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Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia: The General Treatment of Muslim Minorities in

Thailand

Introduction

In studying the existence of Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia, the general focus would be

looking at the ways of how small Muslim groups attempt to survive and adapt in a country where

the majority of the population are non-Muslims. Historically, the spread of Islam in Southeast

Asia was brought about by the Muslim traders who came from the Arab world and even India

who had business contacts with the local inhabitants. It is from this process that Islam as one of

the popular religions began to attract followers across different regions in Southeast Asia.

An example of a country that plays host to the Muslim minorities is Thailand. The Muslim

minorities in Thailand have played a significant role in highlighting internal and external affairs

at international level. The ongoing conflict that is taking place in the Southern part of Thailand

has been seen as the emergence of Islamic insurgence against the Thai authorities. Nonetheless,

seeing the complex nature of this violent uproar which occurs in Thailand‟s “Deep South” areas

namely Narathiwat, Patani and Yala there is a great need to investigate the causal factors. For

this essay, the aim is to investigate the background factors (such as cultural (religious), politics

and economics) which led to the radical movement by the Muslim minorities in the deep

southern Thailand. To aid explanation, several historical events will be used to further highlight

certain key points about the the conflict, general treatment of the Muslim minorities and the

clashes between the Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslims. In addition, there will be an emphasis on

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the steps taken to solve the conflict in the Deep South. To conclude the essay, the main points

will be summarised followed by the author‟s point of views in the subject matter.

Historical Background

The Muslim minorities made up about 6 to 8 percent of Thailand‟s population where the

majority of them are living in the Deep South (Scupin, 1980). These Muslim minorities are

actually the Malay ethnics living in the area and thus, according to Scupin (1980) they are called

the Malay Thai Muslims. Originally the Malay-Muslims in the Deep South existed as an

independent Islamic kingdom before it was assimilated into Thai polity in the “late nineteenth

and early twentieth century” (Scupin, p. 1223, 1980). These Malay-Muslims living in the Deep

South have distinct identity compared to the Thai Buddhists. As noted by Braam (p. 272, 2013),

the Malay-Muslims “share language, religion and family ties” with the Malay community that is

presently known as Malaysia. Braam (p. 272, 2013) further noted that the Malay-Muslims have

been “discriminated against and were considered to be „khaek‟ (guests or visitors) in Thailand”.

Current Political Situation

State Treatment

Since the Malay-Muslims in the Deep South want to maintain their distinct identities against the

majority population who are Thai-Buddhists, they tend to suffer immensely when the ruling

government imposed assimilation measures. Scupin (1980) identifies the term “Thaiify” which

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refers to the attempts by the Thai authorities to assimilate the Malay-Muslim. In the earlier

attempt of assimilation strategies adopted by the Thai authorities, they can be considered as

critically direct (Braam, 2013).

During the premiership of “Prime Minister Phibunsongkram (1938-44 and 1948-57)” (Braam, p.

272, 2013), he wanted to glorify Thai race, cultural practices that were non-Thai were banned.

According to Braam (2013) this included the forbidden of speaking in Malay and even the

practice of clothing and eating habit. Other assimilation measures which the Malay-Muslims

particularly resented were the abolition of sharia law regarding matters such as marriage, divorce

and inheritance which were to be replaced by the Thai Buddhist legal system. In further

examining this cultural integration by the Thai authorities, Braam (p.272, 2013) citing the idea of

Thanet Aphornsuvan, concludes Thanet‟s view that the intensification assimilation policies

happened during the founding of the constitutional policy in 1932. It aims to establish power and

control in the politically active and culturally self-conscious north-eastern and southern regions

of the country and thus, as a result, the provincial administration in the Deep South was replaced

by Thai officials over the Malay rulers (Braam, 2013).

Nonetheless, after World War II, with the attempt to tone down national aspirations among the

Malay-Muslims, the Thai authorities once again “permitted the limited application of sharia”

(Melvin, p. 14, 2007) while integrating Islam within the state structure. Further attempts of

reconciliation between the Thai authorities and the Malay-Muslims occurred after

implementation of The Patronage of Islam Act in 1945 (Melvin, 2007). From this act, it revived

“the post of chularajmontri, the highest Islamic authority in Thailand” (Melvin, p. 14, 2007)

which was “responsible for all religious affairs for Muslim in Thailand”. However, this post of

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chularajamontri proved to be unpopular in the southern because the Muslim officials appointed

were from the capital and not from the Malay Patani.

