Mathes 2007a: The Ontological Status of the Dependent (paratantra) in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra...

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE HEFT 66

INDICA ET TIBETICA

Festschrift für Michael Hahn Zum 65. Geburtstag

von Freunden und Schülern überreicht

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON KONRAD KLAUS UND JENS-UWE HARTMANN

ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

WIEN 2007

WIENER STUDIEN

ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE

GEGRÜNDET VON

ERNST STEINKELLNER

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON BIRGIT KELLNER, HELMUT KRASSER,

HELMUT TAUSCHER

HEFT 66

WIEN 2007


INDICA ET TIBETICA

Festschrift für Michael Hahn Zum 65. Geburtstag

von Freunden und Schülern überreicht

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON KONRAD KLAUS UND JENS-UWE HARTMANN

WIEN 2007


Inhaltsverzeichnis

Verzeichnis der Schriften von Michael Hahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

AN¨LAYOWho said it? Authorship Disagreements between P¢li andChinese Discourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

NALINI BALBIRÀ propos des hymnes jaina multilingues (sanskrit, prakrit, per-san) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

CHRISTINE CHOJNACKILes dialogues dans le Kuvalayam¢l¢. L'inventivité d'Uddyo-tana au service de la foi jaina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

RAHUL PETER DASOn the P¢da-End Break in ¹lokas of ¨yurvedic Sa¾hit¢s . . . . 85

SIGLINDE DIETZThe Saptas‹ryodayas‹tra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

DRAGOMIR DIMITROVRatn¢kara¡¢nti's Chandoratn¢kara and Tath¢gatad¢sa'sChandom¢½ikya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

AKIMICHI EDAFreigebigkeit in Bezug auf Frauen?! Eine Untersuchung zuden Quellen der Ratn¢val¤ des N¢g¢rjuna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

GERHARD EHLERSSieben Seher, sieben Wasser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

FRANZ-KARL EHRHARDA Short History of the g.Yu thog snying thig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

HELMUT EIMERDie Liste der Mah¢y¢na-Texte im tibetischen Nandimitra-Avad¢na . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

KARL-HEINZ GOLZIO¹iva nur noch auf Platz Zwei!? Der Buddhismus des Angkor-Herrschers Jayavarman VII. und die Integration des Hinduis-mus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

10 Inhaltsverzeichnis

ALBRECHT HANISCHNew Evidence of A¡vagho¼a´s S‹tr¢la¾k¢ra: Quotationsfrom the mDo sde rgyan of g an la phan pa'i dbyaËs in theTibetan Version of Dharmak¤rti's J¢takam¢l¢¿¤k¢ . . . . . . . . . 193

JÜRGEN HANNEDERVasubandhus Vi¾¡atik¢ 1 2 anhand der Sanskrit- und tibeti-schen Fassungen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

PAUL HARRISONThe Case of the Vanishing Poet. New Light on ¹¢ntideva andthe ¹ik¼¢-samuccaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

JENS-UWE HARTMANNEin Schauspielfragment aus Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

MONIKA HORSTMANNCaukasr¢ms Vermächtnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

TAKASHI IWATADharmak¤rti's Interpretation of the Word i¼¿a in the Definitionof the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

PETER KHOROCHEOn the Vocabulary of ¨rya-¹‹ra´s J¢takam¢l¢ . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

SIGNE KIRDEWieviele Wirkungen hat Schlangengift? Bemerkungen zurToxikologie im Schauspiel Bhagavadajjuka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

KONRAD KLAUSZu der formelhaften Einleitung der buddhistischen S‹tras . . . 309

KLAUS-DIETER MATHESThe Ontological Status of the Dependent ( paratantra) in theSa¾dhinirmocanas‹tra and the Vy¢khy¢yukti . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

MAREK MEJORA Tibetan Prose Version of K¼emendra's Bodhisattv¢vad¢na-kalpalat¢ X: Garbh¢vakr¢ntyavad¢na . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

ADELHEID METTEBuddhistische Sanskritstrophen aus dem Rotkuppelraum derMing-öi von Qizil: Proben aus der Fragmentsammlung SHT25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

ULRICH PAGELSt‹pa Festivals in Buddhist Narrative Literature . . . . . . . . . . . 369

Inhaltsverzeichnis 11

BHIKKHU P¨S¨DIKAThe Ekottar¢gama Parallel to J¢taka 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395

ULRIKE ROESLERMaterialien zur Redaktionsgeschichte des mDzaËs blun: DieSelbstaufopferung des Prinzen Suj¢ta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405

LAMBERT SCHMITHAUSENZur Frage, ob ein Bodhisattva unter bestimmten Vorausset-zungen in einer neutralen Geisteshaltung (avy¢k’ta-citta) tötendarf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

JOHANNES SCHNEIDERCandragomins ¨yurvardhanavidhi. Ein Ritual zur Erzielungeines langen Lebens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

PETER SCHWIEGERA Glance at the Problematic Relations Between DifferentBuddhist Traditions in Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453

FRANCESCO SFERRAFragments of Pu½Îar¤ka's Param¢rthasev¢ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459

JAYANDRA SONIAnek¢ntav¢da Revisited ) for do¼as . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477

ULRIKE STARKMakkhanl¢l's Sukhsagar (1846/47): The First Complete Ver-sion of the Bh¢gavata Pur¢½a in Modern Hindi Prose? . . . . . 491

ROLAND STEINERDas Œdreifache Leiden– in S¢¾khyak¢rik¢ 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507

MARTIN STRAUBEDie Adaptation von K¼emendras Sudhanakinnaryavad¢na imBhadrakalp¢vad¢na . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521

RAFFAELE TORELLAStudies on Utpaladeva's ª¡varapratyabhijñ¢-viv’ti. Part II:What is Memory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539

HELGA UEBACHGeheime Wörter und Zeichen aus dem Kreis der Heruka-Tantras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565

CLAUS VOGELThe Propitiation of the Planets in Indian Ritual and AlliedLiterature with Special Reference to Colours and Flowers . . . 587

12 Inhaltsverzeichnis

NOBUYUKI YAMAGIWAVinaya Manuscripts: State of the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607

Improvements to my English by PHILIP PIERCE (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu)1

are gratefully acknowledged. Many thanks also to KAZUO KANO (Kyoto, at the moment atthe University of Hamburg) for providing me with a summary of the Japanese articles usedin this paper.

