Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?

Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms:An Alternative Spiral?

Cristina G. Badescu

University of Toronto

and

Thomas G. Weiss1

The City University of New York Graduate Center

International relations scholars generally argue that norm-buildingrequires a number of successful cases. This essay, however, is about threeconcrete examples when virtually everyone—except for the state citingit—disputes the legitimacy of applying the emerging norm of the respon-sibility-to-protect (R2P). Misrepresentations of humanitarian intentionscan be disingenuous and geopolitically driven, as was the case for the USand UK war in Iraq and the Russian claim to protect South Ossetians, ordisinterested but wrong, as was the French invocation of R2P for Burma.These cases suggest that misuses can advance norms through contestationand conceptual clarification. Because contestation prompts debates,denial, and tactical concessions on the norm in question, it is insightful tocompare and contrast R2P’s development against the early stages of twotheoretical models that deal most explicitly with contestation: the ‘‘spiral’’of human rights change and the ‘‘cascade’’ of norm development.

Keywords: responsibility to protect, norm contestation, Iraq,Burma, South Ossetia

The United States and the United Kingdom eventually justified the war in Iraqas a ‘‘humanitarian’’ undertaking. Finding no evidence of weapons of massdestruction (WMDs) or links to Al-Qaeda, their rationale morphed to humani-tarianism and overthrowing a brutal regime, with London in particular invoking‘‘the responsibility to protect’’ Iraqi populations from Saddam Hussein’styranny.2 Let us be clear: the invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with the

Authors’ note : The authors are grateful to Martha Finnemore, Don Hubert, Naomi Kikoler, and Ramesh Thakurfor their comments and suggestions.

1Cristina G. Badescu teaches at the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto andis the author of the forthcoming Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights

(London: Routledge, 2010). Thomas G. Weiss is the presidential professor of political science and director of theRalph Bunche Institute for International Studies at The CUNY Graduate Center and is past president of the Inter-national Studies Association (2009–2010); his latest authored books are What’s Wrong with the United Nations and

How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity, 2009); UN Ideas That Changed the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,2009); and Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

2Tony Blair, the former UK prime minister, linked R2P and the war on terror in a speech in his Sedgefieldconstituency, see ‘‘Full text: Tony Blair’s speech,’’ The Guardian, March 5, 2004. A more frequent citation wasbefore the Chicago Economic Club on April 22, 1999 that outlined the circumstances that warrant humanitarianintervention, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4–23.html.

doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00412.x� 2010 International Studies Association

International Studies Perspectives (2010) 11, 354–374.

responsibility-to-protect (R2P)—indeed, the vague association almost became aconversation stopper for norm development against mass atrocities. Yet, cansuch misuse actually help the diffusion of an emerging norm?

This essay puts forward a tentative ‘‘yes’’ as a result of examining the impact ofmisapplying the R2P framework to Burma in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargisand to South Ossetia during the conflict between Russia and Georgia. Misrepre-sentations can be disingenuous and geopolitically driven as was the case for theUS and UK war in Iraq and the Russian claim to protect South Ossetians, ordisinterested but wrong as was the French invocation of R2P for Burma. Thesecases suggest that misuses can advance norms, however, through contestationand conceptual clarification. In turn, determinacy aids compliance. ‘‘In theabsence of norms,’’ one observer tells us, ‘‘exercises of power, or actions, wouldbe devoid of meaning’’ (Holf 1998:173). Because of previous humanitarian mis-steps and failures to protect civilians in such conscience-shocking emergencies asSomalia and Rwanda, the search for norms to halt mass atrocities has intensified.

International relations scholars generally argue that norm-building requires anumber of successful cases. This essay, however, is about cases contributing to normadvancement when virtually everyone—except for the state citing it—disputesthe legitimacy of applying the norm to a particular case. There are insufficientsuccessful cases of applying R2P to qualify as customary law, and so looking atmisapplications of the norm provides an alternate way to assess progress. However,such an approach has been neglected in the literature on norm development. AsGary Bass (2008:382) puts it in his history of early efforts to halt mass atrocities,‘‘We are all atrocitarians now—but so far only in words, and not yet in deeds.’’

Although the responsibility to protect is still at a preliminary stage of itsnormative trajectory, we argue that it has the potential to trigger complianceand thus increase protection on the ground, judging by the ongoing processesof norm-guided identity formation, argumentation, and especially contestation.In particular, because contestation prompts debates, denial, and tactical conces-sions on the norm in question, we compare and contrast our process-tracking ofR2P’s development against the early stages of two theoretical models that dealmost explicitly with contestation, the ‘‘spiral’’ of human rights change, and the‘‘cascade’’ of norm development.

This essay explores what for some will be an unexpected source of normconsolidation, the misuse of the responsibility to protect, and we put forward atheoretical addendum. The essay begins with a brief overview of theory and thenexplores how disingenuous humanitarian justifications for the war in Iraq in2003 did not so much definitively tarnish R2P as clarify the distinctions betweenit and doctrines of pre-emptive use of force and regime change. We then intro-duce two cases in which R2P itself was misapplied in 2008—in Burma and inSouth Ossetia—to explain how such abuses can help clarify the scope of anemerging norm and thereby reinforce it. Rather than ringing the death knellfor the new norm, they helped consolidate it.

R2P and Norm Consolidation Theory

The ‘‘life cycle’’ of norms and their role in triggering policy responses is centralto the argument here. We focus in particular on contestation following misappli-cations and discuss what the reactions triggered by such abuses suggest. But first,a brief overview of the responsibility to protect is in order.

The Responsibility to Protect

Since its emergence as the subject and title of the 2001 report by the InternationalCommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the responsibility to

355Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G. Weiss

protect has shaped international responses to egregious violations of humanrights (see also Weiss and Hubert 2001). Given R2P’s declared goal to changethe terms of humanitarian discourse, questions arise as to how far it presentlyis from the status of an international norm. How long can a norm bedescribed as ‘‘emerging’’ before it truly ‘‘has emerged’’? R2P surfaced in anattempt to move beyond the counterproductive and toxic ‘‘humanitarian inter-vention,’’ which since the international response in northern Iraq in 1991, hadoften led to largely circular tirades about the agency, timing, legitimacy,means, circumstances, and advisability of using military force to protect humanbeings. The R2P agenda, however, comprises more complex and subtleresponses to mass atrocities than the use of force, ranging from prevention topost-conflict rebuilding to protecting civilians at risk.3

The central normative tenet of the responsibility to protect, as envisaged first inthe 2001 ICISS report and embraced later by the 2005 World Summit, is that statesovereignty is contingent and not absolute (United Nations 2005:paras. 138–140).Each state has a responsibility to protect its citizens from large-scale ethnic cleans-ing, mass killings, and other conscience-shocking suffering. If that state howeveris unable or unwilling to exercise that responsibility, or actually is the perpetratorof mass atrocities, its sovereignty is abrogated while the responsibility to protectdevolves to the international community of states, ideally acting through the UNSecurity Council. The twofold responsibility in this framework—internal andexternal—draws upon earlier work by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen on ‘‘sov-ereignty as responsibility’’ (see Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild, and Zartman1996; Cohen and Deng 1998).4 The 2001 ICISS report and the World Summit Out-come Document moved away from the language of ‘‘humanitarian intervention.’’Both emphasized the need to do everything possible to prevent mass atrocities sothat deploying military force is an option after alternatives have been consideredand failed—and in the summit’s language, only for cases of ‘‘genocide, warcrimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.’’

