Quine and Whitehead on Ontological Reduction: Properties Reconsidered

Quine and Whitehead on Ontological Reduction: Properties Reconsidered

Christine Holmgren and Leemon McHenry

C!"#$%#&' H()*+"'& teaches philosophy at Santa Monica College. Email: <[email protected]>.

L''*(& M,H'&"- teaches philosophy at California State University, Northridge. Email: <[email protected]>.

ABSTRACT: W.V.O. Quine and A.N. Whitehead shared a dualistic ontology of concrete and abstract objects but di!ered sharply on the status of properties. In this essay, we explore Whitehead’s reasons for admitting properties into his ontology and Quine’s objections. In the course of examining Quine’s position we demonstrate some deficiencies in his position and conclude that in spite of his claims, neither space-time coordinate systems nor classes can do all the ontolog-ical work of properties.

I!"#$%&'"($!In his “Quine and Whitehead: Ontology and Methodology,” McHenry argued for his thesis that a number of common themes between Quine and Whitehead are evident in their respective approaches to ontology. In the first instantiation of .e Forum of this journal in 1997, Quine responded to McHenry with the purported aim of clarifying both his a/nities, as well as his disagreements, with Whitehead’s dualistic ontology of individuals and properties.1 .e greater part of Quine’s typically terse response, however, was spent reiterating his familiar criticisms against the reification of abstract entities, such as properties, rather than providing a clarification of his position.2

.e publication of the current Special Focus issue on Alfred North Whitehead and the Analytic Tradition in Philosophy provides a fresh opportunity to revisit some of the main areas of dispute that surfaced in the McHenry/Quine exchange and a chance to reexamine with greater care the Whiteheadian requirement for an ontology of properties—(“objects,” as Whitehead called them in his middle period and “eternal objects” in his later works)—in contrast to Quine’s complete rejection of properties. However, because the similar outlook that was shared by Quine and

PROCESS STUDIES 41.2 (2012)262

Whitehead extended solely to Whitehead’s middle period, our attention in this paper will be confined exclusively to the ontological view Whitehead advanced during that period.

W)("*)*+% $! ")* $!"$,$-('+, ."+"&. $/ 0#$0*#"(*. Whitehead’s dualism of individuals and properties was fundamental throughout his ontological constructions from Principles of Natural Knowledge to Process and Reality and beyond. Einstein’s formulation of the general theory of relativity had a significant influence on Whitehead, inspiring him to develop a metaphysical view of the universe as a four-dimensional manifold wherein extension was posited as the primary feature of actuality and the whole-part relational property of “extending over” functioned as the basic unifier of the interconnected network of dynamic events. In Whitehead’s late works, he continued to retain the dualism of individuals and properties as ontologically basic, but his four-dimensionalism gave way to an event atomism. Along with this modification, his previous uses of “event” and “object” were replaced by the terminology of “actual occasions” and “eternal objects.”

According to Whitehead, events are unique non-repeatable particulars, and because they are non-repeatable, they cannot be re-cognized. Proper-ties (or “sense objects” in his terminology) are the recognita in events. .ey are the things that happen again in nature. Without them there would be no recognition of events or anything else for that matter (PNK 83-85). For Whitehead, the recurring properties that are regularly recognized in events perform an essential epistemological role, for, without them, knowledge is impossible. It is because properties are repeatable that they are the things that can be known and it is their recurrence within the fluctuating processes of nature that makes science possible. .e discovery of the laws of nature is due to the fact that the properties repeat themselves in a fairly stable fashion (PNK 87). .is is what Whitehead called the periodicity of nature (SMW 40). As he said in Concept of Nature: “.e constructions of science are merely expositions of the characters of things perceived” (148). In Process and Reality, he went even further by asserting that nothing actual would be a definite entity unless it exemplified a form of definiteness that has no temporal limitations. Eternal objects not only explain the characters of particulars, i.e., actual occasions, they are also part of the explanation of how particulars gain the forms of definiteness in the temporal process. Every property is eternal because, whether

263Holmgren and McHenry/Quine and Whitehead

actualized or not, each has some relevance to the temporal process as a potential (22-23, 40).

In Concept of Nature, Whitehead rejected “the bifurcation of nature” doctrine that the properties of nature are furnished by the perceiving mind, while nature itself is nothing but matter in motion (or energy), the posited cause of “psychic additions” (29). He argued that this kind of bifurcation would leave us with two systems of nature: a nature perceived and nature unperceived, i.e., a world of phenomenal appearances in the mind and a world of objects as the inferred causes of the appearances. For him, this meant that the reality of matter would remain nothing but a conjecture, and the reality of appearances would be nothing but a dream (30). Whitehead proposed to remedy this problem, and to set physics on solid empirical ground, by viewing nature as one system of relations knowable through perceptual experience. In making this point, he wrote: “For natural phi-losophy everything perceived is in nature. . . . For us the red glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the phenomenon” (29), i.e., properties are parts of nature rather than psychic additions.

I%*!"("1 +!% (!%(2(%&+"($!: 0)1.('+, $34*'"., ',+..*., +!% 0#$0*#"(*. While Quine found much with which to agree in Whitehead’s four-dimensionalism, he could not accept the idea that properties are legitimate parts of the ontology of science.3 In his “Response to Leemon McHenry,” he mentioned, and partially discussed, three criticisms of properties: (1) properties lack a “clean-cut principle of individuation”; (2) there is nothing that can be “explained in terms of properties that could not be explained equally well in terms of classes”; and (3) spatiotemporal coincidence is a wholly satisfactory principle of individuation, so properties are not needed (13-14).

With regard to the first two criticisms, we will begin with an examina-tion of Quine’s claim that properties lack clear identity conditions, but before doing so, we will be taking a short detour through some terrain where Quine briefly sojourned before reaching his final stance on proper-ties. .is will provide us with some useful background information that will facilitate subsequent discussions.

