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Book ReviewsPublished online: 26 Jun 2007.

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Book Reviews

Der Einfluss von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten in Ostmittel-

und Sudosteuropa, Mariana Hausleitner and Harald Roth, eds. (Munich: IKGS, 2006),

360 pp.þ illustrations.

South-eastern Europe, which developed numerous national minorities and

authoritarian regimes in the aftermath of World War I, has now become a major

field of interest for the breadth of theories of fascism and National Socialism. The

Romanian “Garda de Fier” (Iron Guard), the Hungarian “Nyilaskeresztes Part”

(Arrow and Cross Party ), the “Ustasa” of Croatia and others had backgrounds and

aims in common but also many differences and subsequently developing contradictory

political perspectives. As these movements also had relationships with German and

Italian fascist parties, since the fall of communism it has been one of the main research

focuses to look for the historical contexts and developments in which the extreme right

was able to spread among “German” minorities and in states such as Romania or

Hungary.

The 13 chapters of this German-language book deal with the German and

Hungarian minorities in the new states of the Danube region after the collapse of

the Habsburg Empire. In his introduction, Daniel Ursprung gives a detailed discussion

of the problem of how to define and differentiate fascism and National Socialism with

regard to their South Eastern disciples. He points out the difficulties in comparing

them and also discusses the different varieties of “fascisms”; he sees especially in

the German discussions a lack of referring to “theories of generic fascism,” i.e. a gen-

eralized theory of what all the phenomena comprehend without relying on monocausal

explanations for its genesis.

Ursprung also discusses the question of whether there was something like a special

“Minderheitenfaschismus” regarding the “German” minorities in South East

Europe—a topic that resonates when several articles deal with the microscopic

changes of mentalities of the “German” minority in Romania. Bernhard Bottcher

finds a certain ambiguity in the attitude of the so-called “Saxons” in Transylvania

after World War I expressed in the iconography of their war memorials. An over-

nationalistic stance was not evident after World War I that can be related to a right

wing or even pre-fascist interpretation of their past. This was also caused by the

Romanian authorities not allowing too strong an expression of minority independence

when Romania tried to put together a new state that was composed of very different

historic territories with a large number of minorities. Cornelia Schlarb observes

similar structures of reluctance, congruence and resistance in the attitude of the Pro-

testant Church, which exercised a considerable influence on the minority of “Saxons”

in Transylvania. Although, as Pierre de Tregomain points out, after 1944 the

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 35, No. 3, July 2007

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/07/030579-21# 2007 Association for the Study of Nationalities

DOI: 10.1080/00905990701368837

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Protestant Church was eager to wipe any memories of its involvement with the

German National Socialist taking over of the minority, it could not be clearly foreseen

that the different parts of the Protestant Church would bow to German pressure and

become part of the National Socialist movement.

As Thomas Sindilariu shows, the body and sport politics of the “Saxons” did not

initially adapt to fascism. Certain features of the National Socialist ideology did not

necessarily have the same implications in Romania as in Germany.

The situation was very different in former Russian Bessarabia with its small

German minority that was attached to Romania after World War I. The difficulties

of integrating it into “Greater Romania” included a communist-led uprising in the

town of Tatarbunar close to the Soviet border. Olga Schroeder-Negru shows that

the Germans achieved an improved standing in the Romanian authorities’ eyes

through their assistance in quelling the riot.

This collection of essays has the opportunity to make a comparison of different min-

orities in different states. In a large chapter Franz Sz. Horvath examines the development

of the Hungarians in Romania to fascism; Meinolf Arens and Daniel Bein use edited

documents to describe the different positions towards the Roman Catholic Hungarians

living east of the Carpathians, the “proto”-minority of the “Csangos” in Moldavia.

Norbert Spannenberger and Jozsef Vonyo look at the rise of Hungarian fascism and its

reception by the German minority. As in the case of Slovakia and Slavonia (northern

Yugoslavia) it was the role of the “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle” (VoMi) to prepare the

very different German minorities for the National Socialist ideology and bring them

into line (“Gleichschaltung”). Christoph Morrissey discusses the thin border between

“Heimatforschung” and National Socialist ideology in the example of the Slovak situ-

ation after its creation as an “independent” state, whereas Carl Bethke looks at the Sla-

vonian Germans and Zoran Janjetovic examines the Vojvodina Germans in Yugoslavia.

Resistance was rarely to be found; IvoGoldstein gives a concise overview of the destruc-

tion of the Jews in the Nazi-dependent “Ustasa” state of Bosnia.

What these refreshing studies by young researchers reveal is a specific perspec-

tive on National Socialism from the angle of German minorities in south-eastern

Europe and their co-minorities. The authors use new approaches to differentiate

the political options of the Germans and other minorities in their special political

and ethnic contexts which ultimately led to their “Gleichschaltung.” Although we

know the sombre end of these stories it is still very useful for our understanding

to research the differences and options that minorities and their institutions have

exercised.

For a better understanding of the geography some maps would have been helpful.

Markus Bauer # 2007

School of Languages and Area Studies

University of Portsmouth

markus.Bauer@port.ac.uk

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Rossija: narod, praviteli, civilizacija [La Russie: le peuple, les dirigeants, la civilis-

ation] Andrej Nikolaevic Sakharov (Moscou: Institut Rossijskoj Istorii, RAN,

2004), 960 pp.

Cet imposant ouvrage de pres de mille pages in-8 grand format rassemble une tren-

taine d’articles et d’etudes publies par le Directeur de l’Institut d’Histoire russe

(Academie des Sciences de la Russie) depuis l’effondrement de l’Urss; et il temoigne

a sa facon du renouvellement de la reflexion historique entraıne par ce seisme qui a

oblige les historiens a reconsiderer leurs anciennes certitudes et a remettre sur le

metier des conceptions de plus en plus ouvertement contestees et depassees.

Pour l’essentiel, ce volume au titre ambitieux, qui porte sur un bon millenaire d’his-

toire russe, s’articule en trois parties intitulees, “Histoire,” “Historiographie” et “Pub-

lications historiques courantes (publicistika),” toutes trois egalement dignes d’interet.

A commencer par la premiere partie proprement historique ou l’auteur traite de sujets

familiers aux historiens de la Russie, mais objets de discussions toujours renouvelees.

Abordant tout d’abord les “Facteurs historiques du developpement de la Russie,” l’A.

donne priorite (tout comme deja A.Leroy-Beaulieu) aux facteurs geographiques et cli-

matiques qui ont conditionne (avec la mediocrite de sols) aussi bien les mœurs et le

genre de vie que l’habitat et le vetement des peuples Slaves de l’Est, et qui ont dura-

blement prolonge la survivance de la commune paysanne, avec ses avantages et ses

inconvenients, enumeres au passage par l’auteur.

Autre facteur historique determinant: l’absence de frontieres naturelles qui ouvrait

le pays aux invasions successives venues de l’Est comme de l’Ouest; et cette menace

exterieure permanente (bien anterieure a la formation de la Russie) aurait joue en

faveur d’un pouvoir fort et centralise, responsable de la diffusion du servage, vu la

faible densite d’une population qui etait encore au milieu du XVIIIe siecle (2.3 hab.

au km 2) pres du quinze fois inferieure a celle du royaume de France. Sans omettre

le “facteur ethno-biospherique” cher a L. N. Gumilev, inspire lui-meme par les

travaux de V. I. Vernadskij. En butte au scepticisme des historiens, cette notion enig-

matique fait en realite intervenir l’interaction des societes et (en schematisant) de leur

eco-systeme environnant, qui influencerait l’expansion ou le declin des civilisations

ainsi que leurs fluctuations demographiques au cours de l’histoire . . .

