European Journal of Political Rcwarch 14: SS7-605 ( IOSh) @ Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Dordrecht - Printcd in the Netherlands

National identity and political violence in the Basque country

Gurutz JAUREGUI University of the Basque Country, San Sebastian, Spain

Abstract. The phenomenon of ETA derives from the interaction of two factors: Basque national- ism and Francoism. The fundamental elements of ETA, both ideological and strategical-political, were already well defined and developed in the Basque nationalism of the pre-war period, particularly in its intransigent and radical sector represented by Aberri and Jagi-Jug; groups. Later, ETA acquired characteristics of its own which separated it from the traditional nationalism. The regime of terror and repression imposed by Francoism exerted a fundamental influence on this state of affairs, inclining ETA definitively towards extremely radical and intransigent pos- tures. In this way the activism of ETA arose. This activism should be understood as the sublima- tion of praxis to the detriment of theory, and the structure of ETA as an armed group and the adoption of a third world, anticolonialist-style guerrilla strategy.

1. The origins and birth of ETA

The phenomenon of ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna - Basque country and Freedom) is the result of the interaction of two factors: on the one hand traditional Basque nationalist ideology and, on the other, Francoism. Before the rise and later evolution of ETA can be clearly understood, these two factors must be taken into consideration: a Basque nationalism whose funda- mental ideology is based on the perception of the Basque country as an occupied country, and a Spanish policy, Francoism that makes such an occupa- tion a reality.

In order to understand the relation between the Spanish state and the Basque country during the last two centuries two very important aspects must be taken into account. First, the Basque country has maintained throughout history an extraordinarily peculiar and different personality thanks to its own language, culture, customs and institutions. Second, contrary to what oc- curred in other European states, the formation of the Spanish state turned out to be tardy and deficient; the degree of integration necessary for the establish- ment of an authentic modern national state was not attained.

Relations between the Spanish state and the Basque country throughout the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, but particularly in the last third of the XIXth century and throughout the XXth century, acquired the characteristic of a ‘smouldering war’ - not in the sense of a direct confrontation between both An earlier version of this paper was presented at the XIIIth World Congress of Political Science. Paris, July 1985.

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entities but in the sense of the expression of a permanent situation of mistrust and conflict in general. This ‘smouldering war’ has resulted in sporadic open conflicts of a violent nature, the most expressive of which were the two Carlist wars of the last century and the civil war of 1936 (It is not the author’s intention to suggest that these wars were ones of conflict between the Spanish state and the Basque country, but simply that the positions adopted by the different Basque political forces were directly conditioned by the peculiar conflictual situation existing between the state and the Basque country).

At the end of the XIXth century and even when the Basque country had been formally integrated into the legal and political structure of the Spanish state, it appears evident that amongst the Basques, or at least amongst a great part of the Basque population, there was a total lack of Spanish national conscience and sentiment. On the contrary, what was generated was a Basque national conscience and sentiment antagonistic to the nation and the Spanish national state, which were synonymous with Spanish legal and political uni- fication.

From 1876 when the Spanish unification signified the loss of the ‘Fueros’, that is the traditional politico-institutional system peculiar to the Basque country, a process of demands was initiated, giving rise to the birth of the nationalist movement. The loss of the ‘Fueros’ coincided with the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and this coincidence was to play an extremely important rule in the later development and evolution of Basque nationalism.

As a consequence of the loss of the ‘Fueros’ and the development of the Industrial Revolution, the dominant groups of the precapitalist Basque society lost the politico-juridical instrument which had allowed them to maintain their hegemony in the field of social, economic and political relations. From the time of its origins, Basque nationalism was conditioned - both in its ideology and its political strategy - by this twofold frustration. One of its most notable consequences, contrary to the case of Catalan nationalism, was the rejection of and the radical contrast between what is Spanish and what is Basque. The rejection of Spain and all things Spanish also led to a rejection of the new industrial society ands its politico-juridical structures as being destructive of everything that was essentially Basque.

The driving force behind the nationalist arguments of Sabino Arana. the founder of Basque nationalism, was founded on the idea that the Basque country is occupied by a foreing state. This idea of being an occupied state was further accentuated by the outlawing and prohibition of the Basque language. the progressive replacement of the autochthonous body of civil servants, and the flood of immigrant workers seeking employment in the new industries. As a consequence, the only valid Basque policy was that of the expulsion of the ‘occupier‘, the rejection of all that is Spanish and the maintenance in its purest form of all that is Basque. In this way, a centripetal nationalism was formed.

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purist in its racial and linguistic aspects, and also theocratic and rural. This nationalism was an expression not only of what was essentially Basque, but also of its ancestral customs and its religious tradition in the face of the new industrial society. This gave rise to a consequence of prime importance in the field of political strategy: the renunciation of any political activity within a Spanish setting and the constitution of a Basque political force whose funda- mental objective would be the achievement of Basque independence by means of the expulsion of the Spanish ‘occupier’.

