LogisticsintheFalklandsWar

ForthethousandsofBritishmenandwomenwhoworkedtirelesslybehindthescenesandenabledvictoryintheFalklandIslandsWar.

LogisticsintheFalklandsWar

BehindtheBritishVictory

KennethL.Privratsky

FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2014byPen&SwordMilitary

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Contents

ForewordPrefaceAcknowledgementsGlossaryofTermsandAcronymsMaps

Chapter1 PreludetoWar

Chapter2 MobilizationandDeployment

Chapter3 InitialPlanningandPreparationatSea

Chapter4 SupportOperationsatAscensionIsland

Chapter5 FinalPreparationfortheAmphibiousAssault

Chapter6 D-DayandtheStruggletoBuildupLogistics

Chapter7 TheBreakoutandFightforGooseGreen

Chapter8 MoreForcesandChallenges

Chapter9 ProblemsatFitzroy

Chapter10 TheBattleforMountainsSurroundingStanleyChapter11 AftertheSurrenderChapter12 ARefectionontheBritishExperienceNotesBibliographyIndex

T

Foreword

hisisthefirstbookdevotedtoaddressingthelogisticsoftheFalklandsWarof1982.Perhapsweshouldnotbesurprisedthatithastakenthirty-twoyearsforittoseethelightofday.ForastheAmericanauthorThorpewrote,‘surelyoneofthestrangestthingsinMilitaryHistoryisthealmost

complete silence upon the problems of supply.’ Yet almost every general who knows his businessrecognises this. ‘During the last war eighty per cent of our problems were of a logistical nature,’Montgomeryisallegedtohavesaid.EvenNapoleonwhodismissivelypronounced,‘letnoonespeaktomeofprovisions,’usuallygotitright,althoughlackofattentiontologisticsinRussiaandSpaincontributedtohisdownfall.

Here,atlast,isacomprehensiveaccountofthelogisticsoftheFalklandsWar,fromtheBritishpointofview,written by a highly experiencedAmerican general officer.KenPrivratsky has studied the subjectdeeply,startinginthe1980s.Amonghismanyperceptiveobservationstwostandoutforme,asaseniorcommanderintheFalklands.Firsthisrecognition,basedonpersonalreconnaissance,thattheterraininthe Falklands shaped and impinged on the way the ground forces received, or in some cases did notreceive,theirsupplies.Second,thattheoperationwasconductedbytheBritishoveraverylongdistancefromtheirhomebase–as thecrowfliesnearly2,000miles further fromtheUKthanJapan–withonestagingpostapproximatelyhalfwaydowntheroute.

‘NoonewhohasnotvisitedtheFalklands,beheGovernmentMinister,Serviceman,WhitehallOfficial,MPorjournalist,caneverspeakorwriteconvincinglyaboutthemwithanysenseofconvictionordegreeofcredibility,’wroteMajorGeneralEdwardFursdon,theDefenceCorrespondentoftheDailyTelegraph,afteravisitafewmonthsafterthewar.ThisbeliefisechoedbyKenPrivratsky,whowrites,‘IhavehadtheopportunitytovisittheFalklandIslandstwiceinrecentyears,includingastopinSouthGeorgia.IamnotsurethatanyonecanprovideanadequateaccountoftheFalklandsWarwithoutspendingsometimeontheislands.’

ThoseofusfightingintheFalklandsin1982,Navy,Marine,orArmy,soonrealisedthatthestaffoftheTaskForceCommander(CTF),directingthewarfromabunkerinNorthwood,justnorthofLondon,hadabsolutelynoideaofthescaleofthelogisticchallengeposedbyoperatinginalandofrockywhale-backedhills and peat bog with no roads, or even the most rudimentary track. Major General Jeremy MooreoriginallyprovidedthelandforceadvicetotheCTF.Thedaybeforewelanded,Moore,accompaniedbymostofhisstaff,lefttheCTF’sheadquartersandtravellingsouthinthelinerQueenElizabethII,arrivedtendays later to take commandashore.The commander and staff ofHeadquartersNorth-EastDistrictreplacedhimatNorthwood.Themajorityofthesepeopleseemedunabletomakethementalswitchfromdriving about the north German plain in armoured personnel carriers accompanied by self-propelledartillerytopicturingtherealitiesoffootsloggingacrossapeatbog.Traversingtheformidableterrainwasof courseonlyaminorpart of theproblem facingus.The logisticianshad the fargreater challengeoflifting forward every bean, bullet, gun, and gallon of fuel by a combination of landing craft and alamentably small helicopter force. Before this there was the naval logistic problem of an offload ofsuppliesandequipmentunderfrequentairattack.

Theauthoralsoalludestotheproblemsinherentinconductingoperationsatalongdistancefromthehomebase,andfurthermorethatthisincludedthatmostdifficultofwarfightingpastimes,anamphibiousoperation.Hemakesitplainthatthisisverydifferentfromasea-transportedoperation–thedistinction,operationallyandlogistically,issometimeslostonthepresentgenerationofBritishpoliticians,Officials,and the many senior serving officers lacking even rudimentary training in the art, or even a passingacquaintancegainedby readinghistory, letaloneactualexperienceofamphibiousoperations.With theexceptionoftheinsertionoftheUK’sSpecialBoatServiceintoAfghanistanin2001byhelicopter,andthe2003invasionofIraq,theBritishexperienceofoverseasexpeditionssincetheFalklandshasbeenof‘redcarpet’operations,theclassicexamplebeingthelead-uptothe1991warinKuwait,whereahostnation,SaudiArabia(andotherGulfstates),providedallthefacilitiesneededbytheCoalitionforces:includingdocks, slipways,airfields, roads, fuel, andeven five starhotels for theRAFaircrew.TheFalklandswarinvolvedaquintessentialamphibiousoperationwhereyouhavetotakeeverythingyouneedwithyou,orcaptureitafterarrival–forexampleaport,oranairfield–shouldtheseevenexist.If,asinthecaseoftheFalklands,theobjectivefortheamphibiousassaultisbeyondtherangeofland-basedair,youneedaircraftcarriers to provide air cover and close air support; as well as carriers dedicated to bring supporthelicoptersinfargreaternumbersthanweremadeavailabletotheamphibiousandlandingforcesintheFalklandsWar.

Anotheraspectofanamphibiousoperation,which theauthormakesclear in thisbook, is that it isajointoperationinawayandtoadegreethatasea-transportedorstraightlandormaritimeoperationisnot.Inasea-transportedoperation,asinthepositioningofforcesforGulfWarOnein1991,thosebeingtransported (the landforce)aretoall intentsandpurposespassengersandhavea limitedneedtoplanand interact with their transporters; the Royal and Merchant Navy. They do not have to think; themovementstaffwilltellthemwhattodoonarrival.Itisamovementoperation.Thatisnottosaythatitdoes not require a great deal of logistic planning, but in essence it is little different from taking

passengers, vehicles, and containers across theNorthSea or any other stretch ofwater in peacetime.Thosebeingtransporteddonothavetotakeaccountofthemyriadfactorsthathavetobeweighedupbytheir transporters to thedegree that the landing force (note change of name)has to in an amphibiousoperation.Inthiscase,theamphibiousandlandingforcecommandersmustworkhandinglove,takingaccountsofeachother’srequirementsateverystagetoproduceajointplan.Thiswasafeatureofthewarin theFalklands that clearlyhadnotbeenassimilatedby the5 InfantryBrigade, the follow-upbrigadeafter the 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines had landed. This was not their fault. The role of the 5InfantryBrigadewas‘intervention,’theBritishterminthelate1970s/early1980sforwhatineffectwasa‘redcarpet’operationtorescueBritishNationalsfromaforeigncountryinatimeofcrisis.This, itwasassumed,becauseitwasconvenienttodoso,wouldbebyinvitationonthepartofthecountryconcerned,or at worst, in the face of very light opposition: a few dissidents equipped with small arms. In short,operationsagainst thesortofenemythatconstitutedthesoleexperienceofallbutahandfulofBritishservicemenatthattime.ThebrigadewaspitchforkedintotheFalklandswithoutthenecessarytraining,most essentially in how to conduct joint operations. Other than some rudimentary exercises with RAFhelicopters,neitherthe5InfantryBrigade,noranyotherArmyformationorunit,otherthanthoseinthe3CommandoBrigade,hadtheremotestnotionofhowtoco-operatewiththeRoyalNavy.

This ignorancepersists.SeniorservingBritishArmygeneralofficershaverecentlybeenheardsayingthatthereisnoneedforelitetroops,suchastheRoyalMarines,thatthereis‘nothingtheydothatcannotbedonebyagood infantrybattalion,’ citing the June1944 landings inNormandyasanexample.Theyforgetifindeedtheyeverknew,that,forexample,theBritish3rdInfantryDivision,thelefthandassaultdivisiononGoldBeachinNormandyinJune1944,begantheiramphibioustraininginlate1942,eighteenmonthsbeforetheyhadtocarryouttheoperation.Betweensummer1943andJune1944,inadditiontonumerousunitlevelamphibioustrainingandcourses,thisDivisiontookpartinnolessthantenformationlevelamphibiousexercises–usuallylandinginthesamecraftthatwouldlandtheminNormandy.In1982,nobodywasgrantedsuchabonus.Itwasa‘comeasyouare’partyandislikelytobenexttime.

Fortunately,inthecaseoftheFalklandsWarof1982therewassufficientresidualexpertiseamongthestaffsof3CommandoBrigadeandCOMAW,andtheunitsof3CommandoBrigade,toovercomethelackofrecentjointtrainingthankstofinancialcutsbyMrJohnNott,theUKSecretaryofStateforDefence.TheRoyalFleetAuxiliaryhaddoneevenlessjointtraining,andtheMerchantNavynone.Thepointisthatjointtrainingbyallpartieslikelytobecomeinvolvedinanamphibiousoperationisessential.

Asmadeclear inKenPrivratsky’sexcellentbook, theeffortsof the logisticians in theFalklandswereremarkable. The achievement is best summed up by an experienced rifle company commander in 3Commando Brigade (at the very point of the spear and hence at the end of the logistic line ofcommunication),whowrotelater:

Allcommentsandlessonsfromthelogisticsofthiscampaignshouldbeleavenedbythefactthatthismustbeoneofthefewcampaignsfoughtbyaregularforcesincetheinternalcombustionenginebecamegenerallyavailable,wherethewidespreaduseofwheeledtransportwasnotpossible.This,combinedwiththespeedwithwhichitwasnecessarytoputthewholeacttogether,andtheenemy’seffortstodisrupttheact,makesitarguablethatwewerefortunatetohaveanylogisticsatall.

Awell-researchedaccountoflogisticsintheFalklandsWarin1982islongoverdue;andthisbookwillbewelcomedbyawidereadership,notjustlogisticians.

JulianThompson

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Preface

ehavewitnessedahalfadozenconflictssincetheFalklandsWar,eachdifferentinvariousways.Giventhemagnitudeanddurationofcoalitionefforts intheMiddleEastoverthepasttwentyyears,itisperhapsnotsurprisingthatsomehavefadedintothebackground,theFalklandsWar

beingoneofthem,especiallyoutsideoftheUnitedKingdom.Inseveralways,thiswarbetweenBritainandArgentinain1982remainsquitedifferentfromothersrecently.NotsincetheSecondWorldWarhavenationsbattledatseaastheydidintheSouthAtlantic.Therehavebeennoamphibiousassaultstospeakof since Inchon in theKoreanWarandSuez in1956,bothagenerationearlier. Itwasacomparativelyquick war as well. Only seventy-five days separated the invasion from surrender in the islands,notwithstanding sailing times of threeweeks for ships to travel the 8,000miles separating theUnitedKingdomandtheFalklands.Thebattlesonlandwereoverinthreeweeks.Thewarhadaclearbeginning,afairlydecisiveend,andafterwardstheBritishmilitaryhelpedre-establishnormalcywithinarelativelyshort time as well. What makes the Falklands War unique in all of military history, however, is whathappened in termsof logistics.Neverhasanationassembledanddeployed forcessoquickly to fightawarsofarawayinanareawhereithadsolittlewherewithal.Britainwasnotreadyforthisfightin1982butstillwon.Understandingwhy thathappenedandhowclose theBritishcameto losingcouldnotbemorerelevanttoday,particularlyforagenerationoflogisticianswhohavespentcareerssupportingwarsintheMiddleEast.AtthetimeofArgentina’sinvasionoftheFalklands,Britain,likemanyNATOcountries,waspoisedto

move forces quickly. Although states of readiness varied between members, quick deployment ofdesignatedunitswasessentialtoreinforcepositionsinEuropetodefendagainstanattackbytheWarsawPact.Thoseunitswerereadytodeploywithsomeequipment,butthevastmajorityoftheneedsofalliedgroundforceswerepositionedalreadyinCombatEquipmentGroupsonthecontinent.ThousandsoftonsofsupplieswereprepositionedinandaroundGermanytosustainthefirstweeksoffighting.Navalunitsweredesignated toprotect seasas furtherdeploymentsand large-scale resupplybecamenecessary. InBritainasintheUnitedStates,militaryunitswereaccustomedtoparticipatinginno-noticeexercisestoretrievethisprepositionedequipmentandsuppliesandmovetoassemblyareas.Asaresult,whenunitslike3CommandoBrigadeRoyalMarines,whichledthegroundwar,receivedalerts in1982,theyknewwhattodo,althoughnotnecessarilywhattotakeorhowtomoveittoanarealiketheFalklands.Thosehighstatesofreadinesstodeploystartedtodeclineinwesternmilitariestowardtheendofthe

century. After the first Gulf War, countries like Kuwait became the new staging areas with billions ofdollarsofprepositionedequipmentandsupplies,muchlikeGermanyhadbeenduringtheColdWar.ThisprepositioningprovedinvaluableforthebuildupprecedingthesecondwarinIraqin2003.Sincethen,ascoalitionforcescontinuedfightingintheregion,focusshiftedfromtheabilitytodeployquicklytoalmostexclusiveattentiononrotatingasufficientnumberoftrainedunitsinandoutoftheregion,oftenrelyingheavilyonreserveforces.Thenetresultisthatoverthepasttentofifteenyearswesternmilitarieshavenolongermaintainedthesamereadinesstodeployquicklytoenforcepoliticaldecisionsastheydidinthe1980s.Unitspreviouslyaccustomedtoconductingemergencydeploymentreadinessexercisesasamatterofroutineconcentratedonpreparingsoldiers forcontinuingmilitaryoperations inestablishedtheatres.Forlogisticiansthishasmeantdisembarkingplanesonsecurerunways,offloadinglargecontainershipsatfixedportswithcranes,movingthosecontainersdownhighwaysandissuingsuppliesfromwell-stockedwarehouses. Although they certainly encounter many challenges in doing so, this experience remainsquitedifferentfromtryingtogetsuppliesoverabeachduringanamphibiousoperationormovingthembeyondtherewithoutroads,allthewhilebeingunderthreatofattack.It is likely that forces in the futurewill again be expected to deploy quickly and operate over great

distancesinaustereareas.Whenthathappens,logisticianswillneedtoprovidesupportwithoutrelianceonfixedinfrastructure,deepdraftportsorairfields.TheBritishexperienceintheFalklandshighlightsthedifficultyofprovidinglogisticsoverlongdistancesintoaustereenvironments,particularlyinsituationsofsignificantthreatandespeciallyforamphibiousoperations.Accordingly,itisnotsurprisingthatmilitaryschoolsareshowingrenewedinterestintheFalklandsWar.Thereismuchtolearnfromthatexperience,especiallywiththeBritishgovernment’srecentreleaseofmanypreviouslyrestrictedofficialdocuments.Therehavebeenmanyfinebookswrittenaboutthiswaroverthepastthreedecadesbutnonethusfar

have focused on the remarkable logistics efforts that enabled victory. The FalklandWar remains verymuchuniqueintheannalsofmilitaryhistorybecauseofthateffort.Italsoprovidesawatershedforthoseinterestedinthelogisticsofwagingwar,particularlylong-distancewar.We see the word ‘logistics’ around us today on a daily basis. Back in the 1980s, that termwas not

commonexcept in themilitary.Peoplenotonlydidnotdiscuss logisticsoutsideofmilitarycircles; theyseldomwroteaboutitforanyaudience,includingmilitaryaudiences.AndsosomeoneinthemilitarylikemyselfwhowasinterestedinreadingaboutthesubjecthadtobesatisfiedwithtitleslikePureLogistics:TheScienceofWarPreparation(1917),FortheWantofaNail:TheInfluenceofLogisticsinWar (1948),LogisticsintheNationalDefense(1959),SupplyingWar:LogisticsfromWallensteintoPatton(1977),orperhapsAlexandertheGreatandtheLogisticsoftheMacedonianArmy(1978).Therewasnotmuchelse,

besides a two-volume exhaustive history of logistics in the SecondWorldWar. Logisticswas amilitarythingupuntil1991,whenDesertShieldandDesertStormaddedthetermtothelexiconsofmanyafternewsprogrammesrevealedthemultitudeofchallengesposedbydeployingtheequivalentofalargecityto the Gulf. Unbeknownst to most, though, that deployment took six months to complete because ofreadinessshortfallsanddistancechallenges.Todayweseetheword‘logistics’everywhere.Ithasbecome,quiteunderstandably,themantraofmanybusinesses.TheBritishmilitarywaswellschooledinthesubjectof logisticsbackintheearly1980s.Asanisland

nation,Britainhadtotakelogisticsseriouslywheneveritsforceswentsomeplace.Infact,atthetimeofthe FalklandsWar, the Britishwere several years ahead of us Americans in tailoring logistics units toimprove support capabilities on battlefields, even integrating different military services into tacticallogisticsunits.ThewisdomofsuchinitiativesprovedveryapparentintheSouthAtlantic.WhentheFalklandsWarcapturedtheworld’sattentionin1982,IwasayoungUSArmymajorserving

inPanama.Likemostothersatthetime,IhadneverheardoftheFalklandIslandswhenthesabre-rattlingstarted.Ireadnewspaperstolearnwhatwashappening.Afewyearsafterthewar,thenastudentatStaffCollege,Ifacedarequirementtowritesomethingontheartofwar.IchosetoresearchtheFalklandsWarwithafocusonlogistics,whichbythenhadbecomemymilitaryspeciality.AsIstartedresearch,IsoonbecamefascinatedbywhattheBritishhadaccomplished,withfewexceptionsallontheirown.Thewarhadendedjustafewyearsbefore,andtherewaslittleinformationavailableaboutthelogisticsbehindthevictory. Thankfully, Britishmilitary leaders at the time and years later graciously answeredmy lettersseekinginformationandavailedthemselvesforinterviews.Intheearly1990swhenIwasonfellowshiptotheHoover Institution ofWar,Revolution andPeace, I began a book-length study of thewar, but soonthereafterIbecamesidetrackedbymilitaryandeventuallyindustryrequirements.WhenIretiredforthelasttimein2010,Idustedoffmyproject.Overthoseyears,IoftenworriedthatsomeonewouldtellthisstorybeforeIdid.AsIlookbacknowoveraquarterofacentury,Iampleasantlysurprisedthatnoonedid, except in small pieces, since the logistics challenges behind the victory were so immense. Thedifficulties of supporting war over such a long distance with no forward presence would have beenintimidatingforanycountry.TowagewarinaplaceliketheFalklandsmadeitevenmoreso.IhavehadtheopportunitytovisittheFalklandIslandstwiceinrecentyears,includingastopinSouth

Georgia. I am not sure that anyone can provide an adequate account of the Falklands War withoutspendingsometimeontheislands.Visitorscannotmisstheminefieldsthatarestillawaitingclearance;thetreeless,boggyterrainwithnocover;thestonerunsthatstretchforhundredsofyards;orthestrongwindsthatoccasionallymakeitdifficulttostandwithoutmoving.SailingtheroughwatersoftheSouthAtlantic, seeing theruggedcoastlines,walkingup the jaggedslopesofhillswheremen foughtatnightagainst defencesprepared over severalweeks—all of this andmoredeepensone’s perspective on thewar.DuringmybrieftimeintheFalklands,Ikeptremindingmyselfthatthevastmajorityofthosewhofoughttherewerelikeme.Theyhadneverbeentothispartoftheworldbefore.Mostknewnothingaboutit.Unlikeme,however,theydidnothaveareturnflight,andtheywereaverylongwayfromhome.Theywere heading into a fight at the end of an 8,000-mile logistics tether against an enemy that waspassionateaboutretainingitsnewholdontheislands.Althoughthewarendedfavourably,manythingsdidnotgoasplanned.TheBritishcouldverywellhavelosthadsomeeventsturnedoutdifferently.Itisnotmyintentinthisbooktofocusonlessonslearnedfromthiswar,logisticalorotherwise.Rather,

I want to tell the story as it happened with as little military speak as possible so that readers canappreciatetheextentoftheeffortsbehindthevictory.I trymybesttodiscuss logisticsactivities inthecontextofmilitaryrequirementsandtacticalneeds.Combatatsea,on landand in theairprovides thecontext,butlogisticsbecomesthefocusofthestory.Attheend,IoffersomebriefobservationsabouttheBritishexperiencefromalogistician’sstandpoint,butthoseareonlyastartingpoint.Iencourageothersin themilitary to spendmore timewith thiswar.Warsnowadaysproduce fewnew lessons.Theyoftenrevealmistakes from lessonsunlearned. Itcanbeverycostly torelearn lessonswhenwagingwaroverlongdistancesliketheBritishdidintheFalklands.Regarding logistics, it is best that I provide some clarity for general readers aboutwhat thatmeans

withoutleadingtodefinitions.Militarylogisticscomprisesthoseactivitiestoprojectmilitarypowerwhereitisneededandtosustainforceswhilethere.Onthesurfaceitmightseemsimple.Itrequiresanetworkofcapabilitiesonthehomefrontincludingships,ports,trucks,trains,andplanesaswellasdepotsfullofsupplies.Formilitaryunits,ittraditionallyincludessuchactivitiesastransportation,supply,maintenanceand repair of materiel, as well as administrative services like postal and pay. It can include medicalservices.Itoftenincludesburialandrepatriationresponsibilities.Itencompassespertinentactivitiesforprisonersofwaraswell.TheUSArmyhasreferredtothisassortmentofactivities foryearsascombatservice support. There are three levels of logistics, just as there are three levels of war: strategic,operational and tactical. Strategic logistics involves the readiness of industrial bases, equipping anddeployingforces,andthefollow-onsupportofthoseforces.Operationallogisticsinvolvestheintegrationof logistics generally beyond the homeland, across services and in support of military units seekingmultiple objectives. Tactical logistics becomes the domain of battlefields, where soldiers fight andsometimesdieintheexecutionofbattleplans.Executinglogisticsisacomplexundertakingatalllevels.Andbecausethingsneverturnoutasplanned,itbecomesacontinualprocessofre-evaluatingandmakingadjustmentsascombatchangesandlossesoccurbothofforcesandlogisticswherewithal.Itisnevereasy.

KennethL.PrivratskyMajorGeneral,USArmy(Retired)

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Acknowledgements

herearemanywhomIneed to thank for theirassistance inmaking thisbookpossible.The firstpersonkindenoughtoanswerthelettersofacuriousUSArmymajorin1986wasIvarHellberg,British Army and Commander of Commando Logistic Regiment, 3 Commando Brigade Royal

Marinesduringthewar.Henotonlycorrespondedwithme;healsograciouslyhostedmyfamilyandmeathisquartersnearPlymouthin1988andpulledtogetheragroupofofficerswhosharedinformationwithme. They included Rick Jolly, Royal Navy surgeon, who commanded the field hospital during the warknown as the ‘Red and Green Life Machine’; Gerry Wells-Cole, Royal Marines, who was the seniorlogisticsstaffofficer for3CommandoBrigade;andPeterLamb,alsoRoyalMarinesandakey logisticsplanner for the two-brigade Land Force. All of these gentlemen spent hours educating me. Ivar hascontinuedtoanswermyquestionsthispastyear.Gerrywasparticularlyhelpfulinrecentmonthsreadingandsuggestingchangestoallchaptersindraft.ImetAnthonyWelchoftheBritishArmyataUSArmylogisticsschoolin1988.HecommandedOrdnanceSquadroninCommandoLogisticRegimentduringthewarandlaterretiredasabrigadier.Wespentmanyhourstogethertalkingaboutthewar,oftenoverbeer.Heprovidedmewithdozensofphotographscapturinglogisticsoperationsinthewar.MajorGeneralIanBaxterwaskindenoughtoletmeinterviewhimintheearly1990s.Duringthewar,hewasDeputyChiefofStaffof theLandForce,aRoyalCorpsofTransportofficerwhoguidedmuchof thedeploymentandeventuallybecametheseniorlogisticsstaffofficerforthegroundwar.Morerecently,NickvanderBijl,anIntelligenceCorpsstaffsergeantwhoservedwith3CommandoBrigadeduringthewar,kindlypreviewedand advised on chapters dealing with 5 Infantry Brigade, answered numerous queries on a variety oftopics, and offered the use of photographs. Roderick Macdonald, British Army, who commanded 59IndependentCommandoSquadronwith3CommandoBrigadeandlaterretiredasabrigadier,allowedmetousephotographsfromhispersonalcollectionnowinthepublicdomain,manyofwhichweretakenbymen inhis command.TymMarsh, the senior logistics staff officer for5 InfantryBrigade, reviewedmychapters on that brigade and provided inputs. Robin Smith, also British Army, who commanded 91Ordnance Company with 5 Brigade during the war, provided valuable information on deployment andsupportandmanyphotographsformetouseaswell.PatrickWatts,aresidentofStanleyandtheradiobroadcasterwhobravelygaveoutupdatesduring the invasionuntilArgentinesstuckagun inhisside,recentlyescortedmearoundsomeofthemountainssurroundingStanleywherethefinalbattlesoccurred.Hisknowledgeofthoselocationsandhisexperienceduringtheoccupationprovedinvaluable.IowegreatthankstoMichaelClapp,theRoyalNavycommodorewhocommandedtheAmphibiousTask

Forceduringthewarandcorrespondedwithmeextensivelyduringtheearly1990s.Hiscourtesyandhisprofessionalismintypingdozensofpages(onatypewriternoless)toanswerhordesofquestionsatthattimestillimpressme.Overthepastyear,afterwerenewedcommunication,hehasgiventirelesslyofhistimetoadvisemeonmattersrelatedtothewar,toincludereadingmydraftsandsharingmaterials.Iowethe same great thanks to Julian Thompson,whowas the brigadier commanding 3 Commando BrigadeRoyal Marines during the war. A distinguished author of several military history books, he was kindenoughtoletmeinterviewhimatlengthinhishomeintheearly1990s,shortlyafterhisretirementasamajorgeneral.Atthetime,Iwasalieutenantcolonelstilltryingtogetthestorystraight.Hetoohasgivenpatientlyofhis timereadingdrafts,providingadditional information,andalsowritinga foreword.BothThompsonandClappbecomecentrepiecesinseveralchaptersofmybooksimplybecausetheywerethatimportant to thewarasawhole.Bothare remarkablemen,and I remainhumbledby theirassistance.Thisbookwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthetwoofthem.Ihavequoteddirectly fromseveral of theabove individuals, in somecasesonmultipleoccasions.At

other times, I have used extensively information they provided in conversations, correspondence, andemails.Withoutthetotalityoftheircontributions,thisbookwouldhaveturnedoutquitedifferentlyandbeenlessaccurateforsure.IextendmyappreciationtothestaffoftheStaffCollege,Camberley,manyofwhomareprobablyretired

todayaswell.Theyopenedtheirlibrarystackstometohelpmyresearchintheearly1990s.AndIwishtothankthestaffattheBritishArmyHistoricalBranchattheMinistryofDefenceinLondon,eventhoughitno longerexists. In the1990s, theyprovidedmanydocuments thatprovedveryhelpful tome.Perhapssomeofthosewhoworkedtherewillreadthisandlearnofmyappreciation.Ahostofotherorganizationshavebeenhelpfulinprovidingadviceandassistance,includingtheDefenceImageryTeam,FleetAirArmMuseum, ImperialWarMuseum,NationalArmyMuseum,RoyalAirForceMuseum,andRoyalMarinesMuseum.Ialsowouldliketoacknowledgethegraciouspermissionbypublishersandauthorswhohaveallowed

metoquotefromtheirpublications.TheseincludeAnovaBooks,AurumPublishingGroup,HarperCollins,Naval InstitutePress,MaritimeBooks,Methuen,Pen&SwordBooks,SterlingLordLiteristic,Taylor&Francis Books andWhittles Publishing, aswell as personal permissions from Sir Lawrence Freedman,RickJolly,andNickvanderBijl.ExtractsfromTheBattleoftheFalklandsarereprintedbypermissionofPeters,Fraser&DunloponbehalfofMaxHastingsandSimonJenkins.ThisbookwouldnotbepossiblewithouttheconsiderationofHenryWilsonatPen&SwordBooksorthe

assistanceofmyeditor,GeorgeChamier.Tobothofthem,Ioffermysincerethanksfortheopportunitytosharethisstorywiththosewhomadeithappen.Finally,Iwouldliketothankmydaughters,ErikaandKylie,andmywife,Kathy,fortheirsupport.Erika

usedherskillstodevelopsomeverynicemapsforthisbook.Kathypressedmeoftenoverthepasttwentyyearstogetonwithmyproject.Shehelpedmeendlesslyalongthewayandtoleratedresearchmaterialsspreadaroundourhouseforaverylongtime.Thisbookisasmuchhersasminenow.Few if any books are free of errors and I expectminewill be no exception. Anymistakes of fact or

interpretationinthisbookareminealone

GlossaryofTermsandAcronyms

AEchelon LogisticselementbehindfightingunitsBEchelon LogisticselementinrearsupportareaBBC BritishBroadcastingCorporationBde BrigadeBergen RucksackBFSU BritishForcesSupportUnitBlowpipe Wire-guided,surface-to-airmissilefiredfromshoulder.BluesandRoyals CavalrywitharmouredvehiclesBMA BrigadeMaintenanceAreaBV202(Snocat) Trackedcrosscountry,over-snowvehicleCanberra British-made(Argentine)lightbomberCasevac CasualtyEvacuationC-130Hercules US-madecargoplaneCAG CommanderAmphibiousGroupCATF CommanderAmphibiousTaskForceCdo CommandoCH47Chinook US-made,twin-rotorheavy-liftcargohelicopterCLFFI CommanderLandForceFalklandIslandsCTF CommanderTaskForceCLF CommanderLandForceCIA CentralIntelligenceAgencyCINCFLEET Commander-in-ChiefFleetCOMAW CommodoreAmphibiousWarfareCoy CompanyDCSR DailyCombatSupplyRateDOMS DefenceOperationalMovementsStaffDP DistributionPointDracone TowedflexiblefuelcontainerEFHE EmergencyFuelHandlingEquipmentEPW/POW EnemyPrisonerofWar/PrisonerofWarFBMA ForwardBrigadeMaintenanceAreaFMA ForceMaintenanceAreaHMS HerMajesty’sServiceHarrier Britishverticaltake-offjetfighterLADE LineasAéreasdelEstadoLCU LandingCraftUtilityLCVP LandingCraftVehicleandPersonnelLFFI LandForceFalklandIslandsLLA LogisticsLoiteringAreaLPD LandingPlatformDockLSL LandingShipLogisticM&AW Mountain&ArcticWarfareMEZ MaritimeExclusionZoneMILAN Britishwire-guidedmissileoperatedbytwomenMirage French-made(Argentine)jetfighterMoD MinistryofDefenceMV MerchantVesselNAAFI Navy,ArmyandAirForceInstitutesNASA NationalAeronauticalandSpaceAgencyNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

OGroup OrdersGroupPara Parachutebattalion

Pucara Argentinedual-propfighterQE2 QueenElizabethIIRAF RoyalAirForceRapier Ground-to-airmissilelauncher,radar-guidedRCT RoyalCorpsofTransportRFA RoyalFleetAuxiliaryRM RoyalMarinesRN RoyalNavySAS SpecialAirServiceSBS SpecialBoatSquadronScimitar SmalllighttankScorpion SmalllighttankSeaKing RoyalNavyhelicopterSidewinder USair-to-airguidedmissileSkyhawk US-made(Argentine)jetfighterSST SurgicalSupportTeamSTUFT ShipTakenUpFromTradeSuperEtendard French-builtjetTEZ TotalExclusionZoneTRALA Tug,Repair,andLogisticsAreaUHF UltraHighFrequencyUKLF UnitedKingdomLandForceVictor RoyalAirForcetankerplaneVulcan RoyalAirForcebomberWasp RoyalNavylighthelicopterWessex RoyalNavymedium-lifthelicopter

Maps

DesignedbyErikaPrivratskyMilligan

TheChallengeforLogisticiansAscensionIslandandSouthGeorgiaIslandClapp’sTrapTheLogisticsBattlefield2Para’sFightforGooseGreen(28May1982)BattleforMountainsSurroundingStanley

ThemapattheleftisacopyoftheoneusedonDDayintheFalklandIslandsWarbyCommodoreMichaelClapp,CommanderAmphibiousTaskForce.ItshowstheapproachoftheTaskForceintotheAmphibiousOperations Area and ship locations during the initial landing phase. Captions have been added tohighlightshipsandlocations.Clappdescribestheoperationthatday:‘TheSanCarlosareaofferedcalmseas,noswells,a land-lockedbaywithdeep-wateranchorage,and

beaches for landing.Argentinesneverexpectedus to landso faraway fromStanley.Wechosethe firstlandingtobe0230hrson21MaytotakeadvantageofdarknessbothforpassageintoFalklandSoundandtheassault.Shipsapproachedfromsea in fourgroupsthatnight.Uponarrival,Antrimmoved intoFireSupportArea(FSA)IandArdentmovedintoFSAIItoprovidenavalgunfiresupportforlandings.Enemyaircraft sankArdent later that day, causing considerable loss of life and many wounded, but she hadaccomplishedhermission.Fearless led the first group of amphibious ships. Brigadier Thompson and I with our staffs were on

boardtocontroloperations.IntrepidandYarmouthfollowed.WhentheassaultshipsFearlessandIntrepidreachedpointAlpha,theywenttodesignatedanchorages,dockeddown,andreleasedtheirlandingcraftinpreparationforarrivalofthemerchantshipscarryingtroops.ThenextgroupincludedCanberraandNorlandescortedbyBrilliantandPlymouth.Canberrasubsequentlymovedcloserwhenweverifedwaterswere free ofmines.BrilliantwithherSeaWolfSurface-to-AirMissiles roamedwhilePlymouthwent toFSAIII.Norland,StromnessandFortAustinallanchoredinitially.ThefinalgroupwasmadeupmainlyofthesmallerLandingShipsLogisticescortedbyBroadswordandArgonaut.Landingsweredelayedalittlebutwentwell.TheWeatherLineofDeparturewaswherelandingcraftstartedtheirassaulttobeaches.Troops secured objectives quickly with little opposition, and we started moving supporting arms andlogisticsashore.Vacantcirclesonthemapdenoteanchoragesthatwewerereadytouse.TheonesnearWestFalkland

wereplannedincaseweencounteredmines.Weneverneededtousethem.Asairattacksdeveloped,wemovedanchoragesclosertoshorewherepossibleandstoppedusingthoseanchoragesinFalklandSoundthatwereexposed.EscortsringedLSLsandmerchantshipstoprovideprotectionthebesttheycould.Asaresult,theyborethebruntofairattacks.Mendemonstratedextraordinarycourageduringairattacksandwhendefusingunexplodedbombs.Sadlytheoperationledtothelossofseveralships,manylives,and

lotsofcasualties.AirattacksonDDayandthenonD+2requiredustochangeplansinordertosafeguardshipssincewe

didnotcontroltheskies.Thebuildupofsuppliesashoreneverthelesswassuccessful.WeoperatedinSanCarloswaterforthedurationofthewar,enteringtheSoundatnightforprotection.WetotallysurprisedtheArgentinesonDDayandthendefeatedthemdecisivelythreeweekslater.’

ThemoreIhaveseenofwar,themoreIrealizehowitalldependsonadministrationandtransportation(whatourAmericanallies call logistics). It takes little skill or imagination to seewhere youwould likeyourarmytobeandwhen; it takesmuchknowledgeandhardworktoknowwhereyoucanplaceyourforcesandwhetheryoucanmaintainthemthere.Arealknowledgeofsupplyandmovementfactorsmustbethebasisofeveryleader’splan;onlythencanheknowhowandwhentotakeriskswiththosefactors;andbattlesandwarsarewononlybytakingrisks.

FieldMarshalArchibaldWavell‘AdvicetoaSoldier’,intheSundayTimes,13August1944

O

Chapter1

PreludetoWar

n28March1982,anArgentinenavaltaskforceleftitsbaseatPuertoBelgrano,about300milessouth of BuenosAires, allegedly to take part in a joint exercisewithUruguay. FewArgentinesnoticed. Most were more concerned about the sad state of affairs in their country: high

unemployment,annualinfationexceeding100percentandarepressivenewmilitaryJuntaledbyGeneralnowPresidentLeopoldoGaltieri,thelatestinaseriesofmilitarydictatorswhohadsuppressedandoftenbrutalizedthepopulation.Thesesuccessiveregimeshadimprisoned,tortured,ormurderedanestimated30,000 journalists, union workers, students, academics, and others who voiced contrary opinions,including some foreigners. There had been demonstrations recently on streets of Buenos Aires. If thegeneralpublichadnoticedthetaskforceheadingtowardtheAtlantic,theymighthavesensedsomethingofimportance,particularlyiftheyconsideredthattheshipsweresupposedtobejoininganavalexercisefocusedonanti-submarinewarfareprocedures(astheexercisehadbeenbilled).Forthecompositionofthe task force leaving Puerto Belgrano that day hardly ftted the role of training for such procedures.Rather, itconsistedofanaircraftcarrier,twodestroyers,threefrigates,anicebreaker,atanker,andanamphibiouslandingship.Onboardwasamarinebattalionaugmentedbyplatoonsofinfantry.Insidethetank landing ship were sixteen amphibious, tracked landing craft. An Argentine submarine waited forthembelowthesurfacefurtheroutatsea.TogethertheycomprisedTaskForce40.Thoseonboardwerenot thinkingofa jointexercisewithUruguaybutsetonexecutingOperationAzul (‘blue’) toretake theFalklandIslands. In itsplanningstages, theoperationhadtakenthenameOperationRosario(‘rosary’).Nowthatexecutionwasunderway,thenamehadchangedtoAzul tosignifythebluerobeoftheVirginMary,inwhatonehistorianbelieveswasanefforttocomparetheimpendinginvasiontoasemi-religiouscrusade.1ThepeopleofArgentinacouldhavebeenaspassionateabouttheircountry’ssovereignrightstotheMalvinas,theirnamefortheFalklands,astheywereabouttheirreligion.By1ApriltheArgentinenavaltaskforcehadarrivedoffthecoastofthemainislands.Hadtheyseen

theshipsthatevening,BritishinhabitantsonEastFalklandmighthaveregardedtheirpresenceassometype of April Fools Day joke. They did not, however, and the task force was anything but a hoax.Falklanders went to bed that night as free people loyal to Britain. Much to their dismay, to that ofcountrymenandrelativesinBritainandalsototherestoftheworld,theyawokethenextmorningtofndthemselvescaptivesofArgentina.Thefollowingday,ArgentineforcesoverpoweredanothersmallgroupofRoyalMarinesontheislandofSouthGeorgiafurtheroutintheAtlantic.ThestreetsofBuenosAiresflledagain with citizens, this time not protesting about dire economic conditions but cheering that theircountry’sflagfinallywaswavingovertheirMalvinas.Whenwordof the invasionhit news channels around theworld, it is doubtful thatmanyoutside the

immediate area even knew of the archipelago in the SouthAtlantic called the Falklands. It consists ofhundredsofsmallislandsstarting350milesoffthepresentcoastlineofArgentinaandextendingnearlythree times further out into the Atlantic with the islands of South Georgia and South Sandwich. TheprimaryislandsofEastandWestFalklandprovidethenameforthewholearchipelago,aswellashomesandlivelihoodforthevastmajorityofresidents.In1982,thetotalpopulationwasabout1,850,with1,200concentratedaroundthecapitalofStanleyonEastFalkland.Thefewhundredotherslivedinsettlementsscatteredabouttheislands,wherelifewentonlargelyoutoftouchwiththerestoftheworld.Therewasno road network over the treeless, boggy terrain. Communication was limited to short-wave radiotransmissions. Residents sometimes lived their whole lives in isolated settlements. It was a toughenvironment inhabited by penguins, sea lions, about a half a million sheep, and the world’s largestpopulationofblack-browedalbatrosses.LifeintheFalklandswouldnotappealtomany.Therewasnoprivateindustryafterwhalingstationson

outer islands closed earlier in the twentieth century.Most residents had become employees of Britishcompanies exploiting resources on the islands over the years, had taken employment with the Britishgovernmentornowjustraisedsheepinthesettlements.Inhabitantsowedboththeirwayoflifeandmuchoftheir livelihoodtocontinuedBritishsovereignty.Theyoftenwithstoodbrutalconditions inthewintermonthsasgaleforcewindsbuffetedcoastlines.ThosewintersnormallystartedinJune.Falklanders,however,wereproudoftheirsurroundingsandcontentwiththeirlifestyle.Theywerenot

pleased in the least when Argentines hoisted their flag over Stanley that morning. And although theinvasionmight have surprised them and countless others around the world, it remained the result ofdecades of frustration brought to a head by both desperation andmissed or confused signals. BritainneveranticipatedthatthosefrustrationshaddeepenedsomuchthatArgentinawouldinvade.ItdidnotrealizethatitsdecreasinginterestintheFalklandsandplannedcutsinmilitarycapabilitywouldactuallybeanothercauseoftheinvasion,evenasintelligencestartedrevealingsuchapossibility.AndArgentinaneverbelievedthattheBritishwoulddevelopsuffcientresolvetorespond.ItdoubtedBritishcapabilitytowagewar that far fromtheirhomelandgiven the immense logisticsdiffcultiesofdoingso.Evenseniorgovernment offcials in Britain doubted their country’s ability to project power into the southern

hemisphereandthensustainitlogisticallyoversuchvastdistances.Bothcountrieswouldlearntheywerewrong.Britain andArgentina had been on a collision course over this group of islands for about 150 years.

Britishseacaptain JohnDavisdiscovered the islandson14August1592,but the frst recorded landingwas not until 1690, also by the British. They named the channel between the two principal islandsFalklandSoundinhonouroftheTreasureroftheNavy,ViscountFalkland.TheborderingislandswouldlatertakeonthenamesofEastandWestFalkland.Overtheyearsfollowingthefirstlanding,theislandswouldseeSpanish,FrenchandDutchoccupantsaswellasBritish,andtheywouldassumevariousnames,including LasMalvinas for the Spanish. The Spaniards forced out the British in 1769, but the Britishreturnedin1833,expelledsomeofthesettlersandthenproceededtomaintainacontinuouspresence.Atthe time, the areahadbecomean important foothold for protection ofBritish shipping interests.CapeHorn, at the tip of South America, cornered the busiest trading routes in the world. Hundreds if notthousandsof ships transited these treacherouswatersbetweenEurope, theFarEast andboth sidesofNorthAmericaeachyearastheymovedeverythingfromfoodandspicestofursandgold.TheFalklandsofferedoneof the fewplaceswhereshipscouldreceivesomeservice,supplyandmedicalcare.Overacenturylater,withtheriseinArgentinaofColonelJuanPeron,afascistdictatorwhotookpowerafteracoup, ownership of the islands came into dispute. Britain proposed at one point that the InternationalCourtofJusticeatTheHaguehearclaimsfromthetwocountries.Argentinarefused.Inmore recent years, the twocountrieshadcooperated in limitedways to improve services forEast

Falkland. They reached agreement in the early 1970s for Argentina to operate aweekly air service toStanleyasaconveniencetobothcountriesandtoinstallfueltanksontheislandtosustaintheserviceandalsosupplyresidents.TheBritishhadagreedtoassistinbuildinganairstripontheoutskirtsofStanleyand to establish a sea service from the Argentine mainland. Neither happened. Eventually, BritaincoordinatedaplanfortheUnitedStatestoprovidesteelmattingforanairfeld,andArgentinaconstructedtheairfeldusingthismaterialwithoutfurtherBritishassistance.TheBritishevenpermittedArgentinatoinstituteproceduresforwhitetravelcardstocircumventtheneedforpassportsforFalklandIslandersandArgentinesfyingbetweenArgentinaandtheislands.SomeArgentineshadbecomeresidentsofStanley;afew were teaching Spanish to students. And yet talks remained at a standstill regarding transfer ofsovereignty.ItisnotdiffculttounderstandwhyArgentineangstwasincreasinginthesecondhalfofthetwentieth century. Discussions had occurred between the two countries about a possible leasebackarrangement of the islands to Argentina, but the Islanders remained entrenched in their desire tomaintaintieswithBritain,eventhoughtheywerenotgrantedBritishcitizenship.Argentinawasgettingtiredofwhatitperceivedtobehalf-bakedanswersoversovereignty.ArgentinawasnotmisinterpretingtheappearanceofdiminishingBritishinterestintheFalklands.That

declinewasafact,partofanoveralldecisiontoreduceoverseascommitments.WiththeopeningofthePanama Canal in 1914, the strategic importance of the islands had declined as shipping lanes shiftedtowardCentralAmerica.Inthemid1970s,LordEdwardShackleton,sonofthefamedBritishexplorerofAntarctica, developed an extensive report for Parliament, which recommended bolstering BritishinvestmenttoexploitFalklandresourcesrangingfromseaweedandfsheriestooil.Hisreportfellondeafears. Meanwhile, economic pressures were mounting in Britain to reduce military budgets andcommitmentsaroundtheworld.TheFalklandsseemedtosometobeaveryexpensiveobligationandthusalikelyopportunityforsavings.AplatoonofRoyalMarineswasstationedatStanley,aswellasasmallRoyalNavyvessel,theHMSEndurance.Theirpresenceposedlittlethreattoanycrediblemilitaryforce.Consequently,midwaythrough1981,BritishSecretaryofDefenceJohnNottsignedtheordertoretiretheEndurancebytheendof1982withoutreplacement.Thatorderwasnotasecret.NorwasthefactthatretirementofEndurancewouldterminateBritishnavalpresenceinthearea.TheclosestBritishmilitarybase to theFalklandswas5,000miles away inBelize; itwas simply a training area, hardly capable ofprojectinganymeaningfulresponseifsomethinghappenedintheFalklands.TheBritishmainlandwasawhopping8,000milesaway,threeweekssailingtimeinthebestofweather.ProximityclearlyworkedinfavourofArgentina.SecretaryNotthimselfbelievedthetimehadcometorethinkBritishcommitmenttotheFalklands.HehadrecentlyjoinedwithotherkeyCabinetmemberstosupportaproposaltonegotiatealong-termleaseoftheFalklandIslandstoArgentina,butthe‘proposalhadbeensabotagedbyacross-partyallianceintheHouseofCommons’.2SuchwasthesituationwhenGaltieriassumedleadershipofthenewmilitaryJuntainBuenosAiresin

late1981.Frustratedwith lackofBritish resolve to takesovereigntynegotiations seriously,andseeingsignsofadiminishingoverallcommitmenttotheislands,theJuntadeclaredthat1983wouldbe‘theyearoftheMalvinas’,150yearssincetheBritishhadestablishedtheirpresenceonEastFalkland.TheJuntaprobablywasbolsteredtosomeextentbythesuccessfuloccupationbyArgentinescientistsofThuleintheBritishSouthSandwichIslandsin1976,whichhadprovokedconcernsinBritainbutnoactualresponse.Now, on 15 December, Admiral Jorge Anaya, Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy and ardentproponent of Argentine rights to the Falklands, attended a change of command ceremony at PuertoBelgranoforViceAdmiralJuanLombardo,thenewChiefofNavalOperations.AsheadoftheNavy,Anayahadspearheadedlargeprocurementsofships,planes,helicoptersandothermilitaryequipmentinthelate1970s, signifcantly enhancingArgentinemilitary prowess and probably contributing signifcantly to theeconomicproblemsnowplaguinghiscountry.Aftertheceremony,AnayametwithLombardoprivatelyandinstructed him to prepare a plan to take control of the Falklands. Anaya stressed that this wascontingency planning only and that Lombardo should work secretly with his flag-level counterparts inothermilitaryservices.HeadvisedLombardothattheJuntawaslookingtoselectanoptionandexecuteif

necessarybeforetheendof1982.BythentheBritishvesselEndurancewouldbegone,andtheArgentinemilitarywouldbeinreceiptofadditionalFrenchSuperEtendardaircraftandExocetmissiles,signifcantlybolsteringitsaircombatandoveralldefencecapabilities.3Thenextmonth,theJuntaformalizedtheirintentioninNationalStrategyDirective1/82,declaring:TheMilitaryCommittee,facedwiththeevidentandrepeatedlackofprogressinthenegotiationswithGreatBritaintoobtainrecognitionofoursovereigntyovertheMalvinas,GeorgiasandSouthSandwichIslands;convincedthattheprolongationofthesituationaffectsnationalhonor,thefullexerciseofsovereigntyandtheexplorationofresources,hasresolved,toanalysethepossibility of the use ofmilitary power to obtain the political objective. This resolutionmust be kept in strict secrecy andshouldbecirculatedonlytotheheadsoftherespectivemilitarydepartments.4

On 24 January, an Argentine journalist writing in La Prensa stated, ‘a military attempt to resolve thedisputecannotberuledoutwhensovereigntyisatstake.’5Amonthlater,ArgentinemarineswerealreadypractisingamphibiouslandingsinPatagonia.GaltieriandhisJuntawereconfidentthatBritainwouldnothavethepoliticalwillortheoverallability

torespondtotheinvasion.TherewerenoindicationsofstrongBritishresolvetodemonstrateotherwise.TheywerewellawarethatBritainhadbeentakingstepstodownsizeitsforceprojectioncapability.Thelogistics challenges of getting a credible force 8,000 miles south simply seemed insurmountable,particularlysincethenotoriouslyroughSouthAtlanticwinterwouldarrivebyJune.ThelasttimeBritainhadtriedtoprojectitspowerwasduringtheSuezcrisis inthe1950s;andthatdeploymenthadprovendisastrous for theproudBrits.TheFalklandsweremuch furtherawaythantheeasternMediterranean.Mountingandsailingalargeforcesuchavastdistancewithwinteronlyafewmonthsaway,overcomingArgentinedefences,simplyexecutinganamphibiousassaultagainstalarger,establisheddefensiveforce,andsustainingforcesbothatseaandonlandforweeksandmostlikelymonths–allofitjustseemedlikeabridgetoofar.Moreover,ifArgentinescontrolledtheseaandairsuffcientlytoattackshipsandinterdictsupplylinesaroundtheFalklands,theycouldmakethepositionuntenablefortheBritish.Argentinawasbargainingon thebelief that theBritishwouldbe intimidatedby themanychallengesof regaining theFalklandsandthatanArgentineinvasionwouldcompelearnestnegotiationsbetweenthetwocountries,eventuallyproducingachangeinsovereigntyoftheislands.Withaquicksurpriseinvasion,italsohopedtoavoidcasualtiestotheRoyalMarinegarrisonandcivilians,perhapsgarneringgreatersupportintheUnitedNations.InBritain,informationstartedcirculatingaboutArgentina’semergingbellicosity.Itdidnotgainmuch

attention from the government, though, until early March when Prime Minister Margaret ThatcherreceivedinformationaboutarticlescirculatingintheArgentinepress.On3March,shetoldheradvisers,‘wemustmakecontingencyplans’,6althoughshewasnotexpectinganyplantoincludeafull-scaleBritishinvasiontoregaintheislands.BythenArgentineplanningwaswellunderway.TheJuntareceivedthefirstdraftof its invasionplanaweek lateron9Marchandadvisedmilitary servicechiefs tocontinue theirfocusforexecutiontowardtheendoftheyear.7ThecatalysthardeningresolveofboththeArgentinesandBritishoccurredoverthenexttwoweekson

the islandofSouthGeorgia,900milesout in theAtlantic fromEastFalklandandadependencyof theFalklands.Itwasaruggedplace,uninhabitedexceptforitsfamousthree-foottallKingPenguinsandsomeBritishscientistssurveyingAntarcticaonaseasonalbasis.ResponsibilityforaffairsthererestedwiththeGovernoroftheFalklands,whoresidedinthecapital,Stanley,onEastFalkland.VisitorstoSouthGeorgiaweresupposedtoreportinatGrytvikentothemanageroftheBritishAntarcticSurveyPartyteam,whichservedasarepresentativeoftheGovernorandcontrolledaccesstotheisland.Manyyearsbefore,SouthGeorgiahadbeenahomeofsorts forwhalers.Severaldilapidatedwhaling

stations fromdecadespast remained. In the late1970s,Britishownersof thesestationshadgrantedacontract toanArgentinemetalmerchantnamedConstantinoDavidoff todismantle them.ThatcontractprohibitedDavidofffromtakinganyweaponsashoreorharmingwildlife.TravellingtoSouthGeorgiatoconductdismantlingworkalsorequiredpriorcoordinationwithandapprovalbytheBritishEmbassy inBuenosAires.DavidoffhadvisitedscrapsitesonSouthGeorgiatoassessthesituationinDecember1981without proper documentation or even checking inwith themanager at Grytviken, thereby creating aminordiplomaticstorm.Hewasnowplanningtosendapartyofworkerstostartdismantlingthestations.Davidoff visited the British Embassy in Buenos Aires to get paperwork for travelling to work sites onSouth Georgia. He even hoped to secure passage for his workforce on the British vessel EndurancestationedatStanley.TheEmbassywasnot immediately responsive,however, indicating theyneeded tocoordinate furtherwith theGovernor of theFalklands,RexHunt. The impatientDavidoff proceeded tomakehisownarrangementsregardlessofwhetherhehadapprovaltogotoSouthGeorgia.HecharteredtheArgentinenavalsupportvesselBahiaBuenSucesoandsetoffanywaywithoutproperauthorization,inwhat some believewas deliberate collaborationwith Argentina’smilitary to put some forces on SouthGeorgiaasafollow-uptestofBritishresolveaftertheoccupationofThuleIslandsixyearsbefore.Ifthatwasthecase,theresultswerenotthesame.On19March,BritishAntarcticsurveyscientistsintheareareportedthatDavidoff’spartyhadlandedatLeith.Theincursionmighthavefadedintomemorywithlittlemorethananotherdiplomaticrebuke.Unfortunately,uponarrivaltheDavidoffpartydecidedtoraiseanArgentineflagatopanoldgeneratorstationatLeithandthenproceededtoshootlocalreindeerfortheirmeals.Theseactionschangedeverything.Word of the workers and their flag rocketed to Stanley and London. The next day, Governor Hunt

dispatchedEndurancewithtwentyRoyalMarinestoSouthGeorgia.Thatseemedtogetsomeattention.Argentinaapologizedandconveyedthatthepartywouldleave.On22March,however,Britishscientists

reconfrmed that although the Bahia Buen Suceso had departed, a dozen of the scrap metal workersremained. On 23March, Britain issued a direct communiqué to Argentina that if the workers did notvacateSouthGeorgiaimmediately,RoyalMarineswouldremovethemforcibly.ItalsoformallyrecanteditspreviousdecisionthatEndurancewouldbeleavingtheSouthAtlanticattheendoftheyear.Thesameday,Argentinarespondedbydivertinganothernavalvessel,BahiaParaiso,fromanexerciseintheareatoLeith with a small military party of its own; that party arrived on the 25th, shortly after the Britishmarines were landing twenty miles away at Grytviken with orders to hold in place and assess thesituation.BritishmarinesweresoonspottingArgentinemarinescomingashoreatLeith.ItappearedthatArgentinacouldbeusingtheactionsofthescrapmetalworkerstotestBritishresolve.Whateverthebasisfor those actions on South Georgia in March 1982, the situation hardened the resolve of Argentina’smilitary Junta toreclaimtheFalklands.The Juntaaskedtheirmilitaryplanninggrouphowquickly theycouldfnalizetheinvasionplan.PlannersrespondedthattheycouldbereadytosailfromArgentinaon28March.8The Juntadecided tomoveup thedateof the invasion fromtheendof theyear. Itwould takeplacejustdaysaway,onAprilFoolsDay.Back in England, as the Argentine task force was leaving Puerto Belgrano for the Falklands, Prime

Minister Thatcher was becoming increasingly worried about the situation. She had been monitoringintelligencecomingoutofArgentinaandtherecentdevelopmentsonSouthGeorgia.Itappearedthataninvasionwasimminent.Herclosestadvisers,however,hadnotcometothatconclusioneventhough,ataminimum, there were clear causes for concern. Few were even in London. Foreign Secretary PeterCarringtonwasheadingtoBrusselsandthentoTelAviv.ChiefofDefenceStaffAdmiralTerenceLewinwasinNewZealand.ChiefoftheGeneralStaffGeneralEdwinBramallwasinIreland.SecretaryNotthadjustreturnedfromNATOmeetingsintheUnitedStatesandwasnowtravellingelsewhereinBritain.NoneofThatcher’sclosestadvisersseemedalarmedbytheevolvingsituation.On29March,justbeforesheleftformeetingsinBrusselsandthedayaftertheArgentinenavaltaskforcesailedtowardtheFalklands,sheconcluded that thedevelopingsituation in theSouthAtlantic requiredaction.Shedecided therefore todispatch three nuclear-powered submarines as a show of force, even though it would take the firstsubmarinetwoweekstoarrive.Thefollowingday,wordofthesubmarinedeploymentsleakedoutthroughtheBritishpressandthenrippleddownnewswirestoArgentina,onlyconfrmingtotheJuntathattheyhadmadetherightdecisiontoadvancethetimelineforinvasion.Having suggested to her staff severalweeks earlier that they needed to contemplate options for the

Falklands, Thatcher nowmulled over the assessment of her experts. Defence Secretary JohnNott hadsubmitted to herwhatwas called a ‘DefenceMinute’ outlining scenarios, challenges and options. TheoffcialviewoftheChiefsofStaffhadnotchangedsincethelatestmilitaryreviewoftheareainthemid-1970s,whichwasessentially that ‘defenceagainstanArgentine invasionwas impossible’.9Now,at thestartof the1980s,Britishmilitary strengthwasmuch less, largelybecauseof changes in strategyandbudgetreductions.Britain’smilitarypresenceoverseashadchangedsignifcantly in the1970sas forceswithdrew from former colonialpossessions in theFarEast,MiddleEast andMediterranean, leading tosizeableforcereductions.SecretaryNottwasnotpopularinmilitarycirclesbecausehehadspearheadedfurtherchanges.TheRoyalNavyhadseen itsactive fightingforceofcarriersandwarshipsreducedbythirtypercentinthelastfewyears.Asaresultofcutsannouncedinthe1981DefenceReview,boththeremainingaircraftcarriersintheRoyalNavywereearmarkedforsale,HMSHermes toIndiaandHMSInvincible toAustralia.Aspartof anewstrategy, theRoyalNavy’s focuswould shift toanti-submarinewarfareintheNorthAtlantic.TheRoyalAirForce’sonlylong-rangebomber,theVulcan,wasalsointheprocessofbeingphasedout.TheRoyalAirForce’sstrategictransportfeethadshrunkfromfvesquadronsin1975toasinglesquadronatthestartof1982.10Onlytwenty-threeVictorfueltankersremainedintheinventorynow.Andwhereasamphibiousforcesandshipshadsurvivedthecuts,theeffectivenessofanyfuture amphibious operationwould surely be reduced if therewas no air cover from carriers.Causingmore concern, theRoyalNavy had no airborne earlywarning aircraft left to provide advancewarningagainstairattack.11Despitesuchreductionsinstructureandhardware,however,theBritishmilitarymenremainedasgoodasanyanywhere.Theywereproud,professional,confident,andhighly trained.Suchtraitscouldmakeallthedifference.Theywould,however,havetobringeverythingtheyneededwiththeminorder to regaincontrolof the islands.Adecision togo towarwouldbecome for themandBritaina‘comeasyouare,bringwhatyoucan’affair.The story of Argentina’smilitary over recent years provided amarked contrast to these reductions.

