MODERNIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT: THE TRADITIONAL POPULATIONS SURVIVAL

Profª.. Dra.Tânia Elias Magno daSilva1

Prof. Dr.Eliano Sérgio AzevedoLopes2

Msc.Ana Rieper3

This article has the central focus of analyze on theState intervention in the Low São Francisco River Zone,in Sergipe (Brazil), through the Companhia deDesenvolvimento do Vale do São Francisco (São FranciscoValley Development Company) - CODEVASF actions, inspecial the social and environmental consequences onVarzea de Propriá (Varzea is a low and flat landalongside a watercourse) and these actions results, inthe improvement of locale people.

Finding basis on the results of a study done in 2000about the Projeto Irrigado de Propriá (Propriá IrrigatedProject), seated in State of Sergipe, on northeasternBrazil, this article seeks to discuss in a large range,the relation between public policy, development andenvironment, especially the hydric resources uses.

The Projeto Executivo de Propriá (Propriá ExecutiveProject), that is part of the Projeto Nacional deIrrigação – PRONI (Irrigation National Project) had, likeone of its objectives, to improve the Low São FranciscoZone, through the creation of a goods and service floodand to enable a low cost of hydric and agriculturalutilizations, using as possible the existent resources(FONSECA 1988)

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So the CODEVASF (São Francisco Valley DevelopmentCompany) had established irrigated borders in Propriá,intending to help in the food and raw material productionfor the regional market, and to server, as well, as aorientation basis for the others varzea areas in thatzone, all of them in risk because of the construction ofmany succeeding stations down the river.

1 Sociologist. Sociology Department Teacher at Sergipe Federal University – UFS,Sociology Doctors at Pontificia Universidade Católica – PUC São Paulo2 Economist, Sergipe Federal University Teacher – UFS, Development, Agricultural andSociety Doctor – at CPDA-UFRRJ3 Geographer. Development and Environment P.H.D. at NESA/UFS4 The study called “Estudo Diagnóstico do Perímetro Irrigado de Própria e os ImpactosGerados nos Municípios de Cedro de São João, Telha e Propriá”, was like a pilot studydone in 2000 and had as central point determine the “parceleiros” actual life andproduction state, as well as try to find the possible relations between the localdevelopment and the CODEVASP. The person in charge for the historical data of CODEVASPProject was Doctors Vania Fonseca

The governmental action, consolidated by the implement ofthe mentioned project, as shown by many studies ( BARROS,1985; FONSECA, 1988; Sigaud, 1992; OFICINA DO SÃOFRANCISCO, 1992), objectified the minimization of theimpact that the Sobradinho and Itaparica’s stationscaused to the riverside dwellers (called beiradeiros),most directly to the people that lives in the lowlands ofriver margins (called vazanteiros), who aretraditional rice producers at the river margins, and tothe fishermen.

Almost a 4.200 square kilometers area had been flood bySobradinho Station, in the middle course, promoting araise of São Francisco River minimum flow from 1.000m3/sto 2.100 m3/s, and a reduction of maximum middle flowfrom 5.500 m3/s to 4.000 m3/s (BARROS, 1985)

Otherwise, it brought a great alteration on the rivernatural cycle through the human interference, changingthe overflowing system, and disordering the riversidedweller traditional economy, that is placed at theStations downstream. According to RIEPER (2001) the São

Francisco river has, when not in the rush time, airregular and very reduced flow, on Sundays over all, andthe decisive agent for the water flood that goes throughthe turbines is the power generation, what has beenseriously jeopardizind the river level.

So, the irrigated border implementation down the Low SãoFrancisco to profit by the large low lands, come from theconviction, that the overflow never more occurs, and theregional economy traditionally based on the rice cultureand the artesanal fishing done on the flood areas by thenaturals overflows, will be in danger if there would notbe some kind of compensatory intervention.

Among the Projeto de Implantação do Perímetro Irrigado dePropriá (Propriá Irrigated Perimeter ImplantationProject) listed objectives, are detached: to promote theregional development, to lift the regional farmers lifelevel, and the Perimeter defense against the riveroverflows (almost finished nowadays). The São FranciscoRiver overflows are still alive in the riverside dwellerpeople imagination, like a kind of blessing that keepingthe life on, for people who lived on the moving of thisnatural seasonality: overflows and ebb tide times.

The changing in the natural river course, done by thelarge hydro-electric power stations, had drasticallydisordered the traditional economies, causing an exodusof great part of the traditional rice growers andfishermen and the impoverishment for many dwellersstraightly depending on the river activities.

The RIEPER study (2001) about the riparian identityconstruction and the environment conditions in Low SãoFrancisco Zone, with the older regional dwellers andfishermen testimony, many of them ex rice growers of thelagoons arose when the river bottomed, shows the contrastbetween two times before and after the station.

According to Mr. Romão memories -from Mato da Onça place– before the dams “everybody cultivated and everybody had. It was fullof rice, bean, corn and no one toke care. Life was easy in that time there,Holly Mother. We lived in peace, wasn’t so?” The testimony of Heleno,an Indian Xocó dweller of São Pedro Island, confirms thehard situation lived nowadays for the riverside dwellerpeople, and the ecological consequences of the large damconstructions. “The river doesn’t overflow anymore. The water hasbrushwood what we called “golfo” that stay in the water’s surface and doesn’tlet the casting net sinker’s get the bottom, where the fishes are. And the wateris too clean, when the river flowed the water turned into dirt and everybodywas a fisher. But nowadays it is very difficult” (RIEPER, 2011, 38, 45).

The Propriá low water, in the Low São Francisco, the mainexplored culture, the one that not only gave the biggerrent at all and attracted the owner interests, but alsoshaped the regional identity was the rice. According toCORREIA (1980) the river in fluency had a decisive actionin the regional economic life and was the river flood andnot the rain that controlled the agricultural calendar.

The overflow guaranteed a natural fertilization on theflood area, once the river put on it 2 a 3 cm of mud,locally called “colha”, and it was like a littleriverside dock, that kept the water for sometime in thedepression, known as “lagoas de arroz” (rice lagoons).The São Francisco’s riparian lands productivity was rightand the rice’s middle productivity was about 1.800 kilosper hectare (CORREIA, 1980, 118).

The irrigated perimeter that CODEVASF implanted, once thenatural system of river flow was definitively changed,proposed to go on with the growing-rice on the cultivatedplain, traditional economic activity, improving theproduction from a modern agricultural pattern, enablingthe farmers “parceleiros” to turn into a middle producerwith empresarial view, and through the lift of their rentand waste level they contribute to the regionaldevelopment. What the original Project creators mean was

that a mentality changes happened, and that the alreadyrunning modernization process had been consolidated.Although the done investments and changing promises thezone is still marked for the pourness and the extremesocial disparity, characterizing the place like a miserytraditional site.

After 25 years of its foundation, we thought that aPropriá Project valuation was suitable and necessary tobe better known, from a case study, the resultsproceeding from the governmental interventions in Low SãoFrancisco, established by many public policy, all of thembased on the progress discourse and the regionaldevelopment

1 – The State Presence in Low São Francisco

The seventy decade represented a significant temporalmark of the capitalistic expansion on northeasternBrazil. The developmental euphoria that characterized themilitary government, diffusing the Brazil High Powerideology, also created the slogan of a New Northeastern,what, in reality was, nothing more than another time ofthe brazilian capitalistic monopoly expansion,consolidated by a inciting taxes policy, witch purposewas to improve that region industrialization, or in theOLIVEIRA’S words (1976), to do the no-programmed program ofnortheastern Brazil industrialization.

The discourse and the developmental policy for thatregion, ended serving like basis to the capital’sexpansionist’s interest’s realization, materialized inform of large projects of irrigations, agro-industrialsand industrials. These projects consequencies, almost allof them justified for the Modern Northeastern panaceaconstruction, were: the aggravation of social disparity,the country exodus and the and the consequential citiespopulation growing, once the cities worked like aattraction pole to the people that was expelled from the

fields, as much as to the people attracted for newinvestments done and the job’s promises, as well as themisery poles expansion and the consolidation of thetraditional power relations, besides the water and soilproductive potential destruction. (CAVALCANTI, 1992)

The mark for the deeper transformations begins with thelarge hydroelectric Dams construction by the SãoFrancisco Hydro-electric Company (Companhia Hidroeletricado São Francisco) – CHESF, and with implantation offederal programs seeking the agriculture modernization,especially the irrigation field of action, with theutilization of the large dams water.

The Tres Marias, Sobradinho and Itaparica Stationsconstruction caused big environmental problems to theregion, including the strongly changes on the overflowand ebb tide river São Francisco system, jeopardizing thereproduction of several fishes species and thetraditional life of the fishermen river people. These aresome examples of the promoted actions done for theBrazilian Government, through the energetic policy, togive a satisfactory answer to the capitalist interestexpansion in the field, what had found the climax atseventy decade.

The Low São Francisco Zone started to be a site ofgovernmental intervention, more effectively from 1975,when the Irrigated Perimeter in Propriá (Sergipe) andItituba (Alagoas) were implanted by CODEVASF. Thatintervention which was a result of a Mundial Bank order,what had conditioned the Sobradinho and the PauloAfonso’s Hydro-electric Complex money liberation to theirrigated perimeters creation, had objectivities to takeactions that could reduce the negative impacts that, forsure would occur, if these works did not be done.(FONSECA, 1988)

This idea – to use the river São Francisco waters toirrigate the semi-arid zone in northeastern Brazil – hadbeen discussed since 1847, when a congressman from CearáState called Marco Antonio Macedo, who made a statementabout the São Francisco river transposition to Jaguariberiver (Araújo e Ribeiro, 1995), seeking to make possiblethe internal navigation between São Francisco river andPorcos rivulet, across 200 kilometers of waterways.(SANTANA, março, 2000). Since that time, this subject hadbeen ever present at the conversations about possiblesolutions for the semi-arid zone in northeastern Brazil.

