"NEVER AGAIN SAY 'LAND!'": UNDERSTANDING MEDIA SILENCE ON POST-WAR CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA

"NEVER AGAIN SAY 'LAND!'": UNDERSTANDING MEDIA SILENCE ON POST-WAR CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN

UGANDA

1 2Ayobami Ojebode & Jackline Atingo Owacgiu

"If you avoid the very sensitive topics and individuals and you write about the weather, for instance, you can enjoy maximum press

freedom" Ugandan journalist, quoted by Kavuma (2012)

Abstract:When the media ignore an issue, literature and theory suggest, the issue probably lacks intrinsic news value, or it is of little market worth or it just does not interest journalists. These do not explain the silence of Ugandan media on the post-war conflicts especially land tenure-related violence that continues to wreak havoc on citizens and communities in Northern Uganda. Our analysis of secondary data and events in the Ugandan media scene shows that an atmosphere of ambivalence and fear among journalists and citizens explains media silence on the post-war conflicts. Although the Ugandan constitution explicitly provides for press freedom, certain legislations are used to scare and harass journalists, resulting in death, maiming and detention of journalists who attempt to critically cover forbidden issues such as land, oil and presidential term limit. Journalists have learnt that the way to peaceful professional practice is to avoid the issues of land and oil, the very core of the conflicts in the North. Pointing out the inadequacies of Western received models and interpretations in explaining media practice in Africa, this article ponders on the negative implications of the media silence for the future of Northern Uganda, especially the post-war reconstruction, rehabilitation, healing and development.

1 Department of Communication and Language Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria; [email protected] 2 London School of Economics, United Kingdom; [email protected]

Journal of Communication and Language Arts, 2013 4 (1) 37

Key Words: news judgement, press freedom, Ugandan press, Ugandan media, post-war reporting, post-conflict reporting, Northern Uganda, Acholi, land grabbing, land and oil in Northern Uganda.

IntroductionNorthern Uganda was plagued for two decades by one of the most horrendous wars in human history. After the war that ended in 2006, the region should be on a steady path to economic, cultural and human restoration and development but it is not. Instead, it is still home to frequent violent conflicts which lead to loss of lives, maiming, and destruction of property. Like the war before them, these conflicts are largely unknown to many within and outside Uganda because they are given little, if any, media attention.

Both theories of pure journalism and market-oriented journalism (McManus, 2002) should shed plausible insight into the reasons for the media silence. Newsworthiness in pure journalism is determined mostly by "expected consequence of the story and the size of the audience for whom [the story] is important" (McManus, 2002:272). In market-oriented journalism, it is determined by the "expected breadth of appeal of the story to the audiences advertisers will pay to reach" (McManus, 2002:272). To the extent that this perspective is valid, one could understand the silence of international media on the ongoing gruesome post-war conflicts in Northern Uganda. The audiences of international media are not likely to feel affected by events in a small dot on the world map, just as sponsors and advertisers are not likely to put their money where the audiences' minds do not go.

These theories do not, however, easily help our understanding of the silence of Ugandan media on the post-war conflicts in Northern Uganda. The audiences of Ugandan media are likely to feel affected by the events in Northern Uganda, and (therefore) there is no reason to presume that advertisers would not want to support such coverage. In this article, we argue that the major reason for the near-total

Ayobami Ojebode & Jackline Atingo Owacgiu38

silence of the Ugandan media on the post-war atrocities in Northern Uganda was the unsafe atmosphere created by the current government of Uganda for the journalists in that country. That atmosphere silences not just critical journalism but also most voices of dissent including the political opposition.

The War in Northern UgandaTo understand the post-war conflicts in Uganda, one requires an overview of the war itself. Between independence in 1962 and 1986, Uganda was a country marked with political violence and instability. At independence, the British had left the country in a potentially explosive condition. There had been ethnic tension between the people of Southern Uganda who dominated the civil service and the mainly Acholi and Langi ethnic groups of Northern Uganda who dominated the military. At Independence, the President was the Kabaka, the traditional monarch of the Buganda in the South, while the Prime Minister was General Milton Obote, an Acholi from the North. Within four years, the power tussle between the two became fierce, and Obote ordered his Chief of Army Staff, Idi Amin, to depose the Kabaka. Under Idi Amin's supervision, hundreds of the Kabaka's supporters were arrested and thrown into Lake Victoria, buried alive or crushed with army vehicles. Thus began the orgy of blood splattering in Uganda (Temmerman, 2009).

In 1971, Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin, his army chief and erstwhile torture tool. In the six years that followed, Uganda witnessed what could be the most bestial rule in the history of the continent. Amin, who was not from the North, feared the domination of the Acholi people in the army, and took explicitly crude measures to decimate them. Some were stripped naked and then executed in public; some others were buried alive; some had their skulls smashed with rods. All it took to be killed was to be declared an Obote man. Amin was said to have killed about 100,000 people during his reign, most of whom were Acholi. Some estimates ran as high as 300,000.


