National coordination inBulgaria on reaching the
country`s position regardingEU affairs
By Loreta Bahtchevanova, Desislava Antonova and Lyza Sabaihi
14/01/2014
Erasmus University Rotterdam
ContentsChapter 1: Problem analysis..........................................21.1 Problem definition..............................................2
1.2 Research question...............................................2Chapter 2 Theoretical framework......................................3
2.1 Governance......................................................32.2 EU governance (multi-level/state-centric).......................3
2.3 Bottom-up/Top-down..............................................42.4 National Coordination...........................................4
Chapter 3: National Coordination.....................................53.1 National Coordination from the perspective of National Government..........................................................63.2 Who is further consulted?.......................................7
3.2.1 The role of Non-governmental organizations..................73.2.2 The role of stakeholders...................................10
3.3 Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria on the EU.103.4 The role of the national Parliament; Parliamentary scrutiny; Principle of subsidiarity..........................................133.4.1 The role of National Parliaments in EU decision-making.....13
3.4.2 The role of Bulgarian parliament within the coordination mechanism. Scrutiny of the Parliament vis-à-vis government.......14
3.4.3 National Parliament and the Principle of Subsidiarity......18Chapter 4. Coordination in practice.................................19
Conclusion..........................................................23
1
References:.........................................................24
Chapter 1: Problem analysis The European Union is formed by 28 member states which are
different in culture and languages. Thus it is not hard to
imagine that when it comes to decision making every member state
has its own interests and preferences. Elaborating on models such
as the state-centric model and the multi-level model, we will
discuss the case of Bulgaria and its governance. Regarding the
governance at the European level, there have been several shifts
in different directions. In this research we will focus on
governance in Bulgaria by starting off with a theoretical
framework, followed by the institutional setting in Bulgaria.
Additionally, we will discuss the national coordination with
different roles of the government and parliament for instance.
1.1 Problem definition
The problem that we are examining concerns Bulgaria and its
national coordination. The lack of coordination between different
national actors involved in the EU policy and decision-making
2
leads to lack of effectiveness in the negotiations and defending
of Bulgarian interests.
1.2 Research question
In order to examine the former mentioned problem, the following
research question was formulated:
- How do national actors, involved in the EU policy and
decision-making coordinate the effectiveness of defending
Bulgarian interests?
The following sub questions were also formulated:
- Who are the actors involved?
- What is the role of the government?
- What is the role of the parliament representations?
- According to Kassim’s (2003) scheme where can Bulgaria be
placed?
- What is the role of parliament scrutiny?
- How are decisions made in practice?
Chapter 2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Governance
Governance as we know it today has been shaped and formed over
time. With these changes also comes a great deal of literature
that discusses these changes in governance. What mostly is
discussed regarding the changes in governance is the shift in
3
governance and certain issues these shift of governance took with
them (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004).
The former named shifts in governance both took place
horizontally and vertically (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004). These
shifts can also be used both, however it is better to start off
by defining them both. To start off with the horizontal shift;
this can be divided in another two shifts namely a shift from
executive/legislative to judiciary so a more active or stricter
role towards rule. Additionally a shift from public to private
organizations and governance is part of the horizontal shift
which includes a shift in delegation of tasks to semi-public
institutions (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004). When there is a shift
from national to international institutions or a shift from
national to supranational institutions, this mostly describes the
vertical shift. This shift can be explained through globalization
and internationalization of certain markets, this makes certain
institutions or organizations shift to a more international
governance (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004). The former described
internationalization and globalization can also contribute to the
fact that organizations need local organizations in order to
implement rules for instance. In addition, this so called
vertical shift downwards can thus also go from international to
national level (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004).
2.2 EU governance (multi-level/state-centric)
4
Now that it is clear that through the years there has been some
shifts in governance, it is interesting to discuss the European
Union, its governance and how it is organized. There are two
models regarding the European Union governance, namely a multi-
level model and a state-centric model (Hooghe & Marks, 2001).
When a national government is considered as the institution that
‘has the last word’ or as a ‘centric’ decision maker we speak of
a state-centric model. Institutions on a more supranational level
do not have much to say regarding policies and rules for
instance. The state-centric model, basically represent the
‘lowest denominator’ of the national actors (Hooghe & Marks,
2001). On the other hand we have the multi-level model which
discusses decision making and the different actors it involves.
Moreover, these actors are involved from different levels in the
government. This means that regarding policies and governance
nation states and different actors from multiple level come
together (Hooghe & Marks, 2001).
2.3 Bottom-up/Top-down
After discussing both the state-centric and the multi-level
models, it is also interesting to discuss the different
approaches of the European governance. There are two main
approaches namely; a bottom-up approach and a top-down approach
(Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 2004). The bottom-up approach
focuses on discussing and to change the European policies by
agreements of the EU states and this can be done through meetings
5
for instance. In addition, these changes in policy areas go step
by step and are also called incremental changes. Summing this up,
the bottom-up approach involves all member states in order to
change EU policies, however these changes are often incremental
(Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 2004). On the other hand we have the
top-down approach; this approach focuses on the influence on EU
decisions and the impact on the EU states and their policies
(Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 2004).