The ICISS removed the ‘‘H’’ adjective from humanitarian intervention partlyto insist that the merits of particular situations be evaluated rather than blindlyblessed as ‘‘humanitarian.’’ For anyone familiar with the number of sins justifiedby the use of that adjective during the colonial period, the change was morethan semantic. The language marked a dramatic shift away from the rights ofoutsiders to intervene toward the rights of populations at risk to assistance andprotection and the responsibility of outsiders to come to the rescue.

In what Gareth Evans (2008a:28) calculates as ‘‘a blink of the eye in thehistory of ideas,’’ the developments since the release of the ICISS report inDecember 2001 suggest that R2P has moved from the prose and passion of aninternational commission toward being a mainstay of international public policy.It also has substantial potential to evolve further in customary international lawand to contribute to ongoing conversations about the responsibilities of states aslegitimate sovereigns. In 2004, the UN’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal-lenges and Change issued their report titled A More Secure World: Our SharedResponsibility, which endorsed ‘‘the emerging norm that there is a collectiveinternational responsibility to protect’’ (UN 2004:para. 203). Former UN secre-tary-general Kofi Annan (2005) endorsed it in his report, In Larger Freedom. Themost significant normative advance came in September 2005, when heads ofstate and government unanimously supported the responsibility to protect inparagraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, which gave R2P

3For interpretations by commissioners, see Thakur (2006a) and Evans (2008a); also see Weiss (2007) andBellamy (2009).

4This history is also analyzed in Weiss and Korn (2006), and Badescu (2009).

356 Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms

its own subsection title. In addition to the official blessing by the UN GeneralAssembly in October 2005, the Security Council made specific references to R2Pon two occasions: the April 2006 resolution 1674 on the protection of civiliansin armed conflict expressly ‘‘reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and139,’’ and the August 2006 resolution 1706 on Darfur, which was the first to linkR2P to a particular conflict.

In addition, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a special adviserfor the prevention of genocide (Francis M. Deng) and a special adviser taskedwith promoting R2P (Edward C. Luck). He has referred to the implementationof R2P as one of his priorities and in January 2009 released his report entitledImplementing the Responsibility to Protect. This report details ‘‘three pillars’’ as theapproach for implementing R2P, which includes the protection responsibilitiesof individual states, international assistance and capacity-building, and timelyand decisive international responses (United Nations 2009). Thakur and Weiss(2009:22) have dubbed the cumulative impact as ‘‘the most dramatic normativedevelopment of our time.’’

The UN General Assembly plenary debate in late July 2009 represented thelatest significant step in R2P’s normative trajectory. In preparation, the statesmembers of the ‘‘Group of Friends’’ of the responsibility to protect in New York,the UN special adviser, and civil society picked up the mantle from previousnorm entrepreneurs and mobilized around the secretary-general’s report. Ini-tially, many feared the debate would produce a resolution diluting the Septem-ber 2005 commitment, or normative backpedaling as a result of what theEconomist (2009) described on the eve of the debate among opponents who‘‘have been busily sharpening their knives.’’ A troubled start had critics tryingto paint R2P in imperialistic colors, including the opening harangue by theNicaraguan president of the General Assembly, Father Miguel d’EscotoBrockmann (2009), who called it ‘‘redecorated colonialism’’ and suggested ‘‘amore accurate name for R2P would be the right to intervene.’’

However, a close reading of remarks by 92 countries and two observers whoaddressed the plenary showed faint support for undermining R2P. Virtually allsupported its implementation, with only four countries directly questioning the2005 World Summit agreement—namely Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Venezu-ela. Of especial relevance were remarks from major regional powers that hadpreviously been reticent or even hostile, including Brazil, Nigeria, India, SouthAfrica, and Japan. The R2P agenda item ended without any resolution but aninaccurate summary from Brockmann, who suggested once again that until thelimits are clear, no implementation is possible. In this regard, past and futureinvocations of the responsibility to protect are bound to be precedents in clarify-ing the concept.

Despite disagreement and contestation, the General Assembly debate in thesummer of 2009 and again in the summer of 2010 showed governmental sup-port for implementing the September 2005 consensus. R2P is in fact at thebeginning of a long, and slow-moving, normative process. Given the early stageof its normative trajectory, R2P lacks applications in practice and examples ofcompliant behavior. As such, we find it insightful to track actors’ reactions andchanges in discourse produced by recent misapplications of the norm. By look-ing at dominant models of norm diffusion, we emphasize the early stages ofthese models in light of R2P’s novelty. As with all humanitarian initia-tives—beginning with the Geneva Conventions after 150 years—time elapsesbefore new norms stimulate routine change and compliance. Even so, it is hardto disagree with David Rieff (2008:41) that ‘‘there is considerable evidence ofchanging norms, though not, of course, changing facts on the ground.’’ By look-ing at misuses of R2P, we ask whether the norm is on a track that would ulti-mately release its potential to increase protection on the ground.


Explanations for Norm Consolidation

Norms are shared understandings and values that shape the preferences and iden-tities of state and nonstate actors that legitimize behavior, either explicitly orimplicitly (see Kratochwil 1989; Florini 1996). They are established through theevolution of precedents and eventually customary international law. The literatureon norms employs various models to explain norm creation and displacement, torecognize an emerging norm and its effect on state behavior, and to understandwhy some norms matter more than others in the international arena.

Dominant constructivist models describe norm development in the shape of‘‘norm cascades’’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), ‘‘spirals’’ (Risse, Ropp, andSikkink 1999), ‘‘boomerangs’’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998), or as processes of argu-mentation, pressure and persuasion, and diffusion (Risse 2000; Checkel 2001).This literature provides a host of insights about norm innovation in interna-tional society, but all stress the need for successful application to concrete cases.What happens, however, when we have a dearth of positive precedents accompa-nied by failed attempts at implementation and evident misuses? Successful exam-ples are an understandable preoccupation for international relations scholars aswell as decision makers. While international relations scholars also cite norm vio-lations, it is commonplace to point to why norms pale in comparison withpower; the potentially positive effects of misapplications are generally neglected.

One intriguing insight results from the possibility that illegal acts can alsohelp advance a norm. Public international law places such debates in the fore-front. These range from legal perspectives according to which ‘‘hard cases makebad law’’ (Simma 1999; Chesterman 2003), to suggestions that customary inter-national law develops through misuses and breaches of current law, with statepractice and opinio juris supporting the emergence of new norms (Cassese 1999;Charney 1999; Wedgwood 1999). Limitations on sovereignty in the name of pro-tecting human rights and redressing inequalities, for example, could beregarded as ‘‘illegal’’ for violating the basic organizing principle of internationalrelations. And so, some international lawyers suggest that ‘‘illegal acts may benecessary in order to achieve significant improvements in the international legalsystem’’ (Buchanan 2003:133).