The three niÀsvabh¢vat¢s, which are first found in the Sa¾dhinirmocanas‹tra, are the2

lack of essence in terms of characteristics (lak¼a½a-n.), arising (utpatti-n.) and the ultimate(param¢rtha-n.), see MATHES 1996: 161.

These are also called the three natures (trisvabh¢va) in other Yog¢c¢ra treatises.3

The Ontological Status of the Dependent (paratantra)in the Sa¾dhinirmocanas‹tra and the Vy¢khy¢yukti 1

KLAUS-DIETER MATHES, Hamburg

General RemarksThe history of Mah¢y¢na Buddhism witnessed two major doctrinal devel-opments, namely the notion of the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢s‹tras that everything,including all phenomena or factors of existence (dharmas), lacks an own-being (emptiness), and the Yog¢c¢ra interpretation of this emptiness basedon distinguishing three types of the lack of essence (niÀsvabh¢vat¢),2

which are equated with the imagined ( parikalpita-), dependent ( para-tantra-) and perfect characteristics ( parini¼pannalak¼a½a). This trilak¼a½a3

interpretation of the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢ has its doctrinal foundation in theSa¾dhinirmocanas‹tra (SNS), and is best explicated in Vasubandhu's“handbook of hermeneutics”, the Vy¢khy¢yukti (VY).

While the ontology of older Buddhism rested on momentary dharmasthought of as existing in terms of their specific characteristics (svalak¼a½a),the M¢dhyamikas negated such a predication on logical grounds (some-thing which exists in terms of its specific characteristics or own-being can-not be momentary) and brought the differences between the Prajñ¢p¢ra-mit¢s‹tras and the Abhidharma to a head by ascribing definitive meaning(n¤t¢rtha) to the new teaching of emptiness, on the basis of the Ak¼ayamati-nirde¡as‹tra. The relevant passage from this latter s‹tra, which is quoted inCandrak¤rti's (7th cent.) Prasannapad¢, is as follows:

“Which are the discourses with a provisional meaning (ney¢rtha), and whichare the ones with definitive meaning (n¤t¢rtha)? Those discourses which

324 KLAUS-DIETER MATHES

PP 43.4!7: katame s‹tr¢nt¢ ney¢rth¢À katame n¤t¢rth¢À › ye s‹tr¢nt¢ m¢rg¢vat¢r¢ya4

nirdi¼¿¢ ima ucyante ney¢rth¢À › ye s‹tr¢nt¢À phal¢vat¢r¢ya nirdi¼¿¢ ima ucyante n¤t¢-a

rth¢À › y¢vad ye s‹tr¢nt¢À ¡‹nyat¢nimitt¢pra½ihitaº ... nirdi¼¿¢À › ta ucyante n¤t¢rth¢À. The scribe of the Prasannapad¢ omitted the following sentence: mdo sde gaË daga

bdag daË › sems can daË › srog daË › ... bstan pa de dag ni draË ba'i don Óes bya'o.See PP 43, fn. 3.

I.e., a teaching “for those to be guided” ; it has provisional meaning which needs to be5

interpreted in the light of n¤t¢rtha teachings. See LOPEZ 1988: 61f.6

According to NAKAMURA (1989: 210), the Ak¼ayamatinirde¡as‹tra already existed at7

the time of N¢g¢rjuna, and the Sa¾dhinirmocanas‹tra was written down around 300 A.D.(see SCHMITHAUSEN 1969: 819).

For a detailed description of the three dharmacakras see POWERS 2004: 103!137.8

were taught in order to [instigate their hearers to] enter upon the path arecalled ney¢rtha; they are called thus inasmuch as they teach a self, sentientbeings, a life-force [and so forth ... ]. Discourses which were taught in orderto [instigate followers to] enter upon the fruit are called n¤t¢rtha; they arecalled thus inasmuch as they teach emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness[and so forth ... ].” 4

Accordingly, the momentary dharmas, which possess a svalak¼a½a andrepresent the ultimate in the old Abhidharma ontology, are assigned thestatus of ney¢rtha and included under apparent truth, and it is only their5

being empty of a svabh¢va or svalak¼a½a that meets the requirements ofn¤t¢rtha and thus the new ultimate.6

About a century later, the Yog¢c¢ras formulated their own interpretation7

of the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢ in terms of three niÀsvabh¢vat¢s, and in the SNSsummarized this latest development as the third dharmacakra, the twoolder layers of doctrine, namely the ¹r¢vakay¢na and Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢,corresponding to the first two dharmacakras. Only the final dharmacakra8

is declared n¤t¢rtha, while the first two are taken as merely ney¢rtha.The M¢dhyamikas reacted in different ways to these new Yog¢c¢ra

hermeneutics. In the sixth chapter of his Madhyamak¢vat¢ra, Candrak¤rticriticizes the key topics of the Yog¢c¢ra doctrine and concludes that s‹trapassages which teach Yog¢c¢ra (including the trilak¼a½a interpretation ofemptiness in the SNS) are ney¢rtha:

“[Our] teacher said that this [s‹tra passage which teaches cittam¢tra] isney¢rtha. This is called for, among other reasons, by logic. [MA VI.95ab]

Not only this s‹tra [passage] is ney¢rtha; others are too.This ¢gama makes it clear that s‹tra passages with a similar content arealso ney¢rtha. [MA VI.95cd]

The Ontological Status of the Dependent ( paratantra) 325

MA 195.17!196.2: 'di ni ston pa'i draË don ñid gsuËs ¡iË › 'di ni draË don ñid du rigs9

pas 'thad › [VI.95ab] ces bya ba'o › mdo 'di draË ba'i don yin pa 'ba' Óig ma zad kyi gÓanyaË › rnam pa de lta bu'i mdo sde gÓan yaË ni › draË don ñid du luË 'dis gsal bar byed ›[VI.95cd] › rnam pa de lta bu'i mdo sde de gaË Óe na › ji skad du dgoËs pa Ëes par 'grel pa'imdo las › brtags pa daË gÓan gyi dbaË daË yoËs su grub pa Óes bya bar raË bÓin gsum bstanpa las › brtags pa med pa ñid daË › gÓan gyi dbaË yod pa ñid daË › ...

