Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1998, Vol. 15, No. 2, 383-393

Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0022-3514/98/S3.00

Membership Has Its (Epistemic) Rewards: Need for ClosureEffects on In-Group Bias

James Y. Shah, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Erik P. ThompsonUniversity of Maryland, College Park

Three studies examined the impact of the need for cognitive closure on manifestations of in-groupbias. All 3 studies found that high (vs. low) need for closure increased in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Specifically, Study 1 found a positive relation between need for cognitive closureand both participants' ethnic group identification and their collective self-esteem. Studies 2 and 3found a positive relation between need for closure and participants' identification with an in-groupmember and their acceptance of an in-group member's beliefs and attitudes. Studies 2 and 3 alsofound a negative relation between need for closure and participants' identification with an out-groupmember and their acceptance of an out-group member's beliefs and attitudes. The implications ofthese findings for the epistemic function of in-groups are discussed.

Cognitive needs are an important source of affiliative behavior. . .if one assumes a need for cognitive clarity, U is plausible to assumethat attempts to reduce ambiguity will take the direction of intensivesocial contact. (Schachter, 1959, p. 5)

The present research examined the relation between individu-als' need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996)and their tendency to identify with their in-group. We assumethat one function of in-groups is to furnish "social reality" fortheir members based on a group consensus. Such stable socialreality is particularly valued by those with a heightened needfor closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991), that is, a desire forconfident knowledge that may not be sustained without the ac-cord of significant others. Hence, people with a heightened needfor closure should particularly value their in-groups and identifywith them, consequently fostering out-group derogation and dis-tancing. Applying need for closure theory (Kruglanski & Web-ster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, in press) to the phenomenonof in-group bias highlights the epistemic function that groupsmay serve for their members and begins to identify the circum-stances under which such bias may be particularly likely toappear.

In-Group Bias

Dating from Summer's (1906) seminal work on ethnocen-trism, overidentification with one's in-group, or an in-groupbias, has been regarded as a fundamental social psychological

James Y. Shah, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Erik P. Thompson, Depart-ment of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park.

This research was supported by National Institute of Mental Health(NIMH) Grant 1RO3 MH 52578 and NIMH Research Scientist AwardKO5/MH01213.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to JamesY. Shah, who is now at Department of Psychology, University of Wiscon-sin, 1202 West Johnson Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53706. Electronicmail may be sent to jshah@facstaff.wisc.edu.

phenomenon at the root of numerous pernicious intergroup con-flicts in the world at large. A striking feature of the in-groupbias is its pervasiveness. Although its strength may vary acrosscultural settings (Bond, 1988), its presence appears universalor nearly so (Smith & Bond, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1996).Furthermore, in-group bias has been observed not only in real-world social groups boasting enduring history and profoundsignificance for their members (e.g., the various ethnic or na-tional groups) but also in the ephemeral and relatively insignifi-cant groups made salient in the specific ad hoc contexts of theexperimental laboratory. In fact, the mere experience of inclu-sion in one group and exclusion from another seems often suffi-cient to instigate an in-group bias, however transient and seem-ingly unimportant the groups involved (Allen & Wilder, 1975;Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).

Given such ubiquity, it is not surprising that considerableresearch efforts have been lodged to understand the nature ofthe in-group bias and identify its antecedent conditions andconsequences. Because this bias is essentially affective, em-bodying liking for one's own group and its preference over othergroups, efforts to understand the phenomenon have focused onits motivational underpinnings, (i.e., on the affective needs thein-group may fulfill for its members). One widely examinedmotivational hypothesis, derived from social identity theory(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), assumes that group membership repre-sents an important component of self-identity and thus consti-tutes a significant source of self-esteem. Individuals can fulfilltheir esteem needs by increasing the status of groups to whichthey belong relative to various out-groups. In other words, onereason why individuals may favor in-groups over out-groups isto boost, by association or ' 'reflected glory,'' their own personalstatus and self-esteem.

Although the self-enhancement explanation of in-group biasmakes a great deal of sense, the actual empirical support forthis notion has been rather mixed. One implication of the self-enhancement hypothesis is that individuals with a particularlydire need for self-esteem enhancement will manifest a corre-

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384 SHAH, KRUGLANSKT, AND THOMPSON

spondingly elevated degree of in-group identification. Yet, therelevant investigations of this topic have yielded inconsistentand, in some cases, contradictory results. Consistent with theself-enhancement hypothesis, Fein and Spencer (1997) foundthat in those individuals whose self-esteem had been threatenedby negative feedback, derogating a stereotyped target led to anincrease in self-esteem. Abrams and Hogg (1988) describedtwo studies revealing a significant negative correlation betweenpersonal self-esteem and in-group bias, and Finchilescu (1986)found that groups experimentally assigned low status demon-strated greater in-group bias. Crocker and Schwartz (1985),however, found that individuals low in self-esteem denigrateboth out-group and in-group members (see also Cracker,Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987), and Sachdev andBourhis (1987) found that, contrary to what one might expect,high status groups showed an even more pronounced in-groupbias than did low status groups. These equivocal findings suggestthat there may be more to the in-group bias phenomenon thansimply the quest for positive self-evaluation. Indeed, as notedearlier, a salient additional possibility is that in-groups also mat-ter to their members because they afford the construction of ameaningful "social reality" without which intelligible decisionsand actions may not be possible (Festinger, 1954; Hardin &Higgins, 1996).

This is hardly a novel idea. In fact, it figured prominently inclassic social psychological conceptions of group function thatstressed how members' personal attitudes, experiences, and be-havior are anchored in group norms (Asch, 1952; Festinger,1954; Kelley, 1955; Lewin, 1947; Sherif, 1936). From this per-spective, in-groups play a critical epistemic role as a primarysource of social comparison and verification: Because a mean-ingful validation of beliefs or values is more likely to be soughtfrom individuals with whom one shares relevant social identi-ties, in-groups may play a uniquely important role in definingone's social reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996).

