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MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR SUB-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

AN ACADEMIC DISCOURSE

Introduction

1. Pakistan Armed Forces, like many other militaries, are

primarily organized, equipped and trained to fight a conventional war,

thereby thinking in clear-cut terms like friend and foe. In a

conventional war, battle lines are unmistakably drawn, objectives are

clearly defined and above all success / defeat is mostly visible and

measurable. The situation in sub-conventional1 domain is different;

which is characterized by blurring distinction b/w friend and foe,

uncertainty and more critically the notion of success / defeat remains

ambiguous.

2. While a successful re-orientation has taken place in our Army

pertaining to the facets like equipping, training, planning and

execution, there is a need for greater understanding of what

constitutes success in sub-conventional operations and more

essentially, how to measure it. The commonly used terms by the Western

Militaries in this regard are Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and

Measures of Performance (MOPs). The former term in the context of this

article should be taken as analogous to success/ victory.

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3. According to James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, the style of

warfare for which we routinely prepare ourselves i.e, traditional

force-on-force engagements waged within a finite campaign, is not as

likely to occur as irregular-style sets in2 . Since the same assertion

is applicable to our situation as well, correct understanding of MOEs

that are pertinent to own environment, can serve as a useful tool for

commanders to assess various operations and make future decisions

accordingly.

Aim

4. To explain the concept of MOEs, highlight its significance for

sub-conventional warfare and draw pertinent conclusions/ lessons.

Scope

5. The paper encompasses following aspects of MOEs:-

a. The conceptual underpinning.

b. Conventional vs sub-conventional warfare – comparative

notional explanation of success.

c. Enhanced significance in case of sub-

conventional warfare.

d. Key conclusions/ lessons.

The Conceptual Underpinning

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6. The Background . Developing quantifiable methods to measure

effectiveness is becoming more popular in the Western societies. They

try to make sense out of the enormous amount of information being

produced, using measures that have become both common and useful.

These MOEs are being objectively exercised in agriculture, education,

commerce, energy, health / human services, interior, justice and state

departments3 . Similarly, there is an increasing trend in the

militaries also to use measurable methods to analyze and justify their

actions to higher headquarters, political leaders and the public.

These measures fall in the administrative realm as well as in the

combat missions.

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7. Understanding the MOE

a. A Framework Definition . Since the term ‘MOEs’ is

generally used as synonym to success / victory4 in the absence

of any universal definition, following will be used as the

basis for discussion in this paper:-

“MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior,

capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the

attainment of an end state, an objective, or the creation of an effect. It

measures the relevance of actions being performed”5.

b. Characteristics of a Valuable MOE . Since an MOE has to

serve as a basis for assessment, mid-course corrections of

plans and re-orientation of the future course/s of action, it

must be:-

(1) Meaningful.

(2) Observable.

(3) Quantifiable.

(4) Precise.

(5) Linked to the strategic end state.

(6) Reflective of a strong identifiable relationship

between cause and effect.

(7) Adaptive to changes in the environment.

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8. The Place of MOEs in the Operational Planning Process

a. General . The Operational Planning Process takes its roots

from strategic direction provided by the political

leadership for application of the military instrument.

Unambiguous strategic direction and frequent interaction

between political and military leadership result in clear

understanding of desired strategic and military end states/

objectives. Military operations are then planned with the

strategic and military end states in mind. In order to

ascertain the extent to which these objectives have been

achieved, a deliberate assessment/ evaluation process is

followed. MOEs, wherever referred in this paper, will be

analogous to the said process.

b. Major Planning Functions . The Operational Planning Process

encompasses four planning functions, namely; politico-

military assessments, developing the Concept of Operation,

plan formulation and assessment/ evaluation. While the first

function is intrinsic to the strategic direction6 , the others

take following course:-

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(1) Concept of Operation . It is the product of Strategic

Appreciation and invariably includes scheme of

operation, conduct of operation, distribution and

grouping of forces, and articulation of command7.