In a 1975 essay titled “On the Individuation of Attributes,” Quine wrote:


Faulty individuation has nothing to do with vagueness of boundaries. We are accustomed to tolerating vagueness of boundaries. . . . However, this vagueness of boundaries detracts none from the sharpness of our individuation of . . . physical objects. . . . they all have their impeccable principle of individuation; physical objects are identical if and only if coextensive. ("eories 100-01)

In asserting that “physical objects are identical if and only if coexten-sive,” it is important to know more precisely how Quine intended the term “identical” to be construed in this passage. Some clues about how he most certainly did not intend for it to be construed may be gleaned from an entry titled “Identity” in his Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. .ere he credited Wittgenstein with the following articulation of the problem: “[E]vidently to say of anything that it is identical with itself is trivial, and to say that it is identical with anything else is absurd. What then is the use of identity?” (30, 90).

Quine responded:Genuine questions of identity can arise because we may refer to something in two ways and leave someone wondering whether we referred to the same thing. .us I mention Simon, someone men-tions Peter, and we explain that Simon is Peter; they are identical. It is neither trivial to say so nor absurd to doubt it. . . .What is more important is reference to something not by two names but by two descriptions, or by a name and a description. We need to be able to identify Ralph with the man who mows the lawn, and his house with the one nearest the station. Identities such as these permeate our daily discourse. (90)

.ese passages indicate that, in asserting physical objects to be “identi-cal if and only if coextensive,” Quine was most certainly not talking about the kind of identity that one object bears to itself (viz., self-identity); nor was he speaking of the identity of two di0erent objects, for there can be no true identity between numerically distinct objects. .is leaves us with co-referential identity of linguistic signs. .e claim he made here is that referential identity obtains between two or more linguistic expressions whenever their denotata are coextensive. .is is undoubtedly true, but what is not clear is just how—or why—Quine thought that a linguistic notion of identity could contribute to, or even be relevant to, the task of determining whether physical objects are well-individuated or how they may be well-individuated. In what manner could the linguistic identity of two signs have any e0ect upon the individuation of physical objects?


How does the fact that two linguistic signs co-refer to the same object help us to understand how the ontological boundaries of that object, itself, are to be clearly discerned? Put di0erently: If a man were informed that two linguistic signs were being used to designate one and the same object, but he were given no information about the identity of the object itself (and had no idea of what it might be), how would his knowledge about the referential identity of the linguistic signs be relevant to his understanding of the individuation and identity of the co-designated object? How would this information help him to single out the relevant object for reference or to distinguish it from other candidate referents? .e answer is obvious: It would contribute nothing to his ontological understanding of the co-des-ignated object. He would remain ignorant not only of the ontological boundaries that define and individuate that object, he could not even be sure that the object purportedly designated by the two linguistic signs actually existed. After all, Quine’s well-known slogan “To be is to be the value of a bound variable” really tells us nothing about the actual existence of any entity purportedly represented by the singular term that serves as the value of the bound variable. It only tells us what ontological commit-ments are incurred by the sentences of our best theories—if such sentences are true. It does not—and cannot—tell us whether they actually are true.

Furthermore, without some prior understanding of the ontological boundaries constituting, defining, and individuating the identity of the object to which Quine’s linguistic co-referential principle of identity/individuation is to be applied, how could the process of applying this principle even begin? Indeed, any application of his notion of linguistic identity could begin only after the referent presumably denoted by the two linguistic signs is already singled out and identified as the object of reference (i.e., its ontological boundaries have already been ascertained). For if the object’s boundaries have not yet been ascertained, how could talk about that object (as opposed to talk about some other object) take place at all? In sum, Quine’s coextensive identity principle not only makes no contribution to the task of determining the ontological identity and individuation of objects, it presupposes that this task has already been completed, and thereby begs the question. It seems, then, that coexten-siveness is not the “impeccable principle of individuation” that Quine imagined it to be after all, at least not in any ontological sense.

.at established, we return to our earlier question of how it is that physical objects are well-individuated in the first place. .roughout his


1975 essay, “On the Individuation of Attributes,” Quine simply assumed physical objects were well-individuated, without explaining how. .en, on the basis of this assumption, he went on to conclude that “classes of physical objects are well individuated too since their identity consists simply in the identity of the members” ("eories 101). To his credit, however, Quine added the following proviso: “[T]he principle that classes are identical when their members are identical” is a “good principle of individuation of classes of physical objects” only when there is “a good prior standard of identity of physical objects” (102—emphasis added). But precisely what is to count as a “good prior standard of identity for physical objects”? .is is a question of utmost importance, and one for which Quine needed to provide an adequate answer. For, as long as class members are not well-individuated, the classes of which they are purported members will fail to be well-individuated too. He was well aware of this problem, noting “that classes themselves are satisfactorily individuated only in a relative sense. .ey are as satisfactorily individuated as their members. . . . .e notion of a class of things makes no better sense than the notion of those things” (102-03).4

We have now seen that Quine’s proposed coextensive identity principle contributes little to our understanding of the identity and individuation of objects. When conjoined with his premise that a class is well-individ-uated only to the extent that its class members are well-individuated, the implied inference seems obvious: Quine has failed to demonstrate any satisfactory principle of identity/individuation for classes (at least not in terms of the coextensive criteria examined up to this point).

.ere are two other relevant points to be made here regarding Quine’s claims about classes. .e first pertains to the coextensive criterion of identity that he proposed for classes, which is roughly analogous to his coextensive criterion for the identity of physical objects. Simply put, Quine proposed that class x and class y are the same class if and only if they have the same members. .is criterion is subject to the same kinds of criticisms that have already been leveled against the coextensive identity principle that Quine proposed for objects. For to say that two classes are identical when their members are identical is a statement not about classes, as objects, but is a statement about how we linguistically speak about classes. For if class x and class y are identical, then the two symbols ‘x’ and ‘y’ are dual, but the class that these two symbols are being utilized to denote is presumably one and the same class, not two classes.


