“Looking at Religion and Greek National Identity from the Outside: The National Identity Cards...

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Looking at religion and Greek identity from the outside:The identity cards conflict through the eyes of Greekminorities

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Looking at Religion and Greek Identity from the Outside:

The Identity Cards Conflict through the Eyes of Greek

Minorities

LINA MOLOKOTOS-LIEDERMAN

Introduction

This is the third article emerging out of the research project ‘The Religious Factor inthe Construction of Europe: Greece, Orthodoxy and the EU’, funded by theLeverhulme Trust from 2003 to 2005. The starting-point is the 2000 controversy inGreece about whether or not to include religious affiliation on national identity (ID)cards.

The goal of the Leverhulme study was to analyse the public debates that occurredover the ID cards issue and related themes as they appeared in the Greek news mediaand in various political, academic and religious milieux. The analysis is based on twosets of research data. The first source of data is the Greek national daily press inwhich journalists, scholars, intellectual figures, public officials, church figures andrepresentatives of minority religions expressed their opinions on the ID cardscontroversy and related issues. Using a systematic qualitative analysis of presscontent, we examined and compared the key issues, prevalent opinions and supportingarguments on the subject of the inclusion or exclusion of religion on ID cards, as theyemerged from an extensive body of newspaper articles.1 A second source of dataincludes 34 interviews with carefully selected commentators and persons who weredirectly or indirectly involved in the ID cards controversy.2

The ID cards controversy has attracted the attention of a variety of researchers whohave viewed it primarily as a political and legal issue indicative of Greece’s closechurch-state relations (Makrides, 2005) and as an illustration of the strong linkbetween religion and national identity. But the issue of religion and national identityinevitably leads to the question of pluralism and religious minorities. The growingnon-Orthodox minorities that have arrived in Greece through immigration since the1990s are challenging Greece to evolve from a homogeneous nation to a more diverse,multicultural society. Therefore, if the ID cards debate is a useful lens through whichto analyse the role of religion in national definition, it is also a window into the statusof religious minorities in Greek society.

Focusing on the point of view of non-Orthodox religious minorities has the addedvalue of providing a different angle to the conflict: a Greek perspective but outside the

Religion, State & Society, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 2007

ISSN 0963-7494 print; ISSN 1465-3974 online/07/020139-23 � 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09637490701271145

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‘Greek Orthodox norm’. Human rights and religious freedom were critical issues inthe ID cards conflict. This paper therefore highlights the relevance of the conflict forreligious freedom in Greece and how the ID cards conflict relates to broader questionsof human rights and religious minorities in Greece. The analysis focuses on howGreek religious minorities viewed the issue and how they felt directly or indirectlyconcerned by this question.

If the Greek case study provides an innovative way in which to reflect on the statusof religious freedom and the relationship between the Orthodox majority and non-Orthodox minorities in Greece, it also offers a lens through which to view thechallenges of national, religious and European identity. These are linked to generalissues of pluralism across Europe, including how the relations between (a) nation andreligion and (b) church and state relate to religious freedom.

Nation and Religion in Greece: Legal Implications for Religious Freedom

A brief outline of the legal context for religious freedom in Greece provides thecontext in which the ID cards conflict took place, as it relates particularly to Greekreligious minorities. The status of religious freedom in Greece is closely linked to thespecificities of modern Greek history. The tight bonds between Greeks and theirOrthodox faith have remained salient, thus challenging certain aspects of thesecularisation thesis in Europe (for more on Greek religiosity, see Makrides andMolokotos-Liederman, 2004).

The Greek Constitution is declared in the name of the Holy Trinity, and Article 3stipulates that the ‘dominant’ or ‘prevailing’ religion of the Greek population isEastern Orthodoxy under the authority of the autocephalous Church, which isunited spiritually with the Ecumenical Patriarchate (Constitution, n.d.). In Greece,therefore, we have an official religion and no separation between church and state.Greekchurch-state relations are close and the state is directly responsible for financing theOrthodox Church of Greece (OCG). The influence of the OCG, both as an institutionand as a cultural, spiritual and political factor, is acknowledged by Greek politicalmilieux, as an essential parameter in Greece’s socio-political system (Makrides andMolokotos-Liederman, 2004). This situation encourages clientelistic relationsbetween certain political milieux and members of the Orthodox clergy.

The Greek model of treatment of religious minorities3 is somewhat unusualcompared with that in other European countries, insofar as Orthodoxy continues toenjoy special privileges in areas of public life (including education, rites of passage,political life4). Greek Orthodoxy in fact is the only truly free religion in Greece – otherfaiths are simply tolerated. More precisely, according to Article 13 of theConstitution, the somewhat vague differentiation between ‘known’5 and other (not-known) religions, and between ‘legal person in public law’ and ‘legal person in privatelaw’ creates conditions that preserve a preferential status for the OCG, with seriousimplications for other faiths (Constitution, n.d.; HWRF, 2005).

The OCG is a ‘legal person in public law’ with exclusive territorial holdings towhich the Greek state grants exclusive legal and financial privileges not applicable tonon-Orthodox faiths. Judaism, Islam and the OCG are also recognised as ‘legalpersons in public law’, but other religious groups, including the Roman CatholicChurch, Old Calendarists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Protestant churches (primarilyEvangelical and some Pentecostal churches), are considered to be ‘legal persons inprivate law’ (HRWF, 2005). This distinction creates legal obstacles for some minorityreligions. Freedom of religion is secured through Article 13 of the Greek Constitution,

140 Lina Molokotos-Liederman

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which legally guarantees freedom of conscience and religious worship only for‘known’ religions (Constitution, n.d.). Most ‘known’ religious groups are organisedand have their own places of worship and associations (including special schools in thecase of Catholic, Jewish and certain Muslim communities). Article 13 also prohibitsproselytism against or in favour of any religion, including Orthodoxy, but in practiceit has almost exclusively been used against religious minorities.6 The definition ofproselytism can often be problematic, since the simple distribution of literature bynon-Orthodox religious groups has been so interpreted and prosecuted by the Greekstate as an act of proselytism.7

Greece as a Place of Immigration

Beyond the legal parameters of religious freedom in Greece there are socio-economicfactors that complete the general context. Since the 1970s Greek society has beenrapidly transformed: economic wealth (including a large informal ‘black’ economy,ongoing benefit fraud and tax evasion, and financial and political favouritism),technological prosperity and consumerism have been accompanied by largediscrepancies between significant socio-economic sections of the population comparedto those of other European Union (EU) countries as far as lower education, income,healthcare, social protection and employment levels are concerned. At the same time,since the 1980s Greece has also changed from a country of emigration into a hostcountry to thousands of immigrants.8 Immigration thus presents an additionalchallenge to the homogeneous nature of Greek society. For example, Albaniansseeking jobs frequently decide to change their names and/or convert to the OCG,hoping thereby to be better accepted and find work in Greece (Baldwin-Edwards,2004). In 2003 the controversy over whether an Albanian schoolboy who earned topgrades had the right to carry the Greek flag at the national Independence Day paradein northern Greece received significant public and media attention (Associated PressWorldstream, 22 October 2003). This was an isolated case, but nonetheless it offers anexample of the ways in which immigration is challenging conceptions of Greekidentity and citizenship; it reflects possible anxieties towards immigration and acts as amicro-illustration of Greek social attitudes to ethnic or religious minorities.

We cannot assume that all religious minorities in Greece are immigrants and/ornon-Greek citizens, as there are many non-Orthodox or non-Christian Greek citizens(see below). At the same time, given the large number of immigrants fromneighbouring countries with significant Orthodox populations (including Bulgaria,Romania, Georgia and Ukraine), non-Greek Orthodox immigrant populations makeup a large proportion of foreign immigrants into Greece. One way of getting a closerpicture of religious minorities in Greece is by looking at data on immigrants, whichprovides a context in which to place religious minorities in Greece. Collecting data onimmigration in Greece is a particularly difficult process given that statistics onimmigrants are fragmented – there has been little effort to consolidate the numbersavailable in different ministries and government agencies. According to a 2005 studythat aggregated various data sets, there are a total of 1.15 million immigrants inGreece, approximately 10.3 per cent of the total population (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004).This figure includes approximately 190,000 undocumented immigrants (lacking thenecessary legal documents) and 950,000 documented immigrants including homogeneis(literally meaning ‘people of the same race’), that is, ethnic Greeks (first- or second-generation Greek emigrants returning to their home country). About two-thirds of theimmigrants come from neighbouring countries, primarily Albania (accounting for 56

Religion and Greek Identity 141

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per cent of the total number of immigrants),9 but also Bulgaria, Romania andGeorgia; the remaining originate primarily from the former Soviet Union (forexample, Ukraine), the EU, North America and Australia (mostly first- or second-generation immigrants returning home) and Asia (Pakistan, India). They tend tocluster in economically vibrant regions in Greece, especially in places attractingtourism and the cities of Athens and Thessaloniki (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004).

