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Journal of Area Studies Nurnber 7 Auturnn 1995

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors

50 Years On: Contrastive Perspectives of 1945 J eremy Leaman

Tbe Silences of Memory, Memories of Silen ce Pierre Laborie

European Memories ofWorld War Two Charles Burdett Claire Gorrara & Helmut Peitsch

The Significance of 1945 Fred Halliday

The Soviet Union, Russia and 1945: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Mark Webber

A Contest without Victors: Political Action in the Age of the Geo-Economy Elmar Altvater

5

9

16

28

40

42

57

The United Nations as History Adam McConkey 68

No More Sonderweg : Germany's Return to the 'Normality' of the Nation State Stefan Berger 86

Redefining German Identity: Ulla Spittler & 100 Ca se Studies in Berlin Gerd Knischewski

Theory and Practice of Area Studies

Comparativism in Interdisciplinary Studies fnes Brulard 114

Book Reviews 131

Books Received 150

Cumulative Index 1992-1995 153

No More Sonderweg: Germany's Return to the 'Normality' of the Nation

State

Stefan Berger

On 9 November 1989, the day the Berlin wall fell, Willy Brandt, the erstwhile Social Democratic chancellor, and darling of the Left in Germany, stated: ' What belongs together can now once again grow together' 1. The metaphor most often used in connection with German reunification in 1990 was the train metaphor. The train had left the station and whoever would dare to stand in its way would just be run over by its sheer power and speed. It was the organicist rhetoric of ' naturalness', 'normality' and inevitability which dominated public discourse in Germany in 1990. The crude marginalisation of reunification sceptics like Günther Grass and the vitriolic attacks on hirn serve as an indicator of how widely accepted the new national feeling was in Germany. And yet, only two years earlier, representatives of the Left in the FRG had seriously debated accepting at long last GDR citizenship, thereby de facto recognizing that a second German state had emerged after 1945. On the right, almost everyone agreed on the need for pragmatic policies vis-a-vis the GDR which included the strengthening of official relations on all levels

2.

Increasingly, both left- and right-wing commentators in the 1980s had stressed that the national question was not on the agenda. For much of the fifty years of the FRG's existence, the national question had been in the forefront of public political debates. Just when it was about to take a se at in the back row, irony of history, it came back with a vengeance and surprised almost everyone. The surprise effect, I will argue in this paper, had wide­reaching consequences for the politics of national identity in Germany. After briefly reviewing the discourse of national identity in Germany before 1989, I would like to put forward the thesis that something like a new nationalliberal consensus has been emerging in Germany after 1990 which centres around the alleged 'normality ' of the nation state. Taking a bird's eye view, the framework , in which the nation is discussed, has shifted from post­nationalism and constitutional patriotism back to the nation. However, within this broad framework of consensus, there are also significant differences both between broadly left-wing and broadly right-wing ideas of the nation and within both ideological camps. On the left, for example, many Social Democrats have gone furthest in endorsing the new national rhetoric. However, amongst the PDS, the Greens and sections of the SPD, there remains a good deal of scepticism in regard to the right-wing euphoria for the nation. Hence, it would be wrong to give the impression that there is no left-

1 Cited in Konrad J arausch rhe Rush to German U nity, Oxford 1994, p.11 2 See paradmigmatically, only half a year before the collapse of the SED-regime in the East, the call for a continued normalization in the inner-Germ an relations by the then minister of inner-German affairs, Dorothee Wilms, 'Die deutsche Frage - Freiheit und Einheit als Aufgabe', in: Von Weimar nach Bonn. Freiheit und Einheit als Aufgabe: Berliner Kongr~ß 1989, Cologne 1989, p.13

86

1

Germany's Return to the 'Normality' of the Nation State 87

right divide in questions of national identity. In fact, in so me respects the current debates can be seen as a continuation of the vitriolic controversies in the mid 1980s (Historikerstreit). Even amongst the neo-nationalists, the question of how this new 'normality' should look like has been highly contentious. Without being able to do fulI justice to the multi-faceted discussions amongs the Left and the Right in Germany, I shall discuss the pros and cons of some of themost prevalent arguments on ' normalisation' in the final part of this paper.

Binationalism, Postnationalism and Constitutional Patriotism: National Identity in the Old Federal Republic bejore 1989

After the 'German catastrophe,3, most German politicians on the democratic left and right (from CSU on the right to SPD on the left) were intent on saving the 'good' national traditions from the rubble left behind by the allegedly anti­national National Socialism. Oroviding Germans with national identity was regarded as an important means of uplifting the spirits of the defeated people and thus contributing to the rebuilding of the country. For various reasons, which shall not be discussed here, nationalism became more a property of the Left than of the Right - a clear role reversal to the situation before 1933. The SPD which had included commitment to the building of a united Europe in its party programme as early as 1925 (Heidelberg Programme), under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher after 1945 committed itself to a rabid nationalist rhetoric against which Konrad Adenauer's Europeanism sounded pleasantly civilised4 . However, both major political parties formulated their policies with the national interest of Germany firmlyon their mind. The importance of national traditions and national identity was not seriously questioned until the 1960s, when the silence on the National Socialist period finally ended5. Nazism, and especially the holocaust wer now linked directly to the creation of the first German nation state by Bismarck in 1870n 1. The concept of a German special path into modemity (Sonderweg) was developed to explain the victory of the most radical variant of fascism in this country. Germany, it was argued, faced all three crises of modernity at roughly the same time: industrialisation, parliamentarisation and nation-building. Whereas in Britain and France, these processes developed one after the other and often over centuries, in Germany the problems all surmounted in the second half of the nineteenth century, fatefull burdening the first German nation with an insurmountable task6 . Against the background of these ideas, which I can