Initially Basque nationalism fed off social sectors of the old regime but gradually its sphere of influence extended to sectors of the lower and middle bourgeoisie and even to the shipping sector, a free trade exporting group of the upper bourgeoisie. The influence of the bourgeoisie made it possible for Basque nationalism to initiate a more practical and compliant policy with respect to the Spanish state. However, this policy encountered strong opposi- tion in an intransigent nationalism which strove to maintain its ideological legitimacy. From this moment onwards, Basque nationalism found itself in a permanent state of contradiction between on the onehand a practical strategy which had ceased to uphold the idea of the necessary compatibility between the recovery of the Basque national identity and independence and which attempted to overcome Basque-Spanish antagonism, and on the other ide- ological bases which defended a radical and intransigent nationalism. This lack of definition and ambiguity lasting up to the Civil War. Clear examples of this ambiguity and contradiction can be found in the radical divisions of ‘Aberri’ in 1921 and the indiscipline of ‘Jagi-Jagi’ in 1931.

In 1936, when the civil war was raging and in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust between the Basque nationalist and the republican governments, a statute of autonomy for the Basque country was promulgated, but the war and the consequent Francoist victory caused its application to be ineffective. In the immediate post-war period Basque nationalism began to act politically within a two-sided framework: on the one hand, faithfulness towards the legitimacy of the Republic, and on the other the firm conviction - shared by the rest of the republican forces - that the defeat of the Axis powers would automatically signify the fall of the Franco regime and the restoration of republican legality and, consequently, the statute of autonomy.

In the years following the war, the Basque language and culture weat through the most critical period in their history. Although these two elements ‘did not lose the war’ as it were, the political group - that is the Basque nationalist party - that upheld them, did and, as a result of defeat, so did the entire cultural movement behind the party. The linguistic and cultural repres- sion was ferocious. The Basque language, both written and spoken, was prohibited in public and in private, and its use punished even in the environ- ment of the family. All folklore or cultural demonstrations (dancing, music,

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literature, etc.), however insignificant, were suppressed. In short, any identity with anything other than the Spanish language was denied.

In the 1950s there were profound transformations in the social and economic field which, as far as the Basque country is concerned, signified the relaunch- ing of an industrial development of great importance which would affect the Basque social structure and determine to a great extent the appearance of a modern anti-Francoist political opposition, and thus of a new nationalism far removed from the classical Republican opposition.

From the point of view of the social structure, further industrial expansion gave rise to waves of immigration which provoked an extraordinary accelera- tion in the population growth rate (See Tables 1 and 2). Thus began a process of demographic concentration around the industrial centres which generated a cultural mix in the major Basque cities, as well as a demographic pressure and a truly alarming occupation of land for urban development.

Immigration played an important role in the generation of political tensions. The immigrants were fundamentally peasants coming from the depressed areas of the rest of Spain. This factor was responsible for the creation of a proletarian mass which was concentrated in the industrial belts of the cities and which gave rise to serious social problems caused by a deficient town-planning infrastructure and inadequate services. All this seriously hindered the integra- tion of the immigrants who were concentrated in population ghettos isolated from the native Basque population. Furthermore, the debased situation of the Basque culture and language led Basques to reject all that represented, in one way or another, the dominant Castilian culture: inevitably, this produced anti- immigrant sentiments. This feeling of being cornered, as it were, increased considerably with the str.ategic settlement within the four Basque provinces of an immigrant elite (civil servants, teachers, judges, the military, police, etc.) which acted objectively as an agent of the linguistic, cultural and national centre.

During the first few years of the post-war period, Basque resistance to Francoism centred around the old nationalist militants who had lived through

Table 1. Demographic evolution in the Basque-Spanish provinces (190&1975).

Province 1900 1930 1940 I950 1960 1970 1975

Alava 96385 104176 112876 I18012 138934 204323 237473 Vizcaya 311361 485205 511135 569188 754383 1043310 1151680 Guipuzcoa 195850 302329 331753 374040 478337 631003 683400 N a v a r r a 307669 345883 3696 I8 382932 402042 464867 483687

Total 91 1265 1237593 1325382 1444172 1773696 2343503 2556420

Source: Jauregui (1981: 64).

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Table 2. Total incrcase. natural increase, and net migration in the Basque-Spanish provinces (19O~l975).

