and the ultimate end to the dream of a Greater Serbia. Bosniaks favoured a decentralized state with a strong central government. However, they rejected the ethno-national organisation of the Bosnian state as a result of ethnic cleansing. Only the pressure of the United States, NATO and the EU ensured that the parties agreed on the Dayton Peace Agreement. Besides, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were not even directly involved in the major debates and decisions in Bosnia, as they were represented by leading politicians from Serbia and Croatia instead. Th erefore, they never completely agreed to the peace treaty and Karadžić and others argued their case in the aftermath of the implementation of the peace agreement.


Soeren Keil214


Federalism became a tool of peace-making. It ensured the existence of a united Bosnian state, while providing autonomy and extensive veto rights to Serbs and Croats in the central institutions of the state. Because federalism addressed some but not all demands and fears of all groups, it became the preferred method of international actors to bring peace to Bosnia. In the end, the involvement of the United States ensured that the Bosnian elites would be pressured into agreeing on a peace treaty, which organized the country federally. However, since 1995 fed-eralism has been used as a tool not only of peace-making, but to address some of the wider issues of the Bosnian state and therefore directly tackle the root causes of the confl ict, namely the relationship of the three peoples to each other and to the joint state and their relationship to Bosnia’s two big neighbouring states, Serbia and Croatia.

Th e evolution of Bosnia’s federal system since 1995

Bosnia’s federal system, characterised by two entities and strict power-sharing guidelines20 has undergone a remarkable process of change over the last 15 years. While federal countries such as Germany, Austria and the United States have witnessed calls for decentralisation and a reduction of the decision-making and fi nancial powers of the central government, in Bosnia there has been a constant call for more centralisation. Indeed, the state that was created in 1995 was hardly functional and continued internal obstruction resulted in a lack of political progress. Important reforms to recover the economy, rebuild the infrastructure and re-unite the broken society were blocked or delayed. Political elites refused to meet and there was literally not progress in post-war reconstruc-tion between 1995 and 1997.21 Th is resulted in the decision of the international community to extend the powers of the High Representative (HR), whose role it was to oversee the civilian elements of the Dayton Peace Agreement.22 As a result of this decision, the HR was allowed to impose legislation, stop and veto legislation that had passed parliament and to remove obstructive offi cials, who were acting against the peace process. Since the HR was the last instance to interpret the peace agreement, he became judge and executor at the same time. As a consequence of this important decision, a number of key reforms have been implemented in Bosnia due to interventions by the HR. Th ese include the introduction of new state symbols and a new currency, the reform of the army and constitutional changes to the entity constitutions.

20. F. Bieber, Post- War Bosnia (Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mc-Millian, 2006). S. Keil, “Mythos und Realität eines ethnischen Föderalismus in Bosnien und Herzegowina,” Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, Vol. 50 (2010): 76-86.21. C. Bildt, Peace Journey (Th e Struggle for Peace in Bosnia) (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1998).22. Peace Implementation Council (PIC) (1997) PIC Bonn Conclusions, available at:http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182#11




More generally, four periods of reform can be distinguished in post-war Bos-nia.23 In the fi rst period, ranging from 1995-1998 the international community focused on peace-building. NATO troops were the main actor and the local po-litical elites focused on de-militarisation and adjusting to the new circumstances in the country. Neither the HR, nor the local elites have demonstrated any will-ingness to implement the civilian aspects of the peace agreement and contribute to the reconstruction of the Bosnian state. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a great success of international intervention and peace-building that no large-scale vio-lence broke out in Bosnia after 1995.

Th e second period goes from 1998 to 2002/3. In this period it was particu-larly the HR, who introduced important reforms and contributed to the recon-struction of a Bosnian state. Th e political institutions at state level were rebuilt and became more infl uential due to a number of important decisions by the HR. While local elites continued to undermine the peace process they also recognised the importance of the new changes. Some, such as Bilijana Plavsić demonstrated their willingness to work together with the international actors, while others, such as the Croat leadership refused and openly challenged the international au-thority and the Bosnian state.24 Nevertheless, reforms to allow for free movement and a recovery of the economy, as well as the Millions of US Dollar in Aid showed signs of success. More refugees returned to their former homes, the elites in the RS started to cooperate with the international community and in 2000 a non-nationalist government took over at the state level and in the FBiH. Important changes to the entity constitutions in 2002 also meant that ethnic homogeneity was removed as a constitutional principle. Furthermore, reforms of the customs and taxation system meant that the central state received its own independent income. Th e years between 1999 and 2000 were furthermore important, because democratic governments took over in Croatia and Serbia and the support for the secessionist tendencies of Bosnian Croats and Serbs vanished (but political sup-port particularly from Serbia for the Bosnian Serbs remained). After the Kosovo War in 1999 the European Union (EU) started to become active in the region and off er membership as a long-term political solution. Th e reforms in the state focused on re-installing state structures and providing the central level with more authority and competences. Federalism became a tool of state-building and the adjustment of competences between entities and central state can be seen as an example for this.

23. Florian Bieber also distinguishes between diff erent periods of post-war development in Bosnia.F. Bieber, “After Dayton, Dayton? Th e Evolution of an Unpopular Peace,” Ethnopolitics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2006): 15-31.24. F. Bieber, “Croat Self-Government in Bosnia- A Challenge for Dayton?” ECMI Brief, No. 5. (2001).


Soeren Keil216


Th e third period between 2002 and 2006 saw the connection of state-build-ing and Europeanization. Th e EU became more and more involved in Bosnia, and the Offi ce of the HR was combined with the offi ce of an EU Special Rep-resentative (EUSR). Important reforms that altered the balance between central and regional level were implemented by the HR, but often after local elites have been involved in the discussion and even agreed on the basics of the reform. Th e defence forces were put under a central command and new ministries were cre-ated to demonstrate the growing importance of the state-level. While reforms were still contested between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, there seemed to be a general drive for EU integration and stabilisation in Bosnia. Th e economy grew at about 5 percent per year and the post-war recovery generated some wealth. However, while local elites became more involved in the reform process and Serb and Croat politicians started to take the central level seriously as a forum of political decision-making, key reforms were still implemented by the HR and a general consensus on the nature of the Bosnian state was still missing. Th is period ended when a Constitutional Reform Package failed to get a 2/3 majority in the House of Representatives in April 2006.

Th e fi nal phase can be dates since 2006. It is a phase of permanent crisis, in which the diff erent local elites have blocked each other, the representatives of the RS have become more radical in their rhetoric and the international com-munity has become less focused on the developments in Bosnia.25 While the EU has become more involved in Bosnia and has attempted to manage the reform process,26 there has been a general lack of progress since 2006. Th e international community decided that Bosnian elites should take control of their state and that the state cannot be reformed via international imposition anymore. Th e EU’s soft power focused on the use of conditionality as the main tool to motivate local elites to implement important reforms.27 Th is however had very limited success, because Bosnian elites are still divided over fundamental issues regarding the very nature of the Bosnian state. While Bosniaks prefer more centralisation and changes towards liberal democracy (one person, one vote), Serbs and Croats demand a further manifestation of the strict power-sharing system. Croats de-mand territorial changes to allocate a third entity for Croats and Serbs focus on the autonomy of the RS and their veto rights in the joint state. Th e state as such remains contested and Bosnian Serbs have threatened secession as a last resort numerous times. Because the state remains contested and its status is unclear and

25. F. Bieber, and S. Keil. “Th e Bosnian Crisis and the Independence of Kosovo,” in Kosovo: Independence, Status, Perspectives, ed. Hysa, H. and Dušan Janjić (Bologna: A Longo Editore, 2011).26. S. Sebastian, “Th e Role of the EU in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in: Ethnopolitics, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2009): 341-354.27. D. Chandler, “Th e EU and Southeastern Europe: Th e Rise of Post-liberal Governance,” Th ird World Quar-terly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2010): 69-85.




questioned the EU’s conditionality cannot act as a catalyst of reforms and create political unity as it has done previously in Eastern Europe. Without a solution to the permanent crisis of the Bosnian state and its federal model there will be no political progress and Bosnia’s risks losing out in the EU integration process.

Since 1995, there has been a remarkable centralisation in Bosnia and Herze-govina. Th e number of state institutions, ministries and agencies has grown rap-idly and important policy areas such as defence and taxation have been central-ised. Th e Dayton Constitution, which is very strict on constitutional changes and requests 2/3 of the vote in both Houses of the Parliament has nevertheless been proven to be relatively fl exible, particularly when the fi nal interpretation of the Constitution came from the HR.28 However, in 2006 the international commu-nity believed that they had established a federal state in which the three diff erent constituent peoples can decide independently on the future of their state. Inter-national actors believed that the reforms implemented until 2006 were enough to ensure that the Bosnian state as such would not be questioned anymore. We know today that this was not the case and that the fundamental issue of Bosnian statehood and the relationship of all three constituent peoples to the Bosnian state remains contested.

Conclusion

Bosnia became a federal country in a very unique way. Federalism was im-posed by outsiders as a confl ict-resolution mechanism to end the violence in the country and ensure the establishment of a number of institutions and levels of governance. Since 1995 however, the system has undergone a number of im-portant reforms. Generally, there reforms have contributed to strengthening the central state institutions. In contrast to other federal states it was recognised that political reforms were needed to strengthen the central level since the autonomy of the entities was seen as a serious threat to Bosnian statehood. In 2006 the international community believed that it had built a federal state. While they rec-ognised the need for further reforms in Bosnia, international actors thoroughly believed that the reforms until 2006 had enforced a political reality in which Bosnian statehood could not be contested anymore. More than fi ve years later we can conclude that this was not the case. Bosnia remains a contested country and even EU conditionality and European support for reforms has not been enough to overcome the fundamental disagreement on the nature of the Bosnian state. What Bosnia needs is a consensus on the state. Political elites from all major groups must fi nd a compromise to defi ne the state and reform the institutions to

28. F. Bieber, “After Dayton, Dayton? Th e Evolution of an Unpopular Peace,” Ethnopolitics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2006): 15-31.


Soeren Keil218


ensure effi cient decision-making and the protection of vital interests of all groups. Th e EU can encourage discussions about these reforms and countries like Bel-gium, Canada and Switzerland might off er important lessons for Bosnia in terms of diversity management. What the EU or any international body cannot do is to build or adjust the Bosnian state via direct intervention. If there is one lesson to be learnt from the use of federalism as a tool of confl ict-resolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it is that federalism and power-sharing might be appropriate instruments to end violent confl icts. In the case of Bosnia federalism has also con-tributed to state-building. But international actors cannot force their vision of a state on local elites (and indeed the local population). While international actors can guarantee security and peace, they cannot build states. Th is can only be done through compromise and cooperation of local political elites.

AbstractFederalism has been used as a tool to end the violent confl ict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ensure

political cooperation after the war. However, the ideology of federalism as well as the federal state institu-tions were constructs of international actors and not indigenous to Bosnia. As a consequence it can be witnessed how the idea of federal statehood remains challenged from all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina today.

While there have been a number of important reforms in Bosnia since 1995, these have generally fo-cused on strengthening the central level at the expense of the entities. What the reforms have not created is an environment in which the Bosnian state as such is not challenged anymore. Instead, the EU had to realize that its conditionality is not working in Bosnia since local elites continue to see politics as a zero-sum game. What Bosnia needs is a constitutional reform in which the major parties agree on the nature of the Bosnian state and their relationship to the state and to each other. These reforms have to be achieved through local compromise and cooperation and cannot be imposed from the outside. Finally, this paper will demonstrate how federalism has contributed to building peace and building a federal state in Bosnia, but how it has failed in creating a consensus on the state and ensure that all parties accept the state and its federal nature

RésuméLe fédéralisme a été utilisé comme instrument pour mettre fi n au violent confl it de Bosnie-Herzégovine

et pour assurer la coopération politique après la guerre. Cependant, l’idéologie du fédéralisme comme les institutions de l’État fédéral furent bâties par les acteurs internationaux et non par les acteurs internes à la Bosnie. En conséquence, on constate aujourd’hui que l’idée même d’État fédéral est remise en cause par toutes les parties de la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Bien qu’il y ait eu un nombre important de réformes en Bosnie depuis 1995, celles-ci se sont en général concentrées sur le renforcement du niveau central aux dépens des entités membres. Les réformes n’ont pas pu créer un environnement dans lequel l’État bosniaque en tant que tel ne serait plus remis en cause. Ainsi, l’Union européenne a dû accepter de considérer que la conditionnalité qu’elle imposait ne fonc-tionne pas en Bosnie, car les élites locales continuent à considérer la politique comme un jeu à somme nulle. Ce dont la Bosnie a besoin est une réforme constitutionnelle, dans laquelle les groupes les plus importants s’accordent sur la nature de l’État bosniaque, sur leurs relations à cet État et sur leurs relations réciproques. Ces réformes doivent être réalisées au travers de compromis locaux et de coopération, et ne peuvent être imposées de l’extérieur. Enfi n, cet article démontre en quoi le fédéralisme a contribué à bâtir la paix et à construire un État fédéral en Bosnie, mais aussi en quoi il n’a pas réussi à créer un consensus au sujet de l’État et à assurer que toutes les parties acceptent l’État et sa nature fédérale.



Territoriality is in the Eyes of the BeholderUntangling The Nation-State from Below with a Little Help from Above

Senka Neuman Stanivuković

Ph.D. Candidate at Groningen Institute for the Study of Culture (RUG).Th e author wishes to thank the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb and the Groningen Institute for the Study of Culture (ICOG) for supporting the research upon which this article is based.

Introduction

Simply put, the Europe of the Regions concerns the sub-state dimension of Eu-ropean polity. On the one hand, it is a normative concept established as a result of European political and academic discourse from post-WWII federalists and is maintained by the EU integration project. As such, the concept envisions regions as fundamental units within a European federation and concurrently re-concep-tualizes the territorial and political structure of the European nation-state.1 On the other hand, the European institutional order reads the Europe of the Regions as de facto transnationalisation of the self-governing regions within the EU’s politi-cal space, embedded in a range of norms from subsidiarity to decentralization. Hence, in addition to EU treaty law,2 organizing norms are drawn from a wider European context as established in the European Parliament’s Community Char-ter for Regionalization from 1998, the Assembly of the Region’s (AER) Declaration

1. See Guy Héraud, L’Europe des Ethnies (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1963), 201. Denis de Rougemont, Th e Idea of Europe (New York: Macmillan 1966). Leopold Kohr, “Disunion Now: A Plea for a Society based upon Small Autonomous Units,” Th e Commonweal (1941).2. Direct reference to subsidiary, partnership, coordination, and additionality, as underlying norms of the EU’s regional policy are made in the so-called Delors’ 1998 reform package. Regional competences are further out-lined in the Maastricht Treaty, in particular the institutionalization of subsidiarity and partnership and the formation of the Committee of the Regions.


Senka Neuman Stanivuković220


on Regionalism in Europe, and the Council of Europe’s Draft European Charter for Regional Self-Government. As such, the Europe of the Regions is a sui generis blend of political decentralism, regionally-driven economic development and transna-tionalisation of regional activities, which is juxtaposed to a revived nation-state. Th e outlined institutional framework redefi nes state territoriality to make space for the regions, but it does so in a cacophonic fashion. Consequently, one fi nds a pallet of diverging territorial systems coexisting within the European polity.3

Ergo, the Europe of the Regions remains an essentially contested concept, ac-commodated to fi t political constellations of individual periods in EU integra-tion history.4 To reconcile this problem, the author understands the Europe of the Regions as outlined by the European political discourse. In consequence, the Europe of the Regions is defi ned as discursive formation with an attached set of norms that alter domestic perceptions of territoriality from Westphalian to post-Westphalian.5 Th is is what Keating refers to as ‘new regionalism’: “a combination of factors that have given new meaning to territory and shaped new regional spaces.”6

Th is article links the aforementioned problématique with EU accession to study the shifts in the perception of state territoriality in countries that are yet to become EU members. Th e problem is operationalized in the question of the extent to which and how the Europe of the Regions resonates in domestic policy discourse with it consequently being applied to the case study of Croatia. Th is research question implies a dual analytical model, which decomposes the Euro-peanization process as two concurrent trajectories of vertical and horizontal norm dispersion on the one hand and domestic norm contestation on the other. Th us, one fi rst examines how domestic intrastate actors learn about EU norms and consequently what actors do with these norms at home. Accordingly, the analysis transcends the cause-eff ect analysis to account for detached causalities where the actor is more than just a mediator of EU rules and norms at home. Th e author is hopeful that the study will point towards an existing research gap within EU ac-cession literature and shed some doubt on the almost universally accepted maxim of the applicants as passive observers of the Europeanization process.7

Th is article proceeds as follows: Firstly I outline the adopted research ap-proach embedded in post-structural discourse analysis and the heterarchical grasp

3. Charlie Jeff ery, ed. Th e Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Th ird Level in Europe? (London: Frank Cass 1997).4. See discussion in John Loughlin, “ ‘Europe of the Regions’ and the Federalization of Europe,” Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 26, no. 4 (1996).5. Th e author draws from post-structuralism to defi ne discursive formation as an épistème, hence a quasi meta-discourse. Michel Foucault, Th e Order of Th ings. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge 1989).6. Michael Keating, “Rethinking the Region,”European Urban and Regional Studies 8, no. 3 (2001): 221.7. See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004).


Territoriality is in the Eyes of the Beholder... 221


on territoriality within the EU. In the second section, the analysis turns to Eu-ropeanization of the sub-state actors by means of the vertical and the horizontal norm dispersion. Th e third section analyses domestic policy discourse on region-alization to track the process of norm domestication.8 Th e conclusion discusses the implications of the presented empirical fi ndings for a larger debate on territorial reforms qua EU accession.

Research Framework

Moving beyond the conditionality-inspired research, this analysis has two theoretical premises. Firstly, to overcome the EU/state dichotomy within Euro-peanization, this study has adopted a heterarchical conceptualization of the Euro-pean Union in line with governance scholarship. Th e EU is defi ned as a complex polity marked by multileveled and multi-actor patterns of decision-making. For EU member-states and aspiring member-states (in their central, regional, and municipal manifestations), this ultimately means that power is neither lost nor gained, but is unbound (de-bordered) from a certain spatial unit to be dispersed across several units within a polity.9 Besides opening the research towards hori-zontal norm dispersion via interaction in Brussels-policy-networks, the govern-ance scholarship sees deliberation as a leitmotiv of EU governance. As such, it rectifi es the gap within neo-institutionalism by seeing the logic of deliberation as equal to more renowned logics of appropriateness and consequentialism. Hence, for the research at hand, heterarchical understanding of the EU allows one to include into the canon of Europeanization accession scholarship instances of dispersed causalities and non-coerced norm diff usion.

Secondly, the study draws from post-structuralist scholarship to account for the contested nature of the Europe of the Regions. Th us, discourse is defi ned as both a structure of meaning and a process of articulation. Consequently derived concepts such as discursive practice and discursive contingency explain the proc-ess of construction and reconstruction of discursive formations.10 In essence, through articulation the actor constructs nodal points and consequently fi xes dis-cursive meanings. However, seeing that these nodal points are also discursively defi ned means that they are also contested and subjected to change. Any fi xation of discourse is solely partial seeing that once a hegemonic structure is unable to

8. Th e term is adopted from the transnational movement scholarship and used to account for Europeanization as a trajectory within the domestic policy discourse. Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, eds., Transna-tional Protests and Global Activist. People, Passions, and Power (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, 2005).9. Jürgen Neyer, “Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to European Governance,” EUI Working Papers, no. 57 (2002).10. Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouff e, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Second Edition ed. (New York: Verso, 2001).




accommodate an event, it is subjected to dislocation and change.11 When ap-plied to Europeanization theorizing, discursive analysis enables one to account for institutional change, which is contingent and processual—thus, not attribut-able to external shock but to agency.12 As such, post-structural interpretation of discourse allows one to escape the EU-centeredness of one-directional models. By articulating norms arising from the Europe of the Regions discursive frame-work domestically, actors dislocate these norms from their habitat and subject the very same norms to contestation against a novel set of domestically operating discursive formations. Th en again, discursive analysis also resolves the problem of actor-centeredness by portraying change in the actors’ perception as a through-put13 rather than an output of the Europeanization process. Th is means that the actor’s discursive action is relational to the discursive space in which the actor is positioned. Ultimately, the theorem on norm duality allows one to treat the Europeanization process for what it is—a blend of EU and domestic causalities.

For the purposes of this study, I defi ne Europeanization as a process where a) domestic actors are infl uenced by discursively produced ideas about policy-making when they act at the EU level, and where b) domestic actors employ/use these ideas at home. Th e following line of reasoning is consequently derived. Firstly, the context of EU accession generates interaction between the EU and its applicants. Th is interaction is not only state-centric but includes nongovernmen-tal and sub-governmental actors from candidate countries who are granted access points to Brussels-based policy-networks. Secondly, this process of interaction generates vertical and horizontal norm dispersion. Th irdly, for a norm to have signifi cance, it needs to be articulated, discussed, deliberated and legitimatized through discursive interaction. Fourthly, discursive interaction enables norm change (or preservation) and norm internalization.

In order to make sense of concurrent norm dispersion and norm contestation within the Europeanization process, a dual methodology is adopted. Th e study fi rst adopts process tracking to account for norm diff usion in Brussels-based pol-icy-networks. Th e collected data combines EU and Croatian policy documenta-tion and accompanying reports, minutes from deliberations in relevant policy-networks and associations. Th is documentation is supplemented with thirty-fi ve in-depth interviews based on semi-structured questionnaires, with relevant do-mestic and EU actors. Th e interviews were conducted between February and June 2011. As a second analytical step, this paper adopts a discourse analysis to deconstruct how EU norms are framed within domestic policy discourse. Next

11. Ibid., 113.12. Vivien A. Schmidt, “Discoursive Institutionalism: Th e Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008).13. Th e actor is therefore defi ned as a transmitter of the Europeanization process at home.




to analyzing policy deliberations recorded in parliamentary and/or governmental minutes, the author’s analysis covered three national (Jutarnji list, Vjesnik, and Večernji list) and three regional dailies (Glas Istre, Slobodna Dalmacija, and Novi list).

‘Europe of the Regions’ and EU Accession – Norm Diff usion

In the context of EU accession, regionalism and ascending norms are diff used vertically via thick and thin conditionality and horizontally via the participation of sub-national elites in European policy-networks. Vertical and horizontal as-pects of the Europeanization process are intertwined and mutually re-enforcing, but they diff er in the underlying logic that constitutes them. Th e vertical dimen-sion of the Europeanization process is pressure-generated, hence it relies on con-ditionality. Th erefore, it incorporates only a narrow segment of the European dis-course on regionalism. Th e horizontal dimension, however, relates to un-coerced harmonization with the EU, making the actor exposed to a wider set of norms.

To comply with EU conditionality, the acceding country needs to establish an institutional and legislative framework for the absorption of structural and cohesive programs. Th e pre-accession funding programs provide the Commission with a set of mechanisms for building administrative, fi nancial, and institutional capacities on the candidate’s sub-national level via the partnership principle, sub-sidiarity and additionality. Nonetheless, the consolidation of regional self-govern-ment is at the same time obstructed by the EU’s weak institutional capacity with regards to member states’ territorial organization and the state-centric character of the EU’s accession negotiations. As a result, Europeanization via conditionality supports centrist rather than pluralist governance.

By having substantial autonomy in the implementation of acquis, the Croatian central government maintained control over regional policies. Th is resulted in limited decentralization of state competences and selective redistribution of re-gional funding. In addition, the government framed the reforms as an economic problem and has therefore successfully decoupled decentralization and territorial governance from regional development.14 In essence, a quick and effi cient absorp-tion of EU pre-accession funding proved more pivotal than the restructuring of territorial organization. Th is has pushed multileveled governance and accompa-nying norms of subsidiarity and partnership into the margins of the policy proc-esses and has undermined the ability of the sub-state to take part in EU programs. Most of the counties15 behave reactively towards inducement from the central

14. “Prijedlog zakona o regionalnom razvoju Republike Hrvatske PZE,” (Zagreb: Hrvatski Sabor 2009), 483.15. Croatian territorial organization classifi es counties (županije) as units of meso-level self-government. Th e author uses counties and regions interchangeably.




government. Accordingly, sub-national awareness of and identifi cation with the EU is sporadic and concentrated in only a few counties.16

Additionally, the inevitability-effi ciency-expertise logic, underlying the acces-sion talks, disrupts pluralist decision-making.17 Th e negotiation framework au-thorizes a handful of civil servants to re-design legal, political and social life in ap-plicant countries. Communication is primarily intergovernmental, technocratic and nontransparent. Although this method might be effi cient, it leaves little time for democracy. Th e Croatian case confi rms the state-centric nature of EU acces-sion negotiations. Negotiations were conducted between the Commission and the central government, with limited to no possibility of public scrutiny over the course of negotiations. Th e information about what had been agreed upon be-tween Brussels and Zagreb was rare and released selectively to support the existing political constellations. Th e majority of acquis-related legislation was transposed into the domestic legal system by automatism in absence of any substantial po-litical discussion on the matter. Seeing that EU laws were passed in absence of consultation with the national associations and the civil society representatives, the interviewees describe the EU accession process as uncritical, nontransparent, and hence undemocratic.18

Intrastate actors’ demands for a more extensive say in the accession nego-tiations remained largely unnoticed. Th e sub-state representatives pleaded for more extensive harmonization with EU norms, convinced that the EU govern-ance model was able to correct state-centrist practices by bringing pluralism into policy-making and transparency into fund allocation. Th ey also asked for greater transparency concerning the accession-negotiations. Th e Association of Cities de-manded formalization of the consultation procedure regarding the implementa-tion of fi nancial assistance instruments.19 Th e local level, which felt particularly marginalized by the accession, took steps in enhancing the engagement of cit-ies and municipalities in negotiations with the EU and harmonization with the acquis.20 Th ese eff orts, however, have shown limited results due the failure of both national and EU level in recognizing sub-national voices and the failure of the sub-national political nomenclatura to rise above party-politics.21 Th us, the government’s response was pro forma at best. Th e existing legal framework on

16. Senka Neuman Stanivuković. “Interview F.” Zagreb: Udruga gradova u Republici Hrvatskoj 2011.Senka Neuman Stanivuković. “Interview I.” Zagreb: Hrvatska zajednica županija, 2011.17. Kristi Raik, “EU Accession of Central and Eastern European Countries: Democracy and Integration as Confl icting Logics” East European Politics and Societies, no. 18 (2004): 575.18. Neuman Stanivuković, “Interview F.”19. “Očitovanje na Prijedlog zakona o regionalnom razvoju,” (Zagreb Udruga gradova 2009).20. “Declaration on Active Involvement of Local Authorities of South East Europe in EU Integration Process,” (NALAS 2009).21. Senka Neuman Stanivuković. “Interview J.” Zagreb: Udruga općina u Republici Hrvatskoj 2011. : 4.




regional development, established by the Ministry for Regional Development in cooperation with the European Commission, was constructed and implemented in a top-down manner, with the purpose of preparing Croatia for post-accession absorption of structural funds. It does not, however, prepare the sub-state to act as equal partner to the EU and the central government in the preparation and implementation of regional development programs.

Accordingly, Croatia confi rms the hypothesis that regional policy, in the con-text of accession, suff ers from regional defi cit.22 Not only is the sub-national level obstructed from participating in the negotiations, but it is also poorly informed seeing that the information about pre-accession funding is used as a bargaining chip in the domestic scramble for power and is therefore trickled down to re-gions and localities.23 Because the Commission did not ask for territorial reforms directly and the Croatian political elite did not feel pressured to do it, institu-tionalization of norms constituting the Europe of the Regions discourse via acces-sion conditionality did not happen. On the one hand, regulation arising from Chapter 22 of the acquis, in conjunction with pre-accession aid mechanisms, has the potential of changing domestic perceptions of political territoriality. It may promote the EU as a novel centre of gravity for sub-national bodies and empower regional self-government via the adherence to organizing principles in the EU’s regional policy. On the other hand, emphasis is placed on preparing the country for post-accession absorption of structural and cohesion funds. Th us, EU conditionality proved pivotal in creating a niche for the formulation of regional development policy. Yet, it also proved impotent in decentralizing domestic gov-ernance practices.

In consequence, central authorities acted as gate-keepers vis-à-vis accession negotiations. However, this did not prevent sub-national actors with suffi cient administrative and fi nancial capacities from approaching Brussels directly. Even prior to the initiation of the accession talks between Zagreb and Brussels, Croatian sub-national actors established a good network of contacts with EU institutions and EU based policy-networks while strengthening bilateral and multilateral rela-tions with other sub-national actors from EU member-states. Th ese contacts were carried into and were often enhanced by the start of the accession talks. Th ese transnational activities opened space for the process of horizontal norm diff usion, despite of the accession negotiations’ state-centricity.

Regions and localities have direct, and from 2010 also formalized, access to the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Th e CoR sees strong sub-national self-

22. James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, “Th e Regional Defi cit in Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: Top Down Policies and Bottom Up Reactions,” in ESRC One Europe or Several (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2001).23. Senka Neuman Stanivuković. “Interview K.” Zagreb: Odbor za regionalni razvoj, šumarstvo i vodno gos-podarstvo, 2011.




government as crucial for both the success of the Europeanization process in its applicant countries and the maintenance of the EU’s multileveled govern-ance structure. In communication with Croatian representatives, the Commit-tee has framed decentralization in conjunction with subsidiarity and pluralist decision-making as raison d’être for the EU’s governance model.24 Moreover, the Committee did not restrain itself from criticizing centrist tendencies in Croatian policy-making as a challenge to the country’s progress towards EU membership.25 Additionally, the CoR provided the sub-state political elite with an opportunity to articulate concerns regarding EU accession and domestic governance practices. Croatian representatives have used this platform to raise awareness about the un-easy relationship between the central state and its counties, caused by an insuffi -cient degree of fi nancial decentralization and fragmented territorial organization, and to demand a bigger say in domestic decision-making as well as in accession negotiations.26 Nevertheless, despite the initial enthusiasm, Croatian sub-state of-fi cials soon found themselves disillusioned to the CoR’s cooperation. From their perspective, the CoR off ered little to no access to the accession negotiations, not least because of the condescending approach that EU representatives took to-wards the Croatian sub-state representatives. Th e inability of the Committee to respond to the needs of Croatian actors refl ected negatively upon the legitimacy of this institution as a channel for sub-state interests within the EU.27

In light of the aforementioned information, contact with other EU institu-tions, such as the EU Commission, was predominantly maintained in an ad hoc fashion at the initiative of individual Croatian actors and indirectly via Brus-sels-based policy-networks. Croatian counties have increasingly been opening regional representation offi ces to communicate their interests in the EU. Istria County was the fi rst to open a representation offi ce in 2005 in cooperation with Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. Other Croatian counties followed swiftly. In essence, the existing representation offi ces of Croatian regions are replicating the activities of EU member-regions’ offi ces, thus are predominantly concerned with profi ling the home region in Brussels due to either fi nancial or political motives. As such, these offi ces act as liaisons between EU institutions and policy-networks and counties and localities.28

24. Working Group on Croatia, chaired by Isidoro Gottardo (IT/EPP)—video message (Brussels: Europa Press Releases, 2009).25. Georgios Papastergiou, “Draft Opinion of the Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Aff airs on Enlargement Strategy and the Main Challenges 2009-2010,” ed. CIVEX Commission (Brussels: Committee of the Regions, 2010), 3.26. “Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Working Group on Croatia”, ed. Working Group on Croatia (Bol: Com-mittee of the Regions, 2007).“Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the Working Group on Croatia”, ed. Working Group on Croatia (Brussels: Committee of the Regions, 2009).27. Neuman Stanivuković, «Interview J.», Neuman Stanivuković, «Interview I.»28. Senka Neuman Stanivuković. “Interview P.” Zagreb: Varaždinska županija 2011.




In addition, Croatian sub-state actors are members of a number of regional and municipal associations operating in Brussels. Th e Institut der Regionen Eu-ropas (IRE), the AER, and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) are listed as the most prominent platforms in promoting the economic and political interests of Croatian sub-state actors. Th ese associations, with their close ties to European institutions—particularly the EU Commission—are the motor-wheel behind the Europe of the Regions discourse. Th e AER is historically signifi cant for Croatia’s sub-national presence in Brussels as it provided a gateway into the EU when Istria joined in 1994. Presently, all Croatian counties and three cities are associated with the Assembly, even though some are more active than others. Th e interviewees point out networking opportunities and a political voice, which the AER gives to its members, as key advantages of being a part of this platform.29

Communication with the EU is further achieved via interregional programs and networks. Some, such as the Adriatic Euroregion and the Euro-Mediterrane-an Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM), resulted from bottom-up eff orts by sub-national governments under the auspices and/or patronage of the EU. Other projects supporting inter- and trans-regional consolidation, such as the Cross-border Cooperation (CBC) developed by the pre-accession funding framework, are part of the EU’s regional policy and are therefore coordinated by policy-mak-ers in Brussels. Th e existence of historical and cultural ties with regions from bor-dering countries has been instrumental in fostering cross-border communication. Ties with regions from EU member-states have helped substantially in preparing counties for EU funding absorption.30

It follows from the above that the accession exposes Brussels as a power cen-tre supplementary—and at times, alternative—to the central state. Consequent transnationalisation of sub-state activity is a norm also followed by regions which are only to become members of the EU. Th e empirical data confi rms that some Croatian sub-national actors are well integrated with policy-networks operating within the European political space. Th e sub-state actors already discovered Brus-sels in the 1990s and have accordingly mobilized their activities beyond their national borders. Th e accession negotiations have therefore only enhanced rather than caused transnationalisation of the Croatian sub-state. When asked whether Croatian sub-national actors use the EU for promoting interests, an interview-ee answered, “Yes, that is what the EU is for; otherwise it would be yet another fi scal burden.”31 Moreover, by coming to Brussels, these sub-state actors open

29. Senka Neuman Stanivuković. “Interview R.” Zagreb: Istarska županija 2011.30. Senka Neuman Stanivuković. “Interview S.” Zagreb: Agencija za regionalni razvoj Varaždinske županije 2011.31. Neuman Stanivuković, “Interview I.”




themselves up to learning about EU rules and norms and ways of doing things in an un-coerced fashion. Whereas conditionality, as a top-down Europeaniza-tion instrument, often fails to reach regions and municipalities, participation in Brussels-based policy-networks, via discursive interaction, puts the sub-state into the spotlight of the accession process. Sub-state actors utilize the established con-nections to learn about and adopt the EU’s governance practices. Th is has helped them to better navigate through EU policy-making processes and identify with norms such as subsidiarity, partnership, pluralism, and decentralization. Th e in-terviewees have overwhelmingly recognized subsidiarity and partnership as the most important norms arising from both the EU’s regional policy and a wider Europe of the Regions discourse.32 Additionally, interviewed sub-national offi cials stressed that they highly identify with both of these norms and try to formulate their domestic activities accordingly.33

Nonetheless, these horizontal activities and individual escapades to Brussels were uncoordinated, sporadic, and took place in parallel with, but in considerable isolation from, vertical aspects of the Europeanization process. Many sub-state actors are unwilling, unaware and under-capacitated to engage in such an endeav-our. Consequently, norm diff usion has aff ected a limited number of sub-national representatives, who have chosen to enter the European political space via sub-national policy-networks, very often because they have identifi ed with European-ism as opposed to state-centrism in the fi rst place. Th ese actors saw Brussels as a platform for articulating their interests—but at times this was impossible to do nationally—and as a variable for substantiating interests domestically. As such, bottom-up activities are certainly unable to substitute for the gap created by the regional defi cit of the accession process. Actors who have taken on the opportu-nity of integrating in the EU’s governance processes before entering the EU stand out as Europeanized islands, at the same time acting as main carriers of the Europe of the Regions discourse at home.

‘Europe of the Regions’ Hits Croatia – Fragmented Europeanization and Domestication of EU Norms

In the last two decades, the Croatian public administration underwent four development phases; the establishment, consolidation, Europeanization, and the ongoing modernization phase.34 Within this framework, territorial organization has experienced two reform waves with another reform package pending. Croatia

32. Neuman Stanivuković, “Interview R.”33. Neuman Stanivuković, “Interview P.”34. Ivan Koprić, “Contemporary Croatian Public Administration on the Reform Waves,” in IPSA XXI World Congres of Political Science: Global Discontent? Dilemmas of Change (Santiago de Chile: Research Committee on Public Policy and Administration, 2009), 11.




has a two-tiered territorial structure with 555 municipalities and towns acting as units of local self-governance and 21 counties acting as regional self-government units.35 Predominantly driven by a political-administrative rationale, the existing structure is fragmented, detached from socio-economic parameters, economically diffi cult to maintain and, as such, fails to satisfy the criteria of modern regional-ism. Rather paradoxically, decentralization à la Croatian has an etatist pretext.

Accordingly, Šimunović compares the regionalization process in Croatia to a decades-long ramble concluding that the regionalist-centrist dichotomy, framed as a zero-sum game, remains a constant historical récidive and is therefore inher-ent to all political elites.36 In essence, Croatian discourse constructs regionaliza-tion as a predominantly political problem, mainly adopted to reconcile various and ever-changing power constellations in Croatian modern history. Having a strong political annotation, regionalization, as a method in the territorial organi-zation of the state, is highly contested. In eff ect, the Croatian political discourse of the 1990s and the 2000s off ers a wide spectrum of diverse and often compet-ing interpretations of regionalism. Th e political elite of the early 1990s has con-structed regionalism as autonomism and separatism, and consequently a threat to statehood. Alongside Croatian progress towards EU membership, regionalism was framed in the context of a de-concentrated or decentralized state and there-fore a functional necessity. At the same time, regionalism was described as a pro-gram calling for fi nancial, political, and administrative consolidation of regional self-government. A buzzword of nearly every election, the concept has become overburdened by individual interests of actors across the political and societal spectrum. Th is has hindered the possibility of having a sensible policy debate on regionalization and ensuing policy consensus on territorial governance reform. Regionalism and regionalization, albeit profoundly present in the domestic dis-course on territorial governance, have not manifested themselves in a concrete policy-oriented dialogue to this day.

Accordingly, the Europe of the Regions, as the underlying meta-narrative, and arising norms—such as subsidiary, partnership, regional autonomy, and decen-tralization—as individual discursive conceptualizations of this narrative, have resonated against a chaotic complexity of various and often competing inter-pretations of regionalism. With domestic actors molding EU norms to fi t and consequently legitimize their positions, Europeanization gave a new outfi t to an old debate without changing the debate itself. Th us, the Europeanization proc-ess managed to alter how domestic actors talk about regionalism, but it was less successful in altering how they think about it. Th us, national political elites have

35. Th e City of Zagreb has a double status of a municipality and a county.36. Ivo Šimunović, “Regionalizacija - hrvatska lutanja” (paper presented at the Forumi o regionalizaciji i održivom življenju Zagreb 2007), 23.




resorted to EU’s regional policy and the rhetoric on functional regionalization, which enabled them maintain power in central institutions while still being po-litically correct. Regionalists have again utilized the Europe of the Regions, as it allowed them to demand greater autonomy without seeming autonomist. Ivo Šimunović summarizes the situation as follows: “As long as regionalism was pushed from the inside, it was evaluated negatively. Now that it comes from the outside, it is presented as a magic potion. However, regionalism remains what it is.”37

Th e central state has framed the Europe of the Regions as a purposeful project with the EU region constructed as a functional space and an instrument in meet-ing the requirements of the EU’s single market and the global economy. Th is paradigm builds upon the EU’s cohesion policy, which encourages a rescaling of economic governance in favour of regions as carriers of economic develop-ment. Framed around economic effi ciency and competitiveness, the Europe of the Regions was implemented in domestic discourse to detach regionalization from its political prefi x. Th is to a large extent meant diverting the discussion away from regionalization as consolidation of regional self-government towards regionalization as rationalization. Variations of the meta-narrative on functional regionalization are evident in the discourse of political parties across the political spectrum.38 Whereas the political right and the political left might disagree on the exact model of territorial restructuring, their discourses are economy-driven with rationalization as the key credo behind any reform option. Looking at policy manifestations of the above, the 2010 Guidelines for Functional Decentralization, which is the most concrete policy proposal to this day, link functional and fi scal decentralization on the one hand with territorial restructuring and administrative rationalization on the other.39

Such conceptualization is, however, contested by regionalist parties, who are key advocates of political regionalization. Sub-national political elites have been pushing for territorial organization according to the existing regional identities, while at the same time protecting the boundaries of their political infl uence. Accordingly, the question of territorial restructuring is marginalized in favour of demands for more extensive regional autonomy.40 Nonetheless, in correlation with the EU accession process, regionalist discourse of these actors is shifting away from the nation-state towards the European Union. On the one hand, the

37. Ivo Šimunović, “Regionalizacija—hrvatska lutanja,” (paper presented at the Forumi o regionalizaciji i održivom življenju Zagreb 2007), : 32-33.38. See for instance “Plan 21—Politika decentralizacije,”(Zagreb: Kukuriku koalicija, 2011).“Izborni program 2011.-2015.,” (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 2011).39. “Smjernice i načela za funkcionalnu decentralizaciju i teritorijalni preustroj,” (Zagreb: Ministarstvo uprave Republike Hrvatske, 2010), 2.40. “Deklaracija o polazištima za ustrojstvo regionalne samouprave (Goranska deklaracija),” (Brod na Kupi 2002).




Europe of the Regions discourse is employed to legitimize regionalist aspirations in domestic policy-debate. As such, it is framed in opposition to centralized territo-rial organization and centrist governance practice. Consequently, consolidation of regional self-government is identifi ed as harmonization of Croatian territorial governance with EU norms and a step towards EU integration. It is also claimed to help Croatia in achieving political and economic stability.

“Europe has found a strategic interest in turning itself into a Europe of regions… Regionalization prevents the recurrence of strong centralist, authoritarian, national governments, which have always been a threat to peace. What we need to do in Croatia is to regionalize. Regionalism is a means of reaching harmonious internal development of our country.” 41

On the other hand, the Europe of the Regions has also provided regionalists with a novel discursive framework which transcends the nation-state. As an al-ternative to demands for autonomy within national boundaries, regionalism is increasingly conceptualized as a Europe-wide governance model with Croatian regions as actors within this European political space.42 As a consequence, one observes a paradigm shift with political regionalism constructed in line with mul-ticulturalism, transnationalism, and the transnationalisation of regions as a part of the European polity.

Conclusion

Europeanization of domestic modes of governance qua accession resembles a three-layered marble cake. Firstly, acquis-based thick conditionality establishes the legislative and institutional framework for the implementation of regional development projects. Secondly, pre-accession aid linked to cohesion policy fur-ther strengthens the acquis-based reforms by teaching national and sub-national actors how to design, fi nance, and implement these projects. Th irdly, participa-tion in policy-based networks supplements the previous two. Th is framework fails to contest the domestic territoriality directly. However, it does so implicitly. In contrast to vertical Europeanization qua conditionality, which confi rms, rather than disrupts, state-centrist governance practice, horizontal aspects of this process have dispersed norms arising from the Europe of the Regions discourse. In absence of top-down pressures, the extent of Europeanization is not to be measured in terms of complex transformation of territorial governance resulting in an insti-tutionalized alteration of territoriality from state-centric to multileveled. Rather,

41. Neven Šantić, “Regionalne stranke su jedina prava opozicija”, Hrvatski regionalni grč (Zagreb: Pan Liber, 2006), 123.42. Neven Šantić, “Dvije županije – jedna regija: Ivan Krivičić, član Izvršnog odbora RiDS-a”, Hrvatski region-alni grč (Zagreb: Pan Liber, 2006), 113-14.




one should read Europeanization as a fragmented process with EU norms being highly contested against domestic political constellations and scattered among few domestic advocates of change. Accordingly, drawing from empirical data on concurrent norm diff usion in the EU and norm contestation at home, the article establishes the following.

Firstly, the Croatian case confi rms the hypothesis that EU accession in the context of territorial governance reforms acts as a catalyst rather than a causal factor. Case studies on regionalization reforms in CEECs show how EU con-ditionality provided a critical juncture for the institutionalization of regions as meso-level units of self-government. However, seeing that regionalization was envisioned already by the Constitutions of individual CEECs, Europeanization qua conditionality did not cause the reforms. Prior to EU accession, Croatia already had an established structure of regional self-governance accompanied by decades-long discussions that this structure should be reformed. Again, EU acces-sion acted as a catalyst, adding a new layer to the debate on regionalization, but one can hardly claim causal links between EU norms and rules on the one hand and policy change on the other seeing that policy change did not happen.

Secondly, the Croatian case confi rms the hypothesis that accession negotia-tions suff er from regional defi cit. Th e sub-state was largely excluded from the accession talks in the case of CEECs, and this was, despite visible objections from the side of intrastate and sub-state actors, repeated in the negotiations with Croatian authorities. Accordingly, the EU’s external governance via conditional-ity does little for shifting the understanding of territoriality from state-centric towards multileveled Hence scholars were entitled to sideline this question from their research agendas.

Th irdly, Europeanization beyond conditionality tells a diff erent story. Th e Eu-ropeanisation of domestic actors occurs through the transnationalisation of ac-tor’s activities and domestication of EU norms within domestic discourses. Th ese processes are dual but mutually related. As the accession context implies the del-egation of competences from the state to the EU level, Brussels is detected as a power centre supplementary to the central government long before the very act of joining the EU takes place. Th e accession context pressures domestic actors to transnationalise their political activity. Additionally, the very existence of the EU, as a political space alternative to the national one, provides domestic actors with the opportunity to escape domestic constrains when articulating their interests. Hence, some Croatian regions are proof that Europeanization sans pressure can work.

Fourthly, the European Union exposes domestic actors to a novel set of norms. While participating in EU processes, these actors are exposed to a post-sovereign conceptualization of territoriality, constructed around the Europe of the Regions




discourse. Th is paradigm allows them to legitimize their territorial demands in line with subsidiarity, decentralization and partnership domestically, while not being stigmatized as autonomist. In the context of Croatia’s newly gained state-hood, this proved pivotal in de-tabooing political regionalism.

Lastly, the Croatian case also shows how the Europe of the Regions may con-strain regionalist claims of the sub-state. Hence, by framing the EU’s regional policy in the context of economic development and rationalization, the central political elite managed to deconstruct the EU region into a functional, rather than, political space.

AbstractThe post-communist transition has placed Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the

Western Balkans into a schizophrenic condition of concurrent consolidation and dissolution of the nation-state. While they did their outmost to consolidate their nation-state after years of struggle for sovereignty, they lost a part of their sovereignty during the process of EU accession. This hasty shift from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian order was certainly not spared of its diffi culties. In view of that, this paper studies changes in the domestic perception of state territoriality in the context of EU accession. More specifi cally, it asks to what extent and how l’Europe of the Regions, as a normative discursive formation, resonated in Croatian policy discourse on regionalization. By utilizing a discursive reading of Europeanization, this paper looks beyond conditionality-based analysis to account for horizontal norm dispersion and norm domestication via discursive framing. Ultimately, it puts doubt on the maxims established by the studies on regionalization through the accession of the CEECs.

RésuméLa transition post-communiste a placé les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale, ainsi que les Balkans oc-

cidentaux, dans un état schizophrénique de consolidation et de dissolution simultanée de leurs États-na-tions. Alors que d’énormes efforts ont été faits pour consolider les États-nations après plusieurs années de combat pour leur souveraineté, ils ont dû simultanément céder une part de celle-ci pour accéder à l’Union Européenne. Ce changement accéléré de l’ordre westphalien à un ordre post-westphalien n’a pas été sans diffi culté. Aussi, cet article s’intéresse aux changements dans la perception locale de la territorialité étatique dans le contexte de l’accession à l’UE. L’article cherche à savoir dans quelle mesure l’Europe des régions, en tant que développement normatif, résonne dans le discours politique au sujet de la régionalisa-tion, en prenant le cas de la Croatie. En effectuant une analyse de discours sur l’idée de l’européanisation, l’article cherche à aller au-delà des analyses centrées sur la conditionnalité, pour prendre en compte de la dispersion horizontale des normes et de leur domestication à travers un cadre discursif. En défi nitive, l’article met en doute les axiomes conventionnels des études sur la régionalisation à travers l’accession des pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale.



Effective or Appropriated Federalism?The Case Study of the Republic of Mari El in the Russian Federation

Elvira Nurieva

Elvira Nurieva holds her Master’s degree in Political Science from Central European Univer-sity, Budapest (Hungary). Her research focuses on federalism, governance, self-determination and the rights of indigenous peoples. Nurieva was a Fulbright Fellow in the United States in 2008-2009 and received the Ernest Hemingway Research Grant in 2005.

Introduction

A century ago, federalism was considered as a transitory step rather than an end goal; a group of previously autonomous states, typically driven by the defence imperative, decided to come together and form a single central government.1 To-day, federalism is also viewed as a process, not a fi xed state; it is a process in which competing interests of diff erent segments of society are being reconciled, or, in Daniel Elazar’s words, “diff erent individuals, groups and polities are pursuing com-mon ends without sacrifi cing their own integrity.”2 After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia adopted federalism. Why? Analyzing Russian federalism, Daniel Kempton identifi es two possible answers to this question. On the one hand, the creation of a federal political system may be explained by its Soviet legacy. Th e Soviet Union was a complex and multilayered federal state. However, Kempton emphasizes that “Soviet federalism was at best a myth and at worst a fraud [as] [t]he federal components never had real power.”3 Th e Soviet Union was

1. Daniel Kempton, “Russian Federalism: Continuing Myth or Political Salvation?” Demokratizatsiya, 9 (2001), 201-42.2. Daniel Elazar, Form of State: Federal, Unitory, or… , available at <http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles/formof-state.htm>[last accessed March 2011].3. Ibid.


Elvira Nurieva236


a centralized state in practice. As the result, Russia inherited its federal structure without federal tradition. On the other hand, the adoption of federalism could be viewed as a conscious choice prompted by the need for Russia to survive, and restore the territorial integrity and the unity of the state.

Despite its shortcomings, or, not “full […] [list of…] all the necessary condi-tions for the success of federalism,” Daniel Kempton considers that Russia made “considerable progress in creating conditions benefi cial to federalism,” such as “at least two levels of government, each of which has meaningful autonomy on certain issues […] an increasing potential for centre-periphery bargaining within party structures.”4 Dobrynin also points out that in the early 1990s the development of Russian federalism had a complex path. All the institutional mechanisms used, such as the “erect[ion] and strengthening of the vertical power as well as hierarchical gov-ernance structure, rigid coordination and manageability; the independence of fi nan-cially strong constituent units compensated by high tax revenues to the federal budget; […] the apparatus of presidential envoys to the constituent units; a deviation from the fundamental principle of division of powers […]”5 were not quite in line with democratic principles and may not live up to the benefi ts of federalism, outlined by Kempton. However, those times defi ned the imperative of state reconstruc-tion.6 But today, a number of scholars express concerns about the character and further direction of Russian federalism, particularly in consideration of Presi-dent Vladimir Putin’s federal reforms (2000-2004)7 that were designed allegedly “to strengthen the authority of the federal government in relation to the constituent units and harmonize federal and regional legislation.”8 Th e analysis of the results of these reforms in one of the constituent units of the Russian Federation (RF), the Republic of Mari El, generated a need to address the following question How eff ective is Russian federalism? For the purpose of this discussion I will focus on Ronald Watts’s criteria of eff ective federalism: fi rst, the constitutional distribu-tion of autonomous legislative and administrative power and fi nancial resources to the diff erent orders of government, and second, the eff ective participation of the diff erent regional groups in the central institutions of shared rule, the role

4. Kempton, Russian Federalism: Continuing Myth or Political Salvation? 236-237.5. N.M Dobrynin, Rossiiskii federalism: genezis, evoluciia [Russian Federalism: Genesis, Evolution], (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 2008).6. Ibid., 13-14.7. Andrei Starodubcev, O vsevlastii Prezidenta, ili o tom kak Konstitucionnyi Sud ne zaschitil duh Konstitucii,[On Domination of the President, or How the Constitutional Court Failed to Protect the Spirit of the Constitu-tion], available at <http://cogita.ru/syuzhety/novyi-federalist/andrei-starodubcev.-o-vsevlastii-prezidenta-ili-o-tom-kak-konstitucionnyi-sud-ne-zaschitil-duh-konstitucii> [last accessed 17 March 2011]Andrei Starodubcev, “V Rossii net federacii,” [In Russia Th ere is No Federation], available at <http://cogita.ru/syuzhety/novyi-federalist/andrei-starodubcev.-v-rossii-net-federacii> [last accessed 17 March 2010].8. Gary Wilson, “Russia (Russian Federation),” Th e Forum of Federations, available at <http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/FedCountries/FC-Russia.pdf> [last accessed March 2011].


Th e Case Study of the Republic of Mari El in the Russian Federation 237


of a second chamber.9 To proceed with this question, in the fi rst part of the es-say I will give an analytical account of a series of President Putin’s (2000-2004) reforms that are viewed as a mechanism to strengthen the presidential apex of vertical power, develop a more unitarian model of governance and hence manipu-late federalism such a powerful tool of government based on the principle ‘self rule shared rule’. Th e insights of scholars on federalism, and particularly Russian Federalism, (Andrei Starodubcev, Daniel Elazar, Daniel Kempton, Gary Wilson, Lynn D. Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, N. M. Dobrynin, Ronald Watts) will help to make the picture more comprehensive. Th e following analysis of the case-study of the Republic of Mari El in the second part of the essay will reveal the eff ects of the trends towards appropriation of federalism by the federal centre and their appointees at the regional level. For a comparative aspect, I will also gain insight into the normative issues of justice raised by language policies and avoided by liberal language strategies, according to Will Kymlicka and François Grin.10 Th e situation of Estonians during the Soviet times and Russian-speaking residents in Estonia today will pertain to this discussion. Th e profound research of the leading scholars on indigenous peoples such as Seppo Lallukka, Rein Taagepera, Nikolai Vakhtin and reports prepared by the Minority Rights Group Internation-al (MRG), International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) will be instructive for the development of this part. Tak-ing into consideration Dobrynin’s argument that “a road from totalitarianism to democracy goes through dictatorship,”11 in the concluding remarks I will emphasize that these new federal arrangements have diminished the existing level of democ-racy and government responsiveness in the Russian Federation.

Part 1 – Eff ective federalism? Th e account of President Vladimir Putin’s federal reforms.

In the late 1980s, many of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics’ (RSFSR) regions became involved in struggle for autonomy taking place at the Union-Republic level. Intending to bolster their own authority, both the Soviet

9. Ronald L. Watts, “Federal Second Chambers Compared,” Presentation at Conference on “Federalizing Pro-cess in Italy. Comparative Perspectives”. An international conference organized by the Department for Institutional Reforms, Italy, and the Forum of Federations, Rome, (17-19 February, 2010). Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democ-racy: Government Forms and Performance in Th irty-Six Countries (Yale University Press, 1999).10. Will Kymlicka and François Grin, “Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries”, in Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries. eds. F. Daftary and F. Grin (Open Society Institute, Budapest. 2003), 1-27: Th e authors elaborate upon two liberal language strategies. Th e fi rst strategy trivializes the issues by claiming that language has only instrumental value; it is simply a tool for communicating one’s thoughts and feelings and hence people will value any language insofar as it improves their communication reach. Th e second strategy justifi es the imposition of a single offi cial language as it is connected to the issues of loyalty and identity.11. Dobrynin, Rossiiskii federalism: genezis, evoluciia


Elvira Nurieva238


leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Boris Yeltsin off ered concessions of au-tonomy to the RSFSR’s diverse regions.12 Th e turmoil years of the early 1990s, characterized by the dictum “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow,” resulted in fi nancially powerful regional elites promoting their own agendas, ‘mounting turf battles with Moscow,’ and sometimes gaining more autonomy while poorest regions had almost no leverages for negotiations in the center-region arrange-ments due to their dependency on the centre for funding.13 Between 1994 and 1998, Russia entered into forty-two separate power-sharing treaties with forty-six subjects of the federation. Nelson and Kuzes emphasize that asymmetries in pow-ers among ‘donor’14 and ‘recipient’ regions as well as tensions between the centre and the regions were economically counterproductive and also politically desta-bilizing. On 13 May 2000 President Vladimir Putin signed up a decree creating a new structure for coordination from Moscow. Wilson highlights that this series of reforms were aimed “to strengthen the authority of the federal government in relation to the constituent units and harmonize federal and regional legislation.”15 Notably, policymakers and analysts indeed share an opinion that the current eighty-nine political divisions of the federation are too many for eff ective governance. How-ever, Putin’s plan for federal okrugy is reckoned as a way to weaken the power of regional leaders—not to enhance it. Nelson and Kuzes, for instance, point out that the creation of mega regions headed by Kremlin appointees resulted in the division of the regional economic associations among diff erent okrugy.16 Th e part of the paper proceeds with the analysis of the following three reforms: the estab-lishment of seven federal okrugy, or districts, (Central, North Caucasus, North-west, Volga, Urals, Siberia and Far East) and each okrug, or district, is headed by a federally-appointed presidential representative; a new arrangement of the Federation Council that on the surface was intended to strengthen the effi ciency of this institution; the formation of two new federal consultative bodies (the State Council and its Presidium) that gave the regional head a platform to express their opinion on major initiatives undertaken by the federal government. Watts’s key features of the eff ective operation of federalism—political and administrative autonomy of constituent units and fi nancial resources to diff erent orders of gov-ernment as well as a federal institution advancing the voice of regional representa-

12. Gary Wilson, Russia (Russian Federation), 265.13. Lynn D. Nelson, and Irina Y. Kuzes. “Regional Variations in the Implementation of Russia’s Federal District Reform”, Demokratizatsiya: Th e Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 10, 1 (2002): 5-18.14. Ibid. Offi cially, “donor” regions are those that do not receive money from the Federal Fund for Financial Assistance of Subjects of the Federation. In 2001, nineteen regions were classifi ed in the “donor” category.15. Wilson, “Russia (Russian Federation),” 270-271.16. D. Lynn Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, Regional Variations in the Implementation of Russia’s Federal District Reform, give an example of Great Urals that was split between the Urals and the Volga federal districts.




tives—will be important for the ongoing discussion as a checklist and for the fi nal conclusions in the assessment of Russian federalism under President Putin.

In 2000, President Putin authorized to create seven federal okrugy (districts)—Central, North Caucasus, Northwest, Volga, Urals, Siberia and Far East, and each okrug (district)17 is headed by a federally-appointed presidential representative (envoy) who is in charge of overseeing the activities of the constituent unit and making sure that regional laws comply with their federal counterparts and the federal constitution. To be more specifi c, the decree specifi es four main tasks and thirteen functions of the envoys. Taken together, these statements highlight six principal areas of responsibility. Envoys are to report quarterly to the president on political, social, and economic conditions in the federal okrug and the eff ec-tiveness of law enforcement agencies; to participate in eliminating discrepancies between federal and regional laws; to coordinate the activities of federal offi ces in the okrugy and relations between federal offi ces and regional and local offi ces and organizations; to participate in the work of the executive organs of power of subjects of the federation, as well as organs of local self-government; to approve nominees to key positions in federal offi ces in the okrugy; and to develop pro-grams for economic and social development of the territories within the okrugy. Recognizing that the main obstacles to reform varied from one region to another, President Putin specifi ed the expected work of the presidential representatives in general terms that gave the envoys enough fl exibility to use distinctive strategies. Th e envoys became mainly the ‘eyes and ears’ of the president in RF regions.18

A second reform was characterized by the new arrangement of the Federation Council, the second chamber. Th e understanding of the initial formation of the upper chamber will make the current picture more holistic. Kempton explains that in summer 1993 Yeltsin promised the representation of the constituent units in the Federation Council but the constitution did not specify the form of rep-resentation. Th e leaders of the constituent units were arguing for the automatic representation for the legislative and executive heads of each constituent unit. Although Yeltsin initially demanded direct election of Federation Council mem-bers, or Senators, he made a concession to the constituent units. As a result, the government offi cials were allowed to serve as Senators without resigning their positions at home. Notably, this dual representation at the regional and federal level was quite challenging for Senators and at some point the Federation Council even resorted to postal voting in order to keep up with its workload.19 Watts also

17. Notably, in 2010 Medvedev made a decree to establish a new okrug named as South (as part of North Caucasus okrug). Southern Federal District was called North Caucasian Federal District when it was founded in May 2000, but was renamed soon after for political reasons.18. Lynn D. Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, “Regional Variations in the Implementation of Russia’s Federal District Reform,”19. Kempton, “Russian Federalism: Continuing Myth or Political Salvation?” 217.


Elvira Nurieva240


notes that in most other federations with elected senators such dual membership in legislatures is prohibited in order to avoid confl icting roles and because of ex-cessive time that would be consumed by travel.20 It can be one of the reasons for President Putin’s apparatus to reconsider the dual membership and introduce the new arrangement of the Federal Council. Th e new Federal Law “on the Order of Formation of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federa-tion” specifi ed that the heads of regional executive and legislative branches are to delegate the representative functions to their appointees who could serve full time in the upper chamber.21 In other words, this arrangement was intended to strengthen the effi ciency of this institution. However, observers note the oppo-site trend persists. Although the appointees in the upper chamber were selected to represent regional interests and to “use their infl uence to leverage federal aid and support,”22 in fact many Federation Council representatives have no direct personal links with the regions they represent and hence no motivation to be engaged in the issues of concern to the region in question. Watts notes that the interests of the regional electorates can be represented either by direct or indirect election of the members of the federal second chamber. Th e diff erence is that in the former case regional political party interests also play a signifi cant role.23 Still in both cases the Senators are accountable to their electorate while the new composition of the Federal Council in the Russian Federation undermines the federal nature of the upper chamber and most important its legitimacy to the regional electorate.

Th e third federal reform introduced by President Putin was to establish two new federal consultative bodies: the State Council and its Presidium in order “to placate the regional heads,” as Wilson puts it. Th e State Council includes Gover-nors and President of the constituent units who convene a meeting once in three moths to discuss particular issues with the RF President. Th e Presidium consists of seven members of the State Council (serving on a rotating basis) and meets on a monthly basis.24 Th ese new bodies gave the regional head a platform to express their opinion on major initiatives undertaken by the federal government. Th ese new bodies merely perform advisory roles.

Within the liberal-democratic discourse, federal second chambers are sup-posed to contribute to the protection of individuals and minorities against the potential tyranny of the majority by dispersing authority and emphasizing the

20. Ronald L. Watts, “Federal Second Chambers Compared”, Presentation at Conference on “Federalizing Process in Italy. Comparative Perspectives” An international conference organized by the Department for Insti-tutional Reforms, Italy, and the Forum of Federations, Rome, (17-19 February, 2010).21. Wilson, “Russia (Russian Federation),” 271.22. Ibid.23. Ronald L. Watts, “Federal Second Chambers Compared,”24. Wilson, “Russia (Russian Federation),” 272.




value of checks and balances.25 Although President Putin’s new arrangement of the Federation Council intended to produce a more effi cient and eff ective insti-tution by requiring the constituent units to have ‘full-time’ Senators, the reform was not as successful as planned. Th e reason is probably that the mechanism of the appointment of Senators by the heads of the executive and the head of the legislature at the regional level was not elaborated. As the result, Wilson and Starodubcev note there has been a dramatic increase in the number of Moscow-based offi cials and members of the business elite holding representative positions within the upper chamber, namely persons without direct links with the regions they represent. As for the political autonomy of the constituent units, in 2005 the election of regional representatives to the regional government was abolished. Instead, governors are nominated by the RF President. Importantly, if a regional parliament turns the second proposed candidate down, the RF President has the authority to dissolve the parliament. Although during his presidency, Dmitri Medvedev allowed the party that wins the election to propose a candidate for the post of the Governor, it does not change the situation much as the winning party is often the main party, the United Russia.26 Th e more detailed account of the federal reforms on the ground will follow in the case-study of the Republic Mari El, the second part of the essay.

Part 2 – Appropriated federalism? Th e Case-Study of the Republic of Mari El

To evaluate the implications of the federal reforms, initiated by President Pu-tin in 2000, it is worth gaining insights into the on-ground situation in one of the constituent units of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Mari El. Accord-ing to Seppo Lallukka, studies devoted solely to the Finno-Ugrians have been extremely rare, particularly in Western scholarship on ethnic relations. Th is is one of the reasons behind the choice of this case-study. Another reason is that this practical case enriches the normative theory of justice raised by language policies. To this point, Kymlicka and Grin argue that liberal language strategies, for a long time neglected, act in a two-fold way: imposing a common offi cial language as simply a neutral medium for communication and ‘shaping’ people’s feelings and ‘creating’ certain options.27 However, people often see the intrinsic importance of their language despite its communicative reach. When making a parallel analy-sis of the successes and weaknesses in the presidency of Vladislav Zotin Maksi-movich and Leonid Markelov Igorevich in the Republic of Mari El, particularly

25. Ronald L. Watts, Federal Second Chambers Compared,26. Wilson, Russia (Russian Federation), 272.27. Will Kymlicka and François Grin, Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries, 12.


Elvira Nurieva242


pertinent to the protection and promotion of cultural and political rights of the Mari people, I will come back to the issue of language, titular nations, sizeable minorities (Estonia, the Russian Federation, Mari El). In order to proceed with the focal question—how eff ective is Russian federalism?—I will fi rst of all briefl y introduce background information about the history of the Mari people.

Th e Republic of Mari El (capital city Yoshkar-Ola) is located in the north of the Volga bend of the Russian Federation (the Volga federal district). Th e Mari belong to one of the fi ve Finno-Ugric language groups; the most sizeable groups within these branches are the Hungarians, the Finns and the Estonians.28 Th e Mari can be divided into three ethnic subgroups: Hill (Kuryk) Mari, Meadow (Olyk) Mari and Eastern (Upo) Mari. Th e Meadow Mari are the largest group. Th ere are two literary languages among the Mari and several diff erent dialects are spoken.29 Th e Mari (who number 670,000) make up almost one-half of Mari El’s population (43 per cent). According to the Information Centre of Finno-Ugric Peoples, 52 per cent of the Mari live outside the Mari Republic, in neighbour-ing republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, and in the provinces of Kirov and Yekaterinburg.30 Interestingly, the republic represents one of the last outposts of animism in Europe explained by the fact that the Mari never fully converted to Christianity, introduced in the early mid-nineteenth century. Speaking about the historical context, Taagepera highlights that the Mari resisted the severe impacts of Russian Orthodoxy and Russian Communism, and remained loyal to their traditional religion, and still practice it. Moreover, it is highlighted that Mari resistance to Russian conquest that lasted 300 years (1300-1600) was so fi erce that a new expression was coined in reference to them, the Russian expression for being between a rock and a hard place is “to be between an abyss and the Cher-emiss” (the old Russian name for the Maris). Notably, after the Kazan Khanate collapsed, most peoples on the Volga stopped resisting Russian conquest, but the Mari continued their struggles, known as “Cheremiss wars” (1552-1557, 1572-1574, 1581-1584),31 and only destructive tactics against villages, women, and children broke their resistance.32 Since the nineteenth century the upsurge of the

28. Nikolai Vakhtin, “Native Peoples of the Russian Far North”, Minority Rights Group International , Report 92/5, (August 1992); 379/381 Brixton Road, London SW9 7DE, UK.Rein Taagepera, Th e Finno-Ugric Republics and the Russian State (London: Hurst, 1999), 1-29: Within the Russian Federation, there are fi ve ethnic republics where Finno-Ugric groups constitute the titular nationality, namely the republics of Karelia, Komi, Mordovia, Udmurtia and Mari El.29. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006,) 13.30. MARIS or Cheremisses. Information Centre of Finno-Ugric Peoples (SURI), available at <http://www.suri.ee/eup/maris.htm> [last accessed on 1 February 2012].31. Ibid.32. Taagepera. Th e Finno-Ugric Republics and the Russian State.




Mari nationalism was driven by the aspiration to preserve their religion and to improve the socio-economic conditions of their people. In 1917 there were two essential political events in the Mari life: an umbrella Mari Ushem (Mari Un-ion) organization was established and an All-Russia Congress of the Mari people was summoned. Following Lenin’s thinking, the new Bolshevik regime began to implement policies to foster diverse national groups within the former Rus-sian Empire and thus to advance their level of development.33 In 1920 the Mari Autonomous Province (AP) was established, and the province became the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) in December 1936.34 During the new rise of the Russian industrialization from the late 1950s to the early 1970s the process of Russifi cation began and the Mari lost nearly all of their ethnic privileges, and in the 1960s language teaching was banned that caused a rapid decline in the use of the Mari language in the community.35

Th is sketched historical background helps to refl ect the state of aff airs in Mari El before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It also lays out the path for the fur-ther discussion, namely changes in the political, social and cultural fi elds during Zotin’s and Markelov’s presidency, particularly in the light of the federal reforms for the latter. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the former Mari ASSR was recognized as a constituent republic of the new Russian Federation. Th e hall-mark in the political life of Mari El was fi rst of all the formation of Mari Ushem in April 1990, the major grass-roots organization, set up to promote ‘the revival of the Mari people.’36 Sovereignty was declared in October 1990 and the name of the republic was changed to Mari El.37 Importantly, Mari Ushem was a social reform movement as well as a political organization: it was involved in drafting the sovereignty declaration passed by the Mari ASSR in October 1990 and it also summoned a new All-Russian Congress of the Mari people known as the high-est representative assembly of the Mari people.38 Th e aim of Mari Ushem was to advocate for the Mari language to become offi cial in all schools in the republic and for all civil servants to have bilingual competency. Although the Mari peo-

33. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006), 15-16.34. MARIS or Cheremisses. Information Centre of Finno-Ugric Peoples (SURI), available at <http://www.suri.ee/eup/maris.html> [last accessed on 1 February 2012].35. Ibid.36. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006,)37. “MARIS or Cheremisses”. Information Centre of Finno-Ugric Peoples (SURI), available at <http://www.suri.ee/eup/maris.html> [last accessed on 1 February 2012]; Europe MRG Directory, “Mari,” available at <http://www.minorityrights.org> [last accessed on 1 February 2012].38. Ibid.


Elvira Nurieva244


ple numerically make up close to one-half of Mari El’s population (43 per cent), notably they make only one-quarter of the members of the republic parliament. Importantly, the 1995 Mari El Constitution included a provision requiring the president of the republic to have command of both state languages. However, the Russian Supreme Court later declared this requirement unconstitutional. In the evaluation of Markelov’s presidency, I will come back to this issue and value of language in the political, administrative, and educational fi elds. To this point, it is noteworthy that the fi rst two presidents of Mari El, Vladislav Zotin (1991-1996) and Vyatcheslav Kislitsyn (1997-2000) were both residents of the republic, and the former was Mari by ethnicity and the latter was ethnic Russian.39 Since Janu-ary 2001 the republic has been governed by Leonid Markelov, a native Muscovite with an ideological background in the extreme right Liberal Democratic Party.40

What the federal reforms mean for the cultural and political rights of the Mari? Before turning to the analysis of the changes during Markelov’s presidential terms, I will give an account of the Mari cultural recovery after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Taagepera stresses that early 1990s were marked with the re-vival of cultural trends in Mari El. For instance, in addition to the bilingual Mari National Th eatre, there was also a new Mari Youth Th eatre where performances were in Mari only. In comparison with most eastern Finno-Ugric nations that still struggled to secure native-language education in the fi rst four grades, the authorities of the republic were promoting and protecting language and culture by education in and of the Mari language in public schools, and public funds were allocated to promote the Mari language media and Mari cultural activities.41 In the aftermath of the Soviet break-up, the Mari were able to reprint textbooks, have native-language schools, get published history with their vision of events, and generally restore the population’s self-esteem as individuals as members of a nation.42 A revival of native languages is also taking place. New organizations such as the Moksherzian culture society Mastorava, Mari Ushem, and the Society for Udmurt Culture struggle for the rights of their respective nations in their autonomous areas. Titular nations establish contacts with more developed demo-cratic states. For instance, in his interview, Vladislav Zotin speaks about initiatives taken in Mari El to establish cooperative enterprises together with partners from India, Italy, China, Austria and Germany, and he also makes references to diplo-

39. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006,), 29-46.40. Ibid.41. Taagepera; Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG), 2942. Taagepera. Th e Finno-Ugric Republics and the Russian State.




matic visits to Finland and Italy.43 Th ey also cooperate with each other, starting with the First Congress of Finno-Ugric Writers (May 1989, Yoshkar-Ola, Mari-el), followed by Finno-Ugric congress (December 1992, Syktyvkar, Komimu).

Analyzing the highlights of Markelov’s presidency, the international press and the reports of human rights organizations recognize the following characteristics of his terms: the continual backing from and of the Kremlin, extensive control over regional media and local authorities, repressive campaigns against Mari ac-tivists and intellectuals and the abuses of human and minority rights.44 Notably, the fi rst two Presidents of Mari El were engaged in cooperation with the national movement with the aim to prevent more radical elements from gaining infl uence. Unlike his predecessors, Markelov refused to cooperate with the existing national movement and created an alternative Mari Council that consists of the members who are loyal to the Mari El president and have no initiatives of their own.45 Importantly, with a series of federal reforms and the appointment of the federal envoy Sergei Kirienko (2001-2005) by President Putin, the federal authorities actively interfered into the election and the reelection of the president of the republic.46 In January 2001 Alexander Torshin was appointed to represent the republic interests in the Federal Council.47 Torshin has been entrusted to serve as a regional representative up-to-date despite his no previous formal connection to the region he represents. As it is pointed out in the joint report of the Interna-tional Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and the Moscow Helsinki Group, without any affi liation to Mari El or its titular nationality, the Senator is less

43. Open Society Archives. 300/96 – 04:210 Soviet Central TV Programs. Interview with President Vladislav Zotin.44. Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Russian Federation : Mari, 2008, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49749cba50.html>[accessed 22 January 2012] “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). February 2006, 47; Fuller, Liz. Russia: Marii El Begins To Look Like Belarus On Th e Volga, RFE/RL, 20 August 2005, available at<http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1060809.html> [last accessed 22 January 2012].“Estonian panel tells OSCE commissioner about problems of ethnic minorities in Russia.” Baltic News Service. (26 October 2005). LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2012/02/01. “Estonia’s education minister dis-cusses ways to support mari people in Russia.” Baltic News Service. (9 September 2005). LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2012/02/01.45. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006,), 49.46. Russian Regional Report. International Relations and Security Network – ISN, Vol. 10, No. 19, 22 (No-vember 2005), available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch> [last accessed 22 January 2012]: On 14 November 2005 President Putin replaced federal envoy to the Volga Federal District Sergei Kirienko with 37-year-old Aleksandr Konovalov, the former deputy procurator in St. Petersburg, a former Bashkortostan’s procurator. Konovalov’s appointment came as a major surprise. Many human rights defenders and analysts in one voice warned that his appointment could signal a downturn in the protection of human rights in the Volga and this is end of an era of relative liberalism.47. Lenta. Ru Alexander Torshin’s Biography: <http://lenta.ru/lib/14162747/>


Elvira Nurieva246


likely to understand the needs of the original inhabitants and has little commit-ment to pursuing issues of specifi c concern to the Mari people.48 As a result of the federal reform, the direct election of regional governors was abolished in 2005. Th e political and civil rights of the electorate in all constituent units, including the Mari El citizens to vote and express their preference for the candidate of their choice in the presidential elections, was appropriated by the federal centre. Hence most governors whose term expired were reappointed since early 2005. President Markelov expressed his full support for President Putin and called for the amend-ment of the Russian Constitution to prolong the term of the RF President.49 Importantly, Mari El as a resource-poor region is heavily dependent on federal subsidies, and hence it is in a weak position to oppose the unifying thrust of the federal government. After President Markelov spoke about treating Mari El as any other region and thus proposing the eradication of its special status, Mari national leaders fear that the existing national territorial structure of the federal system could be abolished and this would seriously threaten the future of the Mari people as a culturally and linguistically unique group.50

Th inking over the potential lifespan of titular languages and their endemic character (existence in one country only), Priit Jarve refers to François Grin’s conclusion that brings emphasis to the number of the speakers, and more specifi -cally, the number of native speakers as the key condition to enable the vitality of the titular language and nation.51 As pointed out by a number of authors, a language is much more than just a means of communication; it also serves as an instrument for reinforcing group loyalties and solidarities, for affi rming identities and enabling the reproduction and development of national cultures, literature, history and arts, and its preservation is often related to the survival of nations themselves.52 Also recognizing the paramount importance of language, Jarve gives an account of the language policy in the Baltic states during the Soviet years. He emphasizes that the spread of the Russian language was observed in the number of Russian language educational, cultural and media institutions that, in his opin-ion, were particularly established to serve the needs of Russian-speaking immi-grants. Jarve adds that the position of the Russian language was also dominant

48. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006,), 4849. Ibid 47. It is noteworthy also that Mari El as a resource-poor region is heavily dependent on federal subsi-dies, and hence it is in a weak position to oppose the unifying thrust of the federal government.50. Ibid, 9.51. Priit Jarve, “Language Battles in the Baltic States: 1989 to 2002,” in, Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Lan-guage Politics in Transition Countries. eds. F. Daftary and F. Grin (Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2003), 92.52. Will Kymlicka, and François Grin, “Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries,” in Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries. eds. F. Daftary and F. Grin (Open Society Institute, Budapest. 2003), 10,11.




in administration and several branches of economy. His main point is that the teaching of the titular languages, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian, was widely ignored in Russian-medium schools while ethnic Estonians, Latvians and Lithua-nians were taught Russian at school as a secondary language. As the result, the process of losing language and hence group identity was triggered as the Baltic peoples developed the habit to switch to Russian when in a Russian-speaking company.53 Similarly, during the Soviet times there were eff orts to promote a common Soviet identity, the Russian language as a lingua franca, at the cost of minority cultures and languages, in Mari Autonomous Province (AP) as well.54 Nikolai Vakhtin elaborates that after the World War II the new governmental ethnic policy was based on a newly-coined concept of the “new historic unity, the Soviet people”, “a monolithic unity which was to form very quickly around the central core of the Russians.”55 Th e Russian language was declared as the “international language of the Soviet people” and given priority in all school timetables.56 By 1950 the acquisition of the Russian language as a second language was at a large scale, and Vakhtin notes that “[it] was a positive development, as it allowed access to information via books, newspapers, radio and, later, television.”57 Nevertheless, he also acknowledges that indeed Russifi cation rather than bilingualism was the real aim of the Government’s policies at that time.58

Th e today’s plight of the Mari reminds that of the Estonians’ situation during the Soviet times. Human rights organizations report that nowadays the Russian language is prestigious for the Mari, particularly for the urbanized groups, as it is the language of government, offi cial business and education. Moreover, in the media sector (information and advertisement) it also occupies the most visible position. According to the state statistics, in 2004 a total of 15 publicly funded Mari language newspapers and magazines and only one privately funded Mari language newspaper were published in the republic. In general, due to the socio-economic conditions faced by the readers in the Russian Federation, the circula-tion of newspapers dropped.59 Th e spread of the Russian language at the cost of the Mari language is also observed in the educational sector, namely in such

53. Priit Jarve, Language Battles in the Baltic States: 1989 to 2002, 92.54. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006), p. 16.55. Nikolai Vakhtin, «Native Peoples of the Russian Far North,» Minority Rights Group International, Report 92/5, (August 1992): 379/381 Brixton Road, London SW9 7DE, UK, p. 17.56. Ibid.57. Ibid., 18.58. Ibid.59. ““Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Fed-eration for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006), 34.


