MODELLING PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION IN SPAIN

MODELLING PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION IN SPAIN:

REVENUE ELASTICITIES AND REGIONAL COMPARISONS

JOHN CREEDY JOSÉ FÉLIX SANZ-SANZ

FUNDACIÓN DE LAS CAJAS DE AHORROS DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO

Nº 528/2010

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trastar su nivel técnico. ISSN: 1988-8767 La serie DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO incluye avances y resultados de investigaciones dentro de los pro-

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Las opiniones son responsabilidad de los autores.

Modelling Personal Income Taxation in Spain:

Revenue Elasticities and Regional Comparisons

John Creedy

José Félix Sanz-Sanz1

Abstract

This paper derives analytical expressions for the revenue elasticity of the Spanish

personal income tax system, as applied to tax units and in aggregate. This is

complicated by the schedular nature of the system, and the role of central and

regional governments, along with the existence of a range of tax credits and eligible

expenditures and deductions. Empirical estimates are obtained using a cross-sectional

dataset which enables a number of important ancillary elasticities (relating to

allowances and tax credits, and different income sources) to be estimated. It was

found that there is considerable variation among tax units in the revenue elasticity,

with highly (positively) skewed distributions. The nature of the distributions varies

among regions of Spain, and the aggregate elasticities for each region were found to

display some variation associated with income distribution differences. The national

aggregate is found to be around 1.3. The paper also derives aggregate tax revenue as

a function of characteristics of the distribution of taxable income in each region. This

allows the sources of revenue differences among regions to be identified.

Key words: revenue elasticity, personal income taxation, regional tax revenue. JEL Classification: D31 H24 H30

1 Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne and Universidad Complutense de Madrid,

respectively. We are grateful for support from the Fundacion de las Cajas de Ahorros (FUNCAS).

3

1 Introduction

An important characteristic of any personal income tax structure is the elasticity of

income tax revenue with respect to changes in gross income, when there are no

adjustments to income thresholds or other discretionary changes to the tax structure.

The revenue elasticity provides, at individual and aggregate levels, a measure of

‘fiscal drag’ arising from the failure to adjust income tax thresholds when incomes

increase. Fiscal drag, or ‘built-in flexibility’, has implications for both the revenue

and redistributive effects of taxation over the business cycle.2 This measure is also

useful when considering the ‘automatic stabilisation’ properties of the tax system.3

For tax planning purposes it is also important to be able to estimate the implications

for total income tax revenue of a range of exogenous changes.

The aim of this paper is to estimate the revenue elasticity properties of the Spanish

personal income tax structure and to provide a method of examining the implications

for total tax revenue of a number of changes, including changes in the distribution of

income and in the tax structure itself. Although the focus of attention is the Spanish

structure, the methods used are more widely applicable.

The Spanish tax system differs from that of many other countries and has undergone

significant reforms, in additional to the type of base-broadening and rate-reducing

changes which have been common in many other countries.4 In particular, income

taxation (since 2002) is shared between Central and Regional Governments,

consisting of 15 autonomous regions within the Common Territory. In addition,

different tax rates and thresholds, and other rules influencing the difference between 2 The revenue elasticity is closely linked to one of the measures of progressivity proposed by

Musgrave and Thin (1948), and the link with progressivity is examined further in Podder (1997). On a

possible relationship between the elasticity and government expenditure, see Craig and Heins (1980)

and Misiolek and Elder (1988). 3 On automatic stabilisation aspects of revenue elasticity, see Pohjola (1985), van den Noord (2000)

and Mabbett (2004). A reduced importance was predicted to follow the ‘death of inflation’, by

Heinemann (2001). 4 On the recent reforms, see OECD (2006).

4

gross and taxable income, apply to a range of income sources: this involves the use of

a multi-schedular tax structure. There are numerous deductions, allowances and tax

credits (at central and regional levels) which apply at various stages. A number of

these elements depend on non-income as well as income characteristics of tax units.

This complexity means that extensions need to be made to standard methods of

obtaining revenue elasticities.5

The approach followed here is to derive an analytical expression for the revenue

elasticity of tax units. This is shown to depend on a number of ‘ancillary elasticities’

which affect the way in which eligible expenditures and deductions, and tax credits,

vary with unit income, along with the relative movements of each income source. A

large cross-sectional sample of Spanish tax units is then used to estimate values of

the ancillary elasticities, allowing for a substantial degree of heterogeneity whereby

the elasticities differ according to total tax unit income, the demographic composition

of the unit, the location (autonomous region) and the income source. The aggregate

revenue elasticity for each region and for the country as a whole is then obtained as a

tax-share weighted sum of tax unit revenue elasticities, where the weights depend on

the way in which each tax unit’s income changes when total income changes.

Having examined revenue elasticities, this paper then turns to the derivation of an

expression for aggregate tax revenue, depending on proportions of people (within

each region) and proportions of total income between the income thresholds of the

income tax function. In carrying out the aggregation process in a tractable manner, it

is necessary to begin from a given distribution of taxable income. This contrasts with

the approach used to calculating revenue elasticities, where the latter are related to

changes in gross incomes. The approach allows the sources of differences in tax

revenue among regions to be identified.

5 Alternative methods include times series regressions and simulation. An early study of the US is

Greytak and Thursby (1979). Important contributions were made in a series of papers by Hutton

(1980) and Hutton and Lambert (1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1989). See also Caminada and

Goudswaard (1996). For a survey of analytical properties, see Creedy and Gemmell (2002, 2006).

5

Section 2 provides a description of the Spanish personal income tax system and

formulates analytical expressions for the tax liability of each tax unit. Revenue

elasticities relating to each tax unit are derived in Section 3, which also provides

some numerical illustrations of their variation with tax unit income. Section 4 turns to

the empirical estimation of revenue elasticities. First it obtains the distribution over

tax units, using the ancillary elasticity estimates. Second, aggregate revenue

elasticities for each region are reported. Section 4 also considers the potential

implications of alternative income dynamic processes which allow ‘regression’ away

from or towards the geometric mean income. Aggregate tax revenue is then examined

in more detail in Section 5. Brief conclusions are given in Section 6.

2 The Tax Structure

This section describes the main elements of the personal income tax structure in

Spain. The accounting period is the tax year, which corresponds to the calendar year.

Subsection 2.1 provides a basic description of the structure as it applies to an

individual tax unit, where the unit may consist of single individuals or married

couples who decide to file jointly. In view of the operation of tax credits, several

special cases need to be distinguished, as discussed in subsection 2.2.

2.1 Income Taxation of a Tax Unit

Let hiy denote the gross income of tax unit h from source 1,...,i I . In transforming

from gross to taxable income, there are tax-deductible expenditures and non-income

allowances. Let hiE denote the tax-deductible expenditure for unit h relating to

source i. In general these expenditures are expected to be a function of gross income:

this is examined in more detail below. Non-income allowances for tax unit h relating

to source i are denoted hiA . Taxable income, hix is given by:

max 0,hi hi hi hix y E A (1)

If the sum of actual tax-deductible expenditures and non-income allowances exceeds

gross income for any income source, the unit effectively has ‘losses’ associated with

6

that source.6 A distinction can therefore be drawn between actual expenditures and

those which are claimed in a year: in the following discussion, hiE refers to actual

expenditures. A complication is that any ‘losses’ can be carried forward for a period

of four years, to be deducted against future income for the same source. However, no

allowance is made for this dynamic element on the grounds that the losses form a

very small component of income, as shown in Appendix A.

The income tax structure has marginal tax rates kit and thresholds kia for 1,...,k K ,

where kit applies between kia and 1,k ia (with 1,K ia ).7 In addition, as mentioned

above, separate rates are imposed at the central and regional government levels,

although the income thresholds are common. Letting superscripts C and R refer to

central and regional rates respectively:

C Rki ki kit t t (2)

For a multi-step tax structure with K steps, 0T x for 0 10a x a ,

1 1T x t x a for 1 2a x a , and 1 2 1 2 2T x t a a t x a for 2 3a x a ,

and so on. Then in general, if 1k ka x a , Creedy and Gemmell (2006, p. 25) show

that:

'k kT x t x a (3)

where:

11

1'

k

k j j jjk

a a t tt

(4)

Hence in the present context, if 1,ki hi k ia x a , unit h is in the kth tax bracket for

source i and the following expressions describe income taxation at central and

regional levels.

1, 'C C Ci hi ki hi k i kih hi kihT y a x a t x a (5)

1, 'R R Ri hi ki hi k i kih hi kihT y a x a t x a (6)

6 This creates a tax asymmetry similar to that associated with corporation taxation, where its role is

much more significant. 7 From 2007, there is an exception in that Madrid has a slightly different tax structure from that of the

other regions. This minor difference is neglected here.

7

The terms 'Ckia and 'Rkia are the corresponding thresholds such that tax liability in a

multi-threshold tax structure can be expressed in terms of an equivalent single-rate

structure. In writing the expressions (5) and (6) the marginal tax rate terms, t, along

with the effective thresholds, 'a , need the h subscripts, in order to clarify the point

that the tax rates and thresholds indicated are those that apply to the tax unit in

question, depending on the tax bracket into which the unit falls.

In addition, there are central and regional government non-refundable tax credits of

CC and RC . Total tax paid by unit h is expressed as:

1 1

( ) max 0 , ( ) max 0 , ( )I I

C Rhi i hi C i hi R

i i i

T y T y C T y C

(7)

In addition, there are refundable tax credits, unrelated to income. However, it is

argued that such refundable credits, since they can in principle be administered by a

separate authority and their cost is unrelated to the income tax structure, should not

be included where – as here – emphasis is on the revenue elasticity from the point of

view of revenue growth and fiscal drag. This issue is discussed further in Appendix

B.

The existence of non-refundable tax credits means that several cases must be

distinguished. These are discussed in the following subsection.

2.2 Special Cases

Consider the most common situation where tax unit h is such that 1

IC

i hi Ci

T y C

and 1

IR

i hi Ri

T y C

. The expression given in (7) above for tax liability is thus

simplified to:

1

( ) ( ) ( )I

C Rhi i hi i hi R C

i i

T y T y T y C C

(8)

and:

1

( ) ( ' ' )I

C C R Rhi kih hi kih kih kih kih R C

i i

T y t x t a t a C C

(9)

Furthermore, where 0hix this becomes:

8

1

( ) ( ' ' )I

C C R Rhi kih hi hi hi kih kih kih kih R C

i i

T y t y E A t a t a C C

(10)

A further simplification is available in view of the fact that the central and regional

income thresholds are the same. Using the above expression for 'ka , it can be shown

that:

1,1

' 'ihk

C C R Rkih kih kih kih ji ji j i

j

t a t a a t t

(11)

If, alternatively, 1

IC

i hi Ci

T y C

but 1

IR

i hi Ri

T y C

, tax liability is thus:

1

( ) ( )I

Chi i hi C

i i

T y T y C

(12)

and if 0hix this becomes:

1

( ) ( ' )I

C C Chi kih hi hi hi kih kih C

i i

T y t y E A t a C

(13)

with 1,1

'k

C C C Cki ki ji ji j i

j

t a a t t

. Similarly, if 1

IC

i hi Ci

T y C

but 1

IR

i hi Ri

T y C

,

the above expressions apply with C replaced by R.

3 Individual Revenue Elasticities

This section considers the tax revenue elasticity, measuring the extent to which tax

revenue increases when gross income increases, at the level of the tax unit.

Consider the effect on tax paid by a tax unit of a small increase in gross income,

arising from changes in each of the sources, which does not take the unit into a higher

tax bracket.8 First, define ( )hi hi

T y T as the total tax paid by the unit.

Furthermore, define h hii

y y as total gross income from all sources.

The change in tax paid by the unit when total gross income changes is given by:

8 It is common not to allow for such transitions when using analytical expressions. However, when

using a simulation approach which actually computes discrete income and tax changes, considerable

care is needed because very large individual values, for a very small number of units, can distort the

aggregate results.

9

1

Ih h hi

ih hi h

dT T y

dy y y

(14)

Hence:

1

Ih h hi h h hi

ih h h hi hi h

y dT y T y y

T dy T y y y

(15)

In general denote the elasticity of A with respect to B using the notation ,A B . Thus:

, , ,1

h h h hi hi h

I

T y T y y yi

(16)

The elasticity of total tax paid by unit h therefore depends on the way in which the

individual components of income change when the unit’s total gross income changes,

determined by ,hi hy y .

Consider the component elasticity ,h hiT y . Here it is not possible to obtain a

component elasticity defined in terms of the revenue from a single source, because

the non-refundable tax credits are related to total income tax rather than its

components. If it were possible to distinguish revenue from each source, as for

example hiT , the elasticity ,h hT y could be expressed as a tax-share ( /hi hT T ) weighted

sum of the product of individual elasticities ,hi hiT y and ,hi hy y .

For those with positive taxable incomes in excess of the tax credits, and supposing

that eligible expenditures and allowances change when income from source q

changes:

1 hq hqhkqh

hq hq hq

E ATt

y y y

(17)

This can be rewritten:

, 1h hq

hq kqh hq hq hqhT y

h hq h hq hq

y t y E AT

T y T y y

(18)

The ratio /h hqT y is the total tax paid by unit h as a proportion of h’s income from

source q, which may be denoted by 'hqATR : the prime is added here as it is not the

averate rate associated with source q. It can thus be interpreted as a kind of average

10

tax rate: if there were no distinction between income sources, it would be a standard

average tax rate. The term /h hqT y is the marginal tax rate, hqMTR , relating to a

change in income source q. The tax revenue elasticity for unit h with respect to a

change in income source q is thus the ratio, / 'hq hqMTR ATR , as in the standard result.

Then it can be seen that:

, , ,h hq hq hq hq hq

kqh hq kqh hq kqh hqT y E y A y

h h h

t y t E t A

T T T

(19)

The term /kqh hq ht E T represents the tax ‘saved’ at the margin from the existence of the

deduction, hqE , expressed as a ratio of total tax paid. Denote this by ,E hq . A similar

term, ,A hq , can be defined relating to allowances. Furthermore, let kqh hqht MITR ,

where the subscript h is included as a reminder that the appropriate marginal rate

depends on the specific situation facing the tax unit. The notation, including ‘I’,

indicates that it is the marginal income tax rate, not the effective marginal tax rate,

/h hqT y . The elasticity can therefore be written:

, , , , ,'h hq hq hq hq hq

hqT y E y E hq A y A hq

hq

MITR

ATR (20)

In the special case where hqE and hqA are fixed, so that , , 0E hq A hq , then of

course hq hq kqMITR MTR t .9

A further complication arises where the tax credits, CC and RC , are not fixed, but

depend on household characteristics. These credits are not connected with individual

income sources, unlike the expenditures and allowances. Suppose instead that the tax

credits depend on total income, hy . The above elasticity is then further reduced by

subtracting the term:

, ,,

1Ch h Rh h

hq h

Ch RhC y C y

h h y y

C C

T T

(21)

9 The treatment of the relationship between allowances and income from each source is slightly

simplified here and in the following subsection. However, as explained in Section 4, the full details are

modelled when obtaining empirical values.

11

Using the above property that , , ,1

h h h hi hi h

I

T y T y y yi

, defining /h h hATR T y as the

overall average tax rate facing the unit, and noting that 1, ,hi h h hiy y y y and, for

example, , , ,a b b c a c ,it can be shown that, for those taxpayers with CC hC T and

RR hC T :

1

, ,

1

h h

hi h hi h hi h Ch h Rh h

Ikih

T yi h

hi hi hi Ch Rhy y E y A y C y C y

h h h h h kih

t

ATR

y E A C C

y y y y y t

(22)

This can also be written as:

1

, ,1

1

h h hi h

hi h hi h Ch h Rh h

Ikih hi

T y y yi h h

Ikih

E y hi A y hi C y Ch C y Rhi h kih

t y

ATR y

tE A C C

T t

(23)

If there were only one income source, then ,/ 1hi hhi h y yy y and the first term

above would be simply the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate facing

the unit: this is the standard expression for the revenue elasticity. The second term

shows the modifications arising from the eligible expenditures and allowances, which

are involved in the transformation from gross to taxable income, and the central and

regional tax credits. Special cases of this result apply for situations where tax credits

are greater or equal than the tax liability after the application of the tax schedule.

3.1 Illustrative Examples

This subsection illustrates the way in which the tax revenue elasticity varies for

individuals in Spain. Following the Spanish tax code operating in 2007, attention is

concentrated on just two sources of income and on the effects of varying eligible

expenditures, allowances and tax credits as gross income increases. The first income

source includes: labour income; alimony; self employment income; income from

property and income applications to shareholders coming from Corporations under

the fiscal transparency regime (similar to S-Corporations in the USA). The second

12

income source includes: capital gains and any form of income derived from financial

savings such as interest rates from bank accounts and deposits, share dividends, bond

interest or any other type of yield earned from debt saving instruments. Incomes

include both monetary compensations and fringe benefits.

The allowable tax deductions, E , are income related specific deductions which

generally include a shortlist of necessary expenditures incurred in order to earn the

relevant income. Good examples of this are the employee Social Security

contributions and union membership fees for labour income, loan interest payments,

maintenance costs or economic depreciation in the case of property income, or a

restricted list of some operating expenses from savings or entrepreneurship. Together

with this, E entails the existence of a fixed labour-specific tax deduction of 4,000 €

for earnings less than or equal to 9,000 €. Notwithstanding, this tax deduction turns

out to be income-decreasing for earnings between 9,000 € and 13,000 € and

becoming fixed again at a reduced amount of 2,600 € for earnings of 13,000 € and

above.

Allowances, A , incorporate non-specific tax allowances and deductions. This

includes paid palimony, contributions to Pension Schemes and personal and family

allowances. Examples of the latter are the allowances recognized for special

circumstances such as age, disability or the existence of dependants (ancestors and/or

descendants). These non-specific income allowances are normally capped and

present some limitations for its application in terms of the taxpayer’s income level

and type of income. Finally, tax credits include all non-refundable tax relief enjoyed

by the taxpayers in order to compute the final tax due after applying the tax

schedules. For a detailed description of the specific quantities applied in year 2007

see Agencia Tributaria (2008), and for an evolution of all these concepts through

time in the Spanish case, see Romero and Sanz-Sanz (2007).

The marginal rates and thresholds for the first income source are shown in Table 1.

For the second source, tax is paid at fixed central and regional (marginal and average)

rates of 0.111 and 0.069.

13

Table 1 Tax Structure for Income Source 1

Income Threshold (€s)

Central Govt MTR

Regional Govt MTR

Total MTR

0 0.1566 0.0834 0.24 17,360 0.1827 0.0973 0.28 32,360 0.2414 0.1286 0.37 52,360 0.2713 0.1587 0.43

Four different cases, for parameters listed in Table 2, are illustrated. In each case a

fixed ratio of income from the two sources is assumed, whereby source two is 10 per

cent of source one. Case 1 takes the (unrealistic) extreme of fixed eligible expenses,

allowances and credits. The following cases gradually introduce elasticities, assumed

to be constant, so that Case 4 allows all deductions and credits to vary as income

varies. For example, in obtaining the values of expenditures, and so on, the following

specification was thus used:

,

0E yi i

hi hiE E y (24)

The various elasticities, such as ,i iE y , are referred to here as ‘ancillary elasticities’,

and their estimation for Spain is described in the following Section, with values

reported in Appendix D. For estimation purposes, a major aim was to allow for as

much population heterogeneity as possible. For present illustrative purposes the

parameters in Table 2 are imposed, based on orders of magnitude obtained for the

estimates.