2.4 National Coordination
Kassim (2003) discusses the response of the member states
regarding the membership of the European Union. Each member state
is judged by criteria such as strategies of coordination and
involvement strategies. Kassim (2003) visualized this by making a
scheme running from centralized to decentralized and from
comprehensive coordination ambition to selective coordinating
ambition. When a country is not so ‘open’ regarding the
coordination and is more ‘selected’ in its structure, it moves
more towards the selective coordinating ambition. Additionally, a
more centralized country – as the name implies – would have a
government where structures are more centred and where
professionals are responsible for the coordination (Kassim,
2003). If we find a country more on the decentralized part it
would indicate that opposite from the centralized countries,
there are not really specialists in the area to structure the
government (Kassim, 2003).
6
Maurer (2002) provides us very interesting insights by stating
that: ‘When discussing the role of national parliaments in the EU, it belongs to the
conventional wisdom that national parliaments have increasingly lost in overall
importance due to the evolution of this political system’ (Maurer, 2002, p. 3).
It is therefore also very important to examine to what extent a
parliament is involved in a national system. And more
specifically it is important to look at the decrease in
legislature regarding national parliaments. This decrease/loss
can be explained through the fact that a lot of competencies are
given to the European Union (Maurer, 2002). However, on the other
hand, there is an increase in national actors attaining more
control in the national role through factors as procedures for
instance. (Maurer, 2002) Finally, Maurer (2002) found that the
parliamentary scrutiny is dependent per institution in Europe.
This also means that the outcome is different per institution or
parliament; depending on how a country is able to control its
government.
Chapter 3: National Coordination
In this chapter the coordination between government and
parliament when it comes about reaching of national position on
EU issues will be discussed. Using the theory base of Kassim
(2003) and Maurer (2002) explaining of national coordination
mechanism will be made. Attention will be paid to who has the
leading role and how the parliament scrutiny is applied.
7
Bulgaria is a democratic parliamentary republic. The unicameral
National Assembly, or “Narodno Subranie”, consists of 240
deputies who are elected for four-year term. Parliament selects
and dismisses government ministers, including the prime minister,
exercises control over the government, and sanctions deployment
of troops abroad. It is responsible for enactment of laws,
approval of the budget, scheduling of presidential elections,
declaration of war, and ratification of international treaties
and agreements. (GlobalEdge, 2012)
The prime minister is head of the Council of Ministers, which is
the primary component of the executive branch. In addition to the
prime minister and deputy prime ministers, the Council is
composed of ministers who head the various agencies within the
government and usually come from the majority or from a member
party of the ruling coalition in parliament. (GlobalEdge,
2012)The Council is responsible for carrying out state policy,
managing the state budget and maintaining law and order. The
Council must resign if the National Assembly passes a vote of no
confidence in the Council or prime minister. (GlobalEdge, 2012)
3.1 National Coordination from the perspective of National Government.
Bulgaria like most of the other countries from the Eastern
European Union enlargement faced a problem with the capacity to
effectively coordinate and participate in the EU policy-making
process (Christiansen et al. 2008, p. 248 in in Gärtner, Hörner &
8
Obholzer, 2011). The adoption of Copenhagen Criteria in 1993
established some requirements related to the economic and
societal conditions that countries had to response (Goetz 2004,
p.256 in Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer, 2011). As a result in all of
the countries were established central coordination structures
that played a key role during the accession (Lippert et al. 2001,
989-991 in Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer, 2011). These coordination
structures were situated to the Prime Minister or as part of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lippert et al. 2001, 992 in Gärtner,
Hörner & Obholzer, 2011). The coordination mechanism were adapted
after the accession of the countries but remained as an important
structure in coordination of national participation in the
decision-making process in the EU (Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer,
2011, p.82)
After the accession of the country, the national coordination
mechanism in Bulgaria is defined by Decree No 85 of 17 April 2007
concerning the organization and coordination of matters relating to the European
Union, amended by Decree No 212/27.08.2009. According to Art.1, The
Council of Ministers “shall manage and implement the policy of the Republic
of Bulgaria as a Member State of the European Union”. It is responsible for
agreement and adoption of Annual program for the participation of
Bulgaria in the decision-making process in the EU and for the
approval of country`s positions for the Council of the European
Union and European Council summits. In addition the Council of
Ministers adopts the framework positions of the country on issues
discussed during the Council of the European Union and European
9
Council summits. The Council of Ministers is chaired by the
Prime-Minister who represents Bulgaria during European Council
summits and who has the leading role.