Elvira Nurieva248


important domains as schools and nursery schools, and also into the family and home sphere.60 In interview to RFE/RL, Tunne Kelam, an Estonian deputy to the European Parliament said that “education in Mari is provided in some elemen-tary schools but not at a higher level, and that consequently only some 20 per cent of Mari children are taught in their native language.”61 Pursuing the parallel analysis between Estonia and Mari El, it is noteworthy that the situation of the Russian-speaking citizens of Estonia is, to certain extent, close to the situation of the Mari people in the Russian Federation. Kymlicka and Grin note that the elimination of the Russian speaking schools in Estonia was explained as an incentive to acquire a better knowledge of Estonian. However, it is arguable how legitimate it is to advance the offi cial language in a democratic society with this language policy. Moreover, they emphasize that such measures are not designed to improve peda-gogical eff ectiveness; their aim is to eliminate institutions established during the Soviet rule in order to solidify the nationalist image of a state, characterized by a single specifi c language.62 My tentative conclusion is that in both cases, Estonia and Mari El, and Mari El and the Russian Federation, some minorities are per-ceived as a threat to the state in question due to historical and/or geopolitical fac-tors. As the result, as Kymlicka and Grin note, such ‘disloyal’ or ‘evil’ minorities are either merely tolerated or actively suppressed.63

Kymlicka’s and Grin’s questions—“If a group linguistically assimilates, who will read its old poets and chroniclers? Who will even remember the history of the group? ”64—resonate within the discussion over titular languages and nations. Language as an inter-generational link with one’s ancestors comes to be of com-municative, historical, identity-wise value. Recognizing that the interests of the Mari people are marginalized in the political process of the republic and their nu-merical composition already limits their opportunities to participate in governing the republic, the Finno-Ugric cultural organizations have drafted language laws that would give the republic languages an equal status with Russian and open the way to Finno-Ugric languages as eff ective media of instruction in schools. How-

60. MARIS or Cheremisses. Information Centre of Finno-Ugric Peoples (SURI), available at <http://www.suri.ee/eup/maris.html>[last accessed on 1 February 2012]: According to the 1994 poll, 62.7 per cent of the Meadow Maris and 91.8 per cent of the Hill Maris use only their native language to communicate with their parents, while only 23.3 per cent and 60.9 per cent respectively use the native language to communicate with their school-aged children.61. Liz Fuller, Russia: Marii El Begins To Look Like Belarus On Th e Volga, RFE/RL, (20 August 2005), available at <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1060809.html>[last accessed 22 January 2012].62. W. Kymlicka and François Grin, Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries, 11.63. Ibid.64. Ibid, 11.




ever, such laws are strongly opposed by most Russian authorities, which has led to political action in the form of indigenous protest campaigns in some republics.65

Federalism is a process rather than a fi xed state as well as democracy is also a journey rather than a destination. In this respect Dobrynin’s argument that a country evolving from the totalitarian past cannot avoid the trap of dictatorship in order to create further conducive environment for democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human and minority rights, in theory and practice, is reason-able and sound. However, the analysis of President Putin’s federal reforms and their eff ects in the Republic of Mari El demonstrate that this process and journey can take a backward rather than forward-looking direction. In other words, the harmonization of federal and regional powers, characterized by the appointment of presidential envoys supervising the activities of the constituent units, the com-position of the Federation Council by full-time Senators who dominantly have no direct personal links with the regions they represent, a weak judiciary system (19 judges are nominated by President and confi rmed by the Federation Coun-cil), undermine the key features of eff ective federalism and signal to the appro-priation trend in Russian federalism.

AbstractEffective federalism is characterized by political legal and administrative autonomy of the constituent

units, fi nancial subsidies to different orders of government and a federal body representing the regional interests (Ronald Watts). From the de jure perspective, the Constitution of the Russian Federation en-shrines two levels of government, specifi es competences (federal, shared, residual), and guarantees the voice of regional representatives in the second chamber, the Federal Council. However, de facto Russian federalism, particularly in the consideration of President Vladimir Putin’s federal reforms (2000-2004), represents a model of governance far from ‘effective.’ For instance, the new arrangement of the Federal Council substantially weakened this institution, and turned it into a more ceremonial central body. The appointment of Governors of regions by the RF President deprived constituent units of their political au-tonomy. The analysis of the troubling situation of the Mari people in the Republic of Mari El, particularly during continual Leonid Markelov’s presidency, enriches the discussion with the fi ndings and warnings of leading human rights organizations (Minority Rights Group International, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and the Moscow Helsinki Group).

RésuméUn fédéralisme effectif se caractérise par l’autonomie politique, juridique et administrative des entités

constituantes, par des subventions fi nancières attribuées aux différents ordres de gouvernement et par une instance représentant les intérêts régionaux au niveau fédéral (Ronald Watts). De jure, la constitution de la fédération de Russie considère deux niveaux de gouvernement, précise les compétences (fédérales, partagées et résiduelles), et garantit la représentation régionale dans la seconde chambre, le Conseil de la Fédération. Cependant, de facto, le fédéralisme russe, en particulier après les réformes fédérales du président Vladimir Poutine (2000-2004), représente une forme de gouvernance loin d’être aussi « effec-tive ». Par exemple, la nouvelle organisation du Conseil de la Fédération a substantiellement affaibli cette institution, et l’a transformée en un organe plutôt cérémoniel. La désignation des gouverneurs de région

65. “Russian Federation: Th e Human Rights Situation of the Mari Minority of the Republic of Mari El: A Study of the Titular Nationality of One of Russia’s Ethnic Regions.” Joint Report by International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) and Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG). (February 2006).


Elvira Nurieva250


par le président russe a privé les entités constituantes de leur autonomie politique. L’étude de la situation troublée du peuple Mari dans la république de Mari El, en particulier durant la présidence continue de Leonid Markelov, nourrit ce débat avec les constatations et les mises en garde des principales organisa-tions des droits de l’homme (Minority Rights Group International, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Moscow Helsinki Group).



Contesting Democratic Polities in the Interest of Federalism

Arshi Khan

Dr. Arshi Khan is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, India.

Frame of Discussion

Issues related to governance, autonomy, rights, participation, order and peace are always administrative, political and social in nature but their contents require a legitimate, responsive and citizens’ friendly public in power at diff erent govern-mental levels for managing confl icting interests, maintaining constitutionalism and promoting democratic values. Democracy becomes more important when it is read and underlined with federalism as both of them create dynamic, living and organic fundamental principles and laws. Th eir implementation, as well as their promises and genuine ‘tasks doing’ eff orts to institutionalize a regulating, controlling and caring machinery sensitive to the needs of the people are impor-tant operative aspects of civilized governance.

In this context, there exist several cases in India and other countries where the pattern of political relationships at diff erent levels need to be briefl y men-tioned, investigated and questioned for being inconsistent with the principle of constitutionalism and federalism. Asia is the hub of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversities where most of the post-Colonial States and governments have not been able to seek, maintain and promote corresponding refl ections and formations at social, economic and political levels. Th ere are in some places wide diff erences between the objectives and purposes of the constitution and the exist-


Arshi Khan252


ing ground realities. Th ere are several cases of the rise of majoritarianism vis-à-vis the rights and aspirations of diff erent territories, regions, communities and dis-persed minorities.

Introduction

Over several decades, most of the States have developed the conventional hab-its of maintaining their territorial boundaries and the State building process. Th eir territorial bias is gradually turning them into military posts and police states vis-à-vis those who are excluded, deprived and discriminated. Th is has resulted in the problem of denying the basic federal principles of self-rule and shared-rule, which has engulfed many federal democracies and other polities into ethnic confl icts, communal tensions and massive exploitation of mandate obtained at various oc-casions. Th erefore, the ignorance over giving the primacy to managing diversities and confl icts by sharing powers in the matrix of multiple relationships between the people and the levels of government need to be questioned and investigated so that the political purpose of having the State, the constitution and the govern-ment could be achieved for the cause of freedom, rights, equality, justice, peace and development. Moreover, the tasks of the deferral polities become more cru-cial as they are rightly expected to safeguard the interests of the excluded sections, minorities and other groups from the federal and constituent governments.

It is, however, believed that federalism succeeds in those countries where civic state and society compliment each other or civic communes, like that of the linguistic communities of Switzerland, co-exist due to the recognition of their democratic entitlements within the federal and cantonal constitutions. In other words, federal polities have better prospects in both the Anglo-American and Continental European projects, which determine the role of state and society for the benefi t of the individual and collectivities. Most remarkably, the judiciary has played a catalyst role bringing territorial integrity and social unity particularly in ‘post-historical society’. In brief, they have largely succeeded in ‘internal manage-ment’ due their adherence to responsiveness and accountability in relation to their electorates.

Federal systems in the United States, Switzerland, and Germany have es-tablished multiple linkages within their respective citizens and various layers of governments, which are well defi ned as the ‘matrix model’ by Daniel J. Elazar. Federalism, which is the enriched form of democracy for diverse societies, has been instrumental in providing space to diff erent sociocultural and regional for-mations to play their proportional role in governance based on the principles of devolution, autonomy and power-sharing. It would not be unreasonable to men-tion that federal and democratic principles have made both India and Malaysia more prospective, stable, developing and relatively peaceful countries.


Contesting Democratic Polities in the Interest of Federalism 253


Federalism as a system of multilayered structures of powers authorized by the constitution has gradually proved to be an additional advantage to democratic polities which are inclined to deal with various regions and nationalities. Th us, federalism emerged as an important recipe for those societies whose constituent elements are not mononational but multinational or better termed as plural or federal in nature. Th erefore, federal political arrangements were devised in vari-ous countries to address to the needs and demands of sub-national groups and regions of dispersed and national minorities. Th us, federal polity has been in increasing demand for resolving confl icts, ensuring peaceful settlements, promot-ing dialogues, building peaceful road-maps and encouraging inclusive democracy resulting in recognizing diversity as the source of strength, appreciation and inte-gration rather than the source of confl ict and division.

Federal democracies have succeeded in building composite, concurrent and inclusive frameworks of power-sharing with the notion of self-rule. It has rejected subordination and promoted peaceful integration. It has questioned negative lib-erty and appreciated social justice and affi rmative action policies. It is also con-sidered as an instrument for unity in diversity where diff erential attributes have advanced mutual respect and appreciation. India is one of the examples where federal democracy has also adopted asymmetrical federalism along with the rights of minorities and the regions focusing on recognizing diversities, rule of law, social justice and power-sharing aimed at federal-nation-building. It is quite rea-sonable to mention that federal democracy establishes the relationship of citizens with all the levels of government, which transform them into real stake-holders. Such a relationship expands the space of mutual understanding, tolerance and partnership, which brightens the future of peaceful cohabitation. Th ere are ex-periences in some parts of the world where the adoption of the federal principles have resulted in peace-building and confl ict resolution.

Some Cases

Federalism, when used to enforce democratic governance, requires civic norms and political culture since merely institutional arrangements will not work. Iraq and Afghanistan are examples where the constitutional framework, political structures and doctrines have not produced desired results. Th us, democracy largely depends on the ‘parallelism’ of democratic principles, policies, the level of the political consciousness of the people, the economic and developmental level, the role of decisive agencies, public institutions and also international environ-ment. Th ere are a number of cases of constitutional breakdown, misuse of politi-cal institutions, exclusion of weaker and minority sections, separatism, militancy, terrorism and democratic discontents in the Asian continent where the only ex-ceptions can be found in terms of achievements in resolving the crises through


Arshi Khan254


federal measures. Th erefore, many facts prove failures in critical areas whereas we also fi nd many cases of achievements in Asian polities in dealing with symmetri-cal federalism, a devolution of powers, and decentralization. Th is has happened mainly due to the forces of globalization, the expansion of the structures of grass-root local administrations, emerging multiparty systems, political consciousness and the formation of coalition governments and growing political alliances.

It is also a fact that mediation eff orts for confl ict resolution and crisis man-agement by European members have failed in the case of Sri Lanka (Tamil issue) and India (Kashmir issue) mainly due to hardline approach by nationalist parties in power. On the other hand, internal forces and civil rights groups’ eff orts for peaceful settlement have so far not produced any conclusive result. Moreover, governments have shelved the reports and recommendations of their own com-mittees in India, Sri Lanka and Th ailand. In these cases, nationalistic rhetoric of ‘one nation, one culture, one language’ somehow infl uenced decision makers against the restoring or granting autonomy rights to regions and national minori-ties.

India

Th ere are democratic campaigns for electoral reforms in India to bring about a Proportionate Representation (PR) system in India. Th is is getting wider ap-preciation as the weaker sections of the country are in search of meaningful rep-resentation and participation in the instruments and mechanisms of national governance in India. Decreasing electoral interest among the people was propor-tionately alternated with the increasing use of muscle and money power in subse-quent elections. Th e First Past Th e Post (FPTP) is seen largely all over the world as an electoral system that can easily become the handmaid of dominant forces in reducing the democratic spaces of historically marginalized people. Th ough FPTP has many advantages as a representative electoral system, it has been highly disadvantageous to the Dalits, Adivasi/Tribal people and to other diff erent mi-norities in India.

However, there are more challenges that require serious attention on the part of the sections in power. Th ere exists the problem of deep rooted disappoint-ment for the Kashmiri people with the federal government as the later has not done anything substantial on the ground to satisfy people. Several promises for autonomy have not been put into practice. Th e State Autonomy Committee’s Re-port adopted by the Government of the State Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir on 26 June 2000 was soon rejected by the Cabinet of the Federal coali-tion government. According to the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Moni-toring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council’s report dated 28 November 2011, nearly one million people have been forced to fl ee their homes by ethnic




violence in Western Assam, along the border between Assam and Meghalaya, and in Tripura North-East India over the past 20 years. Over 76,000 of them are still living in displacement in November 2011. Th e report mentions that these inter-nally displaced people are not receiving the protection and assistance they need. Besides, there are turbulent situations in other parts of the North-East region mainly Nagaland, Manipur.

However, it is a fact that the Federal government seems to be in favour of dialogue with Naga leaders taking place outside the country. It has been prom-ising autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. It has also created Autonomous Hill Councils in the North-East region that has not satisfi ed the people, too. Another important aspect of improving federal environment is the bilateral country-based eff orts to better relations with neighbours, which have claimed support and pro-tection to its dissidents and ethnic minorities across borders. It has been observed that whenever relations between India and Pakistan improved, it advanced the agenda of peaceful settlements. Similarly, better coordination between Pakistan and Afghanistan can be a catalyst in settling the issue of national minorities.

With the Pakistan Cabinet deferring the decision to announce the ‘shortened negative list’, India and Pakistan held talks on 15 February 2012 to open another border trading point at Mona Bao-Khorapar in Rajasthan, which opens up into Sindh province in Pakistan. India also indicated that it was ready to put in place a liberal multiple visa regime if Pakistan reciprocated on the issue. Th e issue on strengthening the infrastructure at the Wagah-Attari border along with opening another trading point at the Rajasthan border also came up for discussion during the bilateral talks. Negotiations have been held between both countries regard-ing reopening banking channels on both sides of the border. Th e State Bank of Pakistan and the Reserve Bank of India were in touch in this regard and the RBI was already looking into the issue. Similarly, more friendly relations between Th ailand and Malaysia would help heal the wounds of the Malayu ethnic com-munity in three southern provinces in Th ailand, which have been disturbed for over a decade. Turkish close cooperation with Iraq can be a catalyst in creating federal Iraq with autonomy to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.

Federal polity in India has been helpful in strengthening the majority com-munity and its regions to a large extent through administrative policies and co-ordination, cooperative relations between the federal government and the con-stituent units through the political safeguards of the weaker sections belonging to the majority community. Th is trend has thickened due to the formation of the coalition governments in several constituent units and at the federal centre. Such developments have not aff ected the pattern of relationships between the federal authority and those constituent units, which have the larger concentration of national minorities particularly in the north and in the North-Eastern part of


Arshi Khan256


the country where governments exist without governance. Military forces and the central forces’ deployment become the national symbol of unity and security rather than the cohesive framework of political relationships.

Th ere are other emerging threats to the fundamental rights (as basic features of India’s Constitution) of the minorities in those constituent units where some people from the majority community have come to power on the basis of spread-ing communal hatred and violence. Antiminority violence has engulfed some constituent units wherever they have managed to form their governments. Th ere are cases of some states in India where the antiminority and antifederal political parties in power are on record of misusing political power not only to impose ma-jority’s religion into school text books but also protecting persons, organizations and some government offi cials indulged in the cases of mass murder, arson, rapes, lootings and forced displacements of the members of minority communities. Th e case of the Gujrat State is widely known for it.

Th e judiciary has also noticed it without making any concrete actions against such forces. In such cases, the autonomy of the constituent units has been mis-used by the party in power aff ecting the human rights and the fundamental rights of the minorities. As a result, there has emerged a new way of thinking on how to reconcile maximum autonomy to the constituent units and the protection of minority rights. Th e role of the Federal government becomes crucial as it was originally felt on the part of the members of the Constituent Assembly of In-dia before 62 years. On 27 January 2012, the High Court of the State of Mad-hya Pradesh rejected a petition fi led by Catholic Bishops Council and Harmony Foundation challenging the state government’s decision to introduce the teaching of Bhagwad Gita (Hindu religious book) in public schools all over the state. Th e Court said that the book is a book of Indian philosophy. State government’s deci-sion to introduce the book has been opposed by religious organisations (barring Hindu organisations), many educationists and opposition parties. Another State Karnataka ruled by the same party fi rst allowed discourses on this religious book in schools. Now it wants to make the book a part of the state syllabus. Senior of-fi cials of the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) too do not support the idea of making Gita a part of the syllabus as they fear it could lead to divisions among children from diff erent backgrounds studying in state schools.

Pakistan

Federalism is in crisis in Pakistan mainly due to military interventions, terror-ism and insecurity situations in border areas. Th e Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan historically remained autonomous and later became the hotbed of the infl ux of Afghan refugees during anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. Later it became the refuge for the militants whose presence invited military actions




from the American drones and the federal government of Pakistan. Th e Pakistan army launched its fi rst military operation in the tribal areas on 27 June 2002 and since then is fully involved in its fi ght against terrorism. It used gunship helicop-ters, heavy artillery and even air force help was sought on occasions to bomb the militant‘s hideouts. Th e US is relying heavily upon its drone technology, intro-duced recently to target the high-valued militants. Th is has also resulted in the deaths of many civilians aff ecting the process of reconciliation.

Policies by the federal government have also attracted criticisms from the FATA. In August 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari announced the long-awaited political, judicial and administrative reforms for the FATA by allowing politi-cal activities in the tribal areas. Eventually, on 12 August 2011, in the presence of FATA Parliamentarians, President Zardari signed two important regulations, namely the Extension of the Political Parties Order 2000 (PPO) to the Tribal Areas and Amendments in the FCR called the Frontier Crimes (Amendments) Regulation, 2011. Under Presidential regulations, the political parties are allowed to operate fully and present their party manifestos carrying their socio-economic programmes to the tribal areas.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is known for its recent history of war and feudalism between various factions. Ethnic diversity, inter-ethnic relations, US and Pakistan backed anti-Soviet struggles, domination of religious students (Taliban), their expulsion by NATO bombings and the creation of new political set ups are some of the memories and realities in this troubled region. Th e making of the constitution and the state has not achieved any concrete result in terms of governance. Th e country is engulfed into ensuing internecine battles for power, emerging con-fl icts among contenders aff ecting Afghan society and other players. Th e central government is tasked with restoring peace, security and justice in the country as governmental failures in these spheres would negate federal measures for demo-cratic governance.

the Moro problem

In South-East Asia, the Moro problem known as the ‘Mindanao Problem’, is an issue which refl ects the failure of political federalism on the part of the na-tional leadership of the country. Th ere are records of failed peace negotiations be-tween the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. It is also a fact that there is no viable solution and political restructuring without substantial constitutional changes. Th e constitutional re-engineering is required to address the questions of the relationship between the central government and the Filipino people on the one hand, and the Bangsam-


Arshi Khan258


oro people in Southern Philippines, on the other. It is also an important question to see the possibility of accepting the principle of pluralism by creating a space in the Philippine republican polity and constitutional system to accommodate a Moro Islamic system of norms and values. Th e Mindanao Problem is a problem based on relationships between the three cultural groups: the Christian Filipinos, the Muslim Moros and the indigenous Lumad.

Th ere exits extremism on both sides; one to seek forced integration and the other for forced secession, in which both parties seem to be using violent meth-ods. Th ere is also the case of East Timor, which became separated from Indonesia after some interested parties intervened. Similar concerned parties have no inter-ests in forcing settlement on the central government of the Philippines. Th ere-fore, it all depends upon the sincerity of the national government to resolve it or to maintain the status quo. Th is type of solution does not seem to be the solution as the similar international forces have left it to the national government to deal with it. Moreover, the Philippine government, the Organization of Islamic Con-ference (OIC) and the United Nations (UN) have not shown their choice for a referendum on the question of independence. Autonomy has become a doubtful promise for the Moros because of the adverse experiences they have had to en-dure. Th e representatives of the Philippines government and the Moro National Liberation Front signed the Tripoli Agreement on 23 December 1976 for agree-ing on the autonomy for 13 provinces and nine cities in the southern Philippines. President Marcos approved some cultural autonomy for the Moros in 1977. Im-plementation of the agreement required necessary constitutional changes, which could not be done. Negotiations failed over creating single autonomous unit. Later, complexities developed into the demand for independence, violence and ‘no-solution option.’

Non-independence solutions should be explored. Th ere are helpful concepts in the Philippine Constitution, which speak of religious freedom, equal protec-tion and Due Process, generally accepted principles of International Law and Right to Self-Determination, Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities, ex-panded Social Justice, Direct Democracy, Peace, and Police power. Similarly, the Moro community also proclaims to endorse its cultural norms and values seek-ing a peace treaty and creative reasoning eff orts and pragmatism through which diversity can be managed. Both the Government and the Moro community had created a common ground under the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on 27 August 1998, which recognized human rights in accordance with the prin-ciples of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, joint agreements previously signed by the parties especially the Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities dated 18 July 1997, tolerance for the identity, culture, way of life and aspirations of all the peoples of Mindanao.




On 9 January 2012, the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front peace panels resumed formal peace talks in Kuala Lumpur, Ma-laysia to discuss the proposed Muslim sub-state, which remained to be the most contentious issue during the talks, although both panels have committed to re-maining at peace until an amicable settlement is reached. Under the proposed sub-state, the Central government would not interfere in the internal aff airs of Muslims in Mindanao. Th e MILF chief peace negotiator, Mohager Iqba, stressed that the MILF was just asking for the creation of a sub-state, not independence, citing Scottish and Hong Kong as models of self-governance. Th e government’s chief peace negotiator, Marvic Leonen, says that the proposal has three impor-tant components for one solution to the Bangsamoro problem, which includes a political settlement or a peace accord with the MILF, massive economic develop-ment in Mindanao and cultural-historical acknowledgement. It is at this critical juncture that the nationalist parties, the central government and the Moro leader-ship should move forward towards a federal solution in the larger interests of the country and the region.

Indonesia

Indonesia’s variations in culture have been shaped—although not specifi cally determined—by centuries of complex interactions with their physical environ-ment. In Indonesia the concept of ethnic minorities is often discussed in religious terms. Th e major ethnic groups claimed adherence to one of the major world religions—Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism. Indonesia is made up of twenty-seven provincial units. Th e provinces, in turn, were subdivided into districts, and below that into sub-districts. Th ere were forty municipalities or city governments and at the lowest tier of the administrative hierarchy is the village. Since independence, the nation has been centrally governed from Jakarta in a system in which the lines of authority, budget, and personnel appointment run outward and downward. Regional and local governments enjoy little autonomy. Governments below the national level, therefore, serve essentially as subordinate administrative units through which the functional activities of Jakarta-based de-partments and agencies reach out into the country.

Confl icting interests of politics and administration presented special problems in the Special Region of Aceh and Irian Jaya and erstwhile Timor provinces. Aceh is the westernmost part of Sumatra and the part of Indonesia where the Aceh-nese demand for autonomy has resulted in unrest, violence, promises and lim-ited autonomy. Nevertheless, during the early 1990s, the idea of an independent Islamic state was kept alive by the Free Aceh (Aceh Merdeka) movement, known to the central government as the Aceh Security Disturbance Movement (GPK). Irian Jaya, the former Dutch New Guinea or West New Guinea, remained un-


Arshi Khan260


der Dutch control after Indonesian independence in 1949. In May 1963, full administrative control was handed over to Indonesia. Rich in natural resources, Irian Jaya (Victorious Irian)—as the province was renamed in 1972—in 1992 was the largest and least-populated province. Indonesia’s eff orts to exploit the resources and assimilate the indigenous Papuan and Melanesian populations into the national administration and culture met sporadic armed resistance from the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and aroused international concerns. East Timor, the former Portuguese Timor, was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1976 as Timor Timur Province, but on 20 May 2002, became independent after the Referendum of August 1999 in which the United Nations, Australia and Portugal played an active role.

Th e People’s Republic of China

Th e People’s Republic of China is known to have its own brand of market socialism under the guidance of the Communist Party which controls power. Th is country is also known for adopting a ‘one country two systems’ approach by incorporating Hong Kong as part of China. Th e PRC has a large network of administrative areas in the country. Th e province functions as an administrative division. Th ere are four types of provincial level administrative divisions—Prov-inces, Municipalities, Autonomous Regions and Special Administrative Regions. Th e PRC claims Taiwan as a fi rst-level province, though Taiwan is actually a self-governing democracy that has not accepted this kind of proclamation. Th e PRC also asserts itself as the sole legitimate representative of all of China, but does not administer Taiwan to which it has been building cooperative terms and con-ditions. Th e Communist Party of China’s Provincial Committee, headed by a Secretary, exists in every province in addition to the two special administrative regions. Th e Committee Secretary is in charge of the province, rather than the governor of the provincial government. Th e village in China serves as a fun-damental organisational unit for its rural population. Basic local divisions like neighbourhoods and communities are not informal like in the West, but have defi ned boundaries and designated heads.

In general, urban areas are organized into neighbourhood committees while rural areas are organized into village committees. Th e Special Administrative Regions—a highly autonomous and self-governing sub-national subject of the People’s Republic of China—is directly under the Central People’s Government. Each SAR has a provincial level chief executive as head of the region and head of government. Th e region’s government is not fully independent, as foreign policy and military defence are the responsibility of the central government, according to the 1982 Constitution. Municipality is a higher level of city directly controlled by the central government, with status equal to that of the provinces. In practice,




their political statuses are higher than common provinces. Th e Autonomous Re-gions have a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group along with its own local government, but an autonomous region theoretically has legisla-tive rights. Th e governor of the Autonomous Regions is usually appointed from the respective minority ethnic group. Th e PRC is often criticized for its centrist policies and violation of the rights of Tibetans and Uyghurs, who have their own cultural, historical and linguistic roots and heritage.

Sri Lanka

In the case of Sri Lanka, the national government has disappointed many federalists who have criticized the present government for violating the rights of the Tamil community in northern areas. Th e increasing international pressure on alleged war crimes during the last phase of the war and the absence of a politi-cal settlement led to the appointment of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission set up in May 2010 by the President of Sri Lanka in May 2010 to look into the Civil War and confl ict during 1983-2009 and to provide recom-mendations for an era of healing and peace building. Th e LLRC Report was made public on 16 December 2011. It recommends that the lessons learnt from the shortcomings in the functioning of the Provincial Councils system should be taken into account in devising an appropriate system of devolution. It urges the government to have a structured dialogue with all political parties, and those rep-resenting the minorities in particular, based on a proposal containing the govern-ment’s own thinking on the form and content of the dialogue process envisaged. But the government has done little to ensure progress on those recommendations.

Malaysia

Th e rise of ethnic consciousness in Malaysia has brought diff erent parties to work together to promote respect for one another and the prevalence of justice to bring ethnic peace to build Malaysia as a federal nation. Th e Malaysian Con-stitution and polity have been catalyst to the solution of the problem by balanc-ing confl icting interests in the country. However, present developments trigger the question of how well the government has succeeded in maintaining unity in this plural society. Cases involving misuse of authority have created social unrest among the people. Th us the government may need to play a more active role to counter splintering and to enforce programs that will foster consensus building among disparate groups. A confl ict management strategy needs to be designed as an eff ective measure to protect this delicate relationship.


Arshi Khan262


Th ailand

Th ere is an emerging scope for federal solutions in Th ailand where the south-ern part dominated by the Malayu speaking community is presently demarcated as disturbed area. Th e root causes of this initial phase of confl ict and violence, which are a complex set of history, ethnicity, and religion issues, are the nation-alistic policies of the central government strengthening majoritarian paradigm, backwardness of the region and the community and discriminatory policies. Th e ultra-nationalistic policies of the fi rst Phibun government of Th ailand caused bit-ter clashes. His assimilation policy had a devastating eff ect on the relationship be-tween the Th ai government and Malay-Muslims in the south. Th e initial demand for the devolution of powers and negotiation was rejected resulting in the death and disappearance of leading persons. Southern Th ailand provinces are relatively backward with the heavy presence of armed forces and intelligence. Now the gov-ernment is thinking of negotiations and some administrative reforms, but more compensatory measures are required for the region in turmoil.

Conclusions

We can say that federalism and federal arrangement stand at the cross-roads of complexities born by various forces and factors both on the part of the rul-ing persons and institutions as well as the aff ected communities and the regions. Most of the federal polities have borrowed heavily from their colonial system of governance mainly for the purpose to maintain strong physical control over the people, regions and communities. Th eir proclaimed principles of reforming and restructuring the governing institutions and policies have largely transformed into majoritarianism and in some places anti-minorityism. As a result, political discontentment brew got erupted in regional agitations, demands for autonomy, militancy and self-determination. Under this pressure, rise of multiparty system and formation of coalition governments have checked the process of overcentrali-sation to some extent. On the other hand, some unitary states have shown their inclination to share and initiate some federal principles for confl ict resolution.

Federalism is not only a recipe for the division of powers between the federal and the constituent governments but is also an important principle to live with democracy. It requires the federal government to recognise the rights of the re-gions and communities forming the federal-nation. It also constitutionally oblig-es the constituent governments to prevent the violation of the rights of minorities therein. Th us it seems that federalism has a larger role to play in several parts of the Asian continent where most of the national governments have remained concerned with the priority of State building and the territorial integrity of the borders. Federalism seems to change this type of priority for building integrated




political community along with ensuring democracy, human rights, equality and justice. It is more of a crisis management package for a country where both the majority and minorities need to reconcile. In this federal exercise of new but democratic relationships between the people in power and the people out of power, many ethnic confl icts, separatism and majority-minority dichotomy can be addressed to create a viable bond of unity in diversity.

AbstractFederalism is not only a system of governance, but also an important political principle that has long

been neglected in various parts of Asia. Federalism succeeds in those countries where either civic state and society compliments each other or civic communes, like that of the linguistic communities of Switzerland, co-exist due to the recognition of their democratic entitlements within the federal and cantonal constitu-tions. In other words, federal arrangements have better prospects in those places where the people have experienced a long phase of change, revolutions and reforms. Several Asian countries have endorsed the federal structure of power sharing but they have not yet developed such norms and values to sustain its benefi ts. As a result, political crises have emerged affecting the government and the people. It is also a fact that the application of federal order can overcome most of these crises.

RésuméLe fédéralisme n’est pas seulement un système de gouvernance, mais également un important principe

politique qui a longtemps été négligé dans différentes parties de l’Asie. Le fédéralisme est un succès dans les pays où l’État civique et la société s’apprécient mutuellement, ou quand coexistent les communautés civiques, comme dans le cas des communautés linguistiques en Suisse, en raison de la reconnaissance réciproque de leurs droits démocratiques au sein des constitutions fédérales et cantonales. En d’autres mots, les aménagements fédéraux ont de meilleures chances de succès dans les endroits où le peuple a fait l’expérience d’une longue période de changement, de révolutions et de réformes. Plusieurs pays d’Asie ont adopté une structure fédérale de partage du pouvoir, mais ils n’ont pas encore développé les normes et valeurs susceptibles d’en assurer les avantages. Aussi, des crises politiques sont apparues, touchant les gouvernements comme les peuples. Il faut cependant constater que la mise en œuvre d’un ordre fédéral peut surmonter la plupart de ses crises.



Federalism, Territorial Autonomy and the Management of Ethnic Diversity in Africa: Reading the Balance Sheet

Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha

LLB (Addis Ababa University), LLM (Pretoria), Ph.D. (Western Cape). Senior lecturer, Fac-ulty of Law, University of the Western Cape; Research Fellow, Community Law Centre.

Introduction

Africa most likely accounts for a lion’s share of defunct federations. In the wake of independence from colonial powers, and possibly driven by the euphoria of Pan-Africanism, a number of independent states in Africa established federa-tions with their neighbours. In 1959, Senegal and Sudan (present day Mali), two former-French colonies, joined to create the Mali Federation. Th e federations of Rhodesian (including what are now Zambia and Malawi) and Nyasaland (what is now known as Malawi) was established in 1953. Libya and Egypt joined Syria to establish the Federation of Arab Republics in 1972. Eritrea joined Ethiopia in a United Nations’ sponsored federation in 1952. Th e Federal Republic of Cam-eroon was established in 1961, bringing together French and British Cameroon, which used to be under a single German colonial administration before the First World War.

As the opening sentence of this article suggests, the history of federalism in Africa is not encouraging. Federalism in Africa was, to put it mildly, an ill-fated experiment. Th e Mali Federation collapsed before its second anniversary. Th e Federation of Arab Republics was barely into its fi fth year when it was abolished in 1977. Th e Federation of Rhodesian lasted from 1953-1963. Th e story of other federations on the continent is no diff erent. As Osaghae notes, “federalism has


Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha266


failed to thrive and take fi rm roots in Africa and, on balance, does not appear to have dramatic positive eff ects in countries that have tried the federal solution”.1

Recent developments indicate that the federal idea that was never given a chance to develop and was ‘being strangled at birth’ is now re-entering the politi-cal and constitutional scene of several African countries. Th is short article aims at providing a preliminary balance sheet of the records of federalism from one particular angle, namely the management of ethnic diversity. It examines how African federations have responded to the ethnic diversity that characterizes their societies. In particular, it looks at how the territorial autonomy solution provided by these federations has helped to manage fault lines.

Th e article commences with the discussion of the brief historical narration of African federations and their attempts to deal with the anxieties of ethnic groups that were concerned about their status in post-colonial Africa. It then analyses the nature of politicized ethnicity in Africa and its demands on the (re)structur-ing of the state. Th e focus then shifts to the current federations that, in one way or another, deal with the management of ethnic diversity and examines how the territorial autonomy solution, implicit in these federations, have helped to deal with the challenges of ethnic diversity.

Federalism and ethnic diversity in post-colonial Africa: Detour through history

Not all federations established in Africa had as their objective the accommo-dation of ethnic diversity. Federations were established for many reasons. In fact, some of the federations that were established in the early days of post-colonial Africa were simply the creations of colonial powers or their extensions. Th e Fed-eration of Rhodesian was partly established to perpetuate white hegemony. As King (47) notes “[t]he character of the new federation of Rhodesian and Nyasaland was determined by the presence of (at their peak) three thousand white settlers, over three quarters of whom were in Southern Rhodesian, who ruled over seven million black Africans.”2 Similarly, some of the federations in Africa were created as the result of the decision of colonial powers to use federalism as “a formula for the unifi cation of territorial units of separate antecedents.”3 A prime example is Nigeria, which was established as a result of the decision to bring together, in 1914, “the

1. Eghosa Osaghae, “Federalism and the management of diversity in Africa,” in: Identity, culture and politics, vol. 5 Nos. 1&2 (2004): 162-178, 171.2. Tony King, “Partnership and paternalism: Th e federation of Rhodesian and Nyasaland (1953-1963),” in: Defunct federalisms: Critical perspectives on federal failure, eds. Kavalski, Emilian and Zolkos Magdalena (Hamp-shire: Ashgate, 2008), 47-59.3. Crawford Young, “Ethnic diversity and public policy: An overview,” in Ethnic diversity and public policy: A comparative enquiry, ed. Young Crawford (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, in association with UNRISD, 1998), 10.


Federalism, Territorial Autonomy and the Management of Ethnic Diversity in Africa 267


two contiguous British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria”. Eventually this led to the establishment of a three-region federal system in 1954.4 In other cases, the decision to federate was mainly motivated by the desire to benefi t from a large state. Administrative convenience and effi ciency were also some of the reasons behind the establishment of federations.

Yet, a number of federations or semi-federations in Africa were designed to respond to the multi-ethnic reality that characterizes many of these post-colonial states. Th e option of centralized versus decentralized states dominated the politi-cal discourse of African states beginning from the early days of independence. At the centre of this debate was the tension between the management of eth-nic diversity and the promotion of national unity. Political leaders considered a strong centralized state essential for the purpose of forging national unity. Th is was considered by many African governments to be their most pressing task, to eff ectively govern the newly born states. Th ey, as a result, turned a blind eye to the challenges associated with ethnic diversity. Building the nation was their main agenda. “In the heydays of independence, that began in Ghana in 1957”, notes Welsh, “accelerating in the 1960s ‘nation building’ was assumed to be the priority of all the newly emerging [African] states”.5 Th is was also clear from the public state-ment of the founding fathers of many of these African states:

Zambia’s President Kaunda said that ‘our aim has been to create genius nations from the sprawling artifacts the colonialist carved out’. Cameroons’ President Ahidjo sees the institution of the state as a means to achieve nationhood. For him, ‘L’intégration nationale c’est l’adaptation des citoyens aux diff érentes structures d’État’. Th e same is true of Senghor who writes, ‘Th e state is…primarily a means to achieve the nation’.6

At the centre of the nation-building project is the attempt to achieve a ho-mogenized society. Th is was so aptly stated by Deng who noted that “[u]nity was postulated in a way that assumes a mythical homogeneity amidst diversity.”7 Th e dec-laration of the post-colonial states as ‘indivisible and unitary’ is the major feature of many of the independence constitutions of African states.

Th is attempt at forging a national identity amidst huge diversity was carried out in the face of countervailing concern among some ethnic groups who desired a system that provides them with some space to manage their own aff airs without being vetoed by the dominant group. Th ey were concerned about their political

4. Rotimi Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,” in Ethnic federalism: Th e Ethiopian experience in a comparative perspective, ed. David Turton (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 65-89.5. David Welsh, “Ethnicity in sub-saharan Africa,” in: International Aff airs 72 (1996): 477-491, 477.6. Benyamin Neuberger, “State and nation in African thought,” in: Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 233-234, 235.7. Francis M. Deng “Ethnicity: An African predicament,” Th e Bookings Review 15 (3) (1997): 28-31.




status in the newly born states and feared or perceived domination by numeri-cally dominant groups. As a result, they demanded a system that devolves power and allows communities to exercise control over their own aff airs without inter-ference from the dominant group. In Kenya, for example, the small ethnic groups feared domination by the Kikyu-Luo alliance, the two largest ethnic groups in Kenya.8 Organized under the umbrella of the Kenya African Democratic Par-ty (KADU), one of the two major political parties in independent Kenya, they called for a “Majimbo Constitution”, the Kenyan term for a federalist constitution. Th ey pressed for a federal system of government to avoid what they perceived as Kikuyu dominance. Similarly, one of the issues that confronted Uganda was the status of the Buganda ethnic group, who, based on their proud imperial history related to the Baganda Kingdom, demanded for federo, the term Ugandans use to refer to subnational autonomy based on the principle of federalism.9 Th e situa-tion was similar in the DRC, where the federalists insisted on a constitution that provided for provincial autonomy.10

Eventually, the debate was resolved predominantly in favour of those that championed a centralized unitary state. But this was not without concessions that saw the inclusion of the federal idea in some of the independence constitu-tions. Kenya’s fi rst constitution was imbued with strong elements of ‘Majim-bo’. Th e country was divided into eight autonomous provinces each with their own parliaments that exercise constitutionally assigned powers and functions.11 Th e independence constitution of the war-torn Democratic Republic of Congo was explicitly federalist. It declared that the Republic “is composed of the city of Leopoldville and the autonomous provinces.” 12 Th e autonomy of the provinces was explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Another country that adopted an in-dependent constitution with federal features was Uganda. Th e federal states were established to accommodate the Buganda ethnic group. Under the independence constitution, Buganda enjoyed a special status while most of the rest of Uganda

8. Yash Ghai, “Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state,” in: Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2:2 (2008): 211-226.9. Osaghae, “Federalism and the management of diversity in Africa,”10. Jeremy Sarkin, 2001 “Towards fi nding a solution for the problems created by the politics of identity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Designing a constitutional framework for peaceful cooperation” in: Solomon, Hussein (ed.) “Politics of identity and exclusion in Africa: From violent confrontation to peaceful cooperation” available at http://www.kas.de/db_fi les/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_5094_2.pdf (67-81) (accessed on 15 February 2012)11. H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions without constitutionalism: Refl ections on an African political paradox,” in Constitutionalism and democracy: Transitions in the contemporary world, ed. D. Greenberg et al (New York, OUP, 1993), 65.12. Article 4 Constitution of the Congo (Leopoldville) of 30 May 1960.




was governed by the central government under a unitary arrangement.13 Buganda was allowed to retain the monarchy. It was administered by a directly elected par-liament and prime minister. It also maintained its own school system and own police force.14 Similarly, the Nigerian federation that was established following the amalgamation of colonial areas also adapted to responses to the challenges of ethnic diversity.15

As indicated earlier, these important concessions to the federal idea were, with the singular exception of Nigeria, short-lived. Th e move towards a centralized unitary state did not take long. In Kenya, it was only after one year into the new constitution that a decision was made to transform Kenya into a unitary state. Th e government refused to implement ‘devolution to provinces’; “[e]lections were never held and the provinces were reduced to administrative structure” within a cen-tralized state.16 Similarly, barely fi ve years passed when the national government of Uganda introduced a new constitution that brought an end to the special status of Buganda, transforming Uganda into a complete unitary state. Across the continent, a political claim based on ethnic identity was particularly regarded as an ‘enterprise’ that poses a threat to the fragile nation that the colonial pow-ers left behind; it was regarded as a recipe for state disintegration. Many went to the extent of outlawing or preventing the organization of political parties along ethnic lines.

As the detour through the history of federalism in Africa reveals, there was considerable clamour for a variant of federal arrangement that would help to preserve historical distinctiveness and protect small groups from the hegemony of large ethnic groups. As a result, important elements of federalism and subna-tional autonomy found their way into the independence constitution of several countries. However, the political commitment to these constitutional promises was glaringly absent. Th e clear consequence was the strangulation of federalism at birth in several African states. Large centralized states became the preferred mode of governance.

Politicized ethnicity and its implications on the restructuring of the state in Africa

However, a half-century of the centralization of power in African countries has not delivered political stability. In fact, it has provoked violent responses from

13. Joel Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” in On the fault line: Managing tensions and divisions within societies, eds. Greg Herbst, Jeff rey, McNamee, Terence and Mills (Profi le books: London, 2012), 150-169, 157.14. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 156.15. Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,”16. Brakan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 162.




diff erent political movements and groups. Th e proliferation of ethnic based liber-ation movements in many African states is often attributed to the coerced nation building project that employed a highly centralized state as its primary vehicle. But the failure of the central government to deliver political stability has not nec-essarily generated plenteous demand for federalism or subnational autonomy in one form or the other. Although ethnicity has and continues to play an important role in political mobilization in most African states, subnational autonomy is not necessarily the agenda of many of the political formations on the continent. Th is is partly because of the particular role that ethnicity has assumed in post-colonial Africa, which, to a large extent, dictated the nature of ethnic based claims that characterized African states. Th is is about the nature of nation-building projects with which most African states have been preoccupied with for the last half-a-century and the implication it holds for political mobilization.17

At one end of the spectrum are African countries that tried to build a nation through the development of common language, culture and history by attempt-ing to diff use the language and culture of the majority or dominant group. In Sudan, the decision to develop the identity of the state along the language and culture of the northern Muslim Arab Sudanese and impose that culture on the largely black and Christian South is a prototype of such form of nation-build-ing.18 Th e eff ort to build a nation in Ethiopia was largely characterized by the attempt to diff use the language, culture and history of the Amhara over the rest of the population.19 In Malawi, the attempt at building a common national identity was based on the elevation of the Chewa as the embodiment of the ‘national cul-ture’ (an ethnic group whose language was considered the sole national language). Th e Chewa culture was regarded as “the cornerstone of nationhood and source of its political iconography”.20 Similarly, the development of a nation modelled on the language and culture of the Tswana was the hallmark of the nation-building project that Botswana pursued. Based on the motto that “we are all Tswana”, the government sought to build a nation by diff using the language and culture of Tswana on the rest of the population. As Werbner notes, the policy “left virtually

17. For a detailed discussion, see Will Kymlicka, “National–building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and the West,” in Ethnicity and democracy in Africaeds. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka (Ath-ens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 54-72.18. Anna Rader, “Overcoming the past: War and peace in Sudan and south Sudan,” in multi-case review of the world’s most potent faultlines, eds. Herbst, Jeff rey, McNamee, Terence and Mills, Greg (2012), 45-68.19. Yonatan Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia (Surrey: Ashgate. 2010).20. D. Kaspin, “Tribes, regions, and nationalism in democratic Malawi,” in Ethnicity and group rights, eds. Shapiro, Ian and Kymlicka, Will (New York and London: New York University Press, 1997), 464-503, 483.




no space in the public sphere for the country’s many non-Tswana cultures, unless recast in a Tswana image”.21

Other African states, however, pursued the same objective of building a na-tion-state but based on non-ethnic premises. Th ey sought to build a common national identity not by attempting to homogenize their population along the language and culture of a particular ethnic group but by appealing to non-ethnic bases for identifi cation with the state. Based on their motto ‘kill the tribe to build the nation’ (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo), they declared a commitment to build a “common national identity,… developing common public institutions and a common public sphere operating in a common language”,22 which was the culturally neutral colonial language (i.e. English, French or Portuguese). Th e end result was not substantially diff erent.

Although the language and culture of a particular ethnic group was not used as a vehicle to develop a common national identity, the nation-building project in many of these African states did not succeed in developing a common national identity on a supra-ethnic basis. Many of these African states often ended up cre-ating a state in which a particular group enjoyed a privileged position vis à vis the rest. Th e policy of successive regimes using state resources to advantage members of their ethnic group meant that “access to state power is ethnifi ed”.23 In Kenya, the hegemony of the Kikuyu was established under Jomo Kenyatta, the fi rst president of independent Kenya. When Daniel Arap Moi became president, it was Kalen-jin’s ‘time to eat.’ Moi ensured that the key cabinet, the civil service and the army positions were controlled by Kalenjins, particularly marginalizing the Kikuyus. Th e ethnifi cation of the state continued with the return of the Kikuyu hegemony when Kenya embarked on a multiparty system while Mwai Kibaki, a Kikyuyu, became President.24 Th e dominance of the Chewa in Banda Hasting’s 30 year rule of Malawi, the Muslim Arabs in Sudan, the Hutus and the Tutsi in the pre-1994 Rwanda and Burundi respectively is well documented. Th e political history of most African states is drawn from the same book.25

Although both attempts at building a nation have been less than successful and ended up creating a state which is identifi ed with a particular ethnic group, the grievances they created and the political movements that ensued are not nec-

21. R. Werbner, “Introduction: Challenging minorities, diff erence and tribal citizenship in Botswana” in Jour-nal of Southern African studies, 28(4) (2002): 676.22. Kymlicka, “National–building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and the West,”23. Ibid.24. For more on ethnicity and Kenya see: Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,”25. Th e clearest exception might be Tanzania where, in so far as mainland Tanzania is concerned, ethnicity has not emerged as a major political divide. As a result, access to state power is not ‘ethnifi ed’ and political mobiliza-tion does not follow ethnic lines.




essarily the same. Ethnic groups that are threatened by the fi rst form of nation building have engaged in ethnic-based nationalist movements that sought to re-verse the policy of population homogenization. At the centre of their struggle is a claim for the recognition of their language and culture and an attempt to redefi ne the identity of the state. In their eff ort to advance their version of nationalism (i.e. minority nationalism) and thereby counter the state-led hegemonic nationalism, they sought not only a subnational unit in which they are in the majority but also a subnational unit that has the power to exercise control over its own resources and identity-related matters like language, culture and education. Exercising con-trol over language policy, curriculum in schools and maintaining monopolies over broadcasting agencies “[has] been crucial to nation-building strategies”.26 In short, the claim for subnational autonomy is at the centre of their political con-testations.

Th at is not, however, necessarily the case in many African states that attempt-ed to build a common national identity on a supra-ethnic/non-ethnic basis but nevertheless failed to do so as the nexus of ethnicity and state power remains fi rmly entrenched. Here, the claim is not for cultural or political autonomy but access to state power. Th ey would demand the removal of hurdles to access state power, decrying the status quo in which “some ethnic groups will have much bet-ter access routes to the state, while other ethnic groups are excluded.”27 Th e following observation about the Democratic Republic of Congo captures the political sen-timents that exist in many of these African states:

“Th e Congolese do not typically complain about their integration in the nation. What feeds their grievances is the largely shared impression that their fellow Congolese cheat them and favour their kinsmen at the local level, and that they need to rely on similar solidarities to reach their own goals of safety and well-being. Th is is what the Congolese refer to as tribalism.”28

Federalism, with its emphasis on subnational autonomy, is not necessarily appealing for this group of political contenders. Th e institutional response that such groups clamour for is a system that ensures representation of the diff erent groups at the national level, thereby, guaranteeing a share of state power. Th eir major goal is securing a power sharing deal; the focus is primarily on shared rule rather than self-rule.

26. Norman Wayne, Negotiating nationalism: Nation-building, federalism and secession in the multinational state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10.27. Kymlicka refers to these groups as communal contenders as opposed to ethnonationalists: Kymlicka, “Na-tional –building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and the West,”28. Pierre Englebert “Th e Democratic Republic of Congo: Fault lines and local fi ssures,” in On the fault line: managing tensions and divisions within societies, Profi le eds. Jeff rey Herbst, Terence McNamee and Greg Mills (books: London 2012), 33-45, 36




Of course, this is not to suggest that subnational autonomy does not placate politically mobilized ethnic groups. Subnational autonomy by defi nition multi-plies access to political and economic power. By providing ethnic groups a region in which they are a majority, it facilitates opportunities for political participation and representation. It provides ethnic/regional elites with the means for political participation and representation in the leadership structures of their respective subnational governments, promoting the self-management of communities. Th e conspicuous absence of federalism and subnational autonomy on the agenda of many political movements in Africa is thus not necessarily linked to the inability of the system to address the concerns of these political communities. It is rather the nature of the nation-building project that was advanced by many states in Africa that might explain the dampened interest in federalism and territorial au-tonomy.

A new era of federalism in Africa?

Although not necessarily the case with most African states, the reality of dis-gruntled ethnic groups and political violence, spilling over, in many cases, into intractable armed confl icts, has forced the restructuring of the state and, more specifi cally, the introduction of subnational autonomy on the political agenda of several African states. Th is is particularly true in states that are characterized by ethnic stratifi cation and hierarchy in which a particular group, as a result of a nation-building project that sought to impose the language and culture of a particular ethnic group over the rest of the population, occupies a unique and relatively privileged position vis-à-vis the rest. Many of these states have faced and continue to face ethnic groups that wage collective action demanding greater autonomy. Many of these African states, albeit begrudgingly, have now adopted constitutions that envisage the transfer of power to smaller subnational units.

In fact, history, it seems, is repeating itself. As one author has put it, “as an idea that was universally rejected in the 1960s through to the early 1990s across Africa”, federalism is now, “an idea whose time has come in several countries”.29 It is those same states that, in the early days of independence, conceded to the inclusion of the federal idea in their constitutions only to quickly abandon it, that are now jumping onto the federalist bandwagon. Th ese states do not neces-sarily recognize themselves as federal states. In fact, a common feature of African states deciding to introduce subnational autonomy is the reluctance to explicitly recognize that they have adopted some form of federalism. Federalism is regarded as the ‘F’ word and it is carefully avoided.

29. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 168.




Th e use of the term “federalism” to designate the state was a major point of contention in the making of the 1996 South African constitution. Th e system of government that South Africa has adopted has important elements of federalism. With its three levels, or to use the South African term ‘spheres’, of government, each with devolved powers and functions exercised and implemented by a di-rectly elected parliament and executive respectively, and a second chamber that brings the provinces into the national decision-making process,30 the inclusion of South Africa among the ranks of federations, as contemporary literature on federalism does, should not come as any surprise. Despite this, the South Afri-can constitution and the authorities in that country have deliberately avoided the use of the “F” word. Even the new constitution of Kenya is content with describing its political system as one of devolution. Th is is despite the fact that the constitution provides for the establishment of directly elected subnational units, which enjoy some level of autonomy by exercising assigned powers, and a second chamber that is representative of its subnational units.31 Similarly, the 2005 constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo bears the hallmarks of a federation. It provides for the establishment of 25 autonomous provinces that are independently elected and whose constitutionally assigned powers can only be amended with their consent. More importantly, the provinces, which are brought into the national decision-making process through their representation in the Senate and the Conference of Governors, have the power to retain 40 percent of the tax revenue they generate.32 But nowhere in the Constitution would one fi nd the term “federalism”.

Generally, the reluctance to use the term federalism can be partly explained by deep misgivings about federalism, more specifi cally by the tainted image and history of federalism in many of these countries. In Kenya, the debate on feder-alism, as indicated earlier, can be traced back to the early days of independence when political groups, claiming to represent the smaller ethnic groups in Kenya, agitated for “Majboism”. Many Kenyana associate “Majboism” with the division of people along tribal lines and the disintegration of the country.33 Opponents turned “majimboism into a slur: [and] majimboists were derided as [antinationalist] tribalists who opposed the broader goals of nationalism”.34 In South Africa, feder-alism is associated with the “bantustanisation” of South Africa, a policy of the apartheid government that divided the black population along ethnic lines and sought to expel them from the physical and political terrain of South Africa and

30. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.31. Constitution of Kenya, 201032. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 200533. Yash Ghai, “Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state,”34. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions without constitutionalism: Refl ections on an African political paradox,”




establish white South Africa for white South Africans. Th e same is true with the DRC. As one author put it, “[c]onstitutionally, the DRC has had an ambivalent relationship with federalism”.35 Th e secessionist movements and the civil war that the DRC experienced in the early days of its independence have contributed to the controversial history of federalism in that country.

From the foregoing, the position in Africa, it seems, is that states should worry little about the designation of the state. As the drafters of the South African constitution have done, the focus should be on an appropriate system of consti-tutional government that provides for “good and eff ective government”36 and not on the formal description of the state. In any case, these decisions are attributed to the deep suspicion with which federalism is viewed in many of these African states; a view that regards federalism as a poor device to manage fault lines and a recipe for state disintegration. Th e only country in Africa, with the exception of Africa’s longest run federal experiment, Nigeria, that boldly declares itself as a fed-eral republic, is Ethiopia. Th e opening article of the 1995 Constitution of Ethio-pia declares the establishment of “Th e Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.”

Despite the reluctance to extend a formal recognition, the use of autono-mous or semi-autonomous subnational units in a federal or semi-federal frame for managing internal confl icts, forms an important part of the institutional re-sponse that several African states have adopted to deal with the challenges of eth-nic diversity. Th is involves providing autonomy in the form of subnational units (referred to as provinces in South Africa and the DRC, states in Nigeria, counties in Kenya and regions in Ethiopia) to a geographically concentrated ethnic group. A prime example of this approach is the Ethiopian federation. Th e Ethiopian federal experiment, which was launched almost two decades ago, is primarily designed to accommodate the country’s ethnic diversity.37 Th is is evident in the territorial organization of the Ethiopian federation. Th e federation is divided into nine regions that are, by and large, demarcated along linguistic lines. More than two thirds of the people that live in fi ve of the nine regions belong to a single eth-nic group. Each of these states is also designated after the name of the dominant ethnic group in each state, marking the explicit construction and designation of each regional state as the homelands of a single ethno-linguistic group. With the view to accommodate its 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria has also employed the ‘terri-torial autonomy solution’. Borrowing the words of Elaigwu, “over the years, states and local governments were created as a means of minimizing the majority-minority

35. See Th omas Turner, “Congo-Kinshasa leans towards federalism,” Federations Magazine vol. 7(1) (2007).36. C. Murray, “Republic of South Africa,” in Legislative, executive and judicial governance in federal countries: Global dialogues on federalism, ed. K. Le Roy and C. Saunders (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens Univer-sity Press, Vol. 3, 2006), 259-288, 263.37. For more see: Yonatan Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethio-pia (Surrey: Ashgate. 2010).




confl icts”.38 During negotiations in the 1990s for a democratic South Africa, both conservative Afrikaners and Zulu nationalists pressed for a federal structure in the hope that they would gain control of some of the provinces. South Africa’s 1996 Constitution, with its federal arrangement and nine provinces, has made important, albeit implicit, concessions to this objective. Th e same goes for the quasi-federal constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Th e increase of the number of provinces from eleven to twenty-fi ve is designed to increase the “opportunities for the local management of fault lines”.39 Kenya’s new constitution provides for a devolved system of government that is based on the establishment of forty-seven county level governments.40

Th e lesson from African experience has been that when a state fails to read-ily acknowledge and accommodate its ethnic diversity, through federalism or other such arrangements, this generally leads to increased tensions among ethnic groups. Failure to address the concerns of such communities can also lead to a devastating result for the territorial integrity of the state. Th e case of Sudan il-lustrates this very well where a failure to accommodate the claims of disgruntled communities eventually resulted in border changes. But the mere adoption of federal or similar arrangements does not signify an eff ective accommodation to ethnic diversity. Th e success of subnational autonomy arrangements in address-ing ethnic divisions is not guaranteed. Success depends, among other things, on the particular nature of the federal design. Th e question is then whether the fed-eral design that African states have adopted is appropriate to deal with the exigen-cies of ethnic diversity.

At the centre of this debate is the territorial defi nition of federal subunits, one of the important issues that have emerged with the reintroduction of federalism in Africa. Th e focus is on how the territorial design of the federation can be used to regulate the challenges of ethnic diversity. More specifi cally, the question is to what extent subnational units should ethnically be defi ned. Th is is an important variable in designing a federal solution that helps to respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity while at the same time avoiding the danger of further entrench-ing and deepening those same divisions.

Th e territorial defi nition of federal sub-units

In Africa, one federation that has explicitly defi ned its subnational units in terms of ethnicity is Ethiopia. Ethnicity is the basis for the organization of the

38. J. Iswa Elaigwu, “Nigeria: Th e decentralization debate in Nigeria’s federation,” in Th e Federal idea: Essays in honour of Ronald L. Watts, ed. Th omas J. Courchene, John R. Allan, Christian Leuprecht and Nadia Verrelli (Institute of Intergovernmental Relations: Kingston, Ontario, 2011), 429-444, 440.39. Pierre Englebert “Th e Democratic Republic of Congo: Fault lines and local fi ssures,” 4340. Th e Constitution of Kenya, 2010




Ethiopian federation. Th e use of ethnic based territorial autonomy to address ethnic divisions in that country has had a mixed report card. Th e federal experi-ment has contributed to the extended participation of minorities in the political system. Notwithstanding the claim about “true representation or authentic repre-sentatives” and the dominance of a single party, the system has turned “obscure dis-tricts” into important units of government with signifi cant local empowerment.41 In contrast to the selective cooptation of the previous regimes, the federal govern-ment has also become more diversifi ed than ever in terms of ethnic composition as all subnational administrations are occupied by locals.

Th e constitutional decision to provide a mother state to each ethnic group and to do so by making ethnic groups dominant in a regional state is not, how-ever, without its problems. In as much as the federal response has facilitated the recognition of ethnic diversity and responded to ethnic claims, it has elevated ethnic identity to a primary political identity. Th is has, in turn, facilitated iden-tity fragmentation along ethno-linguistic lines.42 Th is has been observed, for ex-ample, in the proliferation of ethnic-based parties or movements. Although one may be tempted to dismiss the proliferation of ethnic-based parties as the work of the ruling party, there is enough evidence to show that the opposition is also fragmented along ethnic lines. Related to the proliferation of ethnic-based par-ties is the translation of cultural communities into political communities. Ethnic identities that, in the past, had a mere cultural status are increasingly turning into politically relevant entities. Th is is evident, among other things, in the relentless demand for recognition, autonomy and representation by many ethnic groups, which is especially visible in some of the ethnically plural regional states where ethnic groups of all sizes have demanded some form of recognition and territorial autonomy.43 Th e tendency of fragmentation in other socio-economic institutions along ethnic lines cannot be easily discounted either.

Th e unremitting demands of ethnic groups of all sizes to be incorporated or transferred into one or another regional unit is another indication of the fragmen-tation of the population along ethno-linguistic lines. Many small ethnic groups that have been demarcated into one region have demanded to be incorporated into another. Of course, there is nothing unusual in communities demanding transfers from one regional state to another. Th e phenomenon of communities demanding or even refusing transfers to another subnational unit is not unique to Ethiopia. Very recently, residents of some communities in South Africa, for example, protested the government’s decisions to transfer their municipalities to

41. Feyissa Dereje, “Th e experience of Gambella Regional state,” in Ethnic federalism: Th e Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective, ed. D. Turton (Athens: Ohio University Press 2006), 208-230.42. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia.43. See S. Vaughan, “Responses to ethnic federalism in Ethiopias southern region,” in Ethnic federalism: Th e Ethiopian experience in comparative experience ed. D. Turton (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006) 181-207.




other provinces.44 Th e diff erence lies in the reasons behind these demands and protests. In South Africa, residents of the Matatiele community protested their incorporation into the Eastern Cape from KwaZulu-Natal because of the percep-tion that KwaZulu-Natal off ers better services than the Eastern Cape. In contrast, the demand of communities in Ethiopia to be transferred to one or another re-gional state is not motivated by concerns related to service delivery but by issues of identity and belongingness. Members of some communities do not feel that they belong to the regional state they have been demarcated into. Th is is another consequence of the geographical logic of the federation, which is inherent in the decision of the Constitution to explicitly construct and designate regional states as belonging to particular ethnic groups, leaving the rest with a feeling of being outsiders.

Th e Ethiopian experience seems to suggest that the same approach towards the territorial defi nition of subnational units that provides ethnic groups with self-management has the potential to strain inter-ethnic relations by reifying the political dimension of ethnic identity. It particularly invokes the question whether the imperatives of accommodating ethnic diversity requires the state to demarcate each, or at least the major, ethnic group into one subnational unit. Africa’s longest running federal experiment, Nigeria, seems to provide a diff erent alternative in terms of the territorial defi nition of federal subnational units.

As indicated earlier, the Nigerian federation was initially structured along the fault lines of the three major ethnic groups. Confronted with the problem of providing a mother state to each large ethnic group, Nigeria has continuously adjusted its internal boundaries. Initially, the original geographical confi guration of the federation was abandoned and replaced with twelve state structures in 1967. Since then the number of states has increased continuously. Currently, the number of states in Nigeria stands at 36. An important component of this transformation is that the repeated readjustment of the federation from three to the present 36 states involved the use of “the federal structure to fragment, cross-cut and sublimate the identities of each of the [three] major ethnic groups”.45 Th e con-tinuous adjustment of internal boundaries brought about and buttressed historic intra-ethnic divides within each of the three large ethnic groups. Although the reconfi guration has not totally taken away the use of ethnicity as a basis for po-litical mobilization in the pursuit of power and resources, it has, by demarcating each large ethnic group into a number of states, created intra-ethnic mobilization and competition. As a result, “there have been confl icts between otherwise ethni-cally homogenous major sub-ethnic states over the sharing of the assets of subdivided regional or state units, over revenue allocation and over the employment in state-level

44. Yonatan T. Fessha “SA’s mazy route through the province of ethnicity,” Business Day: (12-06-2007).45. Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,”




bureaucracies of so-called ‘non-indigenes’—that is Nigerian resident in states other than their own”.46

Th e new constitution of Kenya seems to follow a similar approach. Th e boundaries of the 47 counties, more or less, mimic the colonial districts that were, to a large extent, demarcated along ethnic lines. By way of emphasizing the ethnic basis of the counties, one author laments that “[t]he suggested 47 counties are not much diff erent from the Masai country [and] Akamba country design un-der the colonial administration.”47 Th e territorial arrangement does not, however, demarcate each large ethnic group into one specifi c county.48 It rather divides numerically large ethnic group into a number of counties. Smaller ethnic com-munities, on the other hand, are given autonomy and greater political voice as they control counties in which they are in a majority.

South Africa has accommodated ethnic diversity without even making ethnic-ity an explicit basis for the organization of the state. South Africa’s nine provinces, although not explicitly, contribute to the management of ethnic diversity. Th is partly has to do with the fact that the majority of the ethnic groups in South Africa have a province in which they are in the majority.49 A clear concentration of particular ethnic groups in the majority of these provinces means that most ethnic communities are provided with the means for political participation and representation in the leadership structure of their respective provinces. Th e fact that the Constitution allows each province to choose its offi cial language(s) fur-ther facilitates the management of its own aff airs by the provincially dominant ethnic groups. Th e decision to accommodate ethnic diversity without explicitly articulating the defi nition of the territorial units in ethnic terms seems to have helped the country avoid conditions that make ethnicity a single rallying point of political competition and cooperation.

Th e foregoing attests to the widely established thesis that emphasizes the in-terplay between institutional design and political behaviour; that the institutional structure of the state and, more specifi cally, in our case, the territorial design of the state, goes a long way in determining the salient identities that become a basis for political mobilization. Th e experience of African federations suggest

46. Rotimi T. Suberu,, “Nigeria,” in Diversity and unity in federal countries: Global dialogue on federalism Vol. 7 eds. Luis Moreno and Cesar Colino (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010), 227-258. 233.Suberu attributes the success of the Nigerian federation in avoiding large scale ethnic confl icts, that engulfed the federation in its early years, to the transformation of Nigeria “from a federation of three major ethnic regions to a union of multiple, smaller constituent units,” (Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,” 228).47. O. Steve Akoth, “Challenges of nationhood: identities, citizenship and belonging under Kenya’s new consti-tution,” Society for International Development (SID) Constitution Working Paper (2011): 15.48. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 169.49. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia, 113.




that demarcating each large ethnic group into one specifi c subnational unit can radicalize ethnic allegiance, contribute to the ethnicisation of the system, cause continuous tension and place a strain on inter-ethnic relations. On the other hand, dividing numerically large ethnic groups into a number of constituent units without denying them territorial autonomy might have the consequence of promoting competitive or cooperative relations that do not reproduce a country’s ethnic fault lines.50 In other words, it might contribute to the development of “a more ‘civil’ and ‘gentle’ politics” as opposed to the emotionally charged ethnic politics that can often spiral into violent confrontation.51

Minorities within minorities

In as much as territorial autonomy, defi ned in exclusive ethnic terms or other-wise, provides an opportunity to locally manage fault lines, it is not a panacea to the multi-ethnic challenge. As the experience of Ethiopia and Nigeria illustrates, the territorial structure of federalism might help to avoid large scale ethnic con-fl icts but the practical impossibility of creating an ethnically pure subnational unit brings new tension: the majority-minority tension at the level of the constit-uent units. Th is is the case, for example, in Ethiopia where the ethnic groups that are numerically dominant at the subnational level consider themselves “owners” of their respective subnational units. People that do not belong to the regionally empowered group “have practically no rights or political voice”.52 Th is is despite the fact that these individuals account for a signifi cant segment of the regional population. For example, in one of the regions, the number of such individuals reaches close to three million.53

Th e Nigerian federation is also strained by a similar challenge. Th e attempt to accommodate ethnic diversity through territorial autonomy in the form of subnational units has “created new majorities and new minorities at the subnational level” in the form of indigenes and non-indigenes. Discrimination against “non-indigenes” is commonplace in almost all states of Nigeria.54 Despite the provision of the Constitution that protects the rights of every Nigerian “to settle down any-where in the country to pursue their legitimate businesses and [enjoy] equal rights eve-rywhere”, Elaigwu notes, “[m]any states and communities recognize their indigenous

50. Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,”51. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 168.52. Assefa Fiseha and Mohammed Habib, “Ethiopia,” in a global dialogue on federalism, VII. eds Moreno and Collino, 2010.Suberu, “Nigeria,”139-167, 154.53. Confl icts between regionally empowered group and internal minorities have led to devastating resulting, including the loss of life and destruction of property, see: Assefa and Mohammed, “Ethiopia,” in a global dia-logue on federalism, 2010.54. Suberu, “Nigeria,” 235.




groups and can easily isolate settlers, and treat them as such, no matter how long they have lived in the area”.55 As is the case in Ethiopia, discrimination against non-indigenes has created a sense of exclusion amongst the latter, relegating millions of individuals to second-class citizens in their own country.56

In both Ethiopia and Nigeria, the exclusionary policies of subnational units seem to have their root in federal policies and laws that make belonging to an ethnic group or, as in the case of Nigeria, being an indigene to a subnational unit, an important political consideration. Th e Ethiopian Constitution, as indicated earlier, designates most of the regions as belonging to a specifi c ethnic group, creating the feeling of ownership amongst individuals that belong to the region-ally dominant group and a sense of exclusion amongst those that have ostensibly originated from other parts of the country (i.e. internal migrants). Similarly, the Nigerian Constitution, based on its constitutional principle of “the federal charac-ter”, uses the criteria of “indigeness” in providing representation in the institutions of the federal government.

Th e experiences of the two federations suggest that a federal arrangement that does not accommodate those who do not belong to the empowered regional majority is likely to be subjected to perennial stress and is less likely to succeed in managing ethnic diversity. Th is particular experience of African federations also highlights one of the conditions that continue to threaten the federal experiment in Africa, namely the lack of consensus on liberal democratic values. One of the reasons for the success of federations in the west is the widespread consensus on liberal democratic values. As Kymlicka notes, most western federations are not afraid that national minorities will use their power to “persecute, dispossess, expel or kill anyone who does not belong to the minority group”.57 In the absence of consensus and respect for liberal democratic values, the precarious federal experi-ments in Africa will continue to pose a grave threat to the fundamental rights of individuals and to the political stability of the state.

Th e imperatives of developing consensus and respect for liberal democratic values becomes more evident when one notes that the territorial approach to subnational autonomy may not necessarily respond to the concerns of all ethnic groups. Th is basically relates to the fact that the territorial concentration of ethnic groups is a precondition for the extension of subnational autonomy towards a particular group. To a group that is not geographically concentrated, the territo-rial solution that federalism provides is less appealing. Th e territorial arrangement in South Africa that, albeit indirectly, gives ethnic groups political space at the subnational level, does not cater for Afrikaners who are dispersed throughout the

55. Elaigwu, “Nigeria: Th e decentralization debate in Nigeria’s federation,” 440.56. Suberu, “Nigeria,” 23557. Kymlicka, “National–building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and the West,”




country. Th is would require the state to look for innovative ways of addressing the anxieties of groups that cannot benefi t from a territorial solution. However, at a minimum, it requires strict enforcement of liberal values in the form of fun-damental individual rights.

Th e question of secession

Although the provision of territorial autonomy has gone a long way in manag-ing the challenges of ethnic diversity and preventing large scale ethnic confl icts, a clamour for secession continues to exist in some of these federations. Th is is especially true in Ethiopia and Nigeria although the DRC is also not immune to secessionist outbursts. In Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a lib-eration movement that claims to represent the Oromo (largest ethnic group in Ethiopia), continues to engage in armed movement having the establishment of an independent state for the Oromo as its major objective. Th e Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is another armed organization that fi ghts to secure the establishment of a separate country for the Somali ethnic community, the third largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. In Nigeria, political movements that have creat-ed secessionist projects include the Movement for the Actualization of the Sover-eign State of Biafra (MASSOB).58 Th e aim of this largely peaceful (non-militant) movement is to revive and actualize the attempted secession of the predominantly Ibo state of Biafra between 1967-70. Secessionist sentiments are also evident in the militant MEND, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, which espouses, albeit in a less offi cial manner, the “creation of an independent Ijaw nation-state”. Now and then, the partition of the DRC is also touted as an option for the achievement of a meaningful peace in that country. Very recently, the government of the DRC has reported that it has foiled a secession plot by the mineral-rich Katanga province,59 the same province that attempted to secede from the DRC in the 1960s before it was crushed in a bloody civil war.

As argued elsewhere, there is no guarantee that secession will help to achieve the desired objective of peace and security. Secession might be regarded as a viable means of managing ethnic confl icts when the partition results in two ethnically macrocosmic states. Given the impractical reality of creating political boundaries that neatly match ethnic boundaries, changes in boundaries, through partition, might only transfer the locus of ethnic confl icts and might even give rise to new ethnic confl icts. As the experience of the newly born South Sudan indicates, there is no guarantee that partition will not “activate and energize new fault lines”.60

58. Suberu, “Nigeria,”59. IRIN 2012, DRC: Secession plot failed, government offi cial says available at<http://www.irinnews.orgprintreport.aspx?reportid=54392> accessed on 27 February 201260. Rader, “Overcoming the past: War and peace in Sudan and south Sudan,” 45




Secession might also create micro-states that are too small to be regarded as states that are economically viable. Add to this the prescription of secession as an in-stitutional solution which might “give rise to [a] protracted border crisis in coun-tries like Nigeria, which alone contains more than 250 ethnic groups”.61 Although it has not prevented the secession and creation of new states like South Sudan and Eritrea, the Organisation of African Unity’s principle of upholding colonial boundaries also means that the creation of new states through secession is not an option that receives recognition easily. A case in point is the African Union’s snub of Somaliland’s quest for formal recognition of its independence after it severed its ties from what was once the Somali Democratic Republic (with which it was voluntarily united in 1966) and established a promising move towards democ-racy and rule of law.

It is also important to note that Ethiopia’s constitution is the only one on the continent that explicitly recognizes the right to secession. Article 39 of the Con-stitution provides each ethnic group the right to secede from a federation provid-ed that it has shown a proven support as required by the Constitution. Certainly, as indicated above, enshrining in a constitution the right of a constituent unit to secede is fraught with pitfalls. But it must also be acknowledged that sometimes there may not be much choice if instability or even civil war is to be avoided. In Ethiopia, the political forces at play during the transition from military rule to a federal arrangement would not have settled for anything less than entrenching the right of secession in the constitution. Not acceding to that demand could well have jeopardized a peaceful transition.62

Conclusion

Th e history of federalism in Africa is a history of ambivalence. In the run up to independence, numerically small ethnic groups and those with historical distinc-tiveness saw federalism as a bulwark against the domination of large groups or the loss of privileged status. It was an idea that galvanized many political movements that, following the retreat of colonial powers, emerged to represent the interest of these small and historically distinctive ethnic groups. But it was also an idea that was subsequently rejected by those that wield state power and thrown into historical dustbins. In the last decade or so, however, we have witnessed the rise of federalism from the dustbin of African political history.

Th e increased and renewed interest in federal arrangements that Africa has experienced in the last two decades or so, provides for a new opportunity to

61. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia, 113.62. Alem Habtu, “Multi-ethnic federalism in Ethiopia: A study of the secession clause in the Constitution,” in Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 35(2) (2005): 313-337.




engage in innovative federal experiments that could go a long way in address-ing the concerns of disgruntled ethnic communities. Th is article has shown that African states should worry about the territorial defi nition of subnational units. Th e same approach of territorial autonomy that helps to manage ethnic fault lines might further entrench and exacerbate those same societal divisions it is designed to manage. Th e experience of African federations, particularly Nigeria and South Africa, suggest that states can respond to the challenges of ethnic di-versity without institutionalizing ethnic divisions. But equally important to the territorial design is the political commitment to the rule of law and fundamental human rights. Th e fi rst is crucial in ensuring the realization of the promises of federalism while the second helps to avoid political instability and promote social cohesion. If constitutional rules are breached at will and the fundamental rights of individuals that belong to minorities are violated with impunity, the federal experiment is less likely to succeed.