3 Friedrich Meinecke Die deli/sehe Katastrophe, Wiesbaden 1946 4 Günther Nenning, 'Nationale Sozialdemokratie. Kurt Schumacher als Klabautermann auf dem Tanker SPD', in: Die Zeit, 9.March 1990 5 Bernd Faulenbach, 'Emanzipation von der deutschen Tradition? Geschichtsbewußtsein in den sechziger Jahren', in: Werner Weidenfeld (ed.) Politische Kultur lind deutsche Frage. Materialien ZIIm Staats- und Nationalbewußtsein in der Bundesrepublik, Co1ogne 1989,73-92 6 For the colourful history of the theory of the German Sonderweg compare Helga Grebing Der 'deutsche Sonderweg' in EI/rape 1806-1945. Eine Kritik, Stuttgart 1986

88 Journal 0/ Area Studies 7: 1995

only refer to inpassing here, the resurrection of the German nation was now beginning to be perceived as undesirable. Karl Jaspers, Golo Mann, Sebastian Haffner and a whole string of German intellectuals began to argue that in German history unity had rat her been the exception than the norm and that the division of the country should best be accepted as a direct consequence of

Auschwitz7. Unnecessary to say, these ideas were at first vigorously contested from the political right and the politicalleft. Timothy Garton Ash ' s magisterial account of Ostpolitik has recently reminded uso to what extent Ostpolitik was, at least in its initial stages, linked to the national interest8. Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt frequently stressed that their motif was not abandonment of the idea of a united Germany but a more realistic path towards a united Germany9The old policy of no contacts and international isolation had not only failed by the mid-1960s , it had also led to a serious alienation of the people in the two Germanies from one another. Hence, the new Ostpolitik intended to build bridges between East and West in the hope that increased contacts would bring an increased feeling of togetherness and ultimately a sense of national identity. It was only in the process of the normalization of relations between East and West in the 1970s and 1980s that 'he other German state was de facto increasingly recognized. The Welldt: of 1982 from the SPD-FDP governments of the 1970s to the CDU-FDP governments of the 1980s was, against some expectations at the time, no great change here. The GDR was increasingly regarded as another state. State visits of Helmut Schmidt to Erich Honecker in 1981 and of Erich Honecker to Helmut Kohl in 1987 resembled official state visits to or from other foreign states 10. By 1988 Willy Brandt could speak of reunification as the great sham belief (Lebenslüge) of the Federal Republic , and the voices calling for an officialaa recognition of GDR citizenship grew louder and louder. The decision of the conservative Kohl in 1982 to finance the building of a new museum, dedicated to the h.istory of the Federal Republic showed the extent to which even conservative politicians in the FRG

7 Karl Jaspers. 'Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung' (1960), in: idem Hoffnung und Sorge , Schriften zur deutschen Politik 1945-1965, Munich 1965; Golo Mann, 'Hat Deutschland eine Zukunft?', Die Zeit , 7.Sept. 1962; Sebastian Haffner, 'Die Deutschen und ihre Nation', Politik und Kultur, vol. 10, 1983,60-7 8 Timothy Garton Ash In Europe' s Name. Germany and the Divided Continent, London 1993 9 Jürgen Leinemann, 'Ein grübelnder Patriot. Willy Brandt und die Deutschen', Der Spiegel 42/1992 10 Whether the Ostpolitik of the conservative governments after 1982 was qualitatively different from that ot its social democratic predecessors has been a bone of contention amaongs political scientists in the 1990s. Whereas Jens Hacker ('Die Ostpolitik der konservativ-liberalen Bundesregierung seit dem Regierungsantritt 1982', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 8.Apri11994, 16-26) has argued far difference, the arguments far continuity, put forward by Heinrich Potthoff Die 'Koalition der Vernunft'· Deutschlandpolitik in den 80er Jahren, Munich 1995, ultimately carry the greater weight.