In fact the EU affairs coordination mechanism in Bulgaria has
three stages - the Council of Ministers, the Council for European
Affairs within the Council of Ministers, which is a consultative
body and 35 working groups in different areas (CEA, 2014). Hence
the Council of Ministers represents the highest level of
decision-making in the national coordination mechanism on EU
affairs. According to Art 2 of Decree 85/2007 the Minister of
Foreign Affairs is responsible for the implementation of single
national policy on all of the European Union matters. He leads
the Permanent Representation of Republic of Bulgaria in the
European Union, gives it instructions and submits projects of
positions for the meetings of European Council. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs is also a Chairman of Council for European
Affairs. “The Council for European Affairs is consultative interministerial body […]
with major functions related to the adoption of framework positions, […] draft positions
for informal and regular meetings of European Council and […] Council of the European
Union, prior to their approval by the Council of Ministers […]. Regular meetings of the
CEA are held once a week (every Monday) but extra sessions are also possible”. Its
coordination Directorate within the Administration of the Council
of Ministers is the Secretariat of CEA (CEA, 2014).
10
With regard to the national positions presented at Council
meetings it could be said that there is a clear division of the
responsibilities of the participants in the process (CEA, 2014).
The structure includes as expert as well political level of
coordination. Crucial role in the preparation of framework
positions on normative acts proposed by the European Commission
according to art 290 and 291 of TFEU have the working groups that
are part of National Coordination Mechanism. The majority of
framework positions (about 70%) are prepared and approved by the
working groups. On some issues, which are of priority for the
country or consensus was not reached in the working groups the
framework positions are considered and approved by CEA. Framework
positions related to the ECOFIN summits, for example, should be
discussed and approved by the Council of Ministers as agenda
items of its meetings (personal communication, country expert,
January 2014). On the basis of the framework positions Ministers
in accordance with their competences prepare and submit for
approval draft positions for the Council`s meetings (Decree
85/2007, art.3).
3.2 Who is further consulted?
3.2.1 The role of Non-governmental organizations
Participation of official representatives of Bulgaria in the
institutions and bodies of the EU gives the opportunity to defend
Bulgarian national interests in the integration process. The
development of the Bulgarian position is continued process that
11
involves consultation procedure at political level, both within
the Council of Ministers itself and with the Parliament.
(Bulgarian Center for Non-Profit Law, 2009) An essential part of
the consultation mechanism is the involvement of civil society in
the process. The consultation mechanism on European affairs,
including the NGOs is regulated with Decree No 85 of the Council
of Ministers in 2007. This mechanism aligns the Bulgarian
framework positions, guidelines and positions for meetings of the
Council of the European Union and other institutions EU. The aim
is to provide interaction and coordination between the various
institutions and NGOs, leading to the elaboration and
presentation of coherent and consistent Bulgarian positions in
the process of decision-making in the EU.
The administration is not obliged to include NGOs in the
composition of the working groups of the CEA (although in most it
is done). The only obligation is that heads of the working groups
have to invite representatives of civil society to the meetings
of the working groups, including representatives of the Economic
and Social Council. Identification of specific NGOs that will
participate is made by order of the Minister or the head of the
leading institution or administration. Usually suggestions
regarding which NGOs shall be included in the working groups are
made by the head of the relevant working groups. (Bulgarian
Center for Non-Profit Law, 2009) The designated NGOs as a rule
are specialized in the matter in question – e.g. consumer
12
protection, industry associations and chambers, etc. There are no
pre-defined formal criteria to select which NGOs are going to be
included, nor specific mechanism to be selected. For the
Monitoring Committee of the National Strategic Reference
Framework and in the Monitoring Committees of the operational
programs co-financed by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion
Fund of the European Union is obligatory to include as full
members of National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria
(NAMB) ; representative of the nationally represented
organizations of employers, workers and employees and officials
and a representative of the nationally represented organizations
of and for people with disabilities1.(Bulgarian Center for Non-
Profit Law, 2009) Committees may include other NGOs under a
certain previously adopted procedure, but they have only advisory
powers. According to the Rules, NGOs are divided into three
groups - social organizations, environmental organizations and
organizations working in the field of education, science and
culture. NGO representatives except for participating as
observers with advisory powers, also receive the information
provided to members of the Committee are entitled to participate
in the discussions, give recommendations and make proposals when
this is appropriate and related to the subject of their
activities. Representatives of non-governmental organizations may
participate in the permanent and temporary subcommittees on
1 Decree № 182 of 21 July 2006 establishing the Committee of the National Strategic Reference Framework and operational programs co-financed by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund of the European Union
13
specific and current issues according to their competence, the
composition of which shall be approved by a simple majority of
members attending the meeting of the Committee. (Bulgarian Center
for Non-Profit Law, 2009).
Usually bodies that have advisory powers and involve NGOs are not
very active and are often created formally (to meet the
requirements of particular legislation). In many cases it is
considered that they do not involve "authentic" representatives
of the third sector, but rather organizations that are indirectly
or in practice related to the government and the political class.
