Phenomenology of Nation-existensibility re. Nigeria

ashimuneze K. heanacho, Ph.D.

Introduction

This is an attempt to adumbrate the first principleproperties of a country qua nation, what constitutes such anexistence, and what is necessary for its persistence as anobjective, subjective, or intersubjective phenomenon, in theabsence of which, one will be forced to reject, as anirrationality, any proposition of such an existence. Thesestandards will be applied to the entity-concept, Nigeria, toevaluate its existensibility, and the form in which Nigeriaexists. In the main, two approaches recommend themselves. One ofthem is metaphysical analysis, whose tripartite arms:epistemology, cosmology, and ontology, I intend to appropriate,where necessary, to examine the nature and the Form (the Platonicstandard) of Nation, to which Nigeria must be analogous, if itexists. Furthermore, metaphysical analysis will be invoked, toexamine questions, such as, “how are shared and unsharedconceptions and consciousness of an entity entertained, ordesignated in metal and physical states?” Consider statementssuch as “x, our dear native land,” and so on, where “x” is aplace-holder for the name of a country. What do such statementsmean, and to whom do they have meaning? Can we determine whetherstatements such as these are universals; that is, whether theyhave comparable meaningfulness when uttered by personsdifferentiated by “Nigerian” ethnicity, or regionality, orwhether, on the contrary, such statements are delimited byparticularities of geographic and mental space? Is “Nigerianness”a legal convenience, resulting from ascriptions in internationalprotocol, or a fact, to which persons so identified have acertain commitment? Moreover, it will be interesting to knowwhether an arithmetical evaluation is necessary before we canconclude that statements about the existensibility (or thecontrary), of Nigeria, validate, or invalidate Nigeria’sexistence in actuality.

Like the former approach, the second approach, understood as“phenomenological reduction,” examines whether there is such athing, as Nigeria, existing by itself, and regardless of whether

or not it is so recognized. The phenomenological approach allowsus to bypass epistemological presuppositions, in order toconcentrate on the existential experiences of people, who live inthe space so named and understood, in the public mind. Thisapproach allows us to go directly to the consciousness which suchpeople express, in favor or disfavor, of the entity in question.The advantage of phenomenological reduction is that it willassist us, to conclude whether or not Nigeria is a subjectivephenomenon, existing in the consciousness of some people, even ifthis is challenged for primacy by ethnic consciousness. Speakingphenomenologically, if Nigeria is merely a physical entity, itwill have no reality, since the real is that which is conceivablein mind, rather than something, which is perceived by the senseof touch, or sight. Consequent upon the preceding beingdemonstrated as true, we will be forced to conclude that Nigeriadoes not exist in reality. This will leave us the alternative ofconsidering whether it exists in potentiality, whether such anentity can be willed into being, phenomenologically. At any rate,that will be an extension of this inquiry, which is not envisagedhere, and as such, will be left to a future exercise.

ThesisAn entity if it exists engenders consciousness – an

intentionality or directedness of the human mind – toward thething as it is in itself. This is the source of our knowledge ofthings that are, according to Husserl (1911). Since ourconsciousness is always about that thing (noema) if it exists,our intentional acts (noesis) are about and for affirming theexistensibility of this timeless, intersubjective thing as it ismeant to be. Wherefore, if Nigeria were existent, theconsciousness of people associated with Nigeria would be vividabout and toward it, and there would be a consistency between ourmental conceptions and the actualities about the object, Nigeria.Therefore, the question is “does Nigeria exist?” If it does, isit a being necessary, sufficient, or merely contingent? If itdoes not exists, and if it is a being necessary, is it also onein potentiality?

DisclaimerStatements about necessity and contingency regarding

populations delimited by space are seldom free of political

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implication. This paper is not a political theory, analysis, orcriticism. This is a philosophical examination of whatconstitutes a country beyond but inclusive of the physicality ofpolitical presence and relations, since all political states areknowable in terms of the space accorded them in internationalprotocol, even when such legitimacy is withheld from the space-holder by at least, some of those who live within and outside it.My intention here is to produce usable information, by means ofopen discourse, for those who render political analysis proper.It is possible that this exercise, if taken too seriously, willengender hues of political interpretation, some of themunproductively contentious. Nonetheless, my primary objectiveremains the same, namely, to engender discourse, beyondsimplistic politics, of the philosophical preconditions ofnation-being in reality, and the criteria for determining validnation-existence.

Ontology of Nation A critical ontological model allows that a country exists on

the basis of the criteria of being, including being an individualapart from others; having qualitative and quantitativeproperties; and having physicality, shape, and relation vis-à-visother entities of its kind; being an event in time and space, andin relation to other events. Nigeria, if it exists, would becharacterized as described here, in addition to having acontinuum of states of affairs. As such, its particularattributes, as a set or categories, will have significance withregard to its history, geographic composition, its individualityas an existent thing, its wholeness, and its indivisibility. Inother words, if Nigeria exists, populations referred to as“Nigerians” would entertain a conception of the entity as such,and will perceive it, not in its parts or the sum thereof, but asa whole whose components are accidents, although positively so.