Procurementshadbeensizeable.AndalthoughArgentineshipsweremostlySecondWorldWarvintage,theyremainedquitecapable. In fact, the long-rangegunsof theArgentinecruiserGeneralBelgrano,aformerAmericanshipthathadsurvivedtheJapaneseattackatPearlHarbor,couldstriketargetsfurtherawaythancouldanyof theRoyalNavy’sships.Argentinahadover200fighterplanesofvarioustypes,includingfveofitsprocurementorderoffourteenSuperEtendardstrikefightersfromFrance.TheBritishcouldnothopetogetaquarterthatmanyplanestotheSouthAtlantic.Severaltypesofplanecouldtakeoff from the Argentine aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo. Others could strike from air bases inArgentina.TheBritishhadnosuchoption.Theirplaneswouldberestrictedtoaircraftcarriersuntilforceswereashore,atwhichtimetheBritishmightbeabletoestablishrefuellingandarmament locationsonland if conditions permitted. They held out no hope, however, of constructing any runway suitable forconventionaltransportorfighteraircraft.TheArgentineshadalsobeenpurchasingExocetmissilesfromFrance,whichtheycouldfreeitherfromairorland.Argentinegroundforcesweresizeable,numbering130,000, and even though seventy per cent of these were conscripts serving one-year hitches, theirsoldiersandmarinesconstitutedasignifcantfightingforce,especiallyconsideringArgentina’scapability

togetmeneasilyfromitsmainlandtotheFalklands.Suchaseeming imbalancebetweenmilitary forces (even ifArgentinahadsomeagedassets)and the

enemy’s proximity to the Falklandswere only part of the problem facing British decision-makers. Onehistorian says thatSecretaryNott believed itwould take fvemonths just tomount a suffcient force torespondtoaninvasionoftheFalklands.12AnotherindicatesNottfoundnocertaintythatanylargeBritishtaskforceevercouldretaketheislandsafteranArgentineinvasion.Itwasclearhewasdeeplyconcernedabout‘thelogisticalproblemsofoperatingatthisdistance’.13Notthimselfadmittedasmuchinapapersubmitted to a symposium focused on the twentieth anniversary of the war in 2002: ‘My own initialreactionwas that this was just not a viable logistic operation.’14 This hardly seemed an unreasonableconcernevengiventhebestofconditions.Projectingforcesandsustainingtheminbattleisnevereasy.Bothbecomeexponentiallymorediffcultiftimeisoftheessence,assetsarefew,andnoplansexist.SuchwasthesituationthatlaybeforeNottandhisMinistryofDefence(MoD).As an important member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Great Britain had made

commitments and developed detailed plans for parts of the northern hemisphere. Its military hadparticipated in many NATO and United States exercises over the years. British military units wereearmarked for specifc commitments in support of various contingencies.Within theNATO area, planswere in place with much detail. Additionally, supplies had been prepositioned not only in the UnitedKingdom,butalsoatkeylocationsincontinentalnorthernEuropetoassistpotentialdeployment,onwardmovement ofmilitaryunits, andengagement.Allied support andassistancewereavailable to shoreupshortages if theyoccurred.Likeothernations,Britainhaddevoteda substantial amountof itsmilitarybudgetandtrainingtowardNATO-typescenarios,specifcallytocounteraninvasionofWesternEuropebythe Warsaw Pact. Its military was quite well prepared to fulfil Britain’s commitment in the northernhemisphere.Thiswas not the case, however, outside theNATO area, in the southern hemisphere and elsewhere,

whereBritainhadreducedcommitmentsdrastically.When itcametotheFalklands in1982, theBritishfaced a situation that was at the other end of the spectrum from NATO preparedness. They had nocontingency plan developed if Argentina invaded. There was no militarily useful infrastructure in theFalklands, not even unpaved roads outside of Stanley. Aside from the several dozen Royal Marinesstationed in or nearStanley theBritish lackedwhatmilitary leaders term ‘forward presence’ near theFalklandIslands.Theyhadnoprepositionedmaterielanywhereinthearea,meaningquitesimplythat,iftheydecidedtocounteraninvasion,theBritishwouldhavetobringeverythingtheyneededwiththem.Theyhadnobases or airfelds in the area onwhich they could rely, either their ownor those of othercountries. Furthermore, Britain would likely receive no assistance from allies if it sent military unitssouth.MostcountriesinthesouthernhemisphereseemedlikelytoalignwiththeArgentinesandperhapsbecomeopenlyhostiletowardtheBritish.EvenmajoralliesliketheUnitedStatesmightbestandoffish,since theReaganadministrationwasactively trying tonourish relationswithArgentinaat the time. Inessence there were no supplies and no supporting services available anywhere between the UnitedKingdomand theFalklands.Thenearestpossible support baseavailablewasAscension Island, a smallBritishprotectorateinthemiddleoftheAtlanticOcean,almostexactlymidwaybetweenEnglandandtheFalklands.IthadanairfeldthatwasbeingleasedtoAmericans.Makingmattersstillworse,Britainhadpreciouslittletimeleftinwhichtothinkabouttheconsequences

ofanArgentineinvasion.EventhoughthestrengthofitsmarinesatStanleydoubledattheendofMarchasplatoonsrotatedinandoutforannualtours,suchasmallforcewouldhardlyevenconstituteaspeedbumpforasizeableenemy invasion.Militaryactionwouldrequirecommitmentofasubstantialsea-air-groundforce,rapiddeploymentofbothforcesandequipment,establishmentofasupplychainspanningthe Atlantic, and months of supplies. This surely weighed heavily on Nott and any others having toformulaterecommendationsforThatcher,particularlythosemindfulofallofthelogisticsimplications.Itisnothardtoimagineboththeirconcernsandtrepidationaboutputtingsuchadauntingmissionbeforetheirmilitary.The evening of Wednesday, 31 March, Nott finally requested an urgent meeting with Thatcher and

others. There was no question that some unusual activity was underway. There had been reports ofoverfights of the islands. An Argentine C-130 had even made an ‘emergency’ landing on the Stanleyairfeldrecently. IntelligencehadconfrmedforhimnowthatanArgentinenaval task forcewasheadingtowardtheFalklands,apparentlywiththepurposeofinvadingwithintwodays.15HewasintheprocessofdiscussingthegloomyscenarioandthebleakoptionswithThatcherandothersinherroomattheHouseofCommons,whenaknockonthedoorinterruptedthem.AdmiralHenryLeach,ChiefoftheNavalStaffwiththetitleofFirstSeaLordof theRoyalNavy,stood in thedoorway inhisnavaluniformandaskedpermission to attend the remainder of the session. Leach had just returned from a day trip to theAdmiraltySurfaceWeaponsEstablishmentandreadthelatestintelligencereports.HewasnotimpressedwithNott’s assessment andwas verymuch opposed to hisweak position on the situation.He and theSecretaryhadnothadacosyrelationship.Leach,infact,hadinfuriatedNottbylobbyingagainstcutstotheNavywiththeoppositionLabourParty.16Likesomeothers inthemilitary,Leachhadbeenkeepingclosetabsonwhatwasdeveloping.Hehad

heard about the meeting in the House of Commons and, although he was not invited, decided to goanyway.At thetime,asizeablepartofBritishnaval forceswereexercising intheMediterraneanunderthewatchfuleyeofhissubordinateAdmiralJohnFieldhouse,aformersubmarinerandnowCommander-in-ChiefFleet.LeachhadalreadycontactedFieldhouseonthesidetheweekbeforeandtoldhimtostartthinkingaboutmovingshipstotheSouthAtlantic.NowhewasgatecrashingthePrimeMinister’smeeting

toofferexactly thatsolution.Eventually,ThatcheraskedLeach forhisopinionon thesituation,andhetoldherwithoutequivocationthatBritain’sroleininternationalaffairswouldmatterlittleinthefutureifitdidnothing.Aftersomediscussion,Leachclaimedwithconfdence: ‘Icanputtogetherataskforceofdestroyers,frigates,landingsupportvessels.ItwillbeledbytheaircraftcarriersHMSHermesandHMSInvincible. It canbe ready to leave in forty-eighthours.’17His confidentassertionmusthave remindedsomepresentofGeorgeC.Scott’s renditionof the famousAmericangeneral in themoviePatton whenScott,portrayingPatton, toldBradley thathecouldmovehisarmoured forces150milesnorth in threedaystoreinforcesoldierssurroundedbyGermansatBastogne.Pattonhadtheadvantageatleastofsomemobility,ifonlyintheshapeofhismarchingtroops.Butunitscannotmarchacrosswater,andatthetimeBritainhadnotrooptransportstomoveitsmilitaryandfewcargo-compatibleshipstosupportthem,noteven a hospital ship. Leach’s claimmight have seemed even bolder to those in the meeting since hefurther statedwith the sameconfdence that theBritish task forcecould retake the islands if required,tellingThatcherallheneededwasherapproval.Sheandperhapsothersapparentlystillhadnotgraspedthechallengethatlayahead.WhenThatcheraskedLeachhowlongitwouldtakeforsuchaforcetoreachthe Falklands, he replied about three weeks. Clearly not grasping the distance and perhaps even thechallengestheUnitedKingdomwould face,Thatcherquestioned, ‘Threeweeks,youmeanthreedays?’,butLeachemphasized,‘No,Imeanthreeweeks.Thedistanceis8,000nauticalmiles.’18LeachleftthemeetingwithThatcher’sapprovaltoproceedwithplanning,althoughthePrimeMinister

withheldapprovaltoexecuteuntilshehaddiscussedmattersfurtherwithherCabinet.Shereservedforthemthedecisionifandwhenthetaskforcewouldsail.Leachhadnotconvincedhisdirectboss,though.NottremainedwithThatcheraftertheadmiral’sdeparture,expressedhisreluctanceandtoldthePrimeMinister he had many doubts about Britain’s ability to respond effectively, and specifcally ‘about thelogisticsoffightingawar8,000milesawaywithoutaircoverfromland-basedaircraft’.19Hecertainlyhadreasonsforconcern.Inthehistoryofwar,onewouldhavetosearchfartofndcomparablyboldventuresinforceprojection.NotthadreceivedcounselearlierfromPermanentSecretaryofDefenceFrankCooper,whenCooperpraisedBritishmilitaryprowessingoingtowar:‘John,whatyoumustrealizeisthatwarisreallyaboutgettingmenandequipmentfromAtoBandtheycanbebrilliantatit.’20NottwasabouttolearnthatCooperwasright.Thatcher,however,hadheardenoughtogiveherhopethatBritaincouldrespondeffectively.Leachhad

become the ‘manof thehour’both for thePrimeMinister thateveningand for theBritish inposterity.Withouthisintrusionintothemeetingandhisoptimisticassertionthathecouldmusterataskforcethatwouldwinifcalledupontodoso,itiscertainthattheArgentineflagwouldhavewavedmuchlongerovertheFalklands.Althoughhehadreceivednofrmdecision,LeachhadreceivedapprovalfortheMinistryofDefencetostartplanningthedeploymentofamulti-servicetaskforce.Thefollowingevening,Thatcherwasassessingthesituationagainwithadvisersat10DowningStreet.

ShesummonedAdmiralLeach,whothenwashostingadinnerpartyathisownresidence,tojoinherforcontinueddiscussionof the situation.ThatcherpressedLeachwithavarietyofquestions.Themeetinglasteduntiltheearlyhoursof2April,afterwhichLeachreturnedtotheMoDandadvisedtheActingChiefofDefenceStaff,‘SignalC-in-CFleettoprepareandsailtheTaskForce.’21HethenpickedupthephoneandcalledFieldhouse.Dispatchessoonarrivedatnavalunitsexercising in theMediterraneanorderingthemtostartconsolidatingintoabattlegroupandpreparetogosouthcovertly.Meanwhile,thousandsofmilesawayinthesouthernhemisphere,theArgentineinvasionplanhadbeen

setbackadaybecauseofastormatseaintheSouthAtlantic.Theweatherwassobadon31Marchthatnavyshipshadtoresorttoradiostosignaleachother.TheBritishinterceptedasignalforthesubmarineSantaFetoconductsurfacereconnaissanceof landingbeachesnearStanley.22TheynowknewforsurethataninvasionoftheFalklandswasimminent.ThefewdozenRoyalMarinesatStanleyhadlittlechanceof stopping the Argentines unless something catastrophic impeded the planned assault. They parkedvehiclesontheairfeldandspreadbarbedwireonnearbybeaches,anticipatingtheassaulttocomeeastofStanley. On the evening of 1 April, GovernorHuntwent to the radio station in Stanley and cautionedresidents, ‘It looksas though thesillybuggersmean it.’23Back inEngland, theheadline in the2Aprilearly edition of the Daily Mirror led with a brief article on the front page: ‘2am: Falkland invasion“imminent”.’Theheadlinewasaccurate.The invasion was over quickly on the morning of 2 April, brief firefights and a few explosions

notwithstanding. Instead of coming in from the east as anticipated, a hundred of Rear Admiral CarlosBusser’smarine commandos landed by infatable rubber boats about twomiles south of Stanley in thevicinity ofMulletCreek.They split into twogroups, oneheading toward theRoyalMarinebarracks atMoody Brook, which then were vacant because the men had taken up defensive positions closer toStanley, and theotherheading towardGovernmentHouse, the residenceofGovernorRexHunt.OtherArgentinemarineslandedonthebeachofYorkBayaboutamilenorth-westoftheStanleyairport.Theytoowere soon en route on the road from the airport to the town centrewith their armed amphibiousvehicles.Lessthanthreehoursfromfirstlandings,theArgentineforceshadsecuredGovernmentHouse,receivedGovernorHunt’ssurrenderandincarceratedtheBritishgarrison.Argentinesclearedtherunwayquickly.Their firstC-130 transportsstarted landingat theStanleyairfeldevenbeforeGovernorHunt’soffcial surrender, unloading up to a thousand soldiers from the Army’s 25th Infantry Regiment. Thatafternoon, another Argentine force arrived at South Georgia and overpowered the handful of RoyalMarines there, who although outnumbered managed to shoot down a Puma helicopter and damage afrigate.Bytheday’send,RoyalMarinespreviouslystationedintheFalklandsandGovernorHuntwereonplanesheadingbacktowardsBritain.

Amphibious operations were well planned and executed, just as the Argentine military had beenpractising in secret for the past couple of months. Soon over 10,000 Argentine marines and soldiers,mostly conscripts serving one-year terms, would fnd themselves on the islands to defend Argentina’sclaim to sovereignty.Asnewsof the successful invasion spread to cities throughoutArgentina,Galtieribecametheherohehadhopedtobe.MillionsofArgentinesstoppedthinkingabouttheeconomyandtheabusesof the Juntaand revelled in thegloryof finallyadding theMalvinas to their country.Onlydaysearlier,Galtieri’smilitaryforceshadbeenfringatsomeoftheseriotingcitizensinthePlazadeMayoindowntown Buenos Aires. Now that square was packed with citizens weeping in joy. As jubilation waserupting in the cities of Argentina, humiliating pictures of armedArgentine commandos standing atopRoyalMarines prostrate on the streets of Stanley started circulating throughout theworld, eventuallyinfamingtheBritishgovernmentandpublic.Argentinahad justset inmotionthepossibilityof the firstwaroutsideitslandbordersinoverahundredyears.TheJuntawasconfidentthatBritainwouldbaulkatthe daunting challenges of dispatching a military force to the South Atlantic. They expected seriousdialoguetostartsoonaboutsovereigntyoftheislands.A seriesof communiquéson thedayof the invasion startedchanging thewayof life for residentsof

Stanley,includingwhichsideoftheroadtheyshoulddrive.TheJuntawastednotimeputtinganArgentinestampontheirnewclaim.MajorGeneralOsvaldoJorgeGarcia, theoverallcommanderforthe invasionandnowactinggovernorof the islands,began tochange thenamesofstreetsandotherpublicplaces.Residents learnedtheir townnowwouldbecalledPuertoRiveroafteragauchonamedAntonioRivero,whohadkilledsomeoftheBritishin1833.24Severaldayslater,dignitariesarrivedfromBuenosAiresforaceremonyswearinginBrigadierGeneralMarioMenendezastheoffcialGovernoroftheMalvinas.Hismilitaryresponsibilitiesincludeddefenceoftheislands,eventhoughnooneatthetimeanticipatedthatsuchwouldbecomenecessary.Thousandsmoretroopsarrived,andtheconstructionofdefencesstarted,whilethenewgovernmentstartedrationingfuel,water,andutilitiesforresidents,aswellascontrollingradio broadcasts. Nearly half the residents of Stanley fed to outlying settlements. Those who stayedstartedidentifyingandreinforcingsafeareasforpersonalprotectionincaseofaBritishresponse.Itwasnotlong,however,beforeArgentinesdiscoveredtheFalklandscouldbeaharshplace.Residentsstartedseeingdozensofdeadsoldiersstackedlikecordwoodontracksoutsidethetown;theywerethefirstofmanyvictimsofexposuretothecoldandwetFalklandsclimate.25ItalsodidnottakelongfortheJuntatolearnthatitsmilitaryactionhadcreatedlittleeuphoriaoutsideofArgentina.Thedayaftertheinvasion,the UnitedNations passed a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces andcessationofhostilities,andurgingapoliticalsolution.Nonetheless,thesurrenderoftheFalklandsrockedBritainlikeamassiveearthquake.TheBritishwould

not understand the real situation on the ground for some time. The local radio station in Stanleysucceededintransmittingsomenewsastheinvasionwasunderway.TheythenlostcommunicationonceArgentinemarineslanded,stoppedtransmissionsandcuttelephonelines.Thatcherandherfellowleaderswouldknow fewspecifcsuntil theRoyalMarinesarrivedback inBritaina fewdays later. Itwasclear,though,thattheBritishnowwerestaringatapotentialcatastrophe.ThebrightsunnymorninginLondonon Friday, 2 April belied the gloom that was settling in government offces. Service chiefs advisingThatcher’scabinetthedayoftheinvasionofferedfrankassessmentsof‘logisticsproblemsposedbythedispatch of a South Atlantic task force’.26 Requirements would be staggering. Before the end of thatevening,though,allbutoneCabinetmembervotedinfavourofsendingaforcesouthBythentheMinistryofDefencehadalreadydesignateditscommanderstoleadthetaskforcesouthand

waswellonitswaytowardmusteringforcesanddeterminingsupportrequirements.ThefirsttoreceivetheoffcialwordwasRearAdmiralSandyWoodward,commanderoftheRoyalNavy’sFirstFlotilla,thenparticipatinginExerciseSpringtrainintheMediterranean.Hisimmediateboss,AdmiralFieldhouse,hadvisitedhim justdaysbefore,givenhimaheads-upabout thesituationdevelopingand toldhim tostartthinkingaboutheadinganavaltaskforce.At0300hrson2April,WoodwardreceivedthecommunicationssignalformallyorderingtheestablishmentofOperationCorporatetorecapturetheFalklands.27HewouldbecomeCommanderoftheCarrierBattleGroup.BrigadierJulianThompson,thecommanderoftheelite3CommandoBrigadeRoyalMarines,wasasleepathishomeneartheRoyalMarinebarracksatPlymouth,whenhisphonerangat0315hrs,justminutesafterthesignalreachedWoodward’sFlotillaHeadquarters.On the other end of the line was Thompson’s boss, Major General JeremyMoore, the Commander ofCommandoForcesRoyalMarines.Moore’smessagewassuccinct: ‘Youknowthosepeopledownsouth:they’reabouttobeinvaded.YourBrigadeistocometoseventy-twohours’noticetomovewitheffectfromnow.’28ThompsonwouldbecometheCommanderLandForce.CommodoreMichaelClappalsowoketoaphonecallat0500hrsthatmorningalertinghimtodevelopmentsintheFalklands.29Hehadjustreturnedfrom Denmark, where he and others had been planning a future amphibious exercise, and hiswhereaboutstooktimetodiscover.LaterthatdayhewouldbedesignatedCommanderAmphibiousTaskForce.Never before had he been involved in an amphibious operation. Itwould beWoodward’s job toestablishcontroloftheseaandskiesintheSouthAtlanticinordertoprotectandsupportthetaskforce;it would be Clapp’s to get land forces and supplies ashore at the right place and time during ananticipatedamphibiousassault; and itwouldbeThompson’s to securebeachesand then take the fightonwardtodefeattheArgentinesandre-establishBritishcontroloftheFalklandIslands.Each of the three commanders had very much to do. Lots of things needed to come together very

quickly for themtogetunitsassembled,supplied,movingsouth,andeventuallysustainedthousandsofmiles away for an undetermined length of time. The British had not taken on such challenges bythemselvesbefore.Theclockalsowastickingdownwardfromtheforty-eighthoursLeachhadpromised

Thatcher.Fortunately,wellbeforeearlymorningphonecallson2Apriltothenewlydesignatedtaskforcecommanders,wheelshadstartedspinningathigh levels toovercomesomeof the immensedeploymentchallengesandtoemplacealogisticsbackbonethatwouldsustainforcesatsea,intheair,andonlandintheSouthAtlantic.

U

Chapter2

MobilizationandDeployment

nlikeThatcher’sgovernment,whichseemedparalyzedintheirslowappreciationofthesituationand decision-making during March, the British military had been leaning forward. Gettinglogistics pieces in place would be key to sustaining any task force. Admiral Leach might have

beenwaiting foragreen light tomobilize troops,butheandsomeofhiscolleagueshadnotwaited tomakethefirstmovesinwhatwouldbecomeanimportantlogisticsbackboneforthewar.Discussionshadalreadystartedaboutwhattodo.Then,whenthe invasionhappenedandParliamentbackedThatcher’sdecisiontolaunchataskforce,aseriesofsimultaneousactivitiescommencedimmediatelythatremainswithoutparallel inmodern forceprojection.Britain’s responsewas swift, decisiveand, although surelyconfusingattimes,veryeffective.Itwasalsonoticeableimmediatelyincitiesandtowns.Peoplenosoonerhadreadnewspaperheadlineson themorningof2Aprilaboutan imminent invasion than theystartedwitnessing hubs of activity in many places. That mobilization remains one of the greatest strategicachievementsofthewarbecauseitenabledeverythingthatfollowed.Itallstartedratherdiscretelyandinvolvedmanyorganizationsworkingquicklyandtogether.

At the time,Britain’s lone ship in theSouthAtlantic,Endurance, only had provisions to last anotherthreeweeks.On27March,theRFAtankerAppleleaf, thenboundfromCuraçaototheUnitedKingdomwithafullloadoffuel,receivedorderstodiverttoGibraltar,toembarkgeneralstoresandthentoheadsouth.Twodayslater,theRFAstoresshipFortAustinreceivedsimilarorders.BothshipssailedpackedwithsuppliesnotjustforEndurancebutalsoascontingencyforothershipsthatmightfollowandneedsupport.Appleleaf andFortAustin became the first pieces in a logistics backbone at sea between theUnited Kingdom and the Falklands that would strengthen in the weeks ahead. In subsequent weeks,dozensmoresupportshipswouldfollowinthewakeofthesetwosupportvessels.

Thenextpiecesforthatlogisticsbackbonetooktotheair.AdozenC-130HerculescargoaircrafttookofffromRoyalAirForcebasesintheUnitedKingdomintheearlyhoursof3April,refuellinginplaceslikeGibraltarandDakarbeforelandingontheremoteislandofAscensioninthemiddleoftheAtlantic,ideallylocatedmidwaybetweentheUnitedKingdomandtheFalklands.AboardthefirstplanewasahandfulofNavypersonnelwiththemissiontosetupaforwardoperatingbaseonAscensionIslandforBritishforcesheadingsouth.ThatbasebecamethesalvationforBritishlogisticsandoperationalsustainmenttoforcesin the South Atlantic. The C-130s would start landing on Ascension later that day and commenceoffloadingdozensofpalletsofmilitaryequipmentastheadvancepartyrushedtofigureoutwheretoputthecargo.Hundredsmorecargoplaneswouldfollowintheirtrailsthroughoutthemonth.Fewinsideoroutsideofthemilitarynoticedtheseinitialmoves,aswellasactionsbehindthescenestostartprojectingforces.

Asthefirstshipsandcargoplaneswereheadingsouth,theBritishgovernmentandmilitaryatahighlevel were streamlining or ramping up their activities to focus on the Falklands. In the government atperiods of crisis, advice normally fowed upward to the Prime Minister through the Cabinet and aTransition to War Committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet and attended by permanentsecretaries of Government departments, specifcally to advise Ministers, implement war measures andcoordinateactions.TheirmilitaryadviceemanatedwithintheMinistryofDefencefromtheChiefsofStaffCommittee, attended by the senior officer of each military service. They in turn receivedrecommendations from the Defence Operations Executive Committee, attended by second-rankingmembers of the three military services and specifcally charged with responsibility for implementingcontingency or other theatre-specifc plans and for advising the Transition to War Committee. Thisstructure in 1982, however, was geared more toward NATO transition to war measures and deliberateplanning.ThesituationintheFalklandseliminatedtheluxuryofdeliberatediscussion.Toconfrontsuchasituationrequiringimmediateattention,PrimeMinisterThatcherformedaninnercabinetknownastheOverseasandDefence (SouthAtlantic)Committee, including theSecretaryofDefenceand theChiefofDefence Staff, Admiral Lewin, to provide military advice. Recommendations to this Committee, soonlabelledThatcher’sWarCabinet,nowwouldcomedirectlyfromtheChiefsofStaffCommittee.

TheDefenceOperationsExecutiveCommitteehadassembledjustpriortotheArgentineinvasion.Theymet twice on 1 April, though focused mostly on the suitability of Port Stanley airfeld. Not until thateveningdid theyconceiveplans fordeploymentofa task forcetoretakethe islands.At thesametime,militaryorganizationsrampedupforround-the-clockoperations.TheDefenceSituationCentrewithintheMoD became the focal point for actions to mount the military force out of Britain. It was the home ofCentralDefenceStaffs, itsoperationsarea locatedconvenientlyadjacent toroomshousingstaffsof thethreeservices.TheCentre’snormaltasksweretomonitorrelevantworldeventsaffectingBritishdefenceinterests,tocoordinatepositionsandprovideadvicetoseniormilitaryleaders,andthentoissueorderstothetaskforceimplementingtheirdecisions.Withothersupportingstaffs,itthentrackedthemultitudeofactionsthatnormallyfollowed.AkeypartoftheDefenceSituationCentrewastheDefenceOperationalMovementsStafforDOMS,anorganizationonlyactivatedforwartimeoremergencypurposes,ledbytwo

brigadiersandconsistingofjointmovement,airandsearesourcesupportstaffstooperate24/7.Itsmaintaskwastoplanoperationalmovementofunitsandsuppliesbasedonprioritieswithintheframeworkofthe Defence Operations Executive requirements and then to allocate, coordinate and task availablemilitaryserviceandcivilmovementresources.1AnotherkeyorganizationwasTransportandMovementsBranch of Headquarters, United Kingdom Land Force (UKLF). Its responsibilities included securingtransportation resources, providing loadingassistanceatports andcoordinating requirementsbetweenunits,depots,docksandairfelds.2Alloftheseofficesandotherswerestill intheprocessoframpingupwhenphonesstartedringingwitharushofrequirementstodeployunitsandsupplies.

ThesamewashappeningatFleetHeadquartersintheNorthwoodsuburbofLondon.Thestafftherehadbeen monitoring events more closely than most. Several days before the invasion, Admiral Leach hadinstructedAdmiralFieldhouse,theCommander-in-ChiefFleet,toalertWoodward’sfotillaparticipatinginExerciseSpringtrainintheMediterraneantopreparetoheadsouth.FieldhousewouldsoonbedesignatedtheCommander-in-Chiefoftheemergingsea-air-groundtaskforce.Assuch,hewouldresponddirectlytoAdmiral Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff and member of the War Cabinet. It was a responsibility forwhichneitherFieldhousenorhisstaffhadtrained.TheirregularrolewasmonitoringSovietsubmarineactivity approaching northern Europe and preparing to protect the fow of logistics ships between theUnitedKingdomandtheEuropeancontinent.Theywereexpectedtodealwithshipscomingintoserviceandoutofrefitormaintenance,andtoliaisefortaskssuchastraining,exercises,fisheryprotection,anddrugsmuggling.IfNATOtransitionedtoareinforcedalertstatus,Fieldhouse’sshipswouldbe‘chopped’tothestaffofNATO,whichwasconvenientlylocatednearbyinNorthwood.Hisstaff,asaconsequence,wassmallandsolelyconcernedwithpeacetimeoperations.Theylackedjointexperienceandassistanceby Royal Marines or British Army staff. They had no amphibious experience and thus no realunderstandingofwhatnowlayahead.

Quiteunderstandably,giventhedistancefromtheUnitedKingdomtotheFalklands,theinitialfocusformanyoftheseofficesduringthefirstweekswasonobtainingsuffcienttransportationtomoveforcesandsuppliessouth.Britainwashardlyinagoodposturein1982toprojectforces,althoughitcouldhavebeenworsebyfar.ThetimingoftheArgentineinvasionactuallyworkedtoBritishadvantageinsomeways.TheMoD’srecentreviewofmilitaryneedshadproducedsomebitterpillsfortheNavytoswallow.SomeoftheargumentshadcentredonwhethertheNavyshouldretainitsonlyLandingPlatformDocks,HMSFearlessandHMSIntrepid,whichservedvitalrolesintransportinglandingcraftandorchestratingcommandandcontrol for amphibious operations. Intrepid, at this time, was being prepared for a reserve role andpossible disposal. Fortunately, those and other amphibious transportation assets were still very muchavailable.Britain’slasttwoaircraftcarrierswereslatedforsale,butinApril1982bothremainedintheinventoryandwerelargelyready.TheaircraftcarrierHMSHermeswasinthesecondweekofasix-weekmaintenance schedule at the time. Some of her major systems had been dismantled as part of thisschedule,buttheRoyalNavycouldreversethatinahurry.Theotheraircraftcarrier,HMSInvincible,wasalongsideHermesatPortsmouth,eventhoughhercrewwasonleave.

ThesituationinBritishdockyardsinApril1982,however,hadbecomenearcatastrophicforworkingonshipsand launchingforces.TheDefenceReviewhadscheduledthedockyardsatPortsmouth,Chatham,and Gibraltar for closure. All three were key for refitting surface ships. Morale at these crucialdeployment locations had hit rock bottom. Such bitterness existed over closure decisions that whenSecretaryNottvisitedPortsmouthin1981hewasgreetedwitha‘hailofmetalboltsandotherdangerousmissiles’ashetriedtoaddressworkers.3Quiteclearly,hadtheArgentineinvasionoccurredtowardtheend of 1982 as originally planned, the readiness of dockyards would have been much less than in thespring. As it was, Portsmouth, Chatham, and Gibraltar became hubs of activity following decisions todeploythetaskforce.ThatisbecausethebiggestchallengefacingtheBritishin1982involvedthelackofshippingtoaccommodate thedeploymentofboth forcesandthe thousandsof tonsofsuppliesand fuelneededtosustainataskforcesailing8,000milessouthtofightforanunknownperiodoftime.Somethinghad tobedone toadd ships to the inventoryof theRoyalNavy.Again, action started immediatelyandeffectively.

ANavalStaffAdvisoryGroupconvenedonthedayoftheinvasiontoassesssealiftcapabilities,toadviseonoptions,andultimatelytosolvetheshipshortageproblem.TheGroupwasconcernedoverallaboutthesize and readiness of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), a civilian-operated agency in the MoD withresponsibilityfortwenty-sevensupportships.Morethanhalfweretankers.Onewasahelicoptersupportvessel. Others performed various supply roles. The most important vessels within the RFA at this timewithoutdoubtweresixspecialityshipsnamedaftertheKnightsof theRoundTable.KnownasLandingShipsLogisticorLSLs,eachcouldcarryover300troops,sixteenmainbattletanks,thirty-fourassortedvehicles,and150tonsoffuelandammunition.Theyweredesignedtounloadtheircargoontobeachesfrom ramps at either the bow or the stern. Helicopters could operate from their decks. Up to twentyhelicopters could be stowed on board each ship in place of tanks and vehicles. Of the six, four wereavailable almost immediately and could sail within a matter of days. Sir Geraint was at Devonportpreparingforrefit.SirLancelotandSirPercivaleweredueinhomewaterson3April.SirGalahadwasscheduledbackon4AprilfromaRoyalMarinesexerciseinNorway.Twootherswerefurtherawayandwouldhavetosaillater:SirTristramwasinBelize,andSirBediverewasreturningfromVancouver.Thesesix logistics ships and the Landing Platform Docks Fearless and Intrepid were irreplaceable for anyamphibious landing. They also had the capability of carrying fat-topped, self-propelled barges calledmexefotesstrapped to their sides.Theseshallow-draftplatforms, roughlysixty feet longby twenty-fourfeet wide, provided transport of supplies to shore and around beaches. Not surprisingly, though,

mexefotes hanging from sides of LSLs in rough seas caused concern to captains because of potentialdamagetotheLSLandtheireffectonstability.Captainswerepreparedtoditchthemifnecessary.

TheLSLsand the rest of theRFA,however,were insuffcient tomeet theneedsof a large task forceoperating8,000milesaway.Theimmediateproblemforplannerscentredonthelackofshippingtomoveseveralthousandtroopsandthemountainsofsuppliesthatsoonwouldbefowingfromdepotsintoportsofdeparture.Themilitaryhadnopassengerandfewcargoships.Servicesnowneededtheminahurrytotransport thousands of men with their equipment and supplies. They also required support ships tosupplementtheRFAinordertosustainalargenavaltaskforceatsea.Andsoon2April,theNavalStaffAdvisory Group started its first meetings to discuss requirements and fnd solutions. The meetingsnormally occurred multiple times a day for the first weeks, and continued into the next month, oftenincludingcommercialshipownersortheirrepresentatives.Theyunarguablyproducedsomeofthemostimportant discussions, cooperation and decisions of the entire war. Their purpose was to acquirecommercial shipping and to coordinate modifcations to the ships as required for the military’s forceprojectionrequirements.

TheBritishBoardofTradehadbeenkeepingmeticulousrecordsofBritish-fagshippingforyears.Planshadbeen inplace for some time touse roll-on roll-off ships to reinforce thenorthern fankofNATO inNorwayifhostilitieserupted.Mattersathand,however,requiredmorethanafewships.ContainershipsoperatingintheirtraditionalfashionwouldnotbehelpfulsincetherewerenofxedportfacilitiesenrouteorintheFalklands,quiteunlikethesituationinnorthernEurope.Themilitarynowneededawiderangeofshipsquicklytohelpprojectandsustaintheforce.

TheprerogativeoftheBritishgovernmenttorequisitionshipsfromtradehadbeenestablishedunderEnglishCommonLaw for centuries,datingback to thekingdom’sparticipation in theCrusades. Ithadusedthisprerogativealreadyinthetwentiethcentury,duringbothworldwarsandintheSuezCampaignin 1956, but had not exercised such authority since then. Again, the British wasted no time in takingactioninresponsetotheArgentineinvasionon2April.Thatsameday,telephonecallswerebeingmadebehind the scenes to shipping companies to verify discreetly the capabilities of certain ships. TheSecretaryofStatereceivedtheproposaltorequisitionshipsfromtradeon3April.TheQueensignedtheorderon4April,andtheDepartmentofTradeoriginated the firstorder foraship thatverysameday.ThoseshipssoonbecameknownasSTUFTfor‘ShipsTakenupfromTrade’.Inthenextcouplemonths,atotal of fifty-four such ships would be requisitioned for military use from thirty-three different civiliancompanies.

Thereweretwooptionsforacquiringcommercialsealiftcapability:bycharterorbyrequisition.Sincemostmerchantshipsalreadywouldbeconductingbusinessundercontractsatthistime,theprospectofcharteringcommercialshipsatshortnoticewasnothopeful.Cruiselinersandferries,forexample,werealreadybookedforsummerseasonvoyages.Somewere inthemidstofvoyages, fullofguestswhohadpaidhandsomepricesfortheirsuites.Therewasnotimetowaitforthosecruisestoend.NorwastheretimeforcargoshipstocompletetheirdeliveriesthroughoutnorthernEurope.Thatlefttheprimaryoptionof requisitioning ships from trade. Ship owners were ready to cooperate. They, in fact, preferred therequisitioning option since it provided them with a legitimate reason to cancel contracts or bookingsalreadysignedwithcustomers.

Requisitioning ships was the simple part of the process. Getting those ships unloaded and moved toBritishports for reconfguration, determiningwhatneeded to changeon eachof them tomeetmilitaryrequirements,gettingmaterialstoportstoenablereconfguration–allofthisbecameacomplex,real-timecommunicationprocessthathadtohappenquicklytofacilitatethefastdeploymenttimeline.EachSTUFTwould requiremodifcation, sometimesquite extensive. Initial expectationswere for themovement of atwo-commando force. Those numbers more than tripled before deployment, signifcantly increasing theneed formerchant shipping.TheDirectorateofNavalOperations, supportedcloselybyDOMS,workedwithmilitarydepartments,representativesoftheDepartmentofTradeandshipownerstoaddressneedsandchallenges.TheDirectoratefocusedonshipstosupporttheRoyalNavyfeet.DOMSfocusedonshipsto support the deployment of the task force with its supplies and equipment. Discussion at meetingspivoted on planned operational roles for ships, modifcation requirements to meet military needsestablished by planners in the MoD, eventual crew composition, loads to be carried, and much more.Attendeesdecideddetailedtimingsandproceduresforwhatneededtoberefitted,wheretheworkwouldtakeplace,andwhichunitsorequipmentwouldbeloadedandwhen.Attheconclusionofeachmeeting,confrmationofdecisionswasrecordedanddisseminated.ThenDOMSdevelopeddetailedassessmentsofbids for cargo movement and loading requirements, eventually passing instructions to ship loadingauthoritiesatportswhointurnconductedpre-stowexercisestokeepcargoshut-outstoaminimum.4Inlater discussions, the subject of insurance became a serious concern. Those discussions were not assimpleasdecidingonfeesforuse.Whatwouldhappen,forexample,ifashipwasdamagedordestroyed?Shipsarenotmanufacturedovernight.Howwouldcompaniesreplacetheirabilitytogeneraterevenueiftheynolongerhadashipafterthewarwasover?Manyquestionsresulted.Nonedelayedthecommitmentofcompaniestosupportthedeploymenteffort.

Theprimarycriterionwhenassessingshipsfromtrade,ofcourse,wasthespecifcmilitaryrequirement,be it for passengers, cargo, fuel, repair capability or something else. But there were several otherconsiderations of critical importance, including range, endurance, practicality, seaworthiness andsurvivability. The latter consideration dramatically separated military from commercial ships. Warshipscannormallystayafoatinconditionsofmoderatewindandwaveswiththreetofourcompartmentsfoodedbetween traversebulkheads; commercial shipsare far lesscapable.5Decisionsweremade early not to

arm any ships taken up from trade. There simply were not enough 20mm or 40mm weapons systemsavailable.6ButeachSTUFTshipneededsomeminimumnavalcommunicationscapabilityviaUltraHighFrequencyandmilitarysignallers.Allmerchantshipshadtobeconvertedsotheycouldberefuelledatsea, a capability not necessary in the conduct of their commercial businesses. Most had not operatedsatellitenavigationsystems,especially if their focuswas limited to transiting theEnglishChannel.Theneedforextendedrangenowmeantthatmerchantships’ballasttanks,normallyusedtomaintainstabilitybybeing flledwithsaltwater,wouldhave tobe flledwith fuel toprovide range.Theseshipswouldnolonger be able to ballast down with salt water as fuel was used, leaving them particularly unstable inroughseas.Manywouldleavewithrepositioneddraftmarkingstoaccountfortheiradditionalfuelloads.SomealsowouldsailfromEnglandwithtwoorthreetimesmorelifeboatsandexemptionsfromnormalcertifcation rules restricting the number of personnel on board. No effort was made to repaint orcamoufagetheships,asidefrompaintingovercompanylogosonfunnels.GovernmentpolicydictatedthatonlyBritish-fagvessels couldbeusedand thatonlyBritishnationals could serveascrew.ThosecrewsenteringtheSouthAtlanticwouldreceivea150percentpaybonus.7

Onceshipswereselectedforrequisition,theNavy’sShipDepartmentatBathassumedresponsibilityfordetailingthespecifcdesignforretrofit.TheDepartmentownedoneoftheworld’smostadvanceddesignsystemsat the time.Survey teams from theShipDepartment visited ships inports as far awayas theIndian Ocean to assess further modifcation requirements and to develop designs that would maintainstability inSouthAtlanticwinterseas.Therewas little time fordetaileddesigns, though.Survey teamshad responsibility to make best judgments on site and telephone them back to the Ship Department,wheredecisionsweremadeonthespot.InthecaseofthepassengershipCanberra,thefirstvesseltobetaken up in order to add troop-lift capability quickly for 3 Commando Brigade, surveyors essentiallyredesignedthedeckonthebackofanenvelope,telephoningresultsbacktoEnglandsothattheNavalOverseercouldarrangeforVosperThornycrofttofabricatetwofive-tonstructuresbeforetheshipevenarrivedinEnglandforretrofit.8Atthetime,CanberrawasintheMediterraneannearGibraltarwithafullcomplement of passengers at the end of a world cruise. Representatives from the services and thegovernmentboardedtheshipdiscreetlyatGibraltar.CanberrasteamedtowardSouthampton,arrivingon6 April, disembarking passengers and then starting extensive modifcations, just four days after theArgentineinvasion.

TheBritishlackedacapablehospitalshipatthetime.TheonlyvesselintheRoyalNavyearmarkedasapotentialhospitalshipwastheQueen’sRoyalYachtBritannia.Butbecausesherequiredspecialfurnacefueloiltooperateandhadonlya200-bedcapacity,plannersdeemedherunsuitabletosupportthetaskforce.TherewerenofriendlyplacestoprovidemedicalsupportinthevicinityoftheFalklandscloserthanMontevideo, Uruguay, 1,000 miles to the north-west. The inability to care for potential casualtiestherefore led to the requisitioning of the cruise ship Uganda. At the time, Uganda also was in theMediterranean, at Alexandria in Egypt, on an educational cruise carrying a thousand school children.After her owners received requisition instructions on 10 April,Uganda proceeded to Naples to unloadthosechildren,andaBathsurveyteam,engineersfromtheownersP&O,andaconsultantsurgeonwentaboard. Uganda then headed to Gibraltar for modifcations to accommodate a major surgical facility,clinicsand laboratories to treatpatients,aswellashelicopterdecks to receivecasualties.Freshwaterwouldbeessential,butUgandalackedtheabilitytoproduceiteitherfordrinkingorwashing.Thereforeadding such capability took high priority. Conversion ofUganda at Gibraltar, complete with Red CrossmarkingstoadheretotheGenevaConvention,occurredatapacecomparabletothatofCanberra, inamere sixty-five hours. While such modifcations were nearing completion, a 135-person medical teamboardedUgandatohelpstore90tonsofmedicalsuppliesforthenew250-bedfoatinghospital.

Concurrently, dozens of other ships steamed toward shipyards as decisions and dock berths becameknown.Foreveryfourvesselsinspectedforuse,onlyonewasactuallytaken.Halfwerecharteredandhalfrequisitioned.AweekfollowingtheQueen’sapprovaltorequisitionships,theDepartmentofTradehadalready requisitioned a dozen. By the end of the month, it would requisition another thirty. Eventuallythesecommercialshipsoutnumberedwarshipsinthetaskforce.Theyincludedshipsretrofttedtocarryammunition, to be minesweepers, to serve as repair ships and aircraft ferries, and more. Seventeenmerchant tankers served roles as convoy escort oilers, auxiliary support and storage. One merchanttankerwascharteredfromCanadianPacifctohaulwater.

MostSTUFTspentlessthanaweekinshipyardsbeforesailingintheirnewconfguration.Theaverageconversion time per ship was seventy-two hours for ninety-five per cent of the work.9Norland was atypical largeshipconversion.Shewastransformedinlessthanfourdays,completewithtwohelicopterpads as well as facilities to accommodate an 800-man parachute regiment. Surely the most famousrequisitionwasofQueenElizabethIIorQE2.Shewastakenupfromtradeon4May,justnineteenhoursbefore she was set to sail to the Mediterranean with a full complement of cruise passengers. Thecontainer ship Atlantic Conveyor, owned by Cunard Steam Ship Company, would become the mostinfamous.Shewastakenupfromtradeon14AprilatLiverpooltobeanaircraftferryandcargoship.AteamstartedredesignworkaboardherasshesailedtoPlymouthforfullretroft.Directionsfollowedforthemanufactureofsteelpanelsweighingffteentonsapiece.10UponarrivalatDevonport,workersclearedobstructions around her hatches, and installed panels for landing complete with lighting. She sailedeleven days later on 25 April. Upon departure, Atlantic Conveyor’s holds were packed with criticalsupplies. Aircraft lined her top deck. Containers stacked four high on each side of the upper deckprovidedadhocprotectionforthoseaircraft.ShewasfullycapableofcarryingandfyingoffHarrierjetsandlargeChinookhelicopters.Herconversionprovidedanimpressivedisplayofwhatdockworkersand

steelworkerscoulddoinshortorder.Butunfortunately,AtlanticConveyorwouldnotreturntotheshoresofEngland.

Thecomplicatedprocessoftakingtheseshipsupfromtradetoservemilitarypurposesranksasoneofthe most impressive strategic successes of the war. Executives from industry worked with the Britishgovernmenttomakeshipsavailableandauthorizemodifcations.Thespeedwithwhichshiprequisitionsoccurred and the extent of both requisitions and modifcations were vital to the successful deploymenteffort.Withoutindustryandgovernmentpullingtogethertosolveshipshortages,BritaincouldneverhavegonetowarovertheFalklandsasitdid.

Getting requisitioned ships ready was complicated, but it was not the only piece of the deploymentpuzzle.Theseships,likeallothers,hadtomarryupwithunits,equipmentandsuppliesatprecisetimesfor loading. If they were cruise ships, they also had to replace inventories already loaded for cruisepassengers. Troops who boarded such ships would not be dining on steaks and caviar. Pursers had toorderbulkquantitiesof food,notnecessarilyknowinghowmanytroopstheywouldbecarryingorhowlongshipswouldbeatsea.Theywouldnotbeabletosupplementfoodshortagesatthenextportofcall.TherewouldbenoseparatesupplychainofgoodsforthemintheSouthAtlantic.Theacquisitionofships,determinationofwhere theyshouldproceed formodifcationandprocurementofnewstocksall startedsimultaneously,asmilitaryunitsrushedtoassembleandtomovesuppliesfromdepotsallovertheUnitedKingdom.

Determiningwhichport tousewasnotasobviousas somewouldhave thought.MarchwoodMilitaryPort, for example, provided unique opportunities, including excellent security to enable covertdeploymentsandlargeholdingareasforstagingequipmentandammunition.ItwasthehomeoftheRoyalCorps of Transport’s 17 Port Regiment and the base for the six LSLs. Since they were under militarycontrol, Marchwood Military Port and the Royal Navy Dockyards were not legally bound by normalrestrictionsonexplosivelimits.Theyhandledwhatevercargotheyneeded.11Marchwoodwouldhavebeenagoodlocationforsomeoftheaddeddeploymentrequirements,particularlysinceitwasalsoservicedbyrail.Unfortunately, the facilitywasnearlyahalfacenturyoldandofferedbutasingle jetty,capableofacceptingonlytwoships.12ShipsbeingtakenupfromtradehaddraftstoodeepforMarchwoodanyway.Theyhadtogoelsewhere.

It was first thought that commercial dockyards could be used, but after consideration of facilities,availablelabourandotherresources,RoyalNavydockyardsbecamethefocalpointsforconversions.ThevastmajorityofSTUFTheadedtoPortsmouthandDevonport,withothersgoingtoGibraltarandRosyth.Ironically,onthedayoftheinvasion,workersatPortsmouthhadreceivedtheirlay-offnoticesasaresultofthepreviousdecisionstodownsize.13PortsmouthnonethelessledthewaywithatleastoneSTUFTonhandfrom8Aprilto21May.Thedockyardconvertedacombinedtotaloftwenty-fivefreighters,tankers,tugs,andshort-sea ferries.Devonport converted fewerbut theywerebetterknown:AtlanticConveyor,AtlanticCauseway,ContenderBezantandAstronomer.Rosythconverted trawlers tominesweepersandrefittedotherSTUFTintosupportanddispatchvessels.ChathamDockyardworkshopssentmetalworkforconversionsatPortsmouthandDevonport.14Thesedockyardsweresooncrammedwithtrucksflledwithsupplies,asevenmoreloadsbackedupoutsidegates.Giventherushtogetsuppliesonshipsinthefirstdays, 3 Commando Brigade would become its own loading authority. Afterwards, UKLF assumed thoseimportantresponsibilities,especiallyfortheloadingofshipstakenupfromtrade.DOMS,inconjunctionwith the Department of Trade, would conduct a rough pre-stow for each ship. The designated loadingauthoritywouldfne-tunetheplanduringapre-stowexercisetoreducecargoshutouts,andDepartmentofTraderepresentativesthenwouldworkwithunitsandshipmasterstoensurecargoandloadswerewithinsafetyparameters.15

WhenBrigadier JulianThompson,Commanderof3CommandoBrigadeRoyalMarines,waswokenbyphoneintheearlyhoursof2Aprilandtoldtopreparehisforcesfordeployment,hewaslargelyunawareof the extent of such high-level actions to put transportation solutions in place to move his men. Hisbrigadehadreceivedsomealertswithoutspecifcstogetreadyoverthepastfewdays.Nowhehadlittletime toworry about logistics challenges at thenational level to enablehismen todeploy.Hismarineswereaccustomedtobeingalertedforcontingencies.Theynormallyoperatedonleadtimesofsevendaysfordeployment.Nowtheyhadabouthalfthat.Heandhiscommandershadmuchtodoontheirownasthestrategicplanningmachineryabovethemchurnedtoputpiecesinplacetodeployforcesandenablethem to win on the battlefeld if the situation in the Falklands eventually led to war. They were at asignifcantdisadvantage,though,astheystartedtopulltogetherunitsandplanwhattodo.GroundforceactionintheFalklandspresupposedthattheBritishwouldconductanamphibiouslandingsomewhereonthe islands, certainly one of the most diffcult military operations to conduct even under the best ofcircumstances.Thompson’sforceswerewellpractisedinsuchoperations.Normally,however,theywouldexpect to have some description of the basics for deployment, including their anticipated mission, theavailability of shipping to transport them to the area of operations, some details about the enemysituation,possiblelandingsites,andmore.Theyhadnoneofthisinformation.TheonlyplanningdirectivetheyhadwastheordertoThompsontobringhisforcestobereadytodeployinseventy-twohours.

Brigadier Thompson, a keen student of military history, was highly respected by his rank and flemarines,whowereamongthebestfightersanywhereintheworld.RoyalMarinecommandoshadtrainedfor years in Norway, both in winter and summer. The Brigade was Britain’s designated landing forcecontribution toamphibious forcesof theNATOalliance.Hismenwereseasonedandexceptionallywelltrained for fighting in all kinds of weather. Operating in the Falklands, however, would bring newchallenges for them, and particularly for those involved in tactical logistical support. Thompson’s 3

Commando Brigade was part of a two-star command called Commando Forces Royal Marines, led byMajorGeneral JeremyMoore, a verydifferentpersonality tohis subordinateThompsonbut alsohighlyrespected.Hehadcommanded3CommandoBrigadejustafewyearsbeforeandwasnowabouttoretire.MoorewouldbecomeAdmiralFieldhouse’sdeputyforplanningduringthedeployment.Hisdeputychiefofstaff,whodirectedadministrationand logistics forCommandoForces,wasColonel IanBaxter,RoyalCorpsofTransport.Baxterwouldbecome thedriving forcewithinCommandoForcesRoyalMarines toensure3CommandoBrigadehadwhatitneededtodeployontime,bothintermsofsuppliesandsupport.

In peacetime, use of the full military supply system is a rarity, not just in the United Kingdom butelsewhere.Timeandcostsaresimplytoogreat.Asaresult,unitsoftenconductFieldTrainingExerciseswith notional stocks, which seldom create a feel for the magnitude of logistics challenges. The RoyalMarineswerenoexception.ButBaxterappreciatedthethousandsoftonsthathadtobemoved,andhehad worked to educate commando units. Just the summer before, he had arranged for three days ofsupplies for 42 Commando to be dumped in its square at the Royal Marines’ Bickleigh Barracks atPlymouth.Itwasaneye-openingexperienceformenoftheBrigade.Afterotherssawthestacksofpalletsin the barracks yard of 42 Commando, word travelled fast among the marines. Also during the yearprecedingtheinvasion,Baxterhadledvisitstodepotsholdingcommandowarreservesandcoordinatedthe rotation of stocks to ensure none were outdated. These initiatives proved invaluable in improvingpreparednessforwhatwasnowunfolding.The42Commandostoresthatshowedupinthesquarethatday represented a fraction of the 9,000 tons of war reserves earmarked for 3 Commando Brigade fordeployment,allofwhichnowhadtomovequicklyoutofdepotsaroundtheUnitedKingdom.

War reserves for theRoyalMarinesweremaintainedat the timebothon seaand land.Thoseat seawereaboardtheLSLSirGeraint,whichhadjustberthedatCrombietwenty-fourhoursearlierforthefirsttimeinfouryearsforroutinestockturnoverandtransfertoanotherLSL.Geraintwasnownearlyempty.Fortunately,resourcestoreloadsupplieswerecloseathand,andtheLSLwassoonreloadedandreadytodeploy.ThevastmajorityofotherwarreserveswerespreadamongdepotsaroundtheUnitedKingdomrunby theRoyalArmyOrdnanceCorpsandRoyalNavy.Thirtydaysofwar reservesupplieswerepre-packedbycommodityontoone-tonpallets,segregatedinthedepotsandontheoneLSL.Whereasstockson the LSL were always ready except during turnover, depot stocks were normally held at seven daysnotice for issue. The war reserve was further divided into assault packs for the commandos and thensubdividedtoprovidesuppliesfortwo,eightandtwentydaysforammunition;fiveandtwenty-fivedaysforrations;andtenandtwentydays formostothersupplies.16Thisprovided fexibility for issue. Italsoenabledthesuppliestomoveinmultipledirections.Thefirst-linesuppliesheadedtotheunitareasonunittransport and the second-line supplies on Brigade transport. Theatre-level and commercial transportroutinelymovedstocksdirecttoshipsforloading.

Baxter made his first call to the UKLF G3 Transport and Movement Branch at 0900 hrs on 2April,asking for immediate assistance to move the assault packs for 3 Commando Brigade from depots atKineton,BicesterandDonningtontoshippinganticipatednearPlymouthandRosyth.17Withintwenty-fiveminutes,thefirstvehicleswereontheroadtoassist.Forhoursafterthat,trucksofvarioustypesweremovingbackand forth fromdepots tostart thepositioningof tensof thousandsof tonsof supplies,allwithout planners knowing which ships would eventually be available for the deployment or where. By1700hrsthatday,nearly150trucksweresupplementing3CommandoBrigade’s limitedtransportationresources. In thedaysahead,help came frommoremilitaryandcommercial truckersaroundEngland.Commercial haulagebecameparticularly essential since the railwayshad insuffcient time to repositionassetstoassistmovementsforthefirstweek.MileagetravelledduringthesefirstdaysbytrucksfromtheCommando Logistic Regiment alone equated to driving to the Falkland Islands and back seven times.UKLFeventuallyutilized1,500trucksofvarioussizestomeetthedemandsformovement,includingover100vehicleshiredfromcommercialcarriers.Containersplayednoroleinthemovementofsupplies.Allcargomovedeitheronpalletsorlooseinpacks,whatiscommonlyreferredtoasbreak-bulk;andalotofsmallerpackagesmovedhand-over-handupramps,downcorridorsandintostorageareas.Supplydepotsdispatched a million operational ration packs and twelve million normal meals; nearly 10,000 tons ofammunition;1,260 tonsofPOL;and3,880 tonsofordnancestores.A largepartofallof itwas loadedwithinseventy-twohours.Beforethefulldeploymentwasover,awhopping38,000tonswouldmovefromdepotsthroughouttheUnitedKingdomtoshipsforloading.18

Whenthecallcametodeploy,andsuppliesstartedheadingtheirway,3CommandoBrigadewastrulyinthepositionofstartingcold.Assemblingpersonnelwasnoteasy:42Commandowasdispersedonleavethroughout the country after recently returning from an exercise in Norway, and twenty-five of itscommandoswereoutofcountry;40CommandohadjustfnishedannualweaponstrainingnearLiverpool;45CommandowasinScotlandabouttogoonleave,andoneofitscompanieswasinHongKongenroutehomefromBrunei.TheCommandoLogisticRegimentwasinthePlymoutharea,justbackfromweeksoftraining in Norway and scheduled to go on block leave the following day. Most of the 3 CommandoBrigade staff was on reconnaissance in Denmark for a future exercise. They started heading backimmediately towardPlymouth,whereStonehouseBarrackswas thehomeof3CommandoBrigadeandnearbyHamoazeHousewasthehomeofCommandoForcesRoyalMarines.HamoazeHousesoonbecamethehubofactivity forseniorMarinecommandersandstaffworking tomakesenseofwhat they faced.Theydidnothavemuchtogoby.AsmarinesstartedheadingtowardPlymouth,thesituationdownsouthbecameclearerthough.Theylearnedat1030hrson2AprilthattheArgentinesinfacthadinvadedtheFalklands.19

Thatevening,3CommandoBrigadestaffarrivedbackfromDenmark.CommodoreMichaelClapp,the

commander of the Amphibious Task Force that would include the ships transporting Thompson’s LandForce, joined the Marines at Hamoaze House, the Headquarters of Commando Forces Royal Marines.ColleaguesdescribedClappasaquiet leader‘withadevastatinglycalmmannerunderallconditions’.20

Hewouldgetplentyoftimetodemonstratethatinthenextthreemonths.PlanningbystaffsfrombothCommandoForcesand3CommandoBrigadecontinuednon-stopatHamoazeHouse for thenext threedays;3CommandoBrigadestartedmovingitswarreservesfromdepotsthroughouttheUnitedKingdomwithoutknowingwhatshipseventuallywouldbeavailableorwhichportshouldreceivethesupplies.Thatinformationbecamesteadilymoreavailableinhoursanddaysahead.Themachineryofmakingithappen,however,couldnotwaitonall thedetails.Plannershadnoappreciationyetofhow large theoperationwouldbecometoretaketheFalklands.Theyhadlittleintelligenceabouttheenemy.Theyhadtogazeintocrystalballs to agreat extent todecidewhat to take, knowing fullwell itwouldbediffcultmakingupshortageslaterwhentheywere8,000milesfurthersouth.Initialplanscalledfortendaysofsupplyofwarreserves. That changed to thirty, then forty-five, and eventually settled at sixty. Some critical suppliesweresimplynotavailable,though.WhenBaxteraskedsomeonetopostamapoftheFalklandsonthewallofHamoazeHouse,thestaffcouldnotfndasinglegriddedmap.ThenextdayhecalledtheRoyalMarineMappingCentretogetthousandsofmapsmadeasquicklyaspossible.Thosemapseventuallywouldbeparachutedtothetaskforcewhileatsea.

Fortunately for everyone, the Royal Marines had a major in their ranks whose knowledge of theFalklandswas comprehensive, if not evenphotographic.MajorEwenSouthby-TailyourhadcommandedtheplatoonofMarinesintheFalklandsinthepast.Hewasalandingcraftspecialistandyachtsmanwhohad charted the coastlines of the main islands in the archipelago while posted there. According toassociates,helookedatbeacheswithlandingcraftapproachesinthebackofhismind.Southby-Tailyourwas not part of 3 Commando Brigade at the time of the invasion. It is not surprising, however, thatThompsoncalledhimearlyon2April,askedhim to rounduphismapsandprepare to starteducatingmarines at Hamoaze House. He also agreed, at the major’s insistence, to take him along. Thompsoncommentedafterthewar,‘IfIwastonameonemanwhoseknowledgeandexpertisewasirreplaceableintheplanningandconductintheamphibiousoperationsIwould,withouthesitation,nameEwenSouthby-Tailyour.’21

Southby-TailyourrushedtoHamoazeHousewithhisarmsfullofmaterialandhadsoonsetupmapsanddisplaysoftheFalklands.HethenstartedthefirstofmanybriefngsfortheTaskForceandothersovercomingweeks.Itishardtooverstatejusthowlittlemostofthoseassembledknewabouttheislandsthen.Asoneyoungmarineadmittedabouttheinvasion,‘EveryonewaslookingupatScotland,andwonderinghowtheArgentinianshadgotupthere.Honestly,everyonewassaying,“AretheFalklandsinScotland?”’22

Thereweremenmuchseniortohim,nowsittingdowninHamoazeHousetolistentoSouthby-Tailyour,who were comparably uninformed, although they might not have mistaken the Falklands for theShetlands. And so Southby-Tailyour started saturating them with information about coastlines,temperatures, winds, terrain, infrastructure, inhabitants, communication, and much more. The salientpointsforplanningwhattotakeatthistimehadtobesomewhatintimidating.IntheFalklandstherewerenoroadstospeakof.Thecountryconsistedmostlyofpeatbogs,makingvehicletravelallbutimpossible,whilemassiverunsofrockmadeoverlandtravelbyfootslow,probablynoisy,andtreacherousinplaces.Therewaslittleoverheadcoveranywhereontheisland,fewtreesoutsideofStanley,very littlepotablewater, andwindswhichblewconstantly at the rate of ffteen to twenty knots.Communicationwith theoutside world was limited mostly to ham radios. Year-round temperatures on the island were roughlycomparabletoNorway,andalthoughthecommandoshadtrainedinNorwayoften,theydidnotdosoformonthsonend.Fighting in theFalklandsmeant that,onceashore,menwouldcarrymostofwhat theyneededontheirbacksoverexposed,openterrain.Andwhatevertheytooktheycouldnotreplaceeasily,sincetheywouldbefightingattheendofan8,000-milelogisticaltether.

BasedonsuchinitialknowledgeoftheFalklandIslands,plannersdecidedthatitwasnotworthwhiletodeploymanyofthevehiclesintheBrigade,onlythosewheeledvehiclesthatcarriedessentialequipmentlikeradiosordefencesystems.WheeledvehiclessimplywouldnotbeabletotravelacrosstheanticipatedboggyterrainoftheFalklands.Theywouldhavetocompeteforspaceonlandingcrafttobelandedandrelocated. Although 3 Commando Brigade would normally deploy with over a thousand vehicles, theBrigadeagreedontakingonlyfifty-fourprimemoversandninemotorcycles.Eventually,afterinsistencebyLieutenantColonelHellberg,Baxteragreedtoaddten fuel-podded four-tonvehiclesandnineEagerBeaver forklifts.23 To make up for wheeled vehicles, the Brigade decided to deploy seventy-five VolvoBV202 tracked vehicles, anticipating that they would be able to traverse bogs easily. These over-snowvehicles produced ground pressure of only twenty-four ounces per square inch, roughly the same as aman on skis. The addition of fuel trucks, forklifts and tracked vehicles proved to be a smart decision.BritishRailmoved theBV202s fromScotland to the southcoastportsofEngland fordeployment.Thisconstitutedtheonlyrailmovementfortheinitialdeployment.TheBrigadedecidedthatwhatevervehiclesittookwouldembarkwithfullfueltanksandcarrytwojerrycansflledwithmorefuel,somethingroutinelyprohibited on shipping during peacetime.24 Many supplies were added as contingency, including onehundredsetsofskis,becausemarineswerenotsureoftheweathertheywouldencounter.

