National coordination inBulgaria on reaching the

country`s position regardingEU affairs

By Loreta Bahtchevanova, Desislava Antonova and Lyza Sabaihi

14/01/2014

Erasmus University Rotterdam

ContentsChapter 1: Problem analysis..........................................21.1 Problem definition..............................................2

1.2 Research question...............................................2Chapter 2 Theoretical framework......................................3

2.1 Governance......................................................32.2 EU governance (multi-level/state-centric).......................3

2.3 Bottom-up/Top-down..............................................42.4 National Coordination...........................................4

Chapter 3: National Coordination.....................................53.1 National Coordination from the perspective of National Government..........................................................63.2 Who is further consulted?.......................................7

3.2.1 The role of Non-governmental organizations..................73.2.2 The role of stakeholders...................................10

3.3 Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria on the EU.103.4 The role of the national Parliament; Parliamentary scrutiny; Principle of subsidiarity..........................................133.4.1 The role of National Parliaments in EU decision-making.....13

3.4.2 The role of Bulgarian parliament within the coordination mechanism. Scrutiny of the Parliament vis-à-vis government.......14

3.4.3 National Parliament and the Principle of Subsidiarity......18Chapter 4. Coordination in practice.................................19

Conclusion..........................................................23

1

References:.........................................................24

Chapter 1: Problem analysis The European Union is formed by 28 member states which are

different in culture and languages. Thus it is not hard to

imagine that when it comes to decision making every member state

has its own interests and preferences. Elaborating on models such

as the state-centric model and the multi-level model, we will

discuss the case of Bulgaria and its governance. Regarding the

governance at the European level, there have been several shifts

in different directions. In this research we will focus on

governance in Bulgaria by starting off with a theoretical

framework, followed by the institutional setting in Bulgaria.

Additionally, we will discuss the national coordination with

different roles of the government and parliament for instance.

1.1 Problem definition

The problem that we are examining concerns Bulgaria and its

national coordination. The lack of coordination between different

national actors involved in the EU policy and decision-making

2

leads to lack of effectiveness in the negotiations and defending

of Bulgarian interests.

1.2 Research question

In order to examine the former mentioned problem, the following

research question was formulated:

- How do national actors, involved in the EU policy and

decision-making coordinate the effectiveness of defending

Bulgarian interests?

The following sub questions were also formulated:

- Who are the actors involved?

- What is the role of the government?

- What is the role of the parliament representations?

- According to Kassim’s (2003) scheme where can Bulgaria be

placed?

- What is the role of parliament scrutiny?

- How are decisions made in practice?

Chapter 2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Governance

Governance as we know it today has been shaped and formed over

time. With these changes also comes a great deal of literature

that discusses these changes in governance. What mostly is

discussed regarding the changes in governance is the shift in

3

governance and certain issues these shift of governance took with

them (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004).

The former named shifts in governance both took place

horizontally and vertically (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004). These

shifts can also be used both, however it is better to start off

by defining them both. To start off with the horizontal shift;

this can be divided in another two shifts namely a shift from

executive/legislative to judiciary so a more active or stricter

role towards rule. Additionally a shift from public to private

organizations and governance is part of the horizontal shift

which includes a shift in delegation of tasks to semi-public

institutions (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004). When there is a shift

from national to international institutions or a shift from

national to supranational institutions, this mostly describes the

vertical shift. This shift can be explained through globalization

and internationalization of certain markets, this makes certain

institutions or organizations shift to a more international

governance (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004). The former described

internationalization and globalization can also contribute to the

fact that organizations need local organizations in order to

implement rules for instance. In addition, this so called

vertical shift downwards can thus also go from international to

national level (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004).

2.2 EU governance (multi-level/state-centric)

4

Now that it is clear that through the years there has been some

shifts in governance, it is interesting to discuss the European

Union, its governance and how it is organized. There are two

models regarding the European Union governance, namely a multi-

level model and a state-centric model (Hooghe & Marks, 2001).

When a national government is considered as the institution that

‘has the last word’ or as a ‘centric’ decision maker we speak of

a state-centric model. Institutions on a more supranational level

do not have much to say regarding policies and rules for

instance. The state-centric model, basically represent the

‘lowest denominator’ of the national actors (Hooghe & Marks,

2001). On the other hand we have the multi-level model which

discusses decision making and the different actors it involves.

Moreover, these actors are involved from different levels in the

government. This means that regarding policies and governance

nation states and different actors from multiple level come

together (Hooghe & Marks, 2001).

2.3 Bottom-up/Top-down

After discussing both the state-centric and the multi-level

models, it is also interesting to discuss the different

approaches of the European governance. There are two main

approaches namely; a bottom-up approach and a top-down approach

(Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 2004). The bottom-up approach

focuses on discussing and to change the European policies by

agreements of the EU states and this can be done through meetings

5

for instance. In addition, these changes in policy areas go step

by step and are also called incremental changes. Summing this up,

the bottom-up approach involves all member states in order to

change EU policies, however these changes are often incremental

(Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 2004). On the other hand we have the

top-down approach; this approach focuses on the influence on EU

decisions and the impact on the EU states and their policies

(Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 2004).

