Liberty UniversityDepartment of Philosophy

CAN WE QUINE THE QUALIA OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE?

by

Shaun M. Smith

5 December 2014

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the impossibility of reducible aestheticexperiential states to purely functional-cognitive mechanisms. The paper primarily argues against the applicability of aestheticexperience to cognitive theories developed by Daniel Dennett. Myprimary argument teases out the problems with Dennett’s theory ofillusory qualia, while adapting strong phenomenological elements towards our understanding of aesthetic experience. The conclusion is simply that we ought to embrace a more ‘extended-

mind’ concept of how artwork and the viewer’s experience are meeting in a unified conscious field. Although the discussion focuses mostly on defeating Dennett’s theory, more work is yet tobe done in the application of mind/cognitive theories and aesthetics.

1

I. Introduction

Any reading of the aesthetic theories of Hume or Kant

immediately reveals the problem of trying to pin all of our

judgments of the aesthetic experience to “taste”: the one special

faculty that is responsible for our apprehension of aesthetic

judgments. The 20th century philosophers of mind, however, are

quick to point out some of the more phenomenal issues with the

theory of taste. One could speak of faculties of the mind, brain

functions, or functional states of the physiological make up of a

human being for days on end. However, the biggest question that

helps us arrive at the heart of the issue is this: what is the

experience itself? The phenomenologist is ready to handle the

issues of this raw data of experience. Philosophers of mind

constantly refer to this notion of qualia. Qualia is simply the

raw data of our experience, the free flowing film of our

experience. Much to the liking of a Peter Jackson film, where

the Lord of the Rings is the motion picture of our experience as we

view it from the comfort of our recliner at home; we contain that

experience for ourselves and recollect the data of that

experience. Ironically, John Locke hints towards this concept of

2

qualia (before it became an evident problem in Kripke’s rebuttal

of the identity thesis and Nagel’s “what it is like” thought

experiment) in his definition of consciousness. Locke defined

consciousness as “the perception of what passes in a man’s own

mind.”1 The discussion of any experience is befuddled by a

discussion of qualia. But ought we to mistake the brain process

for the experience itself? This is what is at stake in the

discussion of aesthetic experiences. Ought we to discuss the

warm fuzzy feelings of the aesthetic experience of, for example,

our viewing of the Mona Lisa, Kazimir Malevich’s White on White, or

our favorite Led Zeppelin album, as a brain process leading to

the qualia of the experience or vice versa? Thus, the paradox of

phenomenal judgment is ever so present in the discussion of an

aesthetic experience.2

The purpose of this paper is to outline the two opposing

views. We will use Daniel Dennett’s Quining Qualia and Thomas

Nagel’s What is it Like to Be a Bat? to give differentiating views. 1 John Lock, Essays Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.D. Woozley

(Bergenfield, NJ: New American Library, 1974): 96.2 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1997): 177-181. Chalmers calls this issue the paradox of phenomenal judgment, because seemingly one could explain phenomenalconsciousness with a brain process correlate, and vice versa. This becomes paradoxical when one asks: which has explanatory power?

3

First, I will give a brief discussion of the problem of qualia.

From here I will shift towards the functionalist response to

these problems of qualia, whether they exist at all. The

discussion will attempt to illustrate how the functionalist views

of Dennett, and perhaps others, ultimately removes the

authenticity of an aesthetic experience. The goal is to

eliminate this idea that we ought to describe experience from a

bottom-up model (brain process to the raw data of experience) to

a top-bottom model (where there is qualitative information that

is distinct from brain processes). To do this, I will refer to a

more phenomenological perspective, specifically from Shaun

Gallagher, to emphasize the concept of self-embodiment and how

attitudes effect our perception of the world we experience.

Dealing with this top-down model will help save the aesthetic

experience form becoming an unfolding rug of subjective terror,

where any judgment is subject to my brain processes instead of a

real qualitative distinction. From this paper, I hope it will

become evident that the functionalist response to the mind/body

problem has far reaching applicative consequences.