In answering these criteria, with a brief recourse toNigeria’s history, one finds that prior to the country’s nominalindependence and reduction of overt and direct colonialadministration, and as long ago, as the era immediatelysucceeding the Richardson Constitutional Conference (1947), someparts of the amalgamated federation (re. Lugard 1914) demurred onproposals for inclusion in the limited self-government, which theBritish Government offered the three constituent regions. The

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former Northern Region is known to have declared its unreadinessfor the entailing administrative responsibilities. Arguing thatthe region lacked the local, indigenous human, and otherresources to assume the stewardship associated with localadministration, Northern Nigerian leaders opted for continuedBritish control of the region as an alternative to hastenedindependence. Northern leaders expressed fear that in the absenceindigenous Northern human resources, Southern Nigerians wouldoccupy those positions. As a result, the other two regions,Eastern and Western assumed domestic control of their respectiveareas of Nigeria, whereas the North remained in British hands.Events following independence in 1960 lent credence to Northernapprehensions. Even with thousands of Arabic and Europeanpersonnel in the public and private sectors of Northern Nigerianlife, Southern Nigerians remained an extra-dominant numericalpresence, compared to indigenous Northern Nigerians. This seemedto be a prelude to the climactic events, which occurred between1964 and 1970, which placed in clear relief the question ofNigeria’s existensibility as a nation, cohesiveness being acriterion of existence. In particular, though, concerning thequalification of indivisibility, then Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (July1966), declared publicly that there was no basis for Nigerianunity. That was a public admission that some necessaryontological property and nation-coagulant were missing. SinceNigeria, as a political construct, was the sum of all itsconstituent parts, as in the original design, Gowon articulated aconsciousness that Nigeria did not exist. But, was this a sharedconsciousness, which it has to be, in order for it to be viewedas significant. Events since 1967 answer the query: Bloodbathsand mass murder of Nigerians by Nigerians, Christians by Moslems,Moslems by Christians, and political figures by theirsubordinates, lend credence to both Gowon’s consciousness, aswell as the view that Nigerians may well be a persistence inontological illegitimacy. But is it? How else may one verifyNigeria’s current being-status and prospects, as a nation?

Property of Entity-beingLegitimate entity-being includes having properties which

reflect calculable moral attributes. In the instance of acountry, such as Nigeria, one should be concerned about qualitiessuch as interethnic empathy and fraternity; cross-ethnic,

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professional collegiality; cross-ethnic marriage, and friendshipsacross boundaries, which bind persons as common toilers inefforts at nation-building, for example. In addition, there isthe necessity for a tenor of unconditional justice within thedomestic jurisdiction such that all social descriptors, which arenot classified by ethnic or other subjective, incidentals areprotected unconditionally, except to the letter of the law andguarantees of a presumption of innocence, until proven otherwise.The extent of voluntary self-identification as a citizen of anystate tends to be a good indicator of how cohesive such an entity(country) is in its constituent regions and ethnic populations.On this criterion, first person accounts show that while it isthe common parlance that someone is a best friend of another whohas membership in another ethnic group, it is hardly the casethat Nigerians know, have been to, or have favorable sentimentsabout geographic segments of their country, or of ethnic persons,other than their own. Similarly, an extremely few number ofNigerians cohabit with people other than those of their ownethnic or linguistic group.

Epistemologically, then, utterances such as “fellow countrymen and women, sisters and brothers,” may be entirely vacuous andwithout legitimacy. Moreover, it seems that these linguisticpreferences pertain more to diasporic individuals than they do topeople who are autochthonous to the space in question, which iscalled Nigeria. These experiences lead to deductions such asthis, that close, physical contact among Nigerians of differentethnic, regional, religious, and linguistic affiliationsgenerates greater tension than cohesion. Further, it illustratesthe kind of ontological disqualifier that critical observersregister with regard to claims that Nigeria approximates to avalues-sufficient nation status.