(2) Formulation of Plan . This function encompasses

formulation of operational, contingency and supporting

plans. It is executed through a ‘six-phase operational

construct’8 , more often applied to counterinsurgency

1 Sub-Conventional Warfare, according to K.C. Dixit, an Indian author,

is a generic term encompassing all armed conflicts that are above the

level of peaceful co-existence and below the threshold of war.2 Assertion made by James Clancy and Chuck Crossett in their article,

Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare, published in Parameters, Summer,

2007.3 Adopted from PART assessments completed in 2002 and 2003, available on

ExpectMore.gov .

4 Ibid.5 Definition adopted from Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation

Planning. US Military, August 2011, page XXV.

6 Ibid.

7 Extracted from Military Methodology Folder of National Defence

University.

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ops, considered within the realm of sub-conventional

warfare. These phases are; Shape (considered as Zero

Phase), Deter, Seize initiative, Dominate, Stabilize

and Enable civil authority.

(3) Assessment/ Evaluation Process . Assessment is the

continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current

situation and progress toward mission accomplishment.

It involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes

to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness

(success or defeat) of the military instrument. The

criteria used in the process are commonly termed as

MOEs9 . While this process is institutionalized in

Western militaries, it remains comparatively neglected

aspect in our case. This process is more critical in

sub-conventional domain as compared to traditional

8 The phrase is commonly used by the US Military during joint

operations; details can be found in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint

Operation Planning, August 2011.

9 Ibid.

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one, and the same will be deliberately later in the

paper.

Conventional vs Sub-Conventional Warfare – Comparative Notional

Explanation

6. Before moving any further, it is appropriate to establish what

success or victory means in the military sense. Colin Grey asserts that

nothing is more important than defining victory10 , even while strategic

thinkers and leaders are developing long-term strategy. The

importance was amply highlighted by General Douglas MacArthur11 , as

“In war, there can be no substitute for victory”. While, it would be

difficult, and probably impractical, to clearly define victory due to

its notional nature, following guidelines suggested by Colin Grey can

be helpful:-

a. Politically, victory should be one that enables achievement

of a favorable postwar settlement.

10 Extracted from the Monograph authored by Dr Colin S. Grey, titled

Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory , published by the US Strategic Studies

Institute in April 2002.11 Cited by Dr Colin S. Grey in his Monograph, titled Defining and Achieving

Decisive Victory , published by the US Strategic Studies Institute in April

2002.

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b. Strategically, victory should be one that decides who wins

the war militarily.

c. At the operational level, victory should refer to a victory

which decides the outcome of a campaign, though not

necessarily of the war as a whole.

7. Once the militaries transit from conventional to sub-

conventional warfare, Campaign Planning and the OPP ought to differ.

Significant changes occur in the processes from planning to execution

stages due to the changed environment, forces and objectives. The

fundamental issue12 that most militaries face while engaged in sub-

conventional warfare is that the tools, models and even the

methodologies for assessing success / effectiveness are biased toward

measuring physical effects on near-peer forces, over a definite period

going through maneuver and attrition oriented battles13 . The

succeeding paragraphs will dwell on the concept of success /

effectiveness in conventional vs sub-conventional warfare.

12 As identified by James Clancy and Chuck Crossett in their article,

Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare, published in Parameters, Summer,

2007.13Ibid.

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8. The history of conventional wars reveals that the concept of

success / effectiveness has mostly revolved around movement and

employment of military forces with two major objectives:-

a. Physical Space . Measuring the success through:-

(1) Gaining control of land.

(2) Domination of sea.

(3) Control of skies.

b. Attrition of Forces . Predicting the outcome of battle/s

through:-

(1) Reducing the enemy forces’ size and composition.

(2) Targeting the cohesion of enemy system of forces thus

hampering its overall capabilities.

9. When we depart from Clausewitzian-style force-on-force

engagements and deal with irregular-style warfare, as confronted

today, the MOEs discussed above appear to be inappropriate for

predicting outcomes. An important aspect to understand is that non-

state actors14 faced by conventional military forces are usually small

and have control of little or no territory. Therefore, control of

14 The author does not intend using the word ‘forces’ since these are not

formally organized as military forces.

