National trajectories of carbon emissions: analysis of proposals to foster the transition to...

Global Environmental Change, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 183—208, 1998( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain0959-3780/98 $19.00#0.00PII: S0959-3780(98)00013-2

National trajectoriesof carbon emissions:analysis of proposals tofoster the transition tolow-carbon economies

Ann P. Kinzig and Daniel M. Kammen

In this paper we develop a framework for ana-lyzing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions trajec-tories from the energy and industrial sectorsof the world’s nations under various policyoptions. A robust conclusion of our analysisis that early action by both developed anddeveloping nations will be required to holdatmospheric CO2 at or below doubled pre-in-dustrial levels, and incentives for renewedinvestments in energy-sector technologiesare a required component of early action.We therefore develop and examine an inter-national emissions regime that: (a) in theshort-term ‘jump starts’ the political and pro-ject-implementation process by providingincentives to exploit profitable or low-costcarbon reduction opportunities; (b) in thenear- and medium-term addresses the inequi-ties resulting from historic imbalances ingreenhouse-gas emissions while promotingefficient pathways for carbon reduction; and(c) in the long-term recognizes the equalrights of individuals to exploit the services ofthe atmosphere and pursue a reasonablestandard of living in a low-carbon economy.We present and analyze a proposal to pro-mote near-term activity in carbon reductionand energy innovation through a revitalizedprogram of international joint implementation(JI) projects for carbon emissions reductionor carbon sequestration projects. Under ourproposal, JI partner nations both receive fullcredit for carbon reductions that can be‘banked’ and applied at a later date towardnational emissions quotas in the climate con-vention. A finite program lifetime providesfurther impetus for early action. This ‘doublecounting’ of credits results in only modestadditional cumulative carbon emissions rela-tive to a similar scenario without cooperativepartnerships. This ‘JI banking’ plan promotes

continued on page 2

Introduction

In this paper we develop a framework to analyze and compare cumulativenational and global aggregate emissions of carbon dioxide (CO

2) under

a variety of proposed and envisioned international policy agreements suchas those under consideration in the ongoing Framework Convention onClimate Change (FCCC) negotiations. A robust result of our analysis isthat early action by both developed and developing nations is required tostabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO

2at or below doubled pre-

industrial levels. The recent Conference of the Parties to the FCCC(COP-3) held in Kyoto, Japan, provides an important but modest begin-ning towards binding agreements that would meaningfully curtail green-house-gas emissions (Macilwain, 1997; BNA, 1997). Ratification of thistreaty, however, is uncertain. In addition, longer-term reductions in car-bon emissions (beyond the period currently covered in the Kyoto agree-ment) will require technological innovation, which in turn depends onincreased commitments to energy research and development (R&D) anddemonstration and commercialization (D&C). The recent record in mostindustrialized nations, however, is of decreased rather than increasedinvestments in energy R&D (PCAST, 1997).

In the next section, we analyze the potential for significant near-termgrowth in carbon dioxide emissions, and summarize potential interna-tional goals for stabilization of atmospheric CO

2.1 In the third section, we

analyze commitments to research, development, and deployment of en-ergy-sector technologies that will be required in a CO

2-constrained world,

and demonstrate that current commitments are not yet sufficient to meetthe challenge of greenhouse-gas reductions required in the coming cen-tury. In the fourth section we examine the rationale and the impacts ofa treaty that limits global CO

2emissions to levels of 2—3 Gt(C) per year

(109 metric tonnes of carbon), significantly below the current level of about6 Gt(C) per year. We also present an analysis that strongly suggests that inthe long term, equity in per person emissions rights is both the most

183

natural and least cumbersome basis for an international agreement, and isethically the most logical goal.

In the fifth section we develop a model for the emissions trajectories ofgroups of nations based on current emissions and possible long-termtargets. We use this model to explore basic features of an equitable andefficient low-carbon global economy that could be achieved by the end ofthe next century. In the sixth section we analyze a proposal that addressesboth the need for near-term action on the part of developing and de-veloped nations towards mitigating greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions andthe need for significant investments in developing and deploying new,low-carbon energy-sector technologies. In particular, we propose that theinternational community initiate early action to mitigate GHG emissionsthrough a new program of cooperative ventures, in which developednations provide funds and resources for carbon savings in developingnations. Our proposal provides incentives for early participation on thepart of developing nations by allowing the ‘banking’ of emissions creditsuntil a later time period, when emissions limits may be required. More-over, these cooperative ventures provide the critical impetus for invest-ments in innovation in low-carbon energy technologies, as well as ‘on theground’ experience in technology deployment and cooperative exchanges.In the seventh section we evaluate this proposal in the context of currentpolicies to foster bilateral jointly implemented carbon-reduction projects,and conclude with a discussion of the political environment in whicha climate treaty must be developed.

Atmospheric CO2 concentrations

The Framework Convention on Climate Change calls for limiting atmo-spheric GHG concentrations to a ‘level that would prevent dangerousanthropogenic interference with the climate system’. There are conflictingdefinitions of what level of greenhouse-gas emissions may be considereddangerous, and we make no attempt to resolve that debate here. A consen-sus is developing among many scientists, however, that even a doubling ofatmospheric CO

2concentrations from the pre-industrial levels of about

280 ppmv (parts per million by volume) will have far-reaching impacts(Wigley, 1997). A doubling of atmospheric CO

2concentration is expected

to result in a mean global temperature increase of 1.5—4.5°C, and couldresult in a sea-level rise of up to 1 m by 2100, increased severity of storms,and shifts in agricultural belts (IPCC, 1996a,b; Mahlman, 1997). In addition,increasing atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations increases the po-tential for catastrophic climatic events such as a reduction in the oceanicthermohaline circulation or the collapse of large portions of the Antarcticice sheets (IPCC 1996b; Doake et al., 1998). Our analyses and proposalsare therefore aimed at limiting the maximum atmospheric concentrationof CO

2to roughly 450 ppmv, short of a doubling of atmospheric CO

2. For

comparison, we also analyze scenarios in which global atmospheric CO2

rises to double its preindustrial value, stabilizing at 550 ppmv.Stabilizing atmospheric CO

2concentrations at 450 ppmv requires con-

straining global cumulative emissions between 1990 and 2100 to about630 Gt(C) (630]109 metric tonnes of carbon) (IPCC, 1996a). These cumu-lative emissions would include contributions from fossil-fuel burning,cement production, non-renewable uses of forest products, and otheremissions from the biosphere. In the future, the terrestrial biosphere is

continued from page 1critically needed scientific and institutionalexperience and innovation, initiates cost-ef-fective carbon reductions, and provides vitalnational flexibility in meeting eventual tar-gets. 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rightsreserved.

Keywords: Framework Convention on ClimateChange, Joint Implementation, carbon emis-sions, energy R&D, equity

A P Kinzig is with the Department of Ecology andEvolutionary Biology and Princeton Environ-mental Institute and D M Kammen is with theScience, Technology and Environmental PolicyProgram, Woodrow Wilson School of Public andInternational Affairs, Princeton University, Prin-ceton, NJ 08544, USA. As of 1 August 1998, APKis with the Department of Biology, Arizona StateUniversity, Tempe, AZ 85287. E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected].

1 We concentrate on CO2 here because it is themost important of the anthropogenically produc-ed greenhouse gases in terms of its impact onradiative forcing.

National trajectories of carbon emissions: A P Kinzig and D M Kammen

184

Table 1 Energy-Technology R&D in the G-7 nations from 1985 to 1995 (millions of 1997 U.S.dollars, converted from national currencies at 1995 exchange rates). Taken from PCAST 1997.

Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA1985 491 NAa 1663 1190 4558 741 23501995 250 704 375 303 4934 87 1800

a Data are available only from 1990, but spending in real dollars has declined from 1990 to 1995.

expected to release carbon as forests are negatively affected by changes inclimate or land conversion for agricultural and other activities (Tans et al.,1995; Ciais et al., 1995; IPCC, 1996a). This forest dieback or degradationcould potentially contribute 10—100 Gt(C) to the atmosphere in thecoming century (IPCC, 1996a). Thus, we assume that industrial CO

2emissions need to be limited to at most 600 Gt(C) between 1990 and 2100 ifatmospheric concentrations are to be held to 450 ppmv. The correspond-ing number for stabilization at 550 ppmv would be 800 Gt(C).

In addition to the constraints on cumulative CO2

emissions, stabilizingatmospheric CO

2concentrations to 450 ppmv requires achieving annual

emissions of about 2 Gt(C) per year by the end of the next century (or4 Gt(C) per year for stabilization at 550 ppmv) (IPCC, 1996a). In contrast,current global industrial emissions2 are about 6 Gt(C) per year. Further-more, emissions from developing nations are growing at about 4.6% peryear, and emissions from OECD nations are expected to increase by 11%between 1990 and 2000 (Goldemberg, 1997a). Under a Business-As-Usual(BAU) scenario, global cumulative emissions between 1990 and 2100would be well in excess of 1500 Gt(C), and annual emissions could stand atover 20 Gt(C) per year by the end of the next century (IPCC, 1990).