Comme on le voit, l’auteur se prononce resolument pour une approche “multifactor-

ielle” trop longtemps eclipsee par le marxisme primaire du Precis d’histoire de l’Urss

de Staline qui minimisait le role des personnalites dans l’histoire et qui expurgeait la

realite au nom de la lutte des classes et d’une histoire lineaire ou encore mono-causale.

Un meme esprit de clarification inspire l’etude intitulee “Rjurik, les Varegues et les

vicissitudes du pouvoir politique (‘gosudarstvennost’) russe” qui s’emploie a elucider

la question passablement embrouillee des origines ethniques de Rjurik et des Vare-

gues, donnes bien souvent pour des Scandinaves venus instaurer l’ordre et la “gosu-

darstvennost” parmi les Slaves de l’Est. Contrairement a cette these dite

“normaniste,” l’A. etablit une fois encore que Rjurik et les siens etaient en realite

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des Slaves, eux-memes d’origine diverse, installes sur les rives meridionales de la

Baltique (le Pomor’e) qui n’avaient pas eu, pour cette raison, de reelles difficultes a

se fondre parmi les Slaves de l’Est. Ces derniers avaient en realite ete prepares a

les accueillir en raison des relations suivies qu’ils entretenaient des le IXe siecle

avec l’empire byzantin, anterieurement donc a l’arrivee des Varegues qui marque

moins un debut qu’une etape dans le developpement de cette gosudarstvennost’ russe.

En realite, rappelle l’A., cette “theorie normaniste” n’apparaıt guere qu’au debut du

XVIIe siecle, a une heure ou la Russie sortait affaiblie du Temps des troubles. C’est

alors que les “milieux expansionnistes suedois,” qui disputaient aux Russes les

anciennes possessions de Novgorod, firent de Rjurik et des Varegues (au nom mal

elucide) des Scandinaves venus a leur appel apporter l’ordre et la civilisation aux

Slaves “barbares” de l’Est, plutot en avance a l’epoque sur les Scandinaves et qui

n’avaient en consequence pas grand-chose a apprendre d’eux. Cette theorie norma-

niste sera ensuite reprise, au service une fois encore d’ambitions etrangeres, par les

historiens allemands du XVIIIe siecle, avant de l’etre de nos jours encore—malgre

le silence des chroniques medievales—par certains historiens et archeologues

russes; et elle continue a alimenter la polemique de la part de tous ceux qui contestent

a la Russie ses origines nationales propres. A suivre donc . . .

Ce meme souci de replacer l’histoire russe dans le contexte europeen de l’epoque

transparaıt egalement dans la retrospective intitulee “aspects internationaux du

bapteme de la Russie” qui replace l’evenement dans un cadre geographique plus

vaste: celui de la rivalite entre Byzance et Rome qui se disputaient alors la Rus’,

sans oublier la resistance vivace du paganisme dont Novgorod etait alors le foyer

face a Kiev, plus ouverte pour sa part aux influences byzantines. En realite, la conver-

sion individuelle de certains de ses predecesseurs avait prepare le terrain a celle de

Vladimir qui s’operera elle-meme en plusieurs temps de 986 a 988–989, et qui

s’accompagnera, on le sait, d’un traite de paix et d’une alliance dynastique avec le

Basileus. Trop edifiante, la legende de l’ambassade chargee de faciliter le choix de

Vladimir entre l’orthodoxie, l’islam et le catholicisme romain serait en realite une

reconstitution post factum; et le choix de l’orthodoxie par Vladimir aurait avant

tout obei, resume l’A., a la volonte d’affirmer le prestige et l’independance de la

Rus’ grace a l’eclat de cette alliance privilegiee avec le Basileus.

Passons plus rapidement sur les exposes retracant les “etapes de la politique de la

Rus’ de l’antiquite au XVIe siecle,” ou encore la “formation du territoire de l’Etat

russe aux Xe–XIIIe siecles” ou l’A. s’efforce une fois encore de replacer l’histoire

russe dans un cadre europeen, voire eurasiatique dont elle est trop souvent detachee;

et mentionnons l’etude portant sur “les peuples du bassin de la Volga (Povolz’e) et de

Russie” qui se disputerent des siecles durant “l’axe Oka–Volga,” dont la conquete est

a l’origine de la civilisation “eurasiatique” de la Russie. Cette derniere se grandirait,

souligne l’A., a reconnaıtre, sans le minimiser, l’apport culturel de ces diverses natio-

nalites, dont l’annexion l’amena a prendre ainsi progressivement ses distances par

rapport a la Lituanie et aux Slaves catholiques de l’Ouest.

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Mentionnons egalement l’apercu intitule “geopolitique russe et formation du

service diplomatique” qui evoque l’action de la diplomatie russe des avant la creation

du prikaz des ambassadeurs en a la fin du XVIe siecle. Sous les ordres des grands ducs,

puis des tsars de Moscou, cette diplomatie s’attachera a realiser les “buts historiques”

que dictait a la Russie sa situation “geopolitique”; et elle parvint, grace a une pleiade

de brillants diplomates (dont le “Richelieu russe” Ordin-Nascokin) a assurer a la

Russie la place qui lui revenait parmi les nations europeennes. Meme l’Urss,

malgre tout son internationalisme, perseverera dans cette voie, comme le prouvaient

ses “succes diplomatiques a la date de 1945”; et son effondrement (raspad) ne

saurait davantage, conclut l’A. (p. 228), mettre fin a l’action de ces constantes

geopolitiques . . .

Dans une autre etude portant sur “les projets constitutionnels et les destinees de la

civilisation russe,” l’A. retrace a grands traits les echecs reiteres des reformateurs

russes de l’avenement de Anna Ivanovna (1730) a 1917. Car les tentatives de

reforme constitutionnelle n’avaient pas manque depuis le milieu du XVIIIe siecle,

comme l’A. s’en est explique dans un ouvrage precedent, dont nous avons donne

un compte rendu auquel nous renvoyons.1 Derniers en date, les juristes cadets elabor-

eront meme en 1917 un ultime projet de constitution pour la nouvelle Russie democra-

tique qui ira rejoindre en octobre 1917 le cimetiere des reformes constitutionnelles

avortees faute d’etre portees par une societe civile dont l’autocratie avait constamment

freine le developpement. La consequence en sera que la Russie entrera dans le XXe

siecle ecartelee entre modernite et archaısme, comme il ressort de la fresque intitulee

“La Russie au debut du XXe siecle: peuple, pouvoir et societe.”

Dans cette synthese de pres de cent pages l’A. passe en revue les principales carac-

teristiques de la Russie au tournant du siecle, a savoir: la croissance demographique

ininterrompue qui faisait certes du peuple russe un peuple jeune (dont la moitie de

la population avait moins de vingt ans), mais qui absorbait et “reduisait a rien,” ou

presque, les progres de l’industrialisation, a la peripherie notamment de l’empire.

Mais aussi le mouvement d’urbanisation dans le sillage de l’industrialisation, ainsi

que la situation de la paysannerie, toujours hantee par son reve utopique du

“partage noir” et prisonniere, malgre Stolypine, de structures communautaires depas-

sees. Ou encore un monde ouvrier toujours impregne de valeurs rurales, et dont l’A.

detaille la condition; habite par une “haine sourde” envers tous les privilegies, il

formait alors “une masse de manœuvre [ideale] pour une revolution extremiste” en

marge de la brillante civilisation urbaine.