LAS 49.2!3:10

¢ture ¢ture yadvad bhi¼ag dravya¾ prayacchati ›buddh¢ hi tadvat sattv¢n¢¾ cittam¢tra¾ vadanti vai ››

LAS 49.4!5:11

t¢rkik¢½¢m avi¼aya¾ ¡r¢vak¢½¢¾ na caiva hi ›ya¾ de¡ayanti vai n¢th¢À praty¢tmagatigocaram ››

Skt. mah¢mate is here rendered only once.12

What are these other s‹tra passages with a similar content? For example, [thepassage on] the non-existence of the imagined and the existence of thedependent in the context of the three natures (trisvabh¢va) ) the imagined,dependent and perfect ) in the Sa¾dhinirmocanas‹tra.” 9

In other words, Candrak¤rti terms as ney¢rtha the very doctrine of theSNS which serves the latter as the definition of n¤t¢rtha. As justification,Candrak¤rti refers to a stanza of the LaËk¢vat¢ras‹tra (LAS II.123) whichdemonstrates for him the intentional character of cittam¢tra:

“Just as a physician provides medicine for the sick, so the Buddhas teachmind-only (cittam¢tra) to sentient beings.” 10

This stanza taken on its own indeed suggests that the cittam¢tra teachingis of a provisional character (ney¢rtha), being compared as it is to a healingagent for a particular disease. But the following stanza (LAS II.124), whichhas not been quoted by Candrak¤rti, sheds a different light on the issue:

“[This cittam¢tra teaching] is an object neither of philosophers nor of ¹r¢-vakas. The masters (i.e., the Buddhas) teach [it] by drawing on their ownexperience.” 11

In other words, the LAS takes the main point of the Yog¢c¢ra teaching assomething which can only be experienced by the Buddhas, being beyondthe reach of an analytical intellect. Without any further comment, Candra-k¤rti then refers to the LAS, in which the Buddha is said to have meantemptiness when he taught the Buddha-nature:

“Mah¢mati, my teaching of a Buddha-nature does not resemble the hereticaldoctrine of a self (¢tman). Rather, O Mah¢mati, the Tath¢gatas teach as the12

Buddha-nature that which is emptiness, the limit of reality, nirv¢½a, non-origination, signlessness, wishlessness and similar categories, and then theTath¢gatas, the Arhats, the perfect Buddhas, in order to avoid [giving] fools


LAS 78.5!11: na hi mah¢mate t¤rthakar¢tmav¢datulyo mama tath¢gatagarbhav¢do-13

pade¡aÀ › ki¾ tu mah¢mate tath¢gat¢À ¡‹nyat¢bh‹tako¿inirv¢½¢nutp¢d¢nimitt¢pra½ihit¢-dy¢n¢¾ mah¢mate pad¢rth¢n¢¾ tath¢gatagarbhopade¡a¾ k’tv¢ tath¢gat¢ arhantaÀsamyaksa¾buddh¢ b¢l¢n¢¾ nair¢tmyasa¾tr¢sapadavivarjan¢rtha¾ nirvikalpanir¢bh¢sa-gocara¾ tath¢gatagarbhamukhopade¡ena de¡ayanti.

MA 198.13!15: rnam pa de lta bu'i mdo sde rnam par ¡es par smra ba rnams kyi Ëes14

pa'i don ñid du khas blaËs pa thams cad draË ba'i don ñid yin par luË 'dis mËon par gsalbar byas nas ...

This follows from the equation of the Buddha-nature with the ¢layavijñ¢na in LAS15

220.9!16. The relevant passage of this s‹tra is quoted in RGVV 6.4!7: “But the Tath¢gata does16

not cease his efforts with only that much. Thereafter he causes sentient beings, who are byorigin of various natures, to enter the sphere of the Tath¢gata through the teaching of theirreversible [turning of] the dharmacakra, the teaching of the threefold purity.” na ca t¢van-m¢tre½a tath¢gato v¤rya¾ pra¡rambhayati › tataÀ pa¡c¢d avivartyadharmacakrakathay¢trima½Îalapari¡uddhikathay¢ ca tath¢gatavi¼aye t¢n sattv¢n avat¢rayati n¢n¢prak’ti-a b

hetuk¢n. B (4a6) om. ca; A is not available. B (4a6) has a da½Îa after avat¢rayati.a b

See NAKAMURA 1989: 281.17

For a detailed discussion of this interpretation of the SNS see CHIZUKO 1994: 295!18

320.

a reason for becoming afraid of the lack of essence, teach the non-conceptualexperiential object without characteristic signs by means of instructionswhich make use [of the term] Buddha-nature.” 13

Next, Candrak¤rti claims that similar doctrines of the Yog¢c¢ras areney¢rtha as well:

“Having shown with the help of this canonical passage [from the LAS on theBuddha-nature] that all parts of s‹tras with a similar content, which theVijñ¢nav¢dins claim are n¤t¢rtha, are [really] ney¢rtha ...” 14

To sum up, while it is true that the LAS may lead one to take the teach-ing of a Buddha-nature (and implicitly also the ¢layavijñ¢na) as ney¢rtha,15

it surely presents its own main tenets, namely cittam¢tra and the relatedtopic of trisvabh¢va, not as something in need of further clarification. Itmakes much more sense to take the emptiness of LAS (which is describedas a non-conceptual experiential object without characteristic signs in theabove-quoted passage) in terms of the related hermeneutics of the SNS orthe Dh¢ra½¤¡varar¢jas‹tra, in which latter the third dharmacakra is de-fined by the similar notion of “entering the sphere of the Tath¢gata”.16

Kamala¡¤la (ca. 700!750) follows a strategy different from that of17

Candrak¤rti and interprets the SNS in harmony with Madhyamaka. In his18


M¨ 162a7!b6: skye ba med pa la sogs pa ya½ 'phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa19

las › Ëes pa'i don Óes bstan te › de lta bas na skye ba med pa la sogs pa kho na don dam pa'oÓes bya bar Ëes so ›› gal te de lta yin na › 'o na ji ltar bcom ldan 'das kyis 'phags pa dgoËspa Ëes par 'grel pa las › Ëo bo ñid gsum po Ëo bo ñid med pa rnam pa gsum la (text: las)dgoËs nas chos thams cad Ëo bo ñid med par bstan ce na › 'di ni ñes pa med de [...] sgro'dogs pa daË 'skur ba 'debs pa'i mtha' gñis su lhuË ba'i blos don dam pa'i tshul gyi rgyamtsho mtha' gñis daË bral ba ¡in tu zab mo la mi 'jug pas de'i don du bcom ldan 'das kyisskye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa don dam pa'i dbaË du mdzad pa kho nar brjod ciË Ëo boñid med pa rnam pa gsum gyi dgoËs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha'gñis daË bral ba rabtu bstan pa'i phyir Ëes pa'i don kho na gÓuË 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no › dbu ma pa rnamskyaË Ëo bo ñid gsum rnam par bÓag pa khas mi len pa ni ma yin te.