Investments in energy-technology development and deployment

Since climate change depends more on cumulative emissions over the nextcentury than it does on the timing of those emissions, immediate, draco-nian action does not appear to be required to stabilize atmospheric CO

2concentrations at or below doubled pre-industrial levels. Modest reduc-tions today, however, will need to be followed by more significant reduc-tions in the future. Thus, the requisite steps need to be taken to promoteenergy-technology research and development, and acquire needed experi-ence with new technologies through market penetration, pilot projects,and large-scale commercialization. The record is, however, not encourag-ing in this regard; recent investments in energy R&D have been decreasingrather than increasing in many of the industrialized nations.

Funding for energy-technology research and development has declineddramatically in all of the G-7 countries except Japan from 1985 to 1995(see Table 1). As a fraction of GDP, federal energy R&D funding in theUnited States is at its lowest point in 30 years (PCAST, 1997), withinvestment in renewables less than one-fifth the level of a decade and a halfago. Total reported International Energy Agency funding for renewable-energy R&D has declined by over 30% from 1984 to 1994 (Reddy et al.,1997). This decline in funding may slow the dissemination of renewable-energy technologies, as has been observed for other technologies (Williamsand Terzian, 1995). Consider, for example, the correlation between de-clines in U.S. funding for photovoltaics (PV) and the decline in the rate ofincrease of deployed PV energy systems worldwide (Figure 1). Shortly

2 In this paper we use ‘industrial’ to include energyproduction, manufacturing, residential uses offossil-fuel energy, and energy used in transporta-tion.


185

Figure 1. Comparison of US federalexpenditures on research and devel-opment of photovoltaic (PV) cells andsystems, and global sales of PV mod-ules. Sales of PV modules increasedat &70%/yr until 1983, and then de-creased to only 16%/yr. This transitionis certainly due to a number of factors,but the transition strongly correlateswith the precipitous decline in PV R&D(source: Williams and Terzian, 1995).

after U.S. investments fell, the overall growth rate in PV unit salesdecreased dramatically, from 70% to 16%.3

Even if policies are implemented to accelerate rates of investmentand thus innovation in R&D and demonstration and commercial-ization (D&C), replacement of existing technologies with advanced-fossil or renewable-energy technologies may take decades if nationswait to retire existing technologies at the end of their useful lifetimes (seeTable 2). This provides a further incentive to initiate these policies at theearliest possible date, particularly because a number of recent studies havefound that the transition to efficiency in energy generation, distribution,and use can, in fact, be achieved today at negative cost (Hayes and Smith,1993).

Renewable energy technologies provide needed energy services withlittle or no carbon emissions. The main drawback of many solar, wind, andbiomass systems has always been high cost relative to fossil-fuel alterna-tives. While the cost of a pilot facility, or initial commercial unit of a newtechnology, is always likely to be greater than existing options, this neednot be true over the longer term. Multiple studies demonstrate that the‘learning curve’ effect, where reductions in per unit cost decrease roughly20% for each doubling of cumulative production (Williams, 1997; Reddyet al., 1997) apply to a wide range of renewable energy technologies.Further, an international regime would have the financial resources toamortize per unit costs of new solar, biomass, or other technologies overthe first several systems instead of looking exclusively at the costs asso-ciated with the pilot plant or initial commercial units. This sort of for-ward-costing strategy would make many renewables close to, or onlymarginally more expensive than, fossil-fuel alternatives, and the costcomparisons become even more attractive when the environmental costsof fossil-fuel-based energy are included. Finally, while the current ‘Action

Table 2 Turnover times for some energysupply and end-use technologies (taken inpart from PCAST 1997).

Industrial process equipment 3–20 yearsPhotovoltaic panel systems 3–20 yearsHome appliances 5–15 yearsElectric power plants 30–50a yearsResidential and commercial 50–100a yearsbuildings

a Although the turnover times for these large in-stallations may run into decades, some of thesubsystems may be replaced on shorter timescales.

3 The capacity to utilize investments in R&D isparticularly sensitive to the availability of humanand infrastructure resources, which are charac-teristically lost when large lay-offs take placein response to funding cuts (Branscomb, 1993;Zinberg, 1993; Kammen and Dove, 1997).


186

Implemented Jointly’ (AIJ) pilot projects, administered under the GlobalEnvironmental Facility (GEF) for the purposes of reducing global netCO

2emissions, could be used to gain early experience in deploying

alternative energy technologies, all but two of the 20 projects registered asof 1996 were in the forestry, rather than the energy, sector (Harvey andBush, 1997; Goldemberg, 1997b)4.

The cost of delaying action on climate change mitigation is potentiallyoverwhelming in terms of the economic, technological, and inevitablysocial resources that would need to be mobilized in order to facilitate themore rapid transition to a low-carbon economy necessitated by sucha delay. This will be particularly true if the current period of modest orminimal reductions is not accompanied by the technological and institu-tional development required to facilitate the necessary reductions later.Moreover, the potential for significant growth in industrial CO

2emissions

in the developing nations in the next 20 years suggests that these nationsmust participate in the GHG-reduction process sooner rather than later.Thus, near-term agreements for reducing GHG emissions must emphasizethe need for early global participation, and the need for the technologicaland institutional investments that will permit more gradual and palatableemissions reductions later.

The basics of an equitable and efficient agreement

Reformulating the global economy to operate with an annual carbonemissions budget of 2—3 Gt(C) will unquestionably require innovation,cooperation, and incentives for both public and private sector institutions.As the basis for discussion, modeling, and the formulation of a workinginternational accord, the simplest framework is to base carbon emissionson equal per capita rights. We further believe that compelling political,institutional, and moral arguments exist to warrant this goal of equity;individuals should have equal rights to the carbon capacity of the atmo-sphere, and thus equal individual rights to emit CO

2. A growing number of

people and organizations have called for carbon emissions agreements tobe based on equity (e.g. Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Swisher and Masters,1992; Ridgley, 1996; Westra, 1996; Global Commons Institute, 1997;Masood, 1997; Reid, and Goldemberg, 1997; Byrne et al., 1998).5 Thetransition from the current distribution to an equitable one will, however,require some time.

The 2 Gt(C) per year emissions limit required to stabilize atmosphericCO

2to 450 ppmv requires not only significant carbon-reduction commit-

ments by developed nations today, but also necessitates emissions mitiga-tion by developing nations sooner rather than later, since many of thesenations are already above the 0.2 tonne (C) annual per capita emissionsthat could be permitted under a probable future world population ofabout 10 billion people (World Population Prospects, 1995). Thistransition to a low-carbon global economy will require that the interna-tional community address the historic national imbalances in GHG emis-sions, and partially redistribute the benefits that have accrued to thosenations whose industrial activities are responsible for the majority oftoday’s anthropogenically derived atmospheric CO

2stocks. The

transition should also guard against rewards for high population growthby using median population projections to allocate emissions quotas inthe next century. Thus, population growth in ‘excess’ of that which could

4 Since 1996 a number of new energy efficiencyand renewable energy projects have been in-itiated under AIJ. The energy-efficiency projects,however, have primarily been deployed in theAnnex I(a) nations (former centrally plannedeconomies); energy projects in developing na-tions are primarily hydroelectric projects (ratherthan efficiency, solar, biomass, wind, or ad-vanced fossil-fuel), and there is still a greateremphasis on forestry rather than energy projectsin the developing nations.5 Even if equity is not adopted, the per capitatarget is a natural basis for discussion and policyanalysis.


187

be reasonably achieved with suitable health, education, and family-plann-ing policies would be effectively discounted, and increased emissions forlarger populations would only accrue in the distant future.

The goal of equity by the end of the next century will increase thelegitimacy of any climate agreement. Chronic and institutionalized in-equity, on the other hand, will limit the ability of developing nations toadvance their economies and improve the well being of the populace,which could result in increased conflict over resources, population dis-placement due to environmental degradation, and more rapidly spreadingand broadly distributed diseases. These phenomena would have negativeglobal consequences. The advantages of equitable international agree-ments are clear; nevertheless, our proposals for near-term cooperativeventures, and the benefits that derive from them, are applicable to otherschemes for allocating long-term emissions caps.

We therefore envision an international emissions regime that: (a) in thelong-term recognizes the equal rights of people to exploit the services ofthe atmosphere and pursue a reasonable standard of living in a low-carbon economy; (b) in the near- and medium-term addresses the inequi-ties resulting from historic imbalances in greenhouse-gas emissions whilepromoting efficient pathways for carbon reduction; and (c) in the short-term ‘jump starts’ the process by providing incentives to exploit profitableor low-cost carbon reduction opportunities.