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physical space and attrition, the two fundamental MOEs in case of

conventional setting have reduced relevance in sub-conventional

scenario. Henry Kissinger described the challenge as “The guerrilla

wins if he does not lose, the conventional army loses if it does not

win”15.

10. Taking lead from Grey’s thesis16 , one may establish that victory

in sub-conventional domain can probably be viewed as a range of

possibilities, rather than as a stark alternative to the failure to

achieve success. That essentially means that we need to avoid planning

and assessing in absolute terms once engaged in this type of warfare.

Nevertheless, the conventional forces need to understand what success

means in these operations in order to assess their own effectiveness.

Enhanced Significance of MOEs in Sub-conventional Warfare

11. While discussing the concept of success/ victory, J. Boone17

shares the

assertion made by Colin Grey18 that winning is an assessment and not a

15 Cited by GOC 37 Div during a seminar at C&SC on 8 Apr 2011.16Ibid.17 J. Boone’s Chapter on Theory of victory is included in Operational

Strategy (Reader) published by Pakistan Armed Forces War College.18Ibid.

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proven conclusion, and that different people, depending on their

perspective, can legitimately differ in their assessment. Such an

assessment in case of conventional wars is somewhat quantifiable, so

more reckonable measures can be formulated. Is it more critical or

difficult to conceptualize success/ victory (MOEs) for sub-

conventional operations? The succeeding paragraphs may enable the

readers to identify the core issues.

12. Intertwined Levels of War . Political overtones are generally

are higher while militaries are dealing with insurgencies or are

operating in sub-conventional domain. The overarching reason is the

political nature of the problem. Therefore, victory would

correspondingly be defined in political terms. Colonel Harry

Summers19 , while talking to a North Vietnamese officer after the

Vietnam War commented that the United States had won all the battles,

and the North Vietnamese replied, “That may be so, but it is also

irrelevant.” The implication, as J. Boone notes, is that tactical or

operational successes without favourable political outcomes are

futile.

19 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Novato.

California, 1982.

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13. Multiple Scales of Success . Another aspect, interesting but

crucial to understand, is that success/ victory occurs on multiple

scales, as opined by Colin Grey20 . This implies; notion of success or

defeat must not be considered in absolute terms once formulating MOEs

for sub-conventional operations. The figure below amply highlights

the phenomenon:-

SCALE OF SUCCESS21

14. Complex Human Behaviours . Assessing many aspects of operations

in sub-conventional domain is difficult due to the dynamic interaction

among own forces, adaptable adversary, politico-military end state/s

and population. For example, assessing the results of planned actions

to convince a group of people to support the government is very

challenging due to the complexities of human behaviour. Formulation of

20Ibid.21 Adopted from J. Boone’s Chapter on Theory of victory included in

Operational Strategy (Reader) published by Pakistan Armed Forces War

College.

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MOEs in this case need to be both objective and subjective while giving

due importance to psychological factors.

15. Analogy of Winning and Losing . According to Liddell Hart, not

achieving victory is sometimes a win. Some analysts opine that not

losing can be the same as winning under certain circumstances. Henry

Kissinger shares this line of argument by saying that guerrilla wins if

he does not lose. This analogy needs to be understood by the military

planners while dealing with irregulars since for them surviving the

war is a form of victory. The key here is that end state should aim at

denying the enemy requisite space for survival; popular support in

most cases, thus steering the formulation of MOEs accordingly.

16. The Cost of War . Any student of Military History will reckon that

cost is an important factor into the equation of winning or losing.

Liddell Hart asserts that a victory is useless if it breaks the

winner’s economy, military or society. The MOEs or concept of victory

for sub-conventional warfare, without due recognition of the costs in

these spheres, is likely to be flawed. Resultantly, the nation may not

accept even the positive outcome (related to the enemy) of such a war if

the cost is unacceptable.