2.4 National Coordination

Kassim (2003) discusses the response of the member states

regarding the membership of the European Union. Each member state

is judged by criteria such as strategies of coordination and

involvement strategies. Kassim (2003) visualized this by making a

scheme running from centralized to decentralized and from

comprehensive coordination ambition to selective coordinating

ambition. When a country is not so ‘open’ regarding the

coordination and is more ‘selected’ in its structure, it moves

more towards the selective coordinating ambition. Additionally, a

more centralized country – as the name implies – would have a

government where structures are more centred and where

professionals are responsible for the coordination (Kassim,

2003). If we find a country more on the decentralized part it

would indicate that opposite from the centralized countries,

there are not really specialists in the area to structure the

government (Kassim, 2003).

6

Maurer (2002) provides us very interesting insights by stating

that: ‘When discussing the role of national parliaments in the EU, it belongs to the

conventional wisdom that national parliaments have increasingly lost in overall

importance due to the evolution of this political system’ (Maurer, 2002, p. 3).

It is therefore also very important to examine to what extent a

parliament is involved in a national system. And more

specifically it is important to look at the decrease in

legislature regarding national parliaments. This decrease/loss

can be explained through the fact that a lot of competencies are

given to the European Union (Maurer, 2002). However, on the other

hand, there is an increase in national actors attaining more

control in the national role through factors as procedures for

instance. (Maurer, 2002) Finally, Maurer (2002) found that the

parliamentary scrutiny is dependent per institution in Europe.

This also means that the outcome is different per institution or

parliament; depending on how a country is able to control its

government.

Chapter 3: National Coordination

In this chapter the coordination between government and

parliament when it comes about reaching of national position on

EU issues will be discussed. Using the theory base of Kassim

(2003) and Maurer (2002) explaining of national coordination

mechanism will be made. Attention will be paid to who has the

leading role and how the parliament scrutiny is applied.

7

Bulgaria is a democratic parliamentary republic. The unicameral

National Assembly, or “Narodno Subranie”, consists of 240

deputies who are elected for four-year term. Parliament selects

and dismisses government ministers, including the prime minister,

exercises control over the government, and sanctions deployment

of troops abroad. It is responsible for enactment of laws,

approval of the budget, scheduling of presidential elections,

declaration of war, and ratification of international treaties

and agreements. (GlobalEdge, 2012)

The prime minister is head of the Council of Ministers, which is

the primary component of the executive branch. In addition to the

prime minister and deputy prime ministers, the Council is

composed of ministers who head the various agencies within the

government and usually come from the majority or from a member

party of the ruling coalition in parliament. (GlobalEdge,

2012)The Council is responsible for carrying out state policy,

managing the state budget and maintaining law and order. The

Council must resign if the National Assembly passes a vote of no

confidence in the Council or prime minister. (GlobalEdge, 2012)

3.1 National Coordination from the perspective of National Government.

Bulgaria like most of the other countries from the Eastern

European Union enlargement faced a problem with the capacity to

effectively coordinate and participate in the EU policy-making

process (Christiansen et al. 2008, p. 248 in in Gärtner, Hörner &

8

Obholzer, 2011). The adoption of Copenhagen Criteria in 1993

established some requirements related to the economic and

societal conditions that countries had to response (Goetz 2004,

p.256 in Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer, 2011). As a result in all of

the countries were established central coordination structures

that played a key role during the accession (Lippert et al. 2001,

989-991 in Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer, 2011). These coordination

structures were situated to the Prime Minister or as part of

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lippert et al. 2001, 992 in Gärtner,

Hörner & Obholzer, 2011). The coordination mechanism were adapted

after the accession of the countries but remained as an important

structure in coordination of national participation in the

decision-making process in the EU (Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer,

2011, p.82)

After the accession of the country, the national coordination

mechanism in Bulgaria is defined by Decree No 85 of 17 April 2007

concerning the organization and coordination of matters relating to the European

Union, amended by Decree No 212/27.08.2009. According to Art.1, The

Council of Ministers “shall manage and implement the policy of the Republic

of Bulgaria as a Member State of the European Union”. It is responsible for

agreement and adoption of Annual program for the participation of

Bulgaria in the decision-making process in the EU and for the

approval of country`s positions for the Council of the European

Union and European Council summits. In addition the Council of

Ministers adopts the framework positions of the country on issues

discussed during the Council of the European Union and European

9

Council summits. The Council of Ministers is chaired by the

Prime-Minister who represents Bulgaria during European Council

summits and who has the leading role.