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II. The Problem of Qualia

What is significant about this strange word qualia? The term

is not really signifying a specific object, but rather a cluster

of objects. In fact, the term qualia attempts to refer to the

cluster of data that you experience. For example, as I look at

this coffee cup, the color of white, the writing on the side, the

shape and form of the mug itself, all of these comprise that

cluster of sense experience from external stimuli. This

particular object, the coffee mug, is seemingly external from

myself, yet it presents itself in a way that makes me feel the

color white, the shape of the mug, etc. Not only is this

experience giving me the feel of all these properties, but I also

have this sense of inner-subjectivity: this experience is my own.

The problem of qualia became evident once Kripke dared to

tackle the all famous identity thesis: that for any x, if y

shares all the properties of x, then x=y, also, necessarily x=y.

Kripke began teasing out the differences between rigid and

nonrigid designators.3 The most famous application of this

understanding of counterfactual logic was in regards to the 3 See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Camridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1980): 74-76 for a brilliant lecture over the issue.

5

mind/body problem. Kripke noticed, interestingly enough, that

the identity thesis failed immensely in regards to the mind/body

problem. Take for example, pain. The identical brain process

responsible for pain, or at least occurs while pain occurs, is

the firing of c-fibers throughout the body. Thus, pain is

equivalent to the firing of c-fibers through the neurons

(identity thesis). However, what is essential to pain, or what

is a rigid designator to pain, is not the firing of c-fibers, but

the feel of pain. The phenomenal quality of pain is essential and

identical to pain. The firing of c-fibers is merely a contingent

fact and not a necessary one.4 Kripke single handedly has given

us the problem of qualia. What are these feels to experience that

are necessary for the experience itself? Specific to aesthetic

experience, what is the feel of an aesthetic experience and is it

necessary to the artwork itself in order to have that experience?

The work of John Locke and Saul Kripke play an important

role in determining exactly what an aesthetic experience consists

of. When I experience the radiant and beautiful sunset on the

Pacific Ocean, do you experience the same qualitative experience

4

Ibid., at 98-99.

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of a yellow hazy, half circle of a sun experience?5 These

questions of conscious content, mental events, etc., are vitally

important in any aesthetic theory. In fact, they actually may be

necessary.

III. Two Opposing Views

There are two ways of approaching the problem of qualia and

how it will apply to the aesthetic experience. First, these two

approaches will be described as either a bottom-up or a top-down

model. Second, both of these approaches will have vital

consequences of some type or token. However, as will be

illustrated, the hard functionalist positions associated with

Dennett and others will make it vitally hard to have a

distinguishing factor in the experience of the sublime or

aesthetic.

Thomas Nagel most famously argues for this inner-subjective

feel of our experience. The raw data of experience is seemingly

owned by me, and no one else can possess that. Nagel, in his

famous exposition of qualia in “What is it Like to Be a Bat,” 5 This is a parallel to the inverted spectrum problem: is my blue your

blue, or is my blue your red, but you call it blue?

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explains some inner-subjective properties that are essential to

the experience of a bat. A bat has the ability to use

echolocation, to be nocturnal, and to have far differing diets

from humans. These experiences are specific to a bat. The bat

experiences them, they are not our humanly experiences.6 Nagel

describes that what it means to be a human, a bat, an insect, or

other creature seems to entail a certain point of view. One

could describe features like sound and color to wavelengths and

their causal efficacy towards our physiological makeup, but the

point of view itself is irreducible to the physical.7

The irreducibility of these “point of views” are at the

heart of an authentic or genuine aesthetic experience. These

phenomenal qualities are essential in what makes the sunset we

are experiencing subjective to two persons. Epistemically, as

Nagel and Searle have commented, we can discuss these phenomenal

qualities objectively even though they are the subjective

elements of each of our lives.8 Collectively, we can discuss the

6 Thomas Nagel,”What is it Like to Be a Bat?” in The Philosophical Review 83,no. 4 (October 1974): 435-450. 7

Ibid., at 4458 Ibid. See also, John Searle, Mind, Language, and Society (New York: Basic

Books, 1998): 43-45.

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feel of the sunset, the yellow radiance and warmth of the sun.