From the eighty decade of twenty century, when the StudyProject was created, looking for the good use of theintegrated water and soil resources on semi-arid zone innortheastern Brazil, through the transposition of SãoFrancisco river hydric resources, on that time in chargeof Departamento Nacional de Obras de Saneamento(Sanitation Woks National Department) – DNOCS, that ideahas been gradually practiced, through the variousirrigated agricultural projects executed along the river.

The Radambrasil Project, on the seventy’s, throughsatellite mapping, comproved the semi-arid soil fertilityand showed a significant potential of excellent qualityirrigable soil, occupying a 1.600.000 hectares area, inthe states as follow: Pernambuco, Paraíba, Rio Grande doNorte, and in the rivers basin as follow: Brigida, TerraNova, Pajeú, Jaguaribe, Piranhas and Apodi, exactly inthe arid epicenter being it the governmental incentiveguarantee, for the following irrigation projects thatcame.(INTERIOR, 1983)

That viabilization of large projects, engaged with thecapitalistic logical of production, has caused, alongsideof the last decades, serious changes on the river system,endangering its environment, as well as the disorder ofthe whole hydrographic basin, affecting the physic and

biotic environment, as much as the antropic environment(Silva, 1999). Even so, no governmental action has been implemented, insense to reordain the São Francisco rivers basin,although the federal government still propose the riverwaters transposition.

The federal government propose to make viable the SãoFrancisco waters transposition that justifies itself likean alternative to bring water to semi-arid areaspopulation, historical victims of the bad weather, can’tgo on before the reordainment of this hydrographic basin.So, that project must be analyzed like one more step ofthe forced modernization process, done along the SãoFrancisco basin, which logical point is privatize thegains and socialize the lost.

The Low São Francisco is placed in the ebb tide of eighthydro-electric stations constructed along the river andreceive, all the time, this stations work impacts. Thatzone could be, on a figurative words, “ the terminalgarbage” once it receives directly the reflex of all theinterventions done at High and Middle São Francisco,living nowadays in terrible conditions, almost in apublic calamity.

That region began on Paulo Afonso´s fall, in Bahia State,going on until the river estuary. When the Hydro-electricStation of Xingó had been made, between the states ofAlagoas and Sergipe and the dam lagoon overflowing in1993, this denomination started to be used for the damebb tide, on the dividing line between the two states.The dam made impossible to navigate down the river, erasing from theriparian people imaginary the flooded area. (RIEPER, 2001, 23)

With the irrigated perimeters implantation, the smallgrowers that planted on the lowlands began to depend onfinancial investments to by irrigation bombs and dieseloil for supply, financial resources that the most part of

the people doesn’t have, because they are smalllandowners, or no landowner people. The cited study triedto understand in which ways the abrupt changes that theregion is passing by, mostly on the ecological andeconomic levels, has affected the traditionalpopulation’s way of life. (RIEPER, 2001).

Another data must be counted, inside this immense list ofdamage, is the river silting up, which is responsible forthe large internal navigation extinction, letting withoutjob the canoe men that lived on board, and besides thefast process of the margins erosion. (CASADO, 2000)

The environmental consequences in the Low São FranciscoZone, resulting from the large stations construction,were very strong in ecological, social, economic andcultural views, despite it doesn’t count to the perversearithmetic of the governmental planners, that calculatecosts and benefits, having in mind the progress, andhaving as main compromises the capitalistic expansionconsolidation on that region instead of the well-being ofthe traditional dwellers (beiradeiros e vazanteiros) –and the environmental equilibrium.

2 – The Propriá Project

The Propriá Project is seating on the homogeneous microregion of Propriá, along the right margin of SãoFrancisco River, and at 70 kilometers from the estuary.The total area of 2.165 hectares includes three towns inSergipe state: Propriá, Cedro and Telha de São João. Thisproject had been implanted on the low land formed byJacaré creek and its affluent, Salgado creek, area thatwas traditionally explored by rice culture.

These enterprises was, at the beginning, projected for1177 hectares irrigation, and were implanted 298 lotswith 3, 96 hectares middle area, attended for two pumpingstations: one to irrigation and drainage and another one

only to irrigation, pumping water across a 40 kilometerslong net (CODEVASF, 1984; CODEVASF-DO, 1984).

The expropriated area by the project implantation shown avery complex and contrasting landed situation: 41, 3% ofthe whole area was occupied by properties with more than100 hectares, that were only 1, 7% of the total existingunities. What preponderated were the small landownersthat represented 78% of the total, with until 5 hectares.There were 354 properties total, with a 2.948 hectaresarea. (SILVA E FONSECA, 2000).

The expropriation process, according with show thestudies done (Fonseca, 1988; Silva, 1990), was verydifficult, promoting strong reactions by the owners andstill by the no owners farming people, because the lotsquantity was lower than the owner’s quantity that livedthere before CODEVASF actuation.

According to a FONSECA study (1988) about the irrigatedperimeters implemented by CODEVASF in Low São Francisco,during the expropriation process, some of theexpropriated were “ghost people”, what increased thenumber of people with rights on the irrigated lots, andcompromised the enterprise credibility, and the fitnessof the people in charge of this.

The wrong strategy used and the inability to lead theexpropriation process were also commented by Fonseca,like a conflict and disagreement generator agent with theno landowners farming , that lost their productionenvironment, and were not correctly indemnified.

The excessively techniques CODEVASF view on the problemsresolution that came, in special that ones what concernedto the people every days life, had promoted strongcritiques from many local and state departments, thatalso joined themselves to defend the rights of the olderdwellers from the expropriated lands, mostly the small

farmers and the no owner land which worked of otherslands, and were in damage with the type of distributiondone.

One of the groups that gave support and made amobilization against the CODEVASF intervention on thatarea was Diocese de Propriá (Diocese of Propriá), whichbesides to defend the small farmer interests – owners andno owners; the diocese started to promote the legalassistance to them, and so the diocese became “one moreclog to the original proposal of the enterprise and onemore clog to the conflicts solving.” (SILVA and FONSECA,2000).

The existent problems became even worse, thought theprotectionist CODESFASF solution found, what promoted theplacing of the people, before the end of the substructurewoks.

Trying to find a solution or to minimize the conflicts,CODEVASF has distributed gratuitously fertilizers andseeds, and had prepared itself the lands of the planting,but the two first crops were almost all lost because ofthe water absence on the perimeter.

Some mistakes on the project physical substructureworsened still more the difficult situation, for thelocal people and for the enterprise, this one each timemore critiqued and discredited. Along this 25 years ofage of Propriá Project many changes have be done, but forall that, there were big mistakes on the originalproposition, so many problems still remain and it looksdifficult to solve, like the equipment maintenance case.

The Project had been done to the rice production throughthe overflow, using selected seeds, that should beenproduced on the own irrigated perimeter, with theagreement of local people and lots of land reserved to

this. But the chosen seeds at the beginning had a verylong cycle and couldn’t give two crops on year.Well, to those problems some another’s one had beenadded, like: the precariousness on the seeds distributionand time to plant, and the high production costs.

The project tried to solve these problems introducing arice variety which has a shorter cycle, and theengagement of a new enterprise to furnish the selectedseeds and to provide the necessary orientation for thenew seeds production. But the seeds fields were in a badplace; near lands of common cultivation what hasdeteriorated a part of the crop, besides the problemswith the seed’s commercialization and furnishing, thefarmer started to sale the seeds not to plant but toconsume.

Another alternative, along these 25 years, tried byCODEVASF on the Propriá Project was a king ofconsociation between the rice and the fish culture, aswell as the sties for pig breeding. This activity had ashort life, once was implanted to attend a NutrialFactory demand, established on Propriá, in the earlyeighty years, because of the taxes incentives that thestate government gave. But the Factory closed very soonand this fact only contributed to complicate thesituation, once that the local people, believing theconsociated production, had raised a loan and doneseveral investments on their lands, to that purpose.

The Irrigated Perimeter has been working since 1975, andhad several states and reformulations including afrustrated emancipation experience at the ninety decade.Nowadays CODEVASF recovered the Propriá Project and theproject administration have been done by a IrrigationDistrict, of which Deliberative Council CODESVASFparticipate without vote rights, but – on a very strangeway – with veto rights, what proportionate to CODEVASF a

power to final decisions and compromise the projectemancipation.

The objectives of the Executive Project proposal soughtto improve the region development with the Irrigatedperimeter implantation, to consolidate a “new ruralmiddle class” and to guarantee a food production, mostlyrice, to supply the product import needs and provisionthe place, with a modern irrigate agriculture, but theseobjectives didn’t happen.

The Project full performance is still hampered for theproject original mistakes, although the several changesthat had been done along this time. The main problemsthat the farmers point in the Project are straightlyconnected with the product trading and the landmaintenance.

Nowadays, the low rice price, the high production costsare pointed as the main clog to the Perimeter developmentand also like justifiers to the abandonment of some landby the owners. Other complaints include: difficulties inthe land maintenance, the channels cleaning and drainage,rats and caterpillar plague combat.

The consortium failed experience regarding to riceproduction, the pig brining and the fish culture caused adiscontent feeling between the farming, who had preparedtheir lands to these activities, and are not producing.The pig’s tries that had been constructed are empty, anda big part of them never worked.

There were 60 lots prepared with all needs to theconsortium, being 1 ha (medium) for fishes and 3 ha(medium) for rice. There were also 100 lots to pigbrining and fish culture, but no one is producing, andthe dwellers are indebted, because they had investedwaiting for the Nutrial Factory promises, and when the

factory failed, only the improvement and the debt withthe Bank remain.The fish culture has, yet, another problem. The ownerslive in Propriá and at night they need someone to keepwatching the lots, because the fishes are stolen. Butthey don’t have money to pay anyone, so these have beencaused a significant retraction on this culture.

The lots productivity is still very small, although 55%of the farming had been there since project implantation.According to a technician words: well, the project didn’t take off.

3 – The Perimeter Actual Situation

The CODEVASF was programmed to continue acting until theProject be considered done, or in another words, untilthe project has conditions to be emancipated. After thatthe Company actuation would be only to the operation andmaintenance of the dike systems, pumping stations,drainage and irrigation and low lands internal roads.