According to Antonio Cassese, who inverts the classic Latin phrase ‘‘ex iniuriaius non oritur’’ into ‘‘ex iniuria ius oritur’’ (meaning a ‘‘right can grow out ofinjustice’’), ‘‘it is not an exceptional occurrence that new standards emerge as aresult of a breach of lex lata.’’ He encourages analysts to keep track of evolvinginternational trends while paying attention to the actual behavior of states.Cassese relies upon the example of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo to illus-trate changes to customary international law through breaches of establishednorms. While ‘‘illegal’’ (that is, without a Security Council authorization), such abreach ‘‘may gradually lead to the crystallization of a general rule of interna-tional law authorizing armed countermeasures for the exclusive purpose ofputting an end to large-scale atrocities… [which could amount to an exceptionin international law] similar to that laid down in Article 51 of the Charter (self-defence)’’ (Cassese 1999:29–30).5

We apply Cassese’s focus on the effects of illegal acts or misuses of norms as thestarting point for our discussion and apply this logic to the actual behavior ofstates. While he argues that if a norm is breached enough by powerful actors thatthe breach can become the new norm, we are interested in the process itself.Here, we find theoretical potential in examining how misguided justifications andattempted breaches of an emerging norm, when they are rejected, ‘‘back-fire’’

5The authors are grateful to Richard Vernon for suggesting this parallel.


and actually have the opposite effect, thereby clarifying matters and fostering thenorm. In focusing on the trajectory of the responsibility to protect, we keep inmind the overall context in which the R2P framework arose, namely amidst ongo-ing explorations of broader notions of sovereignty, greater concern for humanrights, and the changing nature of intrastate armed conflict.

As norms are usually contested, the itinerary of a new idea like R2P dependson its compatibility with the dominant environment. The normative architecturefor human rights within which it emerged is characterized by inconsistentrespect for the non-intervention principle, and its corollary, the non-use of forceto settle international disputes (Thakur 2006a:276–281). The derogations fromsacrosanct sovereignty made possible the ICISS claim of responsibility to protectas an ‘‘emerging guiding principle, grounded in a miscellany of legal founda-tions (human rights treaty provisions, the Genocide Convention, Geneva Con-ventions, International Criminal Court statute, and the like), growing statepractice, and the Security Council’s own practice’’ (ICISS 2001:50).

In the last quarter-century, numerous new challenges confronted thoseresponding to humanitarian disasters. For example, authorizations for UN mili-tary operations went far beyond keeping the peace between opposing parties ormonitoring fragile ceasefires; most significantly, many sought to protect andassist civilians caught in the cross-hairs of violence whose basic human rightswere grossly violated (Durch 2006; Howard 2008; Center for InternationalCooperation 2009). Other initiatives, such as the 1997 Ottawa treaty banninglandmines, managed to reduce the toll of death and injury from landmines overthe last decade (Oxfam International 2008), and the establishment of the Inter-national Criminal Court (ICC) and other ad hoc international tribunals pursuedperpetrators of mass atrocities, including heads of state (Goldstone and Smith2008). One caveat in the context of discussing similar norms needs to be rein-forced: R2P is at a much earlier stage in its ‘‘life cycle’’ than these humanitariancampaigns to ban landmines and child soldiers, or to establish the ICC. As aresult, when assessing R2P’s normative itinerary, we focus on discourse that helpsclarify rather than on compliance as evidence of normative advancement—thefamiliar images of the dead and displaced in Darfur, the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, and Zimbabwe indicate how little compliance exists.

Even so, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s ‘‘life-cycle’’ is pertinentbecause the normative campaign to institutionalize the international responsibilityto protect populations from mass atrocities certainly substantiates the major stepsin their model’s first stage, norm emergence. Process-tracing of R2P also revealsand verifies the types of social interaction that Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkinkidentified in their 5-phase ‘‘spiral model’’ of norm diffusion as instrumental adap-tation and argumentative discourse. In particular, we examine how well R2P devel-opments prior to the July 2009 General Assembly fit within the description of theearly stages of the spiral model, namely ‘‘denial’’ and ‘‘tactical concessions’’ (seeFinnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999). These two stages appearparticularly relevant for misapplications of the norm as they include processes ofadaptation, denial, dialogue, strategic bargaining, and moral conscious-raising.These stages are essential to contestation and its effects on norm development;and, in turn, they may affect moral persuasion, backlash, and widespread interna-tional protest. Counterintuitively, contestation can help strengthen supportive net-works and coalition-building, which eventually translate into reinforcing a nascentnorm.

The campaign to promote R2P includes coalition-building among supportivestates—for example, the 40 or so states members of the ‘‘Group of Friends’’ inNew York. It also encompasses civil society organizations such as the InternationalCoalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) and think tanks such as theGlobal Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). Their collective efforts


resulted in mobilizing constituencies in advance of the July 2009 and August 2010debates by organizing various press conferences to explain what R2P entails andmeeting with state officials to encourage their support for the norm.6 A new aca-demic journal also has emerged, dedicated exclusively to the topic, Global Responsi-bility to Protect. Such efforts since 2001 can be summed up under Risse andSikkink’s ‘‘adaption’’ and ‘‘arguing’’ banners in the second and third stages oftheir spiral.

Responsibility-to-protect’s progress since 2001 can also be tested against whatFinnemore and Sikkink label the ‘‘tipping point’’ in their 3-stage life cycle. Aftertheir emergence, norms move to a second stage of broad acceptance or ‘‘normcascade,’’7 which is followed by a third stage of internalization. The tippingpoint between these first two stages is reached when ‘‘a critical mass of relevantstate actors adopt the norm,’’ namely when at least one-third of the total statesin the system adopt it, including most importantly ‘‘critical states…withoutwhich the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised’’(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:890, 895). R2P was unanimously embraced at therhetorical level during the September 2005 World Summit—the largest-evergathering of heads of state and government—as evidenced by the three para-graphs on the topic in the World Summit Outcome Document. As this adoption goesbeyond the ‘‘critical mass of relevant state actors,’’ it would be hard to arguethat R2P in fact has not reached its tipping point and already moved into thesecond stage of Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, namely ‘‘norm cascade’’ (Bade-scu 2010). Notwithstanding efforts by spoilers, the World Summit Outcome Docu-ment’s provisions on R2P work to ‘‘define the authoritative framework withinwhich Member States, regional arrangements, the UN system and its partners...seek to give doctrinal, policy and institutional life to the responsibility to pro-tect’’ (United Nations 2009:4).