14

Table 2 Alternative Parameters for Four Cases

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Source 1 E0 3500 98 98 98 Elasticity 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 A0 5000 5000 7000 7000 Elasticity 0 0 0.005 0.005 Source 2 E0 35 0.3 0.3 0.3 Elasticity 0 0.8 0.8 0.8 A0 5000 5000 4750 4750 Elasticity 0 0 0.05 0.05 Credits CC0 1200 1200 1200 800 Elasticity 0 0 0 0.05 CR0 550 550 550 13 Elasticity 0 0 0 0.4

The resulting variations in individual revenue elasticities are shown in Figures 1 to 4.

Clearly the highest elasticity values are obtained when expenditures, deductions and

credits are fixed. Tax unit elasticities can become extremely high where income is

just above the tax threshold where units begin to pay tax: in the limit – right at the

threshold – the elasticity is of course infinitely high because the denominator (the

initial tax paid) is zero. This property influences the distribution of elasticities

discussed in the following Section.

From Figure 1, no tax is paid until total income reaches approximately 16,775 €,

when income from the first source becomes subject to the regional government rate

of 0.0834 and income from the second source is taxed at the regional government rate

of 0.069. At these levels, just above the threshold when the individual begins to pay

tax, the revenue elasticity is very high. It then falls, until a total income of about

17,875 € is reached. At this point, the individual’s incomes from both sources are

taxed at both the central government and regional rates, so that the marginal tax rates

applying to sources one and two are 0.24 and 0.18 respectively. On crossing into the

higher marginal tax rate brackets, the revenue elasticity shoots up again, after which

it declines steadily until reaching the next threshold.

When total income is about 28600 €, the marginal tax rate applied to income from the

first source becomes 0.28 (the combined central and regional rates), and a smaller

15

jump in the revenue elasticity is observed. The next income threshold is about 45,100

€ when income from the first source begins to be taxed at a combined rate of 0.37.

The effect is that the pattern of revenue elasticities displays the familiar ‘saw tooth’

pattern.

Figure 1 Variation in Individual Revenue Elasticity with Total Gross

Income: Case 1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

110

0

385

0

660

0

935

0

121

00

148

50

176

00

203

50

231

00

258

50

286

00

313

50

341

00

368

50

396

00

423

50

451

00

478

50

506

00

533

50

561

00

588

50

y

η


Income: Case 2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

11

00

38

50

66

00

93

50

12

10

0

14

85

0

17

60

0

20

35

0

23

10

0

25

85

0

28

60

0

31

35

0

34

10

0

36

85

0

39

60

0

42

35

0

45

10

0

47

85

0

50

60

0

53

35

0

56

10

0

58

85

0

y

η

16

Case 2, where positive ancillary elasticities are introduced for eligible expenditures,

the pattern is similar to that for Case 1, although of course the effective income

thresholds are different. Thus initially only regional government taxes are paid in

relation to both income sources, then another threshold is reached where central

government tax rates are also applied. The individual then gradually moves into the

higher tax brackets relating to the first income source. Similar characteristics apply

when, in Case 3, ancillary elasticities for allowances are also positive.


Income: Case 3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

110

0

385

0

660

0

935

0

121

00

148

50

176

00

203

50

231

00

258

50

286

00

313

50

341

00

368

50

396

00

423

50

451

00

478

50

506

00

533

50

561

00

588

50

y

η


Income: Case 4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1100

3850

6600

9350

1210

0

1485

0

1760

0

2035

0

2310

0

2585

0

2860

0

3135

0

3410

0

3685

0

3960

0

4235

0

4510

0

4785

0

5060

0

5335

0

5610

0

5885

0

y

η

17

Case 4, where all ancillary elasticities are positive, gives rise to a slightly different

pattern. In this case the income level, of about 23,375 €, at which the individual

begins to pay tax involves paying only the central government rates of 0.1566 and

0.111 for the first and second income source respectively. Very soon after this, at the

level of 23,650 €, the individual pays tax on both income sources at the combined

central and regional rates of 0.24 and 0.18 for the two sources. A kink, or ‘tooth’

arises in the revenue elasticity curve at the income of 34,100 €, when income source

one attracts the higher combined marginal tax rate of 0.28. Then at 51,700 €, the

individual moves into the next tax bracket for this source, with a marginal rate of

0.37. Movement to the top marginal tax bracket is not shown in the diagram.

4 Empirical Estimates

This section presents estimated values of the individual revenue elasticity as defined

in equation (23). Results were obtained using the Personal Income Tax information

reported for a sample of 896,390 Spanish tax units. The original dataset comes from a

cross-sectional dataset from the Spanish Tax Agency for year 2002. The data were

adjusted to tax year 2007 and the simulated personal income tax is the one that came

into force in January 2007.

The first step was to compute the ancillary elasticities relating to the variation in

expenditures and allowances. An important priority was to allow for as much

heterogeneity as possible. For each of the 15 Autonomous Communities, the sample

was split into subsamples according to 5 quantiles of total gross income, and within

each quantile by the size of the tax unit. In the latter case three categories were used

consisting of: one member; two members; and three or more members. Therefore, the

total sample was divided into 225 subsamples (15 5 3 ), and for each of these 225

subsamples the ancillary elasticities were obtained by running the following Tobit

regression (where the sampling weight of each tax unit was taken into account):

,log log logh z y h hz y Q (25)

Where z is the relevant variable for which the constant elasticity, ,z y , with respect to

total gross income is required (that is, 1 2 1 2 1, , , , , andC Ry y E E A C C ), and the matrix Q

represents a set of dummy variables capturing the type of tax-return (joint or separate

18

filing), marital status (four categories) and type of main source of income (three

categories).

As a consequence of the procedure described above 1,575 estimations were run

(seven ancillary elasticities for each of the 225 subgroups). The tables in Appendix D

report the ancillary elasticities for each region according to the quantile and the size

of the tax unit. These Tables report the required elasticities as long as they are

statistically significant at a significance level of 5 per cent – otherwise a zero is

reported.

For the case of 2 hA y the procedure was slightly different, as follows. The values of

2A are positive only if the magnitude of 1A has not been entirely absorbed by the

first income source 1y . In those cases, the excess of 1A can be transferred as an

allowance to reduce the second source of income 2y . Thus 2A is positive only for

tax units for whom 1y is sufficiently small not to absorb all its entitled 1A . In other

words, tax units which are rich in income from source 1 will not enjoy any transfer

and as a result they will have 02 A . This fact is confirmed by the basic data as can

be seen in the tables reported in Appendix D, which report the magnitude of 2A by

quantiles of 1y .

As a result, the ancillary elasticity 2 hA y was calculated following the same procedure

as for the other ancillary elasticities, but using the quintiles of 1y instead of hy .

Specifically, 2A exists only for the first two quintiles of 1y and mainly in the first

one, so that the elasticity is reported in greater detailed for the first quintile (divided

into three household sizes) whereas the rest of the tabulated quintiles are taken

together without discriminating by household size. As can be seen, 2 hA y is zero for

the last 4 quintiles of 1y and negative for the first quintile regardless of household

size and region. There are three exceptions: Andalucia; Castilla y León; and Cataluña

present a strong positive elasticity for the second quintile.

19

To compute the remaining terms in equation (23) for each tax unit, the 2007 tax

structure was applied to each tax unit in the sample. For each tax unit the appropriate

values of 1y , 2y , ty , 1A , 2A , CC , rC and the marginal tax rates levied on each

income source, kiht , as well as the weighted total marginal tax rate, 1 21 2k h k h

h h

y yt t

y y ,

and the average tax rate ( ATR ). The last segment of Appendix C reports some basic

statistics for relevant variables, both for the whole country and for each of the

Autonomous Communities (regions).

All the ingredients of hh yT were thus available for each tax unit, and Summary

measures of the distribution of individual elasticities are reported in Table 3 for each

region.

Table 3 Quartiles of Individual Revenue Elasticities by Region and for The

Whole Country

Lower quartile Median Upper quartile

National 1.1214 1.4082 1.7761 Andalucia 0.9673 1.3004 1.6172 Aragon 1.1128 1.3819 1.8037 Asturias 1.1414 1.4731 1.9418 Baleares 1.0127 1.3865 1.9085 Canarias 1.0207 1.3504 1.7578 Cantabria 1.2341 1.5071 1.8395 Castilla-Leon 1.0710 1.3829 1.7248 Castilla-LaMancha 1.0553 1.3905 1.7490 Cataluña 1.1874 1.3660 1.6667 Valencia 1.0806 1.3706 1.8863 Extremadura 0.9384 1.3016 1.6013 Galicia 0.9480 1.3297 1.8183 Madrid 1.2896 1.5507 1.8279 Murcia 1.1164 1.4429 1.9578 Rioja 1.1214 1.4082 1.7761

The distribution of individual revenue elasticities is of course highly skewed because

those individuals who are just above an income threshold have very high revenue

elasticities, as discussed in the previous Section.

20

Further details regarding the distribution of individual elasticities can be illustrated

using ‘box plots’, as in Figures 5 to 7, which provide a graphical representation of the

main characteristics of a given distribution. A box plot is formed by a box, two

‘whiskers’ and two ‘fences’, as follows. The right border of the box is the upper

quartile; the left border is the lower quartile; and the line inside the box is the median.

Hence the width of the box shows the inter-quartile range. The whiskers are the two

horizontal lines to the left and right of the box which end in two vertical lines known

as the fences. The right fence shows the highest value of the distribution that is

smaller than or equal to the third quartile plus 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. The

left fence shows the lowest value of the distribution that is greater than or equal to the

first quartile minus 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. The box therefore indicates the

dispersion and the skewness of the distribution.

Figure 5 Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Income Quintile and Size

of Tax Unit: All Regions

-4 -2 0 2 4

5th

4th3rd

2nd 1st

total gross income

Revenue Elasticity Range

all taxpayersBY INCOME QUINTILES

-100 -50 0 5th

4th3rd

2nd

1st

total gross income


taxpayers with positive tax liabilityBY INCOME QUINTILES

-1 0 1 2 3

More

Two One

tax unit size


all taxpayersBY SIZE OF TAX UNIT

0 1 2

More

Two

One

tax unit size


taxpayers with positive tax liabilityBY SIZE OF TAX UNIT

21

Figure 6 Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Main Income and Marital

Status: All Regions

-2 0 2 4

Entr.

Cap.

Lab.

Typ

e m

ain

inco

me


all taxpayersBY TYPE OF MAIN INCOME

0 1 2 3 4

Entr.

Cap.

Lab.

Typ

e m

ain

inco

me


taxpayers with positive tax liabilityBY TYPE OF MAIN INCOME

-2 0 2 4

Wid.

Div.

Marr.

Sing.

Ma

rita

l sta

tus


all taxpayersBY MARITAL STATUS

0 1 2 3 4

Wid.

Div.

Marr.

Sing.

Ma

rita

l sta

tus


taxpayers with positive tax liabilityBY MARITAL STATUS

Figure 7 Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Autonomous Community

in Common Territory

-2 0 2 4

Rioja

Murcia

Madrid

Galicia

Extremadura

Comunidad Valenciana

Cataluña

Castilla-La Mancha

Castilla y Leon

Cantabria

Canarias

Baleares

Asturias

Aragon

Andalucia


all taxpayersBY REGION

0 1 2 3 4

Rioja

Murcia

Madrid

Galicia

Extremadura

Comunidad Valenciana

Cataluña

Castilla-La Mancha

Castilla y Leon

Cantabria

Canarias

Baleares

Asturias

Aragon

Andalucia


taxpayers with positive tax liabilityBY REGION

22

The boxes on the left hand side of each figure refer to all tax units, and thus include

all those with a zero tax liability. When the elasticities are classified by income

quintiles, it can be seen that there are nurerous negative elasticities, many of which

are large in absolute terms. These negative elasticities are associated mainly with tax

units who pay small amounts of personal income tax but have low incomes and

ancillary elasticities which are greater than unity; thus (some of) the eligible

expenditures, allowances and tax credits increase by more than gross income. The

dispersion is substantially affected by whether all tax units are included, or whether

attention is restricted to those who pay positive amounts of personal income tax.

There is little variation in the dispersion of individual revenue elasticities, classified

by tax unit size. Those whose main source of income is entrepreneurial income have

a lower dispersion when only taxpayers are included, compared with the population

of all tax units. This result is affected by the great ability of such tax units to claim

substantial amounts of eligible expenditure and allowances.

4.1 The Aggregate Revenue Elasticity

Consider next the aggregate tax revenue elasticity, over H tax units. Define

1

H

hh

Y y

and 1

H

hh

T T

as aggregate income and tax revenue respectively. Then:

1

Hh h h h

h h h h

dT Y T y y Y T

dY T y T Y y T

(26)

and:

, , ,1

h h h

Hh

T Y T y y Yh

T

T

(27)

The elasticity of aggregate revenue with respect to aggregate income is thus a tax-

share weighted average of the product of individual revenue elasticities and the

elasticity of individual income with respect to total income. Hence it depends not

only the tax structure but on the extent to which individual incomes change when

aggregate income changes. And, as shown above, the individual revenue elasticities

depend on the extent to which the components of individuals’ incomes change as

each individual’s income changes.

23

In order to show the relevance of taking into account the schedular design of the tax

as well as the rules that affect the definition of the taxable income and the final tax

due, it is of interest to consider alternative measures of the aggregate revenue

elasticity. Allowing for progressively more flexibility or endogeneity of deductions

and allowances, the following terms are used for the individual elasticities:

11

Ikih hi

hi h h

t y

ATR y

(28)

21

hi h

Ikih hi

h y yi h h

t y

ATR y

(29)

31 1

hi h hi h hi h

I Ikih hi kih

h y y E y hi A y hii ih h h

t y tE A

ATR y T

(30)

Along with (23), which gives, say, 4h .

Table 4 Aggregate Revenue Elasticities: , 1hy Y

1 2 3 4

National 2.0732 2.1010 1.6238 1.3516 Andalucía 2.2403 2.2444 1.6813 1.2231 Aragón 2.1577 2.0983 1.5823 1.3266 Asturias 2.1926 2.2358 1.7334 1.4369 Baleares 2.0425 2.0047 1.5878 1.3282 Canarias 2.1566 2.1250 1.6885 1.3235 Cantabria 2.1645 2.1011 1.5900 1.3164 Castilla-León 2.2493 2.2275 1.5390 1.2051 Castilla-La Mancha 2.3570 2.3310 1.7721 1.2842 Cataluña 1.9944 1.9501 1.5615 1.3668 Valencia 2.1714 2.1569 1.6281 1.3026 Extremadura 2.3600 2.2622 1.6661 1.0762 Galicia 2.1924 2.1721 1.6028 1.1985 Madrid 1.8614 2.0515 1.6300 1.5057 Murcia 2.2954 2.2725 1.8047 1.3189 Rioja 2.1905 2.1212 1.6275 1.3665

24

In obtaining results reported here, the assumption was made that ,hy Y is unity; that

is, all incomes move in the same proportion.The resulting aggregate elasticities are

shown in Table 4. The elasticity 1 assumes not only that all deductions and credits

are fixed irrespective of income, but that the two sources of income remain in fixed

proportions for all individuals. The second elasticity, 2 , uses information about the

(cross-sectional) variation in income proportions to attribute an elasticity ,hi hy y to

each tax unit’s income source. This has a relatively small effect on the revenue

elasticity estimates. Larger effects are observed where eligible expenditures and

deductions, and then tax credits, vary with tax unit income: in each case the

aggregate revenue elasticity falls when the ancillary elasticities are used.

The revenue elasticities in the final column of Table 4 vary from just over 1.0 to

about 1.5. The variation across regions arises from regional differences in gross

incomes, since all regions face similar tax structures.

In general, the aggregate values are similar to those reported for a number of other

countries. On the US, see Fries et al. (1982), Dye and McGuire (1991) and

Ram(1991). UK results are reported in Johnson and Lambert (1989) and Creedy and

Gemmell (2004a, 2006, pp. 113). Canadian estimates are given by King and

McMorran (2002)10, and for New Zealand see Creedy and Gemmell (2004b, 2006,

p.171). Lower elasticities of around 1, using time series methods, are given for

Turkey by Kuştepeli and Şapçi (2006).

In considering the revenue elasticities reported above, it should be remembered that

they relate to revenue changes associated with changes in gross incomes. Many

empirical studies actually begin not from gross income but from taxable income; that

is, measured income has already been adjusted for eligible expenditures and

allowances, so that the tax function can be applied directly as a function of taxable

income.

10 They found a large variation between 1994 and 1998 of between 1.8 and 2.9, but judged the

‘underlying’ value to be 1.4. For medium term revenue forecasting, they proposed values in the range

1 to 1.3.

25

In the case of a single income source, where x and y are, as above, taxable and gross

income, and tax paid is T x y , then the revenue elasticity is , , ,T y T x x y .

Furthermore, writing x y D , where D refers to all allowances and deductions, it

can be shown that:

1

, ,1 1x y D y

D D

y y

(31)

Where ,D y is the elasticity of deductions with respect to gross income. It is clear

from (33) that if , 1D y , then , 1x y and the revenue elasticity with respect to

gross income exceeds the revenue elasticity with respect to taxable income.

In the following Section, which turns to the modelling of aggregate tax revenue, it is

shown that a large simplification is possible when taking taxable income as the basis.

4.2 Income Dynamics

The above estimates, in common with most studies, are obtained on the assumption

that all incomes move together, so that ,hy Y is equal to unity. In the absence of direct

information on the dynamic process of relative income changes from year to year, it

is possible to consider the sensitivity of results to an assumed degree of regression

towards, or away from, the geometric mean. Following Creedy and Gemmell (2006),

suppose income dynamics can be described by the relationship:

, 1 1 log loghy Y hy E y (32)

where logE y is the mean log-income, or equivalently the logarithm of geometric

mean income. The coefficient, , therefore governs systematic movements within

the income distribution. If 1 there are systematic equalising relative movements

whereby those below the geometric mean income experience relative larger increases

than those above the geometric mean, when total income increases. A value of 1

implies systematic disequalising income movements.

The effects on aggregate revenue elasticities of differential income changes are

shown in Tables 5 and 6, which may be compared with Table 4.

26

Table 5 Aggregate Elasticities: 0.9

1 2 3 4

National 1.9480 1.9712 1.5054 1.2198 Andalucia 2.1274 2.1296 1.5763 1.0999 Aragon 2.0504 1.9930 1.4908 1.2216 Asturias 2.0856 2.1240 1.6314 1.3162 Baleares 1.9115 1.8804 1.4735 1.1989 Canarias 2.0382 2.0046 1.5786 1.2075 Cantabria 2.0536 1.9801 1.4814 1.1933 Castilla-Leon 2.1476 2.1293 1.4575 1.1062 Castilla-LaMancha 2.2517 2.2303 1.6850 1.1769 Cataluña 1.8706 1.8327 1.4545 1.2495 Valencia 2.0523 2.0371 1.5170 1.1748 Extremadura 2.2580 2.1673 1.5848 0.9714 Galicia 2.0775 2.0660 1.5045 1.0815 Madrid 1.7203 1.8873 1.4778 1.3467 Murcia 2.1804 2.1536 1.6966 1.1882 Rioja 2.0842 2.0290 1.5471 1.2705

Table 6 Aggregate Elasticities: 1.1

1 2 3 4

Nacional 2.1984 2.2309 1.7422 1.4834 Andalucia 2.3532 2.3593 1.7862 1.3462 Aragon 2.2650 2.2037 1.6737 1.4317 Asturias 2.2995 2.3477 1.8353 1.5577 Baleares 2.1735 2.1290 1.7022 1.4575 Canarias 2.2750 2.2455 1.7985 1.4396 Cantabria 2.2755 2.2222 1.6986 1.4395 Castilla-Leon 2.3510 2.3257 1.6205 1.3040 Castilla-LaMancha 2.4623 2.4318 1.8592 1.3914 Cataluña 2.1181 2.0675 1.6686 1.4841 Valencia 2.2905 2.2766 1.7392 1.4305 Extremadura 2.4620 2.3570 1.7474 1.1810 Galicia 2.3074 2.2783 1.7011 1.3154 Madrid 2.0024 2.2157 1.7822 1.6647 Murcia 2.4103 2.3914 1.9128 1.4496 Rioja 2.2968 2.2134 1.7080 1.4625

27

Further detail of the effect of income dynamics can be seen in Figure 4, for the case

of the national aggregate revenue elasticity. It can be seen that the elasticity varies

linearly with .