So, although Quine’s suggested formula for determining class-identity may be useful in helping us to ascertain whether or not two di0erent linguistic descriptions denote the same class of objects, it is of no help at all for the task of determining how any alleged member of such a class is individuated. It does not tell us what the boundary lines are that separate one specific class member from another class member. It does not tell us anything about the ontology of class-membership, and it does not tell us anything about what the conditions are that determine whether any given object does (or does not) belong to a specific class. Once again Quine was begging the question—this time with respect to the identity and individuation of classes. We have already seen that coextensiveness is not an “impeccable principle of individuation” for physical objects, and it is now plain that it is also not an “impeccable principle of individuation” for classes either, at least not in any ontological sense.

.e second relevant point to be made about classes is connected to some of Quine’s comments about how classes are specified. When it comes to specifying classes, he said, we “specify a class not by its members but by its membership condition” ("eories 107—emphasis added). More explicitly, Quine admitted that specifying a class extensionally--i.e., by enumerating each of its members--is “a method that is almost never feasible for any class worth talking about” (Quine 23—emphasis added), instead “classes are normally specified intensionally” (Hahn 317). .e most obvi-ous cases where the intensional method of specifying classes is needed are those in which it is either impossible or impractical to specify a class by extension (i.e., via enumeration). .ese cases include the specification of all the infinite classes that are so crucial to large portions of mathematics, as well as many of the ordinary classes represented by general terms, such as “mankind,” or by phrases such as: “all the inhabitants of Los Angeles.” Definition by intension for these kinds of classes is unavoidable because, of course, no one could enumerate every member belonging to the class of mankind nor could anyone enumerate every member belonging to the class of Los Angeles inhabitants. Indeed, without the intensional mode of defining a class, we would be unable to talk about (or even think about) any class that could not be feasibly enumerated. .is would put the vast majority of classes of daily discourse and many of the most important classes of mathematics completely beyond our reach. For these reasons, and more, the intensional mode of class-specification is not only signif-icant, it is indispensible. And for our purposes, it is significant to notice


that most of the descriptive content employed in the work of specifying classes via the intensional mode consists of descriptions of membership conditions that are defined in terms of properties that are shared by class members. Property ascriptions and other property-talk are ubiquitous in this domain. One wonders how Quine’s claim that properties are dispens-able can be reconciled with his admission that the intensional method of specifying class-membership is not dispensable. .ough he assiduously eschewed all reference to properties, he nevertheless conceded that the intensional method of class specification—a method which, prima facie, always appeals to properties—is indispensible. Is there consistency in this? We will have more to say on this topic shortly.

Given the di/culty of understanding how Quine’s coextensive lin-guistic type of identity sheds any light on the ontological identity and individuation of physical objects and classes, it should come as no surprise to find that coextensiveness is likewise incapable of providing us with any insight into the ontological identity and individuation of properties. Coextensiveness, as an ontological identity-principle, fails for properties for exactly the same reasons that it fails for objects and classes. For how could a co-referential identity between two linguistic signs have any e0ect upon the ontological individuation of the property to which the two linguistic signs co-refer? And, as in the case of objects, without some prior understanding of the ontological boundaries constituting, defining, and individuating the identity of the property (or properties) to which Quine’s linguistic co-referential principle of identity/individuation is to be applied, how could the process of applying such a principle even begin? One must already have some idea of what one is talking about before one can say anything of consequence about that thing. Put di0erently, his linguistic co-referential principle contributes nothing to the fixing of reference nor does it contribute to our understanding of the identity and individuation of properties—it presupposes that a prior understanding of these factors has already been obtained. Hence, once again, Quine begged the question.

Let us briefly recapitulate the ground that has been traversed up to this point: One of Quine’s purported reasons for rejecting properties is that their identity and individuation conditions are unclear. But, as we have seen, his proposed coextensive identity/individuation principle not only fails to shed any light on our understanding of the ontological identity and individuation of properties, it also sheds no light on the ontological


identity and individuation of objects and classes. .us far, then, it looks like properties are no worse o0 than objects and classes are. .is being the case, it is di/cult to see how or why Quine could be warranted in rejecting properties for lack of ontological clarity while retaining physical objects and classes—entities that are equally unclear in this respect. If Quine rejected properties on these grounds, then physical objects and classes should have been rejected, too; and conversely, if physical objects and classes are retained, then properties should have been retained too.

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We turn now to Quine’s third criticism of properties, viz. that properties are not needed because spatiotemporal coincidence is allegedly a wholly satisfactory principle of individuation.

In 1965, Quine had already conceded that macro objects, such as mountains and desks, su0ered from poor individuation. But at that time, he still clung to the idea that the molecular constituents of these macro objects were well-individuated. By the end of 1975, however, he finally admitted that even these molecular constituents (and their subatomic parts) could no longer be regarded as the well-individuated entities that he had previously thought them to be. Developments in the field of physics, particularly in quantum physics, had prompted Quine to acknowledge that the particle model he had previously embraced, and whose particles he had hoped would serve as the well-individuated and coextensive ground members of his classes, simply could not provide the kind of well-individ-uated constituent objects needed for building well-individuated classes. Physicists were regularly encountering situations in which the discrete existence, and the identity, of these tiny particles wavered considerably, giving rise to paradoxes of both identification and individuation (Confes-sions 281; Quine 307; "eories 17). Indeed it was precisely this situation that led Whitehead to replace the traditional substance ontology with an event ontology. As he noted in 1919: “In spite of their insistence in perception these physical objects are infected with an incurable vagueness which had led speculative physics practically to cut them out of its scheme of fundamental entities” (PNK 91).

As a consequence of this, Quine came to believe that some kind of field theory, one in which “states are ascribed in varying degrees to various regions of space-time,” might present a “better picture” (Confessions 281; "eories 17; “Whither” 499). .is was when Quine first hit upon the idea


of utilizing a spatial-temporal coordinate system as a way of fixing reference, and of individuating and establishing the identity conditions for physical objects. Once the spatial-temporal location of a physical object is fixed in terms of the relevant numerical points it occupies vis-à-vis the corre-sponding coordinate model, Quine saw that co-referential identity could be defined for physical objects in the following way: x and y are the same physical object if and only if their spatio-temporal boundaries coincide.

From late 1975 forward, whenever questions about the methodology of reference-fixing or individuating physical objects were put to Quine, he invariably advocated the use of some kind of space-time coordinate system as the best and least ambiguous way of individuating and fixing the reference of physical objects. And, from that point onward, his firm faith in the su/ciency of this spatio-temporal criterion never wavered.