Ce retard culturel (bezkultur’e) des milieux populaires contrastait avec l’epanouis-

sement et le rayonnement sans precedent de la litterature et des arts (musique en tete)

que connaissait alors la Russie, dont les savants: Mendeleev, Pavlov, Timirjazev, et

autres, s’imposaient au meme moment sur la scene internationale. Mais ces milieux

intellectuels qui pouvaient alors compter dans les 5,000 membres restaient etrangers

au gros de la population et constituaient, nous dit l’A., comme une “caste du

savoir” (naucnoe soslovie) sans irriguer le corps social ni elever, sinon tres lentement,

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le niveau intellectuel encore bien faible du pays. En l’absence d’une societe civile

digne de ce nom, l’empire tsariste etait alors une terre de contrastes, ou modernite,

esprit d’entreprise et secteurs de pointe coexistaient avec les survivances du passe

precapitaliste et une agriculture arrieree. Ainsi prise entre un double extremisme—

autocratique et revolutionnaire, la Russie restait toujours, qui plus est, la “propriete

de l’Etat” (kazennaja strana), d’un Etat autoritaire, centralise, militarise et bureaucra-

tise, depourvu de toute classe moyenne instruite a meme d’accompagner le progres.

Aussi l’empire ressemblait-il a une “marmite bouillonnante” ou les classes populaires

etaient animees dans leur ensemble, selon l’A., d’un profond desir de revanche et/oude vengeance. Un tableau bien eloigne, on le voit, de la vision optimiste d’un pays en

plein essor, dont l’elan modernisateur aurait ete brise par la guerre et, plus encore, par

la revolution d’Octobre.

Autre chapitre qui merite de retenir l’attention: sous le titre “guerre et diplomatie:

1939–1945,” l’A. relit, du point de vue russe et a partir de sources sovietiques, l’-

histoire de cette periode tragique, objet de polemiques sans fin. Sans aucunement

innocenter Staline, l’A. part de l’isolement diplomatique de l’Urss consecutif aux

accords de Munich (veritable “Sedan diplomatique,” tranchait alors un Romain

Rolland), avant de replacer dans son contexte “geopolitique” le pacte germano-sovie-

tique d’aout 1939 qui repondait, a court terme tout au moins, affirme l’A., a l’interet

des deux parties. De fait, ce pacte (et le protocole secret du mois suivant) permettait a

l’Urss de recouvrer, dans le prolongement de la politique russe des 18e–19e siecles, les

territoires perdus en 1918–1920. Alors que les diplomates franco-britanniques

n’avaient rien d’autre a proposer a l’Urss que le “piege” d’une coalition anti-nazie

et d’un nouveau Munich qui ferait d’elle leur “marionnette,” le pacte offrait a

Staline l’avantage de maintenir—provisoirement—l’Urss hors du conflit, et de lui

laisser les mains libres face a la Roumanie et en Finlande, a qui sa resistance epargnera

seule le sort des pays baltes dont l’annexion etait, precise l’auteur, “parfaitement legit-

ime” du point de vue tout au moins des interets geopolitiques de la Russie (p. 377).

Si ce pacte etait donc—a court terme—“parfaitement naturel” du point de vue

sovietique, Staline n’en etait pas moins conscient de sa fragilite, comme le montre

l’accord d’avril 1941 avec le Japon, qui non seulement epargnera a l’Urss une

guerre sur deux fronts, mais dont Staline esperait egalement qu’il detournerait

Hitler d’attaquer l’Urss. Au passage, l’A. evoque la question controversee de

l’attaque preventive contre l’Allemagne, a laquelle le discours de Staline du 5 mai

1941 (qui exprime sa preference pour une defense active ou encore “offensive”)

aurait pretendument donne le coup d’envoi. Connue sous le nom de code d’“operation

Ledokol” (ou “brise-glace”), une telle attaque preventive n’avait en soi rien que de tres

logique, et il n’est guere douteux que l’etat-major sovietique n’ait bien effectivement

elabore des plans dans ce sens, comme il en avait le devoir; et cela d’autant mieux que

l’Union sovietique disposait vers le milieu de l’annee 1941, a en croire les

responsables civils et militaires, d’une “superiorite de forces selon presque tous les

parametres” (p. 400).

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Alors que tout l’appareil de la propagande sovietique habituait au meme moment le

pays a l’idee d’une guerre offensive en territoire ennemi, Staline preferera pourtant

temporiser, faute d’avoir, apparemment, ni le temps ni les moyens d’une telle offen-

sive. Cette irresolution fait figure cependant d’“erreur principale, ou mieux de crime

principal de Staline et de son equipe envers le pays” aux yeux de l’A. qui fait etat de

nombreux travaux russes recents sur cette operation “brise-glace,” mal elucidee

aujourd’hui encore, il est vrai, sans que l’on puisse toutefois en tirer argument pour

imputer a l’Urss le role d’agresseur . . .

Si les ouvertures supposees de Staline a Hitler au cours du tragique ete 1941 ne sont

pas evoquees, non plus que l’insurrection de Varsovie de l’ete 1944 et l’etonnante pas-

sivite des troupes sovietiques, l’A. fait etat par contre a diverses reprises, en citant

notamment Cavendish-Bentic (chef des services secrets britanniques), du desir des

anglo-saxons de laisser Allemands et sovietiques s’epuiser mutuellement sur le

front de l’Est dans l’esprit des negociations diplomatiques d’avant guerre; et seule

l’avance des troupes sovietiques en Europe centrale, qui levait la menace allemande

sur leurs interets au Proche-Orient et en Mediterranee, aurait conduit les Allies a

hater l’ouverture d’un second front a l’Ouest. Avec la liberation des territoires sovie-

tiques proprement dits (fin mars 1944), la Grande Guerre Patriotique changeait en effet

de caractere, et tournait a la marche victorieuse des troupes sovietiques en Europe: il

devenait des lors evident que c’etait essentiellement sur le front de l’Est que risquait

desormais de se decider le sort de l’Europe d’apres-guerre; aussi la defense de leurs

interets nationaux prendra-t-elle des lors le pas, dans l’esprit des belligerants, sur la

lutte contre le fascisme.

Interrompons ici le survol de cette retrospective qui fait entendre un son de cloche

que l’on ne saurait ignorer, et notons qu’elle s’acheve sur un vibrant hommage de

Churchill a Staline (p. 422), qui tranche heureusement sur les condamnations stereo-

typees dont on nous rebat les oreilles. Prononce a la Chambre des lords a l’occasion du

quatre-vingtieme anniversaire (1959) du dictateur defunt, cet eloge ne saurait toutefois

faire oublier, conclut l’auteur, que Staline et ses successeurs n’avaient en realite

qu’une vision etriquee de l’Histoire et n’en percevaient pas le cours a long terme,

comme le prouve l’effondrement final de l’Urss qui a eu pour resultat de rejeter la

Russie de plusieurs siecles en arriere . . .

Dans la deuxieme partie intitulee “Historiographie,” l’A. s’emploie a tirer divers

historiens ou ecrivains du purgatoire ou les avait relegues la periode sovietique. A

commencer par “l’immortel historiographe” N. M. Karamzin, auteur, entre autres,

d’une monumentale Histoire de l’Etat russe dont les premiers tomes avaient connu

de son vivant, on le sait, un succes inimaginable pour l’epoque. Tour a tour ecrivain,

poete, romancier, journaliste et fondateur du Vestnik Evropy, Karamzin avait ete

nomme en 1803 historiographe de la Cour, et il avait entrepris a ce titre son Histoire

de l’Etat russe, dont il avait cherche a rattacher les debuts au cours de l’histoire eur-

opeenne, avant que ne l’en retranchent les rivalites princieres et le joug mongol. Inter-

rompue par sa mort en 1826, cette Histoire represente un veritable travail de

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benedictin, dont l’A. nous detaille les merites: erudition, recours aux sources et aux

chroniques les plus diverses, dont certaines ont aujourd’hui disparu, et plus encore

capacite a camper les personnages historiques qui tranche avec le schematisme de

l’histoire sovietique, ou la classe primait sur l’individu. Fin psychologue, un tantinet

hagiographique parfois et trahi a l’occasion par son esprit critique, Karamzin alliait

toutefois, estime l’A. les qualites de l’historien a celles, plus rares encore, du vulgar-

isateur, tout en restant un homme de son temps, comme en fait foi son penchant pour

l’intervention de la Providence: ainsi notamment du role de Moscou dans le rassem-

blement de la Terre russe, grace pour une part, et paradoxalement (ou providentielle-

ment?) a l’action des khans tatars.