Achieving such a regime will require that:

f Annex I nations6 agree to reasonable near-term emissions reductions,stringent enough to promote exploitation of all ‘win—win’ situations(i.e., those situations where the cost of avoided carbon is negative,and/or significant additional benefits are realized from avoidance ofair pollution, acid deposition, etc.) Furthermore, developed nationsmust agree to incur at least some of the cost of carbon-emissionreduction or carbon-emission avoidance in developing nations (Hayesand Smith, 1993).

f Developing nations be included in the process from the beginning.Many LDC nations will have to commit to carbon-emission capssoon, since many of them already exceed emission levels that couldreasonably be permitted in a world that supports 9—10 billion peoplewithout unacceptable environmental costs related to climate change.Moreover, confining carbon mitigation to Annex I nations in the nearterm makes future carbon mitigation much more difficult and expen-sive, as any fossil-fuel energy infrastructure established in developingnations in the interim may have to be retired before the end of itsuseful lifetime, with a subsequent loss of useful capital. Nevertheless,developed nations must recognize that human and economic develop-ment are and should remain a top priority of developing nations, andany agreement must support continued LDC commitments to thosepriorities.

f Near-term agreements should concentrate on gross CO2

emissionsfrom industrial processes, for the simple reason that nations shouldnot be permitted to meet their carbon-reduction obligations becausethey house passively aggrading forest biomes in areas that had pre-viously been deforested. Such an allowance of benefits for past trans-gressions could, for instance, lead to the ludicrous proposal thatdeveloped nations receive credits for the increased ocean uptake ofcarbon driven by elevated atmospheric concentrations of CO

2.

6 Defined in the FCCC (http://www.unfccc.de/in-dex.html) to be the advanced industrialized na-tions. Annex I(a) nations are the former centrallyplanned economies.


188

Receiving credit for an unmanaged response of the biosphere to pastdestruction is equally ludicrous. On the other hand, active reforesta-tion or forest-protection projects, or projects to recover degradedland, should be encouraged under emissions agreements; we return tothis point below.

It is possible, given that the current elevated economic status of de-veloped nations rests on having used a greater share of atmosphericresources in the past, to argue that an equitable endpoint is not just. Thatis precisely why historic imbalances need to addressed in the transitionperiod, so both the means and ends are ethically defensible. But a long-term allocation that permitted LDC nations permanently higher emissionsthan Annex I nations would ignore that (a) CO

2atmospheric lifetimes are

roughly a century (and thus responsibility for past emissions eventuallydiminishes), and (b) a future, permanent imbalance in permitted emissionsis hardly more defensible than an historic one. The time period over whichthis transition to equity should occur is, of course, open to debate. We use2050 here as a convenient benchmark because (a) emissions must besignificantly decreasing by that time if we are to have any hope ofconfining the environmental impacts of global warming to reasonablelevels and (b) population growth will (we hope) have slowed significantlyby then. Nevertheless, true equity in emissions may not be achieved by2050; the ‘justice of means’ may dictate higher-than-average per capitaemissions in the historically poor nations until the end of the next centuryor the beginning of the 22nd century.

A Simple model for analyzing emissions and reductionsscenarios

Methods

To analyze our proposal, we divide all nations into four Annex categories.The Annex I and I(a) nations are as defined in the FCCC to include theindustrialized nations (Annex I) and the former Soviet centrally plannedeconomies (Annex I(a)). We categorize the remaining nations based on thelong-term ‘permissible emissions’ level of 0.2 tonnes (C) per person perannum (leading to total emissions in 2100 of about 2 Gt(C) per year), withnational long-term emissions limits calculated using medium populationprojections for 2050 (World Population Prospects, 1995). Annex IIInations are those developing nations whose current emissions exceedfuture permissible levels; Annex IV nations are currently below theirlong-term permitted emissions levels. (These categories are summarized inTable 3; current emissions and long-term permissible emissions for manynations are given in Table 4.)

For comparison, we also run scenarios in which the long-term ‘permis-sible emissions’ levels are assumed to be 0.4 tonnes (C) per person perannum, consistent with stabilizing atmospheric CO

2levels at 550 ppmv

(twice the pre-industrial level) (IPCC, 1996b). Cumulative emissions be-tween 1991 and 2100 must be held to 800 Gt(C) in order to stabilize CO

2concentrations at 550 ppmv. (Over even longer time scales, annual emis-sions must continue to fall. Thus, stabilizing atmospheric CO

2concentra-

tions at 450 or 550 ppmv will require ‘steady-state’ annual emissions ofabout 1—2 Gt(C) per year, respectively. Thus, our ‘long-term permissible


189

Table 3 Annex classifications and long-term emissions targets

Annex Description Representative nationsa 2050Populationc

(109 people)

1994Emissions(Gt(C))d

Long-termemissionstarget(Gt of C)

I Framework Convention on ClimateChange Annex I&I(a) nations

United States, Russia, Japan,Germany, United Kingdom, Canada,Ukraine

1.2 3.5 0.24

IIIb Current emissions exceedlong-term targetse

China, Mexico, South Korea,South Africa, North Korea, Iran,Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Brazil,Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Thailand,Argentina

3.6 2.0 0.72

IV Emissions may grow to meetlong-term targets

India, Nigeria, Pakistan 4.9 0.38 0.98

Globaltotals

9.7 billionpeople

5.9Gt(C)

1.9 Gt(C)

a Top emitters of industrial CO2 in 1994, accounting for [75% of Annex category emissions.b Annex II is a subset of Annex I signatories to the FCCC; thus we omit Annex II as a category here.c World Population Prospects (1995)d CDIAC (1997) http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em–cont.htm.e National long-term targets are determined assuming emissions limits of 0.2 tonnes (C) per person per year, and using medium population projections for2050.

emissions’ apply only to the next century, and do not incorporate requiredreductions beyond this period.)

Annex I and I(a) nations are presumed to be committed to carbonreductions that will result in emissions in 2010 at or below 1990 levels. Themagnitude of the carbon reductions each year are assumed to varylogistically: that is, initial carbon reductions are small, but increase aspolicies, markets, and technologies adjust to the requirements of theconvention. After a time, annual carbon reductions again diminish as themost promising and inexpensive carbon-reduction opportunities are ex-ploited. This reductions trajectory is consistent with the calls for a ‘slowstart’ in reductions commitments. In particular, the cumulative carbonreductions at time t are given by:

C(t)"Q

1#[(Q/C0)!1] exp(!qt)

, (1)

where Q is the required reductions (emissions at time reductionsstart!permitted long-term emissions) (see Table 3), C

0is the measure of

initial reductions and q is the initial rate-of-change of carbon reductions.C

0is set so that near-term required reductions are met (e.g., for Annex I

nations 10% below 1990 levels by 2010), and q is set so that 95% ofrequired reductions are met by a specified date (e.g., 2100). (Note that thereis a trade-off between C

0and q; lower initial reductions will require

a greater rate of carbon reductions to complete the transition in therequired time period.) Figure 2 gives an example of required carbonreductions for Annex I nations, assuming that emissions in 2010 are 90%of 1990 levels and 95% of required reductions are achieved in 2100.

Emissions from Annex III—IV nations are assumed to grow exponenti-ally prior to the onset of actions to comply with the climate convention.Exponential growth rates are derived from extrapolating previous carbon-emission trajectories in each of the annex categories. Emissions data weretaken from the on-line Compendium of Global Trends data set main-tained by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) OakRidge National Laboratory (CDIAC, 1997). Table 5 gives the best fit


190

Table 4 Current emissions and long-term targets by nation

Nation 1994Emissions(000 tonnes(C)per year)

UN population2050: MediumVariant(000 people)

Long-termemissionsTargetsa

(000 tonnesb

per year)

CurrentEmissions/long-termtargets

United States 1 390 000 350 000 69 800 19.9Germany 220 000 64 240 12 900 17.1Russian Federation 441 000 129 900 26 000 17Canada 122 000 39 870 7980 15.3Australia 75 900 26 060 5220 14.6Czech Rep 31 200 10 880 2180 14.3Belgium 28 000 10 070 2020 13.9Japan 304 000 110 000 22 100 13.8Kazakhstan 66 500 24 280 4860 13.7Finland 14 600 5 373 1080 13.5Italy 107 000 43 630 8730 12.3United Kingdom 150 000 61 640 12 400 12.1Greece 20 900 8591 1720 12.2Netherlands 36 900 15 280 3060 12.1Ukraine 112 000 47 250 9450 11.9Poland 92 400 43 150 8640 10.7Bulgaria 14 500 7091 1420 10.2Austria 15 600 7811 1570 9.94North Korea 71 100 37 200 7440 9.56Belarus 18 200 9717 1950 9.33Spain 59 400 31 770 6360 9.34South Korea 91 900 56 460 11 300 8.13Hungary 14 700 9 223 1850 7.95Slovak Rep 9980 6342 1270 7.86Romania 31 500 20 390 4080 7.72Switzerland 11 300 7422 1490 7.58France 88 200 60 480 12 100 7.29Israel 12 500 8927 1790 6.98Portugal 12 800 9140 1840 6.96Sweden 13 700 9991 2000 6.85Venezuala 49 600 42 150 8430 5.88Azerbaijan 12 700 11 300 2260 5.62Saudi Arabia 61 900 60 900 12 200 5.07Turkmenistan 7860 8180 1640 4.79South Africa 85 500 90 130 18 100 4.72Malaysia 26 400 38 090 7620 3.46Yugoslovia 8190 11 860 2 380 3.44Argentina 35 100 53 120 10 700 3.28Moldova 3680 5579 1120 3.29Uzbekistan 28 600 46 810 9370 3.05Lebanon 3150 5189 1040 3.03Mexico 97 700 161 500 32 300 3.02Cuba 7680 12 910 2590 2.97Libya 10 900 19 110 3830 2.85China 828 000 1 606 000 322 000 2.71Oman 5200 10 010 2010 2.59Chile 11 400 22 450 4490 2.54Thailand 39 600 81 910 16 400 2.41Iraq 25 300 57 690 11 600 2.18Iran 69 600 163 100 32 700 2.13Turkey 44 800 106 300 21 300 2.1Algeria 23 100 55 670 11 200 2.06Colombia 18 100 56 400 11 300 1.6Georgia Rep 1940 6 513 1310 1.48Syrian Arab Rep 12 700 47 210 9450 1.34Brazil 64 500 264 300 52 900 1.22Dominican Rep 3100 13 170 2640 1.17Kyrgyz Rep 2030 8637 1730 1.17Indonesia 67 000 318 800 63 800 1.05Egypt 24 700 117 400 23 500 1.05Costa Rica 1350 6902 1380 0.98Zimbabwe 5110 26 620 5330 0.96Ecuador 3960 21 190 4240 0.93Jordan 3140 16 870 3 380 0.93Armenia 951 5240 1050 0.91Morocco 8380 47 860 9580 0.87Mauritania 885 6077 1220 0.73Bolivia 2460 16 970 3400 0.72India 236 000 1 640 000 328 000 0.72Peru 5680 43 820 8770 0.65Philippines 13 500 129 500 26 000 0.52El Salvador 1260 12 490 2500 0.5