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17. Resistance Power of the Enemy . The prime objective in sub-

conventional operations, as United States Air Force Doctrine22

suggests, must be to outthink, outperform and adapt faster than the

enemy at all levels in order to deny him the ability to set conditions

favourable to his goals. While deciding upon the MOEs related to this

aspect, one needs to take the Colin Gray’s advice regarding irregular

warfare23 seriously; he advocates that the enemy can be understood to

have continuing powers of resistance on a sliding scale instead of

getting eliminated altogether24 . To what extent and in which areas, the

resistance is reduced to acceptable levels will be the key question for

assessment. In such a scenario, the enemy’s capability of causing

22 For detailed study of dealing with irregular enemy, study United

States Air Force doctrine document 2-3, titled Irregular Warfare, August

2007.23 Irregular warfare is defined by Colin Grey as “Warfare waged in a

style, or styles, that are nonstandard for the regular forces” in his

article titled Irregular Warfare-One Nature, Many Characters published in

Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2007.24 Colin Grey cited by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees in Chapter 3 titled

‘ Theory of victory’ included in Operational Strategy (Reader) published by

Pakistan Armed Forces War College.

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damage to the forces, infrastructure and masses must be carefully

assessed while looking at its reach and not necessarily the loc.

18. Eliminating the Key Leaders . Linked to above, a key element in

any type of war is to kill, capture or force the enemy’s key leaders to

surrender. In case of sub-conventional warfare, this fits into the

overall Operational Planning Process and falls in the category of

combat operations being an operational objective. The point to

understand is that eliminating the key leaders is directly linked to

the strategic end state because it provides a peaceful and stable

environment that sets the conditions for transferring the control to

civil authority. Inability of the regular forces to do so can

potentially deny the achievement of strategic end state, therefore,

MOEs must focus on key leaders.

19. Post-War Environment . Assessment of post-war environment is

another area that is more pronounced in sub-conventional warfare. In

this case, both the criteria used for assessment and the assessor

matter significantly. Commonly, peace and stability in the conflict

zone is taken as the most important criterion. The challenge here is

who should establish, and how, whether the post-war anticipated

conditions have been achieved or otherwise. Should it be based on the

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opinion of the local populace, general masses, own political

leadership and/ or international community?

20. Transferring the Control to Civil Authority . This aspect is

in essence a political objective linked to the strategic end state but

the military instrument owes the responsibility to set the conditions.

As alluded to earlier in the paper, tactical and operational successes

are of no use if they do not facilitate the achievement of strategic end

state. Notwithstanding the capacity of civilian setup to assume

responsibilities, the military would not be able to pursue next

operational objective unless this transition takes place.

21. Victory and Conflict Termination – the Delicate Equation .

Possession of territory and annihilation of enemy forces are not

necessarily the conditions for conflict termination in this kind of

warfare. If the strategic end state is to bring peace and stability in

the conflict zone, the war may be terminated if conditions for peace

have been achieved. The point to note is that insurgents may opt to

surrender and respect writ of the state which would warrant conflict

termination. If the MOE at politico-strategic level was correctly

constructed stating, ‘Achieve peace and stability’, the situation

indicates its successful accomplishment.

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22. Temporal Dimension . The temporal dimension of a success in this

type of warfare assumes added significance. Unless there are

conditions for masses to believe that success has an element of

permanence, it would be difficult to consider that objectives have

been met. Therefore, the MOEs at all levels have to be reasonably

unambiguous and realistic.

Key Conclusions/ Lessons

23. The succeeding paragraphs contain some key conclusions from the

above discourse and lessons for our future engagements.

24. There is a clear and distinct delineation between conventional

and sub-conventional warfare with regards to the concept of victory or

defeat. MOEs are more quantifiable and tangible in the former while in

case of the latter, these are more notional and perspective based.

Therefore, we need to avoid formulating concrete measures for

assessing the outcomes.

25. The application of military instrument ought to be within the

confines of and in strict conformity with the strategic direction

provided by the political leadership. Tactical and operational

objectives should be so tailored that these pave way for achieving the

politico-strategic end state. The military planners need to seek the

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political end state in clearest possible terms in order to ensure

calibrated use of hard power.