These features are essential to any reading/viewing of the Lord of

the Rings. At one point in The Return of the King, Samwise Gamgee sees

a parting in the clouds where the twilight beyond is peering

through. Sam directly states to Frodo, “Mr. Frodo, Look! There

is light and beauty up there that no shadow can touch.”9 Surely,

Sam is giving an objective understanding of this experience, yet

there is acknowledgment of how each character is having the

subjective experience simultaneously. Sam sees the beauty as a

remembrance of all things that were good and green in Middle

Earth. Frodo, however, contains a qualitatively different

experience; the twilight only strikes him as pain, as Frodo later

comments about how the ring has caused his perceptual experiences

to be dark and meaningless. Two persons can experience something

beautiful, yet with different inner-subjective experiences.

9

Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King (Extended Edition), DVD, Directed by Peter Jackson (USA, New Line Cinema, 2003). I used the quote fromthe film here for practical reasons. This scene, however, is a parallel to Samwise’s feelings in ch. 2 The Land of Shadow in J.R.R. Tolkien, The Return of the King (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1983): 901. “There, peeping among the cloud-wrack above a dark tor high up in the mountains, Sam saw a white star twinkle for a while. The beauty of it smote his heart, as he looked up out of the forsaken land, and hope returned to him. For like a shaft, clear and cold, thethought pierced him that in the end the Shadow was only a small and passing thing: there was light and high beauty for ever beyond its reach.”

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Nagel’s model gives us a top-down attitude towards these

experiences. These inner-subjective phenomenal feels, point of

views, etc., are not reducible to the physical. They may be

“epiphenomenal” (though Nagel would not agree, but his position

begs this question) in a sense, and from there, we can study and

understand the structures of consciousness and experience.

Daniel Dennett struggles to account for these inner-

subjective feels to experience. The functionalist position that

Dennett holds to argues that all elements of our mental life,

whether we like it or not, can be explained within the framework

of neuroscience. Dennett famously illustrates in Consciousness

Explained that the Cartesian theater, the picture of how we

experience the world almost as if it is a movie, needs to be

reworked in order to ensure that these experiences are shaped by

the cognitive processes that give rise to these experiences.10

In relation to qualia, Dennett denies its true existence (or at

the very least, the discussion of qualia is trivial at best). The

content of our experience, for Dennett, should never be confused

10 Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York: Back Bay Books, 1991): 101-138

10

for the brain processes that are giving rise to these feelings of

qualia.11 Consider Dennett’s example of Chase and Sanborn. Both

work for Maxwell Coffee, as coffee tasters, to ensure the quality

of the product. However, out of the blue (or maybe red, yellow,

or green), both come to work describing that they no longer

appreciate or find all too great the taste of Maxwell Coffee.

Chase states that he has acquired finer tastes. Sanborn states

the opposite, and argues that something physiological has changed

in the past day.12 Dennett argues that this discussion of

qualia, the way things feel to someone like Chase, are seemingly

confusing and incoherent. Chase thinks equivocally when he

thinks of his prior tastes of Maxwell Coffee. However, he has no

resources to make a “finer distinction” between his current

tastes and his prior tastes.13 Discussion of these intrinsic,

incorrigible, self-owned qualia are nothing but descriptions of

the ability to re-identify internal functional mental states.14

11 Daniel Dennett, “Quining Qualia,” in Consciousness in Modern Science, eds. A.J. Marcel & E. Bisiacha (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988): 42-77.12

Ibid., at 52-54.13

Ibid., at 62.14

Ibid., at 74.

11

The model of argumentation implemented by Dennett is a

bottom-up, brain processes to qualia, explanation. Here, Dennett

urges that these properties of qualia, that we believe to be

inherent in us, owned by us, incorrigible, are merely

descriptions of our brain processes. The brain processes

involved in our attitudes towards qualia should be given priority

over the explanation that qualia are these personal, inner-

subjective, data of experience. How does this bode with our

famous Lord of the Rings example? Not too well it seems. Contrary

to how Nagel’s account plays out, Samwise and Frodo are both

experiencing the same content with different attitudes, yet these

are not epiphenomenal qualities, they are merely the workings of

our brain processes and functional states. Samwise is no better

of a situation than Frodo, as both are just discussing and having

differing attitudes towards their experience. The qualia are an

illusion that we bring on ourselves. For Dennett, this concept

of stripping away the raw data of experience is something that we

cannot be so sure of, keeping certain its trivial existence.15

15

Ibid., at 45.