191

Table 4 Continued

Nation 1994Emissions(000 tonnes(C)per year)

UN population2050: MediumVariant(000 people)

Long-termemissionsTargetsa

(000 tonnesper year)

CurrentEmissions/long-termtargets

Nigeria 29 800 338 500 67 800 0.44Albania 446 5265 1060 0.42Paraguay 859 11 670 2 340 0.37Papua New Guinea 645 9614 1930 0.33Guatemala 1900 29 350 5880 0.32Honduras 883 13 920 2790 0.32Pakistan 23 200 381 500 76 300 0.3Yemen Rep 2950 49 280 9860 0.3Viet Nam 8090 143 600 28 800 0.28Rep. of Congo 493 8774 1760 0.28Sri Lanka 1540 28 350 5670 0.27Tajikistan, Rep 759 15 530 3110 0.24Cote d’Ivoire 2820 61 440 12 300 0.23Nicaragua 529 12 210 2450 0.22Senegal 838 23 440 4690 0.18Angola 1370 41 180 8240 0.17Zambia 672 27 170 5440 0.12Cameroon 937 43 100 8620 0.11Bangladesh 5050 238 500 47 800 0.11Tunisia 323 15 610 3130 0.103Ghana 1120 54 870 11 000 0.102Kenya 1790 92 190 18 500 0.097Myanmar 1800 94 570 19 000 0.095Sierra Leone 189 12 090 2420 0.078Togo 194 13 700 2750 0.071Guinea 287 22 610 4530 0.063Sudan 946 84 830 17 000 0.056Benin 177 18 650 3730 0.047Niger 302 34 580 6920 0.044Ethiopia 1560 194 200 38 900 0.04Haiti 146 18 560 3720 0.039Burkina Faso 260 33 370 6680 0.039Nepal 413 53 270 10 700 0.039Liberia 85 11 000 2200 0.039Central Af. Rep 64 8907 1790 0.036Tanzania 620 91 130 18 300 0.034Lao 80 13 000 2600 0.031Dem. Rep. of Congo 967 164 400 32 900 0.029Malawi 196 33 660 6740 0.029Madagascar 295 50 930 10 200 0.029Afghanistan 342 59 960 12 000 0.029Rwanda 118 21 760 4360 0.027Cambodia 133 26 270 5260 0.025Mozambique 257 52 150 10 500 0.024Uganda 261 72 130 14 500 0.018Mali 125 36 820 7370 0.017Burundi 58 19 070 3820 0.015Chad 26 18 450 3690 0.007Somalia 9 32 060 6420 0.001TOTAL 5 737 410 9 685 295 1939 830

Per capita per year limit (450 ppmv scenario).a Based on 0.2 tonnes.

exponential growth rates for Annex III&IV nations for two time periods:1975—1994 and 1985—1994.7

The exponential fits for the 1985—1994 period were used in the calcu-lations. Thus, prior to any imposed limitations on carbon emissions,emissions in year t in Annex III—IV nations are given by

E(t)"E (0) exp (rt) (2)

where E (0) stands for the 1994 emissions, r the average growth rates for1985—1994 period (Table 5) and t the number of years elapsed since 1994.

Once reductions for Annex III—IV nations must begin, the same as-sumptions are made as for Annex I and I(a) nations; cumulative carbon

7 We utilized a 2nd-order polynomial fit to checkfor increasing rates of emission in three timeperiods (1950–1994, 1975–1994, and 1980–1994),and found this to be the case (positive secondderivative in the polynomial fit).


192

Figure 2. Trajectory of required CO2

emissions–reductions for Annex Inations only (excluding Annex I(a)nations), assuming 2010 emissions at90% of 1990 levels, reductions begin-ning in 1995, long-term limits reachedin 2100. C0\0.026]1994 emissions,q\0.08 (Eq. 1), and required reduc-tions Q\2.56 Gt(C)\(1994 Emis-sions – long-term-limits).

Table 5 Best-fit exponential growth rates for historic industrial CO2 emissions in Annex III and IV nations

Annual % increasein CO2 emissions:1975–1994a

R 2 Values forexponential fit:1975–1994

Annual % increasein CO2 emissions:1985–1994a

R 2 Values forexponential fit:1985–1994

Nations used in derivinghistoric exponential growthratesb

Annex III 4.61% 0.989 4.59% 0.987 China, Mexico, South Korea,South Africa, North Korea, Iran,Indonesia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia,Venezuela, Thailand, Argentina

Annex IV 6.16% 0.997 6.23% 0.994 India, Nigeria, Pakistan

a Based on exponential fit to data.b Nations used in determining historic growth rates in CO2 emissions accounted for [75% of annex category emissions in 1994.

reductions follow a logistic form as given in Eq. (1). Initial reductions (C0’s)

are selected to be similar to those made earlier in Annex I and I(a) nations(with slight increases in cases where emissions reductions are delayed toaccount for the greater ease of making reductions as technology advances).Again, q is chosen so that 95% of required reductions are made within thestated time period (e.g., reductions begin in 2020, with 95% of the requiredreductions completed by 2120). Annex-specific annual emissions aretallied, as are total annual emissions and cumulative emissions.

Based on current trends in a business-as-usual scenario, per capitaeconomic activity is likely to be 3—3.5 times today’s level by 2050; energyintensity is likely to have fallen by 2050 to about 60% of 1990 levels astechnological advances allow increased efficiency and the service sectorsincrease their contributions to overall economic activity in many nations(Johansson et al., 1993). The carbon intensity of world energy supply iscurrently falling at a rate of about 0.2% per year (PCAST, 1997); thus,a BAU scenario would lead to CO

2emissions from the energy sector that

are four times greater in 2100 than they were in 1990. We concentrate onscenarios where total annual CO

2emissions decline in 2100 relative to

1990; these scenarios obviously require that economic growth slows rela-tive to BAU, and/or energy and carbon intensity decline more rapidly thanis indicated by BAU. While we would hope — particularly for developingnations — that carbon-dioxide savings derive from improvements in energyand carbon intensities rather than a reduction in the rate of economicgrowth, we do not provide an analysis of the prospects for meeting therates of declines in CO

2emissions presented below. Several authors have,

however, analyzed the potential for inexpensive or even profitable car-bon-reduction projects using current or near-term technologies (see e.g.,Smith and Hayes, 1993; Williams, 1997); these numbers lead us to believe


193

that our near-term carbon reductions presented below are quite feasible.The medium- and long-term projections in the scenarios are less certain;but significant carbon reductions can be realized if political and economicsignals today spur the actions and innovations required for carbon savingsin the coming decades.

Scenarios

We examined a variety of emissions scenarios to determine the qualitativeimpact of early carbon mitigation actions undertaken by Annex I—IVnations, and to evaluate the excess cumulative emissions resulting fromdelayed action. Three industrial-emissions trajectories were analyzed forAnnex I nations: Slow (S), Moderate (M), and Aggressive (A). Similarly,three industrial-emissions trajectories were analyzed for Annex III&IVnation: Delayed (D), Early (E) and Immediate (I). Our Slow scenario forthe Annex I nations corresponds roughly to the agreement signed inKyoto, Japan at the 3rd Conference of the Parties to the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (COP-3); we include the other scenarios inorder to evaluate the potential impact of more aggressive Annex I emis-sions reductions. The emissions trajectories are as follows:

Slow Annex I reductions (S): Annex I and I(a) nations reach 95% of1990 emissions by 2010, and reach long-term emissions limits of 0.2 tonnes(C) per person per year by 2100 (for the 450 ppmv case) or 0.4 tonnes (C)per person per year (for the 550 ppmv case).

Moderate Annex I reductions (M): Annex I and I(a) nations reach 90%of 1990 emissions by 2010, and complete the transition to long-termemissions limits by 2075.

Aggressive Annex I reductions (A): Annex I and I(a) nations reach 85%of 1990 emissions by 2010, and complete the transition to long-termemissions limits by 2050.