When the Irrigated Perimeter had got the emancipation,the farming would have the responsibility for the Projectdevelopment and water offer charge, excepting the investmentsand operation and maintenance costs, derived from the river system changesbecause of Sobradinho and Paulo Afonso’s IV Stations construction(PROCENGE, 1981, 80)5

The irrigated perimeters situation, implanted byCODESVASF is critical and according a denunciations doneto the press and published by CINFORM journal(24/04/2000, edition number 0889), the 99/2000 crop onlyhad loss and 95% of the farming from the State of Sergipewent into bank debts. The farming feels that they wereforgotten by government. According to the journalpublished news:Beyond the rice crisis, that drags on along 5 years, and is now in the mostcritical point, the rice farming had to face a powerful enemy: the rat Theplague was so strong on the three Sergipe perimeters (Betume,

CotinguibaPindoba e Propriá), that we calculate a loss about 35% medium onall the production, because of the rat action (CINFORM, 24/04/2000).

3.1 – Main complaint and demands

The farming alleged like main clogs to the production:off time credit, technical assistance deficiency,production costs, rice processing difficulties, productsale, land maintenance, plundering animals attack,besides the bad quality of seeds.

The main complaints presented were: the low rice pricepaided nowadays and the high production costs, landmaintenance difficulty, combat to the rats andcaterpillar plague, the channels cleaning and drainage,besides the inconstancy of the dam opening to irrigatethe lots.5 These investments and operation costs consist of protection dikes and principalpumping stations. See: SILVA, Tânia Elias M. da e FONSECA, Vânia. Perímetro Irrigadode Própria: Estudo Diagnóstico. Relatório Final. Aracaju, 2000. Mimeo

Nowadays, according to information’s of the techniciansthat work at Propriá District area, there are 37 lotswith fish culture that have good results, because theylet the rice monoculture. Although there were still 60lots prepared with all needed structure for rice andfish culture, with 1 hectare (medium) to fish and 3hectares to rice, that are not producing, due to a greatparcel of the farming are indebted, according to thereasons we said before. The ones that are consorting thecultures are utilizing their own resources, once bankcredits are interrupted due to the no fulfillment.

In relation to the dwellers life quality improvement wehave a very heterogeneous panorama. About 50 to 55% ofthe farming is still from the first selected ones, and agreat part of them started with only one lot and todayare with two, while others still have only one. Aboutthis subject, a technician that has been working therefor more than 20 years commented:

The productivity doesn’t get better, the house doesn’t get better, and so, itdidn’t take off...There are many factors to explain the situation: about 10% ofthe dwellers are not able to be owner; they don’t have this kind of mentality.Another factor that must be said is that the traditional planting systematicwas different, there was no machines, and another data is that on thisperimeter we had a food help (bolsa alimento) and/or a monthly fixed (set)income (renda fixa) distribution, until the project have conditions to work. Itended in 1985, but some people still waits for this help.

The interviewed alleged as main clogs to the production:off time credit, technical assistance deficiency,production costs, rice processing difficulties, productsale, land maintenance, plundering animals attack,besides the bad quality of seeds.

The dwellers complains were corroborated by thetechnician that work on the perimeter, and they alsopointed other factors like: problems on the drainage,what has caused erosion as well as the river bedelevation, and the bad water quality, mostly that onethat came from Jacaré rivulet, due to the drain ofPropriá, Cedro da São João and Telha cities, thatdisembogue on that rivulet, and of course, infect thewater that arrives on the perimeter.6

The water contamination has prejudiced the fish culture,because when the river level is down, there is no way toirrigate the fish culture. Due to this, there areproblems with fungus that atrophied the fry, and thewater hydrogenization. On rice culture the damage issmaller but still exists. The parasitic index on thewater is growing each day and forces the farming not todrink that water. Everybody brings water from home.

The water liberation is done on Sobradinho, and everyFriday the water is closed, what cause a decrease onwater level on Saturday, Sunday and Monday. According tothe technician, the water discharged on Wednesday is onlyrecommended to fish culture

6 To this subject see a SANTOS study (1999)

The indiscriminate use of agro toxics and poison is thefarming people also contaminated the water. Theapplication of these substances is done for not preparedworkers (contracted people), and this use doesn’t obeyany technical or any owner orientation. There isn’t anyinspection that represses the indiscriminate using ofthese products.

The payment for that kind of work is something about 10or 12 reais/day, and contracted people doesn’t have anyqualification and are regimented from the ruralunemployed. This activity is entirely out of control.To combat the rats they use dogs and boys (that kill therats with a blow) and poison is also very used. The mostused poisons are, according to the Propriá stories:“chumbinho”, “Fumirate” “Fenômeno” and “Clerati”. Thepesticide and poison use is bigger than the farming andProject technician say, and has caused the watercontamination and some kind of disease on the dweller andcontracted works, as headache, bellyache and daze.

To combat caterpillars and beetles they use: Folidó,Folisuper, Decis, Eston and Cipitrin. To combat the birds(sparrows) they use Decis poison an also scarecrows.Visiting the perimeter, we can verify the the agro toxicsand poison uses without any individual protection, andthe use of no recommended products as well, chumbinho, incase, what is a forbidden poison by the HealthDepartment.

According to the technician that work on the perimeter isalmost impossible to control the agro toxics use, mostlythe poison, but they do inspection, orientation and aninstruction campaign with the farming about this. Evenso, the results are still faraway from the expected.

The technician accuses the lands owner for the plaguesproliferation, mostly about the rats, because accordingto them, the owner doesn’t keep the channels, drains andtalus clean. If they would do this, the problem would besolved.

Some factors have worsened the situation. We can detach:the owner land absence to maintenance what causecarelessness on the cleaning, some farming doesn’t wantto contract labor to the land maintenance, absence ofhome circle backing, to land maintenance; and how theydon’t live there, it remains abandoned.Another problem due to the owner no permanence at theland, is difficulty faced by the servant who dischargethe water. He can’t discharge the water if there is noone there (owner or some responsible person). Althoughthe most part of the owner be there everyday, some ofthem no show for 3 or 4 days, what represented a clogs tothe land maintenance.

About the problems that emerge with the inconstant landirrigation, is very illustrative the Syndicate of RuralWorkers of Telha President testimony, who is also afaming. According to this sir, the great concern of thePropriá perimeter farming is the water, what is result ofthe disconnection between the pipeline and the producers.He was personally prejudiced when CODEVASF hard done thelast repair on a channel, what let his lands withoutwater when he most needed it, and the rice, that assprouting was destroyed. When the water came, there was acaterpillar plague on most part of plantation, and he hadbig loss.

We could verify this matter with the water during onevisit. When we were talking to one of the technician incharge there, we listened a desperate complain of afarming, regarding the water deficient and his possibleloss. According to him the land was ready to planted andthe CANELEIRO was not the to release the water. He was

waiting for the CANELEIRO almost a week. This complainshappened on a Friday afternoon. The technician alerted to“that only on Monday or Tuesday the water would bereleased, but that he was sending a memorandum to thepeople in charge, asking for a resolution”.

According to the Syndicate President, another problems isthe “baronesa” proliferation (baronesa is a kind of waterplant that stops the water flow in the channels) and theabsence of a systematic work to eradicated the rats. Hecleans his land, but his neighbors don’t, and this factbreaks the alimentary chains. He works only with hisfamily, and the absence of labor worsens the situation.He only contracts a worker when he needs to do somethingon a shorter time.

According to this interviewed, the CODEVASF performanceshould be to follow the needs of each lot, or in anotherwords, run along the project, and not to act how they wish.Another complains was about the debits with the bank thatare suffocating the great number of farming’s. Many ofthem are working to pay the bank

Another fact that works as a clog to the productionimprovement is that there isn’t a resource to makebetterment on the project, like: canalizations, light,constructions, access roads, etc. It is very difficult tofind money to invest.

When we visited the perimeter, we found many abandonedlots, what sustained the technician complains. One ofthem asseverated that the farming’s, who don’t goeveryday to that place, are the ones that have only onelot and don’t go because they found another’s job out ofthere. The farming that have more than one lot, also havean employee who watch over the land.

3.2 – Production, trading and the utilized seeds

The medium production for lot had been two crops/year andthe sale é done to only two regional buyers, so the riceprice is established for the profiteers.

The competition between the rice that comes from thesouth and Middle West regions and the perimeter rice isanother factor that sustains the low prices. Theimprovement on the production on that region allowsbetter prices on the cereal market, besides the betterbenefaction.

According to the technicians that work at the Project,the price and quality of the product are straightlyconnected to the short time between the benefaction andthe consumption of the project rice. This time is nolonger than 40 days. The south rice, which has more timein repose, has a harder grain and a better acceptance onthe market.

On a good year is possible to have 2, 5 crop/year, according to thefarming. The seeds used are Diamante and São Francisco,which are bought inside the perimeter, what concur to thelow productivity, due to the bad seeds quality. Theothers seeds that that State Government send, which aredistributed by the coop: Berriga, Cica8, Cica9, Chatinho,Agulhinha, Santa Helena, Mestiça, Anão, Canela Preta andUmbigo Preto.

The rice production fell from 3 or 4 ton in 1993/1995 to2, 5 ton (maximum) in 1996. The years of 1997 and 1998had about 5, 6 ton (medium) crop, due to the new seeds –Diamante e São Francisco – besides the better control onthe application of fertilizer. Although in 1999 aproduction decrease happened again, due to the ratsattack.

Some lots have obtained 2,5 crop/year, but the soilrepose is about only 15 or 20 days, what exhaust quicklythe soil mostly for the wrong use of the resources.

According to the District technician, that gave the aboveinformation’s, the lots what’s have that production areless than 10% of all, and making an optimisticallyvaluation he computed between 20 or 30 lots, and said:This is not good to the soil. The soil recovery is not done with organicalfertilizer, but with a chemical fertilizer, and in a few time it shall damage thesoil Ph which is about 6 to 7.

The farming uses a plow to prepare the soil, but there isno study or evaluation follow-up about the effects ofthis practice to the kin of soil worked.