Religious Minorities

Information specific to the religious demography of Greece that is broken downaccording to religious minority groups is scarce and can be based only on estimations.Since 1951 the Greek National Statistical Service has not included questions based onreligious criteria in its national census and surveys. This is partly due to an existingsensitivity10 in Greece over minority issues. The numerical size of non-Orthodoxreligious minorities in Greece is relatively small compared to the overall populationand other European countries such as France, the UK and Germany. However, recentand rapid immigration to Greece has accelerated the pace at which Greek society hasbecome more diversified in ethnic and/or religious terms. At the same time, there iseconomic and social insecurity and the rights of the Turkish minority in NorthernGreece remain a sensitive point for both government policies and Greek society,primarily because the issue is viewed as a potential security threat.

Given the above-mentioned problems on collecting data on the size of immigrantand religious minority groups in Greece, we can provide only an estimate of religiousminorities based on cross-referencing of different sources (see Table 1): a 2002 reportby the Greek Helsinki Monitor – Minority Rights Group (Greek Helsinki, 2002), thesources listed in Minorities in Greece (Clogg, 2002), the 2004 report on Greece by theUS Department of State (US Department of State, 2004) and our interviews withreligious minority group representatives in 2004.

Even though they are an Orthodox Christian group and thus not a religiousminority, Old Calendarists belong to an administratively non-recognised branch ofthe Orthodox Church. They adhere to the Julian calendar, as a way to guaranteeOrthodox continuity and tradition (the Greek government and the OCG replacedthe Julian calendar with the Gregorian calendar in 1923). Old Calendarists reject thehierarchy of the OCG and have their own churches, monasteries (including the

Table 1. Religious minorities in Greece

Old Calendarists 500,000 – 800,000Muslims 470,000Greek citizens of Turkish origin 100,000

Foreign-born Muslims living in Greece 800,000Catholics 353,000Greek citizens 53,000

Foreign-born Catholics living in Greece 300,000Protestants 30,000Jehovah’s Witnesses 50,000

Jews 5000Others 1000

Sources: as cited above


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Esphigmenou monastery on Mt Athos) and convents. The Old Calendarist movementalso has supporters among the Greek diaspora worldwide and non-Greek OldCalendarist groups can also be found in the Balkans (Ware, 2002). Although theyremain a marginalised group, declining both in Greece and in other countries, Greekor non-Greek Old Calendarists still have a role to play among emerging Orthodoxconservative movements in Greece, Russia, Romania, Serbia and the North AmericanGreek diaspora.

The Muslim community is the largest and most diverse minority in Greece. Thereare historic Muslim communities established in Greece, namely Turks, Pomaks11 andRoma12 Muslims, concentrated primarily in northern Greece (Western Thrace); thereare also Muslim newcomers who have arrived in Greece as migrant workers, fromAlbania, the Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia – these groups are concentratedaround large urban centres and the working-class districts of Athens. Unlike theTurkish minority in Thrace (see below) these recently-established Muslim commu-nities (including both legal and illegal immigrants) are not well organised, as indicatedby the lack of any official mosque in the greater Athens area.13

The Turks of Greece in Western Thrace are very different. They are a historicminority of Greek citizens of Turkish origin and a direct result of the 1923 LausannePeace Treaty.14 The Treaty sealed the exchange of Turkish nationals of the Orthodoxfaith in Turkey (with the exception of the Greeks living in Istanbul) and Greeknationals of the Muslim faith in Greece (with the exception of Turks living in WesternThrace) in order to increase the national homogeneity of each country (Meinardus,2002). Reciprocity and equal treatment were fundamental principles in the Treaty,according to which both Turkey and Greece agreed to protect the religious freedomand ethnic identity (including education, language and property) of the remainingTurks of Greece and Greeks of Turkey. The Turkish minority in Northern Greece istypically defined as a Muslim minority, thus in terms of its religious, rather than ethnic,identity. However, the determination of whether this group is a religious or an ethnicminority has been the object of ongoing debate in Greece for decades. According to aMember of Parliament representing the Turkish minority in northern Greece, the Greekstate insists on defining the minority in religious terms as a ‘Muslim minority’ (ratherthan a ‘Turkish ethnic minority’) for security reasons, in order to minimise the potentialdevelopment of any nationalist or expansionist claims by the Turkish communities inGreece and/or Turkey itself (Interview, 6 October 2004; Meinardus, 2002).

Catholics comprise the largest Christian minority living in Greece; most are of theLatin rite but there are also some of the Eastern/Byzantine rite (Uniates). There areestablished Catholics who are Greek citizens (predominantly in Tinos and Syros butalso in Athens) and an even large number of Catholic newcomers (primarily fromPoland and the Philippines) currently living as working migrants in Greece (sometemporarily). The Latin-rite Catholic Church includes six dioceses that are under theauthority of the Holy Synod of the Catholic Hierarchy of Greece, with variouscommunities and religious orders (including Capuchins, Dominicans, Jesuits,Assumptionists and Ursulines); most of the services are conducted in the Greeklanguage but there are also some services in Athens that are conducted in English, forexample to accommodate the large Filipino community living in this area. Therelations between the Catholic hierarchy and the OCG have been marked by frictionand hostility, particularly on the contested status of the Catholic Church: it remainswithout a public status, as it is a ‘legal person in private law’ (unlike Islam andJudaism in Greece, which are legal entities in public law) (Greek Helsinki, 2002). In1994, provoked by public views15 in Greece that the Vatican was behind the Bosnian


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Muslims and Croats and against the Serbs, and that the Catholic Church isfundamentally a heretical movement trying to undermine Greek Orthodoxy throughproselytism, the Latin-rite archbishop of the Catholic Church in Greece presented 11issues of discrimination against the Catholic Church in a memorandum to theMinister of Religious Affairs (Frazee, 2002). Most of these issues remain unresolved.

The Protestants in Greece are diverse as they belong equally to three denomina-tional groups: The Greek Evangelical Church, the Free Evangelical Church and themore recent Pentecostal Church (Interview, 29 July 2004). Protestants living in Greecehave recently increased as a result of new arrivals. There are 28 Evangelicalcongregations in Greece, which are under the General Synod of the Greek EvangelicalChurch, with the largest churches in Athens and Thessaloniki. Compared to Greekpublic attitudes towards Catholicism, Protestants benefit from a more positive imagein Greece, with the exception of Pentecostals whose activities are often viewed as athreat to Greek Orthodoxy (Iatrides, 2002).

Similarly to Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses have also been perceived in Greece asa threat to Greek Orthodoxy. Jehovah’s Witnesses are recognised as a ‘known’religion in the Greek Constitution, but the OCG and the Greek Ministry of ReligiousAffairs have denied them an official status in Greece. There have been numerous courtcases taken to the European Court of Justice: for example, when the Greekgovernment violated the religious freedom of Jehovah’s Witnesses in that it refused toexempt them from military service, or denied their applications for building permitsfor places of worship, or wrongfully accused them of proselytism (Iatrides, 2002).These cases have led to a long and well publicised history of discrimination in Greecethat has tainted Greece’s image and record on tolerance of religious minorities (seewww.cesnur.org).

The Jewish community is the smallest religious minority in Greece. According to arepresentative of the Greek Jewish community 87 per cent of Greek Jewry waseradicated during and after the Second World War and approximately half of thesurviving Jews left Greece after the end of the war (Interview, 13 July 2004;Bowman, 2002). Of the 55,000 Jews in Thessaloniki and 1000 in Athens, now only1000 live in Thessaloniki and 5000 in Athens. Thus they are highly concentrated in theAthens region (Bowman, 2002). Jewish communities are legal entities underGreek public law and the Central Organisation of Jewish Communities in Greece(KIS) acts as the official representation of Greek Jewry in Greece, particularly innegotiations or matters involving the Greek government. There are three regularlyactive synagogues; the chief rabbi is appointed by the minister of National Educationand Religious Affairs. Not only because of the low numbers but also because ofhistory Greek Jews maintain a low public profile. Faced with declining numbers,Greek Jews struggle to preserve their history and to continue to sustain theorganisation of the community.

The ID Cards Issue and Religious Freedom

During the first part of the Leverhulme study, we mapped the dominant positions onthe inclusion of religion on ID cards, identifying four ideological orientations rangingfrom negative through neutral and pro-dialogue to positive views on the issue. Fourdominant themes emerge from the newspaper articles and interviews, which aresupported by a bibliographical review of the relevant literature. These are: (a) religionand national identity, (b) church-state relations, (c) pluralism and religious minoritiesand (d) European integration. These themes have been analysed in earlier papers


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outlining the general findings of the Leverhulme study (Molokotos-Liederman, 2003;Molokotos-Liederman, 2007).