There are other conditionals, of course, including relationand state of affairs, which are important metaphysicalnecessities for the conferment of nation-being. An entity hasbeing if, but not only if, it has shape, relation, and state ofaffairs. It must occupy a mental space in the minds of people interms of its moral inclusiveness. These characteristics aresupposed to confer presence and duration to an entity. In thatregard, one must hasten to admit that Nigeria does haveattributes of space, relations, and state of affairs. Thereservation is not that there is a total absence of these

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attributes, it is about their quality, in which case, thequestion has to be pressed further: When one thinks of Nigeria,does the person conceive a country in reality, a coherent whole,or just a phenomenal map of incongruous, ethnic homelands anddisparate peoples distributed in ontological accident? Does onesee a litany of institutionalized criminality against the masses,inflicted by despots and their protégés-in-brutality, incontinuous succession, which would suggest to an observer, that,if this were a nation in fact, and a people, this space would notbe defined by such relations, since a nation in reality wouldexhibit relation and cohesion, rather than ethnic distance anddiscontinuity among its constitutive properties. One would seeinstead, coagulating events, rather than the Southern killing ofNorthern leaders (January 1966), or the pogrom, which decimatedhalf a million Igbo people, in the Northern as well as otherparts of Nigeria, between October 1966 and May 1967); not theBiafra v. Nigeria war (1967 – 1970), the various state-sponsored“police” actions, in Ogoniland, in the 1980s, and so on. A closeexamination of Nigeria’s state of affairs, instances of which includerelationships among the country’s ethnic groups, the Yoruba,Hausa, Igbo, Ibibio, and others of equal significance reveals atenor of instability and tension, such that the phenomenon inquestion, Nigeria, can be said to be deficient of therequirements of entityship, and is not logically self-consistent.Therefore, the said phenomenon may not exist ontologically, inspite of any semblance of identity, connections, and relations itenjoys with external entities: for example, with the immediatelycontiguous countries of Chad, Cameroon, and Ghana, whichchallenge its claims to significance, or members of the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU), and the United Nations Organization (UNO),which condemn its policy of repression toward marginalized ethnicconstituents of the Nigerian political space. So, does Nigeriaexist?

According to Husserl (1931), an entity has ontologicalexistence if it is an individual. An entity is an individual, ifits particulars, relations, and substance evince a capacity forendurance through time and change. It does not have ontologicalreality if some or all of its individual properties are temporalseries of momentary events. Articulating the preceding inAristotelian tradition, a country would be a mere momentary

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event; that is, it would be evanescent, if it is manifest atspecific instants but fails to achieve enduring presence ormomentum. The meaning of this is that nationhood is a universal,with knowable properties, which transcend time and events;properties which, if absent, must render any ostensible country amere accident. In this respect, then, a metaphysical realistwould contend that Nigeria appears to persevere through time(1941–2002) despite constant, unsettling upheavals andinterethnic bloodshed (1966–2002), and constitutional crises(1965–1966) when a temporary leadership vacuum occurred as theregional political and ethnic leaders, as well as theircorrespondingly ethnic political parties [the National Councilfor Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the Northern People’s Party(NPC), the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and theAction Group (AG), to name only the principals in that turmoil]tussled over the prime ministership of the nation, and otherpolitical spoils, in manners blatantly consistent, not with theinterests of a unified country, but rather, with the clearlyexclusive interests of their respective regions and ethnicgroups. The president then, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, vacated theoffice and took refuge in Britain just before the coup d’etat,abandoning the emerging country, and suggesting by his action,that his future and fate were not tied irrevocably, to that ofthe country he had led, even if only in a ceremonial capacity,until that crisis.

Necessity and SufficiencyNot many philosophers agree with the Aristotelian, realist

position outlined above. For instance, an anti-realist wouldargue that, if our conception of an entity as a spatio-temporalexistence is necessarily subjective, we have no good reason tosuppose that there is such a reality. In the minds of somepeople, Nigeria may be that kind of subjective existence. Thatis, to such people, Nigeria exists, not as a necessity, but onlybecause those who think it exists at all, do so, because they arebereft of alternative geographic references. With an orientationof the mind like that, the existence so claimed is justified byitself; and to support their assumption that Nigeria exists, theclaimants tend to substitute subjective incidentals, in place ofnecessity and sufficiency, which would have been more logical,for arguing for the existence of a country. Of course, a true

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realist would counter with the interrogation “What entity can bedescribed like the one just enunciated?” What country existsnecessarily and sufficiently, with no subjective feelings one wayor another, toward it?” And what country exists as a naturalfact, with the implication that an evolutionary certaintyunderlies its emergence and persistence? Since the answer seemsto be “none,” the entailing deduction would then be that Nigeriaexists to no less degree than other nation-entities. But doesthis lead validly, to a conclusion that Nigeria existsnecessarily?