Esprit integre et independant, en bon disciple de Novikov, et co-fondateur de la

langue litteraire russe, Karamzin etait au total un homme de science et de gout, qui

rendait son lecteur fier de l’etre, si l’on peut resumer ainsi la pensee de l’A. Mais il

ne s’en verra pas moins disqualifie en Urss, comme le chantre de l’autocratie, qu’il

n’etait pas (nonobstant l’epigramme bien connue attribuee a Puskin), et comme l’ideo-

logue de milieux aristocratiques reactionnaires, sans etre toutefois jamais oublie par

les Russes qui peuvent redecouvrir aujourd’hui son histoire “immortelle” et l’influ-

ence incontestable qu’elle a exercee sur la culture russe.

Autre fervent d’histoire russe que l’auteur rehabilite a son tour: I. E. Zabelin (1820–

1908), plus attentif quant a lui a l’histoire du peuple russe qu’a celle de son Etat.

D’origine plus que modeste, cet enfant de l’Assistance publique, comme nous

dirions de nos jours, n’avait recu qu’une education rudimentaire qu’il completera

de bric et de broc, avant de se prendre de passion pour l’histoire de Moscou (alors

en pleine resurrection apres l’incendie de 1812) et pour la vie quotidienne de la

Russie medievale, qui lui inspira son “Domasnyj byt du peuple russe aux XVIe–

XVIIIe siecles,” publie dans les Annales de la Patrie (1851 sqq.). Ses premieres chron-

iques, a partir de documents d’archives, ses randonnees archeologiques dans le Pod-

moskov’e, et son erudition bientot reconnue devaient lui mettre le pied a l’etrier:

employe au Palais des armures, puis au Comptoir de la Maison imperiale, il se

verra finalement nomme archiviste du Kremlin, avant de se retirer du service avec

le titre de conseiller d’Etat effectif, tout en poursuivant les travaux historiques qui

avaient assure sa notoriete.

Lecteur de Bielinski et proche des milieux d’opposition, il avait naturellement

applaudi a l’emancipation qui lui avait, comme a beaucoup d’autres, tire, de son

propre aveu, des “larmes d’attendrissement.” Mais il admettait neanmoins une

forme d’affinite, voire de connivence entre le regime autocratique et le peuple russe

“en qui existaient des elements correspondants. C’est donc le peuple qui en est respon-

sable et personne d’autre, ni Dieu ni diable” (p. 500), concluait ce connaisseur de

l’ame populaire.

Enfin reconnu, membre de diverses societes savantes et docteur honoris causa des

principales universites russes, cet historien inclassable se verra denonce, passe 1917,

comme conservateur, nationaliste, et meme monarchiste, alors qu’il s’etait associe aux

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protestations populistes et devoue plus que tout autre a la cause du peuple russe. En

realite, estime l’A., son tort etait d’avoir choisi comme heros non la classe ouvriere,

mais l’homme du peuple concret, authentique, en qui il voyait le moteur de l’histoire

nationale . . .

L’un des lecteurs de Zabelin (et de Karamzin) ne sera autre que Vsevolod Sergeevic

Solov’ev, frere du philosophe Vladimir dont il avait partage la disgrace a l’epoque

sovietique, et que l’A. replace sur orbite. Fils de l’historien Serge Solov’ev, professeur

a l’Universite de Moscou, Vsevolod Sergeevic s’etait impose, a peine ses etudes ter-

minees, dans un genre neglige: le roman historique. Si l’on excepte La fille du capi-

taine ou Taras Boulba, le public russe n’avait guere de romans historiques a se

mettre sous la dent avant la publication (1876) de La princesse Ostrogozskaja qui

assure d’emblee la reputation de son auteur. Ce premier roman a succes sera aussitot

suivi de nombreux autres, dans lesquels Vsevolod Sergeevic fait defiler sous nos yeux

evenements et personnages historiques, des plus celebres aux plus humbles, dans toute

leur epaisseur humaine. Servi par son erudition, l’acces a des sources inexplorees, une

intuition tres sure des situations et des mœurs, il offrait comme une “veritable ency-

clopedie d’un [bon] siecle de vie russe” (p. 567) et il “contribua ainsi a mettre l’his-

toire russe a la portee du grand public” sans sacrifier la complexite des personnages et

tout en brossant quelques portraits d’heroınes parmi les plus remarquables, estime

l’A., de la litterature russe.

Son œuvre maıtresse reste toutefois sa Chronique de quatre generations de

Gorbatovy qui retrace fidelement (en cinq volumes) un siecle de vie nobiliaire des der-

nieres annees du regne de Catherine II a l’apres-emancipation, marquee par la ruine

d’un univers familier, l’apparition de nouveaux modes de vie et la recherche d’un

statut de rechange et de nouvelles alliances. Ni liberal ni conservateur, ni slavophile

ni occidentaliste, Vsevolod Sergeevic avait atteint au tournant des annees 1880–

1890 au sommet de sa gloire; et, lors de son cinquantieme anniversaire, le 12 avril

1901 (soit deux ans avant sa mort), les Nouvelles de Saint-Petersbourg lui consacrent

meme en hommage un article approfondi qui souligne tout a la fois son sens de la

verite historique, sa puissance d’evocation, son realisme et son talent d’ecrivain.

Meme s’il se voit a cette date quelque peu eclipse aupres du public cultive, mais

non des lecteurs de base, par l’auteur de Guerre et paix, une premiere edition post-

hume (1905) de ses oeuvres completes sera immediatement epuisee, tout comme

l’edition de 1917, avant que le rideau ne retombe sur cet intarissable romancier de

l’histoire.

“Les sovietiques n’ont pas besoin des œuvres de V. S. Solov’ev” feront des lors

valoir les membres du Glavlit: “il ne parle presque que des tsars et de l’aristocratie.”

De fait, de meme que Karamzin passe pour l’historien de l’Etat russe, Vsevolod

Sergeevic etait un peu le romancier de la Russie officielle et meme un “historien-

gosudarstvennik” (p. 514), mais etranger aux schemas ideologiques et epris d’objec-

tivite. En ressuscitant la “saga” de ce romancier qui voulait appartenir a tout le peuple

russe, l’A. permet donc a la Russie de rentrer en possession de son passe.

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Passons plus rapidement sur le cas de Anton V. Kartasev, mieux connu du public

francais2 que sovietique. Theologien de formation, ce descendant de serfs ouraliens

avait accueilli avec enthousiasme la revolution de fevrier 1917 et l’effondrement du

tsarisme qu’il rendait responsable du retard de la Russie. Nomme procureur du

Saint Synode, puis ministre des Cultes, a la suite de l’abolition du Reglement eccle-

siastique qui rendait son autonomie a l’Eglise orthodoxe, il avait inaugure le 16

aout 1917 a Moscou, en la cathedrale du Sauveur, le Concile de l’Eglise orthodoxe

russe (le premier depuis deux siecles) qui devait elire le patriarche Nikon; et il sera

l’un des premiers a reconnaıtre la fascination exercee a l’epoque par le bolchevisme

sur les masses populaires. Arrete, peu apres le coup de force du 25 octobre, et

libere trois mois plus tard, A. Kartasev prendra rapidement ses distances avec les

“Blancs” qui ne cherchaient guere, selon lui, qu’a opposer la force a la force dans

l’espoir d’une utopique restauration. Menace a nouveau d’arrestation, il quittera

alors la Russie en janvier 1919, avant de gagner la France l’annee suivante; la, il par-

ticipera, entre autres, a la fondation (1925) de l’Institut Saint Serge a Paris, ou il

enseignera, aux cotes d’autres emigres de renom (Bulgakov et Zenkovski notamment),

l’histoire de l’Eglise russe jusqu’a la fin de ses jours, en 1960.