After R2P reached its tipping point, we started to witness the elements charac-teristic to the second phase of a norm cascade, namely socialization and imita-tion. Even so, R2P does not yet compare favorably with other humanitariancampaigns a year or two before their consolidation, such as the InternationalCriminal Court, the ban on landmines, and child soldiers.8 Typically the secondphase involves the steady accumulation of positive precedents, but this essayexplores an alternative. Although counterintuitive and ignored in the literature,misrepresentations also have the potential to foster normative advancement. It isin this context that the third stage of the spiral described by Risse and Sikkinkas comprising ‘‘tactical concessions’’ offers helpful support for the alternateframework proposed here. That is, we trace R2P’s recent developments againstthe processes characterizing this precarious phase in a norm’s life, which caneither move it forward or result in a backlash (Risse and Sikkink 1999:25). Inevaluating the evidence, we ask what several cases of misapplication of R2P tellus about the norm’s diffusion.

Advancing Norms by Misusing Them

The array of cases for which R2P language was used after the September 2005tipping point includes: misguided applications, such as Burma in the aftermath

6Prior to the debate for instance, the ICRtoP sent a letter to UN member states that was cosigned by 42 NGOs,which called for constructive engagement in the debate.

7The term ‘‘norm cascade’’ is generally associated with Finnemore and Sikkink, but Cass R. Sunstein (1997)coined it in Free Markets and Social Justice.

8Don Hubert suggests this in his forthcoming book, Human Security: Global Politics and the Human Costs of War,London: Routledge.


of Cyclone Nargis; instances when the R2P thresholds have been met but failedto provoke a vigorous reaction, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC); cases in which R2P thresholds have been met and R2P was invoked butinternational reactions have fallen far short of protecting victims, as in Darfur;instances when the R2P terminology was applied ex post facto, but R2P was effec-tive, such as post-2008 elections Kenya; and abuses of the R2P terminology, aswas the case with the conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia.However, the most prominent case of misapplying the basic humanitarianimpulse behind the R2P norm—the 2003 decision of the US-led and UK-backed‘‘coalition of the willing’’ to go to war in Iraq—occurred well before the 2005World Summit. Following shortly after the publication of the ICISS report, weexplore how this case affected R2P’s normative trajectory, before discussingBurma and Georgia.

R2P and Iraq: ‘‘What’s in a Name?’’

The war against Iraq significantly affected the overall perception of the responsi-bility to protect. Some questioned whether it was not, in fact, substantial collat-eral damage because the disingenuous humanitarian rationalizations had‘‘almost choked at birth’’ the emerging R2P norm (Evans 2004; Feinstein, Ku,and Fischer 2006). Washington’s and London’s actions reinforced lingeringsuspicions on the part of some genuinely skeptical developing countries thatsuch a norm could be used by strong against weaker states (Chandler 2002;Ayoob 2004). It also facilitated the task of spoilers—diplomats from Cuba, Vene-zuela, Algeria, Egypt, and Malaysia—denying that outside intervention can everbe anything other than imperial meddling. Despite being a common characteris-tic of the first stages of norm contestation, denial—coming generally fromnorm-violating states—translated in this context into extremely high levels ofopposition. Meanwhile, proponents warned that using Iraq as an example ofhumanitarian intervention risked draining support while not adding much—indeed, draining from—the legitimacy of such enterprises (Thakur 2006a:262).

In 2003, the human rights violations in Iraq did not, in our view, amount tothe threshold of actual or apprehended mass atrocities to invoke the responsibil-ity to protect.9 Had it existed, R2P could undoubtedly have been invoked in thelate 1980s for crimes committed against the Kurds, or in the early 1990s againstthe marsh Shi’ites. In 2003, the absence of the first condition—the gravity of thethreat—meant that the misrepresentation was evident as soon as the principlewas invoked (Roth 2004; Weiss 2004). Virtually all of the 12 ICISS commission-ers, and especially cochair Gareth Evans, vocally and publicly explained why the2003 invasion of Iraq violated the responsibility to protect (Evans 2003; Thakur2003).

The sole exception among commissioners was Michael Ignatieff. After becom-ing involved in Canadian party leadership, he publicly reevaluated his stanceand wrote a mea culpa in the New York Times Magazine (Ignatieff 2007). Hischange of mind illustrates that errors can ultimately be helpful in refining andconsolidating a norm. As a visible public intellectual, Ignatieff’s volte-face sug-gests the potential of mistakes to stimulate reflection, reaction, and clarification.In objecting to abuses, other actors are obliged to specify principles and clarifysituations. Without clear limits, sanctimonious policymakers can and will justifyactions as they like. And so, mistakes and abuses can play a role in furtheringnorms and even in reinforcing their salience when strong voices thoughtfullyand persuasively contest misrepresentations.

9For an opposing view, see Fernando R. Teson (2005).


Politically, the Iraq war made the responsibility to protect more fraught and,temporarily, more toxic. Nonetheless, it eventually helped reinforce the bound-aries of the concept and clarified why run-of-the-mill human rights violations—ifthey fall short of mass atrocity crimes—do not justify an R2P-type reaction.Equally important, Iraq shed light on the confusion between the emerging normand the doctrines of pre-emptive use of force (Nardin 2005). The former impliesproviding protection to the citizens of another country whose own governmentput them at risk, while the latter was intertwined with the right of self-defense,thus referring to a state’s prerogative to act when it or its nationals and territoryare threatened. Misapplying R2P to Iraq also highlighted the concept’s merits,in particular its precautionary principles and criteria for legitimacy (Thakur2006b:476–477).

The fact that the responsibility to protect was adopted in 2005 by presidents,prime ministers, and princes at the World Summit—two years after the norm’sabuse in Iraq—suggests that member states sought to prevent future abuses byclarifying the conditions under which the use of force for human protectionpurposes was permitted. And so, judging by the significant normative develop-ments since the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation, the disingenuousinvocation of R2P to justify the war in Iraq did not destroy R2P. In fact, theimpact was quite the opposite. What about Burma in the aftermath of CycloneNargis, and South Ossetia in the conflict between Russia and Georgia?

Burma After Cyclone Nargis

On May 3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Burma’s Irrawaddy Delta, producing theworst natural disaster in the country’s recorded history. According to various esti-mates, the crisis affected between 1.5 and 3 million people, with death toll num-bers ranging between 100,000 and 200,000 (Beyrer and Genser 2008; Hoagland2008; International Herald Tribune 2008; New York Times 2008). Despite the severityof the crisis, Burmese authorities at first refused to allow access by foreign work-ers, insisting on control over all aid operations. Ten days after the cyclone, lessthan a quarter of the requisite aid was entering the country, and that was beingdistributed ineffectively (Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,2008:2).