A major drawback of the general approach of the central
institutions in the context of institutionalized forms of
cooperation with NGOs is that there are no clear rules, procedures and
policies regulating communication and consultation with the third sector. Very
often the choice of particular NGO that participates in a
particular organ is formed on the basis of personal contacts. As
a consequence, firstly, these bodies are not very popular as a
way to influence decision makers and secondly, their image among
NGOs and civil society in general is not very positive.
(Bulgarian Center for Non-Profit Law, 2009)
For example, the minister of European Integration Meglena Kuneva
in April 2006 established a Public Council to consult various
government policies. Among a series of consultations with
representatives of the civil society, a mechanism for nominating
14
NGOs was adopted and it included: members of the Public Council
may be different organizations without restrictions on the areas
in which they operate, but any organization that wants to be a
member needs to have support for its nomination by at least
another ten NGOs. As a result, twenty nine NGOs have become
members of this council. (Bulgarian Center for Non-Profit Law,
2009)
3.2.2 The role of stakeholders
Another actor in the process are the stakeholders. It is hard to
measure the degree of involvement of stakeholders in decision
making process in Bulgaria. They are invited in the working
groups as well as the NGOs and depending on the Minister of
Foreign Affairs they can be invited to the CEA. (Gärtner, Hörner
& Obholzer, 2011) However, the case is much similar to the
situation with the NGOs and as well it is not formally regulated
whether they are only observing the discussions or taking part in
the actual decision-making process. This leaves a door open to
exclude them in some extent over sensitive issues. What is more,
it is not clear whether the working groups and the CEA have to
respect the opinion of the stakeholders when formulating
positions. Despite the lack of legally regulated participation in
the decision making process, the biggest problem in Bulgaria
seems to be the identification of the relevant stakeholders.
Bulgaria has a selective approach by concentrating efforts on
several policy areas representing the main national interests,
15
such as agriculture, food and nuclear energy. Moreover, there is
a significant deficit in the institutional capacity for public
policy-making. Priorities, represented at European level are
mostly formulated by the political cabinets of the ministers and
do not necessarily reflect the public interest. As regards the
timing of the involvement in Brussels, Bulgaria can be described
as rather reactive, focusing on the decision-making phase in the
Council of Ministers. (Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer, 2011) This is
why the preparation of the Bulgarian position for the European
Council summits is not a strong priority in the political life of
the country. The role of the stakeholders and the levels of
representation of interests are difficult to define.
3.3 Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria on the EU
In the development of the framework positions except for the
members of the relevant working group of the coordination
mechanism on EU affairs, the relevant attaché of the Permanent
Representation of Republic of Bulgaria to the EU (PRBEU) should
also participate actively.
Due to the dynamics of the work and the possibility of some
issues to be addressed in both the formats of COREPER optimal
coordination between sector diplomats, diplomats "Mertens" and
"Antici" and Permanent Representative and his deputy, is a key
determinant of success in protecting the national interest.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall examine whether the guidelines16
prepared for the Permanent Representative are consistent with the
overall policy of the Republic of Bulgaria in the EU. In case of
discrepancies, the Foreign Ministry, in consultation with the
lead agency shall take action to amend and / or supplement the
instructions, for which is notifying by competence the Permanent
Representative or his deputy, and the Secretariat of the CEA.
Bulgarian Permanent Representative and his deputy present the
national position based on guidelines endorsed by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs under Decree № 85 of 2007. In the case of
extremely important issues for the country, which are going to be
discussed in COREPER, the respective leading minister may decide
that Bulgarian position will be discussed at a meeting of the
Council for European Affairs or the Council of Ministers.
Bulgaria has 5 seats in COREPER. They are taken by the Permanent
Representative, respectively - his deputy, diplomat “Antici”,
respectively - the diplomat “Mertens” and sector diplomats of the
PRBEU, in whose competences are the items on the agenda of the
meeting. Sector diplomats expertly support the Permanent
Representative of his deputy, and if necessary shall ensure
prompt contact with the lead ministry in the capital, that has
developed the draft guidelines. A report is made after each
meeting of COREPER and is sent to the Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, certain departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Secretariat of the CEA, the head of the Office of the Prime
Minister and if necessary - to other recipients. The reports must
17
include a summary of the decisions taken, brief information on
the items of Part I of the agenda and extensive information about
the discussion on Part II of the agenda. The necessary documents
shall be attached to the report. (Practical Guide to the
participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in the decision making
process in the Council, 2013)
Figure 1. Source: www.euaffairs.government.bg
According to Kassim (2003, p. 92) there are two dimensions that
can be used for determination of national coordination mechanism
on EU matters. The first one is the so called “coordination
ambition”. In contrast to some countries such as UK and Denmark
that put efforts to agree national position on almost every issue
of EU activities, Bulgaria could be defined as selective in its18
approach. The country concentrates its efforts in some areas that
are of priority for national interest such as agriculture,
nuclear energy, cohesion policy (Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer,
2011, p.92). In terms of the other dimension that Kassim
indicates- extent of centralization of the coordination mechanism
(2003, p. 92), from the information provided above could be
concluded that Bulgaria has decentralized system. Although the
leading role of EU Affairs coordination lies to the Council of
Ministers and CEA that has a central role in preparation and
adoption of framework positions. According to national experts
CEA does not make the system more centralized because first it is
consultative interministerial body and second it does not have
its own ministry but is more like a political appointment
(personal communication, national expert, January 2014).