In light of Einstein’s general theory of relativity, few would deny the utility, and perhaps even the necessity, of employing spatio-temporal coor-dinate systems as the most precise way of fixing reference and demarcating domains of discourse. However, there are at least three distinct indications that it is not a su/cient way of doing so.

I!+%*6&+'1 $/ Q&(!*’. .0+'*-"(5* '#("*#($!To set the stage for our next topic of discussion, consider the following questions: Does all of space-time constitute one big body or do portions of it constitute specific “smaller bodies”? Are there any “empty” space-time regions where no bodies reside? Quine’s answer to the latter question was a/rmative. Some portions of space-time, where no objects reside, are “empty,” he said, whereas other portions of space-time are “full” ("eories 17). In 1995, he rea/rmed this idea: “We are even prepared to say” of each relevant space-time region that “it was what a body was all along, an appropriately filled-in portion of space-time as over against empty ones” (Confessions 470—emphasis added). But what determines the boundary lines that separate the regions of space-time that are “occupied by bodies” from those regions of space-time that are “empty” of bodies? Are spatio-temporal points alone su/cient to this task? Why suppose, as Quine did, that some collections of spatial-points/temporal-instants constitute macro-entities such as Mount Whitney (or micro-entities, such as sub-atomic particles), whereas other collections of space-time/point-instants, of equal number, situated pretty much at random throughout the universe, fail to add up to anything but empty space?


A simple list of space-time coordinates would not, by itself, tell us whether the specific space-time region so designated by such a coordi-nate list is an “empty” region or a “full” one. Nor would it tell us how or why the designated space-time region was singled out and separated o0 from the remaining portions of space-time that were not included within the circumscribed region designated by the selected coordinate list. In accordance with what principle or criteria then is the selected line of demarcation to be drawn to delineate the precise location of the boundaries that determine which space-time/point-instants will be included in (and which ones excluded from) the space-time region so designated? And if such a designated space-time region turns out to be a “full” one, a list of this kind would provide us with no clue as to what sort of thing (event or state) “filled” that designated space-time region. .is strongly indicates that a simple list of space-time coordinates, by itself, is not su/cient for accomplishing the task of demarcating, individuating, and/or fixing the reference of physical objects. Something more is needed to accomplish this.

S0+'*-"(5* '#("*#($! /+(,. "$ (!%(2(%&+"* +3."#+'" *!"("(*.Quine was fully cognizant of the fact that the language of mathematics and the language of set theory abound with examples of reference to mathematical objects. As a consequence of this, he must have realized that, in addition to needing a principle for individuating physical objects, a principle for individuating abstract objects was also needed. For, without such a principle, how are we to clearly determine when an abstract object has been singled out for reference? And how are we to di0erentiate the referenced abstract object from other abstract objects that are not being referenced? But more importantly, for our purposes, what mode of indi-viduation would a principle of this kind have to utilize in order to be e0ective in individuating entities that possess no spatial or temporal traits whatsoever? One thing is certainly obvious: .e spatial-temporal mode of individuation that Quine so strongly endorsed in cases pertaining to physical objects is one that plainly will not work in the case of nonspatial and nontemporal objects, such as numbers or classes.

In the following short passage in which Quine recorded his recollection of a question once posed to him by Burton Dreben, we get a brief glimpse of Quine’s own recognition of this problem. He wrote: “Dreben once put to me a related but more challenging question. . . . What would there being a largest prime number have to do with the distribution of microphysical


states?” (Hahn 430). .ough not explicit, the central point of Dreben’s question seems clear: Spatio-temporal criteria, as applied to the physical realm, are wholly inapplicable to objects in the abstract realm. .us, some means other than space and time is needed to ascertain the ontological boundaries that demarcate abstract entities. But if not in a spatial-temporal manner, how then are these abstract objects to be individuated?

Given that Quine recognized that, for almost “any class worth talking about,” class-specification can only be accomplished intensionally—i.e., via the employment of descriptive content or other connotations (Confessions 356)—and given his claim that all mathematical-talk is reducible to talk about classes, it seems that he would also agree that the individuation of abstract objects can only be accomplished intensionally. .is point is significant for four reasons: (1) it demonstrates that there are limitations to the applicability of his spatio-temporal criteria (for it does not, and cannot, apply to abstract objects); (2) that an additional individuation-cri-terion is needed to individuate the abstract objects not covered by Quine’s spatio-temporal criteria; (3) that the additional individuation-criterion required for abstract objects will have to be one that individuates in an intensional manner, not extensionally; and (4) it raises the following question: Once the door has been opened to at least one principle of individuation that is inherently intensional in nature, what reason could there be for refusing to admit any others?

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Donald Davidson likewise thought Quine’s space-time criteria inadequate to the tasks of individuation, demarcation, and reference-fixing. He too concluded that something more was needed. Davidson had a hunch that some important clues about this “something more” could be gleaned from the predicates of our grammar. Using ocean waves and lenticular clouds to illustrate the kind of di/culties that are generated when the space-time content of an object is identified with the same space-time content of an event, Davidson concluded that:

.e undulations of the ocean cannot be identified with the wave or the sum of waves that cross the sweep of ocean, nor can the complex event composed of condensations and evaporations of endless water molecules be identified with the lenticular cloud. Occupying the same portion of space-time, event and object di0er, one is an object which remains the same object through changes, the other a change in an object or objects. Spatiotemporal areas do not distinguish


them, but our predicates, our basic grammar, our ways of sorting do. Given my interest in the metaphysics implicit in our language, this is a distinction I do not want to give up. (176)

.ere are two significant points that are brought into focus by the remarks that Davidson made here, both of which are relevant to Quine’s rejection of properties. .e first one pertains to the inadequacy of Quine’s proposal to employ space-time locations as the means of individuating overlapping objects and/or events. In contrast to Quine’s position, which was that events, like physical objects, are identical if they occupy the same places at the same times, Davidson urged that “one might want to hold that two di0erent events used up the same portion of space-time” (175). .e reason for this, as Davidson explained, is that spatiotemporal areas alone fail to distinguish between overlapping objects and events. .is failure indicates that Quine’s spatial-temporal criteria is not wholly su/cient to the task of individuating both physical objects and events, and that something more is needed to get the job completely done.