In a recent formulation, Hogg and Abrams (1993) explicitlydwelt on the epistemic function of in-groups in proposing anuncertainty-reduction view of group-related motivation. Fromthis perspective, people are generally inclined to reduce uncer-tainty or ambiguity, and they do so through agreement or identi-fication with in-group members. Viewed in these terms, the in-group bias may reflect a fundamental human desire to acquireand maintain epistemic certainty in one's attitudes, beliefs, andexperiences, gratifiable only through the social validation ofone's cognitions by like-minded others. To the individual mem-ber, the in-group comes, therefore, to represent a source ofunambiguous social knowledge, often a highly valued psycho-logical "commodity." This being the case, it is easy to see whymembers may considerably appreciate the in-group, identifywith it, and be generally biased in its favor.

However appealing, the hypothesized relation between thedesire for certain knowledge and the in-group bias has not beendirectly investigated thus far. Its detailed examination consti-tutes, therefore, a major objective of the present research. More-over, whereas Hogg and Abrams (1993) emphasized a generalquest for certainty by most humans, we assume that such questsmay vary both across individuals and across situations. Morespecifically, we assume that the quest for certainty is associated

with a need for cognitive closure, a motivational tendency ac-corded a considerable amount of recent research attention (forreviews, see Kruglanski, 1990; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996;Webster & Kruglanski, in press). This motivation is specificallycharacterized in what follows.

Need for Closure

The need for (nonspecific) cognitive closure has been definedas a desire for a definite answer to a question, any firm answer,rather than uncertainty, confusion, or ambiguity (Kruglanski,1990). The strength of this desire is a function of the benefitsassociated with possessing closure and the costs associated withlacking it. As already noted, the need for closure, like the drivefor self-enhancement, can vary across individuals and situations.For example, need for closure has been shown to increase inconditions that make information processing difficult or un-pleasant, such as time pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Kruglanski & Webster. 1991), noise (Kruglanski, Webster, &Klem, 1993), and mental fatigue (Webster, Richter, & Kruglan-ski, 1996).

Once aroused, the need for closure may induce a tendency toseek immediate and permanent answers. That is, individuals willseek closure urgently, yet they will also strive for transituation-ally stable rather than transitory answers that avoid the necessityof future revisions and the attendant uncertainty and ambiguitythe revision process may typically entail. In interpersonal set-tings, cognitive closure may be promoted through the quickattainment of social consensus, signifying epistemic stabilityacross persons. Indeed, a number of studies have found thatneed for closure may enhance the desire for consensus withinin-groups (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski et al.,1993). For instance, Kruglanski and Webster (1991) found thatindividuals in small groups placed under high (vs. low) needfor closure by means of time pressure or ambient noise weremore likely to reject a confederate who professed to hold adeviate opinion. Similarly, Kruglanski et al. (1993) found thatindividuals with high (vs. low) need for closure, either manipu-lated via noise or assessed via a personality scale, exhibited astronger preference for agreement with their dyadic partners.Such findings support the notion that a high degree of motivationto eschew ambiguity or seek certainty is related to the valuationof consensus. Furthermore, because consensus is typicallysought within well-defined in-groups, its appeal under height-ened need for closure may readily result in an in-group bias:To members under heightened need for closure, the in-groupcomes to signify a source of potential gratification. This mayenhance the positivity of sentiment they feel toward the in-group, and its psychological centrality for the members, manifestin their degree of in-group identification. Because of this cen-trality, in-group membership may have a larger impact on socialjudgments under high (vs. low) need for closure. This impliesnot only that in-groups will be valued more but that out-groups,as sources of uncertainty, will be valued less under heightenedneed for closure. That is, heightened need for closure may pro-mote both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation.

We examined the foregoing notions in three separate studies.We assumed that an in-group bias might manifest itself in several

IN-GROUP IDENTIFICATION 385

ways. Most directly, it should be reflected in more positive affecttoward the in-group and more negative affect toward the out-group. It should also be manifest in an enhanced identificationwith the in-group and a decreased identification with the out-group. It may also lead to greater acceptance of influence fromthe in-group (vs. an out-group), that is, a greater tendency toadopt judgments, attitudes, or ideas suggested by an in-groupsource. We investigated these notions both in regard to enduringreal-world groups (participants' ethnic group memberships) andin regard to "artificial" groups created in our laboratory. Fur-thermore, we investigated need for closure effects by assessingthis motivation as an individual-differences variable and by ma-nipulating it situationally.

Study 1

Our first study consisted of three separate samples and exam-ined the relation between need for closure, as assessed via theNeed for Closure Scale (NFCS; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994),and (a) positivity of affect toward one's own and other ethnicgroups (Samples A and B) and (b) feelings of collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991; Sample C) .

Sample A; Method

Participants

Four hundred eight students (195 men, 211 women, and 2 who didnot report their sex) enrolled in an introductory psychology course atthe University of Maryland participated in the study in partial fulfillmentof a course requirement.1 They classified themselves as European Ameri-can (64.7%), Hispanic American (4.4%), Asian American (13.5%), orAfrican American (17.4%). All experimental materials, instructions,and questionnaires were presented to participants on IBM-compatiblepersonal computers.

Procedure

Participants were first asked about their own ethnic group. They coulddescribe themselves as European Americans, African Americans, His-panic Americans, or Asian Americans. Participants then filled out theNFCS (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), followed by a number of "filler"questionnaires not related to the purpose of this study. Finally, partici-pants completed a series of four feeling "thermometers" designed tomeasure their affect toward the four ethnic categories just mentioned.