Sans entrer dans le detail de sa pensee, a laquelle l’A. cherche a initier brievement

ses lecteurs russes, rappelons toutefois que Kartasev voyait dans la foi orthodoxe la

source de la conscience nationale et de la richesse spirituelle du peuple russe; et ses

innombrables travaux sur l’histoire de l’Eglise russe permettent de le considerer

comme “l’apotre de la Sainte Russie” entendue dans un sens original a egale distance

de “Moscou—Troisieme Rome,” de la “symphonie” byzantine et d’un eremitisme

etranger aux problemes de ce monde. Hostile a toute forme de separation de

l’Eglise et de l’Etat nuisible, selon lui, aux deux parties qui ne pouvaient plus s’enri-

chir mutuellement de leurs differences, il se prononcait pour leur union organique, ou

chacune preserverait son autonomie, mais agirait de concert au service du bien

commun, concu par lui comme l’edification du royaume de Dieu.

Incompatibles avec le regime, ces reflexions n’avaient de toute evidence pas leur

place en Union sovietique; mais cet ostracisme “coupait artificiellement” (p. 604) le

pays des ressources morales et des courants spirituels qui avaient irrigue l’histoire

russe aux yeux de Kartasev, et sur lesquels l’A. attire opportunement l’attention de

ses lecteurs russes.

Privee d’une atmosphere propice a une recherche independante, et prisonniere des

postulats marxistes, la science historique ne connaissait plus guere que des debats ster-

iles: “son ame avait ete tuee,” n’hesite pas a ecrire l’A. en exergue a l’expose qu’il

consacre aux “discussions dans l’historiographie sovietique.” Avant d’evoquer en

contre point l’historiographie occidentale sur la Russie—de la perestrojka a l’effon-

drement de l’Urss—dont il ne conteste pas le serieux, mais dont les sovietiques

n’avaient reellement commence a prendre connaissance qu’a la faveur de la glasnost’

vers la fin des annees 1980. Cette ouverture sur l’exterieur, jointe a la publication de

documents d’archives inedits et a la denonciation du stalinisme, dont les victimes se

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voient alors rehabilitees par fournees entieres, reintroduit alors un certain “pluralisme”

dans la production historique, mais entraıne egalement, souligne l’A., une “nouvelle

politisation” de l’histoire. D’un cote les “anti-totalitaires,” fils ou petits-fils bien

souvent des purges de l’epoque stalinienne, et les adversaires du regime, gravitant

autour de la nebuleuse “Memorial” contemporaine du “printemps de Gorbacev,”

qui prennent avec plus de passion que d’objectivite le contre-pied du dogme officiel;

de l’autre, les historiens marxistes, orthodoxes ou non, defenseurs des options

communistes. Aux yeux de ces derniers, la construction du socialisme continue de

representer une etape incontournable dans l’histoire de la Russie: celle de l’edification

d’une societe non-capitaliste dont l’Urss aurait ouvert les portes, avant que les epi-

gones ne fassent du socialisme apres Lenine une utopie et un dogme meurtriers.

Aussi faudra-t-il attendre la fin des annees 1990, precise une derniere analyse sur ce

sujet sensible,3 pour qu’un minimum de serenite et d’objectivite preside enfin a ce

reexamen de l’histoire nationale. Non seulement la separation artificielle entre la

Russie d’avant 1917 et la Russie sovietique est abandonnee, mais de nouveaux

champs de recherche, tabous jusque la, sont desormais defriches; et les historiens se

montrent enfin attentifs aux divers aspects de la vie de chaque jour des citoyens

ordinaires, qui constitue de longue date la pature quotidienne des historiens

occidentaux.

Reste la troisieme partie intitulee “Publicistika scientifique” qui regroupe des ecrits

de circonstance d’importance variable et qui se prete mal a une presentation detaillee.

Parmi les themes abordes, mentionnons toutefois l’essai “Democratie et volja dans

notre patrie,” qui offre une analyse pertinente de la conception populaire de la

liberte (“volja”) par opposition a la svoboda, ou liberte reglee. Alors qu’en Occident

cette notion de liberte s’etait developpee de maniere organique, parallelement a la

croissance economique et au developpement des villes sourcilleuses sur le chapitre

de leurs libertes communales, il n’en etait pas alle de meme en Russie: sur les

terres des tsars, la volja consistait trop souvent pour une population asservie a retour-

ner contre l’oppresseur l’arbitraire dont elle etait victime. Or ces represailles ne faisai-

ent que perpetuer un engrenage de violence et de contre-violence: a un pouvoir sans

regle repondait une liberte (volja) elle-meme dereglee, aux antipodes de la liberte

auto-limitee dont l’Occident donnait tant bien que mal l’exemple.

Parmi ces ecrits de circonstance, mentionnons egalement les pages consacrees a “la

dynastie des Romanov comme phenomene historique” ou l’auteur medite a voix haute

sur le sort d’une dynastie dont les souverains voyaient chacun dans le service du pays

la tache de sa vie en prenant appui sur l’absolutisme envisage comme le ciment de la

societe et de l’Etat. Cette dynastie, qui avait assure une modernisation prudente, mais

progressive, du pays, finira toutefois, apres maintes realisations remarquables, par

devenir le principal frein aux reformes, faute d’etre parvenue a concilier—de

Speranskij a Witte—absolutisme et constitution.

Retiendra egalement l’attention du lecteur l’expose intitule “Lenine contre Staline:

une bataille perdue” d’avance, qui rappelle l’isolement progressif du numero un

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sovietique des les premiers signes de sa maladie. Diminue et impuissant, il decouvre

alors que l’appareil du parti etait desormais passe entre les mains de celui dont il avait

lui-meme assure l’ascension, desormais irresistible. Ou encore, et parmi bien d’autres,

l’apercu sur “le totalitarisme revolutionnaire dans notre histoire,” ou “sur le stali-

nisme” ou l’A. expose les resultats du colloque “cinquante ans sans Staline” tout en

precisant au passage que l’assise sociale de son regime etait bien differente de celle

du nazisme. Sans oublier les pages sur “les causes de l’auto-destruction de l’Urss,”

sous l’effet notamment de la poussee identitaire de maintes nationalites.

Enfin, le volume prend fin sur une note plus personnelle, a savoir une retrospective a

batons rompus (et sans pretention a l’exhaustivite) sur son propre parcours et sa car-

riere d’historien avec ses bonheurs et ses deceptions: sa formation, ses maıtres, . . . ou

encore l’atmosphere de la Faculte d’Histoire de Moscou au tournant des annees 1940–

1950, a l’epoque de la lutte contre le “cosmopolitisme,” dans laquelle tous etaient

alors plus ou moins impliques, et compromis. Sans oublier un regard critique sur le

fonctionnement present et passe de l’Academie des Sciences.

Interrompons ici ce survol qui ne donne qu’une idee bien imparfaite de la diversite

et de la richesse de ce recueil qui fait un peu figure de somme historique et qui offre un

vaste panorama de l’histoire russe debarrassee de sa gangue marxiste. Sans doute ces

etudes, fideles aux promesses du titre, ne sont-elles pas toutes de la meme veine, et l’A.

peine parfois a realiser une synthese harmonieuse entre son occidentalisme affirme,

une repudiation sans appel de la periode communiste, ou mieux stalinienne, et un atta-

chement bien comprehensible au passe de la Russie et a ses valeurs nationales. Sans

apporter a proprement parler de nouvelles conceptions historiques, ce recueil n’en

manifeste pas moins a sa facon le degel et le renouvellement de la reflexion historique

par-dela les stereotypes marxistes du passe.