Germany's Return to the 'Normality' of the Nation State 89

had come to accept the FRG as their country 11. In the spring of 1988 the principal governing body of the CDU openly discussed dropping its national goals in an attempt to shift the party to the political centre l2. The politics of identity had shifted from the Bismarckian creation of the nation to the society of the Federal Republic. The contemporary historian Karl Dietrich Bracher prominently called on West Germans to embrace the 'post-nationalism' which had emerged in West Germany as a result of the post war division of the country13. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas revived Dolf Sternberger' s concept of 'constitutional patriotism' and held it up as the only legitimate national identity of Germans after Auschwitz l4. There was much speculation about bi-nationalism - the idea that in effect two separate nations had developed in the FRG and the GDR 15. The identity of West Germans, it was argued, was not with Germany but with the FRG whereas the identity ofEast­Germans was with the GDR. Interestingly, both the concept of post-nationalism and the idea of constitutional patriotism were developed by rather conservative intellectuals (Bracher and Sternberger) trying to fence off challenges from the politicalleft. Sternberger's constitutional patriotism, first formulated in the 1960s, aimed also at the student protest movement and their calls for a very different constitution to the one wh ich governed the FRG. Bracher's post-nationalism was also a reply to the nationalism of the peace movement which had rediscovered the 'national question ' in their desperate fight to prevent the stationing of new NATO missiles in Westy Germany in the early 1980s16. However, by the late 1980s, the mainstream of CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP could unite behind those concepts of post-nationalism and constitutional patriotism. In fact, the Left, which had led the debates on national identity in the 1960s and 1970s, it was much easier and less divisive to endorse these two principles than for the political right, where a significant minority of cold warriors clung to older notions of national identity17. Yet on the whole,

11 Geschichtswerkstatt Berlin (ed.) Die Nation als Ausstellungsstück, Ber!in 1987

12 CDU working paper entitled 'Unsere Verantwortung in der Welt: Christlich­demokratische Perspektiven zur Außen-, Sicherheits-, Europa- und Deutschlandpolitik' , Bonn 1988, especially section fouf.

13 Kar! Dietrich Bracher, 'Das Modewort Identität und die deutsche Frage', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9.August 1986

14 Jiirgen Habermas, 'Histarical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: The Federal Republic's Orientation to the West', in: idem The New Conservatism. Culturat Criticism and the Historian' s Debate, London 1989

15 C.f., for example, Lutz Niethammer and Ulrich Borsdorf 'Traditionen und Perspektiven der Nationalstaatlichkeit', in: A/{ßenjJolitische PerspekJiv en des westdeutschen Staates, vol.2: Das Vordringen neuer Kräfte, Munich 1972 16 Herbert Ammon & Peter Brandt, 'Patriotismus von links', in: Wolfgang Venohr (ed.) Die delltsche Einheit kommt bestimmt, Bergisch-Gladbach 1982, 118-159 17 Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Patriotismus', Die politische Meinung, no.232 1987,40-45; Erich Kosthorst, 'Die Frage der deutschen Einheit im Spannaungsfeld politischer Optionen und historischer Traditionen', in: Karl-Ernst Jeismann (ed.), Einheit - Freiheit

90 Journal of Area Studies 7: 1995

Jasper's definition (first formulated in the late 1950s!) 01' the German problem as in essence a problem of freedom for seventeen million East Germans was very widely accepted on the political left and right of the Federal Republic. The strength of this conviction was visible in the hesitant reaction of the West Gerrnan political elites to the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989. With the exception of die-hard nationalists, few dared to speak of prospects of reunification. A majority warned not to do anything which might destabilize Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. The FRG was to support the democratic opposition in the GDR and ensure a change of government at best, but any talk of reunification was carefully avoided 18. Even Helmut Kohl in his address to the nation on 8 November 1989 cautioned hopes for reunification by stressing that the FRG would do nothing which would endanger its membership of NATO and the EU 19. Things changed rapidly with the fall of the wall on 9 November, the Ten-Point-Plan of Helmut Kohl and the increasing demands from East German streets ' We are one people'. It was now that conservative politicians like Alfred Dregger vigorously mapped out

the road to unification20.

'O//icial Nationalism ' and the emergence 0/ a new national liberal consensus in Germany after 1990

The whipped-up 'official nationalism ' (Benedict Anderson) of the Kohl government paid its dividends in the December 1990 general elections. The sceptics of the rapid reunification process were duly punished: the Greens sank below 5% and were only represented in parliament by the allied East German Alliance 90. The SPD under its distinctly post-national candidate, Lafontaine, brought in its worst ever result since 1957 (1990: 33.5%; 1957: 3l.8%). In the new Länder it only polled 24.3%. This last point is especially relevant, as Kohl won the 1990 elections in the East. where his promise of 'blossoming landscapes' in a arapidly reunified country produced a particularly richt harvest. Four years later, in 1994, with dissatisfaction in the East ever rising about the lies of 1990, Kohl won the elections again, but this time in the West due to the economic indicators taking a turn for the better in spring 1994, but due also to a whole range of campaign blunders by his lacklustre opponent Rudolf Scharping21 . The national question and different attitudes to it played no major role in 1994. The opposition had learnt its lesson and it had come round to endorsing the 'nonnality' of the nation state.