Alava Vizcaya Guipuzcoa Nasarra

Total Natural Net Total Natural Net migr. Total Natural Net Total Natural Net incr. incr. migr. incr. incr. incr. incr. migr. incr. incr. migr

1900- 1930 7791 29500 -21709 173844 141515 t 3’2329 106479 79415 t27063 38214 97840 -F9266 193&

19% 1960 20902 13848 t 7054 185195 81378 b103817 104297 55552 4 8 7 4 5 19110 20066 - 956 196k

1950 13836 14985 - 1149 83983 66340 t 17643 71711 51170 t20541 37019 59185 -18136

1975 9411s 37007 t57108 395454 200481 ti94973 2nnio9 130854 t m s 83551 86708 - 3157

Source: Jauregui (1981: 67).

the war. In 1951 this resistance became somewhat diluted as the hopes for a return to the Republican situation began to crumble with the western world progressively withdrawing its support for the anti-Francoist opposition: Fran- CO’S regime began to consolidate itself further by gaining international recogni- tion (member of the World Health Organization (1951), UNESCO (1952), UNO (1955), the bilateral treaty between Spain and the U.S.A. (1953). The failure of the strategy of the Republican opposition became evident and, from this moment on, a new generation took over from the old. This substitution was caused by a split which manifested itself most clearly in the heart of basque nationalism.

In 1952 a group of young university students, all from bourgeois or lower bourgeois families where nationalist sentiments were predominant, began to hold periodical meetings with a view to studying the history and culture of the Basque people. They published a clandestine and strictly educational bulletin under the name of EKIN (meaning ‘to do’). Their study of Basque history and reality uncovered for them an unknown world which terrorism under Franco had relegated to the category of a non-existent reality. Thus, in their readings, they discovered Basque nationalism and anti-Francoist resistance. Their for- mative period was relatively long and intense, although in 1953 they did initiate a more outward-looking policy.

Gradually they established links with the old leaders in exile who attempted to steer them in the direction of the youth organization of the Basque national- ist party (EGI), the only group which still maintained a certain, though very reduced, clandestine political activity. Differences very soon began to emerge between EKIN and EGI. EKIN, a group which had been formed autono- mously, was not subject to the discipline of any organization and had a

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relatively high level of cultural awareness. This made them difficult to control. In 1956 the two organisations were merged under the direction of the Basque nationalist party. However, its attempts to impose its control and various political objectives failed to satisfy the young members of EKIN. Thus, in 1958 a definitive split took place between EKIN and the Basque nationalist party (PNV). It was at this time that EKIN, which had attracted the majority of the EGI militants, began to consider the possibility of forming a political organiza- tion. This marks, in 1959, the birth of ETA, formed as a nationalist resistance movement.

Their brief experience in EGI had given the young militants a disheartening impression of the reality of the historic Basque nationalism. This contrasted with their idealization of Basque nationalism during the first years of their formation. The tameness and blind faith of EGI members with regard to the PNV, the lack of any plan for establishing specific objectives, the total depen- dence upon the party for political decision-making, and the paralysis of its own policy-making which was more and more removed from the realities of twenty long years of francoism, collided head-on with the mentality of the members of EKIN who had been accustomed, in their formative years, to reasoning in a search for an answer to all questions.

The situation that arose was not one of an ideological split; neither was it a dispute over nationalist orthdoxy. or a struggle for power. I t was simply a question of a younger generation taking over. The spectre of the Civil War was left behind and, from this moment onwards, the new generations began to play a leading political role.

2. The ideological evolution of ETA

The change in generation that took place at the base of Basque nationalism has specific characteristics derived from the fact that EKIN did not stem from the political activity of any of the tendencies of historic nationalism. EKIN, and later ETA, were to rediscover historic nationalism in all its aspects and, in their readings, they saw constant mention of Sabino Arana and the evolution of his thoughts, of moderates and intransigents, 'communionists' and 'Aberri' sympathizers, those in favour of the statute of gutonomy, and 'Jagi-Jagis'. They had no preconceived idea as to which of these tendencies legitimately represented Basque nationalism. However, without hesitation, ETA opted for intransigent Basque nationalism, thus becoming the direct inheritor of the earlier 'Aberri' and 'Jagi-Jagi' groups.

This choice is logical if we take into account the Basque reality of the post- war period. The failure of the PNV's policy during the Second Republic; the mutual mistrust between the nationalists and the Spanish republican rigime;

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lack of support from the western powers during the post-war period; the sensation of annihilation of Basque identity produced by the progressive and alarming disappearance of the Basque language and culture; the enormous contingents of immigrants and the consequent profound social and economic changes; and, hovering above all this, the everpresent Francoist repression which stamped out the least significant demonstration against the regime - all these factors not only inclined ETA towards intransigent nationalism, but on many occasions simply confirmed their theories.

The three year period from the official birth of ETA to the holding of their first Assembly in 1962 can be defined ideologically as the continuation of the job of forming and developing nationalist doctrine, thus giving rise to a rediscovery and recovery of the original Sabinian nationalism. In the strate- gical-political sphere it can be defined as a firm rejection of the PNV’s political passivity and sterility, a passivity which, in ETA’s eyes, appeared to be related to the legitimacy of the Republic and against which ETA proposed strict activism and a break with everything that originated from the ‘oppressor country’.