Finally, the process that leads to the launching of a federal experiment is also crucial in the success of a federation. One of the major challenges of the Ethiopi-an federal experiment is legitimacy as the centralists continue to paint the experi-ment as a recipe for disintegration. Th is perhaps has to do with the fact that there is nothing in the federal design that represents a concession to the demands of those that were concerned about the threat to national unity. Th e federal design “does not provide equal recognition to the competing centripetal and centrifugal forces whose struggle for a place in the public spheres continues to defi ne the political realities of the Ethiopian state and society”.63 Th is, in fact, is what distinguishes the Ethio-pian system from the South African institutional response, which is the outcome of a negotiated outcome. Th e negotiated nature of the South African constitution has led stakeholders and politicians alike to consider the constitution, not only as “basic law, or a higher law,” but “our law”. Th e fi nal outcome provides suffi -cient recognition to the competing centripetal and centrifugal forces that, at the moment of constitution-making, represented the opposing political formations. Process is, therefore, equally important in ensuring that the federal design that a country chooses mirrors its political realities and is therefore acceptable by the major contenders of power.

AbstractThe history of federalism in Africa is a history of ambivalence. In the run up to independence, federalism

was an idea that galvanized several political movements that, following the retreat of colonial powers, emerged to represent the interest of ethnic groups that were anxious about their political status in post colonial Africa. But it was also an idea that was subsequently rejected by those that wield state power and thrown into historical dustbins. Recent developments indicate that the federal idea that was never given a chance to develop and was being strangled at birth is now re-entering the constitutional scene of several African countries. This short article examines how African federations have responded to the ethnic di-

63. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia.




versity that characterizes their societies. In particular, it examines how the territorial autonomy solution, implicit in these federations, have helped to deal with the challenges of ethnic diversity.

RésuméL’histoire du fédéralisme en Afrique est une histoire d’ambivalence. Dans la course à l’indépendance,

le fédéralisme fut une idée qui galvanisa de nombreux mouvements politiques qui, après le retrait des autorités coloniales, étaient apparus pour représenter les intérêts des groupes ethniques inquiets de leur statut politique dans l’Afrique postcoloniale. Cependant, ce fut également une idée ensuite rejetée par tous ceux qui exercèrent le pouvoir étatique, qui la jetèrent dans les poubelles de l’histoire. Les évolutions récentes indiquent l’idée fédérale, à qui l’on n’avait jamais laissé une chance de se développer et qui fut étranglée dès la naissance, revient aujourd’hui sur la scène constitutionnelle de plusieurs pays africains. Cet article étudie comment les fédérations africaines ont répondu à la diversité ethnique qui caractérise leurs sociétés. Il s’intéresse tout particulièrement à savoir comment la solution d’une autonomie territo-riale, implicite dans ces fédérations, a aidé à gérer les défi s de la diversité ethnique.




Specifi c Policies

Politiques spécifi ques



Environmental Protection in the EU Member States: Changing Institutional Scenarios and Trends

Mariachiara Alberton

Dr. Mariachiara Alberton, Senior Researcher in Environmental Law, EURAC, Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism, Bolzano.Th e present article is based on M. Alberton, F. Palermo, (Eds.), Environmental Protection in Multi-Layered Systems. Comparative Lessons from the Water Sector, Brill, forthcoming.

1. Background and changing scenarios for environmental protection in the EU and EU Member States

Th e environmental challenges that the EU and EU Member States’ (MS) policy-makers and legislators confront have changed considerably over the last decades. New and dramatic environmental problems have arisen, the public fa-vour accorded to the ecosystem has increased, roles and capacities of institutional actors have been reconfi gured and the infl uence of opposing global and local instances, have become stronger.

EU environmental policy and law dates back to the beginning of the 1970s, when major policy guidelines were elaborated and legislation was enacted. Th ese developments were preceded by a series of environmental disasters along with considerable environmental activism in the late 1960s, all of which played a role in pushing politicians and legislators to act.

Th e fi rst signifi cant EU political statement on environmental issues was the Commission’s communication on a Community environmental policy,1 adopted in 1971, on the basis of which the Member States reached a political agreement

1. Commission, SEC (71) 2616 of 22 July 1971.


Mariachiara Alberton290


on the guiding principles of a Community environmental policy in 1972.2 Th e fi rst legally binding instruments were adopted in 1975 and concerned water and waste law.3

Among the EU MS, Germany had been widely considered during the 1970s and 1980s as a leader in environmental policy, pushing the EU legislator to adopt environmental measures and pull other EU countries toward the same direction.

During that period, a popular approach called ‘command and control’, ex-isted in legislation designed to prohibit or restrict environmentally harmful ac-tivities by establishing an environmental target by limiting emissions of pollution into the water or air, and imposing penalties if this target was not met. Permits and licences were the favoured instruments to tackle environmental pollution and this approach succeeded in achieving some signifi cant results in halting some forms of environmental degradation.

Nevertheless, by the 1980s this approach started to become widely criticised for being infl exible and excessively costly for business. Direct regulation was fall-ing into disfavour as a consequence of broader shifts in the political and ideo-logical perspectives.4 Th ere had been a turn towards neo-liberalism and the MS governments experienced considerable pressure from industry to reduce the eco-nomic burden of complying with environmental legislation.

Against this changing political scenario, environmental problems did not cease and were perceived by the public as becoming more serious, thus EU pol-icy-makers started to introduce a set of less intrusive regulatory interventions, shifting towards economic instruments. Fiscal instruments including environ-mental taxes, charges and subsidies, and quantity instruments, such as tradeable permit schemes, were employed in many sectors as waste and water management, air pollution control and energy. Increasingly popular were a variety of voluntary initiatives, such as self-regulation, voluntary codes, environmental charters, co-regulation and negotiated environmental agreements. Th ese new tools were per-ceived to be far more effi cient than command and control regulation and capable of providing industry with the fl exibility and autonomy needed to cope with an open and competitive market.

However, by the late 1990s it was clear that the adoption of market based in-struments resulted in higher administrative costs and in any case were employed

2. On the genesis and development of Community environmental law see: L. Krämer, EU environmental law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 2011).3. Among others: Dir. 75/442 on waste; Dir. 75/440 on surface water.4. See: N. Gunningham, “Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures,” Journal of Environmental Law, 21: 2, (2009).


Environmental Protection in the EU Member States 291


only to a limited extent, while the various voluntary initiatives were in reality confi ned to ‘soft’ issues (i.e. information diff usion and consciousness raising).5

Th erefore, in part because of the failings of many of the alternatives to direct regulation, and in part because of a new political change, a further shift in envi-ronmental policy and legislation took place in the EU.6

While politicians and regulators have been seen as not completely eff ective in addressing environmental issues, others actors, including local communities and NGOs have begun to play a complementary role in traditional direct regula-tion, fostering public environmental awareness through information gathering and successful campaigns. Th e result is shaping public opinion lobbying govern-ments, pushing them to enact stricter environmental laws infl uencing consumers and markets through strategies in favour of green products.

A more recent environmental policy and law shift, involving the MS govern-ments of both business and civil society, has been referred to as the “new envi-ronmental governance”.7 Th is formula involves collaboration between a diversity of private, public and non-government stakeholders and consists in increased fl exibility in the setting of norms, accompanied by a ‘proceduralisation’ of law, increasing open-ended environmental standards and an increased role in the use of stakeholders in decision-making processes.8 Th us, after command and control regulation and the parenthesis of market based instruments and voluntarism, a new phase evolved in the EU and its MS, with its most important features being regulatory fl exibility and meta-regulation, pluralistic regulation and collaborative governance.

2. Environmental governance in the EU and EU MS

Against the emergence of diff erent sets of environmental regulation instru-ments and approaches as mentioned above, the roles played by various levels of government in protecting and managing environmental resources have been reconfi gured through the years.

Th e environmental policy and law shifts briefl y described above may share a common basis in terms of rise, development and fall within the EU. To the contrary, the analysis of EU MS governments, as forms of constitutionalized di-visions of power, institutional confi gurations and variances in intra-institutional

5. See: Breton A. et al., Environmental Governance and Decentralisation (Cheltenham, Eds. Edward Elgar, 2007).OECD, “Voluntary approaches for Environmental Policy: Eff ectiveness, Effi ciency and Usage,” in Policy mixes, (Paris: OECD, 2003).6. See: Bailey I., New Environmental policy instruments in the EU, (Ashgate, 2003).7. See: Holzinger K.-Knill C.-Shaefer A., Rhetoric or reality? New Governance in EU Environmental Policy, (ELJ, 13, 3, 2006.)8. See: M.A. Delmas-O.R. Young, Governance for the Environment (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009).




relations, may reveal noticeable insights aff ecting environmental protection ef-fectiveness within the EU MS, despite the EU common framework.

Accordingly, leaving the shifts from command and control approaches to new collaborative-inclusive environmental governance, the present focus of this analysis is on the current de iure and de facto assignments and their use of pow-ers over the environment by various layers of government and bodies and their consequences on environmental protection in federal and (apparently) unitary systems in the EU.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that even the EU has been defi ned more recently as a remarkable and innovative experiment in federalism.9 Th e EU has increasingly opened up the structures of the traditional nation state to the supra-national level and hence to their adaptation to the EU multilevel system of gov-ernance. In the EU, sub-regional, regional, national and supranational authori-ties interact with each other in two ways, across diff erent levels of government (the vertical dimension), and with other relevant actors within the same level (the horizontal dimension). Th is implies that Member States either contribute to the formulation and implementation of EU environmental policy and legislation towards their own national priorities or are aff ected both at the institutional/administrative structural level and domestic policy and legal level in the EU.10 Th us, Member States are not merely recipients of EU directives, but are active and co-equal participants in an interactive reform process, which raises challenges for constitutionalism. Among the many questions this complex topic may sug-gest, this paper investigates the problem of how environmental protection in the EU MS is reshaped by this form of experimental and multilevel federalism and aff ected by the institutional architectures of the States.

In particular, the following paragraphs focus on how some EU systems for-mally allocate responsibility for environmental regulation and implementation between the constituent units (i.e. states, regions or provinces and the centre). Since these formal divisions may not completely resemble actual scenarios due to the presence of other players, mechanisms and practices, a broader investiga-tion is conducted as follows. For example, interest groups and the public may aff ect the shaping of environmental policy and legislation. Mechanisms for set-tling confl icts between competing governmental levels may also result in favour-ing a centralised or a decentralised environmental protection program. To this extent, Constitutional or Supreme Courts may act as policymakers or lawmakers or merely as interpretative bodies. Accordingly, they may have diff erent impacts

9. See among others: De Burca G.-Scott J. (eds.), Law and new governance in the EU and the US, (Hart Publish-ing Oxford, 2006).10. See, for a full discussion, C. Paraskevopoulos-P. Gemitis-N. Rees, Adapting to EU Multi-Level Governance. Regional and Environmental Policies in Cohesion and CEE Countries, Ashgate (Pub. Limited, 2006).




on the environment, from extending to reducing environmental protection, from the reassignment of environmental powers to diff erent levels of government to the fulfi lment of regulatory gaps.

2.1. Germany

In Germany legislative powers are vested in the Länder, while the Bund holds these powers only insofar as they are explicitly conferred to it by the Constitution (Grundgesetz, Art. 70). Th is division results in three categories of legislative pow-ers: the exclusive powers of the Bund, the concurrent powers of the Bund and the Länder, and the exclusive powers of the Länder. Formerly, framework powers of the Bund for Land legislation existed as a fourth category, but this category was abandoned due to the reformation of German federalism in 2006. Instead, as a compensation for the strengthening of Bund competences, the Länder was grant-ed the possibility of introducing legislation deviating from the Bund legislation in certain areas. Broadly speaking, (although very complicated in detail) German federalism provided a rather simple solution: essential decisions were taken at the federal level while execution was at the realm of the Länder.

Consequently, the most important steps in the development of German envi-ronmental law were all taken by federal legislation. Th is includes for example: the environmental impact assessment, requirements of the best available technology, the introduction of the precautionary principle, free access to environmental in-formation, public participation in authorisation procedures, legal standing, waste water charge and the climate gas emissions cap and trade systems, environmental liability, sectoral risk control and nature protection regimes, changes of energy policies.

Th e Länder, on the other hand, plays an important role in federal law making through the Bundesrat. Th is mechanism sometimes leads to a standstill in Bund legislation when the coalition majorities in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat diff er from each other. Whether this acts in favour of or against environmental pro-tection depends on whether the envisaged Bund legislation improves or reduces environmental protection. One possibility is to draft the law in a way which skips the consent of the Bundesrat. Th is applies to those laws not involving ques-tions of administrative procedure and organisation, that is, the realm reserved to Bundesrat codetermination. Even if this system may in theory hinder the Länder’s capacity to develop stricter environmental standards, the Länder has only seldom used their discretionary margins.

What is more relevant is the power of the Länder to enforce environmental legislation, which should be considered a strategic function, insofar as the best environmental law is not eff ective if it is not enforced. Competences have been




shifted to the Bund level only to the extent that administrative activities have consequences for the entire state.

Until the federalism reform of 2006 the Grundgesetz provided the possibility of mixed Bund and Land administration. Th is led to a lack of clarity in account-ability until the mixed administration was removed. Now a trend toward centrali-sation is becoming increasingly noticeable. In particular, within the category of mandated Land administration, the rights of the Land to determine the content of a decision have been almost emptied. In controversial cases, the Länder was degraded to mere receivers of Bund instructions. Concerning Land enforcement of Bund laws, the Bund attracted increasingly more administrative functions by establishing semi-independent Bund agencies.

Many confl icts have arisen between sectoral administrations, especially those representing economic development and others representing environmental pro-tection. In addition, confl icts between bodies defending diff erent environmental concerns have also recently emerged. Confl ict resolution in these cases is based on rules of competence and participation. In most cases, one administrative body is given the fi nal word after having heard others in the decision-making process. Th e law may state that the decision requires the third body’s consent, however, in the environmental fi eld hardly a case exists in which such consent requirement has been introduced due to economic related growth reasons.

Since the early 1970s, public participation has gained much ground in Ger-many and the participation of public rule-making and authorisation procedures was introduced by increasing numbers of sectoral environmental laws. However, in recent years, participation has been cut back in various ways in an attempt to remove investment obstacles. More generally, over the years Germany has given up its earlier role as an environmental pioneer in the EU and acted more as a brake on EU environmental law making. Th erefore, many of the recent environ-mental protection laws and related strategic decisions in Germany were triggered by EU legislation and EU court jurisprudence.

As mentioned before, legislative and administrative (especially after the 2006 reform) competences are clearly distributed between Bund and Länder. Th is divi-sion applies also to EU environmental legislation transposition and enforcement. Th us, taken as a whole, the EU integration process is perceived as leading a co-operation among national actors rather than increasing confl icts between them.

In Germany a general trend of centralising both legislative and administra-tive competences certainly exists in the environmental fi eld. One major element in this regard was the replacement of the category of a framework competence by the category of concurrent competence, which reduced the legislative space of the Länder in relation to nature protection. Although this loss was somewhat compensated by the right of the Länder to initiate deviating legislation, in actual practice they do not often make use of this right.




2.2. Italy

Th e Italian Constitution set out the main features of the Italian system as a ‘Regional State’, however a strong centralization of competences and powers has marked the fi rst decades of this institutional framework. Th e process of enhanc-ing the regions alongside the provinces and municipalities was sped up during the nineties and ended up with the revision of Title V of the Constitution in 2001. Th e reform reorganised, at least formally, the allocation of legislative and administrative competences across institutional levels and introduced in Art. 116 the possibility of a “diff erentiated regionalism.”

With specifi c reference to environmental protection, the new Art. 117 (2) (s) reserves the “protection of the environment, the ecosystem and cultural heritage” to the exclusive legislative competence of the State. In these fi elds, the State also has exclusive competence to adopt regulations, although it may delegate this power to the regions. Th e regions, conversely, maintain concurrent legislative and regu-latory powers in a number of subjects related to the environment, such as the enhancement of cultural and environmental properties, territorial governance, health protection, large transport and navigation networks, national production and transport and the distribution of energy. Furthermore, according to Art. 117 (4), regions hold residual competence in other sectors not expressly mentioned but easily identifi ed, including agriculture, forestry, tourism, hunting and fi sher-ies, which indeed aff ect the environment.

However, as demonstrated by Constitutional Court case law and further un-derlined by scholars, the current constitutional framework has increased insti-tutional confl icts instead of improving cooperation amongst government levels. Prior to the reform, due to the lack of a clear division of powers concerning the protection of the environment both the State and Regions have shared legisla-tive and administrative powers in this fi eld. In particular, the legal basis for re-gional legislation was found either in national laws aimed at the implementation of the ‘Regional state’, or in specifi c environmental acts envisaging a regional competence to integrate and implement the national framework. Th us, the 2001 shift in favour of an exclusive competence of the State for the protection of the environment has raised problems of coordination with the structure progres-sively consolidated under the previous constitutional text. Accordingly, in the fi rst period, the Constitutional Court tried to mitigate the scope of the State’s exclusive competence under the new Art. 177 (s) by interpreting the protection of the environment as a “horizontal, cross-subject sector” where the competence of the State could not be considered rigorously and strictly delimited, overlap-ping with areas of concurrent or residual regional competences. By restating the existence of a concurrent normative power of the Regions to the extent necessary for the pursuit and protection of the environmental related interests, the Court




also affi rmed that the State would continue to retain a primary competence in the determination of uniform standards of environmental protection applicable across the entire national territory. More recent case law, however, marks a radical departure from this interpretation, since the Court affi rmed that the Constitu-tion has entrusted the State with exclusive powers in environmental protection. Th e Court affi rmed that the existence of an exclusive legislative competence of the State in the environmental fi eld would also imply the State’s competence to decide over the allocation of administrative functions at the relevant institutional level. In cases concerning environmental protection, the State shall decide wheth-er administrative functions be vested in the provinces, regions or even the state, provided that such choice is justifi ed on the basis of subsidiarity, adequacy and diff erentiation criteria and respects the proportionality principle. Notwithstand-ing the role of the Court, the high number of confl icts between the State and the Regions in this fi eld has negatively marked the eff ectiveness and coherence of recent environmental policy and legislation.

Furthermore, regarding public participation in the formulation of environ-mental policies and legislation, the Italian system has not enacted a compre-hensive and coherent legal framework yet. Th e public right to participation in environmental decision making fi nds implementation only in a few provisions concerning specifi c sectors or procedures, such as the environmental impact as-sessment procedure and integrated permit procedure. Similarly, with respect to the enforcing mechanisms of environmental legislation, the role of citizens and environmental NGOs is rather limited.

In general, the constitutional reform of 2001 has signifi cantly contributed to enhancing the impact of the EU integration process on the distribution of com-petences between the various institutional levels. In particular, it has strengthened regional autonomy by recognizing the participation of the Regions both in the implementation of EU law and in the EU decision-making process. In theory, the process of EU integration should have enhanced the relationship between the state and the regions by promoting a stronger cooperation with subnational lev-els, i.e. regions and provinces, in line with the subsidiarity principle. However, at least in the environmental fi eld, the general perception is that the 2001 Constitu-tional reform and the implementation of EU directives have led to a stronger role of the State and to a centralisation trend which limits de facto the Regional powers and initiatives and, conversely, raises their recourse to the Constitutional Court. Th us, a more cooperative relationship and better coordination between the State and the Regions would result in more eff ective environmental protection.




2.3. United Kingdom

Th e constitutional history of the United Kingdom is not simple and is com-plicated by the absence of a written constitution that sets out the coherent pow-ers and roles of the various organs of the state. Moreover, the end of last century saw signifi cant constitutional changes through the establishment of a scheme of devolved government. Th is devolution process created new legislative and gov-ernmental bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which have enjoyed signifi cant powers. Prior to this change, the UK had been governed by a single Parliament and government.

Th e arrangements for each part of the United Kingdom are distinctly diff er-ent, but they share common features. Th e United Kingdom’s Parliament retains its supremacy under the constitution and maintains legal control over the devo-lution arrangements and has the power to amend them or even to repeal them altogether. It may also choose to legislate for the whole of the UK on any matter, whether devolved or not, although in such circumstances it seeks the consent of the devolved administration.

In all cases, most environmental matters have been devolved so that responsi-bility for these subjects now lies with the devolved authorities. Nevertheless, some peculiarities exist among them. In Scotland some of the reservations may be sig-nifi cant either by preventing the use of certain mechanisms to achieve policy ob-jectives, or by retaining a UK control of signifi cant policy areas with an indirect impact on the environment. In contrast to the Scottish arrangements, the areas of competence devolved to Wales are specifi cally listed, including the ‘environ-ment’. Th e unique political situation in Northern Ireland has produced a more complex system of devolution, so that the tide of environmental legislation and reform that aff ected the rest of the UK left Northern Ireland largely unaff ected. Th is delay is now being tackled, but still has to be cancelled.

One feature of the devolution arrangements for the UK is that no provision has been made for England. Environmental legislation for England continues to be enacted by the UK Parliament. Similarly it is the UK Government which is responsible for all administrative matters.

Despite the fact that environmental protection is one of the most signifi cant areas of devolved power for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, (with the exception of England), in practice, environmental protection measures trespass onto the reserved areas of competence, thus increasingly being incorporated in the UK sphere. Th erefore, the limits of that competence can signifi cantly hinder the devolved authorities’ freedom of action.

In general, several mechanisms exist to ensure co-operation between the UK and devolved authorities and the fi rst decade of devolution has produced fewer problems than envisaged. Th us, the smooth functioning of the devolution settle-




ments has led to a very limited role for the courts, especially in the environmental fi eld.

Given the signifi cance of the EU in matters of environmental law, the relation-ship between the devolved and UK authorities in relation to the EU is also of vital importance. Within the range of devolved matters, the primary responsibility to ensure compliance with EU law rests on the devolved authorities, however, it is expressly stated that the UK government can still exercise powers to implement EU law across the UK, even in devolved matters. Research on the implementa-tion of EU law in Great Britain has shed light on the workings of the devolution settlements in the environmental context. Legislation from the UK Parliament was justifi ed by the fact that an issue impinges on a reserved matter, by the desire for a coherent regime across the UK to facilitate trade and the industry sector, and by the need to comply with EU legislation.

Transparency and public participation have been growing in signifi cance, ac-celerated by European initiatives on issues such as environmental information and environmental impact assessment, while the arrival of the internet has trans-formed the way in which public consultations can be carried out and information published. Increasing pressures on the environment and public demand for envi-ronmental improvements have led to stronger and more eff ective controls. Public participation can be seen as a well-established part of government across the UK.

However, in times of economic crisis, UK environmental concerns have been marginalised and treated at central level with decisions made for short term ben-efi t.

2.4. France

France, as example of unitary state, has developed a strong tradition of cen-tralization, but in the last few decades has witnessed a new push toward decen-tralization. Th is new trend culminated in the 2003 Constitutional amendment which added at the end of Art. 1 that “territorial decentralization is the organizing principle of France”.

Art. 34 of the Constitution lays down an exhaustive list of the matters deter-mined by statutes (i.e., regulated by the Parliament), whereas Art. 37 provides that “matters other than those coming under the scope of statute law [are] matters for regulation”, that is, are subject to the central executive power and its administra-tion. Th e Constitutional Act of 2005, that introduced the Charter for the Envi-ronment, has amended Art. 34 by including that “statutes shall […] lay down the basic principles of […] the preservation of the environment”. Th erefore, in practice, environmental framework legislation is passed by the Parliament whereas its im-plementing provisions are enacted by the central government and administration. Although not extremely clear, this distribution of powers is eff ective in practice.




Th e matter of distributing competences between the central government and a three-tier system of local governments (i.e. regions, departments and communes) is more problematic and not merely in the environmental fi eld. Th e Constitution does not provide a clear allocation of powers. Art. 34 simply states that statutes lay down “the basic principles of […] the self-government of territorial communities, their powers and revenue”. Environmental competences of the diff erent levels of local governments are therefore attributed by the national legislator in numer-ous texts. However, these local environmental competences are too limited to really have an impact. Th us, environmental legislation and administration is still strongly centralised, implying that environmental related acts and decisions ben-efi t from coherence.

Th e French Charter for the Environment at Art. 7 has enshrined as funda-mental rights of constitutional value both public access to environmental in-formation, and public participation in decision-making processes likely to af-fect the environment. Th is result has been achieved as part of the EU legislation implementation process. Nonetheless, the traditional lack of transparency of the French administration greatly aff ects public participation in environmental deci-sion making.

On the whole, the relationship with the EU structure and legislation has ena-bled the French system to rethink its settings in terms of eff ectiveness. France has in many instances reacted to EU inputs by moving towards a simplifi cation and acceleration of national procedures, by reinforcing administration’s control over environmental measures’ enforcement, and by strengthening cooperative mecha-nisms between government levels.

3. Concluding remarks

By identifying current solutions to the problem of institutional set-up over the environment, potential confl icts among national, regional, local levels, modes and procedures of cooperation/coordination, shortcomings in implementing and enforcing environmental legislation, role of institutional and non- institutional actors, the real impact of the territorial setting of each country on environmental protection may be better understood.

Th e management and protection of environmental resources seem to pose a challenge to both federal and unitary States. To this regard, some authors have observed that countries with federal constitutions face additional challenges in managing and protecting environmental resources.11 Th e line demarcating fed-eral from state authority may be a grey line especially with regard to environmen-

11. See K. Holland, F. Morton, B. Galligan, Federalism and the Environment. Environmental policymaking in Australia, Canada and the United States (Greenwood Press: Westport, 1996).




tal protection, which is intrinsically interwoven with other sectoral policies, e.g. spatial planning, agriculture, energy, water, transport, etc., entailing a diff ering division of competences. Because of this unavoidable interdependency, environ-mental protection in many ways tests the viability of the core federalism model. Th e multi-layered system creates possibilities for confl ict between the state and the federal government, but it provides opportunities for their cooperation, po-tentially leading to the achievement of far more eff ective results in protecting the environment. To this regard, the EU, as an innovative experiment in federalism itself, may off er an opportunity to reshape MS institutional settings and allow a more eff ective cooperation among MS government levels and a stronger involve-ment of subnational levels. Since a centralisation trend with reference to environ-mental protection has been detected in federal MS, a broader examination of the current trend and its causes is especially timely, given the resurgence of federalism and general decentralisation processes.

AbstractThe environmental challenges that the EU and EU Member States’ (EU MS) policy-makers and leg-

islators confront have changed considerably over the last decades, as new and dramatic environmental problems have arisen. The public favour accorded to the ecosystem has increased, roles and capacities of institutional actors have been reconfi gured and the infl uence of opposing global and local instances have become stronger.

While environmental policy and law shifts may share a common basis in terms of rise, development and fall in the EU, the analysis of EU MS governments, as forms of constitutionalized divisions of power, institutional confi gurations and variances in intra-institutional relations, may reveal noticeable insights affecting environmental protection effectiveness within the MS systems, despite the EU common frame-work. Moreover, this preliminary study may offer an interesting and divergent insight into the general decentralisation trend observed in the EU MS.

RésuméLes défi s environnementaux auxquels doivent répondre les décisionnaires et les législateurs de l’Union

européenne et de ses États membres ont considérablement changé ces dernières décennies, suite à l’émergence de nouveaux et importants problèmes écologiques. L’intérêt public pour l’écosystème s’est accru, les rôles et les capacités des acteurs institutionnels ont été revus, et l’infl uence des instances mondi-ales et locales environnementales est devenue plus forte.

Alors que les transformations politiques et légales dans le domaine de l’environnement partagent une naissance, un développement et un déclin commun sur le plan européen, en revanche, l’analyse des gouvernements des États membres, dans leur division constitutionnelle du pouvoir, dans les confi gura-tions institutionnelles et dans les variations des relations intra-institutionnelles, peut révéler des éléments intéressants touchant au différentiel d’effi cacité de la protection de l’environnement au sein des États membres, malgré un cadre européen commun. En outre, cette étude préliminaire peut offrir une approche intéressante et divergente quant à la tendance générale de décentralisation observée dans les États mem-bres de l’Union.



Prospects for Ecological Federalism

Giorgio Grimaldi

Graduated in Political Sciences at University of Genoa in 1997, Ph.D. in History of Fed-eralism and European Integration from the University of Pavia in 2002. He is researcher at Centre for Studies on Federalism (CSF) in Moncalieri (Turin) from 2002 onwards. In his academic experience he taught as adjunct professor in History of International Relations at the University of Valle d’Aosta/Université de la Vallée d’Aoste (2006 onwards) and as member of the teaching staff of the European Module Jean Monnet “European Union Political System and Representation” from 2006 to 2011. His research area involves particularly European in-tegration history, European foreign and security policy, European Union environmental policy, global environmental governance, green parties, Bologna Process. He is the author of various essays and article and the monograph Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi (Milan, Giuff ré, 2005).

Introduction

Th e theories and practices of federalism and political ecology provide the op-portunity to develop a political project to address the challenges posed by glo-balisation and guide humanity towards an eco-sustainable future by ensuring security, peace and environmental protection, especially when faced with the consequences of climate change. While there are various and distinct concep-tions of federalism and ecology, there is a great opportunity for their integration starting from common values and goals such as freedom and responsibility, both personal and of human communities, promoting unity in diversity, interdepend-ence in autonomy and power sharing to achieve greater solidarity and equitable relationships among human beings, respecting the balance of the planet.

Th is article, based on a more extensive analysis already developed in an earlier study,1 highlights the complementarity and integration of the features and values of federalism and political ecology by emphasising their similarities, diff erences and disagreements. Th e aim is to outline the common elements of ecological fed-eralism as a new democratic political institutional horizon and of human security applicable to the diff erent levels of government and political organisation.

1. Giorgio Grimaldi, Federalismo, ecologia politica e partiti verdi, (Milano, Giuff ré, 2005).


Giorgio Grimaldi302


Political ecology between interdisciplinarity and the unitary as well as plu-ral conception of reality

Modern ecology, as an independent science, originated from studies con-ducted mainly since the 19th century that focused on the analysis and under-standing of the relationships among living beings in a given environment, and between them and their specifi c local context. Th e term ecology was introduced into scientifi c literature in 1866 by the German naturalist Ernst Haeckel to de-note “the science of economics, way of living and of the external vital relationships of organisms”2 or rather “the complete science of the relationships between organisms and the surrounding outside world, in which, in the broadest sense, we can see all the conditions of existence”.3 Th e still ‘virgin’ and wild nature of North America became an ideal and privileged observatory for the analysis of natural balance, and studies conducted on this subject contributed greatly to the development of ecology. Meanwhile, two main approaches to the protection of ecosystems began to emerge: the conservationist approach aimed at utilitarian management, which promoted the establishment of natural parks to preserve the natural heritage, considered at risk of destruction due to human settlement, without preventing the killing of predatory animals to safeguard livestock and agricultural crops,4 and the environmentalist approach, which considered the environment a community of life and an end in and of itself,5 and proposed a land ethic.6

Connecting scientifi c ecological data to refl ections on human society and man’s continuous interaction with the environment gradually led to the devel-opment of an ecological/environmental perspective in a number of disciplines, especially since the 1960s.7 Along with it was the emergence, inter alia, of envi-ronmental economics and ecological economics, or bio-economy, aimed at mak-

2. Ernst Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen. Allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen Formen-Wis-senschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin reformierte Descendenstheorie, Vol. I: Allgemeine Anatomie der Organismen (Berlin, Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1866), 8. See also Pascal Acot, Histoire de l’écologie (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1988).3. Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen. Allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen Formen-Wissen-schaft,…, Vol. II: Allgemeine Entwickelungsgeschichte der Organismen, 286. See also Robert Delort, François Walter, Histoire de l’environnement européen (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001).4. Cf. Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Effi ciency. Th e Progressive Conservative Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1959).5. Cf. Henry D. Th oreau, Walden or Life in the Woods Boston (Ticknor and Fields, 1854).6. Cf. Aldo Leopold, “Th e Land Ethic,” in Id., A Sand Country Almanac & Sketches Here and Th ere (New York, Oxford University Press, 1949).7. On environmental history see: J. Donald Hughes, An Environmental History of the World: Humankind’s Changing Role in the Community of Life, (London, New York, Routledge, 2nd edition, 2009). John Robert Mc-Neill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environment History of the Twentieth-Century World (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2000). Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: the Biological Expansion of Europe 900-1900 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1986]). Joachim Radkau, Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).


Prospects for Ecological Federalism 303


ing economic activity conform to natural physical limits by taking into account the continuous loss of energy in the transformation processes (entropy) and its compatibility with environmental balance8 as well as the need to shift from cow-boy economics, which views space and the available natural resources as unlimited, to spaceman economics, subject to the constraints of a limited environment with exhaustible resources like the inside of a spaceship,9 and to privilege the quality of life rather than the quantity of production.10Th e development of environmen-talism has revealed the urgent need to promote a new way of looking at the sur-rounding world and to change human behaviour to prevent the depletion of the planet’s non-renewable resources and the degradation of the ecosystems.

Th erefore, political ecology originated from a progressive interdisciplinary scientifi c awareness that, utilising environmental knowledge, started intervening eff ectively in society to reform it. Contemporary ecologism, ushered in by strong complaints against the production systems and economic and social policies that were responsible for the worsening of the planet’s state of health,11 emerged espe-cially between the early 1960s and 1970s, progressively characterising itself as a social movement as well as an intellectual movement. For the fi rst time, various studies made environmental protection an important issue on the international political agenda, emphasising that it is a complex and holistic challenge requiring profound social, political, economic and cultural change,12 such as Ernst Frie-drich Schumacher’s proposal that human communities be organised according to region as well as into small self-managed and self-suffi cient communities thanks to the use of less polluting production technologies.13 In particular, political ecol-ogy started to highlight the devastating consequences on the natural environment of the unlimited economic growth of industrial societies14 and the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons capable of destroying life on the planet.15

8. Cf. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Th e Entropy Law and the Economic Process (Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1971).9. Cf. Kenneth Boulding, Th e Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy, ed. Henry E. Jarrett (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1966), 3-14.10. Cf. Herman Daly, Beyond Growth. Th e Economics of Sustainable Development (Boston, Beacon Press, 1996).11. Cf. Fairfi eld Osborn, Our Plundered Planet (Boston, Little Brown, 1948). William Voigt, Road to Survival (New York, Sloane, 1948).12. Cf. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston, Houghton Miffl in, 1962). Paul R Ehrlich, Th e Population Bomb (New York, Ballantine Books, 1968). Edward Goldsmith et al., “A Blueprint for Survival,” in Th e Ecologist (Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1972). René Dubos, Barbara Ward, Only One Earth: the Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet, (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1972).13. Cf. Ernst F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1973).14. Cf. Barry Commoner, Th e Closing Circe: Nature, Man, and Technology (New York, Knopf, 1971).15. Cf. Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Th ousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists. (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958).Id., Th e Nuclear State: From Technical Progress to Inhumanity (London, Calder, 1979).


Giorgio Grimaldi304


Political protest against Western consumer society, which emerged in the late 1960s in the United States and Europe, both in student and pacifi st movements against the Vietnam War, merged with ecologism.16

Several approaches have been outlined in environmental philosophy and ethics that have developed in recent decades refl ecting more carefully on new, sensitive issues such as climate change and ecological justice.17 Th e two major approaches are: ‘shallow ecology’, characterised by anthropocentrism and a free market and reformist mentality, aimed at limiting environmental damage, and ‘deep ecology’, which is biocentric and non-violent and recognises that life in its many forms has inherent value, regardless of the value man every time assigns to it.18 Moreover, ecology is also a key to understanding reality according to French sociologist Edgar Morin, a promoter of the new culture of complexity and globality, whereby, through the transcendence of narrow specialised approaches and the association of human beings with their existing reality, a mental attitude tending towards a general and ‘ecological’ knowledge of reality and the interdependence of all living beings may be developed, in which nature and culture are not distinct.19

From these considerations, we can understand how important ecological thought is as well as the awareness to generate new modes of life and extend human freedom,20 remaining conscious of the interconnectedness of life on the planet and off ering a prospect for change to orient human beings and socie-ties (respecting cultural diff erences) towards a common identity in which ‘being’

16. Some major international events brought the issue of ecology to the forefront of global public opinion: the celebration of Earth Day in 1970 in New York and the establishment of the fi rst national agency for the environment (the Environmental Protection Agency - EPA) in the United States and, in 1972, the United Nations World Conference on the Human Environment and the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as well as the publication of the Meadows Report on the limits to growth, commissioned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Club of Rome, aimed at sounding the alarm regarding globality and the interdependence of the planet’s environmental problems and calling attention to the urgent need to halt the steady growth of consumption and destruction of natural resources; cf. Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows et al., Th e Limits to Growth. A Report to the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predica-ment of Mankind (Boston, MIT Press, 1972).Also in 1972, on March 23, the fi rst Green party in the world, the United Tasmania Group (UTG), was estab-lished in Hobart, Tasmania following the mobilisation campaign against damming of Lake Pedder.17. Cf. William T. Blackstone (ed.), Philosophy and Environmental Crisis (Athens, Georgia, University of Geor-gia Press, 1974). Dale Jamieson (ed.), A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, (Malden (MA), Oxford, Mel-bourne, Berlin, Blackwell, 2003). Andrew Light, Holmes Rolston III (eds.), Environmental Ethics: An Anthology (Malden (MA), Oxford, Melbourne, Berlin, Blackwell, 2003). Stephen Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, Henry Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010).18. On deep ecology cf. Arne Naess, Th e Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary, in “Inquiry,” No. 16 (1973): 95-100.Id., Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).Bill Devall, George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered, Salt Lake City (UT), (Peregrine Smith, 1985).19. Edgar Morin, L’an I de l’ère écologique (avec la collaboration de Nicolas Hulot) (Paris, Tallandier, 2007).20. Serge Moscovici, De la nature: pour penser l’écologie (Paris: Editions Métailié, 2002).




takes precedence over ‘having’.21 It is therefore useful to focus on a specifi c and autonomous line of green political thought, ecologism, synthesised in the four foundations of political ecology: ecological wisdom, social justice, grassroots de-mocracy and non-violence, which have become the reference values of the main Green Party, Die Grünen (the German Greens), beginning with the early political programmes and shared to a varying extent by ecologist movements. Ecologism, on the basis of a comprehensive view of reality, provides the instruments and poli-cies to create a sustainable society, i.e. able to meet the needs of present and future generations of human beings, taking into account the limits of natural resources as well as the protection of ecosystems, freedom and individual rights, recog-nising and respecting diversity and other animal species. Given its political and philosophical scope as well as its objectives, ecologism is an independent politi-cal ideology that is diff erent from environmentalism, a more practical approach designed to address environmental problems based on the belief that they can be solved without fundamentally changing the values or the patterns of production and consumption of developed societies, as well as from other historical political ideologies.22 In other words, it does not only involve developing environmental policies or protecting ecosystems but transforming all expressions of society by proposing action at all levels.

Federalism and Ecologism: intersections, convergences, diff erences

Post-materialism,23 the culture of limiting development stemming from the criticism of capitalism and consumer lifestyle, decisive action to protect the en-vironment, the search for peace and defence of indigenous peoples and local cultures as well as the tendency to communitarianism are important features of ecological thought. Its convergence with federalist, religious, solidarist and social-democratic tendencies has been suggested as a possible impetus for an environmental revolution,24 Th e sporadic attention given to the environment (exacerbated in cases of calamities or natural disasters) and the oscillating and very lopsided consensus obtained by Green parties and movements indicate that political ecology is still not considered a priority on the international political

21. Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? (New York, Harper and Row, 1976).22. Cf. Andrew Dobson, Green Political Th ought (London, Routledge,4th edition, 2007).23. Th e term post-materialism was coined by Ronald Inglehart in 1977, based on Abraham H. Maslow’s theory that arranges human needs in a hierarchy, from the physical and biological ones concerning the physical safety and food to those psychological and not material such as love, esteem, social recognition and self-actualisation; cf. Abraham . Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, Harper & Row, 1954).Ronald Inglehart, Th e Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977).24. Cf. Franco Livorsi, “Tendenze politiche e religiose dell’ambientalismo,” in Belfagor Year L, No. 5 (Septem-ber 30, 1995): 531-533 (517-536).


Giorgio Grimaldi306


agenda, although there are clear signs of a political, economic, social and ecologi-cal transition to a society no longer based on fossil fuels.25 A strategy is needed in addition to political and social institutions that support the process already underway of deploying economic resources through political action and making the legal, social, educational and cultural changes necessary to develop a green economy that respects human rights and is geared towards protecting vital basic goods, sobriety and conviviality26 as well as a paradigm shift. Th ere are also clear divisions on economic and institutional choices, particularly between theorists of de-growth27 and proponents of pragmatic ecologism. Perhaps the road to ecologi-cal federalism could act as a bridge linking still diff erent and confl icting proposals in a shared political project.

Th e essential purpose of the federal systems is basically to maintain freedom in a democratic context and establish peace through self-government and the distribution of power, which also implies respect for the minorities settled in the territory. Th ere are also other interconnected social, economic and fi scal objec-tives aimed at ensuring that decisions are taken at the lowest possible level, the level closest to citizens, according to the subsidiarity principle, in which the fed-eral government is only a substitute for the powers provided for in the event of noncompliance or where necessary and entrusts the federal government with the duties necessary to prevent the disintegration of the federal system (in particular the organisation of defence, single currency and the administration of justice), thus allowing for integration among its components. Th is principle, developed as part of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, implies cooperation and aims at making the individual levels of government responsible, effi cient and suited for all purposes according to the powers constitutionally attributed to them. Here we can see an affi nity between subsidiarity and the participatory democracy or grass-roots democracy promoted by ecologism, though the latter with greater emphasis on local powers and self-government.

Many ecologists support decentralisation and cooperation at the confederal level yet reject statehood and, therefore, also federalism as a political option, al-though federalism was present in various state organisations (characterised by bicameral parliamentary democratic decisions and thus shared by the levels of governments, the horizontal and vertical distribution of powers with an internal organisation guaranteeing the autonomy of the individual federated units in rela-tion to the federal central power), and as a pattern of participatory aggregation in

25. Cf. Jeremy Rifkin, Th e Th ird Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power is Transforming Energy, the Economy, and the World (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).26. Cf. Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (New York, Harper and Row, 1973).Id., Towards a History of Needs (New York, Pantheon Books, 1978).27. Cf. Serge Latouche, Vers une société d’abondance frugale. Contresens et controverses sur la décroissance (Paris, Fayard, Mille et une nuits, 2011).




society in various areas according to the vision promoted by the integral federal-ism movements.

Institutional federalism fully defi ned the modern concept of federation and questioned the absolute sovereignty of the national State. Carlo Cattaneo claimed that federalism was the only way of combining unity and freedom and was a conception of reality intended to propose, based on actual experience, multi-institutional unifi cation founded on a variety of histories, cultures, local and in-dependent techno-scientifi c and political and social institutional developments. With Cattaneo, federalism becomes the most fi tting theory of institutional or-ganisation of a certain technical scientifi c period, triggered by a polycentric so-ciety that is capable of launching and developing the industrial revolution and, hence, democratic organisation of this society in its articulation of economic de-velopment. Cattaneo is opposed to nationalism and the centralised State as well as monopolies and all forms of administrative centralisation and bureaucratisa-tions and considers them enemies of autonomous development in many diff erent fi elds (economic, industrial, social), the general process of ‘civilisation’ and the spontaneous growth of fl exible, autonomous and interconnected centres for eco-nomic, social and political initiatives. From this perspective, federalism represents the path to the unifi cation of mankind through the extension of spatial techno-systems and the aggregation and reconciliation of peoples as well as autonomous and free territories, within which the relationship between human beings and the environment also plays an important role in characterising the specifi city and diversity of the federal units.28 In the early 1990s, the Italian Greens (in opposi-tion to the federalist and secessionist tendencies of the Northern League) agreed with Cattaneo and the free and secular nature of his thought, his technical and scientifi c research, aimed at a synthesis of humanistic and scientifi c culture, as well as the rational and operational approach adopted in the proposed processes of spatial development in the economic and agricultural fi elds of urban areas by proposing drainage systems, the creation of water and transport networks and solutions to the problem of prisons.29

Because of its infl uence on some ecologists, especially those of socialist inspira-tion, attention should be given to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s thought and his fed-eral project involving the free association of citizens and the State, built around a limited contract and guaranteed by equal relations designed to limit state power and maintain the integrity of freedom and the initiative of communities with an antihierarchical and anticentralist function, even in the economic sector, through

28. Cf. Luigi Zanzi, “Cattaneo: il federalismo di fronte alla storia,” in Storia e percorsi del federalismo. L’eredità di Carlo Cattaneo, eds. Daniela Preda, Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli (Vol. I. Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005), 41-78.29. Cf. Virginio Bettini, “Marianella Riesi, L’attualità verde di un pensiero,” in Metafora verde, Year I, No. 3 (December 1990-January 1991): 69-72.


Giorgio Grimaldi308


the creation of cooperatives with the gradual development of increasingly exten-sive “confédération de confédérations,” starting from Europe, considered too large to constitute a single confederation.30

Anarchist federalism deserves to be discussed separately. Starting as early as Proudhon’s libertarian federalism, in Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin’s and mainly in Pëtr Alekseevič Kropotkin’s works it represents a radical opposition to the State. Th e federation is conceived of as a free organisation developed from the bottom up that should gradually aggregate individuals, fi rst in Communes, then in provinces, nations and the European federation31 until it becomes a world fed-eration. Th e cornerstone of Kropotkin’s thought is the theory of mutual aid,32 a constructive attitude that the author found both in the animal world and among men, believed to be behind the prosperity of society. It has emerged at various historical moments from the Middle Ages up to the present, taking on many dif-ferent forms, particularly, starting from the 19th century, through self-protection solidarist bodies, such as mutual aid societies, insurance organisations or coop-eratives as well as the non-profi t and micro-credit sectors in support of local labour in areas containing the poorest countries. Even the libertarian anarchist geographer Élisée Reclus contributed to the development of an ecologist vision with his geo-historical perspective.33 Anarcho-federalism inspired the social ecol-ogy of the American Murray Bookchin, who beginning with his early works de-nounced the dangers of industrial pollution caused by chemicals and proposed decentralisation as a way of striking a balance between society and nature as well as of ensuring the survival of humanity.34 In his other works he backs the struggle to achieve a deurbanised society that is decentralised in small confederated com-munities or ‘libertarian municipal confederations’; interdependent, necessary to prevent individual communities from selfi shly closing themselves off ; and politi-cally and economically self-suffi cient, in which agriculture and manual labour are integrated and practised in the areas of life associated with self-management and direct democracy. Bookchin, highly critical of nationalism, off ers a vision that emancipates individuals from the oppression of the State, which is held responsi-

30. Cf. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Du principe fédératif et de la nécessité de reconstituer le parti de la révolution (Paris, E. Dentu, 1863), 88.31. Cf. Michail Aleksandrovič Bakunin, Fédéralisme, socialisme et antithéologisme (Paris, P.V. Stock, 1895.)32. Cf. Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: a Factor of Evolution. (London, William Heinemann, 1902).33. Cf. Elisée Reclus, L’Homme et la Terre (6 volumes), (Paris, Librairie Universelle, 1905-1908).34. Cf. Lewis Herber, [pseudonym of Murray Bookchin], Our Synthetic Environment (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).




ble for environmental disaster.35 Finally, British anarchist Colin Ward promoted a communitarian anarchism, which protects local self-government and the com-munity use of natural resources and common goods like water.36

At this point two approaches shared by federalism and ecologism seem obvi-ous:

1. Th e criticism of the international system based on nation States and eff orts to overcome it given its incapacity to govern the complex reality brought about by globalisation.

2. Th e idea of peace as a priority value and a scope of political action that involves the struggle to reform the international political, legal and economic system to tackle and democratically govern global problems.

Th e fi nal objectives proposed by some ecologists—decentralised societies and participatory democracy—diff er from those of the federalists—continental fed-erations and a world federation—even though in the short-term they agree to support the democratisation of the international system and the development of multilateralism to address the most important political issues (environmental protection, human rights, the fi ght against crime, hunger and poverty, economic restructuring, etc.). While federalism condemns the shortcomings of governance and the absence of supranational democratic institutions, many ecologists reject the creation of global and regional institutions, wary of processes that might tend to centralise powers and propose comprehensive cooperation among local entities from the bottom up.

Th e common global and planetary objectives of federalism and ecologism as political and ideological movements then lead to convergences and diff erences.

With reference to ecologism, Clapp and Dauvergne have classifi ed it includ-ing four major global environmental worldviews: ‘market liberals,’ supporters of the free market and technological development in the green economy as well as the initiatives of international political and economic organisations; ‘institution-alists’, proponents of the reform of the United Nations by developing existing organisations such as the UNEP and promoters of sustainable development, the

35. Cf. Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, San Francisco, Ramparts Books, 1971. Id., Toward an Eco-logical Society, (Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1980). Id., Th e Ecology of Freedom, (Palo Alto, Cheshire Books, 1982). Id., “Th e Meaning of Confederalism,” in Green Perspectives No. 20 (November 1989) [also in “Society and Nature”, Vol. 1, No. 3, (1993): 41-54 and available online at http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol1/bookchin_confederalism.htm] Id., “Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview,” in Green Perspectives No. 24, (Oc-tober 1991) [also in “Society and Nature”, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, 93-104] Id., “Nationalism and the ‘Natural Question’,” in Democracy & Nature: the Journal of Inclusive Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (issue 5) (1994): 8-36 [available online at http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol2/bookchin_nationalism.htm] Janet Biehl, Th e Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism (Montreal, Black Rose Press, 1998).36. Cf. Colin Ward, Refl ected in Water: A Crisis of Social Responsability (London-Washington, Cassel, 1997).


Giorgio Grimaldi310


precautionary principle and greater state and supra-state political capacities to govern the transition towards a more sustainable future (partly aligned with the federalists’ demands); ‘bioenvironmentalists’, who adopt the biocentric approach of deep ecology and are focused on saving the planet by proposing a new eco-nomic model based on new ways of living, sobriety, de-growth and the respect of non-human life; and ‘social greens’, who believe that environmental protection is inseparable from social justice, the development of ecological democracy and the recognition of territorial and local self-governments where communities and the protection of common goods play a key role.37

In general, federalism is opposed by both conservative or reactionary ecolo-gists, calling for authoritarian solutions in order to impose a de-industrialised ecological society managed from the top-down and sacrifi cing individual free-dom, and, for diametrically opposed reasons, by socialists and Marxist ecolo-gists38 as well as, in a diff erent way, by social libertarian ecologists and anarcho-socialists, who look at national or international federation projects with fear and suspicion, assuming there is both the risk of establishing a centralised and totalising power, limiting, at the regional level, local political participation and individual liberty, and the advent, in the world, of a single and standardising international order, dominated by a superpower and resembling a Leviathan of Hobbesian memory or an out-of-control Orwellian Big Brother.39 As an alterna-tive to economic, political and cultural globalisation as well as to the reigning technologisation, libertarian ecologists and anarcho-socialists, along with ecolo-gists advocating an ethical and spiritual approach to the environment (therefore ‘social greens’ along with ‘bioenvironmentalists’ accepting the above-mentioned classifi cation), have proposed the decentralisation and self-suffi ciency of small communities as key principles upon which to build models of sociopolitical and economic organisation. Among the proposals for ecological democracy there are, for example, the inclusive and global democracy of Takis Fotopoulos, based on local ecological communities governed by civic assemblies that should gradually replace representative democracy40 and Vandana Shiva’s Earth democracy, col-lective non-violent resistance that restores power to communities, territories and places by re-establishing their connection to the environment (seeds, soil, water, food); opposing the devastation of eco-imperialism, which expropriates natural resources from local populations through multinationals; and rediscovering self-

37. Cf. Jennifer Clapp, Peter Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World. Th e Political Economy of the Global Environ-ment, (Cambridge (MA), London, MIT, 2005), 14-15.38. Cf. Qingzhi Huan (ed.), Eco-socialism as Politics: Rebuilding the Basis of Our Modern Civilisation, (Dor-drecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, Springer, 2010).39. Cf. Alan B. Carter, A Radical Green Political Th eory, (London, New York, Routledge, 1999).40. Cf. Takis Fotopoulos, Toward a Inclusive Democracy: Th e Crisis of the Growth Economy and the Need for a New Liberatory Project (London, Cassell, 1997).




management along with social, energy and economic equity to ensure sustain-ability and equitable access to common goods.41

Federalism, which many ecologists have wrongly considered and confused with centralisation, being instead based on the mutual autonomy of the federated parties, could facilitate an expansion of democracy, an expansion of democratic rights and, thanks to unitary organisation, a greater effi ciency of policies. Also local self-government, vital to the survival and the free and democratic expression of the communities, must ultimately be based on the power and authority of the federal evolution of the State which, as Mario Albertini pointed out, should have led to the “humanisation of power”, blaming, however, the integral federalists for wanting freedom without authority and politics without power,42 especially at the international level where “to look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defi ance the accumulated experience of ages”.43

On the other hand, a federalist vision that does not include ecologism now seems anachronistic. It is not only a matter of developing national environmental policies or strengthening environmental federalism with the right balance of pow-ers and resources spread throughout the various levels of government in relation to individual and supranational environmental issues in the federal states, where, however, research on the eff ectiveness of environmental policies in three federal states (the United States, Canada and Switzerland) and in the European Union (EU) leads us to believe that centralized environmental policymaking results in a higher level of environmental protection.44 It is important to refl ect on the birth and evolution of the institutions called upon to operate in ecological areas and to be truly functional to the pursuit of peace, justice and welfare in the context of freedom and the recognition of local dimensions. Environmental diversity and an ecological citizenship characterised by a “thick cosmopolitanism”,45 which im-

41. Cf. Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (London, Zed Books, 2006).42. Cf. Mario Albertini, “La federazione,” in Nazionalismo e federalismo (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999), 99-100.Albertini, leader of the European Federalist Movement (Movimento Federalista Europeo, MFE) from the early 1960s to the 1990s, developed a defi nition of federalism as an ideology - not just a theory of the federal State - designed to democratically overcome the division of humanity into social classes and national states as well as achieve peace; cf. Id., Il federalismo e lo stato federale, (Milano, Giuff rè, 1963). According to his view, federalism combines three aspects: the “aspect of value” (peace), the “aspect of structure” (articulation and division of state power on several levels) and the “socio-historical aspect” (realisation of social and institutional pluralism along with cosmopolitanism and striving for a world federation).43. Cf. Alexander Hamilton, “Th e Federalist no. 6. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions between the States,” in Independent Journal (14 November 1787) [available online at http://constitution.org/fed/federa06.htm].44. Cf. Inger Weibust, Green Leviathan: Th e Case for a Federal Role in Environmental Policy, Farnham, (Ashgate, 2009).45. Cf. Andrew Dobson, Andrew, Citizenship and Environment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). Id., “Th ick Cosmopolitanism,” in Political Studies Vol. 54, Issue 1, (March 2006): 165-184 [available online at http://www.politicalstudies.org/pdf/dobson.pdf ].


Giorgio Grimaldi312


plies ecological responsibility and the duty to reduce the anthropic impact on the planet in order to preserve natural balance, indicate how institutions and policies must be consistent with a vision capable of preserving ecosystems, diversity, free-dom and local communities, as well as strengthening environmental multilateral-ism and the emergence of green states and regions as transnational administrative trustees of land protection and actors in global environmental governance.46

Th erefore, a fl exible federalism, promoted and adapted by involving and de-veloping local communities, is needed and it should be polycentric and wide-spread as well as able to extend democracy and ensure governance at all levels. Th e long history of the environment and the ‘ecological’ origin of state institutions should be considered. Th ey are the result of complex and articulated processes, shortened and facilitated by a wealth of plant, animal and geophysical varieties. Furthermore, we must consider how the interaction between resources and en-vironmental factors in each individual geographical area can produce side eff ects unforeseen by political theories, and to what extent these policies should take into account ecology to develop more appropriate institutional proposals for each individual case. Just as in the case of the ecologists, even federalists are called to deepen and refi ne their analysis by dialoguing and ‘mixing’ with other traditions, and in particular with ecological thought.

European federalism, regionalism, non-violence and political ecology

Common experiences of social and political commitment between federal-ists and ecologists have emerged mainly since the 1970s, particularly in Western Europe, and the two groups are getting increasingly closer together. Ecologists’ underestimation of institutional issues has been widespread, especially within Green political parties and movements (at least, with some exceptions, until the mid-1990s). In particular, the German Greens, concerned about the decentralisa-tion of powers and the protection of minorities as well as promoters of a new way of doing politics, about extending political and civil participation and especially about engaging in campaigns against weapons, wars and nuclear power, but with-out a shared conception of the State and focused mainly on environmental and eco-social issues, criticised and rejected the European Communities as undemo-cratic and not very ‘green’ until the end of the Cold War and also after it. In the following years, thanks also to their greater presence in European institutions, the main political line of the Greens in Europe, the Green Group in the European Parliament (initially formed in 1989), the European political party, the European Greens (founded in 2004) made a decisive shift towards a federal, democratic

46. Cf. Robyn Eckersley, Th e Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2004).John Barry, Robyn Eckersley (eds.), Th e State and the Global Ecological Crisis (Cambridge, (MA), MIT Press, 2005).




and ecological Europe. Some MEPs were infl uential and contributed to achiev-ing this change of direction, such as Adelaide Aglietta and Alexander Langer, for whom the European integration process was the only concrete way to implement ecological conversion by limiting consumption and production as well as achieve inter-ethnic co-existence through the transfer of powers upwards (supra-national institutions) and downwards (regions and local self-governments), creating a pan-European and democratic federalism with full powers for the European Parlia-ment (EP), the abolition of the veto power of the states47 and establishing Europe as an independent leading actor in the international arena and helpful partner to the southern hemisphere.48 Monica Frassoni, the current co-president of the Eu-ropean Greens, coming from federalist activism within the JEF (Young European Federalists), and since 2001, co-chairman of the Greens/European Free Alliance (a group consisting of ecologists and regionalists in the EP since 1999), and the former leader of the May 1968 protests in France, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, MEP in offi ce continuously since 1994, have a strong pro-European attitude.49 Some exponents of the green federalists may be considered precursors of ecological fed-eralism, such as Ludo Dierickx, Belgian MP and a supporter of the European federation as an expression of European and global multicultural democracy50 and the Italian Vittorio Castellazzi, supporter of the complementarity of fed-eralism and ecologism as perspectives opposed to nationalism and promoting peace and the protection of terrestrial ecosystem.51 According to other authors, this complementarity could be the result of their shared concern about restoring decision-making and public management at the regional level as well as about creating a polycentric institutional system based on subsidiarity52 and the neces-sary link between the fi ght for peace and for human security and survival, which inevitably leads to the defence of natural heritage and biospheric equilibrium.53 Green parties in favour of local action and federalists concerned about maintain-

47. Cf. Alexander Langer, “Draft Proposal for the Political Position of the Green Group in the EP at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996,” in Id., Th e Importance of Mediators, Bridge Builders, Wall Vaulters and Frontier Crossers (Bolzano/Forlì, Fondazione Alexander Langer Stiftung/Una Città, 2005), 203-227.48. Cf. Id., “Pan-european Federalism,” in Green Leaves, Bulletin of the Greens in the European Parliament, No. 2, (May 1991): 3.49. Cf. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Que faire? Petit traité d’imagination politique à l’usage des Européens (Paris, Ha-chette Littératures, 2009).50. Cf. Ludo Dierickx, “Extrait d’un discours intitulé ‘Th e power of the silent alliance,’ prononcé au congrès du Green Party à Londres le 31 mars 1989,” in La politisation de la valeur d’usage et l’universalitè de la raison (Brux-elles, Editions Artel, 1991), 82.51. Vittorio Castellazzi, Federalismo ed ecologia: complementarietà dell’azione, in “Il Dibattito Federalista,” Year V, No. 4-5 (October-December 1989), 76.52. Cf. Franco Livorsi, Il mito della nuova terra. Cultura, idee e problemi dell’ambientalismo, (Milano, Giuff rè, 2000), 476-477.53. Cf. Guido Montani, “Ecologia e federalismo,” in Il Dibattito Federalista Year XVI, No. 3, (Autumn 2000): 27-28.


Giorgio Grimaldi314


ing political transversality to achieve results could go hand in hand54 and develop the concepts of defensive defence and democratic planning from the basic struc-tures to bioregions (improving the physical territory—ecosystems, watersheds, mountain ranges etc.—as neutral reference elements instead of ethno-cultural and ethno-nationalist elements) to continents, promoting unity in independent diversity and the strict application of the principle of subsidiarity.

Luigi Zanzi has proposed a new concept of political organisation based on an eco-historical interpretation of reality, in which a federal Europe based on “envi-ronmental regions” and consisting of integrated human communities and ecosys-tems aims at preserving the environment and ensuring peace. Th ese regions are the result of the breakdown of existing national states, emerging from a process of ‘territorialisation’ as a state political space separated from natural areas and shar-ing common ecological, ethno-cultural and linguistic features, i.e. an artifi cial reality that is self-legitimated to ensure the maintenance of power, eliminating or marginalising the existing historical, geographical and cultural diff erences and peculiarities.55 Zanzi accuses environmentalism of hardly ever challenging the in-ternational order of states or taking responsibility for their institutional proposals or the proposals for environmental protection within the constituent processes.56 In short, his federalist proposal, also inspired by the emergence of signifi cant federal state (the Helvetic Confederation) and self-government experiences in the European Alpine region includes:

1. Th e articulation of sovereignty at multiple levels depending on the functionalisation of the structures of power in service to society.

2. A confi guration of ‘local’ political units coinciding with the ‘historical-environmental’ regions of Europe.

3. Th e organisation of environmental protection policy at two levels, local and global, with constitutional constraints defi ned by the federal State to ensure a coherent and overall strategy and, with equal protection, the individual right to the environment (to be included as a principle in a programme-based constitution) and eff ective environmental pub-lic policies.

4. An eff ective democratic representation of the populations (no longer minorities) involved in environmental protection residing in situ, with-in the ‘historical-environmental’ regions.

54. Cf. Castellazzi, cit., 76-77.55. Cf. Luigi Zanzi, Le Alpi nella storia d’Europa. Ambienti, popoli, istituzioni e forme di civiltà del mondo ‘alpino’ dal passato al futuro (Torino, CDA & Vivalda Editori, 2004).56. Ibidem, p. 40.




5. Th e possible gradual extension of the European federation to other geographical areas and thus to diff erent “environments”57.

A joint analysis of regions and ecology is carried out by the Swiss philosopher Denis de Rougemont who considers the aggression industrielle inextricably linked to the État-nation and capable of increasing the destruction of ethnic, cultural, social, economic and environmental diff erences. Ecology represented an updat-ing of his personalist philosophy58 and integral federalism, the school of thought aimed at extending the principle of federalism beyond its political-institutional aspects and at off ering an overall federal vision of society and all aspects of human life, became popular especially in France and French speaking areas and charac-terised by the local development and the anti-nationalist recovery of the regional dimension,59 with important contributions from some of its other exponents as well, including Alexandre Marc,60 Bernard Charbonneau and Jacques Ellul.61 Th rough his ‘variable geometry region’, distinct from the administrative or state limits, or state-space limits, and defi ned according to the problems the communi-ties need to address, de Rougemont supported the development of cross-border regions as a framework for living and an appropriate response to the needs of citizens with respect to both the State (considered too large), and the towns (con-sidered too small).62 By proposing a Europe des réalités as a union of regions at the continental level, he hoped that a Fédération des régions, based on a plurality of connections,63 could develop concrete and local solutions to ecological problems as well as build a level of European and world government able to address the en-vironmental issues requiring direct and incisive political action, often prolonged and not very rewarding in terms of political consensus, partly because it was in considerable confl ict with the myth of economic growth. From this perspective, according to de Rougemont, the regionalist, federalist and ecologist movements were all united—even though they were not fully aware of it nor were they seek-

57. Ibidem, pp. 356-360.58. Cf. Denis de Rougemont, Politique de la Personne (Paris, Je Sers, 1934.)59. Cf. Lutz Roemheld, Integral Federalism: Model for Europe - A Way Towards a Personal Group Society: Historical Development, Philosophy, State, Economy, Society (Frankfurt an Main, Peter Lang, 1990).60. Cf. Jean Jacob, Les sources de l’écologie politique (Paris/Condé-sur-Noireau, Le Seuil, 1995) 96-112.Christian Roy, “Humaniser l’entreprise d’après Alexandre Marc à la fi n des années 1930: Convergences avec l’antiproductivisme contemporain,” in L’Europe en formation, No. 355 (2010): 87-127Hartmut Marhold, “Quelques réfl exions sur l’actualité de la pensée d’Alexandre Marc,” in L’Europe en formation, No. 355 (2010): 129-162.61. Cf. Christian. Roy, “Aux sources de l’écologie politique: le personnalisme gascon de Bernard Charbonneau et Jacques Ellul,” in Canadian Journal of History/Annales canadiennes d’histoire, XXVII, (April 1992): 67-100.Id., Ecological Personalism: “Th e Bordeaux School of Bernard Charbonneau and Jacques Ellul,” in Ethical Perspec-tives, Vol. VI, No. 1, (April 1999): 33-44.62. Cf. François Saint-Ouen, Denis de Rougemont et l’Europe des régions (Genève, Fondation Denis de Rougemont pour l’Europe, 1993).63. Cf. Denis de Rougemont, Lettre ouverte aux Européens (Paris, Albin Michel, 1970.)


Giorgio Grimaldi316


ing unity—in a common struggle, and needed to understand that none of the three movements, as a minority, could achieve decisive results without the help of the other two. De Rougemont played a signifi cant role in the establishment of Action écologique européenne, renamed Ecoropa (Ecological Action for Europe), an international association founded in Paris in 1976 by scientists and ecologists from across the continent to adopt and develop joint initiatives, of which he was president and promoter.64 By defi ning itself as the ‘European movement of ecological thought and action’, Ecoropa aimed at overcoming the nation-states and the European Common Market and at promoting “une démocratie écologique dans une Europe régionale et fédérale”.65 Proposing the creation of a Senate of the regions and sustaining the mutual support that regions and ecology provided each other in the common opposition to materialism and the desire for power cultivated by the national states.66 De Rougemont envisaged political ecology not as an environmental fi ght or criticism of a model of economic development, but as a new project of society based on human beings67 and civic participation. De Rougemont’s ‘ecological humanism’, which has had considerable infl uence on French ecologism68 includes the following points:

– Convivial democracy opposed to Jacobinism and the centralism of the na-tion State, based on the rights of the human being (actual participation, transnational political parties, referenda etc.) and not of ethnicity or the sacralisation of people.

– Th e survival of regional culture in the face of cultural uniformisation (the conservation of natural and cultural heritage in diversity) and the protec-tion of regional languages and dialects with new techniques of communi-cation.

– Th e protection of sustainable development and quality of life in the face of the alienation of pollution and damage to the biological cycles.

– Th e protection of individual liberties in the face of cybernetic society. – Th e total denuclearisation and demilitarisation of the economy.69

Unlike peace, non-violence is not central to the federalist conception and like-

64. Cf. Jean Jacob, Le retour de ‘l’Ordre Nouveau’. Les métamorphes d’un fédéralisme Européen (Genève-Paris, Librairie Droz, 2000), 99-109.65. Cf. Ibidem, p. 101.66. Cf. Denis de Rougemont, L’avenir est notre aff aire. (Paris: Stock, 1977). Id., “Ecologie, régions, Europe fédérée: même avenir,” in Cadmos, Year II, printemps 1979, 5-12.67. Cf. François Saint-Ouen, “Denis de Rougemont,” in L’Europe en Formation No. 296 ; (printemps 1995), 7-15. [available online at http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/296fso.pdf ]68. Cf. Jacob, Le retour de ‘l’Ordre Nouveau,’ 140-172.69. Cf. Mark Dubrulle (ed.), Régionalisme, fédéralisme, Écologisme. L’Union de l’Europe sur des bases culturelles et économiques nouvelles. Un hommage à Denis de Rougemont (Bruxelles, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 1997).




wise federal institutions are not central to many ecologists and exponents of non-violence. For instance, Johann Galtung is opposed to the strengthening of state-hood because it is based on armies and oppression and rejects a European federal State proposing a decentralised international legal system which is confederal, netlike, bottom-up and guaranteed by the United Nations (properly reformed and democratised with the establishment of an Assembly of peoples which could also involve nongovernmental organisations and the directly elected, along with the current General Assembly representative of States).70

Th e theory and practice of non-violence, promoted and implemented by Mo-handas Karamchand Gandhi, the goal of which is the harmonious co-existence of all living beings open to the possibility of union among peoples, signifi cantly infl uenced ecologism and federalism. Gandhi, who opposed the savage industri-alisation which was being developed in the West, hoped in political, social and economic reorganisation, based on village life. As in the case of federalism, we see the convergence of communitarianism and cosmopolitan development. Peoples and religions are considered the branches of the same tree and the aspiration to create a world federation is foreseen by Gandhi as the voluntary universal interde-pendence of rural non-violent democratic communities and the fi nal stage after conquered and exploited nations have achieved freedom, compatible with na-tional independence not imperialism, with a slower and simpler lifestyle and not greed and the pursuit of profi t.71 By transforming every sphere of life with non-violence (ahimsa) in order to try and fi nd the truth (satya), Gandhi establishes the close interdependence between means and ends, to the extent that they become a single entity, a process and goal to be pursued to realise human brotherhood. As has been well illustrated,72 Gandhi’s ethical-political thought is characterised by six basic and inseparable concepts, which can be analysed in pairs: truth (satya) and non-violence (ahimsa); the welfare of all (sarvodaya) as a realisation of truth and non-violence in social institutions and the ‘power of truth’ (satyagraha), a non-violent method; self-determination/self-rule/independence (swaraj) and au-tonomy/self-control/self-suffi ciency (swadeshi). To develop a society dedicated to sarvodaya it is essential that it be autonomous and independent and, as a society based on satyagraha—i.e. non-violent—it must be self-suffi cient so that it can support itself without needing to rely on other societies and meet the economic needs of the community and common defence using its own resources. Gandhi

70. Cf. Johan Galtung, Daisaku Ikeda, Scegliere la pace, (Milano: Esperia, 1996), pp. 241-242 [original title: Choose Peace, London, Pluto Press, 1995].71. Cf. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, “Young India,” (July 17, 1924). Id., “Young India,” (December 26, 1924). Id., “Young India,” (December 31, 1931). Id., “Harijan,” (July 3, 1937). Id., “Harijan,” (August 9, 1942). Id., Gandhiji’s Correspondence with the Government, 1942-1944 (Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1957).72. Cf. Giuliano Pontara, “Il pensiero etico-politico di Gandhi,” in Teoria e pratica della non violenza, ed. M. K. Gandhi (Torino, Einaudi, 1996).


Giorgio Grimaldi318


did not elaborate a complete plan for a ‘non-violent State’ and only outlined some of its more general features: the democratic participation of all people in the decisions that need to be made for society at all levels; indirect elections with the right to vote granted only to manual labourers, through a system working from the village up to the level of the central State, governed by only a few representa-tives without creating a hierarchical pyramidal structure but rather a horizon-tally expanded structure of ever-widening circles around the individual, the circle with the greatest circumference not dominating but strengthening all those who are inside it and drawing its own strength from them.73 Gandhi’s non-violence proved to be a path of study aimed at action without envisaging defi nitive solu-tions. Even Aldo Capitini, the leading theoretician of non-violence in Italy, in promoting ‘the power for all’ (omnicracy) suggested “giving prominence to an area that is not exceedingly large, in which eff ective control could be exerted by all inhabit-ants with a solid knowledge of the problems (the maximum development of education and information) and the people and places, in their choice of (revocable) delegations and assignments” and establishing a “federation, i.e. horizontal and not vertical” relationship among these units, a non-violent federalism from the bottom up.74

In addition to a democratic and participatory order, respectful of human rights, based on social justice and aware of the pluralism and autonomy of its components, two distinctive features of a non-violent federation seem to clearly emerge in relation to foreign and defence policy:

1. Trends towards neutrality with respect to blocs or opposing political-military alliances combined with eff orts for confl ict prevention, except for the actual assessment of individual situations and possible action to defend the oppressed, opposing war and violence as a last resort, even with the use of force.

2. Th e adoption of a model of defensive defence, i.e. precluding the devel-opment of an off ensive weapons system.

Only a regional federal union (continent-based) with a global outlook and with a single foreign and defence policy can eff ectively address ecological issues, shifting the focus from the need for security of national States, prone to de-fending themselves from each other, to ensuring multidimensional and global security, which is only possible if an improvement in the social, economic and environmental conditions of human communities and the protection of natural resources on the planet is guaranteed.

73. Cf. Id., “Harijian,” (July 28, 1946).74. Cf. Aldo Capitini, Omnicrazia, Il potere di tutti [original title: Omnicrazia potere di tutti, 1968] (Perugia, Edizioni Guerra, 1999).




Th e EU as a global international actor promoting a new democratic multi-lateralism and an energy transition to an eco-sustainable future could contribute to non-violent ecological security. Th is is because it has developed some aspects of the vision of human and ecological security, which imply the duty to protect and promote individuals/people and ecosystems within the framework of a single foreign policy and with European and international police forces at the UN’s dis-posal that support state-building and development. A dimension of civil action, distinct and independent, albeit with possible and appropriate connections with the police, learning from the experiences of confl ict prevention and peace-build-ing conducted in very diff erent contexts and with non-violent methods, should be based on civilian peace corps at the national, continental and global levels.

Th e prospect of a European federation and a world federal government that represents the struggle to protect the planet’s biodiversity and prevent human self-destruction is presented by some federalists75 and, in particular, by feder-alist economist Guido Montani.76 Th e EU is the most advanced, hybrid and dynamic example of the slow and rocky process of the creation of continental federations that are able to maintain unity in diversity as well as interdepend-ence and coordination among diff erent levels of power. Criticising the “govern-ance without government” that safeguards the sovereignty of States in the era of globalisation while also admitting that the presence of many authoritarian and dictatorial states is an obstacle to supranational democracy, Montani argues that a supranational world federation would gradually be feasible only by eliminating the power of veto exercised by each national State. Th e concept of sustainable de-velopment is considered inappropriate while ecocentric development is proposed as a “development of the human species that does not compromise the survival of other species in the biosphere”.77 Th e world federal system would consist of a Council modelled on the UN Security Council, but would be composed of representa-tives of the continental unions, and of a world Parliament elected concurrently by all the citizens of the continental unions. Th e world federal government, based on the principles of independence in interdependence and hospitality, acting as the guarantor of the precautionary principle and ecological responsibility, should have three fundamental powers: the supervision of an international police force with the mandate to ensure peace and avoid the use of force by continental un-ions, the establishment of a single currency, and the power to use its own fi nancial resources. A global plan for world conservation launched by a world government

75. Cf. “Th e Federalist,” Year XXXIV, No. 3, (1992). [available on-line at http://www.thefederalist.eu/fi les/PDF/EN/1990/1992-3-EN.pdf ].76. Cf. Guido Montani, Ecologia e federalismo. La politica, la natura e il futuro della specie umana. (Ventotene, Istituto di Studi federalisti Altiero Spinelli, 2004).

77. Cf. Ibidem, p. 100.


Giorgio Grimaldi320


with the help of all the components of the hoped-for world federation would be the framework in which to place common global ecological action.

Conclusions: Non-Violent ecological federalism

From the reconstruction of the features of federalism and ecologism, some major elements have emerged, around which a democratic political and social project, which is federalist and ecologist (or ‘eco-federalist’), could be developed. Th erefore, federalism and ecologism can be combined in a single political strat-egy aimed at freeing man and society from environmental degradation and the national lack of openness that prevent a more balanced relationship with nature, peace and supranational democracy on the basis of ecological sustainability.

Federalism and ecologism are ideologies that share the aim of reconciling the global outlook (federation as a guarantee for peace, prosperity, justice and the protection of terrestrial ecosystems) with the local outlook (the autonomy of hu-man communities and the fi ght to protect environmental, social and cultural goods etc.). In addition, they off er a vision open to participation and addressed to all human beings, regardless of their economic condition, social class or any other individual characteristics they may have. Th ey represent and off er ideals of solidarity that are universal and global, and often viewed as utopian by the majority of citizens. Because of the long-term perspective they off er, they are also supported by cultured élites, yet are unable to constantly engage and mobilise the majority groups in democratic societies.