Obote returned in 1985 overthrowing Amin. However, rather than embark on reconciliation and reconstruction, he embarked on vengeance and vindictiveness. By this time, a rebel group, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), later National Resistance Army (NRA), led by a young lieutenant, Yoweri Museveni, had entered Uganda from Tanzania. Under Obote, the army fought the rebels in the Lowero Triangle in the South East, levelling villages and destroying lives. Obote was overthrown in 1986, again by his own army, led by Tito Okello. Okello began reconciliation talks with rebel groups. During a ceasefire, Museveni, built up more arms and men and made a push for Uganda in 1986, breaking the ceasefire agreement. Though Okello bragged about "removing Museveni's fangs", the young man overthrew him in 1986: he had ruled for only six months. From Museveni's rhetoric and initial actions, one could say that the long road to reconciliation and reparation had begun. In reality however, an atrocious war of a bestial level just began in Northern Uganda.

Within a short while, the Museveni government, like Amin's, unleashed severe hardship on the Northerners, especially the Acholi who had dominated the army and had committed abuses in the days of Obote. Many soldiers of Northern origin were abused, tortured, or "disappeared". This coincided with the emergence of a witchy lady, Alice Lakwena and her rebel group, the Holy Spirit Movement. Driven by fear or vengeance, many Acholi soldiers left the army and joined the movement. Lakwena claimed to be in direct contact with the Holy Spirit, and in possession of a potion that if rubbed on her rebels would repel the bullets fired by government soldiers. Many magical deeds were attributed to Lakwena. In 1987, Lakwena marched towards Kampala to overthrow Museveni and to begin a rule based on the Ten Commandments, but her movement was roundly pulverized by the Ugandan army. For their support for Lakwena's movement, the Acholi got horrendous pummelling from the Ugandan army. Alice Lakwena herself went into a refugee camp in Kenya where she later died (OCHA & IRIN, 2004; Temmerman, 2009).


Alice Lakwena and her movement died but that did not end the trouble in the North. Her claims and personality had inspired an extremely queer youngster, Joseph Kony who combined belief in magic, an upside-down interpretation of the Bible, uncouth illiteracy and access to weaponry. Promising to deliver the Acholi and establish an Acholi nation ruled by Biblical principles, Kony got the support of many young and old Northerners and formed the Ugandan People's Democratic Christian Army which later became the notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

Kony took the war in the North to an unprecedented level of brutality. By the end of the 1980's he had moved from attacking government soldiers to attacking the Acholi and Langi, his own people, abducting male and female children and turning them into child soldiers and sex slaves of his rebels. He himself had about 80 wives – all abducted Acholi children. It was at this point that much of the Acholi support to Kony evaporated. Abducted children were made to kill and maim people including members of their family. Children who refused or were too weak to walk long distances or carry out military tasks were killed in the most gruesome manners such as having their skulls smashed, or forcing other children to bite them bit-by-bit to death, or burying them alive. "They don't waste any bullets on you. They take an axe and split your head with it", a 15-year old abductee told his interviewers (OCHA & IRIN, 2004:15). By 2002, Kony rebels had abducted over 20,000 children. Life became so insecure even in the cities such as Gulu, Kitgum and Lira that schools had to be shut. For example, in 1996, Kony's LRA attacks led to the closure or destruction of 136 out of 189 schools in Gulu; in 2003 half of the schools in Kitgum and about 90% of those in Pader were closed (OCHA & IRIN, 2004).

The children were the cannon fodders behind whom the LRA commanders hid. Kony became inscrutably rabid attacking villages and villagers in the Acholi region for working on Sunday, for riding bicycles, for breaking Sabbath, for anything. The worst crime seemed to be voting during an


election in which Museveni won: any Acholi who did earned instant gruesome death sentence from Kony. Meanwhile, as government forces tried to contain the insurgency, they also attacked and killed many Acholi villagers accusing them of collaborating with the rebels. Government forces were also accused of rape and other forms of violence against the Acholi they were sent to protect. From both sides –government's and rebels'—the Acholi and Langi people were viciously attacked (OCHA & IRIN, 2004). For the third round since independence, the Acholi became victims of organised armed attacks.

By 2004, about 1.7 million Northern Ugandans (roughly 90% of the population in that region) had been displaced (IDMC, 2005); 1.4 million of them living in internally displaced people's (IDP) camps where they were to be guarded by government forces (OCHA & IRIN, 2004). Whitmore (2010a) found that many were forced into the camps against their wishes though government claimed it was to enable it protect them from LRA rebels. Yet, at these camps, cases of gross abuse were paramount. Government forces were said to have killed, raped and dispossessed many in the camps. Men were raped in public; some men were castrated by government soldiers (See, Whitmore, 2010a). A survivor of the IDP camp was quoted in Acholi Times (2010: unpaged) as saying that government soldiers:

started collecting both men and women from a place called Baa Dege, and gathered them in a school called St Martin. They were sodomising the men and sometimes they would pick your wife while you were watching and they would dehumanise her in different ways. They would enter any house and defecate in your water pots and even your maize floor or any foodstuff they would come across … after stealing my goats and chickens, they would then come to sodomise me.