- Selbstbestimmung . Die Deutsche Fra.ge im historisch-politischen Bewußtsein. Bonn 1987, 19-42 18 One example amaongst many was Theo Sommer, 'Kleine Schritte oder große Luftsprünge', Die Zeit, 29.Sept. 1989 19 Kohl's address is reprinted in Konrad H. Jarausch & Volker Gransow (eds.) Uniting Germany. DocumenJs and Debates 1944-1993. pp.74-7 20 Alfred Dregger, 'Der Weg zur Wiedervereinigung', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 .11.1989 21 lan King, 'Road Lo Power or Cul-de-Sac? The SPD and the 1994 Election', in: Deballe, vo!.3. p.56f

Germany's Return to the 'Normality ' of the Nation State 91

Three developments in particular indicate the emergence of a new national liberal consensus in the Federal Republic between 1990 and 1994. First of a11 the argument is now very widely endorsed on both the Right and the Left that the strengthening of positive national identity is necessary in the reunified Germany to replace an allegedly predominant economic identity. According to this view, the citizens of the Federal Republic have developed into individualists used to living in the splendours and richness provided by the strength of the economy. If the economy should go into crisis, it is argued, then the whole state is likely to suffer, as there is no sense of a stable identity beyond the one provided by the economic miracle and the welfare state. With gloomy predictions about a possible permanent de-industrialisation of East Germany still readily available22 ., this argument is not likely to go away soon. Secondly, national identity is held to be absolutely necessary to overcome the much talked about wall in the heads of Germans. The ill feelings between East Germans and their Western cousins (between Ossis and Wessis) allegedly continues to demonstrate the need for 'official nationalism ' to keep the country together. In keeping with this spirity, Gustav Seibt of the leading conservative daily newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, has already called on Germany's politicians to deliver more blood, sweat and tears speeches which would appeal to the emotions of Germans and bring them to sacrifice their individual ianterests for the good of the nation23 . Sometimes one can afind that both sceptics as weil as advocates of the reunification process harmoniously stress the need for a 'common national identity,24. Such assumptions generally ignore the volatility and inherent instability of all constructions of national identity. The fact that identities in any larger group tend to be fragmented and heterogeneous means that they need to be rcconstructed permancntly. Any erfort to homogenize national identity would lead to a dangerous atlack on the pluralism underpinning parliamentary democracies. And finally, the national liberal consensus has come to rest on the whol­hearted condemnation of the post-nationalism and constitutional patriotism which had such a wide currency in the 1980s. Both are now increasingly presented as bloodless, without the necessary emotional power to bring people to identify with thcm, as mere constructions of intellectuals who lost touch with the basic realities of Iife. The old Federal Republic, in wh ich these ideas could flourish, is now increasingly presented as a provincial special path (another kind of Sonderweg) which has come to an end with reunification in

22 Klaus von Dohnanyi. 'Die Lage ist dramatisch'. Der Spiegel, 17.7.1995.75-79 23 Guslav Seibl. 'Ein Drama ohne Helden', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 June 1990. 24 c.f. for example for the advocales Hans-Joach im Vcen & Carsten Zelle, 'National ldentity and Poli tical Priorities in Eastern and Western Germany', in: German Politics, vo!.4, 1995. pp. 1-26 with the more pessimistic assessment of Lilly Weisbrod, 'Nationalism in Reunified Germany', in: German Politics, vo1.3, 1994, pp. 222-32.

92 Journal ofArea Studies 7: 1995

199025. The alleged anti-anticommunism and anti-nationalism of a large part of its (mainly left-wing) intellectuals and politicians are now castigated as illusory. They allegedly had catastrophic effects, as they are held responsible for the eradication of positive national identi ty26. Against the allegedly predominant tradition of 'negative nationalism' in the old FRG, the search for a new positive national identity in the reunified country has begun. It has been most visible in the prominent debates on key national symbols and institutions since 1990: the debates on the national anthem (which is played at the end of the daily programmes of the public TV stations since 1990), on the day of national remembrance (3 October or 9 November), on the capital (Berlin or Bonn), on the rebuilding of the palace, the renaming of streets and the design for the new national memorial in Berlin, on the two new lavishly decorated and generonational history museums, one in Bonn, the other in Berlin, both dedicated to giving the Germans a sense of their own national history, on the VE day commemorations, on the veiling of the Reichstag by Christo, and the last, but by no means final debate in this long list is the one on the holocaust memorial to be erected in Berlin. An initiative comprising representatives of both the Right and the Left, entitled 'We for Germany' have started a blatantly nationalist advertisement campaign in a crude effort to spread the national sentiment amongst an allegedly brain- and nation-washed

people27 .

Saving Ihe national idea/or lhe Le/l? All of these debates centred on the content and form of the new national identity of the reunified Germans and they testify to the new centrality of the discourse on national identity. Yet whilst there is widespread consensus on the importance of the national topic, the perceptions of wh at should be included in that identity have also been widely differing. On the politicallcft there have been widespread hopes after 1990 of a successful merger between Western political culture and the national concept. After Lafontaine's debacle, forces elose to the SPD argued that 1989 presented the Left with a genuine and unique opportunity to recapture the concept of the nation for the political left28. In this view, the nation had once been, in the early nineteenth century, a progressiveleft-wing concep!. It was only in the last third of the nineteenth century that it was captured by the Right and linked to racism,