Pluralism and religious minorities, the focus of this paper, is a key theme givenGreece’s particular religious profile. In the ID cards conflict all opinion groups,regardless of their specific conceptions of nation and religion and church and state,acknowledge the need to respect religious minorities in Greece. They take somewhatdifferent views, however, regarding Greece’s dominant Orthodox heritage and itsplace in an increasingly diverse society.

For example, the critics of inclusion of religion on ID cards refer to human andminority rights more often than all other opinion groups. The issue of discriminationis a consideration raised almost exclusively by critics of both the voluntary and themandatory inclusion of religion on ID cards.16 Conversely, for the advocates ofreligion on ID cards, the issue of human rights and minorities does not appear to be amajor concern in their arguments; this is because they believe that there are no majorproblems in the treatment of religious minorities in Greece, and thus they see no directlinkage between ID cards and discrimination.

The complexity in the ID cards ‘puzzle’ is evident in the split between differentopinion groups over how religious affiliation on ID cards and religious minority rightsmanifest themselves in the domain of education. Those in favour of religion on IDcards view the registration of religious affiliation on ID cards as offering certainpractical advantages for minority groups, especially when it benefits certain minorityfaiths and guarantees their rights in Greece. A case in point is provided by theappointed Catholic and Muslim religious education teachers in Greek state schools inareas with large concentrations of Muslim and Catholic families. The inclusion ofreligious affiliation on ID cards is viewed as essential in the process of selectingspecialist RE teachers who are Muslim or Catholic to teach RE at these schools. Thecritics of religion on ID cards view this policy as a way to discriminate againstminority religions, as in the case of non-Orthodox teachers who, until 2002, wereprohibited from teaching religious education in Greek schools (their religiousaffiliation could be verified simply through their ID cards). In 2002 the GreekCouncil of State ruled that RE teachers were not obliged to declare their religiousbeliefs.

Opinion Groups in the ID Cards Debate

We can see the broader divisions of opinion on the ID cards issue in a brief descriptionof the general arguments that relate to religious freedom used by the opinion groupswe identified in the ID cards debate.

The Advocates of Religion on ID Cards

The legal basis for favouring the compulsory inclusion of religion on ID cards wasfounded on the law of 1991 (stipulating the mandatory registration of religion on IDcards), which, advocates of religion on ID cards argued, should remain in effect and,thus, not be abolished by the general law of 1997 on privacy protection.17 Thearchbishop, and many others who were in favour of this policy, had initiallyadvocated a mandatory registration of religious affiliation on ID cards. However, inface of the socialist government’s determination to remove religious affiliationaltogether, they adopted a more pragmatic position in 2000 – advocating the optionalregistration of religious affiliation instead.


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Those in favour of religion on ID cards view its inclusion as a practical means ofrecognising the official status of minority faiths in Greece and according them specialprivileges. They also refer to the right to self-definition and self-determination(Constitution, n.d., Article 15) and to the principle of the rights of the majority, whichthey unquestionably assume to be Orthodox. The opportunity for citizens to choosewhether to include their religious affiliation on ID cards, they argue, does not violatedemocracy; on the contrary it was the government’s decision to remove religiousaffiliation that violated the democratic process of free expression and marginalised theOCG. Those favouring religion on ID cards also use the religious freedom argumentto state that ‘the removal of religious affiliation is a violation of individual freedomand democracy’.18

In 2001 Archbishop Christodoulos organised a mobilisation campaign, collectingapproximately three million signatures (signed petitions) requesting the voluntarydeclaration of religion on ID cards and calling for a national referendum on the issue.If at the end the OCG conceded its position on the ID cards issue, it gained a useful‘bargaining chip’ (three million signatures out of a population of over ten million) inits future relations with the state, which it may want to use to revisit the issue in thefuture. This initiative was promoted as a democratic approach and a form of dialoguebetween the state and civil society.

Advocates of religion on ID cards thus believe that the voluntary inclusion of areligion clause protects and satisfies both those who do and those who do not wish toindicate their religious affiliation on ID cards.

Opinion groups that are in favour of the voluntary inclusion of religion on ID cardsalso use human rights language to make their argument. They support both thefreedom of religious expression and the freedom to express and define one’s identity inreligious terms. They believe that religious minorities enjoy religious freedom inGreece, referring to the legal and constitutional means for guaranteeing religiousfreedom (Constitution, n.d., Article 13). They argue that Greek legislation alreadyguarantees the protection of religious minorities, and that cases of discrimination arefew and exceptional. Looking more pragmatically at the Greek situation, they point toa lack of complaints so far by Muslims or Catholics about any discrimination basedon religious criteria. Using the Muslim example, they make the case that minoritiescan benefit from the registration of religion on ID cards to claim certain protectiveprivileges, available only to them. In this context, they view religious freedom inGreece as independent from the removal of religion from ID cards.

Lastly, the advocates of religion on ID cards also consider the argument thatreligion on ID cards can lead to discrimination in a different sense: to an attempt byminority groups, both within and outside Greece (particularly Jewish organisations),to undermine the ethnic and religious homogeneity of Greece and ultimately to alterGreek identity. They are concerned that greater emphasis on the protection of religionminorities in Greece may undermine the rights of the Orthodox majority, nationalhomogeneity and Greek identity.

Pro-Dialogue Orientations towards Religion on ID Cards

Opinion groups advocating dialogue use a similar line of reasoning as they alsounderline personal and religious freedom as a fundamental value. In the sameperspective as the advocates of religion on ID cards, those who adopt a pro-dialogueposition argue that it is dialogue itself that is the fundamental democratic measuring-stick; they emphasise that dialogue with the OCG is a parameter of both democracy


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and civil society. They deny accusations that there is systematic discrimination inGreece based on religion.

The dialogue that this opinion group advocates would include, for example, theOCG’s proposal for a national referendum among the Greek population on the issuein question (namely whether the inclusion of religion on ID cards should be mandatoryor voluntary, or whether it should not be included at all). Dialogue would alsocomprise consultations between the government and civil society representatives,including the OCG, leading intellectual, political and religious figures, journalists andother opinion leaders, as well as religious, political and social organisations.

The Critics of Religion on ID Cards

Opinion groups with a neutral stance on the issue as well as those with an openlycritical stance towards the inclusion of religion on ID cards refer to religious freedomas an essential component of liberty and democracy. The critics of religion on IDcards emphasise the historical roots of the law in the 1940s, when the registration ofreligion on ID cards was used to differentiate Jews and atheists from the Orthodoxnorm of the majority. They argue that both the mandatory and the optional disclosureof religion on ID cards violates the freedom to disclose or keep private religious beliefs(Constitution, n.d., Article 13). In the optional case, when citizens do not specify theirreligious affiliation on ID cards, this constitutes a negative form of declaration, whichin the Greek context may be seen as suspiciously different from the Orthodox norm.They argue that the inclusion of religion on ID cards creates the conditions fordiscrimination against citizens on religious and ethnic grounds, thus leading toinequalities and human rights violations. They are also critical of Greece’s currentposition on religious freedom and minority rights and would like to see the law againstproselytism abolished.

More generally they view the removal of religion from ID cards as a furthermeasure in guaranteeing religious freedom and in respecting the privacy of religiousbeliefs. If among the authors of positively oriented articles a referendum and dialogueare the key features of a democracy, for this more critical group democracy ismeasured not so much by the rule of the majority, but by how minorities are treatedand protected. Furthermore, since they view the treatment of minorities as ameasuring-stick of democracy, they argue that human rights cannot be dependent onthe views of the Orthodox majority of the Greek population.

The ID Cards Conflict through the Eyes of Greek Religious Minorities

Shifting our attention to the religious minorities themselves we must now look at theirown perspectives on the ID cards conflict and other relevant issues emerging from theconflict. We interviewed six Greek representatives of the major religious minoritygroups in Greece: the Jewish community (two individuals) (13 July 2004); the CatholicChurch (14 July 2004); the Evangelical Church (29 July 2004); the Jehovah’s Witnesses(5 October 2004); and a Member of Parliament from Thrace (6 October 2004). Theinterviews (in Greek) lasted between one and one and a half hours and were taped andtranscribed. The interviews were initially focused on the ID cards conflict as areligious freedom issue, leading to a more general discussion on human rights andreligious minority issues in Greece. We asked respondents a series of questions inorder to (a) map their opinions towards religion on ID cards and (b) get a first-handview of the challenges facing a non-Orthodox Greek. Some interviewees spoke freely


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using their name; others felt more comfortable to speak anonymously. In this articlewe have omitted the names of all interviewees.

In selecting the interviewees we identified people who by their capacity or publicfunction could speak on behalf of each minority group and whose views carried acertain weight. We are aware that such officials cannot wholly represent the religiousgroup in question, especially in cases where religious minorities are diverse(for example, Muslims and Catholics), but they do have an extensive knowledge ofthe history and problems that their respective religious communities face today.