Figure 8 Variation in Aggregate National Elasticity as Varies

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2

Beta

Ela

stic

ity

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2

Beta

Ela

stic

ity

The increase in the revenue elasticity as increases is associated with the resulting

rise in income inequality as those below the geometric mean experience relatively

smaller percentage income increases. The larger proportion of the population just

above the lower income thresholds implies an increase in the number of tax units

having larger revenue elasticities. The decline in the elasticities associated with the

higher income groups is relatively small, as can be seen from the shapes of the

elasticity profiles shown above. Hence, in aggregate the revenue elasticity increases

with .

The linearity of the schedule in Figure 8 can be seen by substituting (31) into (27),

whereby:

, , ,1 1

1 log logh h h h

H Hh h

T Y T y T y hh h

T Ty E y

T T

(33)

Although no direct evidence is available here, it is unlikely that deviates far from

unity. For example, a value of 0.9 would be considered low, implying for

28

example that if total income were to increase by 10 per cent, the lower quartile would

increase by about 14 per cent whereas the upper quartile would increase by only

about 3 per cent. This implies considerable ‘regression towards the (geometric)

mean’.11

5 Total Tax Revenue

This section turns to modelling aggregate tax revenue and its components. First, it is

shown that in view of the complexity of the Spanish tax structure, it is not possible to

express total revenue as a convenient function of proportions of people and

proportions of total income within the tax brackets, or adjacent gross income

thresholds. However, further progress can be made by taking taxable income as the

basic distribution.

5.1 Aggregation over Individuals

Total revenue, T , is made up of revenue from the three categories discussed in

subsection 2.2. Suppose there are C Rn units for whom 1

IC

i hi Ci

T y C

and

1

IR

i hi Ri

T y C

, with Cn units for whom 1

IC

i hi Ci

T y C

but 1

IR

i hi Ri

T y C

,

and a further Rn for whom 1

IC

i hi Ci

T y C

but 1

IR

i hi Ri

T y C

. Total tax revenue

is thus expressed as:

1

1 1

C R

C R

IC R

i hi i hih n i

I IC R

i hi i hih n i h n i

C R C C C R R R

T T y T y

T y T y

n n C n n C

(34)

Given the existence of the different income sources and the application of the non-

refundable tax credits to total income tax liability at central and regional levels

(rather than applying to each source), and the existence of different tax structures for

11 Random variations in proportional income changes, in addition to the systematic regression, can – if

sufficiently large – lead to an increase in overall inequality; see Creedy (1985).

29

different income sources, the above expression for total revenue cannot be reduced to

a convenient expression in terms of characteristics of the distributions of component

gross income sources.

However, further progress can be made by considering as the starting point, instead

of the distribution of gross income, the distribution of taxable income, x. Indeed, as

discussed in subsection 4.1, many studies of revenue elasticities take this variable as

the ‘given’ distribution and define the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to

changes in taxable income rather than gross income. For the C Rn taxpayers whose

central and regional tax exceeds the relevant credits, equations (10) and (11) can be

used to write their tax as:

1,1 1 1

( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ihkI

hi kih hi hi hi ji ji j i R Ci i j

T y t y E A a t t C C

(35)

which becomes:

1

( ) ( )I

kih hi jih R Ci

T Y t x a C C

(36)

where 1,1

1( )

ihk

jih ji ji j ijkih

a a t tt

. If there are N taxpayers (that is, whose tax liability

is positive, so that C R R CN n n n ), the total revenue can be expressed as:

1 1

( ) ( ) ( )N I

kih hi jih R Ch i

T Y t x a N C C

(37)

Where, as above, hix is the taxable income for income source i for tax unit h (that is,

hihihihi AEyx ). The terms CC and RC denote the appropriate average value

defined over taxpayers, remembering the tax schedule asymmetry whereby tax must

be positive. The first term in (37) can be rewritten as:

1 1

( )I N

kih hi jihi h

t x a

(38)

In the case of a single source of income, with a multi-step function, the tax per person

can be expressed in terms of summary information about the distribution of taxable

income, which determines the proportion of tax units falling into the various marginal

30

tax rate groups.12 For example, suppose that F x denotes the distribution function

of taxable income, x>0. Tax per unit is thus:

1

1

'k

k

K a

k kak

t x a dF x

(39)

Define 1F x as the first-moment distribution function, that is the proportion of total

income of units below x, and introduce the general term kG a , defined as:

1 1 1 1

'kk k k k k

aG a F a F a F a F a

x (40)

The first term in curly brackets gives the proportion of total income between adjacent

thresholds, and the second term in curly brackets is the number of tax units between

those thresholds. The expression in (40) can also be written as:

1 1 11

1

'k k kk k k

k k

F a F a aG a F a F a

F a F a x

(41)

The first term inside the square brackets of (41) is the slope of the Lorenz curve of

the relevant distribution of income, between the two points associated with adjacent

income tax thresholds. The Lorenz curve has a slope of 45 degrees at the arithmetic

mean; that is,

1 1dF x

dF x . The second term in the square brackets is simply the

ratio of the ‘effective’ threshold to arithmetic mean income. And of course the term

in curly brackets in (41) is the proportion of people within the tax bracket.

Total revenue per person is thus:

1

K

k kk

x t G a (42)

Hence, for the case of several income sources, each with its own tax schedule, total

tax revenue over all individuals and sources becomes:

1 1

( ) ( )i

i i

i

KI

i k i k R Ci k

T Y N x t G a N C C

(43)

12 For further discussion, see Creedy and Gemmell (2006).

31

The first term in equation (43) can usefully be written in vector notation. Define the

column vectors:

1

2

.

i i

i ii

i Ki

G a

G aG

G a

(44)

and:

1

2

.

i

ii

Ki

t

tt

t

(45)

Then, if a prime indicates that the vector is written as a row vector:

1

'i

i i i

i

K

k k k i ik

t G a t G

(46)

These values may be placed in a column vector, denoted 't G . Then if x represents

a column vector whose ith element consists of the arithmetic mean, ix , then:

1 1

' 'i

i i i

i

KI

i k k ki k

N x t G a Nx t G

(47)

where, as before, a prime indicates transposition. This allows the effects of tax and

income distribution changes to be easily examined.

5.2 Empirical Application

This subsection reports the values of the various terms involved in obtaining total tax

revenue, derived in the previous subsection. First, Table 7 gives, for each region and

for all regions combined, the number of individuals who pay positive amounts of tax,

along with the arithmetic means of the two income sources. The final two columns of

Table 7 show the arithmetic means of the central and regional tax credits, which

together give the last term in equation (43). There are clearly substantial differences

in arithmetic mean incomes among regions.

32

Table 7 Number of Taxpayers (with positive tax) and Arithmetic Means of

Taxable Incomes and Tax Credits (€s)

N 1x 2x CC RC

National 12,229,939 20,816.74 2,220.59 1,228.84 646.27 Andalucía 1,772,425 19,148.92 1,686.22 1,254.13 660.46 Aragón 480,016 19,239.42 2,338.24 1,190.27 626.56 Asturias 362,701 19,894.59 1,648.66 1,203.68 634.44 Baleares 311,943 20,006.38 2,313.47 1,176.61 619.04 Canarias 472,742 20,330.13 1,439.27 1,259.68 661.04 Cantabria 181,796 19,546.91 2,287.14 1,220.81 642.94 Castilla-León 790,965 18,619.11 1,889.49 1,208.71 636.20 Castilla-La Mancha 469,160 17,565.85 1,563.90 1,216.59 640.83 Cataluña 2,473,158 22,266.55 2,506.11 1,225.06 643.65 Valencia 1,391,005 18,720.08 2,278.14 1,197.66 630.46 Extremadura 244,384 17,149.91 1,378.86 1,190.61 628.12 Galicia 730,355 18,520.83 1,763.29 1,161.04 612.92 Madrid 2,131,743 25,885.79 3,096.36 1,279.47 670.80 Murcia 309,242 18,780.95 1,729.87 1,271.32 669.52 Rioja 108,306 18,529.28 2,540.61 1,212.06 637.13

The expression for aggregate revenue in each region requires the various proportions

of people and proportions of income at each of the tax thresholds. This is simple for

the second source of income, since the tax function is linear. For the first income

source, Tables 8 and 9 report values of the first moment distribution, and the

distribution function, respectively for the required income thresholds. These two

tables thus together give three points along the Lorenz curve of the first source of

income in each region. For example, for all regions combined there are

approximately five per cent of tax units (those paying positive tax) above the top

threshold for income source 1, and they are responsible for about 20 per cent of total

income from that source. However, for Madrid, eight per cent of positive taxpayers

are above the top threshold, and they are responsible for about 30 per cent of total

income from source 1.

33

Table 8 Proportions of Total Taxable Income Below Thresholds (First

Income Source)

1 2F a 1 3F a 1 4F a

National 0.29019 0.63216 0.80771 Andalucía 0.33006 0.69497 0.85926 Aragón 0.32503 0.69809 0.86190 Asturias 0.31424 0.70250 0.86856 Baleares 0.32095 0.62923 0.80426 Canarias 0.29832 0.63865 0.82860 Cantabria 0.32786 0.68411 0.85049 Castilla-León 0.34005 0.71888 0.88787 Castilla-La Mancha 0.38301 0.73908 0.89074 Cataluña 0.25939 0.59872 0.77946 Valencia 0.34565 0.68570 0.84315 Extremadura 0.39003 0.74727 0.89608 Galicia 0.34662 0.69615 0.86208 Madrid 0.19713 0.50417 0.70211 Murcia 0.34329 0.69763 0.86529 Rioja 0.36322 0.70585 0.87476

All that is required to obtain the values of G are the values of the effective tax

thresholds, 'ka . For central and regional rates combined, the relevant values are

2,480; 9,748.11 and 15,693.95. The resulting values of G are given in Table 10. From

the analytical results derived above, for any tax bracket, multiplying G by the

relevant tax rate gives the ratio of tax raised by the bracket per capita to the total

income per capita. As the tax rates are common across regions, comparisons of the

extent of revenue within each region, arising from income source 1, can be made by

moving down the columns. The table shows the relative importance of the top tax

bracket in Madrid, and the unimportance of the bottom tax bracket, compared with

other regions.13 Finally total tax revenue is reported in Table 11.

13 Separate values of G for Central and Regional tax schedules are shown in Appendix C.

34

Table 9 Proportions of Taxpayers below Thresholds (First Income Source)

2F a 3F a 4F a

National 0.56074 0.86344 0.95491 Andalucía 0.59035 0.88808 0.96763 Aragón 0.58030 0.88792 0.96704 Asturias 0.55800 0.88570 0.96864 Baleares 0.60398 0.86906 0.95701 Canarias 0.57119 0.86188 0.95896 Cantabria 0.58835 0.88265 0.96492 Castilla-León 0.59488 0.89430 0.97353 Castilla-La Mancha 0.64104 0.90839 0.97528 Cataluña 0.52079 0.84388 0.94432 Valencia 0.61925 0.89186 0.96510 Extremadura 0.65168 0.91198 0.97600 Galicia 0.61687 0.89160 0.96861 Madrid 0.45962 0.79380 0.92136 Murcia 0.60652 0.89010 0.96956 Rioja 0.62178 0.89268 0.97164

Table 10 Values of G for each Tax Threshold (First Income Source

According to Total Tax Schedule)

1G a 2G a 3G a 4G a


35

Table 11 Estimated Total Tax Revenue (€s)

Total Revenue Central Government.

Regional Government.

National 51,148,217,111 33,061,697,229 18,086,519,880 Andalucía 6,155,788,630 3,972,274,107 2,183,514,522 Aragón 1,776,894,526 1,145,725,113 631,169,413 Asturias 1,352,992,058 874,123,198 478,868,860 Baleares 1,271,754,868 818,791,512 452,963,356 Canarias 1,810,355,523 1,167,961,396 642,394,127 Cantabria 683,181,263 440,400,756 242,780,507 Castilla-León 2,672,907,005 1,725,380,941 947,526,063 Castilla-La Mancha 1,410,927,079 910,996,715 499,930,364 Cataluña 11,679,310,225 7,520,720,015 4,158,590,210 Valencia 4,981,828,923 3,209,163,568 1,772,665,355 Extremadura 705,599,802 456,083,010 249,516,793 Galicia 2,521,071,133 1,627,923,016 893,148,116 Madrid 12,712,845,321 8,281,203,401 4,431,641,920 Murcia 1,034,493,203 667,339,810 367,153,393 Rioja 378,267,552 243,610,671 134,656,881

For example, for all regions combined, the total income tax revenue, gross of the tax

credits, is given from (47) by the total number of positive taxpayers multiplied by the

term (where values for G are rounded to two decimal places for convenience):

0.29

0.310.24 0.28 0.37 0.43

20,816 2, 220 0.13

0.16

0.18

(48)

When the total amount of tax credits per (positive) taxpayer, of 1,228+646, is

deducted from this result, the net tax per capita is obtained. Multiplying this value by

the total number of taxpayers gives the value in the first row of Table 11.14 Results

are obtained for the regions simply by changing the vector of arithmetic mean

14 As a useful check on the programming of the calculations, aggregate revenue was obtained both

using the formulae and by simply adding all the individual tax unit amounts, giving exactly the same

results.

36

incomes and the vector of G values in (48), and then using the appropriate values of

N and the average tax credits.

The effects on gross tax revenue of changes in the average income from the second

source, or changes in the relative dispersion of income from the first source (which

changes the Lorenz curve and thus the G values), or changes in the marginal tax rate

structure, are thus easily examined using modifications to expressions of the form

shown in (48). For example, elimination of the top marginal income tax bracket

simply means that the row vector of tax rates has only three elements and the column

vector of G values is reduced to three elements with the third element replaced by

0.29.

Changes in the tax thresholds have the effect of changing the G values. Hence a

‘ready reckoner’ could be produced by replacing Tables 8 and 9 by larger tables

giving values of the distribution function and first moment distribution function for a

range of income levels. The introduction of additional tax brackets for the second

income source could be accommodated by producing similar tables for that source.

The effects of change in the distribution of income within a region can be examined

using the same kind of summary information. For example, if mean income

increases, whereby incomes in a region are assumed to increase by the same

proportion, this is equivalent to a reduction in the tax thresholds, so that information

about the Lorenz curve (the F and 1F values) can be used to obtain the appropriate G

value. A change in inequality can be accommodated by specifying the way in which

the Lorenz curve for the region changes.

The difficulty of dealing with the central and regional tax credits and thus aggregate

net income tax revenue remains, as an analytical expression for aggregate credits has

not been obtained.

As suggested above, the effects of changing only the tax rates are easily examined in

this framework, as only the vector of marginal rates needs to be altered in expressions

corresponding to (48). For example, the previous discussion has not allowed for the

37

small change in the tax rate structure in Madrid in 2007, making it unique among the

Spanish regions. The income thresholds for the first income source are the same as in

Table 1 above, and the central government rates are the same, but the marginal tax

rates for Madrid became 0.0794, 0.0943, 0.1266 and 0.1577 for the four income

brackets. This involves a slight reduction in all the rates, with the largest reductions

being for the first and second tax brackets. Given the nature of the distribution of

income in Madrid for the first source, it is anticipated that this would have relatively

little effect on total revenue. But in view of the differences among regions in their

income distributions, the same could not be said of the other regions.

The effects on total tax revenue, and revenue within each region, if all regions were

to adopt the Madrid structure, can easily be obtained using the information given

above. The percentage changes in total (central plus regional) tax revenue and in the

regional tax revenue alone are shown in Table 12. In producing these values, it was

assumed that the average tax credits within each region remain unchanged. Clearly

the poorer regions, where a much larger proportion of total income is obtained by

those who fall into the first two tax brackets, would experience substantially larger

reductions in tax revenue.

Table 12 Percentage Reduction in Tax Revenue from Adoption of Madrid’s

2007 Tax Rate Structure

Total Revenue

Regional Revenue

National 1.7268 5.0096 Andalucía 1.9868 5.8113 Aragon 1.8754 5.4658 Asturias 1.9240 5.6338 Baleares 1.7081 4.9486 Canarias 1.8697 5.4546 Cantabria 1.8631 5.4260 Castilla-Leon 2.0137 5.8968 Castilla-LaMancha 2.1540 6.3276 Cataluña 1.6141 4.6696 Valencia 1.8701 5.4398 Extremadura 2.2008 6.4844 Galicia 1.9373 5.6687 Madrid 1.3815 3.9630 Murcia 2.0302 5.9393 Rioja 1.9282 5.6124

38

5.3 Regional Comparisons

The previous subsection considered the effects on all regions of adopting a different

regional structure of marginal income tax rates. As explained above, it is possible to

use the same basic approach to consider the effects of a range of changes in the

taxable income distributions of each region. This is particularly useful in the present

context where it is clear that different regions have different fiscal capacities. Such

disparities in regional revenue-raising abilities are especially evident when, as here,

progressive taxes are assigned partially to regional governments.

Central governments normally carry out some form of regional fiscal equalization.

Under these circumstances, sound design of these inter-regional transfers requires a

clear understanding of the precise sources of divergence of regional fiscal capacities.

The present approach can thus contribute to the debate on regional transfers by

clarifying precisely how regions differ with respect to the tax structure and the

distribution of taxpayers. This is because equation (43) makes it evident that

differences in revenue hinge on basically four factors: the number and distribution of

taxpayers, the distribution of taxable incomes and the specific tax parameters that

define the structure –marginal tax rates, tax bracket thresholds and average tax

credits.

The present approach makes it possible to construct a matrix in which each region’s

tax revenue can be computed under the assumption that it shares one or more of the

characteristics of other regions. Thus a ‘15 by 15’ matrix is obtained such that each

entry shows the revenue obtained by a row region, under the assumption that it has a

particular characteristic of the column region. The leading diagonal of such a square

matrix obviously shows the actual revenue obtained by the region. This matrix is

augmented by an additional row and column for the country as a whole. Similarly,

the information can be displayed in relative terms, showing the percentage

differences in revenue which could be raised by each region, given different assumed

characteristics (so that each corresponding leading diagonal element is zero).

To illustrate the kind of information which can be produced along these lines, Tables

13 to 15 report three such hypothetical ‘16 by 16’ matrices for Spanish regions in the

39

2007 fiscal year. These were computed using the sample of tax-returns described in

section 4 and, as before, refer to the fifteen Autonomous Communities of the

Common Territory. Each matrix shows the relative impact on the revenue collection

of the row region if it were to replicate the specific characteristic of the column

region. Specifically, Table 13 presents the revenue impact of differences in arithmetic

mean taxable incomes. Table 14 depicts the effects of differences in the form of the

relative taxable income distributions; that is, the arithmetic means are unchanged but

the proportions of people in each tax bracket, and the corresponding proportions of

total taxable income within each bracket, are assumed to the those of the region in the

columns. Finally, Table 15 shows the revenue consequences of simultaneous changes

in both the arithmetic mean taxable income and the relative distributions of income.15

For example, Table 13 shows that if Andalucía were to have the same arithmetic

mean taxable income as Aragon (a given percentage change in all incomes), it would

have 4.17 per cent higher income tax revenue. However, from Table 14 if Andalucia

were to have its actual arithmetic mean, but the same relative form of income

distribution as Aragon, it would have slightly less revenue: there would be a

reduction of 0.40 per cent. Table 15 indicates that if the distribution of taxable

income in Andalucia were the precisely the same as in Aragon (in both absolute and

relative terms), its revenue would be 3.77 per cent higher. In fact these effects are

additive, so that the elements of Table 15 effectively equal the sum of the

corresponding elements in Tables 13 and 14.