Activity started all over the United Kingdom to meet requirements. First-line transportation fromcommandosbeganmovingsuppliesfromdepotstounitareas.CommandoLogisticRegimenttransportersbacked them up and also moved general war reserves with the help of theatre-level military andcommercial transportation. As some staff huddled in Hamoaze House concentrated on getting suppliesfromdepotstotheBrigadeandtoports,othersfocusedondeterminingwhatwouldgoonwhichshipsas

the availability and location of shipping became known. Soon the British would fnd themselves in thebusinessofstuffngshipsfullwhenevertheybecameavailable,notknowingifmoreshipswouldfollow.Itwastrulyacaseofhotplanningfromdepotstodockyards.

On3AprilBrigadierThompsonlearnedthathisforcewouldexpand.Joiningthelandforcewouldbethe3rdBattalionoftheParachuteRegiment,knownas3Para,andalsotwotroopsoftheBluesandRoyals,each equipped with two Scimitar and two Scorpion light tanks. Both of these Army units were highlytrainedandtough,goodcomplementstothecommandos.Thompsonknewsomeofthecommandersfrompast training experiences. These units would be joining the Brigade with only their first line scales ofrations,ammunitionandequipmentthough.Consequently,Brigadeplannersneededtoaddback-upwarreserves to compensate. No additional numbers were added to the Brigade’s Commando LogisticRegiment,however,eventhoughgroundforceshadincreasedbytwenty-fivepercentwiththeadditionof3Para.TheLogisticRegimentwouldbedeployingwithfarlessthanitsnormalstrength,eventually346of602, few from its Transport Squadron due to the lack of roads in the Falklands and no one from itsPetroleumTroop,whichwasareserveunitandcouldnotbeactivated intime.Also joiningtheBrigadewould be a battery of twelve Rapier surface-to-air missile launchers designed to bolster air defence.Althoughthesewereawelcomeaddition,fewwerefamiliarwiththeRapiersystemsatthetimesincetheyweresonew.Nooneanticipatedthelargeamountofsupporttheyrequired.TheextensiveRapiersupportequipmentwould laterplaysignifcantly intoplacementandrelocationdecisionsofthosesystemsintheFalklands. Rapier support tails exacerbated space constraints for shipping Brigade cargo. Also, no oneunderstoodatthistimehowthirstyforfuelRapierswouldbewhenperformingairdefencewatch.ThattoowouldcomplicatefueldistributionlaterfortheLogisticRegiment.

Finally, given the addition of these forces and considering the possibility of casualties, two moreadditionsresultedforthetrooplist.OnewastheBandofCommandoForcesRoyalMarines,nottoserveasbandmembersbuttotrainasmedicsandstretcher-bearersforuseasneeded.25AnotherwasanArmysurgical team. When asked by Baxter whether women surgeons would be acceptable, Major GeneralMoore respondedwithout hesitation,much to the chagrin of theBritishArmy, ‘Certainly not!’Moore’sconcernmighthavebeenmorefortrainingthanbecauseofgender.

OnSunday,4April,ThompsoncalledallofhiscommanderstoHamoazeHousetobriefthemonwhattheyfaced.ThiswasthefirsttimesomewouldlearnabouttheFalklandsandwhatlayahead.Itwouldbethe start of a learning process that would last for several weeks. Concurrently, key staff attendedmountingbriefs to receivedetails ofwhich ships theywouldbe loading. Later that day,Moore,Clapp,Thompson and Southby-Tailyour met in London to update senior military leaders on the deploymentplanningfor3CommandoBrigade.AdmiralFieldhouseofferedhisapologiestoThompsonforthelackofresourcestomovetheforcesouth:‘Thisisgoingtobeasadandbloodybusiness.IonlywishthatIcouldgiveyoumoreships.’26Thefollowingmorning,ThompsonandSouthby-Tailyourhelicopteredtoanothermeeting,thistimewithGovernorRexHuntandtheRoyalMarineswhohadjustreturnedtoLondonviaMontevideo,andtriedtogleanasmuchinformationaspossibleontheconditionsintheFalklandswhentheydeparted.

Fewpeopleprobablyknewof thechallenges that the lackof shippingwouldpose for theTaskForceoverallatthistime,asunitsstillweretryingtodeterminethesituationintheFalklandsandwhattotake.From planners at the MoD and DOMS to surveyors at the Navy Ship Department at Bath, remarkableresultswerebecomingevident ingettingships fromtradeandreadyingthemfordeployment.Butwithshipscomingonlinepiecemeal,andwithoutaclearpictureofwhatshipswouldfollowandwhen,thoseplanning at Brigade level had little choice but to pack ships as best they could with the assistance oftransporters at ports assisting the deployment. Loading went on simultaneously with refitting ofcommercial vessels to meet military requirements. When it came time for ships to depart, loadingauthoritiesdispatchedsailingreportstoDOMSdetailingwhatwasactuallyonboard.27Seldom,however,wouldtheBrigadeknowwhatwasstowedbylocationonanyship.Moreover,cargoforspecifcunitswouldoftenbecomesplitbetweenmultipleships.Therewouldbemuchtodotosortthisoutlater.

TherushtoloadshipswithnecessarymilitarysupplieswasnotlimitedtoThompson’sLandingForce.TheRoyalNavyandRoyalAirForcehadbeenhurryingtoreadytheirunitsaswell.SeaHarriersquadronshadstartedtoarriveforHermesandInvincibleatPortsmouthon2April.Atotalof twenty-sixHarrierswereassembledfromactive,reserveandtestunitsandsplitbetweenthetwocarriers.TwosquadronsofnineSeaKinghelicopterseach,designedforanti-submarinewarfare,startedembarkingthecarriersthenext day.28 The task force would rely heavily on all of them as they got closer to the Falklands.MaintainingairandseasuperiorityovertheArgentineswouldbecomeessentialinthemindsofmost.

Militaryandciviliansworkedthroughthenightstoreadythefeetandloadsupplies.OntheeveningofSunday,4April,thefirstsurfaceshipdepartedtheUnitedKingdom.Thesea-goingtugTyphoonheadedsouthwithoutanyfanfare.Thenextday, justthreedaysafterThatcher’sdecisiontosendBritishforcessouth,andexactlyasAdmiralLeachhadpromisedher,thefirstshipsofthetaskforcelefttheshoresofEngland bound for the South Atlantic. Frigates HMS Alacrity and HMS Antelope led the way fromDevonporttolinkupwithfourofthesixLSLsthatwerereadytosailandwhichcarriedabout400troopsapiece, including all but a handful of Commando Logistic Regiment. Two of the LSLs had loaded andsailedfromMarchwood,andtheothertwofromDevonport.Indaysahead,theremainingtwoLSLswouldjoin the fowsouth,one fromBelizeand theother fromGibraltar.Sailingdown thePortsmouthchannelshortly before 1000 hrs the following day came the carriers Hermes and Invincible, producing aparticularly inspiring piece of theatre for the deployment, sailors lining the decks and saluting, chaseboatsbelowbuzzingaroundthebigcarriers.Itwasabeautifulsunnyday.Liningthebanksofchannels

leading to open waters were thousands of apprehensive yet inspired British citizens waving the UnionJack.Itwasindeedadaytobeproud.

Mostwouldnotseetherealrushthatwasoccurringstillbehindthescenestogettheseandothershipsunderway, even though they might have noticed Wessex helicopters shuttling supplies aboard the twocarriersastheyheadeddownthechannelstosea.OnthedeckofHermeswereelevenSeaHarrierjetsandeighteenSeaKinghelicopters,animpressivedisplayforcitizensonthebanks.Theon-deckdisplayofaircraftwasnotsimplytoimpressthepopulace.Theaircraftcarrier’shangarhadbecomesojampackedwithcargo,including200tonsofammunitionformarines,thattherewasnoroomleftinsidethehangarforaircraft.29

Theremainderof theLandForce, inwhatwouldbecome the firstwaveof the troopdeployment, leftBritishshores in thenext forty-eighthours.Fearless,whichwouldbe thehomeofCommodoreMichaelClappfortheduration,sailedfromPortsmouthon6April;Stromness,carryingrationsfor7,500menand350moremarines,sailedjustafterdarkon7AprilfromPortsmouth.30BrigadierJulianThompsonandhisstaffhelicopteredtoFearlesson6AprilasshepassedPortland.Canberra, the first ship takenup fromtrade,wouldfollowfromSouthamptonwithmoremarinesandallof3Para,atotalof2,500troops,on9April, which was Good Friday and less than sixty hours since she had disembarked 1,500 cruisepassengersatSouthampton.Theship,soontobenicknamedtheGreatWhiteWhale,wasoverloadedbyawhopping 10,000 tons. At Southampton dock before departure, she was sitting in the water thirteeninchesbelowhermaximumlegalloadlimit.Theowners,P&O,contactedDepartmentofTradeinspectors,whopromptlycamedowntothedock,paintednewlinesonthesidesoftheship,andissuedanewloadingcertifcate.31 Accompanying Canberra was MV Elk, another STUFT, packed with thousands of tons ofammunition,muchofitloadedregardlessofcompatibilityguidelines.Therewasnoautomatedlistingofthe cargo that had just sailed. Loading authorities had forwarded cargo manifests to DOMS beforedeparture. Now an ordnance officer on 3 Commando Brigade staff carried the single copy of theconsolidatedcargomanifest.Thatlistwouldbecomeindispensableinweekstofollow.

It had been a fast-moving few days for Thatcher’s government, the MoD, the services and Britishindustry.AsMajorGeneralNickVaux,thentheLieutenantColonelcommanding42Commando,soaptlystatedyearsafterthewar,‘Itwasthebeginningofabold,unorthodoxdeployment,urgentlydrivenwithdecisivepoliticaldirectionandsustainedbyconstantadaptationtothechangingcircumstances.’32Neverinacenturyfullofwarsandconfictshadacountrypulledtogethersofasttoprotectitsinterests,withnoprior planning and under such unclear circumstances. The rest of the world, and certainly Argentina,marvelledatBritain’sresolve.Nocountryintheworld,noteventheUnitedStates,expectedtheBritishtodispatch a force so quickly. No one knew that Thompson’s commanders were still waiting for griddedmapsoftheFalklandIslands.33Fewoutsidehighcirclesinthemilitaryrealizedthatbeforethelastshipinthefirstwavedeparted,oneofthemostimportantofthemwasalreadybreakingdownatsea.ThecarrierInvincible had sailed fromPortsmouthwith only one of her propellers turning.Shenowneeded anewstarboardmaingearbox andhad stopped in theAtlantic away from sight of land.Sucha repairwouldnormally take place in a dockyard. There was no time or desire to limp back to England after such agloriousdeparture.Repairs tookplaceatseaafternecessaryequipmentarrivedbyhelicopter fromthedockyard.34Manymorechallengeswould follow,but theBritishhadproducedan incredibly impressiveshowofforceinshortorder.Theynowhadtodecidewhattodowithit.

M

Chapter3

InitialPlanningandPreparationatSea

ostpreparationduringtheinitialdaysofAprilwasstrategicinnature.Itfocusedonoutloading3CommandoBrigadeforpossiblebattleandincreasingBritain’sindustrialcapabilitytoprojectand sustain forces. It was three weeks’ sailing to the South Atlantic. That would provide

suffcient time for combat and support units to figure out options and plan for battle, if battle becameessential – at least, that iswhat some surely thought.Certainly, fewonplanning staffs or indeployingunits believed the Task Forcewould sail all theway to the Falklands.Most thought diplomatic effortswouldproducesomecompromise.TheUSSecretaryofStateAlexanderHaigwasshuttlingbackandforthbetweenWashingtonDCandBuenosAiresatthetime,tryingtofindapeacefulresolutiontotensionandin the process balance Reagan administration desires to improve relations with Argentina. Britishplannersanddeployedunits,however,couldnotcountonthoseeffortsbeingsuccessful.Theyneededtoplanfortheworstcase,whichmeantsometypeofamphibiousassaultasafrststeptowardreclaimingtheFalklands.Sailing around Woodward at this time was substantial sea power. Ships included guided missile

destroyersGlamorgan, Sheffeld, Coventry, Glasgow, and Antrim, and frigates Brilliant, Plymouth, andArrow.ClappwasbringingdowntheaircraftcarriersHermesand Invincibleandwould join later.On7April,WoodwardreceivedordersforAntrimandPlymouthtodetachfromhisgroup,proceedtoAscensionatfullspeedandprepareforoperationsfurthersouthatSouthGeorgia.Thatsameday,healsoreceivedamessagethatBritainwasannouncingaMaritimeExclusionZonearoundtheFalklandseffective12April.This announcement meant that any vessel entering waters within 200 miles of the Falkland Islandsbecameapotentialtargetformilitaryaction.ThatwasnotnecessarilygoodnewsfortheRoyalNavy.The200-mileboundaryleftthepossibilitythatacarrierlikeVeinticincodeMayocouldloiteroutsidewithoutthreatandimprovethestrikingrangeoffighteraircraft,sinceairbasesontheArgentinemainlandwereanother 150–200 miles further west. The Royal Navy would have preferred an even more extensiveexclusion zone, and two weeks later Britain would modify the Maritime Exclusion Zone to a TotalExclusionZoneof200milesincludinganyshipsorplanesthatappearedthreatening.It took several days for commanders at sea to receive some clarity of intention for their planning

purposes. A formal ‘Appreciation of the Situation’ arrived fromAdmiral Fieldhouse on 11April, EasterSunday,probablyatthebehestofMajorGeneralJeremyMoore,whobythenhadjoinedFieldhouse’sstaffas his deputy. Moore had substantial experience in operational planning. To their disappointment,however,TaskForcecommandersdiscoveredthattheAppreciationprovidedfewspecifcs.TheMoDwasstill fnalizing amore substantive planning directive. The signal fromFieldhouse stated that the futureplanwould likelyhave fourrequirements: (1)Enforce theFalkland IslandExclusionZone. (2)Establishsea and air superiority in the Exclusion Zone as soon as possible. (3) Repossess South Georgia. (4)Repossess the Falkland Islands. There was no timeline provided. Commanders did learn that initialpriority would be establishing sea and air superiority, which would remain an expectation for weeksahead. This was no small task. The British knew quite well that the Argentines posed a considerablethreattotheTaskForcewellbeforeshipscarryingthegroundforceevennearedtheFalklands.AlthoughtheBritishhadfargreaterseapowerheadingsouthtotakeontheArgentineNavy,thesame

wasnottrueoftheirabilitytocounterairthreats.TheArgentineshadsixtimesmoreplanesthantheTaskForce. If theBritish lostanyof their twenty-eightSeaHarriersor tenGR.3Harrierscapableofgroundattack,therewouldbenoreplacements,sincetheseconstitutedtheirtotal inventoryofthejumpjetsatthe time.What they lackedmore seriously beyond air combat powerwas anEarlyWarning System todetect incoming fightersandmissiles.Thismeant therewasconsiderable riskboth to shipsat seaandthentogroundforceswhenitcametimetoexecuteamphibiousoperations intheFalklands–assumingtheRoyalNavyanditsFleetAirArmhadnotreducedArgentineaircombatpowersuffcientlybythen.Anadditional concernwasArgentina’spossessionofFrench-madeExocetmissiles, variants ofwhichwerecommoninNATOandtheSovietUnion.Theywereformidableweapons,capableofbeinglaunchedfromairorground.TheBritishthoughtArgentinapossessedbothcapabilities.TheExocetwasafre-and-forgetmissile,meaningthatafterrelease itshomingdevicesearchedfor targets, locked inandthenguideda350lbwarhead forwardat750mph,normallyproducingcatastrophic results.Given targets, itwasnearcertain that after release an Exocet would find one of them, most often the largest, and createconsiderabledamage.TheBritishhadnodefenceagainstthesemissiles,shortofshootingchafftodefecttheirfightpaths.1Bynow,theTaskForcewasknownoffciallyasTaskForce317,underAdmiralFieldhouse,Commander

SouthAtlanticTaskForce.ViceAdmiralPeterHerbert,whosethreesubmarineswereheadingsouthwellaheadofthesurfaceships,wastheFlagOfficerSubmarines.OthersnowoffciallydesignatedwereRearAdmiralWoodward as Commander Carrier Battle Group, Brigadier Thompson as Commander LandingForce,CommodoreClappasCommanderAmphibiousTaskForceandRoyalNavyCaptainBrianYoung,thecaptainofHMSAntrim,asCommanderforOperationParaquet.TheParaquetGroup’spurposewasto

retakeSouthGeorgia.Surprisingly,allcommandersincludingYoungreporteddirectlywithequalaccesstoFieldhouse.RearAdmiralWoodward,whosecarrierswerevitaltosuccessandneededtoppriorityforprotection,assumedauthoritytocoordinateassets‘whennecessary’.2TherewouldbeseveraloccasionsoverthenexttwomonthswhenFieldhousesimplycouldnotcommunicatewithhiscommanders.Infact,deployed commanders would sometimes have diffculty communicating with each other around theFalklands. With no one senior to Woodward, Clapp and Thompson in the South Atlantic to arbitratecompetingrequirementsandattimesmaketoughdecisions,frustrationsbecameinevitable,includingforlogisticians.In addition to being Commander Amphibious Task Force, Commodore Clapp held the second title of

CommanderAmphibiousGroup.ThisbroughtwithitpureNavyresponsibilitiesforcommandandcontrolof the ships designated for an amphibious operation. As these ships neared Ascension Island, aircraftcarriers and frigates would transfer to Woodward’s command and control to form the Carrier BattleGroup.WithhisprimarytitleofCommanderAmphibiousTaskForce,Clappwasdirectlyresponsible fortheamphibiousassaultuntilThompson’sforceswerebothashoreandsuffcientlyestablishedlogisticallytobreakoutfrombeachareasandseekobjectives.Thompsonhadreceivedanallocationofspecialforcesto provide intelligence on enemy forces and, based onClapp’s recommendations, on beaches for suchlandings.Althoughhewas responsible for loading ships to suit the amphibious assault and for gettingsupplies and services ashore, Clappwas hampered by the separation of Commando Logistic Regimentleadersonothershipsandthereforehadtorelyheavilyontheirjudgment.Planningstartedinearnestaboardtheshipsheadingsouth.Woodward’steamwasnodifferenttothe

others,inthattheirmindshadnotbeenontheSouthAtlanticbeforetheinvasion.AstheystartedtowardAscension,Woodwardmetwithhis teamtobegindevelopinganunderstandingof thesituation.FreshlyawayfromExerciseSpringtrain,theyhadbeenplanningforotherscenariosformanydaysandtheyknewlittle about theFalkland Islands or theArgentinemilitary.Aswashismanner,Woodwardposed lots ofquestions to his staff. How should the Carrier Battle Group approach the Falklands? What were thepossible landing sites on the islands?Where were the Argentines likely to establish defences?WhereshouldtheBritishconcentratetheirreconnaissance?WasitlikelythattheArgentineNavywouldemployits submarines? Howmanymines could the Task Force expect to encounter?Would Argentina deploythem, and if so,where?Howwould they commit their aircraft?What did all thismean for theCarrierBattleGroup? Such questions andmanymore consumedWoodward and his staff as they sailed south.They had few resources to help them. Their sources for Navy matters were largely limited to Jane’sFightingShips, a standardpublic referencebooknotonly for theRoyalNavyat the timebut forothernaviesaswell.3Woodwardanticipatedatthestarttheneedforanamphibiousoperation.Ashelaterwrote,‘Westudied

themapsexhaustively,weighinguptheprosandconsofawiderangeoflocalsites,wherewecouldlandthe troops and establish a beach-head, from which we might eventually break out to attack theArgentinianmaindefensivepositions.Thatbeach-headwouldhaveto includethepossibilityofscrapingan airstrip out of the unfriendly terrain if the carriers were not to remain at permanent high risk,dangerouslyclosetotheArgentinemainland.’4Althoughhisconcernformaintainingthesafetyofshipswasunderstandable,hiscounterparts,whowerethenstartingplanningprocessesoftheirown,wouldnotagree with some of his recommendations for making the safety of ships top priority. All, includingWoodward,wouldagreethatgainingairsuperiorityaroundtheFalklandIslandswasessentialbeforeanygroundwarcouldbegin.ThestaffsofClappandThompsonbroughtaboardvaryingexperiencesandbackgrounds.Clapp’shad

notworkedtogetherbefore.Inpeacetime,hisstaffconsistedofahalfdozenOfficers.TheywerepartofthestaffatthehigherheadquartersofFlagOfficer3Flotilla,whereClappwasChiefofStaff(AmphibiousWarfare), but whose main focus was on anti-submarine warfare. He was responsible for standards incarriers, amphibious ships and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries; his staff was expected only to execute a two-commando group amphibious operation. This landing force was growing daily much larger andnecessitatedamajorincreaseinstaff,includingtheadditionofsomespecialists.HisstaffnowonFearlesshadassembledatthelastminutetobolsteramphibiousplanningandcommand-and-controlcapabilities.Severalhadnotmeteachotherbefore.Buttheybroughtwiththemexperiencefromvariousexercisesinlanding craft, support helicopters, surface,mines, load planning, air warfare and amphibious warfare.Thompson’sstaffwasnotnew.Theywerecapable,wellacquaintedwitheachother,andmosthadworkedtogether for some time in various positions. The two staffs, however, had notworkedwith each otherbefore. Neither was familiar with the Falklands. Both had been brought up on exercises in NorthernNorway and the Baltic that focused on land operations rather than amphibious landings and in theprocessusedroll-onroll-offterminalswithreceptionparties,alongwithgroundtransportationandfxedsupply storage tomeet logisticsneeds, aswell asNATOairdefence forprotection.The rush todeploymeantthatthesestaffshadbeenunabletodeveloploadsandloadplansthewaytheyhadbeentaught.Ithadbecomeforthemareal‘comeasyouare’deployment.Organizationally, thecombatunit structureof3CommandoBrigadewasnotmuchdifferent from the

structureofmilitaryunitsfoundinothercountries.Itwasessentiallyathree-partorganization,echeloneddownward in threes, thecoreofwhichwere threecommandos, the roughequivalentofaBritishArmybattalion,eachconsistingofthreerifecompaniesofabout120men;asupportcompanywithsix81mmmortarsandfourteenMILANwire-guided,anti-tankmissiles;andaheadquarterscompany.Theirstandardweaponwas the 7.62mmself-loading rife.Companies consisted of three troops or platoons apiece, thefoundationofwhichwerethreesectionsorsquads.Thosesectionseachcarriedanti-tankweaponsaswell

and7.62mmgeneral purposemachineguns. Thesegroups received support fromanartillery regimentwith threebatteriesof105mmhowitzers,acombatengineer squadron,anair squadronofGazelleandScouthelicopters,andotherelementsincludinganairdefencetroopwithshoulder-fredBlowpipesurface-to-airmissilesandspecialoperationsforces.Whenorganizedforbattle,eachcommandogroupnormallyincludedagunbattery,atroopofRoyalEngineersandotherelementsfromtheBrigade.What was truly unique to the Brigade was its Commando Logistic Regiment, formed in 1971/2 to

provide dedicated logistics support. It was patterned after the Parachute Logistic Regiment, whichsupported the Parachute Brigade and disbanded a few years later. There was no comparable militarysupportunitinanyothercountryatthetime,includingintheUnitedStates.Itwasajointorganizationlongbeforejointorganizationsbecamecommoninthemilitariesofothercountries,itsexistencedueinnosmall part to the fact that the RoyalMarines had no supply andmaintenance units of their own. TheLogisticRegiment’snormalstrengthwasjustover600.Planscalledforaugmentationby350moreuponmobilization.Coreunitsincludedmedical,transportation,workshop,andordnancesquadrons,organizedfor themost part into a three-troop structure aswell to provide focused support to each of the threecommandogroups.TheHeadquartersSquadronprovidedcommandandcontrol.TheMedicalSquadronprovidedthreefelddressingstations,eachconsistingofcollection,treatmentandevacuationsectionsandcapable of pushing regimental aid posts forward should combat situations warrant. The TransportSquadronprovided second-line transport in support ofmanoeuvreunits andwas capable of organizingthree forward troops, each possessing trucks, fuel tankers and rough terrain forklifts. The WorkshopSquadronprovideddirectsupportmaintenancetocommandosandwascapableof furnishingthreeself-containedassaultworkshopdetachments.TheOrdnanceSquadronwasdesigned toprovide supplies tounitseitherfromlandorfromships;ittoowascapableoffurnishingthreeassaultordnancedetachmentsto support the commandos. The capability of each squadron to furnish forward troops or detachmentsenabled the Commando Logistic Regiment to establish and maintain multiple support areas, addingfexibilityoverallandenablingmanoeuvreregimentstooperateindependently,forshortperiods,withoutcontinual relianceon linesofcommunication to theBrigadeMaintenanceAreaorBMA, thecommandotermfortheirmainlogisticsbase.EverymemberoftheLogisticRegimenthadpassedtheRoyalMarineCommandoCourseandsportedthecovetedgreenberet.Ahighpercentageofthemhadexperience incommando groups. All were capable of fghting as rifemen if needed. Composition of the RegimentincludedRoyalMarines,BritishArmyandRoyalNavy.ThecommandrotatedeverytwoyearsbetweentheArmy and the Royal Marines. The commander at this time was Lieutenant Colonel Ivar Hellberg, anOfficernotintimidatedbychallenges.Anavidoutdoorsmanandmountainclimber,hehadbeenamemberofateamthatsuccessfullyclimbedMountEverestin1976.Hellberg,likemanylogisticians,servedtwobosses.His direct bosswas Brigadier Thompson, since his responsibilitywas supporting 3 CommandoBrigadeunitsasheworkedcloselywithThompson’sstaff.Heoftenreceivedlogisticsguidance,though,fromColonelBaxter.NeitherCommodoreClappnorBrigadierThompsonhadanyillusionsaboutthechallengestheyfaced.

AsClappputit, ‘Wehadsailedwithlittleideaofwhatlayaheadandevenforwhatweshouldplan.Wehad, too, sailed in a rather unmilitary posture for reasonswhich, althoughwell understood, gave bothJulianandmemisgivings.’5 Complicatingmatters for planning, their staffs onFearlesswere separatedfromLieutenantColonel IvarHellbergandhis logisticiansaboard theLSLSirLancelot.Clapp imposedHigh Frequency (HF) radio transmitting silence on the Amphibious Group to maintain secrecy.Commandersandstaffthereforeneededtocommunicatebyvisitingeachotherordeliveringmessagesbyhelicopter.On7April,Clappissuedorderstoshipstocommencetraininginthedaysahead.Thompsonhadalready

issued instructions to his units before departing. Now units started concentrating on ftness,nuclear/chemical/biologicaldefencetraining,weaponshandlingandcallingforandadjustingartilleryandmortar fre.Hewanted everymarine and soldier to be able to do the latter at a pinch. Clapp told hisaviation components to practise fying in at-sea conditions and advised others to focus on intelligencegathering. He, Thompson and their staffs would concentrate concurrently on developing a greaterappreciationoftheFalklandIslandsandoptionsforattackshouldonebecomenecessary.Formanydaysto follow, Thompson joined Clapp for all meals in Clapp’s dining room. Together they would hash outdevelopmentsfortheday,notalwaysagreeingonwhatwasimportantorshouldhavepriority.6Thetwoleadersdevelopedastrongprofessionalbondover theweeks, thevalueofwhichcannotbeoverstated.Thecommandrelationshipineffectatthetimewasnotdoctrinalforamphibiousoperations,althoughithadimprovedsincetheTaskForce’sdeparture,withClappandThompsonbothreportingtoWoodward.Fieldhousecorrected thissubordinationwhenhe issuedaneworganization forTaskForce317withallthreecommandersreportingdirectlytohim.Accordingtoamphibiousdoctrine,however,theCommanderLandForce issubordinated to theCommanderAmphibiousTaskForceuntil forces land, thebeachheadbecomessecureandsuffcient logisticscapabilitiesexistafoatandashorethatgroundcombatunitscanbreak out. Subordination has nothing to do with rank. It has everything to do with the complexity ofcontrollinganddefendingships,landingcraftandhelicopters;gettingcombatunitsashorequicklyandinthe right places; and then establishing logistics wherewithal so that units can advance. Amphibiouslandingsmaywellbethemostdiffcultofallmilitaryoperations.ThebondthatdevelopedbetweenClappand Thompson enabled the eventual success of the British landing, notwithstanding very poorcommunicationandArgentineairattacks.Earlyintheassessmentprocess,Clapp’sandThompson’sstaffsruledoutlandinglocationsotherthan

on East Falkland. Reports indicated the Argentine forces were concentrated on East Falkland, mostly

aroundStanley.Itwasquiteunlikelytheywouldmovenowtoanotherfarlesspopulatedisland.Alandinganywhere other than onEast Falklandwouldmean simply that theBritishwould have to conduct twolandings,sincetheyeventuallyneededtobeonEastFalklandtotakeontheArgentines,whosemainbodywasguardingStanley.Theydidnotwanttolosetheadvantageofsurprisebylandingsomewherethatwasirrelevant,onlytohavetolandlateronEastFalklandtopursuethefnalobjective.TheyassessednineteenpossiblebeachesonEastFalkland inclosedetail.Foranamphibious landing

they needed a beach with gradients suitable for landing craft and mexefote barges to land men andmaterials.The terrain inproximity to thebeachhad toprovidesomeexits for the few trackedvehiclestheyhad.Theareaneededtobesuitablefordefencefromground,air,andseaattacks.Andtheydidnotwant the landingsiteandanchorages tobevulnerable to fre fromArgentineartilleryanticipated tobearoundStanley,or fromExocets.Eventually, the staffs selectedandClappandThompsonapproved fveareasforcloserexamination.Bythetimetheyhadcompletedalltheirassessmentstheywouldsettleonthreelocations:CowBay/VolunteerBay,BerkeleySound,andSanCarlos.7Meanwhile,LieutenantColonelHellbergandhisCommandoLogisticRegimentleadersaboardLancelot

weredevelopingsupportscenariosforanamphibiouslanding,atfrstnotknowing,duetotherequirementto maintain HF radio transmitting silence, the detailed planning that was underway on Fearless.Sustainmentprocedurespractisedbyhisregimentinpeacetimeemphasizedforwardsupporttothethreecommandos. That process routinely startedwith the topping off of the commandoswith three days ofsupply.TheRegimenthelduptothirtydaysofsupplyafoatundercontrolofOrdnanceSquadroninLSLs.Aftertheamphibiousassaultandtheestablishmentofasecurebeacharea,CommandoLogisticRegimentmovedessentialsuppliesandservicesashore,preferablyasdispersedaspossibleandnormallyincludingtwo storage areas, each with three to fve days of supply. Then, as commandos moved toward theirobjectives,theRegimentestablishedforwardsupportareasmannedbydetachmentsfromitssquadronsandcommandedbytroopcommandersfromTransportSquadron.Fromthoseforwardsupportareas,andfollowingdailycoordinationmeetings,thedetachmentspushedforwardcriticalsupplies,ammunitionandrations to distribution points at night, for retrieval by the support echelons of each commando. TheRegiment had developed procedures formobile,water-borne distribution points and practised pushingsupplies to isolated beaches at prearranged sites when commandos were temporarily in inaccessiblelocations.Theseproceduresweredesignedtoenablequickandcontinuousforwardsupplywhilerelievingcommandosofunnecessaryadministrativeandtransportburdens.AsHellbergandmembersofhisregimentsailedsouthonLSLsandstartedassessingthesituation,not

knowingwheretheywouldeventuallylandintheFalklands,theybecamefrmlyconvincedthatthemosteffectivemethodwouldbetosupporttheLandForcedirectfromtheshipsbyhelicopter,providingthattheyhadcontrolofboththeairandsea.8HellbergconcludedthattwoLSLsshouldbe loadedwithtwodaysofconsumablestocks(anestimatedaverageconsumptionrateofammunition,rationsandsupplies,commonlyreferredtoastheDCSRorDailyCombatSupplyRate)dedicatedforthelogisticsupportofthelandforce.Canberracouldprovideimmediatemedicalsupport,althoughnotasadesignatedhospitalshipunder the Geneva Convention and therefore subject to enemy attack. This concept would enable twooptionswhiledividingLSLassetsincaseanLSLwasdamaged.OptionOnewouldbeforalandinginasingleareabythefullBrigadesupportedbytwoLSLs,oneLSL

heldclose inshoretosupportthe landbattleandtheother inreserveoutsidetheTotalExclusionZone.Each LSL would carry two DCSR with separate command and control teams. The two LSLs wouldexchange places as supplies diminished and gain resupply from the stores ship RFA Stromness andammunition shipMVElk. The BMA ashore to sustain the Land Force would be small, consisting of acommand and control element, a feld dressing station, a rife company for defence, workshop andordnancedetachments,anamphibiousbeachunitanda landingzonemarshalling team forhelicopters.The dressing station would be used for emergency casualties only. The main evacuation of casualtieswouldbedirecttoCanberra.OptionTwowasdesignedtosupporttwoseparateoperations indifferentareas.Inthiscase,oneLSLwouldbeallocatedtosupporteachoperationcarryingtwoDCSRofstocks.EachLSLwouldprovidecommandandcontrolandcarryadressingstation,workshopdetachmentandordnancedetachment.HellbergsharedhisplanswithstaffoftheAmphibiousTaskForce,whovisitedhimon Lancelot on 10 April. That same day, he shared it with 3 Commando Brigade staff and laterhelicopteredtoFearlesstopresenthislogisticsconceptofoperationsinpersonto3CommandoBrigadeHeadquarters,whichacceptedit.9Everyonewasacutelyawarethattheremightnotbeasecondchanceifplanswentwrong.ThevastdistancesbacktoAscensionandtheUnitedKingdomwouldmakeitdiffculttocorrectmistakes.The3CommandoBrigade staff eventually developed a forty-six-pagediscussion of the situationwith

elevenannexesoutliningamphibiousoptionsandsupportplans.Planningforallscenariosassumedthatthelandingwouldtakeplaceundertheprotectionoflocalairsuperiority,therebyallowingthepresenceofanafoatsupplysystem;thatSTUFTandRFAloadedintheUnitedKingdomwouldbeavailablewiththeirknowncargowhenrequiredforoffoading;andthattheoffoadofanyfollow-onforceswouldnotbeunderamphibious conditions but under administrative conditions for units earmarked for reserve or garrisonduties.Someoftheseassumptionswouldprovetobefalse.PriortoleavingBritain,CommodoreClapp’sbosshadwarnedhim,‘thattheRoyalMarineswouldwant

tocarryoutamajorre-stow“as theyalwaysdo”…andtobeverycautiousofwastingeffort indulgingthem.’Fortunately,Clappdidnottakehimtooseriously.Storageproblemsontheshipswereobviousevenwithoutconsideringanylandingplan.Andso,asstaffplanningwasunderwayelsewhere,logisticiansfromCommandoLogisticRegiment’sOrdnanceSquadronstartedtocometogripswiththesuppliesthathad

beenhurriedontotheships.Althoughtheygenerallyknewfrommanifestswhatsupplieswereoneachship,theydidnotknowwheretheywerestowed.Itwasclearthatsomesupplieswerestackedatopothersthatwouldbemoreimportant.EventhecorridorsofthecommandshipFearlesswerelinedwithpackagedfoodrangingfrombakedbeanstocereal,forcingthoseaboardtosqueezethroughstacksofsuppliesastheymadetheirwayabouttheship.Togainbettercontrolof inventories,noncommissionedOfficersoneachshipcarryingsuppliesverifedlocationsastheAmphibiousGroupheadedsouth.Theysentwhattheydiscovered to Headquarters, 3 Commando Brigade, where the Brigade Ordnance Officer on staffconsolidated information. Effortswere not entirely successful, but themen started sorting out tons ofsuppliesstoredinarushtomaximizelimitedspace.Supplieswerepackedsotightlytogetherthatonlythetop layer of some stacks could be identifed at times. Some ships’ captains, understandably, provedunwilling to allowanyone in cargoareaswhile theywere sailing.Theyhad responsibility for safety ontheirvessels.Theweatherdidnotalwayscooperate.Itturnedsourforseveraldays,bouncingtheLSLSirPercivale around so much that mexefote pontoons strapped to her sides were loosened and nearlyrequiredditching.10Meanwhile,asstaffplanningandlogisticsactivitieswereproceeding,themilitaryunitswerecomingto

gripswiththeirownneeds.Duringthefrstfewdaysafterdeparture,troopssortedouttheirownkit.Theirrushtodeploywasnotunlikethehurrytogetpalletsofgeneralsuppliesloaded.ThebulkoftheforceswereonCanberra,hersundecksnowpackedwithammunitionboxes,herelegantloungesconvertedtocanteens.Canberra’s purser no longer had his staff of foreign helpers. Royal Navy and RoyalMarinecookshad replaced themandnowconcentratedon feeding3,000 ravenous troopsmultiple timesdaily.Plentyofbeerhadbeenloadedaboard.Troopsenjoyedarationoftwocansperday.OnCanberraalone,thoserationsevaporatedatthedailyrateof7,000cans.11Unitsaboardshipsfocusedfrstonorganizingpersonalgear.Soontheyandcrewsstartedimplementing

Thompson’sandClapp’sordersfortrainingaswellasfollowingfocusedguidancefromtheircommandersandships’captains.Physicaltrainingemphasizingenduranceandstrengthbecameanearlypriorityfor3CommandoBrigade,withunitsbeingallocateddeckspacesometimeduringtheday.Promenadedecksonships likeCanberra became jogging tracks. Runs started frst with physical training gear and combatboots; soon thereafter, troopswere pounding the decks in full combat attire.12 A number of troops onCanberraeventookpart inamarathonracearoundthequarter-milepromenadedeck,with thewinnerposting a time of three hours and thirty minutes. Needless to say, the cruise ship’s decks had neverexperienced such a pounding, let alone by runners sporting combat boots. With 3,000 men on boardtrying toget intobettershape,physical trainingwentonalmostalldayasunitsusedtheirwindowsoftime for physical ftness training. Not long after the departure, Officers on Canberra started gettingconcernedabouttheabilityoftheship’sdeckstowithstandthisconstantbattering.13Itwasnotallaboutphysicaltraining,though.MenoftheTaskForcealsolearnedabouttheFalklands

during the passage south. They rotated to the stern of the vessel at times to zeroweapons, as otherstossedrubbishbagsandemptydrinkcansoverboardintothewakeoftheshipastargets.14Medicstaughtclasses on basic frst aid, how to administer saline drips and also how to injectmorphine to dealwithsevereinjuries.Thistrainingwouldlaterproveinvaluabletosome,asmentendedtowoundedcomradesduringfrefightslaterintheFalklands.UnitsknewevenlessabouttheFalklandsthantheplannersaboardFearless, but they knew enough to understand they were entering a harsh environment and could beisolated fromsupport fordays.Orderswould follow foreachmarineandsoldier to receiveamorphinecapsulebeforelanding,sothattheycouldeasetheirpainiftheyneededtowaitformedicalevacuationfrom the battlefeld. The Medical Squadron of Commando Logistic Regiment on Canberra alsospearheadedablooddriveinthefrsttwoweeks,promotingfriendlyrivalrybetweenunits.Ithadreceivedaninitialsupplyof800unitsofwholebloodupondeploymentbutcollectedanadditional1,000half-litrebags from men on ships.15 As this training was underway on Canberra, similar medical trainingprogrammesweretakingplaceonotherships,especiallyonmerchantvesselsandtheRFA.Alsoatthistime,Southby-Tailyour,whowassailingwithstaffsonFearless,expandedhisclassesonthe

FalklandsandstartedsharingthemwithothershipsintheTaskForce.HespenthoursinthefrstdaysatseacontinuingtodiscussthefeaturesandchallengesoftheFalklandIslandswiththeir10,000milesofdeeplyindentedcoastline.Gatheringsuchinformationontheirownprobablywouldhavetakenthestaffmonthsofresearch,eveniftheyhadhadresourcesattheircommand.Fewunderstoodhowisolatedthesettlementswereontheislandortheextenttowhichsomeresidentsofsettlementswereunfamiliarwiththeirownisland.Asanexample,oneOfficerlaterrecountedthathemetaFalklandIslanderwhohadlivedatGreenpatchsettlementoutsideofStanleyforfortyyearsandhadneverlefttheareainallofthattime.She apparently was not unique, which meant that reliance on Falklanders for knowledge about theirisland could be risky. Southby-Tailyour shared information on the Falklands at evening briefngs onFearless and then headed to a closed-circuit television studio on board, taped his briefngs and passedthemtoothershipsintheAmphibiousGroup.Staffsandunitslearnedasaresultthattherewereonlyalimited number of harbours and fewbeaches in theFalklands suitable for landing craft.Most beacheslacked sand or shingle and were exposed to surf. Giant kelp, sometimes as thick as a man’s thigh,impeded the travelof small craft in someareas.On land, thewater tablewas rightbelow thesurface.Consequently,iftroopsdugfoxholesortrenchestheywouldmostlikelybecomewaterlogged.MostwateronEastFalklandwasunsafetodrink,muchofitcontaminatedbythehundredsofthousandsofsheepontheisland,manyofwhichcarriedfukes.Thiswouldhavesignifcantimplicationsfortheuseofdehydratedrationsthatrequiredwater,andalsoforhygiene.Itwasfftyormoremilesacrosstheislandoverboggyterrain impassable by vehicles. There was no cover and, as a result, little concealment from enemy

aircraft or artillery. An abundance of huge boulders littered the landscape in places and restrictedmovement.Groupsofsuchboulders,called‘stoneruns’,oftenstretchedoverhundredsofyards,makingtravel diffcult, especially at night for troops lugging combat gear. Running water, showers or otherfacilitieswouldnotbeawaitingtheBritishwhentheyarrived.Thiswouldbeaplaceunlikethosetheyhadseen before on NATO exercises. In case men found themselves isolated somewhere on the islands,Southby-Tailyourdevelopedaseven-pagesurvivalguideforthemthatdetailedthingstheycouldeat,useorshouldavoid.ThompsonhadacopyprovidedtoallmenintheLandForceaswellasaircrews.16NoneoftheeducationandtrainingincludedwhatJulianThompsonbelievedwasessential,afullproper

rehearsaloftheBrigade’slandingplanundercoverofdarkness.Hehadalreadybeeninformedthatthiswould not be possible when they reached Ascension Island. As a result, he and Clapp preferred afterleavingAscensiontotaketheentirebrigadetoSouthGeorgiabeforeanyassaultontheFalklands.Thatwaytheycouldconductamuch-neededrehearsalof theamphibious landingwithoutsacrifcingsurprisefortheattackattheirchosensiteintheFalklands,astandardprotocolforsuchmilitarypreparations,atleastundermost circumstances.Their concernwas valid.Clapp, in fact, initially understood thatunitswoulddisembarktransportsintosmallershipsintheSouthAtlantic,perhapsatSouthGeorgia,beforeanamphibiouslanding.Hedidnotexpectlargetransportstobeusedasassaultships.Othershippingwouldnotmaterializeforthistransfer,though.TheBritishhadnotcarriedoutanamphibiouslandingatbrigadestrengthinnearlytwentyyears.Now,theywouldnotgettostopatSouthGeorgiatorehearseeither,butThompsonandClappwould institutedayandnightdrills trainingmen ladenwithcombatgeartocrossfromthelargetroopshipCanberraintothetinyLCUsbouncingalongside.Suchcross-deckingwashardlyapreferredscenarioforanamphibiousoperation,butitwouldbecomeanabsolutenecessityfortheonetheywouldeventuallyconduct.Aweekintothepassagesouth,commandersandstaffshadallgainedamuchgreaterappreciationof

mattersathand.TheysoonwouldhavetimetohuddlewithAdmiralFieldhouse,becausehewascallingameetingofTaskForcecommandersatAscensionIslandon17April.ClapporderedFearlesstospeeduptomaketheAscensionmeeting,leavingtherestoftheGrouptocatchup.ThatordercausedFearlesstomissherresupplyrendezvouswiththetankerOlmeda,somethingwhichdidnotseemtooimportantatthetimebutwhichwouldtakeonmuchgreatersignifcancewhenFearlessarrivedatAscensionhighinthewater.On16April,asthetwogroupsofshipsnearedeachotherinthevicinityofAscension,Woodwardfewto

Fearlesstoshareinformationandthoughtsaboutwhatlayahead.Staffshadbeenexaminingtheislandsand developing proposals in isolation from each other for the pastweek. The resultingmeetingwouldstarttensionsbetweenthethreecommandersandtheirstaffsthatwouldpersistforthedurationofthecampaign.Woodwardhadbecomekeenlyfocusedonthetimingofoperations,whichwouldbecomeveryimportant for overall planning. He was particularly concerned about the onset of winter in the SouthAtlantic and how long his Carrier Battle Group could stay in the area before ship repairs becameessential.Basedonsuchconcerns,hehadstartedbackwardplanningfromlateJune,thinkingthatatthattimeboththeweatherandtheneedsofhisshipscouldstartthings‘fallingapart’.17Hethoughtitwouldtake the LandForce about threeweeks to land onEast Falkland and retakeStanley.He knew that heneededtoprovidegunfreandnavalairsupportforgroundoperations.HealsoawaitedthearrivaloftheLPD Intrepid, the sister ship to Fearless, in the South Atlantic so that the Task Force could exerciseeffectivecommandandcontrol.Atthetime,Intrepidwasintheprocessofbeingrestoredtoserviceafterpreviousdecisionstodecommissionher.Intrepidnowneededtogetfxedandproceedsouth.Woodwarddidnotthinkshewouldarrivebefore16May.HeconcludedthereforethatthewindowforanamphibiousassaultontheFalklands,regardlessoflocation,wouldbesometimeintheperiod16–25May.ThismeanthiscarriersandothershipsneededtogettotheSouthAtlanticwellbeforethatandtogaincontroloftheseasandair.HewouldemphasizealloftheaboveduringthemeetingwithFieldhousethenextday.Woodward,ThompsonandClapphadbeen involvedactivelywith their staffs in assessingoptions for

retakingtheFalklands.Afterhelistenedtotheoptionsbeingproposedbytheothertwostaffs,WoodwardsuggestedthattheyshouldplaneithertoestablishabridgeheadonWestFalklandoronthefatplainofLafonia, a large peninsula of East Falkland connected to the rest of the island by a small isthmus.Heproposed that such an areawould be defensible until an airstrip could be built to receive C-130s andfighteraircraft.18Bythetimethehuddlewasover,Woodwardhadlefttheothercommandersandstaffsbefuddled.Clapp,ThompsonandtheirstaffscollectivelyhadruledoutsuchoptionsenroutetoAscensionandinsteadhadconcentratedplanningtowardslandingsonEastFalklandproper,wherevirtuallyalltheinvaderswerelocated,thebulkmassingaroundthecapitalofStanley.TheysawseriousproblemsinwhatWoodward was proposing. Any amphibious landing on West Falkland or Lafonia would necessitate asecond amphibious landing on East Falkland before the ground war could be prosecuted. Landingelsewherebefore landingonEastFalklandwouldcauseBritish forces to losetheadvantageofsurpriseandinalllikelihoodprolongtheconfictintotheharshwintermonthsoftheSouthAtlantic,exacerbatingWoodward’sconcernsabouttheserviceabilityofshipsstartinginlateJune.Woodwardleftthemeetingthinkingithadbeenaproductiveexchangeofideas.Thesamewasnottrue

forthoseonFearless.Woodward’sproposalsseemedlikenonsensetothem.AsskilledanavalOfficerasWoodward might have been, he seemed to lack a joint perspective, specifcally an understanding ofamphibious and ground warfare. His brusque and dismissive manner left a lasting impression on allpresent, not the least of whomwas Southby-Tailyour.When themajor introduced himself, the admiralcurtly questioned, ‘Andwhat do you knowabout theFalklands, boy?’19 Staffs onFearless neverthelessstarted working to assess Woodward’s recommendations, but they anticipated that some of theirheartburnwoulddisappearthenextday,whenFieldhouseandotherslandedonAscensionandeveryone

hadachancetodiscusstheiranalysesandrecommendations.Theyhopedthatthemeetingwouldproducedecisionsenablingthemtofnalizetheirplanning.Britainhadachievedalotinthetwoandahalfweeksfollowingtheinvasion.Thebulkofitsforcesnow

were nearly halfway to the SouthAtlantic. British submarineswould soon be in Falkland areawaterswatching themovement of theArgentineNavy.Back inBritain, the services, government and industrycontinuedcollaboratingtorequisitionandconvertmoreships,includingminesweepers,tomeettheneedsoftheTaskForce.DiscussionhadstartedintheMoDaboutaddingmorecombatunitstothegroundforce.Tensions in the South Atlantic, however, had not abated. Fortunately, 3 Commando Brigade fnally hadreceived thegriddedmapsColonel IanBaxter ordered in thehoursbefore frst ships left the shoresofEngland.TwotonsofgriddedmapsarrivedbyparachutewhiletheTaskForcewasenroutetoAscension.Troopsnowhadwhattheyneededtosharegridcoordinates,planadvancesandcallforartilleryfre,ifwarbecamenecessary.

I

Chapter4

SupportOperationsatAscensionIsland

ftheworldunderstoodlittleabouttheFalklandIslandsbeforetheArgentineinvasion,itknewevenlessabouttheremoteislandintheAtlantictowardswhichtheBritishTaskForcewasnowheading.Ascension Island had not figured prominently in history since its Portuguese discovery in 1501.

PerhapsitsbiggestclaimtofamewasthatRoyalMarineshadgarrisonedtheislandin1815asprecautionagainstFrenchoccupationafterBritainandhercoalitionalliesexiledNapoleontothenearbyislandofStHelena. Inyears that followed,Ascensionbecame littlemore thana temporarywaystation forpassingslavetradersandmerchantships,untilthe1940s,whentheUnitedStatesbeganleasingitfromBritain.Americansconstructedanairfield thereat the timetoserveasastagingbaseandto interdictGermanships in the Atlantic during the Second World War. In the 1970s, their focus evolved to deep-spacetracking,but the island remained largelyunchanged, sparselypopulatedandwith few resources.UntilApril1982, theonlyoccasional visitors toAscensionwerenaturalists looking for itsgreen turtles,wilddonkeysandsootyterns.Incomingweeks,though,itwouldcontributesosignificantlytooverallBritishplanningandwareffortsthatsomewouldclaim,‘IfAscensionIslandhadnotexistedwewouldhavehadtocreateit.’1TherecanbelittledoubtthattheBritishwouldhavecreateditdifferentlyhadtheyhadthepowertodoso.Butalthoughfarfromideal,thislittleislandmadetheFalklandIslandsWarpossible.LocatedjustbelowtheEquator,midwaybetweenSouthAmericaandAfricaaswellasbetweenBritain

and the Falklands, Ascension is a small volcanic outcrop of about thirty-eight squaremiles, a place ofdramaticcontrasts.Itshighestpoint,the2,800ftGreenMountain,presentsatropicalappearancefromfaraway,withasmallbamboorainforestonitsupperslopes.Butlushvegetationatopthemountainbeliesboth thebarrennessof lower slopesand thedrynessof theentire island.GreenMountain,as itsnameimplies, claims the only greenery on Ascension Island. It is the single place high enough to capturerainfallsufficientforvegetationtogrow.Thetradewinds,whichslapthecoastlineatabouteighteenknotseverydayandhelpmaintaintemperaturesof18°to24°Centigradeyearround,depositameresixinchesofannualdrizzleelsewhereontheisland.LittlefreshwateraccumulatesroutinelyonAscension,forcinginhabitantstorelymostlyupondistilledseawater.Althoughonecanspotoccasionalsandybeachesalongtheruggedcoastline,gettingtothemisquiteanothermatterbecauseoflargeswells,themselvesteemingwith sharks and other voracious sea life, that unpredictably pound the shores. Those swells preventconventionallandingcraftfromcomingashoreanywherebutataplacecalledEnglishBayonthenorth-westcoast,andeventherethebeachissufficientforonlyasinglelandingcraft.In1982,therewerenofixedportsontheislandtooffloadvessels,justasinglestonejettyatthecapital,Georgetown.Severeseaswells forced ships carrying supplies to anchornearly half amile off the coast and then shuttle goodsashorebylightertothejetty.Theislandmayhaveofferedagreatgeographicallocation,butupcloseitlookedlikeabarrenlandscapeofvolcanicash,jaggedrockandclinker,allsurroundedbyanunforgivingsea.At the time of the Falklands invasion, a thousand people inhabited Ascension, all of whom were

employedbyorwerecontractors forBritishandAmericancompaniesonthe island.Overhalfof these,dubbed‘Saints’,werefromtheislandofStHelena,700milestothesouth-east.EmployersincludedCable& Wireless, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Pan American Airlines, South Africa Cable and theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). There remained no indigenous population. Allresidentslivedinhousingbuiltandfurnishedbytheiremployersinoneofthreesettlements:Georgetownon thewestcoast,TwoBoats in thecentreandanAmericancampnear theairfieldcalledWideawake,operated by Pan American. There were no hotels, buses, taxis, or rental car firms. Visitors were notallowedontheislandwithoutpermissionfromtheBritishAdministrator.Childrenreachingeighteenyearsandunemployed,aswellaspensioners,wererequiredtoreturnhome.FoodandothergoodscamefromeitherAmericanorBritishcommissariesor fromacoupleofshopssuppliedbysteamer twiceamonth.Seapassageremainedtheprimarylinktotheoutsideworldformany,particularlythosewithhomesonStHelenasincenoairfieldexistedthere.LifeonAscensionwasisolated.Althoughtherewasagolfcourse,itwas reputed to be one of the worst in the world due to its lack of greenery. Consequently, residentsexpectedtoseefewvisitors.Life for those on Ascension that spring changed dramatically. Inhabitants enthusiastically supported

BritisheffortstotransformtheircuriouslyremoteislandintoavibrantlaunchpadforBritishforcesandsupplies.Despite the eagerness of its inhabitants to assist, though, the island simply couldnot sustainlargenumbersofsupportpersonnel.Therewaslittleextraaccommodationandinsufficientfreshwaterforlargenumbersofnewresidents,howevertemporarytheirpresencemightbe,sincetheislandreliedupondesalinated water. Limited plant output meant that fresh water production alone would necessarilyrestrictmilitary presence on the island. The British had lots ofmen and supplies heading toward thisisland now, but there was only so much the islanders and their island could do. The rest would takecarefulplanningandimprovementintheweeksahead.WhateverchallengesAscensionposed,theBritishwelcomeditsideallocationandavailabilitywithopen

arms.TheyhadnoalternativesforprovidingoperationalsustainmenttotheTaskForceheadingtowardthe South Atlantic. Countries in South America were not about to offer their ports and airfields asplatforms for launching a war against neighbouring Argentina, whether or not they agreedwith whatArgentinahaddone.EvencountriesinAfricawereunwillingtofacethepoliticaluproarthatmightensue.Fortunately,thecontinuingleasetoAmericanowlefttheislandopenforBritishuse.InanExchangeofNotes in 1962, the two nations had agreed that the United States would grant such ‘logistic,administration or operating facilities at the Airfield … considered by the Government of the UnitedKingdomtobenecessaryinconnectionwithitsusebyUnitedKingdommilitaryaircraft’.2Britaininvokedits prerogative to utilize the airfield according to these agreements immediately following Argentina’sinvasionofEastFalkland.TheyknewtheAmericanshadimprovedandextendedtheairfieldto10,000feetin1966asUSAirForceneedsaroseintheEasternTestRange,makingitcapableofacceptingtheworld’slargestaircraft.Despitehavinga first-class runway, though,Wideawakeofferedonlya smallhardstandareaforparkingandnoparalleltaxiways.Thicklayersofvolcanicdustpreventedhelicoptersfromusingadjacentareas for landingwithout ingestingdust into theirengines.Fuel storagecapacityandaircraftmaintenancefacilitiesremainedlimited.Wideawakesimplywasnotdesignedforheavyairtrafficorforaninfluxoflotsofsupplies,butitwouldbecomethesalvationforataskforcethathaddepartedsoquickly.TheUnitedStatesgovernmentstartedhelpingtheBritishthesameweekendthatArgentinainvadedthe

Falklands.ThebottomlinedirectivetotheUSAirForce’ssinglemilitaryrepresentativeatAscension,alieutenantcolonelcontrollingoperationsatWideawakeaspartoftheAirForce’sEasternTestRange,wasreportedlytoprovideallthehelptheBritishneeded‘butnottogetcaughtdoingit’.3HeandnumerousotherUnitedStatesgovernmentemployeesthereprovidedconsiderablehelpduringthehecticmonthstofollow. Other agencies of the United States government would assist as well by secretly pushingthousands of tons of supplies and millions of gallons of fuel to the island to help the British, whileSecretaryofStateHaigcontinuedhisshuttlediplomacybetweenLondonandBuenosAires.The first British personnel departed the United Kingdom for Ascension on 3 April aboard a C–130

HerculesroutedthroughGibraltarandDakar.TheirtaskwastoestablishanairheadatWideawakeandpreparetooffloadaboutadozenotherC–130sthatwouldstartarrivinglaterthatdaywithsupplies.Theinitialorganizationwassmall:twoofficersfromtheRoyalAirForce’s38AirSupportGroup,anofficerandsixairmenfromtheUnitedKingdomMobileAirMovementsSquadron,anofficerandsixsailorstoformaforward logisticsunit for theRoyalNavyandanofficerandeightsailors tosupportnavalhelicopters.4KnownastheBritishForcesSupportUnitorBFSU,thisorganizationexpandedconsiderablyinweekstofollow.SinceinitialmembersoftheunitandthebulkoftheTaskForcewerefromtheRoyalNavy,itwasnot surprising that the commanding officer came from the Navy too. When Captain Robert McQueenarrived to take command, he brought authority to the small organization.His chain of commandwentdirectlythroughtheViceChiefofDefenceStaffforPersonnelandLogisticstotheChiefhimself.McQueenlaterrecountedsomeofthespecificguidelineshereceivedattheMoDbeforedeparting: ‘Thefirstwasthattri-servicenumbersontheislandwouldnotbemorethanabouttwohundredandthesecondthatIshouldhavethepowerofvetoonanyonesentthere.’5The responsibilities of the BFSU were to get a forward sustainment base started and then to keep

logisticsoperationsgoing.Theyhadtoinitiatelogisticsoperationswithinhoursofarrivalandthenstartcoordinatingoperationsfordaysahead,notknowingnecessarilywhatwouldbearriving,sincemuchofthatwasstillbeingdeterminedbackintheUnitedKingdom.Theyhadtodecidewhatimprovementswereneeded to administer logistics operations and to prepare to supervise the implementation of thoseimprovementswhenresourcesarrived.Theyalsoneededtostartplanningadefenceoftheislandincasethat became necessary. There was not much time. What resulted from their efforts was a forwardsustainmentbasethatprovidedfivedistinctmilitarybenefits.Firstly,Ascensionprovidedananchorageforthefleetasitheadedsouth,aplacewhereshipscouldtakeonadditionalsuppliesthatmighthavebeenconsumedingettingthatfarsouthorleftbehindforanynumberofreasonsupondeparture.Secondly,itprovidedtheairfieldneededbytheRoyalAirForcetocut flightdistancesto theFalklands.Wideawakewould become indispensable to sustaining long-range reconnaissance missions within days of theinvasion, and forVulcanbombingmissions in amatter ofweeks.For pure logistics reasons, it becameessential formaintaininganairbridge to theTaskForce.Nomatterhowgood logisticsplanningmightbecome,shipsandgroundunitswouldeventuallyneedquickreplacementofcriticalstoresandperhapspeople. The fastest way to achieve this would be by airdrop from planes launched out of Ascension.Thirdly,theislandwouldprovideaplacefortheTaskForcetogetsuppliesleftbehindandtosortoutthemess that was then crowding the galleys of ships. Thewaters off Ascension, in spite of irritating andunpredictableswells,werefarmorewelcomingthanthebarrenoceanextendingfromtheresouthward.Fourthly,AscensionIslandprovidedaplacewheresoldiersandmarinesofallspecialitiescouldhoneskillsrequired later ifpoliticalefforts toresolve tensions failed.Notmuchspaceashorewasavailable,but itwould have to suffice. And finally, it became a location where senior leaders of the Task Force couldrendezvous to discuss developments and finalize plans before it proceeded further, while politicianscontinuedtotrytoavoidwar.TherewouldbenootherplacetohuddlebeforetheFalklands.MembersoftheBFSUscarcelyhadtimetodroptheirbagsinthesmallroomofahangarthatwouldbe

theirheadquarters,beforetheairflowstarted.TheywouldeventuallyoptforatentalittlefurtherawaytoavoidsomeofthenoiseandbustleofactivityatWideawake.ThreeLynxhelicoptersarrivedthatsamedaybyC–130fromLyneham,completewithairandgroundcrewsandsupportingsupplies.ModifedtocarrySea Skua air-to-surface missiles, the Lynxes flew on board RFA Fort Austin as she passed AscensionheadingsouthtosupportEndurance.Theywouldprovidesomemuchneededprotectionforthisunarmed

stores ship heading alone toward the possible war zone. Three naval Wessex 5 transport helicoptersarrivedonApril4aboardacivilianShortBelfastcargoplane.TheBFSUmadethemoperationalbythetime twomore arrived on 6 April.Nimrods of 42 Squadron fromStMawgan andKinloss followed theBelfast to provide communications links to nuclear submarines and to assist in any search-and-rescuemissionsthatresultedfromotheraircraftflyingtoandfromtheisland.6TheNimrodswerejustthefirstofasteadystreamofplaneslandingatWideawakeandoccupyingthelimitedtarmac.TheBFSUdidnotarrivewithmuchorganiccapabilitytoconductextensiveairheadoperations.Instead,

theyweredependentonassistancefrompeopleandequipmentfromtheUnitedStateswhowerealreadythere,toincludetwoPanAmericanairtrafficcontrollersaccustomedtoseeingonlyacoupleofhundredaircraft landings annually. Soon, however, they would see as many as 250 in a single day of April,reportedlymakingWideawakebusierthanChicago’sO’Hareatthetime.7AsshipsoftheTaskForcearrived,theovercrowdingwouldseemevenworseaseveryonescurriedto

jugglebothfixed-wingaircraftandhelicoptersinandoutoftheairfieldasreplenishmentoperationsgotunderway.TheworkstartedwiththearrivalofFortAustin,whichalsotookonaddedsuppliesanddozensof Royal Marines who would participate in the plan to recapture South Georgia. Fort Austin thencontinuedsouthon9April.The followingday, thedestroyerAntrimwith the frigatePlymouth andRFAtankerTidespringarrivedtoembarkstoresaswell.