If we look at its ideological evolution we can see that the adoption by ETA of the doctrine of classic nationalism covered several important aspects: firstly, what may be called regeneration in the sense of what is essentially Basque (that is the recovery of the Basque spirit) and in an inward-looking sense (that is the rejection of all that is Spanish); secondly, the assumption of the Basque historical myths (the Basque people as a noble, just, democratic, freedom- loving people has reached this state of degradation as a consequence of the submission to and occupation by a reactionary, feudal country - Spain); thirdly, the consideration of the immigrants as foreigners; fourthly, a visceral anti-communism in opposition to a doctrine that is radically incompatible with what is peculiarly Basque; and finally, various socio-economic concepts based on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, through the encyclicals of Leo XI11 and Pius XI.

However, at this early stage, ETA had two important contributions of its own to offer, which conflict with the historic nationalism. They were, on the one hand, non-confessionalism - a particularly important aspect considering the omnipresence of the Catholic Church in the Basque country - and, on the other, the rejection of the race as a biological-genetic element and its substi- tution by the ethnos, a linguistic-cultural element, as a sign of identity.

ETA’s first assembly represented a change from the historic nationalism to the new nationalism created by the new organization. ETA’s Declaration of Principles was intended to constitute the ideological body capable of giving cohesion to the new organization. However, this Declaration was still-born. Rather than being a programme, it constituted a recapitulation, an account of the activities carried out until that time. To the peculiar contradictions of the

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historic nationalism can be added the new sociological, political and economic reality of the Basque country of 1960. In this Declaration there are two conditioning factors: the archaism of the traditional nationalist ideology and the gap produced by a quarter - century of inactivity and ideological empti- ness. For ETA the Arana school of thought did not hold the solution to the Basque problems, thus making it essential to resort to other ideological sources.

The challenge that ETA faced after its first assembly revolved round three important questions: the search for a theory-capable of giving solid backing to the Basque people's national demands; the adaptation of Basque nationalism to the socio-economic realities of the country; the putting into practice of a political strategy of national liberation. The reply to these three questions was supplied by Federico Krutvig, a Basque intellectual of German origin, in his work published in 1963 entitled 'Vasconia'. The influence of this work was to be decisive, as we shall see, in the later evolution of ETA. Suffice it to say for the moment that in his work there are such important elements as: the need for an urban nationalism in accordancc with the socio-economic transformation; the need for the various intellectual elites to be well-disposed towards na- tionalism; the need for nationalism to appear as a dynamic force with a clear vision of the future; the need for the nationalist ideology to take the same direction as progressive and revolutionary currents.

Krutvig's theses were to find great acceptance amongst the young militants of ETA in these as well as his views on political strategy and organization. Krutvig was well-informed on thc subject of European nationalism and he provided ETA with the doctrinal constructions of German nationalism as well as the new ethnic and federalist currents prevailing in Western Europe. In this way, ethnos substituted for race, the language was established as an essential factor of the Basque ethnos, and the division of the nation into a political nation and an ethnic nation was established: in short, the nation becomes an ethnos with a conscience.

As a consequence of the stabilization plan of 1959, Spain underwent a profound economic crisis: large-scale strikes and social conflicts produced a resurgence of the worker movement and the radicalization of the political struggle against Francoism. Social conflict was particularly intense in the Basque country because of the extent of its industrial development. Initially, the worker question was totally removed from the preoccupations and the specific struggle of ETA. However, the development of this labour conflict began to produce a change of attitude at its base, which was particularly manifest after an important strike which took place throughout the Basque country in 1963.

From the very beginning ETA was conscious of the importance of the struggle of the workers as a reply to Francoism. ETA was not so much

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interested in the objective situation of the working class as in the inherent possibilities of radicalizing its anti-regime stance. But at the same time, the conflicts of the workers aroused the awareness of ETA’S militants. In this way, from 1963 onwards some of these militants began to be active in some of the most important strikes of the time. This is to have important consequences because it generated a certain understanding of the problems of the working class. This caused some changes in ETA thinking, including the appearance of a new terminology with such concepts as bourgeoisie, working class, class war, objective conditions for revolution, a stress upon the need to create a direct link between the Basque national fight for liberation and the demands of the working class, and the establishment of a distinction between middle-class nationalism and nationalism of the people.

Apparently, we have here all the conditions necessary for ETA gradually to identify itself wit other political or revolutionary trade union organizations fighting against Francoism, and, in fact, to become a classic revolutionary option in Western Europe. However, this was not the case and ETA began to evolve in a way that, on first examination, appears to be abnormal and illogical but which, in practice, turns out to be quite coherent if one bears in mind the two factors responsible for the creation of the phenomenon of ETA in the first place: nationalist ideology and Francoism.