Most of the religious minorities in Greece – namely the Catholic, Jewish andProtestant communities – emerge as explicitly against the inclusion of religion on IDcards. However, there was an unexpected finding in the reactions of the representativeof Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Turkish Muslim minority. As a result of specificcircumstances relating to their status or experience in Greece their responses were notconsistent with the explicitly negative reactions of the Jewish, Protestant and Catholiccommunities.

Both representatives of the Greek Jewish community explained repeatedly thatGreek Jews had not brought about the ID cards conflict, nor had had any involvementin the crisis. One underlined the point that it was only after the issue first erupted in1993 that the organisation and the Jewish community in Greece voiced their positionagainst the inclusion of religion on ID cards.19 The same person also referred to theSecond World War, when the inclusion of religion on ID cards during Greece’sGerman occupation ‘was an element that brought destruction’ because Greece was thecountry with the third-largest percentage of Holocaust victims (Interview, 13 July2004). This point was echoed by the second Jewish representative, who noted that theinclusion of religion on ID cards would have been acceptable if we lived in ‘a society ofangels’, but given the events that took place in Greece during the Second World Warany reference to religion had to be removed from ID cards. The first representativenoted that ‘I am not ashamed of being Jewish but for someone to know that I am anatheist, Jewish or Muslim, is diminishing and undermining’ (Interview, 13 July 2004).Going beyond the wartime experience in Greece, this representative also noted thatthe policy of including religion on ID cards did not exist elsewhere in Europe.

In a similar tone, a representative of the Evangelical Church indicated that the IDcards issue was not included in points that Protestants had brought to the attention ofthe Greek government over the last few years, thus underlining the fact that the GreekProtestant communities did not want to draw attention to the issue. Unlike Catholic andJewish officials, then, who made public declarations as early as 1993 – 94, the Protestantcommunity has refrained from public statements regarding religion on ID cards (withthe exception of an article in the daily Eleftherotypia (24 June 2000)). Nonetheless, theProtestant representative thought that the risks of discrimination from the policy ofregistering religious affiliation on ID cards were greater in Greece given the ignoranceand lack of education in tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities; and alsoconsidered the removal of religion from ID cards as a step in the right direction because itstrengthened equal rights. The OCG’s insistence that a state document indicative ofGreek citizenship should also include religious affiliation was in fact indicative of its owninsecurity. Lastly, the Protestant representative deeply regretted that the OCG hadreduced itself to relying on state support for its survival, seeing this as a fundamentallydifferent perspective from that of Protestantism, where ‘the relationship with the churchis different from a relationship with the state’ (Interview, 29 July 2004).

A representative of the Catholic Church endorsed a similar negative opiniontowards religion on ID cards. Indeed, the Catholic Church has been easily the most


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vocal against religion on ID cards: it first voiced its position with several publicdeclarations in 1993,20 at a very early moment in the conflict – several years before itsfull eruption in 2000. The Catholic representative argued that ‘the state has to makesure it has good citizens, rather than good believers’ (Interview, 14 July 2004). Therepresentative believed that the optional inclusion of religion on ID cards was theworst possible option because it put citizens in a dilemma that could still pose risks,and also saw the OCG’s reaction to removal of religion from ID cards as a remnant ofa Byzantine mentality, where the church was a part of the state mechanism.

Jehovah’s Witnesses are different. They adopt a more neutral stance towards the IDcards issue. Despite, or perhaps because of, a long history of discrimination (through astrict application of the Greek law against proselytism), the Jehovah’s Witnessrepresentative expressed a rather subtle position: Jehovah’s Witnesses did not believethat religion had a place on ID cards, but they did not mind either way: ‘the basicprinciple that guides Jehovah’s Witnesses is the principle of neutrality, namely that wenever take a position in a question that does not concern us’ (Interview, 5 October2004). The representative said that they did not want to take a position, but alsoasserted that Jehovah’s Witnesses did aspire to make their identity known: ‘we do notmind if it shows that we are Jehovah’s Witnesses, regardless of whether this can leadto discrimination’ (Interview, 5 October 2004). This somewhat surprising positionmay well be due to aggressive persecution in Greece, which could have forcedJehovah’s Witnesses to keep a low public profile on the issue in order to avoid anyaccusations or involvement in the conflict, similar to the Jewish case. However,beyond the principle of not taking a position on state matters and abiding by statelaws, the Jehovah’s Witnesses representative argued that religious affiliation on IDcards did not really matter, nor did Jehovah’s Witnesses want to display their religionon an ID card (‘if we want to spread our religion we can do this with our own methodsspreading our beliefs door to door, on the streets . . .’ (Interview, 5 October 2004)).Denying an observation that Jehovah’s Witnesses seemed to have a contradictoryofficial (neutral) and unofficial (against religion on ID cards) position, the Jehovah’sWitness interviewee used more theological terms to explain that Jesus preached theprinciple of neutrality, which was also why they as Jehovah’s Witnesses did notparticipate in any form of dialogue with other faiths. However, the Jehovah’s Witnessesrepresentative also asserted that ‘we must obey God as a ruler, rather than man’, evenmore so in certain situations when Jehovah’s Witnesses are forced to follow God’s willwithout any room for compromise. This is why during the ID cards conflict Jehovah’sWitnesses did not voice a position, nor take any specific action, having abided all theseyears by the government decision to include religion on ID cards. ‘We are not interestedwhether religion is included or not on ID cards, but we do care that this will notconstitute a pretext for discrimination’ (Interview, 5 October 2004).

If Jehovah’s Witnesses say that they do not mind if religion is included on ID cards,they also indicate that they are directly concerned by a more general issue, namely self-determination and their wish to call themselves ‘Christian Jehovah’s Witnesses’. Theusage of the term ‘Christian’ is accepted by the Greek state but rejected by the OCG asdeceptive and misleading. As a result the OCG has brought the issue to the Council ofState. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses representative, this indicates that theOCG has a say not only on whether religion is to be included on ID cards but moreimportantly on the exact formulation of religious affiliation on the ID cards, namelythat ‘the Greek Church dictates what I will call myself’ (Interview, 5 October 2004).

The Muslim case is again different. A Member of Parliament from Thracerepresenting the Turkish minority in northern Greece was in principle against the


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registration of religious affiliation on ID cards because faith is a personal matter.However, the MP underlined the particular position of the Turkish minority in Greeceand the fact that according to the Treaty of Lausanne faith is the ‘connecting link’ forthe community. The MP indicated that, in addition to their Turkish name, communitymembers need to be able to identify themselves and prove that they belong to theofficially recognised minority in order to benefit from special rights, such as educationin special bilingual schools and legal and administrative privileges (for example, futureelection of the local mufti (who at the moment is appointed), and administration ofproperty). This is achieved through religious criteria, and if religion on ID cards isremoved, then, the MP suggested, an alternative measure to identify members of theTurkish minority had to be developed. Although there were initial indications that thelocal muftis of Kommotini and Xanthi (who are not elected by the local populationbut appointed by the Greek government) supported the registration of religion on IDcards and even signed petitions in the OCG’s 2000 referendum, the two muftis deniedthat they had done so (Avgi, 23 September 2000). According to the MP, two otherMPs representing Thrace in 2000 remained neutral and did not express a specificposition on the ID cards issue in the Greek parliament in interviews or publicstatements. The MP stated the belief that the ID cards issue was a great opportunityfor the Turkish minority in Northern Greece to remind Greek public opinion of itspresence and to ‘stress that we are here, present, we are not invisible’ (Interview, 6October 2004). In the long term, with the gradual replacement of old ID cards withnew ones, the MP argued, a solution would have to be found for the Turkish minorityin Thrace: possibly, special ID cards issued to the Greek Turkish minority. For theTurkish minority, then, in contrast to all other minorities, registering religiousaffiliation on ID cards seems to be seen as acting not only as an officialacknowledgment of the special status of the population, but more importantly as ameans of safeguarding minority rights.

Religious Freedom in Greece from a Non-Orthodox Perspective

Beyond the ID cards issue, the interviews generated further material on religiousfreedom in Greece. During the interviews, initial discussions on the ID cards becamean opportunity for interviewees to open up a conversation on the broader challengesof being a non-Orthodox Greek. These issues are also discussed in a rich body ofexisting literature on the Turkish minority of Thrace and immigrants in Greece (see,for example, www.kemo.gr, www.mmo.gr and www.migrantsingreece.org).