In fact the EU affairs coordination mechanism in Bulgaria has

three stages - the Council of Ministers, the Council for European

Affairs within the Council of Ministers, which is a consultative

body and 35 working groups in different areas (CEA, 2014). Hence

the Council of Ministers represents the highest level of

decision-making in the national coordination mechanism on EU

affairs. According to Art 2 of Decree 85/2007 the Minister of

Foreign Affairs is responsible for the implementation of single

national policy on all of the European Union matters. He leads

the Permanent Representation of Republic of Bulgaria in the

European Union, gives it instructions and submits projects of

positions for the meetings of European Council. The Minister of

Foreign Affairs is also a Chairman of Council for European

Affairs. “The Council for European Affairs is consultative interministerial body […]

with major functions related to the adoption of framework positions, […] draft positions

for informal and regular meetings of European Council and […] Council of the European

Union, prior to their approval by the Council of Ministers […]. Regular meetings of the

CEA are held once a week (every Monday) but extra sessions are also possible”. Its

coordination Directorate within the Administration of the Council

of Ministers is the Secretariat of CEA (CEA, 2014).

10

With regard to the national positions presented at Council

meetings it could be said that there is a clear division of the

responsibilities of the participants in the process (CEA, 2014).

The structure includes as expert as well political level of

coordination. Crucial role in the preparation of framework

positions on normative acts proposed by the European Commission

according to art 290 and 291 of TFEU have the working groups that

are part of National Coordination Mechanism. The majority of

framework positions (about 70%) are prepared and approved by the

working groups. On some issues, which are of priority for the

country or consensus was not reached in the working groups the

framework positions are considered and approved by CEA. Framework

positions related to the ECOFIN summits, for example, should be

discussed and approved by the Council of Ministers as agenda

items of its meetings (personal communication, country expert,

January 2014). On the basis of the framework positions Ministers

in accordance with their competences prepare and submit for

approval draft positions for the Council`s meetings (Decree

85/2007, art.3).

3.2 Who is further consulted?

3.2.1 The role of Non-governmental organizations

Participation of official representatives of Bulgaria in the

institutions and bodies of the EU gives the opportunity to defend

Bulgarian national interests in the integration process. The

development of the Bulgarian position is continued process that

11

involves consultation procedure at political level, both within

the Council of Ministers itself and with the Parliament.

(Bulgarian Center for Non-Profit Law, 2009) An essential part of

the consultation mechanism is the involvement of civil society in

the process. The consultation mechanism on European affairs,

including the NGOs is regulated with Decree No 85 of the Council

of Ministers in 2007. This mechanism aligns the Bulgarian

framework positions, guidelines and positions for meetings of the

Council of the European Union and other institutions EU. The aim

is to provide interaction and coordination between the various

institutions and NGOs, leading to the elaboration and

presentation of coherent and consistent Bulgarian positions in

the process of decision-making in the EU.

The administration is not obliged to include NGOs in the

composition of the working groups of the CEA (although in most it

is done). The only obligation is that heads of the working groups

have to invite representatives of civil society to the meetings

of the working groups, including representatives of the Economic

and Social Council. Identification of specific NGOs that will

participate is made by order of the Minister or the head of the

leading institution or administration. Usually suggestions

regarding which NGOs shall be included in the working groups are

made by the head of the relevant working groups. (Bulgarian

Center for Non-Profit Law, 2009) The designated NGOs as a rule

are specialized in the matter in question – e.g. consumer

12

protection, industry associations and chambers, etc. There are no

pre-defined formal criteria to select which NGOs are going to be

included, nor specific mechanism to be selected. For the

Monitoring Committee of the National Strategic Reference

Framework and in the Monitoring Committees of the operational

programs co-financed by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion

Fund of the European Union is obligatory to include as full

members of National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria

(NAMB) ; representative of the nationally represented

organizations of employers, workers and employees and officials

and a representative of the nationally represented organizations

of and for people with disabilities1.(Bulgarian Center for Non-

Profit Law, 2009) Committees may include other NGOs under a

certain previously adopted procedure, but they have only advisory

powers. According to the Rules, NGOs are divided into three

groups - social organizations, environmental organizations and

organizations working in the field of education, science and

culture. NGO representatives except for participating as

observers with advisory powers, also receive the information

provided to members of the Committee are entitled to participate

in the discussions, give recommendations and make proposals when

this is appropriate and related to the subject of their

activities. Representatives of non-governmental organizations may

participate in the permanent and temporary subcommittees on

1 Decree № 182 of 21 July 2006 establishing the Committee of the National Strategic Reference Framework and operational programs co-financed by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund of the European Union

13

specific and current issues according to their competence, the

composition of which shall be approved by a simple majority of

members attending the meeting of the Committee. (Bulgarian Center

for Non-Profit Law, 2009).

Usually bodies that have advisory powers and involve NGOs are not

very active and are often created formally (to meet the

requirements of particular legislation). In many cases it is

considered that they do not involve "authentic" representatives

of the third sector, but rather organizations that are indirectly

or in practice related to the government and the political class.