25 Karl-Heinz Bohrer, 'Provinzialismus', Merkur, vol. 44, 1990, pp. 1096-1102, vol.45,

1991, pp. 255-266 26 Rainer Zitelmann, 'Wiedervereinigung und deutscher Selbsthaß: Probleme mit dem eigenen Volk', in: Wemer Weidenfeld (ed.), Deutschland. Eine Nation - doppelte Geschichte. Materialien ZllfIl delltschen Selbstverständnis, Cologne 1993 27 Otto Köhler, '''Wir sind das Land". Dr Oetkers neues Volksbindungsmittel' . Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 39,1994, 910f 28 Wolfgang Kowalsky, 'Zur Kritik linker Deutschlandpolitik', Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, vol. 41 1990; Wolfgang Kowalsky & Wolfgang Schroeder (eds), Linke. was nun?, Berlin 1993; Peter Brandt, 'German ldentity', Debatte, Vol.1, no.2, 1993, pp.30-41; Tilman Fichter Die SPD und die Nation, Frankfurt am Main 1993; the fatal tradition of such left-wing nationalism has been pointed out by Stefan Berger, 'Nationalism and the Left in Germany', New Left Review, no.206, 1994, pp. 55-70

Germany's Return to the 'Normality' of the Nation State 93

authoritarianism and xenophobia. In the process of this shift of the national discourse to the political right, the SPD, it is argued, became alienaated from the concept of the nation. The task for the party after 1990 is held to be one of overcoming this historical alienation and forging a new left-wing national identity wh ich firmly links the nation with participatory and democratic values which are in line with the Western political culture that allegedly emerged in West Germany in the course of its history. In this perception the GDR appears above all as a athreat to what has been achieved in the old FRG, namely Western orientation. Hence, the radical denial on the Left that the GDR had anyathing positive to contribute to the reunification process, hence the broad agreement between Left and Right on totally delegitimating the GDR tradition29. the Left has been divided on whether to endorse the 1968 legacy as keeping up the national topic30 or condemning it for raising the spectre of anti-nationalism3l , but on the whole the national agenda has been firmly taken up on the left. The erstwhile chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, has been behind the creation of a 'German National Foundation' (Deutsche Nationalstiftullg) which aims to strengthen the feeling of national identity32. Young Social Democrats have refounded the Hofgeismar Circle, which had been famous in the 1920s for wanting to adopt a more national rhetoric in the party's propaganda efforts. The right-wing Seeheimer Kreis of the SPD and Hans-Ulrich Klose, vice-president of the parliament and a senior SPD tvlP, have emerged as champions of those in the party who seem intent on making it indistinguishable from its conservative political riyal by advocating law and order policies, a strong and self-confident foreign policy based on national interests and significant cuts in the welfare state33 . And the former Social Democratic mayor of Hamburg, Klaus von Dohnanyi, has formulated the new national consensus most pointedly: 'Like property the nation is of eternal value for us: both are rooted in the anthropological condition of man' 34.

Neo-nationalism on lhe Right The nation as an anthropological constant - this is an idea that many on the political right would have little difficulty in subscribing to. A distinct national political agenda is put forward by, amongst others, the CDU's Deutschland/orum (Forum for Germany), and the FDP's Stresemann Club and the Berlin circle around the former head of the BND, Alexander von Stahl. A prominent spokesperson for the national right is the heir-in-waiting to

29 Thomas Schmid, 'Die Eroberung der Bundesrepublik durch die ehemalige DDR', Die Tageszeitung, 14.12.1990; Jürgen Kocka, 'Nur keinen neuen Sonderweg' , Die Zeit, 19.10.1990 30 Tilman Fichter, SPD und Nation, p. 17

31 Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt Die Linke lind die Einheit, Berlin 1991, p. 39

32 Micha Brumlik. 'Stifter der Nation. Deutsche Staatsmänner in Weimar', Bläuer für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 39, 1994,783-785

33 See, most recently. Hans-Ulrich Klose's programmatic article 'Mut zur Wirklichkeit', in: Der Spiegel, 19.June 1995. 34 Klaus von Dohnanyi, 'Ja zur Nation'. Die Zeit, 12.July 1991; c.f. also idem Das deutsche Wagnis, Munich 1990

94 Journal 0/ Area Sludies 7: 1995

Helmut Kohl, Wolfgang Schäuble, who looks set to become the next leader of the CDU and his party's candidate for the post of chancellor. He is supported by a number of neo-nationalist intellectuals, journalists, publishers and historians who have formulated their own agenda for a more 'self-confident nation '35. The right-wing agenda for a successful renationalisation of German identity can be summed up in five points: first, aaren ewed emphasis on educational values, secondly, areturn to Prussian values, thirdly , anti­Europeanism, fourthly, the remilitarisation of German foreign policy and finally xenophobia often linked to an ethnic understanding of Germanness. Anti-nationalism, the political right has argued, is linked to the emancipatory educational va lues which allegedly crept into the German educational system in the 1970s and led to an ultimately destructive critical questioning of national traditions, the rule of law and the aulhority of the stale. Ataacks on the welfare state and calls for deregulation and more market-orientation as weIl as privatisation are combined with a new emphasis on the state's responsibility for law and order36. A denunciation of individual egotism is mixed with a confirmation of lhe family as the bedrock of the state. The rediscovery of Carl Schmitt as favourite philosopher of the Right in contemporary Germany has much to do with freeing lhe state from all obligations to society37 . And, most importantly for our topic of national identity, history and historiography are seen as being of central imaportance to regain a positive national identity38. The Germans, it is argued, have suffered for too long from a guilt complex about National Socialism. The 'collective psychosis' needs to be overcome and the collapse of the GDR provides the unique opporlunity for doing so. By equating GDR socialism with nazi Germany and insisting on the former being an alien Soviet import inlo Germany, the increased intention given to the GDR and its history after 1990 means that the National Socialist period is fast receding into the background of memory for most living Germans39. The new Prussianism is most visible in the frequent calls of politicians, journalists and intellectuals for a renewed sense of duty and sacrifice which allegedly was part of the Prussian ethos. The Federal Republic and the new Germany are lacking in their appropriate self-portroyal as anational community, and in that respect they can learn from Prussia. 'The need for the