The living conditions in the camps were squalid. Worse still, Kony rebels were able to penetrate the camps regularly and to kill, maim and abduct Acholi people. In 2004 in an IDP camp


in Lira, the rebels killed 200 people in one attack. At the appearance of these violent youngsters, government forces were known to flee. While it was clear that Kony inflicted indescribable hardship on the Acholi, their treatment by soldiers of President Museveni's army was also extremely ruthless.

Several explanations have been given for the two-decade violence in the North in which the Acholi people suffered unspeakable horrors. Some have alleged that the government could have contained the insurgency if it had wanted to. The claim goes that it did not want to contain it because the rebels were, unknown to them, helping to achieve President Museveni's long-term aim, which has been to decimate the Acholi to the point that they would become either extinct or politically and militarily impotent. By far the most controversial scholar in contemporary Acholi studies, David Todd Whitmore, claims to have been shown a memo written by the president to his brother, the head of the Ugandan Army, asking him to destroy the "chimpanzees" (his word for Acholi) completely (Whitmore, 2010a; Whitmore, 2010b; Whitmore, 2010c).

A less controversial explanation is that the government of Sudan supported the Kony rebels to help Sudan fight the then rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army south of Sudan. The explanation goes that even if President Museveni wanted to end the war in the North, he had not the means to end it.

The 'War' after the WarIn 2006, the war was declared officially over as Kony moved from Sudan to Democratic Republic of Congo where he has continued to wreak havoc. The Acholi in IDP camps began to return home but to a fresh set of troubles. The main source of these fresh conflicts was land. Okot (2013), in a brief but sociologically brilliant essay on the land issue among the Acholi, points out that land use was governed by traditional laws and practices. Land was sacred and belonged ultimately to the community though individuals may hold it in trust.


While in the IDP camps, a generation of Acholi emerged without an opportunity to understand these traditional land use laws and practices. To make matters worse, a generation of elders died in the camp and with them died the knowledge of the traditional land use laws. A new generation of Acholi return to the land "but a pall of grim memories of death and displacement hangs over the whole land" (Okot, 2013: unpaged).

Back in their ancestral land with a confused knowledge of ancestral land use law, the Acholi discovered that while they were in the camps, government had started to parcel out their lands to powerful politicians and foreign investors. A new land tenure system had been enacted which treats land as a commodity to be sold in the open market. It dawned on the Acholi that they were, in essence, landless. Being predominantly farmers and herds-people, they saw their landlessness as an end to their livelihood. They then concluded that the reason that government forced them off their lands into IDP camps was not to protect them against LRA but to create a chance for government to take over the land.

Land disputes go on at three levels in Acholi land. The first is the intra-ethnic level. Returning from IDP camps where some had lived for over ten years, the Acholi at individual and communal levels engage one another in brawls over land boundaries and ownership. Some of these become violent leading to loss of lives.

The second level of land conflict involves the Acholi on the one hand and government agencies and politicians on the other hand. There are strong rumours that government had actually sold large portions of Acholi land to politicians and members of the ruling party. These include military officers and other loyalists of the president especially his brother, General Caleb Akandwanaho (also called Salim Saleh). Acholi take this as an assault on the entire ethnic group (Lawino, 2012; Akena & Lawino, 2012; Refugee Law Project, 2012).


There have also been cases of forceful eviction of villagers to make way for government agencies. Examples include eviction attempts at Apaa village in Amuru where Acholi land is being given to the Ugandan Wildlife Authority and where over 6,000 villagers are said to have been evicted (Akena & Lawino, 2012).

The third level is between Acholi people on the one hand and foreign investors from China especially, on the other. These investors are also being given land by government for large-scale agriculture, meaning the Acholi have to move off their land. Matters are made worse with the discovery of oil in the Acholi region. Among the investors embroiled in the controversy is the Madhvani Group of Companies to whom government had given over 40,000 hectares of Acholi land for sugarcane farming. Observers and locals however believe that the land given to Madhvani had oil (Refugee Law Project, 2012).

There are tension and recurrent outbursts of violence in Acholi land with some calling for a return to arms. For instance, a 95-year-old resident of Amuru, Mr Genaro Olum, was quoted as saying: “I am deeply saddened by this issue … fighting to defend this land would be the best option,” (Akena and Lawino, 2012: un-paged). Another threatened: "I heard that my land has been sold to a major, but I was also a major and when time comes to becoming one, it shall be easy for me" (Refugee Law Project, 2012:2). A more explicit threat came from another ex-soldier, "we will call on all able bodied to join the fight against this injustice by Yoweri Museveni" (Lawino, 2013).