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.e second relevant point that Davidson made in the above excerpt is that the predicates of our basic grammar do enable us to distinguish overlapping objects and events. How do they do so? Davidson’s implicit answer seems to be this: It is largely because of the individuating and qualitative content inherent to, and embedded within, the predicates of our basic grammar that (via their utilization) enables us to distinguish overlapping objects and events in the way that we typically do. And such individuating and qualitative content is not confined solely to the predicates of ordinary language. It is also embedded in the predicates of the formal systems of logic that were endorsed by Quine, and this was something of which Quine himself was keenly aware. “.e bound variable of quantification clarified ontology by isolating the pure essence of objective reference, leaving all descriptive content to the predicates” (Quine 129—emphasis added). “All that an open sentence says about the value of the variable is said by the rest of the sentence; the variable says none of it. .e variable is the legitimate latter-day embodiment of the incoherent old idea of a bare particular” (Confessions 311—emphasis added).

But what exactly is it about di0erent particular objects that make it possible for di0erent predicates to be applicable to them? What is it for an object to merit the application of a predicate? On any view, predication


must be a joining of terms, capable of yielding truth or falsity according as the terms are aptly or inaptly joined. Quine expressly acknowledged this to be the case (Confessions 309, 310; Roots 84). Put in a slightly di0erent way: Precisely what are we doing when we make apparent truth-ascribing utterances? Are we saying what it appears that we are saying—namely, that we are predicating a certain property to some truth bearer or other? Quine’s response to this question seems to have been, at least in part, a/rmative: “[T]he truth predicate is an indispensable intermediary between words and world. What is true is the sentence, but its truth consists in the world’s being as the sentence says” (Confessions 423—emphasis added).

.ough Quine denied the existence of properties, he accepted as a basic tenet that, in order to derive a true instant of a one-place existen-tially quantified statement, the value that replaces the bound variable must be one that truly satisfies the requirement stated in the predicate of the sentence. “If we a/rm a sentence governed by ‘something,’ there had better be an object in our universe that meets the condition that the sentence imposes” (Quine 317—emphasis added). Now suppose that the condition imposed by a true sentence of this kind is the condition that the relevant “something” must possess a specific property. Does this mean that there had “better be” an existing object that actually possesses such a property—i.e., does this mean that there actually exists such an object having the property that the predicate of the sentence asserts the object to have? And does it mean that the relevant property said to belong to that object actually exists as well? Consider, for example, the existen-tially quantified open sentence: “.ere exists an x such that x is round” (symbolized as: ( x)Rx ). Whatever value is substituted for x, in the open sentence, “Rx,” must represent a thing having the property of being round in shape in order for the resulting statement to be true. Prima facie, this seems right; and so, prima facie, it seems that the particular property of being round, must actually belong to the specific object that satisfies the condition imposed by this predicate upon the bound variable x. Hence, this instantiated property must be a property that exists, entailing that at least one property exists.

But Quine was not receptive to this line of reasoning. In his opinion, this misguided way of thinking is due solely to a misconstrual of adjectival predicates and a failure to understand that all such property-talk is only apparent. .is is our next topic of discussion.


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People regularly engage in property-talk. Quine readily admitted this, and persistently did so himself. Abundant evidence of this is rife within his extensive body of writing, where one can find terms like “feature,” “trait,” and “property” repeatedly used (Roots 43; Quine 35, 337; "eories 7; Hahn, 26, 94). In fact, Quine declared the word “property” (and its ilk) to be “of a piece” with the ordinary language that we regularly employ to accomplish our “ordinary purposes,” and he even said that “we must acquiesce to its established usage in ordinary language” (Quiddities 24). Nonetheless, Quine insisted that property-talk does not, by itself, con-stitute su/cient evidence of the actual existence of properties, pointing out that there are many things that people regularly talk about that have no actual existence at all. Furthermore, what seems to be obviously and apparently true is not always a good indication of what actually is true. Consequently, the ontic assertions that we typically hear expressed in ordinary parlance should definitely not be taken at face value. Consis-tent with his strong embrace of naturalism, Quine also insisted that the ontological assertions that are found in the most parsimonious theories of science should be the only ones that count as acceptable answers to the ontological question: “What is there?” .us, whatever is not positively countenanced by science should not be taken to exist; and only objects that are indispensable to our best scientific theories are to be considered as potential ontological candidates that—unless disqualified by other criteria—eventually may be deemed worthy of meriting (and incurring) our ontological commitment.

But even when we confine our focus solely to ontological candidates such as these, we still need some way of ascertaining whether we are talking about things that really exist or whether we are talking about things having only apparent existence. As a way of facilitating and ensuring the greatest amount of clarity in making these kinds of determinations, Quine insisted that the sentences of science be translated into the quantificational gram-mar of first-order predicate logic (that he termed “the canonical notation”) as an important prerequisite preceding any careful assessment of ontic commitment. .is is because, for Quine, the language of the first-order predicate calculus is the clearest language we have. .ereafter, an ontic analysis of these sentences is to be carried out. However, in order to do this e0ectively, Quine believed that a clear standard of ontic commitment was


needed. And so he formulated one, and thereafter, frequently expressed it in the following slogan-format: “To be is to be the value of a bound variable.” .e ontic principle stipulated by this slogan is essentially this: .at the ontology to which one’s use of language commits oneself consists solely of the objects that one treats as falling within the domain of values over which one’s quantified variables range. At the most basic level, this means that one is ontologically committed to the existence of a thing if and only if one explicitly asserts its existence; and anything else asserted about a thing will have no direct ontological bearing—it will have, in Quine’s terms, only “ideological” bearing.