35 Heimo Schwilk & Ulrich Schacht (eds) Die selbstbewlIßte Nalion, Frankfurt am Main 1994 36 Wolfgang Schäuble Und der Zukunft zugewandt, Berlin 1994, 111-15. c.f. also Konrad Adam Die Ohnmacht der Mac/lI. Wie man den Staat ausbeutet , betrügt und verspielt, Berlin 1994 37 For a persuasive analysis of the Schmitt revival see: Peter Gowan, 'The Return of Carl Schmitt', in: Debatte, vol.2/no 1 1994. 38 For neo-nationalism in German historiography c.f. Stefan Berger 'Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification', Past and Present, vol. 148, 1995, 187-222 39 Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Das Ende der Identitätsneurose' ,Rheinischer Merkur, 7.Sept. 1990; Ernst Nolte, 'Die fortwirkende Verblendung', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22. Feb. 1992

Gennany's Return to the 'Normality' of the Nation State 95

state and a sense of the bonum commune' are the two things which made Prussia great and, according to conservative neo-nationalists will be the stuff that will contribute 10 the national re-awakening40 . Prussia itself won't be resurrected, but there have been notable efforts to revive its corpse. In 1991 the coffins of Friedrich Wilhelm and Friedrich were laken to Potsdam with great pomp to be reburied in a midnight ceremony attended, amongs others, by chancellor Helmut Kohl. The same year saw the restoration of the Quadriga on top of the Brandenburg gate. And still in the same year, the decision was taken to move the capital of Germany to Berlin. Those opting for Berlin insisted that it would be the fitting symbol of Germany's return to power politics and superposer status. Bonn, by contrast, was attacked as the very epitomy of the FRG's provinciality. By arguing that Berlin had been the historic capital of Germany, they linked the post -1990 Gennany directly with Bismarck's creation. National history, the argument went, would be best represented in Berlin41 . After the declaration had been laken, the lead article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung underlined its symbolical importance: 'the new Germany has signalIed its readiness to shed its sem i-sovereign past and take on a new role which will be more adequate to its changed position in the world. It is no longer possible to have the lowest possible profile internationally, only to whisper the word nation and to let others in this tension-ridden world pull the chestnuts out of the fire - as has happened most recently in the Gu1f'42. This alread touches on the third pillar of right-wing neo-nationalism: the remilitarisation of German foreign policy43. The new superpower, they argue, needs to adhere to the normal imperative of its 'national interests'. The bullish approach 10 the Yugoslav crisis seems to be a good example of the FRG pushing through its own interests. The FRG put enonnous pressure on its Western allies to recognize Croatia's independence thereby accelerating the dissolution of Yugoslavia and fanning the flames of ethnic hatred underpinning the bloody civil war in the Balkans. The attitude to Poland on the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War is another example of the insensitivity of Germany's foreign policy. Kohl refused to invite the Polish president, Walesa, by poillling to the fact that he otherwise would have 10 invite all the other heads of state which declared war on Germany, thus ignoring the very special suffering of the Polish people at the hands of the Germans in the Second World War. The attitude to Ihe Czech Republic and the refusal of the German government to pay compensation to the Czech survivors of Nazi concentration camps until the question of compensation for the Sudeten Germans has been solved in the German interest by the Czech

40 Michael Stürmer, 'Wenig Staat. Deutschland ohne Preußen " Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30. March 1991

41 See paradigm<ltically Christian Meier, 'Plädoyer für die deutsche Hauptstadt Berlin', in: idem: Die Nation, pp. 86-99. Joachim Fest, 'Was für Berlin spricht', Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.4.1990; Patrick Bahners. 'Streit der Symbole', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16.2.1990

42 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" 21 June 1991 43 Wolfram Wette, 'Der Wunsch nach Weltmacht', Die Zeit, 30 July 1993