The rice production costs are very high almost theequable to income. Nowadays the net income doesn’t reach20%. The gross cost is 1000 reais medium add the incomesomething about 1.150 to 1.200 reais. Two factors canexplain this situation: untill middle 1999 the rice pricewas about 0, 35 reais/kg, but the rice from Barreiras deGoiás, Rio Grande do Sul and Tocantins arrives withbetter prices at the cereal market, due to thetransportation, done by ship until Recife and Salvador,and the bigger produtity of those places, which is about5, 5 ton/hectare

The absence of competition on the rice buy was pointed bythe technician and coop president as an impediment toimprove the product price in Sergipe.

3.3 – Before and After Perimeter. what had change?

No one interviewed could answer which was thecontribution that CODEVASF and/or Perimeter brought tothe betterment of people lives. But all of them, withoutexception, connect the enterprise presence with theperimeter and their personal lives, but not with theregional development. According to the interviewedopinion, the CODEVASP actions are restricted to theperimeter only.

As well as the farmer, the dwellers, in the three cities,couldn’t do a connection between the places developmentand CODESVASF and/or Irrigated Perimeter. By the largethe opinions converged to a critic to the problems of thefarmers, and there is a kind of longing for the old timeswhen the low lands were explored on the traditional way

A question that permeated all the interviews, was theconcern about the drastic changes that have been done onthe São Francisco River system due to severalinterventions done along the river as the big hydro-electric stations, and that have been resulting onserious damage to the riverside dwellers populationssurvival7

The river waters transposition project is, nowadays, aquestion that put in motion the people from those cities,and because CODEVASF is not involved on the against thisproject and doesn’t show interest on this debate, thepeople thinks that the enterprise is not involved withthe locale life. On this way to speak about CODEVASF isthe same of to speak about the Perimeter and vice versa.

4 – Place development and the CODEVASF presence

CODEVASF, through Irrigated Perimeter, seems not give anycontribution to the development of the cities embraced byPropriá Project. Almost the totality of the intervieweddwellers couldn’t identify the enterprise influence onthe locale life development. On the contrary, they didhard critics to the situation lived by the farmers.Everybody accuses CODEVASF for the problems.

What really distinguished in the interviews were thecountless conflicts that happened between CODEVASF andthe farmers, along these 25 years. The CODEVASF presenceis seem like something that has no connection with thelocale life.

The picture done was of an enterprise that manage thePerimeter, “very powerful” “the one that order, becauseis the government”, “has power”. Distinguished in theinterviews the authoritarian way that mange the project,a centralizing administration and very for from thelocale life. By the large, this is the interviewedopinion about CODEVASF and about the Perimeter.

About this is very illustrative the interview with an ex-councilman also ex-landowner in the Irrigated Perimeter:The Irrigated Perimeter was solicitation done on my time and was very goodto the Cotinguiba Lagoon people. Nowadays they complain about the water,but everything else is very good and everybody likes. But this water deficiencyhappens due to some kind of problem or irresponsibility of the servant thatopen the dam (canaleiro). I was farmer from 1975 ‘till 1990, and so a retiredand gave the land to my son.Before the Project many people lived from the fishing, there was no machineto ´pick the rice, they planted with the fingers, was sacrifice to pull up the“lingua de vaca” (a kind of herb). So, that project was a progress, becausebefore (the project) came the thunderstorms and the torrents. But not today.Everything is controlled, different from the 1933 inundation, when the watercovered everything. Besides, the trade earned the buy became easier becausethe money came in.7 About this see RIEPER study (2001), Silva (1999) and Vargas (2000)

For the difficulties that the farmer had, I can tell you the Ananias Cardosocase that renounced the lot, after he lost the whole production, because theCoop didn’t send the machines before the thunderstorms. Due to theist,disgusted, sold the lot. There was robbery, low behavior and irresponsibility inthe Coop.

The president of the Propriá Fishermen Colony,remembered, with nostalgia, the arrived of the boats fullof fishes from the old São Francisco (Velho Chico), anddeplored to see Argentine fishes and fattened speciesbreaded on reservoir to sell, because he knows that thereare no more fishes in the river, only shrimp.

Accord info to the president of Fishermen colony, thefishermen had a good life in the past, because they fished1000kg by day, now they do this by a week, when they do. To theinterviewed, privatize the São Francisco river will meanthe category dead. The interviewed criticized theabsence of a support program to the fishermen andspecially the abs erne medical of assistance to thecategory. According to him, many fishermen are sickbecause they had met the daybreak cold, and this factwould be straightly connected to CODEVASF and IrrigatedPerimeter.

The Project prejudiced the fishermen, because before it the fishes multipliedon the lagoons and on the low lands and after the Project this facts don’toccur anymore. Besides the rice production is not good once the promiseswas to three crop, and today there are sectors that have only one crop, due tothe rats, expensive energy, and the empty lots., what according to himdoesn’t show any advantage. Besides the fishermenpractically stayed away of the Project. The interviewed merchants of Fishing Entrepôt of Propriásaid that there is fish scarcity on the Low São Franciscoregion, mostly near the city. So they prefer to sellfrozen fishes that come from the Argentina instead theones that come from the Middle São Francisco, near PauloAfonso. Another question is the sea waters that areentering on the river estuary, being possible to findsome marine fishes near Propriá. They pointed as thecause of this river unbalance the construction of Hydro-electric Stations.

Syndicate of Rural Workers Vice President denounced that90% of labor used on the Perimeter had been dispensed andthe project only favored the high lands and that ones whodoesn’t like to work.

One farmer declarations illustrate that situation livednowadays by mostly of them:

Before 1975, the work at the low lands was only handled. After the Perimeterthe Camuripim Coop was founded and the land had been dispossessed. To bea farmer you could not have any other occupation, to guarantee the fixingthe man on the field. The CODEVASF technician intimidated the people, bysaying that they will bring Chinese people to work there. So, along the timethe complains had came, as that water absence what caused the crops loss.The CODESVASF technician tried to compensate the loss with hours ofmachine work. Nowadays we have another situation because CODEVASFmanagement changed. After I had been investing on the rice production,nowadays I am creating some cattle besides irrigate an area with sprinklersto plant sweet pepper.

5 – Conclusions

CODEVASF appeared on that region to minimalize theimpacts that had come due to the Sobradinho and ItaparicaStation, and to promote the development. But theenterprise seems not to do this, once its actions arealways mentioned as restrict to the project questions. Infact it seems that this have been the enterpriseoccupation since 1975. Along this 25 years many conflictswere created between the CODESVASF and the farmers, whathelped the enterprise have a negative image and almostnothing have been done to revert this process?

On the last two years, seems that the enterprise seeks tochange its public image, with the experience ofIrrigation Districts which is the perimeteradministration department, which management is done by afarmer. But the district is still tutored by theenterprise, that is who has the decision power on thedeliberations, once COEVASF has veto power on thedeliberative council.

So we ask: Which is the farmer’s autonomy on thePerimeter administration? How can they be independent ifthe autonomy is restricted? This tutelage will remainuntil when?

All the experiences of emancipation of the project – Coopand/or Farmer Associations – failed, apparently due tothe farmer difficulties to administrate the project;there was abuse of power, administrative immoderation,robbery. According to the interviews, this facts happenedbecause the technician as much as the farmer. Thatadministrative improbity created the intervention on thecoop, and the end of activities.

The Irrigated District creation, as that perimeteradministrative department under farmer responsibility, isa effort to promote the project emancipation. But theadministrative structure that gives to CONDEVASF the vetorights at the administration counsel menaces thePerimeter emancipation.

The initial idea that with the project a small ruralentrepreneur group became real was wrong, because we cannot change the way of life and the traditional way to seethe world with projects, decrees and intention letters orby the technocrat project wishes, which ignore and don’trespect the cultural values of the people with who theyare. They (the technocrats) are not prepared to dialoguewith that people node they understand as dialogue theagreement to the plans elaborated on the cabinets.

The total of complains shows that until now the Projectdoesn’t take off, as the Basic Project foresaw. Inanother worlds, it was not capable to reduce the mistakesdone by the stations construction along the river, topromote the region development with a modern agriculturalproject that improve the gains, and that elevate theeconomic, social e cultural models of the farmer, as wellas to change the farmers mentality to former a solidmiddle class on the field, to attend the capitalistexpansion interests.Between the cabinets planning elaboration and the realityof CODESVASF actions had a tremendous hiatus and althoughthe improvement of the life level of some people, the

project was predestinated to the failure. Where is thedevelopment? Where is the solid rural middle class? Theaccountancy of the expenses done, the created conflicts,the various fail since the implantation and theenvironmental problems that came along the São FranciscoRiver, point to a need to rethink on a critic way thegovernmental Projects what have been practiced on thatplace as development propelling source, but that are, infact, only bad patches done to reduce the wrong actionsand socialize the loss, as the case of the largestations.

That Low São Francisco is still a misery place. What wecan see the is a complete blunder between the publicpolicies implements and the improve of the local peoplelife. The traditional problems lived by that peoplereached by Propriá Irrigated Perimeter, as the land lacksto the farmers are still waiting for a solution, sleepinginside the government drawers.

The local development impacts created by Projeto Propriáwere very insignificants when compared with the ExecutiveProject justifying. The project brought some gains to thecities, by the commerce improve and the municipalcollection, but is not possible to associate thedevelopment of the cities only with CONDEVASF action.

Although the enterprise management allege, that thecritic analyze about its action on the Low São Francisco,must ponder that without the enterprise interference thedisaster to the population, due to of the Sobradinho eItaparica Stations construction, would be fatal. We cannot justify the great expense of public money and theenvironment disorder, what generated serious consequenceson the economic and social people life, from thequestion: What would be worst.

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SILVA, Rosemiro Magno da. LOPES, Eliano Sérgio. Conflitos deterra e reforma agrária em Sergipe. Aracaju: EDUFS,Secretaria de Estado da Irrigação e Ação Fundiária, 1996.

SILVA, Rosemiro Mogno da. Assentamentos de pequenosprodutores rurais em Sergipe - 1945 - 1992. Aracaju:Secretaria de Estado da Agricultura, do Planejamento e daIrrigação, 1996.