A major drawback of the general approach of the central

institutions in the context of institutionalized forms of

cooperation with NGOs is that there are no clear rules, procedures and

policies regulating communication and consultation with the third sector. Very

often the choice of particular NGO that participates in a

particular organ is formed on the basis of personal contacts. As

a consequence, firstly, these bodies are not very popular as a

way to influence decision makers and secondly, their image among

NGOs and civil society in general is not very positive.

(Bulgarian Center for Non-Profit Law, 2009)

For example, the minister of European Integration Meglena Kuneva

in April 2006 established a Public Council to consult various

government policies. Among a series of consultations with

representatives of the civil society, a mechanism for nominating

14

NGOs was adopted and it included: members of the Public Council

may be different organizations without restrictions on the areas

in which they operate, but any organization that wants to be a

member needs to have support for its nomination by at least

another ten NGOs. As a result, twenty nine NGOs have become

members of this council. (Bulgarian Center for Non-Profit Law,

2009)

3.2.2 The role of stakeholders

Another actor in the process are the stakeholders. It is hard to

measure the degree of involvement of stakeholders in decision

making process in Bulgaria. They are invited in the working

groups as well as the NGOs and depending on the Minister of

Foreign Affairs they can be invited to the CEA. (Gärtner, Hörner

& Obholzer, 2011) However, the case is much similar to the

situation with the NGOs and as well it is not formally regulated

whether they are only observing the discussions or taking part in

the actual decision-making process. This leaves a door open to

exclude them in some extent over sensitive issues. What is more,

it is not clear whether the working groups and the CEA have to

respect the opinion of the stakeholders when formulating

positions. Despite the lack of legally regulated participation in

the decision making process, the biggest problem in Bulgaria

seems to be the identification of the relevant stakeholders.

Bulgaria has a selective approach by concentrating efforts on

several policy areas representing the main national interests,

15

such as agriculture, food and nuclear energy. Moreover, there is

a significant deficit in the institutional capacity for public

policy-making. Priorities, represented at European level are

mostly formulated by the political cabinets of the ministers and

do not necessarily reflect the public interest. As regards the

timing of the involvement in Brussels, Bulgaria can be described

as rather reactive, focusing on the decision-making phase in the

Council of Ministers. (Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer, 2011) This is

why the preparation of the Bulgarian position for the European

Council summits is not a strong priority in the political life of

the country. The role of the stakeholders and the levels of

representation of interests are difficult to define.

3.3 Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria on the EU

In the development of the framework positions except for the

members of the relevant working group of the coordination

mechanism on EU affairs, the relevant attaché of the Permanent

Representation of Republic of Bulgaria to the EU (PRBEU) should

also participate actively.

Due to the dynamics of the work and the possibility of some

issues to be addressed in both the formats of COREPER optimal

coordination between sector diplomats, diplomats "Mertens" and

"Antici" and Permanent Representative and his deputy, is a key

determinant of success in protecting the national interest.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall examine whether the guidelines16

prepared for the Permanent Representative are consistent with the

overall policy of the Republic of Bulgaria in the EU. In case of

discrepancies, the Foreign Ministry, in consultation with the

lead agency shall take action to amend and / or supplement the

instructions, for which is notifying by competence the Permanent

Representative or his deputy, and the Secretariat of the CEA.

Bulgarian Permanent Representative and his deputy present the

national position based on guidelines endorsed by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs under Decree № 85 of 2007. In the case of

extremely important issues for the country, which are going to be

discussed in COREPER, the respective leading minister may decide

that Bulgarian position will be discussed at a meeting of the

Council for European Affairs or the Council of Ministers.

Bulgaria has 5 seats in COREPER. They are taken by the Permanent

Representative, respectively - his deputy, diplomat “Antici”,

respectively - the diplomat “Mertens” and sector diplomats of the

PRBEU, in whose competences are the items on the agenda of the

meeting. Sector diplomats expertly support the Permanent

Representative of his deputy, and if necessary shall ensure

prompt contact with the lead ministry in the capital, that has

developed the draft guidelines. A report is made after each

meeting of COREPER and is sent to the Deputy Minister of Foreign

Affairs, certain departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

the Secretariat of the CEA, the head of the Office of the Prime

Minister and if necessary - to other recipients. The reports must

17

include a summary of the decisions taken, brief information on

the items of Part I of the agenda and extensive information about

the discussion on Part II of the agenda. The necessary documents

shall be attached to the report. (Practical Guide to the

participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in the decision making

process in the Council, 2013)

Figure 1. Source: www.euaffairs.government.bg

According to Kassim (2003, p. 92) there are two dimensions that

can be used for determination of national coordination mechanism

on EU matters. The first one is the so called “coordination

ambition”. In contrast to some countries such as UK and Denmark

that put efforts to agree national position on almost every issue

of EU activities, Bulgaria could be defined as selective in its18

approach. The country concentrates its efforts in some areas that

are of priority for national interest such as agriculture,

nuclear energy, cohesion policy (Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer,

2011, p.92). In terms of the other dimension that Kassim

indicates- extent of centralization of the coordination mechanism

(2003, p. 92), from the information provided above could be

concluded that Bulgaria has decentralized system. Although the

leading role of EU Affairs coordination lies to the Council of

Ministers and CEA that has a central role in preparation and

adoption of framework positions. According to national experts

CEA does not make the system more centralized because first it is

consultative interministerial body and second it does not have

its own ministry but is more like a political appointment

(personal communication, national expert, January 2014).