19
Figure 2: Source: Patterns of national coordination in the new
Member States, Gärtner, L., Hörner, J. and Obholzer, L. (2011).
http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/275/261
3.4 The role of the national Parliament; Parliamentary scrutiny; Principle of subsidiarity.
In this chapter the process of adoption of framework positions
will be examined through the role of Bulgarian National Assembly
according to official legislation. Based on Maurer (2002) and
COSAC (2007) we will try to define the type of scrutiny system of
Bulgarian parliament. Attention will be paid as to the scrutiny
of government, as well scrutiny of European Commission thought
subsidiarity principle.
20
3.4.1 The role of National Parliaments in EU decision-making
Multilevel-governance- the transfer of legislative competences
into the institutions of the EU and the loss of legislative power
in the EU policy-making for national parliaments should be
compensated by increasing the role of national parliament’s
scrutiny vis-à-vis governments (Maurer, 2002). It should be
pointed out that the level and effectiveness of scrutiny of the
Parliament vary in different member states. While in some of the
countries the Parliament receives just ex-post information, in
other the process is enhanced with mandatory procedures (Maurer,
2002).
Even if the process of parliamentary scrutiny is
institutionalized with the “Protocol on the role of national
parliaments in the European Union” into the Amsterdam Treaty,
that addresses the scope of information provided to the national
parliaments, the timing and impact (Maurer, 2002), the protocol
does not define some major features of scrutiny. It is not
clearly defined which institution what kind of documents in
obliged to provide to the parliament (Maurer, 2002, p.4). In
addition to the PNP with the Lisbon Treaty the role of national
parliaments was enhanced by the procedure that foresees scrutiny
in regard to the principle of subsidiarity. According to the TFEU
national parliaments are responsible for the control over the
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. In term of 8
21
weeks after they receives the Commission`s legislative proposal
they have to prepare their motivated opinion whether the
subsidiarity principle is met. So with the Lisbon Treaty this
lack of differentiation in PNP regard who is responsible to
provide the parliaments the necessary information has been
overcame.
3.4.2 The role of Bulgarian parliament within the coordination mechanism. Scrutiny of the Parliament vis-à-vis government
In order to examine the influence and effectiveness of Bulgarian
parliament scrutiny vis-à-vis the government two models will be
used. First of all using the theoretical base of Maurer (2002)
and his three variables we will examine the scope, timing and
impact of the scrutiny process. Using the examination model of
COSAC (2007) it should be defined whether the scrutiny of
Bulgarian parliament is document-based or there are binding
procedures.
The scrutiny role of Bulgarian national parliament in regard to
the European Union policy and decision-making is determined by
two major normative acts- Decree 85/2007 and in the Rules of Organisation
and Procedure of the National Assembly (ROPNA). According to the
Official rules of the National Assembly, Committee on European
Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds (CEAOEF) has been
established. As in the most of other member-states according to
Maurer (2002) the role of this EU affairs committee is to
22
establish general norms and procedures in order to scrutinize
more effectively the government in the EU decision-making
(Maurer, 2002, p.4). Firstly, in Decree 85/2007 is written out
that the Annual program about the Participation of Republic of
Bulgaria in the decision-making process of the European Union
should be send to the President of the National Assembly (art.1).
It is not mention whether National Assembly is eligible to submit
some amendments to the program or to send a reasoned opinion. In
regard to the timing, the CM has to send the annual program to
the parliament at latest 7 days after its approval. On the basis
of this annual program, National Assembly and more precisely
European Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds committee
adopts Annual working program of the National Assembly on issues
of the European Union (art 111, ROPNA). According to art 1 of
Decree 85/2007, the Council of Minister is obliged to inform the
National Assembly about the country`s framework positions related
to issues addressed in the Annual program (art.1).
In a period of three weeks after the Commission proposal on
legislative act which is included in the annual program is sent,
the Council of Ministers has to submit a draft of the legislation
act and the framework position to the National Assembly. Although
as Maurer has mentioned, PNP does not give clear imagination on
what “in good time” means, a period of three weeks seems to be
acceptable (Maurer, 2002, p.4). On the base of the framework
position, the CEAOEF has to prepare and adopt reasoned opinion
and to send it to the President of National Assembly. It should
23
be mentioned that most of the framework positions are not
discussed during plenary sessions of the Parliament, but only in
Committee meetings (personal communication, national expert,
January 2014). National expert, interviewed for the purposes of
this paper gave a clear explanation of the process. “After the
Commission proposal for legislative act is received, working groups, part of National
Coordination Mechanism prepare the framework position that most often is adopted by
them or by CEA or CM. Once adopted, the framework position is sent to the President of
National Assembly. Most often he sends it directly to the CEAOEF. The framework
position has been discussed within the committee and motivated opinion has to be
approved. This motivated opinion has to be submitted to the President of the National
Assembly. More rarely framework positions are discussed during plenary
sessions.”(January 2014)
Based on the information above it is seen that Bulgarian system
focuses on examining of legislative proposals and does not
scrutiny so strictly individual Council meetings. What is more,
National Assembly is not aware of all the positions that Bulgaria
defends on Council`s meetings, especially of these related to
technical and expert issues. Taking into account that at European
level more than 600 legislative proposals have been discussed, a
discussion on all of them in the Parliament would make the
process significantly slower and complicated (national expert).