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SILVA, Tânia Elias Magno da. (coordenadora), TAKAHASHI,Lucilene T, VERAS, Fernando Antônio V. AS VÁRZEASAMEAÇADAS – Um estudo preliminar das relações entre ascomunidades humanas e os recursos naturais da Várzea daMarituba no rio São Francisco. Aracaju/São Paulo:Universidade Federal de Sergipe; Universidade de SãoPaulo, 1990.

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MODERNIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT: THE TRADITIONAL POPULATIONS SURVIVAL

Profª.. Dra.Tânia Elias Magno daSilva4

Prof. Dr.Eliano Sérgio AzevedoLopes5

Msc.Ana Rieper6

This article has the central focus of analyze on theState intervention in the Low São Francisco River Zone,in Sergipe (Brazil), through the Companhia deDesenvolvimento do Vale do São Francisco (São FranciscoValley Development Company) - CODEVASF actions, inspecial the social and environmental consequences onVarzea de Propriá (Varzea is a low and flat landalongside a watercourse) and these actions results, inthe improvement of locale people.

Finding basis on the results of a study done in 2000about the Projeto Irrigado de Propriá (Propriá IrrigatedProject), seated in State of Sergipe, on northeasternBrazil, this article seeks to discuss in a large range,the relation between public policy, development andenvironment, especially the hydric resources uses.

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The Projeto Executivo de Propriá (Propriá ExecutiveProject), that is part of the Projeto Nacional deIrrigação – PRONI (Irrigation National Project) had, likeone of its objectives, to improve the Low São FranciscoZone, through the creation of a goods and service floodand to enable a low cost of hydric and agriculturalutilizations, using as possible the existent resources(FONSECA 1988)

So the CODEVASF (São Francisco Valley DevelopmentCompany) had established irrigated borders in Propriá,intending to help in the food and raw material productionfor the regional market, and to server, as well, as aorientation basis for the others varzea areas in thatzone, all of them in risk because of the construction ofmany succeeding stations down the river.

1 Sociologist. Sociology Department Teacher at Sergipe Federal University – UFS,Sociology Doctors at Pontificia Universidade Católica – PUC São Paulo2 Economist, Sergipe Federal University Teacher – UFS, Development, Agricultural andSociety Doctor – at CPDA-UFRRJ3 Geographer. Development and Environment P.H.D. at NESA/UFS4 The study called “Estudo Diagnóstico do Perímetro Irrigado de Própria e os ImpactosGerados nos Municípios de Cedro de São João, Telha e Propriá”, was like a pilot studydone in 2000 and had as central point determine the “parceleiros” actual life andproduction state, as well as try to find the possible relations between the localdevelopment and the CODEVASP. The person in charge for the historical data of CODEVASPProject was Doctors Vania Fonseca

The governmental action, consolidated by the implement ofthe mentioned project, as shown by many studies ( BARROS,1985; FONSECA, 1988; Sigaud, 1992; OFICINA DO SÃOFRANCISCO, 1992), objectified the minimization of theimpact that the Sobradinho and Itaparica’s stationscaused to the riverside dwellers (called beiradeiros),most directly to the people that lives in the lowlands ofriver margins (called vazanteiros), who aretraditional rice producers at the river margins, and tothe fishermen.

Almost a 4.200 square kilometers area had been flood bySobradinho Station, in the middle course, promoting a

raise of São Francisco River minimum flow from 1.000m3/sto 2.100 m3/s, and a reduction of maximum middle flowfrom 5.500 m3/s to 4.000 m3/s (BARROS, 1985)

Otherwise, it brought a great alteration on the rivernatural cycle through the human interference, changingthe overflowing system, and disordering the riversidedweller traditional economy, that is placed at theStations downstream. According to RIEPER (2001) the SãoFrancisco river has, when not in the rush time, airregular and very reduced flow, on Sundays over all, andthe decisive agent for the water flood that goes throughthe turbines is the power generation, what has beenseriously jeopardizind the river level.

So, the irrigated border implementation down the Low SãoFrancisco to profit by the large low lands, come from theconviction, that the overflow never more occurs, and theregional economy traditionally based on the rice cultureand the artesanal fishing done on the flood areas by thenaturals overflows, will be in danger if there would notbe some kind of compensatory intervention.

Among the Projeto de Implantação do Perímetro Irrigado dePropriá (Propriá Irrigated Perimeter ImplantationProject) listed objectives, are detached: to promote theregional development, to lift the regional farmers lifelevel, and the Perimeter defense against the riveroverflows (almost finished nowadays). The São FranciscoRiver overflows are still alive in the riverside dwellerpeople imagination, like a kind of blessing that keepingthe life on, for people who lived on the moving of thisnatural seasonality: overflows and ebb tide times.

The changing in the natural river course, done by thelarge hydro-electric power stations, had drasticallydisordered the traditional economies, causing an exodusof great part of the traditional rice growers and

fishermen and the impoverishment for many dwellersstraightly depending on the river activities.

The RIEPER study (2001) about the riparian identityconstruction and the environment conditions in Low SãoFrancisco Zone, with the older regional dwellers andfishermen testimony, many of them ex rice growers of thelagoons arose when the river bottomed, shows the contrastbetween two times before and after the station.

According to Mr. Romão memories -from Mato da Onça place– before the dams “everybody cultivated and everybody had. It was fullof rice, bean, corn and no one toke care. Life was easy in that time there,Holly Mother. We lived in peace, wasn’t so?” The testimony of Heleno,an Indian Xocó dweller of São Pedro Island, confirms thehard situation lived nowadays for the riverside dwellerpeople, and the ecological consequences of the large damconstructions. “The river doesn’t overflow anymore. The water hasbrushwood what we called “golfo” that stay in the water’s surface and doesn’tlet the casting net sinker’s get the bottom, where the fishes are. And the wateris too clean, when the river flowed the water turned into dirt and everybodywas a fisher. But nowadays it is very difficult” (RIEPER, 2011, 38, 45).

The Propriá low water, in the Low São Francisco, the mainexplored culture, the one that not only gave the biggerrent at all and attracted the owner interests, but alsoshaped the regional identity was the rice. According toCORREIA (1980) the river in fluency had a decisive actionin the regional economic life and was the river flood andnot the rain that controlled the agricultural calendar.

The overflow guaranteed a natural fertilization on theflood area, once the river put on it 2 a 3 cm of mud,locally called “colha”, and it was like a littleriverside dock, that kept the water for sometime in thedepression, known as “lagoas de arroz” (rice lagoons).The São Francisco’s riparian lands productivity was rightand the rice’s middle productivity was about 1.800 kilosper hectare (CORREIA, 1980, 118).

The irrigated perimeter that CODEVASF implanted, once thenatural system of river flow was definitively changed,proposed to go on with the growing-rice on the cultivatedplain, traditional economic activity, improving theproduction from a modern agricultural pattern, enablingthe farmers “parceleiros” to turn into a middle producerwith empresarial view, and through the lift of their rentand waste level they contribute to the regionaldevelopment. What the original Project creators mean wasthat a mentality changes happened, and that the alreadyrunning modernization process had been consolidated.Although the done investments and changing promises thezone is still marked for the pourness and the extremesocial disparity, characterizing the place like a miserytraditional site.

After 25 years of its foundation, we thought that aPropriá Project valuation was suitable and necessary tobe better known, from a case study, the resultsproceeding from the governmental interventions in Low SãoFrancisco, established by many public policy, all of thembased on the progress discourse and the regionaldevelopment

1 – The State Presence in Low São Francisco

The seventy decade represented a significant temporalmark of the capitalistic expansion on northeasternBrazil. The developmental euphoria that characterized themilitary government, diffusing the Brazil High Powerideology, also created the slogan of a New Northeastern,what, in reality was, nothing more than another time ofthe brazilian capitalistic monopoly expansion,consolidated by a inciting taxes policy, witch purposewas to improve that region industrialization, or in theOLIVEIRA’S words (1976), to do the no-programmed program ofnortheastern Brazil industrialization.

The discourse and the developmental policy for thatregion, ended serving like basis to the capital’sexpansionist’s interest’s realization, materialized inform of large projects of irrigations, agro-industrialsand industrials. These projects consequencies, almost allof them justified for the Modern Northeastern panaceaconstruction, were: the aggravation of social disparity,the country exodus and the and the consequential citiespopulation growing, once the cities worked like aattraction pole to the people that was expelled from thefields, as much as to the people attracted for newinvestments done and the job’s promises, as well as themisery poles expansion and the consolidation of thetraditional power relations, besides the water and soilproductive potential destruction. (CAVALCANTI, 1992)

The mark for the deeper transformations begins with thelarge hydroelectric Dams construction by the SãoFrancisco Hydro-electric Company (Companhia Hidroeletricado São Francisco) – CHESF, and with implantation offederal programs seeking the agriculture modernization,especially the irrigation field of action, with theutilization of the large dams water.

The Tres Marias, Sobradinho and Itaparica Stationsconstruction caused big environmental problems to theregion, including the strongly changes on the overflowand ebb tide river São Francisco system, jeopardizing thereproduction of several fishes species and thetraditional life of the fishermen river people. These aresome examples of the promoted actions done for theBrazilian Government, through the energetic policy, togive a satisfactory answer to the capitalist interestexpansion in the field, what had found the climax atseventy decade.

The Low São Francisco Zone started to be a site ofgovernmental intervention, more effectively from 1975,when the Irrigated Perimeter in Propriá (Sergipe) and

Itituba (Alagoas) were implanted by CODEVASF. Thatintervention which was a result of a Mundial Bank order,what had conditioned the Sobradinho and the PauloAfonso’s Hydro-electric Complex money liberation to theirrigated perimeters creation, had objectivities to takeactions that could reduce the negative impacts that, forsure would occur, if these works did not be done.(FONSECA, 1988)

This idea – to use the river São Francisco waters toirrigate the semi-arid zone in northeastern Brazil – hadbeen discussed since 1847, when a congressman from CearáState called Marco Antonio Macedo, who made a statementabout the São Francisco river transposition to Jaguariberiver (Araújo e Ribeiro, 1995), seeking to make possiblethe internal navigation between São Francisco river andPorcos rivulet, across 200 kilometers of waterways.(SANTANA, março, 2000). Since that time, this subject hadbeen ever present at the conversations about possiblesolutions for the semi-arid zone in northeastern Brazil.