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government also throws a dubious light on Germany's relationship to its Eastern European neighbours. The refugees' organisations and their inability to recognize that the German East has been lost once and for all remains a problem in the reunited country. The financial support of the German foreign office for nationalist organisations stirring German nationalism in Eastern Europe. like the Vereilljür das Deutschtum im Ausland. has been prominently documented recently44. At the time of the Gulf War the normalisation nationalism (Peter Glotz) had not yet allowed the active participation of Germans in the war. Now the crisis in the Balkans serv es the German generals and neo-nationalists as apretext to ' normalize" German military intervention . Klaus Naumann, inspector general of the Bundeswehr, has already publiely thought about the use of the German military as an instrument of pushing through political aims of the German government45 . Roman Herzog, in his first major speech on foreign policy, did not by chance emphasize the need for a ' more self-confident German foreign policy,46. Robert Leicht, editor-in-chief of the influential weekly Die Zeit and politically elose to the CDU, has explicitly argued for perceiving the Yugoslav crisis as a second opportunity, and he has called on all parties to demonstrate national unity in their support for sending German troops to the Balkans47 . Key figures in the SPD like Norbert Gansei, Karsten Voigt, Hans­Ulrich Klose and Freimut Duve as weil as important leaders of the Green Party like Werner Schulz and Krista Sager have endorsed a military intervention in Bosnia with the participation of German tropps. The new German lust for power and military solutions to political conflicts is still carefull fenced in with references to the paramount importance of proving to be a reliable ally to its partners in NATO and the EU, and yet the paralleis in the rhetoric between Wilhelmine Germany and post-reunification Germany are too apparent - especiaIly in relation to Germany's policies towards Serbia. The revival of the concept of 'national interests' in Germany is not only linked to the remilitarisation of German foreign policy, it is also linked to attacks on the European Union. On this issue, however, the Right in Germany remains badly split. Whereas Helmut Kohl continues to combine a robust nationalism with an unerring commitment to closer European Union and the Maastricht Treaty48, others within his own party, including his heir Wolfgang

44 Walther von Goldendach & Hans-Rüdiger Minow 'Deutschtum erwache!' Aus dem Innenleben des staatalichen Pangermanismus, Bonn 1995

45 Ludger Lütkenhaus, 'Deutschland soll endlich wieder Frieden schaffen dürfen. Die Feldzüge des Generalinspekteurs Naumann', in: Hans-Martin Lohmann (ed.), Extremismus der Mille, Frankfurt am Main 1994,207-218. C.f also Klaus Naumann, 'Politik muß Verantwortung übemehmen', Frankfurter Rundschau, 2.August 1994 46 Ada Brandes, 'Herzog betont Deutschlands Gewicht', in: Franbkfurter Rundschau., 14.March 1995. On Herzog's national rhetoric, c.f. also Gunter Hoffmann, 'Ein merkwürdig deutsches Pathos ' , Die Zeit, 27.May 1995 47 Robert Leicht, 'Kein Sonderweg in die Etappe', Die Zeit, 16. J une 1995 48 Helmut Kohl, 'Peace and Freedom can only be preserved in a united Europe', in: Deutschland, no.4, 1995. For Kohl's 'national patriotism' c.f. Hajo Funke, Jetzt sind wir dran. Nationalismus im geeinten Deutschland, Berlin 1991, p. 47

Germany's Return to the 'Normality' of the Nation State 97

Schäuble, have been far more critical of the process of European integration. And even Kohl seems to think of Europe in terms of a conglomerate of nations led by a powerful Germany. As he recently argued in a television interview: 'We simply are number one in Europe. The leadership role is simply there .. .'49. Within the CSU, Bavarian sister party to the CDU, Euro­criticism has been even more prominent. The finance minister. Theo Waigel , has repeatedly attacked the EU as wasteful, maintaining that Germany is paying far too much money to Brussels.Edmund Stoiber and Peter Gauweiler in particular have continuously emphasized a Bavaria/Germany policy first. At the height of the discussion on monetary union in 1991 , the Bild newspaper carried the headline: 'No ECU - we want to keep our Mark' (Nix ECU - wir wollen unsere Mark behalten). thereby apparently hitting the national sentiment. Representative surveys confirm that 70% of Germans have set their

minds against any currency union50. The gist of the argument is that Germany has been far too lenient to constant demands made upon it by its European partners. At a time when the reunification crisis absorbs much of the country's energies and finances, the argument goes, there is little money to waste on the European Union. Yet it is not only an argument about Germany as the paymaster of the EU or about Germany defining and defending its own national interests against that of other EU members; the criticism of Europe goes further than than. After the dream of socialism has produced its monsters, the idea of Europe, neo-nationaIists even amongst the centre parties have argued after 1989, is in danger of following in the footsteps of those utopias ultimately producing a deadly harvest. The nation. it is argued. is the natural focus of people ' s sense of identity and belonging. Hence, any allegiance to the nation state cannot be transcended in some sort of Europe of the regions. The modern nation is not perceived as an historical product that has emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century, found its height in the nineteenth and seems set to decline in importance at the end of the twentieth century51. Such beliefs in national imperatives are at times bound up with xenophobia and an explicitly ethnic definition of Germanness. The latter is, of course, anchored in the citizenship laws of the Federal Republic which go back to imperial Germany (Art. 116 of the Basic Law). They define as German anyone whose parents are German, whether they are born in Germany or abroad (ius sanguinis)52. Whereas on the politicalleft, demands for a change in these laws (towards ius soli, the French territorial concept of citizenship) could have been heard loud and elear throughout recent years, on the right, new and old nationalists are holding out. So Erwin Marschewski, the speaker