The anger is felt and expressed across the different socio-economic and political levels in Acholi land. Olara Otunu, who leads the opposition against President Museveni was quoted as saying,

...the biggest contest is with the land owners. Do not say I never told you so, Mr Museveni, the battle is real. This is an orchestrated scheme of genocide Museveni


is committing against Acholi ... he needs the land for himself, brothers and family. It has nothing to do with Madhvani (Lawino, 2013: unpaged)

The tension is not just palpable, it is already causing harm to intra-ethnic relations, and setback to the healing and reconstruction efforts in post-war Northern Uganda.

Within the two decades that the war in Northern Uganda lasted, gross acts of inhumanity were also taking place in nearby Sudan, Rwanda and Somalia and many other African and non-African nations. Though belatedly in some cases, the world's attention was drawn to these neighbouring states. Not much was heard in the international media on the war in Northern Uganda (Temmerman, 2009). It is not a surprise therefore that the post-war conflicts do not make it to the screens or pages of international media. What is worth explaining, nonetheless, is why the conflicts are also largely under-reported by the media in Uganda.

The Media in UgandaAs it was with most African countries south of the Sahara, the missionaries made the earliest attempt at publishing a newspaper or periodical in Uganda. In 1897, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) began an English-language mimeograph, which later became a printed periodical. In 1907, the CMS also established Ebifa Mu Uganda (literally, News from Uganda, a fortnight publication in Lugand, an indigenous language in Uganda. The Roman Catholic church established Muno (The Friend) in 1911. This was followed by The Uganda Herald in 1912 (Matovu, 1990; Acayo & Mnjama, 2004). The aim of these early papers was to meet the information needs of expatriates and promote literacy and evangelisation among the natives.

The 1920s witnessed the rise of many indigenous newspapers. These included Matalisi (The Messenger) founded in 1923; Gambuze (What is News) and Dobozi Lya Buganda (Voice of Uganda) both founded in 1927. Others published later included Mugobasonga (Followers of Reason)


in 1948; Mwebingwa in 1953, Uganda Empya (News in Uganda) in 1953 and Uganda Mail in 1954. Uganda Argus, founded in 1955 "became the linear predecessor of today's New Vision" (Sunrise, 2012). A complete list of all newspapers in Uganda today is difficult to find as there are many publications going by the term 'newspaper'. The major ones include Daily Monitor, New Vision, The Star, Taifa Uganda Empya, Ngabo, The Citizens, Munnansi, Focus and Independent Observer. There are also online newspapers established by Ugandans. These include Acholi Times.

The history of broadcasting in Uganda is different from that of print media summed up in the preceding paragraphs but it is essentially similar to that of broadcasting in many other African countries. The British colonial administration established the Uganda Broadcasting Services (UBS) in 1954 which broadcast evening programmes in English and four indigenous languages (Matovu, 1990). At weekends, programmes in other Ugandan languages and Hindustani were added. When Uganda attained independence in 1962, UBS was renamed Radio Uganda and came under the total control of government. Private radio broadcasting began in 1993 and today, there are over 250 private radio stations in Uganda (Sunrise, 2012).

Television broadcasting began in 1963 when the Uganda Television Service was established. As one should expect, it was predominantly a tool of government propaganda. But then its influence was also felt in the area of educational broadcasting. As Matovu (1990) pointed out, the impact of television broadcasting in Uganda was impeded in those days because about 90% of the population did not have electricity. Consequently, about half of those watching television in those days were Europeans living in Uganda.

On the surface, the media landscape in Uganda is dotted by multiple actors and is indeed facilitative of diversity of voices and opinions. Beneath the surface, however, the landscape is narrower than it seems. About 90% of newspapers, radio and


television outlets are owned by only two groups. First is The Vision Group. This is the owner of the New Vision Printing and Publishing Corporation, publisher of the most widely circulated newspaper, New Vision. The group also owns five FM stations (Vision Voice, Bukedde FM, Radio West, Etop Radio and Radio Rupiny). It owns the Bukedde TV, and several indigenous language newspapers. The Vision Group is under the firm control of government which holds the major share (OSIEA, 2010).

The second group is the Nation Media Group based in Nairobi, Kenya. Eighty percent of the shares in this group belongs to the Aga Khan Foundation for Economic Development. The group acquired The Monitor, the second most-widely circulated daily newspaper in Uganda. On the stable of the group are Daily Monitor, Saturday Monitor, Sunday Monitor and Monitor Business Directory. The group also owns KFM Radio and a vast business empire that deals in banking, insurance, real estate, power generation, hotels and airlines (OSIEA, 2010).

There are privately owned newspapers also: The Red Pepper, The Observer and the Independent belong here. However, if circulation figures are anything to go by, the two mega-groups, one government, the other business, determine 81.5% of what Ugandans read. The independents supply only 18.5% of the information offered in the print media (See OSIEA, 2010:29).