Idiolect and RealityLanguage constructs a conception of the world. As a medium

for articulating consciousness, language demarcates reality,according to Gadamer (1990). If this is true, Nigeria, with itsmultiplicity of languages reflects a complex diversity ofconceptions of the phenomenon, Nigeria, which to some may be anindubitable reality, but to others, a spurious conjecture, atbest. This suggests that the probability of a single, widelyshared construction or consciousness about Nigeria is a logicalimpossibility. A Kantian would posit that the only way we canknow that Nigeria exists is through our perceptual, conceptualfaculties, meaning the senses, including sight and language.Inevitably, the variable linguistic media, which define Nigeria,as constructed, such as Edo, Hausa, Igbo, Kalagbari, Yoruba,etc., unavoidably articulate divergent conceptions of thatreality (Heiddegger 1956). And since we cannot be sure that ourvisual or linguistic perceptions, or conceptions are true, oreven correspond to reality, we must concede that what we think isor is not Nigeria is actually relative, and does not representthe sum of all particulars about reality.

What, then, may we say about objects, which seem to have nophysical existence but, nonetheless, are memorialized andidealized in minds, public and private alike? For example,“Oduduwa republic,” “Biafra,” “Ogoni and Kalakuta republics,” aswell as other protest entities? Is Nigeria itself, in somerespects, an object in memory, a wish, such that it plays gameswith our minds as a matter of historical acquaintance, anunrealized but persistent desire, substituted nostalgically, forthe real? It has come into the public domain lately, that someethnic individuals (Uwazuruike being an example) are arguing that

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Biafra persists in Igbo consciousness. If this is true, it willbe one instance of objects which have cognitive presence, but nopolitical substance, where “political” is synonymous withinternationally recognized geographic physicality. Objects whichcommand dual space, have cognitive presence as well asrecognizable, geographic presence, as in the examples of Ghana,Botswana, and similar republics, which are well established inboth the mind, as well as in international protocol. On thecontrary, “republics of the mind” are bereft of such duality,which seems to concretize political existence. Nonetheless, itremains arguable, whether one has a more legitimate existence,than the other, since the persistence of republics of the mindmay delimit the legitimacy of republics, which are accorded dualpresence, as in the contextual cases of Nigeria, and “Biafra”. Inthe same manner, and to appropriate both Kant and Heiddegger,Biafra exists as much as Nigeria does, in so far as either can beperceived, conceived, and designated mentally, as well aslinguistically. Wherefore, one must admit that, if the foregoingis valid, and if one may not be both a Nigerian, as well as aBiafran, at the same time, the following propositions arepossible: Nigeria exists. Biafra exists. Nigerians are notBiafrans. Biafrans are not Nigerians. Some people designated asNigerians, may be reluctant Nigerians, but are actually Biafrans.To reluctant Nigerians, that country’s existence is over-extensive, and violates Biafra’s space.

In the context of “connection,” or the relationship alsounderstood as “instantiation,” or “exemplification,” we encountera different kind of problem, namely, whether it is valid tounderline what an entity is by accentuating its relation with itsproperties, without violating some necessary condition, which anargument should satisfy, in order to qualify as coherent andlogical. What if some of these properties are inconsistent withthe ideal nature of the said entity, as in the case of thedivergent relationship between Nigeria and Biafra? In thatrespect, can a country such as Nigeria, in relation to itsproperties (the thirty-nine states and the federal capital,Abuja), or in relation to the ethnic sub entities Oduduwaland,Edoland, Kanuriland, Igboland, and so on, be upheld arguably, asa nation state, given the preceding arguments, which highlightseeming discontinuities in Nigeria’s qualifications?

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Freedom and ExistenceFree people choose freely to enter into a political

association in order to guarantee and safeguard those interestswhich cannot be procured or safeguarded, from the position ofindividuality (Hobbes 1847). Thus citizenship ideally ispredicated on a notion of free association, one which providesclearly indeterminate goods, such as justice, equality of accessto necessary goods, and before the law – and even the right ofwithdrawal from such intercourse – as is guaranteed in theconjugal society (Rosmini 1995). Of course, not all indices ofthis relief are practicable today, except to the extent that onemay withdraw from membership of a country by any of a few ways,including mental and cognitive disassociation or physical removal(emigration or secession). However, in view of the focus of ourdiscourse “whether Nigeria exists,” it seems evident that byexercising the option of physical withdrawal, a dissenter to theproposition that Nigeria exists, actually confirms suchexistence, since one cannot withdraw from an entity that does notexist. On the other hand, a case can be made that what isintended is not “withdrawal.” In other words, withdrawal is amisnomer for “disclaimer” or the statement that one is notmentally, physically, or cognitively associated with the concept,Nigeria, which, to the disclaimant does not represent a reality.If human rights observers are right, Nigerians in the south ofthe country suffer egregious delimitation of freedom and rights,which are supposed to be guaranteed by international convention.For these reasons, and to the extent that Nigeria does notobserve the rights of such persons, who are nonetheless co-optedinto Nigeria’s population, it can be postulated that to suchindividuals, Nigeria does not exist, in as much as theindividuals have no desirable existence within Nigeria. However,this kind of metaphysical idealism does not go unchallenged. Arealist would argue that even such individuals cannot not have adesirable existence in Nigeria, except because Nigeria existseither physically, and or mentally, too. Where else can theirnegative experience be situated, except within a tangible,existential space? A realist would insist that one cannot have aconception of Nigeria or any other country, for that matter, ifthe object of the conception is construed as a real object. Inthis view, if Nigeria or any other country is a real object, we

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can have no conception of it, the way real objects are defined inmetaphysical idealism. As such, the argument goes, no one canform a valid conception, or even a reservation, about Nigeria’sexistence, or its contrary, because any such conception must reston subjectivities one has formed already, as well as onidiolectal language and experience, all of which are presumed tobe intensely lacking in objectivity.