In the 1960’s, ETA considered the need to establish valid formulae with respect to the organization of its activity and the achievement of its objectives. To this end, they set out two alternative nationalist models: that of the European ethnic minorities and that of emergent third-world nationalism. The ethnic minorities expound their political strategy from the point of view of the transformation, reorganization and remodeling of the European national states towards a people’s federal Europe. Third-world nationalism bases the whole of its strategy on a radical and absolute antagonism between the metropolis and the colony so that the solution to the conflict is necessarily the expulsion of the colonizer and the immediate substitution, by means of vio- lence, of the old colonial power by a new autochthonous power.

For a while ETA maintained a certain ambiguity with respect to the political model to be followed but all the facts favoured a definitive leaning towards the third-world model. The most intransigent factions of the nationalism of the pre-war period had already established an identification between the Basque country as an occupied or colonized country and Spain as the colonizing and occupying metropolis. ETA insisted on this identification from the moment of its origin. Once again it was Krutvig who finally tipped the balance towards the adoption of the third world model for it was his opinion that in the Basque people’s demands - fundamentally the attainment of national independence - negotiation and a political solution are neither viable nor practical since throughout history it has been demonstrated that all national struggles for

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independence have without exception always gone through a process of vio- lence and armed conflict.

Krutvig not only opted for the third-world model but in fact went much further than this to advocate the initiation of an authentic revolutionary war after the image and likeness of those that were being waged in Algeria, Cuba or Vietnam. He justified the need for armed conflict in the Basque country on the belief that all political solutions and all possibilities of dialogue had been exhausted.

From this moment ETA was to echo the theses of Krutvig. It is quite evident that in Krutvig’s work there exists a contradictory desire to associate the spirit and methods of conflict of third world countries with the situation of the Basque country - a country totally immersed in the European framework. Nevertheless, Krutvig’s work amalgamated and gave cohesion to the ideologi- cal dispersion that existed in ETA and created an ideological framework within which ETA could find an apparently satisfactory and scientific solution to its doubts and irresolutions. It must not be forgotten that Francoism virtually converted ETA’s colonial mirage into reality. The descriptions by theoreticians of anticolonialism such as Franz Fanon or Albert Memmi were perfectly applicable in many respects to the situation on the Basque country.

The violent Francoist repression that took place after the strike of October 1963 plus a previous wave of repression in 1961, when the militants of ETA were no more than a simple ideological pressure group and not an armed band, merely seemed to confirm the validity of the third-world theses. In ETA’s third Assembly in the spring of 1963, the implementation of a plan for revolu- tionary war, which appears in a pamphlet entitled ‘Insurrection in the Basque Country’ and which constitutes a manual for guerrilla warfare, was approved.

Surprising as it may seem, this third world strategy turned out to be effec- tive, in view of the peculiar situation of the Basque country. ETA insists on the need for the people’s support in its fight and, following the classical plan of action/repression upheld by theoreticians of revolutionary war, it established a strategy of constant attack against and pursuit of the oppressor in order that the latter should lose control of the situation and act indiscriminately against the people. Francoism was to fall time and again into this trap to the extent that it became the most effective promoter of Basque nationalism in the post-war period.

However, on the other hand, this same Francoism was the main obstacle to a correct interpretation of the specific coordinates in which Basque nationalism must be situated not as a third-world phenomenon but as one immersed in a highly developed and industrialized area with a conscious, combatant working class with its eyes on the Europe of the future. This is the beginning of ETA’s great drama, of the great contradiction which is still present at its base, and which was to be the final cause of all the divisions, differences and ruptures

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throughout its subsequent history: this great contradiction is the attempt to apply a third-world revolutionary strategy to a highly industrialized country.

In this contradiction we can once again see the two configurative constants of ETA: the Sabinian ideology on the one hand, and Francoism on the other. In opposition to a developed working class and a powerful worker movement there arose a brutal repression which sought to stamp out even the most insignificant expressions of Basque identity. Thus the Basque country identi- fied with other colonized countries as far as its war strategy and situation were concerned. Bearing in mind the view that the Basque country is occupied, a theory was developed to justify this occupation. Quite simply, to the anti- colonialist precedent that existed in the radical nationalism of the pre-war period one can add the general anti-colonialist feeling of the 1960’s. The reply is immediate: the Basque country is a Spanish colony.

When everything was prepared for the putting into practice of the theories of revolutionary war, contradictions begin to materialize in 1966. In the Vth Assembly the organization split into three clearly contrasting currents. The first current or group was formed by those militants who had participated in working class conflicts over the years, who were not at all convinced by the third-world revolutionary strategy, and who clearly preferred a reconciling of ETA and the revolutionary movements of the new European Left. Their strategy centred round the worker movement and the structuring of a revolu- tionary party capable of welding together the whole of the working class, and at the same time one that totally rejected any type of armed activity.