Madhyamak¢loka, Kamala¡¤la thus sees no fault in the trilak¼a½a interpre-tation of the lack of essence. The relevant passage is as follows:

“Non-arising and so forth have been taught as being n¤t¢rtha in the ¨ry¢-k¼ayamatinirde¡a. Therefore it is certain that precisely such [statements] asthat there is no arising and so forth [define] the ultimate. If this is the case,how could then the Illustrious One teach in the ¨ryasa¾dhinirmocana thelack of essence of all phenomena, having in mind as the underlying intentionthe three natures, that is, the three niÀsvabh¢vat¢s? There is no fault in this.[...] Since an intellect which has succumbed to either of the two extremes ofsuperimposition and wrong denial does not enter the very profound ocean ofthe ultimate, which is free from [these] two extremes, the Illustrious Ones,for that reason, pronounced the teaching of non-arising and so forth exclu-sively with respect to the ultimate, and having taught [its] underlying inten-tion, that is, the three niÀsvabh¢vat¢s, he established a textual [tradition], oneexclusively n¤t¢rtha, in order to teach a Madhyamaka path free from the twoextremes. It is not the case that M¢dhyamikas do not accept the presentationof three natures.” 19

In other words, the hermeneutics of the Ak¼ayamatinirde¡a and the SNSare reconciled. The teaching of non-arising in the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢ (i.e., theemptiness of the Ak¼ayamatinirde¡a) refers exclusively to the ultimate,while the SNS's clarification of this emptiness on the basis of the threeniÀsvabh¢vat¢s helps to avoid the two extremes of wrong denial and super-imposition on the Madhyamaka path. The problem with this interpretation,however, is that the second dharmacakra is defined as ney¢rtha in SNSVII.30.

The Sa¾dhinirmocanas‹traAt the beginning of the seventh chapter of the SNS the Bodhisattva Para-m¢rthasamudgata addresses the doctrinal differences between the Abhi-


Lit. “how”.20

SNS 65.31!66.30: bcom ldan 'das kyis rnam graËs du mar phuË po rnams kyi raË gi21

mtshan ñid kyaË bka' stsal › skye ba'i mtshan ñid daË › 'jig pa'i mtshan ñid ... bka' stsal [...]bcom ldan 'das kyis chos thams cad Ëo bo ñid ma mchis pa › chos thams cad ma skyes pa ›ma 'gags pa › gzod ma nas Ói ba › raË bÓin gyis yoËs su mya Ëan las 'das pa Óes kyaË bka'stsal lags na › bcom ldan 'das kyis ji ltar dgoËs nas chos thams cad Ëo bo ñid med ... bka'stsal ...

SNS 67.13!17.22

SNS 85.14!20 and 85.22!28: bcom ldan 'das kyis chos rnams kyi Ëo bo ñid ma mchis23

pa ñid las brtsams › skye ba ma mchis pa daË › 'gag pa ma mchis pa daË › gzod ma nas Ói badaË › raË bÓin gyis yoËs su mya Ëan las 'das pa ñid las brtsams nas ... chos kyi 'khor lo gñis(gsum) pa bskor te.

dharma and Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢, and directly asks the Buddha about his hiddenintention in teaching the latter:

“The Illustrious One also taught in many enumerations the svalak¼a½as ofskandhas, the characteristics (lak¼a½a) of arising and cessation ... And whenhe taught that all phenomena lack an own-being, have not arisen or ceased,are quiescent from the start, and naturally in a state of nirv¢½a, what was20

the Illustrious One thinking when he taught that all phenomena lack an own-being ... ?” 21

The answer in SNS VII.3 is “the three niÀsvabh¢vat¢s,” which sets the22

stage for a Yog¢c¢ra interpretation of the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢. In other words,the focus of the Yog¢c¢ra teachings, which are summarized in the thirddharmacakra, is the same as in the second one: the emptiness or lack ofessence of the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢. The definitions of the second and third dhar-macakras in SNS VII.30 thus use the same formula,

“starting from the lack of an own-being of all phenomena, the absence of[their] production and cessation, [their] quiescence from the start, and [their]being naturally in a state of nirv¢½a, the Illustrious One ... set the second/third dharmacakra in motion.” 23

What makes the last (i.e., third) dharmacakra definitive (n¤t¢rtha) is thefine distinctions it makes, namely its disclosure of the Buddha's hiddenintention (abhipr¢ya) in teaching emptiness. This becomes clear in SNSVII.24:

“Which scholar is it that claims that [the passage] `Phenomena lack an own-being, have not arisen or passed out of existence, and are quiescent from thestart, and all phenomena are naturally in a state of nirv¢½a´ is without a [hid-den] intention?It is I who explain that [the latter is] the lack of essence in terms of charac-teristics, the lack of essence in terms of arising, and the lack of essence in


SNS 80.3!10:24

› chos rnams Ëo bo ñid med chos rnams ma skyes daË ›› chos rnams ma 'gags chos rnams gzod nas Ói ba daË ›› chos rnams thams cad raË bÓin mya Ëan 'das par ni ›› dgoËs pa med par mkhas pa su Óig smra bar byed ›› mtshan ñid Ëo bo ñid med skye ba Ëo bo med ›› don dam Ëo bo ñid med do Óes Ëas b¡ad de ›› 'di la mkhas pa gaË Óig dgoËs pa ¡es pa ni ›› rab tu ñams par 'gyur ba'i lam du de mi 'gro ›

SNS 68.7!9: rkyen gÓan gyi stobs kyis byuË ba yin gyi › bdag ñid kyis ni ma yin pa.25

SNS 67.18!68.4: don dam yaË dag 'phags de la chos rnams kyi mtshan ñid Ëo bo ñid26

med pa ñid gaË Óe na › kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid gaË yin pa'o › de ci'i phyir Óe na › 'di ltarde ni miË daË brdar rnam par bÓag pa'i mtshan ñid yin gyi › raË gi mtshan ñid kyis rnampar gnas pa ni ma yin pas de'i phyir de ni mtshan ñid Ëo bo ñid med pa ñid ces bya'o.