Can the forgoing criticism withstand challenge? Does it meanthat we can have no knowledge of real objects as they are? Toaccept the delimitation is tantamount to accepting that truthshould not be understood as the correspondence of objects, or tofactual statements made about such objects. Then of course, onewould have to prove irrefutably, that all statements aboutobjects are necessarily factual, in which case, statements aboutNigeria’s existence, as well as about its non-existence, would befactual, since on this criterion, both statements (which areobvious contraries) would be presumed to correspond necessarilyand validly to the truth about Nigeria. Serious consequencesattend acceptance of the latter theses, namely that there are noreal objects, no real minds, and no states of mind, concepts,words, relations, and properties. It implies that there are noexperiences, which correspond to concepts, words, relations, andproperties, either. It is not easily justifiable that one cannotor should not believe that something is real, or that one cannotform a conception of it if the person is disconnected from thething. In the case of existences in contention, such as Nigeriaand Biafra, whose respective proponents chose to be disconnectedfrom conceptions of the prepositional entity, which they do notwish to recognize, it is questionable, whether a voluntarypsychological disposition alone is sufficient to erase theexistence or reality-status of the respective entities, which theparties refuse to acknowledge. Considering the problem attendingthis kind of analysis, it seems that the only obvious benefit ofthe proposition is that it forces us to be cognizant of, and toavoid simplistic views about our cognitive and emotive attachmentto the concrete world. It should force us to subject to criticalexamination our relationship with propositions of nativity andcitizenship. It would seem to be patently less intelligent thanwe claim to be, for us to accept without question that we areNigerians, Biafrans, Kalakutans, or whatever, without analyzingsuch propositions logically, before we confirm our affiliation,

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and understand fully, what it is we have volunteered associationto: a nation in reality or one that exists merely in ourimagination.

It is not conclusive to me, that we can assert that a nationin the imagination should be anathema. However, I am not unawarethat privileged despots may say so, as they have done throughouthuman history and in recent times, in Indonesia, Yugoslavia,Nigeria, the British Isles, the United States, and other places,where secession and contemplation of secession are not acceptedas an aspect of human rights, to which aggrieved groups shouldhave recourse. Therefore, some questions we are invited toaddress are these: Is citizenship an obligation or a privilege?Which creates and legitimizes the other, the state or thecitizen, and is there not a role for mind, in these processes?Also, we ought to ask ourselves: From where does the concept ofcitizen or state come? Only after we have answered thesequestions satisfactorily, can we attend meaningfully to questionsabout “republics of the mind” or nations existing only in theimagination (such as Biafra) versus those which currently enjoydiplomatic, international and other forms of recognition, asNigeria does, but Biafra does not. Ultimately, the argument maybe substantiated that, nations are ideas and all ideas have theirorigin in human imagination, and cognitive processes. When thisis established, what will be left to satisfy is whether theconceptual entity still residing in the imagination is less real,than the substantive nation, or whether they have relativelyequal significance and merit, to their respective publics.

Objectivity and BelongingTests of objectivity can be contaminated, when an account is

offered by someone, who has significant, prior encounter with ansubject. Thus, the question, “does Nigeria exist as a reality, ordoes it not?” may elicit biased responses, as a result of theeffects of a posteriori knowledge, or prior sensory or perceptualexperience of the subject, Nigeria. This may explain why someindividuals who have had unsavory contacts with that country mayhave little positive comments about it. But, it may not be thecase that all persons who have had some negative encounters withNigeria have little positive comments about it. Comparable tocitizens of other countries who have had negative encounters withtheir countries, most Nigerians are likely to have had at least

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one negative experience of Nigeria. Does this mean that mostNigerians are apt therefore, to deny the necessity of Nigeria’sexistence, or to deny that Nigeria exists at all? What we facehere is a real epistemological quandary, which is complicated bythe insinuation of some rather ontological reservations. ThatNigeria has done one wrong does not validly negate its existenceor disconfirm its existensibility. On the contrary, it affirmsNigeria’s existence, for Nigeria has to be, in order to do wrong,although one may question the morality of the entity, and thequantity of justice within its space. Again, we are confrontedwith a psycho-epistemological judgment, rather than anontological one.