FortAustinwasthefirstRoyalFleetAuxiliaryvesseltotakesuppliestotheSouthAtlanticwiththehelpoftheBFSU.It isworthtakingamomenttotraceherpathonthatfirstresupplymission,becauseFortAustin’s typicalmissionsafterdepartingAscensionaccentuateaspectsof thewaroftenoverlooked: theseeminglyendlessworkperformedbyauxiliaryvesselstosustainfightingshipsintheTaskForceandthecorrespondingworkthattheBFSUperformedtokeepasingleauxiliaryvesselsupplied.Duringthethree-daypassagesouth,thecrewofFortAustinstartedpreparingtheirfirstloadsfordeliverybothbyjackstayand helicopter. After linking upwithEndurance, whose supplies were down to two days of food, theydelivered 200 loads before receiving passengers and stores for backhaul to Ascension. The crew thenworkedmostofthenightpreparingloadsfortheAntrimgroupheadingsouthfromAscension.FortAustinlinkedupwiththeshipsthenextmorningandworkednonstopuntilaboutmidnight,deliveringover300moreloadstothem.Ontheafternoonofthefollowingday,14April,shereceiveddirectionstorendezvouswithSheffeld,Brilliant,Glasgow,CoventryandArrow.FortAustin’screwscrambledtoprepareanother380loadsforissueasdemandskeptcomingin.Afterconductingtwojackstaytransfersforeachship,oneforgeneralstoresandoneforammo,shereceivedanother200loadsofbackhaulmaterialrangingfromtrainingammunitiontoexcesspaint.ThenitwasbacktoAscension,justatthetimeRoyalMarineswerearriving, to get as much as possible from the BFSU in forty-eight hours before heading south again.Helicopters and lighters shuttled450 loads of supplies to the ship and took120backhaul loads to theislandduringthosetwodays.FortAustinthenreturnedsouth.Inthesefirsttwotrips,shedischargedoverathousandloadstokeepothershipsgoing.Sheembarkedanotherthousandinreturn,mostofwhichtheBFSUwouldseeatAscension.8TherearecountlessotherstoriesjustlikethatofFortAustin – resupplyshipswhowereable tokeepotherssuppliedbecauseof thebaseatAscensionandwhich,at thesametime,becameonlypartofanimmenseworkloaddevelopingashore.Inlessthanaweek,thesmallBFSUhadstartedfulfillingthefirstofitslogisticsfunctions.Dozensmore

ships arrived at Ascension to take on supplies and then continue southward. A challenge for Britishlogisticiansnowbecamekeeping theseships resuppliedwithoutcomplete relianceonmuchslower sealinesofcommunication.TheRoyalAirForce’sC–130Hercules,theprimaryBritishaircraftfordeliveringsuppliesbyair,becamethesolutiontothatchallenge.Peopleback in theUnitedKingdomhadbeenworking onmodifications to theC–130at this time, to

increase its ability to ‘keep up with’ the Task Force. The C–130 had a range of about 2,000 milesdependingonpayload.Thismeant,unfortunately,itcouldgetonlyaquarterofthewaytotheFalklandsfrom Ascension before having to turn around. Ascension Island had halved the distance between theUnitedKingdomandtheFalklands,making itpossible tocontinueairdropsofcriticalsupplies toships.Butnowsomethinghadtobedonesoontoincreasetheoperatingrangeofaircraftsothatairdispatcherscouldgetsuppliesfurthersouth.TheRoyalAirForcehadinthepastthoughtofhavingitsC–130sfittedforair–to–airrefuelling,butthevalueofthisdidnotjustifythecost,giventhecomparativelyshortrangewithinNATO areas. Now the situation was different. Threemodifications to the C–130 commenced toenableittocovermoredistance.Startingon16April,theEngineeringWingatLynehambegandevisingauxiliarytanksforinstallationin

forwardcabinsofC–130stoaddmoreinternalfuelcapacity.Somecylindricaltankswithacapacityof825Imperialgallonshappenedtobeonhand.Withinfivedays,theWingfittedapairintoaC–130andfoundthey could increase its range by three to four hours. They later determined that installing four tanksincreased the range further but limited payload to about twenty–five per cent of the aircraft’s originalmaximum.Modificationsproceededtocreatebothtwo–andfour–tankmodels.ThemodifiedaircraftwerenicknamedLR2 (forLongRange)orLR4,dependingon thenumberof tanks installed.The insidesoftheseC–130sstartedtotakeontheappearanceofairbornefueldepots.Cargowasstoredonrampdoorsonlysincenoroomremainedincargobays.The second modification was aimed to give the C–130 air–to–air refuelling capability. Marshall of

Cambridge(Engineering)Ltd,whichhadbeendesignatedthetechnicalsupportcentrefortheRoyalAirForce’s C–130 fleet in 1966, had no previous direct experience in the installation of flight refuellingprobeswhenitreceivedthego–aheadtogetinvolved.ProbesforrefuellingwerethenstandarditemsintheRoyalAirForce,butnoneweredesignedforC–130s.ThereforetheBritishdecidedtouseprobesfrom

Vulcanbombers, and the callwent out accordingly all over theUnitedKingdom: ‘If youhaveaVulcanpleaseremovetherefuellingprobe.’9ProbeswereinsuchshortsupplythatamaintenancecrewtookaConcordeshuttletotheUnitedStates,changedplanesinNewYorkforSanDiegoand,withpermissionfrom the Pentagon, removed the probe from aVulcanmounted on display there. By 28April, the firstprobeshadbeenfittedonsomeLR4models,asdayandnighttrainingofcrewscommenced.Thethirdmodificationwas toprovidesomeC–130swithair–refuellingcapability themselves.Marshall completedthismodificationtoanLR4modelaswellby8June,butthiscapabilitywasnotneededbeforetheendofthe war a week later.10 By then, the other modifications had already enabled the British to maintaincontinuousairresupplytotheTaskForcefromthesustainmentbaseatAscension.Ascension became irreplaceable formaintaining aerial resupply of critical items to Task Force ships

movingsouthtotheFalklands.MembersoftheRoyalCorpsofTransport’s47AirDispatchSquadronhaddepartedEnglandforAscensionon5AprilaboardFearless.Theirmissionwastoairdropsmall loadstospecialforcesifrequired.On19April,theywerejoinedatAscensionbyothersfromtheirsquadron,andthenextdaytheymadetheirfirstairdropofhighprioritysuppliestoInvincibleandAlacrity.ThefirstLR2HerculesreachedWideawakeon12May.On16May,inaflightlastingmorethan24hoursandcoveringatotalof6,300nauticalmiles,themodifiedC–130dropped1,000lbofsuppliestoAntelope.11By1June,47AirDispatch had flown on 47 similar sorties, dropping 163 tons of supplies to the TaskForce. TheabilityoftheBritishtoairdropsuppliesintothewarzonepermittedthemtoreduceorder–receipttimeforhighpriorityitemsfromabouttwoweekstolessthantwodays.Bythewar’send,highprioritycargooutofAscension,rangingfromcriticalelectroniccomponentstomissiles,wasbeingdroppedoffEastFalklandwithinfortyhoursofrequest.12Flightswereexceedingtwenty–eighthoursbythen.EachHercules,withtwocrewsaboard,neededtworefuellingsforsuchtrips.BecauseVictortankersalsorequiredrefuellingon these flights, it took fiveVictors toget oneC–130near theFalklands toairdrop supplies.Together,pilotsoftheseaircrafthelpedestablishanewworldendurancerecordfortheC–130Hercules.13Needless to say, these logistical featswerenot achievedwithout considerablebraveryon thepart of

pilotsanddispatchers.TheC–130Herculesbecamethefirstprop–drivenairplanetorefuelfromBritain’sVictortankers.Differencesinairspeedsofthesetwoaircraftmadeitimpossibletorefuelatlevelflight.ThetechniqueeventuallyperfectedwasfortheVictortankertoapproachtheHercules fromaboveandbehind at a height of 23,000 feet.When theVictorwas about amile behind, theHerculeswould startdescending at a rate of about 500 feet per minute. The Victor then would overtake the descendingHerculesandreleaseadroguetoenablethefueltransfer.Refuellinglastedaboutfifteenminutesasbothaircraftfewat230–240knots,theminimumspeedfortheVictortanker.TheHercules,however,hadtobeatfullthrottleinitsdescenttomaintainthisspeed.Temperaturesrosedramaticallyattimes,leadingtoburnout of several C–130 engines over the course of thewar. The refuelling process usually ended atabout8,000 feetabove thesea,but slowdeliveryonoccasionmeant thatdrogueswerenotwithdrawnuntil2,000feetabovethesea!TherewereotherinstanceswhereC–130s,evenaftersuccessfulrefuelling,consumedmorefuelthanexpectedduetostrongheadwindsorrequirementstoloiterneardropzonesfortacticalreasons;buttheirpilotscalmlylandedthembackatAscensionwithlittlefuelremaining.Aerial resupply operationswould produce friction between 47 Air Dispatch Squadron and the BFSU

CommanderthateventuallyhadtoberesolvedattheMoD.BecauseoftheCommander’sinsistencethatspacewaslimitedatAscension,theMoDwasenforcingapolicythatallairdroploadshadtoberiggedintheUnitedKingdomratherthanatAscension,againsttheairdispatcherobjections.Suchapolicysimplyfailedtorecognizethatrequirementsforsuppliesandprioritiesoftenchange.FacedwiththealreadylongflighttimestogetsuppliestoAscension, theBritishcould illaffordtospendadditional timeat the lastminute disassembling and reassembling loads for airdrop. Admiral Fieldhouse therefore changed thepolicyon6May,permittingloadstoberiggedatAscension.14DisagreementsaboutthisBFSU–influencedpolicywereonlyoneofthefrustrationsthendevelopingattheforwardsustainmentbase.Complicatingmattersonadailybasis forBFSUafter itsarrivalwasasteady flowofpassengersand

cargo from theUnitedKingdom,muchofwhichappeared tobeuncontrolled.Unitsanddepots starteddispatchingsuppliestotheislandatthesametimeasshipswerestartingtheirtwo–weekjourneysthere.MilitarypersonnelwhodidnotsailwiththeTaskForcebeganarriving individuallyor inunits,carryingwiththemwhateverequipmentcommandersdeemednecessary.Therewereevenreportsofmenarrivingat the Royal Air Force base at Lyneham, signing up for open passenger lists to Ascension, gettingthemselvesaboardairplanesandheadingsouthwithoutproperorders.15Althoughinstancesofpersonnelarriving at Ascensionwithout authorizationwere probably rare, there undoubtedly remained a lack ofappreciationbysomeintheUnitedKingdomofactuallimitationsontheisland.Theflowofpersonnelandequipmentintotheislandinthosefirstweeksprovedsteady,andsoonspacewasgettingtight.Thebuild–up of support personnel on the island had ballooned to nearly a thousand during this time as well.RoughlyeightypercentoftheseweremembersoftheRoyalAirForce.The BFSU commander, knowing constraints on the island and trying to keep his operation going in

accordancewithMoDguidance,implementedproceduresthattosomeseemeddraconian.Untilportablecabins arrived and were erected, accommodation and subsistence existed for only 200 people atAscension, all provided by Pan American. Fresh water supplies remained critically short. As a result,CaptainMcQueen instituteda strict ‘one in,oneout’policyas themaximumnumberofpersonnelwhocouldbeaccommodatedwasreached.Oneunfortunatemilitarychaplain,afterenduring theexhaustingflight to get to Ascension, arrived unannounced only to discover himself heading back to the UnitedKingdomon thenext returningaircraft.BrigadierThompsonhadarranged for aRoyalArmyOrdnanceteamtocometoAscensionandhelpwithsupplyoperations.McQueensentthembackaswell.16Others

whoshowedupandfoundaccommodationdiscoveredthemselvespressedintoservicetomeetworkloadneeds.CaptainMcQueenoccasionallycommandeeredvehiclesandotherequipmentuponarrivaltoshiftsuppliesaroundthelimitedareaofhardstanding.17Hisunitlearnedtomakedowithwhatevertheycouldmuster.Tosomeontheground,runningWideawakeatthattimewaslike‘operatingalargeaircraftcarrier’.18

AsflightmissionsweretaskedfromtheUnitedKingdom,theseniorRoyalAirForcerepresentativeonthegroundatWideawakejuggledresources,shiftingaircraftalreadyonthegroundorevenflyingthemoutifnecessary, tomakemaximumuse of the limitedhardstandparking.At any one time,Wideawake couldhouseuptothirtyaircraftdependingonsize.Thereweretimes,though,whensomeplaneswerereturnedto theUnitedKingdomor sent toGibraltar for shortperiodsof time to create spaceat theairfield forhigherpriorityaircraft.19PlanesdepartingtheUnitedKingdomgenerallyflewroutesthroughWestAfrica,stoppingatGibraltarenroutedependingonprevailingwinds.MovementplannersintheUnitedKingdomspecificallycoordinatedrefuellinginDakar,SenegalorBanjul,GambiatohelpeaseaircraftdemandsonfuelstocksatAscension.AircraftwouldthentopoffatAscensionwithlesseramountsbeforedepartingonreturnlegs.TherewasonlysomuchthattheBFSUandplannerselsewherecoulddotomakeoperationsefficientin

receivingthepersonnel,supplies,andequipmentthatwerearriving.Beforeoperationsgottoofaroutofcontrol,majorinstallationimprovementshadtooccurontheremoteisland.Theserequirements,rangingfromestablishingmessingfacilitiesforsupportpersonneltoinstallingapipelinesystemtopumpmillionsofgallonsfueltoWideawake,wouldalsocompetefortransportation,space,andmanpower.Solvingthefuelshortageproblemtookhighpriority.Arequestforamilliongallonsofaviationfuelsoon

arrivedatthePentagoninWashingtonDC.CasparWeinberger,thentheUSSecretaryofDefenseandnota supporter of Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s shuttle diplomacy, helped immediately. The Britishcouldhaveobtainedthefuelontheopenmarketthen,butitwouldhavetakenmoretime.GettinglargequantitiesoffueltoAscensionnowbecamerelativelyeasy.ThePentagonjustreplacedtankersdispatchedto Ascension as soon as theywere empty. Themain problem became getting the fuel towhere itwasneeded.ThepipelinethenconnectingCatherine’sPoint,wheretankersdischargedfuelthroughafloatingpipelineintoanAmericanreceivingpoint,andtheairfieldhadcommondischargeandreceptionpiping.Thismeantthatwhenfuelwasdischargedfromtankersitcouldnotbepumpedtotheairfieldthreeandahalfmilesaway. Initially, theBritish transported fuel to theairfieldusing tankers,but thesteep, roughroadprovedinadequatetohandlethetraffic.20TheMoDknewsomethinghadtobedonetoimprovefuelsupplyandstoragecapabilitiesontheisland

becauseoftheanticipatedairflow.SailingtowardAscensioninleadvesselsoftheTaskForceatthattimeweresufficientpumps,pipes,andtankswiththeTacticalSupplyWing,RoyalAirForcetocreateasmallforward airfield installation to receive fuel.21 Soldiers from 1 Troop, 51 Squadron, Royal Engineersarrivedtocompleteatemporarypipelineconnectingthefuelfarmnearthebaytostoragetanksbytheairfield. It tooktheengineersonlytendaystomaketheirassessment,developplansand laythethree–milepipeline.Bythetimeitwascompleted,soldiersfrom12PetroleumOperationsSection,RoyalArmyOrdnanceCorpswerearrivingtotakecontroloftheUSshoreinstallation.TheSectiontookoverthetwoboostpumpsattheinstallationandanotherhalfwayupthelinetotheairfield.Then,withthearrivalofpipingand30,000–galloncollapsiblepillowtanks,theSectionhelpedenlargethefuelfarmattheairfieldbeforetakingoveritsoperationaswell.Withinweeks,Britishsoldiersandairmenhadinstalledafuellingsystem forWideawake that included 180,000 gallons of storage capacity and a pipeline tomaintain aconstantflowoffuel.WiththehelpoftheirAmericanallies,theynowhadasteadyflowofaviationfuelfromtankersanchoredoffGeorgetown.Demandfromthenewsystemwassogreat that, insubsequentweeks, some of the 30,000–gallon tankswould start splitting and leaking from constant emptying andfillingunderthetropicalsun.After completing the pipeline, engineers shifted their attention to other needs to accommodate the

island’sincreasedpopulationofworkers.AgainwiththehelpofAmericansuppliers,theyinstalledanewdesalinationplantatEnglishBay,whichwouldeventuallybecomethesiteofthemaintransienttentcamp.Theyrenewedthesewagesystemthere;renovatedderelictbuildingsloanedbyCable&Wireless,makinguseofwhateverwasavailable;andput intooperationenoughportablepowersources to takecareofasmall village. Engineers also improved the road to a remote valley so that the BFSU could move themassive build–up of ammunition further away from the airfield.22 The United States Air Force flew infourteen planeloads of portable living accommodation, consisting of thirty–one twelve–man livingmodules. Each expanded into air–conditioned living quarters with bunks, showers, and lavatories.OriginallyintendedforusebytheUnitedStatesRapidDeploymentJointTaskForce,thesemoduleswerejustwhattheBritishneededtohousesupportandtransitpersonnel.BritishandAmericanserectedthemin five days.23 When it was all over, the British had created another small village on Ascension andnicknamedit‘ConcertinaCity’.Lotsofotherchangeswereoccurringelsewhereontheisland.Adetachmentfrom30SignalRegiment

arrived theweekendof the invasion.UsingCable&Wirelesscircuits, theyestablishedcommunicationsdirect to telephonecircuits in theUnitedKingdom, throughwhichpeopleatAscensioncouldgetquickaccesstoworldwideoutlets.Duringthenextfourmonths,thesecircuitswouldhandleaboutsixhundredcalls per day. Then2PostalRegiment arrived to providemail and courier service to those in theTaskForce,toincludefreenewspapersandmagazines.BythefirstpartofMay,abouttwoandahalftonsofclassifed mail alone were arriving weekly. By June, the Regiment handled 20,000 mailbags throughAscension.24Afour–mandetachmentfrom9OrdnanceBattalionarrivedtoestablishalaundryservicefor

thoseonthe island; theyplannedtousea1939mobile laundrytrailerbeingflownout fromtheUnitedKingdom.Beforethetrailerarrived,though,thedetachmentdiscoveredanunusedlaundryinTwoBoatsVillage and restored it to working condition instead. A detachment from Navy, Army and Air ForceInstitutes(NAAFI)hadcomeandsetupsmallfacilitiesinGeorgetown,inTwoBoatsVillageandatEnglishBay. And a tri–service mess teamworked nonstop, preparing a thousandmeals a day from three feldkitchensites.25Despitetheseandcountlessotherheroicefforts,thefledglingsustainmentbasewasstartingtocrumble

inthefaceofthemassiveworkloadjustas3CommandoBrigadearrived.Theoriginalsix–manmovementcontroldetachmenthadbecomesooverworkedthattwomoreteamseventuallydeployedtoassistthem.Furthermore,itwasslowlybecomingapparentthatstorehandlerswerehavingdiffcultiesidentifyingandsortingmilitarysuppliesthathadstartedarrivingsincetheweekendoftheinvasion.The first vessel from the Task Force to arrive was the flagship for Admiral Woodward, the aircraft

carrierHermes, on 16April. The following day, the amphibious force started arriving aboardFearless,StromnessandthefiveLSLs.CanberraandElkfollowedon20AprilafterrefuellinginFreetown.Fordaysthereafter,dozensofshipsofvarioussizes,shapesandcolourswouldpassnearoranchor inAscensionwaters. Itwas a curious looking armada indeed.Many shipswere stopping for quick replenishment ofstores before continuing their passage south toward the Falklands. Routine naval procedure called forverticalreplenishmentbyhelicopters toships insuch instances.Butwhatwasthenbobbing inAtlanticswellsofftherockycoastofAscensionwasnotpartofatypicalRoyalNavyexercise.Theassemblyformedacomplexmixtureofunitsfromseveralservicesaboardavarietyofships,aboutwhichlittlewasknownbylogisticianswhohadbeenworkingsofranticallyinandaroundWideawakeAirfieldeversincethefirstplanes landed on 3April. About 500 tons of assorted supplieswerewaiting for these shipswhen theystartedarriving.TheRoyalNavyhadcontrolledreceiptandissueofsuppliesonAscensionwithconsiderablehelpfrom

civilians ever since the first day. Pallets were taken from aircraft as they landed and placed in areasadjacent to theapron.Thentheyweresortedandmovedbymateriel–handlingequipment towaitingorstorageareasbeforehelicoptersflewthemtoships.Navyteamsashore,however,werenotveryfamiliarwith theArmysupply systemorwith3CommandoBrigadeunits.Adding to theconfusionwas the twoweeks’ worth of supplies rushed helter–skelter from theUnited Kingdom and stackedwherever spaceallowed.Someof ithadbeendestinedoriginally forshipsatports in theUK.Thiscargowasrelativelysimple to identify and transship. Knowingwhat went to whom once it arrived on ships, however, wasanothercaseentirely.Mostshipsweretransportingmultipleunits.Consequently,packagesconsignedtoshipsratherthanunitspresentedproblems.Palletsarrivedoffplaneswithoutpaperwork,someunmarkedandotherswithonlybarcodelabelsonboxes.IncompletelylabelledammunitionpalletsmadeitdifficultifnotimpossibletodistinguishWarMaintenanceReserveammunitionfromtrainingammunitionor,insomecases,ammunitionforRoyalMarinesfromammunitionfortheRoyalNavyorRoyalAirForce.Itwasnotunusual to fnd addressees like ‘Royal Marines Ascension’ or ‘3 Commando Brigade South Atlantic’scribbledonpallets.Asaresultofallthis,suppliesattheairheadhadbecomequiteamess.Someofthatmighthavebeenprevented,perhaps,iflogisticiansintheUnitedKingdomhadanticipated

thedifficultyofconductinglogisticsoperationsundertheconditionsprevailingatAscension.TherushtogetthingstotheTaskForceasquicklyaspossible,alltoooftenincompletedisregardofthedisciplinedsupply system that had characterizedBritish forces in the past, certainly created part of the problem.SloppysupplycontroloverthefirstweeksatAscensionmademattersworse.Therewaslittleaccountingforwhat arrived.Supplieswerenot logged inor out, and therefore itwasnotpossible to tellwhereaparticularitemwasunlesssomeonewasactuallylookingatitontheground.Thatistosay,ifaboxwasnot in the holding area, you did not know whether it had arrived, been delivered, misplaced or evenstolen.Regrettably, the latter case became reality at times. Since therewas no security at the airfieldholdingarea,suppliesweresubjecttopilfering.Resolvingthesupplyproblemwouldnotbeachievedwithoutaddingtothefrictionbetweenlogisticians

afloatand thoseashore.Soldiers fromOrdnanceSquadron,CommandoLogisticRegimentcameashoreeventuallytotakeoversupplyoperationsaroundtheairheadunderthesupervisionofCaptainMcQueen.AcompositesupplyteamfromKinetonandDonningtondepotsintheUnitedKingdomlaterreinforcedthecommandos.Together, thesemen,usingmateriel–handlingequipmentdrawn fromvariousunits, sortedthrough the maze of pallets and boxes. Some remained on Ascension for the duration of the war toreceive, sort, hold, repack, and repalletize supplies as necessary. If itemswere to be taken further byhelicopter,aswasoftenthecase,thenriggingteamsattheairfieldpreparedthesuppliesinappropriatenets. In a relativelyquick time, thedetachment restoredorder to the supply situationonAscension.Amajorheadacheforthemsoonbecamenotwhatwasonhandbutprioritiesforissue.VirtuallyeverythingarrivingfromtheUnitedKingdomhadbeenlabelledwiththehighestpriority,whetheritwasammunitionorironingboards.Sometimesunits’actionsexacerbatedthesituation.AnepisoderelatedadecadelaterbyretiredMajor

General Ian Baxter, then the colonel directing administration and logistics for Major General Moore,regardstheRapierairdefencemissilesystembeingdeployedforthecommandos.Baxterindicatedthat,in1982,RoyalMarines,includinghimselfandBrigadierThompson,knewlittleabouttheRapiersystem.Theyweredumbfoundedtodiscovertheassortmentofequipmentthataccompaniedthesystemtokeepitoperating.Whenseniorleaderssawtheextentofthesesupportnecessities,theyscarcelybelievedtheireyesanddoubtedallwasneeded.AndsotheydirectedmuchofitrightbacktoEngland,atthetimenotunderstanding the importance of it all. Eventually, the Rapier equipment had to find a way back to

Ascensionandon toships. It intentionallybecamestowed inbottomcargoholds topreventdamagebysaltwater,whichmeantitwouldtakemoretimetooffloadlater.AmajortaskfacingCommodoreClappatthistimewasre–stowingthethousandsoftonsofsuppliesthat

had so hurriedly been stashed aboard ships in the United Kingdom. During the two weeks at sea,logisticians recorded most storage locations. At Ascension, they commenced the complex process ofshiftingitemsbetweenshipsandrelocatingthemwithinshipssothat,ifwarbecameareality,whatwasneededwouldbeready.Bythistime,WideawakeAirfieldhadbeenaveragingeightcargoplanesperdaypacked with supplies and equipment. About 1500 tons of supplies had arrived, a third of which werewaitingfor3CommandoBrigadeuponitsarrival.Logisticiansafloatworkedwiththoseashoretoshuttlesuppliestoships.Prioritiesweretoissuetwodaysofammunitionandrationstounits,toconfigureLSLswithanother twodaysofsupplies forbackup, tomakesureartilleryammunitionwas loadedwithgunsand to consolidate demolitions and other engineer stores with 59 Independent Commando Squadron,RoyalEngineers.Complicatingmatters at first was the inability of LPDFearless to dock herself down to release her

LCUs.Sinceshearrivedsolowonfuelafterforegoingbunkering,shewasnowtoohighinthewatertoreleasethelandingcraft.Consequently,re–stowstartedwithoutthebenefitoftheonlyLCUsintheTaskForceatthetime.Helicoptersferriedstoresfromislandholdingareastoshipsandbetweenships.Soon,floatingparking lots ofmexefloteswerebobbingupanddown in theAtlantic swell among the strangearrayofshipsoffAscension.Mexeflotesmovedtoandfromshipsandbecamefloatingstagingareas,asmen removed layers of supplies to get atwhatwasneeded. Logisticiansworked as fast as they could.TheyredistributedWarMaintenanceReservesbetweenshipswhiletryingtopreservesomeflexibilitytosupporteventualtacticalplans.TheirfocusremainedonconfiguringtwooftheLSLs–SirGalahadandSirPercivale–withtwodaysofsuppliesforthebrigade,consistingmainlyofammunition,packedfuelandrations,atotalof200tons.AnotherfourdaysofsupplywouldbeonStromness,withsixteenadditionaldaysonElk.ThesetwoshipswouldkeepbackupsuppliesavailableattheedgeoftheTotalExclusionZoneforre–stockingLSLsasrequired.Anotheraimofthere–stowwastoissuefirst–linesuppliestounits.Uptothistime,manyunitshadbeen

separatedfromsuppliestheywouldrequirewhenlandingintheFalklands.Unitsnowneededtheirinitialissuesofammunition,foodandotherselecteditemsonthesameshipsthatwouldcarrythemsouth.Thatway,theywouldhavewhattheyneededfortheamphibiousassault.Re–stowagetookafullelevendays.TheBFSU’shelicoptersupportelementashorepreparedhundreds

of loadsduring this time. Inall thereweresixhelicopterssupporting there–stow: twoWessexes, threeSeaKingsandoneheavy–liftCH47Chinook.Inonedaypilotsfew138Wessex,40Chinook,and40SeaKingsortieswithsuppliesfromtheairfieldtoships.Helicopterpilotsroutinelyrefuelledhotattheairfieldwithenginesrunningamidstfixedwingaircraft,allwithoutmishap.Ashortageofliftinggearandcargonetsslowedoperationsattimes.Ifloadswerepreparedandrequirementschanged,thentheloadshadtobedismantledandrepackaged.Itwas,asonememberrecalled,‘damnedhardwork’.26Theworkwasnoeasieronshipsanchoredoffshore.Theonlywayofliftingitemsonoroffmostships

wasbyair.Considerableworkhadtoprecedethearrivalofhelicopters.Becauseitemshadbeenstuffedeverywhichwayinvessels,itwasroutinelythecasethatsuppliesonupperdeckshadtoberepositionedto create spacebefore cranes could lift suppliesup from lowerdecks for thehelicopters tomove.Thepassage south had not been kind to the haphazardly loaded supplies either. As menmoved cranes toretrieveammunitionfromMVElk,theydiscovered‘roughseashaddislodgedsomeoftheload,soinsteadofneatpallets,everythingwasstuckinthemiddle.Itwaslikelookingforaneedleinahaystack.’27Norwasiteasyforsoldiersonmexefloteplatformsbobbingupanddowninswellstoferrystocks.One

crew had just retired for the night aboard Sir Lancelot after finishing a long day of moving cargothroughouttheanchorage.TheOfficeroftheWatchrousedthemoutoftheirbunksafterafewhoursandinformed them that the LSL had tomove to sea because hostile shipswere in the area. To save time,Lancelotwastosailwithoutmexeflotesandcrews.Sothecrewwascastafloatonitsmexeflotetofendforthemselves. Conveniently for them, they found a mooring buoy in the dark, close to the beach, andsecured themselves to it. The only protection for them on the floating raft was a few cargo nets andammunitionboxes,whichtheyquicklyformedintoashelter.28Thethreatnevermaterialized,buttheBritishtookfewchances.Theyhadnoviabledefenceinplaceat

Ascension at the time, and they knewArgentinawas capable of ranging large aircraft to the island ordischarging special forces from ships. Itsmerchant vesselRio de la Plata passed within fourmiles ofAscensionon25April.Twodayslater,anotherArgentinemerchantshipshowedupinthearea.Then,on2May,aSovietspytrawlerappearedinthedistance.SuchdevelopmentscombinedtocreateconcernforthesecurityoftheTaskForce.TheBritishalreadywereplanningtodeploymoreHarrierstoAscensiontolinkupwithTaskForceshipping.Eventually,somewouldbeusedtoprovideprotectionforshipsoperatinginthearea.Asaninterimprecaution,shipsreceivedinstructionstoweighanchorandsteamouttoseaattheendofeachday;unfortunately,thisslowedthere–stowprocessevenfurtherbypreventingshuttlingofsupplies at night. Eight Harrier GR3s arrived for the Task Force on 5 May, and three remained atAscension until Phantom interceptors eventually replaced them. That same day, the British installed aradarsystemontopofGreenMountain,usingaChinookhelicopterdisembarkedfromAtlanticConveyor.Theythenannounceda200–mile‘terminalcontrolarea’aroundAscensionandrequiredpriornotificationofallflightsintothearea.29ThemajorityofTaskForcemarinesandsoldiersnot involved inthere–stowengaged intrainingboth

afloat and ashore. Troops needed to zeroweapons and armoured vehicles. The BFSU,with assistance

fromthemanagerofPanAmerican,setupseveraltrainingareasforuse,toincludealive–firerangeforarmoured vehicles. Commanders made the most of the time available. Troops were ferried ashore toEnglish Bay by helicopter or landing craft and practised assaults. They conditioned themselves bymarching the sixmiles to ranges to zero theirweaponsand thenback toEnglishBay.Trainingashoreprovidedapremonitionoflikelyammunitionexpenditurerates.Forexample,45Commandofiredanine–yearallocationofMILANanti–tanktrainingammunitionatAscensioninasingleday.Rehearsing procedures for disembarking transport ships into amphibious landing craft was also an

importantunittrainingpriority.STUFTvesselsposedparticularconcern.Theseshipslackedtheinternalcommunicationsystemsfoundonamphibiousshipstofacilitatesuchoperations.Unitsthereforeneededtopractisegettingofftheshipsintolandingcraftquicklyandsafely.Iftheydidnot,thenanyamphibiousassaultcoulddegenerateintoadisorganizedstruggletogetashoreandwouldalmostcertainlyjeopardizethesuccessof theoperation.SomeRoyalMarineshad trained in similarprocedures,butdisembarkingfrom STUFT would be new for all of them. Amphibious operations would be a completely differentexperience forparatroopers, though,sincetheirskillwas in jumpingoutofairplanesontobattlefields.Theydidnottraintodisembarkshipstoassaultbeaches.Consequently,everyoneneededsomedegreeoftraining,andsotheypractiseddisembarkingintolandingcraftwhenshipswerestationaryandalsowhentheyweremoving. Landing craft and helicopter availability constrained the time available since thesemovement assets were stretched already in the re–stow operation. Logistics requirements retainedpriority.Thompsonallocatedeachbattalion/commandoonedayandonenightforlandingcraftrehearsals.As logisticians were just starting to shuffle around supplies, Admiral Fieldhouse andMajor General

Moore arrived atWideawake for a series of briefings as planned on 17 April aboardHermes. Over ahundredcommandersandstaffcrowdedintoasmallbriefngroomonthecarrier,wherebrieferssharedassessmentsofthesituation.FieldhouselistenedcarefullytoWoodward’sconcernsabouttimingandtheeventualmaintenanceneedsof ships.Theyassumed the twocarrierswouldstayoperationaluntilmid–Juneandagreedontheneedto liberateStanleybeforethen.Theydecidedthat theamphibiousassaultmusttakeplacebythethirdweekinMayandthatspecialforceswouldlandintheFalklandsby1Maytoallow sufficient time to gather intelligence. The group concluded that theCarrier BattleGroup shouldproceedsouthimmediatelytoenforcetheTEZblockadeandinsertthosespecialforces.FieldhouseruledoutanamphibiouslandingatanyplaceotherthanEastFalkland.TheexactlocationofthelandingonEastFalkland,however,remainedunspecified.AllagreedthatClappandThompsonwouldcontinueevaluatingoptions for landing areas and that special forceswould provide intelligence regarding locations underconsideration. By the end of the meeting, Fieldhouse stated categorically, for the first time, thatWoodward’sCarrierBattleGroupwouldwintheairandseabattlesbeforeanyamphibiouslandingtookplace. Few, however, believed that would be possible. The Amphibious Task Force would remain atAscensionforthetimebeingtocarryoutitsre–stowofsuppliesandequipment.ThemeetingproducedseveralimportantdecisionswithimplicationsforTaskForcelogistics.Fieldhouse

agreed that 3CommandoBrigade needed reinforcement by another parachute battalion, an additionalbattery of 105mm light artillery guns, more engineers, medics, Blowpipes for air defence and lighthelicopters.Most of these reinforcementswere, in fact, already beingmobilized. Thiswould bring thestrengthof theLandForce to about5,500men spreadover fivebattalion–sizedunitswith twenty–four105mm light guns, eight tracked armoured reconnaissance vehicles, a battery of Rapier surface–to–airmissiles and fifteen light helicopters.30 Moreover, the assembly concluded that another brigade wasrequiredtoincreaseoverallgroundcombatstrength,since3CommandoBrigade,evenwhenreinforcedwith a second parachute regiment, remained only half the size of the 10,000–strong Argentine forceanticipated in theFalklands.TheBritishArmy’s5 InfantryBrigadewouldbecomethatadditional force.Previouslyknownas8thFieldForceuntilitwasrenamedinJanuary1982,itwasquitedifferentfrom3Commando Brigade. Until its redesignation, the brigade had been a mixture of Regular Army andTerritorial Army units,with a primary focus on homeland defence and secondary focus on out–of–areacontingencies.Itwasanewformationthathadnottrainedtogetherbefore.Twoofitsfamousunits,theparachutebattalions,werenowdeployingasattachmentstothemoreprestigious3CommandoBrigade.AboardHermes, Thompson specifically requested more load–carrying transportation to support his

brigade. There being no other aircraft carriers remaining, the MoD agreed shortly thereafter torequisitionthecontainershipAtlanticConveyorandconvertherintoaplatformforheavy–lifthelicoptersandotheraircraft.AtlanticConveyorwouldbemodifiedandsailloadedfromEnglandeightdaysafterthemeeting aboardHermes. Intrepid, the second Landing PlatformDock,would join the Amphibious TaskForceaswell.HellbergandBaxterhuddledseparatelywithMajorGeneralMooreatAscensiontoworkonlogisticsissues.Theyagreedthatthecurrentthirtydays’supplyofammunitionatLimitedWarRateswasinsufficient.Estimates indicated that, at intense rates of fire, artillery andmortar ammunition supplieswouldnotlastaweek.Asaresult,Baxterarrangedforanotherthirtydaysofthisammunition,including30mm armour–piercing rounds for the Scimitar light tanks and variable time fuses for artillery shells.Variable time fuses were not included in the artillery regiment’s first line issue of ammunition. Thesefuses,whosesettingsenabledartilleryshellstoexplodeabovegroundlevel,wouldbemuchmoreeffectiveintheopen,peat–coveredterraincommonthroughoutmuchoftheFalklands.SoBaxtergotmorefusesfromtheBritishArmyoftheRhineinGermany.31ThemeetingaboardHermescuttothequickofsomeimportantissues,butitneverthelessleftBrigadier

ThompsonandCommodoreClappalittlefrustrated.Thompsonhadhopedformorespecificsaboutwhatwas expected. Although itwas agreed that the earliest possible landing datewould be 14/15May, hismission remained vague. Where he was to land and with what objectives in mind would dramatically

influencelogisticsrequirementsandthetimeneededtogetasustainmentbaseashoreonEastFalkland.Theyhadtocontinueconfiguringsuppliesforbattlelargelybyguesswork.On18April,thedayafterthemeetingwithFieldhouse,theCarrierBattleGroupheadedsouth.Tendays

later,TaskForcecommandersfinallyreceivedalittlemoreguidance.ItreflectedtheobjectivethatChiefofDefenceStaffLewinhadproposedtotheWarCabinetweeksbefore,toavoidwarby‘bringingaboutthewithdrawalofArgentineforcesfromtheFalklandIslandsanddependencies,andthere–establishmentofBritish administration there, as quickly as possible’.32 Included in the guidancewere requirements forWoodwardtocutoffsuppliestotheArgentines,discredittheirclaimtosovereignty,provoketheirnavalandairforcesintoaction,andtocontroltheseaandairforamainlanding;andforClapptoestablishabeachheadcloseenoughtoexertmilitaryandpsychologicalpressureonthemainArgentineforceinthePortStanleyarea.Theguidanceexpressed thehope that suchactions ‘maybeenough to convince theArgentines that their own position is militarily untenable and that they can honourably agree towithdraw….’33Thenewinformationprobablyproducedmoreconfusionthanclarity.Itcertainlydidlittleto help Thompson, Clapp and their logisticians assess how to configure forces and supplies for anamphibiousassault.ItremainedclearthatThatcherandherWarCabinetwerestillhopingtoavoidwar.Untilcircumstanceschangedthatperspective,guidanceforplanningagroundwarwouldremainvague.BytheendofApril,there–stowoperationandothertaskswerenearingcompletion.Clapphadarranged

forsomeexpertstoassesstheunderwatersignaturesofshipstoreducetheriskofmagneticmines,andforothers to trainshipcrewsondamagecontrolandrepair.RoyalNavyengineershad installed40mmanti–aircraftgunson theLSLs toprovide someprotectionagainst air attackand repaired the reverse–osmosisfreshwatergeneratorsinstalledinUgandaatGibraltar.MoorefewbacktoAscensionIslandon29April toupdateThompsonandClappondecisions inLondon.All but threeof thenineteenbeachesconsidered for amphibious landings had been eliminated. Those remaining were the ones Clapp andThompsonhadbeenstudying:CowBay/VolunteerBay,BerkeleySound,andSanCarlosBay.WhenMoorereturnedtoLondon,hetookwithhimanoutlineofoperationsordersforeachofthethreeoptions.On30April,Thompsongatheredhiscommanderstogetherand,instrictestconfidence,sharedwiththemdetailsofplanningupuntilthen.Manydecisionsstillwouldbeforthcoming,butonethingseemedsure.Itstartedtolookforthefirsttimeasiftheyreallyweregoingtowar.Thenextday,LieutenantColonelHellbergandthebulkofhisCommandoLogisticRegimentweighedanchorsandheadedsouthintheirslowerLSLs.TherestoftheAmphibiousTaskForcewouldcatchupwiththembeforereachingtheFalklands.Theothermanoeuvrebattalion,the2ndBattalionoftheParachuteRegiment,proudlyknownas2Para,

arrivedaboard the ferryNorland on themorningof7May.Thompsonurgently requesteda littlemoretimesothat2ParaalsocouldpractisedisembarkingintolandingcraftfromNorland.HewasgrantedjustafewmorehoursbeforetheWarCabinetinLondonorderedtheAmphibiousTaskForcesouth.TheGroupsailedat2200hrsthatevening.SomewhereoutintheSouthAtlantic,hundredsofmilesahead,thefiveslowerLSLswerealreadysteaming.FewmembersoftheTaskForcenowdoubtedtheywouldseesomeaction. Toomuchhadhappened since they arrived atAscension threeweeks before. Stillmorewas tohappeninthedaysaheadthatwouldmakewarevenmorelikely.

F

Chapter5

FinalPreparationfortheAmphibiousAssault

ewaboardships,inLondonorinWashingtonDCeverimaginedthatArgentinawouldprefergoingto war rather than negotiate a settlement. By 1 May, however, those beliefs were starting tochange.DespitealmostcompletesupportfortheBritishintheUnitedNations,diplomaticeffortsto

findapeacefulsolutionwerenotfindingtractionineithertheUnitedKingdomorArgentina.TheCarrierBattleGrouphadarrivedintheSouthAtlantic,andArgentinacontinuedmovingtroopsandsuppliesintotheislands,whilethosealreadythereworkedondefences.Then,asBritishforceswerecompletingtheirstayonAscension,bothcountriestookactionwhichmadewarovertheFalklandIslandsanearcertainty.FiveweeksafterArgentinescrapmetalworkershoistedtheircountry’sfagatLeith,theParaquetGroupreclaimedSouthGeorgiawithhardlya fight.On25April, theArgentine submarineSantaFemade themistakeofsurfacing inproximitytoshipscarryingRoyalMarinesreadytoretakethe islandwithforce.Withsomenavalgunfire,severalwell–aimedrocketsfromhelicoptersandacoupleofdepthcharges,theBritishdisabledthesubmarine,whichthenlimpedbackintoGrytviken.Atthetime,themarinesaboardTidespring were still 200 miles away. It would not be necessary for them to execute their plan. Thefrigates Antrim and Broadsword started bombarding the area around Grytviken to intimidate theArgentines. As the bombardment approached the settlement, the captain of theSanta Fe and the 137Argentine military on land soon surrendered. It was an embarrassingly quick reversal of fortune forArgentina.The quick victory at South Georgia, however, was not without misfortune for the British. In whatremains a controversial decision, the commander of ParaquetGroup directed special forces to land byhelicopter on FortunaGlacier and conduct reconnaissance, against the objections of theGroup’s LandForcecommander,whohadexperienceoperatinginsuchhazardousAntarcticconditions.Notlongafterinsertion, the special forces had discovered travel on the glacier to be precarious because ofwhiteoutconditionsandcrevasses.Duringevacuation, twoof threeWessexhelicopterscrashed.Althoughall themenonboardsurvived,thelossofthosehelicopterswouldproveverycostlylater.TheretakingofSouthGeorgiaremovedanydoubtsaboutBritain’sresolvetotakebacktheFalklandsbyforceifnecessary.TheislandalsoprovidedthemwiththeirfirstfootholdintheSouthAtlantic.About900milesfromtheFalklands,itmighthaveseemedaconvenientlocationtoaugmentAscensionasaforwardsustainmentbase.Unfortunately,SouthGeorgiawasvirtually inaccessibleexcept insmallareasaroundtheoldwhalingstationatGrytvikenortheabandonedsettlementsatLeithandStromness.Nodocksorpiersexistedforberthingcargoships.Althoughputtingsuppliesandequipmentonlandwaspossiblebylanding craft, little could be done ashore after that. There was no infrastructure or landing areas forplanes. Itwas an environment farmore inhospitable than themain islands of East andWest Falkland,bitterlycoldandroutinelybuffetedbygaleforcewinds,aplacewhereonlyvastcoloniesofpenguinsandsealsthrived.SouthGeorgianonethelessaffordedtheBritishashelteredanchorage,wellawayfromEastFalkland and the reach of Argentine planes, to take care of other Task Force requirements as theydeveloped.TheRoyalNavybythistimehadearmarkedseveralareasintheAtlantictoservicevesselsinthe Task Force. Midway between Ascension and the Falklands, it established a Replenishment andConsolidationAreaforfleetauxiliaryvesselstoreceiveandissuesupplies.Onthenorth-eastedgeoftheTotalExclusionZone,aTug,Repair,andLogisticsArea (TRALA)provideda locationwhereshipscouldreceivesuppliesfromsupportvessels;wheresuppliescouldbehelduntil takentoshipsthroughoutthearea;andwheremaintenanceandbattledamagerepairtothefleetcouldtakeplace.AlsoontheeasternsideoftheTotalExclusionZone,aLogisticsLoiteringArea(LLA)wasplannedforthoseshipsthatwouldmaintainsuppliesgenerallyfortheAmphibiousTaskForceandthenshuttlethemtoEastFalkland.SouthGeorgiacouldsupplementtheTRALAincomingweeksbyofferingthefleetanother,moreprotectedarea,where ships could rendezvous if necessary to conduct similar activities. Moreover, it would provide aconvenient location for ships to anchor away fromhazards of thewar zone and to transfer troops andequipmenttoothershipsformovementtoEastFalkland.ThiswouldbeparticularlyadvantageouswhenthepoliticallysensitiveoceanlinerQE2arrivedintheSouthAtlantic.On 1May, the British conducted the first of seven long-range Vulcan bomber strikes, attempting tocrater the runwayatStanleyand thereby impedeArgentina’s ability to reinforce the islandor conductairstrikesfromthereonBritishships.CodenamedBlackBuck,thesebombingmissionsdemonstratedthatalthoughitsnearestairfieldwasthousandsofmilesawayatAscension,theRoyalAirForcenonethelesscould strike theFalklands.Eachof theBlackBuckmissions requiredeightyair crewmenandeighteensorties fown by fifteen Victor Tankers, a Nimrod surveillance plane and two Vulcan bombers, in totalnecessitatingseventeenfueltransfersandconsuming2,000,000lboffuel.1Atthetime,theseflightswerethelongestbombingrunsinhistory.Thefirstmissiondroppedtwenty-onebombs.Justonelandedtowardstheedgeoftheairfield.ItwastheonlytimethattheVulcansmanagedtohitneartheactualrunway,andalthoughthebomblefta largecrater, thedamagehadnoeffecton landingsofArgentinecargoplanes.The result was nevertheless quite significant, aside from demonstrating British resolve and striking

power.Menendezhadestimatedthathistroopsrequiredseventeentonsoffoodandoverninetonsoffueleachday.Duringthefirstbombingrun,twocivilianfreighterswereanchoredoffofStanley.Bothpulledanchorsand fledquickly, takingwith them largequantitiesof suppliesandequipment thatwouldhavebeenhelpfultotroopsanddefences.NeithershipreturnedtotheFalklands.2ThesamedaythatRoyalAirForceVulcanscrateredtheairfieldatStanley,BritishHarriersfromtheCarrierBattleGroupbombedthetiny airstrip at Goose Green, destroying several Pucara ground-attack aircraft. These successful airattacks by the British did not create a point of no return between Britain and Argentina. But whathappenedinthenextthreedayssurelymeantthatbothcountrieshadcrossedtheRubicon,andfocusedworldattentiononthearea.By this time, British submarines had been lurking in waters around the Falklands and trackingmovementsofArgentina’sNavy.Theyhaddiscoveredand reported two formationsof ships just on theedgeoftheTEZ.Tothenorth-westoftheFalklandswasArgentina’saircraftcarrierVeinticincodeMayowith other warships. To the south-west was the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with twoaccompanying destroyers. Both formations had the capability of firing Exocet missiles at the CarrierBattleGroup if theygainedrange todoso.Planes fromtheVeinticincodeMayohadawider radiusofactionthantheSeaHarriersandnowwerecomingwithinrange.FearingapotentialpincermovementbythesetwogroupsandthestrikingpowerofExocetmissiles,WoodwardrequestedpermissiontotorpedotheGeneralBelgrano.ApprovalsupposedlycamefromThatcherherself.On2May,theBritishsubmarineConqueror torpedoedBelgrano near the edge of the TEZ. The cruiser sank within an hour, killing anestimated350ArgentinesailorsandcausingoutrageincountriessympathetictoArgentina.Ascontroversialasthissinkingandlossoflifemighthavebeen,itproducedahostofbenefitsfortheBritish, farbeyond their expectations.ThatcherhadaskedAdmiralLeachduringher lastmeetingwithhimontheeveningof1AprilhowthecommanderoftheArgentineNavywouldreacttotheBritishNavy.Whenherespondedthatthecommanderwouldreturnhisfleettoharbour,shepressedhimforareasonwhy, towhichhe said, ‘Because I shouldappreciate that although I could takeout someof theBritishships,theywouldsinkmyentireNavy.Itwouldtakeyearstorecover,ifindeeditwerepracticabletodoso.’3 Whether or not that was the thinking at the time, the Argentine Navy acted precisely as Leachpredicted.AfterthesinkingoftheBelgrano,thecarrierVeinticincodeMayoandtherestoftheArgentineNavyatseaheadedbacktoport.Theythenstayedtherefortheremainderofthewar,seriouslystrippingtheArgentineAirForceofanyflexibilityinitsbombingruns.Nolongercoulditsplanescutdistancestotargetsbyflyingoffthedeckofanaircraftcarrier.Nowtheyhadtoflyfromlandbases350ormoremilesawayfromtheFalklands,leavingpilotsonlysecondstomakebombingdecisionsbeforereturningforfuel.But theeffectof thesinkingof theBelgranowasnot limited to its subsequenteffectsonArgentineairpower.Lackingnaval protection,merchant vesselshadnodesire to enterwaters around theFalklandsagain.ThisforcedArgentinatousecargoplanestoprovidethelargetonnageofsuppliesneededdailybyitsoccupationforce.Strategically,thesinkingoftheBelgranobecameoneofthemostimportantactionsoftheentirewar.On4May,though,Argentinaachievedsomethingtoboastaboutaswell.TwoofitsSuperEtendards,eachcarryingaFrench-madeExocetmissile, ranged theCarrierBattleGroupabout twelvemilesawayand launchedtheirmissiles.OneExocetapparentlywasdeflectedbyBritishairdefencemeasures.Theother,however, struck the starboard sideof theBritishdestroyerHMSSheffield, penetratedandburstintoflamesfedbytheship’sfuel,killingtwentyBritishsailorsandwoundingtwodozenmore.Sheffieldhad been launched less than five years before amidst much publicity. She sank as other ships wereattemptingtopullherbacktoAscensionandbecamethefirstBritishshiplosttoenemyactionsincetheSecond World War. News of the loss of Sheffield was sobering for the British, underscoring thevulnerability of their ships at sea.Woodward’s reaction to theattackwas todirecthisBattleGroup topositionsfurthertotheeast,makingthemevenmoredifficultforArgentinepilotstorangefrommainlandbases.Frustrating theBritish further, theArgentines shotdownaHarrieronabombing runoverEastFalklandthesamedaytheystruckSheffield.Twodayslater,apairofHarrierscollidedinthefogkillingbothpilots.ThefirstweekofMaysuddenlyhadbecomeverycostlyforbothcountries.TheBritishknewat thispoint thatArgentinahadused twoof its original fiveExocets received fromFrance and that it was trying hard to procure more. Although France had agreed secretly to delaycompletion of Argentina’s original procurement order for ten of these missiles, Exocets remainedavailablefromothersources,particularlyfromcountrieslikeIraq,whichhadacoupleofdozen,andPeru,whichwasintheprocessoftryingtoprocuresome.BritainworriedaboutArgentinagettingitshandsonanymoreofthem.SecretaryofDefenceNottthereforeauthorizedsecretagentstotakecovertinitiativestostoporinhibitmorepurchases.Someagentsposedasbuyersininternationalmarketsforthemissilesand outbid the Argentines; others located Exocets in storage for sale and rendered them inoperable.4Suchactionsprovedtoberemarkablysuccessfulinpreventingfurtherprocurements.AfterthesinkingoftheSheffield,though,ArgentinastillretainedthreeofitsfiveExocets.Althoughitwouldreceivenomore,theseremainingthreecontinuedtoworrytheBritishuntiltheendofthewar.The ease with which the British took back South Georgia, coupled with the sinking of theGeneral

Belgrano,mighthavecreatedsecondthoughtsfortheJuntaaboutthewisdomofinvadingtheFalklands.Ifthatwasthecase,thesinkingoftheSheffieldreinforceditsintenttofightback.Hopesforapeacefulsolutionand the likelihoodofanArgentinewithdrawalnowseemedremote.StaffswithFieldhouseandtheTaskForceassessedtheremainingthreeoptionsforlandingsitesonEastFalkland.Somestillwanteda site in proximity to Stanley, thereby permitting a short approach to the concentration of Argentineforcesthere.Otherspreferredalocationfurtherawaythatallowedbetterprotection.Ultimately,however,

Fieldhouse left the decision to his commanderswhowould have to execute the amphibious operation.Clapp contacted Fieldhouse’s headquarters at Northwood on 8 May, as Fearless was leading theAmphibiousTaskForceawayfromAscension,todetermineif itwaspossibleto‘gofirm’onSanCarlos.Northwoodconcurred,whichenabledthetwoleaderstocompletedetailsforanamphibiousassault.SanCarloswasagoodchoiceforseveralreasons.SinceitwasontheothersideoftheislandfromtheconcentrationofArgentineforcesatStanley,landingtherewouldcomeasasurprisetoBrigadierGeneralMenendez.IfArgentinalaunchedairattacksagainsttheTaskForceasoperationswereunderway,pilotswouldnotfinditeasytozeroinonBritishships.Theareawasprotectedbyreasonablyhighground.Pilotswouldnotwanttoentertheareafromhighaltitudesbecausetheywouldbecomevulnerabletotheveryeffective Sea Dart missiles on British ships. Low approaches would obscure ship locations and meanaddedrisksofflyingintoland.HighgroundaroundSanCarlosmadeiteventougherforpilotstolocateand fire on ships before becoming exposed. The area was outside the range of any known Argentineartillery.FalklandSoundleadingtoSanCarlosalsoaffordedmuchcalmerwatersforships,landingcraft,andmexeflotesthanopenseaselsewhere,anditswaters,farawayfromStanley,weremuchlesslikelytobemined.AllofthiswasimportantbecausetheBritishwouldbemostvulnerableaslandingsandbuild-uponbeacheswereunderway.Speedwouldbeessential,andtheprotectedwatersallowedfortwenty-four-hour landing craft and mexeflote operations. It was also easy to guard against counter-attack, eventhoughshipsremainedvulnerabletoArgentina’ssmallsubmarines.Bythistime,theLSLsweresailinganentireweekaheadoftherestoftheAmphibiousTaskForce,eventhoughbowdoorsandside-loadedmexefloteshadbeenslowingtheminroughseas.Itwasjustascleartomenonboard these logistics ships that a groundwarwas becoming imminent, but the location of thelandingsremaineduncleartothem.Thetwo-weekstayatAscensionhadenabledthemtosortoutmuchofthemess in cargo holds of ships before heading south, but their preparation for supporting the LandForcewas far fromover.Neither theCommodore norCommandoLogisticRegiment hadprovided full-scalelogisticssupportfor3CommandoBrigadeinpreviousexercises,letalonetoacombatforcenearlytwiceaslargeaftertheadditionoftwoparachutebattalions.ThetwoamphibiousexercisesplannedeachyearroutinelyhadbeenprearrangedbyotherNATOstaffsoverseveralmonths.Thustheoperationalstaffshadhadnoopportunitytosittogetherandplanalandingorrehashplansasaresultofenemyaction,weatherandotherfactors.OnarecentexerciseinNorwegianwatersinJanuary1982,BrigadierThompsonandhisstaffwerepreventedfromjoiningCommodoreClappbecauseofcosts,despiteneverhavingexercisedtogether.Theexercisebeingplannedforlaterthatyearwouldunfoldlikemostothers:supplieswouldarrivebyrail;CommandoLogisticRegimentwouldbenefitfromhostnationsupporttoaugmentitsownslimmeddowncapabilitiestosupportunits;nologisticsshipswerescheduledtoparticipate,letalonetomovesuppliesontobeaches.Now,however,unitswereheadedtowardanoperationoffargreatermagnitudethananypreviousexercise.TheapproachtotheFalklandstherefore allowed some valuable time for teaching the two staffs towork together and reach essentialcompromises.ResponsibilityforconfiguringsuppliesbasedondirectionsfromBrigadelogisticsstaffandfortrainingtroopstoissuethemquicklyfelltoMajorAnthonyWelch,CommanderofOrdnanceSquadron.Suppliesfor3CommandoBrigaderemainedpackedaroundLSLsheadingsouth.HismenhadsecuredthemthebesttheycouldinanticipationofrougherseasintheSouthAtlantic.TheSquadronnowfacedthechallengeofunloadinglargequantitiesofsupplieswhentheLSLsarrivedintheFalklands.Hoistsonthelogisticsshipsprovidedonly limitedassistancebecause theycouldnot reachmanyof theplaceswheresupplieswerestowed.WelchthereforeinitiatedfurthertrainingafterleavingAscensionsothathismencouldpractisemovingsuppliesfrombottomstorageareastothetopdecksoftheLSLs,wherehelicopterscouldthenliftthem to shore. The Squadron formed human chains to pass supplies hand-to-hand around LSLs. IteventuallysucceededinmovingatonofammunitionfromthebottomofanLSLtothetopdeckinelevenminutes.TheSquadronalso refinedprocedures for issuingsuppliesand formaintaining inventories, sothat during the rush to get supplies ashore they did not duplicate the confusion they had experiencedweeksbeforeatAscension.On12May,theofficialorderfinallyarrivedfortheleadersaboardFearless.ThisinstructedtheforcesintheatretorepossesstheFalklandsasquicklyaspossible.Itoutlinedasix-phaseoperationbeginningwiththe establishment of a Total Exclusion Zone and reconnaissance, both of which had started, andcontinuing with the amphibious landing, initial land operations, the arrival of 5 Infantry Brigade andfinallytherepossessionoftheislands.ItspecifiedthattheamphibiouslandingwouldnotbeinitiateduntilWoodwardhadachievedseaandairsuperiority.On this day,MajorGeneralMoorewas designated officially as theCommander, LandForceFalklandIslands,orCLFFI.ThiswasmuchtothesurpriseandconcernofThompsonandClappasittheoreticallymeanttheCommanderAmphibiousTaskForce,whichcomprisedbothshipsandlandforces,wouldhavetonegotiatewithMooreandnotThompson.ItalsohelpedconfirmtheirbeliefthatnooneabovetheminLondonreallyunderstoodhowanamphibiousoperationshouldbeplannedorcommanded.Theythereforedecided to continue planning the amphibious operation together as if there had been no change incommand structure, but to keepMoore informed of progress. The full Land Force would consist of 3CommandoBrigadeand5Brigade.Moorewouldbesailingsouthwith5BrigadeontheluxurylinerQE2,whichjusthadbeenrequisitionedasanothertroopship.ThompsonreceiveddirectivesfromMoorelaterthesameday,although theydidnotprovidedetails regardingexpectationsbeyondbeaches.Clappwasnotarecipient,eventhoughhewouldbeincommandoftheoperation.MooretoldThompson:You are to secure a bridgehead on East Falkland, into which reinforcements can be landed, in which an airstrip can be

establishedandfromwhichoperationstorepossesstheFalklandIslandscanbeachieved.Youaretopushforwardfromthebridgeheadareasofarasthemaintenanceof itssecurityallows,togaininformation,toestablishmoralandphysicaldominationovertheenemy,andtoforwardtheultimateobjectiveofrepossession.YouwillretainoperationalcontrolofallforceslandedintheFalklandsuntilIestablishmyHeadquartersinthearea.Itismyintentiontodothis,aboardFearless,asearlyaspracticableafterthelanding.ExpectthistobeapproximatelyonD+7.Itisthenmyintentionto land 5 Infantry Brigade into the beachhead and to develop operations for the complete repossession of the FalklandIslands.5