Assessing need for closure. The NFCS is a 42-item self-report in-strument designed to assess stable individual differences in the need for(or the need to avoid) cognitive closure. The scale requires respondentsto rate the extent to which they agree with statements reflecting a prefer-ence for closure (e.g., "I 'd rather know bad news than stay in a stateof uncertainty") and statements reflecting a desire to avoid closure (e.g.,"1 tend to put off making important decisions until the last possiblemoment''). Ratings are made on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). A composite need for closurescore was computed by summing across responses to each item (afterreverse scoring those items reflecting a preference for avoiding closure).Previous studies have shown that the NFCS has satisfactory reliability(Cronbach's a = .84; test-retest reliability over 12 weeks = .86), andadditional research attests that the NFCS is a valid measure as well.In particular, research using the scale has consistently replicated workinvolving situational manipulations of need for closure such as timepressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), environmental noise (Kruglan-

ski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski etal., 1993), and task interest (Webster,1993; for reviews, see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski, Atash,DeGrada, Mannetti, Pierro, & Webster, 1997; Webster & Kruglanski,1994, in press).

Feelings toward in-groups and out-groups. Respondents indicatedthe degree to which they had warm feelings toward each of the fourethnic groups mentioned earlier (i.e., European Americans, HispanicAmericans, Asian Americans, and African Americans). For each ques-tion, 100 "degrees" represented "very warm and favorable" feelings,and 0 "degrees" represented "very cold and unfavorable" feelings.We operationalized in-group favorability as participants' feeling degreerating of their own ethnic group. Participants' out-group score was themean of the feeling degree ratings for the three remaining ethnic groups.

Sample A: Results

Separate multiple regressions were performed on partici-pants' in-group and out-group affect ratings. We regressed eachof these two ratings on the other (that is, the in-group ratingwas regressed on the out-group rating, and the out-group ratingwas regressed on the in-group rating), as well as on partici-pants' need for closure score and on a categorical variable repre-senting their particular ethnicity. With all of the preceding vari-ables included in the regressions, need for closure was foundto be (a) significantly and positively related to participants' in-group rating (pr = .15, p < .005), F ( l , 405) = 9.79, p <.005, and (b) significantly and negatively related to participants'out-group ratings (pr = -.18,/? < .005), F( 1,405) = 12.83,/>< .0001, supporting the notion that need for closure is positivelyassociated with an ethnic in-group bias.

No self-esteem measures were administered in Sample A. Be-cause in-group bias has been often linked to self-esteem needs (Taj-fel & Turner, 1986), we sought to replicate the results for SampleA with Sample B while controlling for participants' self-esteem.

Sample B: Method

Participants

Two hundred fifty-four students (105 men and 149 women) enrolledin an introductory psychology course at the University of Marylandparticipated in the study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.Of these students, 19.7% classified themselves as African American,63.0% classified themselves as European American, 4.3% classified

1 There was no consistent effect for participants' sex in the threestudies. Sample A in Study 1 did show that the effect of need for closureon in-group and out-group ratings was significantly stronger for menthan women, F ( l , 402) = 11.80, p < .001, and F ( l , 402) = 4.77, p< .05. The significance of these interactions, however, did not influencethe significance of the reported main effects for need for closure, andthese significant interactions were not replicated in Sample B. Therewas also no effect for sex in Sample C. The effects reported in Study2 were not moderated by participants' sex, with the exception of theliking ratings for the in-group and out-group. In this instance, the effectof the need for closure manipulation on in-group liking ratings wasfound to be greater for women than men, but the significance of thisinteraction did not influence the significance of the main effect forthe need for closure manipulation on identification. Furthermore, thisinteraction was not significant in Study 3, F < 1. There were no signifi-cant effects for sex in Study 3.

386 SHAH, KRUGLANSKI, AND THOMPSON

themselves as Hispanic American, and 13.0% classified themselves asAsian American. All materials, instructions, and questionnaires werepresented on IBM-compatible personal computers.

Procedure

All participants first indicated their own ethnic group membership.Participants then completed the NFCS, followed by a number of "filler"questionnaires. Finally, they completed the "feeling thermometers" forthe four ethnic groups described earlier and, after an additional fillerquestionnaire, the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, a well-validatedand frequently used measure of personal self-esteem.

Sample B: Results

Separate multiple regressions were performed on partici-pants' in-group and out-group affect ratings. As in our firstsample, each of these two ratings was regressed on the otherrating, as well as on need for closure and a variable representingparticipants' ethnicity. In addition, these regressions also con-trolled for individual differences in self-esteem. Under theseconditions, need for closure was significantly and positivelyrelated to participants' affect toward their in-group (pr = .13,p < .05), F(\, 249) = 3.02, p < .05. Furthermore, it wassignificantly and negatively related to participants' affect towardout-groups (pr = - . 1 3 , p < .05), F ( l , 249) = 6.16, p =.01. Self-esteem was not significantly correlated with need forclosure or with either group affect rating (all Fa < 1).

Sample C: Method

Sample C extended the examination of the first two samples to dierelation between need for closure and the positivity of one's generalsocial identity, defined as those aspects of the identity that relate togroup membership.

Participants

Two hundred eighty students (128 men, 148 women, and 4 who didnot report their sex) enrolled in an introductory psychology course atthe University of Maryland participated in partial fulfillment of a courserequirement. All materials, instructions, and questionnaires were againpresented on IBM-compatible personal computers.

Procedure

Participants first filled out the NFCS, followed by a number of fillerquestionnaires. They then completed a 16-item measure of collectiveself-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) assessing how positively indi-viduals view the social groups to which they belong (i.e., their own in-groups). Responses are made on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (stronglydisagree) to 9 {strongly agree). The instrument includes items assessingin-group identification (e.g., "The social groups I belong to are animportant reflection of who I am") , personal regard for in-groups (e.g.,"I feel good about the social groups I belong to" ) , personal esteemwithin in-groups (e.g., "I am a worthy member of the social group Ibelong t o " ) , and perceptions of how in-groups are viewed by out-groups(e.g., "Overall my social groups are considered good by others")-

Sample C: Results

Luhtanen and Crocker (1991) have shown that individualshigh in collective self-esteem demonstrate a greater bias towardexperimentally formed in-groups than do individuals low in col-lective self-esteem. If a heightened need for closure magnifiesthe degree of in-group favoritism, it may also enhance groupmembers' level of collective self-esteem. Consistent with thisprediction, NFCS score and collective self-esteem were signifi-cantly and positively correlated in this sample (r = .18, p <.005).