Delayed Annex III&I» reductions (D): Annex III and IV industrialemissions grow until 2020 at 4.6% and 6.2% per year, respectively (basedon 10-year historic-average rates, R2"0.99, see Table 5), at which timeemissions reductions begin. Long-term emissions limits (either 0.2 or 0.4tonnes(C) per capita per annum) are reached in 80 years, by 2100.

Early Annex III&I» reductions (E): Annex III nations begin emissionsreductions in 2010 (with growth prior to that time), reaching long-termlimits within a century, by 2110. Annex IV nations continue growth until2010 (450 ppmv scenarios) or 2020 (550 ppmv scenarios), at which timeemissions first exceed the long-term permissible levels. Gradual declines inemissions then ensue, and Annex IV nations reach long-term permissiblelevels 100 years later.

Immediate Annex III reductions (I): Annex III nations begin emissionsreductions in 2000 (with growth prior to that time), reaching long-termlimits within a century, by 2100. Annex IV nations continue growth until2010 (450 ppmv scenarios) or 2020 (550 ppmv scenarios), at which timeemissions first exceed the long-term permissible levels. Gradual declines inemissions then ensue, and Annex IV nations reach long-term permissiblelevels 100 years later.

These emissions trajectories were combined in pairs to form five scen-arios: SD, AD, MD, ME, and MI. The first letter in each scenario gives theemissions trajectory for Annex I and I(a) nations, with the second lettergiving emissions trajectories for Annex III&IV nations. Thus the MD


194

Table 6 Summary of scenario conditions for 450 ppmv scenarios

Scenario Conditions A. I A. III A. IVMD 450 Begin reductions in 1995 2020 2020

Finish transition in 2075 2100 21002010 emissions (% of 1990) 90%Required reductions (Gt(C))Q (Eq. (1)) 3.3 5.8 0.93C0 (Eq. (1))a 0.027 0.03 0.03q (Eq. (1))b 0.079 0.079 0.071

SD 450 Begin reductions in 1995Finish transition in 2100 As As2010 emissions (% of 1990) 95% In InRequired reductions (Gt(C)) MD MDQ (Eq. (1)) 3.3 450 450C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.020q (Eq. (1)) 0.064

AD 450 Begin reductions in 1995Finish transition in 2050 As As2010 emissions (% of 1990) 85% In InRequired reductions (Gt(C)) MD MDQ (Eq. (1)) 3.3 450 450C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.031q (Eq. (1)) 0.115

ME 450 Begin reductions in 2010 2010Finish transition in As in 2110 2110Required reductions (Gt(C))Q (Eq. (1))

MD 4503.4 0.05

C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.025 0.025q (Eq. (1)) 0.064 0.028

MI 450 Begin reductions in 2000Finish transition in As in 2100 As inRequired reductions (Gt(C)) MD 450 ME 450Q (Eq. (1)) 1.9C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.025q (Eq. (1)) 0.059

a C0 is set for Annex I and I(a) nations so that 2010 emissions goals can be met. For Annex III–IVnations, C0 is assumed to be roughly equivalent to those for Annex I and I(a) nations (with slightly fasterrates set for delayed action, since delay may permit faster action as technology is developed).b q is set so that transition (to 95% of required reductions) is completed in indicated time.

scenario is one in which Annex I nations follow a moderate reductionstrajectory while Annex III&IV nations delay reductions. The MD scenariowas taken as a ‘base case’ scenario against which to compare Annex I andAnnex III—IV actions. (Note that base case scenario is not to be consideredBusiness As Usual. Under BAU scenarios (no climate convention), CO

2emissions from industrialized nations would continue to rise, at least in thenear- to medium-term. Further, as already noted, agreements at Kyotocorrespond to the slow — not moderate — emissions-reductions scenarios.The details of each emission scenario are given in Table 6 (450 ppmvscenarios) and Table 7 (550 ppmv scenarios).

Results

The emissions trajectories for each scenario (MD, SD, AD, ME, and MI)under the different stabilization regimes (450 and 550 ppmv) are shown inFigures 3 and 4. Cumulative emissions under the different emissions-trajectory scenarios are given in Figures 5 and 6.

In all of the 450 ppmv scenarios where developing nations delay actionuntil 2020 (SD, AD, and MD) — whether there is aggressive action fromAnnex I nations or not — cumulative emissions are significantly in excess ofour 600 Gt(C) target (Figure 5). Speeding the transition by allowing less


195

Table 7 Summary of scenario conditions for 550 ppmv scenarios

Scenario Conditions A. I A. III A. IVMD 550 Begin reductions in 1995 2020 2020

Finish transition in 2075 2100 21002010 emissions (% of 1990) 90%Required reductions (Gt(C))Q (Eq. (1)) 3.1 5.1 0.73C0 (Eq. (1))a 0.027 0.03 0.03q (Eq. (1))b 0.078 0.077 0.017

SD 550 Begin reductions in 1995Finish transition in 2100 As As2010 emissions (% of 1990) 95% In InRequired reductions (Gt(C)) MD MDQ (Eq. (1)) 3.1 550 550C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.02q (Eq. (1)) 0.063

AD 550 Begin reductions in 1995Finish transition in 2050 As As2010 emissions (% of 1990) 85% In InRequired reductions (Gt(C)) MD MDQ (Eq. (1)) 3.1 550 550C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.031q (Eq. (1)) 0.114

ME 550 Begin reductions in 2010 2020Finish transition in As in 2110 2120Required reductions (Gt(C))Q (Eq. (1))

MD 550 2.7 0.073

C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.025 0.025q (Eq. (1)) 0.060 0.013

MI 550 Begin reductions in 2000Finish transition in As in 2100 As inRequired reductions (Gt(C)) MD 550 ME 550Q (Eq. (1)) 1.2C0 (Eq. (1)) 0.025q (Eq. (1)) 0.057

a C0 is set for Annex I and I(a) nations so that 2010 emissions goals can be met. For Annex III–IVnations, C0 is assumed to be roughly equivalent to those for Annex I and I(a) nations (with slightly fasterrates set for delayed action, since delay may permit faster action as technology is developed).b q is set so that transition (to 95% of required reductions) is completed in indicated time.

than a century to reach long-term emissions goals (MD) is not a substitutefor early action. It is only when there are early activities in developingnations towards reducing emissions that it is possible to confine atmo-spheric CO

2levels to those consistent with stabilizing concentrations at

450 ppmv.Under the 550 ppmv scenarios, ‘aggressive’ action by the Annex I na-

tions (AD 550 scenario) may be enough to allow delay in action from thedeveloping nations while confining atmospheric CO

2levels to double

pre-industrial levels, but such aggressive action would require that theindustrialized nations of the world reduce carbon emissions to 85% of1990 levels by 2010, and complete transitions to low per capita emissionsby 2050. Given the results of the Kyoto Conference of the Parties, suchaction is unlikely. (By the same token, the MI scenario that calls foremissions reductions beginning in the year 2000 in Annex III and IVnations is also not politically realistic. Poorer nations require the resourcesand opportunities to spur economic development; this must be recognizedin any climate convention. Both the AD (Aggressive Annex I reductions)and MI scenarios (Immediate Annex III and IV reductions) are includedto test the sensitivity of emissions trajectories and totals to various policyinterventions.)


196

The developing nations of the world have argued — with some legitimacy— that the Annex I nations must be the first to significantly cut carbondioxide emissions, while the developing nations continue to spur theireconomic development with inexpensive and abundant fossil-fuel energyresources. The resulting emissions totals in our scenarios show the diffi-culty of this stance. Action on the part of both Annex I and Annex III—IVnations is required within the next decade (ME scenario); such early actionincreases the probability of success while decreasing the speed with whichthe ultimate transition to a low-carbon economy must be made.

Many developing nations are extremely vulnerable to the impacts andcatastrophes likely to be manifested under global climate change — becausemany have low-lying coastal areas, because many have either marginalagricultural surpluses or are currently unable to feed their populations,because a greater proportion of their citizens find themselves in fragile andprecarious economic and ecological circumstances. Arguing that only thedeveloped nations should act in the near term — when such action will notbe sufficient to avoid potential catastrophes — is akin to arguing about theplacement of the deck chairs on the Titanic. Who will sit in the bow andwho in the stern as the ship sinks?

Nevertheless, the developed nations of the world cannot insulate them-selves from global events and catastrophes, and their past behavior inco-opting more than their share of the environmental services provided bythe atmosphere, along with the superior economic position that resultedfrom this allocation of atmospheric resources, suggests that they must beara significant fraction of the financial burden involved in procuring earlyparticipation of developing nations in a climate convention (see Smithet al., 1993). The scenarios presented in this section are consistent withinitial action on the part of Annex I and I(a) nations; reductions commit-ments in Annex III and IV nations could follow about a decade behind, aslong as industrialized nations commit to emissions reductions soon. In thenext section, we propose a policy consistent with incentives for earlyparticipation by Annex III—IV nations and greater financial responsibilityfrom Annex I and I(a) nations.