15 In producing these results it has been assumed that average tax credits remain unchanged

40

Table 13 Effects of Varying Arithmetic Mean Taxable Income (Row Region has Mean Income of Column Region)

Nat. And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. Cast.-L.

Cast.-LM. Cat. Val. Extr. Gal. Mad. Murc. Rioja

National 0 -14.73 -11.26 -9.33 -5.65 -6.98 -9.19 -17.81 -27.07 12.04 -15.39 -30.96 -19.09 41.57 -17.29 -15.69 Andalucia 17.31 0 4.17 6.30 10.72 9.01 6.58 -3.56 -14.43 31.42 -0.67 -19.02 -5.07 66.02 -2.98 -0.97 Aragon 12.32 -3.91 0 2.00 6.15 4.54 2.26 -7.25 -17.44 25.55 -4.54 -21.74 -8.67 57.99 -6.70 -4.82 Asturias 10.23 -5.86 -1.98 0 4.11 2.52 0.27 -9.17 -19.27 23.35 -6.47 -23.53 -10.57 55.50 -8.63 -6.75 Baleares 5.80 -9.34 -5.77 -3.79 0 -1.38 -3.64 -12.50 -22.00 18.16 -10.01 -26.01 -13.81 48.49 -11.96 -10.31 Canarias 7.62 -8.43 -4.63 -2.55 1.48 0 -2.37 -11.77 -21.85 20.73 -9.13 -26.10 -13.16 52.89 -11.21 -9.44 Cantabria 9.96 -6.10 -2.24 -0.24 3.85 2.28 0 -9.42 -19.51 23.07 -6.74 -23.76 -10.82 55.20 -8.87 -7.03 Castilla-Leon 21.17 3.60 7.87 9.98 14.51 12.71 10.31 0 -11.04 35.50 2.96 -15.69 -1.54 70.60 0.58 2.67 Castilla-LaMancha 35.79 16.25 21.04 23.33 28.40 26.34 23.74 12.27 0 51.71 15.59 -5.18 10.55 90.71 12.90 15.29 Cataluña -10.88 -24.18 -21.09 -19.29 -16.00 -17.15 -19.20 -26.99 -35.34 0 -24.82 -38.86 -28.13 26.70 -26.50 -25.11 Valencia 17.50 0.66 4.71 6.80 11.09 9.44 7.06 -2.81 -13.38 31.24 0 -17.84 -4.28 64.91 -2.24 -0.30 Extremadura 42.51 22.23 27.21 29.57 34.85 32.69 30.02 18.11 5.38 59.02 21.56 0 16.33 99.47 18.76 21.26 Galicia 22.46 5.09 9.28 11.41 15.86 14.13 11.70 1.52 -9.39 36.62 4.43 -13.99 0 71.34 2.10 4.13 Madrid -30.66 -41.48 -39.04 -37.47 -34.87 -35.68 -37.49 -43.81 -50.61 -21.79 -42.09 -53.46 -44.73 0 -43.39 -42.37 Murcia 20.99 3.08 7.41 9.60 14.19 12.40 9.90 -0.60 -11.85 35.60 2.40 -16.59 -2.17 71.40 0 2.09 Rioja 17.96 0.91 5.05 7.11 11.49 9.76 7.42 -2.59 -13.29 31.87 0.28 -17.81 -4.08 65.94 -2.02 0

41

Table 14 Effects of Varying Relative Incomes: Row Region has F and F1 of Column Region

Nat. And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant.Cast.-L.

Cast.-LM. Cat. Val. Extr. Gal. Mad. Murc. Rioja

National 0 -1.98 -2.32 -2.90 0.89 -0.70 -1.80 -3.15 -3.11 0.13 -0.84 -3.30 -1.69 1.69 -1.99 -2.44 Andalucia 1.89 0 -0.40 -1.09 3.00 1.15 0.14 -1.21 -0.99 1.77 1.32 -1.15 0.40 2.89 0.04 -0.41 Aragon 2.18 0.37 0 -0.65 3.21 1.47 0.51 -0.77 -0.57 2.07 1.61 -0.73 0.74 3.17 0.41 -0.02 Asturias 2.99 1.02 0.65 0 4.01 2.25 1.18 -0.19 -0.06 3.00 2.27 -0.23 1.37 4.36 1.04 0.58 Baleares -0.93 -2.76 -3.10 -3.70 0 -1.61 -2.61 -3.88 -3.77 -0.91 -1.61 -3.93 -2.44 0.38 -2.74 -3.17 Canarias 0.74 -1.29 -1.66 -2.29 1.73 0 -1.12 -2.52 -2.43 0.82 -0.06 -2.62 -0.96 2.32 -1.29 -1.76 Cantabria 1.72 -0.14 -0.51 -1.15 2.73 1.00 0 -1.30 -1.14 1.66 1.08 -1.30 0.21 2.87 -0.11 -0.55 Castilla-Leon 2.96 1.17 0.77 0.07 4.11 2.22 1.29 0 0.28 2.74 2.51 0.14 1.60 3.65 1.24 0.81 Castilla-LaMancha 2.36 0.72 0.27 -0.50 3.68 1.61 0.80 -0.45 0 1.91 2.18 -0.11 1.23 2.38 0.83 0.42 Cataluña -0.30 -2.38 -2.68 -3.21 0.46 -0.99 -2.17 -3.55 -3.63 0 -1.33 -3.84 -2.15 1.86 -2.42 -2.89 Valencia 0.45 -1.26 -1.64 -2.31 1.53 -0.25 -1.15 -2.38 -2.12 0.26 0 -2.26 -0.87 1.16 -1.20 -1.62 Extremadura 2.30 0.74 0.27 -0.53 3.68 1.55 0.79 -0.42 0.10 1.74 2.24 0 1.28 2.01 0.87 0.47 Galicia 1.30 -0.42 -0.81 -1.50 2.43 0.59 -0.31 -1.55 -1.27 1.07 0.89 -1.40 0 1.91 -0.35 -0.77 Madrid -2.98 -5.22 -5.47 -5.91 -2.43 -3.65 -4.96 -6.39 -6.68 -2.39 -4.33 -6.92 -5.10 0 -5.32 -5.81 Murcia 1.79 -0.06 -0.47 -1.18 2.95 1.04 0.07 -1.26 -1.00 1.60 1.29 -1.15 0.36 2.59 0 -0.45 Rioja 2.05 0.35 -0.04 -0.72 3.16 1.34 0.46 -0.78 -0.49 1.82 1.63 -0.63 0.76 2.66 0.41 0

42

Table 15 Effects of Varying Mean Taxable Income and its Distribution: Row Region has Distribution of Column Region

Nat. And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. Cast.-L.

Cast.-LM. Cat. Val. Extr. Gal. Mad. Murc. Rioj.

National 0 -16.30 -13.18 -11.99 -4.75 -7.66 -10.72 -20.19 -28.76 12.38 -15.78 -32.54 -20.16 45.86 -18.72 -17.39 Andalucia 19.69 0 3.77 5.20 13.96 10.44 6.74 -4.71 -15.06 34.65 0.63 -19.63 -4.66 75.11 -2.92 -1.32 Aragon 14.94 -3.54 0 1.35 9.56 6.26 2.79 -7.95 -17.66 28.97 -2.94 -21.95 -7.91 66.93 -6.28 -4.78 Asturias 13.49 -4.85 -1.34 0 8.15 4.87 1.43 -9.23 -18.86 27.42 -4.26 -23.12 -9.19 65.08 -7.57 -6.08 Baleares 4.89 -11.89 -8.68 -7.46 0 -3.00 -6.15 -15.90 -24.72 17.63 -11.36 -28.61 -15.86 52.09 -14.38 -13.02 Canarias 8.39 -9.47 -6.05 -4.75 3.19 0 -3.36 -13.74 -23.12 21.96 -8.89 -27.27 -13.69 58.65 -12.12 -10.67 Cantabria 11.97 -6.23 -2.74 -1.42 6.67 3.42 0 -10.58 -20.14 25.80 -5.64 -24.37 -10.54 63.19 -8.93 -7.45 Castilla-Leon 25.08 4.84 8.71 10.19 19.18 15.56 11.76 0 -10.64 40.45 5.49 -15.34 0.05 82.03 1.83 3.48 Castilla-LaMancha 40.13 17.39 21.74 23.40 33.51 29.44 25.17 11.95 0 57.41 18.12 -5.28 12.01 104.13 14.01 15.86 Cataluña -11.00 -25.48 -22.71 -21.66 -15.22 -17.81 -20.53 -28.95 -36.56 0 -25.02 -39.92 -28.91 29.75 -27.63 -26.46 Valencia 18.49 -0.61 3.04 4.44 12.93 9.51 5.92 -5.18 -15.21 32.99 0 -19.65 -5.13 72.22 -3.45 -1.89 Extremadura 47.30 23.61 28.14 29.87 40.40 36.17 31.72 17.95 5.50 65.29 24.37 0 18.00 113.96 20.09 22.02 Galicia 24.51 4.69 8.48 9.93 18.74 15.19 11.47 -0.05 -10.46 39.55 5.32 -15.06 0 80.26 1.75 3.36 Madrid -31.83 -43.15 -40.98 -40.16 -35.13 -37.15 -39.27 -45.85 -51.79 -23.24 -42.78 -54.42 -45.82 0 -44.83 -43.90 Murcia 23.48 3.04 6.95 8.44 17.53 13.87 10.03 -1.85 -12.60 39.01 3.69 -17.34 -1.80 81.01 0 1.66 Rioja 20.90 1.31 5.06 6.49 15.20 11.69 8.02 -3.37 -13.66 35.77 1.94 -18.20 -3.32 76.00 -1.59 0

6 Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to derive analytical expressions for aggregate revenue and

the revenue elasticity of the Spanish personal income tax system as applied to tax

units and in aggregate. This was considerably complicated by the schedular nature of

the system, the role of central and regional governments, along with the existence of

a range of tax credits and eligible expenditures and deductions.

Empirical estimates of revenue elasticities were obtained using a large cross-sectional

data set which enabled a number of important ancillary elasticities (relating to

allowances and tax credits, and different income sources) to be estimated. The

functional relationship between gross income and personal income taxation was

examined, rather than starting from a given distribution of taxable income.

It was found that there is considerable variation among tax units in the revenue

elasticity, with highly (positively) skewed distributions. Similarly, the aggregate

elasticities for each region were found to vary, associated with variations in the

income distributions. Variations were around a value of about 1.3.

Formal expressions for aggregate tax revenue were derived, in terms of the

distribution of taxable income. It was possible to separate total revenue into

components relating to the income tax structure and summary measures of the

distribution of taxable income, in particular the proportions of taxpayers, and of total

taxable income, in each tax bracket. It was thus possible to examine the sources of

differences among regions.

It is suggested that the approach developed here is of value not only in understanding

the fiscal drag and ‘automatic stabilisation’ properties of the personal tax structure,

but in considering the factors – particularly the nature of the distribution of taxable

income – affecting total tax revenue.

44

Appendix A. Losses as a Proportion of Income

Section 2 refers briefly to the role of losses in the Spanish personal tax system. The

first column of Table 16 reports negative (general) taxable income generated each tax

year, as a proportion of the tax year’s current taxable income. The second column

contains the proportion of the negative taxable income, carried forward from the last

four tax years, used to offset current (general) taxable income. It can be seen that the

amount of negative taxable income generated each tax year is well below 1 per cent.

Furthermore, the amount of carried-forward taxable income from the last four years

to offset against current taxable income is even less relevant in relative terms, being

well below 0.1 per cent. As with corporation losses, many losses are not used by the

taxpayers and becoming ‘stranded’. Hence, the loss asymmetry in the tax function is

of little relevance in determining the aggregate tax liability.

Table 16 Negative Taxable Income as a Proportion of Total Taxable Income

Tax Year % of generated negative taxable income

% of used negative taxable income (coming from previous four years)

1997 0.18 0.06 1998 0.22 0.05 1999* less than 0.35 0.06 2000* less than 0.39 0.06 2001* less than 0.74 0.06 2002 0.55 0.07 2003 0.54 0.06 2004 0.48 0.06 2005 0.5 0.05 2006 0.4 0.06 Source: Memorias de la Administracion Tributaria (Tax Office's Annual Tax Report),

several years.

(*) This figures includes not only negative taxable income but taxable income up to

3,000 €

45

Appendix B. The Treatment of Allowances

This appendix considers refundable and non-refundable tax allowances. Suppose

there is a simple tax structure with a marginal rate of t applied to income, y in excess

of a, and there is a ‘refundable tax credit’ of b. The term ‘refundable’ means that if

income tax is less than b, the individual receives a payment (pays negative tax). The

net tax paid is

T y t y a b (B1)

The total expenditure on the refundable tax credit b remains fixed, so long as the

population size is fixed. Those with incomes between a and /a b t pay some

income tax but face an overall negative average tax rate.

For taxpayers, net income is 1y t at b and the tax-free threshold can be

regarded as giving rise to a kind of tax credit worth at. This is a ‘non-refundable tax

credit’, such that those with y<a receive nothing.

The non-refundable credit is intimately connected with the income tax structure. It

determines who pays a zero marginal income tax rate, and the size of the ‘non-

refundable credit’ is determined by the tax rate as well as a. The total ‘tax

expenditure’ associated with the threshold a varies as the tax rate and the income

distribution changes: it increases as the number of people above the threshold

increases.

Consider only values of income for which tax, net of b, is positive. The average tax

rate is:

1a b

ATR ty y

(B2)

The individual revenue elasticity is given by MTR/ATR and is thus:

1

/1

MTR a b t

ATR y

(B3)

Hence for those with positive net average tax rates, the elasticity is higher when b is

included (essentially because it lowers their average tax rate). A higher value of the

refundable tax credit b has the effect of raising the revenue elasticity.

46

Alternatively, it is possible simply to think of the two components of the structure

separately. It could be said to combine an income tax with a tax-free threshold, and

an unconditional transfer payment that is unrelated to income. Indeed, the refundable

tax credit could be administered, without any change in net incomes, by an entirely

separate agency and could be given a name (such as a ‘basic income’, or ‘grant’) that

is unrelated to income taxation. In contrast, it would not be possible to separate the

non-refundable tax credit from the income tax system.

Considering only the income tax system, the individual revenue elasticity is then:

1

1 1a a

y y a

(B4)

as conventionally obtained.

If interest is in using the revenue elasticity at a given income level as an indication of

overall progressivity of taxes and transfers, then the refundable tax credit clearly

increases progressivity of the tax and transfer system as a whole. Perhaps it is then

desirable to include both components.16 But if concern is with the effect on tax

revenue of inflation – fiscal drag – then it can be argued that allowance should be

made only for non-refundable tax credits, and not refundable credits which, as

suggested above, can be entirely separated from the income tax system, both

conceptually and administratively.

16 However, measures of progressivity based on the Gini measure, such as Kakwani’s measure of

disproportionality, could not be produced because the Gini is not defined for negative values

47

Appendix C.

Table 17 Separate values of G for Central and Regional Governments

Central Government Tax Schedule

1G a 2G a 3G a 4G a


Regional Government Tax Schedule

1G a 2G a 3G a 4G a


48

Appendix D. Detailed Tables

This appendix reports summary information regarding the calculation of individual

and aggregate elasticities reported above.

First, Tables 18 to 22 show ancillary elasticities estimated for a range of types of tax

unit .

Tables 23 and 24 then examine the relevance of allowance transfers from income

source 1 to source 2. The first column reports the total number of tax units within the

quintile in the region that enjoy the transfer whereas the second column exhibits the

percentage of total allowance transfer within the region that is absorbed by the

quintile of 1y . As shown, this allowance transfer seems to be quite regionally

symmetric, as nearly for every region around 10 per cent of the taxpayers within the

first quantile of 1y enjoy the transfer of allowances and around 98 per cent of the total

transferred allowance is enjoyed by tax units in the first quintile. This fact suggests

that in computing the ancillary elasticity 2 hA y attention must be focused on the

distribution of 1y and not of the total gross income hy .

Finally, Tables 26-28 present basic summary statistics.

49

Table 18 Ancillary Elasticities

1.ANDALUCIA

hyy1

hyy2

hyE1 hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.8205 0.2058 1.3595 4.5981 27.3225 2.0410 2.0116

q1_s2 2.4653 0.3790 2.4337 4.3717 3.4366 3.2165 3.1698

q1_s3 2.1075 0.0000 1.7938 2.7451 3.3026 3.4651 3.4229

q2_s1 1.1769 7.1982 0.5454 128.3250 87.9449 0.6522 0.6493

q2_s2 1.1115 -2.1130 1.7965 102.4565 3.7185 1.0644 1.1029

q2_s3 1.0486 5.7543 0.7493 129.1173 3.3098 1.9123 1.8804

q3_s1 0.7120 9.9772 0.0000 59.1907 19.3692 0.3040 0.2826

q3_s2 1.1111 4.9313 1.1714 37.8552 2.5185 0.3718 0.3846

q3_s3 1.0256 7.4778 0.8834 55.6681 1.8466 0.8578 0.8611

q4_s1 0.9262 5.8885 1.3786 31.0950 18.3945 0.2010 0.1935

q4_s2 0.8996 0.0000 0.9749 14.1905 2.0204 0.1908 0.1718

q4_s3 0.9767 0.0000 0.0000 25.7131 1.3256 0.1989 0.1920

q5_s1 0.6873 2.1406 -0.3787 -4.3432 -1.6393 0.0514 0.0444

q5_s2 0.7398 2.9049 0.0000 0.0000 1.3373 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.9277 3.1408 0.2336 -3.3722 1.5950 0.0799 0.0762

2.ARAGÓN

hyy1

hyy2

hyE1 hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.4250 0.5685 0.8685 3.9588 12.4536 1.9495 1.9208

q1_s2 1.8843 0.6728 1.4421 5.0059 2.8221 2.8060 2.7626

q1_s3 1.7934 0.4116 1.2803 3.0965 2.8225 2.8991 2.8628

q2_s1 1.4505 0.0000 1.1728 47.3184 33.2372 0.4147 0.4751

q2_s2 1.2646 -1.8892 0.9436 32.7148 2.6282 1.4606 1.4190

q2_s3 1.0805 0.0000 0.0000 32.1120 5.5508 1.1781 1.1590

q3_s1 0.5632 3.8990 -0.7661 38.4092 14.9674 0.2910 0.2683

q3_s2 1.0306 0.0000 0.0000 38.9248 1.9822 0.3199 0.3874

q3_s3 1.0834 2.8321 0.0000 24.6546 3.1928 0.6635 0.6756

q4_s1 1.0271 0.0000 0.6986 19.7880 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 1.0262 0.0000 0.6376 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.7619 2.0768 0.2393 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0601

q5_s2 0.9181 1.8416 0.4902 0.0000 1.8270 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.8714 1.8909 0.2026 0.0000 1.8559 0.0461 0.0451

3.ASTURIAS

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.7063 0.3353 1.3490 3.5916 14.7046 1.8832 1.8549

q1_s2 2.0593 0.4367 1.8835 5.5782 2.9393 3.1504 3.1024

q1_s3 1.9677 0.0000 2.1454 3.0272 2.2235 2.9185 2.8831

q2_s1 1.3195 0.0000 1.3192 76.5031 51.2197 0.7538 0.7649

q2_s2 0.9585 0.0000 1.2793 59.5610 3.6513 2.0431 2.0477

q2_s3 1.1520 8.4528 -1.0714 0.0000 1.5852 2.1234 2.1103

q3_s1 1.0272 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 15.0482 0.4849 0.4559

q3_s2 0.8664 0.0000 0.0000 47.2858 2.1763 0.6929 0.6721

q3_s3 0.8937 0.0000 0.0000 85.9305 2.2531 0.4859 0.5005

q4_s1 1.0210 10.8294 0.0000 34.1867 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.9503 8.0631 0.0000 38.2689 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.0159 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.7110 3.7579 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.8777 1.6330 0.0000 0.0000 1.0350 -0.0717 -0.0733

q5_s3 0.9737 2.6641 0.0000 0.0000 1.0127 0.0000 0.0000

50

Table 19 Ancillary Elasticities (Continued)