Discussion

Taken as a whole, the results of Study 1 suggest the presenceof a systematic relation between individual differences in theneed for closure and ethnic in-group identification. Researchconducted with our first sample demonstrated that such a rela-tion may hold across different ethnic groups. This effect wasreplicated with a different sample (Sample B), controlling forindividual differences in self-esteem. Finally, our third samplerevealed a link between the need for cognitive closure and col-lective self-esteem, indicating that individuals' degree of closuremotivation relates to the degree to which they value their in-groups.2

Study 2

Overview

Although the findings of Study 1 were encouraging, theysuffer from several obvious limitations. First, correlational re-sults are largely uninformative as to the causal direction ofobserved effects. Our conceptual analysis suggests that a height-ened need for closure should augment in-group bias by increas-ing the subjective value of the "social reality" (or consensus)supplied by the in-group. However, the results of Study 1 areequally compatible with the opposite causal direction, wherebya strong identification with the in-group produces a heightenedneed for closure. It is possible, in other words, that a strongliking for the in-group lends particular appeal to the social real-ity such a group defines. This may lead to an uncritical accep-tance of such reality and, hence, to a closed-minded attitude,which may generalize to the individual's cognitive motivationmore broadly, producing a high generalized need for closure.

To examine the causal direction more precisely, in Study 2 wesystematically manipulated need for closure rather than merelyassessing it as in Study 1. Experimentally varying the need forclosure affords an additional, conceptual advantage: Accordingto need for closure theory (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) needfor closure can be situationally aroused in addition to represent-

2 In addition to replicating the significant results of Study 1 for partici-pants' ethnic in-groups and out-groups, Thompson and Stangor (1998)also found similar results for in-groups and out-groups based on partici-pants' religious background, sex, and sexual orientation. Furthermore,they found that need for closure was significantly positively related toin-group bias after controlling for the effect of collective self-esteem onthis bias, F ( l , 164) - 13.22, p < .001.

IN-GROUP IDENTIFICATION 387

ing a dimension of individual difference. Thus, conceptual repli-cation of our Study 1 results, using a situational manipulationof need for closure, may allow a convergent validation of thesefindings that would enhance their credibility. Furthermore, itseemed desirable to extend our investigation to additional poten-tial manifestations of in-group bias beyond affective positivityand collective esteem (e.g., to one's identification with in-groupand susceptibility to its influence). Finally, it was deemed im-portant to probe the generality of the phenomena revealed inStudy 1 by exploring whether the relation between need forclosure and in-group bias holds also for transient groups createdin the laboratory or whether it is restricted to significant real-world groups (e.g., one's ethnic group). Our second study wasdesigned with all of the foregoing objectives in mind.

Because, in many previous studies, need for closure has beensuccessfully manipulated via time pressure (for a review, seeKruglanski & Webster, 1996), we again decided to use thisparticular manipulation. Also, to experimentally create meaning-ful in-groups and out-groups for our participants, we placednewly formed groups of equal status in competition with eachother (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Rabbie, Benoist, Oosterbaan, &Visser, 1974; Sherif, Harvey, White, & Sherif, 1961). In sum-mary, then, the present study examined whether a time pressuremanipulation of need for closure would influence affect toward,perceived similarity to, and acceptance of influence from experi-mentally defined in-groups and out-groups in competitive rela-tion with each other.

Method

Participants

Seventy-one students (29 men and 42 women) from the Universityof Maryland participated in the study either for partial fulfillment of acourse requirement or for a payment of $7. Three students were droppedfor failing to properly follow the experimental instructions or for exhib-iting suspiciousness toward the procedure.

Procedure

During the experimental session, participants responded to a MicroExperimental Laboratory-based computer progTam (Schneider, 1988)that presented written instructions to them and collected their typedresponses. Participants were led to believe that, together with a team-mate, they would be competing against a rival team of 2 participantson a reading comprehension task. Their stated goal was to outperformthe competitors' team in answering correctly questions pertaining to anupcoming reading passage. As an incentive, participants were promiseda number of lottery tickets for a prize to be awarded at the end of thesemester. The winning prize was $100, and the number of tickets theywere to receive for this lottery was said to depend on whedier their teamoutperformed the competition. Participants were also told they wouldreceive two self-descriptions, one written by their teammate and theother by a member of the competing team, ostensibly to provide themwith information about the other participants. The same two "self-descriptions" were given to each participant. One was said to belongto a member of the blue team and was completed in blue ink. This self-description contained five attributes that, according to the alleged author,best described his or her own personality. It also contained the author'sthree best strategies for retaining written information, which were pre-sumably relevant to the forthcoming reading comprehension task. The

remaining self-description was provided by a member of the red teamand was completed in red ink. This description also contained five self-attributes and three retention strategies, all different from those providedby the blue member. Participants' own membership on the blue or thered team was determined randomly. Participants were then told that theywould answer questions about their competitor and teammate based onthe descriptions they had just read.

Need for closure manipulation. Before participants answered thesequestions, we manipulated their need for closure independently of theirteam membership. In the high need for closure condition, participantswere told that, because we wished them to answer the questions asquickly as possible, tiiere was a time limit imposed on providing theirresponses. Participants were told that if they exceeded diis limit (whoseexact length remained unspecified), they would have to answer an addi-tional set of questions as a penalty. In die low need for closure condition,participants were told that, because we wished them to answer the ques-tions as carefully as possible, there was a minimum time requirementimposed on providing their responses. The exact length of time requiredwas also unspecified. Accordingly, these participants were advised thatif they did not take enough time in answering the questions, they wouldhave to answer an additional set of questions as a penalty.