Jump-starting the process

A revitalized Joint Implementation (JI) Proposal

As a variety of past international agreements and accords have demon-strated, the first step is by far the most difficult, both politically andpractically (Haas et al., 1993; Ha-Duong et al., 1997). Any plan to achievethe environmentally necessary carbon emissions reductions will requirenations to undertake changes in economic activity, establish a monitoringregime, and reach consensus on a wide range of accounting, scientific, andpolitical issues. Consistent impediments to initiating this process haveeither been: (a) calls for additional study largely as a delaying tactic; or (b)claims that the economic costs are too high and therefore voluntarytargets are all that should be sought (Sommers, 1997). Both arguments areincorrect.

The risks of global warming are sufficiently large that, at minimum,a path of least-regrets (minimum cost) action, or insurance (Blinder, 1997)should be initiated. In response to the potential risk, and to the longatmospheric lifetime of CO

2and several other GHGs, initiating a path of


197

Figure 3. Trajectories of Annex cat-egory industrial CO2 emissions underthe five scenarios with long-term limitsdetermined by a 450 ppmv goal foratmospheric CO2 concentrations. An-nex category emissions are graphedas a multiple of the long-term target of0.2 tonnes (C) per person per year (y1(left) axis); long-term levels are deter-mined using median population pro-jections for 2050. Global annual emis-sions are plotted in Gt(C) per yearagainst the y2 (right-hand) axis.Series labels in the MD450 graph ap-ply to all subsequent graphs.

emissions reduction now will obviate the need for draconian measures inthe future. The second argument for inaction, based on economic costs, isalso flawed. A variety of studies have concluded (Cline, 1995; Nordhaus,1996) that significant reduction of anthropogenic GHG emissions could beachieved at costs that are comparable, for example, to current spending onenvironmental protection. While the ideology and the rhetoric on thistopic are both considerable, current levels of economic growth suggestthat such investments are not only possible, but in many cases result inunanticipated innovation and even economic and political benefits(Benedick, 1991; Keohane and Levy, 1996; Khosla and Chatterjee, 1997).Thus, there are compelling reasons to initiate action now to mitigateclimate change, and no substantive reasons to delay.

The global effort to mitigate climate change requires a diversity ofpolicy interventions. We concentrate on a modified and revitalized jointimplementation proposal here because it results in immediate action toreduce the current and future emission of GHGs and because it builds thescientific and political infrastructure needed to implement a full climateconvention. It is important to note, however, that many developing coun-tries have expressed the legitimate concern that JI merely allows the AnnexI nations to abuse the spirit of an international GHG convention or treaty,by focusing their efforts predominantly on JI, to the exclusion of the


198

Figure 4. Trajectories of Annex cat-egory industrial CO2 emissions underthe five scenarios with long-term limitsdetermined by a 550 ppmv goal foratmospheric CO2 concentrations. An-nex category emissions are graphedas a multiple of the long-term target of0.4 tonnes (C) per person per year(y1 (left) axis); long-term levels aredetermined using median populationprojections for 2050. Global annualemissions are also plotted in Gt(C) peryear against the y2 (right-hand) axis.Series labels in the MD550 graph ap-ply to all subsequent graphs.

unavoidable need to reduce domestic emissions (and thus to address somebasic domestic economic issues, and potential accompanying costs). Theproposal we develop below is intended to augment current discussions,and should not be considered a replacement for other essential aspects ofa climate agreement, such as a multilateral fund for developing nations,and expanded commitments of Annex I signatories to provide assistancepackages beyond the JI program. To this end, the Swiss proposal to limitto JI to, for example, 50% of total reduction obligations for AnnexI nations must be a central tenet of any agreement.

Proposal:A framework should be established where bilateral accords are recordedand assessed for their role in carbon mitigation or sequestration. ¹hesecredits will be ‘banked’ for use when an accord is ratified. Initially, bothnations will receive full credit for avoided or mitigated carbon emissions.¹his ‘double counting’ can be phased out over time, providing a furtherimpetus for early action. Credits will have finite lifetimes, with longerexpiration periods for the developing-nation partner than the developed-nation partner (to account for the fact that full ¸DC participation ina convention will likely be delayed relative to Annex I participation).


199

Figure 5. Cumulative emissions under the five scenarios for the 450 ppmv concentration target. Emissions trajectoriesare given in the text. The solid line is the 600 Gt(C) cumulative-emissions target, assuming a 30 Gt(C) release from thebiosphere over the 1990–2100 time period. The upper and lower dotted lines are set for cumulative emissions of630–530 Gt(C) over the 1990–2100 time period, assuming releases from the biosphere of 0–100 Gt(C) during that timeperiod. Cumulative emissions from all sources (fossil-fuel burning, cement production, and releases or sequestration inthe biosphere) must not exceed 630 Gt(C) from 1990 to 2100 if atmospheric CO2 concentrations are not to exceed450 ppmv; the IPCC (1996a) suggests that carbon releases from the biosphere could equal 0–100 Gt(C) over the nextcentury.

This simple proposal addresses a variety of obstacles to implementingsignificant positive steps to alter the current carbon-intensive world econ-omy. This plan immediately implements a no-regrets, or at least min-imum-regrets, policy to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse warming, aswell as initiating a process that forces all nations to grapple with questionsof the carbon ‘content’ of mitigation projects, the issues of monitoring andaccounting, and the long-term efficiency of actual projects compared tothe theoretical yields promised today.

This proposal also resolves a number of problems that we addressbelow.

f Problem: JI agreements will not be explored widely and implementeduntil a GHG treaty is ratified, which may not take place for some time.This problem of inaction reduces policy options and increases costsonce a regime is finally adopted because of the resulting magnitude ofthe problem and the long atmospheric lifetime of GHGs alreadyemitted. Moreover, low-cost, and even some negative cost GHG re-duction options exist (Hayes, 1993), but nations are reluctant to exploiteven these options prior to a convention, which may not recognize pastactions.Action: This proposal short-circuits political delaying tactics andencourages and then rewards early action taken to reduce GHG


200

Figure 6. Cumulative emissions under the five scenarios for the 550 ppmv concentration target. Emissions trajectoriesare given in the text. The solid line is the 800 Gt(C) cumulative-emissions target, assuming a 30 Gt(C) release from thebiosphere over the 1990–2100 time period. The upper and lower dotted lines are set for cumulative emissions of830–730 Gt(C) over the 1990–2100 time period, assuming releases from the biosphere of 0 to 100 Gt(C) during that timeperiod. Cumulative emissions from all sources (fossil-fuel burning, cement production, and releases or sequestration inthe biosphere) must not exceed 830 Gt(C) from 1990 to 2100 if atmospheric CO2 concentrations are not to exceed550 ppmv; the IPCC (1996b) suggests that carbon releases from the biosphere could equal 0–100 Gt(C) over the nextcentury.

emissions that can be redeemed once a treaty is reached. The uncer-tainty in the precise form of the eventual treaty is offset by the benefitsof earlier implementation, and thus a longer period spent accruing thecarbon-reduction credit.

f Problem: Developing nations have been reluctant to include JI asa part of the program for developed-nation reduction commitments,for fear that developed nations would ‘skim the cream’ in developingnations, exploiting the cheapest and most tractable carbon-reductionopportunities and leaving the developing nations with more difficultand costly tasks when their own obligations for emissions reductionsbegin.Action: This proposal gives full credit to developing nations for JIprojects undertaken today. Those credits may be used to offset or delayfuture reductions obligations, and thus developing nations are effec-tively also able to exploit the cheapest and most tractable projects inmeeting their own reductions obligations.

f Problem: Difficult questions exist as to how credit for JI programsshould be divided.Action: Double counting (providing each JI partner nation with fullcredit for GHG mitigation) encourages early action and rewards bothpartner nations. This is particularly true if this ‘double credit’ will beremoved later, or if the balance of credits will shift toward the host


201

developing nation over time. The credit accounting must also beadministered so that cumulative credits do not exceed the lifetimeavoided emissions from the deployed energy technology. Thus, forinstance, nations may receive credit for reductions in carbon emissionsfor perhaps a decade’s worth of avoided emissions by building a low-carbon power plant with a lifetime of 40 years. There is then little harmin the double-counting because the potential additional emissionstoday will be more than compensated by future avoided emissions.

f Problem: As with any technology or management policy, a learningcurve exists that can only be overcome by implementing actual pro-jects. The sooner significant project-implementation can begin, thesooner additional innovations and more efficient project designs willbe discovered or developed.Action: This proposal encourages immediate action, initiating scient-ific, engineering, managerial, and political learning even before thetreaty is ratified.

f Problem: Any agreement resulting from the 4th Conference of theParties (COP-4) in Buenos Aries in November (1998) will be complex,requiring new levels of global coordination and monitoring.Action: If credit is given for projects initiated prior to the ratification ofthe full convention, a smaller infrastructure will be needed in advanceto begin to perform monitoring, and conduct scientific and policyassessments. This proposal provides a structure that is an excellent firststep and test-bed for an eventual GHG regime. In addition, monitor-ing and assessment of the actual GHG benefits of these early JIprograms encourages the development and standardization of newscientific methods and the collection of valuable information. Thisencourages important policy-relevant research. Further, as countriesaccrue credits the momentum will build to ‘cash them in’, which is onlypossible if a climate convention is ratified.