4.BALEARES

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.5501 0.2360 0.8848 6.3064 28.3043 1.9475 1.9192

q1_s2 2.2556 0.3038 1.5877 6.8316 5.6941 2.8488 2.7982

q1_s3 1.7156 0.0000 1.1882 0.0000 3.1893 2.8929 2.8557

q2_s1 0.8698 0.0000 0.4517 138.9513 68.2686 0.5463 0.5543

q2_s2 1.2602 0.0000 0.7924 84.6014 8.4081 1.4202 1.4313

q2_s3 0.9036 0.0000 0.0000 129.4957 10.5477 1.1634 1.1501

q3_s1 1.0517 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 26.5219 0.5627 0.5286

q3_s2 0.9889 3.6977 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q3_s3 0.9223 6.9295 0.0000 60.5937 0.0000 0.5288 0.5251

q4_s1 1.4391 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 1.2056 0.0000 0.0000 28.8982 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 0.9633 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.6188 1.9306 0.0000 -7.6470 -2.2827 -0.1194 -0.1141

q5_s2 0.9829 1.5435 0.3900 0.0000 1.0245 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.8599 1.7982 0.2007 -2.7518 1.8752 0.0409 0.0403

5.CANARIAS

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.3350 0.0000 1.1848 2.4709 20.8826 2.2713 2.2398

q1_s2 1.8006 0.0000 2.0868 3.3040 2.5293 3.2092 3.1628

q1_s3 1.4746 0.0000 1.2656 2.5069 2.4717 2.8763 2.8407

q2_s1 1.0215 11.8792 0.7669 133.9884 42.3304 0.3762 0.3697

q2_s2 1.1385 4.1228 1.4386 80.1577 1.9472 1.2301 1.2621

q2_s3 1.0029 10.4332 0.4987 113.8376 3.3765 1.6138 1.5915

q3_s1 0.7362 7.7179 0.0000 50.2407 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q3_s2 0.6380 9.2348 1.5675 31.9513 1.6762 0.2719 0.2516

q3_s3 0.9330 7.1229 1.6649 42.7605 0.0000 0.6032 0.5976

q4_s1 0.9548 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 1.1288 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5947 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.0401 4.1661 0.0000 28.4397 1.6333 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.6581 2.7895 0.0000 -6.9937 0.0000 0.3120 0.3040

q5_s2 0.8242 3.1597 0.2611 0.0000 0.7369 0.2615 0.2532

q5_s3 0.9688 3.3904 0.3346 -2.5319 1.3082 0.2918 0.2879

6.CANTABRIA

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.9938 0.4285 0.9121 2.1654 18.9311 1.9805 1.9485

q1_s2 2.5854 0.5642 1.4734 5.1249 3.1040 2.4378 2.4003

q1_s3 2.7109 0.0000 1.3822 1.6888 2.6639 3.2045 3.1640

q2_s1 1.5120 2.7318 1.4593 63.5130 49.6894 0.6749 0.7105

q2_s2 1.6249 0.0000 1.8295 53.8142 4.5355 1.8991 1.8483

q2_s3 1.1322 3.6478 0.0000 64.7111 6.9505 1.7383 1.7117

q3_s1 1.4992 0.0000 0.0000 30.0837 20.9058 0.0000 0.0000

q3_s2 0.7369 0.0000 0.0000 43.7776 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q3_s3 0.0000 5.3591 0.0000 51.3651 1.5421 0.7441 0.7404

q4_s1 1.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 0.9628 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.0079 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.9117 1.2343 0.8185 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.9941 2.4223 0.3900 0.0000 1.0926 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 1.0225 2.2780 0.0000 0.0000 1.4441 0.1175 0.1134

51

Table 20 Ancillary Elasticities (Continued.)

7.CASTILLA.-LEÓN hyy1

hyy2

hyE1 hyE2

hyA1

hCcy

hCry

q1_s1 2.0242 0.6203 1.2294 3.6613 28.9743 1.8425 2.1527

q1_s2 2.8639 0.6498 2.3222 4.3653 4.9284 2.7991 3.5656

q1_s3 2.4881 0.4375 2.0019 3.7181 3.9891 2.7058 3.4365

q2_s1 1.3332 -1.0370 1.1798 44.3580 62.2967 0.5313 0.6043

q2_s2 0.9414 -3.1346 1.1729 29.2927 4.0597 1.3595 1.4475

q2_s3 0.8350 0.0000 1.1134 37.3354 6.1049 1.4951 1.5473

q3_s1 0.8839 3.3659 0.6456 26.6663 14.6671 0.3499 0.3304

q3_s2 1.1416 2.6431 0.0000 26.8162 2.3996 0.3543 0.3827

q3_s3 0.7732 3.8607 0.7678 49.4595 3.5170 0.6750 0.6881

q4_s1 0.9590 2.4449 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.9923 0.0000 0.8889 18.1597 1.9230 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.0194 2.8897 0.0000 15.0051 2.0646 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.8441 1.8957 0.3332 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.7643 1.8933 0.4139 2.3468 2.5508 -0.0437 -0.0515

q5_s3 0.9742 1.8554 0.5500 2.3777 2.8466 0.0721 0.0646

8.CASTILLA-LA MANCHA hyy1

hyy2

hyE1 hyE2

hyA1

hCcy

hCry

q1_s1 1.8479 0.4980 1.1269 3.9525 12.2662 1.9043 1.8786

q1_s2 2.1594 0.6174 1.7816 5.1921 1.6619 3.6114 3.5554

q1_s3 2.2881 0.2801 1.7177 1.7446 1.9827 3.6069 3.5632

q2_s1 1.2166 5.9103 1.0560 78.0549 39.5604 0.6283 0.6509

q2_s2 1.3730 -3.8874 1.4940 58.2568 1.5127 1.2970 1.3161

q2_s3 0.9865 2.9457 0.5633 66.0249 2.8651 1.5656 1.5430

q3_s1 0.8097 0.0000 0.9213 37.1462 8.3192 0.2819 0.2537

q3_s2 0.9003 3.7643 1.0943 30.0386 0.0000 0.2463 0.3010

q3_s3 0.9475 5.7290 0.0000 27.1166 0.0000 0.7308 0.7263

q4_s1 1.0243 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 8.8109 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.9769 4.5993 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1906 0.1870

q4_s3 0.8302 3.5042 0.0000 0.0000 1.2409 0.1043 0.1031

q5_s1 0.8559 2.7507 0.6308 0.0000 1.5616 0.1550 0.1463

q5_s2 0.6728 1.7477 0.3617 0.0000 1.4584 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.9516 2.4500 0.3482 1.6601 1.7194 0.0453 0.0480

9.CATALUÑA hyy1

hyy2

hyE1 hyE2

hyA1

hCcy

hCry

q1_s1 1.8801 0.3372 1.3023 5.2325 36.5498 2.1046 2.5151

q1_s2 2.4396 0.5427 2.1184 5.1343 5.4327 2.6641 3.3848

q1_s3 2.0844 0.2930 1.7918 4.8056 4.7565 3.3997 4.3632

q2_s1 1.2691 0.0000 0.7463 93.2560 84.8643 0.6192 0.6302

q2_s2 1.1340 0.0000 0.7777 75.1066 6.6710 1.2067 1.3594

q2_s3 1.2194 1.7079 0.8174 74.8974 10.6875 1.2028 1.2486

q3_s1 1.0628 0.0000 0.7171 40.5051 18.1412 0.4119 0.3768

q3_s2 1.5956 2.5038 0.5831 35.7114 -2.2788 0.3287 0.3462

q3_s3 0.8440 0.0000 0.0000 40.6745 3.9973 0.5346 0.5385

q4_s1 0.6446 0.0000 1.1294 24.9068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.8955 1.6495 0.9527 25.2876 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.1859 0.0000 1.2033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.7671 1.5166 0.1348 -4.3291 -1.2435 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.9682 1.3211 0.2996 -3.0253 1.3964 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.9387 1.4722 0.1951 -6.5189 1.1371 0.1066 0.1035

52


10. C.VALENCIANA

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.6081 0.3398 0.9860 6.7619 26.7854 2.1633 2.1305

q1_s2 2.1051 0.4564 2.0451 5.6606 3.2977 3.1345 3.0837

q1_s3 1.8299 0.0000 1.5441 6.7808 3.3960 2.8988 2.8634

q2_s1 1.2415 0.0000 0.6937 100.8261 87.4532 0.4239 0.4558

q2_s2 1.1155 0.0000 0.7722 85.2117 4.1657 1.3290 1.3561

q2_s3 1.0600 0.0000 0.0000 114.9881 5.3258 1.8076 1.7702

q3_s1 0.9468 8.2590 0.0000 28.9398 16.6372 0.2933 0.2741

q3_s2 0.6716 5.6793 0.0000 37.0663 3.1720 0.2776 0.2495

q3_s3 0.9361 0.0000 0.0000 56.8774 2.0000 0.6566 0.6684

q4_s1 1.2862 0.0000 0.0000 27.3681 18.2219 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.9905 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.8309 -0.1706 0.0000

q4_s3 0.8963 4.4397 0.0000 17.1309 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.7139 2.4676 0.0000 -3.3929 -1.7737 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.7814 2.1786 0.0000 -1.5149 0.7139 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.8982 2.3211 0.0000 -2.5843 1.6074 0.0733 0.0700

11.EXTREMADURA

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.4454 0.3390 0.7411 5.0005 13.1230 1.8823 1.8561

q1_s2 1.6215 0.5181 0.9240 5.0525 1.8199 4.0801 4.0165

q1_s3 1.6483 0.3549 0.9142 3.2053 2.2451 3.8361 3.7859

q2_s1 1.0989 0.0000 1.0289 84.9568 47.7531 0.3849 0.4066

q2_s2 0.9708 0.0000 0.8909 68.8747 1.4870 1.3216 1.3499

q2_s3 1.0784 0.0000 0.5995 88.8294 2.1742 1.8956 1.8590

q3_s1 1.3294 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 20.7554 0.4418 0.4166

q3_s2 0.9508 0.0000 0.0000 40.1981 1.3586 0.4595 0.4900

q3_s3 1.0379 0.0000 0.0000 42.0373 0.0000 0.7770 0.7942

q4_s1 1.0298 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.6486 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.0333 0.0000 0.0000 27.0921 2.3585 0.2542 0.2442

q5_s1 0.7147 3.1426 0.0000 0.0000 3.5106 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.6916 1.9755 0.2927 0.0000 1.0546 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.9408 1.9524 0.2207 0.0000 1.8815 0.0461 0.0440

12.GALICIA

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.8915 0.3832 1.4723 2.4911 25.7811 1.9746 1.9447

q1_s2 2.2954 0.5274 2.4546 4.9655 3.4036 2.8354 2.7887

q1_s3 2.1737 0.3427 2.7202 3.0592 3.0711 2.8585 2.8228

q2_s1 1.4955 2.2678 0.8776 84.6358 78.9203 0.3947 0.4150

q2_s2 1.4210 -1.4378 0.9010 63.5349 5.5315 1.2477 1.3085

q2_s3 1.1512 3.3239 0.0000 93.0862 6.6263 1.5838 1.5570

q3_s1 1.0331 0.0000 0.0000 20.4439 27.7931 0.2989 0.2753

q3_s2 0.8813 0.0000 0.0000 26.5955 4.6097 0.5034 0.5223

q3_s3 1.0031 2.0815 1.1116 29.3046 2.2865 0.6458 0.6504

q4_s1 1.2405 4.7003 1.3134 0.0000 14.8608 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 1.0478 0.0000 0.0000 26.2959 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 0.9678 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1471 0.1465

q5_s1 0.6199 2.5121 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.7226 1.9098 0.0000 0.0000 1.0492 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.9091 2.3956 0.0000 0.0000 1.5111 0.0790 0.0771

53


13. MADRID

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.7376 0.0000 1.1176 5.8808 27.8641 2.0558 2.0289

q1_s2 2.5448 0.0000 2.2251 3.8212 4.1030 2.4541 2.4164

q1_s3 2.0223 -0.4228 1.6699 4.1805 3.4917 2.4758 2.4464

q2_s1 1.0451 14.3179 0.3857 125.6319 100.8233 0.6182 0.6380

q2_s2 1.0806 0.0000 0.6029 71.0491 5.1413 1.6720 1.6147

q2_s3 1.1965 12.7355 0.7417 100.3224 8.7103 1.5100 1.4975

q3_s1 1.0674 21.7006 0.0000 57.6473 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q3_s2 1.1147 0.0000 0.0000 67.5781 0.0000 0.3889 0.3978

q3_s3 1.0286 17.0318 0.0000 71.4179 9.3086 0.6513 0.6314

q4_s1 0.8175 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 28.7706 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.9013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.0371 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.8871 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 1.0707 2.3522 0.5616 -2.5481 0.6368 0.0232 0.0000

q5_s2 0.9531 1.6480 0.2210 -1.4988 1.1803 -0.0217 -0.0237

q5_s3 1.0746 2.4575 0.0941 -3.0772 1.4306 0.1167 0.1123

14. MURCIA hyy1

hyy2

hyE1 hyE2

hyA1

hCcy

hCry

q1_s1 1.2846 0.2726 0.7871 5.4376 21.3876 2.1069 2.0783

q1_s2 1.6568 0.5604 1.4539 6.4650 2.6695 3.6203 3.5734

q1_s3 1.4503 0.2013 0.9833 4.1555 2.6057 3.2809 3.2422

q2_s1 1.1156 5.7032 0.0000 131.3364 41.8318 1.1995 1.1719

q2_s2 0.9684 0.0000 0.4542 103.9960 2.9609 1.9270 1.9741

q2_s3 1.0671 5.6682 0.7225 150.6989 3.3626 1.9864 1.9590

q3_s1 0.9972 0.0000 0.0000 72.4662 16.7221 0.0000 0.0000

q3_s2 0.8422 5.6851 0.0000 50.1372 0.0000 0.5469 0.5347

q3_s3 0.9439 9.0476 0.0000 53.4844 0.0000 0.6699 0.6719

q4_s1 1.0394 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5200 -0.5079

q4_s2 0.7584 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 1.1301 0.0000 1.1018 0.0000 0.0000 0.2754 0.2631

q5_s1 0.9410 2.4641 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.6966 3.1325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.8923 2.1635 0.4289 0.0000 1.4163 0.0958 0.0941

15.-RIOJA

hyy1 hyy2

hyE1

hyE2

hyA1

hCcy hCry

q1_s1 1.4331 0.5671 1.6222 2.5662 8.4924 2.0262 1.9905

q1_s2 1.8920 0.8156 2.8636 5.9033 2.6889 3.5610 3.5082

q1_s3 1.6264 0.3666 1.5478 0.0000 2.3944 3.5131 3.4652

q2_s1 1.5141 0.0000 0.9115 45.8763 29.7247 0.4323 0.4426

q2_s2 1.4904 0.0000 0.0000 23.9619 2.6452 1.3608 1.3231

q2_s3 0.7462 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.5320 0.9685 0.9226

q3_s1 1.0765 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 10.9141 0.0000 0.2662

q3_s2 0.9849 0.0000 0.0000 33.5031 0.0000 0.4056 0.4270

q3_s3 0.9967 5.1696 0.0000 30.6389 2.6807 0.4962 0.5029

q4_s1 1.2425 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s2 0.9285 3.6108 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q4_s3 0.9203 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s1 0.6524 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s2 0.7959 1.5261 0.0000 3.3390 1.2002 0.0000 0.0000

q5_s3 0.8772 2.2746 0.0000 0.0000 1.9354 0.0000 0.0000

54


1. ANDALUCIA 2.ARAGÓN 3.ASTURIAS 4.BALEARES

hyA2

hyA2

hyA2

hyA2

q1y1_s1 -2.3045 -2.3926 -1.8299 -1.6309 q1y1_s2 -1.2318 -1.0804 -1.0348 -1.3616 q1y1_s3 -1.2811 -1.4364 -1.1986 -1.1720 q2y1 27.8889 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q3y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q4y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q5y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5. CANARIAS 6.CANTABRIA 7.CASTILLA-LEÓN 8.CASTILLA-LAMANCHA

hyA2

hyA2

hyA2

hyA2

q1y1_s1 -2.4492 -2.9433 -3.0592 -3.1073 q1y1_s2 -1.5713 -1.2506 -1.5991 -1.7577 q1y1_s3 -1.1071 -1.3995 -1.4823 -1.4018 q2y1 0.0000 0.0000 11.7329 0.0000 q3y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q4y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q5y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 9.CATALUÑA 10. C. VALENCIANA 11.EXTREMADURA 12.GALICIA

hyA2

hyA2

hyA2

hyA2

q1y1_s1 -1.7060 -1.5217 0.0000 -2.9982 q1y1_s2 -1.2424 -1.3263 -1.8460 -2.2999 q1y1_s3 -1.4376 -1.1180 -1.7441 -2.0975 q2y1 19.5174 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q3y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q4y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q5y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 13.MADRID 14.MURCIA 15.RIOJA

hyA2

hyA2

hyA2

q1y1_s1 -0.8009 -1.8647 -3.0001 q1y1_s2 -0.7080 -1.4009 -1.2561 q1y1_s3 -0.6662 -1.3354 -2.0290 q2y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q3y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q4y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 q5y1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

55

Table 24 Relevance of Allowance Transfer from Income Source 1 to Source 2: By

Quintiles of Income Source 1

1.ANDALUCIA % Tax Unit

with A2>0

% over

total A2

2.ARAGÓN % Tax Unit

With A2>0

% over

total

A2

q1_y1 0.101 0.98 q1_y1 0.096 0.97

q2_y1 0.004 0.02 q2_y1 0.006 0.03

q3_y1 0.000 0.00 q3_y1 0.001 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00 q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1

3.ASTURIAS

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.00

% over

total A2

q5_y1

4.BALEARES

0.000

% Tax Unit

With A2>0

0.00

% over

total

A2

q1_y1 0.104 0.94 q1_y1 0.093 0.97

q2_y1 0.010 0.05 q2_y1 0.003 0.02

q3_y1 0.002 0.01 q3_y1 0.000 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00 q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1

5.CANARIAS

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.00

% over

total A2

q5_y1

6.CANTABRIA

0.000

% Tax Unit

With A2>0

0.00

% over

total

A2

q1_y1 0.063 0.98 q1_y1 0.088 0.97

q2_y1 0.001 0.02 q2_y1 0.007 0.02

q3_y1 0.000 0.00 q3_y1 0.000 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00 q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1

7.CASTILLA-

LEÓN

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.00

% over

total A2

q5_y1

8.CASTILLA-

LA MANCHA

0.000

% Tax Unit

With A2>0

0.00

% over

total

A2

q1_y1 0.094 0.97 q1_y1 0.112 0.98

q2_y1 0.006 0.03 q2_y1 0.004 0.02

q3_y1 0.001 0.00 q3_y1 0.000 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00 q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1 0.000 0.00 q5_y1 0.000 0.00

56

Table 25 Relevance of Allowance Transfer from Income Source 1 to Source 2: By

Quintiles of Income Source 1 (Continued).