19

Figure 2: Source: Patterns of national coordination in the new

Member States, Gärtner, L., Hörner, J. and Obholzer, L. (2011).

http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/275/261

3.4 The role of the national Parliament; Parliamentary scrutiny; Principle of subsidiarity.

In this chapter the process of adoption of framework positions

will be examined through the role of Bulgarian National Assembly

according to official legislation. Based on Maurer (2002) and

COSAC (2007) we will try to define the type of scrutiny system of

Bulgarian parliament. Attention will be paid as to the scrutiny

of government, as well scrutiny of European Commission thought

subsidiarity principle.

20

3.4.1 The role of National Parliaments in EU decision-making

Multilevel-governance- the transfer of legislative competences

into the institutions of the EU and the loss of legislative power

in the EU policy-making for national parliaments should be

compensated by increasing the role of national parliament’s

scrutiny vis-à-vis governments (Maurer, 2002). It should be

pointed out that the level and effectiveness of scrutiny of the

Parliament vary in different member states. While in some of the

countries the Parliament receives just ex-post information, in

other the process is enhanced with mandatory procedures (Maurer,

2002).

Even if the process of parliamentary scrutiny is

institutionalized with the “Protocol on the role of national

parliaments in the European Union” into the Amsterdam Treaty,

that addresses the scope of information provided to the national

parliaments, the timing and impact (Maurer, 2002), the protocol

does not define some major features of scrutiny. It is not

clearly defined which institution what kind of documents in

obliged to provide to the parliament (Maurer, 2002, p.4). In

addition to the PNP with the Lisbon Treaty the role of national

parliaments was enhanced by the procedure that foresees scrutiny

in regard to the principle of subsidiarity. According to the TFEU

national parliaments are responsible for the control over the

implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. In term of 8

21

weeks after they receives the Commission`s legislative proposal

they have to prepare their motivated opinion whether the

subsidiarity principle is met. So with the Lisbon Treaty this

lack of differentiation in PNP regard who is responsible to

provide the parliaments the necessary information has been

overcame.

3.4.2 The role of Bulgarian parliament within the coordination mechanism. Scrutiny of the Parliament vis-à-vis government

In order to examine the influence and effectiveness of Bulgarian

parliament scrutiny vis-à-vis the government two models will be

used. First of all using the theoretical base of Maurer (2002)

and his three variables we will examine the scope, timing and

impact of the scrutiny process. Using the examination model of

COSAC (2007) it should be defined whether the scrutiny of

Bulgarian parliament is document-based or there are binding

procedures.

The scrutiny role of Bulgarian national parliament in regard to

the European Union policy and decision-making is determined by

two major normative acts- Decree 85/2007 and in the Rules of Organisation

and Procedure of the National Assembly (ROPNA). According to the

Official rules of the National Assembly, Committee on European

Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds (CEAOEF) has been

established. As in the most of other member-states according to

Maurer (2002) the role of this EU affairs committee is to

22

establish general norms and procedures in order to scrutinize

more effectively the government in the EU decision-making

(Maurer, 2002, p.4). Firstly, in Decree 85/2007 is written out

that the Annual program about the Participation of Republic of

Bulgaria in the decision-making process of the European Union

should be send to the President of the National Assembly (art.1).

It is not mention whether National Assembly is eligible to submit

some amendments to the program or to send a reasoned opinion. In

regard to the timing, the CM has to send the annual program to

the parliament at latest 7 days after its approval. On the basis

of this annual program, National Assembly and more precisely

European Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds committee

adopts Annual working program of the National Assembly on issues

of the European Union (art 111, ROPNA). According to art 1 of

Decree 85/2007, the Council of Minister is obliged to inform the

National Assembly about the country`s framework positions related

to issues addressed in the Annual program (art.1).

In a period of three weeks after the Commission proposal on

legislative act which is included in the annual program is sent,

the Council of Ministers has to submit a draft of the legislation

act and the framework position to the National Assembly. Although

as Maurer has mentioned, PNP does not give clear imagination on

what “in good time” means, a period of three weeks seems to be

acceptable (Maurer, 2002, p.4). On the base of the framework

position, the CEAOEF has to prepare and adopt reasoned opinion

and to send it to the President of National Assembly. It should

23

be mentioned that most of the framework positions are not

discussed during plenary sessions of the Parliament, but only in

Committee meetings (personal communication, national expert,

January 2014). National expert, interviewed for the purposes of

this paper gave a clear explanation of the process. “After the

Commission proposal for legislative act is received, working groups, part of National