In fact, in an attempt to summarise and simplify, some key principles of po-litical ecologism can be identifi ed, which federalism could quite easily share:

1. Th e culture of limits, understood as both power limitation and sharing from a federal perspective and as self-restraint in terms of environmen-tal responsibility (‘living better with less’) and eco-sustainability, un-derstood as eco-development78 that is capable of satisfying basic needs and giving the human population and future generations a chance at freedom and a dignifi ed existence as well as safeguarding the cultural, historical and artistic heritage of past generations and of promoting the capacities and values of the individuals and societies involved—self-re-liance and self-sustainability—within the carrying capacity of the plan-et.79 Sociopolitical and institutional reorganisation in accordance with

78. Cf. Ignacy Sachs, Stratégies de l’écodéveloppement (Paris, Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1980.)79. Cf. Wolfgang Sachs, Reinhard Loske et al., Greening the North: A Post-industrial Blueprint for Ecology and Equity, (London, Zed Books, 1998). Wolfgang Sachs, Tilman Santarius et al., Fair Future. Resource Confl icts, Se-curity, and Global Justice, (London, Zed Books, 2007). Ernst von Weizsäcker, Amory Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, Factor Four: Doubling Wealth and Halving Resource Use, (London: Earthscan, 1997). Ernst von Weizsäcker, Karlson Hargroves, Michael H. Smith et al., Factor Five: Transforming the Global Economy through 80% Improve-ments in Resource Productivity, (London: Earthscan, 2009).




territorial eco-development could simply be federalism that, meeting the need for both autonomy and solidarity, can prevent environmen-tal exploitation. To make this happen, the principle of responsibility should be adopted, i.e. the moral duty suggested by the German phi-losopher Hans Jonas that leads to the application of the precautionary principle, according to which the relationship between man and nature must be changed by avoiding behaviours and actions that result in self-destructive and nonreversible processes.80 Moreover, through the adop-tion of green taxes (like carbon tax and other environmental taxes), federalism could be the road that connects local eco-development with global and democratic eco-development, which is also respectful of the environmental, economic and cultural potential of the territory, within the framework of institutions and common binding regulatory norms that can be eff ectively implemented, providing guarantees for security and control.

2. Th e extension of individual and collective rights/duties and active demo-cratic participation at local, regional, national and global levels based on sound ecological and civic education, by expanding individuals’ freedom with respect to institutions in social and private life (the guarantee of emancipation, self-responsibility, shared responsibility and coopera-tion, the necessary conditions to better protect and improve the envi-ronment and living beings, the recognition and protection of diversity and the elimination of discrimination) and promoting a pluralistic conception of citizenship.

3. Th e enhancement of territoriality and unity in diversity that lead to the development of a non-violent attitude and the preservation of biodi-versity. Th is should also be applied to the environment and human communities to establish a new way of living and being an active and integrated part of nature from a bio-regionalist and community-based perspective, without losing sight of their relationships and links with broader spatial and institutional contexts and horizons as well as over-coming the bioregional concept of small decentralised communities81 and that of eco-anarchism82 from a federal perspective, while combin-ing communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.

80. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, (Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1979).81. Cf. Kirkpatrick Sale, Dwellers in the Land. Th e Bioregional Vision, (San Francisco: Sierra Club Press, 1985).82. Cf. Regina Cochrane, “Bioregion, Eco-polis, Eco(nomic)-Federation: Left-Libertarian Models of Sustainability,” in, Introduction to Sustainable Development, in Encyclopedia of Life Support System, eds. David V. J. Bell, Y. Annie (Oxford, EOLSS Publishers, 2002.)


Giorgio Grimaldi322


4. Th e pursuit of a global multidimensional security policy (ecological security and human security) based on a worldwide multipolar balance of power and non-violent as well as “defensive defence” methods, able to defuse the causes that lead to the persistence and escalation of terrorism, tradi-tional wars and ‘new wars’83 using civilian peace corps as humanitarian organisations as well as the instruments of a new ‘federal’ and ‘demo-cratic’ diplomacy interacting with the traditional political actors and civil society organisations,84 already proposed by the European Parlia-ment.

Th e most promising common ground of federalism and ecologism is Euro-pean integration. In particular, the common concerns of ecologists and federalists aim at building a political Europe without borders and ethnic and national barri-ers. Th e proposal of a European federation as a civil power, with a common secu-rity and defence policy aimed at stabilising the neighbouring areas (the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East) and at directing expenditure towards confl ict prevention and confl ict transformation,85 the development of peacekeep-ing, peace-building, assistance to populations and humanitarian intervention in cases of war and military disasters would be an example of ecological federalism. Europe should develop a Marshall Plan for sustainable development in African countries and developing countries; contribute to the democratisation of interna-tional institutions, governance and the creation of other regional associations and promote a World Environment Organisation with powers and the autonomous fi nancial capacity to establish itself as a leading global climate actor.86

Th e integration of political ecology and federalism might take place within a project that is capable of organising peace both among men and with nature. A perspective of non-violent ecological federalism may be developed by overcom-ing, on the one hand, the logic of exclusive sovereignty, which is national and leads to international anarchy as well as to the logic of treaties, conventions and international agreements, fragile foundations that are incapable of ensuring hu-man and environmental security, and is also claimed on localist, ethno-regional-ist and secessionist grounds by infra-national regional authorities. On the other hand, a materialist and economicist conception of society and the biosphere must

83. Cf. Mary Kaldor, New and Old War. Organized Violence in a Global Era (London, Polity Press, 1999).84. Cf. Alexander Langer, “Creating a European Civilian Peace Corps: Th e Importance of Mediators, Bridge Builders, Wall Vaulters and Frontier Crossers,” in Bolzano: Fondazione Alexander Langer Stiftung (Forli: Una città, print 2005), 185-190.85. Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Confl ict, Development and Civilization, (London, Th ou-sand Oaks, California, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1996).86. Giorgio Grimaldi, Roberto Palea, “Twenty Years After the 1992 UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development: the Durban Step and the Need for a Global Environmental Government on Climate Change,” Turin, Centre for Studies on Federalism (November 2011) [available online at http://www.csfederalismo.it/at-tachments/2313_RP_Grimaldi_Palea_Eng.pdf ].




be overcome through the recognition of the right to the environment, the una-vailability of natural resources and the respect for other non-human life forms. Completing the federalist vision, ecologism could provide the objective of achiev-ing peace between men and human societies with a philosophical and political dimension that is capable of including within peace building also ‘peace with the environment’ as a whole and with all its components (animal rights and care, protection of ecosystems, etc.) and as a ‘union of men’, in addition to providing spiritual upliftment and human liberation, which can be realised through non-violence.

AbstractFederalism and ecologism are ideologies sharing the aim of reconciling the global perspective (federa-

tion as a guarantee for freedom, democracy, peace, prosperity, justice and the protection of world eco-systems) with the local perspective (the autonomy of the human community and the fi ght to protect the environmental as well as social and cultural heritage, etc.) and offer universal ideals of global solidarity, often viewed as unattainable dreams by the majority of citizens. Federalism and ecologism also share the characteristic of being supported by qualifi ed elites and not being able to constantly engage and mobilise large portions of democratic societies. Some common elements (culture of limitation or self-limitation and eco-development or eco-sustainability, extension of individual and collective rights/duties and active democratic participation at the local, regional, national and global level based on solid civic and ecologi-cal education, territoriality enhancement and unity in diversity, the pursuit of a global multidimensional security policy based on a multipolar balance of power at the global level, on non-violent and ‘defensive defence’ methods) could encourage an ecological federalism aimed at dealing with global phenomena as well as recovering, at the local and national level, and building, at the regional and global level, politi-cal and democratic capacity for governance to protect and manage common global goods and promote conditions and services that guarantee a dignifi ed lifestyle to the population, based on minimum shared values and public interests.

RésuméLe fédéralisme et l’écologisme, en tant qu’idéologies, partagent l’objectif de concilier le point de vue

global (fédération comme garantie pour la liberté, la démocratie, la paix, la prospérité, la justice et la protection des écosystèmes terrestres) et le point de vue local (l’autonomie de la communauté humaine et la lutte pour protéger l’environnement ainsi que le patrimoine social et culturel, etc.). Les deux offrent des idéaux universels de solidarité mondiale, souvent considérés comme des rêves irréalisables par la majorité des citoyens. Le fédéralisme et l’écologisme partagent également le fait d’être soutenus par des élites qualifi ées, mais de ne pas être constamment en mesure d’engager et de mobiliser d’importantes parts des sociétés démocratiques. Certains éléments communs (culture de la limitation ou de l’auto-limitation, et de l’éco-développement ou l’éco-soutenabilité ; extension des droits et devoirs individuels et collectifs, et participation démocratique active au niveau local, régional, national et mondial, fondée sur une solide éducation civique et écologique ; évolution de la territorialité et de l’unité dans la diversité ; poursuite d’une politique de sécurité multidimensionnelle globale fondée sur un équilibre multipolaire du pouvoir à l’échelle mondiale, et sur les méthodes non-violentes et « défense défensive ») pourraient encourager un fédéralisme écologique, visant à traiter les phénomènes globaux, à retrouver, au niveau local et national, et à construire, au niveau régional et mondial, la capacité politique et démocratique de la gouvernance pour protéger et gérer les biens communs mondiaux. le fédéralisme écologique pourrait également pro-mouvoir des conditions et des services garantissant une vie digne à la population, sur la base d’un mini-mum de valeurs partagées et d’intérêts publics.



Reforming Fiscal Federalism in Europe: Where Does the Pendulum Swing?

Elisabeth Alber & Alice Valdescalici

Elisabeth Alber, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism at the European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen (EURAC)

Alice Valdesalici, Researcher at the Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism at the European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen (EURAC) and Ph.D. Candidate in Italian and Euro-pean Constitutional Law, Graduate School of Law, University of Verona

1. Introduction

Against the backdrop of the fi nancial and economic crisis, federal and regional States are engaging in several reforms. Th e fi nancial constitutional design and institutional setting in the area of fi scal and fi nancial matters are being revised in order to better adapt to the current challenges, which result both from the supra-national sphere of economic governance and the domestic one. It goes without saying that both the allocation of fi nancial resources to each government tier as well as intergovernmental relations are critical for the economical performance (and thus for the very existence) of a compound State. Both federal and regional States are calling for a new era of fi scal federalism in order to meet required budget stability objectives and boost their economic performance. Th ey do so either by reshaping existing frameworks or by trying to overhaul their multi-tier government and governance system in its principles. Th e rationale behind these reforming processes lies in the struggle between the apparent needs to re-centralize while accommodating decentralization claims. Which tier of govern-ment is better at attributing legislative and executive powers? How can a State best meet budget stability objectives while being a player in various polycentric spheres? Th ere is an obvious need to reduce public expenditure and public debt, but both seem to be a result of a high degree of centralized management in public


Elisabeth Alber & Alice Valdescalici326


aff airs. Moreover, there is a quest for more effi ciency and transparency in allocat-ing responsibilities to better match citizens’ needs and preferences, and eff ectively respond to the so-called democratic defi cit. States have to come to terms with the changing scope, character and varied dimensions of interdependence among governments and governance actors. As a general rule, the decentralization of public service provisions at the local jurisdictions of concern has been widely recognized as a necessary and effi cient tool of multilevel government and govern-ance. Within the European Union it translates in the ‘principle of subsidiarity’,1 enshrined as a fundamental principle in the Maastricht Treaty, while elsewhere it is pursued more informally as the counterweight to the ‘one size fi ts all’ ap-proach. All in all, what is taking place is a growing complexity and specialisation not just in the vertical but also in the horizontal structure of the public sector. Functions amongst government tiers are increasingly overlapping. As a result, the multiplicity of processes coming to the fore has to be newly organized in a fl exible way, providing for example territorial entities with more autonomy, both on the expenditure side and on the revenue side. At the same time, equalization systems have to grant equality and solidarity for the sake of the unity as a whole.

Th is paper focuses on federal and highly regionalized European States and analyses reform processes in the fi scal and fi nancial area from a comparative do-mestic perspective. Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Italy are referred to most in this paper while marginal remarks are devoted to Austria and the United King-dom. Th is paper starts by providing a comparative overview of the rationale that lies at the bottom of the reform processes within the proposed multi-tier systems (chapter 2). It investigates the characteristics that permeate the various legal or-ders. From a comparative perspective, it tries to single out the diff erent trends in shifting powers in favour of either (re)centralization or decentralization. Th e key elements of the reforms will be scrutinized in order to attempt an evaluation of the changing fi scal and fi nancial settings. Th en the paper goes on by paying nuanced attention to fi scal decentralization (chapter 3). Th e recognition of au-tonomy on the revenue side is one of the most important aspects as far as fi scal decentralization is concerned. Revenue regimes are briefl y described through a comparative perspective. Afterwards, the paper focuses on the problem of how to accommodate autonomy and diff erentiation as well as solidarity and equity within the new fi scal regimes (chapter 4). An analysis of the diff erent ways for-ward will be off ered (for instance, equalization schemes and debt brakes). Th e importance of intergovernmental cooperation will be discussed in the following chapter (no. 5). Th e paper goes on in describing the main features of intergov-

1. In the course of the common elaboration of the present paper, the chapters 2, 3 and 4 were written by Alice Valdesalici, the chapters 5, 6 and 7 by Elisabeth Alber and the introduction and conclusions by both.In short, public policy and its implementation should be attributed to the lowest level of government capable to achieve the objectives.


Reforming Fiscal Federalism in Europe: Where Does the Pendulum Swing? 327


ernmental cooperation in fi scal and fi nancial areas (chapter 6). Th e paper con-cludes with an analysis of recently established bodies and procedures in the fi scal area and public fi nance sector. It briefl y outlines some emblematic cases from an institutional point of view by describing the rules of the bodies as well as their role within the respective economic governance system (chapter 7). Finally, some conclusive statements are given to summarize the trends, which characterize the ongoing reform processes (chapter 8).

Th is paper does not stipulate a defi nition of the various terms used. As a gen-eral rule, it adopts terminology with regard to reforming processes as commonly used in the respective State and its offi cial documents as well as widely recognized doctrine. For example, Italy’s so-called fi scal federalism reform translates into a rearrangement of fi nancial relations while in Germany the reforms are in general called Federalism Reform I and Federalism Reform II and do have a larger scope of application. Th e context of each chapter will be self-explaining with regard to the used terminology. Moreover, when referring to the government levels the adjectives ‘multilevel, multilayered and multi-tier’ are used as interchangeable terms.

2. Th e rationale behind the reforms: decentralization or (re)centralization of powers?

European countries are being struck by reforms in fi scal and fi nancial areas, which are either recently concluded or in discussion. Th ey all aim at restructuring the fi nancial system and their intergovernmental cooperation schemes allowing both for the accommodation of pluralism and context-specifi c interests, and for the maintenance of unity and equity. For the sake of this analysis it is worth mak-ing a distinction at the very beginning between ‘mature federations’ (for example, States with a deep-rooted long federal tradition and a strong federal political cul-ture) and ‘emerging federations’ (for instance, States with a less-rooted multi-tier system and a rather weak federal political culture). Th e federal States Switzerland and Germany are examples of the fi rst group, while the highly regionalized States Spain and Italy fi t in the second group, being defi ned as ‘quasi-federal’ and as a “devolutionary asymmetric federation in the making”.2 Keeping this distinction in mind, several diff erences can be highlighted while analyzing the processes which characterize these two types of federations. As a matter of fact, in mature federa-tions the spirit of fi scal and fi nancial reforms seems to be less linked to the growth of power decentralization and is rather perceived as an opportunity (and necessity for competitive economic performance) for bringing coherence to a system by

2. See for example F.Palermo, “Asymmetric ‘Quasi-Federal’ Regionalism and the Protection of Minorities: Th e Case of Italy,” in: federalism, Subnational Constitutions, and Minority Rights, eds. A.Tarr, R.Williams, J.Marko, (Praeger, Westport, 2004), 107-132.




adjusting to new scenarios. Put diff erently, States have no other choice than to get functioning systems to adapt. Emerging federations are without a doubt hit by these same challenges, but their need for a new era of fi scal federalism does come as a consequence to the decentralization of public functions within their federal-izing processes (for example Italy).

In Switzerland, the emblematic example of a mature federation, in 2008 a reform has entered into force aiming at both the rearrangement of competenc-es between the Confederation and the cantons, and the reorganization of the equalization system. Th e existing tax competition inherent to the Swiss Con-federation causes wide discrepancies among the cantons (and in some cases also among the municipalities), even though the Swiss Confederation is a relatively small country. Both endogenous and exogenous factors called for new rules as the former system was ineffi cient in coping with the discrepancies. Th e new system combines vertical and horizontal components with a twofold objective: keeping the country together, while maintaining cantonal tax sovereignty.3 Moreover, the reform intervenes in disentangling several competences that previously were joint tasks. However, a set of common responsibilities is maintained, because in certain circumstances a strict separation is not sustainable. As a general rule, new forms of cooperation between the federal and the cantonal level have been established and block grants have been substituted to the former matching grants, in order to diminish the dependency of the cantons (especially in the poorest ones) from conditional federal transfers (for example, grants and subsidies). Finally, inter-cantonal collaboration and cost-compensation is fostered also through federal intervention on cantonal demand (for example with regard to the university sec-tor). Switzerland’s reforms are perfectly in line with the reforms elsewhere, off er-ing adjusted procedures to better respond to new scenarios and better meet the quest for coherence and effi ciency. As a matter of fact, the Swiss Confederation is one of the most decentralized federations4 and the reform in 2008 does not change in its principles; it confi rms the status quo ante. Th e changes, as such, do not interfere in the equilibrium between decentralization and (re)centralization (or, put diff erently, in the balance between autonomy and solidarity) and confi rm the inherent rationale of federal systems: dynamic and process-oriented systems that require a constant and accurate maintenance.

3. See G Kirchgässner, “Swiss Confederation,” in: Th e practice of fi scal federalism: comparative perspectives, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, eds. A. Shah, J.Kincaid, vol. IV, (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston/Montreal, 2006), 338-339.P. Mischler, “Il federalismo fi scale in Svizzera,” in:, Federalismo fi scale ‘learning by doing’: modelli comparati di raccolta e di distribuzione del gettito tra centro e periferia, ed. A. De Petris (Cedam, Milano, 2010), 68-74.4. R. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal, 3rd ed, 2008), 176-177.




In recent years also the mature federation of Germany has experienced two federalism reforms, respectively in 2006 and in 2009.5 Some of the main objec-tives of Federalism Reform I in 2006 were the improvement of the decision-mak-ing capabilities of the Bund (at the federal level) and its Länder (at its constituent units). Th is was reached by the redefi nition of the Länder’s participation rights in the legislature of the Bund, a clear allocation of political responsibilities and a clarifi cation of the legislative competences of the Bund and the Länder (the so-called disentanglement). Th is fi rst constitutional revision did lead to a clearer distinction in the competences allocated between Bund and Länder. Moreover, it limited both the need for approval on federal legislation (Zustimmungsgesetze) by the Bundesrat (the Federal Council representing the Länder) and the federal intrusion in ‘aff airs’ belonging to the Länder jurisdiction (for example by elimi-nating the framework legislation, reducing the so-called common competences and redefi ning the functioning of the concurrent legislative competence). Even if it overcame the ‘reform tailback’ (Reformstau) that prevented the start of the reform process, the 2006 revision missed dealing with the issues related to public fi nances and intergovernmental fi nancial relationships, and, in particular, with the equalization transfers from the richer to the poorer Länder.6 Finances between the Bund and the Länder had been excluded from the reform. Th e purpose was to postpone the revision of ‘fi scal federalism’ to Federalism Reform II, whose joint parliamentary commission started its works in December 2006 and completed them in 2009. Th e second reform was supposed to address the system of inter-governmental fi nances as a whole. However, a comprehensive restructuring of the system was missed. Th e joint commission of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat failed to elaborate proposals on important issues like taxation and fi scal equaliza-tion. Th e questions related to the equalization system were left off the agenda. Both the federal and state governments have agreed to keep the existing intergov-ernmental transfer scheme (Finanzausgleichsgesetz), which expires in 2019. Th is system was agreed upon in 2005 on the basis of the 1999 decision of the Federal

5. For an in-depth analysis of fi scal federalism in Germany, see: J. Woelk, “I rapporti fi nanziari tra i livelli di gov-erno nell’ordinamento tedesco,” in: Federalismo fi scale in Europa, Esperienze straniere e spunti per il caso italiano, eds. F. Palermo, M. Nicolini, (Edizioni Scientifi che Italiane, Napoli, 2012), 15-42.6. Th e 2006 reform indeed comprises some adjustments as far as Bund-Länder fi nancial relations are concerned. To this regard it is worth mentioning the amendments of art. 104a of the German Basic Law, that now includes: 1. the requirement of the Bundesrat approval over federal laws that provide for Länder administration or funding (para. 4); 2. Th e joint responsibility of both the Bund and the Länder as far as EU law violations are concerned, together with the respective percentage in costs bearing in case the EU should fi ne Germany (par. 6). On the Reformstau, see Woelk, J.Segnali, “di crisi nel federalismo tedesco: verso un modello più competitivo?,” in: Le Regioni (1999), 217-244.On the Federalism Reform I, see A.Gunlicks, “German Federalism Reform: part one,” in: German Law Journal, vol. 8, n. 1 (2007): 111-132 ; the Law Review Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, no. 1 (2007).J. Woelk, “Eppur si muove: la riforma del sistema federale tedesco,” in: Le Istituzioni del Federalismo, no. 2, (2007): 193-216.




Constitutional Court,7 which with regard to arising confl icts between richer and poorer Länder, obliged the legislative bodies to adjust the equalization scheme. Th is adjustment fi xed the equalization scheme for the period between 2005 and 2019 and took place shortly before the commission of Federal Reform II started its works8 Th erefore the main outcome of Federal Reform II is the revision of the constitutional rules that govern sub-national and federal borrowing. Th e so called ‘debt brake’ (Schuldenbremse) was introduced. It reshaped the constitutional in-debtedness rules for both the Bund and the Länder and institutionalized an early warning system to prevent and remedy future budget crisis. Since the seventies both the Bund and the Länder have experienced a high level of public debt and the 2008 fi nancial and economic crisis have worsened the state of public fi nanc-es.9 At a certain point, when some Länder claimed a federal bailout asserting that debt levels were no longer sustainable, the situation began to degenerate.10 Th e constitutionalization of the ‘debt brake’ (see details in chapter 3) prompted a re-centralization eff ect by introducing strong budgetary restraints on the Länder fi nances. Th is trend could have been off set by the recognition of more autonomy to the Länder as far as the revenue side is concerned, but the reform did not in-tervene on tax autonomy, confi rming the status quo ante.

A peculiarity of the German federalism is the gap between the rationale for reform and the objectives reached once the process was concluded. As a matter of fact, while the German Federal Republic has always been referred to as an example of stability, constitutional revisions have been relatively numerous. Th is is due to the very nature of a federal system, which can work eff ectively only if conceived as a process and not as a static equilibrium. Reforms have to be viewed as a rule rather than as an exception, a tool for maintenance rather than as a tool

7. BVerfG, 2 BvF 2/98, 11.11.1999.8. With regard to confl icts arising within the equalization scheme between richer and weaker Länder, the Court deemed the equalization system as constitutional, but under the condition that clear and objective criteria are settle by the law (so called “Maßstäbegesetz” that can be translated as “measure-law”). On the 2005 reform of fi scal equalization system in Germany, see: G.Färber, K. Baranova, “Centralisation and Decentralisation of Fis-cal Federalism in Germany,” in: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, Decentralizing and Re-centralizing Trends in the Distribution of Powers within Federal Countries, (2008 IACFS Conference, Barcelona, 2010) For further details on the reform see: Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Länderfi nanzausgleich at< http://www.bundesfi nanzministerium.de/nn_3378/DE/Wirtschaft__und__Verwaltung/Finanz__und__Wirtschaftspoli-tik/Foederale__Finanzbeziehungen/Laenderfi nanzausgleich/27457.html?__nnn=true>(last access on 3rd March 2012).9. On the link between incentive problems and the growth of public debt in the German Länder, see J. Rod-den, A. Hamilton’s Paradox. Th e Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006), 153-187.10. Th e Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE) provided for a bailout of the Länder Saarland und Bremen, thus Berlin was denied a federal bailout (respectively, BVerfGE 86, 148 – Finanzausgleich II – and BVerfGe 116, 327 – Berliner Haushalt). On the issue of Länder bailouts see: Seitz H., Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany, in: ZEI working paper B20, Bonn, 1999 <http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/pdf/zei/b99-20.pdf>.




for revolutionary changes.11 Th ey permit the system to evolve and adapt to new internal and external challenges. Also in Austria, a centralized federation, the thirst for reform in the area of fi scal federalism derives from the need to keep the system coherent while trying to accommodate diff erent interests. Th e revision of the fi nancial constitution has been a part of the political agenda since 2003, but no agreement has been reached yet.12 Th e aim is to rationalize the system of fi nan-cial relations through an eff ective implementation of the connection principle13 between revenue and expenditure by means of endowing its nine constituent units (Länder) with more fi scal autonomy as well as with an equalization system based on real needs.

Referring to the emerging federations, it is interesting to refl ect on the Span-ish case,14 As a matter of fact, in Spain the recent reforms are a consequence of major power decentralization. Th is is a relentless motus that has characterized the Spanish system during the last three decades. Th us, the seventeen Autonomous Communities (ACs) are in charge of the most relevant public functions (such as education, social services and, since 2002, health) as well as important ad-ministrative powers. Th e decentralized public expenditure has increased due to the re-allocation of competences and thus the resources were in many cases no more adequate to the needs. Moreover, the reduction in State competences was not accompanied by the respective decrease of State resources in favour of the Autonomous Communities. Th e discrepancy in the distribution of resources and functions has triggered a vertical imbalance between the central and the interme-diate level of government. Additionally, the diff erences among the Autonomous Communities generated horizontal imbalances. Indeed, the previous fi nancing system was unable to grant territorial equality in the provision of public functions (basing the amount of revenues only on the population parameter). Th ese imbal-ances have been the main reason for the reform of 2009.

Finally, even the wave of reforms since 2006 has characterized the Statutes (Estatutos) of the Autonomous Communities as a motor for overall innovative changes. As a matter of fact, due to the revision of the Statutes, the framework

11. F. Palermo, “Recenti sviluppi del federalismo tedesco, tra continuità e innovazione,” in: Federalismi a con-fronto. Dalle esperienze straniere al caso veneto, ed. A. Benazzo (Cedam, Milano, 2010), 71-73.12. F. Palermo, “Il federalismo austriaco: un cantiere sempre aperto,” in: I cantieri del federalismo in Europa, ed. D’Atena Antonio (Giuff rè, Milano, 2008), 19-24.13. Th e connection principle suggests that public tasks should only be shifted to a lower level if the level is also provided with the respective fi nancial means and responsibilities to execute the additional functions. For a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the connection principle see; M. Nicolini, “Principio di connessione e metodo comparato,” in: Federalismo fi scale: una sfi da comparata, ed. F. Palermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari, (Eurac Research, CEDAM, Padova, 2011), 97-120.14. For an in-depth analysis of fi scal federalism in Spain, see: A. Carmona Contreras, “Il fi nanziamento delle Comunità autonome in Spagna,” in: Federalismo fi scale in Europa. Esperienze straniere e spunti per il caso italiano ed. F. Palermo, M. Nicolini (Edizioni Scientifi che Italiane, Napoli, 2012), 63-94.




legislation at central level (known as LOFCA)15 had to be revised in order to comply with the new fi scal provisions contained in the single Statutes.16 Put dif-ferently, some provisions of the new Estatutos called for a revision of the State legislation itself. All in all, the ‘Spanish Financial Constitution’ consists of the so-called ‘constitutional block’ (the Spanish Constitution itself ), the Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas (LOFCA) and the Statutes (Es-tatutos) of each Autonomous Community (AC). Th is results in a very complex system of fi nancial relations. 17 Th e Spanish Constitution itself contains only a few provisions relating to fi scal federalism and limits itself in defi ning the general principles guiding the system as a whole. Th e LOFCA and the Statutes are sub-ordinated to the Constitution. In particular, the LOFCA contains general provi-sions enforceable in all Autonomous Communities, while the Estatutos defi ne the rules regarding each single AC. In practice, the recent revision of the Statutes in the area of fi scal autonomy turned out to be in contrast with the general provi-sions of the LOFCA and called for an amendment of the LOFCA itself while affi rming a de facto supremacy of the Estatutos.18

Italy, a highly regionalized State, is aff ected by a similar anomaly. Back in 1997 (Bassanini Laws) signifi cant executive competences were decentralized and in 2001 a constitutional reform revised the intergovernmental relationships, es-pecially with regard to its fi fteen ordinary Regions.19 Regions were given more legislative and administrative powers and provided with fi scal autonomy, both on the revenue and expenditure side.20 Th e 2001 Constitutional Reform reshaped the constitutional relations between the central State and the Regions by chang-ing the distribution of legislative and administrative powers among these govern-ment tiers. Art. 117 of the Italian Constitution now lists all exclusive legislative

15. LOFCA stands for Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas no. 8/1980, adopted on 22 September, as later on amended, last with the LOFCA 3/2009 adopted on 18 December 2009.16. F. Balaguer Callejon, “Lo Stato ‘Autonómico’ Spagnolo: La stagione delle riforme,” in: I cantieri del federal-ismo in Europa, (ed. D’Atena Antonio Giuff rè, Milano, 2008), 333-393.17. At present the fi nancing system of the common regime Autonomous Communities is disciplined in the LOFCA 3/2009, of 18 December, in modifi cation of the LOFCA 8/1980, of 22 September; and the Law 22/2009, of 18 December, regulating the fi nancing system of the common regime Autonomous Communities and Cities with a Statute of Autonomy, for the reforms that did not require an Organic Law (that is a super-primary Law, with a status in between an ordinary Law of the Parliament and a constitutional Law). On the special rank of the LOFCA in the Spanish system, see: Parolari S. and A. Valdesalici, “Le fonti del federalismo fi scale e le tendenze riformiste,” in Federalismo fi scale: una sfi da comparata, ed. F. Palermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari, (Eurac Research, CEDAM, Padova, 2011), 339-370.18. G. Carboni, “Il federalismo fi scale dinamico in Spagna,” in: federalismi.it, no. 9, (2010): 4-8.19. Italy’s cooperative regionalism consists of fi fteen ordinary regions and fi ve special regions. Th e ordinary regions remained on paper until the 1970s, while the special regions as a general rule developed their autonomy systems since 1948. As mentioned in art. 116 of the Italian Constitution the latter are: Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (consisting in the two Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano) and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste.20. Art. 117 and 118 of the Italian Constitution.




powers of the State as well as the concurrent ones, while residual powers lie with the Regions. Th e implementation of the fi nancial aspects of the 2001 Constitu-tional Reform remained unresolved and the model of grants made by the cen-tral government was de facto confi rmed. Only in 2008 fi scal federalism entered once again into the political arena. Framework Law no. 42/2009 implemented art. 119 of the Italian Constitution [Financial Autonomy]. Th is delay had further worsened the asymmetry between the expenditure and the revenue accountabil-ity as far as territorial autonomies are concerned. While the ordinary Regions and local entities were entitled to 50% of the total public spending, they were responsible for only 18% of the revenue. Put simply, the delta of 32% translates into a vertical fi scal gap and points out the unaccountability of the system. Law no. 42/2009 and its bylaws (enactment decrees)21 were given the task to reduce this inconsistency by implementing the constitutional principles of ‘fi scal feder-alism’. Th e framework legislation of 2009 provided for a new order of fi nancial relationships among all tiers of government aiming at entrusting all territorial entities with more autonomy and accountability, both on the expenditure and the revenue side. However, the tax system still remains mostly centralized as far as the legislative power is concerned. Th is guarantees tax pressure uniformity within the Italian territory. All in all, this pattern also characterizes the other European States, with the sole exception of Switzerland.

Finally, even in the devolved United Kingdom a reform is under discussion.22 But the process concerns only a limited part of the territory, more precisely the devolved administration of Scotland.23 On the one hand, the Scottish territory has been entitled with a high level of devolution as far as competences are con-cerned; on the other hand it has not been guaranteed an adequate level of fi scal autonomy. As a matter of fact, the Scotland Act of 1998 distinguished between “reserved ” (listed in the Act) and “devolved matters” (not listed in the Act), but endowed the Scottish Parliament a limited fi scal autonomy. Scotland was recog-nized the power to vary the tax rate over the income tax up to 3%.

21. With Law no. 42/2009 of 5 May, the parliament delegates the central government for the implementation of fi scal federalism principles reckoned in art. 119 of the Italian Constitution.22. For an in-depth analysis of fi scal federalism in UK, see: J. Frosin, “La ‘devolution’ fi scal nel Regno Unito: verso l’apertura del vaso di Pandora?,” in: Federalismo fi scale in Europa. Esperienze straniere e spunti per il caso italiano, ed. F. Palermo, M. Nicolini (Edizioni Scientifi che Italiane, Napoli, 2012), 109-123.23. To follow the steps related to the adoption of the Scotland Bill, see:http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/scotland.html.




3.Th e tax systems: trends in shifting accountability by fi scal decentraliza-tion

Fiscal relations in multi-tier systems can be conceived as the outcome of cen-tralization and decentralization trends. Due to its importance for the very ex-istence of compound States and its inherent dynamic nature, they frequently undergo reforming processes. Such processes shift accountability and powers in favour either of the central or decentralized tiers of governments. Th e recognition of autonomy on the revenue side is one of the most important aspects as far as fi s-cal decentralization is concerned. A revenue regime in multilevel States typically consists of three elements: tax sources owned by each level of government, shared taxes and State transfers. Th e role played by each element deeply relies on the al-location of the taxing powers. As a matter of fact, in some countries subnational entities rely highly on federal transfer or shared taxes, while in others they depend mainly on own source revenues.24

With the sole exception of Switzerland, in the European scenario the legisla-tive power to tax is extremely centralized.25 As a norm, the federation has the legislative competence to create and regulate the tax system, while sub-national entities are recognized only limited taxing power, usually with regard to tax-sources having little relevance as far as the revenue is concerned. Additionally, sub-national entities tend to be reluctant in making use of the limited powers acknowledged because taxing is considered an unpopular measure (for example, in Austria).26 On the contrary, expenditure competences and responsibilities tend to be highly decentralized in European federations, as most of the sub-national entities are entitled with relevant executive powers. Th is is the case not only of the German Länder, which are in charge of both own and delegated executive pow-ers, but also of the Spanish Autonomous Communities and the Italian Regions. Indeed, even the sub-national entities of the two emerging federations have been progressively acknowledged with more and more competences, such as health, education and social assistance.27 Th erefore, in European federations fi scal au-tonomy and accountability of sub-national entities have to be reached by other means; such as shared taxes, which are established and regulated by a federal law

24. For an in-depth analysis on fi scal sovereignty and the role of subnational entities in compound States see: G. Färber, “La sovranità fi scale degli enti territoriali,” in: Federalismo Fiscale: Una Sfi da Comparata, (eds. F. Pal-ermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari, CEDAM, 2011), 123-155.25. On fi scal federalism in the Swiss Confederation, see: S.Gerotto, “Il ‘federalismo fi scale’ svizzero,” in: Fed-eralismo fi scale in Europa Esperienze straniere e spunti per il caso italiano. eds. F. Palermo, M. Nicolini (Edizioni Scientifi che Italiane, Napoli, 2012), 95-107.26. P.Bußjäger, “I rapporti fi nanziari in Austria,” in: Federalismo fi scale tra diff erenziazione e solidarietà. Profi li giuridici italiani e comparati, ed.Woelk Jens (Eurac research, n. 55, Bolzano, 2010), 131-142.27. Extending the competence not only to the executive power, but even to the legislative one, at least recogniz-ing a legislative power shared in between diff erent levels of government.




and then distributed among the tiers of government. Depending on the applied sharing criteria, this source of revenue can foster political and fi nancial account-ability and the responsiveness to local needs.28 Indeed, if the formula applied in the distribution, takes into account the amount of receipts collected within the territory of reference, this results in a linkage between spending capability and tax capacity.

At this point, it is worth mentioning the reforms recently adopted in the emerging federations of Spain and Italy. Th e Spanish Autonomous Communi-ties have been entrusted with increased autonomy and joint responsibility29 in order to reduce the dependency on State transfers. Th e reinforcement can be traced back to both the rise in the percentage of tax-sharing (for instance, taxes partially devolved or ‘ceded’, tributs cedidos)30 to the Autonomous Communities and the increase in the regulatory and administrative powers over them. As far as revenue sharing is concerned, the taxes assigned are the same already set down in the previous system.31 Th e main novelty is the growth in the allotted percentage. For example, the share in the Personal Income Tax revenue amounts to 50% of the taxable yield, while before 2009 Autonomous Communities were entitled to only 33%. Even the part received from the Value Added Tax has been brought from 33% to 50% of the net collection. While the amount received from Spe-cial Manufacturing Taxes on Beer (and on Wine and Fermented Liquors), on Intermediate Goods, on Alcohol and Alcohol Products, on Fuels and on Tobacco Products has increased from 40% to 50% of the net collection. Moreover, Auton-omous Communities were recognized the power to set the individual and family minimum as far as the taxation on Personal Income is concerned, thus enhanc-ing the legislative powers over the ceded taxes already acknowledged in the 2001 reform.32 Despite the progresses in terms of autonomy and joint responsibility, the Autonomous Communities still do not have a regional tax system as the tax-ing power belongs mainly to the central level, in line with the European trend. A similar remark can be asserted as far as Italy is concerned. Regional autonomy on the revenue side is indeed rather limited even after the reform. Despite the link-

28. Anderson George, Fiscal Federalism: A Comparative Introduction, Forum of Federations (Oxford University Press, Canada, 2010), 19-20.29. See Art. II, LOFCA (Ley Orgánica 3/2009).30. For an accurate analysis of the Spanish fi scal federalism system before the 2009 reform, see: J.López-Labor-da, J.Martinéz-Vásquez, C. Monasterio, “Kingdom of Spain,” in: Th e practice of fi scal federalism: comparative perspectives, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, eds. A.Shah, J. Kincaid, vol. IV (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston/Montreal, 2006), 288-316.31. By Law no. 21/2001, of 27 December, regulating the tax and administrative measures of the new system of fi nance applicable to Autonomous Communities under the Common System and Cities with Autonomy Statutes.32. Ley Orgánica 7/2001, of 27 December, modifying the Ley Orgánica 8/1980, of 22 September, on Autono-mous Communities fi nancing (known as LOFCA).




age between regional fi nancing and tax revenue as well as the abolition of State transfers, the legislative power to tax is still extremely centralized. According to art. 119 of the Italian Constitution, Regions have to fund their expenditure by means of their own taxes, shared taxes and un-earmarked transfers fi nanced from an equalization fund. With the reform of 2009, State transfers have been abol-ished and replaced with revenues related to the fi scal capacity of each territory. At present, Regions are entitled to a 44,72% share of the Value Added Tax revenue, which is calculated in appliance to the territoriality principle. Th is means that in estimating the regional revenue the reference goes to the amount collected within the territory and not anymore to the value statistically assessed by the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT).33 Th e reform pursues the accountability of the inter-mediate level of government, connecting the revenue amount to the development of local economy.34 Nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind that the legislative power to set and levy the most relevant taxes still remains in the hands of the State. In practice, regional tax autonomy is limited to taxes with little quantita-tive relevance due to the stringent limits put in place (most importantly, the prevention of double taxation on the same tax base). Th e most signifi cant tax will probably be the regional tax on auto vehicles.35 From a comparative perspective, the Italian Constitution does not list the own-taxes of each level of government as the German Basic Law does.36 Nevertheless, a new order in terms of major fi s-cal autonomy has been reached for certain taxes and under specifi c conditions. Regions have been acknowledged the power to intervene on the surtax of State taxes varying the tax rate within well-defi ned constrains set forth by the State. For example, regional sources comprise a surcharge on Personal Income Tax and the reform has endowed the Region with the legislative power to vary the tax rate within certain limits established by the State. Another example of increased fi scal fl exibility concerns the regional tax on the Income of the Productive Activities (so-called IRAP). As a matter of fact, Regions have been provided with the power to reduce the tax rate, if they meet specifi c requirements.37

33. Th e normative reference is the enactment decree no. 68, of 6 May 2011, published in the Offi cial Bulletin no. 109, of 12 May 2011 and entered into force on 27 May. Th e decree regulates the autonomy on the revenue side of both ordinary regions and provinces and disciplines the criteria for defi ning standard costs and needs in the health fi eld. For a commentary see: E. Buglione, and E. Jorio, “Schema di decreto legislativo in materia di autonomia di entrata delle regioni a statuto ordinario e delle province nonché di determinazione dei costi e dei fabbisogni standard nel settore sanitario,” in: Il federalismo fi scale, ed. Antonio Ferrara, Giulio M Salerno. (Commento alla legge n. 42 del 2009, Napoli, Jovene editore, 2nd edition, 2011).34. Th is principle already applies as a general rule to the fi ve special Regions.35. Gilberto Muraro, Federalismo regionale: la rivoluzione può attendere, in: Lavoce.info, 05.04.2011.36. See Art. 105 Grundgesetz.37. Art. 2, 4, 5 and 6, enactment decree no. 68/2011, of 6 May, on regional and provincial fi scal autonomy on the revenue side.




In Austria, the reforming project aims at conferring the intermediate level of government more fi scal autonomous powers on the revenue side, but the Länder do not welcome this.38 Th ey ask for more competences, but do not seem to be keen on getting more responsibilities. Th e discussion over the conferral of a great-er autonomy in the power to set taxes is telling in this regard. Th e limits that the European Union interposes in order to ensure eff ective fi scal harmonization is one counterargument, while another one can be inferred from the federal pro-posals formulated in order to enhance their taxing powers. In practice, the Fed-eration seems to be willing to attribute to the Länder only tax sources that have little relevance as far as the revenue are concerned. Furthermore, the Länder did not even exploit the powers, they have been recognized, over tax bases. So far the system fails in providing the right incentives for changing the status quo, because the Länder have at disposal adequate sources by means of federal transfers.39

Even the Federal Republic of Germany is tremendously centralized as far as the legislative power to set and regulate taxes is concerned. Moreover, the tax sys-tem is strongly harmonized (especially at the intermediate level).40 Th e system is characterized by a predominant role of the Bund in ruling the major tax-revenue sources with the consequence that the tax pressure is equal within the territory.41 It is therefore not relevant where one is resident (whereas residency in Switzerland can make a signifi cant diff erence with regard to tax pressure). Th e Länder lack au-tonomy as far as the revenue side is concerned, even if they can exert their infl u-ence via the Bundesrat, because legislation in fi scal matters requires its approval. Indeed, the major receipts at the state level are shared taxes (Income and Corpo-ration Tax as well as Value Added Tax) regulated by the Bund, while tax-revenue belonging exclusively to the Länder are residual. Th e other relevant sources are equalization transfers from other Länder (horizontal equalization) or from the Bund (vertical equalization). If tax-revenue and equalization transfers were not adequate, the only practical remedy until now was borrowing. Federal Reform

38. For an in-depth anaysis of fi nancial intergovernmental relations in Austria see: E. D’Orlando, “I rapporti fi nanziari tra i livelli di governo e le antinomie del modello federale austriaco,” in: Federalismo fi scale, Esperienze straniere e spunti per il caso italiano Europa, eds. F.Palermo, M.Nicolini (Edizioni Scientifi che Italiane, Napoli, 2012), 43-62.39. To this regard see: P. Bußjäger, “Novità nell’intreccio dei rapporti fi nanziari in Austria,” in: Federalismo fi scale: una sfi da comparata, ed. F. Palermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari (Cedam, Milano, 2011), 189-190.40. Th e situation is slightly diff erent as far as local jurisdictions are concerned. As a matter of fact, the municipal level has the power to set the rate over the local business and the real estate taxes. See P. Feld Lars, Jürgen von Hagen, “Federal Republic of Germany,” in: Th e practice of fi scal federalism: comparative perspectives, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. IV, ed. A. Shah, J. Kincaid (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2006), 138-143.41. Further details on Federalism reform II and the new “Schuldenbremse”, in: Feld P. Lars Baskaran Th unshy-anthan, Federalism Commission II – Recent Reforms of the Federal-Länder Financial Relationships in Germany, in: www.forumfed.org, 26.10.2009 D. Heinz, Federal Reform II in Germany, in: Centro Studi sul Federalismo, Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 2, issue 2, 2010.




II introduced strict borrowing rules both at the constitutional and primary law level.42 Th e issue of fi scal autonomy has been discussed by the Federalism Reform Commission II, but no agreement has been reached on the point.

In the United Kingdom, the Scotland Bill 2010-2011 should take into ac-count the recommendations advanced by the Calman Commission, recognizing the Scottish Parliament as having the power to set the rate on the income tax and to make adjustments to the boundaries of the devolved responsibilities. Th e recognition of a major degree of fi scal autonomy in the United Kingdom follows the decentralization of competences and aims at creating accountability. But the devolution regards only 15% of the territory and this is one of the most relevant diff erences compared with emerging federations. Th e remainder is highly cen-tralized, not only as far as the taxing power is concerned, but with regard to the overall system.43

Th e Swiss model represents an exception to the European panorama. Can-tons have signifi cant taxing powers, while the Confederation can exploit a tax base only if explicitly defi ned in the Constitution. In particular, indirect taxation belongs to the federal level (for example, the value added tax), while direct taxa-tion is a joint competence of all tiers of government. Cantons can, for example, set tax rates, schedules and deductions as well as defi ne the progressivity of the tax scheme on individual income, wealth and corporate profi ts and capital.44 En-lightening to this regard is the fact that the federal power to set taxes on income is temporary and it will expire in 2020.45

4. Th e problem of squaring the fi scal reforms between autonomy and soli-darity

As previously analyzed, the tax system of European multilevel States remains as a general rule centralized in both mature and emerging federations; the sole exception is Switzerland. As ensuring equality is a recurrent trait d’union of all multilevel States, autonomy and diff erentiation are to be balanced with the equity

42. But things will be changing because the 2009 reform has regulated borrowing restrictions in detail both at constitutional and primary-law level. See E. Bertolini, “I rapporti fi nanziari intergovernativi nell’ordinamento federale tedesco,” in: Federalismo, sistema fi scale, autonomie, ed. G.Ferrari, (Donzelli editore, Roma, 2010), 77-105.43. S.Parolari and A. Valdesalici, “Le fonti dell’ordinamento fi nanziario e le tendenze riformiste: spunti per una comparazione,” in: Federalismo fi scale: una sfi da comparata, ed. F.Palermo, E.Alber, S.Parolari (Cedam, Milano, 2011), 362-369.44. Mischler P. “Il federalismo fi scale in Svizzera,” in: Federalismo fi scale ‘learning by doing’: modelli comparati di raccolta e di distribuzione del gettito tra centro e periferia, ed. A. De Petris (Cedam, Milano, 2010), 68-74.45. See T. Fleiner, “Th e current situation of Federalism in Switzerland,” Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals (REAF), Institut d’ Estudis Autonòmics (IEA), Barcellona, no. 9 (2009): 56.S. Gerotto, “Il ‘federalismo fi scale’ svizzero,” in: Federalismo fi scale in Europa. Esperienze straniere e spunti per il caso italiano, ed. F.Palermo, M.Nicolini (Edizioni Scientifi che Italiane, Napoli, 2012), 95-107.




and solidarity principles in order to grant equal or at least similar opportunities in all territorial autonomies.46 As a matter of fact, uniformity in tax pressure does not guarantee homogeneity in tax revenue, because fi scal capacity tends to vary widely under the impact of several other factors like socio-economic development, the availability of resources, the demographic consistency, the population density and age, as well as topographic and structural aspects. Consequently, multilevel States aim at reducing the existing disparities through equalization mechanisms. Th e goal is to ensure equality in the access to civil and social rights in the entire territory, independently from the place of residence. Comparative refl ections are of signifi cant interest in this regard. Th e German Basic Law mentions as one of its main goals the guarantee of “comparable living conditions throughout Germany”,47 while in Italy the Constitution refers to the “essential levels of services related to civil and social rights”48 (a minimum level to be guaranteed in the fi eld of health, edu-cation and social assistance and to a certain extent, local public transport). Also in Spain, the legislator has foreseen the guarantee of an “equivalent level of essential services in all the territory” with regard to essential services (health, education and social assistance) by taking as a benchmark the average national level.49

After these preliminary and general remarks, it goes without saying that equal-izing funds are highly controversial instruments. Th ey are diff erently interpreted and create confl icts between territorial entities that de facto or de jure contribute to them and the ones that benefi t from them. Th eir regulation calls for periodical maintenance acts in order to eff ectively balance autonomy and solidarity for the sake of the unity of the State.

In Switzerland the reform of the fi scal equalization system has been one of the core objectives of the 2008 reform. In particular, two diff erent tools have been in-troduced. Th e fi rst tool aims at ensuring fi scal equity among the cantons through an equalization based on fi scal resources and consisting of both a vertical (Con-federation-cantons) and a horizontal (among the cantons) component. A second tool—the equalization of the expenditure needs—aims at reducing cantonal dis-parities caused by structural factors. In particular, the latter is twofold: it consists of two funds that focus respectively on geo-topographic and socio-demographic

46. On the balance between solidarity and autonomy/accountability see: M. Bertolissi, “Il bilanciamento tra solidarietà e responsabilità nell’ambito del federalismo fi scale,” in: Federalismo Fiscale: Una Sfi da Comparata, (ed. F. Palermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari, CEDAM, 2011), 13-64.47. Art. 72, par. 3, Grundgesetz. Actually, before Federalism Reform I the German Basic Law referred to the guarantee of equal living conditions throughout Germany.48. Art. 117, par. 2 m), Italian Constitution.49. Th e reference goes to Art. 2, par. 1 c), of the LOFCA 3/2009.




needs.50 It entails both a vertical and a horizontal component, the horizontal dimension contributing in mitigating any re-centralization eff ect. Furthermore, the system has been conceived to guarantee the cantons the chance to compete on equal footing without setting diff erences to zero. Fiscal autonomy has been pre-served, keeping fi scal competition as a sound characteristic of the Swiss system. Th is contributes in off setting potential re-centralization eff ects.

Even in Germany the fi nancial equalization mechanism will be reformed rela-tively soon as the system in force will expire in 2019. Th e present system has been shaped in 2005 with the aim of creating and keeping comparable living condi-tions on the entire territory by means of a complex intergovernmental transfer scheme.51 It consists of four steps52 and two dimensions: a vertical (Bund-Länder) and a horizontal one (Länder-Länder). It aims at adjusting a distribution of rev-enues based on territorial fi scal capacity with transfers that come either from the other territorial entities or from the Bund. Nevertheless, in practice, the equaliza-tion system does not set diff erences to zero. Moreover, in Germany it is prohibited to overweaken net-contributors to the equalization fund (the strongest Länder).53

In Italy, the reform of the equalization mechanism has been included in the 2009 reform (Law no. 42/2009). More precisely, other than regulating the sys-tem, the reform sets the basic principles. Quite relevant to this regard are the changes in the fi nancing criteria in order to grant the so-called “essential levels of public services” throughout the territory. Th e funding of functions will be gradu-ally based on standard costs and needs which are been calculated with regard to each ‘essential’ public service. Th is new system of predefi ned costs will substitute the principle of historic expenditure, which consisted in transfers calculated on the last year’s expenditure. As far as the changes in the equalization mechanism stricto sensu little has been done so far. It will remain a vertical system aiming at guaranteeing an equal starting point. Th e reform poses the prohibition of setting diff erences to zero. Th erefore, future will show how the Italian regional asym-metries will evolve and how each Region will perform.

Also the 2009 reform in Spain has put much emphasis on the equality prin-ciple. According to art. 158 (1) of the Constitution and in compliance with the

50. For further details on the new equalization system see: Nuova impostazione della perequazione fi nanziaria e della ripartizione dei compiti tra Confederazione e Cantoni (NPC), Rapporto fi nale sulla legislazione d’esecuzione, Berna, 2004; and Rapporto sull’effi cacia della perequazione fi nanziaria tra Confederazione e Cantoni 2008–2011, Berna, 2010; both available at: <http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/zahlen/00578/index.html?lang=it> (last access on 3rd March 2012).51. For futher details on the topic, see: V. Losco, “Gli sviluppi dell’equalizzazione fi scale in Germania nella nuova leggedi perequazione,” Le Regioni, n. 6 (2005): 1099-1117.52. Only two of them can be envisaged has equalization mechanism stricto sensu.53. H. See Scheller, “Solidarietà e senso di responsabilità nello Stato federale tedesco – cresce il divario tra i prin-cipi costituzionali e la realtà politico-fi nanziaria?” in: Federalismo Fiscale: Una Sfi da Comparata, (ed. F. Palermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari, CEDAM, 2011), 65-95.




guarantee of an equivalent basis-level (nivel base equivalente) of fundamental pub-lic services (Art. 2.1, Law no. 3/2009), the legislator (Art. 3, Law no. 3/2009) has set up the Basic Public Services Guarantee Fund, which aims at ensuring all Au-tonomous Communities the same resources per unit of need in order to fi nance the essential public services in the fi eld of health, education and social services. Th e overall fund amount is calculated yearly by taking into account the fl uc-tuation in terms of fi scal capacity, while the sum assigned to each Autonomous Community is determined using the index of the weighted population through several new variables: some of them linked to the population like the school- or elderly-age and some others that go beyond the spread (dispersion), the surface and the insularity criteria. By doing so, the equalization system refl ects much more the eff ective conditions of each Autonomous Community and the resource distribution matches the real expenditure needs.54 Nonetheless, a step towards de-centralization could stem from the two additional Convergence Funds (the Fund for Competitiveness and the Fund for Cooperation), newly set up by the Spanish reform (Law no. 22/2009). Even if the funds are centralized as they are fi nanced with additional State resources, they are meant to enable all Autonomous Com-munities to compete on an equal footing,55 as they aim at decreasing disparities in terms of revenues available per inhabitant and at fostering regional economic balance, enhancing equality and equity.

As a matter of fact, equalization systems do not per se exert a re-centralization eff ect. For instance, the boundaries associated to these mechanisms can help in mitigating the re-centralizing trend associated to them. In general all systems meet a common limit to the extent that in reducing disparities they have only to guarantee a common starting point, avoiding setting to zero the territorial dif-ferences. In order to safeguard fi scal autonomy, diff erences among the territorial entities are only partially reduced. Only by doing so, the overall aim of fi scal decentralization can be met: ensuring equality in the opportunities and not in the goals.

Furthermore, the re-centralizing outcome could be off set by an institutional framework, which eff ectively provides for participation of sub-national entities in decision-making processes at the federal level (see details in the chapters 5-7). As a matter of fact, the way equality is realized by means of a co-decision mecha-nism or of a unilateral decision can exert a relevant infl uence on its perception. Germany and Switzerland, for example, ensure an eff ective involvement of all levels of government in the decision making process favouring a sound sense of

54. I. Mut Aguilar, E. Cuéllar Barbeito, “Il federalismo fi scale in Spagna,” in: Federalismo fi scale ‘learning by doing’: modelli comparati di raccolta e di distribuzione del gettito tra centro e periferia, ed. A. De Petris (Cedam, Milano, 2010), 41-45.55. Th ey are regulated in Title II of the Law no. 22/2009.




balance to the system, even though they have introduced wide-scope equalization mechanisms. In practice, Germany’s equalization fund has a greater scope than the Swiss one.

Other tools exerting a re-centralizing eff ect are the ‘debt brake clauses’. Eu-ropean States are obliged to severe budget stability objectives for both internal reasons (economic performance) and external ones (EU stringent limits set up for the Eurozone member States).56 In Germany, as already mentioned, Federal-ism Reform II has regulated the so-called Schuldenbremse57, which forbids incur-ring into new debt in normal economic circumstances and foresees restructuring programs for budget off enders. Th e new ‘close to zero balance provision’ will be eff ective in 2016 for the Bund and in 2020 for the Länder, replacing the old restrictions based on art. 115 and on art. 109 of the German Basic Law (budget defi cit linked to gross investment spending). Once into force, temporary and well-defi ned exceptions will be accepted.58 Moreover, the new system applies dif-ferent criteria to the Bund, on the one hand, and to the Länder, on the other hand. As a matter of fact, the federal budget is balanced even if there is a struc-tural defi cit of 0,35% of the annual GDP growth, while for the Bund and the Länder the maximum debt rate has to be 0,5% of the annual GDP growth.59 Th e stricter limitation introduced for the intermediate level of government together with the limited legislative power to tax could challenge the Länder as they are accountable in providing the most relevant public functions as far as the welfare state is concerned.

Th e issue of a balanced budget has been recently put in the agenda of the legislator even in Spain and in Italy. Th e Spanish Parliament has approved a con-stitutional amendment on the so-called “estabilidad presupuestaria” that entered into force in September 2011 and revised art. 135 of the Constitution.60 Th e reform in constitutionalizing the principle of the balanced budget makes explicit reference to the EU criteria, but at the same time introduces some derogations following the model of the German Schuldenbremse. At this point, it is worth mentioning the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court in July 2011, where

56. F. Fabbrini, , “Il pareggio di bilancio nelle costituzioni europee,” Quaderni costituzionali, Il Mulino n. 4 (2011): 933-934.Even stronger constrains will have to be respected by the EU Member States once the Fiscal Compact Treaty (signed on 2 March 2012) will enter into force.57. Artt. 109 and 115 of the German Basic Law.58. For further details on the Schuldenbremse, see: Feld, P. Lars, Baskaran, Th ushyanthan, “Federalism Com-mission II – Recent Reforms of the Federal-Länder Financial Relationships in Germany,” in: www.forumfed.org, 26.10.2009.59. In practice, the Länder budgets’ debts can reach at the utmost 0,15% of the annual GDP growth. See D.Heinz, “Federal Reform II in Germany,” Centro Studi sul Federalismo, Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 2, issue 2 (2010), 5.60. Palomar, n. 47, 2011, available online at: <http://www.unisi.it/dipec/palomar/palomar.html > (last access on 20 March 2012).




the Court recognizes the power of the central Government to limit the spending of the Autonomous Communities in order to reach budgetary stability. By doing so, the infl uence of the central State is even more strengthened (re-centralization trend).61

Th e same goes for Austria. Th e Austrian government decided to enshrine a debt brake, which is intended to set a limit to the structural defi cit and to the state debt in order to comply with the EU standards.62

In Italy discussions on the debt brake are going on, but the rule has insofar not been constitutionalized.63 Indeed, the constitutional amendment is following the procedure as regulated in art. 138 of the Constitution and is still missing the second approval of the Senate.

Broadly speaking, the need to comply with the limits set up by the EU in-struments of stability and budget consolidation puts decentralization even more in trial. Th e purpose of involving all territorial entities to reach the goals set by the EU is not per se exerting a re-centralizing eff ect. Such a consequence derives mainly from the implementation process at national level. As an example, in Spain anticrisis measures have strengthened the position of the State at the ex-pense of the intermediate level. Th e State has for instance made a distorted use of the spending power issuing and managing conditioned subsidies (the so-called stimulus measures) in economic and social areas which belong to the shared or even exclusive competences of the Autonomous Communities. Some of them have fi led an appeal against the Constitutional Court alleging a confl ict of com-petences (for example, Catalonia). Even the austerity measures, imposed unilat-erally by the State, have triggered a (re)centralizing eff ect further on.64 Also in Italy, the central state has unilaterally imposed a reduction in the decentralized public expenditure without involving the representatives of the territorial entities into the decision-making process. Th e issue is again referable to the institutional framework and its capability in ensuring the participation of sub-national auton-omies in decision-making at national level. Only if mechanisms and procedures are clearly structured and well thought through, the (re)centralizing trends can be mitigated.

61. Tribunal constitucional de España, no. 134/2011, of 20 July (published in Boletín Ofi cial del Estado, no. 197, of 17 August 2011).62. See Art. 51 B-VG. For an analysis see: E. D’Orlando, “I rapporti fi nanziari e le antinomie del modello fed-erale austriaco,” in: Federalismo fi scale in Europa. Esperienze straniere e spunti per il caso italiano, ed. F. Palermo, M. Nicolini (Edizioni Scientifi che Italiane, Napoli, 2012), 59-62.63. In order to follow the ongoing debate, updated information can be found in the website of the Italian Parlia-ment (rectius of the Camera dei Deputati) at: <http://www.camera.it/465?area=1&tema=496&Il+pareggio+di+bilancio+in+Costituzione >(last access 31th March 2012).64. See C. Pi-Suñer Viver, “Impact of Global Economic Crisis on the Political Decentralizazion in Spain,” in: L’Europe en formation, no. 358 (2010): 80-87.




5. Th e importance of intergovernmental relations for a new era of fi scal federalism

Growing complexity and specialisation in the vertical (but also horizontal) structure of the public sector poses new challenges to the institutional arrange-ments, both internally (central-regional/provincial-local) and externally (supra-national-international). Th e rapid growth both in the autonomy and in the re-sponsibilities of sub-national and local governments and in the growth of the plurality of actors is a widely recognized trend in multi-tier government and mul-tilevel governance. Due to these developments, questions of institutional design and coordination are of utmost importance, especially while calling for a new era of fi scal federalism and fi nancial relations. From an institutionalist point of view sub-national governments’ fi scal powers are only meaningful and self-enforcing when the central government cannot challenge the authority of the lower levels. Th e nature as well as legal source of institutional arrangements and coordination procedures are thus of fundamental importance. A set of formal and informal institutions as well as procedures should eff ectively be put into place in order to create an integrated coordination policy in economic and public fi nance within systems, which nowadays have to come to grips with emerging overlays of inter-nationalism and (g)localism. A coordinated approach within intergovernmental relations is needed to guarantee that institutional arrangements—no matter if new or already in force—are being adequately adapted during and in view of the reform processes in order to effi ciently support a new era of fi scal federalism.

As a rule, intergovernmental relations and its institutional arrangements have a twofold objective. Th ey off er a platform where to negotiate on issues still at stake and, subsequently, they should guarantee the embodying of the right sorts of incentives and fl exibility for public decision makers in order to both accom-modate common but also diff erentiated interests. If only viewed in its economic component, any reform of fi scal federalism might easily end up in having a series of commitment problems, resulting in what Rodden would call, “the most for-midable challenges facing multi-tier systems of government: fi scal indiscipline among sub-national governments”.65 In order to avoid such commitment problems, one has to refl ect on the functioning of existing institutional arrangements and its evolution within ongoing reforms. How do fi scal and political institutions co-evolve and under which conditions does coordination in fi scal matters and public fi nance run amongst the diff erent authorities and stakeholders?

Th e importance of intergovernmental relations has been widely recognized in international doctrine. Th ere are key features for putting into place fundamen-

65. J. Rodden, “Th e Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World,” in: Federalism, ed. J. Kincaid, Volume 4, Sage Library of Political Science (2011): 71-100. [originally published in American Journal of Political Science, 46(3) (2002): 670-687].




tal mechanisms aiming at insuring intergovernmental harmony and cooperation, whereas the Constitutional Courts should—at least ideally—only be the last re-sort for ultimately deciding on intergovernmental disputes. Ron Watts defi nes “processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where government responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap” as a structural characteristics of a federal system.66 Many other distinguished federal scholars defi ne intergovernmental relations as an essential feature of federalism (next to other elements, such as a bicameral legislature with a strong federal chamber to represent the constituent units, a written constitution, which is diffi cult to amend, and a Constitutional Court protecting the Constitution through the power of judicial review). With regard to federal fi scal powers and fi scal rela-tions, Ron Watts in his works points out that in most federations the jurisdic-tion appropriate for allocating expenditures tends to be the one closest to the people, thus the lower levels, but that the appropriate jurisdiction for raising revenue tends to be at intermediate and higher levels. Major taxes as the Indi-vidual and Corporate Income Tax as well as the Value-Added Tax are usually set up by the central level, which is the major policy-maker for economic de-velopment. As a general rule, the regulation of economic activity is best left to the central level and due to the infl uence of Keynesian policies, central govern-ments have become the major actors in economic stabilization by developing a variety of intergovernmental relations through the means of institutions and procedures, which create ties that bind local tiers of government to the deci-sions taken at the highest level of government (spending power at central level); additionally, conditional grants, transfers to correct vertical and horizontal fi s-cal imbalances as well as tax sharing and harmonization are fi scal measures that foster intergovernmental relations. In practice, all this underlines the hypothesis of a (re)-centralized outcome, reinforced by the fact that as a general rule the federal government is at the end of the day made responsible for the design of fi scal arrangements. As already mentioned earlier, constitutional restrictions on the ability of the central level to override decisions taken at a lower level of gov-ernment may overcome this problem. Against the backdrop of the economic and fi nancial crisis, intergovernmental relations thus end up playing a crucial role in economic stabilization, being the most appropriate forums for adjusting fi nancial relations in order to both directly or indirectly comply with the parameters set either internally or externally (for example, the stability pacts). No fi scal reform can be carried out eff ectively without the involvement of each local jurisdictions, not only because of the emerging overlaps of government functions but also be-

66. R. Watts, “Th e Federal Idea and its Contemporary Relevance,” in: Th e Federal Idea – Essays in Honour of Ronald L. Watts, eds. T. Courchene, J. Allan, C. Leuprecht and N. Verelli (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal/Kingston, 2011), 13-27.For a comprehensive analysis of the works of Ronald Watts with regard to intergovernmental relations see R. Agranoff , “R.L. Watts and the Managing of IGR in Federal Systems,” in: Th e Federal Idea – Essays in Honour of Ronald L. Watts, ed. T. Courchene, J. Allan, C. Leuprecht and N. Verelli (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal/Kingston, 2011), 269-287.




cause of the widely recognized fact that fi scal policies have worked well in highly decentralized federations such as Canada, Switzerland and the United States.

6. Casting intergovernmental cooperation as ‘pulling together or apart forces’

Th ere is no single model when it comes to deciding who should be responsible for the design of the system of intergovernmental fi scal relations.67 In practice, it is often the norm to make the central government solely responsible for the design of fi scal arrangements. Th is underlines the hypothesis of a (re)centralizing trend, despite the fact that the common characteristics of the ongoing reform processes in fi scal arrangements are to make sure that local jurisdictions are be-coming more responsible and accountable by granting them more autonomy.

Separate bodies and ad hoc created commissions can be involved in the design and implementation of fi scal arrangements. Such temporary or permanent bodies vary across the States and may be composed of both central and local representa-tives on an equal footing and their decisions may be either of binding or consulta-tive nature. What acuminates all models is their aim of facilitating cooperation and coordination, while also reconciling the central level need for balancing soli-darity and autonomy, or, in other words, equity and diversity. Some States use intergovernmental forums, executive federalism or federal-provincial committees to come to terms in negotiating fi scal arrangements. Th is is the case of States like Canada and Germany. In Germany, the Basic Law promotes concurrency of functions and provides that federal laws in fi scal matters have to be submitted for approval to the Bundesrat (Federal Council), where the state governments (Länder) are represented. Th is system enables each state government (Land) to participate in the legislative and executive state functions at the federal level and ensures negotiation and consensus in the whole process of shaping fi scal policy, which is then readily implemented because everybody has previously agreed upon the issues at stake.68 However, it induces decision-making by agreeing on a mini-mum denominator or preservation of the status quo. Put diff erently, Germany’s intrastate federalism allows for decision-making in fi scal area at the federal level where the Länder, who are responsible for implementation, have their say. Th e Länder quota of members is proportional to the relative population size and can

67. A. Shah, “Introduction: Principles of Fiscal Federalism,” in Th e Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives, A Global Dialogue of Federalism, ed. A. Shah (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston/Montreal, 2007), 3-43 (35-37).68. A keyword of H. Kelsen see: M. Kotzur, “Federalism and bicameralism – the German ‘Bundesrat’ (Federal Council) as an atypical model,” in: A world of second chambers. Handbook for constitutional studies on bicam-eralism, eds. J. Luther, P. Passaglia, R. Tarchi (Centro Studi sul Federalismo, Studi 4, Giuff rè, Milano, 2006), 257-58.




be from three to six. Th e integrative character of the federal legislature69 also serves the function of being a guardian of legislative power because of the rep-resentation it gives diff erent national and regional, as well as popular and party interests. Th e ability of the German Bundesrat to serve as an institution to facili-tate intergovernmental co-operation and collaboration is conducive to the fact that —“… unlike the other federal second chambers, …it is composed of instructed delegates of the land governments”,70 even though one has to keep in mind that the system applies to the vertical federal/regional relations as the Bundesrat is a federal organ and as such it is concerned with matters within the federal competence and thus not directly with the horizontal coordination among the Länder themselves. In fact, interlocking politics refers to the relations between the federation and the Länder (Politkverfl echtung).71

It seems that vertical intergovernmental relations predominate. In practice, however, the presence of the relevant federal minister at the interdepartmental conferences of the Länder ministries, where items of both federal and Länder competence are discussed, favour a network of horizontal intergovernmental rela-tions. Depending on the interests of the respective Länder, the states coordinate their policies in negotiations for or against the federal level.72 It goes without saying that horizontal intergovernmental relations are especially developed in the fi elds for which the Länder hold exclusive powers (for example, education and culture).

In fi scal policies the diff erent interests between richer and poorer Länder eas-ily create confl icts and intergovernmental cooperation is politicized (especially since German unifi cation). Prior to the establishment of the Stability Council (see details in chapter 7) fi scal policies were coordinated within the Financial Planning Council (Finanzplanungsrat), in cooperation with the Council for Economic Development (Konjunkturrat). Th ese institutions were of consulta-tive nature and they were mandated to provide guidelines for budgetary deci-sions. Th ey provided for a very loose and ineff ective coordination, also against the backdrop that a considerable share of tax revenues in Germany is deter-mined by joint-decision-making (federal law requiring the assent of the Bun-desrat). Federalism Reform II did strengthen intergovernmental coordination of budget policies between all tiers of government, imposing a preventive mecha-nism (restructuring programs) helping to comply with the new debt brake rules.

69. Th e strong integrative system of Germany with its highly administrative networks shows why Germany rightly was called a unitary federalism. See K. Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat, Karlsruhe, (C.F. Müller, 1962).70. R. Watts, Federal Second Chambers Compared, ed. Institute of Intergovernmental Relations (Queen’s Univer-sity. Special Working Paper Series on Senate Reform, 2007-2008).71. Th e concept was introduced by Scharpf. See, inter alia, Scharpf, W. Fritz, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, Col. Westview Press 1997), 143-145.72. A. Benz, “Intergovernmental Relations in German Federalism – joint decision-making and the dynamics of horizontal cooperation,” conference paper, in: www.forumfed.org (last access on 9 March 2012).




From an overseas comparative perspective, Canada is characterized by its ineff ectual bicameralism, an interstate model of federalism, allowing for the separation of jurisdictional authority between territorial actors and for the pre-dominance of competition and bipolarity. In contrast to Germany, the Canadian provinces do not have any direct say in federal legislation or its implementation but are relatively autonomous in using their own legislative powers and carry out their own policies. Th us, in Canada, the federal government has an extensive scope for fi scal policy making. However, it has a weak scope what implemen-tation concerns as the provinces are independent. It can gain leverage through negotiation and provision of incentives, but more recently the strategy has rather been to withdraw from such incentives (for example, shared cost programs) and leave market forces to impose fi scal discipline on the provinces.73 With regard to the tax system, Canada has a competition tax system, albeit with a shared col-lection arrangement for income tax, while Germany has a cooperative one. On the expenditure side, Canada’s national government can quickly cut expenditure, whereas the German government is constrained by consensus.

Switzerland like Germany has a cooperative system, but weak government constraints replaced by the strong democratic check of popular referendums. In Switzerland, the Council of States represents the cantons, comprising 2 repre-sentatives for each of the 20 larger cantons and 1 each for six smaller cantons. As the American Senate, it is a strong house with full legislative powers and a veto over all legislation. But the fact that its members are directly elected by the people on a cantonal base means that it lacks to give voice to the cantonal governments. For this reason, Conferences of the presidents and of other members of govern-ments have been set up in order to guarantee executive powers to participate at federal decisions.

Also an increasing number of emerging or recently established federations have adopted executive federalism mechanisms to resolve fi nancial issues. In South Africa, a statutory budget council is in force. It is headed by the Minister of Finance and comprises representatives of the nine provinces as well as repre-sentatives of local governments and local government associations. Th is Council is the primary deliberative body for sub-national fi nance recommendations.74 In Spain, the Senate lacks signifi cant policy-making powers; intergovernmental re-lations have for several years engaged in informal channels as bilateral sectoral transfer commissions, sectoral conferences, joint planning bodies and cooperative

73. For a comprehensive analysis of the Canadian case see R. Boadway, “Canada,” in: An Global Dialogue on Federalism - Th e practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives, ed. A. Shah (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston/Montreal, Volume 4, 2007), 99-124.74. For a comprehensive analysis of fi scal federalism in South Africa see B. Khumalo, and R. Mokate, “Republic of South Africa,” in: An Global Dialogue on Federalism, - Th e practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspec-tives, ed. A. Shah (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston/Montreal, Volume 4, 2007), 262-286.




agreements. Increasing multilateral fi scal cooperation and expanding decentrali-zation were a consequence of strong regionalist parties claims in fi scally compe-tent Autonomous Communities, their infl uence at central level and their calls for joint policy making mechanisms. Since 2004, it informally launched and later formalized a Conference of Autonomous Community Presidents that now meets biannually with the Prime Minister. With regard to the Spanish system it is worth mentioning two issues. First, the extensive use of the framework legislative powers made from the Central State in matters of shared jurisdiction. Th e latter should only set the generic and common principles whereas the Autonomous Communities should be responsible for implementation through detailed legisla-tion; in practice, most of the State laws go well beyond these boundaries. Second, certain competences of the central State can be ascribed as transversal powers, powers being enabled to interfere in decentralized matters. Th ese transversal pow-ers have been extensively interpreted by the State; for example in regard with the exclusive State competence in the “regulation of basic conditions guaranteeing the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise of their rights and in the fulfi llment of their constitutional duties” or in the “basic rules and coordination of general economic planning”.75 Even the overwhelming appeal to the notion of “supra-territoriality” has turned out to be an escamotage for justifying the State intrusion in areas that otherwise would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Commu-nities.76 Moreover, even the Spanish Constitutional Court has turned out to be an ally of re-centralization. For example, in the Judgement over the Catalan Statute, even if the Court declared the constitutionality of the law, the interpretation it gave was eff ective in nullifying de facto all relevant aspects concerning the ‘en-forcement’ or even the ‘innovations’ in terms of Catalonian competences. Th ese elements together with the lack of an institutional mechanism enabling eff ective participation of the Autonomous Communities in the decision-making process (with the sole exception of the sectorial conferences) affi rm a de facto prominent status of the central State.77

In Austria, the federal Constitution of 1920 has been revised several times and every time it has led to a strengthening of the federal level, facilitated by the po-litical constellations of grand coalitions. Th e Austrian Länder succeeded only to a limited extent to stop the trend towards centralization and thus Austria remains a centralized federation, in which regional power is clearly subordinated to the federal power (even if theoretically the Länder could have wide ranging powers

75. See Art. 149 Spanish Constitution.76. See Pi-Suñer Carles Viver, Th e transition to a decentralized political system in Spain (Forum of Federations, 2010), 10-14.77. M. Corretja Torrens, “Th e cooperation in the Public Administration as a Mechanism of Centralization in Spain,” in: Governing from the Centre: Th e infl uence of the Federal/Central Government over Subnational Govern-ments, available at <htp://www.foev-speyer.de/veranstaltungen/rueckblick.asp>(last access on 12 March 2012).




because art. 15 B-VG gives them power over all matters not expressly assigned to the federation). At federal level, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) represents the interests of the Bundesländer in the decision-making process. Its members are elected by the Länder parliaments allocating seats roughly proportional to each Land population and closely linked to their political allies in the Nationalrat, which deters them from objecting legislation that was approved by a majority of the National Council as they do follow party logics rather than the interests of their state government. In theory, the National Council and the federal chamber could be peers, but in practice the Bundesrat has a limited and rather ineff ective power. As a rule, the Federal Council is only entitled with a veto78 on legislation that passed the Nationalrat, but this objection may be overruled by a second voting with a qualifi ed quorum.79 In this way the system aims much more at granting a federal control over the Länder, than a cooperation of the two levels of government in adopting decisions. With regard to fi scal area, the Constitution does not defi ne tax-raising powers. Th is is left to the federal legislation (Fiscal Adjustment Act), which cannot be vetoed by the Länder. As a result, the states don’t have almost tax income on their own and depend on tax income shared by the federation or transfer by the federal level. In order to counterbalance the little relevance of the Federal Council, the so-called “26-Commission”80 has been fore-seen. Th e latter one is a joint body responsible in solving trials in fi nancial matters (on laws in matters of taxing power), in case the Federal Council makes use of its veto power.81 In practice, the “26-Commission” does not have a great impact in the Austrian fi nancial system. Both because it did not have the possibility to con-vene often and because negotiations in fi nancial matters between the Federation and the Länder does not take place within such institutionalized mechanisms, being rather a negotiation between parties based on a political consensus (among the federal level and the conference of the Länder presidents, an organ, which in contrast to the “26-Commission” is not disciplined constitutionally). Th us, in Austria for many years intergovernmental cooperation has been more political, than institutional; this was the case until at least 1999,82 the year in which an agreement on a consultative mechanism and on a future stability pact of sub-national entities entered into force between the federation, the Länder and the municipalities (in compliance with 15a B-VG, which as a general rule foresees the establishment of such mechanisms between the three tiers of government).

78. Art. 42 B-VG79. See A. Gamper, “Th e Austrian Bundesrat,” in: A world of second chambers. Handbook for constitutional stud-ies on bicameralism eds. J. Luther, P. Passaglia, Tarchi Rolando (Centro Studi sul Federalismo, Studi 4, Giuff rè, Milano, 2006), 801-802.80. Art. 9 F-VG81. See M. Mazza, “Il federalismo fi scale nell’ordinamento austriaco,” in: Federalismo, sistema fi scale, autonomie, ed. G. Ferrari (Donzelli editore, Roma, 2010), 148-152.82. Agreement between the Federation, the Länder and the Municipalities on a consultative mechanism and on a future stability pact of subnational entities, BGBl. I, n. 35/1999.