12

The question remains for aesthetic experiences: what is it

like to have an aesthetic experience? This question must be

outlined in order to discuss genuine experiences of beauty. The

reason why this question still plagues those philosophers of mind

that want to eliminate qualia from the discussion is because

qualia are necessary to the aesthetic experience. When dealing

with the experiences that we classify as being in contact with

beauty, the sublime, or even something transcendent, there

appears to be some complications with Dennett’s account that this

abstraction is illusory. First, part of understanding what an

aesthetic experience consists of is by having that level of

abstraction where we can strip away the raw data of experience,

teasing out the nuances of experiences, those items we call

qualia. The reason why we tease out the qualia is to make sense

of the experience itself, not the fact that I am experiencing it.

Dennett is conflating the actual subject matter itself. The

experience is worth talking about, while the processes themselves

are merely just contingent facts that follow.

Surely, brain processes and functional states play a central

role in much of our everyday experiences. To change Dennett’s

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thought experiment, let us conceive that Chase and Sanborn are

art critics. They both particularly have a distaste for the

famous Mona Lisa painting. However, one day, both arrive at the

conclusion that the painting is beautiful and timeless. Chase

claims that after 15 years of seeing this painting he finally

apprehends the beauty. Sanborn states that he thinks something

physiological changed in him overnight, his memory-accessing

processes altered after 15 years, and now Sanborn can retain all

that he has learned about beauty and taste, changing his opinion

on the Mona Lisa. In this case, dealing specifically with the

experience of the Mona Lisa, assuming the painting to have

intrinsic beauty passed on from the artist himself, the two are

both correct in different ways. For Chase, after teasing

together the information of the painting, which took him 15

years, he finally has a change in attitude towards the qualia of

experiencing the painting. Sanborn, though a physiological

change has occurred, was able to recollect the understanding of

what beautiful qualia consisted of, and thus applying that to the

painting. All of this is just illustrating that the painting

itself contains the information, stimuli, and colors. Yet, the

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experience itself is subjective and held by both Chase and

Sanborn. For the aesthetic experience, there necessarily are

these feelings and sensations that are personal to our

experiencing of them. In addition, the ability to abstract these

qualities is necessary to even make an aesthetic judgment that is

objectively true. The work of art contains this shared

information that carries forth the consciousness of the artist,

much to the liking of Andy Clark’s extended mind thesis.16

These two views have been long debated. Ought we to side

with Dennett’s neo-behaviorist-functionalist objections towards

qualia, or opt for Nagel’s, Clark’s, and Chalmers’ internalist-

functionalist phenomenal consciousness? From the set of

experiences that are considered aesthetic, there appears to be a

necessary entailment that the functionalist-internalist

phenomenal consciousness that apprehends the qualia of experience

is essential for the experience itself and the judgment of the

experience. There needs to be this ability to abstract and

16 Andy Clark & David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” in Analysis 58, no. 1(January 1998): 7-19.

15

describe the inner-subjective experiences that are irreducible to

any brain processes.

IV. Bodily Influence on Intentional States

Nagel reminds us that there is need to develop a

phenomenology of the experiences that begin with humans.17 That

is immensely clear with his inner-subjective understanding of the

content of experience. The argument has favored the proposition

that qualia are necessary to capture a sense of the subjective

aesthetic experience that is not reducible to brain processes or

functional states. The picture, however, seems incomplete.

Shaun Gallagher has illustrated the argument between Dennett and

Nagel does not ask the question of how embodiment contributes to

the understanding of qualia (paralleled to Husserl’s hyletic

data). Gallagher rightly notes that the question is often not of

what it is like but of what it is like.18

Gallagher’s distinction between body-as-object and body-as-

subject is of some use here.19 For the aesthetic experience, our

17 Nagel at 449.18

Shaun Gallagher, Phenomenology (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2012): 94.19

Ibid., at 95-96.