One of the Greek Jewish representatives underlined that ‘we are Greeks but differfrom the rest of Greeks only in terms of religion . . . we have been Greeks forthousands of years and even more Greek than the Greeks who came to this countrylater on’ (Interview, 13 July 2004). In response to a question on the identification ofHellenism and Greeks with Orthodoxy, this representative was clearly hesitant tomake any further comments (‘I do not have a reason to have an objection or a say onthat’) (Interview, 13 July 2004). Referring to the relations between the Greek Jewishcommunity and the OCG, the responses of both representatives of the Jewish minorityin Greece seemed (at least at the surface) more positive than those of the otherreligious minorities in Greece. One Jewish representative noted the efforts of the OCGto save Greek Jews during the Second World War and referred to the respect ofreligious freedom in the Greek Constitution; ‘the Jews of Greece have never had anyserious problems’ living in Greece (Interview, 13 July 2004). This representativedescribed the relations between the official Jewish representatives and the archbishop


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and the OCG as cordially formal (mostly during official state celebrations whichreligious minorities are invited to attend). However, the second Jewish representativewe interviewed did not hesitate to state that the greatest challenge for the GreekJewish community was to ‘resist assimilation to Orthodoxy’, noting that this wasparticularly difficult during national holidays, where there was an overall climatedominated by a ‘Christian Orthodox air’.

Given the more critical and outspoken responses of the other Greek religiousminority representatives, the relatively subdued responses of both Jewish representa-tives came initially as a surprise, but they may be consistent with a more generalattitude among Greek Jews of ‘keeping a low profile’ because of a broader concernthat any type of criticism regarding religious freedom in Greece could be interpretedas a criticism of the OCG and Greek identity.

Rather different are the Catholic and Protestant minorities in Greece. In both cases,officials are critical in their responses and use concrete examples and personalexperiences to support their arguments. A representative of the Evangelical Church ofGreece accepted the historic contribution of Orthodoxy in Greece, but rejected theOCG’s claim to ‘exclusivity’ and the historic assertion that Orthodoxy is the ‘nation’sark’: ‘we do not deny the historical contribution of Orthodoxy in Greece and its role.What we reject is exclusivity’ (Interview, 29 July 2004). Reversing the usualidentification between Greekness and Orthodoxy (Greek¼Orthodox), the represen-tative questioned what would happen if one were to read this equation in reverse,namely that Orthodoxy equals Greekness. The representative argued that if manypriests in the OCG would be eager to accept this equation, this would not beacceptable to other Orthodox churches. Using more theological terms, ‘if we had toreport to God, his first question would not be if I had served national interests, but if Ihad served the Gospel’ (Interview, 29 July 2004); the representative feared that thiswas a critical question that the OCG had put aside.

For the representative of the Evangelical Church of Greece whom we interviewedthere was more importantly a fundamental issue concerning Greek religious freedom.It concerned the Greek law on proselytism, which was not a religious issue but aquestion of democracy that had not always been taken seriously. ‘It is a fundamentalproblem that any political party, even the most extreme one, has the right to spread itsideas, but when it comes to religious issues, [the proselytism law] may be inactive but itexists’ (Interview, 29 July 2004). This comment is important given the OCG’s ongoingefforts, through its Synodical Committee on Sects, to curb blasphemous, heretical andsectarian movements in Greece.21 Beyond legislation on religious freedom, theProtestant representative also emphasised the importance of Greek ways of thinking,underlining that ‘when it comes to religious issues if you say that ‘‘I am a non-Orthodox Greek’’ it is as if they dislike you. These are experiences that we livethrough’ (Interview, 29 July 2004).

Behind the ID cards conflict lies the question of education; the Protestantrepresentative stated the belief that Greek society had to become multicultural andmore tolerant, and thought that there was a political and a social resistance amongGreek people that had to be dealt with through education. The Protestantrepresentative believed that the OCG had an important role in this: the need forthe archbishop to spread through his speeches a message of mutual respect, toleranceand understanding and to replace negative and defensive views by more positivestatements that could contribute to the free movement of ideas in Europe. TheProtestant representative also noted that the archbishop could be playing on popularfears that Greece would become absorbed in the European melting-pot and would lose


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its Orthodox identity. The OCG presents itself as the only entity struggling to preservethe Greek nation and identity, using this as a means to bring the flock back to theOCG. Commenting on Greek society, the Protestant representative distinguished tworeal but opposing trends: a strong secularisation of Greek society (accompanied bycorruption on political and social levels) alongside a religious conservative tendency.The representative thus observed a distancing from religion in practice but arapprochement with the OCG viewed as the custodian of the nation and Greekidentity (‘Orthodoxy, souvlaki and tzatziki’!). In this context the representative had anegative outlook towards the future, envisaging a status quo in church – state relationsalong with an effort on the part of the OCG to assert its power, including efforts toreactivate more energetically the existing proselytism laws and antisectarian activities(the representative also predicted an increase in court actions).

The representative of the Catholic Church in Greece whom we interviewed valuedthe authentic spiritual power of Orthodoxy as being able to make a great contributionto the spiritual void in Europe in the face of excessive secularisation. The Orthodoxchurches in Europe (particularly in Belgium, France and Italy) that were notconnected to the country of origin of their believers and were free of ethnic criteriaindicated a step in the right direction. Thus, in a more theological perspective, theCatholic representative envisioned the Orthodox faith as independent from any statesupport and as free from any identification with nationality or citizenship. In thissense, the Catholic representative advocated in the future the separation of church andstate, as beneficial for the OCG and as a precondition for any improvement inreligious freedom, noting finally that ‘the state has to make sure that it has goodcitizens, not good believers’ (Interview, 14 July 2004).

In a similar way to the Protestant representative, the Catholic representativespoke very openly on the problems of religious freedom in Greece. The representativestarted by pointing out that both the Greek state and the OCG designate all non-Orthodox faiths and denominations as ‘foreign religions’ (xena dogmata), thereforedifferentiating as foreign any Greek citizen who is not Orthodox. The representativereferred to the traditional visibility in the Greek countryside and small towns of theinstitutional ‘triptych of the policeman, the teacher and the priest’. If the OCG wasfearful of Europe, the representative regretted its defensive and ‘police measures’ tokeep people close to it, which had given rise to ‘anti-European’ attitudes22 inGreece. The Catholic representative emphasised the importance for the OCG of usingpositive means to give Greek people the opportunity to face more constructively whatcomes from Western Europe, rather than reacting out of fear. While acknowledgingthe role of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire, the representative alsobelieved that there was never a complete identification between Hellenism andOrthodoxy because ‘not all Greeks are Orthodox, nor all Orthodox are Greek’(Interview, 14 July 2004). This attitude leads to particular difficulties (which therepresentative illustrated with specific examples) and lack of equal rights for Catholicsand the Catholic Church in Greece, which are often overcome only through themediation of the courts. One interesting observation was the relation between theOCG’s wish to engage in dialogue with other faiths inside and outside Greece and itsstatus as a minority or majority church. The representative argued that as aconsequence of Greece’s EU membership and the minority status of the OCG in theEU, the OCG had to engage in dialogue with other churches and faiths. However, therepresentative regretted that a church that engages in some form of dialogue inBrussels is not interested or committed to doing the same within Greece’s nationalboundaries.


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The law against proselytism and its negative impact on the community was akey issue for the Jehovah’s Witnesses representative, who differentiated betweenGreek society and the Greek state, acknowledging the relative tolerance of the Greekpopulation towards Jehovah’s Witnesses as opposed to discrimination from the Greekstate and the OCG. The Jehovah’s Witnesses representative suggested that the linksbetween religion and state and the close relationship that exists between the OCG andthe state in Greece meant that state decisions had been influenced by the OCG, withnegative consequences for Jehovah’s Witnesses. However, ‘neutrality does not meanthat we do not claim our rights when they are being restricted’ (Interview, 5 October2004). After the first Jehovah’s Witnesses persecution cases were referred to theEuropean Court of Human Rights in the 1990s, therefore, there was an overallimprovement in the attitudes of the Greek state and the Greek legal environment (forexample, giving the option to Jehovah’s Witnesses to substitute community service formilitary duty, rather than face imprisonment). Compared to the Protestant andCatholic representatives we interviewed, then, the Jehovah’s Witness representativehad a relatively more positive outlook, seeing an overall improvement of religiousfreedom in Greece. At the same time, the representative’s optimism was curbed by arenewed awareness of a nationalist and religious turn in Greek society (trying to cometo terms with an increasing number of immigrants), whose direction the representativecould not predict.

One important question that the MP from Thrace raised was the simple issue ofstatistics, namely the need for more precise counting and estimation of the number ofMuslims in Greece (legal and illegal Muslim immigrants, as well as members of theTurkish minority). The MP thought this was important because the size of the Muslimminority in Greece was closely linked with their human rights and religious freedom,as illustrated by the controversy over the construction of a mosque in Athens. Beyondthe issue of statistics, the MP referred to general problems of religious freedom inGreece, using as an example the ongoing issue over the right of the Turkish minorityto elect a mufti as its official representative in Greece.23 This has been a sore point forthe Turkish minority in Thrace, which has contested appointment by the state anddemanded that the local community be responsible for the election. The MP alsonoted an ironic contrast in that the Greek state has allowed sharia law to apply to theTurkish minority in Northern Greece (behind whom lie Turkish Islamists) but has notauthorised the election of a local mufti.