Th is consultation mechanism has turned out to be quite eff ective in institu-tionalizing intergovernmental cooperation.83 Broadly speaking, self-coordination of the Länder turned out to be an important element of Austrian federalism.84 Intergovernmental cooperation, both legal and informal, is contributing in mak-ing federalism in Austria more dynamic and, by doing so, it tries to mitigate its centralized nature. Even though there are no constitutional provisions, high level meetings such as Länder conferences and the joint liaison offi ce became a device to coordinate Länder interests next to private law contracts and public treaties between the federation and the Länder; also in the arena of fi scal federalism, where the federal level plays a predominant role. As a rule, the Austrian fi nancial intergovernmental relations are based on a three-tier system of cooperative and contractual nature (federal-state-municipal level), whereas municipalities are not constituent units of the federal system. Intergovernmental cooperation involves all tiers of government.

On the contrary, Italy has failed to institutionalize the participation of the territorial entities in the decision-making process. Th e Constitu tional Reform in 2001 reshaped the constitutional provisions of the relations between the central State and the Regions by changing the distribution of legislative and adminis-trative powers between the State and the Regions.85 However, the 2001 reform missed to constitutionalize institutions and mechanisms allowing for regional and local participation in the decision-making process by reviewing intergovern-mental fi nancial relations. Completing such reforms was not of interest to the political constellation. Th e issue of reforming fi nancial relations re-entered the scene only in 2008, also due to the determinant support of the Northern League party. Th us, vertical cooperation was not strongly developed in Italy; the same goes for horizontal relations (due to the weak position of the ordinary Regions).86 Th e only existing cooperation mechanism, the Standing Conference for Coop-eration between the State, the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces (Con-ferenza permanente per i rapporti tra lo Stato, le Regioni e le Province Autonome), was established in 1983 and formalized by Law no. 400/1988. Th is Standing State-Regions Conference is a cooperative body vested with consultative pow-ers, which discusses regional interests. Over time it gained signifi cant political infl uence. Given the absence of a federal council representing territorial interests,

83. See Francesco Palermo, “La costituzione fi nanziaria austriaca. Tare genetiche di un sistema in evoluzione,” in: Atripaldi Vincenzo, Bifulco Raff aele (a cura di) Federalismi fi scali e costituzioni (Giappichelli, Torino, 2001), 93-98.84. R. Sturm, “Austria,” in: Forum of Federations (ed. Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005), 45-57.85. To recall, art. 117 of the Italian Constitution now lists all exclusive powers of the State as well as the concur-rent ones, while residual powers lie with the Regions.86. For an anaylsis of the role and development of Italy’s regions within a multilevel governance system, see P. Bilancia, F. Palermo, O. Porchia, “Th e European Fitness of Italian Regions,” in: Perspectives on Federalism, (Vol. 2, issue 2 Centro Studi Federalismo 2010).




vertical coordination between the State and the Regions developed along less institutionalized lines (with the exception of the institutionalized relationships between the State and the special Regions). Th e Standing Conference System meets in three diff erent settings: the so-called “State-Regions Conference”, the “State-cities and Local Autonomies Conference” and the “Joint Conference”, which brings together the three levels of government (State-Regions-local government). In its diff erent settings the Conference System is composed of representatives of the State and territorial entities, who respectively get involved in the specifi c subject matter under discussion.87 Even if not vested with any legal power to veto a national bill, the Conference provides a political and technical forum where the interests of the Regions and the State can be balanced against each other. In a large number of cases its opinion is now actually compulsory. Th e Conference System became the solely forum for vertical negotiation between the diff erent levels of government; it fostered a system, in which Regions focused on bilateral State-Regions negotiation as horizontal cooperation is as a general rule seen as a second-best choice. Th is trend and the increasing political weight of the Standing Conference State-Regions did strengthen the role of the executives at all levels of government. Moreover, the Conference System is limited by its inherent diver-sity. Put diff erently, it is diffi cult to defi ne common positions due to the variety of territorial representatives and interests, which translate into cleavages between diff erent government levels, cleavages between diff erent political views and cleav-ages due to socio-geographical diff erences along the North-South line. Th is was also a reason why other bodies were newly established to deal with delicate issues as fi scal federalism (see chapter 7).

Moreover, the 2001 Constitutional Reform has acknowledged to the Italian State the exclusive legislative power on certain subject matters that touch regional competences, pursuing through an indirect path a re-centralizing outcome (so-called transversal powers). To this regard it is worth mentioning the State com-petence on the regulation of the “essential level of functions concerning civil and political rights” to be guaranteed at an equal level in all the Country or even of the “fundamental functions” of local bodies. With their identifi cation and ruling the State can therefore strongly interfere in the autonomy recognized to the territorial entities. Furthermore, this eff ect is amplifi ed by the extensive interpretation given over the State legislative competences by the Constitutional Court.

87. For an evaluation of these forms of cooperation from the diff erent perspectives of ‘mature Federations’ on the one side, and of ‘emerging Federations’ on the other side, and for a detailed analysis of the evolution of the Italian system of conferences, see: R. Bifulco, “Th e Italian Model of State-Local Autonomies Conferences (also) in the light of Federal Experiences,” in: A world of second chambers. Handbook for constitutional studies on bicameralism eds. J. Luther, P. Passaglia, R. Tarchi (Centro Studi sul Federalismo, Studi 4, Giuff rè, Milano, 2006), 1051-1083.




It goes without saying that intergovernmental fi scal relations pose diff erent challenges according to the distinct economic and societal characteristics of each country. Common to all countries undergoing reforms in the area of fi scal feder-alism is the fact that both decentralization processes and democratic defi cits pose a challenge for maintaining sustainable macroeconomic conditions. A further common trend of present-day intergovernmental systems can be denoted in the increasing use of contracts and reliance on asymmetric arrangements. In practice, unequal bargaining powers deriving either from de jure or de facto asymmetries often leads to arrangements that attribute diff erent degrees of authority to the single sub-national entities. For example, in Spain Navarra and the Basque Com-munities have formal tax and expenditure powers beyond those of other Autono-mous Communities; bilateral agreements were of utmost importance in address-ing their claims of ‘historic communities’ even if the balance between bilateral and multilateral agreements has gradually shifted to an ascendancy of the latter.88

Also in Italy, bilateralism and specialty played and still play a fundamental role.89 Financial autonomy has, for example, been crucial for confl ict settlement in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen (South Tyrol). It was a milestone for implementing the Second Autonomy Statute (1972) and regulating the living together of the three linguistic groups: German, Italian and Ladin. Within the so called “fi scal federalism reform” (Law no. 42/2009) special Regions are negotiating bilaterally on how to participate in the new fi nancial framework. As a frontrun-ner, on 30 November 2009 South Tyrol has signed a fi nancial agreement with the central government defi ning the new rules on how to comply with the objectives and how to participate in the equalization fund.90

Generally speaking, diff erent regional interests and bargaining powers are important for fi scal decentralization as nation constitutions do not always fully specify the degree of decentralization and thus decentralization is determined by political bargains.91 Often the power to make fi scal decisions at provincial and local level is the result of the negotiations between various levels of governments. As a consequence many federal and unitary states have highly decentralized fi scal

88. See Ruiz Almendral, Violeta, “Th e Aysmmetric Distribution of Taxation Powers in the Spanish State of the Autonomies: Th e Common System and the Foral Tax Regimes”, Regional and Federal Studies, 13 (2003), 4: 41-66.89. For an analysis of special autonomies and fi scal federalism, C. Panzera, “Autonomie speciali e federalismo fi scale, tra ‘solidarizzazione’ della responsabilità e ‘responsabilizzazione’ della solidarietà,” in: Federalismo Fiscale: Una Sfi da Comparata, (eds. F. Palermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari CEDAM, 2011), 233-279.90. For a comprehensive analysis of the new South Tyrolean Financial Autonomy; A.Valdesalici, “L’intesa fi nan-ziaria per il Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol tra specialità e solidarietà,” in: Federalismo fi scale tra diff erenziazione e solidarietà. ed. Woelk Jens Profi li giuridici italiani e comparati, Eurac research, n. 55, Bolzano (2010): 95-114.See also the Law Review Istituzioni del Federalismo, Maggioli, Rimini, no. 1, 2012 for a detailed analysis of the newest developments concerning the fi nancial systems of the fi ve special Italian Regions.91. From a comparative perspective see R. Bird, and R. Ebel, “Fiscal Federalism and national unity”, in: Hand-book of Fiscal Federalism, ed. E. Ahmad and G. Brosio (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), 499-520.




and regulator systems, while others are highly centralized.92 All in all, intergov-ernmental cooperation in the fi scal and fi nancial area is of utmost importance for a sound and sustainable national economy because means of cooperation based on pure legislative procedures might be easily bypassed.

7. New fi scal coordination bodies and fi nancial rules in a nutshell

Many institutional solutions have been discussed to eff ectively face current challenges of the economic and fi nancial crisis and of the very nature of single systems (due to delayed implementation of institutional reforms that are mainly conducive to political factors). In practical terms, such solutions translate into diff erent reforms resulting, inter alia, in tax autonomy for sub-national entities, constitutional debt brakes, restructuring programs and stability laws. In order to implement reforms, coordinating bodies and procedures have also to be either re-vised (as a general rule in the case of mature federations) or newly introduced (as a general rule in the case of emerging federations or regionalized). Bodies need to be adapted to the single constitutional and socio-economic context of each State to eff ectively respond to the new rules of the game. As a general rule the presence of such bodies—if vested with appropriate powers—does provide for tighter rules within the State and foster a rather re-centralizing trend (especially if strong hori-zontal intergovernmental relations are absent). Without entering into details, the following subparagraphs intend to both shed light on the most important bodies and rules in the fi scal and fi nancial area, and briefl y refl ect on their interaction within the multi-tier legal orders subject of this paper.

… the German way forward

With regard to the German case, the German Financial Council93 is now upgraded to the so called Stability Council (Stabilitätsrat),94 which controls the compliance with the new borrowing rules (Bund and Länder are required to have a balanced budget by being part of the vertical network of debt limitation) and provides for procedures aiming at containing the indebtedness of all government tiers (restructuring programs). Both federal and states’ governments register too

92. Th e German Länder have little power to taxation, while for example the substantial income tax of Sweden is a local matter rather than a national one.93. Prior to the establishment of the Stability Council there was no close cooperation in force, nor between the Länder themselves, nor between the Länder and the Bund. Besides the “investment-oriented debt ceiling rule” in the German Basic Law expiring in 2020, the so called Financial Planning Council provided only for loose agreements and not for any kind of preventive instrument.94. Th e legal basis for the Stability Council are art. 109a of the German Basic Law (budgetary emergency) and the Stability Council Act [Stabilitätsratsgesetz vom 10. August 2009 (BGBl. I S. 2702)]. Th e Consolidation Aid Act, the Fiscal Equalisation Act and the Act on Basic Budgetary Rules vest the Stability Council with further tasks. Consult <www.stabilitaetsrat.de>for more details (last access on 8 March 2012).




high levels of public debts, which are creating considerable problems within the multi-tier system of Germany.95 Th e Stability Council is a joint body representing the Bund and the Länder.96 It is empowered to control fi scal policies of all tiers of government. Th e Stability Council is composed of the Federal Finance Minister, the Finance Ministers of all Länder and the Federal Economy Minister. It evalu-ates the Länder budgets according to fi nancial indicators, which are defi ned by taking Länder average as a benchmark (structural fi nancial balance, credit fi nanc-ing ratio, debt level per capita, ration of interest expense to tax revenue); even if highly criticized and diff erently interpreted, all in all, the choice of the key ratios does leave relatively sizeable scope for individual limits and interpretation; this also to refl ect the diff erent starting positions of the states. Th e Stability Council is mandated to help states to ensure the achievement of close to balance budg-ets as foreseen in the new debt brake. In other words, it accompanies states in their endeavour of maintaining a zero structural debt from 2020 onwards. Based on the calculated position of regular economic situation, the Stability Council decides upon whether the Bund or a Land faces a recession or is having a boom-ing economy, and, in a second step, whether new debts can be made or not. Th e evaluation procedure by the Stability Council does not trigger any assistance from the federation or the other Länder; aid is still left to the close fi nancial ties within the Länder equalization system (excluded from the scope of Federalism Reform II and due in 2019). Th e basis for the review of the budget situation is the stability reports, which both the Bund and the Länder have to submit annu-ally; they include a report of the current and short-term budget situation and one of the projection of medium-term budget development. Th e latter is as a matter of fact limited by its qualitative political and individual nature, by the multiple assumptions made and by the diff erent fi nancial planning methods in the Länder. Th e Stability Council is considered to be a watchdog that should exert public pressure by making budget and fi scal policy transparent. Governments should by these means be induced to avoid debts. Put diff erently, the Stability Council is meant to be the coordinator of budgetary and fi nancial planning, also with regard to the obligations that arise from the Stability and Growth Pact. It is early to make any in-depth evaluation on its works, but one can say that the procedure

95. See the cases of Saarland and Bremen as well as the case of Berlin. While in the former two, the Constitu-tional Court in 1992 ruled that they were eligible to federal bailout transfers (BVerfGE 86, 148, 358 ff .), it did not rule in favour of it in the case of Berlin in 2006. Th e federal government was not compelled to grant Berlin a bailout. It demanded Berlin to solve its crisis by its own and the German policy makers to formulate eff ective borrowing restrictions to avoid the need for bailouts in the future. Under the new rules of the Federalism Re-form II, Berlin, Bremen, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein will be paid transfers in the next years. Th ese transfers were a political compromise while agreeing on the debt brake and are subject to strict controls. As a precondi-tion for receiving the transfers the Länder had to agree in dismantling their structural defi cits until 2020.96. See Research Briefi ng, Deutsche Bank Research (ed.), “Stability Council: Financial Inspector of Germany’s Länder”, 15 September 2011, available on <www.dbresearch.com>(last access 30 March 2012).




provided with the Stability Council is taking the wind out of the entities’ po-litical interpretation of public debts; budget off ender are now obliged to submit restructuring programs and this procedure eases the introduction of unpleasant containment and savings measures by the policy makers. Additionally, the entity not obeying to the rules is barred from participating in relative votes. Resolutions of the Stability Council are adopted by the votes of two thirds of the Länder and the votes of the Bund. If a decision with regard to a single Land is subject to vote, then the respective state is not allowed to participate in the vote. However, it is worth noting that at the end of the day the Stability Council does not have any scope to impose ultimate direct sanctions (for example the denial of voting rights in the Bundesrat). If any restructuring program or procedure fails, so far it can only point with the fi ngers at the black sheep(s) and renegotiate the implemen-tation of the restructuring program. Th e future will prove if there is evidence of the degree of compliance with the restructuring programs and whether the whole Stability Council procedures lead to successful outcomes. At the end of the day, it is a quite complex system and politicians are careful in welcoming such a transparent procedure, which might lead to an implicit performance comparison based on an average benchmarking of effi ciency (a sort of horizontal competi-tive coordination). Th e restructuring programs directly infl uence the fi nancial planning of the respective Land, even if the framework legislation excludes as-sessment of the budget structure by the Stability Council. Th e restructuring pro-gram is implemented under each Land’s own directive and the Land is obliged to regularly report back to the Stability Council. In theory, consolidation measures could equally occur on the expenditure side and on the income side. In practice, however, the Stability Council Act stresses that the measures are only appropriate if they lie solely in the jurisdiction of the aff ected level of government; as a con-sequence, the restructuring measures will focus on the expenditure side owing to the limited revenue autonomy of the Länder (the real property transfer imposed in several Länder is to be regarded as an exception to the rule). Th e functioning of the new arrangements is based on an average calculation taking all Länder into account; this shows that the procedure is both creating more institutional en-tanglement and indirectly reinforcing the position of the Bund over the Länder, aimed at avoiding too large discrepancies between the Länder. Th is is not the case in Switzerland, where fi scal competition is viewed as preferable. Th e possibility of reforming and making the German fi scal system more responsible was missed in Federalism Reform II, in favour of an agreement on the new borrowing rules. It is also argued that an emerging tax competition could most probably be benefi cial also for Germany.97

97. P. Feld Lars, Baskaran Th unshyanthan, Federalism Commission II – Recent Reforms of the Federal-Länder Financial Relationships in Germany, in: www.forumfed.org, 26.10.2009.




… the Swiss way forward

By contrast to Germany, Switzerland avoids both a bailout guarantee for subnational entities and the negative incentive eff ects of an intense equalization scheme. Th e costs of fi scal indiscipline affl ict other jurisdictions to a much lesser extent. Th e high tax autonomy of its constituent units creates loyal ties between citizens of a certain territory and the public services off ered within the same. After years of rising defi cits and debt in the 1990s, Switzerland’s citizens adopted the debt brake as a constitutional amendment in 2001. Th e rule was implemented starting in 2003. Essentially, the rule calls for structural balance in each year and absolute balance over the course of an economic cycle. Th e rule did initially allow for “extraordinary spending” if a qualifi ed parliamentary majority approved, but recent changes have made this spending count as normal expenditures (see diff er-ences to the German model).

… the UK way forward

Contrary to the case of Germany, in the United Kingdom a non-political body, the Offi ce for Budget Responsibility (OBR),98 was recently set up for moni-toring fi scal policies99 (previously this function was vested in the Financial Serv-ices Authority, accountable to the Treasury Ministers, and through them, to the Parliament). Th e permanent Offi ce for Budget Responsibility (OBR) was estab-lished by the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act in April 2011 and its mandate is to examine and report on the sustainability of the public fi nances include forecasting, rule achievement and long term projections. Th e UK gov-ernment has thus ‘contracted out’ its fi scal forecasts, previously prepared by the Treasury. Th e OBR is considered to be the “most extreme case of positive analysis” in a comparative perspective, as it has to restrict itself to the analysis of the current government’s existing policies and cannot look at the impact of diff erent policy options.100 Th e OBR is a body under the aegis of the Treasury (its budget is part of the Treasury’s); however, it is an independent and very transparent body that is accountable to the Parliament; latter has also a veto over appointments to and dismissals from the OBR.

98. Th e offi cial web page is www.budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk (last access on 8 March 2012).99. Th e Golden Rule and the Sustainable Investment Rule are the main principles of fi scal policies formalized in the Financial Act 1998. Th e Golden Rule states that over an economic cycle the government will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending, while the sustainable investment rule foresees that the public sector net debt as a proportion of gross domestic product will be held over the economic cycle at a prudent level and below 40% of the GDP.100. For a detailed analysis see Wren-Lewis, Simon, “Fiscal Councils: Th e UK Offi ce for Budget Responsibil-ity”, CESinfo DICE Report 3/2011 available at <www.cesifo-group.de>(last access on 8 March 2012).




… the Austrian way forward

By contrast to the UK, the Austrian Public Debt Committee (Staatsschulde-nausschuss) established in 2002,101 comprises twelve members with voting rights (six appointed by the federal government and three each by the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and the Chamber of Labour) and three members without voting rights (one each for the Austrian Association of Municipalities, the Aus-trian Association of Austrian Cities and the Austrian Land Governors). It receives fi nancial support from the Austrian Central Bank and provides recommendations on the direction of fi scal policy and the overall fi scal stance (no macro forecasts). Membership in the committee is an honorary post and discussion is going on about transforming the committee from an advisory body concerned with the eff ects of debt fi nancing to a council for advice in matters of fi scal policy.

… the Spanish way forward

In Spain, the weakness of the Senate facilitated the creation of alternative fi scal intergovernmental coordination. Th e Spanish Council for Fiscal and Financing Policy (CPFF) of the Autonomous Communities (ACs) is the coordinating body between the central State and the Autonomous Communities (except the Basque Country and Navarra). It is the most important multilateral body for fi nancial matters and is composed of the National Minister of Economy and Finance, its respective counterpart in each AC and the Minister of Public Administration. Its nature is consultative and the agreements reached within the CPFF form the basis for developing the AC’s fi nancial arrangements. In practice, this instrument has been defi ned as being at the mercy of whims, a merely symbolic body which fos-ters institutional courtesy.102 In the case of Spain the weak institutionalization of territorial representation at central level fostered the establishment of multilateral subnational coordination, pushed by the strong regionalist parties; this prevents backward Regions from exploiting institutional devices to block fi scal decentrali-zation (for example revenue centralization). Procedures for setting budgetary sta-bility objectives have to be passed by the Spanish Parliament after having taken into account a report by the CPFF. If on approval of the Congress of Deputies the stability objective were rejected by the Senate, the objective will be put on a further vote in the Congress of Deputies and will be approved if ratifi ed by a sim-ple majority. Even if in theory each public administration has autonomy to all the procedures and regulations needed to meet budgetary stability, the central level is responsible for monitoring and ensuring the compliance with the budgetary

101. See detailed information at <www.staatsschuldenausschuss.at>(last access on 8 March 2012).102. J. P. Gordin, “Paradoxes of Federalism?: Political Institutions and Fiscal decentralization in Argentina and Spain,” in: Institut d’Estudis Autonomics, REAF, num. 11, Barcelona, (October 2010): 142-168.




objectives. Th e National government is however obliged to inform the CPFF on the degree of the fulfi llment of the budget stability objective. Th e CPFF also plays a facilitating role in enforcing the stability objectives in budget off ender Regions.

… the Italian way forward

Th e Italian situation up to now recalled the Spanish one of the 1980s, where the Autonomous Communities were granted greater legislative and administra-tive functions but not the power to levy taxes. Recently, the so called Italian “fi scal federalism reform”103 (Law no. 42/2009) provides all Regions with more autonomy as far as both revenue and expenditure are concerned and aim at cre-ating a stronger link between taxation and spending.104 Th e reform also foresees the establishment of new coordination bodies to be integrated with the existing Standing State-Regions Conference. Th is can be traced back to the fact that the principles that inform the Italian reforms in public fi nance and fi scal federalism are institutional loyalty among all levels of government as well as the principle of participation by all public administrations in attaining the objective of the na-tional public fi nances consistent with the restrictions imposed by the European Union and international treaties. With the reforming process of 2009, the princi-ples that govern tax powers have been modifi ed in light not only of the wording of the new art. 119 (Financial Autonomy) of the Italian Constitution, but also with regard to the indispensable link that the Constitution establishes between art. 119 and art. 117 (State and regional Legislative Powers). In detail, art. 117 grants the State exclusive power over national taxes and the equalization system. It also grants both the State and the Regions concurrent competency in relation to coordination of the public fi nances and taxation system; as a consequence

103. Consult <www.portalefederalismofi scale.gov.it>and <http://federalismo.sspa.it>for detailed information on the state of the art of Italy’s fi scal federalism reform.For a general analysis of the implementation of Italy’s Fiscal Federalism Reform that takes into account the con-tents of the diff erent enactment decrees, see; E. Alber, C. Zwilling, A. Valdesalici, “Italiens Finanzföderalismus: Finanzautonomie, gesamtstaatliche Koordinierung und politischer Druck aus dem Norden,” in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen ed. Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2010 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2010), 245-259.E. Alber, “Einer für alle, alle für einen? Eine fi nanzföderalistische Zwischenbilanz rund um das Jubiläum ‘150 Jahre italienische Staatseinheit’,” in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen ed. Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2011 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011), 242-254.C. Fraenkel-Haeberle, “Verfassungsrechtliche Schuldenbremse und neue Haushaltsregeln in Italien,” in: Eu-ropäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen ed. Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2011 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011), 255-267.104. According to art. 119 of the Italian Constitution subnational entities are to set and levy taxes and collect revenues of their own. Th e new system foresees that fi nancial coverage of all areas except essential services is to be provided by own taxes and the central state will no longer be the paymaster of last resort. Th e principle of historic expenditure (transfers based on last year’s expenditure) is being replaced by a so called standard cost system (predefi ned costs). Calculations are contracted out to an agency; consult <https://opendata.sose.it/fabbisognistandard>for latest details (last access on 9 March 2012). See also Rivosecchi, G., La determinazione dei fabbisogni standard degli enti territoriali: un elemento di incertezza nella via italiana al federalismo fi scale, in: <www.federalismi.it> 2011.




residual exclusive competence over regional and local taxes is attributed to the Re-gions. In practice, law no. 196/2009 105 and law no. 42/2009 reshape the whole setting in the area of public fi nance. Both laws aim at introducing an integrated system of horizontal and vertical coordination. Th e provisions contained in law no. 196/2009 establish new rules for the government accounting and public fi -nance; its provisions are to be seen as complementary106 to the provisions within the framework law on fi scal federalism (law no. 42/2009). More precisely, the Accounting and Public Finance Law 2009 provides for coordination implement-ing art. 117, whereas the Fiscal Federalism Law 2009 implements art. 119 of the Italian Constitution. No decentralized fi scal regime (read standard costs system) can be implemented without previously undertaking reforms with regard to ac-counting and public fi nance. Th e Accounting and Public Finance Law 2009 is in-formed by the principle of good faith collaboration and sets up a single regulatory framework governing public fi nance and accounting by harmonizing accounting systems as well as the budget systems of general government. In general terms, the governance problems of the Italian public fi nances are rooted in the budget prep-aration and execution as well as in its political culture. Th e whole budget process is a very fragmented, bottom-up in budget preparation and tightly centralized in budget execution. A single data base107 within the Ministry of the Economy and Finance now collects all data concerning budgets, fi nal balances and information relating to management transactions, so as to ensure a more eff ective and timely monitoring of public fi nance performance, implemented fi scal federalism as well as to prepare the necessary information to start the analysis and assessment of spending.108 In short, the new planning cycle (Public Finance Decision) is sup-posed to better ensure the necessary coordination of all levels of government (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate as well as the Permanent Conference for the Coordination of Public Finance).109 Th e latter body was provided by the Fiscal Federalism Law 2009 and is mandated to bridging the gap between the elabora-

105. And as modifi ed by Law no. 39/2011 with regard to the European economic governance. See R. Dick-mann, la seconda riforma della legislazione di fi nanza pubblica in conseguenza delle esigenze della Governance economica europea, in: <www.federalismi.it>2011.106. For example in both laws art. 2 touches upon the harmonization of public budgets, law 42 with regard to regions and local entities, law 196 with regard to all other public administration.107. It can be accessed by the Parliament.108. See Italy’s Stability Program for more details; available at <www.tesoro.it>(last access on 9 March 2012).109. Th e opinion of the Permanent Conference for the Coordination of Public Finance on the draft of the Public Finance Decision is compulsory. For a detailed analysis on the procedural rules concerning this dynamic coordination process, see L. Cadeddu Cavallini, “Il coordinamento dinamico della fi nanza pubblica nelle ri-forme,” in: <www.federalismi.it> no. 11/2011 (13-20).For a detailed picture of the functioning of the Conference see N. Lupo, “Il procedimento di attuazione della delega sul federalismo fi scale e le nuovi sedi della collaborazione tra i livelli territoriali: commissione bicamerale, commissione tecnica paritetica e conferenza permanente,” in: <www.federalismi.it>no. 23/2009 (chapter 9).




tion and insertion of certain objectives in the Public Finance Decision and the new fi scal rules affl icting the territorial entities.

Th e Fiscal Federalism Law 2009 also foresees an ad hoc commission to draft the contents of the implementation decrees, which acts within the Standing Conference State-Regions and helps the government in drafting the bylaws.110 Th e ad hoc Commission to draft the contents of the reform (Commissione tecnica paritetica per l’attuazione del federalismo fi scale)111 is composed of fi fteen mem-bers appointed by the central government and fi fteen members appointed by the representatives of territorial entities. Its task is to coordinate the implementation of the framework law 42/2009, to act as an advisory body for the territorial enti-ties and as a secretariat of the Permanent Conference for the Coordination of Public Finance (Conferenza permanente per il coordinamento per la fi nanza pub-blica). Th e latter one has important functions as co-defi ning budget objectives (also with regard to tax pressure and indebtedness), advising on the equalization fund, monitoring the territorial entities’ compliance with set objectives and pro-mote the enforcement of convergence programs as well as managing the reward or sanctions system.112 Other bodies, as the parliamentary commission for the implementation of the fi scal federalism with the committee of representatives of the territorial autonomies have advisory and control function as well as its sup-portive body.113 Th ese new bodies were introduced as a corrective measure and are complementary to the Standing State-Regions Conference, which until now has been the solely forum of coordination with all its limits previously described.114 In practice, the Permanent Conference for the Coordination of Public Finance is the advisory body accountable to the government once the whole fi scal regime is in force and the Standing State-Regions Conference preserves its function as prior to the reform of 2009. Considering the reforms examined here, the State ends up in reserving itself a managerial re-centralizing function, contrary to the very nature of federalism. Time will show if the new systems will undermine the

110. Th e Fiscal Federalism Law no. 42/2009 vests the responsibility with the national government, bypassing thus the parliament and not adequately taking into account the opinions of the representatives of local and regional authorities. Bylaws are indeed being adopted without reaching a consensus with the representatives of local entities (for example in the case of the so called municipal federalism bylaw 23/2011 or in case of the bylaw regulating the reward and sanction system with regard to the compliance to the new objectives).111. N. Lupo, “Il procedimento di attuazione della delega sul federalismo fi scale e le nuovi sedi della collabo-razione tra i livelli territoriali: commissione bicamerale, commissione tecnica paritetica e conferenza perma-nente”, in: <www.federalismi.it> no. 23/2009 (chapter 8).112. Th e fi scal federalism reform is aiming to introduce a kind of a “carrot and sticks system” with regard to budget stability objectives introducing rewards and sanctions depending on the performance of the bodies (for example disqualifi cations from offi ce).113. N. Lupo, “Il procedimento di attuazione della delega sul federalismo fi scale e le nuovi sedi della collabo-razione tra i livelli territoriali: commissione bicamerale, commissione tecnica paritetica e conferenza perma-nente,” in: <www.federalismi.it> no. 23/2009 (chapter 6).114. See G. Rivosecchi, “Autonomia fi nanziaria e coordinamento della fi nanza pubblica nella legge delega sul federalismo fi scale: poche luci e molte ombre,” 2009, in Astrid Rassegna, www.astrid.eu.




rebounds of responsibility between the diff erent levels of government, which have been characterizing far too long Italy’s political landscapes.

As far as time is concerned, one has to keep in mind that according to the framework law the new fi scal federalism regime should be implemented within the next fi ve years, but the bylaws to the framework law leave much room for maneuver. As a matter of fact, a time frame of only fi ve years would have been too tight for getting public debt under control and meeting the objectives of the new criteria reshaping and responsibilize sub-national entities in their expenditures.115 Allocating fi nancial resources is a delicate process and takes time. Overall, the role of Regions and local entities in the whole reform is very weak. It is diffi cult to un-derstand how the new coordinating bodies116 are going to interact with existing ones as the Standing Conference State-Regions, which in any case keeps the lead-ing role. Th e Standing Conference itself is considered to be an almost unreadable body, complex and confl ict-ridden; so far, the system does not allow fi ltering the single entities’ positions117 and increasing number of interlocking and interacting bodies under an unclear roof of rules could have a Politikverfl echtung as undesired outcome. Th e new planning and coordination system provides for a multiplicity of bodies to be involved in implementing the new fi scal and fi nancial rules. So far, the new rules did establish specialized bodies that are complementary to the work of the main mechanism, the Standing Conference State-Regions, but at the end of the day they are accountable to the executive.118 Th e decision-making procedure within the Conference is limited to its governmental components and thus subject of criticism, especially in relation to its so called democratic defi cit. As the German case demonstrates, the Bundesrat does not preclude the necessity of a body, which is mandated to govern fi scal and fi nancial rules. Additionally, compared to other legal orders,119 Italian bodies and procedures of fi scal and fi -nancial coordination are also in a rather weak position considering their legal base (not being constitutionalized). Th e risk that such a polycentric system evolves without any clear design of who monitors and decides on what should not be un-derestimated. In particular, two things are missing for a more eff ective intergov-

115. See N. Lupo, “Il procedimento di attuazione della delega sul federalismo fi scale e le nuovi sedi della collaborazione tra i livelli territoriali: commissione bicamerale, commissione Tecnica Paritetica e conferenza permanente,” in: <www.federalismi.it>no. 23/2009 (chapter 3).116. Next the above mentioned bodies, law no. 196/2009 provides also for a Public Administrations Commit-tee for Accounting Principles (23 members, 4 appointed by the government, 1 each from the both chambers, 1 from the Audit Court, 1 from the National Statistics Offi ce, 7 representing territorial entities, 3 experts).117. Th e Conference works based on the consensus principle. Th e regions as a rule should come to a unanimous position. If this is not the case, the regions’ opinion is determined by majority vote.118. For a critical analysis see G. Carpani, “La collaborazione strutturata tra Regioni e tra queste e lo Stato. Nuovi equilibri e linee evolutive dei raccordi ‘verticali’ e ‘orizzontali’,” in: <www.federalismi.it>2009.119. See for example the “German constitutional block” and the Spanish LOFCA and Ley Organica no. 5/200, de 13 diciembre, complementaria a la Ley General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria.




ernmental coordination system within Italy’s constitutional design of cooperative regionalism: a sound institutional framework representing the territorial enti-ties’ interests and a political cooperative culture. Both the Standing Conference State-Regions as well as the Associations representing the Italian provinces and municipalities call for a federal institutional design.120 It is important to recall, that a peculiarity of the Italian system of intergovernmental fi nancial relations compared to other federal or regionalized states is the fact that both, Regions and local entities have direct relations to the government; in federations, fi nance matters with regard to local entities are normally attributed to the intermediate level, which provides for equalization schemes. In the Italian case the latter model is valid only for some of the special Regions (Aosta Valley, Friuli Venezia Giulia and the two Autonomous Provinces of Bolzano/Bozen and Trento composing the Autonomous Region of Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol). It goes without say-ing that reforms of the intergovernmental fi nancial relations and its coordination bodies were badly needed as disparities in the fi nancial treatment between the Regions were getting too large and the whole economical system became a victim of its dysfunctionality.

Conclusions

Th e paper has provided an overview on the main features of current ongoing fi scal and fi nancial reform processes in European compound States. It did so from an institutional point of view by looking at mature and emerging federations from a comparative perspective. Even if the challenges the States are facing may be very similar, the solutions are not. While analyzing the legal orders, we found various diff erences in normative intention, constitutional design and governance practices. All in all, the institutional perspective of fi scal federalism reminds us that there is more to the design of a new era of fi scal federalism than just allocat-ing functions to the appropriate levels of government. As shown in the paper, for a federal scholar, constitutionalist as well as for a political scientist, the allocation of powers in sub-national authorities has also to be guaranteed with respect to the central level, either by constitutional rules or informal constraints. Th at said, the paper shows that the ongoing reforms are—as a general rule—all informed by both the principles of autonomy and diff erentiation, as well as the principles of solidarity and equality. Each of the guiding principles has a diff erent weight in each State. To what extent such principles mingle is up to the constitutional design of each compound State. In short, the paper emphasized the need to move

120. See for example Doc. 24.03.11, Modifi che II parte Costituzione: valutazioni giuridiche su scenari; the Standing Conference State-regions stresses how the role of the regions within the decision-making process is weakened; the same Conference also pointed out that all stability budget objectives defi ned in the so-called manovra 2011-2013 have been approved without being discussed in the forum of the Standing Conference.




beyond traditional classifi cations of government and governance tools by explor-ing the institutional conditions that regulate the coming into force of reforms for a new era of fi scal federalism. Our tentative results show that fi nancial relations in multilevel systems are the outcome of a dynamic process that ties to balance decentralization and re-centralization factors. No equilibrium can be reached for-ever and the systems require constant updates to keep track of changes and de-velopments. As a matter of fact, federalism can be conceived as a well-organized waterworks able to minimize water leakages, but only if regularly under construc-tion.121 Techniques and systems both have to undergo regular maintenance and to avoid institutional entanglement. Th e rules of the game have to be kept fl exible but not loose. Th is is in line with the very nature of federal and highly regional-ized systems: their being dynamic. Th e outcomes of ongoing reforms have much to contribute in the long run as the allocation of fi nancial resources was and is crucial in the quest for good governance and economic effi ciency, especially against the backdrop of the economic and fi nancial crisis.

Th e paper analyzed reforming processes through the lens of multiple spheres of government of compound states, and tried to shed light on the rationale of the reforms, the tax regimes and some broader aspects of economic intergovern-mental governance. Th e variety of the systems refl ects the diff erent legacies and developments of each constitutional design. It also confi rms the very nature of federalism in its never-ending search for balance. Constitutionals designs are be-ing delimited by formal institutions as specifi ed in constitutions and legal inter-pretation, but also by the exercise of informal power. All in all, it seems that the federal pendulum swings in an alternating manner in favour of re-centralization and decentralization of powers, trying to fi nd the right balance between auton-omy and solidarity within multi-tier governments. However, due to the current macroeconomic constraints, for the time being re-centralization seems to have a slight advantage over decentralization.

AbstractAgainst the backdrop of the fi nancial and economic crisis, federal and regional States are engaging

in several reforms. The fi nancial constitutional design and institutional setting in the area of fi scal and fi nancial matters are being revised in order to better adapt to the current challenges, which result both from the supranational sphere of economic governance and the domestic one. The rationale behind these reforming processes lies in the struggle between the apparent needs to re-centralize while accommo-dating decentralization claims. The paper focuses on federal and highly regionalized European States by adopting a comparative domestic perspective and investigates reform processes in the area of fi scal mat-ters and fi nancial intergovernmental relations. It explores the most signifi cant features that permeate the various legal orders, trying to single out the different trends in shifting powers in favour of either (re)centralization or decentralization. To this extent the recognition of autonomy on the revenue side and the accommodation of autonomy and solidarity within the new fi scal regimes will be analyzed. Moreover,

121. F. Palermo, “Per un quadro normativo del federalismo fi scale,” in: Federalismo fi scale: una sfi da comparata, ed. F. Palermo, E. Alber, S. Parolari (Cedam, Padova, 2011), 412-413.




intergovernmental cooperation in fi scal and fi nancial areas will be scrutinized trying to point out crucial characteristics from a comparative perspective. To this regard particular attention will be given to major recently established bodies and procedures in the fi scal and public fi nance area as well as to their role within domestic economic governance.

RésuméSur toile de fond de crise économique et fi nancière, les États fédéraux et régionaux se sont engagés

dans diverses réformes. Le modèle constitutionnel fi nancier et le cadre institutionnel fi scal et fi nancier sont en train de se modifi er afi n de mieux s’adapter aux défi s du temps, qui relèvent à la fois de la sphère supranationale de la gouvernance économique, et de la sphère nationale. Les raisons qui motivent ces processus de réforme tiennent à la contradiction entre les apparentes nécessités de recentraliser tout en s’accommodant des revendications de décentralisation. Cet article s’intéresse aux États européens fédéraux et hautement régionalisés en adoptant une perspective comparative nationale, et étudie les processus de réforme dans le domaine des matières fi scales et des relations fi nancières intergouvernemen-tales. Il étudie les éléments les plus signifi cativement présents dans les différents ordres juridiques, en cherchant à identifi er les diverses tendances du transfert de pouvoir en faveur de la (re)centralisation ou de la décentralisation. C’est dans ce contexte que seront analysées l’autonomie du point de vue des recettes, et la conjonction l’autonomie et de la solidarité dans les nouveaux systèmes fi scaux. En outre, la coopération intergouvernementale dans les matières fi scales et fi nancières sera étudiée afi n d’en dé-terminer les caractéristiques fondamentales de l’analyse comparée. Enfi n, une attention particulière sera portée aux récentes innovations en terme de d’organismes et de procédures dans le domaine des fi nances publiques et fi scales, ainsi qu’à leur rôle dans la gouvernance économique interne.



Immigration and Migrant Integration in Multicultural SocietiesNew Playgrounds for Subnational Governments?

Karl Kössler

Senior Researcher at the Institute for Studies of Federalism and Regionalism at the European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen, Italy, PhD in Comparative Constitutional Law and MA in Po-litical Science.

Introduction

73 years after Harold Laski famously proclaimed the “obsolescence of federalism”,1 the concept is more vital and widespread than ever. During the past decades, de-centralization has eroded central state power from below, while the parallel proc-esses of globalization and Europeanization have done the same from above. Even France, once the stronghold of the centralized unitary state, has slowly started to value the benefi ts of decentralization.2 From the institutional perspective, this trend has resulted in the creation of directly elected regional councils in France and similar bodies of self-government across many other European countries. From the policy perspective, decentralization has led to an increasing role of these subnational bodies in multilevel governance of numerous complex issues, whose diff erent aspects by necessity require the involvement of a plurality of actors.

In this paper I shall explore, whether the general trend towards more subna-tional authority is also true for the fi elds of immigration and migrant integration in multicultural societies. Especially in the European context these issues are and

1. Harold Laski, “Th e Obsolescence of Federalism”, Th e New Republic (May 3, 1939): 367.2. Following the reform of 2003, the French Constitution explicitly stresses the decentralized organization of the state (Art. 1) and confers upon the regions broad powers that entail beyond mere implementation compe-tences usually underrated regulatory powers (Art. 72).


Karl Kössler368


will remain highly topical with states facing continuous immigration both from outside the continent and from within, since mobility is one of the core values of the EU. However, this importance is not matched by suffi cient research on how multilevel systems deal and should deal with immigration and integration.3 Before we go straight to the heart of the issue, we have to make some termino-logical clarifi cations with regard to ‘immigration’, ‘integration’ and ‘multicultural society’. As a result of immigration, a society inevitably becomes multicultural in the descriptive sense referring to the mere existence of cultural diversity. If migrants enter a society with historical minorities, multiculturalism in a descriptive sense is even a twofold challenge and causes specifi c dynamics in the process of integra-tion. One of the options to deal with this reality of cultural diversity is to actively endorse it as something valuable and indeed desirable. Th at is multiculturalism in a normative sense.4 In order to properly explore multilevel governance of immi-gration and migrant integration in multicultural societies, I would like to make an analytical distinction between immigration and integration as two specifi c policy fi elds. Th e fi rst is concerned with the regulation of international migra-tion fl ows,5 which boils down to the authoritative decision on the admission and selection of migrants. Migrant integration, by contrast, is a two-way process involving both migrants and the receiving society, and is much more complex, as we can distinguish a social, economic and political dimension. Th ough having set points in time, such as naturalization in the context of political integration, it is a longer-term process with a scope that is much less clearly defi nable than that of immigration. Th ere is no single and precisely circumscribed policy fi eld called ‘integration’. It is rather a cross-sectoral responsibility, whose dimensions are encompassed by policy fi elds such as labour, health, education, language use, housing, welfare and citizenship.

Immigration: A Central Government Solo

Regulating the admission of noncitizens to the state territory and the selec-tion of migrants are core competences of central governments. Decentralization is rarely found in that realm. For example, when scholars observe a trend in the

3. See Myer Siemiatycki and Triadafi los Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision,” Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation Paper Series (2010): 2available at: <http://www.mowatcentre.ca/pdfs/mowatResearch/13.pdf>Giovanna Zincone and Tiziana Caponio, “Th e Multilevel Governance of Migration,” in Th e Dynamics of Inter-national Migration and Settlement in Europe, ed. Rinus Penninx, Maria Berger and Karen Kraal (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 269-79.4. On the descriptive and normative dimensions of multiculturalism see Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 227.5. See Tomas Hammar, European Immigration Policy. A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), 12.


Immigration And Migrant Integration In Multicultural Societies 369


United States towards “greatly expanded sub-national participation in immigration decision-making” 6 and talk of unprecedented “immigration federalism” 7, it soon becomes clear that expanded legislative power and activity of state and local gov-ernments are in practice related to integration. Again, we have to be mindful of the analytical distinction that we made in the introduction as US immigration policy is nearly as centralized as ever. Th e only new powers that state govern-ments acquired in this area from the mid-1990s onwards have been related to the enforcement of federal immigration laws in the context of fi ghting illegal immigration.8 Th ese enforcement powers did not entail legislative competences.

Beyond such a classical federation as the United States, centralized immigra-tion policy is also the rule with new federal or regional states that have evolved only in the last few decades or even years. Much to the disappointment of Scot-land, immigration has been listed as reserved to the UK government by Schedule Five of the Scotland Act of 1998. Although the Belgian regions and communities have been granted many important competences over the last three decades, the federal government is reluctant to cede any powers in the fi eld of immigration. Th us, this area is still covered by Art. 36 of the Belgian constitution as a residual power of the federal government. In Italy, Art. 117.2.b of the constitution defi nes immigration as the exclusive power of the central government. Although regions are in practice involved in policy-making, this occurs only to a minimal extent. Th e permanent state-regions conference merely participates in drafting the tri-ennial programmatic document that defi nes the medium-term approach of the Italian state and contains among other things the criteria for fi xing the annual admission quota for third-country nationals. In this same context the regional governments can also deliver an annual report to the council of ministers that contains the current number of non-EU residents and suggests a specifi c number of admissions to the region for the year to come.9

Among all of Europe’s recently decentralized states, Spain stands out in terms of subnational involvement in immigration. Th ough Art. 149.1.2 of the Spanish Constitution defi nes this issue in seemingly clear terms as sole respon-sibility of the central government, this exclusivity is not as strict in practice as it appears at fi rst glance. Allowedly, ever since the fi rst law on immigration was passed in 1985,10 the issue has been dominated by the central government. But

6. M.J. Wishnie, “Introduction: Immigration and Federalism,” New York University Annual Survey of American Law 58 (3) (2002): 284.7. Clare Huntington, “Th e Constitutional Design of Immigration Federalism,” Vanderbilt Law Review 61 (2008), 787.8. See P.H. Schuck, “Some Federal-State Developments in International Law,” New York University Annual Survey of American Law 58(3) (2002): 2. 9. See Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerca sull’Immigrazione, Migration and Mobility (Torino: FIERI, 2009), < http://www.medgov.net/sites/default/fi les/thematic_report_migration% 5B1% 5D.pdf, 59. >10. Organic Act 7/1985 and the fi rst executive regulations enacted by Royal Decree 1119/1986.


Karl Kössler370


recently there has been a noticeable trend towards more immigration powers of the autonomous communities. In 2004, their involvement in determining quotas and in the selection of labour force from specifi c countries formed a fi rst step.11 Th en, the 2006 Statute of Catalonia went further. Due to the insignifi -cance of immigration in the early period of post-Franco Spain, the original stat-utes of the Autonomous Communities either did not make any reference to this issue or merely accepted the authority of the central government.12 However, since then a net exporter of people turned into an immigration country13 so that securing subnational power in this emerging fi eld of vital importance become imperative. Th ough there had been an ongoing trend of increasing immigra-tion since the 1980s, the last decade saw an especially sharp rise of the number of foreign residents by roughly 500%. Together with the Balearic Islands and Madrid, Catalonia has been among the most attractive for migrants. Th is de-velopment formed the background for drafting the new Statute of the Autono-mous Community. Beyond merely affi rming Catalonia’s general participation in immigration policies and above all in determining regional quotas (Art. 138.3), it claimed the power with regard to initial work permits. Art. 138.2 stipulated that for migrant workers employed in the territory of the Autonomous Com-munity decisions on such authorizations and on appeals fall within the jurisdic-tion of the Catalan government. In an attempt to avoid a privileged position of Catalonia in terms of immigration policies, the Spanish parliament extended the authority to issue initial work permits to all Autonomous Communities. Consequently, they are certainly the most infl uential subnational entities among all of Europe’s recently decentralized states to date, but are still relatively power-less.

Th is becomes most clear when Spain’s Autonomous Communities are com-pared with the states of Australia and in particular the Canadian provinces, the real exceptions from the rule of centralized immigration policies. Th ese two classical federations have two characteristics in common. First, immigration is a consciously managed process and not ‘suff ered’ as in many European coun-tries.14 Second, both have a clear focus on economic immigration. Precisely in this context of the needs of the labour market, the states of Australia have recently acquired new competences. To be sure, the federal government with its powerful Department of Immigration and Citizenship still plays the dominant role and

11. Royal Decree 2393/2004.12. Art. 11 and 13 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 1979 and Art. 17.1 of the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.13. María Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “Th e case of Spain,” in Migration Policymaking in Europe. Th e dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present, ed. Giovanna Zincone, Maren Borkert and Rinus Penninx (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 295.14. Christian Joppke, “Trends in European Immigrant Integration Policies” (paper presented at the conference Immigrant Integration: the Impact of Federalism on Public Policy, Brussels, 29-30 November 2010).




ensures the uniform management of immigration,15 which is an exclusive federal responsibility according to Art. 51.19 of the constitution. However, the huge importance of the issue in a country with a world-leading 24% of foreign-born population and the unequal distribution of migrants across Australia, has led to a growing consensus that it is imperative to give the states some role in the selec-tion of migrants. Th e ‘best and the brightest’, who were to be attracted, just did not spread evenly over the country so that labour shortages in the mid-1990s in some parts of Australia called for action.16 Th e eventual outcome, which was the State Specifi c and Regional Migration program (SSRM), was aimed at allowing immigration management that is tailored to specifi c regional needs, both on a short-term and long-term basis. On the one hand, it should facilitate the infl ux of temporary workers for urgent needs, e.g. the mining boom in Western Aus-tralia. On the other hand, it should allow state governments, who were supposed to have better knowledge of regional labour markets and its niches, to have a say on their quota of a permanent work force. In this regard, SSRM created a second track for migrant selection. Australian states as well as municipalities and employ-ers can sponsor skilled migrants, who do not meet the points-based requirements of the federal government, as long as these migrants apply for a job outside of in-dicated areas with already high numbers of migrants. Finding the best candidates in this regional selection process is facilitated by a federally administered Skills Matching Database. Although SSRM has certainly resulted in an unprecedented involvement of the states in immigration policy, they still lag behind Canadian provinces under the Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs) and are a very far cry from Quebec.

In terms of immigration powers, the predominantly French-speaking prov-ince of Quebec is undoubtedly the pioneer and leader of subnational entities worldwide. Although Sec. 95 of the Canadian Constitution of 1867 identifi ed the issue as one of only two concurrent competences in an otherwise decidedly dual federation, the federal government soon took the lead by ousting provincial overseas immigration offi cers and retained it for nearly a century.17 Only in the 1960s did the Prairie provinces and Quebec began to rediscover their consti-tutional leeway and started to actively recruit people from abroad. Fuelled by increased self-confi dence in the wake of the 1960s Quiet Revolution (révolu-

15. See Nicholas Aroney, “Australia,” in Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries, ed. Luis Moreno and César Colino (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 27.16. Siemiatycki and Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Migrant Service Provision,” 2.17. See Ninette Kelley and Michael J. Trebilcock, Th e Making of the Mosaic. A History of Canadian immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 77.Th e huge interest of the federal government in immigration has to be seen in the context of its eminent impor-tance for Canada’s expansion to the west. See Rainer Knopff and Anthony Sayers, “Canada,” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 126.


Karl Kössler372


tion tranquille), Quebec took a pioneering role among Canada’s provinces. Bilat-eral agreements in the 1970s gradually increased its competences from placing provincial offi cers abroad (Lang-Cloutier Agreement 1971) and recommending candidates to federal visa offi cers (Andras-Bienvenue Agreement 1975) to defi n-ing its own selection criteria and approving selection decisions (Cullen-Couture Agreement 1978). In an attempt to avoid excessive asymmetry the Canadian parliament passed the 1976 Immigration Act, which obliged the federal govern-ment to consult all provinces on immigration quotas and during the selection process (Sec. 7). Moreover, it explicitly provide for the possibility of concluding federal-provincial agreements (Sec. 109). Th is mandate led to intensive negotia-tions with the English-speaking provinces and to fi rst agreements already in the 1970s.18 Th ough they were in substance much less far-reaching than the accords with Quebec, they had great symbolic signifi cance in light of federal eff orts to avoid excessive asymmetry. Th us, despite Quebec‘s clearly superior role in immi-gration policy-making the province paved the way for a tendency towards general decentralization.

After the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 had failed and with it the constitutional entrenchment of a special status for Quebec,19 the federal government off ered to enshrine the foreseen particular role of the province on immigration at least on a bilateral basis.20 As a consequence, the McDougall-Gagnon Tremblay Accord of 1991 gave Quebec control over 60% of its immigration and further expanded its infl uence on the selection process by allowing for the preferential recruitment of French-speaking migrants. In the aftermath of that agreement a movement of mainly Prairie provinces led by Manitoba demanded for more infl uence on the selection process. As the federal government wanted to avoid a patchwork of bilateral agreements, it developed the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) that foresaw individual federal-provincial agreements, but under a common frame-work. PNP empowers the provinces to determine their own selection criteria and resembles in many ways the current Australian system of sponsored immigration. After years of reluctance even the province of Ontario, which receives about one half of all migrants, concluded a PNP agreement with the federal government in 2005. Th us, it is fair to conclude that Quebec triggered a persistent process of general, albeit still very asymmetrical, decentralization. Such extensive sub-national involvement is highly exceptional in immigration policy-making but,

18. See Kelley and Trebilcock, Th e Making of the Mosaic, 392.19. See Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism and Diversity in Canada,” in Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Compet-ing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, ed. Yash Ghai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000,) 39.20. See Karl Kössler, “Changing Faces of Asymmetry. Th e Canadian Example,” in Asymmetries in Constitutional Law. RecentDevelopments in Federal and Regional Systems, ed. Francesco Palermo, Carolin Zwilling and Karl Kössler (Bol-zano: Eurac Research, 2009), 151.




as we shall see in the following section, rather normal in the fi eld of migrant integration.

Migrant Integration: A Polyphonic Concert

A Self-evident Area of Governmental Action?

It has to be stressed at the outset that commitment of any level of govern-ment to manage the fi eld of migrant integration cannot be taken for granted. In fact, this issue is in most states a quite new playground for governmental action at any level. Long lasting hesitation can be attributed to three diff erent reasons: the prevalence of the minimal state concept, the denial of being an immigration country and a rather short history of being an immigration country.

In some cases the historically evolved perception of the state’s role in society seems to have had a clear infl uence. Where the minimal state concept is deeply rooted, the focus is clearly on newcomer self-reliance instead of public service provision. More than two centuries after Th omas Paine had famously character-ized the state as evil, at best a necessary one and at worst an intolerable one,21 this legacy is still present in the United States, not least with regard to the issue of mi-grant integration. Th roughout the 20th century the U.S. government had its focus on regulating immigration and law enforcement, while it refrained from provid-ing services as measures of migrant integration. Th is task was left to the private sphere, namely to families and charitable organizations. Th ough governmental action has recently increased, it still lags behind migrant integration eff orts of other countries, especially in continental Europe.

Th e lack of a migrant integration policy in Germany and Switzerland until the 1990s has another reason. Although both countries have been characterized by a considerable infl ux of foreign workers from the 1950s onwards, they denied the obvious fact of being immigration countries. In Switzerland, the 1990s saw a shift from the combined strategy of work force rotation and assimilation of permanent workers to integration policies. In Germany, the fi rst step was taken at roughly the same time with the reform of citizenship legislation. A second step followed with the Residence Act of 2005, which marks the beginning of a comprehensive policy of migrant integration.22

Other countries have a much shorter history of being a de facto immigration country. In these cases, such as Spain, it is understandable that it took some time to grasp this new reality and adapt the legal framework to it. After Spain had

21. See his classical pamphlet “Common sense” of 1776: “Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our aff ections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. […] Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil in its worst state an intolerable one.”22. See Siemiatycki and Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision,” 12.


Karl Kössler374


been an emigration country during the times of the Franco regime, this pattern changed in the mid-1980s when immigrants started to outnumber emigrants. Th us, it is understandable that legislation initially focused on the more immedi-ate requirements of regulating immigration and only slowly started to take on the more complex challenge of migrant integration in the early 1990s.23 To sum up, there is not only an ongoing trend towards a proliferation of de facto immigration countries, but as a response there is also an increasing governmental action on migrant integration that even includes for a long time reluctant countries. Th is, of course, is not yet an indication of how action is distributed across diff erent levels of government.

Th e Legal Sources of Subnational Authority

As already stated in the introduction, migrant integration is a cross-sectoral issue and therefore much more complex than the area of immigration, which is basically confi ned to managing admissions to the territory and the selection process. Migrant integration, by contrast, is anything but a precisely circum-scribed policy fi eld, but a responsibility, whose dimensions are encompassed by such competences as labour, health, education, language use, housing, welfare and citizenship. Looking at these areas makes it immediately clear why subna-tional entities usually play a decisive role in the governance of migrant integra-tion. With few exceptions like Belgium,24 it is not because they were explicitly granted special integration competences, but because they have already had general competences relevant to integration. In the six aforementioned integration-related areas, subnational governments are typically vested with considerable administra-tive and often also legislative powers. Most of these areas such as health, housing or welfare are concerned with the provision of public services. As subnational governments are closer to the people, it is assumed that they are more familiar with the needs on the ground and thus in a better position to provide services tailored to individual circumstances.25 Following this rationale, most federations endow subnational units with signifi cant competences in the aforementioned service-oriented areas. Th ese then contain within their much wider general scope as implied power also the authority to take measures that facilitate the integration of migrants. Beyond the authority to provide general services, which are available

23. See Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “Th e case of Spain,” 295-297.24. Art. 128 § 1 of the Belgian Constitution together with Art. 5.1.II.3 of the Special Law of 8 August 1980 explicitly defi nes the integration of migrants as a prerogative of the Communities.25. See Enric Argullol and Xavier Bernadí, “Kingdom of Spain,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 256.




to the general public and thus equally to newcomers, this implied powers rationale also relates to specifi c services intended only for migrants.26

Th e implied authority of subnational units with regard to migrant integra-tion can be most clearly illustrated by the legal debate that has taken place in Spain from the mid-1990s onwards. Arguing against interpreting “immigration” in Art. 149.1.2 of the constitution as all-encompassing, some Autonomous Com-munities applied the following line of reasoning. In dealing with migrants there would be “core functions,” namely regulation of international migration fl ows, and ancillary or peripheral functions. While the fi rst should be reserved to the central government on the basis of Art. 149.1.2 for the sake of uniformity, the latter could be fulfi lled by the Autonomous Communities on the basis of their competences. Th e Constitutional Tribunal eventually applied a similar reasoning in his seminal decision on the Catalan Statute. It interpreted Art. 138.1 of the statute in such a way that the Catalan government has the authority to take meas-ures of social and economic integration by implication from its powers in such fi elds as welfare, health and education as long as this does not compromise the exclusive central government competence for immigration in a narrow sense.27

Th e Scope of Subnational Authority

Th e fi nding that subnational governments usually have competences on mi-grant integration by implication from their responsibilities in service-oriented policy fi elds, does not tell us anything about the scope of this authority. While there is certainly a general pattern of increasing subnational authority, the fed-eral government clearly sets the tone in some countries. Some cases in point are Germany and Australia, where central dominance in terms of regulating integra-tion-related services is striking. Th ey diff er, however, in their approach to service provision. While the German Länder are largely in charge of this task, the states of Australia play an increasingly important albeit minor role. Th is divergence does not only result from the self-restraint of the German government. It also follows from two fundamentally diff erent concepts of federalism: administrative federal-ism typical of Continental Europe vs. legislative federalism in Anglo-American countries.28 While the fi rst tends to divide the legislative and executive functions between the federal and subnational governments, the latter is based on the co-

26. A distinction has to be made between specifi c/direct and general/indirect integration services. See James Lynch and Rita Simon, Immigration the World Over. Statutes, Policies and Practices (Lanham: Rowman and Lit-tlefi eld, 2003), 32.27. STC 31/2010 of 28 June 2010, FJ 83, 588-89.28. See Ronald L. Watts, “Comparative Conclusions,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 329Th omas O. Hueglin, “Canada,” in Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders (Montréal und Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 122.


Karl Kössler376


incidence of these functions and thereby puts more emphasis on autonomous functioning and sole responsibility of each level of government. Despite large administrative responsibilities by the Länder, even in the German model, the federal government has clearly set the tone since the beginning of comprehensive integration policies. Above all, it is the driving force behind language training, which lies at the heart of these policies. Although the Länder have some say on that issue through the National Integration Summits, both fi xing the standards and evaluating the results are a federal domain.29 According to the National Inte-gration Plan, the German Länder are endowed with tasks such as facilitating lan-guage learning for school-age children and the acquisition of employment-related language skills rather than with regulating integration.

In contrast to subnational governments in Australia and Germany, some Ca-nadian provinces dominate the fi eld of migrant integration. Not surprisingly, Quebec has the most comprehensive control over programs in this area. Since the McDougall-Gagnon Tremblay Accord of 1991 the federal government com-pletely withdrew from settlement services to be regulated and provided by Que-bec. Moreover, it allocated funds for these provincial services according to a very favourable agreement. Th e arrangement foresaw that funding annually increased at the same rate as the general Canadian government’s spending and did not stipulate any accountability obligations on the part of Quebec. While services are also devolved to Manitoba and British Columbia, both provinces are required to deliver annual plans and reports to Ottawa. With regard to the other provinces, diff erent models with a lesser degree of subnational authority prevail. Services are co-managed in Alberta, but regulated in the remaining provinces by the federal government only after consultations, albeit in the case of Ontario in an extensive and formal way.30

While Quebec has been the front-runner in Canada, this role is played by Catalonia within Spain. In both cases it was the link between self-government and the protection or even promotion of a distinct regional language that trig-gered this assertiveness. As long as regions with historical minorities had not been confronted with migrants as new minorities, only self-government in the fi eld of language use had been perceived as necessary to protect their regional language. With the arrival of migrants this relation was inverted. From then on, governments of these subnational entities started to look at the protection of their regional language as a requirement for maintaining reasonable claims to self-

29. See Siemiatycki and Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision,” 16.30. See Allen Linden, “Flexible Federalism. Th e Canadian Way,” in Patterns of Regionalism and Federalism. Les-sons for the UK, ed. Jörg Fedtke and Basil S. Markesinis (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), 45-48.




government.31 In order to avoid that the speakers of the regional language will be increasingly outnumbered and thus lose their justifi cation for self-government, these subnational governments made the promotion of the regional language a cornerstone for migrant integration. With regard to Quebec, the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978 fi rst emphasized the potential of immigration for the pres-ervation of the specifi c language and culture of the province. Th e McDougall-Gagnon Tremblay Accord of 1991 then transferred the responsibility of linguistic and cultural integration to the province. While the promotion of Quebec’s re-gional language rests primarily on attracting already French-speaking migrants, Catalonia would have problems to apply the same strategy with Catalan-speakers. Based on the defi nition of Catalan as its own language in Art. 6 of the new stat-ute, the Autonomous Community developed a strategy of “linguistic normaliza-tion” through positive discrimination.32 Th e preferential status for Catalan in the public sphere, which is supposed to foster language learning by immersion, is one pillar of the ‘Catalanization’ of migrants. Language courses are the second one. It is certainly true that Catalonia had a pioneering role similar to Quebec, as it drafted a plan for integration by 1993 before the central government followed in its footsteps with the fi rst Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants. But migrant integration evolved into an issue of great interest to more than just one Autono-mous Community. Soon after Catalonia, other regions with high immigration rates such as Andalusia, Madrid, the Basque Country and the Balearic Islands became more and more active.33 Th e central government, by contrast, remained for a long time focused almost entirely on the area of immigration. Although the Zapatero government after 2004 started to demonstrate more interest in devising policies of migrant integration, the fi eld is still dominated by the Autonomous Communities.

While social and economic integration is quite decentralized, this is not the case for political integration. It is true that issues like institutional representation or the voting rights of migrants naturally aff ect all levels of government. Howev-er, it is usually taken for granted that citizenship, which is at the core of political integration, should be a domain of the central government. Generally speaking, nearly all constitutions defi ne this issue as an exclusively federal responsibility both in terms of legislative and executive power with the latter being usually delegated to local branches of the federal administration. Although there are dif-

31. Rainer Bauböck, “Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights and Self‐Government,” in Citizenship Today. Glo-bal Perspectives andPractices, ed. Alex Aleinikoff and Doug Klusmeyer (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 333.32. In several important decisions the Constitutional Tribunal defi ned the limits of this strategy in the light of Art. 3 of the Spanish Constitution (see STC 82/1986, 83/1986, 84/1986).33. See Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “Th e case of Spain,” 311.


Karl Kössler378


ferences among federations in handling the citizenship issue, they do not relate to the division of power but only to the restrictiveness of requirements for naturali-zation. In this regard, so-called settler federations like Canada and Australian are clearly less restrictive. Th ey only demand legal residency of three and four years respectively as compared to 10 years or more in a number of other federal states. However, even in otherwise highly decentralized Canada the federal government adopts citizenship legislation, which is then applied by the Citizenship and Im-migration Canada (CIC).34

However, there are some notable exceptions to the rule of central dominance in both the legislative and executive sphere. For instance, Germany’s typical ad-ministrative federalism, which implies the implementation of federal laws by the Länder, also applies to citizenship. Th us, although they lack legislative authority, subnational governments have some range of discretion regarding the applica-tion of federal law. It is their responsibility to determine the procedure of natu-ralization and to decide on each individual case. Th e fact that the Länder have some leeway is demonstrated by the striking variation of naturalization practices and numbers under progressive and conservative governments. Th e Länder with Christian Democrats in power have been marked by a general tendency to inter-pret the requirement of a person’s constitutional loyalty in a more restrictive way, which resulted in a lower number of approvals.35 Th e decentralization of citizen-ship goes even further in Switzerland because it includes beyond mere executive authority the power to regulate criteria for naturalization. In a sense, every Swiss is a ‘multilevel citizen’, as nationality not only relates to the national level but also to the cantonal and municipal levels. Th erefore, an applicant for naturalization has to meet the criteria, which is stipulated by all these levels of government. While the sequence of the three decisions varies depending on cantonal rules, the focus is always on the municipal level. In contrast to decisions on the basis of only a few and clearly defi ned criteria at the superior levels, the hardest part for appli-cants is to obtain approval in their respective municipality.36 As opposed to sub-national involvement in Switzerland, citizenship is to some extent also an issue at the supranational level. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, EU citizenship guarantees some additional rights beyond those conferred by the citizenship of a member state. Broadly speaking, these are political rights, the rights of free movement and the right to consular protection by another member state. However, EU citizen-

34. See Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen. Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 107.35. See Heike Hagedorn, “Föderalismus und die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit. Die Einbürgerungspolitik der Bundesländer,” in Integrationspolitik in föderalistischen Systemen, ed. Lale Akgün and Dietrich Tränhardt (Mün-ster: LIT, 2001), 91-117.36. See Marc Hellbling, “Naturalisation Politics in Switzerland. Explaining Rejection rates at the Local Level,” in Th e Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking, ed. Tiziana Caponio and Maren Borkert (Amsterdam: Am-sterdam University Press, 2010), 35-37.




ship is limited in two respects. It is directly derived from citizenship in a member state and its rights are only supplementary to national citizenship rights.

Ultimately, there appear to be two important fi ndings with regard to the scope of subnational authority in the fi eld of integration. Firstly, the evidence shows that the social and economic dimensions of integration are clearly much more aff ected by the trend towards decentralization than the political dimension. Th is follows from the fact that many service-oriented responsibilities with crucial rel-evance for integration are typically allocated at the subnational level. Secondly, multinational federations are generally more inclined to have strong subnational governments on integration than mononational ones.37 Th is was exemplifi ed by the examples of Canada and Spain on the one hand and Germany and Australia on the other. Moreover, I would argue that the distribution of responsibilities in integration often follows diff erent logics. In mononational federations, the allo-cation of tasks at the subnational level seems to be more frequently a top-down process than in multinational federations, which are characterized by bottom-up logics. It is true that some German Länder such as Hamburg, North Rhine-West-phalia and Lower Saxony pushed for a greater role and actively pursued integra-tion policies before the federal government. However, the involvement of sub-national entities in other mononational federations happened on an involuntary basis through the federal downloading of responsibility and service costs. Above all, this is true of the United States, where already limited integration-related services have been delegated more and more to the states. However, as the devolu-tion of competences was not accompanied by granting states adequate fi nancial resources, these services are minimal and function on the unstable basis of short-term funding.38 Th is is a classical example of how decentralization can eventually serve to strengthen the central government “by off -loading the less gratifying func-tions and externalizing diffi cult tasks”.39 In multinational federations, by contrast, subnational entities usually strive for comprehensive competences regarding mi-grant integration. Th e starting point is typically the particular assertiveness of a pioneering region. Th is role has already been played fi rst by Quebec in the 1970s and more recently by Catalonia. Depending on whether the quest of such front for more authority has been emulated by other subnational governments or not,

37. In a multinational federation the boundaries of the subnational entities are drawn in such a way that a state-wide minority with a relatively compact settlement area forms a majority in such an entity. In a mononational federal state a state-wide minority is not transformed into a regional majority but remains in a minority position also at the subnational level. See John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Federation and Managing Nations,” in Multinational Federations, ed. Michael Burgess and John Pinder (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 181.38. See Myer Siemiatycki and Triadafi los Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Migrant Service Provi-sion,” 4-7.39. Michael Keating, “Europeanism and Regionalism,” in Th e European Union and the Regions, ed. Barry Jones and Keating Michael (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 10.


Karl Kössler380


the eventual outcome of decentralization is either more symmetrical or asym-metrical in its legal character. Asymmetry typically entails horizontal diff erentia-tion among subnational entities and incoherence policy-making from the central government’s perspective. While diff erentiation usually has a positive connota-tion and incoherence a negative one, they are in fact two sides of the same coin.

Horizontal Diff erentiation of Competences, Policies and Conceptual Approaches

Incoherence in policy-making is the main concern, which is usually associ-ated with asymmetrical decentralization. Within the federation this results in problems of equity because the access of an individual to services depends on residence. However, we have to be aware that some sort of incoherence not only follows from asymmetry but is inextricably linked with decentralization itself, even in its symmetrical variety. In this case, subnational units have, by defi nition, the same competences. But in practice they will always make use of them to a diff erent extent or in a diff erent way so that there will be a diff erentiation in terms of policies. However, it is obvious that asymmetry will lead to more incoherence because among subnational governments there is even diff erentiation in terms of competences.

Th is kind of diff erentiation is typical of Canada and to a much lesser degree of Spain. In Spain, this is the result of the recent statute reforms. In its quest for authority on initial work permits, Catalonia was only followed by Andalusia. Un-like other new competences in the Catalan statute, the pioneering Autonomous Community has not been emulated by others in this regard.40 Nevertheless, there is a tendency towards horizontal emulation with regard to regional integration plans in terms of similar principles and goals. Th is contributes to considerable uniformity in terms of policies across the Autonomous Communities in the fi eld of migrant integration. In Canada, both immigration and integration are char-acterized by diff erentiation even in terms of competences. As mentioned previ-ously, Quebec’s pioneering role has certainly triggered a catching up process by the remaining provinces. However, they still do not have a say on the selection process and—with the exception of Manitoba and British Columbia—they only have consultative roles in integration.

Whereas Canada and—too a far lesser extent—Spain are thus also character-ized by diff erentiation in terms of competences, there is only diff erentiation regard-ing integration policies in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Without a doubt, the Flemish Government has a much more articulate and structured integration policy that puts more emphasis on language, culture and values of the receiving society and on coercive measures to enforce compliance. In line with a general

40. See Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “The case of Spain,” 300.




European trend, courses involving language training and civics learning are the core of Flemish integration measures. Similarly, Scotland has designed distinct integration policies that diff er clearly from those in other parts of the United Kingdom. Th e Scottish Government takes a defi nitely more proactive stance and recently introduced a number of initiatives. Most notable among them is its ex-plicit support of English language training in general and for adult migrants in particular. In this regard, Scottish policy diverges from the rest of the country.

A third dimension of diff erentiation among subnational units concerns un-derlying integration approaches that form the conceptual basis for designing dif-ferent policies. In multinational states, regions with historical minorities typically face the following dilemma. On the one hand, they typically emphasize diversity and multiple identities within the state to justify their claim to self-government. But at the same time, they are driven to stress unity and distinct identity of their region.41 It is then the central question, whether the construction of this distinct identity allows for the integration of migrants or not. It has been argued that mi-grants would tend to embrace the identity of a state’s majority population rather than a regional one so that the latter would become increasingly threatened.42 Th is would aff ect above all language as the national language usually enables more mobility than a regional language. Migrants to Quebec would be unlikely to view French as benefi cial to their mobility within an otherwise English-speak-ing North America. For the same reasons, migrants to Catalonia would prefer the Spanish language, unless ‘carrots and sticks’ would induce them not to do so. Of course, the language spoken by the majority of the country’s population is not always more attractive. Sometimes the international context matters. In Belgium, for instance, migrants have been more likely to make French the language of their choice because it is more widespread in Brussels and is perceived as more attractive in the general Western European context.43 Nevertheless, the majority language is certainly in most cases more attractive for migrants. If regions with minorities are afraid that this would eventually threaten their distinct regional identity, they basically have two options. Either they reject immigration or they include migrants in their nation-building project and integrate them into the regional community. In most cases, they have chosen the latter option and tend to regard migrants as potential allies in their struggle for self-government against the central government. Nevertheless, approaches among nationalist parties in re-gions with minorities diff er signifi cantly. It is true that the Catalan Convergència

41. See Eve Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the Region’. Party Conceptions of Regional Citizenship and Immigrant Integration,” European Journal of Political Research 50 (2011): 505-506.42. See Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “Intertwined Cultural Demands of Immigrants and Minority Nations,” GRTP Political Th eory Working Paper Series 3 (2006): 5, http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/4049/zapa-ta03.pdf?sequence=1.43. Marco Martiniello, “Belgium’s Immigration Policy,” International Migration Review 37(1) (2003), 228.


Karl Kössler382


i Unió (CiU), the Parti Québécois (PQ) and the Scottish National Party (SNP) all have a civic nationalism in common rather than an ethnic one.44 Both the PQ and CiU emphasized, in the latter case even as early as 1976, that everyone who lives in the region is a Québecois or a Catalan, respectively.45 But only in Scotland has the commitment to civic nationalism been accompanied by a mentionable political representation of migrants in subnational institutions and an environ-ment of frankly fl aunted multiculturalism. Th is is epitomized in the slogan, “One Scotland, many cultures”. By contrast, Quebec and Catalonia are characterized by assimilationist approaches to including migrants into their respective nation-building projects.46 Diff erentiation in terms of conceptual approaches does not only exist horizontally among subnational entities, but also vertically between them and central governments. Th is is one reason why the three archetypes of in-tegration models, the multiculturalist, assimilationist and the functionalist guest-worker model,47 are no longer regarded as characterizing entire countries. Due to the diff erentiation of approaches within one and the same state, there are no longer coherent national models but rather mixed patchworks of approaches.48

Intergovernmental Cooperation: Th e Quest for Minimal Coherence

Once we agree that decentralization, whether asymmetrical or not, always results in a certain incoherence in policy-making, the question arises, ‘To what degree is this incoherence acceptable?’ At this point intergovernmental coopera-tion comes into play in order to make incoherence at least a bit more coherent. As federal systems have been increasingly confronted with the governance of com-plex issues over the last few decades, interdependence of government levels and the resulting need for their cooperation have increased signifi cantly. Th is trend has been vividly illustrated by Morton Grodzins’ famous cake metaphor.49 He symbolized the aim of dual federalism, the independent exercise of powers by al-

44. For the diff erentiation between civic and ethnic nationalism see Michael Ignatieff , Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux), 5.45. Québecois are “toutes les personnes qui ont choisi le Québec comme terre d’adoption” (Parti Québecois, Restons forts. Plate-forme électorale 2003), (Montreal: Parti Québecois, 86).“Everyone who lives and works in Catalonia and has a wish to be so and feels tied to this land is Catalan”; Jordi Puyol, La immigració, problema i esperança de Catalunya (Barcelona: Nova Terra, 1976), 12.46. See Michael Keating, Nations Against the State. Th e New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 83.47. See for instance Stephen Castles, “How Nation‐states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 21(3) (1995).48. See Gary Freeman, “Incorporating Immigrants in Liberal Democracies,” International Migration Review 38(3) (2004): 945-969. Christian Joppke, “Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Europe,” in Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada, ed. Keith Banting, Th omas Couchene and Leslie Seidle (Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2007), 2.49. See Morton Grodzins, Th e American System. A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 60-68.




legedly separate government levels, by a layer cake and unmasked it as an illusion. Functions are rather intermingled, symbolized by a marble cake, so that these levels are by nature simultaneously involved in the governance of policy fi elds. In the face of increasingly complex issues, this statement, which was initially made with regard to the United States in the 1960s, is today more relevant than ever and also applies to other federations. Of course, governance is more similar to a marble cake in some policy fi elds than in others. From the previous chapters it is clear that the containment of incoherence through intergovernmental coopera-tion is needed much more in the fi eld of migrant integration with its multiplicity of actors involved than in the area of immigration with its characteristic of central dominance. In the fi rst case, policy-making is characterized by complex interde-pendence and in the latter case, it is characterized by the relative independence of one actor.