Epistemologically, we are called to ask what qualificationone must have, in order to utter a truth-statement, that is, abelievable statement, regarding a subject, although it is notalways the case that credible statements are believed byeveryone. If all statements were deemed true simply because theutterers were free of a posteriori knowledge, or deemed untrue,merely because they were not free of a posteriori knowledge, wewould be left with serious problems about how to distinguishtrue, believable statements, from their contraries. What is wrongwith having knowledge of a subject? Is knowledge not a betterprecondition for speaking reliably about a subject? One of thecomplexities here is that nations are not ordinary subjects, andcitizenship is not an ordinary relationship with a subject. Bothare characterized by psychological variables, which make suchrelations very complex and emotive. Unlike other subjects say,physics, where utterance-believability is predicated on knowledgeand natural facts, nationhood, nationality, and citizenship tendto evoke polarities of passion, which contaminate reason andobjectivity, and which render dubious any utterer’s statementsabout the subject. Nevertheless, such assertions, the extremes ofpassion considered, lend credence to the existence of thesubjects for, if the subjects did not exist, they would not bethe subject of discourse, of this sort of seriousness. If asubject does not exist, then one can neither know it, lie aboutit, nor speak the truth about it. And if one does not know thesubject, then one cannot know whether or not the subject exists.Therefore, if a posteriori knowledge biases objectivity, it must bebecause the subject exists.

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People who speak good or bad about Nigeria know aboutNigeria, even if they have no physical experience of it.Therefore, Nigeria exists, either concretely, or in the mind.Most people who speak well of Nigeria are likely to have hadpositive a posteriori experience of the subject, while individualswho do not have much that is good to say about Nigeria areequally likely to have had negative experiences of the subject.In either case, their encounters with Nigeria must be a posteriori,since, a priori knowledge, knowledge without prior sensory orperceptual experience with the subject is suspect and withoutbasis. Contrary to Kant (Critique of Pure Reason) all genuine knowledgeis not a priori, even if it has its roots in “pure, speculativereason,” so called, which may well amount to sheer conjecture.This is so, because, unlike other entities, a country -- howeverdubious its existence, in terms of its relationship with itscitizens – cannot be reduced to logical mathematical relations.To a significant degree, and in spite of advancements in mediatechnology as well as the ubiquity of the news media, countriesare more like physical objects, than they are like mentalentities. As such, they tend to be knowable a posteriori, than apriori, where knowing means immersing oneself in the language,soil, atmospherics, idiolects, and encrypted nuances of ethnicityand culture.

This does not contradict the rider that it is not impossibleto conceive of an entity which will rise out of molten lava,which is currently dormant, under the warm, nurturing tides ofthe Bight of Biafra, and whose characteristics, moral properties,and relations would conform closely to the ratiocinations of itsproponents. Call it “Kalakuta” or another republic. Nevertheless,this entity does not exist now, however hard one thinks and isconscious of it, or whatever language one employs to constructit. It remains a conjecture which has no presence, unlike thecurrent, known political state, Nigeria, with all its abominableimperfections.

Nigeria as a PropositionThe ground rules as they are established, in Plato’s Meno,

and Theaetetus as well as in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, state thatpropositional knowledge, that is, a statement that something isso, must satisfy three individually necessary and jointlysufficient conditions, namely truth, justification, and belief.

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The question of whether Nigeria exists can be considered byadherence to similar criteria, so that 1) on a criterion ofbelief, if “N” is the proposition that Nigeria exists, as anation in reality, then 2) anyone who claims to know that “N”exists, must also believe that “N” is the case. For this case, if“x” was born in Nigeria, “x” lived in Nigeria, however minimally,it would follow that “x” has to believe that “N” is true,regardless of whatever psychological, moral, ideological, orother reservations “x” may have about Nigeria, or about whetherNigeria ought to exist.

The obverse to the forgoing should be obvious. A genuineknower is a believer in the existence of a subject or objectabout which the knower has some experience. Belief in thisinstance must be differentiated from a coalition or anunconditional agreement with the subject, its attributes andnature, or its relations. It is a simple acknowledgement of theexistence of the subject, regardless of necessity or sufficiency.The same requirement may not be valid, when one projects his orher belief or knowledge-status to another person. For instance, abeliever-knower (say Etim) cannot assert with any degree ofbelievability that another individual (say Eniafe), numare (anynumber of people), or a class (all tall Yorubas) know or believethat Nigeria is, or is not a viable entity, even if Eniafe and/orall tall Yorubas declare such a view of Nigeria, to Etim. This isa way of saying that knowledge is a psychological and subjectivestate, and one cannot know what other people do or do not know,or believe. In other words, belief statements are first-personaccounts, and have to be so, in order to qualify as truth. Whatthis means is that, no one can make a credible, intersubjectivestatement, that most Nigerians do not believe that Nigeria does,or does not exist. One can only assert that he or she does, ordoes not believe, that Nigeria exists