However, according to the MP there are other more important problems that needto be addressed, notably the poor education levels of the Turkish minority. The MPstated the belief that poor command of the Greek language and high dropout rates24

from education contributed to the ‘ghettoisation’ of the community, and attributedthis situation partly to the Greek state’s indifference to these problems as a result of ageneral wish that the Turkish community should not set roots in Greece, on theassumption that if it is left uneducated it will eventually return to Turkey. (Theseongoing issues about education have led to the economic and social exclusion of theTurkish minority in Greece.) However, on a note of slight optimism the MPmentioned that in 2004 the Turkish minority elected one Muslim MP only as for thefirst time it also voted for Christian MPs. The MP viewed this as an indication of aneffort among the minority to escape from ghettoisation. There was a need for politicalwill to address these problems, but national interests, self-interest and the closerelations between church and state were severe obstacles to an improvement in thesituation. The MP also referred to a widely accepted view among Greek publicopinion regarding reciprocity and equal treatment: using Turkey’s general human


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rights violations25 as a justification for Greek policies towards the Turkish minority inNorthern Greece. In response to this argument, the MP noted that ‘if Greece says thatit is a democratic state that respects human rights, it cannot refer to the argument ofreciprocity in these issues’ (Interview, 6 October 2004). The MP was also critical of theOCG and its position of ‘power without responsibility’. At the end of the interview,the MP suggested the French model of separation of church and state as the bestsolution for Greece.

Cross-Cutting Themes

The key issues that have emerged from the study can be brought together in somegeneral reflections on pluralism and the relations between majorities and minorities inGreece and Europe. We highlight below five key themes that are relevant not only inGreece but in a European context.

The Issue of Self-Definition

How a minority group defines itself, in religious or ethnic terms, seems to be a point ofcontention between the Greek state, the OCG and religious minority in question. The‘war of names’26 (Christopoulos and Tsitselikis, 2004) in the Turkish/Muslim caseconcerns whether ethnic or religious criteria should be the defining characteristics of thishistoric minority. Each choice of appellation entails a specific set of assumptions. Usingreligious criteria (thus defining the community as a Muslim rather than a Turkishminority) has been historically viewed by the Greek state as a ‘safer’ option. It issupposed to protect national security and minimise the minority’s Turkish affiliationand thus neutralise the risks of political mobilisation by the local population orterritorial claims by Turkey. Thus it seems that there is a significant ideologicaldimension attached to the term ‘Turkish’ in Greece. In the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses,the issue of self-determination is about whether this minority group has the right to callitself Christian by adding this term to its name (‘Christian Jehovah’s Witnesses’).

In both cases the question of self-definition is a double issue: who has the power todecide what a religious or ethnic group can call itself and what are the implications ofthe choice of terms themselves? This is a question worth exploring more fully in aEuropean context, noting comparable debates between state/church and religiousminorities.

Criticising Religious Freedom

Criticising religious freedom in Greece is a sensitive point. Probably because of a longhistory of persecution in Greece both the Jewish and Jehovah’s Witness representa-tives we interviewed had relatively subdued and nuanced views on both the ID cardsconflict and religious freedom in Greece. Even if during the interviews the religiousrepresentatives were neutral (Jehovah’s Witnesses) or explicitly negative (Jewishcommunity) about religion on ID cards, their overall comments on religious freedomin Greece were comparatively low-key when compared to those of their Protestant,Catholic and Muslim counterparts. As a result of their specific historic experiences inGreece these two communities may have opted for keeping a generally ‘low publicprofile’ as part of coexisting in Greek society where the Orthodox faith is the norm. Inpractical terms this may mean speaking out and defending rights only when thesegroups are being directly harassed.


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It follows that representatives of minorities with a milder history of discriminationin Greece (Catholic, Protestant and Muslim/Turkish minorities) feel more comfor-table about voicing their criticism of the religious freedom situation. During theinterviews the Catholic, Protestant and Muslim representatives did so by citing avariety of concrete examples of the problems that they face in Greece. The samerepresentatives were also the most critical about the identification of Greek identitywith Orthodox identity, thus criticising the Orthodox claim to exclusivity in thisrespect. Rejecting the equation of Orthodoxy with Hellenism, they also advocated thebenefits of separating church and state in Greece.

Religious Tolerance and Social Attitudes

The existence of an official state church in Greece and its close relationship with the statedo not in themselves result in a lack of religious freedom. Apart from the virtualeradication of the Jewish Greek population during and after the Second World War27

there is no significant history of violent acts of discrimination against minorities.However, there are specific features of Greece’s religious and legislative profile thatcontribute to an ambivalent record on religious freedom. The law on proselytism, thefinancial dependence of the OCG on the Greek state and the clientelistic28 relationsbetween political milieux and members of the clergy have negative implications for thetreatment of religious and ethnic minorities and public attitudes towards them. Thehomogeneous character of Greek society and the historic definition of Greeks asOrthodox help sustain the association of Hellenism (a term often charged with ideologicaland nationalistic elements) with Orthodoxy. This predilection to identify the Greekterritory with the Orthodox faith also indicates an implicit hierarchy of religions, in whichthe Orthodox faith benefits from a special position in Greek public life relative to otherChristian and non-Christian faiths. This situation has negative consequences for religiousfreedom, resulting in implicit if not always explicit forms of discrimination. This situationcontributes to Greece’s mixed record on managing religious pluralism, in areas includingthe free exercise of religion (for example the construction of places of worship, such as amosque in Athens), equality before the law, and education.

In this context, it is important to distinguish between the legal treatment of minoritiesand social attitudes. Ignorance about immigration and about the status of Greece’sminorities both at popular and government level is part of the problem. This can lead toexplicit andmore subtle attitudes of intolerance towards both foreigners and establishedminority groups; the OCG has an indirect role in this, through its public discourse andinterventions in social or political issues involving minorities and immigrants in Greece.Many of the religious minority representatives we interviewed placed great emphasis notonly on legislation, but also on modification of social attitudes, linked to education(emphasising and encouraging religious and ethnic tolerance in school), as aprecondition for any improvement in the status of religious freedom in Greece. In theTurkish case the question of education relates to more basic problems, such ascommand of the Greek language and completion of the nine-year mandatory educationperiod as a means to better integration of the Turkish historic minority into Greeksociety. Beyond the Muslim/Turkish case, there is a broader issue of education,particularly the challenge of changing public attitudes, in order to develop a greatertolerance and openness towards religious and ethnic minority groups in Greek society.Viewing minorities as equals in a Greek plural society remains a challenge. At the sametime, ongoing socio-economic anxieties (including unemployment) in Greece negativelyaffect the process with as many steps backwards as forwards. The European Court of


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Human Rights may be one (the only?) way for religious minorities to achieve theresolution of specific conflicts or acts of discrimination in Greece.

Another related issue is one that specifically links the question of social attitudes tothe fluid relationship between majorities and minorities. For historical reasons thestatus of the Turkish minority in Greece is often compared to the position of theGreek minority in Turkey, essentially in Istanbul. It is not uncommon among certainmilieux to explain or justify Greek policies towards the Turkish minority in NorthernGreece on the basis of the treatment of the Greek minority in Turkey. This issue takesthe discussion towards a more general question: a minority can be a majority indifferent national situations and the nature of this relationship can in turn affect thetreatment of a particular minority group. More generally this means that the principleof reciprocity in the relationship between a majority and a minority can play asignificant role in justifying or even shaping specific policies and social attitudestowards certain minority groups. For example, it is not uncommon to hear argumentsthat the way Christian minorities are treated in countries with a Muslim majority canor should be taken into account in policies towards Muslim minorities, or vice versa.This suggests that how a majority treats minorities can be partly dependent on howthat minority, when in a majority position, treats its own minorities.

The Greek Orthodox Church’s Engagement in Tolerance and Interfaith Dialogue

The salient role of the OCG in Greek society can be an important factor in shapingsocial attitudes. The election of Archbishop Christodoulos in 1998 has certainlystrengthened the OCG’s visibility and involvement in public affairs, from politics tosocial issues and welfare. The OCG’s initiative in opening a representative office inBrussels in order to speak for Orthodoxy as a minority faith in the EU and toparticipate in the religious dialogue among European churches indicates its intentionto increase its visibility at the European level as well. However, the OCG benefits froma majority status in Greece, which has regrettably resulted in indifference, orunwillingness, towards developing a comprehensive and sincere interfaith dialoguewith Greece’s own minority faiths. Hence there is a discrepancy between the readinessof the OCG to engage in religious dialogue and its readiness to offer active support toreligious freedom for all faiths outside and inside Greece. When it is in a minorityposition (particularly in the EU, where Orthodoxy is a minority faith) the OCG ismore open, even advocating the rights of minority faiths and thus more willing toengage in dialogue. Within Greece, where the OCG is in a position of power (as a statechurch), it is much more reluctant to adopt the same attitude towards other minorityfaiths as it does in the European context and reverts to tactics that aim merely toconsolidate its position domestically. Furthermore, the belief that Greek Orthodoxy isthe only true faith (orthi doxa, which means correct opinion/doctrine) is hardly a goodstarting-point for interfaith dialogue both inside and outside Greek borders.29 Thisinconsistent and opportunistic attitude illustrates an unspoken hierarchy of religions,in which Orthodoxy as the true and authentic Christian faith is positioned at the top,with the OCG enjoying the privileges of a majority status in Greece.