The military government’s response presented an acute quandary for humani-tarians, comparable to earlier ones in places as different as Somalia and Bosnia,namely how to succor civilians when a government refuses its consent. On May7, 2008, frustrated by the delay of the authorities in Burma to grant access,French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner—who had been in the forefront ofdebates on humanitarian action since he founded Medecins sans Frontieres(MSF) in the late 1960s (Bettati 1987; Bettati and Kouchner 1987)—called uponthe UN Security Council to invoke R2P to deliver emergency aid without theconsent of the Burmese generals. While some agreed with his stance, othersthought that such action would be counterproductive, making aid more prob-lematic and mediation by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)more difficult. Under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs John Holmesdescribed Kouchner’s call for R2P as ‘‘unnecessarily confrontational’’ (BBC News,2008a). Norm entrepreneurs argued against Kouchner’s passionate call, mainlybecause it would complicate ongoing humanitarian relief efforts and ‘‘not helpthe R2P case’’ (Evans 2008b; Thakur 2008).

As is the case with any normative campaign subject to contestation, othersargued that Kouchner was right to call on the Security Council to act under theR2P banner, with media commentators in particular suggesting that statesrespect their commitments (Ash 2008; Axworthy 2008; Daalder and Stares 2008).Missing from media accounts, however, was a clear view about the most


appropriate way to forcibly deliver aid. A military invasion was out of the ques-tion, but some suggested that the United States and France—the two states withships waiting in the nearby waters, loaded with food, water, medicine, and heavy-lift helicopters—should airdrop aid to victims (New York Times 2008). And yet,R2P requires ‘‘reasonable chances of success,’’ which in this case were doubtfulas food, sanitation, and medical supplies would have remained on pallets with-out boots on the ground, local transport to reach remote settlements, andtrained personnel.

Apart from the paucity of support for Kouchner’s proposition at the UN, theresponsibility to protect also was largely absent in mainstream media, even inFrance. After an initial op-ed (Nougayrede, Bolopion, and Ferenczi 2008:4),commentary was less about Kouchner’s argument and more about the lack ofsupport internationally, even from President Nicolas Sarkozy. Meanwhile, Frenchdiplomats scratched their heads over Kouchner’s oratory. His invocationundoubtedly can be explained by a long-standing tactic of seeking publicity forcauses to which he is personally committed.10

The refusal of the generals to allow external relief after the cyclone wouldnot, in itself, trigger the application of R2P. However, if such actions had led tomassive deaths and displacement, then it would have been relevant. The advo-cates of R2P had to carefully consider the details of this crisis, especially as theoriginal ICISS report included under threshold criteria ‘‘overwhelming naturalor environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling orunable to cope, or call for assistance’’ (ICISS 2001:33). Unlike the 2001 ICISSreport, however, only genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethniccleansing figure specifically in the 2005 World Summit decision as triggers. Inthis case and despite the gravity of the crisis, the barometer of doing betterthan harm led UN officials and Asian diplomats to posit that Burma was not anR2P situation. As Edward Luck argued early on, ‘‘linking ‘the responsibilityto protect’ to the situation in Burma is a misapplication of the doctrine’’ (BBCNews 2008b).

South Ossetia

Three months later, the responsibility to protect returned to the spotlight forthe 5-day war between Russia and Georgia. With only 3% of the total Georgianpopulation, South Ossetia had seceded in 1992 and had been functionally sepa-rate since. Georgia tried to retake the break-away region by force several timesafter the unilateral declaration of independence. The Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitored unstable areas and facilitatedeconomic rehabilitation projects, while Russian troops acted as peacekeepers tomonitor the 1992 ceasefire. This arrangement maintained a tenuous peace, butit also served to exacerbate the conflict in so far as Russian peacekeepers backedthe South Ossetian claim for independence, and Moscow facilitated immigrationby people of Russian heritage. In addition and despite Georgia’s protests, mostSouth Ossetians now have Russian passports; and Moscow accelerated their issu-ance in the months preceding the military confrontation (BBC News 2009). Thenone-too-hidden-agenda was to have an independent South Ossetia vote to fusewith the Russian republic of North Ossetia.

Georgia’s offensive to regain control over the breakaway province began onAugust 7, 2008, arguing that it was acting against violent secessionists andRussian aggression. Georgia’s claims that Russian forces were the first to enterSouth Ossetia were false. One day after the Georgian artillery fire and air strikes

10Telephone interview with Le Monde correspondent, June 15, 2009.


against the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, Russia responded by sendinglarge numbers of troops into South Ossetia, launching bombing raids andquickly outflanking Georgian military forces and expelling them from theenclave. Nearly 100,000 people were driven from their homes, with Russia citing1,600 South Ossetian civilian casualties, a number disputed by Georgia thatclaimed some 200 were killed, and hundreds wounded (Antidze 2008). An inde-pendent commission appointed by the EU to investigate the war found that 850people were killed, and 35,000 of the 100,000 who fled their homes remaineddisplaced more than one year after the war (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009).

President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin insisted thatRussia had the legal right to move into South Ossetia to prevent genocideagainst South Ossetian separatists and to defend Russian citizens and its ownpeacekeepers. Medvedev’s and Putin’s genocide argument found echoes from itsambassadors to the UN and to NATO (Deleroz 2008; Reuters 2008). ForeignMinister Sergei Lavrov was the first to justify Russia’s use of force as an R2P exer-cise in an interview with BBC News on August 9, when he argued that ‘‘the lawsof the Russian Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise theresponsibility to protect’’ (BBC News 2008c).

For Western governments, Moscow’s characterization was transparently falseand unanimously condemned. The decibel level of diplomatic guffaws suggestedthe perceived irrelevance of R2P to Russian military actions. Not only was thegenocide claim empty, but the Russian intervention was also disproportionate; itviolated R2P criteria for an appropriate scope and intensity of response as wellas international humanitarian law. Moreover, the main justification for interven-ing in South Ossetia—protecting Russian citizens—was a classic case of self-defense under UN Charter Article 51. The fact that Russian troops had moveddeep inside Georgia made it even harder for Moscow to justify its claim thattroops and tanks reflected a genuine humanitarian impulse, especially becausethe military exercise was reported to be popular among 80% of Russians.Moscow used R2P internationally to legitimize its intervention, but publicenthusiasm reflected less humanitarian rhetoric than a forceful stance againstGeorgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.

The beginning of a similar incursion in Abkhazia provided further evidence ofthe hollowness of Russia’s humanitarian claims. Moscow argued that sendingadditional ground troops into another breakaway region was preventive and reas-sured the local population that the scenario in South Ossetia would not berepeated (Kendall 2008). Within days, Russian troops had expelled Georgianforces and controlled both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On August 26, 2008,Russia officially recognized both provinces as independent sovereign states andimplemented a ceasefire brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.11

Besides Russia, to date only Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru have recognizedSouth Ossetia.

The debate about responsibility for the war reignited after the release of thereport by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in

11After the conflict, some commentators have compared Kosovo to Georgia, and argued that Russia used the‘‘Kosovo precedent’’ to send tanks into Georgia. (See, for example, Oksana Antonenko’s ‘‘From Kosovo to SouthOssetia: In Search of a Precedent,’’ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 19, 2008.) However, RussianForeign Minister Sergei Lavrov described any parallels between Kosovo and Georgia as ‘‘irrelevant,’’ and suggested‘‘the difference [was]…evident between Belgrade’s policy towards Kosovo and how Saakashvili’s regime behavedtowards South Ossetia and Abkhazia.’’ (See ‘‘Russia’s Case on Georgia Territories: Like Kosovo or Not?,’’ The Chris-

tian Science Monitor, August 28, 2008.) And yet, after Western recognition of Kosovar independence, Vladimir Putinsuggested that Russian support for irredentism in South Ossetia would intensify. (See The Guardian, February 15,2008, ‘‘Kosovo Breakaway Illegal, Says Putin.’’)