In accordance to the division of scrutiny systems made by COSAC
(2007), Bulgarian system can be defined as document-based.
24
Table 1 Source: COSAC 2007
Countries differ also in the extent to which parliamentary
reasoned opinions are binding and how they influence the official
national position defended on Council meetings (COSAC, 2007). In
our case could be concluded that parliamentary provisions are not
binding for the government. More precisely when we talk about the
European Council meetings, parliament does not have the
possibility to draft its official resolution prior to the summit.
What is more there is a lack of possibility to for parliament to
provide an opinion even as a non-binding recommendation. The
model seems like “traditional model” of executive dominance (EP,
2013, p.48-9).
According to the analysis of the scrutiny system of the
parliament vis-à-vis government, based on the provided
information, it could be said that the role of Bulgarian
parliament in scrutinizing government is rather limited. Even if
in the beginning of each year the National Assembly receives the
annual working program of Council of Ministers and framework
positions of proposed legislative acts its influences over the
national position is rather limited, due to the non-binding
status of reasoned opinion. Although there is a clause in the25
Official rules of the National Assembly (Chapter 11, art. 113)
that provides CEAOEF to initiate parliamentary reserve (scrutiny
reserve) for legislative drafts, included in the Annual working
program of the National Assembly. In this case the government is
not allowed to provide a position on Council meetings, until
parliamentary scrutiny process has been completed. In fact
scrutiny reserve is typical for document-based systems and it
some kind of compensation for the weak role of scrutinizing
(COSAC, 2007, p.8). Nevertheless the practice shows that this
approach is not often used in Bulgaria (personal communication,
national expert, January 2014).
Taking a look back into Maurer scheme for measuring parliamentary
participation in EU Affairs in regard to the scope it could be
said that Bulgarian parliament monitors activities and documents
that are of importance for the national interest and the scope is
rather law (COSAC, 2010). In regard to the selection of documents
that to be monitored and scrutinized, a responsible body is
competent specialized committee – CEAOEF. The managing approach
is more reactive, than proactive. Although the parliament has the
right to request a hearing of the Prime Minister prior to
European Council meetings (art 122, ROPNA) the practice shows
that such hearings are more often ex-post and in addition they
happen less than two times a year (Parliament, 2013). The impact
on the government position is low.
26
Scrutiny variablesScope Timing and
Management
Impact
Weak
parliaments
Rather low Reactive and
Accidental
None
Modest policy
influencing
parliaments
able to modify
or to reject
government
proposals
Low - High Reactive but
Formalised
Low
Strong policy-
making
parliaments
able
to substitute
government
proposals
High Anticipative,
Proactive and
Institutionalis
ed
High
Table 2, Source: A Scheme for Measuring Parliamentary
Participation in EC/EU Affairs (p.8) (Maurer, 2002)
Scope Timing and
Management
Impact
Bulgaria Rather low Reactive NoneTable 3.
27
3.4.3 National Parliament and the Principle of Subsidiarity
When it comes about the subsidiarity principle the situation is
completely different. Actually with Lisbon Treaty reform the
scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle became one of the most
important responsibilities regard to EU decision-making.
Examination of COSAC shows that national parliaments focus on
improving their communication and there is significant exchange
of information between national parliaments (COSAC, 2013). The
first reasoned opinion of the Bulgarian parliament on the
principle of subsidiarity was adopted in 2011 with respect to the
European Commission proposal about Directive on common
consolidated corporative tax (Parliament, 2014)
On the question “What is under scrutiny”, put by COSAC (2007)
Bulgaria, together with thirteen other member states answered
that they focus they efforts on scrutinizing documents “emanating
from European institutions” (COSAC, 2007, p.8). In fact in the
Rules of Organisation and Procedure of National Assembly is
clearly written that after the committee responsible for EU
Affairs receives the reports of the standing committees on issues
related to the legislative proposals of the European institutions
and national framework positions discuss them and in period of
eight weeks makes a statement about the application of the
principle of subsidiarity. If the parliament adopts the opinion
that the principle has not been applied a reasoned opinion is
sent to the President of the European Parliament, Council of the
28
EU and the European Commission (art. 114, ROPNA). In addition
Bulgaria has declared that it is necessary a “common
understanding among national parliaments of the principle of
subsidiarity” to be developed (COSAC, 2007, p.23)
Bulgarian National Assembly has the full right to participate “in
the mechanisms for evaluation of the policies of the European Union within the Area for
Freedom, Security and Justice, in the political control over Europol and the evaluation of
the activities of Eurojust” according to art. 117. In addition:
“(2) The National Assembly shall take part in the procedures regarding the
renegotiation of Treaties.