Theamphibiouslandingsandthesubsequentbuild-upashorewouldbecomeknownasOperationSutton.Theearliestdate for the landingswouldbe18May,dependingon the situation.Complicatingmatters,though,werewarnings byWoodward at this time that achieving air superioritymight not be possible.That was something Clapp suspected; it created understandable concern for Thompson. Lack of airsuperiorityposedseriouspotential ramifications for theAmphibiousTaskForce.Abrief reviewofwhatoccursduringanamphibiousassaultwillrevealwhy.Amphibious operations generally take place in three very distinct phases, preceded by intelligencegathering, beach selection and careful planning. The first is the actual assault conducted by groundcombatforcestoseizefootholdsonland;thesecondisthestrengtheningofthelandforcewithcombatsupportunits likeartilleryandairdefence;and the third is thebuildingupof logisticscapabilities.Allphasesrequireprecisesequencingoflandingcrafttomaintainmomentum.Ifhelicoptersareavailabletotransport men or supplies ashore in any phase, then they too are carefully allocated and controlled.Everythingdestinedforlandbecomespartofanintricatemovementplanbrokendownintoassaultwavesbased on available craft and priority of objectives. Anything that impedes the first phase can preventcombatforcesfromseizingobjectivesandsecuringwhatisknownasthebeachhead.Anythinginhibitingthe second jeopardizes the ability of those combat forces to hold on to the beachhead. And anythingpreventing the third threatens the ability of the land force to move beyond beaches with sufficientlogisticssupporttosecureobjectiveselsewhere.Delaysthereforecreateopportunitiesfortheenemytoregaintheinitiativeandpreventforcesfromeverbreakingoutofthebeachhead.Planningthereforeseekstoaccomplishallphasesasquicklyaspossible,toputonlywhatisnecessaryashoreandtokeeppressureon the enemy in themeantime.Clapp’s and Thompson’s staffswere doing just that. They estimated itwouldtaketwodaystogetwhatwasneededintotheSanCarlosbeachheadbeforeanybreakoutcouldoccur.Duringthistime,andparticularlyastheywereestablishinginitialdefences,theoperationwouldbemostvulnerabletocounter-attack.NowthattheCarrierBattleGroupmightnotgaincontroloftheskies,however,adistinctpossibilityexistedthattheArgentinescoulddisruptBritishplanswithoutusinggroundforces.TheamphibiousoperationwouldbeconsideredcompleteonlywhenThompsonjudgedunitswereorganizedashorewithsufficientsuppliesavailableforthemtogoitaloneandthenadvisedClappassuch.AnadditionalcauseforconcernwasthevaguedirectivefromMooretoThompsonon12May.Althoughit gave Thompson the prerogative to do whatever he felt was necessary to maintain security of thebeachhead and establish dominance over the Argentines until Moore landed with 5 Brigade a weekthereafter, the directive did not provide him objectives beyond the beachhead or even the latitude tocommenceagroundoffensivetoretakecontrolof the island.Moreover, it impliedthatMooreexpectedThompson’slandforceandperhapsClapp’samphibiousforcetoremainnearthebeachheadatSanCarlosuntilMoore arrivedwith5Brigade aweek later. That presented a potential problem, too, especially ifArgentinaretainedcredibleairpower.The day after Brigadier Thompson received his directives from Moore, he called his subordinatecommandersaboardFearless tobriefthemonthemissionathand.CommodoreClappandhiskeystaffattendedaswelltoensureteamsweresynchronized,sincehewouldcontroltheoperationuntiltheLandForcewasestablishedashoreandreadytotakeover.Atthemeeting,Clapp’sstaffwoulddetailplansfornaval gunfire and the use of landing craft. Everyone had received copies of the operations orderbeforehandsothattheycouldabsorbdetailsandidentifyquestions.OnecommandernotpresentforthemeetingwasLieutenantColonelHellberg,whowasthenwithhisCommandoLogisticRegimentmovingonLSLsaheadofothershipsintheAmphibiousTaskForce.Hissecondincommand,MajorTerryKnott,waspresent;ThompsonwouldlaterlinkupwithHellbergasthemaingroupofshipsjoinedupwiththeLSLstobriefhimpersonallyaswell.SurgeonCommanderRickJollydescribesthesuccinctseriousnessofThompson’sremarkstohismenthatday:

TheBrigadierstandsup,looksforamomentattheCommandingOfficerssittinginthechintz-coveredfront-rowchairs,donshis spectacles and in aquiet but clear voicegiveshis orders: ‘Mission, gentlemen.To land inPortSanCarlos,SanCarlosSettlement,andAjaxBay,andestablishabeachheadformountingoffensiveoperationsleadingtothecaptureoftheFalklandIslands.’Thereisabsolutesilence.Herepeatsthesentence,thencarrieson:‘Designforbattle.Asilentnightattackbylandingcraft,withtheobjectofsecuringahighgroundbyfirstlight…’Thecrispinstructionsfollow,onebyone,untileveryangleandproblemiscovered.6

Fourdayslater,intelligencearrivedthattheArgentineshadpositionedastrategicreserveintheareaofDarwin, on the isthmus south ofSanCarlos; soThompsonadjustedhis order to confront that possiblethreatfirst.Thefinalplancalledforfourofthefivecombatunitstogoashoreundercoverofdarknessstartingat0230hrs.7Theinitialwavewouldconsistof2Paraand40Commandointwelvelandingcraftto secure high ground around the anchorage. The frigate Plymouth would provide fire support asrequired. The paratrooperswould land first near San Carlos Settlement at a location designated BlueBeach. From there, they would climb the 700–900ft ridges of Sussex Mountain, establish defensivepositionsonthereverseslopeandmaintainobservationtothesouthtowardDarwinandGooseGreeninanticipationofacounter-attack.Thecommandoswouldlandnearbyminuteslater,fanoutandestablisha

similar defence facing east from the smaller VerdeMountains. Landing craft thenwould return for 45Commandoand3Para for the secondwave.The formerwouldhead for a landing sitedesignatedRedBeachonthewestsideoftheanchorageinAjaxBay;3ParawouldlandatanareacalledGreenBeachnearPortSanCarlos.Together,thesecondwaveofcombatforceswouldbroadenthebeachhead.Initially,42Commandowouldremainafloatasreserve;itthenwouldfollow3ParaintotheareaofGreenBeachlater in the day. At daylight, helicopters and landing craft would commence a carefully programmedmovement ofmen, equipment and supplies to areas throughout the anchorage. Itwould startwith the105mmartilleryandRapiersand thenproceed to logisticsnecessities.Movementswere sequenced forthefirstfortyhourstogetrequirementsashore.CommodoreClapp’sstaffhaddevelopedadetailedplanforpositioningwarshipstocounterArgentineairstrikesduringlandingsandthebuild-up.TheBritishnowexpectedsomeattackplanestoarrivefromthewestoverWestFalkland, ifArgentinesreceivedreportsfromanyremainingobservationpostsonMountRosalieaboutlandings.TheplanthereforecalledforanechelonedphalanxofshipstobelocatedinFalklandSound.TogetbeyondtheSoundinordertoattackshipsintheSanCarlosanchorage,Argentinepilotswouldhavetogetpastthisdefence.The last speaker at the ‘O Group’ was Major Gerry Wells-Cole, the Deputy Assistant Adjutant andQuartermaster General for 3 Commando Brigade. Wells-Cole, the chief logistics staff officer in theBrigade, had assumed his position aweek before the Argentine invasion.Hewas now responsible forplanninglogisticssupportoftheBrigade,whichhadbeendetailedinafifteen-pagelogisticsannextotheorder.8Wells-Colehighlightedsalientpointsforsupport.Althoughspecificsforlogisticshadbeenevolvingover the past fewweeks, the general concept remained relatively unchanged fromplans developed enroutetoAscension.Thesupportelementsofthecombatsunits,calledBEchelons,andallofCommandoLogistic Regiment, would remain afloat initially. Combat units would land with basic loads of rations,ammunition and other supplies. Every vehicle would top off with fuel and take two full jerrycans asreserve. Some troopswould carry extra rounds ofmortar ammunition to leave on the beach for quickresupplyduringthefirstphaseof theassault.Abouttwodaysofsupplieswouldremainonships.Unitsneeding anything further would coordinate with their B Echelons, which would receive transportationsupport throughCommandoLogisticRegimentas required.Aftercombatunits secured thebeachhead,someoftheBrigadelogisticscapabilitywouldcomeashore.UnitBEchelonswouldmovetodesignatedareaswiththeirunitsasatailoredportionofCommandoLogisticRegiment formedasmallBMAinthevicinityofAjaxBaynearRedBeach.HellbergandWells-Colewoulddecidetheexactlocationlater.Asthesituation stabilized, engineers then would establish a fuelling system on land so that helicopters andHarriers would not have to return to ships to refuel. Engineers also would establish water points atdesignated locations, since little potable water would be available anywhere on the island. The BMAeventuallywouldstockaboutthreedaysofsupplyforthelandforce.LSLswoulddeliverthesesuppliesstraight to the beach if possible. When other supplies were needed, Commando Logistic RegimentworkingwithThompson’sandClapp’sstaffswouldcoordinatereplenishmentfromsupplyvesselsholdinggreaterquantitiesof stocks in theLLA furtherout in theTEZ. If allwentasanticipated,3CommandoBrigade expected to have five days of supply spread between beaches and logistics ships in theanchorage,withnearlytwomonths’moreatsea.Itwouldrequestothershipstobringmoresuppliestotheanchorageasneeded.The process set forth in the 3 Commando Brigade operations order was, in military terms, a ‘pullsystem’ of resupply. If a company in 42 Commando needed something, for instance, it notified its BEchelon, which either fulfilled the request or obtained support from Commando Logistic Regiment.Requestsforsupportflowedfrombottomtotop.Thisdifferedfroma‘pushsystem’,inwhichhigherlevelsprovided suppliesor services to lower levelsbasedonestimatesof consumptionandwithout requiringthem to ask. Wells-Cole and Hellberg, as 3 Commando Brigade’s primary planner and operatorrespectively for logistical support, would co-chair a daily conference ashore with unit quartermasterrepresentativestodeterminerequirements.Duringthatmeeting, logisticianswouldworkoutdetails forthenexttwenty-fourhours.Unitquartermasterswouldreceivemailandotheritemsturnedinforrepairtotakebacktotheirunits.Thedetachment fromCommandoLogisticRegiment intheBMAthenwouldissue supplies to the requestingBEchelons; orCommandoLogisticRegiment afloatwould arrange fordeliverytotheBMAforsubsequentissuetounits.Ifsupplieswerenotonshipsintheanchorage,Clapp’sstaff would request thatWoodward make them available from other ships at sea. In situations wheresupplieswerenotavailableanywhereintheSouthAtlantic, theBrigadewouldpassrequirementsusingsatellite communications on Fearless direct to relevant logistics headquarters in the United Kingdom,whichinturnwoulddirectdepotstoreleasesupplies.ThelonglineofcommunicationrequiredTaskForcecommands to specify, at the timeof request, theappropriatepriority fordelivery.PriorityOnedeliverywasbyairdropasnearaspossibletotheFalklands;PriorityTwowasairdeliverytoAscensionandfromtherebysea;andPriorityThreewasdeliveryentirelybysea,whichwouldtakeatleastthreeweeks.Allthismeant, in theory at least, that 3CommandoBrigade units could expect to get high priority itemswithin forty-eight toseventy-twohoursbyairdrop.Whensignallingrequisitionsto theUnitedKingdom,Brigade logisticians would also include strength figures, fuel consumption data, and information oncontrolled items,so that logisticians therecouldstayabreastof theoverall logisticalstatusof theTaskForce.Thelogisticsannexcontaineddetailedinstructionsinavarietyofotherareas.Theintentionthroughoutwas tokeep thebulkof servicesafloat initially.Therewouldbenoequipment repaircapabilityashore.CommandoLogisticRegiment’sWorkshopSquadronwouldremainafloat.Whenrequirementsdeveloped,workmenwouldgoashoretoconductrepairsortoevacuateitemstoLSLsforrepair.Asmuchaspossible

would be done aboard logistics ships, where men and equipment were readily available. That way, 3Commando Brigade would not move people and equipment needlessly into the San Carlos area,consuminglotsoftransportationassetstogetthemthere.Theinitialplanformedicalsupportwasechelonedindepth.Self-aidandbuddy-aidtrainingprovidedenroutewouldhelpindividualstokeepthemselvesandothersalive.Beforelanding,eachmanwouldreceiveamorphineinjectortowearonhisdogtagsforuseineasingthepainofwounds.Troopswouldrenderbuddy-aid to each other at the point of injury. Company aid men and regimental aid post would beintegratedintoassaultwavesofunitstohelpkeepcasualtiesaliveforevacuation.Second-linecarewouldbeafloatinitially,withNo.1MedicalTroopaboardGalahadand2Para’sParachuteClearingTroopaboardNorland.CasualtieswouldevacuatethereortoCanberra,whichcouldprovidebothsecond-andthird-linemedical care.Since shewasalso actingas a troop ship, however,Canberrawouldnot haveprotectionunder the Geneva Convention. She carried Commando Logistic Regiment’s Medical Squadron, No.3Medical Troop andNo.2Surgical Support Team, in addition to nursing, holding and advanced surgicalcapabilities. Casualties would be evacuated by air to Sir Galahad, Norland or Canberra as soon aspossible, using a dedicatedWessex helicopter. TheCommando Forces Bandwould be divided betweenthosevesselstoprovidelitter-bearerassistance.Asthebeachheadbecamesecure,No.1MedicalTroopandParachuteClearingTroopthenwouldmoveashoretoestablishasmallfielddressingstation.Whenthathappened,casualtiescouldreceiveimmediatecareintheirunitareas,subsequentcareintheBMAand surgical treatment on Canberra, which would remain anchored in San Carlos Bay. Uganda, thedesignatedhospitalship,wouldprovidethehighestlevelofcareintheatre.ShewouldbelocatedinaRedCrossboxatseaabout twentymilesnorthofPebble Island,alongwithArgentina’shospitalship,BahiaParaiso.Bothcountrieshadagreedthatanycasualtiesevacuatedthereshouldnotparticipatefurtherinthewar.9Threefastdispatchvessels–Hydra,Hecla,andHecate –would transportcasualtiesrequiringadditional or long-term care from Uganda to Montevideo, Uruguay. From there, British medicalevacuationplaneswouldairliftcasualtiestotheUnitedKingdomviaAscension.Shouldtherebefatalities,the plan directed units to conduct emergency burial on land until the BMA could be established.Thereafter,CommandoLogisticRegimentwouldarrangeforburialatalocationinthevicinityoftheBMA.Thosedyingaboardhospital shipsatseawouldeitherbeburiedashore ina temporarycemetery,oratsea.The logistics annex also contained instructions if prisoners of war were taken. Units would escortprisoners taken during landings back to the beach, where others would take custody and arrange forfurthertransportationtoadesignatedship intheanchorage.Unitswoulddeliverweapons,ammunitionandotherequipment taken fromprisoners toCommandoLogisticRegiment forholding.Once theBMAwas established ashore, theRegimentwould prepare an appropriate prisoner ofwar cage andprovidesecurity.AdherencetotheGenevaConventionwasparamount.CommandoLogisticRegimenthadbeenanticipatingupuntilthistimethatmostresupplyfromtheshipstoshorewouldbebyLSL.ThesesupplyvesselswouldlowertheirbowrampsontothebeachattheBMA,enablingOrdnanceSquadrontomovesuppliesright intostorageareaswithoutany transshipment.Thiswould help expedite offload. Since the shallow-bottomed LSLs were designed to do that in support ofamphibious operations, it was natural that the Regiment would plan accordingly. Unfortunately,CommodoreClappwasnotonthatsamesheetofmusic,andforgoodreason.HeknewthatthecaptainsofLSLshadnotpractisedbeachingrecentlyandthattheirvesselsweredesignedmoreforroll-onroll-offoperations in European settings. Peacetime exercises had afforded them few opportunities to practisebeaching, largelybecauseofregulatoryrequirementsandfiscalconstraints.EachtimeanLSLbeacheditself,regulationsrequiredinspectionforpossiblebottomdamage,whichaddedtothecostofexercises.Now,ifacaptainbeachedimproperly,hecoulddamageorevenstrandtheship.Consequently,logisticianslearned, as the LSLswere travelling south of Ascension, that the riskswere too great for captains toattempttobeach.Insteadofmovingsuppliesdirectlyontobeaches,theynowneededtodischargefromsterndoorson tomexeflotesand landingcraft,which thenwould transport supplies tobeaches.10Thisseeminglysimpleandunderstandablechangeproducedsignificantalterationsto3CommandoBrigade’splanstomovesuppliesashore.AtAscension,theRegimenthadstowedLSLsasmuchaspossibleforbowdischarge straight on to beaches, based onbest guesses ofwhatwould beneeded.Much ofwhatwassupposedtocomeofffirstwasthereforelocatedtowardthefrontofLSLs.Becauseofthisdecision,somesuppliespositionedinbowsnowneededtomovetosterns,andviceversa.Italsomeantthatoffloadwouldtake longerbecauseofdoublehandlingof stocks. Insteadof suppliesbeing takenby forklift orhumanchain directly from ramps of LSLs to storage areas ashore, landing craft or helicopters now wouldtransshipsuppliesfromshiptoshore.Toprepareforsterndischarge,OrdnanceSquadronproceededtoshiftstocksasbesttheycouldwhileLSLssailedfurthersouth.BackinLondonbythistime,theMoDhadstartedtogetconcernedaboutthedispositionoftheLandForceonships,specificallyabouttheramificationsifsomethinghappenedtoCanberra.Inherroleasatroop ship,Canberra was transporting the bulk of the combat force: 40 Commando, 42 Commando, acompanyfrom45Commandoand3Para.PlanningthusfarcalledfortheseunitstodisembarkCanberraintolandingcraftfortheamphibiousassault.Staffshaddevelopedanintricatemovementplanforgettingunitsashore.CommandoLogisticRegimenthadshuffledsuppliesatAscensiontogetbasicloadsandfirstissuesofsuppliesonthesamevesselsasunits.CombatunitsaboardCanberrahadrehearsedproceduresfordisembarkingthelargetroopship.Anyexchangeoftroopunitsbetweenshipsthereforeproducedawide-ranging impactonmovementtables,supplystowageplansandtraining. IfsomethinghappenedtoCanberra with three thousand men aboard, however, results could be catastrophic. The ‘Great White

Whale’wassuchamassivetargetthatsomehaddeterminedthatifshesankintheSanCarlosanchorageherupperdeckswouldremainabovewater.11ThompsonandClappsharedthesameconcerns,butfacedwiththelongvoyagesouthofAscensionandshippinglimitations,theyhadfewoptionsinplacingunitsontroopships.Theyhadplannedafinalcross-deckingbyhelicopterbeforelandings,tomarryupsupportingandsupportedunitsinaccordancewiththefinaltaskorganization.ButtheyhadnotintendedtorelocatethebulkofunitsnowonCanberra.ThoseinLondonweremonitoring themovement of the Task Force closely; they too were concerned about theconcentration of troops on some ships.Clapp signalled that one possibilitywould be to divert ships toSouthGeorgiasothattroopscouldcross-decktoothershipsbeforethefinalruntoSanCarlos;butthatwouldpresentastaggeringlylongdistancefortroopstotravelinopenlandingcraft,whentheyneededtobefreshforassaultingbeaches.Anotheroptionwastoshiftunitswithinavailableshippingwhileatseabutbefore the finalapproach toSanCarlos.Theweatherhadnotbeengood for thepastseveraldays.Seashadbeensorough,infact,thatLPDscouldnotdockdownsafelytoreleaselandingcraft,norwouldlanding craft have been able to pull aside another ship and embark troops.On18May,while updatingFieldhouseonprogress,theadmiraladvisedClappthatThatcherherselfwasconcernedaboutCanberra.Theyagreedthat theshipshouldnotapproachthecoastof theFalklandsbeforetransferringtwoof itsthreemajorunitstoothervessels.Clappalertedunitstopreparetotransferthefollowingday,weatherpermitting.Staffsquicklyassembled toplan for thecross-deckingof troopsand to salvage theextensive landingplans already developed. They agreed that 40 Commando and 3 Para would transfer to Fearless andIntrepid respectively.Acompany from45Commandowouldmove fromCanberra to Intrepid toprovideefficiencies in the use of landing craft. That companywould be in the secondwave ashore alongwithotherunitsof45CommandolocatedonStromness.Theworst-caseplancalledfortheLPDsFearlessandIntrepidtosteamoneachsideofCanberraandforthemenof40Commandoand3Paratotransfer,onemanatatime,onalightjackstayfromtheshiptoanLPD.Thisoperationwouldhavetakenanentiredayand posed great risks to themen, each of whomwould be ladenwith combat gear and supplies. Theweather, fortunately,mademattersmuch easier. For the first time in days, the South Atlantic calmed,permittingLPDstodockdownsafelyandreleasetheirlandingcraftfromdockwells.TheLCUsthenwentalongsideCanberraandshuttled40Commandoand3ParaintothedockwellsoftheLPDs,fromwherethemenclimbeduprampstocrowdedspacesforthefinaltransit.TroopscarefullyfollowedeachotherdownnarrowpassagewaysbeforeexitingCanberrathroughherlargesidedoorsontoLCUsbobbingintheswells.Duringthetransfer,onemanfrom40Commandofellintotheseabetweenthetroopshipandalandingcraft;otherspulledhimoutshakenbutwithoutinjury.12Afterthecross-decking,theseunitswerenowseparatedfromtheirBEchelonsaboardCanberra,andtheLPDsFearlessandIntrepidwerecarryingtwotothreetimesthetechnicalcapacityfortroops,leavinglittleroomforcomfort.As these major unit relocations were taking place, more cross-decking operations started to shiftsmallerelementstoshipsprovidingfinalpassagetoSanCarloswaters.Itwasduringthispartofthetroopadjustmentsthattragedystruck.Shortlyaftersunseton19May,SeaKingsfrom846NavalAirSquadronweretransferringtroopsof22SpecialAirServicefromHermestoIntrepidwhenoneofthehelicopterscrashed into the Atlantic, killing twenty-two men. Early accounts claimed the helicopter struck analbatross.Yearslater,participantsacknowledgeditwassignificantlyoverloaded.SeveralofthesemenhadalreadysurvivedcrashesintheoperationtoretakeSouthGeorgiaorparticipatedinahighlysuccessfulraidonPebbleIslandon14MaytodestroyArgentineairplanes.The Amphibious Task Forcewas now poised on the edge of the TEZwith radio transmitting silencestrictlyenforcedsothattheycouldlandwithasmuchsurpriseaspossible.Whilemanywereworkingtoshiftunitson19May,TaskForcecommandersreceivedpermissiontoexecuteOperationSuttonattheirdiscretion. In the few hours remaining, units completed last-minute preparations the best ways theycould.TheweathercontinuedtofavourtheBritishastheAmphibiousTaskForceeaseditswaytowardtheFalklands. A mist now shrouded movement, almost to the shorelines of East Falkland, preventingdetection by Argentine air patrols. British special forces on the island had been reporting lookouts atFanningHeadonEastFalkland.Ifthemistcontinued,itwouldhidethecolourfulmixtureofshipspassinginwatersbelowastheyenteredFalklandSoundandthebayoffofSanCarlosfortheamphibiousassault.

AdmiralHenryLeachconvincedPrimeMinisterThatcherthatresponsewasnecessaryandthatBritaincouldovercomechallengestowin.(Leach’sEndureNoMakeshifts,publishedbyLeoCooperin1993)

AdmiralJohnFieldhouse,Commander-in-ChiefFleet,becamethecommanderoftheBritishTaskForce.(CrownCopyright)

RearAdmiralSandyWoodward,shownherewithsomeofhisstaff,wasCommanderCarrierBattleGroup.Hewasresponsibleforcontrollingseaandair.(CrownCopyright)

CommodoreMichaelClappwasCommanderAmphibiousTaskForce.HeisshownherestandingatrightinthetankdeckofFearlesstalkingtomarineson20MayastheyapproachedSanCarlos.(CourtesyMichaelClapp)

MooreconsultswithhistwobrigadecommandersshortlyafterarrivingatSanCarlos.LefttoRight:BrigadierThompson,MajorSmith(RapierAirDefenceBattery),BrigadierWilson,MajorGeneralMoore.(CrownCopyright)

LieutenantColonelIvarHellbergcommandedCommandoLogisticRegimentof3CommandoBrigade,amultifunctionallogisticsregimentthatwasveryuniquein1982.(CourtesyMaritimeBooks)

BrigadierJulianThompson,Commander3CommandoBrigadeRoyalMarinesandinitialCommanderLandForce,withofficersatPlymouthafterthewar.FromLeft:JohnChester,GerryWells-Cole,EwenSouthby-Tailyour,Thompson,VivRowe,RoderickMacdonald.(CrownCopyright)

ThecruiseshipCamberrawasthefirstshiptakenupfromtrade.HerepassengersdisembarkatSouthamptonastrucksfullofsupplieswait.(CourtesyP&OHeritageCollection)

WorkersinstallaflightdeckatoptheswimmingpoolofCanberra.TheshipwithmanymodificationssailedloadedwithtroopsthreedaysafterarrivinginSouthampton.(CourtesyP&OHeritageCollection)

NicknamedTheGreatWhiteWale,Canberradepartsthepieron9April1982with2,500troopsof3CommandoBrigadeaboard.(CourtesyP&OHeritageCollection)

WorkersconvertedUgandatobeahospitalshipin65hours.HereshepreparestosailfromGibraltarfullystaffedandreadytocareforwounded.(CourtesyP&OHeritageCollection)

AviewofWideawakeAirfieldonAscensionIsland.TheairfieldwasvitalingettingsuppliestotheTaskForceandattimeswasthebusiestairportintheworld.(CrownCopyright)

ACH47ChinookcargohelicopterreturnstoWideawakeAirfield,probablyaftershuttlingsuppliestoshipsoffthecoast.NotethestacksofsuppliesinthebackgroundwithHarriersintheforeground.(CrownCopyright)

Beforethewar,BritishC-130swerenotconfiguredforair-to-airrefuelingandpilotswereuntrained.Withinweeks,theBritishconfiguredplanesandtrainedpilots.Pilotssafelyexecuteddozensofmissionsduringandafterthewar,eachrequiringmanyrefuelingsliketheoneshowninthephotograph.(CrownCopyright)

AirdropsatseabyC-130sfromAscensionwerekeyforquickreplenishmenttotheTaskForceintheSouthAtlantic.Dozensofdropsweremadeliketheoneshowninthephotograph.(CrownCopyright)

Supplieswererushedontoshipswithoutregardforcompatibilityorstability.AfterleavingEngland,logisticiansworkedtosecureloadsandverifywhatwasloaded.(CourtesyAnthonyWelch)

Intherushtodepart,supplieswereloadedinallavailablespaces.HereboxeslineacorridoronHMSFearless.(CourtesyAnthonyWelch)

MarinesatSanCarlosformahumanchaintooffloadsuppliesfromaLCU.(CrownCopyright)

SouthAtlanticseasarenotoriouslyrough.Here’saglimpseoverthesternofanLSLwithhelicoptercabledtodeck.(CourtesyAngusMacMillan)

HereanRFAtankerprovidesfueltoanothershipinroughseas.(CrownCopyright)

TheAtlanticConveyorwastakenupfromtradeandconvertedtotransportaircraftandsupplies.Containerswerestackedatsidestoprotecttheaircraft.ShewashitbyanExocetmissileon25Mayandlatersank.Harriershaddepartedbythattime.Ninehelicopterswerelost.ThesingleCH47Chinookthatsurvivedwasonatestflight.(CrownCopyright)

On21May,QE2withmostof5BrigadeaboardpassedAscensionIsland.MajorGeneralMoorehadflowntoAscension.HelandedwithstaffonthemodifiedsterndeckofthecruiseshipaboardaChinookhelicopter,probablythefirstandlasttimeaCH47landedonQE2.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

TheLandingPlatformDockIntrepidissailingwiththreeofthesixLandingShipsLogistics.ShownhereareSirGalahad,SirPercivaleandSirLancelot,allfullyloadedandwithmexeflotesonsides,nearingtheFalklands.(CourtesyIvarHellberg)

LSLSirPercivalesailingtowardstheFalklandsfullyloadedandwithamexefloteboltedtohersides.Marinesareonthesterndeckexercising.(CrownCopyright)

LSLSirGalahadanchorednearAjaxBaywithsterndoordowntodischargecargo.Onboardcranesarestartingtooffloadcargointolandingcraft.(CourtesyAnthonyWelch)

AfterairattacksonD-Day,planschangedtopushasmanysuppliestoshoreaspossible.Herealandingcraftandmexeflotearrivewithsuppliesfromships.(CourtesyAnthonyWelch)

TheBrigadeMaintenanceAreaatAjaxBayhadafewbuildingsbutlittlehardstand,storageareas,andonlyasingleramp.ThisbecamethehomeformuchofCommandoLogisticRegiment.ItlaterbecametheForceMaintenanceArea.(CrownCopyright)

On27MayArgentineplanesattackedtheBMA,destroyingartilleryammunitionloadedfor2ParaforitsattackonGooseGreenandothersupplies.Unexplodedbombslodgedinthefieldhospital.(CourtesyGusMcMillan)

On27May1982,QE2linkedupwithHMSAntriminthevicinityofSouthGeorgia.MajorGeneralMoore,BrigadierWilsonandotherstransferredtoAntrimfortraveltoSanCarlos.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

Logisticiansof81and91OrdnanceCompaniescrossdeckammofromQE2toCanberraatSouthGeorgia.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

GettingsuppliesoutofQE2wasparticularlydifficult.Herelogisticianslabortogetsuppliesfromthebottomofthecruiseship.QE2eventuallyheadedbacktotheUnitedKingdomwithmostcombatsuppliesfor5Brigadestillaboard.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

On8June,ArgentineplanesattackedtheLSLsSirTristramandSirGalahadnearFitzroy,killing50andwoundingover100.SmokebillowsfromGalahad.(CrownCopyright)

LifeboatscarryingsurvivorsfromattacksontheLSLsarriveatFitzroy,asSirGalahadburnsinthebackground.(CrownCopyright)

Itwasamonumentaljobkeepingjerrycansfilledandthendistributingthem.Dailyrequirementsapproachedathousandcansperdayjustfor3CommandoBrigade.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

Thedraconewasinvaluableforkeepingasupplyoffuelnearshore.AllbutthisonewerelostontheAtlanticConveyor.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

Forwardairrefuellingsitesweresetupatseverallocations.HereahotrefuelistakingplaceforaWessexhelicopter,meaningpilotsarekeepingtheenginerunning.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

Civilianstriedtheirbesttohelptroops,buttheyhaddifficultytoo.Hereaciviliantractorgetsstuck.(CourtesyRoderickMacdonaldCollection)

Atypicalstoneruncomplicatingtravelbyfoot.Theserunsoftenextendforhundredsofmetres.(AuthorPhotograph)

StanleyisvisibleonlyafewkilometresawayfromWirelessRidge,thelocationofthelastfight.(AuthorPhotograph)

Duringthefirstphaseofthebattleforthemountains,thebridgeovertheMurrellRivercollapsed,closingtheonlyoverlandtrackforsupplies.Engineersinstalledatemporaryreplacement.(CourtesyRoddyMacdonaldCollection)

TheRedandGreenLifeMachine,thefieldhospitalintheBMAatAjaxBay,becamefamousforthemanylivesitsaved.Surgeonscontinuedoperatingnotwithstandingunexplodedbombsnearby.HereSurgeonCommanderRickJollytakesabriefbreak.(CourtesyRickJolly)

SailorsaboardthecarrierHMSHermesrushasurvivorfromHMSSheffieldtoamedicalstation.(CrownCopyright)

DuringthefightforMountLongdon,theforwardregimentalaidpostof3Parawasattheverybaseoftherocks.Thecrosscommemoratesthelocationtoday.Severalmedicsdiedtryingtosavelivesofothers.(AuthorPhotograph)

BritishmedicscareforwoundednearMountLongdon.ThesecasualtieswereArgentines.(CrownCopyright)

TheBritishdiscoveredwarehousesandcontainersfulloffoodinStanley.Argentineleadersfailedtogetfoodtotheirsoldiersinthefield.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

ArgentinevehiclespackedthestreetsofStanleyatthetimeofsurrender.BritishlogisticiansusedthemtohelpmovesuppliesthatarrivedonLSLsfromAjaxBay.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

Aftercollectingammunitionfromprisonersandaroundbattlefields,logisticiansandothersfacedthetaskofsortinganddisposal.(CourtesyRobinSmith)

AlthoughbombsandshellsneversucceededinstoppingArgentinecargoplanesfromlandingatStanley,theyhadcreateddamageneedingrepairbeforeBritishC-130sfromAscensionIslandwouldland.Hereengineersstartrepairingtheairfield.Thefirst

BritishC-130landedtendaysafterthesurrender.(CourtesyRoderickMacdonaldCollection)

ManyArgentinesfoughtvaliantly.Mostwereconscriptswithlittletraining.Thefacesoftheseprisonersreflecttheirdisappointmentafterthesurrender.(CrownCopyright)

PrisonersinStanleyturningintheirweaponsafterthesurrender.(CourtesyRoderickMacdonaldCollection)

Animmediateprioritywasrepatriatingprisonerstolessenpotentialfortroubleandstrainsonlogistics.HereArgentinesaremarchingtoboardshipsthatwilltakethemhome.(CourtesyKennethIanGriffiths)

Moore’sfirstpriorityafterreceivingthesurrenderwastomeetwithresidentsofStanleywhohadsufferedunderArgentinecontrolforovertwomonths.(CrownCopyright)

ASeaKinghelicoptermovesslingloadsofjerrycanstoaforwardarea.AreminderofthedifficultieslogisticiansfacedintheFalklands.(CrownCopyright)

MajorGeneralJeremyMooreholdsthesurrenderdocumentthatwassignedtheeveningof14June1982.(CrownCopyright)

T

Chapter6

D-DayandtheStruggletoBuildupLogistics

heAmphibiousTaskGroupmarshalledwiththeCarrierBattleGroupnorthoftheFalklandson18May,afewdaysbeforelandingswerescheduled.Tensionsranhigh,buttherewasgoodcauseforoptimismdespitethesetbacksandfrustrationsofpastweeks.IntelligenceindicatedthatArgentina

hadnotreinforcedareasnear the landingsites.Less thanacompanyofArgentinesoldierswere in theareaofSanCarlosatthetimetomaintainobservationofthestretchofwaterknownasFalklandSound,which separatedEast andWestFalkland.Although several hundredArgentineswere south-east of SanCarlosinthesettlementatGooseGreen,moststillremainedinpositionsaroundStanley,thecapital.TheArgentinesbelievedthattheBritishwouldlandclosertothecapital,eithertothenortharoundBerkeleySound or south in the area of Port Harriet. The British wanted to keep it that way, so they planneddiversionsearlythenextmorningatbothlocationstokeepBrigadierGeneralMenendezlookinginthosedirectionswhile3CommandoBrigadeseizedobjectivesaroundSanCarlos.TheyalsoplannedadiversionatDarwin,halfwaydowntheisthmustowardsGooseGreen.Theyintendedtohavethebeachheadsecurebyfirstlightsothatthebuild-upashorecouldcommencewithoutpause.ThenitonlybecameaquestionofhowquicklyandeffectivelyArgentinawouldreact.Eversincethe17AprilmeetingatAscensionwithAdmiralFieldhouse,theAmphibiousTaskForcehad

beenplanning onBritish air superiority. It hadbecome clear in recent days, however, that theCarrierBattle Group had not achieved control of the skies around the islands as some had anticipated. Now,intelligencewarned that air attackswere likely following the landings, but that itwouldprobably takeArgentinahalfadaytosortouttheconfusioncausedbydiversionsandtocounterwithfightersfromthemainland.Becauseofthispossibility,though,theBritishhadtakenstepstoreducethenumberofhigh-value targets in the area of the landings. Consequently, they were holding merchant vessels likeElk,whichcarriedthousandsoftonsofammunitionfortheTaskForce,intheLLAattheeasternedgeoftheTEZ for safety.No onedoubted thatArgentine pilots could complicatematters.But fewof theBritish,whetherintheTaskForcemakingfinalpreparationstolandorintheUnitedKingdomanxiouslyawaitingfirstreports,expectedwhathappenedinthenextfewdays.Moreover,theAmphibiousTaskForcehadnotagreeduponstepstobetakenshouldairstrikesdisruptthelogisticsplan.Thiswouldproducedramaticconsequencesinthedaysahead.ShipssupportingthelandingssplitawayfromtheCarrierBattleGroupintheearlyafternoonof20May

andheadedsouthtowardFalklandSoundinthreephases,eachtimedtopreventunnecessarycongestioninFalklandSoundandtheSanCarlosanchorage.ThedestroyerAntrimand frigateArdent led the firstgroup,consistingoftheLPDFearlesswith40Commando,theLPD Intrepidwith3ParaandthefrigateYarmouth.AsArdentpositionedherselfintheSoundtoprovidegunfiresupporttotheSpecialAirServicediversionary raid nearDarwin,Wessex helicopters fromAntrim would insertmarines from the SpecialBoatSquadronandnavalgunfireobservers tohelpeliminateanArgentineobservationpostatFanningHead on East Falkland. Shortly thereafter, the LPDs escorted by Yarmouth would sail through thedarkness of the Sound, presumably unnoticed by Argentines at FanningHead or observation posts onplaceslikeMountRosalieonWestFalkland,anchorneartheentrancetoSanCarlosatChancoPointandreleaselandingcrafttoshuttleassaultwavesashore.Asthiswashappening,thesecondgroupconsistingofNorlandwith 2 Para,Stromness with the bulk of 45 Commando andCanberra with 42 Commando,escorted by the frigates Brilliant and Plymouth and the auxiliary Fort Austin, would be entering theSound;theywouldarriveneartheLPDsjustasthelandingcraftwereready.ThelasttoenterFalklandSound, about fourhoursafter the secondwave reached thebeaches,wouldbe those shipsbringing inartillery, Rapier air defences and Commando Logistic Regiment with the first days of supply for theBrigade: the frigatesArgonautandBroadswordescorting fiveLSLsandEuropicFerry, a roll-on roll-offshiptakenupfromtrade.Sequencing of the three groups was carefully planned to ensure that, when daylight came, the

beachheadwouldbesecure.Thatbeingachieved,movementoffiresupportandsuppliescouldcommencewithoutdelayas theLSLsarrived.Theoverallplanhingedonshipsarrivingandmendisembarkingontime.Menfrom40CommandoaboardFearlesswouldloadstraightintothatLPD’slandingcraft;thetwoleadcraftwouldalsocarryeitheraScorpionorScimitararmouredvehicleinthebowtoprovidefirepowerifneeded.LandingcraftwoulddepartIntrepidemptyandgotoNorland,wheretheywouldembark2ParafromNorland’s side doors.MajorEwenSouthby-Tailyour,whohad completedhis detailed guide to thecoastsandinletsoftheFalklandsduringatourwiththegarrisonforceyearsearlier,wouldguidethisfirstwavetodesignatedbeachassaultsites.ThenthelandingcraftwouldreturntoIntrepidandStromnesstopickup3Paraand45Commandorespectivelyforthesecondwave,while42CommandowaitedinreserveonCanberra.H-hourwouldbe0230hrs,21May.Everythingstartedoutasplanned.AsnavalgunfireanddiversionaryattacksfixedArgentineattention

onStanleyandDarwin,marinesoftheSpecialBoatSquadronwerelandingtoeliminateanysoldiersatthe Fanning Head observation post who had survived a barrage of naval gunfire. While this was

happening,though,themistthatobscuredtheAmphibiousTaskForcefromobservationpostsonFanningHeadcreateddirectionalproblemsforsomecaptainsnavigatingshipsthroughtheSound.Norland,whichwascarrying2Paraforthefirstwave,hadevenmoredifficulties.Hercrewforgottoplacemarkinglightsonherbowandsterntoguidelandingcraftnexttothetroopship.IntheirbriefstopatAscension,2Parahadpractiseddisembarking,butonlyduringdaytime.Now,intheearlymorningdarknessofSanCarlos,thelackoftrainingwasrevealed.Oneparatrooper,forinstance,fellbetweenNorlandandalandingcraftwhiledisembarking;hesurvivedbutsufferedacrushedhip.1Theendresultwasthatthedisembarkationof2Paradelayedthefirstwavegettingtothebeach.BrigadierThompsonconsideredalteringthelandingsequence at this time because of delays with 2 Para, but opted against it, fearing that disseminatingchangesatthisstagewouldleadtolossofradiotransmittingsilenceandalerttheArgentines.Thefirstwave did not land until 0430 hrs, about two hours later than scheduled. Subsequent waves werecorrespondinglylateasaresult.Despite these delays, the amphibious landingswere brilliantly successful, and by daylight the entire

beachheadwassecure.Commandosandparatroopersencounteredonlypocketsofresistance,primarilyfrom small groups of Argentines trying to break contact and withdraw. Landing craft carrying 2 Paradroppedrampsongradientsshortofdryland,andparatrooperswadedashore.Theirbootswouldnotdryout until a week later.2 Combat units seized objectives as planned and sustained no casualties, butArgentinessucceededinshootingdowntwoGazellehelicoptersthatwerespottinglocationsforRapiers,killingthreeofthefourpilots.ShipscarryingCommandoLogisticRegimentandBrigadesuppliesstartedarrivingintheanchorageoffSanCarlosonscheduleatdaybreak.Watersintheanchoragewerecalm,justrightforstartingthelaborioustaskoftransportingsupportunitsandsuppliestobeaches.Ithadbecomeabeautifullyclearday.TheAmphibiousTaskForce,however,wouldhavepreferredtheearliermorningfogandcloudcover.By 0900 hrs, the LSLs Sir Geraint,Sir Tristram, Sir Lancelot, Sir Galahad, and Sir Percivale were

anchored in a dispersed row on the west side of the anchorage off Ajax Bay, where the CommandoLogisticRegimentdetachmentintendedtogoashoreatRedBeach,inanareaselectedbyHellbergandWells-Cole,toestablishasmallBMA.EwenSouthby-Tailyourhadprovidedthemwithvaluableinformationaboutpossiblelocations.Oppositetheseships,ontheeastsideoftheinletoffBlueBeachandSanCarlosSettlement, Europic Ferry, Norland, Stromness and the command-and-control LPD Fearless wereanchored. The LPD Intrepid was in the north part of the anchorage near Port San Carlos and GreenBeach.Canberrawaitedjust insidetheanchoragenearChancoPoint.ItwasanimpressivecollectionofBritish ships – thebright red civilian shipEuropicFerrywith ‘TownsendThoresen’ emblazonedonhersideandthehugewhite luxury linerCanberrasharplycontrastinginthemorningsunwiththesmaller,greyamphibiousships.Theshuttlingof105mmartillerygunsandRapierscommencedasplanned.Soonthereafter,Clappstartedmovingreservestocksontobeachesaccordingtoplan.Itwasanticipatedby3CommandoBrigade that itwould takeabout twodays togetwhatwasneeded immediately ashore.Tomoveallsuppliesandequipmentashoretoenableabreakoutfrombeachesmighttaketendaysormore.The only warship inside the anchorage at this time was Plymouth. That, however, was part of a

deliberate plan to defend amphibious forces as they completed their build-up on to the beachhead.AlthoughseveralshipswereclusteredintheSanCarlosanchorage,surroundinghillsmadeitdifficultforenemy aircraft to approach the area undetected. The warships Antrim, Ardent, Argonaut, Brilliant,Broadsword and Yarmouth were all positioned west of the anchorage in Falkland Sound. CommodoreClapp had planned deliberately a defence to take advantage of the protected anchorage and the highground, considering that the most likely avenue of approach for Argentine aircraft, particularly thosecomingfromthemainland,wouldbefromthewestoverWestFalkland.Therefore,hehadformedapicketlineofshipsintheSoundtoforceArgentinepilotstoflyclosetowarshipstogetattheamphibiousships.That,coupledwithaggressiveHarriercombatairpatrolsfromtheCarrierBattleGroup,wouldhopefullystoppenetration.Asoneship’scaptainexplained,‘TheideawastoputacorkinthebottleandbottleuptheentrancetoSanCarlosWatersothatattackingaircraftwouldhavetoflyoverusandthroughouranti-aircraft barrage before they could get to the bulk of the amphibious ships in San Carlos Water.’3Additionally, Thompson’s units would provide another band of air defence with their new Rapier airdefenceweaponsjustassoonashelicoptersairliftedthemfromshipstothehighgroundsurroundingtheanchorage. Units, including Commando Logistic Regiment, were equipped with the shoulder-fire dantiaircraftmissiles called Blowpipes. All elements of the Task Force, includingHarriers from the twoaircraftcarriers,wouldthencombinetothwartArgentineeffortstodisruptthebuild-up.TheBritishplanhadtakenMenendezbysurprise.Infact,hisforcesnearGooseGreen,distractedbythe

diversionary raid and naval gunfire, reported that they were being attacked by at least a battalion.4ArgentineshadnotanticipatedtheBritishwould landsofarawayandthentrytomoveunits,supplies,andequipmentacrosstheruggedterrainofEastFalklandtogetatStanley;andtheythoughtthatiftheBritish tried it they would get bogged down and become vulnerable. The Argentine ability to quicklycounteradistantlandingwithgroundforceswaslimitednowbecauseBritishHarrierattacksinpreviousdays had successfully destroyed some helicopters essential for moving troops. They neverthelessrespondedfarquickertothelandingsthantheTaskForceexpected.The first Argentine planes, armedAeromacchi trainers fromStanley andPucaras fromGooseGreen,

arrived shortlyafterdaybreak.Britishwarships turned thembackwithout incident.Thenwhat seemedlikeanendlessseriesofArgentinefightersarrived,followingtwo-hourflightsfromthemainland,toattackships in theSound.Clapp’swarships andHarriers from theCarrierBattleGroup teamedup to thwartmost attacks, and by themorning’s end only oneArgentine pilot had scored a serious hit. Thatwas a

1,000lbbombthatstrucktheflightdeckofAntrimbutfailedtodetonate.Followingabrieflull,SkyhawksandDaggers returned shortly afternoon.Somebriefly entered theanchoragearea, but luckilydidnotattackanyofthelogisticsshipsthere.Itwouldhavebeendifficultforthemnottonoticethemonstrous,white-hulledCanberraexposedandvulnerablenearChancoPoint.Instead,ArgentinepilotscontinuedtofocusonthewarshipsinFalklandSound.OnesuccessfullyevadedairdefencesandstruckArgonaut.Thatbomblikewisefailedtoexplode.SkyhawkpilotseventuallysucceededinstrikingArdentwiththree500lbbombs,andthistimeoneofthemexploded.Bytheday’send,theskiesaroundSanCarloshadbeenwrackedwithfirefromshipsandplanes,much

tothedistractionofgroundforcestryingtoconsolidateonthebeachheadandlogisticiansonshipstryingtogetsuppliesashore.Argentinepilotshad flownover fiftysortiesagainstwarships in theSound;andalthoughHarrierpatrolsandshipdefencesstoppedoneoutof fiveplanes, theBritishsimplycouldnotdownthemall.Whentheairattackswereover,damagetothefleetwasserious.PlymouthandYarmouthwere theonlywarships tomake it through thedayunscathed.Brilliant andBroadsword had sustainedminor damage; Antrim and Argonaut would be out of action until unexploded bombs lodged in theirstructurescouldbedisarmedandremoved;andArdentwassinking.Clappemphasizedafterthewar,‘ItwasnotluckthattheArgentinepilotsattackedthewarshipsandnot

thelandingships.Wehadlotsoftimetothinkaboutitandthewholeapproachtothelandingshadbeenathreatreductionexercise.’5TherecanbenodoubtthatthesituationwouldhavebeenconsiderablyworsehadfighterstriedtobreachthepicketlineofwarshipsinFalklandSoundandpursuelogisticsvesselsandtroopshipsintheSanCarlosanchorage.Asitwas,theBritishstillhadtorelyonalotoflucktomakeitthrough the day. Five bombs had struck warships and failed to detonate. Demolition experts workedfranticallytodefuseunexplodedbombs.Argentinepilots,facingintensegunfireandanti-aircraftmissilesfromtheBritishwarshipcordon,wereoptingforlow,fastapproacheswhenmakingbombingruns.Theywere forced tomakesplit-seconddecisionsdue to theirneed to refuelafter long flights frommainlandArgentina. As they released bombs, they were not allowing sufficient time for them to arm.6 ThatundoubtedlywouldchangeonceArgentinafiguredoutwhatwashappening.TheTaskForcedidnotwanttorelyonthatmuchluckagain.Attacks on D-Day proved costly for both sides. The British lost twenty-five men, one ship, and two

Gazelle helicopters. Over forty men were wounded and three other ships damaged significantly. ButClapp’sdefencehadworkedoverall.ShipsandHarriershaddownednineMirages, fiveSkyhawks,andthreePucaras.Eventshadproducedavarietyoffrustrationsandanxieties.BrigadierThompson,trappedaboardFearlessandtryingtoexercisecommandandcontroloverhisunitsashore,struggledtomaintaincommunicationsandlearnwhatwasgoingonashismenstartedsecuringobjectives.Hewouldnotgetashorehimselfuntillateintheday,sinceallmovementassetswerekeptbusy.Thenhelandedwithouthisheadquarters,ashisstaffcontinuedtostruggletogetthemselvesandtheirequipmentashore.Pressurehadmounted on him all day to get Rapiers on land to help counter Argentine air attacks. UnloadingRapiersprovedtobeanexcruciatinglyslowprocess,though,becausetheywerestoredinthebottomsofships’holds,whichmeantthatotherequipmenthadtobeshiftedtogetthemout.Everyonediscovered,whenfinallygettingRapiersofftheships,thatrushingthemtopositionsonlandbroughtproblemsofadifferentnature.Areashadtobesecurebeforemencouldgetthesystemsinplace.Complicatingmattersfurther, ifmensitedaRapierwrongly, they thenhad togetanotherhelicopter torelocate it. ItdidnotmatterwhethertheRapierneededtobemovedafewfeetoramile.Mencouldnotmovetheheavyairdefencesystemsbyhand,andRapiersroutinelywentontohilltopsinaccessiblebyvehicles.Tobecomeoperabletheyalsoneededfueltorungenerators.Asaresult,effortstospeeduptheunloadingofsomeequipmentstartedtobackfireandcreatemorework.Argentine air attacks now triggered efforts to reduce risks in the Amphibious Operations Area

encompassingFalklandSoundand theSanCarlos anchorage, and this propelled3CommandoBrigadeinto an even greater rush to get equipment ashore. That afternoon, Admiral Fieldhouse expressedcontinuing concerns about the vulnerability of large ships like Canberra. Clapp directed Canberra,NorlandandStromness todeparttheareathatsameeveningandproceedtowardtheedgeoftheTEZ.LSLscouldremainintheanchorage,buttheyweretounloadasmuchaspossibleasquicklyaspossible.The change came as a surprise to 3 Commando Brigade, which had been hoping to keep supplies

movingashore.Thebuild-uphadbarelybegun.Moresuppliesthanexpectedremainedaboardshipsintheanchorage.Now, theBrigadewitnessed theunravelling of its plans for buildingup thebeachheadandsustainingtheeventualbreakout.TheirplanshadhingedonLSLsandothershipsanchoredoffshoretoform a floating sustainment base within easy reach of the beachhead. Much of Commando LogisticRegiment, according to the established plan, was to remain afloat in the LSLs. Only a small tailoreddetachmentwasdestined togoashore.ThisnewdirectiveallowedLSLs to remain in theanchorage tocontinue the offload, but the same was not true for Canberra, Norland and Stromness, whichunfortunatelycontainednotonlyawidemixofunitsbutalsotonsofsuppliesforunitsgoingashore.DuringtheremainderofD-Dayandintothenight,asflamesfromArdentinFalklandSoundservedasa

sombre reminderofearlierevents, theAmphibiousTaskForce focusedongettingasmuch to shoreaspossible. In the late afternoon, 42Commando, theBrigade’s reserve force, left their rucksacks aboardCanberraandboardedlandingcraftforBlueBeach,wheretheytookupdefensivepositionseastof3Paraat Port SanCarlos. Additional landing craft andhelicopters pushed supplies into theBMAatAjax andotherlandingsitessurroundingtheanchorage.InhabitantsofSanCarlosSettlementandPortSanCarlos,whohadwelcomedcombatunitsearlier thatday,nowassisted theBritish ingettingestablished.Someofferedtheuseoftheirfewsettlementbuildingsasheadquartersoperationsandforquarteringandcaring

formen;othersbrewedandservedhotbeverages;andstillmorehelpedtooffloadandtransportsuppliestostorageareaswithfamilytractorsandtrailers.Theprocess,however,wasexcruciatinglyslow.Complicating matters considerably from a logistics standpoint was the fact that vessels directed to

departwereholdingunits,supplies,andequipmenturgentlyneededashore.Canberra,forinstance,wasstillcarryingunitsuppliesandequipmentfor40Commando,42Commando,and3Para.Supportechelonsand first-line supplies for these units had not been transferred from Canberra to other vessels whencombatunitscross-deckedatseashortlybeforeD-Day.Assaultwaveshadtakenonlyenoughsuppliestolast for forty-eight hours. Moreover, as they normally would when making an assault landing, thecommandosandparatroopershadleftrucksacks,parkas,sleepinggear,cookingitemsandextraclothesaboardtrooptransports.Someunits,like2ParawhichdisembarkedfromNorland,hadnothadthetimetogetpersonalgeartothebeachesyet.Ifrucksacksandpersonalitemsdidnotgetashore,menwouldfindtheirfirstnightsonlandmoreuncomfortablethanexpected.MakingthesituationworseforCommandoLogisticRegiment,Canberrawas intendedtobeafloating

hospitalintheanchorage.Ifshesailedfurtherouttosea,theBrigadewouldforfeititsplannedoffshorehospitalcapability.ThatwouldleaveonlyUgandaintheRedCrossboxnorthofPebbleIsland;andanyoneevacuated there could not return to the fighting because of previous agreements between the UnitedKingdomandArgentina.Furthermore,iftheRegimentdidnothurryandgetmedicalpersonnelashore,itwouldlosetheskillsofdozensofmedicalspecialistsanddoctorsthenaboardCanberra.SurgeonCommanderRickJollyofCommandoLogisticRegiment’sMedicalSquadronandothermedical

specialists in ships throughout the entire area had beenworking frantically to evacuate and savemeninjuredthroughout theSanCarlosareaduringairattacks.Thedayhadnotgonewell.Frustratedafterreceivingcasualty locationsencrypted incorrectly, Jollyhadburst inuponstaffofficersaboardFearlessthat day, demanding to be given locations in the clear.7 After it became apparent that Canberra andNorlandwould leave,he recognized that theoriginalmedicalplanwouldhave to changeand that life-saving surgical capability in particular had to get ashore quickly to augment the small medicaldetachment. Jolly succeeded in getting approval to disembark more medical capability; however, theproblem then became getting those capabilities to the beachhead. Insufficient time remained foreverything to get off before the ships were to sail. Medical Squadron hurriedly assembled whateversurgicalitemstheycould,butwithoutcranesorhoistsaboardCanberra,andwithfewmovementassets,theycouldnothopetogetalltheyneededtothebeachatAjax.Landingcraftwerestillworkingintotheearlymorning of the next day, taking off whatever possible before the troop ship sailed to sea in thewaning hours of darkness. No. 1 Medical Troop from Lancelot and Parachute Clearing Troop fromNorlandhadmade itashore toRedBeach.Canberraweighedanchor, though,withacompletesurgicalteamaboard,muchtothefrustrationofJollyandothers.Moreover,sheandNorlanddepartedearlythenextmorningwith90,000rations,aswellasunitsuppliesandsomerucksacksbelonging to twoof thethreecommandosandbothparachutebattalions.ThechallengenowconfrontingtheAmphibiousTaskForcewasimmense,andtheoptionstoimprovethe

situationwerefew.Ithadtogetasmuchaspossibleashorequickly.AlthoughconfigurationofcargoinshipshadimprovedatAscension,itwasstillfarfromideal.Theneedforspeedwoulddictatethatsomesuppliesnotneededashorewouldfindtheirwaytobeachesanyway.Thoseonshipsdidnothavetimetomovelowerprioritysuppliesoutofthewayandsegregatethemfromhigherprioritycargo.Itwasquickerat times to push all accessible supplies to shore.CommandoLogisticRegiment also had to prepare toissuesupplies tomanoeuvreunitssinceshipshadsailedwith the first-linesuppliesofmostunits.Theyhadseen reconnaissancephotographsofAjaxBayandknew itoffered fewbenefitsasa large logisticsbase. As they reachedRedBeach that day,members of the Regimentwere taken aback by the actuallimitationstheynowsawatfirsthand.TheportionofAjaxBaythatbecametheBMAviolatedalllogisticstextbookrequirements.Theareawas

uninhabited,whichwasgood,butuseablegroundcomprisedonlyafewhundredmetres,aboutathirdofwhat the Regiment normally preferred just to disperse stocks. Outward from that, large stoneoutcroppings on the uneven ground prevented vehicle movements or supply storage. An abandonedmutton refrigeration and packing plant offered some shelter. It soon would become the field dressingstationsupporting theLandForce.Therewasnootheroverheadcover.Asinglecementrampprovidedaccesstotheanchorageforvehiclesandforkliftsunloadinglandingcraft.Theonlyotherhardstandingsurrounded the old refrigeration plant.Makingmatters still worse, the water table was amere threeinches below the surface, which meant vehicles would quickly churn the surrounding area to mud.Foxholeswouldfillwithwaterbeforetroopscouldfinishdiggingthem.ButCommandoLogisticRegimenthadnotimetoworryaboutconditionsbecausetherewasnobetteralternative.Whendaylightarrivedthenextday,bringingwithit initiallymoreclearskiesandcalmweather,fears

wererekindledaboutArgentinepilotsreturningtoattackunitsintheSanCarlosarea.Weatherelsewherewaspreventingplanesfromreturningfromthemainland,though.Withsomeofthehighlyvulnerableandvisible targets now safely at sea, Clapp’s ships continued their cordon defence of the anchorage asHarrier pilots flew combat air patrols. Units maintained surveillance from surrounding hills as menworkedtogetRapierairdefencesystemsinplace.IntheBMAatAjax,membersofCommandoLogisticRegiment’sOrdnanceSquadronworkedtooffloadlandingcraftshuttlingsuppliesashorefromtheLSLsintheanchorage.Membersof theMedicalSquadronsupplementedbymedical teams fromother serviceshurried toconvert the filthymeatpackingbuilding intoasmallhospital.As leadersdeterminedhowtodivide theplant intoareas toaccommodate the triageandcareofcasualties,othersstackedboxesandhungblanketstocreatepartitionsdividingtreatmentareas.Outside,menpreparedsurvivalpositionsin

case of continued air attacks and cut blocks of peat from the rocky soil to reinforce the walls of thebuilding. A sign soon hung over its door proudly proclaiming that it was ‘The Red and Green LifeMachine’,namedforthecoloursofparatrooperandcommandoberetswornbymanyofitsoccupantsandcapturing the proud inter-service spirit developing. Surrounded by thousands of tons of supplies, therefrigerationplantwouldpresentagoodtargetforArgentinepilots.Itwouldmakeanevenbettertargetif highlighted by the red crosses required for protection as a medical facility under the GenevaConvention.TheRegimentthereforedecidednotto identifytherefrigerationplantasamedical facility.They had no reason to believe the Argentines would honour the Geneva Convention anyway, despitemutualagreementtoestablishaRedCrossboxforUgandaandBahiaParaiso,sinceArgentinawasnotasignatoryoftheGenevaConvention.Bytheafternoonof22May,LieutenantColonelHellbergaboardSirGalahadstillhadnotmanagedto

getashore.Movementassetsremainedheavilytaxed.Addingtohisfrustrations,Hellbergnowdiscoveredthat he would not control any movement assets transporting personnel, supplies and equipment fromshipstoshore,notasinglelandingcraft,mexefloteorhelicopter.Havingdedicatedmovementcapabilitywas at the core of the Regiment’s operating procedures. Commodore Clapp required units needingtransportationassistancetosubmitrequestsformovementtohisheadquartersonFearlessforapprovaland allocation of assets, which was in keeping with amphibious doctrine. The Regiment had beenaccustomedtorelyingonitsownfour-tontrucksduringexercisesinthepasttodistributesupplies.Thiswasquitedifferentnow.Watercraftandhelicoptersweretheonlymeansofgettingsuppliestowheretheyneeded to go. Consequently, the centralized control of transportation, understandable though it was,addedtofrictionthathadbeenbuildinginpreviousweeks.Landandnavalforcesdidnothaveacommonunderstandingofamphibiousoperations.ThiswasbecomingparticularlytruewhenitcametomattersoflogisticsaroundSanCarlos.Frustrationswouldgrowinthedaysahead.Asunloadingcontinuedintheanchorageon23May,Argentinefightersarrivedagaininnumbers.Pilots

penetratedClapp’sdefencesandshiftedfocustothehighlyvulnerable,mostlyunarmed, logisticsships.Skyhawks first entered the anchoragearea from the south-east at about 0930hrs, droppingbombsonseveral of the logistics ships. Daggers followed, and thenmore Skyhawks. Pilots succeeded in scoringdirecthitsontheLSLsSirLancelotandSirGalahadandonthenewlyarrivedSirBedivere.Miraculously,noneofthebombsstrikingthethreeLSLsdetonated,eventhoughothers,missingandfallingharmlesslyintothewaterbetweentheships,didexplode.Infact,oneofthetwobombshittingSirLancelotskippedoff the water first, entered and passed through the LSL’s superstructure, re-entered the water on theother side and still did not detonate.8 Considerable damage nevertheless resulted as 500lb or 1000lbbombspassedthroughorlodgedinlogisticsships.Whenitwasallover,Galahadwasbeachedandonfire, andLancelotwas still anchoredbut likewise on fire .Bothhadbeenhit twicebybombs that causedsignificant damage even though they failed to detonate. The British refloatedGalahad the same day.Demolition experts worked frantically and ingeniously to defuse and remove bombs. In the case ofGalahad, for instance, they eventually craned an unexploded bomb over the side of the LSL into aninfatable craft filled with cornfake packets for cushioning, before dumping it in deeper water.9 Oncebombswereremoved,repairscouldstart.DamagetoBediverewasminor,butGalahadwouldbeoutofactionforaweekandLancelotfornearlythreeweeks.Itwasaserioussetbackforthelogisticsbuild-upashore. As Lancelot underwent repairs she would revert primarily to being a helicopter-refuellingplatform,untilengineersestablishedrefuelcapabilityonland.10Logisticsshipswerenottheonlyonestosufferseveredamagethatday.SkyhawksstruckAntelopewith

two1,000lbbombs,andonceagainthebombsfailedtodetonate.CasualtieswereevacuatedtotheRedand Green Life Machine in the BMA. As some evacuated crewmen huddled on banks at Ajax Bay,explosionsbroke thenight silenceasdefusingefforts failed,killingademolitionexpertandothersandsplittingAntelopeinhalf.Bymorning,herbowwasprotrudingskywardoutofthewater.AshoreatAjax,CommandoLogisticRegimentwas coming togripswith theafter-effects of theday’s

catastrophicevents.Casualtieswerearrivingformedicalcare.Dozensofothercrewmenfromdamagedvessels were coming ashore, while demolition experts worked to remove unexploded bombs on ships,addingmorecongestiontothealreadycrampedsupportarea.Makingmattersstillworse,theRegimenthad lost contactwithmuch of Ordnance Squadron. Over a hundredmembers of the Regiment aboardGalahad had been evacuated to another vessel after air attacks. Commanders were having difficultyfindingoutwheretheywentbecausetheyhadlittlecapabilitytocommunicatewithships.Commodore Clapp was intent on preventing such attacks from happening again. On D-Day the

Argentineshadmade theoriginalplan fora floatingsupplybasenear thebeachheaduntenable.Theselatestattacksdemonstrated itwouldcontinue tobedifficult tokeepshipssafeandgetsuppliesashorewithout control of the skies, especially with observation posts on West Falkland at both entrances toFalkland Sound able to observe shipmovements. To reach SanCarlosWater, supply ships entered theSoundfromthenorth-eastunderthenosesofArgentinesonMountRosalie.Astroublesomeasthatwas,itremained better than travelling longer distances and entering the Sound from the south-west, passingsmallislandswithmultipleobservationposts,atleastoneknowntohaveacontingentofspecialforces,andthenasmallArgentinegarrisonatFoxBay.Thedayafterthesecondroundofairattacks,onMay24,FortAustin reportedtappingonherhull,whichsuggestedthatdiversmightbeattachinglimpetmines.Sinceitwouldtaketimetosendtraineddiverstoinvestigate,thequickestmeasurewasforFortAustinandothershipsintheareatoslipanchorsandheadtosea,hopingtowashoffanylimpetminesorenemydivers.Thatdefensiveactionmighthavecreatedtheimpressionthatnewdirectiveswerenowrestrictingshiparrivalsintheanchoragetothehoursofdarkness.Logisticiansin3CommandoBrigadebelievedthat

wasthecase.Thesenewdeparturesdeprivedthemofmoretimetounloadsupplies.TheyalreadyhadlostmostofthepreviousdaywhenplaneshitLSLs,andlogisticsgroundtoahaltasunitsscrambledtocontrolthesituation.GettingsuppliestoAjaxBayfromtheopenseawasnoteasybyanymeans.Supplyshipswereheldin

either the TRALA or LLA, both of which were in areas about 200 miles from San Carlos guarded bysurface escorts andHarriers. It took an LSL travelling at twelve knots in reasonable sea states abouttwentyhourstocoverthatdistance,whetheritwasleavingfromorheadedtotheBMA.Roughseasmadetravelevenslower,sincecaptainsdidnotwanttoriskdamagetobowdoorsorthefloodingoftankdecks.OnceWoodwardreceivednoticeofwhatCommandoLogisticRegimentneeded,itcouldtakeoveradaytocheckavailabilityand transfercargobetweenships,oftenaverydifficultoperation in theheavySouthAtlanticseas.Thetransitandloadtimesthereforemeantthatdailyresupplywasoutofthequestion,evenunderthebestofcircumstancesandwithclearcommunicationofrequirements.Asitwas,ships’captainsalwayspreferredtotravelthe150milesseparatingFalklandSoundfromsurroundingseasundercoverofdarknessbecauseofthethreatfromsubmarinesandExocets(bothairandlandbased)forthedurationofthewar.Rather thanrestrictingoffloads tohoursofdarkness,Clapp’s focus remainedongettingshipsthrough thismost dangerous stretch ofwater under the cover of darkness so thatCommandoLogisticRegiment then could work with watercraft operators and ships to offload either by day or night.Offloading during the day, of course,wasmuch easier and preferable. Therewere no spare crews forlandingcraftorhelicopters,whichaddedtotheproblems.Clappdecidedtolandasmuchashecouldintheshortesttimepossible,becausethiswouldatleastensuremostoftheLandForcestocksweresafelyashoreandnot sunk.Hewasconscious that thismightcauseproblemsashorebut saw itas thesafestoption.Theresupplyprocesssimplytookmoretimethanexpected.ItalsomeantthattheentireBrigadehad to be thoughtful about requirements both for continuing the build-up and for forecasting futureresupply.IfitemswerenotonhandintheBMA,ittookatleasttwodays,andlikelylonger,togetthemfrom ships to thebeachheadbeforemen could offload supplies anddistribute them tounits.Delays ingettingsuppliessoonerchafedatBrigadelogisticians.Onthewaysouth,Thompson’sandClapp’sstaffshaddevelopedanextensive listingofwhatsupplies

shipscarried.NowBrigaderepresentativeswouldvisitClapponFearlesseachnightandprovidehimalistofshipsneededintheanchoragethefollowingnight.11Itsoundedgood.Unfortunately,theBrigadelearned that inventory lists were less accurate than they thought and that the Royal Navy hadrequirementsofitsownthataffectedavailabilityofships.WhereasmembersofOrdnanceSquadronhadsailedwithsupplyvesselsenroutetoAscensionandcompiledinventories,muchhadchangedsincethen.There were no Ordnance Squadron representatives aboard some supply ships in the TEZ now. TheSquadrontraditionallyemployedassaultsupplyteamstocontrolstocksonLSLs,butitdidnothavethemanpower to put them on all civilian ships, now laden with critical Brigade stocks, and also operatestorageareason land.Thereweresimplytoomanyshipsandtoo fewpeople.Asaresultofnothavingsuch stock control elements aboard ships, logisticians lost sight of the quantity and condition of somestocks. Many supplies had been consumed since the stay at Ascension, some had been irreparablydamaged because of improper stowage or cargo handling and still others had been pilfered. Notsurprisingly, the Task Force did not have an automated accountability system that credited receipts,debited issues and determined on-hand balances of the large inventory now scattered throughout theSouthAtlanticinavarietyofvessels.AndsuppliesonshipswerenotonlyfortheLandForce.Reasons for these conflicting supply interests and the resulting frustrations were built into the

compositionofthetaskforcewhenitdeployedfromtheUnitedKingdom.Giventhescarcityofshippingoverallandthespeedofloading,theBritishhardlyhadtheoptionofsegregatingeachservice’ssuppliesaboardships.Stocksfromindividualservicesthereforebecameintermingledfromthebeginning.NowtheCarrierBattleGrouphadrequirementsforsuppliesaboardsomeofthesameshipsthatweretransportingLandForcestocks.Itwasnotunusual,asaresult,forRearAdmiralWoodwardtodispatchsupplyshipstosupport the fleet when necessary, particularly if he was unaware of the urgency of Land Forcerequirementsforspecificitemsonthesameships.AndthisisexactlywhathappenedtofrustrateBrigadelogisticiansevenmore indays that followed.TheauxiliaryshipResource, forexample,whichcarried3Commando Brigade’s War Maintenance Reserves as well as items for the Royal Navy, would not beavailable to the Brigade until after Argentina’s surrender, because the fleet routinely needed herelsewhere.Eachservicehaditsownrequirements,andtherewasnooneseniortoClapp,Thompson,andWoodward in the South Atlantic to monitor events and redefine priorities. Woodward knew of somefrustrationsashore,buthehadshipscoveringamassiveareawithrequirementsaswell.Afterthewarhestatedincorrespondence:Thebattleinthelogisticsworldwhenyoursupplylinesarewideopentoattackisalwaysaboutthebalancebetweencelerityandsecurityofdelivery.It’sabitover-statedbutoftenthefasteryougo,thelesslikelyyouaretogetthere,strangelyenough.Convoysaretheclassicexample–notconfinedtoseawarfare…Yes,thelandforcesmayhavebeenfrustratedattheshortnoticewithwhichtacticaldeploymentchangesofshipsweremade–butthey’dhavebeenadamnsightmoreannoyediftheshipshadallbeensunkbeforetheyunloaded.