Is there a Connection between Religion/Nation, Church-State Relations andReligious Freedom?

On the basis of the Greek example, a strong identification between religion andnational identity combined with close church-state relations may be preconditions for


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a mixed record on religious tolerance and freedom. Inversely, this would suggest that aseparation of church and state and a distinction between religion and nationalidentity, such as we find in France, might help create an environment with morefavourable conditions for religious minorities. The key question here is the effect of astrong religious identity and close church-state relations on the definition and practiceof religious freedom. The relationship between these two factors and tolerance ofminorities is not one of direct cause and effect. In the European context, France andEngland are useful case studies that seem to challenge these assumptions.

In the English case the Church of England is an established church, which is notfinancially dependent on the state but nevertheless enjoys a public role. At the sametime, English society is markedly multicultural with a variety of minority groups fromdiverse ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds. Each group enjoys a relatively highlevel of religious freedom and rights, especially considering the numbers of minoritiesinvolved, within an approach marked by pragmatism in the accommodation ofdiversity. The situation in England is not free of problems and challenges, as indicatedfor example by the Rushdie affair and the issue of whether the British state should fundMuslim schools. In France, the situation is very different. Here the principle of laicite(religious neutrality) has regulated church-state relations but has also relegated religionto the private sphere. As in the British case, French society has received a large numberof immigrants, and thus hosts important ethnic, racial and religious minorities,especiallyMuslims. The French integration model, strongly influenced by laicite and theconcept of assimilation, has been severely challenged, particularly byMuslim minoritiesand especially in the sphere of education. The recent legislation by the French state (withwide support from French public opinion) to prohibit by law ostentatious religioussymbols in state schools, which was designed essentially to address and resolve thewearing of the Islamic headscarf (hijab) by Muslim girls, is one example of policydealing with issues of religious freedom and tolerance.

The French and British examples illustrate that church-state relations, as well as thelinks between religious and national identity, are complex, and one of several factors thatcan shape the status of religious freedom and tolerance of minorities. Going back tothe Greek case, we can see that the eventual separation of church and state and theamendment or abolition of the law on proselytism may well offer a partial solution to thelarger problem. These legal measures would not guarantee an improvement in religiousfreedom to the extent that all faiths were free to coexist on equal terms in the Greekreligious landscape, but they would be steps in the right direction. They must becomplemented, however, by improvements in the management of immigrants (namelythe backlog of pending residence and work permit applications) and in education and themodification of social attitudes (through interreligious dialogue and interculturalexchanges) in which both state and church have a role. Managing pluralism andintegrating religious and ethnic minority groups (Greece’s historic minorities and recentimmigrant groups) requires a long-term investment in political, social and economicpolicies in which the education of future generations is a critical component.

Conclusions

The somewhat supportive stance on the inclusion of religious affiliation on ID cardsby the Turkish minority in Greece seems to weaken the argument that the inclusion ofreligious affiliation on ID cards increases the risk of discrimination for religiousminorities in Greece. In the Turkish/Muslim case the issue is about positive, ratherthan negative, discrimination towards an officially recognised minority. It is therefore


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more accurate to say that only some, but not all, Greek minorities are in favour ofremoving religion from ID cards. The specificity of the Turkish minority in Greece onthe ID cards issue also challenges an implicit assumption shared by otherGreek religiousminorities, namely that religious affiliation (particularly, affiliation to a minority faithwithin an Orthodox majority) must remain a private issue and thus does not belong onofficial documents. In broader terms, a key issue is that the public expression of religiousaffiliation by a minority faith, which is considered a private matter by a majority, seemsto be a point of debate both in Greece and in the broader European context, particularlywith the development and increased visibility of Islam in Europe.

Notes

1 Seven dailies were selected, including popular mainstream and elite national Greeknewspapers, reflecting a wide range of political and ideological orientations, from

conservative through centrist to leftist (socialist and communist). Subsequently we selecteda sample of 216 opinion articles on a random basis from a larger number of opinion articles(392 articles), which we grouped according to newspaper and position on the inclusion of

religion on ID cards (positive, negative, pro-dialogue and neutral).2 The persons we interviewed include knowledgeable lay and religious (Orthodox and non-Orthodox) persons, such as journalists, intellectuals, academics, state officials and religious

leaders and clerics. In selecting the interviewees, we sought individuals from differentintellectual, academic, political, religious and news media milieux in Greece, covering a widerange of views, from conservative to liberal (regardless of their specific position on the ID

cards controversy).3 The very definition of what constitutes a minority in Greece is itself a point of contention.According to a definition adopted by the UN, a minority is a ‘dominant group of individualswho share certain national, ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which are different

from those of the majority population’ in a given state (Minority, n.d.). However, given thatthe Turkish Muslim minority in Thrace (by virtue of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty) hasan official status in Greece, there is a widely held view that any minority ‘must have a

recognized legal status’ accorded by the Greek government (Clogg, 2002).4 For example, the OCG is financed by the Ministry of National Education and ReligiousAffairs; and the archbishop of Athens is present during swearing-in ceremonies of new

cabinets and ministers and provides his blessing.5 Known religions include Orthodoxy, Old Calendarists, Roman Catholicism, Islam, Judaism,Jehovah’s Witnesses and Adventists. There is no formal mechanism or process for a religiousgroup to become recognised as a ‘known’ religion in Greece; this can usually be achieved

through approval of a permit to operate a place of worship.6 In 1938 General Metaxas introduced legislation prohibiting Catholics from converting anyGreek Orthodox citizens; this prohibition was widened by the Constitution so that all faiths

in Greece are now prohibited from converting citizens from any recognised religion(Salakhas, as cited by Frazee, 2002).

7 For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses who had distributed literature were arrested or

imprisoned in 1987 and 1993 after being accused of proselytism. Greece was subsequentlycondemned by the European Human Rights Court for violating their right to freedom ofconscience and religious expression (see www.cesnur.org).

8 Between 1991 and 2004, immigrants in Greece have increased dramatically, from 270,000 to1.15 million (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). Greece has one of the highest percentages of foreign-born people as a percentage of total population (10 per cent), higher than France and theUK (The Financial Times, 18 May 2006).

9 Because of the high numbers of Albanian immigrants, among EU countries Greece has thehighest percentage of non-EU nationals: just over 6 per cent of the total population (TheFinancial Times, 18 May 2006).


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10 Nikiforos Diamandouros, a leading Greek scholar, said in the 1980s that ‘the sensitivity

surrounding the issue of minorities in Greece is further indication that the process ofnational integration initiated over a century ago remains incomplete’ (Diamandouros, 1983,as quoted in Clogg, 2002, p. ix). Similarly, two younger Greek scholars have argued that‘Greece belongs to the category of countries that have left unresolved issues with the

traditional minorities within their borders’ (Christopoulos and Tsitselikis, n.d.).11 Greek Pomaks (estimated at 30,000) are Bulgarian-speaking Muslims who live in the

northern part of Greece, near the border with Bulgaria (Meinardus, 2002).

12 The Roma (or Gypsies) are Greek Pomaks (estimated between 5000 and 18,000) who live inthe northern part of Greece, near the border with Turkey (Meinardus, 2002).

13 In contrast to the 300 mosques operating in Western Thrace and despite the large numbers of

Muslims living in Athens, the city lacks an official mosque. The construction of mosques wasauthorised in the 1930s by law and after the authorisation of the local metropolitan and theMinistry for Education and Religious Affairs. Since then efforts to proceed to the construction

of the Athens mosque have been delayed. With the prospect of the 2004 Athens OlympicGames, the socialist government decided to authorise the construction of an Islamic culturalcentre and mosque in Peania (near Athens airport). Although the mosque would be financedby Saudi Arabia, Greek officials would oversee it. The OCG approved the plan for the

construction of a mosque, as a place of worship, but objected to the creation of a culturalcentre. The construction was also delayed because the conservative mayor of Peania,supported by the local bishop, argued that construction plans had not received proper

building permits. The local authorities also cited cultural issues and felt that having a minaretwould alter the traditional skyline of the town and, being near the airport, it would give amisleading impression to first-time visitors in Athens. Local residents erected a three-metre

cross at the highest point of the proposed location. Proposals to erect a mosque elsewhere inAthens are still pending. TheMuslim population in Athens is therefore still obliged to worshipin unofficial and unlicensed places of worship (The Times, 4 August 2003; The Economist, 22November 2003; New York Times, 26 July 2004; Le Monde, 9 August 2004).