Essentially, there are two approaches to facilitate intergovernmental coopera-tion: the bilateral and the multilateral approach. Th e most illustrative example of multilateral cooperation is Germany’s recent strategy of organizing public and highly publicized National Integration Summits. Th e fi rst such event was held in 2006 and gave rise to the publication of the National Integration Plan one year later. Th is document involved mutually concerted obligations for each level of government and beyond that for migrant organizations, the German media, busi-nesses and non-profi t organizations such as the German Football Association.50 Th e fact that the National Integration Summit was hosted by Chancellor Merkel might be interpreted as a sign of commitment to the issue, but it also epitomizes the unquestionable dominance of the federal government. In sharp contrast to the German example, policy-making in the Canadian federation has its focus on bilateralism. Th e four already mentioned agreements between the federal govern-ment and Quebec between 1971 and 1991 are clear examples of that. On the other hand, the Provincial Nominee Program and Settlement Service Arrange-ments with predominantly English-speaking provinces are a hybrid type. Th ey are agreements but operate within a multilateral framework agreement. In doing so, the federal government intended to prevent the excessive incoherence that is often associated with bilateralism. From a comparative perspective, intergov-ernmental cooperation in Canada is not only more deeply rooted but also more important than in Germany. Th is is to be ascribed to the specifi c Canadian no-tion of “fl exible federalism” 51, which perceives the constitutional distribution of powers as a framework for intergovernmental negotiations rather than as a strict and rigid allocation of competences. In spite of these diff erences Germany and Canada have in common that intergovernmental cooperation is very intense.

50. See Siemiatycki and Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision,” 13-15.51. Linden, “Flexible Federalism,” 18.


Karl Kössler384


Th is is not the case in a number of other multilevel systems. Belgium is a par-ticularly obvious example of almost absent intergovernmental cooperation. Th e federal government already has a shrinking role in integration governance and is increasingly sidelined by the Flemish government, which regards all-Belgian initiatives as an interference into its own aff airs. Consequently, there is almost no vertical cooperation between the federal government and the regional govern-ments. Horizontally , the lack of cooperation between Flanders and Wallonia can hardly be surprising in the face of the eagerly pursued Flemish nation-building project and the aforementioned importance of migrant integration into such projects. Since institutional devices, such as the Interministerial Conference on Integration, would be in place, the problem is clearly the political will to make use of them. In this regard, Spain is characterized by a similar situation. Although obligations to collaboration had been stated as early as 1996,52 instruments of intergovernmental relations have so far failed to facilitate cooperation, largely because Autonomous Communities have deemed them inappropriate. In par-ticular those with an established tradition of self-government such as Catalonia complain that they have to sit around the negotiating table with other institu-tions such as municipalities or even NGOs. Th ey claim to be treated by the central government as partners on an equal footing. Th erefore, bodies with broad membership, such as the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, have not created a lasting impact. Similar to other intergovernmental instruments, like the Sectoral Conference on Immigration, it has largely been reduced to facilitat-ing exchanges of information and consultation rather than leading to substantive outcomes in terms of policy design.53

Concluding Remarks

Towards Coordinating the Governance of Immigration and Integration

At the outset of this paper I suggested making an analytical distinction be-tween immigration and migrant integration. Th is was supposed to serve the pur-pose of enabling a clear and diff erentiated view on the question of how govern-ance in these two policy fi elds functions in multilevel systems. And indeed, the previous chapters revealed considerable diff erences. As a general rule the fi eld of immigration is highly centralized. Canada, and—to a lesser extent—Australia and Spain are the few exceptions in this regard. Migrant integration, on the other hand, is characterized by substantial subnational powers. Th ese diff erent logics have serious repercussions on the coordination of governance. Centralized im-migration on the one hand and largely decentralized migrant integration on the

52. Royal Decree 155/1996.53. See Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “Th e case of Spain,” 317.




other does not account for the interconnectedness of these two policy fi elds. In fact, they are not only related to each other in terms of the chronological se-quence. Developments in the area of immigration also hierarchically determine those in the sphere of migrant integration.54 Complaints about the divergent log-ics of the two fi elds are voiced in particular by some Autonomous Communities in Spain. By arguing that without having a say on immigration they would not be able to design eff ective integration policies, they have exerted pressure on the central government since the mid-1990s. Th is pressure eventually resulted in the recent increase of powers with regard to work permits. However, this subnational assertiveness to acquire more authority on immigration is in no way typical of multilevel systems, but is an exception.

Th e practical problems associated with diff erent governance logics in immi-gration and integration are best illustrated by the Scottish example. Whereas the fi rst policy fi eld is a reserved power of the UK government, the latter is character-ized by substantial subnational involvement. Th e absence of a coherent national strategy on migrant integration has left space for the Scottish government to devise its own policies. Making use of the powers acquired under devolution such as education, health or housing, Scotland took a proactive stance by introducing a variety of initiatives on integration. Th e rationale behind this new interest in attracting newcomers is Scotland’s alarming demographic development towards an ever smaller and ageing society. In this regard it very much resembles Quebec in the 1960s before the province embraced immigration as a chance to reverse this trend. However, there is a problem with immigration policies. Although the United Kingdom is one of the major immigration countries in Europe today, Scotland does not get the share of people it would like to receive. England, by contrast, would not object to reducing the infl ux of migrants.55 Th is divergence follows from both problems of distribution and a much more immigration-friendly public opinion and political leadership in Scotland than in England. As long as the regulation of immigration is concentrated in the hands of the UK government, Scotland simply does not get enough migrants to sustain its demographics. Calls for devolution of immigration that would allow the Scottish government to set a population target and to apply a points system involving age, skills and education have so far been rejected.56 How more subnational author-ity in the fi eld of immigration could solve the Scottish problem is illustrated by Canada’s Provincial Nominee Program. While before PNP the bulk of migrants went to Ontario, the program has succeeded in attracting people to formerly less appealing provinces such as Manitoba or Saskatchewan. Th us, it brought forth a

54. See Bruquetas-Callejo et al., “Th e case of Spain,” 308.55. See Siemiatycki and Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision,” 17-20.56. See Hepburn, “‘Citizens of the Region’,” 512.


Karl Kössler386


more even distribution of migrants across Canada – something that could be in the interest of both Scotland and England.

Two or four Levels? Th e Roles of the EU and Municipalities

Th e focus of this paper was consciously set on the role of central and sub-national governments. Th is should be suffi ciently justifi ed by their undoubted dominance in the governance of immigration and migrant integration. But what about the levels above and below these two main players, the supranational and local levels? It is important to note that depending on the policy fi eld the EU and municipalities have assumed more or less minor roles.

While municipalities have no say in the fi eld of immigration, they are in a cru-cial position to facilitate migrant integration. As local service providers closest to the people they are by nature the most frequent point of contact between migrants and the public administration. However, due to the usual fi nancial dependence and absence of regulatory powers, municipalities normally fi nd themselves in the role of junior partners. Exceptions to the rule of the fi nancial shortfall are such re-cent initiatives as the Local Immigration Partnerships in Canada and the Socially Integrative Cities Programme in Germany.57 In both cases funding is granted in order to adjust local services to the needs of migrants and their improved access to such services. Th is is supposed to benefi t the integration process.

In contrast to local government, the supranational level is of substantial im-portance in the fi eld of immigration. In the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and the fi ve guidelines defi ned at the European Council summit in Tam-pere (1999), the EU acquired some authority in that area. By adopting directives on such issues as family reunion or permanent residence, it has added fl esh to the bones of a common policy. In contrast to these legal measures concerning im-migration, migrant integration has so far been characterized by mere ‘soft’ Euro-peanization through the diff usion of ‘best practices’ or the provision of fi nancial incentives using the European Integration Fund (EIF). Although the European Commission is perfectly aware of the need for action in this fi eld, a common, coherent and clear European approach to migrant integration is still lacking.58 As yet only minimum denominators of such an approach have been drafted. Th e Common Basic Principles adopted by the Council in 2004 include the follow-ing cornerstones: an understanding of integration as a two-way process, non-discrimination, respect for the basic values of the EU, employment as the key to integration as well as obligatory basic knowledge of the language and institutions of the receiving society. Th e persisting lack of anything that goes beyond mere

57. See Siemiatycki and Triadafi lopoulos, “International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision,” 16.58. See Marco Martiniello, “Towards a coherent approach to migrant integration policy(ies) in the European Union,” OECD Report (2006), 21, < http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/38295165.pdf.>




principles follows from the staunch opposition of the member state to relinquish the prevalence of their authority on migrant integration. Most recently, this at-titude was illustrated by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Its Art. 63a.4 stated that the EU “may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Mem-ber States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories”. But it explicitly excluded “any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.”

Federalism as a Tool of Governance

“People are not likely to go to the stake, or the barricades, to defend federalism as such. Th ey may undertake heroic actions for the sake of some value which federalism happens at the minute to favour, and may even then inscribe federalism on their banner.” 59 In line with this quote, federalism should not be perceived as an end in itself but rather as a pragmatic and adaptable tool that may serve various pur-poses. In the context of such an instrumental understanding of federalism, one of the main purposes is nowadays democratic and eff ective governance. Anyway, democratic and eff ective governance is not an absolute value so that it has to be balanced against other values. Prominently fi gure among these the fundamental right to equal treatment and rule of law.

Th is appreciation of values seems to be problematic in the case of the al-ready mentioned citizenship practices in Switzerland. As pointed out earlier, the decision-making process on naturalization requests involves all three levels of the federation but has its focus on the local level. Th e federal and respective cantonal governments approve or reject applications on the basis of merely a few and clear-ly defi ned criteria. Art. 14 and 15 of the federal law on citizenship stipulate in particular that applicants must respect the legal order, pose no threat to internal and external security, reside legally in Switzerland for at least twelve years, be in-tegrated into the Swiss society and be familiar with its customs and habits. While the fi rst three criteria are easy to check, the last two are very vague. Th ey are left completely to the assessment at the local level. Th ere, each municipality can also establish additional requirements. In practice, however, a formal and clear speci-fi cation of criteria is lacking in a large majority of municipalities.60 Th e naturali-zation procedure is, in almost all cases, characterized by recommendations from the local administration and commission composed of politicians to the fi nal decision-maker. While in some municipalities the local parliament or executive has this role, it is the entire citizenry in other municipalities. An analysis has dem-onstrated clearly that such decisions made by all citizens are more discriminatory than those by offi cials of the public administration. Th is might result from the

59. Geoff rey Sawer, Modern Federalism (London: Pitman Publishing, 1969), 153.60. See Hellbling, “Naturalisation Politics in Switzerland,” 37.


Karl Kössler388


fact that popular decisions are subject to the opportunity of political mobilization by anti-immigration parties, which usually dominate the public debate on the issue. Whether citizenship is granted or not, then often depends on the power of such parties to mobilize against an individual applicant or a group of applicants. Th is inevitably leads to a high degree of opacity in the decision-making process that is even aggravated by the aforementioned absence of clear criteria.

At this point the tension between (direct) democracy on the one hand and rule of law and equal treatment on the other becomes obvious. Th is tension is refl ected in the Judgement of the Federal Court on the “Emmen case.”61 By se-cret ballot, the citizens of this small town located in the canton Luzern had ap-proved all naturalization requests by Italians and rejected all those by applicants from former Yugoslavia and Poland. While apologists of this procedure pointed to the Swiss tradition of direct democracy and local autonomy within a federal framework, it was eventually found unconstitutional both on the grounds of the rule of law and equal treatment. Th e Federal Court ruled that decisions by secret ballot cannot guarantee the prohibition of arbitrary decisions, which is at the core of the rule of law concept. Th e obligation to state reasons (Art. 29.2 of the Swiss Constitution), which is intended precisely to prevent arbitrariness, is not fulfi lled by such a procedure.62 By defi nition, a secret ballot excludes any possibil-ity of justifi cation. If decisions are made under such a procedure, they violate the principle of non-discrimination (Art. 8 Abs. 2 of the Swiss Constitution). Th is example illustrates that democratic and eff ective governance fostered by federal-ism is not an absolute value that prevails in all circumstances. Instead, it has to be balanced against other values and is therefore highly contextual. Th is applies as much to the governance of immigration and migrant integration as of other complex issues.

AbstractThis paper analyzes whether the general trend towards increasing subnational authority concerning

the governance of complex issues is also true for the fi elds of immigration and migrant integration in multicultural societies. It is argued that an analytical distinction should be made between ‘immigration’ as the mere regulation of international migration fl ows and the much more complex and multidimen-sional issue of ‘migrant integration’. Precisely the multiple dimensions of integration—social, economic and political—entail that it is a cross-sectoral responsibility and an issue which involves more than one level of government. The fi eld of immigration, by contrast, is with very few exceptions a stronghold of central government power. It is demonstrated how these different logics have serious repercussions on the coordination of immigration and migrant integration because the intrinsic interconnectedness of these policy fi elds is neglected.

61. BGE 129 I 217 of 9 July 2003. Along the same lines BGE 130 I 140 of 12 May 2004. See also Daniel Th ürer and Michael Frei, “Einbürgerung im Spannungsfeld zwischen Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Zu zwei historischen Entscheiden des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts”, Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 123 (2004), 205-232.62. BGE 129 I 217 of 9 July 2003, Erwägung 3.3.




RésuméCet article s’intéresse à la tendance générale d’accroissement de l’autorité intra-étatique dans la gou-

vernance de problèmes complexes, et analyse dans quelle mesure cette tendance est également valable dans le domaine de l’immigration et de l’intégration des migrants dans des sociétés multiculturelles. L’article considère qu’une distinction analytique doit être faite entre la question de « l’immigration », comme simple régulation des fl ux internationaux de migration, et la question beaucoup plus complexe et multidimensionnelle de « l’intégration des migrants ». Plus précisément, les multiples dimensions de l’in-tégration – sociale, économique et politique – relèvent d’une responsabilité intersectorielle et constituent une question qui prend en compte plusieurs niveaux de gouvernement. Le domaine de l’immigration, par contraste, est à de rares exceptions près le domaine exclusif du gouvernement central. L’article démontre comment ces différentes logiques entraînent d’importants dysfonctionnements dans la coordination de l’immigration et de l’intégration des migrants, car l’interconnectivité intrinsèque de ces politiques est né-gligée.



L’évolution des droits linguistiques en Europe : Structures territoriales décentralisées et impact de l’immigration en Italie

Giovanni Poggeschi

Professeur associé de droit constitutionnel comparé, Faculté de droit de l’Université de Lecce (Italie), et chercheur senior à l’Institut d’études du fédéralisme et du régionalisme à l’Académie européenne de Bolzano-Bozen (Italie).

1. Ces dernières années, les droits linguistiques ont connu une forte évolution, non seulement en Europe, mais dans le monde entier. Cette courte contribution ne touche qu’à la situation européenne, en raison de la cohérence du discours que j’entends aborder sur le sujet1.

Les droits linguistiques peuvent être considérés, avec raison, comme une sous-partie des droits des minorités2, dans le sillon tracé par le droit comparé3. Cepen-dant, il existe d’autres points de vue pour comprendre la réalité et la complexité des droits linguistiques : ainsi, il faut renvoyer au cadre des droits linguistiques la problématique du langage juridique, liée par sa nature au « devoir » (sollen) ; d’un autre point de vue, le langage juridique est considéré par une brillante doctrine comme lié à une sphère relative au « magique4 ».

Plus modestement, cet article veut explorer d’une part l’infl uence de la struc-ture territoriale de l’État, et d’autre part (en essayant de lier les deux dimensions)

1. Pour une analyse globale des droits linguistiques, voir Giovanni Poggeschi, I diritti linguistici. Un’analisi comparata, Roma, Carocci, 2010.2. Francesco Palermo, Jens Woelk, Diritto costituzionale comparato dei gruppi e delle minoranze (deuxième ed.), Padova, Cedam, 2011.3. Giuseppe de Vergottini, Diritto costituzionale comparato (huitième ed.), Vol. 1, Padova, Cedam, 2011, p. 18.4. Karl Olivecrona, « Linguaggio giuridico e realtà », in Uberto Scarpelli (a cura di), Diritto e analisi del linguag-gio, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1976, pp. 239-283.


Giovanni Poggeschi392


la problématique des droits linguistiques des immigrés de première et de seconde générations, en analysant spécifi quement la réalité de l’Italie (ponctué de réfé-rences à d’autres États). Le cas de l’Italie est très intéressant pour de nombreuses raisons qui peuvent être résumées par la grande diversité des situations minori-taires et des réglementations juridiques conséquentes. On peut citer à ce propos la très grande protection des minorités nationales liées à un « État parent » (Alle-mands, Français et Slovènes), qui diff ère de manière substantielle de la protection « moyenne » de la minorité frioulane de la région Frioul-Vénétie Julienne, et en-core plus sensiblement de la protection « faible » des minorités arbëreshë (ancien groupe albanais, depuis longtemps en Italie, à ne pas confondre avec la nouvelle minorité albanaise issue de l’immigration récente) et grecques (Grica) des îles linguistiques du Midi.

L’intensité de la tutelle minoritaire est directement proportionnée au poids politique et démographique du groupe qui la reçoit. La tutelle est plus forte et effi cace lorsqu’il y existe une structure territoriale qui favorise les politiques mi-noritaires et linguistiques : l’exemple du Haut-Adige, ou Tyrol du Sud, aide à la compréhension de ce phénomène. Bien entendu, l’autonomie ne se borne pas à la question linguistique5, mais il est évident que la langue et la culture jouent un rôle décisif comme condition d’autonomie politique.

Les nouveaux défi s des politiques minoritaires de l’État italien sont causés par le phénomène de l’immigration de ces vingt dernières années : l’Italie compte aujourd’hui environ cinq millions d’étrangers qui parlent une autre langue6. Cer-tains d’entre eux rentreront dans leur pays d’origine, mais la plupart resteront probablement en Italie, avec ou sans la citoyenneté italienne. En conséquence, il est nécessaire d’établir de fortes politiques d’intégration, notamment du point de vue de la langue. Mais pourrait-on envisager aussi une reconnaissance, même partielle, des langues des immigrés en Italie ? Ce bref article essaye de répondre à cette interrogation en tenant compte de la structure territoriale de l’État italien.

2. Un point de départ utile pour l’analyse qui suit est celui de la subdivision des droits linguistiques en trois types7. Les droits (et devoirs) linguistiques de premier type sont les droits d’intégration linguistique et de non-discrimination en matière de langue : ils sont à la fois grégaires et instruments des droits fon-damentaux. L’exemple le plus évident est le droit de défense dans un procès8 : la langue n’est pas ea ipsa un droit, mais une façon de pouvoir jouir d’un droit fondamental. Si l’accusé ne parle pas la langue du procès (la langue offi cielle), il

5. On trouve une autonomie politique de même intensité dans la province du Trentin, où la question linguis-tique a cependant beaucoup moins d’importance qu’au Sud-Tyrol.6. Dossier « Statistico Immigrazione Caritas-Migrantes 2011 », Roma, Idos, 2011.7. Je développe cette systématisation dans Giovanni Poggeschi, I diritti linguistici, pp. 32-40.8. V. Silvio Sau, Le garanzie linguistiche nel processo penale. Diritto dell’interprete e tutela delle minoranze riconos-ciute, Padova, Cedam, 2011.


L’évolution des droits linguistiques en Europe 393


peut concrétiser son droit fondamental à la défense par le biais d’un interprète. Les droits linguistiques de premier type étaient au départ conçus pour les ci-toyens, mais l’élargissement (et en même temps l’aff aiblissement9) de la notion de citoyenneté, telle qu’elle intègre aussi les étrangers résidant légalement dans un pays, permet de – et je dirai même oblige à – intégrer dans les bénéfi ciaires des droits linguistiques de premier type les étrangers.

Un autre cas, un basculement vers les droits linguistiques de deuxième type, se produit quand le procès peut se développer dans la langue minoritaire. Dans ce cas, nous sommes devant des droits linguistiques de deuxième type, droits qui sont adressés aux minorités nationales : toutes les personnes appartenant à une minorité n’ont pas le droit – je dirais même le privilège – de pouvoir bénéfi cier d’un procès dans leur langue d’origine. Pour cela, il faut une organisation très complexe (et coûteuse), qui peut seulement être off erte dans le cas d’une mino-rité très forte, nombreuse et organisée, dotée d’une langue très représentée dans laquelle le droit est enseigné à un niveau universitaire. L’autonomie est donc sou-vent la meilleure technique pour assurer les droits linguistiques de deuxième type.

Les exemples de tutelle linguistique dans les États régionaux et fédéraux sont nombreux : on pense à l’Italie, déjà mentionnée, avec la législation régionale et les provinces autonomes de Bolzano et de Trento. La tutelle est très diversifi ée selon les diff érents choix politiques qui, comme il a été indiqué, sont liés au poids de la minorité.

Le mandat constitutionnel de l’article 6, selon lequel « la République protège par des normes particulières les minorités linguistiques » a été suivi par une législa-tion à tous les niveaux de la République. Le Statut du Haut-Adige/Tyrol du Sud, qui est la base de la législation régionale et en particulier des provinces autonomes de Bolzano et de Trento, est une loi de rang constitutionnel, comme les statuts de la Vallée d’Aoste et du Frioul-Vénétie Julienne. Les nombreuses lois régionales de ces régions à statut spécial donnent exécution au mandat constitutionnel ; de même pour les rares lois d’autres régions, qui n’encadrent pas seulement les mi-norités reconnues par la Loi 482/1999, mais aussi les parlers régionaux. L’exemple le plus récent de loi sur les minorités linguistiques vient de la région des Pouilles, adoptée par le conseil régional le 14 mars 201210.

C’est également en Espagne, où les Communautés autonomes sont les auteurs des politiques linguistiques sur les langues locales (« lenguas propias », selon le

9. Les deux conséquences sont liées ; il y a aujourd’hui un statut de citoyenneté plus large, mais moins fort qu’avant, quand le rapport entre la personne et l’État était exclusif et sanctionné par la citoyenneté : voir Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights from Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 325-398.10. L’adoption de ladite loi suit de quelques semaines la « préparation » de la ratifi cation par l’Italie de la Charte européenne sur les langues régionales et minoritaires : le 9 mars 2012, le gouvernement a préparé un projet de loi que le Parlement adoptera vraisemblablement.




terme utilisé par le législateur catalan). Il en est ainsi en Catalogne, dont le dernier Statut de 2006 est l’instrument de législation subétatique le plus généreux sur la réglementation des droits linguistiques, notamment à propos de la protection ainsi que de la promotion de la langue régionale, qui est la plus importante langue minoritaire sans État de référence en Europe. En Allemagne, les rares – parce que rares y sont les minorités linguistiques traditionnelles – lois sur la protection des langues minoritaires relèvent des Länder11.

Les droits linguistiques sont souvent des objets privilégiés de la législation des régions, des Communautés autonomes et des Länder parce que, dans lesdites en-tités sous-étatiques, le groupe linguistique minoritaire à niveau étatique se trouve être majoritaire au niveau régional, ou du moins avec une puissance numérique.

Le fait que, parmi les pays mentionnés, ce sont ceux avec un système régio-nal et non fédéral qui ont la plus forte discipline linguistique n’est pas habituel : l’expérience montre que ce n’est pas la distinction entre les systèmes fédéraux et régionaux qui compte, mais plutôt la diversité entre les systèmes symétriques et asymétriques, que ceux-ci soient fédéraux ou régionaux. La plupart des États asymétriques en Europe ont un système régional, et cela peut s’expliquer par le fait que l’encadrement de la diversité linguistique et culturelle s’accommode beaucoup mieux du régionalisme que du fédéralisme : en eff et, le dernier est sou-vent caractérisé par une forte composante unitariste, avec des mécanismes de coopération qui risquent de frustrer les capacités des entités sous-étatiques plus fortes et ambitieuses.

Il faut néanmoins noter que, en Espagne comme en Italie, il y a eu récemment un certain self-restraint des cours constitutionnelles envers les pouvoirs en matière linguistique : c’est le cas en Italie de la décision n° 159/2009 sur la loi de la langue frioulane, et surtout en Espagne avec les décisions sur le Statut catalan de 2010, en particulier la n° 3112.

Même avec le retour mentionné du centralisme (pour utiliser un vocabulaire très grossier, mais clair), le rôle des régions, des Communautés autonomes et des Länder n’est pas remis en cause.

3. A contrario, on peut dire que dans les États plus centralisés, la protection de la diversité linguistique est beaucoup plus faible : on pense tout de suite à la Turquie, qui ne répond toujours pas aux critères de Copenhague sur la protection des minorités nationales13.

11. Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen & Georg Hansen (Hrs), Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, C.H. Beck, 1995.12. Voir Giovanni Poggeschi, « L’autonomia controllata : la sentenza del Tribunale costituzionale spagnolo n. 31 del 28 giugno 2010 sullo Statuto catalano », Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, n. 4, 2011, pp. 3303-3032.13. Voir le rapport de la Commission européenne du 2011 : tout en reconnaissant un certain progrès sur l’usage des langues minoritaires dans l’éducation, la Commission estime que « dans l’ensemble, l’approche sur les mino-rités reste restrictive. Les pleins respects et protections de la langue, de la culture et des droits fondamentaux, en accord




Ce n’est pas par hasard que la France s’est récemment ouverte à la fois au ré-gionalisme, avec la révision de la Constitution de 2003, et à la protection des par-lers régionaux, selon le nouvel article 75, « partie du patrimoine culturel français ». Pour être plus précis, j’estime qu’il n’y a pas encore une relation directe entre les deux phénomènes décrits : il n’y a pas, aujourd’hui en France, une politique régio-nale pour les droits linguistiques, et les mesures de tutelle linguistique en France sont issues de l’État central. Soit elles sont rares (comme la loi Deixonne de 1951 sur les langues régionales14), soit elles statuent sur les normes de la langue offi cielle (la loi Toubon de 199415).

La coïncidence entre la décentralisation et l’ouverture à la diversité linguis-tique (des parlers régionaux, mais pas les langues étrangères) renvoie à la même conception du respect et de la valorisation de la diversité, qui est dans ce cas terri-toriale et linguistique/culturelle. C’est dans cette logique que je parle d’un certain parallélisme entre les changements normatifs mentionnés en France.

Il n’est cependant pas toujours vrai de dire que les entités sous-étatiques sont plus favorables à la protection des droits linguistiques. Pour des raisons histo-riques, aux États-Unis, les normes sur la protection minoritaire viennent en parti-culier du niveau fédéral, tandis que certains États ont adopté des lois qui rejettent le bilinguisme ou le plurilinguisme : il s’agit de lois « English only »16, qu’une tren-taine d’États ont adoptées, avec l’idée de freiner l’expansion de la langue espa-gnole, de loin la plus parlée des langues minoritaires aux États-Unis.

4. Au-delà de rares exceptions (comme celle mentionnée des USA), la structure régionale ou fédérale s’est donc avérée être un instrument utile pour la protection des minorités linguistiques « traditionnelles », ou historiques ou nationales selon l’usage, avec une législation typique de « deuxième type ». Je passe maintenant à la question des droits et des devoirs linguistiques de troisième type.

La question qu’il faut se poser aujourd’hui relève du défi : les techniques et l’esprit de législation des droits linguistiques de deuxième type pourraient-ils ser-vir comme modèles pour les droits linguistiques de troisième type ? En d’autres termes, comment peut-on protéger les droits linguistiques des immigrés et de leurs descendants (la seconde génération) ?

Tout d’abord, il faut se demander s’il est nécessaire de s’intéresser aux droits linguistiques spécifi ques pour les étrangers : on considère généralement que, pour

avec les standards européens, sont encore à acquérir » : Turkey Progress Report 2011, pp. 40-41 : <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_oct_2011_en.htm>14. Florence Benoìt-Rohmer, « Les langues offi cieuses de la France », Revue française de droit constitutionnel 1/2001 (n° 45), pp. 3-29.15. Roland Debbasch, « La reconnaissance constitutionnelle de la langue française », Revue française de droit constitutionnel, 1992, p. 457 e ss.16. Juan F. Perea, « Democracy and Distrust : an Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Offi cial English, » Minnesota Law Review, n. 77, 1992.




les étrangers, la priorité doit porter sur l’intégration, plutôt que sur la recon-naissance de leur spécifi cité culturelle. Si l’intégration signifi e la possibilité de jouir des droits fondamentaux des citoyens nationaux, les droits linguistiques de premier type, c’est-à-dire les droits de la non-discrimination, sont pleinement suffi sants. (Un pas supplémentaire serait de jouir de droits politiques ; comme en témoignent aujourd’hui les luttes pour le droit de vote aux élections locales des étrangers en Italie.) Mais on pourrait envisager une reconnaissance partielle des langues des étrangers (et de leurs descendants), particulièrement au niveau sco-laire. Sur base volontaire, les langues des immigrés (qui sont souvent des langues d’envergure internationale, comme l’arabe et le chinois) pourraient être ensei-gnées, non seulement aux membres du groupe linguistique concerné, mais à tous les écoliers qui désirent ouvrir leur connaissance linguistique.

La structure régionale pourrait-elle être utile à cet égard, c’est-à-dire envers les droits linguistiques de troisième type ? Pas nécessairement ; je pense plutôt que les compétences des régions et des communes pourraient surtout s’avérer utiles pour la mise en pratique des devoirs linguistiques (de premier type) que des décrets ont récemment imposés en Italie. Il s’agit des nouveaux tests de connaissance de la langue italienne, prévus par les décrets entrés en vigueur le 9 décembre 2010 et le 10 mars 2012, relatifs aux règles du permis de séjour.

Le premier décret concerne les résidents de longue période, et sa mise en œuvre a été précisée par des circulaires du ministère de l’Intérieur fi n 2010. Ce sont les institutions éducatives qui organisent le test, avec un contrôle souple et non spécifi é de la préfecture.

Le deuxième est très novateur, mais il laisse place à de nombreuses questions quant à la sécurité juridique. On parle d’un « système de crédits », qui comprend aussi, pour la personne qui entre pour la première fois en Italie, un accord d’in-tégration. Cet accord inclut notamment l’obligation d’apprendre la langue ita-lienne.

L’alinéa 3 de l’article 2 du décret en question encadre du point de vue tech-nique la gestion des crédits, tandis que l’alinéa 4 du même article règle l’engage-ment de l’étranger, qui ne consiste pas seulement en la connaissance de la langue italienne, mais aussi du fonctionnement des institutions publiques en Italie et de la vie civique, comportant en particulier des références à la santé, aux services sociaux, au marché du travail et aux devoirs fi scaux.

L’article 6 prévoit la possibilité d’accroître les crédits de l’accord d’intégration si l’étranger montre un progrès dans la connaissance de la langue italienne. Cet accord d’intégration est un cadre sévère parce que, si la personne qui l’a signé ne réussit pas les points essentiels, la conséquence est le refus de la concession d’un nouveau permis de séjour et l’expulsion. Il est à noter qu’il n’existe pas d’obliga-tions similaires dans le droit comparé pour un simple permis de séjour, les me-




sures adoptées et leurs conséquences ressemblant plutôt aux obligations relatives à l’acquisition de la citoyenneté.

Il est trop tôt pour juger les mesures présentées, mais il va sans dire qu’en face des obligations notamment de nature linguistique des étrangers, l’État se doit d’assurer l’assistance nécessaire aux personnes concernées pour l’apprentissage de la langue italienne. Pour cela, L’État devrait fi xer des critères uniformes, mais un certain rôle pourrait être laissé aux régions et aux municipalités pour l’organisa-tion des tests et pour leur préparation.

Il ne s’agit pas d’un rôle d’une envergure importante dans la spécifi cation de ces devoirs linguistiques de premier type. Dans le cas présent, la structure régionale n’est pas très utilisée. Au contraire, j’estime que dans le cadre, bien encore hypothétique, des droits linguistiques de troisième type, les régions et les municipalités pourraient, et je dis même devraient, être porteurs de politiques interculturelles ambitieuses et novatrices.



South Tyrol’s Education System: Plurilingual Answers for Monolinguistic Spheres?

Elisabeth Alber

Senior Researcher at the Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism at the European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen (EURAC).

1. Introduction

Th e Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen in Northern Italy is generally considered to be one of the most successful examples of the accommodation of minorities through territorial self-government. According to the census in 2001, South Tyrol’s population of about half a million people consists of 69.15 percent of German speakers, 26.47 percent of Italian speakers and 4.37 percent of Ladin speakers.

In the Province (hereinafter South Tyrol) the German language has the same standing as Italian,1 the offi cial language of the state, and can be used in the whole public sphere. Each person has the right to address the administration in Italian or German. Th e general rule established by the Autonomy Statute is that admin-istration must be bilingual in the whole territory of South Tyrol (and trilingual in the Ladin valleys),2 and that the choice of language is made by the individual. Th e civil servants (and persons working for companies in charge of the provision of public utility services) are required to be bilingual (trilingual in the Ladin val-

1. Art. 99 of the Second Autonomy Statute (ASt).2. Th is means that in South Tyrol the use of the two offi cial languages is based on the personal principle, while for the use of Ladin follows the territorial principle.


Elisabeth Alber400


leys), which has to be proved by a public examination. 3 All these provisions and even more importantly all the stipulations on the use of language are reinforced by strict legal remedies. Th e Autonomy Statute and its enactment decrees con-tain numerous and detailed guarantees for the case of an alleged violation of the minority (rather: group) rights, available to individuals and groups as a means to strengthen mutual confi dence.4

Th e education and school system in South Tyrol is based on the principle of separation and monolingual instruction (in German-and Italian-language schools). Th e plurilingual Ladin school system uses the principle of ‘teaching language parity’ (hours are given in German and Italian in an equal amount and Ladin itself is also taught and used as a back-up language while teaching). With regard to administration in the school system, three independent inspectors are appointed, being responsible for the overall functioning of the respective schools. Teaching in tertiary education institutions in South Tyrol is trilingual (German, Italian and English) and partially also provided in Ladin language (training for teachers at the Faculty of Education Sciences).

Th e status quo of the threefold sophisticated provincial schooling system has to be considered through the lens of South Tyrol’s history. Th erefore, the paper fi rstly provides an overview of the history of South Tyrol and the settle-ment of the confl ict by outlining the consequences for the German-language school system (chapter 2). Th en the current legislative frame enshrined in the Second Autonomy Statute (1972) and the essential features of the German-and Italian-language school system are analysed (chapter 3). Th e analysis out-lines the specifi c rules regulating the school system. In practice, two separate and parallel school systems (nursery, primary, secondary and upper secondary school) are established, with pupils taught in their “mother tongue” by teachers of the same language. Th e paper goes on by analysing the plurilingual “Parity Model of Ladin-language schools”(chapter 4) that is characterized by the prin-ciple of ‘teaching language parity.’ Tertiary education in South Tyrol is as well based on plurilingualism (chapter 5). Th e Free University of Bolzano/Bozen was established in 1997 and provides for a unique Faculty of Education Sciences that trains teachers to be employed in South Tyrol. Furthermore, the bilingual “integrated curriculum in Italian Law” at the University of Innsbruck (Austria) plays a fundamental role in training specialists and executive staff for South

3. Presidential Decree (dPR) no. 752 of 1976 established bilingualism as a prerequisite for employment in the public service (broadly interpreted).4. Th ese guarantees include, inter alia, the right of linguistic groups represented in the provincial Parliament to veto a draft law they consider in breach of the equality between the groups (alarm-bell procedure, that can ultimately end in front of the Constitutional Court, Art. 56 ASt) and the right to challenge decisions of non-admission to schools on grounds of insuffi cient language skills (Art. 19 ASt).


South Tyrol’s Education System: Plurilingual Answers for Monolinguistic Spheres? 401


Tyrol’s German-language administration (referring to Italian legal institutes).5

Th e paper concludes by an analysis on how stakeholders and politics react to the demands of partially abandoning monolingualism as a teaching princi-ple in the school system (chapter 6). Especially in the urban areas demands for plurilingual teaching increase. Schools use their partial autonomy in didactics and teaching to introduce ‘language immersion’ as a teaching method of the sec-ond language (the target language is used for instruction). Other schools opt for pupil exchanges and projects among classes with diff erent instruction languages. Cross-border cooperation, increased immigration and Europeanization are just some of current challenges South Tyrol’s school system has to face.

2. South Tyrol’s education and school system before 1972

After World War I, with the peace treaty of St. Germain (1919), both Tren-tino (predominantly Italian) and South Tyrol (predominantly German) were an-nexed to Italy. Th e Italian Government promised to protect the German-speaking minority through territorial and cultural autonomy, but any eff ort was stopped in 1922 when the fascist regime came to power. During the fascist dictatorship a number of repressive measures were taken against the German-speaking mi-nority. Th is led to the dismantling of the functioning German-language school system. In 1921, the enactment of the legislative decree ‘Corbino’ introduced the obligatory enrolment of Italian-speaking children in schools where Italian was the language of instruction, thus contradicting the principle of free choice in force today (see chapter 3). In July 1923, the Commissioner for language and culture in South Tyrol, Ettore Tolomei presented the program for the Italianization of the territory, which included, among other measures, the creation of Italian-language nursery and primary schools. On 23 October 1923 the fascist government prom-ulgated a regulation (riforma Gentile) forbidding German-language instruction in South Tyrol and by the end of 1929 all optional German language courses were defi nitively forbidden. From 1923 to 1927 more than 70% of teachers in German-language schools were dismissed; public and private German language

5. Th e eff ective and coherent use of a minority language in the public sphere does not only depend on the status of the language, but also on more specifi c problems that might constitute a practical obstacle to the full use of a language. Language is very specifi c to the country it refers to. Overall, a bilingual regime can only work if ter-minology in the minority language is reliable. While this is not a problem with regard to everyday’s German, in some special fi elds such as in particular legal terminology the concepts and the terms may diff er from those used in Austria or Germany, due to the diff erence in the legal system. Th erefore, the by-law on the use of languages has set up a special joint commission consisting of six experts, three Italian speakers and three German speakers (Art. 6 par. 1 dPR no. 574/1988) whose task is to standardize terminology. Th ey determine, update and validate the legal, administrative and technical terminology in use by the public administration and judiciary as well as by concessionary agents of public utility services. See in detail, E. Alber, F. Palermo, “Creating, Studying and Experimenting with Bilingual Law in South Tyrol: Lost in Interpretation?” in: Bilingual Higher Education in the Legal Context, ed. X. Arzoz, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden Boston, 2012), 287-309 (297-303).


Elisabeth Alber402


teaching was also forbidden.6 With regard to higher education no foreign degrees were recognized and post-secondary studies at foreign universities were prohib-ited.7

In 1939 Hitler and Mussolini agreed on a ‘fi nal solution’ for the South Ty-rolean question: accordingly, the German-speaking South Tyroleans had to choose between keeping their identity (thus becoming Germans and being forci-bly moved to Hitler’s Reich) and keeping their home (thus accepting to assimi-late including by changing their names). Around 86% of the German-speaking population decided to leave, although only a small part of them really left, due to the outbreak of war, and many returned after the war.8 Art. 22 of that Agreement foresaw the creation of German courses for the children of those who decided to leave for the Th ird Reich.

In 1946, the Peace treaty confi rmed South Tyrol as part of Italy, but it pro-vided for an international anchoring of minority rights, ensuring that the Ger-man-speaking population would be given special provisions.9 According to Art. 1 (a) of the Gruber-Degasperi Agreement, enshrined in Annex IV of the Peace Treaty, German-speakers had to be guaranteed “elementary and secondary teaching in the mother-tongue”, in accordance with legislation already enacted or awaiting enactment. Shortly beforehand, on 4 October 1943 German-language schools ‘reopened’; mother tongue education was enforced again and reintroduced at primary and secondary level. Its organization was extremely diffi cult due to the fact that there were almost no qualifi ed teachers.10 Teachers of German mother tongue did not have an appropriate educational background and, due to the big demand, students themselves were employed as teachers. A series of specialisation courses was started by the Austrian University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the Italian University of Padua counteracting the educational arrears.

In the course of summer 1946 the school inspector Francesco Zorzi elabo-rated guidelines for a new institutional structure concerning elementary schools in South Tyrol. It included an education superintendent able to understand Ger-man, German-language instruction and teachers of German mother tongue. Ac-cording to Art. 1 of the legislative decree no. 555/194711 school teaching in pri-mary schools in the Province of Bolzano and the bilingual areas of the Province

6. C. Vidoni, La scuola dell’autonomia provinciale (Armando Editore, Roma, 2006), 17.7. R. Seberich, Südtiroler Schulgeschichte (Edition Raetia, Bozen, 2000), 239.8. E. Lantschner, “History of South Tyrol Confl ict and its Settlement,” in: Tolerance through Law. Self-Govern-ance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, eds. J.Woelk, F. Palermo and J. Marko (Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden-Boston, 2008), 3-15.9. Th e smallest (and oldest) linguistic group, the Ladins, are technically not covered by the Gruber-Degasperi Agreement. Th e claims of the Ladin minority group has been traditionally put forward by the German speaking group and by its most representative party, the South Tyroleans’ People’s Party (SVP).10. C. Vidoni, La scuola dell’autonomia provinciale, (Armando Editore, Roma, 2006), 20-21.11. D.C.S. 16 maggio 1947, no. 555 – insegnamento in lingua materna nelle scuole elementari dell’Alto Adige.




of Trento had to be provided in the mother tongue of the pupils, preferably by teachers for whom the language of instruction was their mother tongue. School enrolment back then was based on the decision of the parents or the guardian (as it is today according to Art. 19 of the Second Autonomy of 1972).

For tertiary education, Art. 3 (b) of the Gruber-Degasperi agreement com-mitted Italy to concur in a joint agreement on the reciprocal recognition of valid-ity of certain study degrees and university diplomas for the sake of neighbourly relations. However, it was only in 1952 that the agreement for the promotion of cultural relationships between Italy and Austria was signed.12 It was only in 1979 that German-and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans were set on a par with Austrian citizens for the sake of access to services in Austria, including access to university and students’ benefi ts.13 In concrete terms this implied that diplomas of secondary education were equated with those of Austrian high schools and that South Tyroleans were entitled to the same treatment with regard to study fees (§ 4 par. 1 of the Austrian Law on equal status for South Tyroleans); additionally, the Austrian University system opened up for full and associated professorships for South Tyroleans in spite of them holding Italian citizenship (§ 2). In 1982 Austria and Italy fi nally agreed on the manner and extent to which a cooperation of universities should become reality. Th e Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Italy entered into force on 1 October 1983.14 Th is bi-lateral agreement paved the way for the ‘integrated curriculum on Italian law’ of the University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the Italian University of Padua.15

In 1948 the Italian Parliament issued, by constitutional act, an Autonomy Statute (ASt, regional constitution), which ensured far-reaching autonomy but essentially at a regional level (including the Province of Trento), where the Ital-ians were the clear majority. Th is was signifi cant because of the fact that primary legislative powers in key sectors of the economy were vested in the Region (and not in the Provinces of Trento and Bolzano). With regard to education, the Prov-ince of Bolzano enjoyed primary legislative powers only in relation to specialized courses in agriculture and commerce (Art. 11 of the ASt). For primary, second-ary and uppersecondary education the Province of Bolzano was only granted secondary legislative powers (Art. 12 of the ASt) within the limits of a national framework law. Th e ASt provided for teaching in mother tongue and ‘mother tongue teaching’ in the second language. Furthermore, Art. 15 provided that in German-language schools teaching of Italian (being the offi cial language) was obligatory. On the contrary, Italian-language schools did not have to provide for

12. BGBl. no. 270/1954.13. Gleichstellungsgesetz, Bundesgesetz 25.01.1979, BGBl. no. 57.14. BGBl. no. 423/1983.15. See chapter 5 in this paper.


Elisabeth Alber404


German language classes. It is interesting to stress that two previous legislative de-crees (no. 775/1945 and no. 555/1947) provided for mandatory German classes in schools having Italian as language of instruction (even though the implementa-tion of such classes was almost impossible due to the lack of German teachers). Furthermore, the regulation on school enrolment provided in legislative decree no. 555/1947 (declaration of the father or the guardian) was not taken over in the provisions of the ASt.

Th e teaching and administrative staff were substantially an integral part of the Italian national educational system. Back then the provincial school system had little fi nancial means and all regional and provincial laws required approval by the central government in Rome.

In the early 1960s the Austrian Government urged the UN to take position on the South Tyrolean case (two resolutions in 1960 and 1961). Th is led to ne-gotiations within a special commission, whose members fi nally agreed on the so called “package” of legislative measures. With regard to education and school policy the package provided 20 measures, which concerned, among others, the transfer of primary legislative powers in the schooling sector and new procedures for the appointment of school inspectors of each school division.16

Th e most important consequence of the ‘package’ was the reform of the First Autonomy Statute 1948 that foresaw the transfer of essentially all legislative and administrative powers from the Autonomous Region Trentino-South Tyrol to the two Autonomous Provinces of South Tyrol and Trentino. Th e Second Autonomy Statute applies generally to both Provinces in the same way, but South Tyrol has in addition special provisions regarding, among others, the use of mother tongue and the organization of the school system. Th e implementation of the specifi c measures lasted until 1992, when the confl ict was formally closed.

Today South Tyrol’s population enjoys the highest degree of protection within the Italian Republic, whose Constitution takes only the language as a distinctive feature to identify minorities.

3. South Tyrol’s education and school system: essential features

Th e Autonomy Statute as promulgated in 1972 (Second ASt)17 provides South Tyrolese with very broad legislative and administrative powers, which include nearly all competences except the army, administration of justice, the police and a few minor issues. Even more importantly, the relationship between South Tyrol and the Italian state is essentially bilateral: all enactment decrees to the Autonomy Statute (which prevail over laws of the national Parliament) are negotiated by a

16. C. Vidoni, La scuola dell’autonomia provinciale (Armando Editore, Roma, 2006), 42-44.17. Presidential Decree (dPR) no. 670 of 31 August 1972.




joint commission composed of 6 people, representing on an equal footing the state and South Tyrol (3 each) as well as the Italian and the German speaking group.18 Th is makes the basic rules unchangeable against the will of South Tyrol and ultimately of its dominant population, the German speaking minority.19 Th e whole institutional setting in South Tyrol is a power-sharing system based on strict separation and forced cooperation of the two main linguistic groups, Ger-man and Italian speakers.20 In the civil service, jobs are assigned to the linguistic groups “in proportion to the size of the groups themselves, as they appear in the decla-rations of the offi cial census”.21 Th is rule stretches to privatized institutions such as the railroad and the postal service and aims to guarantee both the representation of the groups as such and the provision of bilingual services (trilingual in the Ladin area) throughout the territory of South Tyrol.

Separation is the rule also in education. Each group runs its own schools, from the nursery to upper secondary schools, and they are competent for the administration and programmes of the school of their respective linguistic group. Th e distinct authorities are also responsible for the legal treatment and salary of teachers, who must prove their mother tongue to be entitled to teach in the school of the respective group. Th e education and school system (school authori-ties and respective school inspectors, the three pedagogical institutes supporting the development of the schools and the three evaluation authorities) is thus sub-ject to an administration referable to the provincial institutional regime.22 Due to the principle of monolingualism, in the Italian-language schools all subjects are taught in Italian and, conversely, the schools with German language of instruc-tion only teach in German.

18. F. Palermo, “Implementation and Amendment of the Autonomy Statute,” in: Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, Martinus Nijhoff , eds. J. Woelk, F. Palermo, and J. Marko (Leiden-Boston, 2008), 143-159.19. J. Woelk, “What it Means to be Special in Relations with the Central State: Institutions and Procedures,” in: Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, eds. J. Woelk, F Palermo, and J. Marko (Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden-Boston, 2008), 121-142.20. S. Wolff , “Complex Power Sharing as Confl ict Resolution: South Tyrol in Comparative perspective,” Toler-ance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, eds. J. Woelk, F. Palermo, and J. Marko (Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden-Boston, 2008), 329-370.21. Th rough this declaration the strength of the linguistic groups can be ascertained, and it then forms the legal foundation of the public life. Th ose who do not make the declaration are excluded from applying for public posts, offi ces, public housing and various social contributions. E. Lantschner, G. Poggeschi, “Quota System, Census and Declaration of Affi liation to a Linguistic Group,” in: Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol eds. J. Woelk, F. Palermo, and J. Marko (Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden-Boston, 2008), 219-234.In French language, F. Palermo, “Un système de ‘proportionelle ethnique’: le secteur public du Trentin-Haut Adige,” 118 Revue française d’administration publique (2006): 321-334.22. Provincial Law No. 13/1987. See P. Höllrigl, R. Meraner, and I. Nicolussi, “Umsetzung der Autonomie der Schulen und der Schulreform in Südtirol,” in: Schulreformen in Italien und ihre Umsetzung in Südtirol, Studien Verlag, eds. P. Höllrigl, R. Meraner, K. Promberger (Innsbruck/Wien/Bozen, 2005), 153-210 (162-167).


Elisabeth Alber406


Th e Second ASt attributes to South Tyrol primary and secondary legislative powers with regard to the school system (Art.s 8, 9 and 19 of the Second ASt); regulation is to be found in the respective enactment decrees to the Second ASt. According to Art. 8 Second ASt, South Tyrol enjoys exclusive legislative power on nursery schools, school welfare, school buildings and vocational training. Furthermore, the Province is entitled to issue laws on primary and secondary education (and teacher training) in conformity with the principles established by state legislation.23 Art. 19 par. 1 of the Second ASt provides for regulation on the language of instruction. Th is Article is the cornerstone of the provincial educa-tion and school system. It provides for mother tongue instruction and second language teaching. Teaching of the ‘second language’ (this is the offi cial name of Italian in German schools and of German in Italian schools) is compulsory and determined by provincial law (as provided in Art. 6 par. 1 dPR no. 89/1983). Second language teachers are required to prove an adequate knowledge of the language of instruction of the school.

Art. 19 Second ASt also provides for special measures in the schooling con-tents, the structure and the administration of the provincial school system. Th ey are in derogation of the principles established by state law but functional to the needs of South Tyrol. Th is results in three independent school authorities (the Italian, the German and the Ladin one) and in obligatory second language teach-ing. As to diplomas obtained in German-language secondary schools, they are equivalent to those of schools having Italian as instruction language. In order to guarantee this equivalence, the National Higher Education Council must be consulted with regard to the teaching programmes and examinations.24 As to the administration of South Tyrol’s school system, since 1996 the Provincial Govern-ment appoints both the superintendent (in agreement with the National Min-istry of Education) as well as the German and Ladin school inspectors (prior consultation with the National Ministry of Education).25 In the rest of Italy, the regional level is responsible for implementing the overall national education and schooling off er; some administrative tasks are fulfi lled by offi ces at provincial level.

Th e principle of free choice of enrolling either in German-, Italian- or Ladin-language schools applies as a general rule in the Second ASt (Art. 19 par. 3). Parents have the right to enrol their children into schools of their choice. Th is right cannot be abused to infl uence in any manner the language of instruction of the respective school. Th e school authority has the right to contest and refuse in-

23. Art. 30, 33 and 34 of the Italian Constitution refer to the general principles applicable to education, State schools and the right to free education within the cycle of compulsory education.24. Art. 8 Second ASt; Art. 3 of the dPR 89/1983.25. Legislative decree no. 434/1996.




scriptions if the pupil’s language skills are considered to be too weak and are thus not able to ‘usefully’ follow the lesson (or, broadly interpreted, compromise the effi ciency of the lesson). Th e case is submitted to a joint commission with equal representation appointed by the respective school inspector and the superintend-ent. Provided that the respective school authority confi rms its decision to refuse the enrolment, the parents have the possibility to challenge the decision in front of the Autonomous Section of the Bolzano/Bozen Regional Court of Administra-tive Justice.26 As to the contents, South Tyrol is granted the right to adapt the syl-labi to local necessities, notwithstanding their conformity with the fundamental principles at national level. Given that the knowledge of the German and Italian language is not only a fundamental means of peaceful co-existence, but part of a South Tyrolese public sphere within Europe, the search for innovative syllabi in language learning seems essential. Provided that one validates this argument, both the German-and Italian-language schools could legitimately adopt new measures without prejudicing the principle of mother-tongue teaching enshrined in Art. 19 Second ASt;27 for example, Content and Language Integrated Learn-ing (CLIL), in which pupils learn a subject through the medium of a foreign language.

4. Th e plurilingual Ladin Parity Model

Ladin is the third community language in South Tyrol and is spoken in two valleys. Ladin-speakers are granted the right to use the language in public offi ces in the Ladin municipalities, but also in offi ces located outside of those valleys, if those offi ces represent Ladin interests. Art. 32 of the dPR no. 574/1988 regulates its use in administration (the same by-law specifi es also the use of German and Italian language)28 and determines that the Ladin citizen can use Ladin with the public and if located in the Ladin municipalities (within the two valleys Gröden and Badia in the Dolomites area); additionally, Ladin can be used in contact with regional and provincial authorities if they are in charge of representing La-din interests (for example, with the Ladin Education Authority established in 1975 and the Ladin Pedagogical Institute created in 1987, both having their seat

26. dPR no. 301/1988 (5); cf. E. M. Pföstl, Die Entwicklung, “der Rechtsprechung des Verfassungsgerich-tshofes unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf die Schulordnung der autonomen Provinz Bozen,” Informator 1998/2, 70-91 (81).27. C. Vidoni, La scuola dell’autonomia provinciale (Armando Editore, Roma, 2006), 128.28. In particular, the use of language in relations with the administration could be regulated in its main parts even before the new ASt was adopted in 1972, whereas the establishment of a fully bilingual judiciary was postponed until 1988, when the fundamental by-law on the use of languages (dPR no. 574/1988) was eventu-ally enacted.


Elisabeth Alber408


in Bolzano/Bozen/Bulsan). However, there is no indication in the by-law about standardizing legal terminology in Ladin language.29

Ladin schools are based on the principle of ‘teaching language parity’, with the same number of hours given in German and Italian. Ladin itself is also taught, used as a back-up language and, in the lowest grade, as a language of instruction. Th e right to Ladin-language schools is enshrined in Art. 19 par. 2 of the Second ASt, which provides that “Ladin shall also be used as a teaching language in schools of every type and grade […].” Already the Ministerial Decree no. 5145/76 of the year 1948 enunciated provisions that now are inherent to the so-called “Parity Model of Ladin School”: it provided that certain subjects had to be taught in German, the rest in Italian language. Ladin had also to be used as language of instruction in all levels of education. Th e Ladin population has always fought for the elaboration of a trilingual primary schooling system. Th e debate continued to be heated also with the entry into force of the Second ASt in 1972. Th e rul-ing South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP), led by its demands for full autonomy in the school system, was demanding either a German or Italian school in the Ladin valleys (in conformity with the right of being off ered teaching in mother tongue throughout all subjects during obligatory education). Th e dispute culmi-nated in an appeal against Art. 7 of the enactment decree no. 116/1973 which concerns the principle of teaching language parity and the use of Ladin as an assistant language. Th e Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal (judgement no. 101/1976) and the Parity Model of Ladin schools became the offi cial one in the Ladin municipalities.30 Th e judgement excludes the possibility to choose be-tween a school having Italian or German as language of instruction and confi rms the de facto discrimination of German or Italian-speaking children with regard to mother-tongue instruction. According to the Constitutional Court the right to attend German- or Italian-language schools is precluded in the Ladin municipali-ties under the terms of Art. 19 Second ASt because of the trilingualism of the La-din schools.31 Today this model arouses public interest and Ladins consider it as an ideal model.32 Th e success rate of Ladin-speakers in the bi(tri)lingualism exam on provincial level seems also to concede this point to the supporter of the La-din school model. Already in nursery school, children are confronted with three languages. In primary and secondary school teaching is provided with the same

29. At present both ‘Ladin forms’ in the valleys, the ‘Gadertaler Ladin’ and the ‘Grödner Ladin’, are considered literary language in South Tyrol (decision no. 210/2003 of the Provincial Government).30. J. Runggaldier, “Die paritätische Schule der Ladiner in Südtirol,” in Politika10, Jahrbuch für Politik, Südti-roler Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft, (Edition Raetia, Bozen, 2010), pp. 477-493 (483-485).31. G. Rautz, “A Minority within a Minority: the Special Status of the Ladin Valleys,” in: Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, eds. J. Woelk, F. Palermo, and J. Marko (Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden-Boston, 2008), 279-290 (290).32. F. Vittur, Ein Leben, eine Schule. Zur Geschichte der Schule in den ladinischen Ortshaften, (Institut Pedagog-ich Ladin, Bozen, 1994), 63-66.




numbers of hours given in German and Italian (the principle of the quantity of hours distributed during the whole school year is in force). Neither German nor Italian is thus predominant. Additionally, Ladin is taught as language two hours weekly during the years of compulsory education and one hour weekly in upper secondary school. Also in upper secondary school Ladin may be used any time as an assistant language.33 Additionally, English is introduced as foreign language at the fi fth grade of school. As to enrolment, the same principle as in German-and Italian-language schools is in force: free choice of the parents. Everybody can enrol in the Ladin parity schools. Teachers have to know all three languages to be employed in Ladin-language schools and with regard to nursery and primary schools employment is preconditioned by the fact that teachers did declare them-selves as affi liated to the Ladin language group.

5. Higher multi-and bilingual education in and for South Tyrol

Recently established institutions in tertiary education follow the principle of multilingualism. Th is primarily translated in an extensive use of English in addition to German and Italian. In 1992 the research centre European Acad-emy of Bolzano/Bozen has been established as a non-profi t private entity aiming at the promotion of applied research and the creation of know-how in sectors of special relevance for South Tyrol. Furthermore, the trilingual (Italian, Ger-man and English) Free University of Bolzano/Bozen was founded in 1997 and confers state-recognized qualifi cations. Th e university breaks for the fi rst time with the principle of segregated education and opens up—although still to a limited extent—to a new model of education. Th e foundation of the Free Uni-versity of Bolzano/Bozen was highly controversial. Some feared that the rela-tionship with the University of Innsbruck could be blurred, others were afraid of an increase of Italian immigration. Generally, the University of Innsbruck has always been considered as the “Landesuniversität der Tiroler bzw. Südtiroler” (the university of the Tyrolese people of German mother tongue) because of its cultural-linguistic bond and geographical proximity (120 km from Bolzano/Bozen, and 30 from the Brenner border). In reality, the above mentioned ap-prehension was in vain as a large number of registered undergraduate and grad-uate students are from Germany. All this seems to indicate that, albeit slowly and not for the whole population, in South Tyrol “the collective idea is grow-ing according to which language is no longer simply the symbol of a minority iden-tity and culture but also an element for personal and community enrichment”.34

33. R. Verra, Die Entwicklung der drei Schulmodelle in Südtirol seit 1945, in: Istitut Ladin Micurà de Rü ed., Ladinia XX-XII/2008, pp. 223-260 (248).34. C. Fraenkel-Haeberle, “Linguistic Rights and the Use of Language,” in: Tolerance through Law. Self-Govern-ance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, eds. J. Woelk, F. Palermo, and J. Marko (Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden-Boston, 2008), 259-278.


Elisabeth Alber410


Th e Faculty of Education of the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen is charac-terized by optional multilingualism (even if all faculties of the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen are considered to be multilingual). With regard to the teaching syllabus, German and Italian experts in education sciences cooperate. Th is is very benefi cial for the off ered study programmes, which comprise teacher training for all levels, sociology of education, social work and multilingual communication sciences for the public, semi-public and private sector. Th e programmes concern-ing teacher training are unique in the German speaking area. In fact, programmes had to be created whose structure did not resemble either courses off ered in Germany nor courses off ered in Austria. Considering the special education and schooling system in South Tyrol, the degree course in Primary Education is di-vided into three sections: training of teachers who will work in German-language schools, training of those to be employed in Italian-language schools and training of teachers who will be part of the ‘Parity Model of Ladin Schools’. Students have to enrol in one section but all enrolled students have the possibility to take classes also in the respective other sections (optional multilingualism). Th is regulation provides for detailed programmes and prepares upcoming teachers to respond to the diff erent language needs in South Tyrol due to the diff erent geographical distribution of the language groups. Unlike German speakers, who are more or less present everywhere, Italian-speakers are mostly concentrated in the cities and larger towns and Ladin speakers are in the Gröden and Badia valleys. Th e migra-tion tendency from the periphery to the centres is also an indicator to be taken into account when assessing the needs for training German-, Italian- and Ladin-language teachers. In practice, considering the school system, students training for German-language schools will have little or no professional use for Italian and vice versa; the same is obviously valid for students training for Ladin-language schools.

With regard to training for legal experts to be employed in the administra-tion apparatus of the education and schooling system in South Tyrol, the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen does not off er a full curriculum. At present, a full curriculum of legal studies is only off ered by universities outside of South Tyrol. Both the University of Innsbruck in the Land Tyrol (Austria) and the University of Trento in the neighbouring Autonomous Province of Trento off er a full law curriculum, which, among the degrees off ered at the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen opens up for legal professions and competitions in public administra-tion. Th e Law School in Innsbruck enables students to register for the “integrat-ed curriculum on Italian law”35 (partly taught in German and partly in Italian).

35. On the establishment, development and current status of the ‘integrated curriculum on Italian law’ at the University of Innsbruck (Austria) cf. E. Alber, F. Palermo, “Creating, Studying and Experimenting with Bilin-gual Law in South Tyrol: Lost in Interpretation?,” in: Bilingual Higher Education in the Legal Context, ed. X. Arzoz (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden—Boston, 2012), 287-309 (303-308).




Currently, the existing integrated curriculum in Italian law at the University of Innsbruck off ers training for bilingual legal experts and lawyers and is generally considered to be a cornerstone of the identity of the greater area Tyrol.36 Th e law school of the University of Trento in the Autonomous Province of Trento (55 km from Bolzano/Bozen) off ers a program on comparative and transnational law, which is predominantly taught in Italian (some classes are in English).

6. Current trends and prospects—from monolingualism to plurilingualism?

Language, just as every other part of culture, is a dynamic entity that evolves and changes with time. It is not an abstract and artifi cial artefact, but very spe-cifi c to the reality (and its changes) it refers to. In South Tyrol, education in the mother tongue has been and still is an essential aspect in relation to minority pro-tection. Except for the Ladin schools, the embracement of monolingualism in the development of the bilingual German-and Italian-language school system is part of the complex autonomy governance guaranteeing rights to the German speak-ing population. However, for a bilingual governance system to work eff ectively, bilingual education is necessary. Th e teaching of the second language (German or Italian) is thus fundamental and obligatory. German and Italian school authori-ties aim to coordinate their activities and jointly defi ne common objectives for the comprehensive evaluation of the Provincial Education system by convening twice in the course of a school year. However, it seems that the two authorities continue to place diff ering and sometimes contrasting emphases in the discussion of objectivism, the evaluation of working procedures and results. Th e attitude of the Ladin schools and their education policy for schooling cannot be compared with those for German and Italian.

Recently, politics and school authorities are faced with the fact that a number of South Tyroleans support a less rigid application of the ethno-linguistic separation in schooling. Especially in urban areas the call for a more integrated system is rapidly increasing up to calls for immersion teach-ing. Multilingual instruction is increasingly understood as being benefi cial to support language profi ciency and good career chances in a knowledge-based society. Surveys confi rm strong elements of linguistic integration37 be-tween the groups in South Tyrol as well as the desire of a consistent number

36. P. Pernthaler, Die Identität Tirols in Europa (Springer, Wien, New York, 2007).37. Th e linguistic barometer, published by the Statistics Institute of the Province of Bolzano/Bozen ASTAT in 2006, provides a snapshot view of the opinions expressed regarding the use of language and the linguistic identity of South Tyroleans.


Elisabeth Alber412


of South Tyroleans to develop an integrated model of language teaching.38

In particular, the Italian school system is intensively calling for measures in lan-guage policy and didactics. Recently, Italians have a stronger readiness for learn-ing the German language.39 First attempts of new didactics for language learning (such as partial immersion teaching and team teaching) were rejected by the Pro-vincial Government in the early 1990s. Since 1997 the Provincial Government changed its school policy against such attempts. Resolutions by the Provincial Government provide for guidelines for the instruction and acquisition of Ger-man as a second language at Italian-language schools in the life cycle of obligatory education, and for pilot projects promoting a playful contact with German lan-guage in nursery schools.40 All in all, the Provincial Government did not change the monolingualism principle in education and school policy, but it allowed for additional measures addressing the needs for the single schools. Th e adoption of Legislative Decree no. 12/2000 (Law on Provincial School Autonomy)41 provid-ed for more room for manoeuvre. Consequently, several Italian-language schools created plurilingual sections,42 in which a certain amount of hours is conducted in both German and Italian as language of instruction (CLIL, Content and Lan-guage Integrated Learning, in which pupils learn a subject through the medium of a foreign language).43 CLIL is facilitated by trained teachers whose mother tongue is the same as the so-called vehicular language to ensure eff ective teach-ing. In the above referred Italian-language schools the diff erent subjects are only partially taught in German language, in conformity with Art. 19 Second ASt.

Reservations against immersion teaching are being uphold by arguing that a concerted promotion of the fi rst (and minority) language is a fundamental precondition for learning any other language and vital to the development of the German-speaking minority within the Italian state. Th erefore, German school authorities actively and successfully support other measures facilitating second

38. For example, the results of the survey conducted by the research institute Apollis on behalf of the weekly South Tyrolean journal FF show that 81% of South Tyroleans would welcome a bilingual school policy (16% are against it); this is the opinion not only of 98% Italian-speakers, but also of 73% German-speakers and even of 74% of sympathizers of the SVP, the ruling German ethnic catch-all South Tyrolese Peoples’ Party. FF Um-frage, “Die Stimmen des Volkes,” in FF No. 23/2008, 20-31.39. For long time (especially in pre-1972) policy of the Italian schools was emphasized by an overemphasis on the Italian language.40. S. Baur, R. Medda-Windischer, “Th e Educational System in South Tyrol,” in: Tolerance through Law. Self-Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, ed. J. Woelk, F. Palermo, and J. Marko (Leiden-Boston, Martinus Nijhoff , 2008), 235-258 (247-248).41. Provincial Law on School Autonomy no. 12/2000.42. For example, the Italian-language primary schools Manzoni, Chini and Longon in the capital city Bolzano/Bozen. For details see Davide Pasquali, “La svolta della scuola’ Insegnare,” in Tedesco matematica e storia’, an interview with Prof. Cavagnoli, scientifi c coordinator of the CLIL projects, in Alto Adige (Italian-language local daily newspaper), (16 January 2011).43. Th e introduction of CLIL approaches is regularly applied in the neighbouring Autonomous Province of Trento (predominantly Italian-speaking) in cooperation with the Land Tyrol in Austria.




language learning (school partnerships, projects among twin schools, summer camps etc.).44 In the opinion of the school authorities, CLIL is just one possible means to increase the second language knowledge, but not necessarily the best one. In most valleys there is almost no possibility to interact with the Italian-language reality. Th ere the Italian language is not perceived as second language, but as foreign language. Th e German school authority promotes bilingualism by life-long training for teachers, specifi c materials for the second language instruc-tion and by ensuring regular possibilities to meet with Italian-speakers. Th e Presi-dent of the Province recently affi rmed that full immersion teaching—teaching of some subjects as mathematics, history or geography only through the medium of Italian in German schools or German in Italian schools—will not be institution-alized. Th e schools’ tasks are to guarantee mother tongue education and second language teaching. For the latter the schools are enabled to choose the most ap-propriate methodology.45

Generally speaking, bi(multi)lingualism is highly supported by all school au-thorities because it has become a factor for economic development in and for South Tyrol. In economic terms, South Tyrol is located in a strategic geographic position at the edge of strong economic areas. Th us, knowledge of more languag-es is a determining factor in and for South Tyrol, also in the private sector. Both, Italian and German language, are required not only in the public sector (ethnic quota system) but also highly desirable in the private sector. Th e knowledge of languages is a fundamental prerequisite for the South Tyrolean labour market. Th e second language (German or Italian) but also others (primarily, English) are becoming important for integration into social and professional life. Together with the benefi ts of territorial autonomy, multilingualism has been decisive for the creation of highly specialized jobs, for the settlement of a large number of modern enterprises and also an increasing scientifi c research. A survey also shows that multilingual families earn more than monolingual ones. Th ey have more possibilities to compete for good job positions, because of their language profi -ciency but also because of their ability to understand both the German-and Ital-ian socio-economic contexts in all its nuances.46

Politics and the school authorities are also faced with the challenge to fi nd proper solutions for the integration of foreign pupils (having neither German nor

44. Davide Pasquali, “La scuola tedesca punta ai gemellaggi,” Alto Adige (28 January 2011).45. “Immersionsunterricht? Mit mir nie,” Dolomiten (German-language local daily newspaper), (10 January 2011). Th e President of the Province, Luis Durnwalder, reacted to a statement made by the Minister in the Pro-vincial Government Christian Tommasini (competent for Italian schooling), who declared the political will to regularly establish bilingual teaching sections in Italian-language primary schools by 2013 (cf. Davide Pasquali, “Sezioni bilingui, la scuola dice sì,” in Alto Adige (Monday 10 January 2011).46. ASTAT (Provincial Statistics Institute) “Einkommen, Vermögen und Lebensbedingungen der Haushalte in Südtirol” (2008-2009) 27 - available at < http://www.provinz.bz.it/astat/de/haushalte-soziales-leben/einkom-men-armut.asp >(30.03.2012).


Elisabeth Alber414


Italian as fi rst language). In South Tyrol immigration increased signifi cantly in the last two decades. In 1990, the number of non EU-citizens resident in South Tyrol was below 0,1 percent, while at the end of 2010, this percentage raised to 7,8 per-cent.47 Th is increase is also visible in data48 concerning the enrolment of foreign pupils. German-and Italian-language nursery, primary and secondary schools are diff erently confronted with the need to integrate foreign children or students. Th e number of enrolled South Tyrolese pupils (Italian citizens) is decreasing in some school grades (Italian-language nursery schools, German-language primary schools and Ladin primary schools, German-language secondary schools), while the number of enrolled foreign pupils increases in all schools. Th e data also con-fi rms that the number of foreign pupils is particularly on the increase in Italian-language schools. Th e German-language schools have only recently witnessed the increase of foreign pupils in their classrooms. Th e increase of enrolment in Italian-language schools may have some impact in the long run on the institutional ethnic governance system, if foreign (and autochthonous) pupils then decide to declare themselves to belong to the Italian-speaking group.49 Enrolment of foreign pupils in Italian-language schools in peripheral areas also guarantees the preservation of classes located in mountain areas. Th ey might close without foreign students. As to the enrolment of foreign students, Art. 19 Second ASt also fi nds application vis-à-vis foreign pupils. Accordingly, the parents of foreign pupils can choose to send their child to either attend a German- or Italian-language school. Th e pupils are obliged to learn both languages, German and Italian. Additionally, English is mostly introduced as fi rst foreign language. To facilitate the integration of foreign pupils, the education and school authorities have elaborated diff erent measures under the terms of the Provincial Law on School Autonomy no. 12/2000. Th e latter one introduced autonomy in teaching and organization by assigning also further fi nancial autonomy. Schools were now enabled to introduce innovative methods in language teaching and to support their educational off er with facul-tative courses and specifi c projects. A broad margin of appreciation is left to the education authorities and schools on how specifi c linguistic support measures should be arranged. In order to facilitate the integration of foreign pupils in the school system, South Tyrol has introduced the ‘cultural mediator’ institution, which contributes to intercultural understanding and communication between the school, the pupils and the parents; several NGOs are as well active in this fi eld.

In short, South Tyrol’s education and school system is in search for a change in continuity aiming at accommodating the claims for a more integrated society

47. Compare data on http://www.provinz.bz.it/astat/. Th e increasing amount of foreigners in South Tyrol nowadays doubles the amount of the Ladin-speakers challenging some aspects of the institutionalized ethnic governance system.48. See details in R. Medda-Windischer “Condizione e prospettive d‘integrazione degli stranieri,” in Alto Adige: relazioni sociali, lingua, religione e valorieds. Ed. H. Flarer, R. Girardi, F. Grandi, Indagine analitica / Standbild und Integrationsaussichten der ausländischen Bevölkerung Südtirols. (Gesellschaftsleben, Sprache, Religion und Wertehaltung, Eurac Research, 2011).49. Norbert Dall’Ó, Multikulti über Nacht, ff -Südtiroler Wochenmagazin (26 January 2006), 15.




without scaring away those for whom such a society is not at all desired. Th e func-tional division of the school system has not changed recently. It rightly upholds the core principle of mother tongue education as a fundamental minority right but, at the same time, it has to allow spaces for innovative language teaching.

While the impact of plurilingual education on confl ict settlement is diffi cult to measure in absolute terms, its contribution cannot be denied when consid-ering the European context (mobility of workers, European Language Portfo-lio etc.). An education and school system open to plurilingualism will certainly be increasingly needed also in the legally monolinguistic space in South Tyrol. Th e management of a complex and densely regulated autonomy system, trans-national and Euro-regional trends as well as the overall Europeanization process require a future-oriented school system, which emphasizes multilingualism as a value—in theory and in practice.

AbstractThe bi(tri)lingual Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen-South Tyrol in Northern Italy successfully

accommodates its linguistic groups (69,38% of German speakers, 26,30% of Italian speakers and 4,32% of Ladin speakers) through territorial self-government. The Second Autonomy Statute (1972) regulates the coexistence of South Tyrol’s ethno-linguistic groups (’ rights). With regard to linguistic rights there is hardly any area of public and to a considerable extent also private life that is not covered by a complex network of norms, guarantees and remedies. The educational system in South Tyrol is based on separation and the principle of mother tongue instruction. The teaching of the second language (German or Italian) is obligatory. A plurilingual system is implemented in the Ladin valleys. Tertiary education in South Tyrol is also based on plurilingualism. Intensive talks about how to reform school policies are on a daily agenda, in order to move towards an integrated model of language learning. All in all, South Tyrol’s education system has to be considered through the lens of South Tyrol’s history (annexation to Italy in 1919, fascist occupation, First and Second Autonomy Statute). By retracing the development of school governance in South Tyrol, the article attempts to shed light on how South Tyrol’s institutional set-up is organized and how it responds to multilingual challenges.

RésuméLa Province autonome bilingue (trilingue) de Bolzano/Bozen-Tyrol du Sud, au nord de l’Italie, est

une réussite de vie en commun de ses groupes linguistiques (69.38 % de Germanophones, 26.30 % d’Italophones et 4.32 % parlant ladin), à travers son autonomie territoriale. Le second Statut d’autonomie (1972) organise la coexistence des groupes ethnolinguistiques du Sud-Tyrol. En matière de droits linguis-tiques, tous les domaines de la vie publique et une partie considérable de ceux de la vie privée sont cou-verts par un réseau complexe de normes, garanties et recours. Le système éducatif au Sud-Tyrol est fondé sur la séparation et le principe de l’instruction dans la langue maternelle. L’enseignement d’une seconde langue (allemand ou italien) est obligatoire. Un système plurilingue est mis en œuvre dans les vallées ladines. L’éducation supérieure au Sud-Tyrol est fondée également sur le plurilinguisme. Des négociations intensives sur les réformes des politiques éducatives sont présentes en permanence, afi n de développer un modèle intégré d’apprentissage des langues. En fait, le système éducatif du Sud-Tyrol doit être envisagé au travers de l’histoire du Sud-Tyrol (annexion à l’Italie en 1919, occupation fasciste, premier et second Statut d’autonomie). En retraçant l’évolution de la politique scolaire au Sud-Tyrol, cet article cherche à mettre en lumière les fondements institutionnels de l’organisation du Tyrol du Sud et comment ils peuvent répondre aux défi s du multilinguisme.



Public Safety in Federal Systems: A Primer

Christian Leuprecht

Christian Leuprecht is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Econom-ics at the Royal Military College of Canada, and cross-appointed to the Department of Politi-cal Studies and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University, where he is also a fellow of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.

Introduction

As basic as the protection of citizens’ life and property is to the modern state, as diffi cult this fundamental principle seems to realize. Th e growing intensity, scope, cost and magnitude of public safety make issues of public safety in federal and multilevel governance systems all the more pressing.1 In recent years, many federal governments have set up new central institutions to coordinate, centralize or oversee the more eff ective provisioning of public safety. Over the past dec-ade, many federal governments signifi cantly transformed their approach to deal-ing with security and large-scale emergencies. Th ese changes have necessitated more extensive, and eff ective, coordination of policy and action across levels of government. Th e importance of these policies and the extent of reorganization notwithstanding, the new-found punctuated equilibria have received precious little scholarly attention. Since the overarching norms of state organization make processes of governance notoriously impervious to restructuring, it is not self-evident that the fl urry of activity the public-safety dossier has seen in recent years necessarily eff ected change, let alone improve the system’s operation. In eff ect,

1. Ross T. Newkirk, “Th e Increasing Cost of Disasters in Developed Countries: A Challenge to Local Planning and Government,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 9 (2001): 159-170.


Christian Leuprecht418


historical norms and patterns of interaction are not necessarily congruent with best practices of public safety. If reform outcomes of public safety are no less path-dependent on historical norms and institutions than other policy areas, then that is all the more cause for concern: ineffi cient multilevel coordination often stands in the way of public-safety or emergency management, causing unneces-sary delays or inadequate organization while impeding governmental planning and preparedness. Federal actors tend to privilege eff ectiveness and effi ciency of measures and response over administrative and political divisions. Constituent and local units, by contrast, tend to insist on respect for divisions of authority. Th is article investigates this prevailing tension between shared-rule and self-rule as a function of entrenched structures, processes and recognized norms and patterns that serve political interests fl owing from territorial commitments and structural constraints that are intrinsic to federal and multilevel governance systems.