Analysis of the impacts of *Double Counting+ Credits

The near-term ‘double counting’ of emissions credits might lead to someconcern over the impact on total emissions. If the goal is to force reduc-tions, it is counterproductive to allow both nations to benefit by permit-ting a slower rate of reductions in developed nations today (by offsettingsome of their 2010 reduction obligations) and a comparable slower rate ofreductions in developing nations tomorrow (when they can use credits tooffset early reduction commitments). To analyze the impact of this doublecounting on total emissions, we extended our model to analyze a jointimplementation regime. Annex I and I(a) nations were committed toreductions in 2010 totalling 10% of 1990 emissions (i.e., 2010 emissionsequal to 90% of 1990 emissions); half of those reduction requirementscould be offset by JI so that the net effect was to reduce national emissionsto about 95% of 1990 levels. (Global emissions are still reduced consistentwith total Annex I and I(a) commitments, with some reduction takingplace in developing nations.) Thus, JI projects offsetting about 0.2 Gt(C)over the period 1995—2010 were assumed to be deployed in Annex III—IVnations. JI projects were allocated in this scenario based on share of totalAnnex III—IV emissions, on the assumption that current emissions area reasonable measure of opportunities for reduction. (Annex IV nations,for instance, account for about 20% of Annex III—IV emissions in the year2000, qualifying them for 20% of the JI projects in that year.) Developing


202

nations had CO2emissions that were assumed to grow exponentially (with

the rates as given in Table 5) between 1995—2010 (minus the reductionsthat come from JI), and JI credits were ‘banked’ until emissions reductionsbegin in 2010. The banked credits were then used each year to offset 50%of reduction commitments in developing nations.8 The banked credits aresufficient to offset the first decade’s worth of reduction commitments byabout 50—80% for Annex III and IV nations, respectively.

Cumulative emissions in this scenario are 605 Gt(C), a penalty of onlyabout 15 Gt(C) relative to a similar scenario without early cooperativepartnerships (ME 450). The slower start in reductions permitted after 2010by the ‘banked’ credits in the JI scenario is compensated for by the slowerexponential growth in the period 2000—2010 that occurs because of thedecreased deployment of fossil-fuel-based energy infrastructure assumedto result from JI. This penalty is insignificant when one realizes thatinvestments in efficiency and renewable energy technologies are requiredin developing countries today if early transitions to efficient, low-carboneconomies are to occur at all. Banked credits also provide developingnations with flexibility in crafting appropriate strategies for meeting event-ual emissions-reduction obligations. Moreover, many analysts have ob-served that there is significant potential for inexpensive or cost-savingcarbon-reduction projects using current or near-term technologies (Hayesand Smith, 1993; Reddy et al., 1997) suggesting that our proposed earlyinterventions are not only possible, but both environmentally and eco-nomically beneficial.

JI for reforestation vs. energy

As we discussed above, emissions credits for passive forest regrowth inareas that were previously deforested should not be awarded in a globalconvention to mitigate greenhouse-gas emissions. Nevertheless, the cur-rent rates of deforestation and the potential for forest degradation underglobal climate change suggest that some program for encouraging activereforestation or forest protection should be part of any climate conven-tion. Moreover, reforestation has many benefits in addition to reducingatmospheric carbon-dioxide burdens, including the potential for recover-ing degraded land, establishing habitat for forest species and thus preserv-ing biodiversity, improving local access to forest products and the materialand economic benefits deriving from this access, and stabilization ofwatersheds and regulation of local hydrologic cycles.

Nevertheless, when greenhouse-gas mitigation is the primary goal, ourscenarios indicate that the greater need for near-term intervention lies withindustrial CO

2production. The global community must reduce deploy-

ment of fossil-fuel infrastructures with 20- to 40-year lifetimes if it is toslow and reverse atmospheric CO

2accumulation on acceptable time-

scales; reforestation does not contribute to slowing long-term potential forgrowth in carbon-dioxide emissions. Even the wildly optimistic assump-tion, for instance, that all of the estimated 910 million hectares of moder-ately degraded land ‘available’ globally (Oldeman et al., 1990) can bereforested with standing biomass equalling about 200 tonnes of carbonper hectare results in at most an additional 200 Gt(C) of carbon storedon those lands.9 The economic, social, political, and ecological constraintsare such that a more reasonable estimate would indicate potential storageof 50 Gt(C) or less. Even allowing for additional carbon storage in thesoils, reforestation on degraded lands could, under extremely optimistic

8 This analysis is meant to illustrate the impacts ofdouble counting on total carbon emissions; manyother JI scenarios are consistent with our overallrecommendation.9 We consider only moderately degraded landshere, because lightly degraded lands frequentlycontinue to be used in agricultural endeavors,and severely degraded lands will be expensive torecover and will likely be limited – at least forseveral decades – in the amount of carbon thatcan be sequestered.


203

scenarios, store only about a decade’s worth of the expected annual CO2

emissions at the end of the next century under a BAU scenario, and suchstorage will not be nearly enough to constrain cumulative emissions to600—800 Gt(C) if there are not corresponding interventions in the energysector. (The exception lies with those cases where biomass plantations areestablished for energy production, thus avoiding the need to producefossil-fuel-based energy.) As of 1996, however, over 95% of JI projects hadbeen in the forestry, and not the energy, sector (Bush and Harvey, 1997;Goldemberg, 1997b).

Moreover, even internationally funded development projects in theenergy sector have concentrated on deploying, rather than avoiding,fossil-fuel-based energy — consider, for instance, the record of the WorldBank. The World Bank is formally committed to carbon reduction, andfunds JI projects through the GEF. In the past decade, however, roughly20 JI projects have been implemented, with a total cost of under US$ 1.6billion and a carbon impact of about 0.14 Gt(C) over two decades (Harveyand Bush, 1997; Goldemberg, 1997b). On the other hand, in the 1990’s theWorld Bank directly sponsored energy projects totalling at minimum US$12 billion, accounting for at least two orders of magnitude higher levels ofemissions than the carbon savings represented by the JI projects (Flavin,1997). The international regime should be at least carbon neutral in theirproject support.

JI in the poorer nations

The largest potential for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions in the nextcentury through JI lies with Annex III nations (since their current emis-sions and forecasted absolute emissions growth are greater than those forAnnex IV nations). The greatest needs for international assistance fordevelopment, however, lie with Annex IV nations. Moreover, internationaldevelopment aid that adequately targets the needs of the lower or medianincome citizens of the poorest nations of the world will certainly aid inlong-term efforts to reduce poverty, minimize the dislocation that canresult from environmental degradation and conflict over natural re-sources, and slow population growth — all laudable and necessary goals ifwe are to create a livable world for all of tomorrow’s citizens. Thus, anyregime for allocating JI projects must adequately balance the needs forimmediate greenhouse-gas reductions in the higher-income developingnations with the pressing need for development in the lower-incomedeveloping nations.

Conclusions

Our analyses suggest that beginning GHG emissions reductions immedi-ately in developing as well as developed nations is the most effective meansto confine atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide to acceptable levels.Reductions today — particularly under JI where credits can be ‘banked’ topartially offset initial reductions commitments in the future — can beaccompanied by slower rates of CO

2reductions than would be required if

action is delayed, and we call for such an emissions banking scheme to bepart of the COP-4 discussions in Buenos Aries in November. This ‘slowerstart’ brings greater promise that fossil-fuel energy infrastructure can beretired at the end of its natural lifetime, rather than prematurely, as may be


204

required under delayed but faster transition regimes, and this naturalretirement brings with it significant economic savings. The slower startalso places less pressure on the social, political, economic, and technolo-gical resources that must be brought to bear in addressing the problem ofatmospheric CO

2burdens. While some have speculated that technological

progress should make delaying CO2

reductions less painful, technologicalprogress relies on political and economic signals. Simply passively allow-ing a decade or two to pass, without providing the proper incentives forprograms, policies, and technologies designed to curtail greenhouse-gasemissions, will not suffice. An early, moderate, JI-based start will not onlypromote ‘on the ground’ experience for relevant technologies andcooperative programs, but provide the needed political and economicsignals to spur further development. In addition, mechanisms for promo-ting investments in energy R&D and D&C should be a focus of dis-cussions at the COP-4 meeting.

Our proposal also provides greater flexibility than would be possible ifaction is delayed and then initiated ‘all at once’ under future developing-nation emissions-reduction commitments. Annex III—IV nation could,for example, utilize the credits to ease the transition from emissions growthto emissions reductions, or even sell credits to assist in the financingof new renewable energy or low-carbon fossil-fuel technologies (Williams,1997).

The added advantage of focusing on JI as a means to accelerate effortsto control global climate change is that it will result in substantial invest-ments in developed—developing nation partnerships and technology trans-fer. Fundamental to plans for a low-carbon society and emissions equity isthe investment in infrastructure development for poorer nations. The JIprojects would have to verifiably achieve long-term carbon savings andeconomic growth. Both the developed and developing nation partnersbenefit from investments in research, and in identifying, developing, andmaintaining cost-effective improvements in the energy infrastructure andservices provided from JI projects.

While some JI projects are, of course, already occurring, the magnitudeof projects is smaller than what we propose here, and these projects have(until recently) been devoted to reforestation projects rather than energyprojects. In the future, JI simply must concentrate on the energy sector ifwe are to have any hope of containing future CO

2emissions to reasonable

levels. But promoting energy-sector projects will require that developedand developing nations alike benefit from such interventions with respectto their own emissions-mitigation obligations.