Predicting Media Silence: Theory and LiteratureBasic news reporting classes often begin with definitions of news and criteria for deciding newsworthiness. An event is newsworthy, in other words, the media cannot keep silence over it, if it possesses oddity, impact or consequence, conflict, magnitude or proximity to the audience of the media. Human interests, entertainment, timelessness and involvement of prominent persons are the other criteria that, if an event possesses, the media must notice and report on such an event. The more of these features that an event possesses, the


greater is the likelihood that it will be reported by the media (Elders, 2006; Shoemaker, 2006).

McManus (2002), however, reduced all of these criteria to a theoretical phrase: the journalistic theory of news production. According to him, "the probability of an event or issue becoming news is proportional to the expected consequence of the story and proportional to the size of the audience for whom it is important" (McManus, 2002:272). The nine criteria for news selection are summed up between these two: expected consequence and audience rating of the event as important. This, however, is one wing of the flight.

The market theory of news production, according to McManus (2002) is the second wing. Market considerations have become a major criterion in the neo-liberal news-as-a-commodity world of journalism. News organisations are also business corporations which are rating-driven, that is, profit-driven. They are also beholden to advertisers for revenue, in fact, for survival. The interest of the market and the cost of uncovering and reporting an event are important considerations in the market theory. McManus sums up this into an understandably winding theoretical statement:

the probability of an event or issue becoming news is inversely proportional to the harm the information might cause investors or sponsors, inversely proportional to the cost of uncovering it, and inversely proportional to the cost of reporting it, and directly proportional to the expected breadth of appeal of the story to audiences and advertisers will pay to reach (McManus, 2002: 272)

It is not enough, therefore, for an event to be of impact or consequence, or to have the audience approval as being important. Reporting it must be economically justifiable in terms of cost of reporting, and be incapable of hurting the business interests of advertisers, patrons and sponsors.

With particular reference to the three phases of conflict,


Jakobsen (2000) added a new set of criteria that might help explain media silence on conflicts. According to him, the phase of the conflict determines whether the media report an issue or not. The media often ignore events in the pre-violence stage. "The media always fails to take an interest in conflicts before violence or mass starvation kills a large number of people … preventive successes are invisible" (Jakobsen, 2000:132, 133).

At the violence phase, when the crisis reaches a cataclysmic stage, the media report on it but even that is not automatic: "a trigger event such as an exodus of refugees or a massacre is usually required and the crisis must be photogenic and dramatic: a short bloody war…" (Jakobsen, 2000:137). According to Jakobsen (2000), this explains why Somalia, and not Sudan, got media attention in 1991 though Sudan was going through a worse humanitarian crisis.

The post-violence phase, like the pre-violence phase, gets little or no media attention. When media report on this phase, it often has to do with corruption, fraud and mismanagement, and lack of meaningful evaluation criteria in the post-conflict rehabilitation project.

In addition to the newsworthiness of the event, the market and the phase of violence, the journalists' socio-cultural background may also determine whether or not they are silent over an issue. Sonwalkar (2004) argues that selectivity is built into the news selection process, and that journalists often ask if an event interests them personally before reporting on it. In his views, journalists are drawn from the mainstream of the society, not often from the economic, political or ethnic minorities. Their reports often bear explicit allegiance to the mainstream from which they were chosen. The editorial "we" and "them", according to him, are visible in news and reports as well. An event is likely to get a journalist's attention if it concerns "we" and not "them"; if it concerns the "right" perpetrators or victims.


The foregoing predictors of media silence over an event can be summed up into four: intrinsic news worthiness of the event; interests of the market, that is, sponsors, advertisers, and media owners; the phase of violence being considered, and the journalist's socio-cultural background. In the section that follows, we attempt to interrogate media silence on the post-war conflicts in Northern Uganda from these lenses.

Media Silence on Northern Uganda Post-war ConflictsAgainst the foregoing theoretical background intrudes a set of questions: to what extent can the journalistic notion of newsworthiness; the economic notion of newsworthiness; the phase of violence notion; and journalists' background explain media silence on the post-war conflicts in Northern Uganda? If these fail to explain the silence, what factors do?

Most of the post-war conflict events in Northern Uganda possess many of the criteria for newsworthiness. The land-related disputes that continue to create tension and outbursts of violence affect over a million people in Gulu, Lango and Teso districts. In 2011, two people were killed in land related disputes; in 2012, the figure rose to five (IRIN, 2012). Occasional outbursts of violence among individuals and villages are on the rise. In a study by Rugadya, Nsamba-Gayiiya and Kamusiime (2008), it is reported that 85% had experienced threats to land tenure security, and 59% felt the threat was significant. Land-dispute cases at the Lira Circuit Tribunal rose from 189 in 2006 to 239 in 2007, and only 22 of these cases were resolved thus suggesting a rising rate of discontent and anger (Rugadya et al, 2008). As a result of these conflicts, the poverty gap between the north and the rest of the country continues to widen. Put in journalistic terms, the events have magnitude and impact. They are also conflictive and possess proximity to a large number of Ugandans.