Georgia, which the European Union (EU) established to investigate the 2008war between Russia and Georgia.12 Despite EU declarations denying that thereport was about assigning blame, the report’s findings blaming both sidessparked nothing but debates on the causes of the war. On the one hand, thereport concluded that Georgia caused the 5-day war and that its attack on theSouth Ossetian capital was not justified under international law. On the otherhand, Russia was also responsible for the war in that the Georgian attack fol-lowed months of Russian provocation; and Russia escalated the conflict throughthe massive deployment of troops and pushing far into Georgia, also in violationof international law (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on theConflict in Georgia 2009). According to the report, Russia’s initial militaryactions in defense of its personnel in South Ossetia were justified, but its subse-quent actions were not. Moscow’s military actions were triggered by ‘‘humanitar-ian’’ motives every bit as much as Washington’s and London’s decisions toinvade Iraq. In a heated exchange of declarations with Russia in the July 2009General Assembly, Georgia pointed to the Russian abuse of the ‘‘noble principleof R2P’’ (General Assembly 2009).

Misrepresenting a Norm, the Dynamics

The United Nations is still searching for doctrine to address the unpredictablecontemporary security environment (Slaughter 2005). R2P provides one for massatrocities, but a contested norm can lead to inconsistent policies. As PeterKatzenstein (1993:286) argues, norms cannot determine outcomes as long as‘‘they are contested and … contingent.’’ It is not outcomes in Myanmar andSouth Ossetia that preoccupy us here, but rather what triggered the invocationof R2P in the first place and how such misuses affect R2P’s normative journey.Such cases test different hypotheses about causality and norm conformance,including: material self-interest (Krasner 1999); behavioral logics of utility maxi-mization related to either ‘‘consequence’’ or ‘‘appropriateness’’ (March 1994);conformity to norms based on available choices, or the lack of choice as a resultof social structures (Goldstein and Keohane 1993); and persuasion (Finnemoreand Sikkink 1998).

While existing theories address norm violations, they do not probe the poten-tial benefits of misrepresentations. The literature describes norm progression asessentially dependent on successful arguments, which Neta Crawford (2002)defines as those able to persuade other actors to see a state’s actions as legiti-mate or to adopt a specific course of action. Successful political arguments thengenerally push a contested norm toward the final stage of its life cycle, internali-zation. However, ‘‘arguments are less likely to be persuasive if the social andmaterial contexts do not align with the argument’’ (Crawford 2002:37). None-theless, we suggest that instances when the argument and context are misalignedcan help advance norms too. Since ‘‘norms and practice are mutually constitu-tive’’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998:35), it is instructive to gauge the actual impact ofmisuse. And so, assessing normative shifts not only through the lenses of out-comes but also of contestation can shed light on consolidation. Primarily, whatwe introduce here is a supplement to the model for norm development, whichis centered on the advantages of debate and contestation after misuse.

Contestation is a reality that is seldom explicit in the literature, but it can playa central role in an alternate path to normative progress. We focus on changes

12The EU-sponsored report contains the findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on theConflict in Georgia. Because it was written by the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, it is also known as the ‘‘TagliaviniReport,’’ see Volume I, II, and III, September 2009, available from http://91.121.127.28/ceiig/Report.html.


in discourse and subsequent clarification in tracking R2P’s normative evolution,which are distinct from actual compliance when assessing whether a norm is‘‘spiraling’’ or not. Nonetheless, in this instance at least, contestation triggeredby misuse helped advance the norm by fostering necessary clarification. Toexplain this theoretical proposition, we first describe the conditions needed forour variation to work, followed by a discussion of the effects of contestation andthe range of potential benefits.

Responsibility-to-protect’s status as an emerging norm makes it easy to diffuseand to abuse—although proponents argue that it is more difficult to manipulatethan ‘‘humanitarian intervention.’’ To date, many hard-core opponents havelamented R2P’s potential for abuse, but few have pointed to a silverlining—namely, the benefits of the ensuing clarification. Along with positiveprecedents, misrepresentations clearly falling outside the norm’s legitimatescope—certainly for Iraq, Burma, and South Ossetia—represent alternative pathsto norm formation; they too contribute to building a consistent R2P message byclarifying what the concept is, and is not. Contestation from key actors is a sinequa non for this process. That is, only when actively contested can misrepresenta-tions help as much as positive precedents in clarifying ongoing debate overscope and boundaries.

In the widespread objections to the use of the responsibility to protect in thethree cases, a host of actors had the opportunity to formulate positions thatincreased the norm’s determinacy—an essential component of development thatmeasures the extent of the standard’s clarity to those expected to adhere to it(Franck 1990). The initial blow-back may have been negative from the abuse ofhumanitarian rhetoric for Iraq along with the misuse of the R2P language forBurma and South Ossetia, but the longer-term effects were increased conceptualclarity. The vitriolic debates triggered by the 2003 invasion of Iraq clarifiedbeliefs by UN member states. The denial stage included refusals to accept thevalidity of the responsibility to protect and reaffirmations of such establishedinternational norms as non-intervention as well as moral consciousness-raisingabout the need for such a norm as R2P. The objections ranged from civil societyand government representatives supportive of the R2P framework, to institutionsand states responding not so much to the abuse of the norm, but to the nega-tive effects in which misrepresentation could result, such as aggression.

Visible contestation by such diverse actors proved important not only as publicdiplomacy but also as a means to influence domestic and international opinion.The constitutive aspect of norms contributes to both learning and norm sociali-zation and ultimately helps to determine whether norms apply under given cir-cumstances (Risse 2000). For instance, Moscow’s feeble attempt in August 2008to justify its military actions in South Ossetia as in line with R2P failed abysmallywith international audiences. Russian claims were deemed bogus not onlybecause of transparent self-interests but also because of the unseemly rapidresort to military force without even a semblance of diplomacy. In the post-ColdWar era, military muscle-flexing is less acceptable and legitimacy is more salientto justify actions to domestic, but especially external, audiences—the EU’s fact-finding report that both parties were to blame was a clear reflection of this real-ity (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia2009).

The search for legitimacy drives the spread of norms, and so states struggle toincrease the acceptability of their far-fetched humanitarian claims by makingnormative appeals. However, the harsh and immediate reactions to such misusesof R2P quickly exposed the humanitarian charade in Iraq as well as in Burmaand South Ossetia. Invoking R2P was transparently illegitimate and out of linewith behavior-based definitions of ‘‘meeting a normative expectation of the com-munity of states’’ (Franck 1992:46). The early stages of norm development—the


first stage in the cascade and second and third in the spiral model—compriseprecisely processes debating the boundaries of the new norm, its application toparticular cases, and inadequate or opportunistic compliance.