For several days following the landings, Commando Logistic Regiment found itself scrambling to getsupplies to units as it struggled to unload ships as they returned to the anchorage. Lacking internalcapability to move supplies to units only made matters more difficult. One category of supplies thathighlights the challenges it facedwas fuel. LieutenantColonelHellberghad succeeded in gettingninetrucks with fuel pods added to manifests upon deployment and had a total of twenty-four 400-galloncollapsiblerubberfueltanksforuse.Thestrugglecameindistributingfuelfromthosetankstounits.The

generator-poweredRapier air defence systemswere consuming gasoline in large quantities. Eachwaslocated now in an outlying area to protect the beachhead andwas accessible only by helicopter. Thismeant that a Sea King had to be dedicated exclusively to fuel resupply and routine maintenance forRapiersonadailybasis.12Thatwasonlypartofthedistributionchallenge,though.Otheritemsrequiringgasolineonarecurring

basisincludedRigidRaiderboats,BV202Bandwagonsandcookingequipment.TheBandwagons,whichserved as command vehicles, drank fuel at especially high rates because operators often kept enginesrunning to charge radios and keep warm. As a result, units were relying on twenty-litre jerrycans todistributefuelfromthecollapsiblestoragecontainerstothistypeofequipment.Therewasplentyoffuelonships.Thechallengebecamegetting that fuel fromships toshoreandthenstoring it there.RoundsfiredbyArgentinefightershadpiercedtheBrigade’sonly10,000-litrecollapsiblepillowtankasitmovedtoshoreonamexeflote.13Truckswithfuelpodsattachedcouldtransportfuelbetweenshipsandshoreaboardlandingcraftormexeflotes,butoncefuelpodswereonland,someonehadtodispensefuel intocans and then distribute it to locations where it was needed. Although that sounded simple enough,keepingasteadysupplyoffuelreadyinjerrycanswasfarfromeasy.RoyalMarineshadtriedtoload250tons of packed gasoline on Atlantic Causeway in the United Kingdom, but shipping regulations andinspectorspreventedthemfromgettingmorethanafewdozentonsonboardthatandothervessels.Now3CommandoBrigadehadhundredsofjerrycanstofillandkeepfilledonadailybasis.Thentheyhadtodistributethecanswhereneeded.BrigadeestimatesofjerrycansonhandonD-Daytotalled1880:1,000empty,600 filledand280more filledandcarriedonunit vehiclesat the rateof twoper vehicle.Dailyconsumption,however,wasstaggeringforabrigadethathadslimmeddownequipmentfordeployment.Dailygasolinerequirementsconsistedof698jerrycans:160forRapiers,378forVolvoBV202over-snowvehicles, 106 for LandRovers and 54 for cooking.14 Thismeant that the Brigade had to keep emptiesflowingbacktothefuelsupplypointintheBMA;anditneededfarmorecansifiteverwantedtomaintainfilled cans so that units did not have towaste timewaiting for empties to be filled.Consequently, theBrigade was anxiously anticipating several thousandmore jerrycans scheduled to arrive with the fuelhandlersof5InfantryBrigade.Inthemeantime,theRegimentwouldhavetokeepgasolineflowingthebestwayitcould,whichwasbyahandpump,sinceithadnootherwaytofilljerrycans.Airattackshaddelayedeffortstoestablishanemergencyfuelhandlingsystemtoprovideaviationfuel

ashore.WhenStromness returned to theanchorageon23May, shebrought theequipmentneeded forsuchasystem.It includedabanana-shapedfloatingfueltankcalleda‘dracone’,thatcouldbepulledtoships, filled with fuel and then moored offshore. Piping and pumps would connect the dracone tocollapsible tanks on land. Eventually, pipingwould be installed tomove fuel to even larger collapsiblepillowtanks.Onceinoperation,suchfuelpointswouldmeanthatnavalvesselsnolongerhadtoremainnear the coastline just to refuel helicopters supporting ground operations, thereby reducing threats tosometypesofshipping.Completinga landingstripwouldalsoeliminatetheneedforHarrierstotravelover 200miles fromWoodward’s Carrier Battle Group to fly combat air patrols around San Carlos orstrikegroundtargets.15TacticalairpowerwouldbemoreresponsiveonceHarrierswereabletorefuelonland.SomemattingforthestripwasonStromness.TherestwouldbecomingaboardAtlanticConveyor.Although with time engineers could develop these fuel points, operating them would present a

completely different challenge. Since Commando Logistic Regiment’s Petroleum Troop consisted ofreservistswho had not beenmobilized for thewar, theRegiment had no one certified to dispense thevolatileaviation fuelor,as importantly, tomaintainqualitycontrol.Unlesssomeonecouldbe trained,3Commando Brigade would have to wait until specialists arrived with 5 Brigade in about a week. Thiswouldbethe first timeRoyalMarineshadusedanemergencyfuelhandlingsystemlikethis toprovideaviationfuel.The overriding concern for 3CommandoBrigade, though,was the sheer difficulty of gettingwhat it

neededintherightquantitiestotheproperlocations.Severalthingswerecontributingtothefrustrations.Firstofallwastheshortageofmovementassets.TherewereatotalofelevenSeaKingandfiveWessexhelicoptersavailableatthetime.Ofthese,onlyfourSeaKingswereequippedwithpassivenightvisiongogglesandthereforehadtobededicatedtonightmissionsinsupportofspecialforces.16FactoringoutanotherSeaKingfordedicatedsupporttoRapiers leftonlysixSeaKingsandtheWessexesforship-to-shoremovements,untilAtlanticConveyorarrivedwithmorehelicopters,mostnotablytheheavy-liftCH47Chinooksshewascarrying.TimeforoffloadingwasbecomingmorelimitedaswinterapproachedintheSouthAtlantic.Therewereonlyabouteighthoursofdaylightineachdaynow.That these helicopters were performing well was not in dispute. On D-Day alone, helicopters had

transported288loads,totalling220tonsand520men,from11shipsto21differentsites.17ButArgentineairattackshaddeprivedtheBrigadeofmanyhoursofvaluableunloadingtime.Forsomein3CommandoBrigade,centralizedcontrolofallmovementassetswasbecomingafurtherhindrance,sincetheBrigadecould rarely influence actions at short notice.Decisions directing ships out of the anchorage, howevernecessary they were, had separated several units from supplies and personal gear they needed andsubstantially complicated the build-up and resupply. During the first few days the Brigadewas on thebeachhead,almostnoresupplyreachedcommandounits.OrdnanceSquadronenteredadesperateraceagainsttimetokeepupwithrequirements.The problem was not just with helicopters. Ship-to-shore movement by watercraft was not going

smoothly,either.InitialdifficultiesbeganonD-Daywhencargohandlersandtransporterstriedoffloadingsomeofthecivilianships.Theseshipshadbeendesignedtopullnexttopiersandeitheropensidedoorsand let cargo roll off orusepier-side cranes to lift containers on todocks.Now,break-bulk cargohad

replacedcontainers,andtherewerenopiers.Vehicledecksofroll-onroll-offvesselswerestillsopackedwithsuppliesthatcargohandlershaddifficultygettingmateriel-handlingequipmentnexttowhatwastobemoved.Additionally,logisticiansfoundthatvesselslikeNorlandcouldnotlowersterndoorssufficientlyto reach mexeflote lighters being used to transport supplies to shore.18 The British would ultimatelyimprovisewaystogetsuppliesoffbypositioningmexeflote lightersbetweenrampsofvessels tocreatecausewaysformovingsuppliesbyforklift.Removingbreak-bulkloadsfromships,onepalletatatime,wasnevertheless very time consuming. Try as theymight to improvise solutions, they quickly learned thatrequisitionedshipswerenosubstituteforamphibiousvesselsdesignedforgettingsuppliesashorequicklyinsuchsituations.Theoffloadrateforcivilianvesselsaveragedonlytwentytonsperhour,comparedtoninetytonsperhourforLSLs.19Complicatingmattersfurther,mexeflotescouldnotgettolandingsitestooffloadsuppliesatlowtide.Controllingship-to-shoreoperationshadbecomeachallengeonlandaswell.Partofthisstemmedfrom

the inability of all participants to communicate with each other. Thompson and Clapp shared a singlesecure voice Very High Fire quency (VHF) channel. There was no central administration/logisticscommunicationsnetforcontrollingormonitoringthesituation.Thompson’sstaffatSanCarlosSettlementbarely could talk to Clapp’s onFearless. Hellberg’s subordinates could talk to Thompson’s but not toClapp’s.AndalthoughHellberghadrepresentativesonsomeships,he rarelycould talk to themeither.Beach support units ashore couldgenerally speak to ships, but not to theRegiment orBrigade. Thereweremanytimes,asaresult,whenelementsinvolvedinship-to-shoreoperations,bothashoreandafloat,simplydidnotknowwhatwasgoingonbecausetheyhadnomechanismtostayabreastofdevelopments.Consequently,asairattacksoccurredorasotherchangesdeveloped,offloadingbecameveryconfusing.20Itdidnothelpthat3CommandoBrigadehadnotdesignatedaliaisonofficertostayaboardFearlessandcollaborate with Clapp’s staff to work through requirements, stay abreast of situations that affectedshippingorkeepnavalstaffinthepicturewithregardtotroopmovementashore.Ifanythingcouldhavehelped alleviate confusion and frustrations exacerbated by poor communication, it would have been aseniorLandForceofficerworkingwithClapp’sstaffandlisteningforchangesaffectingsupporttogroundforces.Afterthesecondroundofairattacksontheanchorage,pressurehadstarteddevelopingforBrigadier

Thompson todosomething,nowthathehadsecureda footholdonEastFalkland,despite the fact thatMajor General Moore, who was then still en route to the Falklands aboard QE2, had not given himobjectivesbeyondthebeachheadandremainedoutofcommunicationforfurtherdiscussion.Britishshipshad been taking a pounding since arriving in the South Atlantic throughout the area of operations.Thompsonwent toFearless by a Rigid Raider boat each evening following the landings, until satellitecommunications could be installed ashore at Ajax, to provide updates direct to Admiral Fieldhouse atNorthwood.FrustrationswerealsodevelopingbackintheUnitedKingdom.AlthoughThompsonhadnotreceived clear guidance, he nonetheless had his plannersworking on options.On 23May, he issued awarning order to 2 Para to conduct a raid on Darwin and Goose Green. Bad weather two days laterpreventedhelicopters frommoving forward artillery, so he decided the raidwas too risky. Itwas evenmoreriskytomoveunitsfromSanCarlostowardStanley,whichwasfiftymilesaway.Suchamovewouldrequirehelicopters to keepunits suppliedas theymoved forward.Morehelicopterswere scheduled toarriveinacoupleofdaysaboardtheconvertedcontainershipAtlanticConveyor.Departingprematurelybeforethencouldjeopardizethebuild-upandforwardresupplytounits,ifnottheunitsthemselves.OfficialsbackintheUnitedKingdomwerenottheonlyonesbecominganxiousfor3CommandoBrigade

tomove out from the San Carlos area. Some of Thompson’s subordinate commanders were becomingequallyconcernedanddidnotappreciatefullytherequirementtobuildupthebeachheadsodeliberately.Thompsoncalledan‘OGroup’meetingforhiscommandersandstaffon24Maytoupdatethemonthesituation. As local children played among camouflage netting covering commando equipment in SanCarlos Settlement, he asked his leaders to curb their impatience and explained that offloading mustcontinueinorderforthemtogetvitalstoresashore.21Therewasamplereasonforalltobeworried.Wellover fifty Argentine planes had attacked ships in and around San Carlos by this time, seriouslycomplicating the supply build-up and overall ship-to-shore operations. Fortunately for the British, fewbombshadexplodedwhenhittingships.Argentineplaneswerecausingseriousconcernsforeveryone,butmatterscouldhavebeenfarworse.

Had pilots concentrated on targeting ships key to command and control, troop transport or supplies,difficultieswouldhavebeenmagnifiedconsiderably.Instead,mostfirststrikeswereagainstwarships,andClapp’sdefencegavepilotslittletimetochoosetargets.AttacksonthecommandshipFearless,thelargetransportsCanberraandNorlandorshipslikeElkpackedwithammunitioncouldhaveproducedcripplingeffectsontheBritish.Following attacks in the San Carlos anchorage, the British were expecting even more to happen.

‘VeinticincodeMayo’(25May)wasArgentina’sNationalDay.InflictingagreatlossontheTaskForcethatday could bolster themorale of Argentines both at home and in the Falklands. Past days had broughtconsiderablefrustrationstoseniormilitaryofficialsinBuenosAires.Althoughpilotshadflowndozensofsorties,manyhadnotreturned,andreportsindicatedthatdamageinflictedonBritishshipswasfarlessthanexpected.ABritishreporterintheFalklandsinadvertentlyprovidedanexplanationwhenhereleasedinformationregardingthehighproportionofArgentinebombsnotexplodingtotheBritishBroadcastingCorporation,whichreleaseditonthenews,muchtothedismayofBritishforces.Somebelievethat,asaresult, Argentina started using bombs fitted with direct-action fuses, which armed upon release andactivatedwhenstrikinganythingsubstantial.22

ItwasathirdExocetmissile,however,whichbroughtthenextseriousblowtotheTaskForceanditslogistics.Earlyon25May,anArgentineLearJetflyingathighaltitudetookaerialphotographsofBritishforcesinthevicinityoftheSanCarlosarea.23AshewasclosinginontheFalklands,AtlanticConveyor’scivilian captain Ian North commented, ‘Well boys, it’s May 25. Something spectacular should happentoday.’24CaptainNorthdidnotknowhowcorrecthewas.HisAtlanticConveyorwasduetocomeintotheSanCarlosanchoragethatevening.Thefirstairattacksthatdaycameshortlyafterdaybreakandconcentratedagainonthewarships.The

destroyerCoventryandthefrigateBroadswordborethebruntofattacks.Bymid-afternoon,Coventrywasinflames.Helicopterpilotsstruggledtoretrievesurvivors.Bytheday’send,thedestroyerhadcapsized,andpilotshadflown263ofthesurvivorstoSanCarlosforboardingFortAustin,sixteenminorcasualtiestoAjax for treatment,andfourseriousburncasestoUganda.Nineteenmen lost their lives.25Atabout1800 hrs, as rescue operations fromCoventry were concluding, Brigadier Thompson was chairing hisusualeveningconferencewithstaffofficers.Theyhadbeengoingover finaldetailsofplans forgroundcombatoutsidethebeachhead,whenanotherofficerstuckhisheadinthetentandannouncedtherejusthadbeenanotherstrikefurtheroutatsea:anExocetmissilehadslammedintoAtlanticConveyor.TwoArgentineSuperEtendardpilotshadnotbeenlookingforAtlanticConveyorthatafternoon.Infact,theirrealhopewasoffindingtheBritishaircraftcarriersHermesandInvincible.Thepilotsregisteredtargets,however,andreleasedtheirExocetsabouttwentymilesfromthenearestship.RoyalNavyshipsdetectedtheplanes,readieddefencesandfiredchaff.Thechaffdeflectedthemissiles,butonethenlockedontoAtlanticConveyor,whichlackedanydefensivecapabilityofitsown.TheExocetstruckthecontainershiponherside,startingfiresthateventuallyspreadtotheammunitionhold,whichthenexploded.Thecrewhadbeenworkingthroughoutthedaytoprepareforoffloading intheSanCarlosanchoragethatnight.Oneofthefourheavy-liftCH47Chinookhelicoptersshewascarrying,andwhichwereneededashoresobadly,wasonanaerialtestflightwhentheExocetstruck.HarriersbeingtransportedhadflownawaytoHermes as well. But everything else on the converted container shipwas lost.Within ninetyminutes,CaptainNorthdirectedhis150-mancrewtoevacuate.Twelveperished.AtlanticConveyor latersankassalvage efforts were still underway, taking with her Captain North and thousands of tons of valuablesuppliesandequipment.ThelossofAtlanticConveyorwasnearlyunimaginabletotheLandForce,whichwasanxiouslyawaiting

herarrival.Theshipwascarryingahostofcriticalitems:tentsfor10,000men,mattingfortheHarrierrunway planned for Port San Carlos, small support boats, materiel-handling vehicles, emergency fuel-handlingequipmentincludingallremainingfloatingdraconesforfuelstorage,desalinationsupplies,lightsets and generators.Most importantly, though, shewas carrying helicopters that theBrigade so badlyneededtogetunitsandsuppliesacrossEastFalkland.AtlanticConveyorsanktothebottomoftheSouthAtlanticwiththreeCH47andsixWessexhelicoptersaboard.AsingleCH47survivedaboardHermesbutcouldnot get toSanCarlos before29May.When that helicopter arrived, itwouldnot have any sparepartsortools;theytoohadperishedwithAtlanticConveyor.26ThoseintheBMAatAjaxBaythatnightcouldscarcelybelievetheirearswhenhearingofthislatestcatastrophe.WhathadstartedoutasabrilliantoperationintheearlymorningdarknessoftheD-Daylandingshad

turned into a nightmare. It took the British less than four hours to secure their objectives in the SanCarlosbeachheadon21May.Theynowhadbeenon land for fivedays. Ithad taken themthat long toconsolidateandestablishasmallsustainmentbasebecauseofattacksbyArgentinepilotsdaringClapp’scordondefenceintheSound.Duringthattime,riftsbetweenserviceshaddeepened.TheRoyalNavyhadcontinuedtosustainlossanddamageworsethananyoneimagined.ArgentinepilotshadstruckfourteenBritishshipssincethefirstdaysofMay,sinkingfive.FortunatelyfortheBritish,bombshittingsevenofthoseships,somemultipletimes,didnotexplode.Eventhoughmatterscouldhavebeenmuchworse,thewarhadbecomefarmorecostlythananyoneexpected.Leaders in London, including Thatcher, were becoming very concerned. Few if any understood the

situation on the ground on East Falkland and why it was taking so long for troops to get off thebeachhead. Brigadier Thompson andCommodoreClapp had been planning a breakoutwhen sufficientsupplies had reached shore. Time was no longer on their side, though. Nightly conversations withsuperiorsbackinLondonwerebecomingmorestrained.Thompsonwouldsoonreceiveanultimatumtogetunitsawayfromthebeachheadanddosomething.Thegroundwarwasabouttobegin.

F

Chapter7

TheBreakoutandFightforGooseGreen

ollowingthesuccessfulamphibiouslandingson21May,3CommandoBrigadefacedthedifficultyofimplementingthevaguedirectivesissuedbyMajorGeneralMooreon12May.Ontheonehand,MoorehadaskedThompsontolookforopportunitiestopushforwardfromthebeachhead;onthe

other,Mooreadvisedthatuponhisarrivalwith5Brigadehethenwouldleadatwo-brigadeattackagainstthe Argentines. Brigadier Thompson and his staff had been assessing options for implementing thisdirectiveevenbeforearrivinginSanCarlos,buttheydidnotwanttoshifttheirfocusunnecessarilyfromtheconcentrationofArgentineforcesatStanley.BythetimetheBritishlanded,Argentinahadamassednearly 13,000men in the Falklands, around 11,000 ofwhomwere positioned near the capital. That iswhere the British Land Force would have to win the war after it had built up sufficient logisticscapabilities ashore.Now 3 Commando Brigadewasworking to complete that build-up at Ajax as theyanxiously awaited thearrival ofAtlanticConveyorwith additional helicopter support. TheBrigadewasplanningtoinsertreconnaissanceelementsonMountKent,just15kmwestofStanley.Oncethosespecialforces had determinedArgentine locations, Thompson intended to useChinook helicopters offAtlanticConveyor tomove an entire commando to secure that dominant terrain feature. TheBrigadewas alsoplanningtoairliftanothercommandoandaparachutebattalionfromthebeachheadeastwardtotheareasofDouglasSettlementandTealInlet,distancesof35kmand50kmrespectively.Aftersecuringthoseareasandthenrepositioningcriticalsuppliesforward,BritishgroundforceswouldbeposturedtoattackfromthewesttowardStanley.TheBrigadeneverviewedthesmallArgentinecontingentatGooseGreenasanimpedimenttoreaching

Stanley.Muchof this forcesupposedlyconsistedofmembersof theArgentineAirForcesupportingairoperationsfromthesettlement’stinyairstrip.Givengoodweather,BritishHarrierscouldneutralizethatthreat if needed. Thompson had positioned 2 Para on Sussex Mountain to block any advance up theisthmustowardthebeachhead.Staffhadcometoviewthesettlement,though,asatargetofconveniencefor a small-scale ground operation, thus satisfying Moore’s directive while not draining resources ordivertingfocusfromStanley.SpecialforceshadconductedasuccessfuldiversionaryraidinthatareaonD-Day.A second raidnowwould strengthenperceptionsby theArgentines that theBritish intended toattack Stanley from that direction. Thompson therefore met with Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, thecommanderof2Para,shortlyafterunitscameashore,todiscussthispossibility.Jones’paratroopershadbeendigging in since the landings,watchinghelplessly asArgentineplanes attacked ships inFalklandSound. Thepopular battalion commanderwelcomedan opportunity to leadhismen into action.On23May,ThompsonissuedJonesawarningordertaskinghimtodevelopaplanfora limitedraidonGooseGreen, and later discussedhis intentwithFieldhouseduring a nightly update.At the time,Fieldhouseconveyednosenseofurgencyfortheraid.Complicating thesituation,however,wereeventssince the landings.AirattacksonshipsaroundSan

Carlos had slowed the build-up considerably. Helicopter support was now crucial for starting movestowardStanley.TheBrigadesucceeded ingettingreconnaissanceelements forward toMountKentandTealInleton24May.Thenbadweathersetin,restrictinghelicoptersfromflyingandmakingitimpossibletorepositionartillerytosupport2Para’sadvancedowntheisthmustowardGooseGreen.Thompsonandhisplannerswereinahuddleassessingalternativecoursesofactionintheeveningmeetingof25May,when they learned of the loss ofAtlantic Conveyor. Onemember of his staff responded after hearingaboutthelossofhelicopters,‘We’llhavetobloodywellwalk.’1LieutenantColonelAndrewWhitehead,thecommanding officer of 45 Commando, one of the two units designated to move to the DouglasSettlement/Teal Inlet area, later told his men that if their forebears had been able to march fromNormandy to Berlin in the Second World War, then walking across East Falkland should not be aproblem.2MarchingacombatunitthedistancefromSanCarlostoStanleywouldbequitechallenging,however,

given the cold,wetwinterweather. It hadbeencalculatedby3CommandoBrigade thatmencarryingmostof their individualequipmentwould takeaboutanhour tomarcha singlekilometreatnight.3 Asslowas thatwas,movingsupportunits, equipmentandsupplies to sustainaground fightwouldbeanentirelydifferentmatter.Itwouldnowtakemoretimeandcarefulcontrolofthefewtransportationassetsremaining.Plannershadcalculatedthat itwouldtakeeighty-fiveSeaKingsorties toairliftasinglesix-gun,105mm lightgunbatterywithabasic loadof 500 roundsof ammunitionpergun.4With fourgunbatteries tobemoved,much remained tobedonebeforeThompson’sground forces couldget forwardwithenoughequipmenttostartthepushonStanley.ThelonesurvivingChinookhelicopterfromAtlanticConveyorwasnot anticipatedatSanCarlos tohelpbefore29May.Thus anything shiftingassets fromrequirements inthenorthwouldnowjustmakeitthatmuchlongerbeforetheBritishcould launchthedecisivebattle.BythetimetheweatherclearedaroundSanCarlos,Thompsonhaddecidedthatsupportingoperations

towardStanleyandGooseGreenwouldspreadcapabilitiesfartoothin.Hethereforecancelledtheraid,

much to the consternation of 2 Para, intending instead to wait on the arrival of 5 Brigadewith someadditionalhelicopters.Hedidnotbelieveitwasimportanttosendoneofhiscombatunitstoneutralizethe few hundred Argentines at this out-of-theway settlement, given recent developments. Thompson’sdecision, however, would not stand because Admiral Fieldhouse had changed his mind about theimportanceofGooseGreen.EversincelandingonEastFalkland,Thompsonhadbeenoperatingunderincreasingpressureto‘geton

withit’awayfromtheSanCarlosbeachhead.IthadbecomeclearduringhisnightlyupdatesthatpoliticalandmilitaryleadersintheUnitedKingdomwerebecomingincreasinglyconcernedaboutlossesinflictedontheRoyalNavyastheLandForcecontinueditsbuild-up.AnditwasnosecretthatfrustrationsweredevelopingwithintheCarrierBattleGroupforthesamereason.Thompsonwasatacleardisadvantage.HeandMajorGeneralMoorehadworkedtogetherofteninthepast,andMoorehadcompleteconfidenceinhisbrigadier.ButthoseinLondondirectingthewareffortknewlittleofhim,neitherAdmiralLewinintheWarCabinetadvisingThatcher,norAdmiralsLeachandFieldhouse.ThompsonandWoodwardhadnotworked together either prior to the deployment, and since departing they had developed a coolrelationshipatbest.All theadmiralskneweachother,butnoneof themhadexperience inamphibiousoperationsorunderstoodtheassociatedrisksofbreakingawayfrombeachheadsprematurely.Nowtheywerequestioningtheneedtodelaygroundoperationsany longer.Butconcernswerenot limitedtotheRoyalNavy.LieutenantGeneralRichardTrantof theBritishArmy,whoreplacedMooreasFieldhouse’sdeputy,hadsignalledconcernstoMooreon24Mayaboutthelackofmovementoutofthebeachhead.5SeniorleadersintheBritishArmyhadexpressedreservationsabouttheviabilityofsuchalongdistancewarbeforeforcesevendeployed.Nowthepoliticianswerestartingtogetconcernedthatifsomethingdidnotchangecoursesoon,Britaincouldbeforcedintoaceasefireleadingtonegotiationsfromapositionofweakness.Suchstrategicconcernswerequitevalid.TheonlyproblemwasthatnoonesharedthemwithThompson.AsignalfromMoorehadreachedThompsonon24MayreassuringhimthatMoorewasnot‘insympathywithpressuretorushyou’.6MoorehadbeenhavingcommunicationproblemsaboardQE2eversincesailingfromEnglandwith5Brigade.Hewasnowwithoutcommunicationscapabilityagain.OfficialsinLondonwerelookingforsomeactiononlandtoregaintheinitiative,provideaBritishvictory

tocounterrecentlossestoArgentineairattacksandbuytimepsychologicallyandpoliticallyuntilMooreand 5 Brigade arrivedwithin the next week. Thompson therefore bore the brunt of these frustrationsduringhisnightlyphonecalls.Atonepoint,FieldhousesupposedlycontactedWoodwardand‘toldhimtogo ashore and shout at Thompsonuntil hemoved out of the beachhead’.7Woodwarddeclined.Shortlybeforenoonon26May,BrigadierThompsonwassummonedtospeaktoFieldhouseviathesatellitephonenewlylinkedtoLondonfromAjaxBay.Duringthecall,FieldhouseorderedhimtoattackGooseGreenorbereplaced.Thompsonthereforeresurrectedtheplanfor2Paratoraidthesettlement.Hisoriginalintenthadbeen

fortheparachutebattaliontogetinquickly,causeasmuchdamageaspossibleandthenwithdraw.Thatnowchangedtoamissionfor2ParatocaptureGooseGreen.Thompsondidnotgiveuponhisplantogetother forces across the island in preparation for an attack on Stanley. Given the loss of heavy-lifthelicopters, he intended to direct 45 Commando and 3 Para to cross East Falkland on foot. Then, asweatherpermitted,hewouldairlift42CommandoforwardtosecurethehighgroundofMountKentwithall themedium-lifthelicoptershecouldmuster.The leastdesirablemission foracombatunitwouldbeassumedby40Commando; itwouldremain intheSanCarlosanchoragetoprotecttheBMAandotherareas.TheBritishstillexpectedtoencounteronlyafewhundredArgentinesatGooseGreen.TheBrigadehad

received conflicting intelligence reports sinceD-Dayabout enemy strength there.One report indicatedthat over three infantry companieswere deployed aroundDarwin andGooseGreen, supported by two105mm artillery pieces and a dozen anti-aircraft guns. Just before leaving Sussex Mountain, though,Lieutenant Colonel Jones met with special forces who had conducted the D-Day raid on Darwin; theysuggested to him that only a single company of Argentineswas on thewhole isthmus.8 The challengebefore2Pararemaineddauntingeitherway.TheArgentinesheldgoodterrainandifproperlydeployedcouldcreateatoughdefenceagainsttheparatroopers.Approachestothesettlementincludedlargeareasofferinglittlecovertoadvancinggroundforces.Inoneplace,theisthmusnarrowedtoaboutamile.Aftergettingthroughthatchokepoint,attackerswouldhavetonegotiatearidgeoflandknownasDarwinHillthatstraddledtheterrainbetweentheDarwinandGooseGreenSettlements.ShouldthedefendersrealizetheBritishwerecoming,theycouldprepareanevenbetterdefencetheretobogdownagroundassault.Thestrengthof2Parafortheattackwasslightlymorethan600,abouthalfofwhomwereconcentratedinthethreeriflecompanies.IftherewasonlyacompanyofArgentinesspreadoutontheisthmus,asspecialforcesadvisedJones,then2Parawouldretainathree-to-onenumericaladvantage,notbadoddsforanattackingforce.Ifthereweremore,itcouldbeatapotentialdisadvantage.Resourcestosupport2Para’sattackwerethin,duetorequirementstosupportlogisticsoperationsand

the two other units advancing from the beachhead toward Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet. On theeveningof26May,2ParawouldmoveoutfromSussexMountain,carryingmostthingswiththem.Jones’intentwastousethecoverofdarknesstogethisparatrooperstotheareaaroundCamillaCreekHouse,about12kmfromtheirpositionsonthemountain.Theywouldremaininhidingthereduringthedayandthenattack indarknessearly thenextmorning to seizeGooseGreenanother12kmdown the isthmus.Eachsoldierwouldcarryammunitionestimatedtobesufficient for twodays, individualrationpackstoeatwhenevertimepermitted, twocanteensofwater,andmedicalsupplies issuedbefore landing.Manywouldcarryextraroundsforthegeneral-purposemachinegunsforadditional firepower.Arequestwas

submittedtoBrigadeheadquartersforBV202over-snowvehiclestohelpmovemortarsandammunitionforward.Tothebattalion’sfrustration,Brigadeturneddowntherequestbecauseoflimitedavailabilityofthetrackedvehicles,difficultiesofdistributingfuelforwardinjerrycansandthebeliefthatthevehicleswouldbogdownintheterrainontheisthmus.9Consequently,LieutenantColonelJonesoptedtotakeonlytwoofhiseightauthorized81mmmortarsandatotalof300roundsofmortarammunition,whichwouldbeman-packed bymortar sections, assault engineers and anyone else available.He had twoBlowpipedetachmentsallocatedtohisbattalionwithman-portablesurface-to-airmissiles.Otherfiresupportwouldcomefromthree105mmlightguns,whichtheBrigadewould liftbyhelicoptertoCamillaCreekHousethenightof27May.Thismightnotseemsufficientsupportingfirepowerforabattalionattack,butastheyleft CamillaCreek the nextmorning, 2 Para alsowould receive naval gunfire support from the frigateArrowandcloseairsupportfromHarriersoffthecarriers.Nonetheless,2Parawasfarfrompleasedbythelackofsupporttheyappearedtobegetting.Jonesplannedtokeephisquartermasterofficerwiththebattalion’sBechelonatSanCarlostocoordinateanticipatedneedsforresupply.Alsoon27May,45Commandoand3ParawouldbegintheirlongtreksonfootovertheundulatingEast

Falkland peat bogs toward Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet respectively. Two days later, helicopterswould transport 42 Commando from its positions around San Carlos to Mount Kent, from which thecommandoscouldmaintainobservationofallapproachestoStanley.Then,usingLSLs,theBrigadewouldformasea lineofcommunication fromtheBMAatAjax,north-eastwardaroundEastFalklandand intoTealInlet, inordertoestablishatailoredForwardBrigadeMaintenanceAreaorFBMAtheretosustainthe attack towardStanley. If allwent as planned, 3CommandoBrigadewould be postured in forwardpositionswhenMajorGeneralMoorearrivedwith5Brigadearound1 June.Comingdays looked tobetiringfortheentireBrigade.Brigadeunitsstartedwalkingtowardtheirobjectivesundercoverofdarknessontheeveningof26May.

Meanwhile,45CommandoboardedLCUstotakethemacrosstheanchoragetoPortSanCarlos,wheretheywouldbegintheir35kmmarchnorthtoDouglasSettlement.FearingthathelicoptersmightnotgettheirrucksacksforwardoncehiscommandosreachedDouglasSettlement,LieutenantColonelWhiteheaddirected that his men take ammunition and rations for two days, as well as sleeping gear and extraclothing. Individual rucksacksgrew toa staggering120lbormore.The sameapplied to3Para, ledbyLieutenantColonelHughPike, as they started their50kmmarch toTeal Inlet.Although3Parawas tofollow45Commandointhetrek,PikehadreceivedinformationfromalocalresidentaboutabetterroutetoTealInlet.Hesubsequentlyreceivedapprovaltoparallelthecommandosfurthertotheeast.AtroopofScorpionandScimitar light-armouredvehicleswereoriginallysupposedtoaccompanytheparatrooperson theirmarch. Fuel shortages prevented them from leaving the same day, though,when the LSLSirLancelot was forced to ditch fuel because an unexploded bomb remained on board. The troop leadereventuallyhijackedsomefuelandfollowed3Parathenextday,pickingupstragglersenroute.10BeforetheymarchedofftheslopesofSussexMountaintowardCamillaCreekHousethatnight,2Parahijackedtwo over-snow vehicles with Royal Corps of Transport drivers to resupply ammunition during theirattack.11 The paratroopers left their rucksacks in place on SussexMountain for support personnel toairliftforwardwhenthetacticalsituationpermitted.Aside from the loss of helicopters and supplies aboardAtlantic Conveyor, the logistics posture of 3

CommandoBrigadehadimprovedslowlysincethe24MayattacksonLSLsintheanchorage.Eachnight,members of Ordnance Squadron would await the arrival of ships carrying specific supplies. On someoccasions,vesselsrequestedwouldnotshowup;onothers,membersofOrdnanceSquadronwouldboardvesselsonlytofindthatoriginalloadshadbeencross-deckedtoothervesselsintheTEZontheordersofWoodward’sstaff,butwithoutcoordinationwith3CommandoBrigade.12Whentheysucceededinlocatingsuppliesneeded,OrdnanceSquadroninevitablyfounditselfracingagainsttimetogetsuppliesoffloaded,not knowing exactly which ships or supplies would show up in the anchorage. These conditionsnotwithstanding,itstillhadmanagedtoamassaboutthirtydaysofsupplyatAjaxbythetime2Para,3Paraand45Commandodepartedon27May.Brigade logisticianswere then starting toplandetails oftheirmajorlogisticalmoveinafewdays,whentheywouldestablishtheFBMAatTealInlet.ThesamedaythatcombatunitsdepartedtheSanCarlosareafortheirobjectives,MajorGerryWells-

Cole,Thompson’slogisticsplanner,wasintheBMAfortheregulardailymeetingwithunitquartermastersto work out logistics requirements. Ordnance Squadron had just finished preparing sling loads ofammunition for 2 Para,which helicopterswould lift to Camilla CreekHouse that night to support theparatroopers’attackthenextmorningonGooseGreen.Itwasshortlyafternoon.CookswerecleaningupafterservingamealtoseveralhundredmenfromCommandoLogisticRegimentand45Commandointhemesshallestablishedinonesectionoftherefrigerationplant.Afewdozenfeetaway,inanothersectionoftheplant, surgeons in thesmallhospitalareawere in themiddleof twooperations.Suddenly,whistlessounded,asignalthatenemyaircrafthadbeenspottedinthearea.MenscrambledforthefoxholesandfightingpositionstheyhadbeenworkingonsinceD-Day.ItlookedlikesomeSkyhawkshadjustmadeabombing run near San Carlos Settlement. This would be the first time that Argentine pilots hadpenetratedairdefencesandattackedBrigadeunitsonland.Wells-Colerecountedthechaosthatfollowed:HellbergandIweremovingupthesideoftherefrigerationplant,neartheentrancetotheRedandGreenLifeMachine.Wewereabout50metresfromtheentrance.Iwasheadingtothehelicopterpad.ThatwaswhenwesawfightersattackingSanCarlos.Theywerehitting40Commandohard.Then,secondslater,Skyhawkswereontopofus.Ihittheground.Dirtstartedflyingallaround.Then,Iranforthenearestslittrenchforcover.Ammunitionstartedblowingupallovertheplace.

Skyhawk pilots succeeded in dropping twelve bombs into the congested BMA. Fortunately, only four

exploded.Someofthosethatdidexplode,though,struckinthemiddleoftheammunitionstoragearea,ignitingstacksof105mmartilleryshells,mortarroundsandMILANmissiles.TherewaslittleCommandoLogistic Regiment could do to contain the raging fires that erupted, since it had no fire-fightingequipment.Efforts tohosedown fireswith seawaterhelped little.Membersof theRegiment rushed tomovesuppliessafelyaway fromfiresbutwith littlesuccess.The lackofspacehadmeant thatsupplieswereintermingledandstackedincloseproximitytoeachother.ExplosionswrackedtheBMAthroughoutthenightaswindsfannedflamesintosurroundingstocks.Eventually,CommandoLogisticRegimenthadtoletthefireburnitselfout.Fourbombsalsohittheoldrefrigerationplant,whichhousedtheRedandGreenLifeMachineandthe

messhall.Onepassedallthewaythroughtheplantwithoutexploding,butanotherdetonatedonimpactin themesshallportionof thebuilding.Hadtheattackoccurred justanhourearlier, thatbombwouldhavefoundmanymorecommandosinthemessarea.Asitwas,theattackwasstillcostly.Fourmenfrom45 Commando and one from Commando Logistic Regiment were killed at Ajax. Twenty-seven werewounded.Anothermanwaskilledandseveralotherswoundedby theairattackon40Commando thatday.Makingthesituationevenmoretreacherous,two500lbbombslodgedintherefrigerationplantnearthesurgicalwards.Theywouldremainthereforthedurationofthewar,defusedandsandbagged,justafew feet away from surgeons and other medical personnel working to save lives. Memories of thedestruction that afternoon would remain etched forever in the minds of those who were present. AsMedicalSquadronCommanderRickJollyrelatedyearslater,‘Istillcannotpassafootballfieldandhearthereferee’swhistlewithoutfeelingatighteninginmygut.’13LieutenantColonelHellbergknewthatcasualtiescouldhavebeensignificantlyhigherhadhismennot

beenhighlytrainedinsurvivalskills.HisRegimentstoodapartfromotherlogisticsunitselsewhereintheworldbecauseoftherigoursofitscombatskillstraining.AllmenwererequiredtopasstheRoyalMarinesCommandoCoursetoserveintheRegiment.Manyhadalreadyservedincombatarmspositionsinoneof3CommandoBrigade’scommandos;andallthemen,asaresultofthiscommandotraining,hadbecomeskilledinindividualweaponsandpreparationofdefences.Referringtohissubordinatesandtheairattackthatafternoon,Hellbergcommented,‘Notonlycantheyfightaspartofariflesection/troopshouldtheneedarise,theyalsoknowhowtodigineffectivelywithagoodtwofeetofoverheadcover–withoutthisourcasualtytollwouldprobablyhavebeenthreetimeshigher.’14Inspiteofthis,theattackontheBMAreinforcedbeliefsthroughouttheRegimentthatadditionalweaponryandcombattrainingwerenecessaryinBritishlogisticsunitsinthefuture,inordertosavelivesandprotectsupplies.DamagetotheBrigadesustainmentbasethatdaywasconsiderable.Bombsandfiresdestroyedseveral

hundred rounds of 81mm mortar and 105mm artillery ammunition, including those that had beensegregatedandnettedintoloadsthatsamedayforairlifttosupport2Para.Additionally,45Commandolostallof itsMILANmissiles.Thecommandoshad intended touse theseasbunker-bustersduring theattack on Stanley. The attack simply could not have happened at a worse time. Explosions continuedthroughouttheeveningintheBMA,as2Parapreparedtostartitsadvanceandas45Commandoand3ParabegantomoveacrossEastFalkland.TheLandForcefounditselfintheprecariouspositionofhavingfour of its five combat unitsmoving away from the beachheadwhile units in the anchoragewere stillreeling fromadevastatingairattack.Logisticiansscrambledto findadditionalcargonetsand fill themwith artillery ammunition. Helicopter pilots managed to lift the half battery of 105mm guns andammunition to Camilla Creek House for 2 Para. It required eighteen helicopter sorties: one for thegunners,threeforthegunsandfourteenfortheartilleryammunitionloose-loadedintocargonetstosavetheweightofboxesandpallets.15AscoldweathersettledinuponparatroopersnearCamillaCreekHousethatnight,theytriedtogetafewhoursofrestbeforetheattack.Theyhadtomakethebestofitwithoutthewaterproofclothingandsleepingbagsleftbehindonthemountains.Adding toeveryone’s frustrations thatevening, thebattalionbecameaware that someonehad leaked

informationtotheBBCregardingthebreakoutfromthebeachhead.TheysuspectedtheleakcamefromoneofthereportersaccompanyingunitsonEastFalkland,butthatwasnotthecase.Theconsensuslaterwas that some official in the British government actually caused the leak. Whatever the source, thedamagewasdone.Thatafternoon,theBBCreportedtotheworldthat3CommandoBrigadeunitsweremoving away from San Carlos and, more specifically, that 2 Para was then heading south to attackArgentines in the vicinity ofDarwinandGooseGreen.Anyadvantage fromsurprisewasnow lost.Thenext day, 2 Parawould discover tougher defences andmore firepower than they had anticipated fromintelligencereports.LieutenantColonelJoneshaddevelopedadetailedsix-phaseplanfortheattackdowntheisthmusbyhis

fourcompanies.PatrolsfromCCompanyfirstwouldclearthestart line locatedatthenarrowthroatofthe isthmus5kmfromCamillaCreekHouse.ThenACompanyandBCompanywouldclearareasabout1km south of the start line on the east and west sides of the isthmus respectively, with D Companyfollowinginreserveinitiallybetweenthetwo.ACompany’sfocuswastheareaaroundBurntsideHouseandBCompany’sonareasoverlookingCamillaCreek.Oncethoseweresecure,ACompanywouldclearCoronationPointontheeastsidenearDarwin,andDCompanywouldmoveforwardtoclearareasfurthersouthaboveCamillaCreek.ThenBCompanywouldpassthroughDCompanytoanareanearBocaHouse,asCCompanyadvancedtosecuretheairstripwestofDarwin.DCompanywouldbepreparedtoreinforceBCompanyifneeded.Afterthisphase,thecompanieswouldberoughlyinlineacrosstheisthmuswesttoeastnearDarwin.ACompanythenwouldclearDarwinasBandDCompaniesattackedtogethertoclearGooseGreen. In the finalphase,CCompanywouldadvance southofGooseGreen, seizeBrodieCreekBridge and take up positions to prevent enemy reinforcements. The planwas complex. It also did not

anticipatethattheArgentinemaindefencemightbeonthehighestgroundoutsideDarwincalledDarwinHill.AlthoughspottedbyArgentines,2Para scoutsprovided Jonesgood informationabout the locationof

defences. He intended to overrun defences straddling ridgelines near Darwin during the hours ofdarkness, then captureDarwinandGooseGreen indaylight.Theattackwould startquietly,withunitscrossing the start line at 0230 hrs on 28 May, and then become noisy as units made contact withArgentines,atwhichtimetheywouldreceivesupplementary firesupport fromthe4.5 inchgunsof thefrigateArrow inGranthamSound,fromthethree105mmlightgunseachwith320roundsnearCamillaCreek House and, at daybreak and weather permitting, from close air support by Harriers. By theirnature,noisyattacksmeanthigherratesofammunitionexpenditure.Thiswasparticularlyimportantforthe105mmartilleryandmortarcrews.Iftheattacktooklongerthanexpected,gunnerswouldprobablyrequireresupplyofroundstomaintaincontinuousfiresupport.Companies started their attacks on both sides of the isthmus with good success initially. Rain had

startedpouringdownontheparatroopers.Withintwentyminutesofcrossingthestart line,ACompanymadefirstcontactwiththeenemyontheeastsideoftheisthmus.TheArgentinessoonwithdrewunderprotectionofartilleryfire.Tothewest,BCompanycameincontactwithArgentinesaswell,anhouraftercrossing the start line; it overwhelmed themwith the assistance of naval gunfire fromArrow. In theirinitial move, B Company paratroopers had bypassed some Argentines in the dark, however, and theadvanceofDCompany,whichwasfollowing,slowedsignificantlybecauseofthesepocketsofresistance.Bythen,thegunsonArrowhadgonesilentbecauseofmechanicalproblems,whichtookthesailorstwohourstofix.Asitworkedtocleartheresistance,DCompanyreliedonmortarsandartilleryforsupport.Althoughothercompanieshadachievedtheirfirstobjectivesbymidnight,thefightbyDCompanywasnotover.Thebattalion’s attackwas starting to take longer thananticipated.By0400hrs,ACompanyhaddiscoveredtotheirsurprisethattherewasnoresistanceonitssecondobjectiveatCoronationPoint.Asaresult,asDCompanywasstillclearingitswaysouth,ACompanyproceededtosetupabaseforfireandpositionunitsforitsassaultonDarwin.TheplanhadbeenforthemtowaitbeforeattackingDarwinuntilother companies had achieved their second objectives. B Company was still fighting through toughresistanceasitapproacheditsobjectiveatBocaHouse.Nowtheproximityofforcesbeganmakingmortarandartillerysupportdifficult.Theparatroopershadbeenfightingdownthe isthmusfortwohours,andtheiroveralladvancewasslowing.ItwasatthispointthatJonesorderedACompanytoholdinplaceashe moved his tactical headquarters forward to join them and assess the situation. After doing so, heorderedACompanytocontinueitsattack,buttheArgentinedefencedugintotheridgewestofDarwinand,aidedbyartillery,blockedtheirpath.By0530hrs,ACompany’sadvancecametoahaltaswell.Itsparatroopers had encountered Argentina’s main defensive belt on Darwin Hill, which had receivedreinforcementbyanotherinfantrycompanyearlierthatmorning.16Now,asdaylightbroke,theattackby2Parastalled.ItwasduringthiscriticaljunctureinthefightthatJonesstartedreassessingoptionswithhisunits.He

nolongerhadassistancefromnavalgunfire,sinceArrowhadbeencalledoffstationbecauseoftheneedtoleaveGranthamSoundforSanCarlosWaterforherownsafety.Despitehergunsbeingoutofactionforawhilebecauseof themechanicalproblem,thefrigatehadfiredhundredsofroundstosupport2Paraand remained twohoursbeyondher scheduleddeparture time. Jonesopted foragroundattack ratherthanwaitforaddedfiresupport.Agroupoffifteenmenincludingthebattalionadjutantfor2Para,whowasmovingwithJonesandhistacticalcommandpost,madeanassaulttosilenceamachinegunpinningdown A Company. It was not successful. Three died, including the adjutant. Jones then led anotherattempthimself.Ashechargedforward,anothermachinegunfromatrenchtheyhadnotseencuthimdown. Later, two scout helicopters shuttling ammunition forward tried to extract the battalioncommander. A Pucara shot one of them down, killing the pilot andwounding his observer. Jones diedbeforeanyhelicopterscouldgethimout.Major Chris Keeble, Jones’ second in command, inherited a situation at this point thatwas far from

encouraging. He was at the main command post to the rear near Camilla Creek House, trying toorchestratesupportforthefight.Ammunitionwasstartingtorunlow.Casualtyevacuation,inparticular,wasbecomingaproblem.Woundedparatrooperswerescattered throughout the isthmus.Companies inthebattalionwerediscoveringthattheyhadfewlitterstogetcasualtiestolocationswheretheycouldbetreated. Theyhadnoground transportation tomove casualties to the battalion aid station; and enemyartilleryfirewashinderinghelicoptersfromgettingammunitionforwardandthenevacuatingcasualtiesto thehospital atAjax. Paratroopers thereforewere attempting to evacuate comradeswithponchos oranything else they could find.One account indicates, for instance, thatwhenLieutenantColonel Joneswaswounded,paratroopersworkedfranticallyamidstenemyfiretoimproviseastretcherfromwoodandtinoffanadjacentArgentinetrench.Whenthatfellapart,theytriedmakingastretcherusingriflesandpersonalequipment.17Despitetheirefforts,JonesdiedlongbeforeahelicoptercouldhavereachedhimamidstthefightingunderwayontheDarwinridgeline.Makingmattersworsefor2Para,thebattalionhadexpendedallofitsmortarammunition,andbadweatherpreventedHarriersfromtakingoff.Itwasnowdaylight,andtheparatrooperswerespreadoutacrossthebarrenisthmus.Keebleassumedcommandundertheseformidablecircumstances.Fortunately,ACompanysucceededin

finding positions where they could fire anti-tank weapons at bunkers that had been obstructing theiradvance.BCompanydidthesameand,withtheassistanceofaflankingmovementfromthewestbyDCompany,causedArgentinesaroundBocaHousetosurrender.AsKeeblemovedforwardtotakecharge,hereceivedupdatesfromhiscompanycommanders.TheseasonedmajordirectedACompanytocontinue

toholdDarwin,tookoneofitscompaniestoreinforceCCompany,andorderedthereinforcedCCompanytoheadsouthtoattackGooseGreen.KeebleorderedDCompanytoseizetheairfieldatGooseGreenandB Company to set up a blocking position on the high ground south of the settlement to preventreinforcement. Paratroopers fought through Argentine defences as they advanced on objectives,withstandingartillery fire and several air attacks that includedPucaras trying in vain tohit themwithnapalm canisters. In the last hours of daylight, as the firstHarrierswere arriving to provide close airsupport, 2 Para finally surrounded Goose Green. It was about 1530 hrs. The paratroopers had beenfighting forover twelvehours.TheHarriersnowbrought intimidating firepower tobearonArgentinesaroundGooseGreenastheyreleasedclusterbombs,eachburstingforthintofourdozensmallerbombs.TheairattacksdemoralizedtheArgentines,whosoonabandonedtheirartilleryandairdefenceweapons.KeeblereportedthedevelopmentstoThompsonbackatSanCarlos.ItwasstartingtosnowaroundGooseGreen.Personalgearand sleepingbags forhismen remainedonSussexMountain.Henowneeded tofigureouthisnextsteptoforceanArgentinesurrender.Despite their eventual success, it had not been a good day for 2 Para. Goose Green, their primary

objective,wasstillinArgentinehands.Itwasclearthatthebattalionhadencounteredtougherdefencesthananticipated.Alreadyparatroopershadkilledover twohundredArgentines inheavy fighting,but2Parahadlostsixteenmenthroughouttheday.Anotherthreedozenwerewounded,andsomeofthosestillhad not been evacuated. Casualties were staying on the battlefield far longer than anticipated. Thedetailedmedical trainingBrigadeunits receivedwhile sailing southhelped somemenkeep themselvesalive until they could receive medical care. Field expedients remained the rule for getting individualcasualties to locationswhere they could be evacuated eventually. Additionally,most unitswere in direneed of resupply. They had expended four to five times daily allocations of most ammunition. Mortarsections had used up all their rounds. They now needed to move forward before any further attackbecausetheirmortarswereatrangelimits.CompanyAwasoutofammunition,andCompanyBcriticallyshort.18Accordingtooneaccount,somebattalionsoldiershadbeencrawlingdownthenarrowisthmusthroughouttheday‘amongdeadandwounded,relievingthemofspareammunition’.19Forwardobservershadsubmittedfiremissionsduringtheday,onlytoreceivethereply,‘Wejusthaven’tgottherounds.’20Bytheendoftheday,2Parawasbeginningtofeelvictorious,buttheconditiontheywereinchafedatsomeparatroopers.Theybelievedthebattalionwarrantedhigherprioritysupportandwerefrustratedbylackof resupplyand slowevacuationof casualties.21 It did notmatter to them thatweather conditionshadpreventedHarriersfromflyingformostoftheday.Theyhadsucceededregardlessofthesecircumstancesbecausetheyweredetermined,toughmenandhadboldleaders.TheyhadprovedthemselvesfarbettersoldiersthantheArgentines.Yearsafterthewar,Thompsonfaultedhimselffornotproviding2Parawithmoreresourcesforitsfight

that day and for notmaking itmore of a Brigade affair.22 Although that is understandable after whathappened,hecouldhardlyhaveforeseentheconfusionresultingfrominaccurateintelligence,airstrikesontheBMA,malfunctioninggunsonArroworbadweatherdelayingcloseairsupportbyHarriers.AstheLandForcecommander,healsohadconcernsfortwounitsmarchingacrossEastFalkland,specialforcesatopMountKent,anothercommandowaitingtoflythereandabeachheadnowwiththindefencesandavulnerableBMA.TheBrigadehadtriedhardtosupporttheparatroopersduringtheirattack.AirattacksontheBMAat

AjaxthepreviousafternoonunderstandablyhadsplitthefocusofCommandoLogisticRegiment,aswellas that of others in the anchorage area. Complicatingmatters further for those trying to get suppliesforward to 2 Para was the lack of helicopters. Commodore Clapp retained operational control of allhelicopters and had allocated some to the tactical control of 3CommandoBrigade, but 2 Para clearlyperceivedthat itwasnotreceivingtimelyhelicoptersupport.Atonepoint in the fighting, thebattalionhad tried invain togethelicopters through itshigherheadquarters tocome forwardandevacuate twoseriouscasualties.Finally,anoff-dutyArmyAirCorpsofficeroverheardtheurgentrequestandrespondedonhisown.23TheoverallprocedureforprovidinghelicoptersupportwasnolessfrustratingforthoseinCommandoLogisticRegimentorattheBrigadeheadquarters.On29May,SurgeonCommanderJolly,whocontinually faced the challengeof coordinating casualty evacuationneeds for theBrigade, submitted arequesttoClapp’sstaff,onlytoreceiveamessageinreturn:‘Requestbetterassessmenthelicopterneedsfor future casevac to avoid unnecessary tasking scarce assets.Difficulty of assessment understood butmustimprove.Give24Hoursnoticeoffuturecasevacrequirements.’24Therejustseemedtobealackofawarenessbysomeintheapprovalchanneloftherealitiesofunpredictablerequirementsduringcombat.AsFearlessdepartedtheareaofEastFalklandthatdaytorendezvouswithAntrim,thedestroyerbringingMajor General Moore and Brigadier Tony Wilson, the commander of 5 Brigade, Clapp handed overoperationalcontrolofhelicopterstothecaptainoftheLPDIntrepid.Ontheeveningof28May,KeebletransmittednewrequirementstoThompson,ashisunitsconsolidated

aroundGooseGreeninthefallingsnow,sothathecouldcontinuetheattackthenextdayanddefeattheArgentines.These included threemore105mmgunswith2,000roundsofammunitionand themortarswithammunitionthebattalionhadleftbehind.Thompsonagreed,andinadditiondecidedtodispatchacompany from 42 Commando to cover the southern approach to Goose Green; he also contactedFieldhouse’sheadquartersatNorthwoodforassistanceingettingthehospitalshipUgandatomoveclosertoSanCarlossothatCommandoLogisticRegimentcouldevacuatecasualtiesfromitssmallfieldhospitalatAjax.25Thatfieldhospitalwasestablishingaremarkablerecordofsavinglivesoncecasualtiesarrived,butgivenrecentairattacksonthebeachheadand2Para’sfight,itsimplywasrunningoutofspaceforcasualties.Theairliftofadditionalguns,mortarsandammunitionbeganatfirstlightthenextday.Despite

a relatively short round tripof38km from thebeachhead to2Para locations, it tookhelicopters sevenhourstoflytheadditionalgunsandammunitionforward.26Bythen,somethingremarkablehadhappenedtomakeadditionalfirepowerunnecessary.Bynightfall, theparatroopershadclearlygainedtheupperhand,havinghemmedtheArgentines into

the small settlement. Victory seemed certain, unless Brigadier General Menendez could somehowreinforcehisforces.Neithersidehadanaccurateassessmentoftheforcetheywerefacing,though.MajorKeeble confirmed, afterhis soldiers interrogated someprisoners that evening, that theArgentineshadbeenholdingoverahundredcivilianscaptiveintheGooseGreencommunityhousesincethebeginningofthemonth.Thatcomplicatedmattersifhewantedtouseallofhisadditionalsupportingfiretobringthedefenderstotheirknees.HefinallydecidedtooffertheArgentinestheoptionofsurrenderingratherthansufferingwhat,inallcertainty,wouldbeapainfulsiege.Thenextmorning,withThompson’sapproval,hesent two Argentine prisoners forward under a white flag with two options: surrender, or suffer theconsequences.Heremindedthedefendersthattheywereresponsibleforthewelfareofciviliansstill inthesettlementandthattheBritishwouldholdthemaccountableafterthefight, inaccordancewiththeGenevaConvention, for any injuries to civilians. Then hewaited for a reply. The response came a fewhours later: the Argentines had agreed to surrender. Their commander requested that his men bepermittedtomarchawayfromtheirdefencesandlaydowntheirarmswithhonour.Whentheyeventuallymarchedoutfromtheirshelters,theArgentinesdiscoveredtotheiramazementthatonlyafewhundredparatroopers surrounded them.Thewearymen of 2 Parawere no less surprisedwhen they counted athousandArgentineprisonersfilingpast.ItwasastunningvictoryfortheBritish.Theparatroopersalsotookpossessionof the spoils ofwar in andaround theGooseGreen settlement, including four105mmhowitzers,two35mmairdefenceguns,six20mmairdefenseguns,six120mmmortarsandtwoPucaraaircraft.27The achievement of 2 Para at Goose Green was tremendous to say the least. The victory stood as

startlingevidence,foranywhomighthavedoubtedBritishresolveatthatpoint,thattheUnitedKingdomwasnotjustcommittedtobutcapableofregainingtheFalklands.TheengagementwasclearlyamomentofreckoningforArgentinegroundforces.Althoughsomeputupagoodfight,theyprovedtobenomatchfor the highly trained and determined paratroopers. That so few had captured so many made theArgentinesurrenderthatmuchmoreembarrassing.Butif2Para’ssuccesswasaboosttoBritishmoraleandacatalystforfutureplanning,italsoprovedto

be a bane for logisticians in 3 Commando Brigade. The stunning capture of a thousand Argentinesprovidedgoodpublicity.Atthetimeofcapture,though,theseenemyprisonersofwarrepresentednearlytwentypercentoftheentireBritishLandForce.TheimpactonCommandoLogisticRegimentandfuturelogistical planning became staggering. The Regiment knew before landing that it would haveresponsibilityforguardingprisoners.Infact,Hellberghadreceiveddirectsupportfromacommandoriflecompanytohandlethatpossibility.Theproblempresentedbythismasssurrender,however,wasnotjustone of guarding and controlling prisoners in a congested BMA. As he put it later, Commando LogisticRegiment simply ‘didnothave the tentage,wire,pickets, cookersandcanteens’ toestablishandrunaprisoner of war camp. Now, transportation, always at a premium whether on sea or land, had to bedivertedtotransferringprisonersfromGooseGreentoAjax.TheArgentineswereinneedoffoodduetolackofadequateprovisioningatGooseGreen.Severalhundredof themrequired treatmentofwounds,andBritishbloodsuppliesalreadywerecriticallylow.28Dozensmorehadtobeburied,andtheRegimentstillhadnotmanagedtolocatethebodybagsitshippedsouthforitsowncasualties,letaloneforenemydead.TheRegimentwouldeventuallyburythedeadArgentinesinamassgravenearDarwin.Decidingwhattodowithsuchalargenumberofprisonerssimplywasnoteasy.TheBritishconsidered

putting them on ships at first, but since all ships apart fromUganda were potential targets, puttingprisonersaboardthemwouldruncountertotheGenevaConvention.Astheysortedoutalternativesoverthenextfewdays,theykepttheArgentinesunderguardinsheep-shearingshedsatGooseGreen.Thentheymarched them toAjax,whereCommandoLogisticRegiment tookcontrol, fed themBritish rationsandprovidedmedicalcare.TherewassimplynogoodplacetoputthematAjax.AlthoughtheBrigadehadbeen expecting tentage for thousands to arrive, those supplies had been lost days before on AtlanticConveyor.TheRegimentthereforekepttheprisonersoutsideandunderguardduringdaylight.Atnighttheyherdedthemintooneendoftherefrigerationplantforgreatercontrolandsecurity.Withindays,theTask Force boarded the Argentine prisoners on to a ship and sailed them toMontevideo,Uruguay forrepatriation toArgentina, thereby reducing thepotential drain on logistics resourcesmeant forBritishunits. In theend, theBritish learned the importanceofhavingaunitdesignatedbeforehand tohandleprisonersofwarandofmakingsurethatback-upsuppliesandserviceswereavailablefortheircare.The logistical posture of theBrigadehaddeteriorated significantly in the past forty-eight hours as a

resultoftheattackontheBMAand2Para’sfight.Requirementstoprovisionprisonersonlymademattersthatmuchworse.Severalthousandtonsofsupplieswereonhandnow,butinventoriesofspecificitemsweredesperatelylowforsometypesofsupply.Logisticiansbriefedataneveningconferenceon28MaythatintheBMAatthetimethereremainedonlyeighty-threeroundsofammunitionforthe105mmlightguns,thirtyMILANmissilesfortheentireBrigade,noone-manrationpacks,onlytwodays’supplyoften-manrationpacks(whichwereunsuitableforthetroopstocarryastheymovedforward),nocookingfuelforheatingrations,nospareclothingandonlythreedays’supplyofassortedmedicalstocks.29Itwasnowevenmorecriticalthanbeforetogetshipsintotheanchoragewiththerightsupplies.TheBrigadehadtoreplenishitsstocksatAjax;itlikewisehadtostartgettingothersuppliesforwardtoTealInlet,because3Paraand45Commandowouldbetherewithinhoursandwouldneedresupply.TheBrigade’sfrustrations

andsenseofurgencywereevidentinamessageMajorWells-ColesenttoClapp’sstaffthatevening:After last-minutepleaGalahad departure tonight has been delayed as she is not yet unloaded for future ops. Further shecontinuestoholdsomestocksthatareessentialtotheforcethatmustbeoffloaded.AlsounderstandPercivalnotcoming inuntil29May.Planwas to loadherwith stocks for futureopsaswellasGalahad.