In the 1940s, the Patani‟s People Movement (PPM) demanded for “self-rule in the South,

language and cultural rights, and reintroduction of sharia” (Melvin, p. 14, 2007). In further

advocating the rights of Malay-Muslims, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir in Mohammad el Patani,

the chairman of the Pattani Provincial Council (Melvin, 2007), he demanded “a locally elected

governor, proportionate representation of Malay Muslims in the local government, and other

measures aimed at preserving Malay-Muslim identity and countering the official policy of

Siamization” (Braam, p. 282, 2013). As for the 1950s, the formation of the United Greater Patani

Malays Movement (Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya, GAMPAR) and the PPM (Melvin, p. 15,

2007) as well as the BNPP (created by the ex-leaders of GAMPAR and the PPM sought to

promote the Malay Muslim political agenda such as the call for Patani‟s independence (Melvin,

2007). By 1960s to 1970s, the political movement by the Malay Muslims became more apparent

due to the series of guerilla activity in the rural Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala where police posts

and public buildings were attacked (Melvin, 2007). From this movement, clearly it can be seen

that the state treatment for Malay-Muslims in the political arena is still undermined. Therefore,

by the 1980s, several measures were taken to solve the ongoing conflict which occurred since the

1940s which included negotiations with the Malay-Muslims s(Melvin, 2007).

Apart from the state‟s cultural and political treatment to the Malay-Muslims, it is also important

to pay attention to the socio-economic treatment. This factor has somehow been interlinked to

the violent uprisings in the southern Thailand. As Melvin (2007) argues, in linking the

underdevelopment and conflict in the South is far from straightforward. He further added that the

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southern provinces experienced high rates of poverty and slower economic development in

comparison to other developed regions in Thailand. Apart from this finding, Melvin (p. 18, 2007)

further stresses the belief among many in the Malay Muslim community “that the natural

resources of the South have been exploited by interests outside the region or by local Thai

Buddhists”. Because Thai language has been upheld in various aspects of the nation including

employment and education, this proved to be an obstacle for the Malay-Muslims. As a result,

public sector or high-status employments were not attainable by the Malay-Muslims since they

do not speak the Thai language.

Radicalism

The treatment by the state did not bear any productive outcomes. This is clearly evident when

violent confrontation through the emergence of radical movement in the Deep South. According

to the definition given by Iik Mansurnoor (p. 223, 2009), radicalism refers to the “use of any

means to achieve change and improvement so to fulfill its set-agenda and objectives”. The

following paragraph will explore more on this issue.

The nature of conflict in the Deep South could be seen as a shift from ethno-national and

separatists aims to a radical Islamist ideology (Melvin, 2007). In examining the shift, Melvin

(2007) notes the nature of the attacks as well as the tactics and targets. In Melvin‟s analysis in

2007 regarding the insurgent attacks in the Deep South, he notes that currently the attacks are

being coordinated in the urban area by small cells of militants. The members of these cells of

militants are usually “young religious men, and most of them are in employment” (Melvin, p. 8,

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2007). Although no official groups have claimed responsibility of these violent acts, there is a

possibility it could be due to the work of several factions working together through a loose

coalition (Melvin, 2007). Melvin (2007) also notes that the insurgence could be carried out by

the Coordinate splinter group of the National Revolution Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional–

Coordinate, BRN-C). As for the tactics and targets, the attackers, according to Melvin (2007)

seem to focus on killing those who are associated with the Thai authority. To further explore the

nature of tactics and targets of these Islamic insurgents, it is useful to use the analysis by Braam

(2013) in the violent confrontation in the Deep South. Through Braam‟s work, he also aims to

highlight the problem of counterattacks by the Thai-Buddhists and Thai security forces to the

Malay-Muslims which further complicate the nature of conflict in the affected areas such

Narathiwat, Patani and Yala.

Based on the analysis provided by Braam (2013), he identifies several violent incidents which

occurred in the period of 2000s in south Thailand as the violent confrontation towards the Thai

authorities. In January 2004, the incident which received international attention saw a group of

separatists attacked an army base, police posts and twenty schools which were burned in the

Narathiwat province. Due to the nature of this organized attack committed at a large scale, the

government at that time (Under Thaksin) responded by sending military troops to the south and

simultaneously declaring martial law. In the Krue Se incident which took place in 28 April 2004,

a small insurgent group attacked several policemen and army in the Patani, Yala and Songkhla

provinces which resulted in several casualties from both sides. Not long after the Krue Se

incident, another incident occurred in Tai Bak in Narathiwat on 25 October 2004. What started as

a mass protest demonstration, resulted in the killing of six protestors by gunfire and the

suffocation of seventy-eight detainees after their “arrest from Tak Bai to the detention center in

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Pattani and Songkhla” (M. Abdus Sabur, 2005). As a result, some angry Malay-Muslims took

this incident as a justification to conduct revenge killings (Braam, 2013). The Al Furqan incident

which took place on 8 June 2009 also provides an example of violent confrontation. From this

incident, “ten gunmen shot Malay Muslims” (Braam, p.279, 2013) which killed eleven people

and wounded ten others inside the Al-Furqan mosque in the Narathiwat province. Despite there

were many theories surrounding this incident, the outcome saw the arrest of a number of Thai

Buddhists (who were trained and armed by the Thai security forces) (Braam, 2013).