Human beings leave the state of nature where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brut-ish and short,” and enter into a social contract, not primarily in return for govern-ance, economic development, or interpersonal trust, but, fi rst and foremost, to gain security. Such is the job of Hobbes’ Leviathan: to provide security.2 All peo-ple, then, are “consumers” of public safety, not all states have the same capacity to provide it. Security is a pure public good: Its consumption by one individual does not reduce its availability to others (non-rivalry) and no one can eff ectively be excluded (non-excludable). Government has a key role to play in the provision of public goods. Weak governmental institutions thus make it more diffi cult to pro-vision these goods eff ectively. On the one hand, federal systems are designed to enhance security by balancing shared rule with self rule. Indeed, systems resorted to federalism because cohabitation was possibly only by imposing constitutional limits on federal governments while providing a constitutional guarantee of at least some degree of local autonomy. On the other hand, federal governments retain many of the key legislative and institutional capacities that have the poten-tial to overwhelm local jurisdictions. Bosnia-Herzegovina would be unlikely to exist as a single country were it not its federal solution. Yet, fi fteen years after the signing of the Dayton Accord, the country continues to struggle with fi nding a security solution that is acceptable to all communities. Federalism not only off ers security benefi ts but also raises new security challenges.

Th reats to public safety do not discriminate by regime type: natural disasters, violent extremism and terrorism, organized crime, cybersecurity, espionage, and the illicit, illegal or undocumented movement of good and people are just a few example of the litany of threats to public safety that affl ict unitary and federal countries alike. Hitherto, the prevailing approach seems to have been that public

2. Th omas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).


Public Safety in Federal System: A Primer 419


safety is largely divorced from matters of federalism and multilevel governance. Th at is really the only way to explain the notably absence of a systematic body of literature or research in the fi eld, save for the exceptional single-n case study. Th is article has two objectives. One is to ask whether the distinction between federal and unitary systems is at all useful when discussing public safety. From a multi-level governance perspective, one would think it is: In the classic, common-law federations, sovereignty is divided between federal and constituent governments; by contrast, the relationship between constituent and local governments is uni-tary in nature since cities are not a separate level of government with distinct con-stitutional protections. In other words, public safety in federal systems perforce has both federal and multilevel governance dimensions. To this end, the second section of the article considers whether structural features shape the positions political actors take on matters of public safety. It is premised on an examination of the way institutional constraints, such as regulations, rules, and institutional-ized practices as well as party systems and the rules regulating venues of policy deliberations empower and constrain interests.

Th e article’s other objective is to explore diff erent interests, and to work out the implications for comparative research, policy development and security-sector reform. Th at is, the third section explores how territorial commitments and structural constraints (1) determine public-safety choices among diff erent levels of government and (2) shape actors’ understanding of social reality, aff ect how actors understand the nature of their own interest, and how policies further specifi c interests.3 Th is section is framed in the context of a classic debate in the study of comparative federalism: Are the federal manifestations of public safety a function of a country’s society or of its institutions? For the purpose of develop-ing policy and reforming institutions, it is important to know not only what is the impact of society on government, but also what is the impact of government on the functioning of society. Th e former sociological reductionism is common in the literature; the agency approach inherent in the latter question that inverts the dependent and independent variables, by contrast, is less common. Which perspective better accounts for public safety arrangements in federal systems? Ini-tially, however, the article frames the ‘problématique’ that informs the subsequent theoretical and comparative discussion.

I. Framing the discussion on public safety in federal systems

Th is article is generally concerned with the institutional capacity to coordi-nate public safety among federal and subnational governments, and the necessary

3. Maarten Hajer, Th e Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process (Ox-ford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 51.




institutional and intergovernmental mechanisms for such coordination to gener-ate and sustain public-safety equilibria that result in local communities that are suffi ciently secure for eff ective governance and economic development to occur. On the one hand, federal arrangements, by their very nature, require a tenable compromise between shared-rule and self-rule. In practice, however, that com-promise can be highly problematic. From Gujarat through Chechnya, local secu-rity forces have been implicated in complicity in acts against just the local popula-tions they are supposedly meant to protect. Moreover, local populations in many of the world’s federations are weary of their local security forces. Often, they trust federal security forces more than their local ones. On the other hand, federal gov-ernments and their security forces run the risk of conducting themselves as if they operated in a unitary system, with little or no respect for jurisdictional divides and local autonomy. Precisely this attitude, however, runs the risk of exacerbating local security problems, federal forces’ ability to provide kinetic surge capacity notwithstanding. Military troops performing targeted urban security missions in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, exemplify a situation where local security services are simply no match for the context, organization, networks and fi repower in some favelas. Central governments, after all, have a formidable arsenal of well-trained, well-equipped, and well-paid security personnel at their disposal. Th e tempta-tion, then, is to deploy these forces at the local level to stabilize the situation.

Federalists, of course, have long been sensitive to the dangers presented by the unchecked use of the central government’s power. As James Madison writes in Federalist n° 51:

If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great diffi culty lies in this: you must fi rst enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.4

As Madison goes on to point out, however, guarding against oppression by a society’s rulers is but one concern:

It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Diff erent interests necessarily exist in diff erent classes of citizens. If a major-ity be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.5

4. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison. Th e Federalist Papers. Project Gutenberg:http://www.gutenberg.org/fi les/1404/1404-h/1404-h.htm5. Ibid.




Federations are instruments meant to guard against both, oppression by those who rule as well as injustices a majority may commit against a minority. Alexan-der Hamilton writes in Federalist n° 85:

Th e additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefl y in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and infl uence enough, from leaders and favourite, to become the despots of the people.6

By design, therefore, federations defy the Leviathan by intentionally divvying up his power among two (or more) levels of government, by enshrining a division of powers in the Constitution.

By and large, this division of powers follows the same rationale in all federal systems. Areas where the state has to overcome collective-action problems among constituent units are apportioned to the federal government, notably national defence, economic union, and international relations. By contrast, matters of purely local concern tend to belong to the constituent units. Security, however, is not readily divisible between two levels of government. On the one hand, as Hobbes realized, a strong state is indispensable to the eff ective provision of secu-rity. On the other hand, the state, as Madison and Hamilton observe, has itself the potential to menace society.

Federal forces necessarily represent national interests and values, local public safety assets interests and values of the local community. In large countries es-pecially, a federal police force whose membership is composed of citizens from across the country is, by its very nature, unlikely to be as sensitive to local values, needs, and customs as a police force composed of locals who grew up with, un-derstand, and share those local values, needs, and customs. As in so many other policy fi elds, federal and local values and interests are not necessarily congruent. In the case of ethno-linguistic minority communities in post-confl ict situations, for instance, concerns about being subjected to undue federal intervention neces-sitate a federal solution but can also paralyze its implementation. Tension can be healthy; but the risk here is that federal governments enjoy such an overwhelm-ing security prowess that there is little to thwart them from infringing on local jurisdiction should they so choose.

Th ere are two basic ways to implement security arrangements in federal coun-tries. One model is to have multiple police forces working concomitantly in the same territory but with a clear division of labour: one (or more) federal police

6. Ibid.




force(s) whose primary purpose it is to enforce federal law and a force at the level of the constituent unit that enforces both the law of both the constituent unit and the federation. Th ese forces may be augmented by municipal police (that fall under the jurisdiction of the constituent unit) as well as Aboriginal police (that tend to fall under federal jurisdiction). Th is is the case in Canada and Australia, for example. Another model is that found in administrative federations where the federal level of government has just about all the constitutional powers to make security legislation but the administration and enforcement of that legislation tends to fall under the purview of the constituent units. Under this arrange-ment, the federal government tends have only very limited enforcement abilities, including a federal criminal police, a border police, an immigration police and a security police dealing specifi cally with threats against the state. Th is is the Ger-man model.

Yet, even in Canada, a country that is often cited as a prime example of federal dualism, the administration of criminal justice follows the approach of adminis-trative federalism: Th e federal government has the constitutional competence to make criminal legislation while the provinces are tasked with administering crim-inal (and some related) legislation. Concretely, that means even in cases where the federal police, the RCMP, investigate a fi le, the ultimate authority as to whether to lay charges or not rests with the attorney general of the province in which the charges are to be laid. Th is is not a formality; attorneys general regularly avail themselves of their discretion to lay charges (or not) in potentially controversial cases, such as those involving violations of immigration law.

Although structurally the United States looks similar to the Canadian or the Australian model, its logic is one of limiting the powers of the federal govern-ment, both by curtailing the policing powers of the federal government and by dividing law enforcement at the federal level into several specialized agencies that often eff ectively compete with one another. “Ambition,” writes Madison in Fed-eralist n° 51, “must be made to counteract ambition.” In the United States, for example, a FBI offi cer is constitutionally prohibited from pulling over a driver in a vehicle for a moving violation; in Canada, nothing prevents a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from doing so.

II. Th eorizing public safety in federal and multilevel governance systems

Th e study of federalism is overwhelmingly concerned with institutional change and the way institutions emerge from and are embedded in concrete tem-poral processes. Analytically, though this neo-institutionalist has rather limited comparative traction and aff ords little opportunity to theorize. Th e alternative is the pioneering application of a rational-choice framework to the study of federal-ism that is concerned with institutions as coordination mechanisms that generate




or sustain equilibria. It focuses institutional stability in the form of measurable independent social and institutional eff ects and the way they shape the patterns of intergovernmental relations.

Th e principle of subsidiarity prevails with respect to public safety: It is prima-rily a local matter and needs to refl ect local values and priorities. Th at explains why fi rst responders, such as police, fi re, ambulance services, are local (and han-dle the bulk of matters related to public safety). Local responders are on the front-line and forefront of public safety. As the fi rst line of defence, they tend to take the lead in responding to local public-safety concerns. Th ey are best suited to such tasks as they are the most familiar with local conditions in their communi-ties and thus best positioned to ascertain the best response to a local problem. As urbanization continues apace along with the systematic risks associated with ur-ban life, the importance of local authorities in public safety grows as well.7 Recent large-scale public-safety events such as 9/11 in New York City, Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, and the SARS epidemic in Toronto revealed the vulnerability of modern urban areas in federal and multilevel governance systems insofar, as anthropogenic or natural emergencies can quickly create a large number casual-ties, signifi cant hardship and large-scale economic damage. Th reat prevention, mitigation, response and recovery have signifi cant federal implications, since legislative, fi scal, administrative and operational capacities are distributed across two or more levels of government. For example, by virtue of the implications for urban planning and zoning regulations, the resilience of cities requires risk-based territorial management.8 Th e necessary policy levers, however, tend to fall un-der the jurisdiction of constituent or local governments. Similarly, much critical infrastructure, including waterworks and electricity-distribution grids, tend to come under the jurisdiction of constituent or local governments. Politically and conceptually, then, public safety necessitates extensive intergovernmental coop-eration along with strengthening the role of municipalities.

However, in many federations the federal government is rather limited in its ability to liaise with municipalities directly. In other words, federal intergovern-mental relations are inevitable; multilevel governance ones are not. Whereas there

7. See Neil R. Britton, “A New Emergency Management for the Millennium?” Australian Journal of Emergency Management 16 (2000): 44-54.Kiki Caruson, Susan A. MacManus, Matthew Kohen, and Th omas A. Watson, “Homeland Security Prepared-ness: Th e Rebirth of Regionalism,” Publius 35 (2005): 143-168.Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, “Designing Homeland Security Policy within a Regional Structure: A Needs Assessment of Local Security Concerns,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 4 (2007): art. 7.Peter Eisinger, “Imperfect Federalism: Th e Intergovernmental Partnership for Homeland Security,” Public Ad-ministration Review 66 (2006): 537-545.Paul Gabriel, “Th e Development of Municipal Emergency Preparedness Planning in Victoria, Australia,” Aus-tralian Journal of Emergency Management 18 (2003): 74-80.8. Britton, “A New Emergency Management for the Millennium?” 44-45.




is close federal-provincial coordination on matters of public safety in Canada, contrary to what the above-mentioned model would predict, the same does not obtain for the federal government’s relations with Canadian municipalities.9 First responders fall under the auspices of constituent units, either by virtue of mu-nicipalities falling within the jurisdiction of constituent units, as is the case in the classic federations (the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and Germany) or because they are assigned to municipal governments which enjoy standing as a separate constitutional tier of government (as is the case in South Africa and Brazil). Two possibilities fl ow from this observation: the opportunistic (or functional) model whereby constituent and local units in federal systems are happy to defer to federal demands, and the legislative model whereby the logic that informs constituent and local governments causes them to assert their own over federal interests:

[Th e functional theory] predicts that each level will expand in its area of com-petence but will remain limited or diminish in its less competent areas. Th e second, legislative theory, says that the modern federal system is shaped by the political needs of legislators responsible for its design. Legislators at all levels of government will seek to distribute government benefi ts for which they can take credit.10

Following the opportunistic model, institutional capacity of public safety is treated as a resource that can be mobilized for any end at the behest of policy makers. Th is model refl ects an understanding of federal systems in which “any ac-tivity performed by nations can be performed by cities”.11 Th is model presumes that constituent units and local governments can readily be enlisted in the service of national goals. Th is conception of federalism harkens back to Grodzins’ descrip-tion of federalism as a “marble cake”: policy functions are distributed somewhat arbitrarily among local, state and national governments.12

However, this perspective fails to account for the distinctive limits within which local government operates. Does the fragmented and decentralized na-ture of federal and multilevel governance shape the role of constituent units and municipalities with respect to the function and politics of public safety? Th is is an interesting question as it lends itself to a hypothesis that can be subjected to empirical testing. Constituent and local governments have only a fraction of the federal governments’ powers: “they cannot make war or peace; they cannot issue passports or forbid outsiders from entering their territory; they cannot issue currency;

9. Juillet and Koji, forthcoming.10. Paul E. Peterson, Th e Price of Federalism (Washington, DC: Th e Brookings Institution Press, 1995).11. Paul E. Peterson, City Limits. (Chicago University Press, 1981), 15.12. Morton Grozins, Th e American System: A New View of Government in the United States. Ed. Daniel Elazar (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).




and they cannot control imports or erect tariff walls”.13 Th ese limits pervade local policymaking. Politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups are aware of these lim-its and have reason to adapt their preferences accordingly: Failing to do so risks driving dissatisfi ed resident away.14

H1: Local government’s limited powers infl uence the interests of constituent units and municipalities in federal systems, the political dynamics that express those interests, and the policy choices that emerge.

If this hypothesis obtains, it would posit limits on the public-safety role of constituent and local units in federal and multilevel governance systems, quite diff erent from central/unitary systems. Th at is because this hypothesis eff ectively treats constituent and local governments as a particular kind of social structure that, like all social structures, have interests determined by “their place in the larger socioeconomic and political context”.15 Constituent and local governments have reason to pursue only those policies that advance city interests defi ned as the component of individuals’ overall interest that they have by virtue of their residence or movement in a particular legal jurisdiction.16

Max Weber poignantly observed that legal institutions have distinctive in-terests. Constituent and local governments in federal and multilevel governance systems are social actors in their own right. Not only do legal institutions dis-tribute fi nancial benefi ts and burdens but they also distribute the benefi ts and burdens associated with the use of governmental coercive authority, such as the surveillance and information-gathering used to identify deviance17 and the co-ercive force used to stop it.18 Weber acknowledged that in modern societies in-terests in class, status and power cannot be readily disentangled from economic interests but may confl ict.19 In those cases, economic interests alone do not off er an adequate explanation.20 Weber argued that the interests of social actors are a function not only of economic position, but also of social honour and political power.21 Th e interests of constituent and local units can be defi ned in accordance with these three specifi c interests: (1) a unit’s policy decisions can confer honour and stigma upon the unit, (2) they can aff ect perceptions of the unit’s legitimacy, and (3) they can aff ect the well-being of a particular territories. Th ose respon-sibilities limit the policy functions constituent and local units can and should

13. Peterson, City Limits, p. 3.14. Peterson, City Limits, p. 29.15. Peterson, City Limits, p. 4.16. Peterson, City Limits, p. 21.17. Gary Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).18. Egon Bittner, Aspects of Police Work (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990).19. Max Weber, Economy and Society, (2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 932, 938.20. Weber, Economy and Society, 212, 926, 932.21. Weber, Economy and Society, 926-940.




pursue. It is not in a jurisdiction’s interest to pursue a policy whose benefi ts ac-crue overwhelmingly to jurisdictions other than the one that bears its burden. It would actually be inappropriate for local government to do so because its purpose is to serve local interests.22

In an empirical analysis of homeland security of this federal-local dialectic, Th acher fi nds a geographic mismatch between the costs and benefi ts of home-land security, for instance. In antiterrorism activities, the US federal government is looking to municipalities to perform investigative eff orts to local individuals who have committed or intend to commit terrorist acts. Instead, local govern-ments have a strong preference for performing community-protection functions of homeland security, such as emergency response and protective security for potential targets.23 Th e reason that local governments are better situated to ad-minister the latter rather than the former is that the latter privileges place over people. Th is distinction, as Th acher observes, is signifi cant because the two tasks typically distribute their benefi ts and costs diff erently:

When a city pursues community protection, both the benefi ts and the costs redound to the city itself because community protection safeguards just those people and places the city chooses. But since terrorism is a national or even international problem, the benefi ts of searching out off enders do not necessarily accrue to the city where potential terrorist reside, while the costs do.24

A city that increases its eff orts to seek out people suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, either to bring them to justice after they have committed an attack or to prevent them from doing so in the fi rst place, must spend its own resources and place its own residents under increased surveillance to prevent acts of terrorism that are likely to be perpetrated elsewhere: Local police are neces-sarily reluctant to take costly and controversial steps to prevent crime arising in other jurisdictions. In fact, they actually have an incentive to displace crime into other jurisdictions so as to offl oad costs and responsibilities and opportunistically optimize for local payoff s relative to the availability of scarce resources.

To bolster his point, Th acher compares homeland security to conventional crime control. On the one hand, a community’s concerns about being harassed put pressure on police to minimize surveillance when targeting street crime. On the other hand, concerns about safety create countervailing pressures to increase surveillance. Owing to these confl icting pressures make policing street crime con-troversial. However, pressures arise in both direction; so, the fi nal equilibrium usually ends up involving some attention being given to searching out off enders

22. Peterson, City Limits.23. Eisinger, “Imperfect Federalism: Th e Intergovernmental Partnership for Homeland Security,” 2006.24. David Th acher, “Th e Local Role in Homeland Security,” Law & Society Review 39(3) (2005): 638.




to control crime. With respect to antiterrorism, by contrast, local police depart-ments have little incentive to pursue because the people who suff er the burdens of police surveillance often diff er from the people to whom the benefi ts accrue. Insofar as the benefi ts of off ender search typically accrue to other jurisdictions, “no city interest counterbalances the burdens of police surveillance”.25 On the one hand, the community of fi rst responders, then has a strong incentive to privilege territorial commitments over performing specifi c functions. Functionally, on the other hand, there is a strong incentive to focus on public-safety functions with a tangible benefi t for their community. Faced with a clear and present danger, New York City, and to a lesser extent New York state, has an incentive to be proac-tive about antiterrorism at the local level; by contrast, Dearborn, Michigan, does not: “Although local off ender search eff orts may serve important national goals, any particular city has little reason to pursue them except in rare cases when local political actors believe that suspected terrorists have targeted their city”.26 Th acher concludes: “Since local government is mainly concerned with the well-being of a specifi c place, it has little reason to bear the costs of new police activities unless the benefi ts to the city itself are clear.”27 In other words, the priorities of constituent units in a federal or multilevel governance system cannot readily be reduced to economic interests.

However, the argument is not deterministic. Th at is, just because it is in a constituent or local unit’s interest to pursue a particular policy choice does not mean that it will. One of the questions of inquiry is precisely whether, with respect to public safety, there is a patter as to the conditions under which legal entities reach decisions that are in a given unit’s interests, when interests have little bearing on decisions that simply allocate benefi ts, and when the conditions under which they reach decisions that run counter to a unit’s interest (but that may, for example, be in line with federal priorities). Whether a certain decision serves a political actor’s interest is one question; whether these interests can trump historical norms and deeply entrenched structures and processes of interaction is quite another.

III. Operationalizing the comparative study public safety in federal and multilevel governance systems

Th e impact of society on government is a common theme in the study of democratic polities. Less common, especially outside of multination federations, is an agency approach which inverts the dependent and independent variables by stressing the impact of government on the functioning of society. So, is public

25. Th acher, “Th e Local Role in Homeland Security,” 669.26. Th acher, “Th e Local Role in Homeland Security,” 668.27. Th acher, “Th e Local Role in Homeland Security,” 667.




safety a function of its society or of its institutions? Understood as coordinat-ing mechanisms, federal institutions are functionally predicated on generating or sustaining equilibria. But what impact do changes in independent social ef-fects have on institutional stability? Either these equilibria are highly elastic; or there comes a tipping point of social change beyond which equilibria become increasingly costly and diffi cult to sustain, let alone generate. Notwithstanding the challenges posed by everything from natural disasters to terrorism, federal institutional structures have remained largely unchanged. Th is observation has important implications for theorizing about the relationship between structure and institutional change: Is sociological change presaging changes to public safety arrangements; or are federal institutions proving themselves to be agents of conti-nuity in the face of substantial sociological change? Th is comparative approach to public safety in federal systems thus facilitates the measurement and comparison of both the nature and magnitude of change over time. How much eff ect do so-cial, political and economic changes, such as economic integration, the ‘decline of deference’, the rise in the status and political claims of cities, have on the cen-trality and conduct of intergovernmental relations with respect to public safety?

In the mid-16th century, much of Europe was beset by wars of religion, pitting Catholics against Protestants, the same sort of events that later inspired Th omas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Bruegel vividly depicts violence done in the name of the state by organs of the state in ‘defence’ of state interests. Th is is, after all, the legacy of the gens d’armes throughout much of continental Europe. Originally referring to a professional soldier in medieval Europe in the form of a fully armoured heavy cavalryman in the king’s household, the gens d’armes morphed into a paramili-tary force with police duties among civilian populations, mostly enforcing state interests. Th is is known as “high policing”: safeguarding the central government as the ultimate locus of political authority and sovereignty. France’s Louis XIV established the haute police whose job it was to protect the national government from internal threats. Its purpose was to police the ‘higher’ interests of govern-ment rather than those of individual citizens or the mass population. Th e term also refl ects the fact that high-policing organizations are endowed with authority and legal powers superior to those of other police organizations. Whether the gendarmerie in France, the Carabinieri in Italy, the Guarda Nacional Republicana in Portugal, the Guardia Civil in Spain28, or the now-defunct Gendarmerie in Austria, Luxembourg, and Belgium or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the South African Police (until 1994), Russia’s Internal Troops, and the Central Re-

28. Th e Guardia Civil, however, is being eclipsed by the decentralization of law-enforcement in Spain where a growing number of Autonomous Communities have been setting up their own police forces, including the Ertzaintza in the Basque Country, the Mozos d’Esquadra of Catalonia, and the Policía Foral in Navarra as well as the ACs of Canarias and Galicia which have approved new laws to set up their own autonomous police forces but have yet to do so.




serve Police Force in India, the legacy of central organizations to police civilians pervades many modern democracies.

Th e hallmark of national security forces in a federation, however, is precisely that they are representative of the federation as a whole. On the one hand, then, they represent and enforce national values and priorities, not local ones. On the other hand, they are neither sensitive to nor familiar with local values and priori-ties. Th e centre can thus off er overwhelming kinetic force in an eff ort to try to stabilize a local security situation. But if security is ultimately local, then kinetic force can at best alleviate symptoms, but not the roots of insecurity. Th e centre is not usually under any illusion in this regard. Th e problem is that, as the deploy-ment of the army in Mexico in places such as Cuidad Juarez has shown, an exit strategy is diffi cult unless such a deployment is clearly coupled with an eff ort to rebuild local communities’ capacity to provide the services necessary to take care of their own aff airs. For the aforementioned reasons, however, federal forces are not only less-than-ideal means to remedy local shortfalls but may also end up further undermining local capacity to provide for itself. And it is the central gov-ernment’s scepticism about the subnational or local level’s ability to do so that is partially responsible for the deterioration in security in the fi rst place.

Since the circumstances under which the central government intervenes in subnational aff airs in this manner are related to matters of national security, con-stitutionally the central government is often perfectly in its right to intervene. Even when intervention is constitutionally controversial, jurisdictional disputes may end up taking a long time to settle. Th ere is, then, a temptation to treat secu-rity in federal systems similar to the way unitary systems such as the UK devolve home rule and policing to Northern Ireland: Local control is conditional and subject to override by the central government.

Central governments are inherently wary of local politicians advancing par-ticularistic interests or, at the very least, interests that are not readily congruent with those the centre would like to see pursued and enforced. So, the temptation for the centre is to starve local units fi scally. Th at deprives them of their ability to provide eff ective local services, thus delegitimizing them and strengthening the authority of the centre. Fiscal starvation, however, may only further exacerbate the problem by providing an incentive for local politicians to concentrate the few resources they have on advancing ever more particularistic interests and to fi nd other, possibly illicit, sources to fund their ventures.

Corruption, then, is one example of an equilibrium that can become punctu-ated. If local authorities or law enforcement delegitimize their position with the local population by being seen as corrupt or in some other way not serving the




public interest29—as is the perception of local law enforcement in many develop-ing countries—that may precipitate intervention by the central government.30 Comparative research can help ascertain both the conditions that aff ect the prob-ability of such intervention and the way limited sovereignty of constituent and local governments shapes policy decisions in an eff ort to maintain an equilibrium that forestalls the looming prospect of central intervention and concomitant loss of autonomy. Divided sovereignty in federal systems notwithstanding, constitu-ent units may fi nd their autonomy curtailed by intervention by central security forces, as occasioned in Indian states such as Gujarat by communal rioting, or in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. Th e prospect of intervention provides a strong incentive to avoid punctuating the equilibrium—that is, bringing intervention upon themselves.

As a result, policy makers in constituent units have an incentive to concern themselves with the legitimate use of authority, stemming corruption among lo-cal security forces, etc. At the same time though, the provision of eff ective polic-ing requires (1) an institutionalized and functioning system of fi scal transfers from the centre to the constituent units and (2) a commitment by the centre not to politicize such transfers and fund subnational units adequately. Mexico is an example par excellence. On the one hand, fi scal transfers are notoriously politicized in Mexico. On the other hand, Mexico’s states are insuff erably underfunded.31 Th is has a spillover eff ect into underfunded municipalities. It compromises the ability of Mexico’s states and cities to provide eff ective policing, especially at the municipal level. While the causal mechanisms at work are certainly far more complex than funding, the correlation between underfunded security forces at the state and municipal level is diffi cult to dismiss. Of course, Mexico is hardly the only federation that is plagued by this problem. But the example demon-strates that path-dependency is as much a force to be reckoned with in public safety as in any other policy area.

IV. Conclusion

Federal systems have to reconcile a peculiar tension. Th ey are federal precisely because some subnational units do not trust the central governments to run mat-ters on their own. Yet, this aura of mistrust makes a common approach and un-derstanding between federal and constituent governments more diffi cult than in

29. Tom Tyler, “Enhancing Police Legitimacy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (2004): 84-99.30. John P. Crank and Robert Langworthy, “An Institutional Perspective of Policing,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1992): 338-363.31. Allison Rowland, “Th e Interaction of Municipal and Federal Governments: Trends, Issues and Problems,” in Spheres of Governance: Comparative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems. Eds. Harvey Lazar and Christian Leuprecht (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007).




just about any other policy fi eld. In other words, one would not expect otherwise but for the intergovernmental arrangements around provision of public safety in federal systems to prove contentious and controversial. Public safety requires as much intergovernmental compromise and collaboration as any other policy issue. Th e diff erence is that security issues do not have the luxury of time. Responding promptly to public-safety concerns is often a matter of life or death. In the case of larger emergencies, that requires a considerable degree of multilevel coordination, both to prepare and to be able to respond eff ectively.

Moreover, public safety is a fi rst mover of sorts: where security does not pre-vail, governance and economic development become problematic if not impos-sible. Federalism is meant to preserve local autonomy through a degree of quali-fi ed self-rule. It is also meant to limit the otherwise unbridled power wielded by central governments. When both principles are adhered to, federalism holds out the possibility of providing security under circumstances where security would be unlikely to reign under a unitary system. When one or both are compromised for the sake of expediency, the risk is a return to just the sort of security dilemma that gave rise to the need for a federal solution in the fi rst place. Intergovernmental public-safety equilibria are diffi cult to generate, let alone sustain. And once es-tablished, the prevailing structures, processes and norms become hard to change as they come to serve well-established political interests. Th is conundrum gives rise to a series of research questions that can be answered systematically only by marshalling evidence from comparative study.

First, the territorial commitments and structural constraints of federal and multilevel governance systems engender a decision-making logic that is quite dif-ferent from that found in conventional unitary systems. In federations, this is a feature of institutional design. Quoting James Madison from Federalist n° 51: “Th e great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”32 Th is hypothesis lends itself well to comparative inquiry because it can readily be subjected to empirical scrutiny by testing whether territorial commitments and structural constraints do, indeed, shape decision-making and, if so, in what way.

Second, if they are rational actors, then the political rationality according to which territorial commitments and structural constraints shape the positions of political actors is complex. Th at is, the rationality that informs public-safety deci-sions in federal systems cannot readily be reduced to means-ends calculations of economic effi ciency. Th is observation has signifi cant implications. As Th acher observes, if public-safety interests in federal systems were primarily economic, “then there are limits to the kinds of policies that constituent and local governments

32. Allison Rowland, “Th e Interaction of Municipal and Federal Governments: Trends, Issues and Problems,”




will fi nance, but there are no limits in principle to the policies they will administer, since higher levels of government can simply subsidize them.”33 Yet, not all interests can be monetorized. Legitimacy is one example. One might thus hypothesize that federal governments will experience diffi culties getting constituent and local gov-ernments to take on interests that cannot readily be monetorized, because there is no incentive for them to do so.

Th ird, enlisting the cooperating of constituent or local governments in imple-menting federal public-safety objectives is likely to be costly, especially if interests are not easily monetorized. To get lower levels of government to follow through, they would have to create detailed regulations, monitor compliance, provide in-centives to comply. Th at is, getting lower levels of government to comply with public-safety expectations that are not in their interests requires structural chang-es. Even if those are forthcoming, expectations should remain low as long as constituent units do not have much of an incentive to comply. As a result, it may be easier for the central government to expand the mandate of an extant federal actor than to attempt to incentivize local compliance. Or the central government could attempt to manipulate institutional constraints in an attempt to alter the decision-making logic at the local level.

In theory, then, one might reasonably expect public safety in federal and mul-tilevel governance systems to play out diff erently than in unitary systems. In prac-tice, many of the dynamics and fi ndings with respect to federal and multilevel governance systems are likely to be relevant to unitary systems as well. Owing to the principle of subsidiarity, unitary systems tend to decentralize matters of pub-lic safety, such as fi rst responders, as well and, in many cases, they are responsible to local rather than central authorities.34 Th e Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) is one example.35 Since these local authorities are often elected them-selves, the institutional logic with respect to public safety may be similar to the one that operates in federal and multilevel governance systems. By virtue of the absence of divided sovereignty that is the hallmark of federal and many multilevel governance systems, however, central governments in unitary systems have great-er ability to solicit cooperation from lower levels of government. One might thus expect to fi nd fewer incentives, regulations and monitoring mechanisms of local undertakings in unitary countries than in federal ones. For example, the existence of municipal police forces in France notwithstanding, in practice it has few pow-ers beyond regulating traffi c. Security enforcement rests with the police nationale (under the ministry of the interior) and the gendarmerie (under the ministry of

33. Th acher, Th e Local Role in Homeland Security , 671.34. David Bayley, Patterns of Policing (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 54.35. John McGarry, and Brendan O’Leary, Policing Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999).




defence). In eff ect, then, in the provision of security in France, national interests and those of the state are clearly intended to trump local ones.

In eff ect, one of the premises behind federal solutions is that there is a good reason why not all services are necessarily entrusted to the central government. If the hallmark of federal systems is that, contrary to unitary systems, the inter-governmental constitutional relationship is not determined by the central gov-ernment, then security becomes the litmus test of a federal system’s maturity measured as a function of the extent to which intergovernmental coordinating mechanisms are honoured by the central government. If security is ultimately local, then one way to measure a central government’s commitment to federalism is its respect for local autonomy over security decision-making and enforcement.

Confronted with intransigent structures, processes and norms, the coordinat-ing mechanisms that intergovernmental arrangements provide too readily end up having to yield to expediency. Yet, the evidence also suggests that a public-safety equilibrium is ultimately likely to prevail only when federal institutions can play their role as a mechanism to mediate a security equilibrium that balances shared-rule and self-rule. It would appear that those federal systems that respect subna-tional autonomy and where the central government respects subnational units preserve of their autonomy, funding, and decision-making power in the case of federal intervention in security-related matters, fare better on security than feder-al countries with central governments that do not. Th is is a hypothesis that needs further elaboration and testing. Th ere are a lot of independent and intervening variables to disentangle. Yet, unilateral or uncoordinated interventions by central governments in matters of public safety rarely seem to fare well in the sense that, unable to overcome the path-dependency engendered by territorial commitments and structural constraints, they prove unsustainable over the long term.

AbstractFour basic conditions have to be met for any society to function effectively: security, good governance,

economic development and psycho-social conditions. Much of the literature focuses on the latter three aspects. Yet, security appears to be a precondition, a fi rst-mover of sorts, without which it appears diffi cult for the other three to take root. Whilst security concerns are the raison d’être at the heart of many federal arrangements, the nexus of federalism and public safety has received little scholarly attention. In light of the exponential growth of federal systems and the newfound interest in public safety in federal systems as a result of heightened concerns about terrorism on the one hand, and about the capacity of federations to respond to both natural and anthropogenic emergencies on the other hand, this article proposes a preliminary theoretical and substantive framework to inform and entice the comparative study of public safety in federal systems.

RésuméQuatre conditions de base doivent être respectées pour le fonctionnement effi cace d’une société : la sé-

curité, la bonne gouvernance, le développement économique et les conditions psycho-sociales. Une bonne partie de la littérature porte sur les trois derniers aspects. Pourtant, la sécurité semble être une condition préalable, un élément premier, sans laquelle il semble diffi cile pour les trois autres à prendre racine. Alors




que les préoccupations de sécurité sont la raison d’être au cœur de nombreux arrangements fédéraux, le lien du fédéralisme et de la sécurité publique a reçu peu d’attention de la part des chercheurs. À la lumière de la croissance exponentielle des systèmes fédéraux et de l’intérêt retrouvée dans la sécurité publique dans les systèmes fédéraux en raison de préoccupations au sujet du terrorisme d’une part, et de la capacité des fédérations de faire suite aux urgences naturelles et anthropogéniques d’autre part, cet article pro-pose un cadre préliminaire de théorie et de substance afi n d’informer et d’inciter l’étude comparative de la sécurité publique dans les systèmes fédéraux et multi-palier.



In Memoriam



In Memoriam

Jan Westenbroek & André Thiéry

L’ami Jan

Jan Westenbroek nous a quittés. Il allait avoir 77 ans. J’ai perdu un ami, l’Eu-rope un serviteur exemplaire, le CIFE un avocat inlassable et un protecteur vigi-lant, à la fi délité jamais démentie.

Jan a rencontré le CIFE en Vallée d’Aoste quand, en 1962, il participa à la deuxième session d’été du Collège universitaire d’études fédéralistes. Il y connut instantanément une popularité sans partage qui en fi t un animateur obligé de cette petite communauté estivale et son agent improvisé de relations publiques auprès de la population valdôtaine et de ses dirigeants. Ceux-ci, parfois méfi ants à l’égard de ces intellectuels fédéralistes qui « parlaient diffi cile », se reconnaissaient immédiatement dans ce moujik batave, rustique et chaleureux. Le Frison du plat pays et des polders avait, il est vrai, avec les Valdôtains, l’essentiel en partage : le fonds paysan, le bilinguisme disputé et le sentiment minoritaire toujours vif. Tout ce qu’il fallait pour être adopté par ces montagnards taciturnes, volontiers ombrageux mais avides de reconnaissance et de fraternisation. Et c’est ainsi que Jan Westenbroek, admis parmi les alpinistes chevronnés du mythique Club alpin de la Vallée d’Aoste, devint le premier Frison de l’Histoire à escalader, chaque été, glaciers et parois vers les sommets les plus ardus qui couronnent la vallée.


In Memoriam438


Sa force et sa résistance physiques l’y prédisposaient naturellement : Jan était un malabar blond, au regard d’un bleu aussi délavé que celui des ciels d’hiver de sa Frise natale. Aucun défi physique ne le rebutait et chacun de ses condisciples de l’été 1962 se souvient que, dédaignant de monter avec eux, dans le car qui, chaque matin, les transportait de leur hôtel de Saint-Vincent au château Gamba, lieu des travaux et distant de quelques kilomètres, il préférait se lancer dans un jogging éperdu derrière le véhicule pétaradant et, parfois, parvenait même à le précéder à l’arrivée. Il fallait voir, alors, le sourire de triomphe malicieux qu’af-fi chait le vainqueur de ce duel matinal pour lequel s’enthousiasmaient, dans un joyeux tohu-bohu, les voyageurs aussi bien que le conducteur.

Pour alimenter un tel moteur, il fallait, évidemment, une grande quantité de carburant et ses prouesses de table fi rent sans doute autant pour sa notoriété que ses exploits sportifs. Sa réputation fut établie une fois pour toutes au restaurant « La Brenva », rendez-vous des alpinistes et des touristes, situé alors au-dessus de Courmayeur, à l’entrée du Val Veny et au pied du glacier éponyme. Notre gargantua batave y faisait l’admiration des convives, engloutissant l’interminable succession de plats les plus roboratifs, concoctés à l’intention d’estomacs aff amés par les courses, et dont il n’hésitait pas à redemander les pourtant gigantesques portions. Après quoi, ayant couronné ces agapes par un saladier de glace au miel, il sacrifi ait à l’usage et aux prières de l’assistance en entonnant l’hymne national frison, hommage à l’abondance et à la qualité de la chère et pensée pour sa petite et lointaine patrie.

Quelques années plus tard, Jan Westenbroek, qui avait épousé Maria et fondé une famille, réalisa son ambition de vouer son activité à la cause européenne en devenant un collaborateur du groupe PPE au Parlement européen. Dans ce cadre, certes moins propice aux exploits sportifs, son charisme et son activisme fi rent, néanmoins, merveille. Veillant en toute occasion à la discipline du groupe et jouant les chiens de berger lors des votes, en rameutant ceux de ses membres qui s’attardaient au restaurant ou à la cafétéria, il sut s’imposer comme un rouage déterminant de la mécanique parlementaire. Mais, plus que tout, c’est le mélange de bonhomie naturelle et d’entregent spontané qui fi t son succès. Sa cordialité in-fuse en fi t le familier de tous, du plus anonyme au plus éminent, abordant chacun dans sa langue natale, dont il maniait sans complexe une syntaxe souvent approxi-mative mais qui, conjuguée à un tutoiement immédiat, devenait une formidable arme de complicité. Sous ses aspects rustiques qui dissimulaient une grande fi -nesse, Jan était un diplomate accompli, infi niment précieux dans un milieu où, derrière les grandes envolées lyriques et la magie du verbe des séances plénières, le compromis et les marchandages sont, dans la coulisse, la règle cardinale. Pas étonnant, dès lors, que le PPE en fi sse son secrétaire général adjoint et le main-tienne, après sa retraite, dans un rôle de conseiller volontiers consulté. C’est dans


In Memoriam 439


cette période qu’il put manifester au CIFE cette fi délité qu’il lui vouait depuis les années valdôtaines, Dans sa position privilégiée, nul n’était mieux qualifi é que lui pour prodiguer à ses dirigeants conseils et recommandations qui s’avérèrent aussi avisés que précieux dans la gestion de leurs dossiers. Cinquante années ont passé, mais il y compte encore quelques amis qui se souviennent et qui le pleurent.

Claude Nigoul

André Th iéry

André Th iéry, décédé le 22 février dernier, dans sa 93e année, était l’un des derniers compagnons de route d’Alexandre Marc. À ce titre, il avait participé, dès les années 1950, aux enseignements du CIFE dans les stages et séminaires, ainsi que dans diverses sessions universitaires, à partir de 1961, en Vallée d’Aoste, au sein du Collège d’études fédéralistes.

André Th iéry a apporté une collaboration appréciée à notre revue dont il était devenu membre du comité de rédaction en janvier 1963. Européen engagé au sein du Mouvement fédéraliste européen et de l’Union européenne des fédéra-listes, il a publié dans la collection « Réalités du Présent », créée par le CIFE, un ouvrage remarqué sous le titre L’Économie pour l’homme. De plus, il fut l’un des fondateurs de l’Association des Réalités européennes du présent, dont il a assumé la fonction de secrétaire général depuis sa fondation en 1967 jusqu’en 2001.

André Th iéry, croix de guerre 1939-1940, diplômé de l’École polytechnique, était Expert économique d’État. C’est à ce titre qu’il participa aux activités de la Haute autorité du charbon et de l’acier à Luxembourg.

Jean-Pierre Gouzy



Chronique



La vie politique en Europe et dans le monde

Jean-Pierre Gouzy

Rédacteur en chef puis directeur politique de L’Europe en formation, Secrétaire gé-néral du Centre international de formation européenne (1954-1982), il a également présidé l’Association des journalistes européens de 1978 à 1982.L’auteur tient cette chronique depuis 1964.

(Paris, le 6 mars 2012)C’est aux confi ns des mois d’octobre et novembre 2011 que nous avons

été amenés à conclure notre dernière chronique… Depuis lors, la marche du monde et le chassé-croisé des événements qui ont frappé de plein fouet une construction européenne toujours inachevée, en privilégiant sa « zone euro », méritent d’être appréhendés plus attentivement que jamais, qu’il s’agisse des bouleversements en cours depuis le surgissement d’un « prin-temps arabe » aux multiples facettes ; du séisme économique, fi nancier, monétaire qui met en cause la gestion de la dette « souveraine » de l’Union européenne ; ou encore de l’avenir de cette « autre Europe » qui s’incarne, tant bien que mal, dans la mouvance russe, jouant – Gazprom aidant – un rôle charnière entre les grands émergents (Chine, Inde, Brésil, entre autres) et les États-Unis d’Amérique, « superpuissance » un brin déclinante sous Obama.

La déprime

Pour les Européens, la conjoncture économique telle qu’elle s’observe au début de mars 2012 peut se défi nir en un mot : déprime. Selon toutes les organisations internationales auxquelles on reconnaît une compétence


Jean-Pierre Gouzy444


en la matière, la croissance devrait rester atone dans l’Union européenne jusqu’à l’été. Sur l’ensemble de l’année 2012, elle oscillerait entre -0,2 % (prévision OCDE) et -0,3 % (Commission européenne). Le FMI est plus pessimiste, envisageant même une hypothèse négative (-0,5 %) pour la zone euro. La Grande-Bretagne en décroissance l’an dernier connaîtrait un léger frémissement de son PIB (0,6 %). Parmi les « grands » de la zone euro, la Commission prévoit un PIB en hausse de 0,5 % pour l’Allemagne ; 0,4 en France. Ces perspectives malingres ne sont que des prévisions, mais si on les compare entre elles, nous nous apercevons de leur relative simili-tude. D’autant que dans toute une série de pays de la zone euro, on pré-voit des résultats négatifs. Tel serait le cas de l’Italie (-1,3 %), de l’Espagne (-1 %) pour ne pas parler du Portugal (-3,3 %) et de la Grèce (-4,4 %). Même un État modèle comme les Pays-Bas s’annonce en croissance néga-tive (-0,9 %).

Parmi les principaux pays de l’Union européenne, mais hors zone euro, seule la Pologne se porterait comme un charme avec en perspective 2,5 % de PIB en crue.

Aux États-Unis, par contre, les prévisionnistes du FMI envisagent 1,8 à 2,2 % de croissance en 2012. La Maison Blanche (année présidentielle oblige) est encore plus optimiste. Autrement dit, schématiquement, les Américains qui furent, avec le clash des subprimes et la faillite de Lehman Brothers, à l’origine de la crise mondiale (eff ondrement brutal de leur PIB de 8,9 % au quatrième trimestre 2008 et encore de 6,7 % au premier tri-mestre 2009) redémarrent, alors que l’Europe clapote toujours dans les bourbiers de la crise. Plus pour longtemps, espérons-le, mais il faudra trou-ver autre chose au-delà des purges austères, si indispensables qu’elles puis-sent paraître, afi n de diminuer les défi cits publics. Il s’agit fondamentale-ment de retrouver une croissance durable permettant de résorber la dette et, plus encore, de mettre fi n aux écarts intolérables de développement que l’on décèle dans une même zone monétaire.

La panne de croissance de l’Union européenne (et pas seulement de son « eurozone ») risque-t-elle d’avoir des eff ets d’entraînement négatifs signifi -catifs sur le reste du monde ? Pour le moment, il ne le semble pas, puisque, toujours selon les augures du FMI, la croissance mondiale 2012 serait en-core de 3,3 %, tandis que ceux de la Banque mondiale, dans leur rapport du 18 janvier dernier, ont ramené les prévisions de croissance planétaire à 2,5 %. Par ailleurs, parmi les émergents, la Chine est plus particulièrement dans le collimateur des observatoires internationaux. Le train d’enfer de la locomotive mondiale permettrait encore d’atteindre 8,2 points de PIB supplémentaires en 2012, contre 9,2 en 2011 et 10,4 en 2010. À moins


La vie politique en Europe et dans le monde 445


que, selon l’agence Bloomberg, Pékin ne procède, de son propre chef, à un rééquilibrage de l’ensemble du système économique.

Cet infl échissement met en lumière le fait que le géant asiatique est dépendant de ses exportations. Par ailleurs, Pékin doit résorber des ten-dances infl ationnistes (5,4 % de hausse des prix en 2011). L’Inde, pour sa part, aurait un taux de croissance de l’ordre de 7 %, tandis que le Japon, qui a payé un lourd tribut à Fukushima (0,9 % en 2011), rebondirait pour sortir du rouge. Au total, les pays classés dans la catégorie des « émergents » devraient, selon la Banque mondiale, voir leur PIB croître globalement de 5 points, de plus de 7 dans l’ensemble asiatique et de 3,6 % en Amérique latine.

Un développement économique contrasté continue donc à caractériser l’écart qui se creuse entre le bloc économique des pays occidentaux (et singulièrement de la plupart des pays européens) et le nouveau monde des émergents. Bien entendu, le scénario qui permet de projeter les prévisions de l’année en cours peut être modifi é par des événements environnemen-taux lourds de conséquences (cas du Japon en 2011) ou de nature straté-gique (par exemple, à propos de l’Iran ou d’autres éléments perturbateurs majeurs dans les autres grands pays détenteurs de sources d’énergie qui alimentent l’activité planétaire).

• Victime privilégiée du ralentissement économique, l’Union euro-péenne est, de plus, confrontée aux conséquences d’un chômage accen-tué, notamment dans la zone euro où il atteignait fi n 2011 le pourcentage de 10,4 % de la population active, soit 16 400 000 individus pour les 17 États qui ont fait le choix de la monnaie unique. L’Union européenne glo-balement considérée en compte 23,8 millions. Rappelons quelques pour-centages révélateurs : 22,85 % de chômeurs en Espagne ; 19,2 en Grèce ; 14,5 en Irlande ; 13 au Portugal ; 9,9 en France. Seuls quelques petits pays fl irtent avec la barre des 4 à 6 % de leur population active, parmi lesquels les Pays-Bas et l’Autriche où les mouvements populistes, remarquons-le au passage, sont très actifs.

Une « règle d’or » et mille milliards d’euros

La crise à rebondissements multiples que traverse la zone euro a com-mencé, sinon à se dénouer, du moins à évoluer signifi cativement lors des réunions successives du Conseil européen ou des ministres des Finances de l’eurozone, sans oublier les rencontres bilatérales, notamment franco-allemandes, quand le 26 octobre dernier un accord de principe a été ob-tenu par les parties concernées, banques et assurances ayant accepté de perdre la moitié de la valeur des titres grecs en leur possession (soit une




centaine de milliards d’euros). Les seules banques concernées par la crise hellène, au surplus, ont admis une augmentation de leurs fonds propres à hauteur de 106 milliards d’euros, à la fi n de juin 2012 au plus tard (soit un ratio de 3 %) ; le Fonds européen de stabilité fi nancière (FESF) créé le 9 octobre 2010, avec une capacité d’emprunt de 440 milliards d’euros en tant que mécanisme provisoire, pouvant, en principe, disposer d’une faculté d’action de 1 000 milliards d’euros destinés à garantir partiellement les emprunts émis par des pays en diffi culté. Les États, pour leur part, se sont engagés à adopter des « règles de préférence au niveau constitutionnel ou un niveau équivalent », en vertu du pacte de stabilité et de croissance, avant la fi n de 2012. De cette manière, la fameuse « règle d’or », destinée à pla-fonner constitutionnellement désormais les dettes souveraines et défi cits publics, se trouverait reconnue dans un futur traité européen en gestation.

Ce premier résultat, dont il n’était pas inutile de rappeler les grands axes dans ce numéro, puisque tout ce qui va suivre en découle, a été accueilli avec un certain scepticisme. Il a donc paru indispensable de convoquer le 9 décembre suivant un nouveau Conseil européen, dans le but d’arrêter les principales lignes d’un pacte budgétaire destiné à combler les lacunes d’un traité de Maastricht à l’origine de l’Union monétaire, mais aussi d’un faux-semblant d’Union économique, comme la crise sans précédent de-puis les années 1930 du système fi nancier mondial venait d’en faire une démonstration actualisée. Seule la Grande-Bretagne s’est, d’entrée de jeu, auto-exclue de tout nouvel engagement envers l’euro, les intérêts de la City primant naturellement ceux du continent dont elle ne s’exclut pas, mais auxquels elle ne s’assimile pas vraiment. La république Tchèque a décidé d’emboîter le pas au gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, lors d’un Conseil européen convoqué le 30 janvier 2012.

Quoi qu’il en soit, le 9 décembre dernier, il a été convenu que le pacte budgétaire européen devrait désormais dépendre de « sanctions automa-tiques » (ou quasiment réputées telles) contre tout État de l’eurozone dont les défi cits publics dépasseraient la barre de 3 % du PIB prévue par le traité de Maastricht, un vote à la majorité qualifi ée étant nécessaire pour s’y opposer.

• Les défi cits dits structurels ne devraient pas excéder les 0,5 % du PIB ; la Cour de justice étant habilitée à vérifi er la transposition de cette « règle d’or » dans les diverses panoplies constitutionnelles de la zone euro.

• Des eurosommets seraient organisés « au moins » deux fois l’an pour « activer la gouvernance ». En temps de crise, comme c’est le cas présente-ment, la périodicité serait accélérée.




• Le projet de traité instituant le Mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES) destiné à se substituer au Fonds européen de stabilité fi nancière sera mis en place dès juillet 2012, avec une année d’avance par rapport à l’agenda politique précédemment envisagé. Sa dotation a été prévue à hauteur de 500 milliards d’euros, mais pourrait être réévaluée. Une procé-dure d’urgence favorisera l’introduction d’une majorité qualifi ée de 85 % dès lors que la viabilité de la zone paraîtra menacée. Le dispositif prévu permettra aux « grands États » (Allemagne, France, Italie) de conserver un droit de veto de facto.

• Enfi n, pour amadouer les marchés, le secteur privé (banques, as-surances) ne sera plus « mis à contribution », comme il a dû s’y résoudre contre son gré dans le cas de la Grèce.

• Reste l’essentiel : le problème de la dette demeure pratiquement en-tier, alors que l’activité ralentit et que le chômage augmente. Le refus de la Banque centrale européenne d’acheter « massivement » de la dette publique s’est trouvé confi rmé par le nouveau président de la BCE, le 8 décembre dernier, même si celui-ci, dans les limites des contraintes statutaires dont il a hérité, saura faire preuve, comme l’expérience n’a pas tardé à le prou-ver, d’une souplesse « à l’italienne » qui lui permettra de contourner les obstacles, en accordant aux institutions fi nancières privées de la zone euro des prêts à des taux plus qu’avantageux (voire dérisoires), leur donnant la possibilité d’accorder aux États des taux rémunérateurs. C’est un tour de passe-passe.

• Par ailleurs, les projets de taxation des transactions fi nancières au ni-veau de la zone euro, faute d’accord, ont été renvoyés à des temps meilleurs. Idem en ce qui concerne le recours aux eurobonds, c’est-à-dire à une tenta-tive communautaire de mutualisation de la dette, même si on nous assure que ce dessein n’est pas perdu de vue à terme et demeure même d’une singulière actualité, au moins pour fi nancer de grands projets. Comme l’a dit le président de la Commission européenne, José Manuel Barroso, il aurait un avantage considérable en permettant d’instituer « un marché des obligations bien plus large et fl uide, comparable à celui des bons du Trésor américain ». La Commission européenne a adopté, le 29 novembre, un « livre vert », c’est-à-dire une étude pertinente et fouillée sur la question, en avançant diverses options. Si en Allemagne Merkel s’est montrée si rétive jusqu’ici à l’égard des eurobonds, c’est précisément parce qu’elle ne croit pas que la zone euro puisse eff ectuer aujourd’hui une avancée politique qui suppose, sur un point sensible, l’acceptation d’un vrai partage des pré-rogatives de souveraineté, même si l’opposition sociale-démocrate se dit prête, elle, à prendre les paris nécessaires. Quant à la « force de frappe »




de 1 000 milliards d’euros dont on nous disait qu’elle devrait être mise à la disposition de l’actuel Fonds européen de sauvetage, on en a très peu entendu parler ces derniers temps, les pays potentiellement sollicités – no-tamment, la Chine – préférant attendre que les nouveaux dispositifs dont les Européens ont imaginé la mise en place, pour surmonter les eff ets de leur endettement aient fait leurs premières preuves avant de s’engager eux-mêmes à leur prêter main-forte.

Le spleen, le spread et les notations

De fait, la période qui, grosso modo, a séparé les congés de la Toussaint des fêtes traditionnelles de fi n d’année 2011 restera synonyme dans l’his-toire de l’Union européenne, de désarroi, marquée par la défi ance des mar-chés, des banques, des États. Ce désarroi s’est refl été dans les taux d’intérêt et d’emprunt qui ne cessaient d’augmenter et surtout le spleen suscité par les écarts du spread, c’est-à-dire les écarts des rendements entre les emprunts de tel ou tel pays de la zone euro et ceux de tel ou tel autre ; Un cas typique est celui des obligations françaises à dix ans et des emprunts du Bund al-lemand de même durée. Ainsi, fi n novembre 2011, la France empruntait, par exemple, deux fois plus cher que l’Allemagne sur les marchés. Ainsi, autre exemple, quand l’Italie empruntait entre 6,5 et 7,5 % à dix ans, la France le faisait à 3,7-4 % alors que les taux allemands oscillaient entre 1,7 et 2,5 points. Les écarts de spread illustrent les distorsions qui caractérisent, en interne, une zone économique et monétaire en réalité incapable de faire face aux coups de boutoir d’une crise systémique d’envergure.

Dans le même registre, nous avons appris à connaître le rôle pervers que peuvent être amenées à jouer les agences de notation, dans la mesure où elles sont trop souvent conduites à exacerber, plus qu’à prévenir, le désarroi des investisseurs. Pour l’essentiel, jusqu’ici, elles sont trois à faire la loi : Moody’s, Standard & Poors, Fitch. Leur rôle est, en principe, « informatif », mais les Big Th ree ont été critiquées soit pour n’avoir ni prévu la crise asia-tique de 1997-1998 ni la crise des subprimes de 2008 ; ou lorsque Standard et Poors s’est illustrée par une erreur de calcul de 2 000 milliards de dollars lors de la dégradation du triple A américain en novembre de l’an dernier.

On s’est souvent interrogé, dans le même esprit, sur l’opportunité du « coup de semonce sans précédent » qu’a représenté, à la veille du sommet de la zone euro de décembre 2011, la menace de S&P de « mettre sous surveillance avec implication négative » la zone euro considérée dans son ensemble, le verdict défi nitif devant intervenir ultérieurement. Six États détenteurs du 20 sur 20 (AAA) se trouvaient visés en la circonstance : l’Al-lemagne, l’Autriche, la Finlande, la France, le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas ;




la Belgique ayant vu, pour sa part, se note dégradée dès le 25 novembre 2011.

Finalement, neuf des dix-sept États de la zone ont été dénotés par la même agence le 13 janvier 2012. La France et l’Autriche qui ont perdu leur triple A pour se voir classées en AA+, puis, dans l’ordre alphabétique : Chypre, Espagne, Italie, Malte, Portugal, Slovaquie et Slovénie. Les quatre États de l’eurozone gardant leur notation d’excellence sont l’Allemagne, la Finlande, le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas. Hors zone euro, c’est également le cas du Royaume-Uni (curieusement, car ses « fondamentaux » sont comparables à ceux de la France), du Danemark (qui préside aujourd’hui l’Union) et de la Suède. Pour leur part, tous les pays du Sud sont en chute libre : Chypre (qui va présider l’Union au second semestre), le Portugal et, au plus bas de l’échelle, la Grèce. Ces pays constituent, dans le lan-gage fi nancier du temps, le club des junk bonds, c’est-à-dire des détenteurs « d’obligations pourries ». Précisons encore, concernant la note française (AA+), que l’orgueil élyséen n’a pas trop eu à en souff rir dans la mesure où, pour une fois, les marchés avaient déjà intégré la perte du AAA depuis plu-sieurs semaines. C’est une chance, mais le petit jeu de concurrence entre les agences de notation se poursuit, Moody’s ayant jusqu’ici maintenu le triple A de la France, tout en la plaçant en perspective négative avec une notation identique attribuée au Royaume-Uni, alors qu’elle abaissait de deux crans la notation de l’Espagne et d’un la notation des notes souveraines de l’Ita-lie, de Malte, du Portugal, de la Slovaquie et de la Slovénie ; en annonçant, par ailleurs, la mise sous surveillance de 114 banques européennes.

On peut donc dire qu’avec des nuances et un minimum de contra-dictions, les « chiennes de garde » de l’actuel système fi nancier mondial aboutissent à des constats similaires concernant l’évolution des pays de la zone euro englués dans une crise qui dure depuis 2008 et atteint, à des degrés divers, les autres composantes de l’Union européenne. Il existe ainsi bel et bien, avec des variantes selon les cas de fi gure, au moins deux grandes mouvances dans la même zone monétaire : celle des pays du Sud et celle qui s’appuie sur les pays du Nord, notamment l’Allemagne qui, sous l’ère Merkel, a fi ni d’absorber les pesanteurs de la réunifi cation, en s’affi rmant comme puissance exportatrice essentielle de la communauté monétaire eu-ropéenne. Ce que l’Allemagne fédérale a fait avec la RDA, ne convient-il pas de l’envisager aujourd’hui, à égalité de partenariat, à l’échelle de notre continent, en commençant par réduire les écarts de compétitivité et en adaptant en conséquence nos méthodes de gouvernement ?




La Grèce, de Papandréou à Papademos

Le spleen, le spread et les dénotations en cascade ont, par ailleurs, pro-voqué au passage des changements politiques dans toute une série de pays confrontés aux conséquences de la tornade fi nancière. L’un d’eux a bien failli provoquer une panique : la Grèce.

Quand le premier ministre Papandréou, leader du PASOK (socia-liste), après avoir obtenu l’abandon de 50 % de la dette bancaire, s’est décidé le 31 octobre dernier à soumettre les résultats du sommet européen du 26 octobre 2011 à l’approbation du peuple grec par la voie référen-daire, son coup de poker provoqua une chute signifi cative des bourses, les marchés anticipant un « non » bien senti de la vox populi, du fait de la cure d’austérité à laquelle les citoyens hellènes étaient appelés à se sou-mettre stoïquement après des mois de tractations entre ses représentants et les diff érentes autorités européennes compétentes. Finalement, le pro-jet de référendum fut abandonné sur les bords de la mer Égée, au profi t de la constitution d’un gouvernement de quasi-union nationale présidé, jusqu’aux prochaines élections du 8 avril, par Lucas Papademos, professeur d’économie à l’université d’Athènes, ex-banquier central et « ancien » du Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Papademos a été investi, le 7 dé-cembre, par le PASOK de Georges Papandréou, la Nouvelle Démocratie (opposition de droite au Pasok jusqu’alors) et le Laos « Alerte populaire or-thodoxe » (classé à l’extrême droite) qui ont participé à son gouvernement.

Avec une dépression qui contribue à plomber l’économie grecque, on ne perçoit pas de retour aux normes européennes jusqu’ici admises de défi -cit public (3 % du PIB), ni en 2011 où ce défi cit a atteint 9 % et la dette a encore gonfl é de 6 %, ni en 2012, ni même avant 2015. Nous restons donc loin, très loin de la StabilitätsKultur chère à Angela Merkel. Si, en eff et, le pacte budgétaire est ratifi é et s’incarne dans la réalité, il ne sera applicable en Grèce qu’avec des délais de faveur.

Lucas Papademos fl anqué de son ministre grec des Finances, Evangelos Venizélos, a dû négocier pied à pied pour tenter de ramener la dette grecque de 160 % du PIB à 120,50 % de celui-ci, d’ici 2020. Sur les 350 milliards d’euros d’endettement total, la seule dette privée représente 200 milliards d’euros. Un premier tour de force a été d’obtenir une décote d’au moins 50 % (en fait, 53) de ce montant par les banques, assurances et institutions assimilées. Par ailleurs, un second plan de sauvetage de 130 milliards d’eu-ros a été échafaudé par la troïka (FMI, BCE, Commission européenne), le premier plan de 110 milliards d’euros dont Athènes a bénéfi cié en 2010 s’étant avéré insuffi sant (sinon inopérant) face à la dégradation écono-mique qui s’est poursuivie. Dans l’impossibilité, en particulier, de rem-




bourser 14,5 milliards d’euros à l’échéance du 15 mars, le nouveau prêt de 130 milliards d’euros revêtait une importance stratégique décisive. C’est alors que s’est engagé un marchandage intense entre Athènes, d’une part, Bruxelles et Berlin, d’autre part, le rôle du principal bailleur de fonds éven-tuel (l’Allemagne de Merkel) étant considéré comme décisif, d’autant que les précédents engagements pris (notamment en matière de privatisation) n’ont pas été tenus par les partenaires helléniques.

Le 31 janvier, un sommet européen a estimé qu’un nouveau plan d’austérité renforcée était donc indispensable, l’Eurogroupe condition-nant l’octroi de l’aide fi nancière attendue à l’adoption par le gouverne-ment grec d’une nouvelle cure d’austérité drastique. Passons sur les détails pour évoquer une autre date : celle du 12 février 2012 où, malgré l’at-mosphère émeutière qui régnait à Athènes (incendie de bâtiments et de commerces, échauff ourées), le parlement grec a quand même accepté de voter, à la requête du gouvernement Papademos, par 199 voix contre 74, 29 s’abstenant, des dispositions telles que : l’abaissement du salaire mini-mum (ramené de 750 euros à 556 mensuellement), la réforme du marché du travail et des conventions sociales (les 13e et 14e mois de salaire étant particulièrement visés) ; des coupes dans le budget de la défense (estimé dispendieux pour un petit pays membre de l’OTAN), mais aussi dans celui de la santé ; le licenciement progressif de 15 000 fonctionnaires ; 604 mil-lions d’euros d’économies sur les retraites complémentaires ; la fermeture d’établissements publics, etc.

À vrai dire, l’énoncé d’un tel chapelet de dispositions de nature très di-verse laisse perplexe… Certaines d’entre elles apparaissent, en eff et, comme autant de facteurs potentiels de paupérisation à terme même s’il est, par ailleurs, indéniable que le peuple grec est déjà la première victime d’un secteur public hypertrophié, en attendant un verdict électoral où l’extrême droite et l’extrême gauche seront tentées de se renforcer mutuellement. Même si les assurances écrites de M. Samaras, au nom du centre droit et de MM. Papandréou et Venizélos pour la gauche, quant à la mise en œuvre du plan d’austérité, ne peuvent pas être mises en cause, une question de fond reste toujours posée : celle de la soutenabilité de la dette grecque, alors que le ratio de cette dette n’a pas cessé jusqu’ici d’augmenter et que la Banque centrale européenne est invitée, à son tour, à « faire un geste »…

Somme toute, l’avenir de la Grèce au sein de la zone euro reste ou-vert… alors qu’elle entame sa cinquième année de récession !

Pour limiter les risques, les euros de la « troïka » ne seront disponibles que par tranches limitées successives ; une task force de la Commission européenne sera installée en permanence à Athènes, même si l’idée mer-




kelienne d’un commissaire européen au budget offi ciant à demeure dans la capitale grecque a été abandonnée à l’issue du sommet bruxellois du 30 janvier dernier.

Certes, comme l’aurait fait savoir le président du comité des notations souveraines de Standard & Poor’s : « Il n’est pas dit qu’un défaut grec ait un eff et domino dans la zone euro ». Mais l’inverse n’est pas dit non plus… À bon entendeur, salut !

Italie : double Mario

À Rome, autre cas de fi gure, la crise des marchés appréciée par un spread télévisé de plus en plus défaillant a eu raison du Cavaliere. Lâché par sa majorité, décrédibilisé par ses frasques, Silvio Berlusconi a fi ni par être lâ-ché par sa majorité. Le 12 novembre 2011, il a été remplacé, subito presto, au palais Chigi par Mario Monti deux jours plus tard, avec le mandat de Giorgio Napolitano, toujours très populaire président de la République (et ancien communiste), de former un nouveau gouvernement.

Napolitano et Monti sont classés parmi les « Européens » de convic-tion. Quelques mots sur il Professore… Sénateur à vie, ancien commissaire européen à la concurrence et au marché intérieur, président de la presti-gieuse université Bocconi de Milan, cet ancien de Yale fut aussi membre du Conseil de recherche de la Banque américaine Goldman Sachs qui fait toujours la pluie et le beau temps à Wall Street. Le 16 novembre, Mario Monti formera un gouvernement d’experts, de techniciens et d’universi-taires dont le premier soin sera de faire adopter un premier plan compre-nant 20 milliards d’économie et de hausses d’impôts, mais aussi plus d’une dizaine de milliards d’euros destinés à relancer la croissance. Ce dispositif adopté par 495 députés contre 88 (seule la Ligue du Nord votant contre en bloc), s’est ajouté au train de mesures déjà acquises sous le précédent gouvernement, sans que pour autant et pour l’essentiel elles aient été ap-pliquées. En vérité, comme on en prête le propos à un sénateur italien : « Avec Berlusconi, c’était le carnaval tous les jours, avec Monti, c’est le carême qui commence ».

Depuis lors, il Professore a su restituer à l’Italie le rôle qui était le sien en Europe et dans le monde. Sur le plan interne, un redressement s’est esquis-sé après quelques mois de pouvoir. Tout, semble-t-il, est passé au peigne fi n, qu’il s’agisse de la taxe immobilière, de l’ouverture de pans entiers de l’économie aux règles de concurrence, de la libéralisation (en cours) du marché du travail, de la lutte contre l’évasion fi scale, de la réforme du code du travail, du cumul des mandats, des crédits militaires (en diminution de 20 %), de l’immobilier, du contrôle des déclarations fi scales et même des




impôts fonciers que l’Église catholique est désormais invitée à acquitter comme le commun des mortels (le gouvernement grec, pour sa part, n’a pas osé s’attaquer jusqu’à maintenant au statut fi scal privilégié de l’Église orthodoxe).

Ceci dit, la tâche reste considérable et la majorité parlementaire de Monti, au gré des votes, a tendance à se réduire à la marge, en attendant les élections législatives de mai 2013 à l’occasion desquelles la classe politique compte bien mettre un terme au « gouvernement des experts », d’autant que les sujets d’inquiétude ne manquent toujours pas, qu’il s’agisse du ni-veau de vie ou des écarts de niveau de vie et d’emploi qui alimentent le débat interne, avec en prime 1 900 milliards d’euros de dettes et une crois-sance défaillante.

Mais l’Italie a plus de ressort qu’il n’y paraît… C’est ainsi qu’un deu-xième « super Mario » a fait irruption sur la scène européenne, avant même qu’il ne soit question de Monti, en obtenant que le successeur de Jean-Claude Trichet à la tête de la Banque centrale européenne, soit Mario Draghi, professeur d’économie ayant occupé les fonctions de directeur du Trésor et de président de la banque d’Italie ainsi que, d’autre part, celles de président de Goldman Sachs pour l’Europe. C’est dire que les paroles et les actes du nouveau patron de la Banque de Francfort seront suivis avec attention. À cet égard, il n’a pas déçu, qu’il s’agisse de la baisse des taux d’intérêt décidée le 8 décembre dernier, à hauteur d’un quart de point ; du refus confi rmé par la BCE à la même date de « racheter massivement » des dettes publiques, même si nul n’ignore que celle-ci a déjà racheté depuis 2010 plus de 220 milliards d’euros d’emprunts grecs, portugais, islandais, italiens, espagnols, dont encore 462 millions d’obligations souveraines lors de la dernière semaine de 2011 ; ou qu’il s’agisse de la souplesse dont il a su faire preuve en annonçant, le 21 décembre 2011, un fi nancement illimité des banques sur trois ans à un taux réduit de 1 %, amenant 523 d’entre elles à souscrire, fi n décembre 2011, pour un montant de 489 milliards d’euros à l’horizon de trois ans, ou encore d’une deuxième opération simi-laire décidée le 29 février 2012, au profi t de 800 banques et pour un mon-tant encore supérieur au précédent (529,5 milliards d’euros), alors que ces établissements peinaient à se refi nancer sur le marché bancaire. Mieux en-core, cette même BCE, du fait de son statut qui lui interdit de fi nancer des défi cits publics, peut ainsi permettre aux banques bénéfi ciaires de cet affl ux de liquidités de faciliter le placement d’emprunts d’État.




Les autres vulnérabilités

Le tour d’horizon des changements politiques survenus dans la zone euro du fait de, ou en liaison avec, la crise fi nancière serait incomplet si nous ne mentionnions pas, dans la période récente, le cas de la Finlande qui a surmonté électoralement la montée du populisme, mais aussi ceux de la Slovaquie, de la Belgique et de l’Espagne. La Belgique en eff et, après une dégradation de sa note par Standard & Poor’s, a fi ni par mettre fi n le 7 décembre, à une crise gouvernementale de 541 jours pour résoudre les problèmes linguistiques en suspens. L’avènement d’un gouvernement de coalition de six partis politiques néerlandophones et francophones, sous la houlette du socialiste Elio Di Rupo, a permis du même coup de faire face à l’adversité des nationalistes fl amands militant ouvertement pour l’indé-pendance. La prévision de croissance du pays serait néanmoins très légère-ment négative en 2012.

• L’Espagne, pour sa part, a également basculé dans la crise politique à la suite de la démission anticipée du gouvernement socialiste de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Le 20 novembre 2011, jour anniversaire de la mort du « Caudillo », elle a donné le pouvoir au Parti populaire (centre droit). Son nouveau leader, Mariano Rajoy dispose d’une majorité absolue d’am-pleur historique pour, comme il le dit, « faire la guerre à la crise », alors que son pays, bien que moins endetté que d’autres (73,8 % du PIB en prévi-sion pour 2012), doit aff ronter les conséquences d’un défi cit budgétaire es-timé à 8,5 % pour l’exercice 2011 et d’un chômage record aff ectant 49 % des jeunes de moins de 25 ans. Là encore, un eff ort drastique d’austérité a été décrété. D’un premier montant de 16,5 milliards d’euros, il concer-nera, au premier chef, les administrations espagnoles. Un nouveau train de mesures de l’ordre de 9 milliards d’euros est en cours et comporte une augmentation signifi cative de l’impôt sur le revenu. De plus, la durée du travail sera également augmentée. Solidement installé à la Moncloa, siège de la présidence espagnole, il reste au gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy à faire ses preuves en passant de la parole aux actes. Solidement, disais-je, mais qu’en sait-on vraiment, alors que le président de la Catalogne a fait savoir publiquement que par la voie référendaire, la « Généralité » catalane pourrait être tentée d’accéder directement à l’Union européenne, et que l’eff ervescence sociale ne cesse de se manifester, par exemple en Castille et à Valence.

• Sur les bords du Douro, le nouveau gouvernement du Portugal, sorti vainqueur d’élections législatives anticipées provoquées par la crise, se dé-bat dans des diffi cultés similaires, même si – à la diff érence de l’Espagne – il a déjà bénéfi cié d’un plan de sauvetage (FMI, BCE, Union européenne) de




78 milliards d’euros. Malgré, là encore, un plan de rigueur et de réformes (baisse des protections sociales, gel des salaires dans la fonction publique, programme de privatisations de sept milliards d’euros, plafonnement des retraites, baisse de 10 % de la TVA dans certains secteurs, dont celui des soins médicaux, etc..), le pays doit aff ronter en 2012 une récession accrue, une infl ation sensible et un taux de chômage de 14 % (fi n 2011). Même si, comme le proclament les autorités portugaises, « le Portugal n’est pas la Grèce », la question d’un deuxième plan de sauvetage de son écono-mie défaillante n’en reste pas moins posée. Seul, parmi les pays de la zone euro qui ont bénéfi cié d’un sauvetage communautaire, l’Éire paraît devoir redresser la tête, avec une prévision de croissance d’un demi-point pour 2012, tout en décidant de soumettre le pacte budgétaire à une ratifi cation référendaire.

• Si nous avons tenu, dans cette chronique à donner un aperçu relati-vement fouillé de l’ampleur des dégâts causés par la crise dans les pays de l’Eurogroupe les plus durement vulnérabilisés économiquement (à l’excep-tion, pour le moment, de la Belgique), c’est avec l’intention de permettre aux lecteurs de mieux mesurer la portée et les interférences des événements que nous vivons en cascade depuis 2008. La France elle-même doit se sentir visée, au moment où se déroule une campagne présidentielle selon les règles du jeu politique hexagonal qui, à bien des égards, nous semblent désuètes… Comme l’observait Michel Rocard dans une interview au jour-nal Le Monde du 26 février dernier : « […] On parle de nos petites aff aires sans vouloir regarder le reste du monde. Or, c’est de l’extérieur que viennent les plus graves. » En particulier, « parce que nous sommes partis pour des années de croissance faible et peut-être de récession. » Nous aurons l’occasion d’y revenir dans une prochaine analyse… Pour nous en tenir à l’immédiat, on ne voit pas comment, avec une croissance annoncée pratiquement atone cette année, un endettement de plus de 85 % du PIB français (près de 1 700 milliards d’euros), un défi cit commercial de 69,8 milliards d’euros en 2011 (contre 51,4 en 2010) et en outre, près de trois millions de chô-meurs, il sera possible d’éviter une hausse des prélèvements obligatoires après les prochaines élections présidentielles et législatives du printemps 2012, même si l’actuel premier ministre français, François Fillon, a cru pouvoir annoncer le 5 décembre dernier sur France 2 : « il n’y aura pas de troisième plan de rigueur », sauf si… la croissance 2012 est inférieure aux prévisions gouvernementales. Or, c’est déjà le cas ! Que Nicolas Sarkozy se succède à lui-même ou que François Hollande l’emporte, la facture sera là ! Pour le reste, tout dépendra des orientations européennes du nouvel hôte




de l’Élysée, dans la perspective d’une Europe « ajustée » (pour reprendre un terme à la mode) aux réalités de notre temps.

• Or, François Hollande a déjà fait savoir que s’il était élu président de la République française, le 6 mai prochain, il demanderait la « rené-gociation du traité de discipline budgétaire pour préciser certaines options et obtenir la prise en compte de perspectives complémentaires de nature à favoriser un rebond de la croissance », même si, comme nombre d’éditorialistes et d’observateurs avertis n’ont pas manqué de le faire remarquer, toute remise en cause d’un texte déjà signé par 25 États de l’Union après de longues et laborieuses négociations est périlleuse. D’autant qu’en la circonstance, plusieurs des revendications du leader socialiste (euro-obligations pour fi nancer de grands projets, renforcement du budget européen au profi t des fonds structurels destinés à réduire les écarts de croissance entre les pays de la zone euro) peuvent parfaitement se négocier indépendamment de l’objectif recherché par la mise en œuvre d’un pacte destiné à durcir la discipline budgétaire. L’exercice exclusif d’une souveraineté budgétaire stato-nationale – la crise a mis cette évidence en relief – est incompatible avec le pilotage d’une souveraineté monétaire commune à dix-sept États, comme la descente aux enfers de la Grèce vient encore de le rappeler. C’est pourquoi le match Sarkozy-Hollande est eff ectivement suivi de près par les partenaires de la France au sein de la zone euro, et tout particulièrement à Berlin.

Le Conseil européen du 2 mars

Dans ce contexte, le Conseil européen réuni à Bruxelles le 2 mars est enfi n parvenu à signer le pacte budgétaire déjà paraphé le 30 janvier par les États de l’Union à l’exception du Royaume-Uni et de la Tchécoslovaquie, même si la ratifi cation n’est pas acquise dans un pays comme la France qui se prononcera après les élections présidentielles et législatives ; ou dans le cas de l’Irlande, dont les caprices référendaires ont déjà réservé bien des surprises à leurs partenaires. Par ailleurs, nous devons faire face à une conjoncture particulièrement fl uctuante : dans une Europe très largement gouvernée au centre droit où, tout naturellement, l’austérité n’est pas po-pulaire, les forces qui se veulent à « gauche » ont mis l’accent sur la nécessi-té d’un retour à la croissance. Une sorte de surenchère a même inspiré, par exemple, courant février 2012, le collectif de personnalités de gauche qui a diff usé un large appel pour contrer l’austérité, sous l’égide d’Européens de conviction comme Josep Borrell (PSOE), Jo Leinen (SPD), Hannes Swoboda (SPÖ Autriche) et d’autres personnalités qui ont engagé leur au-torité gouvernementale (a plan for growth), tels les premiers ministres de




Grande-Bretagne, des Pays-Bas, d’Italie, d’Irlande, d’Espagne, de Pologne, alors même que certaines d’entre elles, en tête desquelles David Cameron, le champion incontestable des europhobes, mènent des politiques écono-miques parmi les plus restrictives. Quand on lit les textes des uns et des autres, on mesure mieux une solide évidence : la croissance ne se décrète pas. En l’occurrence, elle suppose un changement de cap économique et poli-tique à l’échelle continentale. Elle suppose la mise en œuvre d’une stratégie européenne volontariste, une cohérence communautaire et une discipline entre les pays partenaires, tous – même si c’est à des degrés divers – mal-menés par la crise. Nous en voulons pour preuve le dernier avatar survenu dans la zone euro : celui du modèle néerlandais, aux prises avec des défi cits publics qu’excluent les règles du pacte de stabilité et qui vient d’entrer, à son tour, dans une phase de tensions politiques.