26. A holistic comprehension of the Operational Planning Process is

absolutely necessary. Focusing on planning and executing of

operations while leaving the assessment/ evaluation part to

historians paves way for repetition of same mistakes time and again.

The lesson herein is that operations must be thought through to

strategic end state/s and assessment should be the intrinsic part.

27. Cultural and human behavioural complexities warrant apt

understanding of the operational environment. Any effort to apply the

borrowed solutions as a template to a different set of conditions is

likely to seriously counter-productive. This applies; while the plans

have to be specific to the environment, assessment criteria should be

equally focused. The history of warfare testifies that some people

cannot be conquered and some cultures cannot be subjugated.

28. While dealing with irregular enemies, their scale of resistance

should be assessed in terms of effects they can generate and not the

number of killed or captured. If an enemy key leader manages to escape

from the conflict zone and retains the operational capability

(organizing terrorist attacks), the tactical/ operational objective

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of clearing a particular area is less useful since the strategic end

state is not achieved. Therefore, formulation of MOEs at tactical and

operational level, though procedurally correct, must not be divorced

from strategic end state.

29. I t is possible, and sometimes desirable, to terminate conflicts

without producing a winner per se; a notion more especially applicable

to sub-conventional environment that we are also confronted with.

While engaging in such operations, MOEs should eventually seek to

achieve peace in the area instead of attempting to emerge victorious in

typical military sense. Such an approach will keep the avenues for mid-

course adjustments open, such as interjection of soft power.

30. Post-war environment, as envisaged in the strategic direction,

should always remain focal issue for the military planners. Restoring

the erstwhile peace, enabling the civilian authority and transferring

the control should be essential constituents. The contemporary

conflicts in the region amply denote that correct visualization of

post-war environment and corresponding MOEs is essential at the

conception stage, and operational activities need to be steered

accordingly.

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31. The system of assessment/ evaluation, unless completely

institutionalized, is unlikely to serve as an effective tool for

commanders to clearly judge the efficacy of MOEs. The United States

Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and Centre of Excellence may

prove to be useful models for making own analysis modules, feedback

mechanism and corrective actions.

Conclusion

32. Pakistan Military is likely to remain involved in sub-

conventional warfare for foreseeable future; therefore,

understanding the methodology from strategic direction to assessment

is imperative for us. During the Operational Planning Process,

complete harmony is to be ensured between tactical/ operational and

strategic objectives while assessment must constitute an essential

component of the process.

33. In most forms of sub-conventional warfare, assessment will be

more subjective than in traditional warfare. Since a large part of the

desired effects deal with feelings and perceptions rather than with

conventional measures, MOEs should be constructed carefully.

Properly designed MOEs can be useful analytical tools to assess the

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success of such operations, using an operational framework that is

linked to the strategic end state.

Lieutenant Colonel Ghulam Muhammad Malik was commissioned in

medium regiment artillery in 1993. He obtained diploma in German

Language from National University of Modern Languages in 2002. Is a

graduate of Command and Staff College Quetta, United States Field

Artillery School Fort Sill and Senior and Command Staff Course

Ireland. He has done his masters in ‘Art and Science of Warfare’ from

University of Balochistan and in ‘Leadership, Management and Defence

Studies’ from National University of Ireland, Maynooth. His

assignments include General Staff Officer – 3 and Brigade Major in

infantry brigades, and instructor at School of Infantry and Tactics.

He is currently serving on the faculty of Command and Staff College

Quetta.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. James Clancy and Chuck Crossett. Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular

Warfare.

Parameters, Summer, 2007.

2. Douglas D. Jones, Major, US Army. Understanding Measures of

Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency Operations . United States Army Command and

General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005-06.

3. K.C. Dixit. Sub-Conventional Warfare Requirements, Impact and Way Ahead.

Journal of Defence Studies , Vol 4. No 1. January 2010, Institute of

Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

4. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. US Military, August 2011.

5. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach . London: Faber &

Faber, 1941.

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END NOTES

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