49 Karl Grobe, 'Der Kanzler schockt Italien', Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 May 1995 50 Nina Grunenberg, 'Was wollen die Deutschen mit Europa', Die Zeit, l.July 1994 51 Ludwig Watzal, 'Der Irrweg von Maastricht', in: Rainer Zitelmann, Karlheinz Weißmann & Michael Großheim (eds), Westbindung: Chancen und Risikenfür Deutsch/and, Frankfurt am Main 1993,477-500; Tilman Mayer, 'Die nationalstaatliche Herausforderung in Europa', Aus Politik lind Zeitgeschichte, 2 April 1993, 11-20 52 For the German concept of citizenship see Roger Brubaker Citizenship and Nation/wod in France and Germany, New York 1992

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on doemstic affairs in the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, has opposed even the limited step of allowing dual nationality with the uItimately völkisch argument thai anyone holding dual nalionalily can aIIegedly nol feel an exclusive belonging to the German people. In 1992/93 the CDU/CSU supported a vicious campaign to limit the constitutional right for politically persecuted people to seek asylum in the FRG. One example was Max Streibl's public denunciation of asylum-seekers as 'economic parasites (Wirlschajlsschmarolzer) from the whole world'53. When mobs of right-wing and neo-nazi youths repeatedly aUacked foreigners and hostels for asylum seekers, like in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, prominent members of the government pointed the finger not at the neo-Nazi threat but at the laxness of tyhe asylum la ws which allegedly opened the floodgates. With the argument 'The boat is full', the governmental parties argued in favour of limiting the asylum laws, and uItimately the SPD as the major opposition party gave way in 1993. The SPD's continued refusal to formulate a proposal which would regulate the immigration into Germany just demonstrates how intent the party has become to avoid any further conflict in this matter with the government. The brutality of the official policy of departation against those seeking political asylum in the FRG, personified in the Bavarian interior minister Günther Beckstein, has met with little opposition from political parties or public political opinion. Furthermore, the rise of antisemitism in Germany after re-unification as weil as the regular maItreatment of foreigners, in particular if they are black54 , point to the alarming reality of xenophobia that apopulist policy can exploit in contemporary Germany. A new 'extremism of the centre'55 has gripped hold of the country, and it looks as though it has managed to win a foothold in the mainstream of German catch-all parties. Faced with such extremism, and by way of conclusion, I would argue that it would be fatal, for the left in particular, to create what uItimately amounts to a false dichotomy between good patriotism and bad nationalism. Whether we call the sentiment patriotism or nationalism, historically they have always mixed up participatory demands with an aggressive, often xenophobic potential56. Nowhere is this clearer than in the 1848 revolution in Germany which, according to some observers on the Left, was re-enacted in 1989. Whilst the demands for a more liberal Germany - which would give at least the middle classes a greater say in politics - were clearly present in 1848, the resolutions of the Paulskirche parliamerlt in Frankfurt am Main on foreign

53 C.f. Matthias von Hellfeld Die Nation envacht. Zur Trendwende der deutschen politischen Kultur, Cologne 1993, p. 13

54 Martin Klingst & Kuno Kruse, 'Hilfe, Polizei !', in: Die Zeit, 23.9.1994; 'Mißhandlungen von Ausländern durch Polizisten sind keine Einzelfälle', Frankfurter Rundschau, 20.6.1995; Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Zur Aktualität eines Vorurteils, Munich 1995

55 Hans-Martin Lohmann (ed.), Extremismus der Mitte, Frankfurt am Main 1994; Peter Glotz Diefalsche Normalisierung. Essays, Frankfurt am Main 1994 56 Dieter Langewiesche Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: zwischen Partizipation und Aggression, Bonn 1994

Germany's Return to the 'Normality ' of the Nation State 99

policy, in particular towards Denmark and Poland, read like rabid Gerrnan expansionism justified by nothing but naked national egotism. In the light of the disastrous consequences of the national idea throughout the twentieth century, right from the 1900s to the 1990s, the only sensible demand is the transgression of the national principle which, in any case, seems to have outIived its functionality with the increasing globalisation of markets and communication. The Gerrnan example over the past five years confirrns fears that any revival of the national idea cannot go hand in hand with an increased commitment to Europe - despite the wishful thinking of some observers57. The nation is far too dependent, firstly on the view of the other as enemy, and secondly, the definition of interests as egotistically national ones in order to achieve a coming together of different European traditions and cultures. Whils, as Dahrendorf has rightly reminded us, the nation state is still the most effective guarantor of civil rights and the rule of law and whilst the EU in its curren t form still has very real shortcomings58, any return to the talk of the nation as the ' normality' in Europe would leave the door wide open for the Balkanisation of Europe in the twenty-first century.

57 Kurt Sontheimer, 'Nationalstaat und vereintes Europa ' , Die Welt , 13.1.1992

58 Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Die Zukunkft des Nationalstaats ' , Merkur, vol.48 1994,751-761