Coordination Mechanism prepare the framework position that most often is adopted by

them or by CEA or CM. Once adopted, the framework position is sent to the President of

National Assembly. Most often he sends it directly to the CEAOEF. The framework

position has been discussed within the committee and motivated opinion has to be

approved. This motivated opinion has to be submitted to the President of the National

Assembly. More rarely framework positions are discussed during plenary

sessions.”(January 2014)

Based on the information above it is seen that Bulgarian system

focuses on examining of legislative proposals and does not

scrutiny so strictly individual Council meetings. What is more,

National Assembly is not aware of all the positions that Bulgaria

defends on Council`s meetings, especially of these related to

technical and expert issues. Taking into account that at European

level more than 600 legislative proposals have been discussed, a

discussion on all of them in the Parliament would make the

process significantly slower and complicated (national expert).

In accordance to the division of scrutiny systems made by COSAC

(2007), Bulgarian system can be defined as document-based.

24

Table 1 Source: COSAC 2007

Countries differ also in the extent to which parliamentary

reasoned opinions are binding and how they influence the official

national position defended on Council meetings (COSAC, 2007). In

our case could be concluded that parliamentary provisions are not

binding for the government. More precisely when we talk about the

European Council meetings, parliament does not have the

possibility to draft its official resolution prior to the summit.

What is more there is a lack of possibility to for parliament to

provide an opinion even as a non-binding recommendation. The

model seems like “traditional model” of executive dominance (EP,

2013, p.48-9).

According to the analysis of the scrutiny system of the

parliament vis-à-vis government, based on the provided

information, it could be said that the role of Bulgarian

parliament in scrutinizing government is rather limited. Even if

in the beginning of each year the National Assembly receives the

annual working program of Council of Ministers and framework

positions of proposed legislative acts its influences over the

national position is rather limited, due to the non-binding

status of reasoned opinion. Although there is a clause in the25

Official rules of the National Assembly (Chapter 11, art. 113)

that provides CEAOEF to initiate parliamentary reserve (scrutiny

reserve) for legislative drafts, included in the Annual working

program of the National Assembly. In this case the government is

not allowed to provide a position on Council meetings, until

parliamentary scrutiny process has been completed. In fact

scrutiny reserve is typical for document-based systems and it

some kind of compensation for the weak role of scrutinizing

(COSAC, 2007, p.8). Nevertheless the practice shows that this

approach is not often used in Bulgaria (personal communication,

national expert, January 2014).

Taking a look back into Maurer scheme for measuring parliamentary

participation in EU Affairs in regard to the scope it could be

said that Bulgarian parliament monitors activities and documents

that are of importance for the national interest and the scope is

rather law (COSAC, 2010). In regard to the selection of documents

that to be monitored and scrutinized, a responsible body is

competent specialized committee – CEAOEF. The managing approach

is more reactive, than proactive. Although the parliament has the

right to request a hearing of the Prime Minister prior to

European Council meetings (art 122, ROPNA) the practice shows

that such hearings are more often ex-post and in addition they

happen less than two times a year (Parliament, 2013). The impact

on the government position is low.

26

Scrutiny variablesScope Timing and

Management

Impact

Weak

parliaments

Rather low Reactive and

Accidental

None

Modest policy

influencing

parliaments

able to modify

or to reject

government

proposals

Low - High Reactive but

Formalised

Low

Strong policy-

making

parliaments

able

to substitute

government

proposals

High Anticipative,

Proactive and

Institutionalis

ed

High

Table 2, Source: A Scheme for Measuring Parliamentary

Participation in EC/EU Affairs (p.8) (Maurer, 2002)

Scope Timing and

Management

Impact

Bulgaria Rather low Reactive NoneTable 3.

27

3.4.3 National Parliament and the Principle of Subsidiarity

When it comes about the subsidiarity principle the situation is

completely different. Actually with Lisbon Treaty reform the

scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle became one of the most

important responsibilities regard to EU decision-making.

Examination of COSAC shows that national parliaments focus on

improving their communication and there is significant exchange

of information between national parliaments (COSAC, 2013). The

first reasoned opinion of the Bulgarian parliament on the

principle of subsidiarity was adopted in 2011 with respect to the

European Commission proposal about Directive on common

consolidated corporative tax (Parliament, 2014)

On the question “What is under scrutiny”, put by COSAC (2007)

Bulgaria, together with thirteen other member states answered

that they focus they efforts on scrutinizing documents “emanating

from European institutions” (COSAC, 2007, p.8). In fact in the

Rules of Organisation and Procedure of National Assembly is

clearly written that after the committee responsible for EU

Affairs receives the reports of the standing committees on issues

related to the legislative proposals of the European institutions

and national framework positions discuss them and in period of

eight weeks makes a statement about the application of the

principle of subsidiarity. If the parliament adopts the opinion

that the principle has not been applied a reasoned opinion is

sent to the President of the European Parliament, Council of the

28

EU and the European Commission (art. 114, ROPNA). In addition

Bulgaria has declared that it is necessary a “common

understanding among national parliaments of the principle of

subsidiarity” to be developed (COSAC, 2007, p.23)

Bulgarian National Assembly has the full right to participate “in

the mechanisms for evaluation of the policies of the European Union within the Area for

Freedom, Security and Justice, in the political control over Europol and the evaluation of

the activities of Eurojust” according to art. 117. In addition:

“(2) The National Assembly shall take part in the procedures regarding the

renegotiation of Treaties.