9.CATALUÑA % Tax Unit

with A2>0

% over

total A2

10.VALENCIA % Tax Unit

with A2>0

% over

total

A2

q1_y1 0.090 0.97 q1_y1 0.081 0.97

q2_y1 0.005 0.02 q2_y1 0.005 0.03

q3_y1 0.001 0.00 q3_y1 0.000 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00 q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1

11.EXTREMADURA

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.00

% over

total A2

q5_y1

12.GALICIA

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.00

% over

total

A2

q1_y1 0.113 0.98 q1_y1 0.086 0.97

q2_y1 0.003 0.02 q2_y1 0.005 0.02

q3_y1 0.000 0.00 q3_y1 0.001 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00 q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1

13.MADRID

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.00

% over

total A2

q5_y1

14.MURCIA

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.00

% over

total

A2

q1_y1 0.090 0.97 q1_y1 0.107 0.95

q2_y1 0.004 0.02 q2_y1 0.007 0.05

q3_y1 0.000 0.00 q3_y1 0.000 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00 q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1

15.RIOJA

0.000

% Tax Unit

with A2>0

0.01

% over

total A2

q5_y1 0.000 0.00

q1_y1 0.116 0.98

q2_y1 0.005 0.02

q3_y1 0.000 0.00

q4_y1 0.000 0.00

q5_y1 0.000 0.00

Table 26 Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for

each Autonomous Community

WHOLE COUNTRY 1.ANDALUCIA

Mean Std_Dev Max Mean Std_Dev Max

1k ht 0.2938 0.0771 0.43 1k ht 0.2818 0.0712 0.43

2k ht 0.1527 0.0646 0.18 2k ht 0.1424 0.0731 0.18

(weighted)kht 0.2871 0.0712 0.43 (weighted)kht 0.2775 0.0656 0.43

hATR 0.1235 0.0923 0.43 hATR 0.1040 0.0878 0.43

*_ hATR TI 0.1503 0.1012 0.43 *_ hATR TI 0.1277 0.0979 0.43

1h hy y 0.9259 0.1902 1 1h hy y 0.9374 0.1841 1

2h hy y 0.0716 0.1846 1 2h hy y 0.0587 0.1744 1

1h hE y 0.2588 0.1665 1 1h hE y 0.2720 0.1776 1

2h hE y 0.0038 0.0262 1 2h hE y 0.0021 0.0221 1

1h hA y 0.0604 0.1084 1 1h hA y 0.0783 0.1228 1

2h hA y 0.0087 0.0858 1 2h hA y 0.0095 0.0898 1

Ch hC y 0.0615 0.0302 0.2612 Ch hC y 0.0640 0.0303 0.1566

Rh hC y 0.0325 0.0161 0.1293 Rh hC y 0.0339 0.0162 0.0834

2.ARAGÓN 3.ASTURIAS


1k ht 0.2862 0.0721 0.43 1k ht 0.2853 0.0712 0.43

2k ht 0.1658 0.0485 0.18 2k ht 0.1544 0.0629 0.18


hATR 0.1161 0.0820 0.42 hATR 0.1136 0.0835 0.42

*_ hATR TI 0.1443 0.0922 0.42 *_ hATR TI 0.1427 0.0935 0.42

1h hy y 0.9048 0.2055 1 1h hy y 0.9236 0.1982 1

2h hy y 0.0941 0.2034 1 2h hy y 0.0736 0.1921 1

1h hE y 0.2519 0.1627 1 1h hE y 0.2668 0.1812 1

2h hE y 0.0066 0.0323 1 2h hE y 0.0041 0.0252 1

1h hA y 0.0540 0.0992 1 1h hA y 0.0593 0.1044 1

2h hA y 0.0114 0.0980 1 2h hA y 0.0115 0.0988 1

Ch hC y 0.0613 0.0300 0.1566 Ch hC y 0.0598 0.0311 0.1566

Rh hC y 0.0324 0.0160 0.0834 Rh hC y 0.0318 0.0167 0.0834

* _ hATR TI stands for the ratio of total tax due to total taxable income ( )TI i.e. _ /h h hATR TI TI y

58


each Autonomous Community (Continued)

4.BALEARES

5.CANARIAS


1k ht 0.2935 0.0776 0.43 1k ht 0.2924 0.0746 0.43

2k ht 0.1618 0.0543 0.18 2k ht 0.1171 0.0858 0.18


hATR 0.1269 0.0936 0.42 hATR 0.1188 0.0866 0.42

*_ hATR TI 0.1532 0.1019 0.42 *_ hATR TI 0.1449 0.0960 0.42

1h hy y 0.9323 0.1798 1 1h hy y 0.9575 0.1540 1

2h hy y 0.0648 0.1728 1 2h hy y 0.0396 0.1452 1

1h hE y 0.2574 0.1589 1 1h hE y 0.2674 0.1665 1

2h hE y 0.0027 0.0180 1 2h hE y 0.0020 0.0202 1

1h hA y 0.0435 0.0907 1 1h hA y 0.0591 0.1044 1

2h hA y 0.0077 0.0827 1 2h hA y 0.0045 0.0622 1

Ch hC y 0.0628 0.0300 0.1566 Ch hC y 0.0619 0.0293 0.2612

Rh hC y 0.0332 0.0160 0.0834 Rh hC y 0.0328 0.0156 0.1286

CANTABRIA

7. CASTILLA Y LEÓN


1k ht 0.2938 0.0771 0.43 1k ht 0.2808 0.0688 0.43

2k ht 0.1527 0.0646 0.18 2k ht 0.1621 0.0539 0.18


hATR 0.1235 0.0923 0.43 hATR 0.1062 0.0811 0.42

*_ hATR TI 0.1503 0.1012 0.43 *_ hATR TI 0.1328 0.0921 0.42

1h hy y 0.9259 0.1902 1 1h hy y 0.9029 0.2126 1

2h hy y 0.0716 0.1846 1 2h hy y 0.0951 0.2087 1

1h hE y 0.2588 0.1665 1 1h hE y 0.2507 0.1702 1

2h hE y 0.0038 0.0262 1 2h hE y 0.0056 0.0299 1

1h hA y 0.0604 0.1084 1 1h hA y 0.0673 0.1167 1

2h hA y 0.0087 0.0858 1 2h hA y 0.0121 0.1018 1

Ch hC y 0.0615 0.0302 0.2612 Ch hC y 0.0638 0.0311 0.1566

Rh hC y 0.0325 0.0161 0.1293 Rh hC y 0.0337 0.0167 0.0834


59



8.CASTILLA-LA MANCHA

9.CATALUÑA


1k ht 0.2754 0.0668 0.43 1k ht 0.3021 0.0798 0.43

2k ht 0.1571 0.0600 0.18 2k ht 0.1633 0.0522 0.18


hATR 0.0943 0.0820 0.41 hATR 0.1361 0.0917 0.43

*_ hATR TI 0.1179 0.0935 0.42 *_ hATR TI 0.1650 0.0998 0.43

1h hy y 0.9252 0.1901 1 1h hy y 0.9183 0.1937 1

2h hy y 0.0728 0.1857 1 2h hy y 0.0802 0.1905 1

1h hE y 0.2638 0.1692 1 1h hE y 0.2453 0.1543 1

2h hE y 0.0036 0.0289 1 2h hE y 0.0046 0.0289 1

1h hA y 0.0899 0.1381 1 1h hA y 0.0437 0.0872 1

2h hA y 0.0120 0.1009 1 2h hA y 0.0079 0.0821 1

Ch hC y 0.0650 0.0302 0.1566 Ch hC y 0.0594 0.0298 0.1566

Rh hC y 0.0343 0.0162 0.0834 Rh hC y 0.0313 0.0159 0.0834

10.COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA

11. EXTREMADURA


1k ht 0.2848 0.0730 0.43 1k ht 0.2729 0.0650 0.43

2k ht 0.1502 0.0669 0.18 2k ht 0.1571 0.0600 0.18


hATR 0.1116 0.0883 0.42 hATR 0.0907 0.0821 0.40

*_ hATR TI 0.1370 0.0977 0.42 *_ hATR TI 0.1125 0.0938 0.41

1h hy y 0.9254 0.1860 1 1h hy y 0.9321 0.1820 1

2h hy y 0.0723 0.1805 1 2h hy y 0.0657 0.1765 1

1h hE y 0.2739 0.1669 1 1h hE y 0.2786 0.1801 1

2h hE y 0.0035 0.0251 1 2h hE y 0.0020 0.0178 1

1h hA y 0.0583 0.1055 1 1h hA y 0.0951 0.1435 1

2h hA y 0.0073 0.0782 1 2h hA y 0.0108 0.0952 1

Ch hC y 0.0631 0.0292 0.1938 Ch hC y 0.0645 0.0305 0.1566

Rh hC y 0.0334 0.0156 0.1090 Rh hC y 0.0342 0.0164 0.0834


60



12.GALICIA

13.MADRID


1k ht 0.2831 0.0715 0.43 1k ht 0.3167 0.0836 0.43

2k ht 0.1474 0.0693 0.18 2k ht 0.1508 0.0663 0.18


hATR 0.1085 0.0864 0.42 hATR 0.1558 0.0996 0.43

*_ hATR TI 0.1342 0.0968 0.42 *_ hATR TI 0.1849 0.1054 0.43

1h hy y 0.9268 0.1911 1 1h hy y 0.9300 0.1852 1

2h hy y 0.0695 0.1827 1 2h hy y 0.0680 0.1803 1

1h hE y 0.2693 0.1763 1 1h hE y 0.2388 0.1508 1

2h hE y 0.0033 0.0269 1 2h hE y 0.0042 0.0258 1

1h hA y 0.0676 0.1243 1 1h hA y 0.0465 0.0880 1

2h hA y 0.0089 0.0860 1 2h hA y 0.0063 0.0738 1

Ch hC y 0.0637 0.0317 0.2248 Ch hC y 0.0564 0.0294 0.1612

Rh hC y 0.0338 0.0170 0.1293 Rh hC y 0.0297 0.0156 0.0834

14.MURCIA

15.RIOJA


1k ht 0.2805 0.0712 0.43 1k ht 0.2827 0.0714 0.43

2k ht 0.1463 0.0703 0.18 2k ht 0.1653 0.0493 0.18


hATR 0.1000 0.0866 0.41 hATR 0.1117 0.0818 0.39

*_ hATR TI 0.1234 0.0970 0.42 *_ hATR TI 0.1377 0.0913 0.42

1h hy y 0.9358 0.1819 1 1h hy y 0.8966 0.2168 1

2h hy y 0.0615 0.1754 1 2h hy y 0.1020 0.2143 1

1h hE y 0.2828 0.1795 1 1h hE y 0.2474 0.1674 1

2h hE y 0.0025 0.0225 1 2h hE y 0.0064 0.0316 1

1h hA y 0.0680 0.1125 1 1h hA y 0.0545 0.1031 1

2h hA y 0.0098 0.0900 1 2h hA y 0.0126 0.1023 1

Ch hC y 0.0647 0.0295 0.1566 Ch hC y 0.0629 0.0302 0.1566

Rh hC y 0.0343 0.0158 0.0834 Rh hC y 0.0332 0.0161 0.0834


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199/2005 Análisis de impacto de los Fondos Estructurales Europeos recibidos por una economía regional: Un enfoque a través de Matrices de Contabilidad Social M. Carmen Lima y M. Alejandro Cardenete

200/2005 Does the development of non-cash payments affect monetary policy transmission? Santiago Carbó Valverde y Rafael López del Paso

201/2005 Firm and time varying technical and allocative efficiency: an application for port cargo han-dling firms Ana Rodríguez-Álvarez, Beatriz Tovar de la Fe y Lourdes Trujillo

202/2005 Contractual complexity in strategic alliances Jeffrey J. Reuer y Africa Ariño

203/2005 Factores determinantes de la evolución del empleo en las empresas adquiridas por opa Nuria Alcalde Fradejas y Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar

204/2005 Nonlinear Forecasting in Economics: a comparison between Comprehension Approach versus Learning Approach. An Application to Spanish Time Series Elena Olmedo, Juan M. Valderas, Ricardo Gimeno and Lorenzo Escot

205/2005 Precio de la tierra con presión urbana: un modelo para España Esther Decimavilla, Carlos San Juan y Stefan Sperlich

206/2005 Interregional migration in Spain: a semiparametric analysis Adolfo Maza y José Villaverde

207/2005 Productivity growth in European banking Carmen Murillo-Melchor, José Manuel Pastor y Emili Tortosa-Ausina

208/2005 Explaining Bank Cost Efficiency in Europe: Environmental and Productivity Influences. Santiago Carbó Valverde, David B. Humphrey y Rafael López del Paso

209/2005 La elasticidad de sustitución intertemporal con preferencias no separables intratemporalmente: los casos de Alemania, España y Francia. Elena Márquez de la Cruz, Ana R. Martínez Cañete y Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar

210/2005 Contribución de los efectos tamaño, book-to-market y momentum a la valoración de activos: el caso español. Begoña Font-Belaire y Alfredo Juan Grau-Grau

211/2005 Permanent income, convergence and inequality among countries José M. Pastor and Lorenzo Serrano

212/2005 The Latin Model of Welfare: Do ‘Insertion Contracts’ Reduce Long-Term Dependence? Luis Ayala and Magdalena Rodríguez

213/2005 The effect of geographic expansion on the productivity of Spanish savings banks Manuel Illueca, José M. Pastor and Emili Tortosa-Ausina

214/2005 Dynamic network interconnection under consumer switching costs Ángel Luis López Rodríguez

215/2005 La influencia del entorno socioeconómico en la realización de estudios universitarios: una aproxi-mación al caso español en la década de los noventa Marta Rahona López

216/2005 The valuation of spanish ipos: efficiency analysis Susana Álvarez Otero

217/2005 On the generation of a regular multi-input multi-output technology using parametric output dis-tance functions Sergio Perelman and Daniel Santin

218/2005 La gobernanza de los procesos parlamentarios: la organización industrial del congreso de los di-putados en España Gonzalo Caballero Miguez

219/2005 Determinants of bank market structure: Efficiency and political economy variables Francisco González

220/2005 Agresividad de las órdenes introducidas en el mercado español: estrategias, determinantes y me-didas de performance David Abad Díaz

221/2005 Tendencia post-anuncio de resultados contables: evidencia para el mercado español Carlos Forner Rodríguez, Joaquín Marhuenda Fructuoso y Sonia Sanabria García

222/2005 Human capital accumulation and geography: empirical evidence in the European Union Jesús López-Rodríguez, J. Andrés Faíña y Jose Lopez Rodríguez

223/2005 Auditors' Forecasting in Going Concern Decisions: Framing, Confidence and Information Proc-essing Waymond Rodgers and Andrés Guiral

224/2005 The effect of Structural Fund spending on the Galician region: an assessment of the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 Galician CSFs José Ramón Cancelo de la Torre, J. Andrés Faíña and Jesús López-Rodríguez

225/2005 The effects of ownership structure and board composition on the audit committee activity: Span-ish evidence Carlos Fernández Méndez and Rubén Arrondo García

226/2005 Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by managing loan loss provisions Ana Rosa Fonseca and Francisco González

227/2005 Incumplimiento fiscal en el irpf (1993-2000): un análisis de sus factores determinantes Alejandro Estellér Moré

228/2005 Region versus Industry effects: volatility transmission Pilar Soriano Felipe and Francisco J. Climent Diranzo

229/2005 Concurrent Engineering: The Moderating Effect Of Uncertainty On New Product Development Success Daniel Vázquez-Bustelo and Sandra Valle

230/2005 On zero lower bound traps: a framework for the analysis of monetary policy in the ‘age’ of cen-tral banks Alfonso Palacio-Vera

231/2005 Reconciling Sustainability and Discounting in Cost Benefit Analysis: a methodological proposal M. Carmen Almansa Sáez and Javier Calatrava Requena

232/2005 Can The Excess Of Liquidity Affect The Effectiveness Of The European Monetary Policy? Santiago Carbó Valverde and Rafael López del Paso

233/2005 Inheritance Taxes In The Eu Fiscal Systems: The Present Situation And Future Perspectives. Miguel Angel Barberán Lahuerta

234/2006 Bank Ownership And Informativeness Of Earnings. Víctor M. González

235/2006 Developing A Predictive Method: A Comparative Study Of The Partial Least Squares Vs Maxi-mum Likelihood Techniques. Waymond Rodgers, Paul Pavlou and Andres Guiral.

236/2006 Using Compromise Programming for Macroeconomic Policy Making in a General Equilibrium Framework: Theory and Application to the Spanish Economy. Francisco J. André, M. Alejandro Cardenete y Carlos Romero.

237/2006 Bank Market Power And Sme Financing Constraints. Santiago Carbó-Valverde, Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández y Gregory F. Udell.

238/2006 Trade Effects Of Monetary Agreements: Evidence For Oecd Countries. Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero y José Antonio Martínez-Serrano.

239/2006 The Quality Of Institutions: A Genetic Programming Approach. Marcos Álvarez-Díaz y Gonzalo Caballero Miguez.

240/2006 La interacción entre el éxito competitivo y las condiciones del mercado doméstico como deter-minantes de la decisión de exportación en las Pymes. Francisco García Pérez.

241/2006 Una estimación de la depreciación del capital humano por sectores, por ocupación y en el tiempo. Inés P. Murillo.

242/2006 Consumption And Leisure Externalities, Economic Growth And Equilibrium Efficiency. Manuel A. Gómez.

243/2006 Measuring efficiency in education: an analysis of different approaches for incorporating non-discretionary inputs. Jose Manuel Cordero-Ferrera, Francisco Pedraja-Chaparro y Javier Salinas-Jiménez

244/2006 Did The European Exchange-Rate Mechanism Contribute To The Integration Of Peripheral Countries?. Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero y José Antonio Martínez-Serrano

245/2006 Intergenerational Health Mobility: An Empirical Approach Based On The Echp. Marta Pascual and David Cantarero

246/2006 Measurement and analysis of the Spanish Stock Exchange using the Lyapunov exponent with digital technology. Salvador Rojí Ferrari and Ana Gonzalez Marcos

247/2006 Testing For Structural Breaks In Variance Withadditive Outliers And Measurement Errors. Paulo M.M. Rodrigues and Antonio Rubia

248/2006 The Cost Of Market Power In Banking: Social Welfare Loss Vs. Cost Inefficiency. Joaquín Maudos and Juan Fernández de Guevara

249/2006 Elasticidades de largo plazo de la demanda de vivienda: evidencia para España (1885-2000). Desiderio Romero Jordán, José Félix Sanz Sanz y César Pérez López

250/2006 Regional Income Disparities in Europe: What role for location?. Jesús López-Rodríguez and J. Andrés Faíña

251/2006 Funciones abreviadas de bienestar social: Una forma sencilla de simultanear la medición de la eficiencia y la equidad de las políticas de gasto público. Nuria Badenes Plá y Daniel Santín González

252/2006 “The momentum effect in the Spanish stock market: Omitted risk factors or investor behaviour?”. Luis Muga and Rafael Santamaría

253/2006 Dinámica de precios en el mercado español de gasolina: un equilibrio de colusión tácita. Jordi Perdiguero García

254/2006 Desigualdad regional en España: renta permanente versus renta corriente. José M.Pastor, Empar Pons y Lorenzo Serrano

255/2006 Environmental implications of organic food preferences: an application of the impure public goods model. Ana Maria Aldanondo-Ochoa y Carmen Almansa-Sáez

256/2006 Family tax credits versus family allowances when labour supply matters: Evidence for Spain. José Felix Sanz-Sanz, Desiderio Romero-Jordán y Santiago Álvarez-García

257/2006 La internacionalización de la empresa manufacturera española: efectos del capital humano genérico y específico. José López Rodríguez

258/2006 Evaluación de las migraciones interregionales en España, 1996-2004. María Martínez Torres

259/2006 Efficiency and market power in Spanish banking. Rolf Färe, Shawna Grosskopf y Emili Tortosa-Ausina.