(3) The National Assembly shall consider the applications of countries willing to join the
European Union.
(4) The National Assembly shall take an active part in the inter-parliamentary
cooperation of the EU member-states.”
In accordance with the official rules of the parliament, CEAOEF
organizes hearings of the candidate for positions in European
Institutions. All these competences included in the official
legislation enhanced the role of the Parliament in regard to EU
Affairs.
Chapter 4. Coordination in practiceIn this chapter will be discussed how in practice the
coordination happen and who has the leading role. An attempt will
be made to explain the limited role of the Bulgarian national
parliament when it comes to positions that the country defends on
29
Council sessions. For the purposes of this chapter real cases
will be used. The focus will be put on the legislative proposal
of EC about the new economic governance of the EU and more
precisely the so called “Six-pack” that was adopted by Council of
the EU on 4th of October 2011. Other examples what will be used
are related to the “Euro+ Compact” and the Moratorium on sale of
agricultural land to EU citizens, adopted by national parliament
in end of 2013.
Based on the information provided in chapter 4, where the process
of preparation and adoption of official country positions on EU
legislative proposals is discussed, it could be concluded that
when it comes about Council`s sessions, the leading role is hold
by Council of Ministers, supported by Council for European
Affairs. The CEA has to coordinate positions between different
ministries when the legislative proposal concerns different areas
of competence. Within the coordination mechanism key role plays
the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is responsible for the single
Bulgarian foreign policy. Important role plays also the Permanent
representation of Bulgaria to the European Union that also has to
defend Bulgarian positions on COREPER I and II sessions, but also
has to provide information about other countries` preferences.
Permanent representation of Bulgaria is under the control of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
When it comes about European Council summits the leading role is
hold by the Prime Minister and his team. Because Bulgaria is
30
parliamentary republic, the Prime Minister is responsible for the
representation of the country during European Council meetings.
Detailed information about positions of Bulgaria presented at
European Council meetings does not exist (Government, 2014). The
former Prime Minister of Bulgaria - Mr. Boyko Borisov - provided
information to the society principally using the media. Search
the archive page of Council of Ministers on the official website
shows that only twelve titles with information for adoption of
national positions for the period 2009-2014 could be found. What
is more, an attempt to reach the position is not possible,
because under titles there is no information (Government, 2014).
Most often the parliament is also not aware of Prime Minister`s
position. Plenary discussion on the Bulgarian position expressed
during European Council meetings is too rare. Revision of the
parliamentary control transcript from 20112 onwards shows that
only 5 cases had been discussed and for two of the in fact there
were no discussions because the Prime Minister provided written
responses3 (Parliament, 2014). An explicit example that
illustrates the dominate role of Prime Minister and especially of
the former one is the case with “Euro+” Compact. Official
position of the country is not duplicated and there was no
discussion in the parliament. An hour prior his flight to
Brussels Mr. Borisov went to the Parliament in order to inform
the National Assembly that he will sign the compact (EUinside,2 Plenary transcripts official page http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst 3 Written responses of the Prime Minister Boyko Borisov in Bulgarian only: http://www.parliament.bg/pub/StenD/KMBT36220120724105853.pdf http://www.parliament.bg/pub/StenD/KMBT36220111208165358.pdf
31
September 2011)4. Due to the complicate political situation in
the country within on the last few European Council summits the
country was represented by the President of Bulgaria- Mr.
Plevneliev (President, 2013).
Bulgarian Parliament is the most politicized institution in the
country where confrontation between the ruling and the opposition
parties is often met (Parliamentary transcripts, 2014). As
mentioned in Chapter 4 significant number of decisions taken by
the Council of the EU has an expert character and possible
politicizing could have negative effect. This might be a reason
why the parliament does not have a significant role in adoption
of country positions and why most of parliamentary discussions
are led by committee responsible for EU affairs and not in
plenary sessions. Actually the Parliament has a leading role in
the implementation of European legislation into Bulgarian one. It
is responsible for transposition of Directives and changing of
national legislation in accordance with the European. Clear
example for the politicizing of expert decisions and using of
populism for gathering electoral votes is the case with the
Memorandum on the sales of agricultural lands to EU citizens that
was adopted by the Parliament in the end of 2013 (Parliament,
4 EUinside.eu organized a huge discussion in July 2011 in Sofia, with the participation of representatives of the European and national parliaments, theEuropean Commission, prominent economists, political scientists, media and citizens related to the new economic governance of the EU. The statement provided above is done by Member of the Parliament Mrs. Meglena Plugchieva, Vice-Chair of the parliamentary Committee on EU Affairs in the 41st Bulgarian Parliament. http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/euinside-discussion-eu-economic-governance-and-the-challenges-for-bulgaria
32
2013). With this memorandum the National Assembly breached the EU
law.