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environments and intentional states can alter how we interpret

works of art. Taking the aesthetic experience in terms of body-

as-object, we would view these experiences as happening to or

within our bodies. The body-as-subject, however, observes that

these experiences alter or change the way we experience the

world. The sense of embodiment that accompanies this idea that

the qualia are things within myself is simply misleading. Here,

Gallagher seems to make the further distinction that makes an

active engagement with the world a possibility for both our minds

and bodies. The content is not within consciousness itself. The

processes of the body help make the changes of how we experience

the world itself. Thus, when one sees a sunset while not

experiencing bodily pain, the sunset is far more enjoyably

compared to experiencing the sunset while experiencing pain. In

a sense, our bodily processes do affect the experiences we have

of the world.

Again, however, Gallagher’s addition of bodily influences of

intentional states still denies the real distinctive ability of

separating the objects from the qualia. Gallagher himself is

separating two quale of experience: pain (or some other

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sensation) with the experience of the world). The problem begins

with the use of a bottom-up model: all things begin with the

neural processes and ends with qualia. The problem that

physicalism has always struggled with: phenomenal consciousness

being irreducible. Dennett, Nagel, and other physicalist are not

able to account for the anomaly of the logical distinctiveness of

consciousness. For instance, logical supervenience is often held

as the foundation towards these physicalist positions.20

However, as Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment illustrates,

there can conceivably be a zombie twin with the same functional

states as us humans, yet with no conscious experience.21 The

“what it is like” experience is a distinction that separates the

properties of the experience from the neural processes that guide

our interpretation of that experience. Aesthetic experience

would not be so aesthetic if that abstraction was not possible.

The result would lead aesthetics to be in no better shape than

where Kant and Hume left it. Kant himself struggled with that

20 See Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005): 32-57.21

David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

18

intentional nature that seemed to guide the will towards the

understanding of the aesthetic. For Hume and Kant, the theory of

“taste” was in no better shape to handle the qualia of aesthetic

experience than Dennett’s neo-behaviorist-functionalist rejection

of qualia. Qualia are intuitively present. Raw sense data is

necessary for the distinctions between colors, beauty, and the

sublime. Without qualia, those distinctions are impossibly

implied. Simultaneously, qualia are inner-subjective content.

Aesthetic experience helps us to highlight both the objective-

subjective features of phenomenal consciousness. Perhaps, then,

we can make sense of the problem of objectivity and subjectivity

occurring simultaneously in the aesthetic experience.

V. Objections

There are a few objections worth pointing out in this

qualitative-phenomenal analysis of aesthetic experience. These

objections are raised in response to the problems of qualia

itself. The issue of qualia can be seen from the lens of the

paradox of phenomenal judgment: for each mental state there is

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always the ability to explain that state in terms of physical

processes.

Ned Block highlights an important issue with similar

functional states and absent qualia. Compare two functional

states that are identical; one has qualitative properties while

the other has absent qualitative properties. Take a hydraulic

device, to use Block’s example, that takes fluid to run. There

can be an identical hydraulic device that does not run with

fluid. Perhaps the device runs off electricity, and we do not

have to commit ourselves to epiphenomenal qualities of any

kind.22 Block is specifically addressing Sydney Shoemaker’s

argument that if absent qualia are possible, then functionalism

collapses on itself because there are epiphenomenal qualities

that are independent of the functional states.23

In relation to the aesthetic experience, if Ned Block is

correct, then functional states can be identical while

qualitative properties can be different: one absent and one not.

Though this does not show agreement with Dennett’s rejection of

22 Ned Block, “Are Absent Qualia Impossible?” in Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Vol 1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007): 382-383.

23 Sydney Shoemaker, “Functionalism and Qualia,” in Philosophical Studies 27, no. 5 (May 1975): 291-315.

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qualia, Block does demonstrate how functionalism (non-irreducible

consciousness) wins the day given that identical functional

states can exist with differing output qualitative properties.

If the qualia can change amongst identical functional states,

then what good is qualia to become a necessary feature of the

aesthetic experience? There must be some other feature that

guides that apprehension of the aesthetic experience because

qualia is not as objective as has been assumed thus far.

Ned Block seems to miss the epistemic objective features

that are being illustrated by Nagel and others.