Egalement a l’aise dans l’histoire socio-economique, culturelle ou institutionnelle et

dans le genre biographique, tout comme dans le long ou le court terme, A. N. Sakharov

s’efforce de retablir l’histoire dans ses droits et de restituer a la Russie, en mal d’iden-

tite, sa culture et la memoire de son passe, dans le sillage des maıtres d’avant 1917. A

leur suite, il invite ses lecteurs a reprendre a son exemple ce travail de Sisyphe qu’est le

metier d’historien inlassablement en quete, non de certitudes, mais d’une verite histor-

ique objective toujours a reconstruire et qui se derobe sans cesse.

Francois-Xavier Coquin # 2007

College de France

francois-xavier.coquin@college-de-france-fr

NOTES

1. Cf. Cahiers du Monde Russe 43, no. 4 (Octobre-Decembre 2002): 821–32.2. Pour plus d’information, le lecteur pourra se reporter a l’etude recente de A. Niviere publie

dans la collection Cahiers de l’emigration russe 7 (Paris: IES–MSH, 2003), 121–40.

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3. Sous le titre “nouvelles approches dans la science historique russe. Le tournant du XXIesiecle,” et dont le lecteur aura profit a consulter la bibliographie pp. 710–18.

Silesia and Central European Nationalism, Tomasz Kamusella (West Lafayette, IN:

Purdue University Press, 2007), xvi, 370 pp.þmaps.

With this volume, Tomasz Kamusella seeks to highlight the consequences of the intro-

duction of nationalist ideology into Upper Silesia, which today lies almost wholly

within Poland. His basic thesis is that before the dawn of the age of nationalism

three indigenous groups of people could be identified in the region, namely the

Slunzaks, the Morawecs, and the Slonzoks. He further claims that the basis for differ-

entiation between these three groups was to be found in language, area of residence,

and to a lesser extent religion.

Space precludes me from a thorough capitulation of the myriad comments I could

make about this volume. However, I will attempt to encapsulate them within a few

general observations. First, as it stands, this volume is beset with structural problems.

These include length, style, and questions regarding layout and thematic coherence.

With regard to length, the book contains too much material that is barely relevant

to the theme. There is no need, for example, for the author to engage in detours con-

cerning such matters as: the (consequences of ) Austria–Hungary’s occupation of

Bosnia-Herzegovina (pp. 205–06), the formation of Belgium (p. 22), Imperial

Germany’s colonial policy in Africa and the South Pacific (p. 162), and the course

of World War I on the Eastern Front (pp. 238–39).

Second, neither was there any need for the author to reference as heavily as he does.

One, two, or possibly three citations are sufficient. Anything more than that simply

takes up space to no good effect. As for the prose itself, the author makes it clear at

the outset that he has chosen to write in English in order to aid him in his objective

of retelling the story of Upper Silesia in a neutral way. He also believes that by

writing in English he will reach a larger audience. The second point is certainly

valid, the former less so. First, his style is awkward, and throughout the volume,

there are numerous instances of repetition. A more ruthless approach to copy-

editing should, and I assume could, have been take prior to the book going to press.

In addition, Kamusella, far from being neutral, makes it abundantly clear that in his

opinion nationalism is an ideology that does more harm than good, and in the case

of Upper Silesia introduced decidedly alien elements into society, namely German,

Czech and, more especially, Polish nationalism.

If we now turn to the three groups of indigenous inhabitants he identifies, namely

the Slunzaks, the Morawecs, and the Slonzoks, nowhere in the text is it made clear

what exactly it is that differentiates them from one another. To be sure, he writers

at length of dialects, sub-dialects, creoles and on occasion pidgin, but he does not

explain these terms any more than he explains the extent to which the written and

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oral speech of the three differ from one another, or indeed standard written or oral

German, Czech and Polish. Differences are alluded to, but not in a systematic and

coherent manner. Some explanation of these linguistic terms, and how they could

be applied to each of the aforementioned groups, would have been welcome. If the

author had adopted a more clearly thematic approach to the volume then some of

these problems might have been avoided.

Maps, or rather more of them, would have been appropriate. The two that occur at

the beginning of the volume are insufficiently distinct in terms of shading, and only

someone with intimate knowledge of the area will have anything other than the

vaguest idea of where exactly in Europe this story is unfolding. There is also a host

of statistical information, for example on pages 270 and 298, which should have

been presented in tabular form, instead of within the main narrative.

Underpinning thework is a consideration of the theory of nationalism.Kamusella takes

a firmly modernist stance, namely that nationalism did not exist until the French Revolu-

tion of 1789. To be sure, early in the volume, he acknowledges the existence of alternative

primordial explanations, and discounts them.However, there is little excuse for not exam-

ining perennialist arguments, and especially for ignoring the work of Anthony D. Smith

and the ethno-symbolist school. The latter omission is curious. Smith argues that despite

the fact that nationalism as an ideologymay not have existed prior to 1789, anymore than

did modern mass nations, the political behaviour of elite groups in Europe can be ident-

ified as nationalist, and that such groups shared what we now term a national conscious-

ness. Kamusella argues that neither the German nor the Polish nation, in any modern

interpretation of the term, came about until the period 1789–1848. Amongst others, he

completely reinterprets the nature of the Polish uprisings against the Russians of 1794

and 1830, and with regard to Germany all but ignores the idea of Germany as aKulturna-

tion. He perhaps should also have paidmore attention toBenedict Andersonwho points to

the invention of printing, the corresponding arrival of national languages and with it the

“imagined community” as being crucial to the formation of modern national conscious-

ness. Kamusella seems to think nationalism arrived almost literally by train, and all but

ignores alternatives.

Given Kamusella’s extensive knowledge of the region, that at least some of these

shortcomings were not avoided is a pity. As he rightly points out, both the history

and reality of contemporary Upper Silesia are more complicated than a majority of

Germans, Czechs, and Poles thinks, if indeed any but a small minority of Germans

thinks about the area at all. The reader does not have to buy Kamusella’s version of

events, but had he expressed and ordered himself more clearly those new to the

subject could have been somewhat enlightened. As it stands, I doubt that they will be.

Karl Cordell # 2007

School of Law & Social Science

University of Plymouth

K.Cordell@plymouth.ac.uk

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The Endurance of Nationalism, Aviel Roshwald (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2006), xii, 349 pp.þ illustrations.

With this book Aviel Roshwald seeks to restore some intellectual credibility to the pri-

meval school that argues that nations are not the socially constructed entities as pro-

claimed by modernists, nor necessarily the creations of a “strategic ethnie” as is

argued by Anthony Smith. He cites the Armenian, Chinese, Greek, and Jewish

nations as examples and with consummate ease and skill devotes the early passages

of the volume to the Greek and Jewish cases. In so doing, the reader is left in no

doubt as to where Roshwald stands with regard to the aforementioned debate on the

roots of modern nations. As such, this book is well worth reading, and is to be rec-

ommended to anyone interested in the themes of nation, nationalism, and the relation-

ship between past and present.

His basic argument is that the written record indicates that some modern nations

have deep roots, stretching thousands of years into the past. I suppose that for those

Greeks and Jews who view themselves as being the descendants of ancient peoples

this is welcome news. Without a doubt, his claims deserve to stimulate a wider

debate among all those with an interest in nations and nationalism. However, this

reviewer is not convinced that many minds will be changed upon a reading of this

book. Roshwald puts forward a seductive argument, based primarily upon, with the

case of the Greeks: an evaluation of Periclean Athenian democracy and the contem-

porary language employed; and in the case of the Jews the modern-day relevance

of the Bible and Talmud as points of reference for both religious and secular Jews.