260/2006 Asimetrías en volatilidad, beta y contagios entre las empresas grandes y pequeñas cotizadas en la bolsa española. Helena Chuliá y Hipòlit Torró.

261/2006 Birth Replacement Ratios: New Measures of Period Population Replacement. José Antonio Ortega.

262/2006 Accidentes de tráfico, víctimas mortales y consumo de alcohol. José Mª Arranz y Ana I. Gil.

263/2006 Análisis de la Presencia de la Mujer en los Consejos de Administración de las Mil Mayores Em-presas Españolas. Ruth Mateos de Cabo, Lorenzo Escot Mangas y Ricardo Gimeno Nogués.

264/2006 Crisis y Reforma del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento. Las Limitaciones de la Política Econó-mica en Europa. Ignacio Álvarez Peralta.

265/2006 Have Child Tax Allowances Affected Family Size? A Microdata Study For Spain (1996-2000). Jaime Vallés-Giménez y Anabel Zárate-Marco.

266/2006 Health Human Capital And The Shift From Foraging To Farming. Paolo Rungo.

267/2006 Financiación Autonómica y Política de la Competencia: El Mercado de Gasolina en Canarias. Juan Luis Jiménez y Jordi Perdiguero.

268/2006 El cumplimiento del Protocolo de Kyoto para los hogares españoles: el papel de la imposición sobre la energía. Desiderio Romero-Jordán y José Félix Sanz-Sanz.

269/2006 Banking competition, financial dependence and economic growth Joaquín Maudos y Juan Fernández de Guevara

270/2006 Efficiency, subsidies and environmental adaptation of animal farming under CAP Werner Kleinhanß, Carmen Murillo, Carlos San Juan y Stefan Sperlich

271/2006 Interest Groups, Incentives to Cooperation and Decision-Making Process in the European Union A. Garcia-Lorenzo y Jesús López-Rodríguez

272/2006 Riesgo asimétrico y estrategias de momentum en el mercado de valores español Luis Muga y Rafael Santamaría

273/2006 Valoración de capital-riesgo en proyectos de base tecnológica e innovadora a través de la teoría de opciones reales Gracia Rubio Martín

274/2006 Capital stock and unemployment: searching for the missing link Ana Rosa Martínez-Cañete, Elena Márquez de la Cruz, Alfonso Palacio-Vera and Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar

275/2006 Study of the influence of the voters’ political culture on vote decision through the simulation of a political competition problem in Spain Sagrario Lantarón, Isabel Lillo, Mª Dolores López and Javier Rodrigo

276/2006 Investment and growth in Europe during the Golden Age Antonio Cubel and Mª Teresa Sanchis

277/2006 Efectos de vincular la pensión pública a la inversión en cantidad y calidad de hijos en un modelo de equilibrio general Robert Meneu Gaya

278/2006 El consumo y la valoración de activos Elena Márquez y Belén Nieto

279/2006 Economic growth and currency crisis: A real exchange rate entropic approach David Matesanz Gómez y Guillermo J. Ortega

280/2006 Three measures of returns to education: An illustration for the case of Spain María Arrazola y José de Hevia

281/2006 Composition of Firms versus Composition of Jobs Antoni Cunyat

282/2006 La vocación internacional de un holding tranviario belga: la Compagnie Mutuelle de Tram-ways, 1895-1918 Alberte Martínez López

283/2006 Una visión panorámica de las entidades de crédito en España en la última década. Constantino García Ramos

284/2006 Foreign Capital and Business Strategies: a comparative analysis of urban transport in Madrid and Barcelona, 1871-1925 Alberte Martínez López

285/2006 Los intereses belgas en la red ferroviaria catalana, 1890-1936 Alberte Martínez López

286/2006 The Governance of Quality: The Case of the Agrifood Brand Names Marta Fernández Barcala, Manuel González-Díaz y Emmanuel Raynaud

287/2006 Modelling the role of health status in the transition out of malthusian equilibrium Paolo Rungo, Luis Currais and Berta Rivera

288/2006 Industrial Effects of Climate Change Policies through the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Xavier Labandeira and Miguel Rodríguez

289/2006 Globalisation and the Composition of Government Spending: An analysis for OECD countries Norman Gemmell, Richard Kneller and Ismael Sanz

290/2006 La producción de energía eléctrica en España: Análisis económico de la actividad tras la liberali-zación del Sector Eléctrico Fernando Hernández Martínez

291/2006 Further considerations on the link between adjustment costs and the productivity of R&D invest-ment: evidence for Spain Desiderio Romero-Jordán, José Félix Sanz-Sanz and Inmaculada Álvarez-Ayuso

292/2006 Una teoría sobre la contribución de la función de compras al rendimiento empresarial Javier González Benito

293/2006 Agility drivers, enablers and outcomes: empirical test of an integrated agile manufacturing model Daniel Vázquez-Bustelo, Lucía Avella and Esteban Fernández

294/2006 Testing the parametric vs the semiparametric generalized mixed effects models María José Lombardía and Stefan Sperlich

295/2006 Nonlinear dynamics in energy futures Mariano Matilla-García

296/2006 Estimating Spatial Models By Generalized Maximum Entropy Or How To Get Rid Of W Esteban Fernández Vázquez, Matías Mayor Fernández and Jorge Rodriguez-Valez

297/2006 Optimización fiscal en las transmisiones lucrativas: análisis metodológico Félix Domínguez Barrero

298/2006 La situación actual de la banca online en España Francisco José Climent Diranzo y Alexandre Momparler Pechuán

299/2006 Estrategia competitiva y rendimiento del negocio: el papel mediador de la estrategia y las capacidades productivas Javier González Benito y Isabel Suárez González

300/2006 A Parametric Model to Estimate Risk in a Fixed Income Portfolio Pilar Abad and Sonia Benito

301/2007 Análisis Empírico de las Preferencias Sociales Respecto del Gasto en Obra Social de las Cajas de Ahorros Alejandro Esteller-Moré, Jonathan Jorba Jiménez y Albert Solé-Ollé

302/2007 Assessing the enlargement and deepening of regional trading blocs: The European Union case Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero y José Antonio Martínez-Serrano

303/2007 ¿Es la Franquicia un Medio de Financiación?: Evidencia para el Caso Español Vanesa Solís Rodríguez y Manuel González Díaz

304/2007 On the Finite-Sample Biases in Nonparametric Testing for Variance Constancy Paulo M.M. Rodrigues and Antonio Rubia

305/2007 Spain is Different: Relative Wages 1989-98 José Antonio Carrasco Gallego

306/2007 Poverty reduction and SAM multipliers: An evaluation of public policies in a regional framework Francisco Javier De Miguel-Vélez y Jesús Pérez-Mayo

307/2007 La Eficiencia en la Gestión del Riesgo de Crédito en las Cajas de Ahorro Marcelino Martínez Cabrera

308/2007 Optimal environmental policy in transport: unintended effects on consumers' generalized price M. Pilar Socorro and Ofelia Betancor

309/2007 Agricultural Productivity in the European Regions: Trends and Explanatory Factors Roberto Ezcurra, Belen Iráizoz, Pedro Pascual and Manuel Rapún

310/2007 Long-run Regional Population Divergence and Modern Economic Growth in Europe: a Case Study of Spain María Isabel Ayuda, Fernando Collantes and Vicente Pinilla

311/2007 Financial Information effects on the measurement of Commercial Banks’ Efficiency Borja Amor, María T. Tascón and José L. Fanjul

312/2007 Neutralidad e incentivos de las inversiones financieras en el nuevo IRPF Félix Domínguez Barrero

313/2007 The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility Perceptions on The Valuation of Common Stock Waymond Rodgers , Helen Choy and Andres Guiral-Contreras

314/2007 Country Creditor Rights, Information Sharing and Commercial Banks’ Profitability Persistence across the world Borja Amor, María T. Tascón and José L. Fanjul

315/2007 ¿Es Relevante el Déficit Corriente en una Unión Monetaria? El Caso Español Javier Blanco González y Ignacio del Rosal Fernández

316/2007 The Impact of Credit Rating Announcements on Spanish Corporate Fixed Income Performance: Returns, Yields and Liquidity Pilar Abad, Antonio Díaz and M. Dolores Robles

317/2007 Indicadores de Lealtad al Establecimiento y Formato Comercial Basados en la Distribución del Presupuesto Cesar Augusto Bustos Reyes y Óscar González Benito

318/2007 Migrants and Market Potential in Spain over The XXth Century: A Test Of The New Economic Geography Daniel A. Tirado, Jordi Pons, Elisenda Paluzie and Javier Silvestre

319/2007 El Impacto del Coste de Oportunidad de la Actividad Emprendedora en la Intención de los Ciu-dadanos Europeos de Crear Empresas Luis Miguel Zapico Aldeano

320/2007 Los belgas y los ferrocarriles de vía estrecha en España, 1887-1936 Alberte Martínez López

321/2007 Competición política bipartidista. Estudio geométrico del equilibrio en un caso ponderado Isabel Lillo, Mª Dolores López y Javier Rodrigo

322/2007 Human resource management and environment management systems: an empirical study Mª Concepción López Fernández, Ana Mª Serrano Bedia and Gema García Piqueres

323/2007 Wood and industrialization. evidence and hypotheses from the case of Spain, 1860-1935. Iñaki Iriarte-Goñi and María Isabel Ayuda Bosque

324/2007 New evidence on long-run monetary neutrality. J. Cunado, L.A. Gil-Alana and F. Perez de Gracia

325/2007 Monetary policy and structural changes in the volatility of us interest rates. Juncal Cuñado, Javier Gomez Biscarri and Fernando Perez de Gracia

326/2007 The productivity effects of intrafirm diffusion. Lucio Fuentelsaz, Jaime Gómez and Sergio Palomas

327/2007 Unemployment duration, layoffs and competing risks. J.M. Arranz, C. García-Serrano and L. Toharia

328/2007 El grado de cobertura del gasto público en España respecto a la UE-15 Nuria Rueda, Begoña Barruso, Carmen Calderón y Mª del Mar Herrador

329/2007 The Impact of Direct Subsidies in Spain before and after the CAP'92 Reform Carmen Murillo, Carlos San Juan and Stefan Sperlich

330/2007 Determinants of post-privatisation performance of Spanish divested firms Laura Cabeza García and Silvia Gómez Ansón

331/2007 ¿Por qué deciden diversificar las empresas españolas? Razones oportunistas versus razones económicas Almudena Martínez Campillo

332/2007 Dynamical Hierarchical Tree in Currency Markets Juan Gabriel Brida, David Matesanz Gómez and Wiston Adrián Risso

333/2007 Los determinantes sociodemográficos del gasto sanitario. Análisis con microdatos individuales Ana María Angulo, Ramón Barberán, Pilar Egea y Jesús Mur

334/2007 Why do companies go private? The Spanish case Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar

335/2007 The use of gis to study transport for disabled people Verónica Cañal Fernández

336/2007 The long run consequences of M&A: An empirical application Cristina Bernad, Lucio Fuentelsaz and Jaime Gómez

337/2007 Las clasificaciones de materias en economía: principios para el desarrollo de una nueva clasificación Valentín Edo Hernández

338/2007 Reforming Taxes and Improving Health: A Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform to Eliminate Medical and Pharmaceutical VAT Santiago Álvarez-García, Carlos Pestana Barros y Juan Prieto-Rodriguez

339/2007 Impacts of an iron and steel plant on residential property values Celia Bilbao-Terol

340/2007 Firm size and capital structure: Evidence using dynamic panel data Víctor M. González and Francisco González

341/2007 ¿Cómo organizar una cadena hotelera? La elección de la forma de gobierno Marta Fernández Barcala y Manuel González Díaz

342/2007 Análisis de los efectos de la decisión de diversificar: un contraste del marco teórico “Agencia-Stewardship” Almudena Martínez Campillo y Roberto Fernández Gago

343/2007 Selecting portfolios given multiple eurostoxx-based uncertainty scenarios: a stochastic goal pro-gramming approach from fuzzy betas Enrique Ballestero, Blanca Pérez-Gladish, Mar Arenas-Parra and Amelia Bilbao-Terol

344/2007 “El bienestar de los inmigrantes y los factores implicados en la decisión de emigrar” Anastasia Hernández Alemán y Carmelo J. León

345/2007 Governance Decisions in the R&D Process: An Integrative Framework Based on TCT and Know-ledge View of The Firm. Andrea Martínez-Noya and Esteban García-Canal

346/2007 Diferencias salariales entre empresas públicas y privadas. El caso español Begoña Cueto y Nuria Sánchez- Sánchez

347/2007 Effects of Fiscal Treatments of Second Home Ownership on Renting Supply Celia Bilbao Terol and Juan Prieto Rodríguez

348/2007 Auditors’ ethical dilemmas in the going concern evaluation Andres Guiral, Waymond Rodgers, Emiliano Ruiz and Jose A. Gonzalo

349/2007 Convergencia en capital humano en España. Un análisis regional para el periodo 1970-2004 Susana Morales Sequera y Carmen Pérez Esparrells

350/2007 Socially responsible investment: mutual funds portfolio selection using fuzzy multiobjective pro-gramming Blanca Mª Pérez-Gladish, Mar Arenas-Parra , Amelia Bilbao-Terol and Mª Victoria Rodríguez-Uría

351/2007 Persistencia del resultado contable y sus componentes: implicaciones de la medida de ajustes por devengo Raúl Iñiguez Sánchez y Francisco Poveda Fuentes

352/2007 Wage Inequality and Globalisation: What can we Learn from the Past? A General Equilibrium Approach Concha Betrán, Javier Ferri and Maria A. Pons

353/2007 Eficacia de los incentivos fiscales a la inversión en I+D en España en los años noventa Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz

354/2007 Convergencia regional en renta y bienestar en España Robert Meneu Gaya

355/2007 Tributación ambiental: Estado de la Cuestión y Experiencia en España Ana Carrera Poncela

356/2007 Salient features of dependence in daily us stock market indices Luis A. Gil-Alana, Juncal Cuñado and Fernando Pérez de Gracia

357/2007 La educación superior: ¿un gasto o una inversión rentable para el sector público? Inés P. Murillo y Francisco Pedraja

358/2007 Effects of a reduction of working hours on a model with job creation and job destruction Emilio Domínguez, Miren Ullibarri y Idoya Zabaleta

359/2007 Stock split size, signaling and earnings management: Evidence from the Spanish market José Yagüe, J. Carlos Gómez-Sala and Francisco Poveda-Fuentes

360/2007 Modelización de las expectativas y estrategias de inversión en mercados de derivados Begoña Font-Belaire

361/2008 Trade in capital goods during the golden age, 1953-1973 Mª Teresa Sanchis and Antonio Cubel

362/2008 El capital económico por riesgo operacional: una aplicación del modelo de distribución de pérdidas Enrique José Jiménez Rodríguez y José Manuel Feria Domínguez

363/2008 The drivers of effectiveness in competition policy Joan-Ramon Borrell and Juan-Luis Jiménez

364/2008 Corporate governance structure and board of directors remuneration policies: evidence from Spain Carlos Fernández Méndez, Rubén Arrondo García and Enrique Fernández Rodríguez

365/2008 Beyond the disciplinary role of governance: how boards and donors add value to Spanish founda-tions Pablo De Andrés Alonso, Valentín Azofra Palenzuela y M. Elena Romero Merino

366/2008 Complejidad y perfeccionamiento contractual para la contención del oportunismo en los acuerdos de franquicia Vanesa Solís Rodríguez y Manuel González Díaz

367/2008 Inestabilidad y convergencia entre las regiones europeas Jesús Mur, Fernando López y Ana Angulo

368/2008 Análisis espacial del cierre de explotaciones agrarias Ana Aldanondo Ochoa, Carmen Almansa Sáez y Valero Casanovas Oliva

369/2008 Cross-Country Efficiency Comparison between Italian and Spanish Public Universities in the period 2000-2005 Tommaso Agasisti and Carmen Pérez Esparrells

370/2008 El desarrollo de la sociedad de la información en España: un análisis por comunidades autónomas María Concepción García Jiménez y José Luis Gómez Barroso

371/2008 El medioambiente y los objetivos de fabricación: un análisis de los modelos estratégicos para su consecución Lucía Avella Camarero, Esteban Fernández Sánchez y Daniel Vázquez-Bustelo

372/2008 Influence of bank concentration and institutions on capital structure: New international evidence Víctor M. González and Francisco González

373/2008 Generalización del concepto de equilibrio en juegos de competición política Mª Dolores López González y Javier Rodrigo Hitos

374/2008 Smooth Transition from Fixed Effects to Mixed Effects Models in Multi-level regression Models María José Lombardía and Stefan Sperlich

375/2008 A Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform to Increase Demand for Public Transport Services Carlos Pestana Barros and Juan Prieto-Rodriguez

376/2008 Measurement of intra-distribution dynamics: An application of different approaches to the Euro-pean regions Adolfo Maza, María Hierro and José Villaverde

377/2008 Migración interna de extranjeros y ¿nueva fase en la convergencia? María Hierro y Adolfo Maza

378/2008 Efectos de la Reforma del Sector Eléctrico: Modelización Teórica y Experiencia Internacional Ciro Eduardo Bazán Navarro

379/2008 A Non-Parametric Independence Test Using Permutation Entropy Mariano Matilla-García and Manuel Ruiz Marín

380/2008 Testing for the General Fractional Unit Root Hypothesis in the Time Domain Uwe Hassler, Paulo M.M. Rodrigues and Antonio Rubia

381/2008 Multivariate gram-charlier densities Esther B. Del Brio, Trino-Manuel Ñíguez and Javier Perote

382/2008 Analyzing Semiparametrically the Trends in the Gender Pay Gap - The Example of Spain Ignacio Moral-Arce, Stefan Sperlich, Ana I. Fernández-Saínz and Maria J. Roca

383/2008 A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Two-Sided Card Market Santiago Carbó Valverde, David B. Humphrey, José Manuel Liñares Zegarra and Francisco Rod-riguez Fernandez

384/2008 A Fuzzy Bicriteria Approach for Journal Deselection in a Hospital Library M. L. López-Avello, M. V. Rodríguez-Uría, B. Pérez-Gladish, A. Bilbao-Terol, M. Arenas-Parra

385/2008 Valoración de las grandes corporaciones farmaceúticas, a través del análisis de sus principales intangibles, con el método de opciones reales Gracia Rubio Martín y Prosper Lamothe Fernández

386/2008 El marketing interno como impulsor de las habilidades comerciales de las pyme españolas: efectos en los resultados empresariales Mª Leticia Santos Vijande, Mª José Sanzo Pérez, Nuria García Rodríguez y Juan A. Trespalacios Gutiérrez

387/2008 Understanding Warrants Pricing: A case study of the financial market in Spain David Abad y Belén Nieto

388/2008 Aglomeración espacial, Potencial de Mercado y Geografía Económica: Una revisión de la litera-tura Jesús López-Rodríguez y J. Andrés Faíña

389/2008 An empirical assessment of the impact of switching costs and first mover advantages on firm performance Jaime Gómez, Juan Pablo Maícas

390/2008 Tender offers in Spain: testing the wave Ana R. Martínez-Cañete y Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar

391/2008 La integración del mercado español a finales del siglo XIX: los precios del trigo entre 1891 y 1905 Mariano Matilla García, Pedro Pérez Pascual y Basilio Sanz Carnero

392/2008 Cuando el tamaño importa: estudio sobre la influencia de los sujetos políticos en la balanza de bienes y servicios Alfonso Echazarra de Gregorio

393/2008 Una visión cooperativa de las medidas ante el posible daño ambiental de la desalación Borja Montaño Sanz

394/2008 Efectos externos del endeudamiento sobre la calificación crediticia de las Comunidades Autóno-mas Andrés Leal Marcos y Julio López Laborda

395/2008 Technical efficiency and productivity changes in Spanish airports: A parametric distance func-tions approach Beatriz Tovar & Roberto Rendeiro Martín-Cejas