It is important, at this juncture, to remind ourselves that, for Quine, there is a clear distinction between ontology and ideology: .e ontology of a theory pertains solely to objects, while the ideology of a theory pertains solely to what ideas are expressible by the predicates, operators, and other expressive devices of that theory. It is also significant to notice here that, within the language of first-order predicate notation, the “x” occurring in a sentence such as “( x)Fx” is to be understood as a variable for a name denoting an object, but the “F” is to be understood as an abbreviation for an incomplete sentence, not the name of an object (not even the name of an abstract object like a property). In other words, only the “x” portion of the notation pertains to ontology, the “F” portion does not. It pertains exclusively to ideology, not ontology. A key factor here is this: For any sentence translated into the canonical notation, as long as the predicate symbol does not fall within the range of the values of the quantified variables, there is no ontological commitment incurred to anything that such a predicate may seem to “represent” (such as a property). .at is, a predicate of this kind ontologically incurs no commitment to the exis-tence of properties. Its import is exclusively ideological, not ontological.

Quine firmly believed that once a sentence is translated into the canon-ical notation of first-order calculus, and is carefully analyzed in accordance with his proposed ontic principle, that any true ontological commitments imbedded in the sentence would be made manifest. Sometimes, upon analysis, an ontological commitment that is apparent in the original form of the sentence will disappear when translated into canonical form. At other times, a hidden ontological commitment that is not apparent in the original sentence will be revealed by such an analysis. But, in any case, as long as the analysis is carried out in a careful and diligent manner, Quine was convinced that, in the end, all apparent references to properties would


either disappear or else they would be revealed to be references to classes, not properties.

Quine acknowledged that there are at least three types of linguistic expressions that, prima facie, seem to incur an ontic commitment to properties: (1) adjectival predicates; (2) abstract singular terms (Word 122-23); and (3) property quantifiers (Word 206-07). Because ontological commitment is incurred only when something falls within the domain of values over which the quantified variables range, there will be no incurred ontic commitment as long as the predicate symbol does not fall within the range of the values of the quantified variables. .is was Quine’s strategy for “eliminating” any apparent reference to properties that might seem to be made by adjectival predicates. His strategy for dealing with abstract singular terms and property quantifiers consisted of two steps. First, determine whether or not the abstract singular term (or, as the case may be, the property quantifier) reoccurs after the original sentence has been translated into canonical notation. If the canonical notation does not contain an existentially quantified variable that corresponds to the abstract singular term (or, as the case may be, the property quantifier) occurring in the original sentence, then the apparent reference to properties in the original sentence has been shown to be merely apparent—not real. .e second step of Quine’s strategy is required only if the abstract term (or, as the case may be, the property quantifier) is not successfully eliminated by translating the original sentence into canonical notion. If it has not been eliminated in this way, Quine claimed that it is not necessary to interpret the occurrence of the abstract term (or property quantifier) as referring to a property—instead it can be interpreted as referring to a class.

Quine devised each of these strategies in order to show that, in one way or another, any apparent property-talk is always going to be either eliminable or else reducible to class-talk. And, insofar as these strategies are successful, the need for positing properties would likewise be eliminated, as would any ontic commitment that we might previously have thought ourselves to have toward properties.

But are all apparent references to properties really eliminable or else reducible to class-talk as Quine claimed them to be? A number of thinkers have argued that there simply are no known ways to translate many of the significant locutions of science into the formal extensional notation of Quine—without quantifying over properties (see Putnam 235-54).

Whitehead, we believe, would rank among these philosophers in his


argument for retaining properties. And, with regard to Quine’s claim that any uneliminated property-talk is reducible to talk about classes, at least one problem still remains: In light of his acknowledgement that the most important classes are specifiable only through intensional idioms, there is reason to think that property-talk is not wholly reducible to class-talk, for property-talk seems to be the only available vehicle through which the specification of the most important classes is made possible. In this way, class-talk seems to presuppose and require property-talk (and not the reverse, as Quine claimed).

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.ough Quine often emphasized a great divide between ontology and ideology, his own holism indicates that they are simply two reciprocal aspects of one continuous web, and thus inexorably linked to each other. To see an example of this, we need only look to the activity of theory-build-ing, where the resulting sizes of both the ontology and ideology of the built-theory invariably depend upon whether ontological parsimony or ideological parsimony is more highly prized by the theory-builder. If the theory-builder values ontological parsimony over ideological parsimony, he will seek to diminish the number of ontological entities in his theory, but in doing so, he will unavoidably increase the number of its primitive predicates. On the other hand, if the theory-builder values ideological par-simony over ontological parsimony, she will accordingly seek to diminish the number of primitive predicates within her theory, but in so doing, the number of its ontological entities will be unavoidably increased. In other words, there is an inevitable trade-o0 relationship between the entities of ontology and the primitive predicates of ideology in any theory-building endeavor. Being the consummate theory-builder that he was, Quine was not immune. And, given Quine’s taste for “desert landscapes”— his predilection was to minimize his ontology as much as possible while still accommodating the needs of science.

We have already seen how Quine excluded properties from his ontol-ogy, and how he endeavored to eliminate many of the apparent references to properties occurring in sentences of ordinary language by constructing paraphrased versions of them into the canonical grammar of predicate logic. However, two serious problems are created by this practice. .e first problem is this: By eliminating apparent references to properties in this way, Quine inevitably increased the stock of undefined primitive predicates


constituting his ideology. .is is potentially problematic because, within any first-order logic language L, each semantically primitive predicate P needs its own definition of “satisfaction” integral to a definition of truth for L. .us, whenever any apparent reference to a property is eliminated in this way, for each newly introduced primitive predicate, a separate definition of “satisfaction” must be given. If an infinite number of such semantically primitive predicates are introduced into the first-order logic language L, the component of the truth definition specifying satisfaction will need infinitely many clauses. In that case, of course, the satisfaction clause could never be completed, and “is a true sentence of L” would remain undefined. .us, in endeavoring to eliminate apparent references to properties in this way, as Armstrong noted, Quine became

like a man who presses down the bulge in a carpet only to have it reappear elsewhere. . . . or like a man without funds who writes a cheque to cover his debts. When this is challenged, he is prepared to write another cheque to cover his debts. When this is challenged, he is prepared to write another cheque to cover the first cheque: and so forever. He may postpone the evil day but he does not meet his debts.” (Armstrong 21)