From the eighty decade of twenty century, when the StudyProject was created, looking for the good use of theintegrated water and soil resources on semi-arid zone innortheastern Brazil, through the transposition of SãoFrancisco river hydric resources, on that time in chargeof Departamento Nacional de Obras de Saneamento(Sanitation Woks National Department) – DNOCS, that ideahas been gradually practiced, through the variousirrigated agricultural projects executed along the river.

The Radambrasil Project, on the seventy’s, throughsatellite mapping, comproved the semi-arid soil fertilityand showed a significant potential of excellent qualityirrigable soil, occupying a 1.600.000 hectares area, inthe states as follow: Pernambuco, Paraíba, Rio Grande doNorte, and in the rivers basin as follow: Brigida, TerraNova, Pajeú, Jaguaribe, Piranhas and Apodi, exactly inthe arid epicenter being it the governmental incentive

guarantee, for the following irrigation projects thatcame.(INTERIOR, 1983)

That viabilization of large projects, engaged with thecapitalistic logical of production, has caused, alongsideof the last decades, serious changes on the river system,endangering its environment, as well as the disorder ofthe whole hydrographic basin, affecting the physic andbiotic environment, as much as the antropic environment(Silva, 1999). Even so, no governmental action has been implemented, insense to reordain the São Francisco rivers basin,although the federal government still propose the riverwaters transposition.

The federal government propose to make viable the SãoFrancisco waters transposition that justifies itself likean alternative to bring water to semi-arid areaspopulation, historical victims of the bad weather, can’tgo on before the reordainment of this hydrographic basin.So, that project must be analyzed like one more step ofthe forced modernization process, done along the SãoFrancisco basin, which logical point is privatize thegains and socialize the lost.

The Low São Francisco is placed in the ebb tide of eighthydro-electric stations constructed along the river andreceive, all the time, this stations work impacts. Thatzone could be, on a figurative words, “ the terminalgarbage” once it receives directly the reflex of all theinterventions done at High and Middle São Francisco,living nowadays in terrible conditions, almost in apublic calamity.

That region began on Paulo Afonso´s fall, in Bahia State,going on until the river estuary. When the Hydro-electricStation of Xingó had been made, between the states ofAlagoas and Sergipe and the dam lagoon overflowing in1993, this denomination started to be used for the dam

ebb tide, on the dividing line between the two states.The dam made impossible to navigate down the river, erasing from theriparian people imaginary the flooded area. (RIEPER, 2001, 23)

With the irrigated perimeters implantation, the smallgrowers that planted on the lowlands began to depend onfinancial investments to by irrigation bombs and dieseloil for supply, financial resources that the most part ofthe people doesn’t have, because they are smalllandowners, or no landowner people. The cited study triedto understand in which ways the abrupt changes that theregion is passing by, mostly on the ecological andeconomic levels, has affected the traditionalpopulation’s way of life. (RIEPER, 2001).

Another data must be counted, inside this immense list ofdamage, is the river silting up, which is responsible forthe large internal navigation extinction, letting withoutjob the canoe men that lived on board, and besides thefast process of the margins erosion. (CASADO, 2000)

The environmental consequences in the Low São FranciscoZone, resulting from the large stations construction,were very strong in ecological, social, economic andcultural views, despite it doesn’t count to the perversearithmetic of the governmental planners, that calculatecosts and benefits, having in mind the progress, andhaving as main compromises the capitalistic expansionconsolidation on that region instead of the well-being ofthe traditional dwellers (beiradeiros e vazanteiros) –and the environmental equilibrium.

2 – The Propriá Project

The Propriá Project is seating on the homogeneous microregion of Propriá, along the right margin of SãoFrancisco River, and at 70 kilometers from the estuary.The total area of 2.165 hectares includes three towns inSergipe state: Propriá, Cedro and Telha de São João. This

project had been implanted on the low land formed byJacaré creek and its affluent, Salgado creek, area thatwas traditionally explored by rice culture.

These enterprises was, at the beginning, projected for1177 hectares irrigation, and were implanted 298 lotswith 3, 96 hectares middle area, attended for two pumpingstations: one to irrigation and drainage and another oneonly to irrigation, pumping water across a 40 kilometerslong net (CODEVASF, 1984; CODEVASF-DO, 1984).

The expropriated area by the project implantation shown avery complex and contrasting landed situation: 41, 3% ofthe whole area was occupied by properties with more than100 hectares, that were only 1, 7% of the total existingunities. What preponderated were the small landownersthat represented 78% of the total, with until 5 hectares.There were 354 properties total, with a 2.948 hectaresarea. (SILVA E FONSECA, 2000).

The expropriation process, according with show thestudies done (Fonseca, 1988; Silva, 1990), was verydifficult, promoting strong reactions by the owners andstill by the no owners farming people, because the lotsquantity was lower than the owner’s quantity that livedthere before CODEVASF actuation.

According to a FONSECA study (1988) about the irrigatedperimeters implemented by CODEVASF in Low São Francisco,during the expropriation process, some of theexpropriated were “ghost people”, what increased thenumber of people with rights on the irrigated lots, andcompromised the enterprise credibility, and the fitnessof the people in charge of this.

The wrong strategy used and the inability to lead theexpropriation process were also commented by Fonseca,like a conflict and disagreement generator agent with the

no landowners farming , that lost their productionenvironment, and were not correctly indemnified.

The excessively techniques CODEVASF view on the problemsresolution that came, in special that ones what concernedto the people every days life, had promoted strongcritiques from many local and state departments, thatalso joined themselves to defend the rights of the olderdwellers from the expropriated lands, mostly the smallfarmers and the no owner land which worked of otherslands, and were in damage with the type of distributiondone.

One of the groups that gave support and made amobilization against the CODEVASF intervention on thatarea was Diocese de Propriá (Diocese of Propriá), whichbesides to defend the small farmer interests – owners andno owners; the diocese started to promote the legalassistance to them, and so the diocese became “one moreclog to the original proposal of the enterprise and onemore clog to the conflicts solving.” (SILVA and FONSECA,2000).

The existent problems became even worse, thought theprotectionist CODESFASF solution found, what promoted theplacing of the people, before the end of the substructurewoks.

Trying to find a solution or to minimize the conflicts,CODEVASF has distributed gratuitously fertilizers andseeds, and had prepared itself the lands of the planting,but the two first crops were almost all lost because ofthe water absence on the perimeter.

Some mistakes on the project physical substructureworsened still more the difficult situation, for thelocal people and for the enterprise, this one each timemore critiqued and discredited. Along this 25 years ofage of Propriá Project many changes have be done, but for

all that, there were big mistakes on the originalproposition, so many problems still remain and it looksdifficult to solve, like the equipment maintenance case.

The Project had been done to the rice production throughthe overflow, using selected seeds, that should beenproduced on the own irrigated perimeter, with theagreement of local people and lots of land reserved tothis. But the chosen seeds at the beginning had a verylong cycle and couldn’t give two crops on year.Well, to those problems some another’s one had beenadded, like: the precariousness on the seeds distributionand time to plant, and the high production costs.

The project tried to solve these problems introducing arice variety which has a shorter cycle, and theengagement of a new enterprise to furnish the selectedseeds and to provide the necessary orientation for thenew seeds production. But the seeds fields were in a badplace; near lands of common cultivation what hasdeteriorated a part of the crop, besides the problemswith the seed’s commercialization and furnishing, thefarmer started to sale the seeds not to plant but toconsume.

Another alternative, along these 25 years, tried byCODEVASF on the Propriá Project was a king ofconsociation between the rice and the fish culture, aswell as the sties for pig breeding. This activity had ashort life, once was implanted to attend a NutrialFactory demand, established on Propriá, in the earlyeighty years, because of the taxes incentives that thestate government gave. But the Factory closed very soonand this fact only contributed to complicate thesituation, once that the local people, believing theconsociated production, had raised a loan and doneseveral investments on their lands, to that purpose.

The Irrigated Perimeter has been working since 1975, andhad several states and reformulations including afrustrated emancipation experience at the ninety decade.Nowadays CODEVASF recovered the Propriá Project and theproject administration have been done by a IrrigationDistrict, of which Deliberative Council CODESVASFparticipate without vote rights, but – on a very strangeway – with veto rights, what proportionate to CODEVASF apower to final decisions and compromise the projectemancipation.

The objectives of the Executive Project proposal soughtto improve the region development with the Irrigatedperimeter implantation, to consolidate a “new ruralmiddle class” and to guarantee a food production, mostlyrice, to supply the product import needs and provisionthe place, with a modern irrigate agriculture, but theseobjectives didn’t happen.

The Project full performance is still hampered for theproject original mistakes, although the several changesthat had been done along this time. The main problemsthat the farmers point in the Project are straightlyconnected with the product trading and the landmaintenance.

Nowadays, the low rice price, the high production costsare pointed as the main clog to the Perimeter developmentand also like justifiers to the abandonment of some landby the owners. Other complaints include: difficulties inthe land maintenance, the channels cleaning and drainage,rats and caterpillar plague combat.

The consortium failed experience regarding to riceproduction, the pig brining and the fish culture caused adiscontent feeling between the farming, who had preparedtheir lands to these activities, and are not producing.The pig’s tries that had been constructed are empty, anda big part of them never worked.

There were 60 lots prepared with all needs to theconsortium, being 1 ha (medium) for fishes and 3 ha(medium) for rice. There were also 100 lots to pigbrining and fish culture, but no one is producing, andthe dwellers are indebted, because they had investedwaiting for the Nutrial Factory promises, and when thefactory failed, only the improvement and the debt withthe Bank remain.The fish culture has, yet, another problem. The ownerslive in Propriá and at night they need someone to keepwatching the lots, because the fishes are stolen. Butthey don’t have money to pay anyone, so these have beencaused a significant retraction on this culture.