SNS 69.17f.: raË gi mtshan ñid kyis med pa gaË yin pa de ni ma skyes pa yin.27

terms of the ultimate. Whatever scholar is aware of this intention does notenter upon the path of destruction.” 24

In other words, the Buddha was thinking of the three niÀsvabh¢vat¢swhen he rejected the notion of an own-being in all phenomena. It should benoted that such an exegesis not only protects the Bodhisattva from nihilism,but also explains the difference between the first and second dharmacakras:a threefold division of the lack of essence allows the old Abhidharma onto-logy to be accommodated within the dependent (paratantra) or the “lack ofessence in terms of arising.”

In SNS VII.5 paratantra is defined as “having arisen under the sway ofother conditions, not by itself.” Even though the ultimate existence of the25

dependent is nowhere claimed in the SNS, TsoË kha pa (1357!1419) in hisLegs b¡ad sñiË po reaches this conclusion indirectly from the explanationsof the imagined nature in SNS VII.4 and VII.8, which are as follows:

“Param¢rthasamudgata, what is here the lak¼a½aniÀsvabh¢vat¢ of the phe-nomena? It is the characteristic of the imagined. Why? It is, namely, thecharacteristic which is established in the form of names and conventions, butit does not persist by virtue of its own specific characteristic (svalak¼a½a).Therefore it is called the lack of essence in terms of characteristics (lak¼a½a-niÀsvabh¢vat¢ ).” 26

In SNS VII.8 it is said:“Whatever does not exist by virtue of its own specific characteristic has notarisen.” 27

From this TsoË kha pa concludes that whatever arises (in other words,the dependent) exists by virtue of its own specific characteristic:


Legs b¡ad sñiË po 9a2ff.: kun brtags la skye 'gag med pa'i rgyu mtshan du raË gi28

mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa bkod pa'i phyir skye 'gag yod na raË gi mtshan ñid kyis grub padaË gÓan dbaË la raË gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye 'gag yod par yaË bstan no.

See CHIZUKO 1993: 92.29

See CHIZUKO 1993: 119, fn. 51.30

SNS 68.14!18: don dam yaË dag 'phags chos rnams la rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa31

gaË yin pa de ni Ëas don dam pa yin par yoËs su bstan la › gÓan gyi dbaË gi mtshan ñid deni rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa ma yin pas de'i phyir don dam pa'i Ëo bo ñid med pa ñid cesbya'o.

“Because [the phrase] `is not established by virtue of its own specific charac-teristic´ is given as the reason for the fact that the imagined is without arisingand cessation, it is [implicitly] taught [in the SNS] that when there are arisingand cessation, they are established by virtue of their own specific character-istic and that the dependent possesses such arising and cessation.”28

In the eyes of TsoË kha pa, the Yog¢c¢ras further claim that things whichare established by virtue of their own specific characteristic exist ultimate-ly. The fact that some Yog¢c¢ra texts take the dependent as existing on29

the level of apparent truth is explained by distinguishing ontological fromepistemological existence: (1) from an ontological point of view, anythingthat is established in terms of its own specific characteristic is defined asultimate existence, (2) while from an epistemological point of viewultimate existence is ascribed to an experiential object of the undefiled wis-dom during meditation. In the first case the dependent exists ultimately, andin the second on the level of apparent truth.30

It is difficult to say whether the author of the SNS really intended TsoËkha pa's conclusions (they strike one rather as undesired consequences). Itis not only that nowhere in the SNS is the dependent equated with the ulti-mate or said to exist ultimately, but such an explanation is in fact excludedby the definition of the lack of essence in terms of the ultimate in SNSVII.6:

“Param¢rthasamudgata, I have taught as ultimate that which is a cognitiveobject conducive to purification in the phenomena, but since the charac-teristic of the dependent is not such a cognitive object, [this criterion is onlyfulfilled by] the `lack of essence in terms of the ultimate.´” 31

This leaves us with TsoË kha pa's claim that the dependent may not beaccepted as pertaining to the ultimate from an epistemological point ofview, but ontologically it still follows that the dependent is the ultimate inview of its svalak¼a½as. The relation between the dependent and the ulti-


SNS 47.10!13:32

› 'du byed khams daË don dam mtshan ñid ni ›› gcig daË tha dad bral ba'i mtshan ñid de ›› gcig daË tha dad du yaË gaË rtog pa ›› de dag tshul bÓin ma yin Óugs pa yin ›

SNS 44.22!26: gal te 'du byed kyi mtshan ñid daË › don dam pa'i mtshan ñid tha dad33

pa ma yin par gyur na ni › des na ji ltar 'du byed kyi mtshan ñid kun nas ñon moËs pa'imtshan ñid du gtogs pa de bÓin du don dam pa'i mtshan ñid kyaË kun nas ñon moËs pa'imtshan ñid du gtogs par 'gyur ro.

The conditioned is equated with apparent truth.34

An “ isolate ” can be isolated by thought and discussed separately from the thing it35

characterizes, as in the case of the whiteness of a conch and the conch of which it is aquality (POWERS 2004: 59).

mate is best defined in the following summarizing stanza of the third chap-ter in the SNS:

“The characteristic of the conditioned realm and of the ultimate is the [one]characteristic of being free from identity and difference. Those who think interms of sameness and difference have comprehended these two (i.e., theconditioned and the ultimate) in an improper way.” 32

It should be noted that the reasons for this negation of identity and dif-ference in SNS III are not all epistemological in nature. Thus, in SNS III.4it is said:

“If the conditioned characteristic and the ultimate characteristic were not dif-ferent, then even the characteristic of the ultimate would pertain, in the sameway as that of the conditioned, to the characteristic of all defilements.” 33

To sum up, given this description of the ultimate in the SNS, an ultimateexistence of the svalak¼a½as of the dependent seems unlikely to me evenfrom an ontological point of view. In his extensive study of the ultimate inthe SNS, POWERS (2004: 59!60) comes to the conclusion that the dGe lugspa interpretation, namely that the two truths (i.e., the conditioned and ulti-mate) are different isolates (ldog pa tha dad), while being one entity (Ëo34

bo gcig), does not do justice to the proper intention of the s‹tra, which35

“presents conceptual antinomies as problems that cannot be resolved con-ceptually.”