In-group and out-group identification ratings. On the basis of thesedescriptions, participants then rated how much they liked their teammate(i.e., the in-group member) and their competitor (out-group member) andindicated how similar each seemed to themselves. Each rating was recordedon a 7-point scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (7).

At this point, participants performed a reading comprehension taskin which they studied a literary passage and responded to a 12-itemmultiple-choice test pertinent to the passage. After completing this test,participants were given feedback that their team had either won or lostto determine whether, in this situation, the tendency to identify withone's in-group depends on its degree of success. The feedback thatparticipants received was varied randomly and did not reflect their actualperformance. Participants were then asked to list the three best ways, intheir opinion, of retaining written information in memory. This measure,referred to henceforth as "retention strategies," was later used to assessthe degree to which participants tended to be influenced by an in-group(vs. an out-group) source.

Manipulation check. The speed of participants' response to the lik-ing and similarity questions and the speed with which they provided thestrategy listings were recorded by the computer program. In addition,participants were asked how quickly tfiey tried to complete the proce-dure. Responses were recorded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (notat all) to 7 {extremely). Using the same 7-point scale, participantsindicated how generally positive they felt while completing the task andhow confident they had been that they could complete it accurately afterhaving received their instructions (i.e., after receiving the experimentalmanipulation). These last items were included to examine whether theneed for closure manipulation varied participants' perceptions of effi-cacy or emotional experience during task performance.

Participants were then fully debriefed. They were informed that thefeedback they had received did not reflect their actual performance.Therefore, each participant in the study would be receiving the samenumber of lottery tickets (1) for the $100 prize (odds of winning:approximately 1 in 150). In addition, all participants received eitherexperimental credit or a payment of $7 for taking part.

Results

Manipulation Check

Participants in the high (vs. low) need for closure conditionindicated a stronger motivation to provide answers as quickly

388 SHAH, KRUGLANSKI, AND THOMPSON

as possible (M = 5.4 vs. 4.5), F(l, 60) = 14.39, p < .001.Furthermore, these participants were significantly faster in eval-uating their teammate and competitor {M — 75.9 s vs. 46.6 s),F ( l , 60) = 12.71, p = .001, and in providing their strategylistings (M - 89.9 s vs. 67.2 s) , F ( l , 60) = 4.12, p < .05.

Participants in the two need for closure conditions did notsignificantly differ, however, in their postmanipulation confi-dence that they could complete the task accurately or in howemotionally positive they felt while completing the task, Fs <1. Finally, it should be noted that although the need for closuremanipulation was found to influence the time taken to completethe experimental procedures, the amount of time itself did notaffect the liking or similarity ratings or the strategy listings, allFs < 1. This suggests that potential differences in participants'cognitive capacity to consider information presented to themconcerning their teammate and competitor were not responsiblefor the present results.

Identification With In-Group and Out-Group Members

Because identification with a group is thought to involveboth liking of and perceived similarity to the group's members(Deaux, 1996), we combined the liking and similarity ratingsfor the teammate and the competitor to form their respectiveidentification scores.3 Separate analyses of covariance were per-formed on each of these identification scores, controlling forthe opposite identification score. Consistent with our hypothesis,the time pressure manipulation significantly increased partici-pants' identification with their teammate, F ( l , 51) = 13.50,p = .001, but significantly decreased identification with theircompetitor, F{\, 51) = 4.57, p < .05. Analyses controlled forparticipants' team membership (red team vs. blue team) andwhether they had been paid or received credit for their participa-tion (all Fs < 1). Figure 1 summarizes the adjusted means forthe identification ratings.

Proportion of In-Group-Based Strategies

The number of participants' retention strategies that had beenmentioned by their teammate and the number of those that hadbeen mentioned by their competitor were recorded. The natureof the experimental design created a dependency between thesetwo numbers, because the most they could sum to was 3. We

ILowNFCC DHighNFCC

7.797.46

In-GroupIdentification

Out-GroupIdentification

therefore created a single proportion that represented partici-pants' bias toward listing strategies mentioned by their team-mate rather than strategies listed by their competitor when listingstrategies that had already been presented in the study. This in-gToup strategy proportion was created by dividing the numberof teammate strategies listed by the total number of teammateand competitor strategies listed (a constant value of .01 wasadded to the denominator so that if no teammate or competitorstrategies were listed, participants would receive a proportionof 0) . We also calculated the sum of these two scores as ameasure of participants' overall tendency to use (or be influ-enced by) recently presented information, regardless of itssource.

We then performed a regression analysis on participants' in-group strategy proportion. This analysis controlled for whetheror not the participants' team had won or lost and for overalldifferences in our sample in preferences for some strategies overothers. When strategies from the experimental procedure wereincluded, participants under time pressure—that is, those in thehigh (vs. low) need for closure condition—listed a significantlylarger proportion of teammate strategies than competitor strate-gies, F( 1,60) = 5.90, p < .05. In addition, a separate regressionanalysis revealed that the need for closure manipulation had noeffect on the overall likelihood of listing strategies from theexperimental procedure (i.e., the total number of strategies listedby teammate and competitor), F < 1. Thus, it appears that thegreater tendency of our high need for closure participants toadopt the strategies listed by their in-group member over theout-group member does not reflect a mete tendency to be moreinfluenced by recent information under a heightened need forclosure. It is also noteworthy that whether participants were ledto believe their team had won or lost had no significant influenceon the in-group strategy proportion and did not significantlyinteract with the need for closure manipulation, Fs < 1. Thissuggests that, in the present situation at least, the tendency toaccept the in-group member's influence did not derive fromparticipants' esteem needs.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 conceptually replicate and extend thefindings of Study 1, affirming a positive relation between indi-viduals' need for cognitive closure and their tendency to exhibitan in-group bias. Whereas in Study 1, participants with high (vs.low) need for closure, assessed via an individual-differencesmeasure, professed a more positive feeling toward their ethnicmembership group and exhibited higher collective self-esteem,in Study 2, participants under conditions of time pressure as-

Figure 1. Adjusted mean identification ratings: Study 2, NFCC = needfor closure condition.