The lots productivity is still very small, although 55%of the farming had been there since project implantation.According to a technician words: well, the project didn’t take off.

3 – The Perimeter Actual Situation

The CODEVASF was programmed to continue acting until theProject be considered done, or in another words, untilthe project has conditions to be emancipated. After thatthe Company actuation would be only to the operation andmaintenance of the dike systems, pumping stations,drainage and irrigation and low lands internal roads.

When the Irrigated Perimeter had got the emancipation,the farming would have the responsibility for the Projectdevelopment and water offer charge, excepting the investmentsand operation and maintenance costs, derived from the river system changesbecause of Sobradinho and Paulo Afonso’s IV Stations construction(PROCENGE, 1981, 80)5

The irrigated perimeters situation, implanted byCODESVASF is critical and according a denunciations doneto the press and published by CINFORM journal(24/04/2000, edition number 0889), the 99/2000 crop onlyhad loss and 95% of the farming from the State of Sergipe

went into bank debts. The farming feels that they wereforgotten by government. According to the journalpublished news:Beyond the rice crisis, that drags on along 5 years, and is now in the mostcritical point, the rice farming had to face a powerful enemy: the rat Theplague was so strong on the three Sergipe perimeters (Betume,CotinguibaPindoba e Propriá), that we calculate a loss about 35% medium onall the production, because of the rat action (CINFORM, 24/04/2000).

3.1 – Main complaint and demands

The farming alleged like main clogs to the production:off time credit, technical assistance deficiency,production costs, rice processing difficulties, productsale, land maintenance, plundering animals attack,besides the bad quality of seeds.

The main complaints presented were: the low rice pricepaided nowadays and the high production costs, landmaintenance difficulty, combat to the rats andcaterpillar plague, the channels cleaning and drainage,besides the inconstancy of the dam opening to irrigatethe lots.5 These investments and operation costs consist of protection dikes and principalpumping stations. See: SILVA, Tânia Elias M. da e FONSECA, Vânia. Perímetro Irrigadode Própria: Estudo Diagnóstico. Relatório Final. Aracaju, 2000. Mimeo

Nowadays, according to information’s of the techniciansthat work at Propriá District area, there are 37 lotswith fish culture that have good results, because theylet the rice monoculture. Although there were still 60lots prepared with all needed structure for rice andfish culture, with 1 hectare (medium) to fish and 3hectares to rice, that are not producing, due to a greatparcel of the farming are indebted, according to thereasons we said before. The ones that are consorting thecultures are utilizing their own resources, once bankcredits are interrupted due to the no fulfillment.

In relation to the dwellers life quality improvement wehave a very heterogeneous panorama. About 50 to 55% ofthe farming is still from the first selected ones, and agreat part of them started with only one lot and todayare with two, while others still have only one. Aboutthis subject, a technician that has been working therefor more than 20 years commented:The productivity doesn’t get better, the house doesn’t get better, and so, itdidn’t take off...There are many factors to explain the situation: about 10% ofthe dwellers are not able to be owner; they don’t have this kind of mentality.Another factor that must be said is that the traditional planting systematicwas different, there was no machines, and another data is that on thisperimeter we had a food help (bolsa alimento) and/or a monthly fixed (set)income (renda fixa) distribution, until the project have conditions to work. Itended in 1985, but some people still waits for this help.

The interviewed alleged as main clogs to the production:off time credit, technical assistance deficiency,production costs, rice processing difficulties, productsale, land maintenance, plundering animals attack,besides the bad quality of seeds.

The dwellers complains were corroborated by thetechnician that work on the perimeter, and they alsopointed other factors like: problems on the drainage,what has caused erosion as well as the river bedelevation, and the bad water quality, mostly that onethat came from Jacaré rivulet, due to the drain ofPropriá, Cedro da São João and Telha cities, thatdisembogue on that rivulet, and of course, infect thewater that arrives on the perimeter.6

The water contamination has prejudiced the fish culture,because when the river level is down, there is no way toirrigate the fish culture. Due to this, there areproblems with fungus that atrophied the fry, and thewater hydrogenization. On rice culture the damage issmaller but still exists. The parasitic index on the

water is growing each day and forces the farming not todrink that water. Everybody brings water from home.

The water liberation is done on Sobradinho, and everyFriday the water is closed, what cause a decrease onwater level on Saturday, Sunday and Monday. According tothe technician, the water discharged on Wednesday is onlyrecommended to fish culture

6 To this subject see a SANTOS study (1999)

The indiscriminate use of agro toxics and poison is thefarming people also contaminated the water. Theapplication of these substances is done for not preparedworkers (contracted people), and this use doesn’t obeyany technical or any owner orientation. There isn’t anyinspection that represses the indiscriminate using ofthese products.

The payment for that kind of work is something about 10or 12 reais/day, and contracted people doesn’t have anyqualification and are regimented from the ruralunemployed. This activity is entirely out of control.To combat the rats they use dogs and boys (that kill therats with a blow) and poison is also very used. The mostused poisons are, according to the Propriá stories:“chumbinho”, “Fumirate” “Fenômeno” and “Clerati”. Thepesticide and poison use is bigger than the farming andProject technician say, and has caused the watercontamination and some kind of disease on the dweller andcontracted works, as headache, bellyache and daze.

To combat caterpillars and beetles they use: Folidó,Folisuper, Decis, Eston and Cipitrin. To combat the birds(sparrows) they use Decis poison an also scarecrows.Visiting the perimeter, we can verify the the agro toxicsand poison uses without any individual protection, andthe use of no recommended products as well, chumbinho, in

case, what is a forbidden poison by the HealthDepartment.

According to the technician that work on the perimeter isalmost impossible to control the agro toxics use, mostlythe poison, but they do inspection, orientation and aninstruction campaign with the farming about this. Evenso, the results are still faraway from the expected.

The technician accuses the lands owner for the plaguesproliferation, mostly about the rats, because accordingto them, the owner doesn’t keep the channels, drains andtalus clean. If they would do this, the problem would besolved.

Some factors have worsened the situation. We can detach:the owner land absence to maintenance what causecarelessness on the cleaning, some farming doesn’t wantto contract labor to the land maintenance, absence ofhome circle backing, to land maintenance; and how theydon’t live there, it remains abandoned.Another problem due to the owner no permanence at theland, is difficulty faced by the servant who dischargethe water. He can’t discharge the water if there is noone there (owner or some responsible person). Althoughthe most part of the owner be there everyday, some ofthem no show for 3 or 4 days, what represented a clogs tothe land maintenance.

About the problems that emerge with the inconstant landirrigation, is very illustrative the Syndicate of RuralWorkers of Telha President testimony, who is also afaming. According to this sir, the great concern of thePropriá perimeter farming is the water, what is result ofthe disconnection between the pipeline and the producers.He was personally prejudiced when CODEVASF hard done thelast repair on a channel, what let his lands withoutwater when he most needed it, and the rice, that assprouting was destroyed. When the water came, there was a

caterpillar plague on most part of plantation, and he hadbig loss.

We could verify this matter with the water during onevisit. When we were talking to one of the technician incharge there, we listened a desperate complain of afarming, regarding the water deficient and his possibleloss. According to him the land was ready to planted andthe CANELEIRO was not the to release the water. He waswaiting for the CANELEIRO almost a week. This complainshappened on a Friday afternoon. The technician alerted to“that only on Monday or Tuesday the water would bereleased, but that he was sending a memorandum to thepeople in charge, asking for a resolution”.

According to the Syndicate President, another problems isthe “baronesa” proliferation (baronesa is a kind of waterplant that stops the water flow in the channels) and theabsence of a systematic work to eradicated the rats. Hecleans his land, but his neighbors don’t, and this factbreaks the alimentary chains. He works only with hisfamily, and the absence of labor worsens the situation.He only contracts a worker when he needs to do somethingon a shorter time.

According to this interviewed, the CODEVASF performanceshould be to follow the needs of each lot, or in anotherwords, run along the project, and not to act how they wish.Another complains was about the debits with the bank thatare suffocating the great number of farming’s. Many ofthem are working to pay the bank

Another fact that works as a clog to the productionimprovement is that there isn’t a resource to makebetterment on the project, like: canalizations, light,constructions, access roads, etc. It is very difficult tofind money to invest.

When we visited the perimeter, we found many abandonedlots, what sustained the technician complains. One ofthem asseverated that the farming’s, who don’t goeveryday to that place, are the ones that have only onelot and don’t go because they found another’s job out ofthere. The farming that have more than one lot, also havean employee who watch over the land.

3.2 – Production, trading and the utilized seeds

The medium production for lot had been two crops/year andthe sale é done to only two regional buyers, so the riceprice is established for the profiteers.

The competition between the rice that comes from thesouth and Middle West regions and the perimeter rice isanother factor that sustains the low prices. Theimprovement on the production on that region allowsbetter prices on the cereal market, besides the betterbenefaction.

According to the technicians that work at the Project,the price and quality of the product are straightlyconnected to the short time between the benefaction andthe consumption of the project rice. This time is nolonger than 40 days. The south rice, which has more timein repose, has a harder grain and a better acceptance onthe market.

On a good year is possible to have 2, 5 crop/year, according to thefarming. The seeds used are Diamante and São Francisco,which are bought inside the perimeter, what concur to thelow productivity, due to the bad seeds quality. Theothers seeds that that State Government send, which aredistributed by the coop: Berriga, Cica8, Cica9, Chatinho,Agulhinha, Santa Helena, Mestiça, Anão, Canela Preta andUmbigo Preto.

The rice production fell from 3 or 4 ton in 1993/1995 to2, 5 ton (maximum) in 1996. The years of 1997 and 1998had about 5, 6 ton (medium) crop, due to the new seeds –Diamante e São Francisco – besides the better control onthe application of fertilizer. Although in 1999 aproduction decrease happened again, due to the ratsattack.

Some lots have obtained 2,5 crop/year, but the soilrepose is about only 15 or 20 days, what exhaust quicklythe soil mostly for the wrong use of the resources.According to the District technician, that gave the aboveinformation’s, the lots what’s have that production areless than 10% of all, and making an optimisticallyvaluation he computed between 20 or 30 lots, and said:This is not good to the soil. The soil recovery is not done with organicalfertilizer, but with a chemical fertilizer, and in a few time it shall damage thesoil Ph which is about 6 to 7.