The July 2009 and August 2010 General Assembly debates on R2P provideadditional evidence of this assertion. Bargaining among proponents and oppo-nents, processes of norm-guided identity formation, and contestation character-ized the debate; overall it demonstrated member states’ desire to move forward.And this reality was further highlighted in September 2009 when General Assem-bly resolution 63 ⁄ 308 agreed to ‘‘continue its consideration.’’ Even non-support-ers, such as Egypt representing the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), remainedwithin the boundaries agreed UPON in September 2005. As Risse and Sikkink(1999:7) argue, ‘‘to endorse a norm not only expresses belief, but also createsimpetus for behaviour consistent with the belief.’’ Other unexpected voices,such as Brazil, admitted that paralysis on the implementation of R2P was not anoption, while Chile emphasized that ‘‘misuse of a concept does not invalidateit.’’13 The central effect of contestation in this, and earlier episodes, was to clar-ify the scope of the responsibility to protect; and in this case, the conceptualgap was and remains one of the biggest deterrents to normative advancement.

The three misrepresentations helped to reduce the conceptual gap in twoessential ways. First, R2P should not be seen narrowly; it is not only about the useof military force and is not a synonym for ‘‘humanitarian intervention,’’ althoughsupporters sometimes lapse into this language. This clarification was especiallypertinent after Washington’s and London’s rhetoric disingenuously morphed intoa ‘‘humanitarian’’ justification for the war in Iraq when WMDs and links to Al-Qa-eda proved non-existent. The South Ossetian case was helpful in that humanitar-ian concerns were so transparently absent; moreover, R2P was not to be viewednarrowly as forceful military intervention even to protect one’s ‘‘nationals.’’

The responsibility to protect is above all about taking timely preventive action,about identifying situations that are capable of deteriorating into mass atrocitiesand bringing to bear diplomatic, legal, economic, and military pressure. As theWorld Summit Outcome Document stresses, preventing atrocities is a state’s responsi-bility, and part of international prevention efforts is to help countries to helpthemselves. We require reactions long before the only option remaining is the USArmy’s 82nd Airborne Division; and we also require additional commitments afterdeploying outside military forces. ‘‘R2P prevention’’ and ‘‘R2P peacebuilding’’should be distinct from the normal panoply of early- and post-conflict measures,or R2P packaging has no value added.

Second, and at the opposite end of the spectrum, R2P also should not beviewed as the protection of everyone from everything. The hostile reactionsagainst the French foreign minister’s claim that Burmese foot-dragging afterCyclone Nargis should trigger an R2P-type response demonstrated why the normcannot be applied too widely. Broadening perspectives away from reaction hasopened the floodgates to numerous appeals to address too many problems. Forexample, part of the political support at the World Summit reflected an under-standable but erroneous desire to use R2P to mobilize more support for root-cause prevention, or investments in economic and social development. Forbureaucrats’ seeking a way to finance pet projects, there is nothing that may notfigure on the R2P agenda. While it may be emotionally tempting to say that wehave a responsibility to protect people from HIV ⁄ AIDS, small arms, or the Inuitfrom global warming, if R2P covers everything, it means nothing.

13For more details on the declarations of Egypt, Brazil, and Chile during the Plenary Meeting of the GeneralAssembly on R2P, July 23, 2009, see http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/NAM_Egypt_ENG.pdf, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Brazil_ENG.pdf, and http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Chile_ENG_SP.pdf, respectively.


Hence, the responsibility to protect is not synonymous with the catch-allnotion of human security. The norm’s utility arises as a rallying cry for visceraland rapid international reactions in the face of mass murder and not garden-variety abuses of human rights. Removing ambiguity about invoking R2P ininstances related to self-defense provided additional clarity for the norm’s scope.Had the justification related to Russia’s responsibility to protect its own nationalsbeen genuine, UN Charter Article 51 and the legitimate right to self-defenseshould have first come to mind. The Russian rhetorical flourish was instantlydebunked as a crude and unsuccessful attempt to dress-up self-interested inter-vention in humanitarian garb, remarkably akin to the American and British dis-guises in Iraq. But the newer clarification came in Burma. The claim thathumanitarian crises brought about by natural disasters might also fall under R2Pumbrella also came into sharper focus, but only if the actions of the governmentof Burma had led to crimes against humanity.

Apart from refining its scope and boundaries, misrepresentations also canclarify the actors and the means through which a new norm is to be imple-mented. The loud and clear international reactions to these cases emphasizedthe importance of sequencing. That is, peaceful means (diplomatic, economic,or political) should be used first and the use of force only as a last resort.Clarifying the role of regional and sub-regional actors is also important. Themisuse in Burma helped clarify useful patterns of collaboration and a division oflabor among actors. One proposition was that the ‘‘bad cop’’ Kouchner made itpossible for the ‘‘good cop’’ diplomats and humanitarians to be more effectivethan they would have been otherwise. In any case, ASEAN persuaded the govern-ment to allow access for relief and rescue teams. The Tripartite Core Group wasa collaborative effort between the UN, ASEAN, and Myanmar; but in effect, itacted as an ASEAN-led mechanism to facilitate post-Cyclone Nargis cooperationbetween Myanmar and other actors. Although the Security Council has alwaysbeen the preferred institutional home for authorizations, ASEAN’s diplomaticefforts in Burma built upon earlier efforts ranging from NATO’s efforts in theBalkans to those by the Economic Community of West African States.

In addition to key conceptual clarifications, misuses generate additional bene-fits for norm advancement when various actors find common ground to collabo-rate in supporting the norm. In doing so, contestation creates and consolidatesnorm promoters. Norm entrepreneurs play a critical role by calling attention toissues falling under the R2P banner and framing cases using this terminology.They may have various motivations for contesting misuses of R2P. Regardless ofwhether their concerns are genuine, advancing the norm and attracting othernorm promoters in a coalition result from taking a position on R2P and unmask-ing misrepresentations.

Whether intentional or not, norm promoters serve to highlight organizationsand officials as future allies. For both Burma and South Ossetia, norm promot-ers worked from an existing framework and also invented new ones specificallyto lobby for the norm. This dynamic encompassed nonstate actors like theGCR2P and the ICR2P, state members of the ‘‘Group of Friends’’ in New York,and intergovernmental organizations (including the secretary-general’s specialadviser and other senior staff).

Misuses can also oblige reluctant organizations and hesitant bureaucrats toacknowledge R2P and redress the effects that misrepresentations have on theirday-to-day policies and activities. For instance, if a UN agency or departmentskeptical of or even hostile to R2P decides to ignore a Burma or South Ossetia,the consequences on future work (that is, being left out of the action) might beworse than taking a public position in support of R2P. As such, misuses have thepotential to draw skeptical organizational units and individual dissidents into thenorm promoters’ camp.