The preceding should be so, since, believing is not just amatter of concurring with a proposition. More than a mere assent,belief in something is a psychological disposition, a state ofmind, which tends to persist, even when such a belief is notovert or articulated. For example, “x” does not stop believingthat “biafra” is a nation within a nation, even while shebelieves that Nigeria exists. This is so because “x” may alsobelieve that Nigeria is a necessary, temporal transition to“biafra.” Thus, two contending beliefs can coexist at the same

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instance, and within the same mind. Although knowledge that “N”requires belief that Nigeria exists, it does not requireknowledge that Nigeria exists in perpetuity, or in actuality, forthat matter, since typically, a belief can be false, or simplyunconnected with reality. The converse holds true, in the matterof the truth condition of knowledge (Plato, Theaetetus). Whereas Ican believe that Biafra has collapsed, without knowing thatBiafra has actually collapsed, I cannot know that Biafra hasdisintegrated, unless I also believe, at the same time, theproposition that Biafra has disintegrated. This is so because oneof the conditions of a statement being true is that acorrespondence exists between a truth proposition and the actualsituation or event which the statement claims to be the case.What then does one have to do, in order to convince an audiencethat “x” as a declarative statement about what one believes to bethe case, is actually and truthfully so? In other words, whatdoes one have to do, in order to convince the audience or readerthat Nigeria does or does not exist, when the only evidence isthe person’s belief that Nigeria does, or does not exist, andthat this is the truth?

Justification ConditionTo know something, it is not sufficient to have true belief.Knowing that “N” exists or is the case requires that both thetruth and belief conditions be met. Epistemologists John Dewey,Wittgenstein, Thomas Kuhn, et al., propose that contextualismshould be a part of epistemic justification. Contextualism is theproposition that, in order to gain validity, the justification ofone’s belief should be based on the admissibility of allassumptions and conjectures, which that person has used to decidethat he or she is going to believe a statement (proposition). Forexample, Uche believes that Nigeria’s existence is indubitableand that arguments about the possibility of a Biafra republic area wasteful distraction. Contextualists require that the groundsfor Uche’s conclusions must be admissible, even if they arepredicated on conjectures, which Dewey allows as a set ofunjustified (read “unproven”) beliefs, which one is permitted topresume to require no justification (read “proof”). Despite theproblem which one must envisage in this line of argument (usingunjustified beliefs as if they require no justification) is thefundamental argument that, in most cases, people tend to assume

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the admissibility of some conceptually fundamental claims(propositions) which may have no immediately evidentialjustification in themselves, but which nonetheless, seem to becapable of serving as evidential support for subsequent claimswhich one is likely, or certain to make, in an investigation.Regardless of this explanation, a problem attaches to thisprocedure: How can an improbable, unjustified claim plausiblyprovide the logically valid basis for other similarly improbablepropositions? For that matter, how can one conclude that Nigeriais viable, if one knows that Nigeria has serious epistemologicalproblems, which it may never be able to resolve, with regard toits composition and relation with its constituents parts, giventhat such tension militates against cohesion and endurance, andthat tension and incoherence make disintegration unequivocal?

Phenomenology of NationDespite all that has preceded this stage of the discussion,

it can be asserted, with some caveat, that nationhood ispossible, if citizens want one, and impossible, if they do not,regardless of the repressive power of the state. Nationhooddemands a commitment to a certain attitude of mind, and anauspicious creative methodology, preferably a phenomenologicalanthropology, for bringing about the emergence of such a reality.Phenomenological anthropology is a philosophical process by whichmeans a population, qua country, comes to create, know, and havean understanding of itself, as a people, and to progress toward aunion with one another, which is distinct from the union of othercollectives. It is the act of a country becoming fully consciousof its population, and the population becoming conscious of thenation they have created, the population being the mind andspirit of the nation, and therefore, its absolute self, ratherthan an accidental collection of disparate others (Hegel 1807),while the country becomes the personification of the population,their body-politic, as it were.