3 Consistent with past research on the relation of similarity to at-traction (Byrne & Nelson, 1965), ratings of in-group similarity andliking were found to be highly correlated in both Study 2 and Study 3(rs = .44 and .64, respectively). Because we combined similarity andattraction to form our measure of identification, we also performedseparate analyses to determine whether need for closure had a signifi-cantly greater effect on either of these variables individually. Need forclosure was not found to affect the liking and similarity ratings differ-ently in Study 2 or Study 3 (all Fs < 1).

IN-GROUP IDENTIFICATION 389

sumed to elevate their need for closure (a) expressed greaterliking for an in-group member, (b) perceived greater similaritybetween themselves and the in-group member, and (c) weremore likely to accept the in-group member's suggestions inregard to retention strategies. Thus, not only did the presentstudy reproduce the positive relation between need for closureand in-group bias, but it did so with alternative operationaldefinitions of both of these variables, convergently validating theoriginal finding. Furthermore, it demonstrated that this relationapplies also to transient groups created ad hoc and is not limitedto the stable real-world groups examined in Study 1. Finally,systematically manipulating need for closure in Study 2 castlight on the causal direction of its relation with the in-groupbias, confirming that an elevated need for closure can, in certaincircumstances, function as a cause of this bias.

Whereas the consistency in results between Studies 1 and 2supports our analysis, the substantial differences in proceduresacross the two paradigms, particularly in operationalizing needfor closure, beg the question of whether the effects found in thetwo experiments reflect the workings of the same underlyingvariables. Specifically, it is possible that time pressure imposeda constraint on participants' cognitive capacity and that suchrestriction, in turn, compelled them to restrict their attention tothe more salient stimulus, possibly represented by the in-groupmember, leading to greater acceptance of his or her ideas (i.e.,retention strategies). Restricted capacity could also increase thetendency toward heuristic reasoning and to infer one's likingfor—and similarity to—an in-group member based on an "in-group heuristic." Although the absence of a significant relationbetween the amount of time spent on the task and any of ourdependent measures argues against a restricted cognitive capac-ity explanation, it would be desirable tp replicate our findingswith an alternative way of operationalizing need for closure, oneinvulnerable to the restricted capacity reinterpretation. Study 3was conducted to investigate whether the results of Study 2would replicate with the operational definition of need for clo-sure used in Study 1. That is, we used participants' scores onthe NFCS, which are highly unlikely to reflect cognitive capacitydifferences (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).

An additional purpose of Study 3 was to examine whetherneed for closure may also affect the formation of new attitudesbased on an in-group (vs. an out-group) source. Note that Study2 may not have tapped such new altitudes but, rather, may havereflected a validation of old attitudes toward various retentionstrategies. It is possible, in other words, that the mention ofspecific strategies by an in-group member enhanced their valid-ity in our participants' eyes but that these particular strategiesmay have been previously available in participants' mental rep-ertoires. Would an increased in-group bias under a high needfor closure extend to the acquisition of new attitudes? Our nextstudy sought to address this issue as well.

Study 3

Method

Participants

Fifty students (29 men and 21 women) enrolled in an introductorypsychology course at the University of Maryland participated in partial

fulfillment of a course requirement. TWo students were dropped forfailing to properly follow the experimental procedures.

Procedure

In most respects, the procedure was identical to that of Study 2.During the experimental session, participants completed a Micro Experi-mental Laboratory computer program whereby they learned they wouldengage with a "teammate" in a contest against two "competitors" ona reading comprehension task. Specifically, their goal was to outperformthe other team on questions about an upcoming reading passage. As anincentive for doing well on the task, participants were advised that theywould be receiving a number of lottery tickets for a monetary prize tobe awarded at the end of the semester. The winning prize was $100, andthe number of tickets participants were to receive was said to dependon their team's performance. Participants were then told that they wouldreceive information about their teammate and one competitor so thatthey would have at least some acquaintance with the other participants.As in Study 2, all participants received exactly the same two descrip-tions, but identification as either the teammate or the competitor wasvaried randomly. Each of these alleged individuals provided self-descrip-tions in terms of five attributes as well as noting their three best strategiesfor retaining written information (i.e., retention strategies). On the basisof these descriptions, participants rated how much they liked their"teammate" and their "competitor" and how similar each was to them-selves. Participants then completed a reading comprehension task inwhich they studied a reading passage and responded to a 12-item multi-ple-choice test on the passage. After completing the 12 questions, partici-pants received feedback that their team had either won or lost. Thisfeedback was varied randomly between participants and did not reflecttheir actual performance.

Participants were then presented with a positive attitude statementabout the argument contained in the reading passage. The statementindicated that the reading passage was personally relevant and writtenin a way that was interesting and well organized. This statement wasrandomly identified as expressed either by the participants' teammateor by one of the competitors. Participants responded to three questionsthat assessed how much they agreed with this statement. The specificquestions tapped general agreement with the presented statement andidentification with the specific ideas it expressed (i.e., liking for thepassage topic and liking for the style in which it was written). All threeassessments were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all)to 7 (extremely). These questions were designed to tap the degree towhich participants were influenced by an in-group or an out-group mem-ber in the formation of a new attitude.

Participants then listed their three preferred ways of retaining writteninformation (i.e., retention strategies). Finally, they completed the NFCSand other filler questionnaire items that were included to minimize thelikelihood of participants seeing a connection between the experimentalprocedure and the NFCS (in fact, no participants reported making sucha connection). Because the items of the NFCS are quite general andseemingly unrelated to the experimental procedure (e.g., "My personalspace is usually messy and disorganized''), it was assumed that partici-pants' scale responses were not the result of how they responded to thisprocedure.