Ironically, misrepresentations show the importance of the responsibility toprotect because even those rejecting it predicate their position on accepting theoverall validity of the norm. If it were without value, states would not be temptedto justify their actions by using the language, especially countries that have notaccepted the R2P framework in the first place. Russia’s temporary embrace, inparticular, suggests the entrapment power of an emerging norm. Of numerouspossible justifications, Paris and Moscow specifically opted for R2P. The unani-mous agreement at the World Summit circumscribed the limits to the UN Char-ter’s prohibition on outside interference in the domestic jurisdiction of memberstates. It is relevant that Kouchner’s proposal to authorize the forcible deliveryof aid in Burma was rejected in the Security Council first by China and Russia,only for Moscow to do a volte-face and invoke R2P four months later in SouthOssetia. As Ramesh Thakur (2010) reminds us, normative imitation is the mostsincere form of flattery. Reactions to violations of R2P, ranging from amity tohostility, prove the very existence of the norm. Furthermore, the hearty andwidespread international repudiations of the three attempted misapplicationsand abuses helped boost confidence in the robustness of the R2P norm.

Conclusion

Both application and misapplication—in rhetoric and in reality—can foster anorm’s advancement. They both augment conceptual clarity and thus putemerging norms like R2P more firmly into place, thereby constituting prece-dents for customary law solidification. We have argued that debates and contes-tations after misapplications and abuses can constitute steps in the direction ofnorm advancement. Misuses and violations prompt discussion and contribute toclarifying the scope and boundaries of a new norm. In turn, such determinacycan foster compliance and what is ultimately required of a norm, namelyincreased protection on the ground. Despite ongoing grousing about the norm’srelevance and purpose, the General Assembly debates of 2009 and 2010 suggestthat the responsibility to protect is unlikely to be dislodged any time soon.

The implications are twofold for assessing the trajectory of emerging norms inthe ‘‘unfinished journey’’ of global governance (Weiss and Thakur 2010). First,one clear gap in constructivist theorizing about norm consolidation could befilled by examining how misuses actually contribute to norm advancement. Inter-national relations literature stresses positive examples and precedents whereasnegative ones in the form of misuses also contribute to norm solidification. Weshowed that an unexpected source of momentum for a normative spiral resultsfrom misusing the responsibility to protect. Misrepresentations have served toremove confusion about the circumstances under which R2P should be invoked;the cases of Burma and South Ossetia were helpful, not hurtful. As is the casewhen a rule of customary international humanitarian law is violated, protestsover abuse can reinforce the salience of a rule rather than weaken it. The paral-lel is valid, as former UN high commissioner for human rights Louise Arbourwrites, because R2P ‘‘is anchored in existing law, in institutions and in lessonslearnt from practice. Its vitality flows from its inherent soundness and justice, aswell as from the concept’s comparative advantages over formulations of humani-tarian intervention’’ (Arbour 2008:447–448).

Second, in spite of skeptics’ arguments, the misuse of the R2P language—andespecially trenchant protests—suggest a paradox: this norm is better understoodand more broadly accepted than often believed. As expected during the earlystages of a norm spiraling toward socialization, backlash, and contestation domi-nate much of public diplomacy; but backlash and contestation also can serve asboundary-defining exercises that clarify the actual meaning and limits of thenorm. For instance, before the July 2009 General Assembly, the secretary-general


called upon member states to ‘‘resist those who try to change the subject or turnour common effort to curb the worst atrocities in human history into a struggleover ideology, geography or economics’’ (UN News 2009). Meanwhile, civil soci-ety emphasized how widely the basic elements of the norm resonated14 and theneed to go beyond verbal commitments toward implementation (Evans 2009).The debate ended on a surprisingly positive note, with regional powers not pre-viously members of the choir recognizing the need to move R2P forward anddownplaying any association of the norm with neo-imperialism and neo-colonial-ism. And so, the feared retreat and buyer’s remorse never took place.

Nevertheless, we should not minimize the operational challenges to imple-mentation. The Security Council’s dithering since early 2003 in spite of massivemurder and displacement in Darfur resembles its demonstrated inability toaddress the woes of the DRC. The dramatic disparity between lofty multilateralrhetoric and the collective spinelessness to prevent mass atrocities is distressingbut is not lethal to an emerging norm (Badescu and Bergholm 2009:306). Eventhe abuse of the ‘‘H’’ word in relationship to the fabricated case of the war inIraq did not do that.

Nonetheless, the responsibility to protect was not unscathed, which is whyenthusiasm greeted the shot-in-the-normative-arm resulting from the successfulinternational efforts in early 2008 that halted carnage and ethnic cleansing afterthe disputed December 2007 presidential elections in Kenya (Weiss 2010). Whenseveral dozen ethnic groups took to the streets after the presidential ballot,cynics thought that lofty sentiments once again would do little to forestall whatseemed like an inevitable downward spiral of yet another African state. Yet Kenyabecame the focus of rapid and consolidated international action. Instead ofmerely chanting the hollow mantra of ‘‘never again,’’ outside actors did notdefer to the shibboleth of national sovereignty. Instead of letting Kenya continueto slide toward the precipice of becoming a fragile if not failed state, crucialmembers of the international community of states—in this case, African neigh-bors, the African Union (AU), and former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan asthe AU mediator backed by the United States and the European Union—alongwith the United Nations and the Kenyan and international civil society, actedrapidly and in unison. Earlier misrepresentations and failures to apply the normmay in fact have facilitated its subsequent application in Kenya.

Indeed, in another departure from the preferences in the mainstream litera-ture, the Kenya example suggests that a norm need not even be explicit to beinfluential. Given the continued normative controversy, it was probably best notto place R2P in neon lights even if the fear of a Rwanda-like catastrophe moti-vated Kenyans and non-Kenyans alike. ‘‘It’s worth noting that the Responsibilityto Protect was explicitly not part of the debate in the Council,’’ US AmbassadorSusan Rice tells us. ‘‘Colleagues who handled this issue in 2008 tell methat…[r]aising the R2P flag may be morally satisfying, but it can be politicallyfraught’’ (Rice 2009).

The responsibility to protect is an idea, and we should remind ourselvesthat ideas matter, for good and for ill. Their use as well as misuse helps movea norm forward. The cumulative effect of R2P theory and practice is a sub-stantial curtailment of sovereignty and the correlative principle of non-inter-vention. In short, internal affairs are not what they used to be. Politicaltheorist Daniel Philpott (2001) demonstrates that revolutions in sovereigntyare driven primarily by the power of ideas; and we are in the midst of one in

14For one example in point, see the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘‘Open Letter toGovernments in Advance of the General Assembly Debate,’’ available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil_society_statements/2442?theme=alt1.


which state sovereignty is becoming more contingent on upholding basichuman values, in which states have obligations and not just rights. ‘‘For allthe difficulties of acceptance and application that lie ahead, there are,’’Gareth Evans (2008a:7) encourages us, ‘‘not many ideas that have the poten-tial to matter more for good, not only in theory but in practice, than that ofthe responsibility to protect.’’

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Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?

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