In the Vy¢khy¢yukti, the five exegetical principles which must be addressed when ex-36

plaining the meaning of a s‹tra are as follows: (1) the goal/motive, (2) the concise meaning,(3) the meaning of the words, (4) the connections [among its different topics], and (5) theobjections [urged by opponents] together with rebuttals [of them]. Thanks to a quotation inHaribhadra's Abhisamay¢la¾k¢r¢loka (AAA 15.23f.), the Sanskrit of the relevant stanza atthe beginning of Vasubandhu's Vy¢khy¢yukti (VY 6.13!16) is available:

prayojana¾ sapi½Î¢rthaÀ pad¢rthaÀ s¢nusa¾dhikaÀ ›sacodyaparih¢ra¡ ca v¢cyaÀ s‹tr¢rthav¢dibhiÀ ››

VY 176.9!177.16: chos thams cad ni raË bÓin med pa › ma skyes pa ma 'gags pa [...]37

›› rab 'byor byaË chub kyi bar du yaË dËos po med do Óes 'byuË la › sde pa thams cad lagrags pa'i saËs rgyas kyi gsuË las ni [...] rga ¡i'i bar du chos thams cad kyi raË bÓin yaËbstan › [...] skye ba la sogs pa yaË bstan to ›› de'i phyir rab tu grags pa'i saËs rgyas kyi gsuËdaË 'gal bas theg pa chen po ni saËs rgyas kyi gsuË ma yin no.

This topic has been already dealt with in detail by YAMAGUCHI 1973: 299!320;38

MATSUDA 1985: (114)!(120); CABEZÓN 1992: 223!235; SKILLING 2000: 323f. and LEE2001: 79!83. See also MATHES: in print.

VY 200.19!201.5.39

UV 377.5f. (stanza XXIX.24):40

“Having killed father and mother, having killed the king and the two pure [Brah-mins], and having destroyed the kingdom together with its inhabitants, the Brahminremains without sin.”m¢tara¾ pitara¾ hatv¢ r¢j¢na¾ dvau ca ¡rotiyau ›r¢¼¿ram s¢nucara¾ hatv¢ anigho y¢ti br¢hma½aÀ.

Yog¢c¢ra Hermeneutics in the Vy¢khy¢yukti In his explanation of the fifth exegetical principle of the VY, Vasubandhu36

raises in a way similar to SNS VII.1 the objection that the doctrine of thePrajñ¢p¢ramit¢ contradicts the common ontology of (Abhidharma) Bud-dhism:

“[There are Mah¢y¢na passages such as] `All phenomena lack an own-being,have not arisen or passed out of existence ...´ or `Subh‹ti, form does not ex-ist, [nothing] up to enlightenment exists.´ According to words of the Buddhawhich are accepted in all divisions [of s‹tras], an own-being of all phenom-ena [...] up to old age and death has been taught. [...] Moreover [their] arisingand so forth have been taught. Therefore the Mah¢y¢na is not the word of theBuddha, because it contradicts the generally accepted Buddha-words.” 37

The rebuttal of this objection takes up the entire fourth chapter of theVY. Vasubandhu shows that the scriptures of the old canon, too, contain38

contradictions, such as that, on the one hand, sensations are equated withpain, while on the other are subdivided into blissful, painful and neutralones. When confronted with Ud¢navarga XXIX.24, the fictive propo-39 40

nent of the ¹r¢vakay¢na explains that one has to distinguish between teach-ings of definitive meaning (n¤t¢rtha) and those which were given with a


VY 202.6!203.13.41

VY 203.14!21. For the view of the Vaibh¢¼ikas on lost s‹tras, see HONJ¬ 1989:42

(59)!(60). On the corresponding view in the Ny¢y¢nus¢ra, see HONJ¬ 1989: (61)!(62). Thus, the Mah¢parinirv¢½as‹tra is quoted in different ways (see CABEZÓN 1992: 22743

and SKILLING 2000: 323). VY 209.14f.: de lta bas na theg pa chen po la yaË da ltar Ëes pa'i don gyi mdo sde mi44

snaË ba'i phyir Ëes pa'i don ñid med par Ëes par gzuË bar mi bya'o. Tib. bkri ba'i don is probably the translation of Skt. ney¢rtha, which otherwise is ren-45

dered in Tibetan as draË ba'i don. The verbs bkri ba and draË ba have the same meaning.

hidden intention (¢bhipr¢yika). Vasubandhu wants to apply this herme-41

neutic strategy to the Mah¢y¢na, but his opponent raises the next objection,that there is no n¤t¢rtha statement in the Mah¢y¢na with the help of whichall scriptures can be explained without contradiction. This obviously meansthat Vasubandhu is forced to accept that the well-known s‹tras of the sec-ond dharmacakra do not contain passages which can be used as a definitionof what n¤t¢rtha is. He goes on to say that this can only be claimed whenone knows the entire Mah¢y¢na (i.e., including the hitherto unknownYog¢c¢ra s‹tras, such as the LAS and SNS). ¹r¢vakas should not abandonMah¢y¢na just because the latter has not been completely transmitted, forthis is true of their own canon. Moreover, Vasubandhu stresses the point42

that there are no reliable versions of the transmitted s‹tras. This paragraph43

of the VY concludes with the following remark:“In Mah¢y¢na, too, [s‹tras] should not be construed without [taking their]definitive meaning [into account], [only] because s‹tra passages with defi-nitive meaning have not become evident till now.” 44