Solutions to Overcome Conflict in the Deep South

By taking the definition of revivalism by Iik Mansurnoor (2009), he identifies revival movement

as an evolutionary change to avoid open, violent conflict. To further understand how revival

movement can be one of the solutions to overcome the conflict in the Deep South, Braam‟s

analysis on the political participation and accommodation would be relevant to answer this

question.

In his analysis, he highlights the importance of political participation of the Malay-Muslims to

advance the Malay-Muslims into the Thai government. One of the examples that Braam uses to

demonstrate this fact is through the activity of Wahdah in the Thai political system. It was

formed in 1986 where its members comprised of Malay-Muslim politics and religious leaders

from the South and its agenda were to improve education for Muslims, promoting economic

development and safeguarding Islamic way of life (Braam, 2013). However, Braam (2013)

concludes that Wahdah, despite being seen as an democratic form of achieving change for the

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Malay Muslims community, it was not effective enough in bringing out changes for the South

and that its members were corrupted. The second example highlighted by Braam (2013) is the

Puritan Islamic Reformist Movement. He notes that this movement became visible in the 1980s

when it began to have major following. The core of this movement is to provide Islamic

education in the South and in the long run, to establish a reformist Islam foothold in the southern

Thai. Because its founder, Dr Lutfi is a respected figure who is educated and has international

relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, this movement has received the Thai authorities‟

approval and support. Through Dr Lutfi‟s charismatic leadership, a university was established –

which aims to provide revivalist Islamic ideas among the Malay-Muslims (Braam, 2013).

Different to Wahdah and the Puritan Islamic Reformist Movement, the Tablighi Jama‟at is

another form of movement which sought to improve the conflict in the south. The focus of the

Tablighi Jama‟at appears to be an Islamic missionary in trying to attract the Malay-Muslims “to

go to the mosque more often and follow in the footsteps of the Prophet” (Braam, 2013). The

Tablighi Jama‟at members operate according to khuruj (making obligatory travels in certain

areas) and they are not interested in involving themselves in the political activities (Braam,

2013). As further noted by Braam (p. 297, 2013), the Tablighi Jama‟at‟s activity helps the

Malay-Muslims because it “provides a reprieve from tensions, as well as from the more mundane

pressure of making a living”. In a way, by redirecting the Malay-Muslims focus towards

religious obligations and being closer to the faith like praying it helps to reduce violence.

Conclusion

Historically, the provinces in the Deep South were once existed as Islamic state which was ruled

by Malay rulers. However, after these provinces were integrated in to Thai polity, it has been

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subjected to an immense assimilation policy since then. The population from the southern

provinces made up about 6 to 8 percent of the population where the majority of them are ethnic

Malay-Muslims. As noted earlier, these Malay-Muslims have distinct identities compared to the

Thai-Buddhists where they speak Malay instead of the Thai language and that their religion is

Islam. Given to this distinction, the Thai authorities want to assimilate the Malay-Muslims into

the state structure by introducing harsh policy which affected the use of the Malay language,

customs and even sharia law in the Malay Muslims community. To further complicate matter,

the state treatment through social, political and economic reforms on the Malay-Muslims have

produced unfavourable outcomes. For instance, the Malay-Muslims were under presented in the

government as well as employment. Given to this situation, there is an emergence of violent

conflict in the South between Islamic insurgent and the Thai authorities. Nonetheless, the

emergence of some revivalist movement in the Deep South has showed some hope of solving the

ongoing conflict. The identified ways of achieving peace without violent acts could be through

political participation in a democratic way, providing education that promotes Islamic ideas

against violence and also encouraging the Malay-Muslims to focus on spiritual aspects like

praying.

Personally, the Thai authorities and the Malay-Muslims they need to learn and adopt the concept

of diversity. For the Thai authorities, while it may be important to promote their Thai national

ideologies, they should not enforce practices which aim to completely change the identities of

the Malay-Muslims. According to Osman Abdullah Chuah (2010), he suggested the idea of

voluntarily assimilation. Based on Osman Abdullah Chuah‟s suggestion, the author believes that

the Thai authorities should allow the Malay-Muslims to be bilingual where both languages are

appreciated. In return, the Malay-Muslims should also see the bigger picture of being a Muslim

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person. The issue of language should not be seen as a threat to the existence of their Malay

identity. To speak in both languages would be beneficial because they can promote their socio-

economic life and improve their living conditions subsequently. For instance, countries like

Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and even in Singapore, most of the Malays (who are Muslims) are

able to speak in different languages other than Malay. Hence, if this practice is made possible,

the Thai authorities and even the leaders from the South should take examples from these

countries. If diversity is adopted, perhaps it could pave ways for the other challenging concepts

such as tolerance (of religion or cultural practices) to be practiced in Thailand.

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Bibliography

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