The farming uses a plow to prepare the soil, but there isno study or evaluation follow-up about the effects ofthis practice to the kin of soil worked.

The rice production costs are very high almost theequable to income. Nowadays the net income doesn’t reach20%. The gross cost is 1000 reais medium add the incomesomething about 1.150 to 1.200 reais. Two factors canexplain this situation: untill middle 1999 the rice pricewas about 0, 35 reais/kg, but the rice from Barreiras deGoiás, Rio Grande do Sul and Tocantins arrives withbetter prices at the cereal market, due to thetransportation, done by ship until Recife and Salvador,and the bigger produtity of those places, which is about5, 5 ton/hectare

The absence of competition on the rice buy was pointed bythe technician and coop president as an impediment toimprove the product price in Sergipe.

3.3 – Before and After Perimeter. what had change?

No one interviewed could answer which was thecontribution that CODEVASF and/or Perimeter brought tothe betterment of people lives. But all of them, withoutexception, connect the enterprise presence with theperimeter and their personal lives, but not with theregional development. According to the interviewedopinion, the CODEVASP actions are restricted to theperimeter only.

As well as the farmer, the dwellers, in the three cities,couldn’t do a connection between the places developmentand CODESVASF and/or Irrigated Perimeter. By the largethe opinions converged to a critic to the problems of thefarmers, and there is a kind of longing for the old timeswhen the low lands were explored on the traditional way

A question that permeated all the interviews, was theconcern about the drastic changes that have been done onthe São Francisco River system due to severalinterventions done along the river as the big hydro-electric stations, and that have been resulting onserious damage to the riverside dwellers populationssurvival7

The river waters transposition project is, nowadays, aquestion that put in motion the people from those cities,and because CODEVASF is not involved on the against thisproject and doesn’t show interest on this debate, thepeople thinks that the enterprise is not involved withthe locale life. On this way to speak about CODEVASF isthe same of to speak about the Perimeter and vice versa.

4 – Place development and the CODEVASF presence

CODEVASF, through Irrigated Perimeter, seems not give anycontribution to the development of the cities embraced byPropriá Project. Almost the totality of the interviewed

dwellers couldn’t identify the enterprise influence onthe locale life development. On the contrary, they didhard critics to the situation lived by the farmers.Everybody accuses CODEVASF for the problems.

What really distinguished in the interviews were thecountless conflicts that happened between CODEVASF andthe farmers, along these 25 years. The CODEVASF presenceis seem like something that has no connection with thelocale life.

The picture done was of an enterprise that manage thePerimeter, “very powerful” “the one that order, becauseis the government”, “has power”. Distinguished in theinterviews the authoritarian way that mange the project,a centralizing administration and very for from thelocale life. By the large, this is the interviewedopinion about CODEVASF and about the Perimeter.

About this is very illustrative the interview with an ex-councilman also ex-landowner in the Irrigated Perimeter:The Irrigated Perimeter was solicitation done on my time and was very goodto the Cotinguiba Lagoon people. Nowadays they complain about the water,but everything else is very good and everybody likes. But this water deficiencyhappens due to some kind of problem or irresponsibility of the servant thatopen the dam (canaleiro). I was farmer from 1975 ‘till 1990, and so a retiredand gave the land to my son.Before the Project many people lived from the fishing, there was no machineto ´pick the rice, they planted with the fingers, was sacrifice to pull up the“lingua de vaca” (a kind of herb). So, that project was a progress, becausebefore (the project) came the thunderstorms and the torrents. But not today.Everything is controlled, different from the 1933 inundation, when the watercovered everything. Besides, the trade earned the buy became easier becausethe money came in.7 About this see RIEPER study (2001), Silva (1999) and Vargas (2000)

For the difficulties that the farmer had, I can tell you the Ananias Cardosocase that renounced the lot, after he lost the whole production, because theCoop didn’t send the machines before the thunderstorms. Due to theist,

disgusted, sold the lot. There was robbery, low behavior and irresponsibility inthe Coop.

The president of the Propriá Fishermen Colony,remembered, with nostalgia, the arrived of the boats fullof fishes from the old São Francisco (Velho Chico), anddeplored to see Argentine fishes and fattened speciesbreaded on reservoir to sell, because he knows that thereare no more fishes in the river, only shrimp.

Accord info to the president of Fishermen colony, thefishermen had a good life in the past, because they fished1000kg by day, now they do this by a week, when they do. To theinterviewed, privatize the São Francisco river will meanthe category dead. The interviewed criticized theabsence of a support program to the fishermen andspecially the abs erne medical of assistance to thecategory. According to him, many fishermen are sickbecause they had met the daybreak cold, and this factwould be straightly connected to CODEVASF and IrrigatedPerimeter.

The Project prejudiced the fishermen, because before it the fishes multipliedon the lagoons and on the low lands and after the Project this facts don’toccur anymore. Besides the rice production is not good once the promiseswas to three crop, and today there are sectors that have only one crop, due tothe rats, expensive energy, and the empty lots., what according to himdoesn’t show any advantage. Besides the fishermenpractically stayed away of the Project. The interviewed merchants of Fishing Entrepôt of Propriásaid that there is fish scarcity on the Low São Franciscoregion, mostly near the city. So they prefer to sellfrozen fishes that come from the Argentina instead theones that come from the Middle São Francisco, near PauloAfonso. Another question is the sea waters that areentering on the river estuary, being possible to findsome marine fishes near Propriá. They pointed as the

cause of this river unbalance the construction of Hydro-electric Stations.

Syndicate of Rural Workers Vice President denounced that90% of labor used on the Perimeter had been dispensed andthe project only favored the high lands and that ones whodoesn’t like to work.

One farmer declarations illustrate that situation livednowadays by mostly of them:Before 1975, the work at the low lands was only handled. After the Perimeterthe Camuripim Coop was founded and the land had been dispossessed. To bea farmer you could not have any other occupation, to guarantee the fixingthe man on the field. The CODEVASF technician intimidated the people, bysaying that they will bring Chinese people to work there. So, along the timethe complains had came, as that water absence what caused the crops loss.The CODESVASF technician tried to compensate the loss with hours ofmachine work. Nowadays we have another situation because CODEVASFmanagement changed. After I had been investing on the rice production,nowadays I am creating some cattle besides irrigate an area with sprinklersto plant sweet pepper.

5 – Conclusions

CODEVASF appeared on that region to minimalize theimpacts that had come due to the Sobradinho and ItaparicaStation, and to promote the development. But theenterprise seems not to do this, once its actions arealways mentioned as restrict to the project questions. Infact it seems that this have been the enterpriseoccupation since 1975. Along this 25 years many conflictswere created between the CODESVASF and the farmers, whathelped the enterprise have a negative image and almostnothing have been done to revert this process?

On the last two years, seems that the enterprise seeks tochange its public image, with the experience ofIrrigation Districts which is the perimeteradministration department, which management is done by a

farmer. But the district is still tutored by theenterprise, that is who has the decision power on thedeliberations, once COEVASF has veto power on thedeliberative council.

So we ask: Which is the farmer’s autonomy on thePerimeter administration? How can they be independent ifthe autonomy is restricted? This tutelage will remainuntil when?

All the experiences of emancipation of the project – Coopand/or Farmer Associations – failed, apparently due tothe farmer difficulties to administrate the project;there was abuse of power, administrative immoderation,robbery. According to the interviews, this facts happenedbecause the technician as much as the farmer. Thatadministrative improbity created the intervention on thecoop, and the end of activities.

The Irrigated District creation, as that perimeteradministrative department under farmer responsibility, isa effort to promote the project emancipation. But theadministrative structure that gives to CONDEVASF the vetorights at the administration counsel menaces thePerimeter emancipation.

The initial idea that with the project a small ruralentrepreneur group became real was wrong, because we cannot change the way of life and the traditional way to seethe world with projects, decrees and intention letters orby the technocrat project wishes, which ignore and don’trespect the cultural values of the people with who theyare. They (the technocrats) are not prepared to dialoguewith that people node they understand as dialogue theagreement to the plans elaborated on the cabinets.

The total of complains shows that until now the Projectdoesn’t take off, as the Basic Project foresaw. Inanother worlds, it was not capable to reduce the mistakes

done by the stations construction along the river, topromote the region development with a modern agriculturalproject that improve the gains, and that elevate theeconomic, social e cultural models of the farmer, as wellas to change the farmers mentality to former a solidmiddle class on the field, to attend the capitalistexpansion interests.Between the cabinets planning elaboration and the realityof CODESVASF actions had a tremendous hiatus and althoughthe improvement of the life level of some people, theproject was predestinated to the failure. Where is thedevelopment? Where is the solid rural middle class? Theaccountancy of the expenses done, the created conflicts,the various fail since the implantation and theenvironmental problems that came along the São FranciscoRiver, point to a need to rethink on a critic way thegovernmental Projects what have been practiced on thatplace as development propelling source, but that are, infact, only bad patches done to reduce the wrong actionsand socialize the loss, as the case of the largestations.

That Low São Francisco is still a misery place. What wecan see the is a complete blunder between the publicpolicies implements and the improve of the local peoplelife. The traditional problems lived by that peoplereached by Propriá Irrigated Perimeter, as the land lacksto the farmers are still waiting for a solution, sleepinginside the government drawers.

The local development impacts created by Projeto Propriáwere very insignificants when compared with the ExecutiveProject justifying. The project brought some gains to thecities, by the commerce improve and the municipalcollection, but is not possible to associate thedevelopment of the cities only with CONDEVASF action.

Although the enterprise management allege, that thecritic analyze about its action on the Low São Francisco,

must ponder that without the enterprise interference thedisaster to the population, due to of the Sobradinho eItaparica Stations construction, would be fatal. We cannot justify the great expense of public money and theenvironment disorder, what generated serious consequenceson the economic and social people life, from thequestion: What would be worst.

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