14 In his detailed account of the exchange of these populations Bruce Clark writes: ‘Rarely inhistory has there been a proposal whose parenthood was so vehemently denied by all theinterested parties, even though each side had its own strong reasons for wanting it to be

accepted’ (Clark, 2006, p. 42).15 The widespread identification between national self-awareness and Orthodoxy in Greece was

expressed by a conservative (New Democracy) official who claimed that Catholics were

‘Greek according to law, but not according to consciousness’ (Katholiki, 14 September 1993,as cited by Frazee, 2002).

16 The voluntary or mandatory registration of religious affiliation distinguishes whether the law

can either require Greek citizens to declare their religion or give them the right to choosewhether they want to declare their religion on ID cards.

17 The privacy protection law (2472/1997) prohibited the inclusion of personal and sensitive data(including religion, occupation andmarital status) on state documents. The lawwas not applied

until 2000, at which time it enforced the controversial removal of religion from ID cards.18 Interview with the metropolitan of Piraeus, Kallinikos, 5 March 2004.19 Declarations criticising the registration of religion on ID cards by the KIS were published as

early as 1993 in the Greek dailies Eleftherotypia (18 January 1993 and 22 February 1994)and Vima (17 January 1993). The Jewish position was also expressed outside Greece, by theJewish communities in the US and Europe, followed by the Jewish community in Greece.

This is possibly why the OCG and other milieux accused American and other Jewishorganisations and groups of putting pressure on the Greek government to remove religiousaffiliation from ID cards.

20 See: Eleftherotypia, 18 January 1993, 24 April 1993, 6 August 1993, 23 February 1994,

22 September 1994, 13 May 2000; Vima, 17 January 1993.21 An indicative example is the OCG’s 2004 banning of a performance of Aristophanes in an

ancient theatre in the town of Serres, which was next to a church. In June 2005 the OCG’s


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Synodical Committee on Sects criticised (but did not request a ban on) a performance by the

rock group ‘Slipknot’ in Athens, as spreading songs with satanic and dangerous messages toGreek young people (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/4595257.stm).

22 The MP used as an example the difficult moments for Greek Catholics and the GreekCatholic Church during the pope’s visit in 2002, which was heavily criticised in Greece.

23 The Greek government retains and exercises the right to appoint muftis who, acting asreligious leaders and Islamic judges, have official functions in civil matters (e.g. marriage anddivorce, etc.); it insists that the state has to appoint an official mufti because of concerns that

a popular elected mufti would be susceptible to mobilising the local population, with the riskof political uprisings and territorial claims by Turkey. So the Greek government officiallyappoints one mufti, while the local community elects another who has no real administrative

duties (commonly called ‘pseudo-mufti’ by the Greek government but considered the realmufti by the local population).

24 He indicated that 88 per cent of children do not complete the nine-year mandatory

education, particularly girls who live in remote agricultural areas with limited access to theupper schools available in the area.

25 There are also specific claims among Greek milieux, including the OCG, the EcumenicalPatriarchate in Istanbul and the Greek minority in Turkey, that the Greek communities in

Turkey are being suppressed as a result of Turkish policies against them. For more on thispoint, see for example HRW (1992).

26 That is, whether the group in question should be called a Muslim or a Turkish minority.

27 It is estimated that approximately half of the Greek Jewish population that survived theSecond World War left Greece in the decade following the war to migrate primarily toPalestine (Bowman, 2002, pp. 77 – 78).

28 Often reminding political figures that the OCG can still count on the support of millionsamong the population, the current archbishop seems still to have the power to mobilise orinfluence Greek voters against or in favour of government policy, thus exerting politicalpressure (directly or indirectly) on politicians.

29 According to Epifanios Oikonomou, the former press attache of Archbishop Christodoulos,‘Orthodoxy brings something pure and authentic in Europe as far as cultural and religiousheritage . . . we are something more authentic in comparison to what Europe is going

through, which is de-christianised and de-spiritualised’ (Interview, 3 March 2004).

References

(a) Books and Articles

Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2004) Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece: an Analytic Study ofAvailable Data and Recommendations for Conformity with European Union Standards

(Athens, Mediterranean Migration Observatory, Panteion University).Bowman, S. (2002) ‘Jews’, in R. Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society

(London, Hurst and Co.), pp. 64 – 80.Christopoulos, D. and Tsitselikis, K. (2004) ‘Impasses of treatment regarding minorities and

homogeneis in Greece’, Jahrbucher fur Geschichte und Kultur Sudosteuropas, 5, pp. 81 – 93.Christopoulos, D. and Tsitselikis, K. (n.d.) Treatment of Minorities and Homogeneis in Greece:

Relics and Challenges, http://www.kemo.gr/archive/papers/ChristTsitse1.htm (accessed

19 March 2007).Clark, B. (2006) Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey

(London, Granta Books).

Clogg, R. (ed.) (2002)Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society (London, Hurst and Co.).Constitution (n.d.) Constitution of Greece, Fifth Revisionary Parliament of the Hellenes, Basic

Provisions, http://www.hri.org/MFA/syntagma/ (accessed 19 March 2007).

Diamandouros, N. (1983) ‘Greek political culture in transition: historical origins, evolution,current trends’, in R. Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 1980s (London, MacMillan).


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Frazee, C. (2002) ‘Catholics’, in R. Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society

(London, Hurst and Co.), pp. 24 – 47.Greek Helsinki (2002) Religious Freedom in Greece (Greek Helsinki Monitor and the Minority

Rights Group, Athens), http://www.greekhelsinki.gr (accessed 19 March 2007).HRW (1992) Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity: the Greeks of Turkey (Helsinki,

Human Rights Watch).HRWF (2005) Religious Intolerance and Discrimination – Greece: Categorisation of Religious

and Institutional Discrimination (Human Rights Without Frontiers, Brussels), http://

www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/2005PDF/greece_2005.pdf (accessed 19 March 2007).Iatrides, J. (2002) ‘Evangelicals’, in R. Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural

Society (London, Hurst and Co.), pp. 48 – 63.

Makrides, V. (2005) ‘Between normality and tension: assessing church-state relations inGreece in thelight of the identity cards crisis’, in V.Makrides (ed.),Religion, Staat und Konfliktkonstellationenim Orthodoxen Ost-und Sudosteuropa (Frankfurt, Peter Lang), pp. 137 – 78.

Makrides, V. and Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2004) ‘Orthodoxy in Greece today: anintroduction’, Social Compass, 51, 4, pp. 459 – 70.

Meinardus, R. (2002) ‘Muslims: Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies’, in R. Clogg (ed.), Minorities inGreece: Aspects of a Plural Society (London, Hurst and Co.), pp. 81 – 93.

Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2003) ‘Identity crisis: Greece, Orthodoxy and the European Union’,Journal of Contemporary Religion, 18, 3, pp. 291 – 315.

Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2007) ‘The Greek ID cards controversy: a case study on religion and

national identity in a changing European Union’, Journal of Contemporary Religion, 22, 2,pp. 187 – 203.

Minority (n.d.) Minority Rights (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights, Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev. 1)), http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs18. htm#N_16 (accessed 19 March 2007).

US Department of State (2004) International Religious Freedom Report: Greece, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35458.htm (accessed 19 March 2007).

Ware, K. (2002) ‘Old Calendarists’, in R. Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a PluralSociety (London, Hurst and Co.), pp. 1 – 23.

(b) Newspaper Articles

Associated Press Worldstream, ‘Albanian student abandons honor guard after protest at Greekschool’, 22 October 2003.

Avgi, 23 September 2000.Eleftherotypia, 18 January 1993, 24 April 1993, 6 August 1993, 22 February 1994, 23 February

1994, 13 May 2000, 24 June 2000.

Financial Times, ‘The price of prosperity: why fortress Europe needs to lower the drawbridge’,18 May 2006.

Le Monde, ‘Musulman, c’est possible, mais dur’, 9 August 2004.

New York Times, ‘Stepped-up police activity irks an Arab area in Greece’, 26 July 2004.The Economist (US Edition), ‘Minus a minaret’, 22 November 2003.The Times (London), ‘Athenians fight plans for mosque’, 4 August 2003.

Vima, 17 January 1993.

(c) Web References (all accessed 19 March 2007)

Research Centre for Minority Groups, http://www.kemo.gr/en/Mediterranean Migration Observatory, http://www.mmo.gr

Greek Helsinki Monitor and the Minority Rights Group, http://www.greekhelsinki.grCenter for Studies on New Religions, www.cesnur.orghttp://www.migrantsingreece.org


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