The second current, which was formed by the majority of the founders of ETA, constituted the most faithful representation of the intransigent national- ism of the pre-war period and favoured the sublimation along nationalist lines of the struggles between the social classes. This second group rejected ETA’S acceptance of revolutionary theories and Marxism, even in the case of a third- world heterodox Marxism. Nor did it accept the adoption of guerrilla warfare methods, but tended more towards an ethnic-style nationalism, which was, to a certain extent, closely related to the arguments of the European minority nationalities.

The third current, constituted by an extraordinarily heterogeneous ideologi- cal conglomerate, was a firm advocate of activism and armed conflict. Its members were united against occupation and advocated third world-style revolutionary means of attaining the liberation of the Basque country. The first two groups were expelled from the organization thus leaving the authority of the third group unchallenged.

After the Vth Assembly, ETA put into practice the tactics of action/ repression with considerable success. Their intense political and armed ac- tivity was cut short by the Francoist police only in 1969. This revolutionary praxis plus the efficacy of the Francoist repression obliged ETA to reconsider

the validity of the colonialist theses. After 1969 an extremely delicate situation was created because of the necessity to reconsider revolutionary strategy and also because of the police’s detention or exile of the majority of the leaders of the organization.

Confusion reigned, and the VIth Assembly was convoked. Here, in strictly ideological terms, four main currents came to light: communist cells formed by militants in exile who were of the opinion that nationalism in general and Basque nationalism in particular constitute a question that is completely detached from the interests of the working class; the leaders of ETA whose fundamental objective was the creation of a Basque working class party that would lead the revolution; the defenders of the anti-colonialist strategy whose theses we are already familiar with; and the ‘milis’, or the members of the military front, who were not particularly fond of theoretical digressions and who considered armed activity to be the driving force behind Basque resis- tence.

The situation created by these internal differences reached a head, and there was even talk of dissolving the organization. However, once again, Francoism came to the aid of ETA - involuntarily of course. The Burgos Trials began, and they were to focus the attention of the whole of the Basque population upon their perceived subordination and to clear the way for the crystallisation of some of the existent tendencies, in particular the anti-colonialist and the ‘mili’ factions. As has always happened throughout the history of ETA, the more extreme tendencies and those more directly linked with armed activity became more dominant, with the other tendencies being expelled. ETA had arrived at the definitive consolidation of a tendency which exalted the strategy of armed conflict to the point of converting it into an end in itself rather than a means of attaining political objectives.The anti-colonialist tendency has since served as nothing more than an instrument for providing minimum ideological support to the armed conflict and the actions of the activists of the organiza- tion.

To all inteals and purposes since 1970 ETA has been ideologically dead. Although doctrine has undoubtedly been weak throughout ETA’S history, as of 1970 all theoretical and doctrinal activity was paralysed. All discussions after 1970 have centred only around problems of strategy and political tactics; even so they have been of greater intensity than previous debates before this date. The great contradiction between a highly developed social and economic reality and a third world-style revolutionary strategy still exists.

In 1974, there was a further split which gave rise to the formation of two different factions: a military branch and a politico-military branch. The im- mediate cause of the split was ostensibly a difference of opinion on the most suitable strategy to employ, but underneath there was the underlying need to determine once and for all the role of the working class in the Basque

revolutionary process. While the politico-military branch favours a close relationship between the struggle of the masses and armed conflict, the military branch has isolated itself as a strictly clandestine group which advo- cates the self-organization of the masses independently of the armed organiza- tion. The problem is thus fundamentally one of political strategy and tactics faction. In both cases it is evident that the idea that the Basque country is under occupation is the motivatingforce as a valid formula for the liberation of the Basque country. Furthermore, in both factions there is a dissociation with the worker movement as well as a sublimation of the armed conflict as the only solution to the state of occupation of the Basque country.

3. Political strategy and organization

One of the most notable characteristics of ETA throughout its historical evolution has been the absolute priority given to the political praxis and especially to armed conflict over doctrine or theory. From the very beginning, ETA never considered the reasons why the Basque country should constitute an independent national state nor the reasons on which such an aspiration was founded. ETA is not preoccupied with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the right to self-determination but with the need to set in motion the appropriate machinery in order to give credibility to this demand at the earliest oppor- tunity.

If we leave to one side ETA’S first three years during which time the organization theoretically covered such heterogeneous fields as Basque his- tory, legal and political institutions, the Basque language and culture, the different political currents such as ‘fuerismo’, Carlism, Francoism, Falangism, Marxism, etc, democracy, human rights, the relationship between the church and the state, the nation or the state, i t can be clearly seen that from 1962 onwards ideological questions were exclusively subject to the search for a valid revolutionary model for the fulfilment of the ultimate objectives. To a certain extent, this absence of analysis could be partially justified by the omnipresent Francoist dictatorship whose solidity and brutality did not leave much room for an excess of scientific lubrication. However, there are other reasons for the absence of such theoretical analyses.