HoweverasElkcannotcomeinforanother24hourswedonotholdnecessarystockstofillPercivalnorsupporttheBrigademuchlongerwithoutresupply--ifpositionnotimprovedwewillgrindtoahalt.30

Meanwhile, the movement of 3 Para and 45 Commando had proceeded to the north toward DouglasSettlementandTealInletlargelywithoutincident.Relativelyfewmendroppedoutofthetrekundertheirstaggeringloadsofequipment,suppliesandammunition.Thecommandoscoinedtheterm‘yomping’todescribetheirmarchacrosstheisland,meaningYourOwnMarchingPace;theparatrooperscalledtheirs‘tabbing’forTacticalApproachtoBattle.Theweatherwasnotbadforthefirstday,butthemenstillhaddifficultykeepingtheir footingundertheweightoftheirheavyrucksacksbecauseoftheboggy,uneventerrain.Unfortunately, thenightafter leaving thebeachhead it rained,soakingmenaswellassleepingbagsandmakingthenextday’smarchevenlessbearable.Intheearlyafternoonof28May,leadelementsof45CommandoreachedDouglasSettlement.Theyhadbeenmovingincombatformationthelastdozenkilometres of their approach, so that theywere ready in case they encountered resistance. Argentineswhohadbeen in thearea,however,had fld.Localswereglad tosee thecommandosandhelpedmovetheirgearwithtractorsandtrailersoverthelastlegofthemarch.3ParaarrivedatitsobjectiveofTealInletwitharmouredvehiclesfromtheBluesandRoyalslaterthatevening.Unbeknownst to most in 45 Commando and 3 Para, special forces performing reconnaissance had

precededthemintotheareaseveraldaysbefore.FearlesshadsailedaroundthenorthendoftheislandfromSanCarloson25Mayanddroppedoff a team fromSpecialBoatSquadron in smallRigidRaiderwatercraft.TheirmissionwastosurveythenarrowwatersthatledtoTealInletforsuitablebeachareasthatLSLscouldusetobringsuppliesforward.31Withinformationaboutbeachesavailableand3Paraand45Commandoattheirobjectives,3CommandoBrigadewouldsoonbeinpositiontostartmovingsupportechelonsandsuppliestotheareafortheeventualattackonStanley.On29May, 3CommandoBrigade issuedorders to45Commandoand3Para toprepare to continue

theiradvancethenextdaytoEstanciaHouse,another20kmtotheeast.Oncethoseareaswerecleared,theLandForcethenwouldbeabletodominatehighgroundstartinginthenorthwithMountsEstanciaandVernetandextendingsouth-easttoMountsKentandChallenger,oncetheothertwocommandoswereabletorelocatefromSanCarlos.Atthatpoint,thestagewouldbesetforthefinalattackonStanleyafterhelicoptersrepositionedartilleryand logisticiansmovedsufficientammunitionandsupplies forward. Inthemeantime,45Commandoand3Parawouldremainlessthan20kmfromStanleyandwithinrangeofArgentineheavyartillery.Efforts toget42CommandoatopMountKenthadbeen less successful.Badweatherhad repeatedly

preventedhelicoptersfromreachingthemountaininrecentdays.On30May,though,theweatherclearedforawhile,justafterthelonesurvivingChinookhelicopterfromAtlanticConveyorarrivedatSanCarlos.ThathelicopterwouldearnareputationthroughouttheentireTaskForceasarealworkhorsefromthento theendof thecampaign. Itsmaiden flightwas toMountKent thatday, carrying42Commandoandsome of its supporting arms. On the return leg, the pilot encountered a severe winter snow storm,temporarilylosthisvisionandskiddedthehugehelicopterontoacreeknearPortSalvadorforaboutahundred metres before he could pull it up again. The near catastrophe prevented further flights thateveninguntilpotentialdamagetotheundercarriagecouldbechecked.32By the following day, 3 Commando Brigade had succeeded in getting the three units to the desired

locations. Both 3 Para and 45 Commando had reached areas around Estancia House; andmost of 42Commandowasweatheringblizzard-likewintryconditionson the slopesofMountKent.All threeunitsweresorelyinneedofresupply,though.Theyhadonlywhattheycarriedwiththem.Logisticianshadbeenworking nonstop on the beachhead in the meantime, receiving and sorting supplies to move forward.Relocation of stocks beganwith a combined effort by helicopters andBV202 over-snow vehicles. LSLswouldliftmassivetonnagestoTealInletinthedaysahead.Now3CommandoBrigade had its ground combat forces postured for the final offensive on Stanley.

Nevertheless,itwouldtakequitesometimebeforetheBrigadecouldshiftartilleryandsuppliesfortheattack.Upto70kmseparated42Commando,45Commandoand3Parafromtheirsupportechelonsandother Brigade units near San Carlos; and 2 Para was still in the area of Goose Green, looking for anopportunity to move closer to Stanley. Providing what units needed would take time. Meanwhile,reinforcements were about to arrive in the anchorage. British forces on East Falkland soon wouldapproach 10,000, twice as many as originally deployed as part of 3 Commando Brigade. That woulddemandalotmoreworkforlogisticiansevenunderidealcircumstances.

W

Chapter8

MoreForcesandChallenges

hen senior Task Force leaders met aboard Hermes at Ascension on 17 April, they agreedadditionalgroundcombatpowerwasneededtosupplement3CommandoBrigade.Intelligenceindicated that Argentine defenders on East Falkland already outnumbered Brigadier

Thompson’sforcebymorethantwotoone.TherecertainlywasnoreasontobelievethesituationwouldhavechangedbythetimetheBrigadelanded.Thereremainedagoodpossibility,infact,thatratioscouldchange to disadvantage the British even more. Even assuming 3 Commando Brigade would be able tosurprisetheArgentineswiththeirinitialassaultandestablishasufficientbeachhead,takingthebattletoStanleywouldbequiteadifferentmatter.TheBritishclearlyneededmoregroundforces,iffornootherreasonthantokeepseveralthousandofBrigadierGeneralMenendez’ssoldiersoccupiedasThompson’scommandospunchedthroughoutlyingareastotakeStanley.Accordingly,AdmiralFieldhousereturnedtotheUnitedKingdomfromAscensionandsetanotherbrigade inmotion towardtheSouthAtlantic.Thatunitbecame5InfantryBrigade.

Thiswasaverydifferentorganization from its counterpart3CommandoBrigade.Formedonly threemonthsbeforewithitsprimarymissionasareserveforceforthedefenceoftheUnitedKingdom,ithadnocommitmenttoNATOandclaimedthreecombatunitsofbattalionsize.TwooftheseunitswerealreadymovingtowardtheSouthAtlanticnowbutnotaspartof5Brigade:2Paraand3Para,regardedastheBrigade’s premier fighting units, had been attached to 3 Commando Brigade, a standard militaryprocedure for task organizing for battle to meet mission requirements. The only remaining organiccombatunitwasabattalionofGurkhas.Withabout700soldiersinthe1st/7thDukeofEdinburgh’sOwnGurkha Rifles, this battalion was slightly larger than a parachute battalion and commando. TheseNepalesesoldiersweretoughandproud.Theyclaimedareputationgoingbacktothe1800sofstrikingfearinenemieswiththeircurvedkukriknivesandbattlecry‘AyoGurkhali!’(‘HerecometheGurkhas!’).Legendhaditthattheyusedthoseknivestobeheadtheirenemiesand,asaresult,enemysoldiersfledwhentheyheardtheGurkhaswerecoming.BritishofficialscoordinatedwiththeNepalesegovernmenttogetapprovalfortheGurkhastodeployaspartofthefollow-onforce.

Thatbeinggranted,theMoDthenattachedtwootherbattalionsto5Brigade.Theday-to-daydutiesof1stBattalionWelshGuards,thefirstunit tobeattached,wereasceremonialguardsatWindsorCastle.They had completed a training exercise in Kenya the previous winter, but their speciality was fightingfromarmouredpersonnelcarriers.TheWelshGuardswouldnowhavetoreverttobeingplaininfantryforthe Falklands War. The battalion had the benefit of being at full strength both in terms of men andequipment. For the first three months of 1982, it had served as the British ‘Spearhead’ battalion forcontingenciesbeforebeingreplacedonrotationby3ParainApril.1Theday-to-daydutiesofthesecondunit,2ndBattalionScotsGuards,werealsoceremonial,butatBuckinghamPalace.Thereisnoreasontobelieveeitheroftheseunitswerepoorchoices,butneitherhadtrainedwiththenewbrigadebefore.Asdedicated and professional as both of these units were in their own ways, they were a far cry fromThompson’s,mostofwhomconstantlytrainedintoughconditionsforrolesinhelpingtodefendNATOinnorthernEurope.Tobesure,bytheendofMay,2ParahadalreadydemonstratedanabilitytoslugitswaythroughArgentinetrenchesonthewaytocapturingGooseGreen,and3ParahadstartedtrekkingacrossEastFalklandpeatbogsundertheweightofonehundred-poundpacks.

The size of the brigade being assembled became a little more than 3,000 men, which included fewsupportingarms.Nothavingorganicartilleryforitshomelanddefencemission,5Brigadegainedasinglesix-gunbatteryof105mmartilleryguns,comparedtothenormalallocationofthreesuchbatteriesforathree-battalionbrigade;3CommandoBrigadehadfourbatteriessupportingitsfivebattalions.Inaddition,5Brigadewouldreceivesupport fromnine lighthelicopters (sixGazellesandthreeScouts),whichwasroughly half thenumber that deployed to support 3CommandoBrigade. It also gained a full engineerbattalion.

Certainly,oneofthestrikingdifferencesbetweenthetwobrigadesinvolvedlogisticscapabilities.Unlike3CommandoBrigade,whichreceivedsupportfromitsorganicCommandoLogisticRegiment,5Brigadehadnodedicated,active-dutylogisticsorganization.Moreover,theBrigadelackedaseparatesubordinateheadquarterstocommandlogisticsunitsandcontrol logisticsoperations.CommandoLogisticRegimentwas a self-contained organization that provided lots of capability as well as organized command andcontrol of logistics for 3 Commando Brigade. All members of Commando Logistic Regiment werecommandotrained,andtheyroutinelypractisedperformingtheirmissionsinharshwinterenvironmentsas in Norway. In contrast, reserve units were intended to be the backbone of logistics support for 5Brigade.Sincereserveswerenotactivatedforthewar,though,theMoDhadtoidentifyacontingentoflogisticsunitstotrainwithanddeploywiththeBrigade.It turnedtotheLogisticSupportGroupoftheUnitedKingdomMobileForce,alargebrigadewitharoleofdefendingJutlandandtheDanishIslandsandcomprisedofRegularArmy,TerritorialArmyandRoyalAirForceunits.Asseniorplannersidentifiedanappropriatesliceofsupport,theytriedtokeepunits,personnelandvehiclestoaminimum.

Units assembled to support 5 Brigade appeared adequate on paper. They included portions of twosupply companies, a maintenance company and the remainder of a field hospital that already haddeployedelementssouth.Thecapabilitiesofunitsremainedthin,however:81OrdnanceCompany,whichnormally supported Britain’s 1 Infantry Brigade, would provide routine second-line supply support tobrigade units, but would have only one Land Rover and two four-ton vehicles to handle the tons ofsupplies that supported units would require. Supplementing 81 Ordnance would be elements from 91Ordnance,acompanynormallyassociatedwithhigher-level, third-linesupportprovidingpetroleumandrations,oftenworkingcloselywithRoyalEngineersandRoyalAirForcefuelsupplyunits;otherelementsincluded a laundry section, a bath unit and a field bakery. The capabilities of this second ordnancecompanywereintendedtobenefitallgroundforcesuponreachingEastFalkland.Itsskillsinthehandlingofpetroleum,however,wouldproveespeciallyvaluable,sinceCommandoLogisticRegimenthaddeployedwithoutitsreservistpetroleumtroop.ThecompanyclaimedtheonlyRegularArmypetroleumplatooninthe United Kingdom. These two ordnance companies would later fall under the command of singlecommander.Medicalsupportfor5Brigadecamefrom16FieldAmbulance,whichhadalreadydeployeditsParachuteClearingTroopwith2Para. Itnowlackedsurgicalcapability.UKLFeventuallyassembledthatcapability for16FieldAmbulance,butnotuntilhigh-level interventionhadoccurred.Maintenancewould be provided by 10 Field Workshop, a company that had just switched missions with anothermaintenance company on 1 April, as part of a bigger reorganization. That change had left 10 FieldWorkshop poorly prepared in manpower, vehicles and equipment to support anyone; it lacked bothinternal equipment and many repair parts.2 Additionally, 5 Brigade had no organic transportationcapabilitybutreceivedaugmentationfrom407TroopoftheRoyalCorpsofTransporttoprovideforkliftcapability.Roundingoutsupportserviceswere160ProvostCompanyoftheRoyalMilitaryPoliceandthe6thFieldCashOfficeoftheRoyalArmyPayCorps.

Taken together, the assembled units comprised a logistics organization more suited to supplementCommandoLogisticRegimentortofurnishgarrison-typesupport,thantoprovidedirectsupporttounitsin battle. Logistics specialists throughout these units totalled about 300, about the same as thosepresently insupportof3CommandoBrigade.Noseparatecommandstructureexistedover thevariousunits,though.Theunitshadnotworkedtogetherbefore.Therecouldnothavebeenagreatercontrastto3CommandoBrigade’sCommandoLogisticRegimentcommandedbyLieutenantColonelHellberg.Notunexpectedly, it was anticipated at higher levels that when this collection of 5 Brigade support unitsarrived on East Falkland, they would become attached to Hellberg’s Regiment. He then would gainresponsibilityforprovidinglogisticalsupporttobothbrigades.Butthiswasnotcleareitherto5InfantryBrigadeor3CommandoBrigade.

Thecommanderofthereconfigured5BrigadewasBrigadierTonyWilson.A46-year-oldLightInfantryofficerwhohadbeenawardedaMilitaryCrossasacompanycommanderinNorthernIreland,Wilsonhadestablishedareputationbothforcompetenceandinnovation.Hewasprobablyfrustratedbythepeelingoff of 2 and 3 Para, his two prize units, to the commandos. Since being reconfigured and renamed inJanuary1982,Wilson’sbrigadehadbenefitedfromonlyasingleopportunitytotraintogetherpriortotheArgentine invasion. That exercise had seen some tensions rise between the paratrooperbattalions andWilson,supposedlybecauseofWilson’sstyleandideas.ThattensionwouldberenewedintheFalklands.

WilsonandhisunitshadoneadvantageinthattheydidnothavetorushawayfromtheUnitedKingdomashurriedlyas3Commandohad.DuringthefirstdaysofApril,astheyhadbeenthinkingthroughvariousoptions and assessing unit augmentation, military planners contacted Wilson to discuss needs for 5Brigade should deployment become necessary. The MoD arranged for Wilson to have the opportunitybeforedeploymenttoorganizehisforcesandtopractiseprocedurestogetherforthefirsttime.Soldiersofthe Brigade would participate in a two-week exercise called Welsh Falcon at the Sennybridge trainingareaintheBreconBeaconsofWales.Itlookedtobeanidealtrainingsite,sincetheterrainthereseemedtoresembletheFalklands.TrainingstartedinthemiddleofAprilwithintensivelivefiringofweapons.Itthenprogressedtosimulatedcombatoperationsinvolvinghelicoptermovementsandevensomepracticeinconductingamphibiousassaults.3Duringthefirstweek,theweatherwascoldandrainyasanticipated.By the second week, it had turned unseasonably warm. Although beneficial in many respects, WelshFalcon fell far short of the time needed to put in place the skills and procedures that staffs and unitsneededtooperateasateam.Wilsonopted,correctlyitwouldseem,toconcentrateeffortsattheplatoonandcompanyleveltohonetheskillsofsmallunitsandindividualsoldiers.Asthistrainingwasunderway,hedidnot demand simultaneouslymore intensivebattle staff training at brigade andbattalion levels.4Soldierscertainlyneededeveryminuteavailabletoworkontheirbattlefieldskills.Wilson’sbrigadestaffhadbarelybeentogetherforthreemonths,though,andhadnotworkedtogetherwithatleasttwoofthethreebattalionstaffs.

Logistics units faced further challenges during the two-week training period before deployment.Similarlytobattalionsinthebrigade,thesecompany-sizedunitshadnottrainedtogetherbeforeExerciseWelsh Falcon. Making matters even more difficult for them in Wales, they had to get themselvesorganized;receiveandfamiliarizethemselveswithequipmenttofillshortages;workoutprocedureswitheach other and with supported units; sustain the brigade during the entire training exercise; and,simultaneously, try to figure out the scales of supplies its supported units would need. While that wasunderway, they also had to start thinking about their own deployment requirements. Theirs was a fullplate,somethingnotentirelyuncommonforlogisticsunitspreparingfordeploymentastheytrytotrainthemselveswhile supportingothers.Thebigdifferencewas that theseunitshadnotworkedwitheachother before. And without a logistics headquarters to provide command and control of the assorted

activities,responsibilityfelltoWilson’snewandinexperiencedbrigadestaff.Asecond logistics issue thatplagued5Brigade fromthestartwas the lackofsufficientsuppliesand

suitableequipment.Unlike3CommandoBrigadeunits,Wilson’shadnodedicatedstoresuponwhichtodrawintimeofwar.MilitaryplanspreviouslyhadnotallocatedthemWarMaintenanceReserveastheyhad for the commandos. Without such reserves, units had no earmarked sources for the specializedequipmentandclothingtheywouldneed,nottomentionammunition.Norhadtheypractiseddeterminingrequirements for deployment. Instead, planners in Fieldhouse’s headquarters and the MoD foundthemselves scurrying to put together supplies that 5 Brigade could use. While Welsh Falcon wasunderway,thesehigh-levelplannersdevelopedsupplyrequirementsfor5Brigadeconsistingofthirtydaysofammunitionandotherstocksbasedonaprojectionoflimitedwarconsumptionrates.TherushtotakecareofWilson’sbrigadeconflictedat timeswith lastminute requirements forThompson’s,which thenwascompletingitsstayatAscensionandpreparingtosailsouthtothewarzone.NooneatNorthwoodorthe MoD explained how 5 Brigade would be employed once it was in the Falklands. Fieldhouse’sheadquartershadnotgiven it a specificmission.Leaders couldhaveassumed this follow-on forcewasbeingputtogethertojointhecommandosandfightArgentinesaspartofalargerBritishgroundforce.TheprevailingopinionbeingreportedintheNationalPresswasthattheseunitsweresailingsouthonlytobeagarrisonforce,andcouldarriveintheFalklandsafterthewarwasover.

Givensuchassumptions,itmighthaveseemedlogicalthatsoldiersandunitswithinthebrigadedidnotrequire supplies and equipment comparable to that taken by commandos. When 5 Brigade requestedsomeBV202over-snowvehiclessuchascommandoshadtaken,itreceivedonlythenotoriouslyunreliableolder Snowcat versions. When it requested more capable radios, it received far fewer than requested.Whenitrequestedmoreammunitionforgrenadelaunchers,itlearnedtheammunitionwasonlyavailableforspecialforces.Andwhenitaskedforadditionalclothingforsoldiers,theBrigadeseldomreceivedtheexact items or the quantities requested. Serious clothing deficiencies for soldiers were corrected onlyaftertheinterventionofanofficer’sfatherintheHouseofLords.5Eventually, theMoDscouredcivilianshops toobtainbergens for thesoldiers,butsupplystill fell shortbya thousand.AcoupleweekswereavailablefortheMoDtoassembleallthespecializedsuppliesrequestedby5Brigadeandtomakegoodother deficiencies in organization, equipment and supplies, if only by borrowing from British unitselsewhere. For whatever reasons, Wilson’s units received provisions less than those allocated toThompson’s both in number and quality. It appeared that the MoD, at least on the surface, treated 5Brigadewithlowerprioritythan3CommandoBrigade.Whetherthatwasinfacttrueisnotclear,buttheperceptionofthisbrigadebeingamerestepchildoftheotherstartedtakingholdwithin5Brigadeevenbefore it departed the United Kingdom. And it probably only underlined that perception that a RoyalMarinewasdesignatedtocommandthetwo-brigadelandforce.MajorGeneralMoore,however,wenttogreat lengths not to show preference, which included donning a camouflage forage cap instead of thegreenberetofRoyalMarinecommandos.Regardless,theperceptionwouldpersistandstrengthendownthroughtheranksofbothbrigades.Onethingwascertainatthistime–BrigadierWilsonhadhishandsfullthroughnofaultofhisown,andhehadnotevenreachedportyet.AttheconclusionofWelshFalcon,hereceivednoticethat5BrigadewouldembarkfortheSouthAtlanticon12May.

The Brigade’s outload from the United Kingdom proceeded, in many ways, no better than that of 3Commando Brigade thirty days before. One high-level after-action report detailing lessons learnedindicates that 5 Brigade had concurred with stowage plans developed by Headquarters UKLF, theorganization responsible for starting to load ships while the Brigade still was training in Wales.6 ButWilson had also received repeated assurances that his Brigade would have the benefit of stopping atAscensionIslandenroute,justas3CommandoBrigadehaddone,totrain,issuefirst-linesuppliesandre-stowotherstocksasrequired.Outloadofsuppliesforhisunitsbecamehecticandconfused,perhapsevenworse,ifthatwaspossible,thanthatforcommandosthepreviousmonth.Again,trucksandtrainsjammedtheportofSouthamptonwiththousandsoftonsofcargo.Movementpersonnelresponsiblefortheactualloading foundstocksarrivingwithoutnoticeand frequentlywith incompletedocumentation.As inearlyApril,loadingdidnotproceedwithatacticalorientationsincetherewasnoclearunderstandingofhow5BrigadewouldbeemployedonceitarrivedintheSouthAtlantic.Havingnoindicationabouttheorderinwhich supplies and equipment would be needed further south, stevedores at Southampton proceededonceagain to loadshipswithwhateverarrived first.Theoverridingcriterion for loadingwassimply tomake supplies and equipment fit on designated ships so as not to delay departure. The prevailingassumption remained that 5 Brigade would have a chance to sort it all out before reaching the SouthAtlantic.Onceagain,althoughthiswasunderstandableforsafetyreasons,theBoardofTraderefusedtoloadfilled jerrycans,whichwouldhaveeasedgreatlyrefuellingchallengesfurthersouth.Fivethousandwouldremaindocksidewhen5Brigadesailed.

CompoundingproblemsfortheBrigade,regardlessofwhetheritboughtsometimeatAscensiontore-stow important items, were the types of ships carrying units and supplies. All soldiers, stocks andequipment would move on ships taken up from trade: QE2, Nordic Ferry, Baltic Ferry, and AtlanticCauseway.ForsoldiersfreshoutoftrainingfieldsinWales,vesselsliketheluxurylinerQE2mighthaveseemedawelcomeberth.Sheroutinelycarried1,500guests,butnow3,000soldierswouldpacktheship.Forlogisticians,civilianshipslikeQE2becametroublesome.Theyweredesignedforpier-sideloadinganddischarge,be itof supplies, vehiclesorpassengers,andwouldbeslowerconsiderably tounload in theSouthAtlanticthanLSLs.TheAmphibiousTaskForcewith3CommandoBrigadewasalreadydiscoveringthis further south. Lack of a tactical loading plan and first-come-first-served loading procedures mademattersworsestill.Cargowasstackedfrequentlyinblocks,makingsomeofitinaccessible,dependingon

theorderofloading.StevedoresstuffedthemaindeckofNordicFerry, forexample,withstocks loadedfrombowtosterninthefollowingorderwithlittlespaceinbetween:fifteenrowsofammunition,threepalletshigh;sixrowsofrations,threepalletshigh;eightrowsofmiscellaneousunitsupplies;refrigeratedsupplies in containers; and finally, vehicles.7 Since Nordic Ferry’s loading door was in the stern,logisticianscouldonlyreachammunitioninthebowbyremovingothercargo.TheloadingofBalticFerrywascomparable.LoadsonQE2wereevenmoreinaccessible.Unliketheroll-onroll-offferries,thisluxurylinerhadeightlevelsofconventionalholdslocatedforward.Loadingwasbydocksidecrane,startingwiththelowestlevel.Whenthiswasfull,craneoperationsshiftedtothenexthighestlevel.Oncetheshipwasloadedfully,itwasonlypossibletogainaccesstolowerlevelsthroughaseriesofcorridorsandstaircasesleadingtosmalldoorsineachlevel.Havingstocksconcentratedonjustafewships,inspiteofhowthecargo might have been arranged, nevertheless offered some advantages for 5 Brigade. The Brigade atleastwouldnothavetoscourthedecksofadozenorsoshipssimilarlyloadedinahaphazardwaytofinda particular item, a task which had plagued the Commodore’s staff and logisticians of 3 CommandoBrigadethepreviousmonth.

AfterfinishingtheirtrainingexerciseinWales,5Brigadeunitshadtoconfronttheconfusionatports.When81OrdnanceCompanyarrived inSouthampton toboardQE2, forexample, it foundmuchof theBrigade’s 81mm mortar and 105mm gun ammunition stowed in the bottom of the ship. Rations, smallarmsammunitionandunit supplieswerespread throughoutother levels.Moreammunitionwason theupper deck, with additional rations stacked atop and covered with tarpaulins. Needless to say, 81Ordnanceandothersagreed theywerenot loaded forwar.Elsewhere,unitswereseparated fromtheirsupplies,gunners fromgunsand infantry frommortars.Oneunit’smortarswereonQE2, but thebaseplates for themortarswereon the two ferries.Anotherunitdiscovered its radiobatterieswereon theferriesbutitsbatterychargerswereonQE2.8

The degree of confusion is perhaps best evidenced by one of the smaller logistics units, 10 FieldWorkshop.Theoriginalplancalled forabouthalfof thecompany’ssupplies tobesplitbetweenNordicFerry andBaltic Ferry. The rest was to follow a week later inContender Bezant. Company personnelwouldsailonseveralships:twelveonNordicFerry,twenty-threeonBalticFerry,twenty-fouronQE2andatrailpartyofthirty-threeonStEdmund.Uponarrivingatthedocks,though,thecompanyfoundalmosteverythinghadchanged.Severalpassengersmanifestedforthetwoferrieswereturnedawaybecauseoflackofroom.SomewenttotheQE2.Eventually,fifteenmembersflewbyairtoAscensionandrejoinedthecompanythereasshipssailedpast.CompanystockswentoneitherNordicFerryorBalticFerryaccordingto what arrived first.9 All of this translated into nightmares for unit commanders at a time when theyneededtosortoutlast-minuteshortagesandgetonwithtrainingtheirmen.

Mostsoldiersin5BrigadesailedsouthfromSouthamptononQE2onthemorningof13May.Aheadofthem,withmuchoftheirsupplies,werethetwoferries.Makingsenseoftheentireoutload,gettingtheinitial issuesofsuppliestounitsandtrainingsoldierswouldbechallenginginthedaysahead.Thetaskbecamemoredifficultforlogisticiansbecauseaccommodationrestraintsonthetwoferrieshadrestrictedthepresenceof81OrdnanceCompanytotwomenpership.Thatwasclearlyinsufficientforrearranginganything.Consequently,5BrigadehadnosoonerdepartedSouthamptondocksthanlogisticianseagerlybegan awaiting their arrival at Ascension to reconfigure and issue supplies. En route, they starteddeterminingwhere supplieswere located, just as theirCommandoLogisticRegiment counterpartshaddonethepreviousmonth.TheBrigadewashardlystowedforwar,withartillerygunnersseparatedfromtheir guns and infantrymen from their mortars. OnQE2, ammunition packed the bottom levels. If shewere to be torpedoed, she would likely sink quickly after a very loud explosion. It would be difficultshiftinganyofthelargeloadsnowwithinorbetweenships,exceptinasecureanchoragearea.

Unitsstartedanaggressivetrainingprogrammeafter leavingtheUnitedKingdom,much liketheonedevelopedby3CommandoBrigadeearlier.Considerableemphasiswasplacedonphysicalconditioningandmedicalskills.Doctorsandmedics instructedsoldiersonemergencytreatment forvarioustypesofwound, how to clear air passages, how to administer drips and morphine and methods of carryingcasualties on stretchers. Like the commandos and paratroopers who had preceded them, 5 Brigadesoldierswouldeachcarryadditional supplies tohelp themsurviveon thebattlefield.Troops rehearsedmethods of embarking and disembarking ships with full loads, and from the few light helicopters thatdeployedwiththeBrigade.Aftereachdayoftrainingwithhelicopters,soldierswouldhavetore-marktheimprovisedlandingpadontheluxurylinerbecausehelicopterstrutsandrotorwashwouldstripawaythepaintedmarkings.10

Withinsixdays,QE2hadreacheditsfirststopatFreetowntotakeonfreshwaterandfuel.Then,on21May, the same day that 3 Commando Brigade was assaulting beaches at San Carlos, ships carrying 5Brigade began arriving at Ascension. Since departing the United Kingdom, Wilson had not receivedguidanceastowhetherhisbrigadewouldbeafullparticipantinthegroundwarorifitwouldbecomeagarrisonforceperformingotherfunctions.

ItsooncameasacompletesurprisetoeveryoneonQE2thatthecruiselinerwouldnotrendezvouswithBalticFerry,NordicFerry, andAtlantic Causeway at Ascension, as 5 Brigade had been led to believe.Instead,theshipmerelysloweddownneartheisland,justlongenoughtoreplenishsomestores,pickupmailandtakeaboardMajorGeneralJeremyMoore,hisstaffandsomeothers,allofwhomhadflownsouthbyairtoAscension.ItwasprobablythefirstandlasttimethatalargeCH47ChinookhelicopterlandedonQE2. Moore, who had been serving as the land force deputy to Fieldhouse in Northwood, was nowofficially designated Commander Land Force Falkland Islands, the new designation of the two-brigadedivision.Hedisembarkedthelargehelicopterasitlandedonthenewlandingplatformatthesternofthe

ship.Moore called an Orders Group meeting with Brigadier Wilson and staffs on 21 May, shortly after he

arrivedonboard.Headvised5Brigade:3rdCommandoBrigadeisnowlandingtosecureabridgeheadonEastFalkland,intowhichIcanreinforce,andfromwhichIcandevelopoperationstorepossesstheislands…Itismyintentiontoland5Brigadeintothebeachheadandthentodevelopoperations,usingbothbrigadestofurtherdominatetheenemytosuchanextentthathecracksandgivesup.11

TheBrigadenowknew for the first time that itwouldhavea role in thegroundwar.Moore reassuredWilson that his units would be full participants in the final battle for Stanley and not become a meregarrisonforce.Heagreedthat2Parawouldrevertbackto5Brigadeuponarrival;thatWilson’senlargedfour-battalionbrigadewouldopenupanotheraxisofadvancefromGooseGreentoStanley,adistanceof85kmtothenorth-eastthroughFitzroyandBluffCove;andthat5Brigadewouldreceiveequalpriorityinallocationofsupportingresourceswith3CommandoBrigade,whichat that timewas in theprocessofpreparingtoattackGooseGreen,insertforcesonMountKentandmarchacrossEastFalklandtoprepareforanattackonStanley.12NeitherMoorenorWilsonhadanappreciationatthetimeofthesituationonEast Falkland, let alone how spread out Thompson’s forces were becoming. Nor did they realize thedifficulty,becauseofthefewhelicoptersavailable,ofgettingunitsandsuppliesontothebeachheadandthenforward.Later,whenhereachedEastFalklandandgainedsuchappreciation,Moorewouldchangehismindand,totheconsternationof5Brigade,keeppriorityofsupporteffortswith3CommandoBrigadeforseveraldays.

AfterthemomentarypauseatAscension,QE2continuedhercoursesouth.Steamingadayaheadofherwere the other ships carrying 5 Brigade’s supplies and equipment. Men thought they would continuestraightforSanCarlos,butsoonthedestinationofthetroopshipchangedtoSouthGeorgia.QE2wouldrendezvous there with other ships and transfer her soldiers and supplies. Concern in London for thesafetyofQE2 led todirection to thecaptain that thecruise linershouldgono furtherwest thanSouthGeorgia.Afterunloading,shewouldheadbackimmediatelytoEngland.NooneinLondonwantedtoriskthepoliticalconsequencesof losing this famousship toanotherArgentinemissile.SomerumourswerecirculatingthatArgentinawasevenattemptingtostrike largecivilianshipsbyrollingbombsoutofthebackendsofC-130s.SoldiersonQE2thereforestartedtapingblackplastictotheship’spicturewindowsto cut down glare from the sun, thereby making the huge ship less noticeable from above by enemyplanes.

Prospects of battle now closer, 5 Brigade was hard at work in other preparations. Rifle companiesconductedtrialstodeterminequantitiesofammunitionandrationsthemencouldbestcarry.Intheend,two days of supply per man became the target. Then 81 Ordnance Company started issuing fromwhatever stockswere onQE2. The process proved to be slow and tedious. Soldiers had to manhandlestocks, boxbybox, downnarrowcorridors on to elevators or up staircases to the fewavailable roomssufficientforsupportechelonstoopenthemandissuesuppliestosoldiers.

ThepassagesouthofAscensionsoonprovedfrustratingforMajorGeneralMooreaswell.AlthoughQE2had been equipped with an expensive satellite communications system to help him stay in touch withevents on East Falkland, the equipment failed to operate properly right from the start.13 As a result,Moore was unable to exchange information with Brigadier Thompson or Commodore Clapp on aconsistentbasis.WhereasMooreknewthatlandingswereunderway,henowhadnowayofreceivingfirst-hand updates or of providing direction. Nor was he able to provide the important command interfacebetweenFieldhouse’sheadquartersatNorthwoodandThompson’s atSanCarlos.This communicationsbreakdown prevented the direct exchange of information between commanders and staffs that wascriticalatthispointtoidentifythebestwayoflandingandemployingthefollow-onforcethentravellingsouth.

ColonelIanBaxterandhissmallstaffwerealsoworkingoutlogisticsdetailsfortheBrigade.Baxter,asMoore’s logistics deputy, would now have responsibility for the myriad of details affecting logistics forLFFI.Theintentwasforstocksofthetwobrigadestobetreatedasdivisionalassets.ThesupportplanwascomparabletotheinitialplansofCommandoLogisticRegiment.Elementsof81OrdnanceCompanyand91OrdnanceCompany,nowconsolidatedundera single companycommander,wouldoperatewithsomepersonnelashore,inaBeachSupportArea.Theremainderwouldstayonboardvarioussupplyshipstocontrol stocks.Thenormalmethodof supplywouldbebyhelicopterand landingcraft fromships tounitsashore.Plannersenvisionedthat81/91Ordnanceandother5BrigadelogisticsunitswouldworkforCommando Logistic Regiment, which would become the organization responsible for sustaining bothbrigades.Creationofa‘divisionlevel’logisticsorganizationtorespondtoMoore’sdirectives,toallocatesupplies and to enforce priorities was critical now that two brigades would be competing for limitedresources and movements assets. Lieutenant Colonel Hellberg, Commander of Commando LogisticRegiment,hadreceivedasignal tellinghimwhichsupplieswereheadingsouthwith5Brigade,byshipandby locationwithinships.14Noonehadbeenable toadvise3CommandoBrigade, though, that theplanwasforHellbergtoassumecommandandcontrolof5Brigade’slogisticsunitsandresponsibilityforsustainingallgroundforces.UnbeknownsttoBaxterandothers,alothadhappenedfurthersouth.TheystillwereunawarehowsignificantlyArgentinepilotshaddelayedthebuild-upashoreandcausedlogisticsplanstochange.On22May,Baxterreviewedandapprovedtheoutlineoftheplanforresupplyingatwo-brigade force in the ground war. The day before, Argentine air attacks on D-Day had shredded the 3CommandoBrigadeplan.

Alsoduringthemovesouth,5Brigadestaffrefinedplanstoprovidefortheadministrationofprisoners

of war that would prove invaluable in weeks ahead. The Land Force had the beginnings of a standardoperatingprocedure forprocessing, caring forand repatriatingprisoners. It anticipatedhaving todealwithasmanyas10,000prisonersafterdefeating theArgentines.Whileen route,5Brigadedraftedanorderfortheestablishmentofprisonerofwarcamps.Itprovidedtheframeworkforadministrationanddiscipline of prisoners in temporary camps at Ajax Bay, Goose Green and Fitzroy, and at the FalklandIslands Company and the airport in Stanley, as well as for the transport of prisoners on designatedships.15BythetimetheBrigadearrived,othersalreadywouldbegrapplingwiththechallengesposedbyalargeinfluxofprisoners.Noprovisionhadbeenmadeformanpowertoguardprisonersofwar.Thoseguards,whenneeded,wouldhavetocomefrommenperformingotherduties.Considerableattentionwasgiventodevelopingapetroleumsupplyplanaswell,basedonanticipatedconsumptionofdifferentfuels.

Any relaxed atmosphere on QE2 had long since vanished by this time in the passage south.Temperatureshadplungedfrom28°to5°CentigradeassheenteredthefreezezoneoftheSouthAtlantic.Thecaptainreducedtheship’sspeedfrom25to10knotsasmorethanahundredicebergsappearedonhisradarscreen.AsQE2slippedthroughthemist,pastonebergmorethanamilelongand300feethigh,somesoldierspeeredoutandrecalledstoriesoftheTitanic.16Moore,Wilsonandmembersoftheirstaffscross-deckedbyhelicoptertothebattle-streakeddestroyerAntrimandheadedtowardSanCarloson27May to rendezvous with Commodore Clapp on Fearless. Included in the party to make contact withCommandoLogisticRegimentwasMajorGeoffThomas,whohadbecomethecommanderof81OrdnanceCompanyand91OrdnanceCompanytofacilitatebettercommandandcontrolofassets.

Meanwhile, QE2 continued through frigid South Atlantic conditions to rendezvous with ships atCumberlandBayoffGrytvikenonSouthGeorgia.CanberraandNorlandwereheadedherwayfromtheFalklandswithcrewskeenlyawareofthehazardsofwar.TheWelshGuards,ScotsGuards,Gurkhas,16Field Ambulance and 5 Brigade Headquarters would transfer to Canberra and Norland with theirequipment as quickly as possible and head to San Carlos. Most logistics units would trail later onStromness. These ships started arriving just before QE2 so that the cross-decking could commencewithoutdelay. Itbeganon27Mayandcontinuedthroughoutthenight.ThetrawlersNorthella, Junella,Farnella, Cordella and Pict ferried soldiers and 250 tons of supplies, carrying whatever they couldbetweenQE2 and other vessels.17 The cruise ship’s captain had never attempted to unload at anchorbefore. All tried their best. Trawlers had difficulty, however, even staying alongside the massivesuperstructureofQE2withoutknockingdentsinhersides.Soldiersformedchaingangsdowntheluxuryliner’scorridorstopassboxesofsuppliesfromforwardstoragedecksthroughsidedoorstotrawlers.ThefewhelicoptersthathaddeployedwiththeBrigadeferriedfreightaswellbetweenthetopdecksoftheassembledships.

Workcontinuednonstopthenextday.At2100hrson28May,CanberraandNorlandweighedanchorsandheadedback towardSanCarlos.By this time, other shipshadarrived to transfer cargo, includingStromness,Resource,Lycaon,Saxonia andLeedsCastle, and the tankersBritish Esk andBritish Tay .EffortscontinuedtogetsuppliesoutofthenarrowstoragespacesofQE2,whilesentriescautiouslystoodwatchwithautomaticweaponspointedtowardsthesky.Then,amidstrenewedreportsthatArgentinawasattempting to strike civilian vessels, QE2 abruptly headed north at dusk on 29 May for the UnitedKingdom. On board were survivors of Ardent,Antelope, andCoventry.18 The troop ship had been sodifficult to unload that, when she sailed, 70 per cent of 5 Brigade’s 81mm mortar and 105mm gunammunitionremainedburiedinlowerdecks.AsQE2startedthelongvoyagebacktotheUnitedKingdom,StromnessheadedtoSanCarloswiththeremaininglogisticsunitsandsupplies.Whatwassupposedtobea two-day sail to East Falkland increased to four because of appalling weather that prevented thecontinuation of training and made many soldiers seasick. To their credit during this difficult time, theWelsh Guards aboard Canberra continued providing forty machine-gun teams during daylight on theupperdecksforairdefence.19AsStromnessheadedwestawayfromSouthGeorgia,theadvancepartyledbyMajorGeneralMoorewasjustarrivingintheSanCarlosanchorage.

Moore and others had transferred from Antrim to Fearless about fifty miles from the Falklands.CommodoreClapphadsailedFearless tomeetthenewdivisioncommander.Thebriefpassagetogethergave Clapp the opportunity to share the latest tactical situation reports, since faulty communicationssystemsonQE2 hadpreventedMoore from receivingupdatesduringmuchofhis journey.On theway,theyalsowereabletolinkupwithHermesandshareupdateswithRearAdmiralWoodward.OtherthanClapp,noonewasawarefullyofthetacticalorlogisticalsituationsince3CommandoBrigadehadhitthebeachesonD-Day.IncludedintheadvancepartywithMoorewasMajorGeoffThomas,commanderoftheconsolidated81and91Ordnancecompanies,tocoordinateinitial logisticalarrangementsfor5Brigadewhenitarrived.HeadmittedinabriefingfollowingthewarthatamaphadservedashisonlysourceofinformationaboutthebridgeheaduntilhisarrivalonEastFalkland.Hehadbeentoldthathisunitwouldbe put ashore at San Carlos Settlement, where it would establish a support area to supplement 3CommandoBrigade’sBMAatAjaxBay.Thatwouldbewherehissoldierswouldoffloadandstoresuppliesfor5Brigade,sincenoroomremainedatAjaxforadditionallogisticsunitsorsupplies.Thomashadbeentold that there was a great beach at San Carlos Settlement. What he found when he went ashore toreconnoitretheareawasasmalljettywithanarrowentryforasinglelandingcraft,unuseableexceptathightidesincethegradientwassosteep.Holdingsuppliesonthebeachwasnotpossiblebecauseitwascovered at high tide. Behind the beach area, peat bogs started. Marines, still in the San CarlosSettlement, had been making the area suffice for over a week now. There simply was nothing elseavailable,though.Logisticiansin5Brigadewouldconclude,justasthoseinCommandoLogisticRegimenthadwhenarrivingatAjaxonD-Day,thattextbookproceduresforestablishingasupportareasimplycould

notapplyhere.Eventually,81Ordnancesoldierswouldborrowatractorandtrailertosupplementtheirmeagre assets and shift supplies wherever they could, after having moved the majority of stocks fromlandingcrafttoshorebyhand.

NoonewashappiertoseeMajorGeneralMoorearrivethatdaythanBrigadierThompson.Moorewouldnow provide a much-needed buffer between him and Admiral Fieldhouse’s headquarters in London,therebyrelievingthebrigadierofcumbersomerequirementstotraveltoAjaxBaydailytousethesatellitecommunications link to update Northwood. Thompson would be able to concentrate exclusively onfighting thewarwith3CommandoBrigade. Inanticipationof this, evenasMoorewascomingashore,Thompson’sstaffwasintheprocessofrelocating3CommandoBrigadeHeadquarterstoTealInletsothatThompsonwouldbeincloseproximityto3Para,42Commandoand45Commando.MovementofsuppliestoTealInlettoestablishaForwardBrigadeMaintenanceAreaorFBMAhadalreadystarted,tosustainthefinalpushtoStanley.

But if the new arrivals provided relief for Thompson, the same was not the case for his seniorlogistician,LieutenantColonelHellberg.CommandoLogisticRegimenthadbeenstrugglingsincearrivingatAjax tomeet the logisticsdemandsof3CommandoBrigade.Changes tooriginalplansandsetbacksfromairstrikeshadcombinedtocreateconcernsinavarietyofareas.ForwardresupplytoTealInletwasbeginning, which eventually would split the Regiment. Hellberg currently had hundreds of enemyprisonersofwartohandlewithnoadditionalresources.Hismenhadassumedthesoberingresponsibilityof burying British dead in a makeshift cemetery at Ajax. Ordnance Squadron had started an equallysobering‘deadman’skitsection’forstoringequipmenttakenfromthosekilledinbattle,asanexpedientwayofreplacingsmallitemsneededbyunits.Providingpersonalcomfortitemsrangingfromcigarettestotoiletrieshadbythistimebecomearealsorespotformany.Therewerenoprovisionsforsuchitemsin3CommandoBrigade’sWarMaintenanceReserve.Theoriginalplanhadcalledforgroundforcestodrawsuch items from the Navy. That worked fine for some units while they sailed south, because the NavymaintainedsmallcanteensonshipsrunbyNAAFIemployees.Unfortunately,thosetinycanteenslackedthecapabilitytomeetthedemandsofthousandsofdeployedtroops.Asaresult,mostmenhadrunoutofsundryitemsevenbeforereachingtheSouthAtlantic.Now,groundforceshadbeensufferingashorefornearly two weeks. The arrival of 5 Brigade provided no relief, in fact it made matters worse, becausethosesoldierswereexperiencingshortagestoo.BackintheUnitedKingdom,ashipmentof176tonsofcanteen itemshaddepartedwithanine-manteamtohelp issuethemtounits.TheshipmentwouldnotarriveatAjax,though,until9June.20Bythen,itwashopedthatgroundforceswouldbeinvolvedheavilyinrecapturingStanleyattheotherendofEastFalkland.

Upon learning from Colonel Baxter that Commando Logistic Regiment would become a ‘divisional’asset,withhimselfnolongerunderthecommandofThompsonbutofMoore,LieutenantColonelHellbergwenttoThompsoninfrustration.HisBMAnowwouldbeknownastheForceMaintenanceAreaorFMA,andhewouldberesponsibleforsustainingtwobrigades.Asbothleadersagreed,though,therewaslittlealternative. It was essential to have a single organization controlling division logistics operations.Although consternation would continue when Commando Logistic Regiment discovered the state of 5Brigade’s supplies and its ad hoc logistics structure, all knew and respected Baxter, Moore’s logisticsdeputy, himself commando-trained. Baxter now would be directing the Division’s planning efforts forlogistics.

One of the first decisions that Baxter made upon arriving was for the petroleum specialists from 91Ordnance to assume the hectic fuel supply operations in the San Carlos area. Commando LogisticRegiment,havingdeployedwithout its ownpetroleumspecialists,hadbeen struggling since landing tokeep jerrycans filledat thebrigade’ssingle fuel supplypointatAjax.Onesoldier,aPrivatePotter,hadbeenhandling theentireoperationsince the landings.Potter, in fact,hadbeentherecipientofa lotoftongue-in-cheekribbingssincehefilledhisfirstjerrycanonD-Day.Thathadbeenthedaywhenhistermofenlistmenthadofficiallyexpired.TheOrdnanceSquadronCommander,MajorAnthonyWelch,hadbeenjoking with him since then, saying that he would now have to pay his own way back to the UnitedKingdomwhenthewarended!Theyoungsoldierhadbeenworkingroundtheclocksincearriving,andwithoutcomplaint.Petroleumspecialistsfrom91Ordnancewouldnotlanduntil3June,butwhentheydidthey would relieve pressures at this fuel supply point and operate others. By this time, 3 CommandoBrigade’s59 IndependentCommandoSquadron,RoyalEngineershadcompleted theconstructionofanairstrip with emergency fuel handling equipment at Port San Carlos to service helicopters, but theBrigade had no personnel qualified to issue the more volatile aviation fuel needed by Harriers untilspecialistsfrom91Ordnancearrived.

Themainunitsandstocksof5BrigadearrivedonthefirsttwodaysofJuneaboardCanberra,Norland,BalticFerry,andNordicFerry.ForthosewhohadwitnessedthedevastationArgentinepilotshadwroughtintheanchorageinrecentdays,thereturnofthelargetroopshipdubbedthe‘WhiteWhale’musthavebeendiscomforting,eventhoughovercastskiesmadeairattacksunlikely.Tosome,disembarkationbytheScotsGuardsandWelshGuardsfromCanberraappearedalltooleisurely,givenexperiencesonD-Day.21

TheGurkhas,however,seemedtoexitNorlandwithfarmoredetermination;andonceashore,theysetoffalmostimmediatelytoGooseGreenwiththemissionofrelieving2Para,whichhadremainedtheresincecapturingthesettlement.22

Once 81 Ordnance arrived aboardStromness on 3 June, logisticians focused on making up first-linestocksforthethreecombatbattalions.Sincesuppliesfor5Brigadehadbeenloadedinbulk,ratherthanin preconfigured assault packages from War Maintenance Reserve as they had been for 3 CommandoBrigade,logisticiansnowhadtobreakoutsuppliesbycommodityandsortthembyquantityandunit.The

non-tacticaloutloadfromtheUnitedKingdomslowedmattersfurther,assupplyhandlershadtoremovewallsoflessimportantsuppliesintheconfineddecksofshipstogetatstockstheyneeded.Complicatingmattersstill further,palletsofboxessometimeswerenotmarked,whichmeantthatsoldiershadtoprythem open to see what was inside. Logisticians had no trouble, however, locating additional jerrycansloadedonBalticFerry.Unfortunately,allwereempty,theBritishBoardofTradeagainhavingcontinuedtorefusetoliftpeacetimerestrictionsontransportoffuelinsmallcontainersaboardthecivilianferries.Althoughitwouldtakeconsiderabletimetofilltheemptycans,menfrom91OrdnancewerepresentonEast Falkland to relieve the strain of issuing fuel, which was particularly important now for units thatwereacrosstheislandpreparingforthefinalpushonStanley.DistancesacrossEastFalklandandlackofsuitable transportation assets would complicate distribution of fuel and all other supplies, the typicalmethod of transport being helicopters with sling loads. One of the most alarming discoveries by 3CommandoBrigadelogisticianswasthat5Brigadehaddeployedwithoutanywaterpurificationtablets.WithlittlepotablewateronEastFalklandoutsideofStanley,andmilitaryrationsthatrequiredfivetosixpintsforrehydration,thisoversightpresentedasignificantchallenge.

Theunloadingof5Brigadesuppliesandequipmenthadbeenunderwayonlyashorttimewhenconcerndeveloped again for the safety of ships. Consequently, shortly after arriving, 5 Brigade logisticiansexperienced the same irritation Commando Logistic Regiment had been experiencing since D-Day ofhaving supply ships pulled away from them when they least expected. No sooner had 81 OrdnancesucceededinreachingammunitioncrammedinthebowofBalticFerry,thantheship’scaptainreceivedorderstoleavetheanchorage.Suchinstances,coupledwiththesheerdifficultyofgettingsuppliesoutofshipsquickly,meantintheendthatsuppliesforsomeunitsneversawthelightofday.Mostof10FieldWorkshop’sequipmentaboardBalticFerryandNordicFerryremainedafloatfortheentirewar;membersofthatmaintenanceunitsubsequentlyassumedrolesasguardsforenemyprisonersofwar,whileothersborrowedequipmenttoformarearcommandpostfor5Brigade.23Perhapsmostimportantly,thetwentySnowcat vehicles from 407 Transportation Troop that had accompanied 5 Brigade, however unreliableandfrustratingtheseolderversionsoftheVolvoBV202mighthavebeen,remainedafloatduringthefirstdays.Sixeventuallygotashore.Allcouldhavebeenhelpfulearlyonfordistributingsmallquantitiesofsuppliestounits.

Several factors combined to slow and disrupt the offload of 5 Brigade equipment and supplies andsubsequent distribution of supplies to units. The way stocks were stowed, coupled with the addeddifficultiesofgetting suppliesoutof civilian ships, certainlywasa large factor. In instanceswhere theRoyalNavydirectedashiptoleavebeforeoffloadingwascomplete,matterswereevenworse.Butwhathadthemostlastingeffectwas5Brigade’soverallinabilitytohelpitself.Itarrivedwiththousandsoftonsof stocks but embarrassingly little capability to move supplies by land, sea or air to where they wereneeded. InthewordsofLieutenantColonelHellberg, ‘Theadditionof5InfantryBrigadesimplyspreadthejamtwiceasthinandresupplytooktwiceaslong.’24Whatheandotherlogisticiansnowneededwastime to get units and supplies to where they were needed. They could ill afford any actions that tookattention away from relocation of units from San Carlos and the methodical build-up of supplies inforwardareas.

The situation regarding availability of transportation assets in the San Carlos area had changeddramaticallyinthepastfewweeks,andnotjustbecausetheTaskForcehadlostallbutoneofitsChinookhelicoptersonAtlanticConveyor.Movementeffortshadshifted,justbefore5Brigadearrived,fromship-to-shore activities to forward resupply. Following the victory at Goose Green, 3 Commando Brigade’spriority for transportation of all types moved to resupplying its forward units and then building upsufficientstocksatTealInlettopermittheassaultonStanley.Thepushtogetsuppliesto3Paraand45Commandohadstartedon31May,whenIntrepidmadeanemergencyrunaroundthenorthcoastofEastFalklandandlaunchedtwoofherLCUswith250tonsofcriticalsuppliesforTealInlet.25Thefirstsnowfallof winter had started, making it difficult, yet even more important, to get sufficient supplies forward.Fortunately, also on 31 May, helicopters had managed to get through bad weather to deliver somesuppliesaswell.Thefirstlargedeliverytookplaceontheeveningof1June,whentheLSLSirPercivalecompleted her first of several trips between Ajax Bay and Teal Inlet.Sir Percivale’s Captain Tony PittwouldlaterreceivetheDistinguishedServiceCrossfornavigatinghisshipthatnightinthedarkthroughelevenmilesofthenarrow,hazardousinlettogetsuppliesforwardtomarinesandparatroopers.26Hehadnowayofknowingwhetherthenarrowinletwasminedoriftheenemywasonshorereadytoobstructhispassage,eventhoughtheAmphibiousTaskForceandspecialforceshadtriedtheirbesttoclearthearea.AsecondLSL,SirLancelot,madeanotherrunthenextdaywithmoresupplies.