Phenomenologically, one can come to an objective understanding of

the sense of self-ownership in the experience itself. What is

essential to Nagel’s bat thought experiment is not just the

external qualia of the experience, but also the internal,

intuitive quale of self-ownership. Self-ownership is a feature

that cannot be changed between differing environments. This has

been illustrated with the rubber hand illusion, where a person

believes the rubber hand to be their actual hand through the

observation of the stimuli that is replicated simultaneously on

21

the real hand and the rubber hand.24 One feature of every

experience that is necessarily attributed is the “I am”

experiencing this experience. The experience is owned by those

who are experiencing. One can point out the redness and

roundness of the apple and how that feels, but in the end, it

feels that way to me. Between Block’s hydraulic machines that

emit differing qualitative properties, the property of ownership

of those qualitative properties are completely different between

the functional states, thus illustrating that functionalism

collapses on this explanation of different qualitative self-

ownership experiences. With aesthetic experiences, there is

always the sense that I am experiencing a work of art like

Dante’s Inferno. Others can have an identical functional state as

me, but they are the owner of their experience of Dante’s

beautiful poem. There are external qualia (redness, roundness,

etc.), yet there are also these intuitive unseen sensations

(pain, self-ownership, etc.). Functionalism does not seem to

distinguish between these.

24

M.P.M. Kammers, et al., “The Rubber Hand Illusion in Action,” in Neuropsychologia 47 (2009): 204-211.

22

Another important objection that needs rebuttal is the

problem of introspection and self-authoritative knowledge. David

Armstrong argues that introspection often leads to incorrect

judgments of our mental states.25 Qualia are often apprehended

by introspective judgment of the content of our experience.

However, we often do not abstract the properties of sense

experience. For example, one often walks around not asking

themselves what the properties are of each car that passes by.

When we think of the experience of a bat, of using echolocation,

being nocturnal, etc., this comes with much thought in regards to

our experience, and what it means to experience our own lives.

Introspection is often used to make a judgment of the qualia of

aesthetic experience. One ponders their own mental states: how

they feel, think, or perceive Dante’s Inferno. If Armstrong is

correct about introspective judgments (I believed Dante to be a

wonderful poet, then I reread him and found out how horrible The

Divine Comedy was), then qualia do not serve as a necessary

condition for an aesthetic experience. The observer could easily

mistake their mental status of that experience.25 D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge, 1968):

97-99, 326.

23

Again, the materialist/physicalist perspective is riddled

with problem of self-ownership. One could develop a sense in

which the rubber hand is their own bodily hand, but that does not

remove the judgment of self-ownership itself. The overall frame

of experience has guaranteed that my bodily hand is my own hand.

Likewise, the experience of the aesthetic has guaranteed me that

I am experiencing the aesthetic, the artwork of Malevich for

example. There exist these moments when the environment or other

factors contribute to an error on our part, but necessarily the

experience itself has self-ownership. The feature of self-

ownership gives me the reliable sense that my judgments of the

qualia of experience, the reds, pains, itches, tickles, etc., are

indeed my experiences. Introspective error does not jettison the

ability to make these qualitative distinctions.

VI. Conclusion

The case has been that the existence of epiphenomenal qualia

is necessary for the aesthetic experience. The ability for one

to divide, abstract, and strip away the raw data of experience

that is external from the functional and neurological states

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helps guarantee that one truly has an aesthetic experience.

Dennett’s rejection of qualia is also a rejection of the truly

objective sense in which we can delineate our experiences of red,

itches, pain, happiness, beauty and all of those features that

are part of the aesthetic experience. If these properties are

illusions or of trivial existence, then there can be no true

sense of self-ownership in the aesthetic experience. However, as

has been argued above, self-ownership is a feature that cannot be

removed from experience itself. The judgment of self-ownership

has helped guaranteed that there are phenomenal qualities of

experience that the subject is experiencing, and they can be

discussed independently of the functional brain states of a

person. Simultaneously, qualia that are epiphenomenal, in the

sense of being independent, are necessary for artwork to truly

have intrinsic beauty, existing as part of the conscious mind of

the artist who shares the work.

25

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