As a radical intransigent nationalist movement ETA has rejected any type of intervention in Spanish political activity. I t is the Basque people themselves who should rise up not only against Francoism but against the Spanish oc- cupier with the aim of regaining their national identity. ETA always defines itself as a movement of national liberation and not as a political party. Its activity is not exclusively political but fundamentally resistant; i t is a regenera- tive activity. This regeneration has led ETA to adopt an attitude of constant

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patriotic activism and to believe in the inevitable necessity for action which would lead to an immediate initiation of the reconstruction of the Basque nation.

Activism and violence are practically inevitable consequences of the config- uration of Basque nationalism, that is the consideration of the Basque country as an occupied country and the feeling of anguish caused by the disappearance of the Basque language and culture. I t is this which makes the atmosphere ripe for the adoption of violents means. In fact, in 1961, ETA’S perpetration of its first act of aggression, though without victims, provoked a disproportionate repression on the part of Franco. Violence came to be seen as the only valid form of response to Franco’s dictatorship. In spite of the existence of certain postures which defend - with very little conviction - the validity of Ghandi’s thesis of passive resistance, the need and the opportunity to use violent methods and, in particular, the need to initiate an armed resistence was absolutely clear from the very beginning.

With these facts in mind one must not be surprised at the ease with which ETA began to adopt the third world-style revolutionary model in 1963. Krut- vig’s ideas found a perfect culture medium amongst the young nationalist militants, all the more so if we take into account the fact that in his book ‘Vasconia’ the answer to many of their doubts and their irresolution can be found. Krutvig, who has a great knowledge not only of the classics of modern warfare like Clausewitz but also of such strategists of revolutionary warfare as Mao Tse Tung or Ho Chi Minh and of the professionals of counter guerrilla warfare, advocated for the Basque country the initiation of a revolutionary war through a combination of military strategy and ideology. He established the necessity of creating a type of urban guerrilla warfare together with a psychological conditioning of the masses and he put forward, as a basis for this strategy of guerrilla warfare, the establishment of a spiral of violence based on the principle of action/repression/action as well as the need to establish a parallel clandistine hierarchy which would act as a kind of revolutionary shadow cabinet.

This guerrilla strategy was etablished definitively in 1964 in the pamphlet entitled ‘Insurrection in the Basque Country’, which represents the putting into practice of the ideas expressed by Krutvig in ‘Vasconia’. The basic lines of this pamphlet can be summarised in the following way: the Basque country is a territory that is occupied by Spain and France; world opinion and international law have legalized this ‘right of conquest’; the only alternative left for the Basque people is resistance and a war of liberation; in the face of this ‘right of conquest’ all that remains to be done is to resort to arms.

Having established the legitimate basis for revolutionary war, the pamphlet goes on to expound the basic principles to be applied. They are: revolutionary guerrilla warfare as opposed to classic warfare; the importance of a combina-

60 1

tion of military and psychological-ideological action; and urban guerrilla warfare. Owing to a total lack of analysis of the Basque reality, the situation in the Basque country is likened to that of Algeria or Vietnam, and ETA, with its duplicating machine, half dozen guns and a hundred militants in exile, is identified with the Algerian or Vietnamese N.L.F. which had a whole army and all the people behind them. In this way, a mistaken comparison with the third world was made.

Amongst the many fantasies in the pamphlet, there are some aspects of enormous importance for the later development of ETA’s political strategy; for example, a genuine mysticism surrounding the guerrilla, a revolutionary messianism which virtually borders on delirium and a blind faith that armed violence is the only way of attaining the objectives sought after. This revolu- tionary illusion, very much in keeping with the feeling of anguish produced by the disappearance of the Basque people, acquired romantic, irrational and tragic connotations closely related to the idea of sacrifice and death as an indispensable condition for the achievement of the future happiness and resurgence of the Basque mother country.

In practice ‘Insurrection in the Basque Country’ proved to be useless although some of its ideas are valid, especially the principle of action/repres- sion/action and that of the National Front. The first of these principles, based on a dialectical spiral of violence, was to be applied in a fourfold escalation. First ETA carries out an act of provocation against the system. The state’s machinery of repression strikes back at the masses. In the face of repression, the masses react in two different but complementary ways - by panicking and rebelling ETA then counterattacks, thus gradually causing the masses to panic less and rebel more. Francoism was to become the foremost collaborator in this spiral of violence, making good all ETA’s visions.