(3) The National Assembly shall consider the applications of countries willing to join the

European Union.

(4) The National Assembly shall take an active part in the inter-parliamentary

cooperation of the EU member-states.”

In accordance with the official rules of the parliament, CEAOEF

organizes hearings of the candidate for positions in European

Institutions. All these competences included in the official

legislation enhanced the role of the Parliament in regard to EU

Affairs.

Chapter 4. Coordination in practiceIn this chapter will be discussed how in practice the

coordination happen and who has the leading role. An attempt will

be made to explain the limited role of the Bulgarian national

parliament when it comes to positions that the country defends on

29

Council sessions. For the purposes of this chapter real cases

will be used. The focus will be put on the legislative proposal

of EC about the new economic governance of the EU and more

precisely the so called “Six-pack” that was adopted by Council of

the EU on 4th of October 2011. Other examples what will be used

are related to the “Euro+ Compact” and the Moratorium on sale of

agricultural land to EU citizens, adopted by national parliament

in end of 2013.

Based on the information provided in chapter 4, where the process

of preparation and adoption of official country positions on EU

legislative proposals is discussed, it could be concluded that

when it comes about Council`s sessions, the leading role is hold

by Council of Ministers, supported by Council for European

Affairs. The CEA has to coordinate positions between different

ministries when the legislative proposal concerns different areas

of competence. Within the coordination mechanism key role plays

the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is responsible for the single

Bulgarian foreign policy. Important role plays also the Permanent

representation of Bulgaria to the European Union that also has to

defend Bulgarian positions on COREPER I and II sessions, but also

has to provide information about other countries` preferences.

Permanent representation of Bulgaria is under the control of

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

When it comes about European Council summits the leading role is

hold by the Prime Minister and his team. Because Bulgaria is

30

parliamentary republic, the Prime Minister is responsible for the

representation of the country during European Council meetings.

Detailed information about positions of Bulgaria presented at

European Council meetings does not exist (Government, 2014). The

former Prime Minister of Bulgaria - Mr. Boyko Borisov - provided

information to the society principally using the media. Search

the archive page of Council of Ministers on the official website

shows that only twelve titles with information for adoption of

national positions for the period 2009-2014 could be found. What

is more, an attempt to reach the position is not possible,

because under titles there is no information (Government, 2014).

Most often the parliament is also not aware of Prime Minister`s

position. Plenary discussion on the Bulgarian position expressed

during European Council meetings is too rare. Revision of the

parliamentary control transcript from 20112 onwards shows that

only 5 cases had been discussed and for two of the in fact there

were no discussions because the Prime Minister provided written

responses3 (Parliament, 2014). An explicit example that

illustrates the dominate role of Prime Minister and especially of

the former one is the case with “Euro+” Compact. Official

position of the country is not duplicated and there was no

discussion in the parliament. An hour prior his flight to

Brussels Mr. Borisov went to the Parliament in order to inform

the National Assembly that he will sign the compact (EUinside,2 Plenary transcripts official page http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst 3 Written responses of the Prime Minister Boyko Borisov in Bulgarian only: http://www.parliament.bg/pub/StenD/KMBT36220120724105853.pdf http://www.parliament.bg/pub/StenD/KMBT36220111208165358.pdf

31

September 2011)4. Due to the complicate political situation in

the country within on the last few European Council summits the

country was represented by the President of Bulgaria- Mr.

Plevneliev (President, 2013).

Bulgarian Parliament is the most politicized institution in the

country where confrontation between the ruling and the opposition

parties is often met (Parliamentary transcripts, 2014). As

mentioned in Chapter 4 significant number of decisions taken by

the Council of the EU has an expert character and possible

politicizing could have negative effect. This might be a reason

why the parliament does not have a significant role in adoption

of country positions and why most of parliamentary discussions

are led by committee responsible for EU affairs and not in

plenary sessions. Actually the Parliament has a leading role in

the implementation of European legislation into Bulgarian one. It

is responsible for transposition of Directives and changing of

national legislation in accordance with the European. Clear

example for the politicizing of expert decisions and using of

populism for gathering electoral votes is the case with the

Memorandum on the sales of agricultural lands to EU citizens that

was adopted by the Parliament in the end of 2013 (Parliament,

4 EUinside.eu organized a huge discussion in July 2011 in Sofia, with the participation of representatives of the European and national parliaments, theEuropean Commission, prominent economists, political scientists, media and citizens related to the new economic governance of the EU. The statement provided above is done by Member of the Parliament Mrs. Meglena Plugchieva, Vice-Chair of the parliamentary Committee on EU Affairs in the 41st Bulgarian Parliament. http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/euinside-discussion-eu-economic-governance-and-the-challenges-for-bulgaria

32

2013). With this memorandum the National Assembly breached the EU

law.