In order to trace the process of coordination of national
positions on EU legislative proposals the case with “Six-pack”
will be taken. Based on the official documents of Bulgarian
institutions analysis of the balance between parliament and
government will be made and who has the leading role.
In September 2010 European Commission has launched a brunch of
legislative and regulatory measures for strengthening the
Stability and Growth Compact and for improving the economic
governance within the European Union (European Commission, 2010).
The package includes five regulations and one directive that
foresee preventing and correcting of macroeconomic imbalances,
establishing national fiscal frameworks of quality and stronger
enforcement (European Commission, 2010). As it is obvious all of
the proposed measures would have significant effect on national
economic policy and deserve wide discussion.
When searching in the website of Council of Ministers about
Bulgarian position on these issues very limited information could
be found. It is expected that through the coordinated information
systems used by all of the European institutions for
communication with member states` administrations the Commission
proposal had been received in the end of September of 2010 or at
latest in the beginning of October. Nevertheless no piece of
information from this period is accessible. The first piece of
33
information about national position regard the “six-pack” and
actually the last one was included in the Annual program for the
Participation of Republic of Bulgaria in the decision-making
process in the EU” for 2011, adopted in January 2011 (CEA, 2014).
In less than one page the Council of Ministers expresses the
opinion that the country in principle supports the new economic
governance but has some reserves with respect to two out of six
of the legislative proposals. The country was not in favor with
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic
imbalances and the proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on enforcement measures to correct
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area (Council of
Ministers, Decision 24, 2011). Further information for the
development of Bulgarian official position are not accessible
neither on the Council of Minister`s website, nor on CEA website,
nor on the website of Ministry of Finance. The “six-pack” was
also included in the Annual working program of the National
Assembly (Parliament, 2011).
A report of the CEAOEF from 30.03.2011 provides information that
on 16. 03. 2011 the framework position regard regulations and the
directive proposed by the EC was adopted under number 102-00-15
(Parliament, 2011). Access to this position is not possible. Two
week after the adoption of the framework position by the Council
of Ministers (29.03.2011) the CEAOEF initiated a discussion with
the Council for Civil Consultations within the committee where
34
the EC proposal was discussed. From the information provided in
report of CEAOEF is visible that “National Assembly has formed its
position after consultations with representatives of the business and NGOs, after
hearings of representatives of the executive authority, participation in
interparliamentary meetings organized by EP, participation in COSAC session and
communication with the EU institutions” (CEAOEF, 2011). On their common
session on 30.03.2011 CEAOEF and Budget and Finance Committee
after the consultations mentioned above and discussions within
the session, both committees decided to support the framework
position adopted by the Council of Ministers. In the report is
written that CEAOEF had expressed its concrete proposals regard
“Six-pack” in relation with European Parliament resolution from
20.10.2010. In its report the committee gave the opinion that the
principle of subsidiarity and proportionality has been applied
(CEAOEF, 2011).
Further information about the position that Bulgaria defended on
the Council session in October 2011 is not provided through
official websites of Bulgarian institutions. In a press release
of Ministry of Finance from October 2011 is written that
Ministries of ECOFIN has agreed on measures proposed by European
Commission without to be mention what position Bulgarian Minister
of Finance has defend neither is written whether Bulgaria has
reached its goals (Ministry of Finance, 2011).. Although the
country has some reserves regard two out of six proposals, the
final decision of ECOFIN shows that the whole package of measures
was adopted.
35
ConclusionThe theories we examined in this research prove that the
Bulgarian approach towards decision making is decentralized and
selective according to Kassim’s scheme. This is mostly due to the
economic and political position of Bulgaria in the European
scene.
The leading role is assigned to the Council of Ministers and the
permanent representative. The Prime Minister as well is a
powerful actor, as a representative of Bulgaria in the European
Council Summits.
However, the role of the parliament is weak, even though it is
formally regulated. In practice this is completely different with
the government adopting a stronger role. Having in mind the
former named examples, we can state that the parliament is a very
weak actor in the decision making process.
One of the more difficult points in this research was finding all
of the information regarding positions in Bulgaria. More
transparency in the decision making process regarding the
Bulgarian framework positions would in some extent increase the
public interested towards this topic and the importance of it
shall be properly valued. Another recommendation point is to
increase parliamentary scrutiny in order to ensure representation
of the Bulgarian interests as a whole, not those in line with the
government's policies.
36
This brings us to our next point of recommendation, namely the
opinion of the parliament is not legally binding now and
therefore in practice it is mostly neglected during the process.
Making it compulsory with a law would increase its power and
apply the principle of the division of powers both in theory and
in practice.
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