From a market perspective, could reporting the post-war conflicts in Northern Uganda harm the interests of investors, media sponsors and advertisers? A direct answer to this is


difficult. A strong inference is that reporting the events might not be in the interests of investors, sponsors and advertisers. To this list must be added some media owners who are also businesspersons. Studies and comments on the land-related conflicts in the concerned region showed that leading local and international businesspersons were the beneficiaries of land-grabbing acts in Northern Uganda (Rugadya et al, 2008; Akena & Lawino, 2012; IRIN, 2012; Lawino, 2012).

In addition to this, the cost of uncovering the stories and reporting them might be considered high. Cost should be understood to include the actual cash cost as well as the cost in political goodwill to the newspaper establishment. Although the appeal to the audience may be broad, potential harm to the interests of sponsors and advertisers as well as cost may be part of the reasons why the media in Uganda have largely ignored the post-war conflicts in Northern Uganda.

Northern Uganda is in a post-war stage. From the 'phase of violence' perspective, one expects that media attention should begin to wane (Jakobsen, 2000). Jakobsen however misses the point that post-war situations are themselves sometimes marked with violence. The post-war situation in Uganda is marked with occasional eruption of violence leading at times to destruction of lives and property. Therefore, if, as 'phase of violence' notion claims, violence makes news irresistible to journalists, the notion then does not explain the silence over the post-war problems in Northern Uganda.

Journalists' socio-cultural background also hardly explains the silence. Although the Acholi are in the minority, about 5% of the Ugandan population, there are Acholi journalists in many media organisations who could have used their position to report on the problems in the North. We agree with Sonwalkar (2004) that journalists indeed make personal choices but disagree on the influence of journalist's socio-cultural background as the main basis for the choices. As we argue later, the choices are the result of contextual factors at


work in Uganda.

The foregoing makes it difficult to explain media silence on the post-war conflict in terms of journalistic theory of newsworthiness or the 'phase of violence' notion. Only the market theory holds some promise in this regard. More than this, we argue, the legal, administrative and other contexts in Uganda in which the journalists work explain the silence more clearly.

Press Un-freedom as Reason for Ugandan Media SilenceJournalists in Uganda operate in a legally ambivalent and paradoxical situation. The Constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of the media but another body of enactments severely limits this freedom. Article 29(1)(a) of the Ugandan Constitution clearly guarantees press freedom and free expression: "Every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media". Article 41 reinforces this further:

1) Every citizen has a right of access to information in the possession of the State or any other organ or agency of the State except where the release of the information is likely to prejudice the security or sovereignty of the State or interfere with the right to the privacy of any other person;

2) Parliament shall make laws prescribing the classes of information referred to in clause (1) of this article and the procedure for obtaining access to that information.

Article 43 also states that in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed in this Chapter, no person shall prejudice the fundamental or other human rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.

Contrary to the foregoing provision, there exist several repressive laws in Uganda that limit press freedom severely. Among these is the Press and Journalist Act (2000) (formerly Statute 1995) which “seeks to ensure the freedom of the


Press, to provide for a Council responsible for the regulation of mass media, to establish an Institute of Journalists of Uganda, and to repeal the Newspaper and Publications Act and the Press Censorship and Correction Act”. The Act gives the government power to determine who can be a journalist in Uganda, by compelling journalists to register with the government-owned Media Council which issues practising certificates. The certificate may be suspended for up to six months if a journalist is “guilty” of “professional misconduct”. The minister of information is responsible for appointing members of the Media Council.

As it ordinarily was, the Act became a source of fear to many journalists. To make it even more draconian, government began the process of introducing an amendment in 2010. The proposed amendment attracted widespread condemnation from local and international individuals, organisations and governments including Swedish government and US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, (See, for instance, Kavuma, 2010; Ojebode, 2010; Evans, 2012; Kavuma, 2012) yet the government has not given up on it. When amended, the Act will require annual re-accreditation (or registration) of media organisations with government, implying that media organisations critical of government will lose re-accreditation.

Professional misconduct, it has been observed, includes publishing issues harmful to national security, stability, unity, the relationship with friendly countries, or that amount to economic sabotage. In interviews conducted across sections of Ugandan population, African Media Barometer (2012) found that issues of oil, land grabbing and presidential terms are the ones that are considered sensitive and forbidden for discussion in the media (AMB, 2012:13). Discussing them may be interpreted as capable of causing economic sabotage, and even threatening national security.