What Vasubandhu tries to show is that the Mah¢y¢na ) to the extent thatit consists of the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢ ) does not offer convincing n¤t¢rtha pas-sages with the help of which all doctrinal inconsistencies can be explained.The Mah¢y¢nas‹tras of which his fictive opponents are not yet aware mustbe the SNS and the LAS, whose trisvabh¢va exegesis offers defensiblepassages for a Mah¢y¢na definition of n¤t¢rtha. The Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢s‹trasthemselves cannot provide such passages since their repeated negation ofan own-being contradicts other passages, such as the ones on confessingone's sins:

“One must investigate whether these [passages in the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢] areney¢rtha, or whether they should be taken literally. But without a clear ex-45

planation of what is definitive (n¤t¢rtha) one cannot know whether theyshould not be taken literally. Well, they are ¢bhipr¢yika then! Why? Theyare contradictory. [Phrases] such as `All phenomena lack an own-being´ have


VY 209.17!212.1: ci 'di bkri ba'i don nam › 'on te sgra ji bÓin gyi don yin Óes dpyad46

par bya ste › Ëes pa'i don b¡ad pa mi snaË bar yaË 'di sgra bÓin gyi don ma yin no Óes ¡espar ni mi nus so ›› 'on kyaË dgoËs pa can yin no ›› ci'i phyir Óe na › 'gal ba'i phyir ro ›› ¡esrab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las chos thams cad ni Ëo bo ñid med pa Óes bya ba de lta bu lasogs pa 'di lan maË du bstan la [...] sdig pa thams cad so sor b¡ags pa la sogs pa yaËbstan to.

VY 212.2!15: gal te Ëo bo ñid med pa la sogs pa'i tshig rnams sgra ji bÓin kho na'i47

don yin na › 'di thams cad daË 'gal bar 'gyur te › blaË bar bya ba rnams ci yaË med pa'iphyir [...] de lta bas na tshig de rnams kyi ni sgra ji bÓin gyi don du Ëes par gzuË bar mi byaste › mdo sde gÓan daË 'gal ba'i phyir ro ›› 'o na ci Óe na › dgoËs pa can yin no ›› dper na ›pha daË ma ni gsad byas ¡iË › [...] Óes bya ba'i tshigs su bcad pa 'di la Ëes pa'i don b¡ad pamed par yaË sgra ji bÓin gyi don du (Text: tu) Ëes par gzuË bar mi bya ste.

See VY 212.19!224.12 and CABEZÓN 1992: 227f.48

been taught many times in the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢. [On the other hand,] theconfession of all sins has been taught as well.” 46

In other words, it is entirely out of the question for Vasubandhu to takethe negation of an own-being in all phenomena itself as a definition ofn¤t¢rtha. Such a negation should not be taken literally under any circum-stances, any more than Ud¢navarga XXIX.24 should:

“If phrases such as the `lack of an own-being´ are only taken literally, theycontradict everything [said before], since there would be nothing to be adopt-ed. Hence, [such phrases] should not be construed literally, for doing sowould contradict other s‹tra divisions. Why? They (i.e., phrases such as the`lack of an own-being´) are ¢bhipr¢yika. Verses such as `having killed fatherand mother´ should not be construed literally without a [prior] explanation oftheir definitive meaning.” 47

The point here is that the ¹r¢vakas are expected to accept the Prajñ¢p¢-ramit¢ in the same way as their stanza on killing in the Ud¢navarga. Nei-ther of these two texts deserves the charge of nihilism just because it con-tains ¢bhipr¢yika statements. Vasubandhu points out that the Prajñ¢p¢rami-t¢s‹tras themselves criticize nihilism and that the latter must be interpretedin the right way. This must be done on the basis of SNS VII.24 (see a-48

bove), in which a topic of the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢ deemed problematic by the¹r¢vakas (namely that everything lacks an own-being) is addressed andexplained in the light of the three niÀsvabh¢vat¢s. It should be noted thatthe SNS does not simply claim the status of n¤t¢rtha for itself and the rightto be taken literally in its entirety, while relegating the older teachings ofthe first two dharmacakras to ney¢rtha. Even the definition of the thirddharmacakra in SNS VII.30 consists of a Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢ phrase which is¢bhipr¢yika. To be sure, neither the SNS nor the VY take the Prajñ¢p¢ra-


VY 229.14f.: byis pas kun tu brtags pa'i Ëo bo ñid yod pa ñid du 'dzin pa bsal pa'i49

phyir. VY 229.19f.: mgo smos pa mi ¡es pa rnams brjod du med pa'i Ëo bo'i chos med par50

'dzin pa bsal ba'i phyir. See AKBh 468.20f.: bhagavat¢ param¢rtha¡‹nyat¢y¢m › iti hi bhik¼avo 'sti karm¢sti51

vip¢kaÀ k¢rakas tu nopalabhyate. VY 236.1!9: bcom ldan 'das kyis don dam pa stoË pa ñid las › las kyaË yod rnam par52

smin pa yaË yod la byed pa po ni mi dmigs so Óes gsuËs pa gaË yin pa de ci don dam pa ñiddu'am › 'on te kun rdzob ñid du yin Óe na › [...] gal te don dam pa ñid du yin na › ji ltar nachos thams cad Ëo bo ñid med pa yin › gal te kun rdzob tu yin na byed pa po yaË kun rdzobtu yod pas byed pa po ni mi dmigs so Óes brjod par mi bya'o Óe na ...

mit¢ to be nihilistic, but Vasubandhu can defend the latter against thischarge only by taking its stance that all phenomena lack an own-being as¢bhipr¢yika (or ney¢rtha).

Vasubandhu provides reasons of his own for such a hermeneutic strate-gy. Thus, the lack of essence of all phenomena must be further clarified (inthe sense of the Yog¢c¢ra)

(1) in order to keep fools from clinging to the existence of the imagin-ed nature;49

(2) in order to keep those who do not understand [when merely] mainpoints are mentioned from clinging to the [wrong view that] phenom-ena which are by nature inexpressible do not exist.50

This leads to our initial question whether Vasubandhu claims the ultimateexistence of these inexpressible phenomena, or the dependent nature. In theVY the two truths are introduced and discussed in the following way:

“Question: The Illustrious One taught in the P¢ram¢rtha¡‹nyat¢[s‹tra]:`Both karman and retribution [for it] exist, but an acting subject is not per-ceived.´ Does this [refer to] the ultimate or apparent truth? [...] If [karman51

and retribution exist] ultimately, how is it, then, that all phenomena lack anown-being? If they exist on the level of apparent [truth], one should not saythat an acting subject is not perceived, since the latter, too, exists on the levelof apparent [truth].” 52