This concluded the experiment. Participants were fully debriefed andinformed about the true nature of the study. They were also advised thatthe feedback they had received did not reflect their actual performance.Accordingly, each participant in the study received the same number oflottery tickets (1) for the $100 prize and was informed that the odds ofwinning this lottery were approximately 1 in 150. In addition, all partici-pants received experimental credit for their participation.

390 SHAH, KRUGLANSKI, AND THOMPSON

Results

Participants' need for closure score was calculated in thesame manner described earlier, as were participants' identifica-tion scores and in-group strategy proportion.

Identification With In-Group and Out-Group Members

Separate regression analyses were performed on teammateand competitor identification scores, in each case controlling forthe opposite score. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants'need for closure score was significantly and positively relatedto their identification with their teammate, F( 1,45) = 4.84, p <.05, but significantly and negatively related to their identificationwith their competitor, F ( l , 45) = 3.74, p = .05. Each analysiscontrolled for participants' team membership (red team vs. blueteam), F < 1.

Proportion of In-Group-Based Strategies

A regression analysis was carried out on participants' in-group strategy proportion. Need for closure was found to besignificantly related to a tendency toward listing teammates'strategies when participants included strategies from the experi-mental procedure in their own listings, F ( l , 42) — 4.99, p <.05. A separate regression analysis revealed, in addition, thatneed for closure did not significantly affect participants' overalllikelihood of listing experimentally presented strategies (that is,their teammate's and their competitor's collectively), F < 1.Furthermore, just as in Study 2, whether the participant's teamwas said to have won or lost had no significant influence on thein-group strategy proportion and did not moderate the effect ofneed for closure on this proportion, F < 1.

In-Group and Out-Group Members' Impact inFormation of a New Attitude

Participants' answers to the three questions concerning theirattitude about the reading passage were highly inlercorrelated(Cronbach's a - .88). Thus, they were summed to form a singlenew attitude score representing the degree to which participantsagreed with the presented attitude statement (teammate's orcompetitor's).

Participants' agreement scores were analyzed as a functionof need for closure and source identity (teammate vs. competi-tor). A regression analysis revealed a significant two-way inter-action effect of need for closure and source identity on attitudeagreement. The effect of need for closure on attitude agreementwas greater when the source was the teammate than when thesource was a competitor, F ( l , 41) = 6.43, p = .01. Separateanalyses of the simple effects of need for closure examinedwhen the source was the teammate and when the source was acompetitor. When it was the teammate, need for closure had astrong and significant positive effect on attitude agreement, F( 1,12) = 13.75, p < .005. When it was a competitor, however, needfor closure had a nonsignificant negative effect on agreement, F< 1. It should be noted here that whether the participant wason the winning or losing team did not affect agreement, F < 1,

and did not moderate the effect of source on agreement, F( 1,41) - 1.20, ns.

Discussion

The results of Study 3, in which we assessed individual differ-ences in need for closure, conceptually replicated those of Study2, in which we manipulated need for closure situationally viatime pressure. Both studies revealed that high (vs. low) needfor closure was related to greater identification with in-groupmembers and lesser identification (or greater disidentification)with out-group members. High (vs. low) need for closure wasalso found to increase the relative influence of the in-group (vs.the out-group) member on participants' attitudes and beliefs.This influence was evident in participants' preferences for reten-tion strategies in both studies and in their attitude agreement inStudy 3. Whereas the former could reflect participants' tendencyto validate their pre-existing opinions by reference to an in-group member, the latter clearly reflects the increased tendencyunder need for closure to accept an in-group member's influenceon the formation of novel opinions. Finally, given the consider-able procedural similarity between Studies 2 and 3, their highlyconsistent findings provide further support for interpreting thefindings of Study 2 as resulting from need for closure effectsrather than from cognitive capacity restriction due to timepressure.

General Discussion

If in-group bias reflects group members' quest for uncertaintyreduction (Hogg & Abrams, 1993), if such quests vary acrossindividuals as well as situations, and if their intensity is at leastpartially determined by the need for cognitive closure, assessingsuch a need or manipulating it experimentally should be tied tomanifestations of in-group bias. This thesis was strongly sup-ported by our three studies, which obtained evidence for thepredicted relation between need for closure and in-group biasacross varied manifestations of the need and the bias. In Study1, we found that stable individual differences in need for closurewere related to liking for one's in-group, dislike for out-groups,and collective self-esteem. In Study 2, a situational manipulationof need for closure via time pressure resulted in greater identifi-cation with an in-group member, lesser identification with anout-group member, and a greater tendency to exhibit preferences(for retention strategies) consistent with those of the in-groupmember. The results of Study 2 were replicated in Study 3, inwhich we again assessed the need for closure via our individual-differences measure. Finally, in Study 3, we also obtained evi-dence that need for closure is related to individuals' tendencyto adopt an in-group source's attitude on a novel issue.

Our three studies convergently validate each other and controlfor each other's interpretative vulnerabilities. Specifically, StudyI was correlational and hence unclear as to the causal directionof the relation between need for closure and in-group bias. Incontrast, Study 2 was experimental and therefore clearer in itscausal implications, suggesting that need for closure may indeedconstitute a determinant of an in-group bias. Whereas Study 2manipulated need for closure via time pressure, Study 3 proce-

IN-GROUP IDENTIFICATION 391

durally replicated Study 2 and obtained highly similar findingswith an individual-differences measure of need for closure lessopen to a cognitive capacity interpretation. The fact that, inStudy 3, high need for closure participants showed a greatertendency to form a new attitude in agreement with that of theirin-group member further supports the notion that it was needfor closure that produced the in-group bias rather than viceversa. Because the attitude at issue concerned an entirely noveltopic and did not exist beforehand, it is highly unlikely that itproduced stable individual differences in need for closure,whereas the opposite causal direction, predicted by our analysis,is much more plausible. Finally, the fact that need for closureeffects were found for both significant real-world social group-ings and for transient, ad hoc dyads created in the laboratoryattests to the generality or external validity of our results. Collec-tively, then, the present research offers solid support for thenotion that the need for cognitive closure constitutes an im-portant determinant of in-group bias across its diverse manifes-tations and for a wide range of possible groups.