The National Front is the political instrument needed for national libera- tion. Although it is an old idea pertaining to historical intransigent national- ism, its degree of acceptance can be appreciated when we consider the many national fronts which exist in colonized countries. The need for a national front can be seen to be a logical development if we take into account the ideology of radical and intransigent nationalism. The Basque people con- stitute a specific national community. This community finds itself subject to a regime of oppression and genocide. Consequently all patriotic forces must unite to attain national liberation and the recovery of their national identity. Independently of attempts to organize national fronts before the Civil War, ETA tried on several occasions, as in 1964, to create an effective National Liberation Front. In every case they met with failure because of the refusal of the Basque Nationalist Party to participate in the Front.

As a consequence of the divisions and conflicts that took place between 1965 and 1967, the armed activity of ETA turned out to be very sporadic during this

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period. Once the worker and ethnic tendencies were expelled and after the second part of the Vth Assembly, the whole strategic and organizing machine was set in motion, converting ETA into an armed guerrilla organization.

During the Vth Assembly, ETA decided to organize itself on four fronts: political, economic, military. and cultural. The Basque country had to adopt anti-colonialist guerrilla tactics, something which Krutvig clearly explains when he distinguishes between social revolutions and national revolutions. In the former only three fronts are necessary: political, economic and military. However, in revolutions of national liberation as is the case in the Basque country, a cultural front is necessary as given the specific linguistic-cultural and national nature of the Basque country with respect to its oppressors, it acts as supreme director of the other fronts.

In practice, the cultural and economic fronts have been of little relevance, at least from the point of view of strict organization. The cultural movement and the movement to resuscitate the Basque language and literature coincide with the time when ETA became extremely important, but, strictly speaking, one cannot talk in terms of a cultural front in ETA but of numerous groups of intellectuals who strongly sympathise with ETA’s actions and whose interests coincide to a certain extent as far as objectives and ends are concerned.

Thus, the structure of ETA was, in fact, reduced to two fronts: the political and military. In theory, after the Vth Assembly, the political front was to find itself in a situation where it had absolute priority over the military to the extent that the latter would become a kind of armed band subject to the strategy established by the political front. I n practice, however, it is quite clear that the military front has always exerted greater influence than the political. This is one of the key questions that must be taken into account when considering the evolution and later development of ETA activity, that is the absolute priority of praxis and activism over theory and doctrine.

In the ideological field we have already made reference to the great drama of ETA’s desire to apply a third-world-style guerrilla strategy to an indus- trialized society. In practice, the same drama continues to exist, as can be seen in the persisting controversies between the political and the military fronts. How can a revolutionary guerrilla strategy be carried out in conjunction with the actively participation of the masses? All the splits and divisions that have take place since 1970 up have revolved around this contradiction.

In an industrialized country like the Basque provinces, the masses are fundamentally composed of working class people. The question is what can be done to get the working class struggle t o run in parallel with the nationalist revolution? The economic front showed itself to be totally inadequate. It was necessary to establish connections between the working class and ETA, and for this purpose the economic front was substituted in 1968 by the workers’ front. But in practice this front was totally subordinated to the strategy and,

what is worse, the mentality of the militants of the military front. In fact, in the first split, which took place in 1966, there had been serious

problems with the militants who demanded that more attention be paid to the question of the worker movement. The result was of course the adoption of a third-world-style policy; those who advocated armed activity finally expelled the worker sector to become the leading force of the organization. In the 1970 split, history repeated itself. Those who control and dominate the organization after the various splits are the ‘milis’ - the hard military wing of the organiza- tion.

From 1970 to 1974, the worker sectors and the military sectors coexisted with great difficulty. Not even the attack against the President of the Government, Carrero Blanco - considered to be the most brilliant act of aggression by the military strategists of the organization - could prevent the worker front from splitting away from the organization in 1974, rejecting the use of arms, and instead considering the need to organize a workers’ party and a trade union whose activity will be tolerated and eventually, after Franco’s death, legal. In the same year, another and enduring split took place between the politico- military and the military wings.

At the present time, the politico-military wing, which has undergone a profound evolution in that the majority of its members have abandoned the armed fight to join the political struggle though the creation of a Basque left- wing political organization whose activity is completely democratic, is virtually non existent. The strictly military wing is still active and is organized like an authentic guerrilla army with much active experience and with an internal discipline and hierarchy that is typical of an army but with the advantage that there exists no political power to direct, moderate or organize it.

One may ask how an organization like ETA can survive in the face of the profound transformation that has taken place in Spain in the last few years and which has led to the formation of a democratic state comparable to those of other European states, and to a widely decentralized state of with a high degree of regional autonomy. The answer to this question is complex and cannot be considered in this paper. However, it must be pointed out that, at present, the activity of ETA is supported by 15% of the population, whereas 50% of the population show as understanding of it. How can such widespread sympathy and understanding exist? The answer to this question, as has already been mentioned, is complex, but it can undoubtedly be found in the ‘smoulder- ing war’ of over 200 years between the Spanish state and the Basque country. Many questions still have to be solved before a situation of fluidity and comprehension between both entities can be attained.

604

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