Ceci, au moment où, au niveau mondial, le G20 a fait savoir aux pays européens qu’il leur faudrait, dans les meilleurs délais, procéder au ren-fl ouement de leur « pare-feu » fi nancier, en combinant le solde des dispo-nibilités du Fonds européen de stabilité fi nancière (250 milliards d’euros) et les 500 milliards prévus pour le futur Mécanisme européen de stabilité qui devrait, avec 500 milliards d’euros, entrer en fonction le 1er juillet pro-chain. Les États-Unis et les grands pays émergents, en eff et, ne se décide-raient à augmenter substantiellement les ressources du FMI – en principe de 630 milliards d’euros, pour venir en aide aux « pays fragiles », c’est-à-dire en priorité pour procéder au sauvetage de pays européens empêtrés dans la crise de la dette et de la décroissance – que si ceux-ci consentent à un tel eff ort. C’est la réponse du berger à la bergère : aide-toi, le ciel t’ai-dera ! En retour, les BRICS demandent de plus larges pouvoirs au sein du FMI et de la Banque mondiale (pratiquement sous contrôle américain). Autrement dit, là encore : donnant-donnant !

L’autre Europe

Tournons-nous maintenant vers l’autre Europe, qui n’en est pas moins notre Europe à l’orient du vieux continent. Celle surtout qui, pour des raisons historiques, s’est tour à tour incarnée dans l’Empire des Tsars et l’URSS, avant de donner le jour au Poutinistan à l’aube du xxie siècle, et qui ne se confond pas avec celle des pays balkaniques, tous en quête d’adhésion à l’Union européenne depuis le « oui » référendaire croate du 23 janvier dernier.

Le 25 décembre 1999 – voici vingt ans le soir de notre dernier Noël – le drapeau russe remplaçait celui de l’Union soviétique sur le Kremlin, à minuit très précisément. L’événement avait – et garde – une immense




portée symbolique. Nous assistions, à vrai dire, au dénouement d’un pro-cessus de dislocation dont les signes avant-coureurs étaient apparus en dé-cembre 1988 en Pologne, avec la « proclamation de l’état de guerre » par le général Jaruzelski, qui résultait de la naissance de Solidarnosc et des grèves de Gdansk huit ans plus tôt. Puis, avec la chute spectaculaire du mur séparant Berlin-Est de Berlin-Ouest les 10 et 11 novembre 1989 sous la pression d’une foule indescriptible.

• Pour en revenir à l’actualité, quelle opinion pouvait-on avoir de la Russie après les élections législatives du 4 décembre 2011, qui paraissaient avoir amorcé une nouvelle phase de l’ère Poutine-Medvedev, alors que Vla-dimir Vladimirovitch, ancien président deux fois élu comme tel en 2000 et 2004, puis premier ministre sortant, représentait sa candidature une troisième fois au Kremlin, et que son compagnon de route, Dmitri Anato-lievitch, ancien premier ministre, puis président de toutes les Russies, lui laissait sa place privilégiée pour reprendre sa fonction première. Ce tour de passe-passe a été formalisé solennellement, comme il se doit, par leur parti commun jusqu’ici largement majoritaire Russie Unie, en vue des élec-tions présidentielles annoncées pour le 4 mars 2012. Le parti poutinien représentatif de 64 % des suff rages exprimés en 2004 était même devenu légèrement minoritaire en 2011 avec 49,32 % des voix, même si, grâce au mode de scrutin, il limitait les dégâts en gardant une faible majorité à la Douma en accusant quand même la perte de 77 sièges.

Le parti communiste du « dinosaure » Guennadi Ziouganov venait en deuxième position, avec plus de 18 % des suff rages et 93 sièges, suivi des sociaux-démocrates de Russie juste (13,25 %) et des libéraux assimilés dans le cas russe aux « ultranationalistes » de Vladimir Jirinovski.

Poutine et Medvedev ont d’ailleurs été accusés d’avoir largement bé-néfi cié d’un « bourrage » frauduleux des urnes. Des cas précis ont été rap-portés dans la presse russe et internationale qui ne sont pas faits pour nous surprendre dans un pays où l’héritage soviétique demeure encore pesant. L’image politique en profondeur que Poutine, ancien colonel du KGB, a voulu donner de lui-même en soignant son look de macho au volant de sa Lada Kalina sport, jaune fl ambant neuf, ou à l’occasion de chevau-chées dans la steppe infi nie ; l’image encore d’un Vladimir Vladimirovitch assimilé à un Batman rêvant de sauver les hommes quand les diffi cultés se présentaient, a commencé à se ternir, au moment où précisément en Russie aussi, il fallait de plus en plus compter avec la diff usion généra-lisée d’Internet sur les réseaux sociaux qui ouvrent des espaces de liberté jusqu’ici inconnus. Les imposantes manifestations qui se sont déroulées à Moscou et dans plusieurs grandes villes russes pour dénoncer les fraudes




et les contrefaçons de la « démocratie russe » ont valeur de mise en garde à l’adresse du pouvoir.

• Quelle opinion peut-on avoir de Poutine au lendemain des élections présidentielles du 4 mars 2012 ? Pour les citoyens russes, visiblement, les eff ets négatifs de la corruption, du népotisme et du clientélisme ambiant sont largement entrés en ligne de compte quand ils ont dû se prononcer, mais, en défi nitive, le Tsar Vladimirovitch l’a emporté dès le premier tour de scrutin, largement devant le zombie communiste Ziouganov et le mil-liardaire de service Prokhorov, nouvel oligarque à la mode.

• Sur le plan international, l’entrée annoncée de la Russie à l’OMC est considérée comme une avancée prometteuse après 18 ans de négociations. De même que le lancement de l’équivalent d’une Silicon Valley à Skolkovo, pour stimuler les investisseurs étrangers et leurs collègues russes tributaires d’une industrie lourde et retardataire qui dépend elle-même pour plus de 80 % des revenus du gaz et du pétrole.

Que serait la Russie, en eff et, sans Gazprom et ses réseaux qui innervent littéralement le continent européen ? Première puissance gazière et second exportateur de pétrole du monde, sa croissance a atteint 4 points en 2010, alors qu’elle s’eff ondrait dans la plupart des pays de l’Union européenne. L’annonce de mise en service, le 8 novembre 2011, de Nord Stream, reliant directement à travers la Mer Baltique, Vyborg à Greifswald, en Allemagne, sur 1 224 kilomètres, permettra de couvrir 50 % de l’approvisionnement global des pays européens en provenance de la Sibérie orientale. D’énormes intérêts sont en jeu avec le consortium que préside l’ancien chancelier so-cial-démocrate, Gehrard Schröder, fi nancé à 50 % par les Russes, 30 % par l’Allemagne, suivis de GDF pour la France et par les Pays-Bas.

• Sur le plan géopolitique par contre, la Russie, même si elle a récem-ment amélioré ses rapports avec la Pologne, demeure méfi ante et facile-ment irritable dès que ses intérêts lui paraissent en cause quand il s’agit tout particulièrement de « l’étranger proche ». Son attitude dans le Caucase, notamment dans le cas géorgien, à propos de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud indépendantistes, ses rapports changeants avec l’Ukraine, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui encore avec le président pourtant pro-russe, Viktor Ianoukovytch, permettent aisément de le démontrer. La même observa-tion vaut pour la Biélorussie du bureaucrate Loukachenko. Au cœur des tensions dans les deux derniers cas : le gaz.

• Sur le plan stratégique, la Russie, qui dispose d’un droit de veto au Conseil de sécurité a fi ni par adopter le traité de désarmement nucléaire partiel START, conclu avec les États-Unis voici dix ans. Ce traité maintient en état de fonctionnement 1 550 têtes nucléaires. Par ailleurs, la Russie




conteste la volonté de l’OTAN, c’est-à-dire, en premier lieu, de Washing-ton, de mettre en place en Roumanie, Pologne, Turquie, un « bouclier » pour parer à une éventuelle menace nucléaire iranienne. À titre d’avertis-sement, Moscou a cru devoir annoncer en mars dernier l’éventualité d’un système radar d’alerte qui lui serait propre, d’une portée de 60 000 kilo-mètres, dans la sympathique enclave postsoviétique de Kaliningrad, face à la Pologne. Comment ne pas sentir dans cette attitude ombrageuse des relents de « guerre froide », d’autant que, par ailleurs, en février dernier, Poutine a annoncé un programme de 590 milliards d’euros d’investisse-ments militaires d’ici à dix ans.

• Sur le plan diplomatique, les prises de positions russes ressemblent plus à celles de Pékin qu’à celles des capitales occidentales, et se traduisent par des votes similaires au sein du Conseil de sécurité. Qu’il s’agisse de la Syrie ou de l’Iran, pour ne citer que ces exemples, cette évidence est frap-pante. D’autre part, la Russie et la Chine exercent une infl uence commune au sein du groupe des grands émergents, infl uençant indéniablement les engagements diplomatiques de l’Afrique du Sud, du Brésil et de l’Inde. La Russie joue en fait dans le monde d’aujourd’hui le rôle d’un aigle à deux têtes. L’une tournée vers l’Asie jusqu’aux confi ns de l’Extrême-Orient (Si-bérie oblige) ; l’autre vers le monde occidental et, en premier lieu, l’Europe. Nord Stream, dans cette perspective, matérialise un engagement politique : celui d’une communauté d’intérêts privilégiés avec l’Allemagne. De plus, l’Union européenne renonçant, de facto, à singer un rôle de superpuis-sance, la Russie a joué le jeu jusqu’ici de la monnaie européenne, accumu-lant plus de 40 % de ses réserves de change en euro. Elle est même pour le moment l’un des rares grands pays hors zone euro ayant fait connaître son éventuelle disponibilité à apporter sa contribution à la mise en œuvre des mécanismes de sauvetage imaginés lors des derniers grands rendez-vous européens pour sortir de l’impasse fi nancière, comme Medvedev l’a laissé entendre lors du récent sommet Russie–Union européenne en dé-cembre 2011. Le chiff re de 15 milliards d’euros a même été évoqué.

• Pour clore cet examen cursif des changements en cours dans « l’autre » Europe, il ne reste qu’à mentionner l’échec du sommet organisé à Kiev le 19 décembre 2011, dont l’objectif était de permettre la signature d’un ac-cord d’association entre l’Ukraine et l’Union européenne, en discussion depuis 2007 ainsi que le piètre état de ses rapports avec la Biélorussie.

L’actuel n° 1 ukrainien, Viktor Ianoukovytch, est revenu au pouvoir en février 2010. Le temps de présidentialiser en sa faveur la Constitution et Ioulia Timochenko, la femme « à la tresse d’or » de la révolution « oran-giste », ancienne présidente d’une Ukraine pro-occidentale, est devenue la




cible privilégiée du nouveau pouvoir qui incarne l’Ukraine russophone. Au-delà des péripéties… la belle Ioula a été condamnée, le 11 octobre 2011, à sept ans de prison pour avoir signé « indûment », en janvier 2009, un accord gazier estimé défavorable aux intérêts ukrainiens mais favorable à ceux de la Russie. Sans attendre le jugement, le tribunal l’avait d’ailleurs fait incarcérer au mois d’août, malgré un état de santé déclinant. L’Union européenne et les États-Unis sont intervenus en sa faveur, ainsi, d’ailleurs, que le président Medvedev. Rien n’y a fait. La Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme, au surplus, a fait savoir en décembre 2011, qu’elle se penche-rait sur le cas douteux qui a motivé son incarcération.

La Pologne, voisine de l’Ukraine et de la Biélorussie, a été particulière-ment déçue par le tour pris par l’échec ukrainien au moment où, précisé-ment, elle présidait l’Union européenne et voulait donner un nouvel essor au « partenariat oriental » de l’Union. En fait, nous savons aujourd’hui que tout véritable rapprochement durable avec la Biélorussie de l’ancien direc-teur de kolkhoze Alexandre Loukachenko et l’Ukraine style Ianoukovytch, passe par des changements signifi catifs au Kremlin. Sans de tels change-ments, il n’y aura pas de transformation caractéristique dans les pays de « l’autre » Europe, c’est-à-dire, en particulier, à Minsk et à Kiev. Nous en voulons pour dernière preuve le rappel fi n février des ambassadeurs de l’Union européenne en poste à Minsk, après la décision de Loukachenko d’expulser les représentants de l’Union européenne et de la Pologne.

Le nouveau « grand Moyen-Orient » au-delà du « printemps arabe »

L’expression de « grand Moyen-Orient » a été employée par les géopoli-tiques américains pour désigner la vaste zone qui court des rives africaines de l’océan Atlantique, avant d’atteindre les confi ns afghano-pakistanais dont les États-Unis ont décidé de tenter de s’extraire fi n 2014.

Cette commodité linguistique concerne concrètement, aujourd’hui, les étendues ethnico-religieuses liées à la montée politique tumultueuse de l’islamisme radical dans cette partie du monde contemporain, d’une part, jusque dans les régions septentrionales du Nigeria, du Mali, du Soudan, puis des rivages pirates de l’Océan indien, avant de désigner, le Proche-Orient, les espaces arabiques qui courent de la mer Rouge au golfe Per-sique, l’Iran, l’Afghanistan et le Pakistan.

Les ébranlements dus à l’avènement popularisé par les médias sous le nom de « printemps arabe » ont changé la donne, tout particulièrement au Maghreb, à l’exception cependant de l’Algérie où des élections normales sont prévues le 10 mai prochain. L’armée continue de facto à partager le pouvoir avec le FLN sous l’égide du président Abdelaziz Boutefl ika, en




charge depuis 1999. L’assemblée algérienne a adopté le 6 décembre der-nier une loi interdisant le retour du Front islamique du salut sur la scène politique, ainsi qu’à « toute personne responsable de la religion ayant conduit à la tragédie des années 1990-2000 » ; même si les islamistes catalogués de « modérés » du Mouvement de la société pour la paix devraient gagner en audience dans un pays où l’Islam est « religion d’État ».

• Au Maroc, la contestation islamiste qui s’est manifestée dès fé-vrier 2011 a perdu une bonne part de son agressivité. Le roi Mohammed VI, sultan du pays depuis 1999, héritier de la plus ancienne dynastie de ce temps, au surplus commandeur des croyants, a pris les devants face à l’agitation en réformant la constitution pour permettre, très légalement, de porter au pouvoir Abdelilah Benkirane, secrétaire général d’un parti de la Justice, certes islamiste, mais plus accommodant que les radicaux du Mou-vement du 20 février. De plus M. Benkirane, qui ne dispose que d’une majorité relative (107 sièges sur 393), est à la tête d’un gouvernement de coalition confronté à des diffi cultés économiques et sociales d’envergure avec près de 30 % de chômeurs.

• En Tunisie, on a fêté le 14 janvier dernier la chute de Zine el-Abidine ben Ali, symbole de la corruption des régimes arabes déchus avec l’Égyp-tien Moubarak. L’ancien patron de la Tunisie de l’après-Bourguiba (c’est lui, en eff et, qui destitua le « Combattant suprême » pour incapacité) avait été élu pour la première fois en 1989 avec plus de 99 % des voix. L’as-semblée tunisienne désignée le 29 octobre pour accoucher d’une nouvelle Constitution comprend 89 députés d’Ennahda (Renaissance) sur 217. Là encore le parti islamiste vient en tête, mais il ne dispose que d’une ma-jorité relative au sein d’un gouvernement de coalition, tout en s’assurant d’un certain nombre de portefeuilles déterminants. Le premier ministre en charge, Hammad Jebali, a passé 18 années de sa vie en prison pour des raisons politiques. C’est donc un « pur ». Les salafi stes (partisans de la foi originelle de l’Islam) ne se sont pas présentés aux élections, mais sont très présents dans les espaces publics. Ils requièrent, en particulier, le droit des femmes à porter le niqab (voile intégral) à l’université. Il semble donc bien que le statut de la femme fera l’objet d’une loi fondamentale dans la Tunisie nouvelle.

Le changement de régime tunisien à partir de décembre 2010 et au cours des premiers mois de 2011 a coûté la vie à 323 personnes, tuées par balles, gaz lacrymogènes, etc. Le pays est actuellement engagé dans une phase de transition dont l’un des enjeux majeurs concerne la valeur consti-tutionnelle éventuelle de la charia et qui devrait se terminer à l’issue des élections législatives de 2013. Deux mouvances, en attendant, se font face :




celle que, faute de mieux, on appellera « progressiste », et les islamistes, alors que la population fait face tant bien que mal à des diffi cultés sociales grandissantes.

• En Libye, après la liquidation sommaire de Kadhafi dans les circons-tances que l’on sait, l’OTAN a mis un terme à son expédition, le 31 oc-tobre dernier.

Le 29 novembre 2011, un nouveau gouvernement de « transition » a vu le jour à Tripoli, surtout pour assurer le partage du pouvoir entre les « anciens de Benghazi, Zentem et Misrata », les principaux centres de la résistance. Néanmoins, le plus grand désordre a continué à régner sur le territoire. Les organisations humanitaires, notamment Human Rights Watch et Médecins sans frontières, ont dénoncé l’étendue des sévices et des cas de tortures. Évoquer, dans ces conditions, des « procès équitables » n’est qu’une mauvaise plaisanterie. Ces agissements ont d’ailleurs été dé-noncés à la tribune des Nations unies les 25 et 26 février derniers. En attendant qu’une assemblée constituante libyenne puisse être réunie en juin prochain, les groupes armés ont continué à se disputer le contrôle de Tripoli. Rien ne sera possible dans ce pays tant qu’une armée digne de ce qualifi catif n’aura pas « absorbé » les groupes militarisés qui prétendent, aujourd’hui encore, chacun pour leur propre compte, faire régner la « loi » des clans. Au surplus, si rien n’étonne plus personne de nos jours, quand on a vu sur les écrans de télévision l’ancien ministre du colonel Kadhafi et actuel premier ministre libyen, Mustapha Abdeljalil, recevoir en grande pompe le président soudanais Omar al-Bachir, inculpé de « génocide », de « crimes contre l’humanité » et de « crimes de guerre » par le Tribunal international, on se demande si on rêve.

Sans doute, cette phase de transition chaotique n’aura qu’un temps ; mais la dispersion des armements libyens dans les étendues désertiques de l’immense Sahel, notamment aux confi ns du Mali, du Sud-Algérien et de la Mauritanie, alimente la rébellion des Touaregs (pour la libération de l’Azawad) et les activités terroristes, mais aussi mafi euses, de l’AQMI (Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique), provoquant des mouvements de popu-lation dont l’extrême pauvreté est accentuée par la généralisation de l’insé-curité. Quand, en outre, on suit ce qui se passe au Soudan où nordistes et sudistes s’entre-déchirent à propos du pétrole ; au Nigeria du Nord entre islamistes et chrétiens du cru ; en Somalie où les forces kenyanes et sud-africaines tentent de réduire la rébellion des islamistes d’Al-Chebab avec l’appui et la bénédiction de la « communauté internationale », l’organisa-tion de l’Union africaine en crise depuis l’aff aire libyenne s’avère plus que jamais évanescente.




• En Égypte, pays charnière entre le Maghreb et le Proche-Orient, fort de ses bientôt 87 millions d’habitants, la révolution arabe joue toujours son véritable destin. Et pourtant, ce qui s’y déroule aujourd’hui n’a plus guère de rapport avec le mouvement spontanéiste qui s’est développé place Tahrir il y a un peu plus d’un an, pour mettre fi n à l’autocratie et la corrup-tion incarnées par le « Moubarak système » en place depuis octobre 1981, année où le général-président fut élu par plus de 98 % des électeurs et régulièrement toujours réélu dans son fauteuil, après l’assassinat de son prédécesseur, Anouar el-Sadate, lors du défi lé de la fête nationale.

Aujourd’hui, même si les jeunes acteurs de la place Tahrir n’ont pas disparu et s’expriment avec véhémence, les principaux compétiteurs s’in-carnent dans la caste militaire, la confrérie des Frères musulmans, la nébu-leuse du Salafi sme. Les généraux qui exercent le pouvoir au sein du Conseil suprême des forces armées n’ont sacrifi é l’ex-président Hosni Moubarak, comme le remarque fi nement un ancien ministre des Aff aires étrangères d’Israël, que « pour protéger l’appareil du pouvoir en place » dont l’armée constitue le pilier central. Cette armée de 486 000 hommes, elle-même, n’existe que grâce à l’appui logistique et fi nancier (1,3 milliard de dol-lars annuellement) des États-Unis. D’où une « interminable » période de transition et de négociations pour préserver son budget et son appareil de tout contrôle parlementaire réel. C’est donc cette armée qui, malgré la reprise des manifestations violentes au cours de l’automne 2011, pro-voquant notamment l’incendie de l’Institut d’Égypte abritant 200 000 manuscrits dont certains d’une valeur inestimable, a organisé, à partir des 28 et 29 novembre dernier, des vagues successives de scrutins électoraux qui ont abouti à l’élection d’un nouveau Parlement où les partis islamistes disposent de 71 % des sièges et dans lequel les libéraux, laïques et divers sont représentés à la portion congrue, même si ce n’est pas ce qu’avaient imaginé les jeunes protestataires de la place Tahrir, au début de leur « ré-volution ».

L’Assemblée est présidée par l’ancien secrétaire général du parti de la Liberté et de la Justice, c’est-à-dire de la Société des Frères Musulmans, fondée en 1928 par Hassan al-Banna assassiné en son temps, implantée dans l’Égypte des profondeurs. Ses 235 élus devront œuvrer avec les repré-sentants de la coalition salafi ste, représentative d’un islamisme rigoriste, de la même nature que la mouvance wahhabite saoudienne. La bulle salafi ste est, évidemment, étrangère à la pratique démocratique et aux droits des femmes tels que nous les concevons. Celles-ci se comptaient d’ailleurs sur les doigts des deux mains lorsque la nouvelle Assemblée a tenu sa ses-sion inaugurale le 25 janvier 2012. Une commission d’une centaine de




membres sera chargée de la rédaction d’une nouvelle constitution. L’élec-tion présidentielle est prévue en juin après l’entrée en fonction d’une chambre haute.

En fait, comme l’écrit le New York Times, à propos du procès fait à des ONG d’origine américaine par les autorités du Caire, l’Égypte navigue encore en « eaux troubles », tant il est vrai que la paix civile, dans un pays prompt à toutes les réactions épidermiques – le suivi de l’actualité permet de le constater – dépend du bon vouloir et de la capacité de compromis de la confrérie des frères musulmans et de l’État-major de l’armée. C’est appa-remment, de nos jours, le prix à payer pour marier les genres (apparences démocratiques, réalité islamique) sur les bords du Nil. Mais qu’en pense le président Obama, en campagne électorale ; Israël, autre grand protégé de la politique américaine sur l’Orient ; et l’Union européenne aff ublée des instruments diplomatiques que l’on sait ?

• Tout autre est le cas de la Syrie, majoritairement sunnite, mais pour partie peuplée de communautés : alaouite (apparentées chiites), chré-tiennes (grecs orthodoxes, jacobites, nestoriens, arméniens grégoriens, ca-tholiques, chaldéens, maronites, etc.) et, enfi n, de Druzes et de Kurdes. Cette mosaïque est dominée par le parti Baas (laïque) fondé en 1947 par Michel Afl ak, considéré à l’époque en Europe et aux États-Unis comme « progressiste », avant de tomber sous la férule du clan Hassad (alaouite) en 1971, avec Hafez d’abord, puis Bachar, secrétaire général du parti Baas à la mort de ce dernier, élu président syrien par plus de 97 % des suff rages ex-primés en juillet 2001. C’est une première caractéristique du « cas » syrien. La seconde tient à la dureté de cette région riche en liquidations physiques incessantes. On ne compte plus le nombre de coups d’État et d’assassinats politiques qui ont marqué la vie du pays depuis l’indépendance en 1946. Troisième caractéristique : la liaison privilégiée avec les Soviétiques entre-tenue par Hafez el-Assad, confortée par un traité d’amitié et de coopéra-tion par Bachar, qui met aujourd’hui à la disposition des Russes la base navale méditerranéenne de Tartous, au cœur de la Méditerranée orientale. La Syrie s’est d’ailleurs longtemps présentée comme une « démocratie po-pulaire » socialiste et laïque. Poutine ne fait donc aujourd’hui qu’assumer l’héritage soviétique quand, par deux fois, le Kremlin soutenu par Pékin s’est opposé à tout vote du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU contre le régime de Damas. Pourtant, contrairement à ce qui s’est passé au mois d’octobre 2011, le Conseil de Sécurité devait se prononcer sur un projet de résolu-tion pour appuyer la Ligue arabe appelant à un transfert de pouvoir de l’apparenté chiite Bachar el-Assad au profi t de son vice-président sunnite et à la formation « pacifi que » d’un gouvernement de « transition », puis à la




tenue d’élections, comme il se doit « transparentes » et « démocratiques ». Certes, le 16 février dernier, l’assemblée générale de l’ONU a bien voté à la majorité de 137 pays sur 193 l’arrêt immédiat des violences, exprimant son plein soutien au plan de paix de la Ligue arabe, mais les résolutions votées par l’assemblée de l’ONU n’ont aucune force contraignante. Ce qui n’est pas le cas au niveau du Conseil de sécurité, quand l’un de ses membres permanents n’exerce pas un droit de veto.

On pourrait s’étonner du rôle que tente de jouer la Ligue arabe, appa-remment unanime dans cette aff aire, même si les canardages sanglants de la rébellion syrienne révulsent, puisqu’ils auraient causé la mort de plus de 9 000 personnes, notamment dans les principaux bastions de la rébellion sunnite et tout particulièrement dans la grande ville de Homs qui compte près d’un million et demi d’habitants. En fait, la Ligue arabe, actuellement présidée par le richissime Qatar, est composée quasi exclusivement par des gouvernements sunnites, et l’Arabie saoudite y exerce une infl uence pré-pondérante, fondamentalement hostile à l’hérésie chiite qui s’incarne au premier chef dans l’État iranien, de l’autre côté du golfe Persique. Pour Ryad, Bachar el-Assad est un pion dans le grand jeu chiite au Moyen-Orient. Le Hamas en est un autre au Liban ; de même que la population majoritairement chiite potentiellement dangereuse de Bahreïn. Ce qui a amené les Saoudiens à intervenir militairement en février-mars de l’an der-nier, pour préserver les intérêts de la dynastie sunnite aux commandes. Cette « guerre des religions » de la mouvance islamique revêt aujourd’hui, incontestablement, une ampleur nouvelle. Ainsi, Ayman al-Zawahiri, suc-cesseur de Ben Laden à la tête d’Al-Qaida, a lancé en février dernier un appel au djihad contre le régime proto-chiite de Damas, à peu près dans le même temps où des attentats contre le bâtiment de la sécurité politique faisaient à Alep 28 morts et 175 blessés. L’Union européenne a lancé douze trains de sanctions contre le régime de Bachar, et la Ligue arabe lui a em-boîté le pas, accélérant les pénuries d’un système désormais bien décidé à vendre chèrement sa peau.

• Dans l’Irak voisin d’où les dernières troupes américaines ont fi ni par s’extraire, le 18 décembre 2011, les violences entre chiites et sunnites n’ont pas pour autant diminué. Sur fond de violences confessionnelles, le pre-mier ministre chiite Nouri al-Maliki (pro-Bachar) tente d’imposer son au-torité, mais, par vagues successives, des attentats encore souvent attribués à Al-Qaida continuent à frapper le pays, tuant, par exemple, le 23 février, 39 personnes et en blessant 250 autres, à Bagdad comme dans le nord du pays.




Plus au sud, fait passé à peu près totalement inaperçu, alors que l’oppo-sition dominée par les islamistes a remporté 34 des 50 sièges du parlement au Koweït le 2 février, le Yémen, après une longue période d’aff rontements intenses et de rebondissements dignes d’un fi lm sur le Far West, est enfi n parvenu à élire le successeur du président Ali Abdallah Saleh au pouvoir depuis trente-trois ans. Le vice-président sortant Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, l’heureux élu du moment, devra composer avec le gouvernement de « transition » (là encore !) mis en place pour réunir partisans de l’ancien président et forces de l’opposition en vue de promouvoir un « nouveau Yé-men », même si Al-Qaida au Yémen continue sporadiquement de gagner du terrain dans le sud de ce pays très pauvre, malgré les frappes des drones lancés à partir des navires américains qui patrouillent en mer d’Oman. Pour sa part, heureusement, la Haute représentante de l’Union européenne pour les Aff aires étrangères et la sécurité, Catherine Ashton, a salué comme il se doit du haut de son perchoir bruxellois, « le dialogue national, la récon-ciliation et le processus de réformes constitutionnelles qui doivent maintenant ouvrir la voie à un État véritablement inclusif, démocratique et civil ». C’est une manière comme une autre de faire entendre la petite fl ûte de l’Union européenne dans le concert discordant d’un univers oriental qui ne par-vient pas vraiment à sortir de l’ébullition.

• Pour compléter le tableau régional, il convient d’avoir bien présent à l’esprit le cas posé par la nucléarisation de l’Iran, dictature théocratique depuis l’instauration de la « République islamique » sous la tutelle d’un « guide suprême » (l’hodjatoleslam Ali Khamenei). Signataire du traité de non-prolifération nucléaire, l’Iran est, on le sait, de plus en plus soupçonné de vouloir se doter de l’arme atomique, alors qu’il prétend mener un pro-gramme nucléaire à des fi ns civiles. Depuis des années, Téhéran joue au jeu du chat et de la souris avec les inspecteurs de l’AIEA (Agence interna-tionale de l’énergie atomique). Tout ceci est connu et archiconnu, mais les années passant, on fi nit par s’y accoutumer, même si les années passant, précisément, les indices du développement d’un programme nucléaire dans un but militaire fi nissent par s’accumuler au nord du golfe Persique. En novembre dernier, l’AIEA a publié un nouveau rapport alertant, alors que de nouvelles sanctions internationales renouvelées ont accru depuis 2006, dans le cadre de l’ONU, la pression sur un pays déjà confronté à des problèmes économiques et sociaux déjà très lourds. Le 23 janvier 2012, l’Union européenne s’est décidée, après les États-Unis, à annoncer un embargo pétrolier progressif sur le pétrole iranien. L’embargo devrait être appliqué à 100 % à partir du 1er juillet prochain, sauf si, d’ici là, les négociations reprenaient sur des bases crédibles et si le gel des avoirs de




la banque centrale iranienne pouvait être réenvisagé. Pour leur part, les responsables israéliens continuent crescendo à évoquer un possible scénario militaire dont ils assumeraient éventuellement la responsabilité en propre, alors que les États-Unis s’enfoncent dans la campagne électorale pour les élections présidentielles.

Dans les cercles militaires américains, on estime que l’Iran ne devrait guère mettre plus d’un an pour produire suffi samment d’uranium et per-mettre ainsi à sa première bombe A de voir le jour, si Téhéran décidait – ce dont il se défend toujours – de se doter de l’arme nucléaire. Dans ce jeu de tensions rémanentes, les forces américaines stationnées dans la zone du golfe Persique, du Koweït au sultanat d’Oman, en passant par le Qatar où se trouve le QG US pour le Moyen-Orient et l’Asie centrale, demeurent aux premières loges, au cas où le détroit d’Ormuz, qui permet au quart des pétroliers du monde de passer vers l’océan Indien, deviendrait une zone d’aff rontements confl ictuels.

La grande absente, stratégiquement et politiquement, demeure, cette fois encore, l’Union européenne.



Lectures



Lectures

François Saint-Ouen. l’Avenir fédéraliste de l’Europe II – Du traité de Maastricht à celui de Lisbonne, sur les traces de Dusan Sidjanski, Préface et postface de Dusan Sidjanski, Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2011, 336 p.

Cet ouvrage est le troisième d’une collection du Centre européen de la culture fondé par Denis de Rougemont en 1950, dont les auteurs sont, d’une part, Dusan Sidjanski, conseiller spécial du pré-sident de la Commission européenne, professeur émérite de la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales ainsi que de l’Institut européen de l’Uni-versité de Genève et, d’autre part, François Saint-Ouen, chargé de cours à l’Institut européen de la même université. Parallèlement, Dusan Sidjanski est président d’honneur du Centre européen de la culture et François Saint-Ouen, le secrétaire gé-néral de la Fondation Denis de Rougemont pour l’Europe.

J’avais, en son temps, particulièrement apprécié la contribution magistrale de notre ami Dusan, à propos de L’Avenir fédéraliste de l’Europe, publié en 1992 ; de même qu’il m’avait été donné d’appréhender avec un vif intérêt le Dictionnaire international du fédéralisme que François Saint-Ouen a fait paraître deux années plus tard et à la réalisation duquel il me fut demandé de m’associer. Pour bien comprendre la nature du livre qui nous est proposé aujourd’hui, Sur les traces de Dusan Sidjanski, il faut, comme le fait le préfacier, per-mettre aux lecteurs de bien situer les auteurs dont, effectivement, les « parcours européens » se sont, « souvent croisés et parfois superposés », notam-

ment sur le plan universitaire, tous deux « parta-geant les idées de Denis de Rougemont, non sans quelques réticences au sujet de la perception de l’État, origine selon lui de tous les maux ».

Dusan Sidjanski n’en est que plus à l’aise pour qualifi er de « travail remarquable », la contribu-tion de son ancien étudiant qui, à la lumière du fédéralisme, dépeint bien « les fl uctuations et la fragilité du processus de l’Union » et qui « s’il ne nous apporte une réponse tranchée, nous aide néanmoins, en nous faisant réfl échir sur les grandes étapes de l’intégration européenne, à interpréter et à pressentir les courants profonds qui alimentent la dialectique de l’UE. ». Effectivement, François Saint-Ouen nous livre à cet égard une analyse per-tinente de 281 pages, consacrant un premier cha-pitre aux « deux visages du fédéralisme» (l’école « personnaliste » dite « globale » ou « intégrale » et l’école « institutionnelle ») ; un deuxième, à « l’actualité du fédéralisme » avec, en particulier, une réfl exion argumentée sur les conclusions qu’il convient, selon lui, de tirer de la « dislocation » yougoslave ; un troisième et quatrième chapitres voués à l’examen de « l’après-Maastricht, des traités d’Amsterdam et de Nice », puis aux élargis-sements de douze à vingt-sept (depuis l’adhésion croate, on peut même parler des « vingt-huit ») ; un cinquième qui permet de revenir utilement sur


Lectures472


le cas de feu le projet de traité constitutionnel et de ses « déboires » en France et aux Pays-Bas, mais aussi sur le traité qui lui servit de substitut (Lisbonne). Les chapitres suivants, comme l’auteur nous en prévient, sont tournés « davantage vers la prospective », le VIe permettant effectivement d’initier le lecteur aux méandres du parcours euro-péen qui, partant de Delors, aboutit à Barroso, en passant par Santer et Prodi, tandis que le chapitre qui suit examine avec une grande bienveillance le rôle de « clé de voûte » du Haut représentant de l’Union, en charge de sa politique étrangère et de sécurité, en posant la bonne question : « une politique étrangère pour quelles raisons et pour quoi faire ? ». Successivement, le chapitre VIII se présente comme un véritable dossier consacré aux « nouveaux élargissements » et à l’épineuse ques-tion des frontières, tandis que les dernières contri-butions se concentrent sur le débat, plus que jamais rémanent du « noyau fédérateur » et de la portée des « coopérations renforcées » ; puis ce que l’au-teur appelle « les points noirs d’un nouveau pacte européen » avec, entre autres, des remarques ju-dicieuses sur la nécessité de « réduire l’anomalie du fédéralisme à l’envers », déjà décelée dans les années 1960 par John Pinder, avant de nous livrer un certain nombre de conclusions en éventail à propos du traité de Lisbonne, de la « pédagogie des catastrophes », chère à Denis de Rougemont ; de la nécessaire formation des Européens ; de l’intérêt d’établir un vrai partenariat avec la Russie.

Il ne restait plus, dès lors, à Dusan Sidjanski, qu’à reprendre la plume pour nous faire part de ses propres réfl exions sur « le traité de Lisbonne face à la tentation intergouvernementale » ; « l’Union européenne dans la tourmente fi nan-cière » ; « l’Union européenne en mouvement » à partir d’une « monnaie unique » perçue comme « l’aboutissement logique du marché unique », mais qui constitue, dans le contexte où les événe-ments se sont déroulés, « un saut dans un quasi vide politique, en l’absence d’un système politique européen ». Pour autant, la conclusion de l’ou-vrage reste optimiste. Elle « se refl ète dans l’esprit et la méthode fédéralistes qui, de surcroît coïnci-dent avec l’explosion de réseaux sociaux et l’émer-gence des pouvoirs horizontaux […]. L’Union eu-ropéenne s’engage de crises en crises, par touches successives, dans la voie d’un nouveau fédéralisme participatif ».

Ceci dit, certains des « éclairages » livrés par François Saint-Ouen méritent, me semble-t-il,

une attention particulière et je voudrais donc les évoquer sommairement. L’opinion selon laquelle le fédéralisme a deux visages : l’un, institutionnel […], l’autre personnaliste et globalisant ne méri-terait-elle pas d’être nuancée ? Il existe, en effet, de nombreux textes théoriques où les écoles de pensée se conjuguent et fi nissent même par se marier, notamment à propos des fi nalités et des structures de la construction européenne. Un tra-vail méthodique permettrait, sans aucun doute, de conforter le point de vue que nous venons d’es-quisser. A contrario, l’accent mis sur le fédéralisme économique, par exemple, n’est pas le même dans l’œuvre d’Alexandre Marc et celle de Denis de Rou-gemont. Ces contrastes théoriques sont également sensibles dans le camp des « constitutionnalistes » (pour faire bref) quand on compare certains textes d’Altiero Spinelli et de Mario Albertini ou encore d’autres membres de « l’école de Pavie ». Atten-tif au développement des strates successives de la pensée fédéraliste en Europe depuis la rencontre fondatrice d’Hertenstein (1946) et plus encore du Congrès de l’Europe de La Haye (1948), auquel il m’a été donné de participer, j’en arrive à me de-mander s’il ne serait pas plus exact de parler de « fédéralismes », au pluriel. On peut, en tout cas, avec le recul du temps, se poser la question. Je saisis seulement l’occasion qui m’est donnée pour faire part de cette réfl exion, même si la perception que l’on peut, par ailleurs, avoir des expériences fédéralistes contemporaines qui nous sont les plus proches (États-Unis d’Amérique, Allemagne fé-dérale, Confédération helvétique) nous conduit à formuler des conclusions réconfortantes. La brève, mais éclairante étude comparative à laquelle François Saint-Ouen s’est livré sur ce point per-met, en effet, de penser qu’au-delà des réfl exions théoriques, les expériences fédéralistes concrètes présentent indubitablement « avec des variantes, un exemple de caractéristiques communes et des aménagements selon des principes communs et en fonction des réalités hétérogènes ».

Le regard que porte François Saint-Ouen sur l’état de la construction européenne est également propice à de nouvelles réfl exions, qu’il s’agisse de l’euro, de « l’indispensable noyau fédérateur » et de la Commission, de l’objectif constitutionnel, des coopérations renforcées, de la « formation » des Européens, etc..

À propos de l’Euro, il est rappelé à juste titre qu’il allie la puissance du symbole à la force om-niprésente de la réalité de tous les jours. Avec


Lectures 473


nombre d’auteurs, il en retrace le parcours his-torique, insistant à juste titre sur le rôle majeur joué par la Banque centrale européenne. Qu’on le veuille ou non, la zone euro a constitué un « noyau pionnier », ne serait-ce que par sa capacité d’en-traînement. Elle incarne incontestablement « le cas inédit de partage de la souveraineté moné-taire avant la création de l’Union politique ». C’est précisément, à nos yeux du moins, ce qui en fait la fragilité, comme la crise fi nancière vient d’en ap-porter la preuve. Compétence exclusive de l’Union, la politique monétaire a souffert d’un manque évi-dent de complémentarité en matière économique, fi scale et budgétaire. Elle est, au premier chef, victime aujourd’hui de l’endettement souverain en Europe

« L’indispensable noyau fédérateur » est un objectif fort pour François Saint-Ouen qui insiste, notamment, sur le « noyau formé par la Commis-sion et le Parlement », ainsi que sur le rôle-clé joué, dans le contexte présent, par son Président consi-déré comme « leader identifi able devant l’opinion publique ». Dans le même esprit, l’auteur met en garde contre les effets d’une « Commission plétho-rique à vingt-cinq, puis à vint-sept commissaires ». Cette réforme, en effet, a conduit encore plus que par le passé, à voir dans chaque commissaire, sinon à faire de chaque commissaire, le « représentant » de son État dans le Collège commun.. Le traité de Lisbonne, il est vrai, devrait permettre d’inverser cette tendance puisqu’il prévoit de ramener à par-tir de novembre 2014, le nombre des membres de la Commission aux deux tiers du nombre des États membres, mais avec une réserve de taille puisque le Conseil européen peut en décider autrement. Un système de rotation devrait servir de substitut, laissant présager l’explosion de marchandages stato-nationaux. Or, l’exécutif communautaire, tel que le voulait Jean Monnet, n’est pas là pour re-présenter les États, mais l’intérêt commun. Cette règle fondamentale de la dynamique communau-taire doit être rappelée, comme l’a fait F.S-O., pour éviter une confusion des genres préjudiciable à la construction européenne elle-même.

Plus discutable, à mon sens, est l’appréciation portée sur la présidence permanente du Conseil européen et surtout sur le profi l du « Haut repré-sentant de la PESC ». Ces personnages, du seul fait des rôles qui leur ont été assignés, renforcent le poids de l’intergouvernementalisme dans ce qu’Alexandre Marc aurait aimé appeler « l’archi-tectonique » de Lisbonne. Au Parlement européen,

par ailleurs, les services mis à la disposition de Lady Ashton sont le plus souvent considérés comme aussi dispendieux qu’ineffi caces, au vu des résul-tats obtenus.

Après le cuisant échec du projet conventionnel et sans doute pour un moment encore, l’objectif constitutionnel, apparaît, pour tout dire et à moins d’un « coup de Trafalgar », assez irréel. François Saint-Ouen, dans un ouvrage de référence sur la problématique communautaire des vingt dernières années ne pouvait, pour autant, ne pas l’évoquer. Il l’a fait d’ailleurs de manière interrogative, en rappelant que le projet adopté sous la houlette de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing se proposait d’instaurer « une constitution qui n’en était pas une ». D’une part, elle se fondait sur un traité. D’autre part, elle se présentait sous la forme d’un enchaînement ju-ridique de 448 articles donnant « l’impression de tout vouloir cadenasser alors qu’un texte d’am-bition constitutionnelle se borne aux principes fondamentaux et laisse aux politiques, dont c’est éminemment le rôle, le soin de conduire l’action publique dans ce cadre, au gré de leur inclination et forts de leur légitimité démocratique ». C’est tout à fait exact et nous avons connu en France, en tant que fédéralistes, tout l’inconfort de la situa-tion. Avec la sanction référendaire à la clé, la plu-part d’entre nous ont défendu ce qu’ils estimaient être le moindre mal en appelant à voter, faute de mieux, pour un texte que certains qualifi aient de « monstre juridique », dans une atmosphère po-litiquement confusionniste hantée par le cas de fi gure imaginaire, en l’occurrence, du « plombier polonais ».

Cet échec n’est donc pas prêt d’être oublié, même si je garde (avec beaucoup d’autres obser-vateurs de la politique européenne) la conviction qu’un vote constitutionnel sanctionnera tôt ou tard l’entreprise européenne née de la deuxième guerre mondiale, et même si cet acte ne peut relever que de la volonté de quelques peuples, agissant comme une avant-garde. En attendant, les faiseurs d’Eu-rope tentent d’orienter les esprits vers des projets répondant, au-delà du domaine institutionnel stricto sensu, à des attentes réelles. Je dirai : pour-quoi pas ? Sous la forme d’un nouvel « Acte unique européen », tel que Philippe Herzog (cité par l’auteur) s’en est fait le champion dans la revue « Confrontations d’Europe », en 2007, à propos, entre autres, des transports et de l’énergie, pour-quoi pas encore ? Jacques Delors tente d’ailleurs, ces temps-ci de donner consistance au projet d’une


Lectures474


Communauté européenne de l’énergie, alors que le « chacun pour soi » dans ce domaine majeur, mais complexe, imprègne le comportement des États.

Parmi les autres chantiers que François Saint-Ouen nous propose d’arpenter, il y a aussi celui des « coopérations renforcées ». Et, sans aucun doute, il n’est pas inutile de rappeler cette opportunité qui a le mérite d’exister dans les textes, depuis le traité d’Amsterdam de 1997, avec les procédures de dé-clenchement assouplies par le traité de Nice, puis réactualisées par celui de Lisbonne. Si, en effet, on laisse de côté les régimes spécifi ques applicables à la politique étrangère, la sécurité, la défense (do-maine exclusif des États souverains où le Conseil décide à l’unanimité) et si on garde à l’esprit que les coopérations renforcées ne peuvent concerner les matières relevant de la compétence exclusive de l’Union européenne (politique monétaire, par exemple), dès lors que neuf États membres en se-raient, par hypothèse, d’accord et le feraient savoir à la Commission pour avis, le Conseil sur proposi-tion de celle-ci et après approbation du Parlement européen est en mesure d’autoriser à la majorité qualifi ée la mise en œuvre des procédures prévues pour ce type de coopération.

Pour quelles raisons, dès lors, il ne s’est jamais trouvé encore un nombre d’États suffi sant pour utiliser cette facilité juridique, afi n d’aller au-delà de ce que l’Union globalement considérée serait en mesure de promouvoir ? Précisément en cherchant à emprunter la voie des coopérations renforcées, un « noyau » d’États européens pourrait effecti-vement ouvrir des perspectives nouvelles dans des domaines aussi variés que la politique sociale, la cohésion économique et territoriale, l’environne-ment, les transports, l’énergie, etc.. « L’Europe » serait-elle, à ce point, dépourvue d’imagination et de volontarisme politique, accaparée comme elle se trouve l’être, par les priorités du moment ? Ou bien, convient-il d’attendre sagement de donner encore un peu plus de temps au temps, en laissant les États de l’Union, donner libre cours à leur pen-chant naturel pour la coopération intergouverne-mentale, comme c’est le cas pour la France et l’Al-lemagne ? Voire la France et la Grande-Bretagne sur le plan de la défense en nous référant, par exemple, à l’illusoire rendez-vous de Saint-Malo ?

Enfi n, il nous faut dire notre pleine communauté de vue avec les auteurs quand ils soulignent le trait en matière de culture, d’éducation, de formation, et même, ajouterai-je, d’information bien com-prise, pour qu’enfi n puisse se manifester l’émer-

gence d’une conscience européenne.Comme le Centre européen de la Culture, le

Centre international de formation européenne1 s’est engagé dans cette perspective, « sur les traces » précisément de leurs fondateurs respec-tifs (les « anticonformistes » des années 1930). Qu’il s’agisse du « Dialogue des cultures », de l’approche interdisciplinaire consubstantiellement liée à l’attitude et la méthode fédéralistes, ou, plus modestement, des rudiments d’une éducation eu-ropéenne qui englobe les objectifs d’Erasmus, tout en ayant l’ambition d’aller au-delà, nous restons (et François Saint-Ouen le perçoit également) en-core loin du compte. Ainsi, bien installés dans leur bulle, nos interlocuteurs communautaires peuvent donner parfois le sentiment de ne pas toujours prendre pleinement la mesure du décalage qui sépare les « décideurs » très largement bruxellois et les « acteurs » de terrain. Malgré sa vocation démocratique et des contraintes réglementaires constamment rappelées, la construction de l’Union européenne est trop souvent perçue comme un phénomène lointain, abscons, voire contingent qui n’intéresse vraiment que les gouvernements et les « experts », même si cette classifi cation sommaire est abusive quand on pense au rôle joué, entre autres, par les europarlementaires, les membres du Comité économique et social européen, ceux du Comité des régions, etc. Quant à la classe po-litique, il lui est le plus souvent reproché de ne s’en occuper vraiment qu’à l’approche des élections européennes… Ainsi s’expliquent sans doute, au moins en partie, les abstentions croissantes qui ont jalonné leurs dernières échéances électorales. Sans parler de l’éloignement des personnalités qui com-posent la Commission par rapport à l’opinion pu-blique, du moins dans les « grands » pays, comme tend cruellement à le rappeler un récent sondage du Financial Times…

Il nous reste à remercier, pour conclure, Dusan Sidjanski et François Saint-Ouen d’avoir stimulé, à partir de leur commune contribution à « L’Avenir fédéraliste de l’Europe II » (de Maastricht à Lis-bonne), notre intérêt et nos propres réfl exions qui débordent – j’en conviens – le cadre généralement imparti à un compte-rendu de lecture.

Jean-Pierre Gouzy

1. Le CIFE, je le rappelle au passage, a été créé à Paris et non à Nice, en 1954, avec un statut international déposé à Genève. Il s’est progressivement installé à Nice à partir de 1965, où la pre-mière session de son Institut européen des hautes études interna-tionales s’est tenue du début avril à la mi-juin de la même année.


Lectures 475


Michel Mouskhely, Gaston Stefani. Confédération et fédération : l’antithèse, Textes choisis par Jean-Francis Billion et Jean-Luc Prevel, Gardonne : Éditions Fédérop, Coll. Textes fédéralistes, 2012, pp. 168, 16 €, ISBN 978-2-85792-205-6

Juriste éminent, Michel Mouskhely a successi-vement publié en 1949 « L’Europe face au fédéra-lisme » (avec Gaston Stefani) ; « Confédération ou fédération européenne » en 1953, avec un Avant-propos d’Henry Frenay ; « Structures fédérales » en 1964, avec une note liminaire d’Alexandre Marc. Ce dernier texte reprenant l’essentiel d’une confé-rence magistrale maintes fois présentée dans le cadre des activités du CIFE a d’ailleurs été vulgari-sé dans notre revue. La réédition de ces documents épars (ou plus exactement de l’essentiel d’entre eux) demeure d’une étrange actualité, surtout quand ils sont reproduits sous l’intitulé lapidaire mais signifi catif : « Confédération et Fédération : l’antithèse ».

En France, depuis les temps qui suivirent la deuxième guerre mondiale, les partisans d’une « confédération » se sont prévalus de cette ter-minologie pour brouiller les pistes et s’opposer, en réalité à toute tentative de donner vie à des institutions européennes qui disposent de leurs or-ganes propres d’exécution, et qui, dans les limites d’un pacte fondateur, puissent concerner direc-tement les citoyens dans des domaines sensibles mais limités. Ainsi, le général de Gaulle, cham-pion historique de « l’Europe des États » (souve-rains) se gaussait de la méthode Monnet (CECA = « méli-mélo de charbon et d’acier ») et martelait à l’attention d’Adenauer, lors de leurs entretiens : « Staatenbund, ya ; Bundestaat, nein ! ».

C’est pourquoi, disons-le sans barguigner, les exposés de Michel Mouskhely n’ont pas pris une ride si on excepte, à mon sens, le jugement discu-table qu’il émet à l’égard du concept de « commu-nauté supranationale » ou quand il glisse dans le même fourre-tout juridique des « confédérations modernes » : ONU, OTAN et Communautés euro-péennes. C’est pourquoi, également, il ne nous dé-plaît pas, d’analyser ce qu’il écrivait à la fi n des an-nées 1940 et au début des années 1960, en tenant compte des réalités de la construction européenne telle qu’elle s’observe aujourd’hui.

À l’époque de MM., le peu d’« Europe » qui émergeait de la deuxième guerre mondiale tentait de s’organiser sur la base de traités (par nature d’essence confédérale : « l’engagement ne saurait survivre à la situation qui l’a engendré »). De nos jours, « l’Europe du traité de Lisbonne » repose,

certes, sur l’accumulation des traités antérieurs, mais ne rassemble pas que des États. Elle com-prend des États et des peuples, du fait, notamment de l’existence d’un Parlement européen élu au suf-frage universel et disposant, conjointement avec les États membres, des fonctions législative et bud-gétaire. « Lisbonne » pérennise également la « ci-toyenneté européenne » reconnue à Maastricht et permet à la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union de devenir juridiquement contraignante. Par contre, il n’existe toujours pas de nationalité européenne ; l’Union ne se situe pas dans un cadre constitutionnel ; l’exigence de l’unanimité demeure pour la révision du Traité dans les domaines-clés ; les États peuvent expressément se retirer librement de l’Union. Ce qui correspond dans les divers cas de fi gure évoqués, aux défi nitions que MM. donne de tout pacte confédéral. Raisons pour lesquelles il souffre de fragilité congénitale et ne saurait créer un lien, indissoluble avec ses membres.

L’examen auquel se livre ensuite MM. à propos des compétences, est d’une clarté rare. Dans toute association internationale, rappelle-t-il en subs-tance, les États ont une compétence de principe et ne reconnaissent donc à l’association qu’une compétence d’attribution. A contrario, dans une fédération, « l’État fédéral comme les États fédé-rés détiennent d’abord des compétences exclusives qu’ils exercent en toute indépendance. D’autres compétences appartiennent concurremment aux deux »

Concernant la réalité de la répartition des pou-voirs attribués à l’État fédéral, MM. cite « la dé-fense, la politique étrangère, la monnaie, les im-pôts, le budget, le commerce, la banque ». Dans le cas du traité de Lisbonne, les seules compétences exclusives de l’Union aujourd’hui reconnues, sont l’Union douanière, la concurrence, la politique commerciale commune, l’Union monétaire (pour les États dont la monnaie est l’Euro) et curieuse-ment la conservation des ressources biologiques de la mer. Les politiques économiques demeurent de la compétence des États membres, étant entendu qu’elles doivent être « coordonnées » mais, on l’a vu avec la crise, cette coordination au sein de la soi-disant union économique et monétaire créée à Maastricht, relève encore de la mythologie. Entre l’énumération pédagogique de MM. et la situation


Lectures476


Luuk van Middelaar. Le passage à l’Europe, Histoire d’un commencement, Édition Gallimard, Collection Bibliothèque des Idées, 2012, 470 pages, 27,90 €

concrète de 2011, il y a donc, encore, à l’évidence, un gouffre.

De plus, et surtout, la clé du système européen tel qu’il fonctionne aujourd’hui demeure toujours du ressort des États qui disposent de la « compé-tence de la compétence » dans tous les domaines régaliens, à l’exception du monétaire, dangereu-sement isolé malgré l’existence d’une banque cen-trale, dans le contexte d’États-nations souverains.

Ceci dit, la démonstration de MM. est riche d’autres observations fondamentales auxquelles j’invite le lecteur à se reporter : primauté du droit fédéral, régime constitutionnel basé sur les prin-cipes démocratiques et le choix de régimes poli-tiques (présidentiel, conventionnel ou collégial, parlementaire) ; importance majeure du pouvoir judiciaire (fédéralisme = suprématie du droit) ;

technique du fédéralisme ; défi nition des principes fondamentaux d’un « ordre » fédéral : subsidiarité, autonomie, participation ; quête d’une démocratie fédérale interétatique, mais aussi, intra-étatique, etc.

Une mine, somme toute, pour alimenter les réfl exions et connaissances des uns et des autres, mais aussi les débats, de la part d’un personnage attachant qui fut, en son temps, un compagnon de route d’Alexandre Marc, d’Henri Frenay, d’Altiero Spinelli au sein de la mouvance fédéraliste, mais aussi, plus encore, un remarquable éveilleur de la conscience européenne se référant aussi bien, dans une même démarche, à Proudhon qu’à Georges Scelle ou aux pères de la Convention de Philadel-phie.

Jean-Pierre Gouzy

Europe : La symbiose du politique et de l’institutionnel

Publié en 2009, au Pays-Bas, ce nouveau livre sur l’Europe est une adaptation « grand public » de la thèse de doctorat de Luuk van Middelaar, jeune historien et journaliste néerlandais, qui a mené ses recherches à l’Université d’Amsterdam et à l’École des Hautes études en sciences sociales à Paris. Pour analyser les relations entre États eu-ropéens, l’auteur propose un paradigme en trois « globes » (p. 38) : La « sphère externe », en-semble des États souverains du continent, qui ont si souvent fait appel à la guerre pour régler leurs confl its extérieurs ; la « sphère interne », à savoir l’Europe des institutions et des traités ; la « sphère intermédiaire », axée sur le Conseil européen des chefs d’État et de Gouvernement qui assument vis-à-vis du monde extérieur une responsabilité allant au-delà des seuls traités. La thèse de l’auteur est que « Cette sphère intermédiaire s’est révélée être la source principale de la politique euro-péenne et son premier relais. » (p. 47).

I. démonstration, par l’auteur, de sa thèse.Fort de cette conviction, l’auteur raconte alors,

avec brio (le journaliste) et érudition (l’historien)1, cette genèse de l’Union européenne dans un en-

1. Luuk van Middelaar se réfère à des historiens, philosophes et politologues, du XVIIe siècle à nos jours, tant européens qu’amé-ricains, et il s’appuie aussi sur des documents et entretiens privés fort éclairants.

vironnement jalonné de crises et de surprises im-prévisibles, avec des luttes internes pour le pouvoir, discrètes ou spectaculaires, et l’émergence pro-gressive et irrésistible du Conseil européen comme pilote de l’ensemble. Résumons les principales étapes de cette épopée.

En novembre 1956, la crise du canal de Suez, montre la fragilité de l’Europe. Face au revers subi, et au retrait forcé des troupes françaises et britan-niques, la France se mobilisera pour débloquer les négociations en cours sur le projet de Communau-té économique européenne en initiant le premier Sommet des Chefs de gouvernement, ancêtre du Conseil européen.

En juillet 1965, la crise spectaculaire de la « chaise vide », ouverte par le général de Gaulle, rappellera que l’État nation est toujours là. Le compromis de Luxembourg (1966) actera qu’on ne pourra pas passer au vote à la majorité, sans re-cherche complémentaire de compromis, lorsque la proposition menace des « intérêts très im-portants » d’un État. L’auteur rappelle (p. 136) que, 40 ans après, ce compromis se retrouve dans le traité sur l’Union européenne (Lisbonne, 2007) : « Si un membre du Conseil déclare que, pour des raisons de politiques nationales vitales et qu’il expose […] le Conseil, statuant à la ma-jorité qualifi ée, peut demander que le Conseil européen soit saisi de la question en vue d’une décision à l’unanimité ».

En décembre 1974, le Conseil européen sera


Lectures 477


créé, à l’initiative du Président Giscard d’Estaing, comme une instance de rencontres régulières entre dirigeants européens soucieux de prévenir ou ré-gler les crises internes, comme celle de 1965, et de déterminer les priorités de l’Europe communau-taire.

En juin 1985, le « putsch de Milan », initié par le Président du Conseil Bettino Craxi, entraînera, pour la première fois de son histoire, le Conseil eu-ropéen à trancher un désaccord par le recours au vote. Le Conseil européen sortait ainsi de sa chry-salide et devenait un authentique organe politique. La question débattue était celle de l’opportunité de convoquer une Conférence intergouvernementale pour modifi er le traité de Rome afi n de pouvoir mettre en place le Marché unique avant la fi n de 1992 par un recours accru au vote à la majorité. Face à l’opposition de Margaret Thatcher et à l’at-tentisme de François Mitterrand, Bettino Craxi im-posera un vote qui mettra en minorité la Dame de fer et ouvrira la voix à une révision du Traité (L’Acte unique) qui entrera en vigueur le 1er juillet 1987.

La chute inattendue du Mur de Berlin, le 9 novembre 1989, sera suivie d’une « partie de poker » entre la France et l’Allemagne : le Chan-celier Kohl obtiendra l’unifi cation allemande, le Président Mitterrand aura son Union monétaire, avec la fi n de la domination du mark, et une Union européenne minimaliste (traité sur l’Union euro-péenne, Maastricht 1992), alors que le chancelier d’Allemagne était disposé à aller plus loin, ce que souhaitait le Président de la Commission euro-péenne, Jacques Delors.

Enfi n, l’attentat surprise du 11 septembre 2001, et les guerres américaines contre le terro-risme qui s’en suivirent, montreront aux États de l’Union européenne la nécessité de coordonner leurs actions en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité commune. Le traité sur l’Union euro-péenne sera révisé (Lisbonne 2007) et le Conseil européen se verra reconnaître le statut d’insti-tution européenne dotée d’un président stable et d’un rôle d’amiral en chef : « Le Conseil euro-péen donne à l’Union les impulsions néces-saires à son développement et en défi nit les orientations et les priorités politiques géné-rales. Il n’exerce pas de fonction législative. ».

Dans la dernière partie de l’ouvrage, l’au-teur analyse les actions de ses trois sphères pour conquérir le public européen, sur la base d’une nouvelle trilogie : « la stratégie allemande ou l’art de fabriquer une nation » (politique cultu-

relle ; drapeau et hymne européens ; choix du nom des programmes européens) ; « la stratégie ro-maine ou l’art de s’attacher des clients » (à travers les politiques de l’Europe communautaire : libre circulation et autres droits individuels ; libertés d’établissement ; politiques sociales et régionales) ; « la stratégie grecque », ou la conquête de la légitimité démocratique (élection du Parlement européen depuis juin 1979 ; double citoyenneté – nationale et de l’Union – depuis le traité de 1992 ; implication possible des parlements nationaux dans le processus décisionnel avec le traité révisé de 2007). L’auteur conclut que la double citoyenneté a ses implications institutionnelles : Le Parlement européen parle au nom des citoyens en leur qualité d’Européens tandis que le Conseil européen parle au nom des citoyens en tant que ressortissants des États : Belge, Français, Luxembourgeois, etc. Tou-tefois, dans son pays, chaque membre du Conseil européen est désormais devenu LE représentant de l’Europe (p. 433 & 444). C.Q.F.D. : Le Conseil européen est bien : « la source principale de la politique européenne et son premier relais ».

Enfi n, le lecteur lira avec intérêt l’avant-propos rédigé pour la version française de janvier 2012. L’auteur y complète son texte de 2009 par quelques réfl exions sur la crise de l’euro. Il y rappelle aussi que depuis le « non » retentissant au référendum néerlandais de 2005, « les hommes politiques néerlandais » perçoivent l’Europe comme « une puissance occupante2. » Or, à l’époque de sa thèse l’auteur militait au Parti Populaire Libéral et Démocrate (VVD)3 où il était « conseiller du pré-sident du groupe libéral au Parlement néer-landais » (p. 15). De surcroît, depuis le « non » au référendum, le gouvernement néerlandais ne parle plus « d’intégration européenne » mais de simple « coopération européenne » (p. 27). Luuk van Middelaar a-t-il réussi, dans la version grand public de sa thèse, à se détacher de cet environne-ment politique et culturel ?

II. CommentairesSur la forme, le lecteur appréciera le style

2. On notera à cet égard que les partis libéraux en Belgique (y compris l’Open VLD en Flandre), au Luxembourg et en France n’ont pas ce sentiment (même si les Français ont également voté non au référendum de 2005).

3. Selon Wikipédia, l’encyclopédie en ligne sur internet, le VVD soutient l’entreprise privée, est opposé à la bureaucratie, et est avocat d’une administration légère. Après 1971, ce parti est de-venu plus populiste et plus sceptique sur l’État providence, qu’il souhaite réformer, et est partisan d’une réduction de la charge fi scale.


Lectures478


alerte et l’humour sympathique de l’auteur (le journaliste) lorsqu’il défend sa thèse sur la préé-minence du Conseil européen. En revanche, il sera surpris par la terminologie utilisée pour parler de la « sphère interne ». Dans certains cas, il s’agit de problèmes de traduction : Ainsi, « militant » (de la cause européenne) aurait dû être utilisé au lieu d’« activiste » (p. 413) qui a une connotation né-gative. De même, interrogé par nos soins, l’auteur nous a signalé que le terme « contre-pouvoir » avait été mal traduit en « pouvoir de nuisance » du Parlement européen (p. 429). En revanche, la traduction n’est pas en cause dans nombre d’ex-pressions polémiques qui fl eurissent tout au long du livre :

Alors que la « sphère intermédiaire » est glo-rifi ée, la « sphère interne » (Commission et Par-lement européens notamment) est dénigrée par le journaliste et militant. Ainsi est-elle présentée comme « une usine à mots » (p. 66). La Com-mission européenne devient « chien de garde » (p. 91) au lieu de gardienne des traités. L’ancien commissaire européen français, Robert Marjolin, est « vice-président de la bureaucratie euro-péenne bruxelloise » (p. 26). Quant au Parle-ment européen, « […] à chaque modifi cation du traité, le Parlement n’a cessé de ramasser des miettes de compétences grâce aux pressions des gouvernements amis et au renforcement de ses pouvoirs de nuisance » (« contre-pou-voirs » selon l’auteur) (p 429).

Pire, les termes « bureaux » et « bureaucra-tie » (voire « ronds de cuir ») sont utilisés en lieu et place d’«institutions » et ce, du début du livre p. 22 (« L’Europe des Bureaux ») à la fi n p. 458 (« La fuite hors de l’histoire dans la bureau-cratie voulue par Monnet et consorts en 1950 […] »), avec bien d’autres outrances comme p. 24 où cette Europe (pourtant promue par un politique visionnaire comme Robert Schuman) « se passe très bien de tout objectif fi nal visionnaire, si ce n’est celui du maintien en place de la bureau-cratie ».

À l’évidence, ce n’est pas le chercheur, partisan d’une Europe politique sous la houlette du Conseil européen, qui s’exprime ainsi mais le jeune militant sensible, à l’époque de ses recherches, aux sirènes du souverainisme et du populisme qui s’activaient aux Pays-Bas au moment du « non » au référen-dum de 2005.

Sur le fond, plusieurs observations peuvent être formulées.

1. Paradigme des trois sphères, « bureaucra-tie » de la sphère interne, et Conseil européen. Le paradigme des trois sphères est élégant mais confus : Elles sont d’abord « concentriques » (p. 38) puis elles se « chevauchent » (p. 63) puisque le Conseil des Ministres sectoriels appar-tient aux deux sphères, « intermédiaire » et « in-terne ». Cette « sphère interne » regroupe donc toutes les institutions, mais son chef est… le prési-dent de la Commission (p. 152) ! En réalité, l’auteur cible son attention d’une part sur les acteurs clés de la sphère « interne », les institutions pré-fé-dérales garantes de l’unité européenne (Com-mission, Cour de justice et Parlement européens) et, d’autre part, sur l’acteur central de la sphère « intermédiaire », le Conseil européen, garant à la fois de l’unité européenne et de la diver-sité nationale. À l’évidence, ces acteurs sont sou-mis au même traité : Le Conseil européen oriente, la Commission européenne propose, le Conseil et le Parlement européen décident. Le langage sur la « bureaucratie » de la « sphère interne » et l’ex-cès de zèle juridique de la Commission (p 44-45) est donc factice d’autant plus que le garde-fou de la subsidiarité (on ne légifère qu’au niveau approprié) a été introduit il y a déjà vingt ans dans le traité sur l’Union européenne.

2. Politiques internes de l’Europe commu-nautaire. Elles ne sont évoquées que marginale-ment et avec une légèreté caustique par le journa-liste et militant politique. Par exemple :

Dans le chapitre VII sur la « Stratégie alle-mande ou l’art de fabriquer une nation », l’auteur énonce que « Les États-nations ne supportent pas la concurrence dans la bataille pour leur Panthéon » (p. 359) … et il évoque les « tentatives d’europanthéonisation » (sic) de la sphère interne pour dénommer ses grands programmes. Ainsi, l’appellation Erasmus serait une « appropriation » (sic) réussie, tandis que celle de Leonardo da Vinci (pour désigner le pro-gramme de soutien à la mobilité dans la formation professionnelle) serait un échec (?). Le « joli nom de Galiléo […] satellite de positionnement (en réalité une constellation de 27 satellites qui devrait être opérationnelle au milieu de la décennie) […] semble avoir plus de chance […] ». Au fait, ces programmes sont adoptés par le Conseil et le Par-lement européen sur proposition de la Commission européenne sans qu’ait jamais été émis le moindre sentiment d’usurpation du patrimoine national.

Dans le chapitre VIII « La stratégie romaine


Lectures 479


ou l’art de s’attacher les clients » l’auteur évoque une proposition faite par un universitaire américain pour instaurer une allocation euro-péenne aux citoyens ayant un faible revenu … en supprimant les fonds structurels. Idée saugrenue qui, à l’évidence, ne peut être soutenue … mais l’auteur ajoutera de façon polémique « en dehors peut-être de certains cercles socialistes fran-çais et belge » (p. 399). Plus sérieusement, l’au-teur évoque les droits dont bénéfi cient aujourd’hui les Européens pour avancer sa seconde thèse : « L’élargissement des droits est une stratégie qui sape plus la légitimité de l’Union qu’elle ne la renforce. Le public bénéfi ciaire est à peine reconnaissant. Voyager sans devoir s’arrêter aux frontières, s’installer librement dans la campagne française, étudier à Barcelone, faire opérer sa mère dans un pays voisin : le public privilégié qui a profi té de ces libertés et droits l’a fait avec une indifférence polie ». (p. 397). Sur quelle base se fonde l’auteur pour avancer cette thèse ? Dispose-t-il d’études d’évaluation ou de sondage ? Justement, à propos de sondage, l’auteur présente les Eurobaromètres (p. 412-413) comme un outil lancé par la Commission euro-péenne pour se procurer « un formidable ins-trument pour parler au nom des Européens » Thèses et conclusions tout de même un peu trop caricaturales…

3. Fonctionnalisme, Commission et Conseil européens. Pour l’auteur, l’Union européenne est avant tout un fait politique. Il ne croit pas en la thèse du fonctionnalisme : les institutions conçues comme antidote à la guerre et comme moteur de l’intégration européenne. Pour lui, c’est le Conseil européen qui est et a été « la source principale de la politique européenne et son premier relais ». Malheureusement, l’auteur transforme sa thèse en dogme et il en oublie le rôle clé de la « sphère interne ». Autrement dit, pour l’auteur, la Commission européenne ne serait pas un organe d’impulsion politique et de proposition ; Jacques Delors ne serait pas l’un des pères du Marché unique ; Raymond Barre ne serait pas l’un des pères de l’Union monétaire.

Rappelons, tout d’abord, que « les écono-mistes, et politologues » proches des institutions ne sont pas « les pères du fonctionnalisme » (p. 28)… déjà prôné, il y a un siècle, par le Président américain Woodrow Wilson. Robert Schuman, fi n politique s’il en est, en fut aussi un adepte convain-cu. Le visionnaire n’a-t-il pas eu raison ? L’Europe

communautaire ne nous a-t-elle pas garanti la paix et le passage d’une Union du charbon et de l’acier à une Union monétaire, grâce à une dynamique « institutionnelle » et « politique » féconde ?

En réalité, comme tout système vivant, le sys-tème européen est complexe et ambivalent et les oppositions tranchées entre « Fédération » et « États nations », entre « Sphère interne » et « Sphère intermédiaire » ou entre « L’institu-tionnel » et « Le politique » ne correspondent pas à la réalité et à la dynamique de l’Europe contem-poraine. Ainsi, le Marché unique appela naturelle-ment le passage à un Marché intégré des capitaux, préalable « institutionnel » essentiel4 au grand bon « politique » vers l’Union monétaire… grâce au choc historique inattendu de la chute du mur de Berlin… et à une préparation de trente années par « l’institutionnel » (Le premier plan Barre date de 1969 !). Cette barrière franchie, la progression reprend et l’Union budgétaire et le marché obli-gataire européen ne seront-ils pas les prochaines étapes de l’intégration européenne sur le long chemin, cahoteux et imprévisible, de l’Union poli-tique ?

De surcroît, les acteurs de ces deux « sphères » ne vivent pas dans des mondes étrangers puisque le président de la Commission est membre du Conseil européen. Ainsi, Luuk van Middelaar aurait-il pu rappeler que la brillante idée du passage au vote ayant mis Mme Thatcher en minorité à Milan en 1985, avait été suggérée au « politique », Bettino Craxi, par l’« institutionnel » à savoir Lorenzo Natali, Vice Président de la Commission, et Fran-çois Lamoureux, conseiller de Jacques Delors (Mé-moires, Plon 2003, p. 215). Rappelons aussi que les commissaires européens peuvent devenir Premier Ministre, comme l’économiste Raymond Barre qui laissera la France avec un excédent budgétaire de 0,5 % du PIB en 1980. (Depuis, la France vit dans le défi cit). Plus près de nous, c’est l’économiste et an-cien commissaire européen italien, Mario Monti, qui sera nommé Premier ministre et membre du Conseil européen.

Enfi n, une lecture de l’histoire autre que celle de Luuk van Middelaar s’impose. En effet, tous les grands bonds en avant sur la route de l’Union

4. L’intégration monétaire suppose aussi l’émergence d’un Mar-ché du travail européen débarrassé des entraves à la mobilité et des Mécanisme de solidarité fi nancière, conditions déjà signalées dès 1969 par Robert Mundell, prix Nobel d’économie, que Ray-mond Barre avait associé aux travaux préparatoires sur l’Union économique et monétaire.


Lectures480


politique se sont fait grâce à la symbiose entre « l’institutionnel » (les Monnet, Rey, Barre, Delors…) et le « politique » (les Schuman, Ade-nauer, Spaak, Brandt, Kohl, Mitterrand, Juncker…) en réponse à des chocs historiques comme la guerre 1939-1945 et celle de Corée en 1950, la crise de Suez en 1956, l’ébranlement du système moné-taire international des années 1960-1970 et la chute du mur de Berlin en 1989.

4. Remarque fi nale. Qui a été l’initiateur du concept de Conseil européen ? C’est Jean Monnet qui était bien conscient que, pour progresser, l’Eu-rope devait s’appuyer à la fois sur « le politique » (les Chefs d’État et de Gouvernements) et sur « l’institutionnel » (les institutions pré-fédérales : Commission, Parlement et Cour de Justice). Il avait donc pré-vendu cette idée au Président français, au Chancelier Allemand et au Premier Ministre Britannique avant que celle-ci ne puisse naître of-fi ciellement, au Sommet de décembre 1974, avec la déclaration du Président Giscard d’Estaing : « Le Sommet est mort, vive le Conseil européen ». (Mémoires, Fayard 1976, p. 589-605). Précision supplémentaire : Monnet était même plus au-dacieux puisqu’il avait proposé la dénomination « Gouvernement européen provisoire ». Sur ce point au moins, Luuk Van Middelaar (2009) n’est-il pas d’accord, en quelque sorte et quelque qua-rante ans après, avec Jean Monnet ?

Souhaitons au journaliste et historien Luuk van Middelaar un large succès pour sa brillante genèse de l’Union européenne et du Conseil européen. À ce titre « Le Passage à l’Europe » mérite de fi gu-

rer dans la bibliothèque de tous ceux qui œuvrent à l’émergence d’une Union politique5. Regrettons, toutefois, la vision populiste du jeune militant po-litique et sa lecture partisane de l’histoire où « le politique » est glorifi é et où « l’institutionnel » fait l’objet de dénigrements intempestifs qui ne font que desservir l’historien. Et l’histoire qui s’anime sous sa plume… Espérons donc que paraîtra bien-tôt une version en livre de poche, débarrassée de ces scories, et complétée par un bilan sans com-plaisance de la gestion de la crise de l’euro par les « politiques » du Conseil européen, par les « institutionnels » de l’économie et des fi nances (Commission et Parlement européens, Conseil des ministres de l’économie et des fi nances) et par « l’institutionnel » de la monnaie unique, la Banque centrale européenne.

Michel Richonnier6

5. Outre les « Mémoires » de Jean Monnet (Fayard, 1976) et celles de Jacques Delors (Plon, 2003), on pourra aussi se référer à Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, « Histoire de la construction euro-péenne de 1945 à nos jours », Éditions Complexe, 2004 et 2008 pour l’édition de poche ou à Jean Pierre Gouzy, « Histoire de l’Europe (1949-2009) », Éditions de Paris, 2009.

6. Économiste et ingénieur. Auteur des « Métamorphoses de l’Europe de 1769 à 2001 », (Flammarion, Espas Calpe, Publicaçoes Dom Quixote, 1985). Co-auteur, pour le Commissariat Général du Plan, du rapport « Quelle stratégie européenne pour la France dans les années quatre-vingt ? », La Documentation française, 1983.L’auteur a pu observer l’évolution de la construction européenne de différents points de vue depuis 1969 : des États-Unis (Université de Californie et Harvard), du Commissariat au Plan en France, et de la Commission européenne comme membre de cabinets ou directeur de programmes (éducation et recherche).


New Developments in Spanish Federalism

Documents

Transcript of New Developments in Spanish Federalism