This variant of the Kantian view of mind as spirit, and ofknowledge as the ultimate knowing of the self, where “self” ismind and country (nation) is ergo sum, serves a facilitativepurpose for entities, such as Nigeria, which have problematicrelations among their constituent parts. In this regard, Iconclude that reality is so particular to instances and placesthat, claims that Nigeria exists are themselves as valid (with

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respect to instance and place) as claims that it does not exist.However, claimants ought to distinguish between Nigeria as apossible “perceptual object” on one hand, and as “essence,” onthe other. While perceptual objects are not directly available tomind-consciousness, because they are perceived only in theiraspects, rather than in totality, object-essence is presented tothe mind directly, totally, and in a single, intuitive act. Onthese grounds, Uche’s belief that Nigeria exists, will be truefor Uche, in places which confirm Nigeria’s existence, because,as an outcome of Uche’s subjective, mental relationship with thesubject, Nigeria, Nigeria exists, indeed, as a phenomenal oreidetic intuition, which is supported by a very reliablephilosophical tradition. For example, Husserl (1931) providesthat by eidetic processes, one can have a direct perception ofabstract universals. The only reservation here is about howNigeria can be undoubtedly such an abstract universal, as thetype Husserl (1931) specified. That remains to be proven. At anyrate, Uche’s knowingness being a subjective particular which isas different as the Nigeria, of which he has consciousness, theessence of Nigeria, which is presented to Uche’s mind is equallydifferent from all other possible conceptions of Nigeria, whichmay be had by other individuals, in other places, and at othertimes. Inasmuch as about 150 million Nigerians conceive ofNigeria, their 150 million mental images cannot validly representa Nigeria, since each person perceives Nigeria in aspects, ratherthan in totality. Now, perception through aspects being partialis neither complete nor uniform, even when it is illuminated bypersonal logic, enlightenment, morality and sensitivity tojustice and fairness, neutrality, and generosity. Of course,there are millions of Nigerians who are endowed with these nobleattributes. Yet, we will be hard-pressed to achieve a numericallyreasonable aggregation of those who having exercised thesequalities, to the limit, are able to set aside completely, theirprivate, emotive dispositions toward the subject, enough to reacha consensus on whether and how Nigeria exists, or should beperceived. What then do we need, in order to construct aconsensual view of Nigeria, whether or not it exists, shouldexist, is necessary or is unnecessary? I propose that first, weshould establish a unified purpose, for which reason we need aconsensual view of Nigeria? Second, we must agree that such aview, though consensual, does not have to be an agreement to a

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single statement, which is then postulated as if it were the onlyabsolute truth about the phenomenon, Nigeria. Instead, we oughtto admit that, there are many conceptions about the entity,Nigeria, whether it is a fact or fiction, and that suchperceptions are valid. However, for the sake of peace andcollective progress, those who do, as well as those who do nothave credence in Nigeria, can reconcile their antagonisms, bypermitting multiple existences, within the same geographic andmental space, whatever the are called.

What is needed to reconcile all our private conceptions ofNigeria, and to unify them into a nation-consciousness is awillingness for conciliation, a rejection of hegemonicaspirations, a movement toward true, democratic intentions, and amethodology which will allow for a reliable account of time,space, and the world as these are experienced and lived byNigeria’s respective peoples, as individuals and collectives,delimited by language and other modifiers. We must yield credenceto one another’s grievances and reservations, and move toconstruct what ought to be, by means of what is, for, regardlessof the limitations of our insights, we are able to assert that wehave direct knowledge of our own consciousness, as mental acts,such that we know truly and comprehensively our own memories, ourdesires, and our essences in relation to the object of ourconsciousness, Nigeria, because all consciousness has being whichis distinct from other being. This process will facilitate ourability to undertake the eidetic reflections, by means of whichwe will be able to focus on necessary and vital essences andtheir connections, and to shift our attention from the particularinstances of physical properties pertaining to our encounterswith Nigeria, to abstract properties (essence) whoseparticularities reveal to us, totally and directly, thestructures and meanings which are formed by the respectiveessences that pertain to the country, Nigeria; to ourselves; andto forming our destinies, within an objective world, whichexploits our distractions.

In conclusion, if there can be one to such an evolutionarydiscourse, let me say that we have assumptions about Nigeria,which are not inconsistent with the state of a mind which iscluttered by beliefs about contingent rather than essentialevents. This condition prevents us from achieving consciousnessof the essence, as well as necessary nation-building intuition

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(Scruton 1991:11). A pure, mind-only orientation, otherwisecalled anthropological phenomenology, will provide the cogitativemethodology and orientation to thinking properly and productivelyabout and relating with Nigeria. This approach will enable us tounclutter our minds and to make correct meaning of the world,life, and experiences as they are intertwined with space andtime, and are connected with Nigeria. Without this, Nigeria willremain a map in numerous minds. As a map, Nigeria will remain amere picture, an appearance, which is genuinely and objectivelypresent in our private and collective consciousness (mind) but isstill not the essence, which we ought to apprehend. While thispicture or consciousness may be revealing, and while it is themeans by which we may apprehend (know) the consciousness, it isnot identical with reality, which, though knowable via thepicture in the mind, the mental consciousness is neverthelessmere appearance and nothing more (Scruton 1994:10).

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