Immediate deployment of JI should satisfy reasonable demands that thedeveloping nations be included in a mitigation process from the beginningwhile insuring that Annex I nations fund the initial process of GHGmitigation. Moreover, the constraint that Annex I nations can only par-tially offset their emissions-reduction commitments with JI guaranteesthat substantial restructuring of the economies of developed nations to befar less carbon intensive will occur.

Finally, the compelling evidence that developed nations do need to beincluded quite soon in the process — both because many current nationalemissions are close to or exceed those that can reasonably be expected asa long-term cap, and because avoiding deployment of new CO

2-intensive

energy infrastructure is crucial if we are to meet long-term atmospheric-concentration and emissions goals — should provide sufficient encourage-ment to guarantee cooperative participation by all nations.


205

Acknowledgments

It is a pleasure to thank Shardul Agarwala, David Bradford, RichardDuke, Jose Goldemberg, John Holdren, Daniel Klooster, Moussa KolaCisse, Simon Levin, Masse Lo, Isabelle Niang Diop, Agus Sari, RobertSocolow, Frank von Hippel, and Robert H. Williams for their commentson earlier versions of this manuscript. We also thank an anonymousreviewer for helpful comments. This work has also benefited from gener-ous feedback and commentary from colleagues at ENDA-Energie (Dakar,Senegal). This work was supported by grants from the Mellon and HewlettFoundation, and by the Class of 1934 Preceptorship to DMK.

References

Agarwal, A. and Narain, S. (1991) Global ¼arming in an ºnequal ¼orld: A Case ofEnvironmental Colonialism. Center for Science and Environment, New Delhi.

Benedick, R. E. (1991) Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet.Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Blinder, A. S. (1997) ‘Needed: Planet Insurance’. New ½ork ¹imes, October 22.BNA (1997) Bureau of National Affairs

(http://www.bna.com/prodhome/ens/kyoto.htmdbreakingnews)Branscomb, L. M. (1993) ‘Empowering technology policy’. In Empowering ¹echno-

logy, ed. L. M. Branscomb, pp. 266—294, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.Byrne, J., Wang, Y. D., Lee, H. and Kim, J. D. (1998) ‘An equity- and sustainability-

based policy response to global climate change’. Energy Policy 26(4), 335—343.Ciais, P., Tans, P. P., White, J. W. C., Troiler, M., Francey, R. J., Berry, J. A.,

Randall, D. R., Sellers, P. J., Collatz, J. G. and Schimel, D. S. (1995) ‘Partition-ing of ocean and land uptake of CO

2as inferred from d13C measurements from

the NOAA climate monitoring and diagnosis laboratory global air samplingnetwork’. Journal of Geophysical Research 100, 5051—5057.

CDIAC (1997) http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em—cont.htmCline, W. (1992) ¹he Economics of Global ¼arming. Institute for International

Economics, Washington, DC.Doake, C. S. M., Corr, H. F. J., Rott, H., Skvarca, P. and Young, N. W. (1998)

‘Breakup and conditions for stability of the northern Larsen ice shelf’. Nature391, 778—780.

Flavin, C. (1997) Financing a new energy economy: a key role for the World Bank.¼orld ¼atch 10(6), 25.

Global Commons Institute (1997) http://www.gn.apc.org/gci/frames.html.Goldemberg, J. (1997a) ‘The importance of the cooperation between industrialized

and developing countries for the prevention of global warming’. Presented atthe International Environment and ¹echnology Forum, Kyoto, Japan, 5—6December.

Goldemberg, J. (1997b) ‘Is joint implementation a realistic option?’ Environment39(9), 44—45.

Haas, P. M., Keohane, R. O. and Levy, M. A. (1993) Institutions for the Earth:Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection MIT Press,Cambridge, MA.

Ha-Duong, M., Grubb, M. J. and Hourcade, J.-C. (1997) ‘Influence of socio-economic inertia and uncertainty on optimal CO

2-emission abatement’. Nature

300, 270—273.Harvey, L. D. D. and Bush, E. J. (1997) ‘Joint implementation: a strategy for

combating global warming?’. Environment 39(8), 14—20, 36—43.Hayes, P. (1993) ‘North-South carbon abatement costs’, In ¹he Global Greenhouse

Regime: ¼ho Pays? eds. P. Hayes and K. R. Smith, 101—143. Earthscan,London, UK.


206

Hayes, P. and Smith, K. R. eds. ¹he Global Greenhouse Regime: ¼ho Pays?Earthscan, London, UK.

IPCC (1990) Climate Change: ¹he IPCC Scientific Assessment. Report Prepared forIPCC by ¼orking Group I, eds. J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins and J. J.Ephraums. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Cambridge Univer-sity Press, Cambridge

IPCC (1996a) Climate Change 95: ¹he Science of Climate Change. Contribution of¼orking Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change. eds. J. T. Houghton et al. (Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.

IPCC (1996b) Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of ClimateChange. Contribution of ¼orking Group III to the Second Assessment Report ofthe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. eds. J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, E. F.Haites, (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, UK.

Johansson, T. B., Kelly, H., Reddy, A. K. and Williams, R. H. (1993) RenewableEnergy: Sources for Fuel and Electricity Island Press: Washington, DC.

Kammen, D. M. and Dove, M. R. (1997) ‘The virtues of mundane science’.Environment 39(6), 10—15, 38—41.

Keohane, R. O. and Levy, M. A. (1996) Institutions for Environmental Aid. MITPress, Cambridge, MA.

Khosla, A. and Chatterjee, K. (1997) ‘Is Joint Implementation a Realistic Option?’.Environment 39(9), 46—47.

Macilwain, C. (1997) ‘Kyoto meeting will seek to build bridge over troubled water’.Nature 390, 215—216.

Mahlman, J. D. (1997) ‘Uncertainties in projections of human-caused climatewarming’. Science 278, 1416—1417.

Masood, E. (1997) ‘Equity is the key criterion for developing nations’. Nature 300,216—217.

Nordhaus, W. D. (1994) Managing the Global Commons. MIT Press, Cambridge,MA.

Oldeman, L. R., Hakkeling, R. T. A. and Sombroek, W. G. (1990). ¼orld Map of theStatus of Human Induced Soil Degradation: An Explanatory Note. InternationalSoil Reference and Information Center, Wageningen, Netherlands.

PCAST (1997) Federal Energy Research and Development for the Challenges of the¹wenty-First Century (November 5). (Energy Research and Development Panel,The President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology) Also avail-able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/¼H/EOP/OS¹P/html/OS¹P—Home.html.

Reid, W. V. and Goldemberg, J. (1997) ‘Are developing nations already doing asmuch as industrialized nations to slow climate change?’ ¼orld ResourcesInstitute Climate Notes, 1—6 June.

Reddy, A. K. N., Williams, R. H. and Johansson, T. B. (1997) Energy After Rio:Prospects and Challenges, United Nations Development Programme, New York.

Ridgley, M. A. (1996) ‘Fair sharing of greenhouse-gas burdens’. Energy Policy24(6), 517—529.

Smith, K. R., Swisher, J. and Ahuja, D. R. (1993) ‘Who pays (to solve the problemand how much)?’ ¹he Global Greenhouse Regime: ¼ho Pays? Earthscan,London, UK, pp. 70—100.

Sommers (1997) Comments made at the White House Conference on ClimateChange, 6 October, 1997; http://www.whitehouse.gov/Initiatives/Climate/con-ference.html

Swisher, J. and Masters, G. (1992) ‘A mechanism to reconcile equity and efficiencyin global climate protection — international carbon emission offsets’. Ambio21(2), 154—159.

Tans, P. P., Fung, I. Y. and Enting, I. G. (1995) ‘Storage versus flux budgets: theterrestrial uptake of CO

2during the 1980’s. In Biotic Feedbacks in the Global

Climate System, eds. G. M. Woodwell and F. T. Mackenzie, Oxford UniversityPress, New York, pp. 351—374.


207

Westra, L. (1996) ‘Environmental integrity, racism and health’. Science of the ¹otalEnvironment 184(1—2), 57—66.

Wigley, T. M. L. (1997) ‘Implications of recent CO2

emission-limitation proposalsfor stabilization of atmospheric concentrations’. Nature 300, 267—270.

Williams, R. H. (1997) ‘Suggested Industrialized Country/Developing Countryenergy Technology Initiatives for the 3rd Conference of the Parties to theFCCC’, unpublished (May 7).

Williams, R. and Terzian, G. (1995) A benefit/cost analysis of accelerated develop-ment of photovoltaic technology, PU/CEES Report No. 281, Princeton Uni-versity, Princeton, NJ.

World Population Prospects 1994 Revision (1995) Department of Economic andSocial Information and Policy Analysis, Population Division, United Nations,New York, NY).

Zinberg, D. S. (1993) ‘Putting people first: Education, jobs, and economic com-petitiveness’, in Empowering ¹echnology, ed. L. M. Branscomb. pp. 235—265.MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.


208

National trajectories of carbon emissions: analysis of proposals to foster the transition to...

Documents

Transcript of National trajectories of carbon emissions: analysis of proposals to foster the transition to...