In order to trace the process of coordination of national

positions on EU legislative proposals the case with “Six-pack”

will be taken. Based on the official documents of Bulgarian

institutions analysis of the balance between parliament and

government will be made and who has the leading role.

In September 2010 European Commission has launched a brunch of

legislative and regulatory measures for strengthening the

Stability and Growth Compact and for improving the economic

governance within the European Union (European Commission, 2010).

The package includes five regulations and one directive that

foresee preventing and correcting of macroeconomic imbalances,

establishing national fiscal frameworks of quality and stronger

enforcement (European Commission, 2010). As it is obvious all of

the proposed measures would have significant effect on national

economic policy and deserve wide discussion.

When searching in the website of Council of Ministers about

Bulgarian position on these issues very limited information could

be found. It is expected that through the coordinated information

systems used by all of the European institutions for

communication with member states` administrations the Commission

proposal had been received in the end of September of 2010 or at

latest in the beginning of October. Nevertheless no piece of

information from this period is accessible. The first piece of

33

information about national position regard the “six-pack” and

actually the last one was included in the Annual program for the

Participation of Republic of Bulgaria in the decision-making

process in the EU” for 2011, adopted in January 2011 (CEA, 2014).

In less than one page the Council of Ministers expresses the

opinion that the country in principle supports the new economic

governance but has some reserves with respect to two out of six

of the legislative proposals. The country was not in favor with

the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of

the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic

imbalances and the proposal for a Regulation of the European

Parliament and of the Council on enforcement measures to correct

excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area (Council of

Ministers, Decision 24, 2011). Further information for the

development of Bulgarian official position are not accessible

neither on the Council of Minister`s website, nor on CEA website,

nor on the website of Ministry of Finance. The “six-pack” was

also included in the Annual working program of the National

Assembly (Parliament, 2011).

A report of the CEAOEF from 30.03.2011 provides information that

on 16. 03. 2011 the framework position regard regulations and the

directive proposed by the EC was adopted under number 102-00-15

(Parliament, 2011). Access to this position is not possible. Two

week after the adoption of the framework position by the Council

of Ministers (29.03.2011) the CEAOEF initiated a discussion with

the Council for Civil Consultations within the committee where

34

the EC proposal was discussed. From the information provided in

report of CEAOEF is visible that “National Assembly has formed its

position after consultations with representatives of the business and NGOs, after

hearings of representatives of the executive authority, participation in

interparliamentary meetings organized by EP, participation in COSAC session and

communication with the EU institutions” (CEAOEF, 2011). On their common

session on 30.03.2011 CEAOEF and Budget and Finance Committee

after the consultations mentioned above and discussions within

the session, both committees decided to support the framework

position adopted by the Council of Ministers. In the report is

written that CEAOEF had expressed its concrete proposals regard

“Six-pack” in relation with European Parliament resolution from

20.10.2010. In its report the committee gave the opinion that the

principle of subsidiarity and proportionality has been applied

(CEAOEF, 2011).

Further information about the position that Bulgaria defended on

the Council session in October 2011 is not provided through

official websites of Bulgarian institutions. In a press release

of Ministry of Finance from October 2011 is written that

Ministries of ECOFIN has agreed on measures proposed by European

Commission without to be mention what position Bulgarian Minister

of Finance has defend neither is written whether Bulgaria has

reached its goals (Ministry of Finance, 2011).. Although the

country has some reserves regard two out of six proposals, the

final decision of ECOFIN shows that the whole package of measures

was adopted.

35

ConclusionThe theories we examined in this research prove that the

Bulgarian approach towards decision making is decentralized and

selective according to Kassim’s scheme. This is mostly due to the

economic and political position of Bulgaria in the European

scene.

The leading role is assigned to the Council of Ministers and the

permanent representative. The Prime Minister as well is a

powerful actor, as a representative of Bulgaria in the European

Council Summits.

However, the role of the parliament is weak, even though it is

formally regulated. In practice this is completely different with

the government adopting a stronger role. Having in mind the

former named examples, we can state that the parliament is a very

weak actor in the decision making process.

One of the more difficult points in this research was finding all

of the information regarding positions in Bulgaria. More

transparency in the decision making process regarding the

Bulgarian framework positions would in some extent increase the

public interested towards this topic and the importance of it

shall be properly valued. Another recommendation point is to

increase parliamentary scrutiny in order to ensure representation

of the Bulgarian interests as a whole, not those in line with the

government's policies.

36

This brings us to our next point of recommendation, namely the

opinion of the parliament is not legally binding now and

therefore in practice it is mostly neglected during the process.

Making it compulsory with a law would increase its power and

apply the principle of the division of powers both in theory and

in practice.

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