.e second problem is that by pouring all of the semantic content into the metalanguage of his ideology, none remains in Quine’s ontology. Only the bare variable and the semantically-empty sca0olding of his structuralism remain, the ontological content having been totally removed (Stimulus 74-75). It is no wonder that reference has become inscrutable. As a consequence of this, Quine’s notion of ontic commitment is wholly undermined. To better understand this, it is important to remember that, whenever one speaks about ontic commitment, one is always implicitly (if not explicitly) doing so relative to some specific language L or language system L. And this specific language L must be an interpreted language, i.e., a semantical system, and not a mere formal calculus. .is is because an uninterpreted system can carry no ontic commitment whatsoever. As is widely known, one and the same calculus may be interpreted in many di0erent ways, depending on the specific domain of objects to which it is applied. But Quine did not think that ontic commitment can extend to every possible domain to which a purely formal L might be applied (see "eories 21, 22). .e ontic commitment carried by L can only be rooted in, and emerge solely from, the specific semantic content inherent in the interpretation that is selected and imposed upon L. And so, if one wants to


gain a clear description of what is meant by the ontic commitment carried by L, one must consider the ontic commitment carried by the semantical metalanguage of L—or what Quine termed its “ideology.” Indeed, with-out explicitly taking into account the accompanying semantics of one’s ideology, there is simply no point in discussing the ontic commitment of language systems at all, because without semantic content there is no specific ontic content to which one could be (or fail to be) committed.

.is is precisely Quine’s predicament—in endeavoring to avoid having to grant ontological status to properties (or to any other kind of intensional thing), he was left with a semantically empty ontology. As a consequence of this, nothing remained to which any ontological commitment could be given. In this way, the very notion of “ontological commitment” became vacuous, and thereby undermined. Indeed, on this rendering, any assertion of an ontological commitment would be tantamount to an assertion of ontological commitment to “something I know not what.” In that case, his denial of any ontological status to properties would be no more (or less) semantically meaningful than would be his assertion of the ontological status of classes. .is is a consequence that Quine neither desired nor embraced. As already stated, Quine did not think that ontic commitment can extend to every possible domain to which a purely formal L might be applied. According to him,

it is a confusion to suppose that we can stand aloof and recognize all the alternative ontologies as true in their several ways, all the envisioned worlds as real. It is a confusion of truth with evidential support. . . . We must speak from within a theory, albeit any of various.” ("eories 21, 22)

More specifically, Quine stated that “all ascriptions of reality must come rather from within one’s theory of the world; it is incoherent otherwise” ("eories 21). Or again:

It has been a long-standing platitude that intension determines extension; . . . . everyone said that meaning determined reference. How can everyone have been so wrong? I think that solution is evident: meaning determines reference within each fixed ontology.” (Confessions 361)

In these passages, we see Quine’s express acknowledgement that any ascriptions made of reality must be made from within the ascriber’s own theory of the world, i.e., from the perspective of some ideological interpre-tation or other. And it is from this ideological interpretation that semantic


content is poured into the otherwise empty structural sca0olding. It is from this ideological interpretation that one’s ontology is then determined and becomes fixed. And it is to this fixed ontology that one’s ontological commitment is subsequently incurred. Now since any speaking that any of us do, and any ascriptions of reality that any of us make, at any time, are always made—and can only be made—from within our own respective theories of the world, it follows that any ascriptions of reality that any of us could ever make, are inevitably going to derive from whatever our fixed ontology happens to be at the time that such ascriptions are made. No one is immune. And because there is no escaping this human predic-ament, it is impossible for any speaker-ascriber at any time to be without a fixed ontology. And given that “meaning determines reference within each fixed ontology,” it follows that meaning is always what determines reference. If that statement is correct, then Quine’s claims about meaning, property-talk, and other intensional locutions being unnecessary for the tasks of fixing reference, drawing ontological boundaries, and individu-ating objects falls to the ground.

.e foregoing may help us to understand why Quine subsequently came to place “less importance” upon “mere ontological considerations,” and came to regard “the lexicon of natural science, not the ontology” as “where the metaphysical action is” (“Whither” 503-04).5. Implicit in Quine’s recognition of ideology as the domain wherein all the “metaphys-ical action” takes place, is also his recognition that it is in the predicates that all of the truly significant work is done. And it is in the predicates, too, where the lexicon of science resides—and where all property-talk takes place.

When a closer look is taken at the content of the “lexicon of natural science” and more attention is paid to what the predicates found there are being used to say, we find that the amount of property-talk going on in all areas of science is widespread in its proportions. Indeed, it seems fair to say that science, as currently understood and practiced, would be unrecognizable without property-talk. Even Quine acknowledged the pervasiveness and necessity of property-talk within science, as evidenced in his remark that “the notion of property or its reasonable facsimile is needed for technical purposes in scientific theory, especially mathematics” (Quiddities 24). It therefore seems appropriate, at this juncture, to reiterate one of Quine’s basic precepts—namely that it is ultimately up to science to determine what there is. If this precept is applied to the question of


whether ontological status should be granted to properties, the answer seems clear: Whether or not there are properties is a question to be deter-mined by science. And since, at the present moment, it looks very much like properties are indispensible to science, in accordance with Quine’s own naturalism, it looks very much like properties should be retained.