396/2008 Network analysis of exchange data: Interdependence drives crisis contagion David Matesanz Gómez & Guillermo J. Ortega

397/2008 Explaining the performance of Spanish privatised firms: a panel data approach Laura Cabeza Garcia and Silvia Gomez Anson

398/2008 Technological capabilities and the decision to outsource R&D services Andrea Martínez-Noya and Esteban García-Canal

399/2008 Hybrid Risk Adjustment for Pharmaceutical Benefits Manuel García-Goñi, Pere Ibern & José María Inoriza

400/2008 The Team Consensus–Performance Relationship and the Moderating Role of Team Diversity José Henrique Dieguez, Javier González-Benito and Jesús Galende

401/2008 The institutional determinants of CO2 emissions: A computational modelling approach using Arti-ficial Neural Networks and Genetic Programming Marcos Álvarez-Díaz , Gonzalo Caballero Miguez and Mario Soliño

402/2008 Alternative Approaches to Include Exogenous Variables in DEA Measures: A Comparison Using Monte Carlo José Manuel Cordero-Ferrera, Francisco Pedraja-Chaparro and Daniel Santín-González

403/2008 Efecto diferencial del capital humano en el crecimiento económico andaluz entre 1985 y 2004: comparación con el resto de España Mª del Pópulo Pablo-Romero Gil-Delgado y Mª de la Palma Gómez-Calero Valdés

404/2008 Análisis de fusiones, variaciones conjeturales y la falacia del estimador en diferencias Juan Luis Jiménez y Jordi Perdiguero

405/2008 Política fiscal en la uem: ¿basta con los estabilizadores automáticos? Jorge Uxó González y Mª Jesús Arroyo Fernández

406/2008 Papel de la orientación emprendedora y la orientación al mercado en el éxito de las empresas Óscar González-Benito, Javier González-Benito y Pablo A. Muñoz-Gallego

407/2008 La presión fiscal por impuesto sobre sociedades en la unión europea Elena Fernández Rodríguez, Antonio Martínez Arias y Santiago Álvarez García

408/2008 The environment as a determinant factor of the purchasing and supply strategy: an empirical ana-lysis Dr. Javier González-Benito y MS Duilio Reis da Rocha

409/2008 Cooperation for innovation: the impact on innovatory effort Gloria Sánchez González and Liliana Herrera

410/2008 Spanish post-earnings announcement drift and behavioral finance models Carlos Forner and Sonia Sanabria

411/2008 Decision taking with external pressure: evidence on football manager dismissals in argentina and their consequences Ramón Flores, David Forrest and Juan de Dios Tena

412/2008 Comercio agrario latinoamericano, 1963-2000: aplicación de la ecuación gravitacional para flujos desagregados de comercio Raúl Serrano y Vicente Pinilla

413/2008 Voter heuristics in Spain: a descriptive approach elector decision José Luís Sáez Lozano and Antonio M. Jaime Castillo

414/2008 Análisis del efecto área de salud de residencia sobre la utilización y acceso a los servicios sanita-rios en la Comunidad Autónoma Canaria Ignacio Abásolo Alessón, Lidia García Pérez, Raquel Aguiar Ibáñez y Asier Amador Robayna

415/2008 Impact on competitive balance from allowing foreign players in a sports league: an analytical model and an empirical test Ramón Flores, David Forrest & Juan de Dios Tena

416/2008 Organizational innovation and productivity growth: Assessing the impact of outsourcing on firm performance Alberto López

417/2008 Value Efficiency Analysis of Health Systems Eduardo González, Ana Cárcaba & Juan Ventura

418/2008 Equidad en la utilización de servicios sanitarios públicos por comunidades autónomas en España: un análisis multinivel Ignacio Abásolo, Jaime Pinilla, Miguel Negrín, Raquel Aguiar y Lidia García

419/2008 Piedras en el camino hacia Bolonia: efectos de la implantación del EEES sobre los resultados académicos Carmen Florido, Juan Luis Jiménez e Isabel Santana

420/2008 The welfare effects of the allocation of airlines to different terminals M. Pilar Socorro and Ofelia Betancor

421/2008 How bank capital buffers vary across countries. The influence of cost of deposits, market power and bank regulation Ana Rosa Fonseca and Francisco González

422/2008 Analysing health limitations in spain: an empirical approach based on the european community household panel Marta Pascual and David Cantarero

423/2008 Regional productivity variation and the impact of public capital stock: an analysis with spatial interaction, with reference to Spain Miguel Gómez-Antonio and Bernard Fingleton

424/2008 Average effect of training programs on the time needed to find a job. The case of the training schools program in the south of Spain (Seville, 1997-1999). José Manuel Cansino Muñoz-Repiso and Antonio Sánchez Braza

425/2008 Medición de la eficiencia y cambio en la productividad de las empresas distribuidoras de electri-cidad en Perú después de las reformas Raúl Pérez-Reyes y Beatriz Tovar

426/2008 Acercando posturas sobre el descuento ambiental: sondeo Delphi a expertos en el ámbito interna-cional Carmen Almansa Sáez y José Miguel Martínez Paz

427/2008 Determinants of abnormal liquidity after rating actions in the Corporate Debt Market Pilar Abad, Antonio Díaz and M. Dolores Robles

428/2008 Export led-growth and balance of payments constrained. New formalization applied to Cuban commercial regimes since 1960 David Matesanz Gómez, Guadalupe Fugarolas Álvarez-Ude and Isis Mañalich Gálvez

429/2008 La deuda implícita y el desequilibrio financiero-actuarial de un sistema de pensiones. El caso del régimen general de la seguridad social en España José Enrique Devesa Carpio y Mar Devesa Carpio

430/2008 Efectos de la descentralización fiscal sobre el precio de los carburantes en España Desiderio Romero Jordán, Marta Jorge García-Inés y Santiago Álvarez García

431/2008 Euro, firm size and export behavior Silviano Esteve-Pérez, Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero and José Antonio Martínez-Serrano

432/2008 Does social spending increase support for free trade in advanced democracies? Ismael Sanz, Ferran Martínez i Coma and Federico Steinberg

433/2008 Potencial de Mercado y Estructura Espacial de Salarios: El Caso de Colombia Jesús López-Rodríguez y Maria Cecilia Acevedo

434/2008 Persistence in Some Energy Futures Markets Juncal Cunado, Luis A. Gil-Alana and Fernando Pérez de Gracia

435/2008 La inserción financiera externa de la economía francesa: inversores institucionales y nueva gestión empresarial Ignacio Álvarez Peralta

436/2008 ¿Flexibilidad o rigidez salarial en España?: un análisis a escala regional Ignacio Moral Arce y Adolfo Maza Fernández

437/2009 Intangible relationship-specific investments and the performance of r&d outsourcing agreements Andrea Martínez-Noya, Esteban García-Canal & Mauro F. Guillén

438/2009 Friendly or Controlling Boards? Pablo de Andrés Alonso & Juan Antonio Rodríguez Sanz

439/2009 La sociedad Trenor y Cía. (1838-1926): un modelo de negocio industrial en la España del siglo XIX Amparo Ruiz Llopis

440/2009 Continental bias in trade Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero & José Antonio Martínez Serrano

441/2009 Determining operational capital at risk: an empirical application to the retail banking Enrique José Jiménez-Rodríguez, José Manuel Feria-Domínguez & José Luis Martín-Marín

442/2009 Costes de mitigación y escenarios post-kyoto en España: un análisis de equilibro general para España Mikel González Ruiz de Eguino

443/2009 Las revistas españolas de economía en las bibliotecas universitarias: ranking, valoración del indicador y del sistema Valentín Edo Hernández

444/2009 Convergencia económica en España y coordinación de políticas económicas. un estudio basado en la estructura productiva de las CC.AA. Ana Cristina Mingorance Arnáiz

445/2009 Instrumentos de mercado para reducir emisiones de co2: un análisis de equilibrio general para España Mikel González Ruiz de Eguino

446/2009 El comercio intra e inter-regional del sector Turismo en España Carlos Llano y Tamara de la Mata

447/2009 Efectos del incremento del precio del petróleo en la economía española: Análisis de cointegración y de la política monetaria mediante reglas de Taylor Fernando Hernández Martínez

448/2009 Bologna Process and Expenditure on Higher Education: A Convergence Analysis of the EU-15 T. Agasisti, C. Pérez Esparrells, G. Catalano & S. Morales

449/2009 Global Economy Dynamics? Panel Data Approach to Spillover Effects Gregory Daco, Fernando Hernández Martínez & Li-Wu Hsu

450/2009 Pricing levered warrants with dilution using observable variables Isabel Abínzano & Javier F. Navas

451/2009 Information technologies and financial prformance: The effect of technology diffusion among competitors Lucio Fuentelsaz, Jaime Gómez & Sergio Palomas

452/2009 A Detailed Comparison of Value at Risk in International Stock Exchanges Pilar Abad & Sonia Benito

453/2009 Understanding offshoring: has Spain been an offshoring location in the nineties? Belén González-Díaz & Rosario Gandoy

454/2009 Outsourcing decision, product innovation and the spatial dimension: Evidence from the Spanish footwear industry José Antonio Belso-Martínez

455/2009 Does playing several competitions influence a team’s league performance? Evidence from Spanish professional football Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo & Francisco González-Gómez

456/2009 Does accessibility affect retail prices and competition? An empirical application Juan Luis Jiménez and Jordi Perdiguero

457/2009 Cash conversion cycle in smes Sonia Baños-Caballero, Pedro J. García-Teruel and Pedro Martínez-Solano

458/2009 Un estudio sobre el perfil de hogares endeudados y sobreendeudados: el caso de los hogares vascos Alazne Mujika Alberdi, Iñaki García Arrizabalaga y Juan José Gibaja Martíns

459/2009 Imposing monotonicity on outputs in parametric distance function estimations: with an application to the spanish educational production Sergio Perelman and Daniel Santin

460/2009 Key issues when using tax data for concentration analysis: an application to the Spanish wealth tax José Mª Durán-Cabré and Alejandro Esteller-Moré

461/2009 ¿Se está rompiendo el mercado español? Una aplicación del enfoque de feldstein –horioka Saúl De Vicente Queijeiro, José Luis Pérez Rivero y María Rosalía Vicente Cuervo

462/2009 Financial condition, cost efficiency and the quality of local public services Manuel A. Muñiz & José L. Zafra

463/2009 Including non-cognitive outputs in a multidimensional evaluation of education production: an international comparison Marián García Valiñas & Manuel Antonio Muñiz Pérez

464/2009 A political look into budget deficits.The role of minority governments and oppositions Albert Falcó-Gimeno & Ignacio Jurado

465/2009 La simulación del cuadro de mando integral. Una herramienta de aprendizaje en la materia de contabilidad de gestión Elena Urquía Grande, Clara Isabel Muñoz Colomina y Elisa Isabel Cano Montero

466/2009 Análisis histórico de la importancia de la industria de la desalinización en España Borja Montaño Sanz

467/2009 The dynamics of trade and innovation: a joint approach Silviano Esteve-Pérez & Diego Rodríguez

468/2009 Measuring international reference-cycles Sonia de Lucas Santos, Inmaculada Álvarez Ayuso & Mª Jesús Delgado Rodríguez

469/2009 Measuring quality of life in Spanish municipalities Eduardo González Fidalgo, Ana Cárcaba García, Juan Ventura Victoria & Jesús García García

470/2009 ¿Cómo se valoran las acciones españolas: en el mercado de capitales doméstico o en el europeo? Begoña Font Belaire y Alfredo Juan Grau Grau

471/2009 Patterns of e-commerce adoption and intensity. evidence for the european union-27 María Rosalía Vicente & Ana Jesús López

472/2009 On measuring the effect of demand uncertainty on costs: an application to port terminals Ana Rodríguez-Álvarez, Beatriz Tovar & Alan Wall

473/2009 Order of market entry, market and technological evolution and firm competitive performance Jaime Gomez, Gianvito Lanzolla & Juan Pablo Maicas

474/2009 La Unión Económica y Monetaria Europea en el proceso exportador de Castilla y León (1993-2007): un análisis de datos de panel Almudena Martínez Campillo y Mª del Pilar Sierra Fernández

475/2009 Do process innovations boost SMEs productivity growth? Juan A. Mañez, María E. Rochina Barrachina, Amparo Sanchis Llopis & Juan A. Sanchis Llopis

476/2009 Incertidumbre externa y elección del modo de entrada en el marco de la inversión directa en el exterior Cristina López Duarte y Marta Mª Vidal Suárez

477/2009 Testing for structural breaks in factor loadings: an application to international business cycle José Luis Cendejas Bueno, Sonia de Lucas Santos, Inmaculada Álvarez Ayuso & Mª Jesús Del-gado Rodríguez

478/2009 ¿Esconde la rigidez de precios la existencia de colusión? El caso del mercado de carburantes en las Islas Canarias Juan Luis Jiménez y Jordi Perdiguero

479/2009 The poni test with structural breaks Antonio Aznar & María-Isabel Ayuda

480/2009 Accuracy and reliability of Spanish regional accounts (CRE-95) Verónica Cañal Fernández

481/2009 Estimating regional variations of R&D effects on productivity growth by entropy econometrics Esteban Fernández-Vázquez y Fernando Rubiera-Morollón

482/2009 Why do local governments privatize the provision of water services? Empirical evidence from Spain Francisco González-Gómez, Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo & Jorge Guardiola

483/2009 Assessing the regional digital divide across the European Union-27 María Rosalía Vicente & Ana Jesús López

484/2009 Measuring educational efficiency and its determinants in Spain with parametric distance functions José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Eva Crespo Cebada & Daniel Santín González

485/2009 Spatial analysis of public employment services in the Spanish provinces Patricia Suárez Cano & Matías Mayor Fernández

486/2009 Trade effects of continental and intercontinental preferential trade agreements Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero & José Antonio Martínez-Serrano

487/2009 Testing the accuracy of DEA for measuring efficiency in education under endogeneity Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero & José Antonio Martínez-Serrano

488/2009 Measuring efficiency in primary health care: the effect of exogenous variables on results José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Eva Crespo Cebada & Luis R. Murillo Zamorano

489/2009 Capital structure determinants in growth firms accessing venture funding Marina Balboa, José Martí & Álvaro Tresierra

490/2009 Determinants of debt maturity structure across firm size Víctor M. González

491/2009 Análisis del efecto de la aplicación de las NIIF en la valoración de las salidas a bolsa Susana Álvarez Otero y Eduardo Rodríguez Enríquez

492/2009 An analysis of urban size and territorial location effects on employment probabilities: the spanish case Ana Viñuela-Jiménez, Fernando Rubiera-Morollón & Begoña Cueto

493/2010 Determinantes de la estructura de los consejos de administración en España Isabel Acero Fraile y Nuria Alcalde Fradejas

494/2010 Performance and completeness in repeated inter-firm relationships: the case of franchising Vanesa Solis-Rodriguez & Manuel Gonzalez-Diaz

495/2010 A Revenue-Based Frontier Measure of Banking Competition Santiago Carbó, David Humphrey & Francisco Rodríguez

496/2010 Categorical segregation in social networks Antoni Rubí-Barceló

497/2010 Beneficios ambientales no comerciales de la directiva marco del agua en condiciones de escasez: análisis económico para el Guadalquivir Julia Martin-Ortega, Giacomo Giannoccaro y Julio Berbel Vecino

498/2010 Monetary integration and risk diversification in eu-15 sovereign debt markets Juncal Cuñado & Marta Gómez-Puig

499/2010 The Marshall Plan and the Spanish autarky: A welfare loss analysis José Antonio Carrasco Gallego

500/2010 The role of learning in firm R&D persistence Juan A. Mañez, María E. Rochina-Barrachina, Amparo Sanchis-Llopis & Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis

501/2010 Is venture capital more than just money? Marina Balboa, José Martí & Nina Zieling

502/2010 On the effects of supply strategy on business performance: do the relationships among generic competitive objectives matter? Javier González-Benito

503/2010 Corporate cash holding and firm value Cristina Martínez-Sola, Pedro J. García-Teruel & Pedro Martínez-Solano

504/2010 El impuesto de flujos de caja de sociedades: una propuesta de base imponible y su aproximación contable en España Lourdes Jerez Barroso y Joaquín Texeira Quirós

505/2010 The effect of technological, commercial and human resources on the use of new technology Jaime Gómez & Pilar Vargas

506/2010 ¿Cómo ha afectado la fiscalidad a la rentabilidad de la inversión en vivienda en España? Un análisis para el periodo 1996 y 2007 Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz

507/2010 Modelización de flujos en el análisis input-output a partir de la teoría de redes Ana Salomé García Muñiz

508/2010 Export-led-growth hypothesis revisited. a balance of payments approach for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico David Matesanz Gómez & Guadalupe Fugarolas Álvarez-Ude

509/2010 Realised hedge ratio properties, performance and implications for risk management: evidence from the spanish ibex 35 spot and futures markets David G McMillan & Raquel Quiroga García

510/2010 Do we sack the manager... or is it better not to? Evidence from Spanish professional football Francisco González-Gómez, Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo & Miguel Á. García-Rubio

511/2010 Have Spanish port sector reforms during the last two decades been successful? A cost frontier approach Ana Rodríguez-Álvarez & Beatriz Tovar

512/2010 Size & Regional Distribution of Financial Behavior Patterns in Spain Juan Antonio Maroto Acín, Pablo García Estévez & Salvador Roji Ferrari

513/2010 The impact of public reforms on the productivity of the Spanish ports: a parametric distance function approach Ramón Núñez-Sánchez & Pablo Coto-Millán

514/2010 Trade policy versus institutional trade barriers: an application using “good old” ols Laura Márquez-Ramos, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso & Celestino Suárez-Burguet

515/2010 The “Double Market” approach in venture capital and private equity activity: the case of Europe Marina Balboa & José Martí

516/2010 International accounting differences and earnings smoothing in the banking industry Marina Balboa, Germán López-Espinosa & Antonio Rubia

517/2010 Convergence in car prices among European countries Simón Sosvilla-Rivero & Salvador Gil-Pareja

518/2010 Effects of process and product-oriented innovations on employee downsizing José David Vicente-Lorente & José Ángel Zúñiga-Vicente

519/2010 Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax-mix Jenny De Freitas

520/2010 Efectos del desajuste educativo sobre el rendimiento privado de la educación: un análisis para el caso español (1995-2006) Inés P. Murillo, Marta Rahona y Mª del Mar Salinas

521/2010 Sructural breaks and real convergence in opec countries Juncal Cuñado

522/2010 Human Capital, Geographical location and Policy Implications: The case of Romania Jesús López-Rodríguez, Andres Faiña y Bolea Cosmin-Gabriel

523/2010 Organizational unlearning context fostering learning for customer capital through time: lessons from SMEs in the telecommunications industry Anthony K. P. Wensley, Antonio Leal-Millán, Gabriel Cepeda-Carrión & Juan Gabriel Cegarra-Navarro

524/2010 The governance threshold in international trade flows Marta Felis-Rota

525/2010 The intensive and extensive margins of trade decomposing exports growth differences across Spanish regions Asier Minondo Uribe-Etxeberria & Francisco Requena Silvente

526/2010 Why do firms locate r&d outsourcing agreeements offshore? the role of ownership, location, and externalization advantages Andrea Martínez-Noya, Esteban Gárcía-Canal & Mauro f. Guillén

527/2010 Corporate Taxation and the Productivity and Investment Performance of Heterogeneous Firms: Evidence from OECD Firm-Level Data Norman Gemmell, Richard Kneller, Ismael Sanz & José Félix Sanz-Sanz

528/2010 Modelling Personal Income Taxation in Spain: Revenue Elasticities and Regional Comparisons John Creedy & José Félix Sanz-Sanz

MODELLING PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION IN SPAIN

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