Our findings add to the growing knowledge that epistemicprocesses are firmly and intimately tied to various group phe-nomena. Previously, we observed that a heightened need forcognitive closure increases individuals' desire for agreementfrom their interaction partners (Kruglanski et al., 1993) andgroup members' tendency to reject opinion deviates (Kruglan-ski & Webster, 1991). More recently, we obtained evidence thatthe "linguistic intergroup bias" (Maas & Arcuri, 1996)—thatis, the tendency to perceive positive in-group behavior and nega-tive out-group behavior in abstract terms and negative in-groupbehavior and positive out-group behavior in concrete terms—is magnified by the need for cognitive closure (Webster, Krug-lanski, & Pattison, 1997). Now we have obtained evidence thatepistemically engendered positivity toward one's in-group ex-tends beyond linguistic expression to the realms of affect, self-perceptions, and attitude and opinion formation.

Strikingly, these phenomena even appear with what mightseem highly ephemeral and temporary group memberships ofpatently short duration (as in our Studies 2 and 3) . Indeed,common experience confirms that we often react to a completestranger (e.g., a waiter at a restaurant, a fellow traveler on atrain, or a salesperson at a car dealership) as if he or she werea member of a highly significant in-group whose opinions mat-tered a great deal for how we think about various matters, in-cluding ourselves. Yet, often only minutes later, once the contexthas shifted and the momentary "in-group feeling" has dis-solved, these strangers' opinions virtually cease to matter, andtheir influence over our psyches is all but gone.

Although previous theorists (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) werewell aware of such impacts of ephemeral (or ' 'minimal1') groupmemberships on people's feelings, cognitions, and behavior, thepresent work suggests, in addition, that their influence may bemoderated by aspects of individuals' epistemic state, such astheir need for cognitive closure. People's knowledge is sociallyconstructed in specific contexts. Hence, the knowledge forma-tion process is significantly influenced by the different ways inwhich relevant epistemic variables are contextually represented.For example, contextual elevation of the need for closure maylend the in-group particular value as a source of socially sup-

ported closure (or social reality). Because this may increasethe weight of in-group membership in determining the positivityof one's interpersonal attitudes, it may also result in out-groupdenigration, in an effort, perhaps, to maintain or defend thereality that has been forged with the in-group. This is preciselywhat our studies seem to show.

The relevance of the epistemic process to a classic intergroupphenomenon such as in-group bias brings together unlikely con-ceptual bedfellows that, on first blush, appear to have little todo with each other. For instance, time pressure may appear ratherunrelated to feelings toward one's own group, and its relevanceis made apparent only by the theoretical connection outlined inthe lay epistemic framework (Kruglanski, 1989). Additionalvariables known to induce the need for closure, such as environ-mental noise, fatigue, and boredom (for a review, see Kruglan-ski & Webster, 1996), may appear similarly unrelated to in-tergroup phenomena, yet their relevance in this connection isclearly implied by need for closure theory.

Although the present results are highly consistent with thehypothesis that group members' need for cognitive closure en-hances their tendency to favor their in-groups and derogate out-groups, additional implications of our epistemic analysis remainuntested. Such implications relate to the mediating process un-derlying these particular relations and to their boundary condi-tions. Specifically, our analysis suggests that the relation be-tween need for closure and one's feelings toward in-groups andout-groups will be epistemically mediated by the desire for in-group consensus and firm social -reality. A boundary condition,then, on the present effects should be the perceived potential forin-groups to provide such social reality. Specifically, our analy-sis suggests that need for closure will augment in-group biasonly for in-groups characterized by relative uniformity of opin-ions. It is not expected to exert such effects for in-groups charac-terized by internal strife and discord and, hence, incapable offurnishing the basis for cognitive closure. Future research isneeded to test these particular implications of our theory.

Furthermore, the impact of need for closure on in-group biasmight give rise to additional social psychological phenomenauntapped in the present work. For instance, need for closuremay influence the type of relationships one may develop within-group and out-group members. Consistent with the presentresults, it seems possible that relationships with in-group mem-bers will be characterized by a "communal orientation,"whereas those with outgroup members will be characterized byan "exchange" or a "strictly business1' orientation (Clark &Mills, 1993). In turn, these qualitatively different modes of relat-ing to others may affect the manner in which one allocatesrewards to one's in-groups and out-groups. Thus, need for clo-sure may increase the degree to which one dispenses dispropor-tionately large rewards to in-group versus out-group members.Moreover, because individuals high in need for closure mayperceive themselves as more similar to in-group members, theymay be more likely to use an equality rule when allocatingrewards between themselves and in-group members and an eq-uity rule when allocating rewards between themselves and out-group members. Again, these possibilities could be profitablyaddressed in future research.

Finally, it is of interest to consider the implications of the

392 SHAH, KRUGLANSKI, AND THOMPSON

present findings for social identity theory (Tajfel & Tinner, 1986)more generally. Our results suggest that self-esteem considera-tions are not the exclusive motivational basis for in-group bias;rather, the in-group may be valued by its members for closure(or social reality) consideration as well. Future perspectives onin-group bias may expand this motivational examination stillfurther to encompass the entire variety of functions that in-groups may serve for their members (e.g., esteem, social reality,protection from external enemies, and social support in timesof crisis). Indeed, when any of these functions are renderedsalient (that is, when any of the corresponding needs arearoused), the tendency to identify with the in-group and disiden-tify with the out-group may be manifest.

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Received August 18, 1997Revision received February 4, 1998

Accepted February 4, 1998 •