This points again to the problem to which the new ontology of thePrajñ¢p¢ramit¢ leads. Given the latter's emptiness of all phenomena, theexistence of karman can only be accepted on the level of apparent truth, butthen there can no longer be any distinction between the factors of existence(karman and retribution) and a purely imagined personal subject (or self),which must be also accepted on the level of apparent truth. It is precisely


VY 236.11!18: re Óig kun rdzob ces bya ba 'di ni ci yin › don dam pa ni gaË Óig yin › de53

las ci kun rdzob tu yod dam › ci don dam par yod par ¡es par bya'o ›› miË daË › brjod pa daË› gdags pa daË › tha sñad ni kun rdzob yin la chos rnams kyi raË gi mtshan ñid ni don dampa ma yin no Óe na › 'o na de lta na las daË rnam par smin pa gñis miË du yaË yod › raË gia

mtshan ñid du yaË yod pas de gñis ji ltar 'dod par yod pa ñid du rtog (text: rtogs) la rag go. TsoË kha pa does not have the negative particle ma in his Legs b¡ad sñiË po, wherea

this passage from the VY is quoted (see THURMAN 1989: 222). VY 236.18!237.3: Ëed ni gaË zag kun rdzob tu yod kyi rdzas su ni ma yin te › phuË po54

rnams la de'i miË gdags pa'i phyir ›› las daË rnam par smin pa dag ni kun rdzob tu rdzas suyod › don dam par ni med de › 'jig rten pa'i ¡es pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir ro ›› dam pa ni ye ¡es'jig rten las 'das pa yin te › de'i don yin pas don dam pa'o ›› de gñis kyi raË gi mtshan ñid nide'i yul ma yin te › de'i yul ni brjod du med pa'i spyi'i mtshan ñid yin pa'i phyir ro.

this lack of distinction which makes the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢s‹tras so dangerousin the eyes of the Yog¢c¢ras. The VY continues with Vasubandhu's answer:

“First of all, what is this `apparent´ and what the ultimate? By [finding ans-wers to] this, one should come to know what exists on the level of apparent[truth] and what exists ultimately.If [the ¹r¢vakas] answer: `The apparent consists of names, expressions,designations and conventions, the ultimate being the svalak¼a½as of phenom-ena,´ [one should consider the following:] In this case, since both karmanand retribution exist as either names or svalak¼a½as, [whether they pertain tothe ultimate or not] depends on one's idea of existence, [namely] in accor-dance with how these two (i.e., karman and retribution) are taken (i.e., asnames or svalak¼a½as).53

We maintain the following: A person[al self] exists on the level of apparent[truth], but not as something substantial, for it is [only] the skandhas, whichare given its name. Karman and retribution exist on the level of apparent[truth] as something substantial, but not ultimately, because they are the ex-periential object of worldly knowledge. The ultimate (parama) is supermun-dane wisdom, and being the object (artha) of the latter, it is the ultimateobject (param¢rtha). The specific characteristics of these [other] two (i.e.,karman and retribution) are not an experiential object of it, since [any]experiential object of it is an inexpressible general characteristic.” 54

Here, karman and retribution correspond to the dependent nature, whichthus exists on the level of apparent truth. It should be noted that the reasonfor this is not only that the svalak¼a½as of karman and retribution are notexperienced by supermundane wisdom, but also that their ultimate exis-tence would contradict the Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢'s stance that the phenomena lackan own-being. It is obvious that Vasubandhu does not reject the latterstance, but only stresses the need to further clarify it in terms of the trisva-bh¢va.


MATHES 2004: 318!323 and 2005: 7f.55

To sum up, in his VY Vasubandhu takes the dependent to exist on thelevel of apparent truth. Ontological existence of the dependent on the ulti-mate level is not maintained at all. As we have seen, the distinction madewithin the apparent truth between the imagined (i.e., the personal self) andthe dependent (karman and retribution for it) is an essential step in solvingthe problem of the contradictory ontological models of Abhidharma andPrajñ¢p¢ramit¢.

ConclusionIt could be shown that both the SNS and the VY in their interpretation ofthe Prajñ¢p¢ramit¢ use the trilak¼a½a or trisvabh¢va model to rescue theAbhidharma distinction between svalak¼a½as and the merely imagined(namely the agency of a personal self etc.). They are forced to take thedependent (consisting of svalak¼a½as) as existing on the level of apparenttruth, even though this is not explicitly stated in all passages. As I haverecently shown in other papers, Vasubandhu adopted the same strategy in55

his commentary on the Madhy¢ntavibh¢ga in order to balance two modelsof trisvabh¢va.

Primary Sources

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AKBh: Abhidharmako¡abh¢¼yaEd. by PRAHLAD PRADHAN. Patna 1967 (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8).

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RGV: Ratnagotravibh¢ga Mah¢y¢nottaratantra¡¢stra


Ed. by EDWARD H. JOHNSTON. Patna 1950. (Includes the Ratnagotravibh¢gavy¢-khy¢).

RGVV: Ratnagotravibh¢gavy¢khy¢.See Ratnagotravibh¢ga. (The manuscripts A and B on which JOHNSTON's editionis based are described in RGV, vi!vii. See also BANDURSKI et al. 1994: 12f.).

LAS: LaËk¢vat¢ras‹traEd. by BUNYIU NANJIO. Kyoto 1923 (Bibliotheca Otaniensis 1).

VY: Vy¢khy¢yukti (Tibetan translation)Ed. by JONG CH. LEE in: A Study of Vasubandhu: With Special Reference to theVy¢khy¢yukti (in Japanese), vol. 2: The Tibetan Text of the Vy¢khy¢yukti ofVasubandhu. Tokyo 2001.

SNS: Sa¾dhinirmocanas‹tra (Tibetan translation from the Kanjur)Ed. by ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE. Louvain 1935.

TsoË kha pa Blo bzaË grags paLegs b¡ad sñiË po: “DraË ba daË Ëes pa'i don rnam par ¡es pa rnam par phye ba'ibstan bcos legs b¡ad sñiË po”, The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa blo bzanggrags pa, vol. 21 (bKra ¡is lhun po blocks). New Delhi 1979.

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