Other legislations that restrict press freedom include the Regulation of the Interception of Communications Act of


2010 which allows authorities to monitor and intercept telecommunication in the country; and the Anti-terrorism Act of 2002 which criminalises publication of information that promotes terrorism – a nebulous term indeed. Certain sections of the old Penal Code (1950) as amended in 2007, especially Section 41, come in handy in limiting press freedom. That section criminalises printing, publishing, making or uttering any statement or performing any act which is likely to (a) degrade, revile or expose to hatred or contempt; (b) create alienation or despondency of; (c) raise discontent or disaffection among; or (d) promote, in any other way, feelings of ill will or hostility among or against any group or body of persons on account of religion, tribe or ethnic or regional origin …". These terms are as defined by government.

In addition to enacting these repressive legislations, the government has instituted an elaborate administrative and enforcement structure to ensure that the laws have a bite. According to African Media Barometer (2012:13), there is the evidence collection department of the police whose "members carry cameras to gather evidence, mainly during riots and other disturbances, in order to make a case against troublemakers". These troublemakers often include presspersons covering the events.

Another enforcement organ is the Media Offences Unit of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), which specifically analyses media reports and footage to see if media contravene laws and regulations. There are also Resident District Commissioners (RDC's) and Gombolola Internal Security Officers (GISO's), who monitor media and journalists working in their respective areas (African Media Barometer, 2012:13).Taken together, the legal environment in Uganda and the unwritten declaration of land and oil matters as sensitive 'no-go' areas make it unreasonable for journalists to want to report on the post-war conflicts in Northern Uganda. Journalists no doubt exercise personal choices, but these choices are conditioned by the narrow elbowroom created by repressive legislations, rather than by socio-cultural and


ethnic considerations.

Unsafe Journalism as Reason for Media SilenceOwing to relentless enforcement of repressive legislations and extrajudicial actions of law enforcement agents in Uganda, the atmosphere is that of fear. An interviewee of the African Media Barometer (2012:14) says:

If you look at the level of fear today compared with 2010, I think we have reached peak levels.… People are paralysed. There is a sense of hopelessness, which turns to apathy. It is still expressed sometimes in spurts of anger.

The fear is not unfounded. Many journalists have in recent times been harassed, beaten even shot by soldiers and police in Uganda. Victims include Julius Odeke who was shot by soldiers in February 2011 while covering election-related violence in Eastern Uganda. Odeke was taking photographs of soldiers manhandling an opposition candidate. Freedom House (2012) reports several other occurrences: Radio Simba journalist, Christine Nabatanzi was shot in the leg while covering the walk to work protests in Kampala. At least ten foreign journalists were also attacked while covering the return of the brutalised and hospitalised opposition leader, Kizza Besigye on May 12, 2011. Journalists covering the leader of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change were also beaten on March 28, 2012, and their cameras were seized. One of them, Lubwama Siraje, alleged: "they beat me, and stole one of my mobile phones and Shs 150,000" (CIME, 2012). The Centre for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ) reported 21 cases of brutal attacks on journalists in 2011 alone (CPJ, 2012).

Radio stations and newspaper organisations have also been shut down by government. In 2009, for instance, government shut down four radio stations for inciting civil unrest and protests in which several people were shot dead. The Daily Monitor and its sister FM station, KFM, have at different times been shut down by invading government security


officials (Africa Media Barometer, 2012).

Occasionally, government was quite civil, taking journalists and their organisations to court or media tribunals, but the lopsidedness of the cases shows government partiality in favour of its praise-singing journalists and their organisations. In an interview with Africa Media Barometer, Paul Mukasa of the Media Council said its council had heard 53 cases filed by the police against media organisations. Of these, 39 were against The Red Pepper, nine against The Monitor, three against The Observer but only one against The New Vision – a government-controlled newspaper.

These instances show that the repressive legislations against press freedom in Uganda are not impotent scare tactics. Government enforces them. Given the generally anti-press atmosphere, security agents also freely take the law into their hands in dealing with journalists. If anyone was in doubt that government meant business, the Ugandan Minister of Information in 2009, Kabakumba Masiko made it clear. As reported by Kavuma (2010), Minister Masiko told journalists and religious leaders:

All media content falls under my mandate, therefore, make sure that your content promotes government programmes. Stick to your mission and vision … leave politics to politicians, or be ready to bear the consequences.

These categorical statements show how much government was prepared to control opinion in Uganda. They also show why reporting on matters classified as sensitive, matters such as oil and land, might be considered not just as unsupportive of government but also suicidal.

Survival Tactics: Not Saying 'Land'Though newsworthy events occur in the North, it is almost impossible for Ugandan journalists to report it because these events are connected to forbidden subjects: land and oil. "Right now, the issues of oil and land grabbing are the ones


that elicit fear," (African Media Barometer interviewee, 2012:13). Journalists have devised tactics for coping with the situation.