He does so in a clear and logical manner, which will give even the most hardened

of modernists much to think about.

However, in riposte, modernists might point to a number of factors that counter-

balance Roshwald’s claims. For example, Ancient Greece was in essence ephemeral

and comprised a number of political entities that despite their possession of a

common mythology, culture and language did not succeed in establishing anything

we might call a nation-state. There is also the question of the Slav invasions. With

regard to the Jews, it is beyond all doubt that today many, if not most, Jews, like

their Greek counterparts, seek to draw a direct line between themselves and their

supposed ancestors. Whether or not the modernist in the face of mass migration,

forced or otherwise, inter-marriage and identity shifts would be swayed by argu-

ments grounded in particular interpretations of the ancient past is an entirely differ-

ent question. They might well argue that those who today identify themselves as

Greek or Jewish have come to embody these categories as the result of accultura-

tion, socialization, and the dissemination of a politically inspired project, namely

modern nationalism.

Yet I do not wish to become bogged down by this debate any more than I seek to

enter into polemics concerning it. Let us instead move on, and consider other elements

of the volume. As the work progresses, Roshwald really comes into his own. Through

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the employment of—dare I say it—more modern examples, he seeks to show that

nations are invariably more grounded in history than some modernists think. His

various case studies, for example of the Czech, French and American national move-

ments, all serve to show that modern nations are not quite as new as some would like to

believe. This, however, does not mean that they are all grounded in the pre-Christian

past, and Roshwald is not claiming that they are. There is, though, a need for caution.

He correctly identifies the Protestant reformer Jan Hus as an individual whose mission

has been incorporated into the Czech pantheon. On the other hand, plenty of evidence

exists to show that many of Hus’ partisans were German speakers, so the extent to

which Hus was embarked upon a nation-building project as opposed to a specifically

religious mission is an entirely different matter.

In part, space precludes me from any further commentary on the text. Before con-

cluding, I must mention his careful and serious study of myth and chosenness, as,

for example, being integral to any serious study of British, American and Ulster Pro-

testant nationalism. I now wish to conclude by turning to Arab nationalism and the

challenge being mounted by pan-Islamist movements to established global political

structures.

Arab nationalism, as Roshwald correctly points out, in all its guises has failed its

target audience. On the one hand, it has led to the establishment of a series of nasty

dictatorships, and dynastic rulers of entities carved out of the desert by foreign carto-

graphers, their political masters, and local acolytes. On top of that, there is the fact of

Israel, a state created on territory once populated by Jews that for the best part of two

millennia was populated primarily by Arabs who for the past 1,400 years have adhered

to Islam. In his volume Roshwald enlightens the uninitiated reader with regard to the

debates surrounding Temple Mount that so excite significant numbers of Jews, Chris-

tians and Muslims alike. In a timely fashion, he also reminds us of the increasing

attraction to many who profess the great monotheistic faiths of radical and apocalyptic

interpretations of doctrine that set Temple Mount as their focus. In the closing pages of

the book, he also rightly rails against the vacuous nature of what some would label as

post-modern national identity, which mistakes shopping for substance, and exhibits a

fixation with dysfunctional characters parading themselves in front of television

cameras. Roshwald then warns of Osama bin Laden’s “dystopian” vision. Dystopian

it may well be, but in the light of the above and the failure after over 50 years to

achieve anything remotely resembling justice for the Palestinians, such a vision

might well be more attractive to many Muslims, and Arab Muslims in particular,

than anything “the West” might have to offer.

Karl Cordell # 2007

School of Law & Social Science

University of Plymouth

K.Cordell@plymouth.ac.uk

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The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005, Sabrina

P. Ramet (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 819pp.

Sabrina P. Ramet has written the most comprehensive history of twentieth-century

Yugoslavia available to date. The Three Yugoslavias considers the history of the

country since its inception in 1918. Ramet describes her book as a “thematic history”

(p. 6), by which she means that it is not comprehensive, but rather represents a sustained

argument in which only the relevant details are included. The themes she has chosen to

emphasize are political development, political legitimacy, and nationalism. She adds

that she also considers foreign policy where necessary. That said, she clearly considers

her book a contribution to literature on political legitimacy, as she includes one introduc-

tory chapter on the subject and makes reference to it throughout the book.

Minus the portions relating to political legitimacy, which Ramet suggests can be

ignored if the reader wishes to do so, the book becomes a relatively traditional

history. She begins with a discussion of the formation of the state and quickly moves

through the interwar period, World War II, and the communist period. Her book is

heavily weighted to the final 20 years of the story (approximately 260 pages of the

600 being devoted to them), and really does not stray from most interpretations of

the history of the state that have been published in the past, with an occasional exception

during the more controversial recent period. In general, her book wears its thematic

approach loosely—she introduces a chapter with a brief discussion of how “legitimacy”

will apply to the coming discussion and then tells the story. It is for the most part a satis-

fying history of the state. There are some exceptions to this general verdict.

In some ways, it is more than satisfying. For instance, Ramet’s discussion of the

growth of interwar nationalist and paramilitary organizations, especially among the

Croats, is quite interesting and informed by the use of some archival materials from

Croatia. Her examination of the 1960s and 1970s—similar to that in her earlier

book Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991 (Indiana University

Press, 1992)—is also rich. I do consider the book to be a valuable and reliable

guide to the history of Yugoslavia. In general, Ramet can always be counted on for

stimulating and engaged writing and the occasional quirky verdict; these too one

can find in The Three Yugoslavias.

In other ways, the book is a little less than satisfying. It is, for instance, extremely

detailed. There is a limit to how much detail a reader can stand—there is a line

between a wealth of information and an impenetrable thicket; occasionally, Ramet

crosses that line. One’s reaction to such detail probably depends on one’s place in

the audience. An expert can handle it; an informed outsider might be overwhelmed;

a student may well simply set the book aside. For me, the detail made it difficult to

track her success in defending her thesis.

Another weakness, in my view, is that Ramet includes little discussion of cultural

issues in her book. She may aver that an examination of culture does not fit her

themes. I disagree. There is a wealth of literature, film, and non-fiction writing that

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serves to illuminate the collapse of the Yugoslav project, and I would argue that her

exposition would not only be richer but more complete had she discussed cultural pro-

cesses that led to the weakened legitimacy of communist Yugoslavia. The same gen-

erally could be said of her treatment of the first Yugoslavia.

Finally, the sections of the book on the period from the rise of Slobodan Milosevic

forward will undoubtedly annoy just about every reader, but for a different set of

reasons in every case. Ramet never shrinks from controversial conclusions. I will

not list what I found controversial here—my point is simply that the book’s treatment

of the collapse of Yugoslavia from about 1987 forward is thought provoking. It is

never irresponsible, though, and therefore the book is all the more valuable for its pro-

vocative verdicts.

Ramet’s book will compete with other one-volume histories of Yugoslavia. It is too

pricey for use in the classroom, and I fear it might be a bit too dense as well. If Indiana

University Press chooses to publish Ramet’s book in an affordable paperback, I would

consider using it. Along the way, the press might wish to correct the many annoying

typos, especially the misuse of diacriticals (for instance, Rankovic instead of the

proper Rankovic on p. 246, among dozens of others).

Nick Miller # 2007

Boise State University

nmiller@boisestate.edu

The Burdens of Freedom: Eastern Europe since 1989, Padraic Kenney (London and

New York: Zed Books, 2006), 179 pp.þmaps, index.