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In his “Reply to Leemon McHenry,” Quine admonished McHenry for confusing “the mere use of an adjective phrase with the appeal to a property” and suggested that McHenry’s confusion in this regard was what had produced his puzzlement “over how we can make sense of the boundaries of the space-time regions without recognizing the existence of properties.” McHenry’s central mistake, according to Quine, was essentially that he had been trying to make “sense of such boundaries by means of phrases” erroneously taken “to be names of properties” (13). We wholly concur with Quine that it would, indeed, be a mistake to confuse adjective phrases with properties. More strongly still, we hold that the use of an adjective phrase could never, by itself, constitute evidence of the existence of a corresponding property—anymore than the description of a class-membership condition, by itself, is evidence of a class. But just as—for any given class-membership description—there may be none, one, or many existing classes that correspond to the given description, we maintain that, for any given adjective phrase, there similarly may be none, one, or many existing properties that correspond to the given adjective phrase. .ough Quine was well aware of the fact that class-membership descriptions sometimes fail to correspond to any existing class, he certainly did not regard this as warranting the conclusion that there are no classes at all. So why then should the fact that some adjective phrases fail to correspond to any existing properties be accepted as a reason for thinking that no properties exist? Unlike Quine, we not only hold that there are contexts in which the use of an adjective phrase indicates a likelihood of the existence of a corresponding property, more strongly still we urge that there are some contexts in which the only reasonable way that adjective phrases can be understood is as designating corresponding properties that are ontologically real.

In light of the foregoing, Quine’s inordinate emphasis upon a pur-ported confusion of adjective phrases with properties is surely a red herring. For the central question put to Quine was not the question:


Why did McHenry, Whitehead, or anyone else fail to make proper sense of the boundaries between disparate space-time regions? .e question actually posed was: How it is that Quine could adequately make sense of the boundaries between disparate space-time regions without positing the existence of properties? In a comment that is as near as Quine came to providing a response to this question, he wrote: “McHenry asks how we individuate spatiotemporal objects. Perhaps he misses the answer because it is too close to his eyes: the objects are identical if they coincide: if they are coextensive” (14). But, even here, Quine failed to address the relevant question. He merely reiterated his old familiar co-referential identity principle, which, as we have already seen, contributes nothing to our understanding of how to make sense of the boundaries of space-time objects and/or regions.

We believe that in this paper we have shown that a spatiotemporal coordinate methodology is not an adequate means of individuating and demarcating disparate spatio-temporal objects. We also believe that we have demonstrated there to be at least two reasons why classes are inade-quate substitutes for properties: (1) Because the specification of the most important classes can only be accomplished via intensional descriptions, which require properties; and (2) because, according to Quine’s own lights, the identity of any class requires that there be a clear prior standard of identity/individuation for each class member; but since Quine’s proposed space-time coordinate method fails to accomplish this task, and since there is no plausible alternative method in sight to do so, classes seem to be in a far worse state than properties are.

Whitehead held that properties are required because they are repeat-able entities in event sequences, crucial for the individuation and identity of physical objects, which in turn are crucial for measurement and the formulation of scientific laws. .ough Whitehead o0ered relatively little argument to support his claims about properties, we believe that White-head’s position has withstood Quine’s critical onslaught. .ough Quine characterized Whitehead’s retention of properties in his later philosophy as “ill-individuated structural elements of science,” claiming that properties have no place in science (“Response” 14), just the opposite seems to be the case. As we have seen, the very notion of a class presupposes, and thus requires, that there be properties—as does science, where property-talk is ubiquitous and intensional descriptions indispensable. On behalf of Whitehead, we suggest that Quine apply his own naturalistic premise to


properties: “Science itself, in a broad sense, and not some ulterior phi-losophy, is where judgment is properly passed” (Confessions 321). .us, what properties there are in the world should be decided by science. And, at the present moment, properties look to be quite indispensible to science. .erefore, there is good reason to believe that properties should be retained, not rejected.

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1. Oddly, Quine protests that McHenry has ascribed to him a monistic ontology of individuals instead of one that is dualistic, but nowhere is this to be found in McHenry’s essay. In his essay, McHenry explicitly stated that “Quine’s ontology is dualistic, containing events (which he calls ‘physical objects’) and classes” (10). Moreover, all remarks made thereafter by Quine, in his “Reply to Leemon McHenry,” make sense only if Quine is credited with believing that his ontology had been characterized by McHenry as dualistic (not monistic).

2. Quine’s response to McHenry was subsequently re-printed in two books: Process and Analysis: Whitehead, Hartshorne and the Analytic Tradition, edited by George Shields, and Quine in Dialogue, edited by Dagfinn Føllesdal and Douglas Quine.

3. Quine’s brand of extensionalism rejects properties (or attributes) in favor of classes, but includes abstract entities, provided that they have a clear principle of individuation. Nominalism, on the other hand, is typically understood as the rejection of universals in favor of an ontology of exclusive individuals. Everything real is particular and abstract universals are nothing but names; the mistake of dualists, according to nominalists, is reification of general concepts. As Quine puts it: “Discourse adequate to the whole of science can be so framed that nothing but particulars need be admitted as value of variables” (Confessions 16). But Quine himself was not a nominalist in this sense. It is important to be clear about two kinds of nominalism in metaphysics: (i) the view that there are no abstract objects, and (ii) the view that there are no universals when universals are construed to be properties. As mentioned above, Quine is a nominalist in the latter sense but not the former. As he was motivated largely by the nominalist’s principle of parsi-mony, or as he put it in his classic “On What .ere Is,”—“a taste for desert landscapes”—he sought to keep his ontology to a bare minimum (Logical 4). Nominalism, for him, is an ideal for ontological construction, one that seeks a theory about what there is, no more, no less. In this manner, the metaphysician attempts to avoid empty theorizing and perplexing questions about the relation between universals and particulars. But as much as Quine


aspired to nominalism in the sense of (i) above, he was forced to admit classes to his ontology, and to reluctantly concede to a form of Platonism, his main reason being that science would be impossible without recognizing their service to the formulation of quantitative laws, numbers being reducible to sets ("eories 13-14; see also Mancosu).

4. Also in a reply to Joseph Ullian, Quine stated: “.e celebrated principle of individuation of classes, namely that they are identical if and only if their members are identical, serves to individuate them only insofar as their mem-bers are already individuated; and on this score an ungrounded class totters over an infinite regress” (Hahn 590).

5. And in his 1983 essay titled “Ontology and Ideology Revisited,” Quine confessed agreement with his “disturbed readers” about the fact that ontology had “undergone a humiliating demotion” (Confessions 317).

We wish to thank Ronald McIntyre for critical evaluation and suggested improvements of the present article.

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Quine and Whitehead on Ontological Reduction: Properties Reconsidered

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