First is to stay off writing or talking about land issues especially in Northern Uganda. Instead, journalists focus on soft topics and 'development' issues such as agriculture and weather. Another interviewee of the African Media Barometer, a journalist, says:

If you publish everyday news about agriculture you can get your paper out, but no one will buy it. But if you touch anything that is politics, you will get phone calls, your calls will be tapped. I don't think there is much restriction on starting a paper if you don't touch politics. (African Media Barometer, 2012:16)

Another journalist whose words we quoted at the opening of this article confirms this survival strategy. Covering the opposition seems to be another assignment that journalists would like to stay away from in Uganda (Africa Media Barometer, 2012; CIME, 2012; CPJ, 2012).

There is thus an increase in the number of jocular disc jockeys known generally for innocuous entertainment, as well as increase in tabloidisation in the print media sector. Employers are also said to be laying off critical journalists and employing pliant ones (Evans, 2012; Freedom House, 2012).

Harassment is not as frequent in the cities as it is in the rural areas. In the countryside, government's popularity curve drops sharply and government's monitors are more determined to please those who appointed them (Africa Media Barometer, 2012; Kavuma, 2012). Given that in the rural area, radio is patronised more than any other medium, working for a radio station in the rural areas puts a journalist in the constant radar of government media monitors. About 85% of Ugandans live in rural areas, meaning that these are served only the information that pleases the government.


The survival tactics employed by journalists can be summarised as staying off sensitive subjects such as land and oil, staying off politics, staying off rural radio. Many observers opine that an increasing number of journalists are adopting this method, thus obeying Information Minister Masiko's injunctions.

ConclusionPure journalistic news judgement, the influence of the market or the 'phase of violence' notion does not explain the silence of Ugandan media on the post-war land-related bloodshed and tension that go on in Northern Uganda. What does is the atmosphere of fear and actual harassment, maiming and murder of journalists that pervade the Ugandan society. Discussing land (and oil) is forbidden in the media and those who violate government stipulations should be "ready to bear the consequences". The way to peace is to, inter alia, "never say land".

What implications does this have for the future of Northern Uganda especially the post-war reconciliation and development process? Media silence on the events in Northern Uganda creates the false impression that life goes on normally and that reconciliation, reconstruction, development and healing are well underway, whereas reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts are sometimes halted by bitter land-related rancour. The region is sitting on a time bomb ticking by the second towards explosion. Yet, the media are unable to draw attention to this impending danger and so preventive measures are not being taken.

In addition to land disputes leading to violence, media silence in itself can lead to violence in Northern Uganda. Invisibility in the media has been known to cause erratic and irrational conduct capable of attracting media attention (Ojebode & Akinleye, 2009).

That government expends much energy and resources on curtailing media freedom says something about the power of


the media in Uganda. It implies a clear belief by government that the media in Uganda can educate and influence the populace and cause disaffection. Government domineering presence in the broadcast sector and control of the most widely circulated newspaper notwithstanding, the media landscape in Uganda still parades a sufficient quantum of critical press that has to be pocketed by draconian rules. Pro-press freedom groups, such as the Article 29 Coalition, must work hard to ensure that the press is released from the cage in which it is.

The state of the media in Uganda is unhealthy for the nation's democracy. Democracy thrives on diversity of voices and ideology. It is not periodic elections or representation or majority rule that qualifies a nation for the democratic appellation; what does is the freedom of citizens to engage their representatives in ongoing discussion and accountability debates in the kind of sphere provided by a free media. With the growing narrowing of the scope of freedom of expression in Uganda, the nation cannot progress towards the entrenchment of democratic values and culture.Our analysis has implications for theorising media and democracy in Africa. We have seen the inadequacies of received (Western) explanations of media attention or silence in explaining the situation in Northern Uganda. Theorising media in Africa must take into account the nature and structure of democracy in the concerned nations. State and institutional fragility, journalists' professional competence and elbowroom, and ability of free speech advocates to stand against dictatorial tendencies should be considered in conducting normative or heuristic evaluation of the media in Africa.

Still on the inadequacies of received models, we would add that the situation in Uganda is theoretically incongruent in view of the three corners of liberal democratic thinking. Democracy is said to require political pluralism, economic liberalism and press freedom. These three are said to be mutually reinforcing. In Uganda, economic liberalism seems


to be progressing, press freedom is shrinking while political pluralism exists only by claim. The political terrain remains too slippery for potent opposition in most cases.

Our final question is: what else should the media realistically expect in the pseudo-democratic context that exists in Uganda? President Museveni has been ruler since 1986 and has the constitutional guarantee to continue to be ruler for as long as he wishes. As a new ruler, he was an advocate of press freedom and created the atmosphere in which private media multiplied. Both he and the media were friends for some time. However, the clearer it was that Museveni was another sit-tight ruler, the more strained his relationship with the press became. Free press is usually the first casualty in the quest for perpetual reign by dictators. The relationship between the press and government in Uganda promises to remain strained for a long time to come.

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"NEVER AGAIN SAY 'LAND!'": UNDERSTANDING MEDIA SILENCE ON POST-WAR CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA

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