Against the current trend of more specialized works on Eastern Europe, Padraic

Kenney proposes a general overview of post-communism that attempts to identify pat-

terns and explain differences in development among 15 countries in the region. As is

the case with all overviews, The Burdens of Freedom lacks in systematic detail and is

certainly not a user-friendly source of factual information. Evidence and illustrations

are drawn mainly from Central Europe, the Baltic countries, and the former

Yugoslavia, providing less insight into the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian

cases. Yet that is hardly a weak point, since this book was clearly not meant to be a

comprehensive guide to the region, but rather a synthesis of “overall trends, which

are as well illustrated with one or two examples as with a dozen” (p. 2).

The perspective is thematic: Chapter one deals with economic and social change;

Chapter two examines nationalism or “ethnopolitics”; Chapter three discusses attitudes

to the recent past; Chapter four describes post-communist politics; and Chapter five

analyzes Eastern Europe’s international context. Kenney’s generally clear and

eloquent writing and the format of this book make it a useful assignment for any

upper-division undergraduate or graduate course on Eastern Europe, even though the

concluding section would have greatly benefited from a more careful editing process.

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Unlike Kenney’s previous work, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe, 1989

(Princeton University Press, 2002), The Burdens of Freedom employs practically

none of the author’s own research and personal experience in the region, except for

a handful of anecdotal details that serve to illustrate the author’s general claims.

Instead, Kenney relies almost exclusively on a large and generally up-to-date

English-language bibliography (as well as a few titles in Polish).

The author’s intimate familiarity with—and slight partiality to—the object of his

inquiry is, however, apparent in subtler ways. For instance, Kenney makes a point

of rejecting cultural judgments and he refuses to acquiesce, either implicitly or expli-

citly, to the many theories of East European backwardness that attempt to explain the

region’s political and economic problems. In Kenney’s book, East Europeans are por-

trayed as rather sensible and quickly maturing voters who react with more common

sense to given circumstances than Western observers are able to recognize.

It is the “West” that receives the harsher treatment instead. According to Kenney,

the EU and the US were at times either unwilling or unable to correctly perceive the

challenges of post-communism, and therefore failed to contribute with effective sol-

utions—particularly in the case of the Yugoslav wars (pp. 140–42). Kenney believes,

however, that “the world” is learning from its mistakes, as illustrated by the evolution

of the Kosovo conflict (p. 68). In the book’s last chapter, the author empathizes with

the East European inclination to support US foreign policy based on a shared love for

freedom (p. 156). More convincingly, he credits the newly admitted EU members with

providing an opportunity to redefine European identity: if “Old Europe” is “secure,

prosperous, and defensive,” the “New Europe” to the East “claims to see European

civilization as a goal in itself” (p. 158).

The Burdens of Freedom offers a number of thought-provoking reinterpretations of

post-1989 developments. For instance, Kenney notes that nationalism has not only

diminished in East European politics in the past few years (p. 51) but it also “has

been rediscovered . . . all across the continent. Nor is it clear that it is a negative

force, nor a relic of more primitive urges in the human brain” (p. 45). Similarly, the

East Europeans’ unwillingness to radicalize their break with the past is not so much

nostalgia for a corrupt way of life as a propensity for compromise and ultimately

“an approximation of democracy” and “a fabric of tolerance that underlies the pro-

gress made after 1989” (p. 99). And lastly, the succession of neo-communist and

liberal governments that has characterized the post-1989 period appears as a manifes-

tation of the voters’ reactions to economic and social transformations, and is thus “the

stuff of normal politics” (p. 125).

In an effort to neutralize the stereotype of Eastern Europe as a place ridden with

“ancient hatreds,” Kenney dismisses the weight of the region’s more distant past and

concentrates solely on the scope and manner of anti-communist dissent as the basis

for post-1989 democratization. Kenney argues that pre-WorldWar II history is less rel-

evant than the experience of the 1980s. What he finds most important is whether at that

time societies had any degree of democratic exposure via opposition movements:

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The places where stable democratic politics took hold by 1995—the Baltic states, theCzech and Slovak republics, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia—were also those wherecivil-society opposition to communism emerged earliest, and was quite well developedby 1989 . . . (Of course, long-term cultural traditions, ranging from education to theprivate ownership of land, play a role here, too; nevertheless . . . recent factors . . .exert a more direct influence on the individuals who participate in political lifetoday.) The revolutions of 1989, then, set some countries directly on the path to politi-cal democracy. Others were far behind, but would begin a similar journey that has yet toreach that same endpoint. (p. 124)

Kenney is worried about the occasional resurgence of “ethnopolitics,” which he con-

siders the main threat to post-communist democratization (p. 126), and he wonders

about the path that the countries lagging behind the success stories of Central

Europe will take in the next few years; but the overall tone is one of hope. This opti-

mism, however guarded, together with the author’s view that 2004 marks the end of

the post-communist period for most of the region (p. 2), make the choice of title some-

what baffling. In Kenney’s book, Eastern Europe does not seem so much burdened by

its newly gained freedom as merely adapting to it by reinventing itself and taking the

rest of Europe along in the process.

Felicia Rosu # 2007

Georgetown University

rosu.felicia@gmail.com

Soviet and Kosher: Jewish Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939, Anna

Shternshis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

Anna Shternshis is a specialist in Yiddish literature and culture, and has written this

book on the history of Yiddish literature/culture from the beginning of the Soviet

regime to approximately the 1930s, albeit with some information that actually stretches

almost to the present. One should feel nothing but sympathy for the author who has

tried to study Yiddish culture not just as an abstract academic subject but as a sort of

personal undertaking to trace her personal roots. Fluent in Russian and Yiddish, she

has collected a great deal of material. Still, there is a serious problem with the book:

the narrative on Yiddish culture and the life of Soviet Jews is often removed from

the historical context. In fact, it appears that the author seems unaware of the

context, and this hardly helps to give meaning to the material presented.

In the beginning of the narrative the author has stated that, while being negative to

all religions, the Bolsheviks were more predisposed to Judaism in the sense that they

plainly did not discard the Jewish religion/traditions but tried to bring new meaning to

them, to some degree accommodating them to the ideology of the regime. The reason

for this benevolent approach can be easily explained. In many ways the Bolsheviks

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had come to power through the support of the minorities. Indeed, Jewish commissars

and Lettish Rifleman had been janissaries of the regime, and this was one of the major

reasons why upon the Bolshevik victory they had exercised a kind of “affirmative

action” and adopted a benevolent approach to the minorities.

When the author comes to the 1930s, she fails even to mention the rise of Russian

nationalism, which had become increasingly incorporated in official ideology and

which explains why the interest in Yiddish culture was downplayed.

There were other important changes that took place in the minds of the Russian

Jews and in their position in the USSR, which the author fails to mention and

which are essential for the explanation of her narrative. For example, in the beginning

of the book she provides an interesting, amusing anecdote about the relationship

between recent Russian Jewish emigres and Western Jews. The Western Jews often

refuse to accept recent Russian Jews as “real” Jews, for they have no interest in

Judaism, do not follow kosher laws, and are not even circumcised. At the same

time, the newcomers are absolutely sure that they are “one hundred percent” Jews.

The point here is that since the 1930s, with the rise of Russian nationalism and the

introduction of the “nationality” (ethnicity) clause in international passports,

Russian Jews have identified themselves and were identified by the authorities as

belonging to an ethnic/racial group rather than a religious group, as previously in

Imperial Russia. None of this is mentioned by the author. In short, the book, while,

of course, a labor of love, still looks more like an unfinished draft of a Ph.D. thesis

rather than a cohesive monograph.

Dmitry Shlapentokh # 2007

IUSB History Department

Email: dshlapen@iusb.edu

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