Itwasnotlong,though,before3CommandoBrigadebecameconcernedaboutthepaceofthisforwardbuild-up.IthadrelocatedBrigadeHeadquarterstoTealInlettobeclosetothreeofitscombatunits.On4June, Thompson’s staff started putting pressure on Moore’s newly arrived staff to maintain focus on 3CommandoBrigade’ssupplyneeds:

1.UnderstandweonlyhaveoneSeaKingandoneWessexunderopcon[operationalcontrol]tomorrow.2.Thisallocationtotallyinadequateforcurrentresupplytaskseg2,100rounds105ammo.3.Noshells,noattack!

LiftofRapierthislocationincompletealthoughassurancegivenyesterdaytothecontrary.Rapierthislocationnonoperationalandshortvehiclesandvitalstores.Alllaunchersdumpedononesite.

TealInletnowplumtarget…asuccessfulstrikecouldspoilourdayandmanymoretocome.27

Therewasindeedsomecauseforconcern.FrustratingThompsonandhisstaffatthistimewerereportsbroadcastonBBCWorldNewsthathisforceshadrelocatedtoareaswestofStanleywithaheadquartersatTealInlet,andthattheywerepreparingtoattackStanley.

Theresimplywerenotenoughassetstoprovidethesameprioritytoeveryone.Unfortunately,bytheendof the first week in June, matters had become significantly more complicated. Thompson’s units wereposturedinthenorthandnearlyreadyforanattackonStanleytoendthewar.EventsontheothersideofEastFalkland,however,wereabouttotakeaturnfortheworse.TheywoulddelaysuchanattackforoveraweekandproducetheworstBritishlossesinthewar.

W

Chapter9

ProblemsatFitzroy

henhearrivedintheSanCarlosareaon30May,MajorGeneralMoorewasintentonbringingthewar smartly to anend.AllBritish land forcesnowwereunderhis commandandcontrol.WhentheScotsGuards,WelshGuardsandGurkhasarrivedinthenextfewdays,numberson

landwould increase to around10,000. It hadbeenninedays since the successful amphibious landing.Losseshadbeensignificantonlandaswellasatseasincethen.AlthoughthestunningvictoryatGooseGreenhadbolsteredmorale in theTaskForceandback inLondon,much remained tobedone.Moorehopedtobringthewartoanendinthenextweek.Muchdepended,however,onhowquicklyhecouldgetremainingunitsandsupplies inpositionforanattackonArgentineforcesconcentratedaroundStanley.By this time, units were spread around East Falkland. Two units, 45 Commando and 3 Para, werecompletingtheirmovementsacrossEastFalklandcarryingheavypacks.OnMountKent,42Commandowasdigginginunderharshweather.Exhaustedfromfightingdowntheisthmus,2Pararemainedaroundthe settlement atGooseGreen,where itwas finally getting its first shelter sinceD-Day in communitybuildingsand trying todryoutclothing. In reserveandstill atSanCarloswas40Commando.Supportarms,includingCommandoLogisticRegiment,remainedintheSanCarlos,PortSanCarlosandAjaxBayareas.Helicoptersneeded to relocateartillery forward.LSLsalsoneeded to continue themovementofhundredsoftonsofsuppliesaroundthewestsideofEastFalklandintoTealInlettostrengthentheFBMA,fromwhichCommandoLogisticRegimenteventuallywouldsupportthepushtowardStanley.Althoughthebuild-upatTeal Inletwould takea fewmoredays,piecesappeared tobemoving intoplace tostartanadvanceonStanleysoon.Themainquestiontobeansweredwashow.ThiswasforemostinMoore’smindwhenhearrived.Hisfirstprioritywastohuddlewithhistwobrigadecommandersanddecidethebestpathforward.Marineswithin3CommandoBrigadeHeadquartersandSignalSquadronhurriedly setup space ina

cowshed provided by a farmer at San Carlos Settlement for Thompson’s staff to brief Major GeneralMoore.BrigadierThompsonurged the continuance of his current build-up aroundTeal Inlet and, fromthatgeneral area, a concentratedattackonStanley from thewest.Hedidnot see theneed fora two-prongedadvance,especiallyifthatwasjusttogetadditionalunitsintothefight.Instead,heenvisionedphasedcombatoperations todefeatArgentines,whohadbeenestablishing fightingpositionsoverpastweeksatopthehalfdozenmountainssurroundingStanley.Intelligencehadreportedthattheseforceshadestablished formidabledefences. Thompsonknew that his unitswouldbypass thesemountains at theirownperil.TheyhadtodefeatanddemoralizetheArgentinesonthehilltopsbeforetheirleadersinStanleywould ever surrender. His plan called for 45 Commando to take Two Sisters, 42 Commando to seizeMountHarriet,and3ParatodefeattheArgentinesonMountLongdon.OncetheseobjectiveswereunderBritish control, 3 Para would seize Wireless Ridge and 45 Commando would assault TumbledownMountain and Mount William, with 42 Commando reverting to forward reserve. After that, he woulddesignateaunittoseizeSapperHill.ThenunitswouldbreakintotheflatgroundsurroundingStanley.Inreserve would be 2 Para at Goose Green and 40 Commando at San Carlos, throughout fights for themountainsandforStanleyasconditionswarranted.Thompson’sBrigadewasjustafewdaysawayfromhavingsufficientsuppliespositionedforwardthathecouldexecutethisbattleplan.Mooreagreedtocontinuethebuild-upofthelogisticsbaseatTealInletfor3CommandoBrigade,since

itwasalreadyunderwayandunitswouldbecomevulnerablewithoutit.Thisdecisiontofocusonbuildingup logistics in that forward area would reduce the number of available helicopters, landing craft andmexeflotestoassisttheoffloadofsuppliesintheanchorageandtomoveanysuppliesto5Brigadeunits.Once thebuild-upatTeal Inlet for3CommandoBrigadewas complete, however,Moore indicated thatprioritywouldshiftto5BrigadetoestablishanotherFBMAinthevicinityofFitzroyandBluffCove,10–15kmtothenorthofFitzroydependingontheroute.Thereweresimplytoofewtransportationresourcesto share equally between the twobrigades after the loss ofAtlanticConveyor.WithMoore now in theFalklands,officialsbackinLondonseemedtotempercriticismofdelayedactivityontheground.AsoneWar Cabinet minister supposedly confessed, ‘I think ministers were a bit ashamed of the way theybehavedafterSanCarlos…Wewerelearningfromexperience:wewantedaquickvictory,butthistimeweweremore ready to defer tomilitary advice.’1Moore gave Thompson andWilson guidance for hisanticipatedtwo-prongedapproachtowardStanley.Hewantedtoget5Brigadeintotheaction.ThompsonwouldcontinueonhisnorthernaxisandWilsonwouldestablishanewaxisfromthesouthbeyondGooseGreentoFitzroyandthenonwardtoStanley.Whenbothforceswereinpositionandready,thebattleforStanleywouldbegin.Moorealsochangedtheorganization.Notsurprisingly,2Pararevertedtocommandandcontrolof5Brigade, justasMoorehadindicatedtoWilsonduringtheirpassagesouth.MoorewaskeenlyawareoftheprecariouspositionofBritishforces,withwintersettinginandalsobecauseofthesignificantBritishlossestodate.Concernswerestartingtodevelopaboutthefitnessandhealthofunitswho had now been operating in this harsh environment for nearly two weeks. There was no way ofavoidingtherealitythatthousandsofmilesseparatedtheTaskForcefromtheforwardoperatingbaseat

Ascensionand that theRoyalNavyremainedveryvulnerableatsea.Heneeded toget thewaroverassoonaspossiblebutalso inamethodical,sustainable fashion.Thatrequiredthe integrationof logisticsinto planning and execution, just as Thompson had been working to achieve since landing. Moore’sguidancecalledforcompletionofthelogisticsbuild-upatTealInletandthenatFitzroy,beforetheassaulttowardStanley.Afterthemeeting,MooreconfrontedthepainfulrealityofrecentfightingonEastFalkland.Overpast

days,helicoptershadbeenextractingtoAjaxBaythebodiesofparatrooperskilledinthefightforGooseGreen.Engineershadpreparedamassgravesitefortheirburialthatday.HeanddozensofothersstoodsolemnlyaboveassixparatrooperscarriedeachbodybagcoveredbytheUnionFlag,onebyone,downinto the grave. Seventeen men were buried that day, eleven of them officers and noncommissionedofficerswhohaddiedleadingtheirmen.2Also on 30May,Wilson boarded a helicopter forGooseGreen tomeetwithMajorKeeble to discuss

optionsaboutasouthernadvancetowardStanley.JustofftheirastoundingvictoryatGooseGreen,2Parawas tired,but its leadersalsowerepumped formoreaction.Theyhad ideasofhowtoadvance,asdidWilson.Hisplanenvisionedacross-countrymarchby5BrigadeunitsfromSanCarlosareasandGooseGreen to Port Pleasant near Fitzroy, with 2 Para reverting to support, essentially providing flankprotectionfromthemountainstothewestforthemarchoftheotherthreecombatbattalionstoFitzroy.Keeble and staff were not happy with Wilson’s ideas. The plan they preferred would continue themomentum gained at Goose Green by immediately advancing toward Swan Inlet, defeating whateverenemyforcewasthere,andthenmovingonwardindirectfashiontoFitzroy.Livelydiscussionensued.Thebattlefield huddle ended, however, with no decision but some hard feelings on both sides. The get-together did not get off to a start that encouraged camaraderie, when paratroopers witnessedWilsonarrivingattheirlocationwearingaredberet,thecherishedsymboloftheParachuteRegiment,insteadofhisownlightinfantryberet,aswellaswellingtonboots.3Theboots, indeed,weresensiblefootwearfortheFalklands,butnooneelsehadthem,andtheparatroopers’feetwerestillwetfromtheirlandingonD-Day. It was probably at this meeting that Wilson also advised Keeble that he was not remaining incommand of 2 Para, higher authorities having determined that, despite Keeble’s successful leadershipduringthefightforGooseGreen,2Parastilldeservedahigherrankingcommander.ThatmanwouldbeLieutenantColonelDavidChaundler,whowasthenenroutetotheSouthAtlantic.WilsonreturnedtoSanCarlosfromhismeetingatGooseGreenhavingissuednoordersandhavingfrustrated2Para.On 1 June, ships started arriving in the anchorage to unload 5Brigade and its stores. The firstwas

Atlantic Causeway with twenty Wessex helicopters and eight Sea Kings. Both types would be vital incontinuingtheforwardbuild-upofsuppliesandammunition.Thenextday,CanberraandNorlandarrivedwith 5 Brigade troop units. It took twenty-four hours to offload the Scots Guards, Welsh Guards andGurkhas. Once off their ships, these battalions reorganized around anchorage areas. Due to limitedcommunications during their passage south from the United Kingdom, they knew littlemore than thegeneral situationon theground.The twoGuardsbattalionshadnot receivedguidanceabouthow theywouldbeemployedbeyondthebeachhead.TheGurkhasquicklypreparedtorelocatebytheloneChinookhelicoptertoGooseGreentorelieve2Parainplace.Atthesametime,LieutenantColonelChaundler,thenewlydesignatedcommanderof2Para,arrivedintheSanCarlosarea,evenlessawareofthesituationathandthanthethreebattalionsoffloadingfromships.AlthoughKeeblehadperformedexceptionallywellasactingcommanderfollowingthedeathofH.Jones,theMoDpreferredalieutenantcoloneltolead2Para,and Chaundler was the designated officer to replace Jones as command tours changed. In fineparatroopertradition,hehadparachutedintotheSouthAtlanticon1JuneneartheCarrierBattleGroupandarrivedonFearlessintheearlymorningof2June,wherehemetWilsonbeforefindingabunkforafewhours.HeawokelaterthatmorningtolearnthattheBrigadierhadleftbyhelicopterforGooseGreentomeetwithKeeblewithouthim.Chaundlerhitcheda rideonanotherhelicopter toDarwin,walked toGooseGreenandarrivedlaterthatday.Bythen,however,WilsonhadalreadytoldKeebletoexecutethe2ParaplanfortakingSwanInlet.Actionswerewellunderway.4The paratroopers hadwasted no time. They softened up the area of Swan Inletwith fire from scout

helicopters, then shuttled troops forward with other helicopters. Entering the settlement, they weresurprisedtodiscovernoevidenceofArgentines.Locatingaworkingtelephone,aparatrooperproceededto dial a number at Fitzroy settlement and received an answer from the daughter of the settlementmanager. He asked whether there were any Argentines in the Fitzroy area and learned to everyone’ssurprisethatnonewerethere.ScouthelicoptersreturnedparatrooperstoGooseGreenwithinthehour.TheyquicklycontactedandbriefedWilsonabouttheirdiscovery,seekinghisapprovaltomovetoFitzroyimmediately,confidenttheycouldsecurethesurroundingareawithoutastruggleandfurtherpreparethewayfortheassaultonStanley.Itwasaboldinitiativeandtimely,sincethatsamemorningArgentineshaddestroyedmuchofthe150-foottimberbridgeconnectingDarwintoStanleyovertheFitzroyInlettoslowanyBritishadvance.Wilson’sapprovaltoproceedand2Para’srapidadvanceforwardsetinmotionaseriesofactionsthat

ultimatelywouldproduceshockingconsequencesandsignificantlydelayMoore’splansforarapidendtothewar.At the time, theonlyChinookhelicopteroperating in theFalklandswas then in theprocessofrelocating the Gurkhas and their supplies to Goose Green. Wilson hijacked without permission thatChinooktohelpspringboardparatroopersforwardtoFitzroyasquicklyaspossible.ThesingleChinookand5Brigade’sscouthelicoptersstartedshuttlingtheparachutebattalionfromGooseGreentoFitzroy,refuellingbetweensortiesfromdrumsofArgentinefuelattheGooseGreenairstrip.Atonepoint,2ParapressuredChinookpilotstotakeasmanyaseightyparatroopersforwardinasinglelift,nearlydoubling

the published troop-carrying capacity of the large transport helicopter. A BritishMountain and ArcticWarfare Cadre observation post on a nearby mountain watched the insertions, thinking at first thatArgentinesweremovingintoFitzroy,andnotified3CommandoBrigadeHeadquarters,whichproceededtopreparetwobatteriesofartilleryto fireonthesuspectedenemytroops.Fortunately, itcheckedwithLFFIHeadquarters, learnedof2Para’smoveandcancelled the firemission.5 Failure to keep adjacentunits informedhadnearlycauseda friendly-fire incident.Bynightfallon2 June,mostof2Paraand itsbattalionheadquartersweresecureinareassurroundingFitzroy.Themoveprovedtobeanothercoupby2 Para. Unfortunately, it did not figure in LFFI strategy. Matters became complicated because of thedifficultyofprovidingsupporttotheparatroopersintheirnewlocation,supportwhichtheynowneededandfullyexpected.Britishgroundforcesatthetimewereinnopositiontodowhatlogicallywouldfollowinasynchronized

operation:toconsolidatetheirfootholdandprepareforfutureoperationsbymovingsupportingunitsandsuppliesintotheFitzroyareaaswell.SeizingFitzroywasaboldundertakingtobesure,verymuchakintotheParas’successatGooseGreen,butthistime2Parahadputitselfclosetoenemy-heldterritory,lessthan30kmfromArgentine forcesatStanleyandcloserstill to thosewhowereonmountain tops.Theywere over 50km from their sustainment base on the beachhead at Ajax.Now theywere huddling intoFitzroy as night closed in, with only the supplies they had carried forward on their backs. Theparatrooperslackedprotectionfromsupportingartilleryandairdefence.Theyhadadvancedfarbeyondtheabilityof5BrigadeortheFMAtosustainthem.Makingmattersevenworse,theyhadoutruntheirradiocommunicationcapabilitiesandcouldtalktoneitherWilson’sheadquartersnortoanyunitsonthebeachhead.Theunithadpusheditselftotheveryendofaweaktetherandwithoutanywayofreceivingsuppliesorreinforcementquickly.Thesurprisingadvanceby2ParaintoFitzroyhappenedatatimewhenmovementassetswerestraining

totheirlimit.ShipscarryingWelshGuards,ScotsGuards,Gurkhasandsuppliesforallof5Brigadewerejustarrivingintheanchorage.Logisticianswerepreparingtooffloadthoseshipsasquicklyaspossibleastheyworked to complete thebuild-upatTeal Inlet approvedbyMajorGeneralMooreuponhisarrival.Logistics ships, landing craft and helicopters would be needed in the anchorage and between theanchorage and Teal Inlet for several days to transport supplies and equipment. With no large cargohelicoptersotherthanthesingleChinook,transportationcapabilitiesremainedscarcetomovesuppliesbyairtoFitzroy,despiteaddedassetsunloadingfromAtlanticCauseway.Transportationoverlandwasnotpossible.Theonlyalternativeroutetobolster2ParanowwasfromtheSanCarlosareatoFitzroybysea.ThatrouteextendedfromtheanchorageinSanCarlosWaterallthewayaroundLafoniaanduptheeastcoasttowardFitzroy,adistanceof157nauticalmiles,morethantwicethedistancefromtheanchoragetoTeal Inlet. It would take a slow LSL sixteen hours to complete such a trip, making it impossible tocompletethepassageinthefourteenhoursofdarknessprevailingintheFalklandsatthetime.NoneofthecoastlineorsurroundingseaoverthislongdistancehadbeenclearedofArgentineforces,shipsorseamines.Furthermore, itwas important for ships tokeep radioand radar silence soasnot togiveawaytheirapproach.Thismadeitaverydifficultroutetonavigateastherewerereefsandlowlandthatcouldnotbeseenatnight.ThewaterinPortPleasant,theanchorageforFitzroy,wastooshallowforafrigatetoescortandoffergunfiresupport.UnlikeatTeal Inlet,wheresoldierscouldunloadanewlyarrivedLSLunder the protection of remaining hours of darkness, those at Fitzroy would have to offload duringdaylight. Ships, landing craft and soldiers would be far more vulnerable. Making matters worse, thewatersoffFitzroywerevisiblefromMountHarrietandMountChallenger,whereArgentineobservationpostswerelocated.But5BrigadeandothersatDivisionHeadquartersweretoview2Para’ssurpriseadvancefromquite

differentperspectives.Wilsonhadbeenwaitingforsuchanopportunitytogethissoldiersforwardquicklyever since he had arrived, and now saw nothing but opportunities ahead. He excitedly announced hisintentions later that night at San Carlos: ‘I’m moving people forward as fast as I can with stocks ofammunitiontolaunchwhatIsupposecouldbecalledthefinaloffensive.I’vegrabbedfifty-fivekilometresinthisgreatjumpforwardandIwanttoconsolidateit.’6HecommandeeredalocalcoastalvesselnamedMonsoonenatGooseGreenwhichsomesoondubbed‘Wilson’sprivatenavy’.7Mannedbywatch-keepingofficersfromFearless,thevesselsoonwouldstartmovinghistacticalheadquarters,remainingtroopsandsupplies.WilsonissuedorderstotheWelshandScotsGuardstopreparetorelocate.TheWelshGuardswouldtakeoverfrom2ParanorthofFitzroyatBluffCove,establishingpositionsevenclosertoStanley.TheScotsGuardswouldtakeoverfrom2ParaeastofBluffCove,and2ParathenwouldreverttoBrigadereserve.SuchpositioningwouldsetthestageforabrigadeattacktowardStanleyalongasouthernroute.Theproblem,however,wasnottheconceptbutthetiminganddifficultyofrelocatingadditionalgroundforces and the necessary support and supplies for his entire brigade, most of which still awaitedoffloading in theSanCarlos anchorage.Thenewly arrived commander of 2Para recommended, ‘Sincethere was no immediate need for fighting troops, air defence and logistics should be moved beforeinfantrybattalions.’8OthersatDivisionHeadquarterssharedChaundler’sopinion.Thefocusnonethelessremainedonteethratherthantail.Theadvance toFitzroyhadmadea shamblesofplans to integrate tacticsand logistics.Even though

Thompson’sforceswerepressuringMoore’sheadquartersformovementassetstogetsuppliesacrosstheisland for theattackonStanley, somethingnowhad tobedone soon toget supplies andprotection toFitzroy. The possibility remained thatMenendezwould launch a counter-attack against 2 Para. If thathappened, paratroopers would be in for a tough fight without possibility of reinforcement or addedsustainment.ShiftingtransportationassetsavailabletopushunitsorsuppliestoFitzroywouldsetback

thefinalpushtoStanleybyseveraldays,evenunderthebestofconditions.Ifanythingelseintervened,thenthepushtoStanleycouldbedelayedevenmore.WhenMoore’sstaff first learnedof thehastymoveof2Para toFitzroyon2 June, theywere furious.

They thought 5 Brigade’s first priority upon arrival in the Falklands should have been to establishcommandandcontrolofitsunits,particularlysincethebrigadewasshortofcommunicationsequipment.9ThethreebattalionsthathadsailedsouthwithWilsonandMoorewerejustthenintheprocessoflandingandgettingsettled.Uponreceivingnewsthat2ParahadadvancedtoFitzroy,Moorehimselfsharedhisbrigade commander’s enthusiasm. He felt that having British forces at Fitzroy would keep GeneralMenendezlookingsouth,therebyenablingthecommandostocontinuetheirbuild-upandpositioningeastofTealInlet.10ButBritishgeneralsandadmiralsfromtheFalklandstoLondonsoonlearnedthatgettingeithermen or supplies to Fitzroywould not be that easy. The long distance around Lafonia to Fitzroymeantlandingcraftandmexeflotescouldnottravelthatdistanceontheirown.TheLPDsFearlessand/orIntrepidwouldhavetosailawayfromSanCarlostomovelandingcraftforward;theywerefastenoughtobeabletogetthereandbackindarkness.TheLSLscouldnot,buttheycouldmovemexeflotessecuredtotheirsidestoassistthemovementofsuppliestoshore.Acombinationofbothnowhadtobedivertedfromcurrentmissionstomeetmovementneedstosupport5Brigade.Noonerelishedputtingvesselsatfurtherrisk or reducing the numbers of landing craft back at San Carlos, where logisticians remained busyoffloadingships.As the realityof thesituationbegan tosink inonstaffs, theWelshGuardsstarted their25kmmarch

from the beachhead area to Goose Green on 3 June, as directed byWilson. They had obtained threetractorstoassisttheminthemove.Withinthefirsthourofthemarchthatevening,asbadweatherwassettling in, tractors had becomemired in peat bogs and guardsmenhadwithered under theweight ofheavy rucksacks.The commanderof theWelshGuards,LieutenantColonel JohnnyRickett, orderedhismen to turn around andheadback to positions onSussexMountain.11Word of their failed attempt tomarch such a short distance chafed at commandos and paratrooperswho had been on the island twoweeks,exposedbothtotheharshenvironmentanddozensofArgentineairattacks.TheparatroopershadspentnearlytwodaysontheisthmusleadingtoGooseGreen,movingintopositionandthenfightingtheirwaytovictoryinbothrainandsnow.Asaresultoftheabortedmarch,doubtsstarteddevelopingwhetherthetwopublicdutybattalionscouldwithstandacross-countrytrekfromGooseGreentoFitzroy,letalonea fight fromthere toStanley.Thedistance fromGooseGreen toStanleywas three times that fromtheanchoragetoGooseGreen,anditwasapparentthatalotofArgentineswouldbeduginandwaitingtointervenefromhillsandbunkersaroundthecapital.Moore’s staff aboard Fearless worked frantically to organize movement assets to transport units,

equipment and supplies to Fitzroy. It had been their plan all along to establish another support areaaroundFitzroytosustain5Brigade’seventualadvancefromthesouth,buttheyhadwantedtocompletethebuild-upatTealInletfirstandthenproceedinamoremethodicalmannertostrengthenFitzroy.TheFitzroysettlementwasactuallymuchmoresuitable insomewaysthanAjax,withabeachsufficient forlanding craft, large wool sheds for shelter, surrounding areas for stock storage, running water andelectricity.LogisticiansatdivisionlevelhaddebatedwhethertomovemostoftheoriginalBMAatAjaxtoFitzroyforthefinalbattle.Thepresentpredicament,however,changedthesituationandofferedthemfewalternatives.Recurringbadweatherandcompetingrequirementsforhelicoptersmeantthatanairliftofthreebattalionsandrequisitesuppliessimplywasnotpossible.PlanningfocusedthereforeonusingacombinationofLPDsandLSLsastheybecameavailabletomove

unitsandsupplies.RearAdmiralWoodward,rightfullysensitivetolossesanddamagesustainedthusfarby the Royal Navy andmuch aware that Argentines retained land-based Exocet capability, urged thattroops march to Fitzroy to provide for the southern advance and that they receive sustainment fromsuppliesandservicesbeingpositionedatTealInlet.12AdmiralFieldhousesuggestedthatMooreabandonaltogetherthefocusonFitzroyandBluffCoveandinsteadmovethetwoGuardsbattalionsaroundtoTealInlettoparticipateinanorthernattackonasingleaxis.13Inhindsight,hissuggestionmighthavebeenthebest alternative, consideringall factors: if theBritish couldhave continued tokeep theArgentinesfocusedonasouthernadvanceso theydidnot reinforcedefences inanticipationofanattack fromthewest.ItmighthaveappealedtoThompson,butitdidnotsatisfyMoore’spreferencetohavebothbrigadesshareinretakingStanley.MajorGeneralMooreandCommodoreClappsignalledNorthwoodon4Junewithwhattheybelievedto

bethebestsolution.14TheirplanwastousetheLPDIntrepidwith itsLCUstomovetheWelshGuardsandScotsGuardsintwowavestoFitzroyandthenhavethemadvancethe10kmto15kmfurthernorthonfoot to takeuppositions aroundBluffCove. Fieldhouse remained concerned about havingLPDs so farforward.Hethereforedirectedthattheseships,soimportantforcommandandcontrol,notsailoutsideofSanCarlosWaterduringdaylight.15That leftMooreandClappwith thealternativeofusingLPDsonlyundercoverofdarkness tomoveunitsandLCUsas far forwardaspossibleandofsailingoneormoreLSLs to move everything else. Conducting unit movements over two nights would reduce further theexposureofandrisktotheLPDs.TheplanevolvedforIntrepidtosailontwosuccessiveevenings,releasingitsLCUsshortofFitzroyfor

transportingScotsGuardstoBluffCoveonthefirsteveningandWelshGuardstoFitzroyonthesecond.16As these moves were underway, LSLs Tristram and Galahad would commence successive uploads ofsupportunitsand supplies fromSanCarlos.Clappwasverymuchagainst sending twoLSLsgiven therisksandotherneeds,buteventuallyrelentedafterappealsbyColonelBaxter,whoremainedconcernedabout getting sufficient logistics forward as quickly as possible. Tristram would depart first, with a

mexeflote side-loaded to assist cargo offload, and arrive after the ScotsGuardswere ashore. ItwouldcarryRapier air defence systems and 16FieldAmbulance, both vital in protecting forces forward andtreatingthemifnecessary.Extrafood,fuelandammunitionwerealsoincluded.GalahadwouldfollowwiththerestofsuppliesneededfortheFMBAfor5Brigade,arrivingafterWelshGuardswereashoreandtheoffloadofTristramwascomplete,sothatthetwoLSLswouldnotbeforwardatthesametimecompetingforlimitedwatercraftforunloading.AnavalMineCounterMeasuresTeam,someRoyalEngineersandaSpecialBoatServicepartyhadalreadybeentoFitzroyandBluffCovecheckingoutbeachesandexitsformines,obstaclesandenemyoutposts.BrigadierWilsonissuedordersforhisunitstogetready.Nothing,unfortunately,wentaccording tooriginal intentionsexcept for theembarkationofScotsGuardsatSanCarlosontheeveningof5June.ExecutionplansunravelledoverandoveragainandeventuallyledtothemostdevastatingBritishlossesofthewar.Intrepidandherescorts,PenelopeandAvenger,leftSanCarlosundercoverofdarknessontheevening

of5JunewithScotsGuardsaboardandproceededaroundLafoniatowardElephantIsland,whereitwouldreleaseitsLCUstotransporttheguardsmenforwardtoBluffCove.PlannersestimateditwouldtakefourhoursforLCUstomakethemovementinopenwaterfromElephantIslandtoBluffCove.Itwouldbeatoughpassage for theScotsGuards in theopenLCUs.Theactualreleasepoint for theLCUs,however,was left to the judgment of the commander of Intrepid, Captain Peter Dingemans. After releasing herLCUswiththeScotsGuards,IntrepidthenwouldreturntoSanCarlostoembarktheWelshGuardsandagainmovearoundLafoniaundercoverofdarknessandrendezvouswithLCUsreturningfromBluffCove,which would take theWelshmen to Fitzroy. The LCUs then would be in position at Fitzroy to shuttlesuppliesfromtheLSLSirTristramwhenshearrivedthatnightwithunitsandsuppliestostartformingtheforwardsupportbase.CaptainDingemansconcludedenroutethatitwasnotsafetoproceedallthewaytoElephantIsland.

Instead,hedecidedtoreleaseIntrepid’sfourLCUsatLivelyIsland,about20kmshortofElephantIsland,whichmeant theywould reachBluff Cove in daylight and potentially in view of Argentine observationposts.TheLCUswithScotsGuardsaboardfloatedoutofthedockwellofIntrepidat0230hrson6June,withMajorEwenSouthby-TailyourguidingthepassagenorthtoBluffCove.Southby-Tailyourhadchartedthe Falkland waters in previous years and had guided landing craft to beaches on D-Day. The ScotsGuardscouldnothaveamoreexperiencedpersonnavigatingthemtoBluffCove.Unfortunately,hehadbeenrushed into theoperationsoquicklyat the lastminute thathedidnothavehisnavigationchartswithhim,andtheLCUshadonlysteeringcompasseswithatleasta30°errorpossibility.17Thisfirstshuttleof5Brigadeunitsalmostledtodisaster.Britishwarshipsoperatingintheareawere

unaware of the troop movement by LCU, even though Clapp had discussed plans with Woodward.18RadarsonHMSCardiffandHMSYarmouthpickeduptheLCUsmovingtowardBluffCove.Theshipsfiredillumination rounds over the LCUs and determined fortunately that the Guardsmen in LCUs were notArgentines. Itwasaharrowingnight for theScotsGuardstravelling inunknownwatersatnight in theopenlandingcraft,notknowingifArgentinescoulddetectthemfromlandorsea.BythetimetheLCUsreachedBluffCoveat0800hrs,theguardsmenweresoakedandfreezingfromtheirlongvoyageintheopenlandingcraft.Thetransithadtakenthemnearlytwiceaslongasanticipatedbecauseofthedrop-offatLivelyIsland.Althoughtheyhadescapedafriendlyfiredisaster,aGazellecarrying5Brigade’sSignalOfficerandanotherpassengerwasnotsofortunate.PilotswereflyinghighenroutetotheFitzroyareatoestablish a retransmission site to improve communications and had turned off the helicopter’sIdentification Friend or Foe signal because it was interfering with communications. Woodward hadestablishedano-flyzoneintheareawithouttheknowledgeof5Brigadeorothers.CardiffpickeduptheGazelleonitsradarandshotitdown,killingbothpassengersandthetwopilots.19ThearrivaloftheScotsGuardscameasquiteasurpriseto2Para,whichbythenhadpressedforward

to the Bluff Cove area. Like crews on British warships in the area, the parachute battalion had notreceivednoticethattheScotsGuardswerearrivingtorelievethem.TheywastednotimeinvacatingBluffCovefortheguardsmen,though.Totheirgreatcredit,theScotsGuardsquicklyrecoveredfromtherigorsof their passage, took over 2 Para positions and started patrolling. The damage to FitzroyBridge nownecessitatedalongcross-countrymarchtogetfromBluffCovetoFitzroy.Oneof2Para’sofficerswavedhispistolatcoxswains,hijackedthreeofthefournewlyarrivedLCUsandforcedtheircrewstotransportthemoverwatertoFitzroy.Bythistime,BrigadierWilsonhadrelocatedhistacticalheadquartersbyairtoFitzroyaswell.Southby-TailyourhadcaughtahelicopterridebacktoSanCarlostoupdateleadersontheadvance.UponhisreturntoBluffCovelaterthatday,hewouldlearntohisdismaythatonlyasingleLCUremained at that location. The hijacking of the other three became the major factor in preventingmovementoftheWelshGuardsintothearealaterthatnight.Throughoutthisfirstday,theLSLSirTristramhadbeenloadingmenandequipmentinSanCarlos.That

hadnotgoneaccordingtoplaneither.BadweatherhadpreventedhelicoptersfrommovingRapiersfromlocationsonlandtotheship.16FieldAmbulancehadnotbeenabletogetreadythroughouttheday.Lateintotheevening,shesailedwithoutRapiersystemsandmedics,arrivingatFitzroyonthemorningof7Junetostartunloading.Meanwhile, on her return to San Carlos, Intrepid had developed engine troubles.20 The mission for

movingWelshGuardsforwardduringthenightof6/7JunethereforefelltohersisterLPDFearless,whoseCaptain JeremyLarkin appeared less reluctant about taking his LPD beyond Lively Island to ElephantIsland.21ThenextphaseoftheshuttleplancalledforFearless,carryingtwoofitsownLCUspreloadedwith guardsmen’s supplies, to link upwith the fourLCUs from Intrepid thatwere in the forward areaalready.TwoofIntrepid’sLCUsandthetwofromFearlesswouldcarrytheWelshGuardstoFitzroy.The

remaining twoLCUs from Intrepidwould load intoFearless for return toSanCarlos to assist in otherworkthere.BackinFitzroyandBluffCove,however,harshweatherhadsetin,makinganeveninglinkupwithFearlessnolongerpossible,asSouthby-Tailyourstillscrambledtolocatethethreemissinglandingcraft.HethereforedecidedagainstsendinganyLCUstomeetFearlessnearElephant Island,butsincetherewerenocommunicationlinksbetweenBluffCoveorFitzroyandtheSanCarlosanchorage,hewasunabletoinformCaptainLarkinofFearless.Larkin,therefore,setsailfromSanCarlosontheeveningof6JunewithWelshGuardsaboardandtwoLCUs,expectingtolinkupwiththefourLCUsfromIntrepid,thistimeatElephantIslandnotLivelyIsland.WhenLCUsfailedtoshowearlythenextmorning,andafterusing itsonboardhelicopter tosearch for them, thecaptainofFearless signalledClapp,whoconsultedwithMooreandthenreleasedhistwoLCUswithasmanyoftheWelshGuardsaspossible.ThemissionforguidingtheseLCUsbeyondthereleasepointfelltoMajorTonyTodd,aRoyalCorpsofTransportofficerwithconsiderableamphibiousandmaritimeexperience,whowaserroneouslytoldtotakethecontingentofWelshGuardstoBluffCoveinsteadofFitzroy,theirintendeddestination.ToddexpertlyguidedthetwoLCUssafelytoBluffCove.TheyarrivedwithhalfoftheWelshGuardsat0800hrsasFearlesswaswellonher way back to San Carlos with the other half of the battalion. By this time, as one could imagine,frustrationsweredevelopingintheotherWelshGuardsheadedbacktoSanCarlos.Itwashardforthemnottofeeljerkedaround.SincearrivingonEastFalkland,theyhadmovedtowardGooseGreenonlytobepulledbackaftermarchingonlyashortway.NowtheyhadtravelledmostofthenightpastLivelyIslandtoElephantIsland,expectingtoloadLCUsanddisembarkatFitzroy,onlytodiscovertheywereseparatedfromhalftheircomradesandheadedbacktoSanCarlos.Throughout 7 June, the LSL Sir Galahad had been loading at San Carlos for the second shuttle of

suppliestoFitzroy.WhentheWelshGuardsreturnedaboardFearlesstheyweredirectedaboardGalahadfor their return voyage to Fitzroy. However, by the time everything was aboard, including about 450soldiers,Rapiersand16FieldAmbulance,itwaswellintothenight.CaptainP.J.G.Roberts,commandingofficerofSirGalahad,signalledCommodoreClapp’sstaffaboardFearlessexpressinghisintenttostayatSanCarlos until the following night.He received an order to set sail immediately for Port Pleasant atFitzroynotBluffCove.22ItwasnotpossibletogetanLSLintoBluffCoveduetoshallowwater.WhilethefrustratedremainderoftheWelshGuardswenttosleepthatnightthinkingtheywerebeingtakentoBluffCove tomeet theirbuddies,Galahad steamedaroundLafonia towardFitzroy.Normally captainsadviseembarkedforcesofsailingplans.Forwhateverreason,thatdidnothappenthisevening.NordidanyonefromtheWelshGuardscheckwiththecaptain.ThefocusofthoseatFitzroyatthistimewasnotonreceivingmorecombattroopsbutonoffloadingand

organizingsuppliesforthenewsupportarea.The1/7Gurkhashadjustrelocatedmostofitssubordinateunits by helicopter from Goose Green to the Fitzroy area. Soldiers nearly had completed offloadingammunition from Sir Tristram by the end of 7 June. The movement from ship to shore had goneexcruciatinglyslowlybecauseofdifficultyingettingatsuppliesandequipmentontheLSL.Earlythenextmorning, though,whileGalahadwassteamingtowardFitzroy,Southby-Tailyourreceived instructions tosendvessels toChoisuelSoundnearGooseGreentopickupequipment from5Brigade’sheadquartersandtodispatchIntrepid’sLCUstomarryupwiththeLPDforreturntoSanCarlos.HesentanLCUandthecapturedcoasterMonsoonentocompletethemission,withfurtherinstructionstoreturnundercoverofnight.23ThatlefthimwithonlyoneotherLCUandasinglemexefloteforoffloadingremainingsuppliesfromTristram.Notsurprisingly,heandothersatFitzroywerealarmedtoseeSirGalahadroundthebendjustbefore0700hrson8JuneandanchornearSirTristram.WhentheWelshGuardsawoke,theyweredismayedtodiscoverthemselvesatFitzroyratherthanBluffCove,wheretherestoftheirbattalionwas.Those at Fitzroy, like Southby-Tailyour, who had experienced the fury of Argentine air attacks at SanCarlosnowwerehorrifiedatwhattheysawandhurriedtoGalahadwiththeonlyremainingLCU, itselfpartiallyfilledwithammunitionfromTristram,toencouragepassengerstogetashorequicklyandwalktoBluff Cove. By then, however, it was discovered that the ramp of the lone LCU could not be loweredsufficiently tomarryupwith the sterndoorofGalahad, therebypreventing soldiers fromboarding thelandingcraftwiththeirheavyweaponsdirectlyfromthesterndoor.Instead,theWelshGuardsfacedtheprospectofclimbingdownthesideoftheLSLonropeladderstoboardthelandingcraft.ThisfrustratedevenmoretheWelshGuards,whowerestillperplexedastowhytheywerenotatBluffCove.ArgumentsensuedbetweenWelshGuards leaders aboardGalahad andSouthby-Tailyour intent on gettingmen offshipsasquicklyaspossible.FourhoursafterarrivalofGalahad,mostofthosewhohadsailedaboardtheLSLwerestillbelowdecksinacanteenwatchingamovie.ASeaKinghelicopterhadsucceededinliftingaRapiertoshore,butitwasstillundergoingcalibrationtests.Harriercombatairpatrols,whichDivisionHeadquartershadscheduledforthatsamemorning,wentoffstationatthearrangedtimesincetheyhadreceived no word to stay longer.24 The movement to Fitzroy had become one surprise after another,surpassedonlybyhorriblypoorcommunication.Fewsuspected that the stagewas set for anotherdevastatingArgentineair strike.BrigadiersWilson

andThompsonwerebothaboardFearlessoffSanCarlosmeetingwithMooreatthetimeandassessingoptions for the final thrust toward Stanley. Lieutenant Colonel Hellberg, Major Anthony Welch fromOrdnanceSquadronandMajorPeterLamb,anofficeronColonelIanBaxter’sdivisionallogisticsstaff,hadjustarrivedatFitzroy toassess itspotential asaneven larger supplybase.After thewar,CommodoreClapp best summarized the series of events that set the stage for what would soon follow: ‘Tragedystruck,perhaps,becausewewereallrunningalittlefast…CommunicationswerealwaysdifficultandmystaffandIweremoreusedtodealingwithRoyalMarines,whoaretrainedtogetoffashipasquicklyaspossible, than with soldiers, inexperienced in amphibious operations.’25 He was right. Not even the

weatherwasturningouttoBritishadvantage.Thelastcoupleofdayshadbeenovercast.Galahadarrivedunderclearsunnyskies,though.Argentinesoldiersatopanearbymountainwokeuptodiscovertheyhada clear view of the two LSLs anchored together at Port Pleasant. They radioed their headquarters atStanley.Anelectronicwarfaretroopfrom3CommandoBrigadeonMountKentinterceptedthereportbutdidnothavesufficienttimetopasstheintelligencetoDivisionHeadquarters.26Bythattime,therewasnothingthatMooreorotherscoulddoanyway.ArgentinepilotsandbombshadwastedseveralopportunitiestocauseseriousdamagetotheBritishin

previousdays.Thatwasnot tobethecase,however,atFitzroy.Whathadbecomefrustratingdelays inmovingunits and suppliesbecameadisaster of near catastrophicproportions.TheBritishdetectedonradarwhatappearedtobeincomingArgentineaircraftlatethatmorningandwerealertingunitswhen,shortlyafternoon,fiveSkyhawksfoundtheLSLssittinginopenwatersintheanchorageofPortPleasantoffFitzroywithouttheprotectionofasinglewarship,sinceabarpreventedwarshipsfromgettingcloser.Argentinepilotsscoreddirecthits,theirbombsrippingdeepintothebowelsoftheundefendedLSLs.TwobombsstruckSirTristram and three struckSirGalahad,with onepassing completely through theLSLwithoutexploding,ashadhappenedtotheshipduringattackson23MayinSanCarlos.27Withinseconds,bothvesselswereengulfedinflames.ManyoftheseveralhundredsoldiersaboardGalahadimmediatelybecametrappedbelowdecksastonsofammunitionandpetroleumeruptedintoballsoffirerushingdowncorridorsandupstairwells.Thoseonupperdeckshurledliferaftsoverthesideandscrambledtoescape.Asifmatterscouldgetnoworse,ArgentinepilotscomingoutofattackrunsatFitzroynoticedanLCUinopenwater,abouthalfwaytoGooseGreen,headingtowardFitzroy.ItwastheLCUthatSouthby-Tailyourhad sent to Goose Green earlier in themorning with instructions to return that night under cover ofdarkness.Contrarytohisinstructions,theloneLCUwasnowinopenwaterinbroaddaylight.Argentinefightersattackedagain,killingsixmenandbadlydamagingtheLCUanditscargo.AboardwerethesixLandRoversthatcomprised5Brigade’sheadquarters,filledwithitscommandandcontrolequipment.The day ended in total disaster for 5 Brigade. Soldiers from 16 Field Ambulance aboard Galahad

disregardedtheirownsafetyandworkedfranticallytosavelivesasexplosionswrackedtheLSL.TheloneSeaKinghelicopter at Fitzroymade repeated trips into dense smoke to removewounded soldiers andrushthemashorefortreatmentbythesmalladvancepartyof16FieldAmbulance.OtherhelicoptersfromthroughoutEastFalklandsoonrespondedandestablishedasteadyshuttlethroughouttheafternoonandnightcoveringthe50kmbetweenFitzroyandthefieldhospitalatAjaxBay.OneofthefirsthelicopterstoarriveatAjaxwasaGazelle,fromwhicharunnerrushedintotheRedandGreenLifeMachinewithanoteforCommanderRickJollyfromJohnRoberts,theseniormedicalofficerworkingfranticallytosavelivesatFitzroy.Itwassimpleandurgent:‘GALAHADHITBEFORESURGICALTEAMSUNLOADED.MANY(NOTYET COUNTED) BURN CASUALTIES. NEED FLUIDS AND MORPHIA PLUS PLUS.’28 Some medicalpersonnelfromAjaxgrabbedsuppliesandflewbacktoFitzroyintheGazelletohelp;othersfollowed.Somany casualties soon started arriving at the Red and Green Life Machine, though, that Jolly calledFearless and asked the headquarters to identify vessels that could take casualties. Eventually, Jolly’shospitalhadoverahundredcasualties lying inandaroundthetinyrefrigerationplantatAjax.Landingcraft took twodozencasualtieseach toFearless, Intrepid, andAtlanticCauseway in the anchorage, ashelicopterscontinuedtheshuttlefromFitzroy.OtherhelicopterstooksomecasualtiesstraighttoUganda.Medics and doctors at both locations worked tirelessly and, despite such a heavy influx of casualties,continuedtomaintaintheirmiraculousrecord.EveryBritishcasualtywhoarrivedaliveatthesmallAjaxhospitalremainedalive.Regrettably,manyothersneverhadtimetogetofftheburningLSLs.FiresaboardTristramsubsidedcomparativelyquickly,sothatnextdaytheBritishcouldremovesomeof

herremainingstocks.Beforethatcouldbedone,however,engineershadtogetthesterndooroftheLSLopen.TheywentasidethesmokingLSL,cutthechainsfromhersterndoorandallowedtheheavydoortofall into the water, thereby creating a gaping hole for others to enter Tristram. A forklift, with tyressmoking from the hot, plated floors of the LSL, shuttled supplies to the waiting LCU, as soldiers,continuingtodisregardtheirownsafety,labouredheroicallytogetwhatevertheycouldashore.Nothingcouldbedone,unfortunately,tosaveSirGalahadoranythingonboard.Firesragedfordays.Eventually,theRoyalNavypulledthesmoulderingLSLfurtherouttoseaandtorpedoedher.SirTristramwouldbesalvaged,butnotuntillongafterthewar.ThelossofthesetwovaluablelogisticsshipsmeanttwofewerLSLstoassisttheforwardbuild-upofunits,equipment,andsuppliesbeforethefinalbattle.The lack of communication between 5 Brigade and Division Headquarters had created massive

misunderstandingsanddangerousassumptions.Acombinationofoversights,mistakesandcoincidencesfollowed, creating awindow of opportunity for Argentine pilots that day.When it was all over, Britishgroundforceshadsustainedtheirbiggestsetbackofthewar.Inmanyways,theBritishhadbeenluckyindayspast.DozensofArgentinepilotshadscoredhitsonvesselssincetheamphibiouslandings.WhentheTaskForcewasmost vulnerable inwatersoffSanCarlos, though,as itworked frantically in thehoursfollowingthelandingstogetsuppliesashore,Argentinepilotshadleftlogisticsvesselsalone.Evenwhenpilots struckSirLancelot andSirGalahad in those early days, their bombs failed to detonate. All thatchanged at Fitzroy. The British luck had run out. Forty-ninemen lost their lives as a result of the airattacksandahundredandfifteenwerewounded,forty-fiveofthemveryseriously.29MostwerefromtheWelshGuardsand16FieldAmbulance.Countlesstonsofsuppliesalsohadbeendestroyed.MuchhasbeenwrittenaboutwhathappenedthatdayatFitzroy,althoughmostaccountsdonotdetail

thecascadeofdecisionsandeventsthatledtothemassivelossoflife.Itisdifficulttoimagineanythingelse that could have gonewrong at Fitzroy. In the rush to open up a southern approach, 2 Para tookadvantageofanopportunity,approvedbyitshigherheadquarters.However,5Brigadeapparentlydidnot

clearthelargeadvancewithMooreandhisLFFIstaff,whichwasorchestratinglogisticsatthispointforallunits.Thewardiaryof5 InfantryBrigadeseems to indicate that2Parawason the fringeofbeingcombat-ineffectiveatthetime,in‘poorphysicalshapehavingbeenintheopensince2Juneandstilltiredafter Goose Green battle … [with] a large number of cases of trench foot’.30 Once paratroopers hadadvancedtoFitzroylateon2June,LFFIconfrontedtheconundrumoftrying,atthesametime,tooffloadshipsinSanCarlos,continuetopushsuppliestoTealInletfor3CommandoBrigadeandnowshoreup2Para at Fitzroy. The leap forward to that settlement became the catalyst for everything that followed.EventsmighthavebeendifferenthadWilsontold2ParatoinsertonlyitsPatrolsCompanytosecurethearea,diginandmaintainreconnaissanceuntilLFFIcouldplanthenextstepstoincreasecapability;buttheywouldhavebeenvulnerableaswell, andwithout reinforcement. It alsomighthavebeendifferenthadWoodwardcommittedships toprotect theoperationmore.Hindsight isalwayseasy.ThenetresultfromFitzroywasthatitcostseveraldozenlives,leftmanymoremenseriouslymaimedandshortenedthecareersofsomewhootherwisemighthavebeenrecognizedasheroes.Events at Fitzroy rocked many in the Task Force and senior leaders in London. Losses had been

staggering. Medical facilities both on land and sea were overflowing. Forces now needed to bereconstituted.LogisticsleaderswhohadflowntoFitzroybeforetheattacktodecidehowbesttousethesettlement witnessed the catastrophic loss of lives and supplies. They had seen first-hand that thesettlementwastoofarforwardtobeusedforanythingotherthanaforwardbase.TheynowreturnedtoSanCarlosknowingthatitwouldtakealotmoreworkandtimetogeteverythingwhereitneededtogo.Therewould not be another incident like this one.Major GeneralMoorewould insist that tactics andlogisticsbeintegratedfullybeforelaunchinghisbrigadesinthefinalthrusttotraptheArgentinesinthecapital.HedeliberatelysuppressedinformationabouttheextentofcasualtiessothatitwouldnotbolsterArgentineimpressionsaboutthesuccessoftheairattacks.Iftherewasanyglimmeroflightamidstthedarknessthatday,itcamefromtheincreasedfocusbyArgentinesonthesouthernapproachtoStanley.TheyweremoreconvincedthaneverthatthemainthrustbytheBritishwouldoriginatefromthesouth.Threeweeksbefore, theywereanticipatinganamphibious landingnearStanley too.Again, theBritishwouldsurprisethem.

M

Chapter10

TheBattleforMountainsSurroundingStanley

ajor General Moore had summoned his two brigade commanders to Division HeadquartersaboardLPDFearlessearlyon8JunetodiscussoptionsforthefinalattackonStanley.Unlikehisstaff,MoorehadnotbeensoupsetaboutBrigadierWilson’ssurprisemovetoFitzroynearlya

weekearlier.Riskythoughithadbeen,5Brigade’sleapforwardfixedtheenemy’sattentionallthemoreclosely on the southern approach toStanley. TheArgentineshadbeen thinking for some time that theBritishwouldlaunchtheirmainassaultfromaroutethroughFitzroy,despitereportsofBritishadvancesto thewestofStanleynearTeal Inlet.And tobesure, theydidnotknowthatactivity to thesouthhadbecome a frantic struggle to reduce the vulnerability of 2 Parawithout supplies and supporting arms.IncreasedactivityaroundFitzroyfurtherpromotedtheperceptionthatitwouldbecomethespringboardforthefinalattack.Fitzroywasnot,however,partofadeceptionplantomaskacommandoattackfromthe west. Quite the contrary, it was intended to play a significant role in the final attack. Just howprominentthatrolewouldbewasoneofthemainissuesatMoore’smeetingwithhiscommanders.

Thecontentious issueathismeetingthatdaywaswhetherBritishgroundforceswouldconducttheirfinalassaultthroughthemountainsnearStanleyonabroadoranarrowfront.ThebroadfrontinquestionstartedwithMountLongdontothenorth-westofStanleyandincludedhighgroundstartingafewmilessouth of Longdon and extending eastwards to Stanley: Two Sisters, Mount Harriet, TumbledownMountain, Mount William and Sapper Hill. Should Mount Longdon be an objective, then anotherprominentfeatureknownasWirelessRidgestoodbetweenMountLongdonandStanley.Inthatcase,theBritishwouldneed to takeWirelessaswell.ThenarrowoptionexcludedMountLongdonandWirelessRidge.

BrigadierThompsonobjectedtothenarrowfrontoptionforreasonsbothtacticalandlogistical.1SincetheArgentineswereexpectingathrustfromthesouthnowmorethanever,concentratingtheattackintoanarrower front from thewest and southofStanleywouldplay into their suspicions.Froma logisticsstandpoint, very importantly, thenarrow frontoptionwithBritish forcesbypassingArgentine forcesonMountLongdonposedsignificantrisks.FordaystheDivisionhadbeenconcentratingongettingsuppliesinto the FBMA at Teal Inlet. That area now served as the forward sustainment base for 3 CommandoBrigade.Thompson’s3Paraand45CommandohadmovedeastfromthereseveraldaysbeforeandtakenthehighgroundofMountEstanciaandMountVernettothenorth-westofLongdon.ThetrackfromTealInlet through a small settlement called Estancia House near Mount Estancia now became the criticalgroundsupplyrouteforhisunits,regardlessofwheretheywereattacking.

Oppositionastridethissupplyroute,mostnotably fromArgentineunitsatMountLongdon,hadtobeneutralizedinordertoensurecontinuityofsupportto3CommandoBrigadeunitsduringthefinalbattle.From a logistics perspective, Thompson’s battle plan enabled interior rather than exterior lines ofcommunication, therebyenabling3CommandoBrigade tomaintain thesecurityof itsonlygroundandhelicopterresupplyroutefromtheFBMAatTealInletthroughadistributionpointatEstanciaHouseandfromtheretocombatunits.TheBrigadecouldnotrelyonthefewavailablehelicopterstomovesuppliesforward from Teal Inlet. Combat units would carry considerable supplies with them, but approachmarcheswouldbe long,andonce fightingstarted theunitswouldrequirereliableresupply.During thefinal battle, helicopters would focus on resupply if possible, but mainly on movement of artilleryammunition and medical evacuation. Mount Longdon, therefore, became a critical objective fromThompson’sperspective,and3CommandoBrigadehadtocontrol ittoprotect logisticssustainmentforthebattleforStanley.

SomeatdivisionlevelclearlydidnotshareallofThompson’sconcerns.WhileMoorewaschairinghismeetingaboardFearlessthatday,othermembersoftheDivisionstaffandCommandoLogisticRegimentwere forward at Fitzroy assessing the potential of that area as a sustainment base. Shifting suppliesforwardfromAjaxBaycouldshortendistancessignificantlybetweenthebulkofstocksandcombatunits,even though there were risks in moving large quantities of supplies that near to Stanley; but gettingsuppliestherewaschallenging.DistancesbyseafromtheAjaxareaweretwiceaslongtoFitzroyastheyweretoTealInlet.

As Moore, Thompson, Wilson and others were discussing tactical and logistical options for the finalbattle,Argentine observerswere, unfortunately, peeringdown from their observationposts to discoverandeventuallyreportthearrivaloftheLSLsSirTristramandSirGalahadatFitzroy.WordarrivedabouttheArgentineairattacksasthemeetingonFearlesswasstillinsession.Thesessionendedabruptly,andtheleadersreturnedtotheirunitsasLFFIshifteditsfocustosavinglivesandrestoringorderatFitzroy.Moorehadreachednodecisionsabouttheplanforafinalattackbeforethehastyadjournment.

By9June,astheextentoflossesatFitzroybecamefullyknown,thelocation’sappealasalargesupportareavanished.PlanningshiftedtowardestablishingonlyanotherFBMAatFitzroy,thisonefor5Brigade.While staff and units were adjusting to the magnitude of losses, Moore shifted his attention to 3CommandoBrigadeasthemaineffortfortheupcomingfinalbattle.WhenarrivingonEastFalklandten

daysearlier,hehadanticipatedthathisbrigadeswouldbebeginningthefinalbattlebythistime.Now,however, Moore still faced requirements to get artillery and ammunition forward for both brigades tosupport the attack. Additionally, something had to be done to reconstitute the combat strength of 5Brigade,given the largenumberof casualties sustainedby1stBattalion,WelshGuardsand the stocksthat had been lost. He would focus deliberately on building up logistics capabilities in forward areasbefore launching the finalassaultandonensuring that logistics remained integrated fullywith tacticalplansthroughallphasesofthebattleplanuntilhisforcescapturedStanley.

That day, Moore flew forward to 3 Commando Brigade’s headquarters at Teal Inlet to meet withThompson and tell him that 3 CommandoBrigadewould be theDivisionmain effort in an attack thatwouldincludeMountLongdon.Theplanwouldcontainthreephases:duringthefirstphase,3CommandoBrigadewouldattackMountLongdon,TwoSisters,andMountHarriet;duringthesecond,3CommandoBrigadewouldcontinueitsattacktotakeWirelessRidgewhile5BrigadeattackedTumbledownMountainandMountWilliam;Thompson’sBrigadewouldthencontinuetheattackinphasethreetoseizeremaininghigh ground south of Stanley, beginning with Sapper Hill. The hope was that the Argentines wouldsurrenderbeforephasethreebecamenecessary.

Thompson’sunitshadbeenplanningtowardsthisendforsometimeandhopingforsuchadecision.Toaddmorepunchtohismaineffort,Mooreattached2Parabackto3CommandoBrigade.Healsoattached5Brigade’s1WelshGuards,whichwasaugmentednowbytwocompaniesfrom40Commando,becausetheapproach route for thecommandoattackonMountHarrietwouldcross into its sector.HelicopterswouldlifttheparatroopersfromtheircurrentlocationnearFitzroytoanassemblyareaasideMountKent,where they would be in reserve initially. Moore, however, did not let Thompson retain control of theremainder of 40 Commando, which had been providing security around the beachhead since D-Daybecauseofcontinuingconcernsaboutapossibleattackonrearareas.Thompson’sunitswerepreparedandeagertogetonwithit.Theyhadbeenforwardnowforwelloveraweek,andalthoughtherehadbeensome skirmishes with Argentines, most of their time had been spent patrolling to determine enemydispositionsandvulnerabilities.

Conditionsinforwardareashadtakenadistinctturnfortheworsesincecommandoshadmovedawayfrom the San Carlos beachhead, particularly for those units in hills approaching Stanley. LieutenantColonelNickVaux’s 42Commandoprobably hadbeenwithstanding theworst of it.HismenhadbeenpatrollinginandaroundMountKentsincetheendofMayandatMountChallengersincethefirstdaysofJune.Someofhisunitshadwaitedseveraldaysfortheirpackstogetforwardandstilllongerforresupplyoffood.AlthoughthereremainedtonsoffoodandsuppliesatbothAjaxandTealInlet,badweatherhadcomplicatedeffortstogetsuppliesforwardbyhelicopter.Whensuppliesdidarrive,commandosthenhadto man-pack them further forward at night to unit positions. The dried Arctic rations being providedcontainedover5,000caloriesbutrequiredwaterandcookingfueltoreconstitutethem.Unitsgenerallyran short of both; and as a result, men were starting to suffer from diarrhoea and dehydration.2Consequently,manyrelishedfindingcapturedenemyrations,becausetheycamewithfueltabletscalledhexamineforcookingandsometimeswithasmallbottleofwhiskyandcigarettes.

As Vaux recalls, ‘Each day brought blizzard, squall and downpour in relentless sequence.’3 Hiscommandoswouldattempttoerectponchoshelters,onlytohavethefiercewindsbuffetingthemountainschangedirectionandripthemapart.Onlyoccasionallywouldthesunbreakthroughtoprovidethemwithtemporarywarmthandachancetodryoutclothes.Theyhadcometodespisethestandardissuemilitaryboot that soaked upmoisture like a sponge; these bootswere nowmaking cases of trench foot a realproblem.Whenpackscontainingtheirextraclothingandpersonalitemsfinallyarrivedon7June,Vaux’smencouldhardlycontaintheirenthusiasm:‘Forabrief,carefreespelltheatmospherewasreminiscentofopeningpresentsatChristmas,withweather-beatenmarinesgleefullyextracting“drysoxandcleannix”,cachesofnutty(chocolate),eventheoddbattery-poweredrazor.’4

Makingmattersworse,though,42Commandohadsufferedseveralcasualtieswhenmarinesstumbledon to Argentine mines as they patrolled areas around Challenger. The difficulty of evacuating thesecasualties frompointsof injury toaidstations foreshadowedthedifficultiesallBritishunitswould faceduringthefinalbattle.Atthesametime,however,itprovedagainthewisdombehindthedetailedmedicaltrainingmarinesandsoldiershadreceivedwhilesailingsouthfromtheUnitedKingdom.Oneillustrativecase inpoint isthatofMarineMarkCurtisof42Commando,whowasonpatrolwhenhesteppedonamine.Curtisdescribedwhathappened:

ItwasatthebottomofalittleslopethatIsteppedonamine;“Cuth”andtheothermarinehadwalkedoverit.Iseemedtobethrownupintheairandfellonmyrightside.Itookthegunoffmyshoulderandpointeditforward,waitingforsomeonetofireatus;Istillthoughtitwastheambush.Myfootstartedtofeelnumb.Itriedtofeeldownbutmytrouserswerealltornroundthebottom.Themiddleofmyfoothadbeenblownoff;thetoeswerestillthere,connectedtomyshinbyafleshybitofskin.Itlookedweird.Halfaninchofmyheelhadbeenrippedback.Thatwasalltherewasleft–thetoesandthebackoftheheel.“Cuth”shouted,askedwhatwasgoingon–abitofheavylanguage.ItoldhimI’dhadmyfootblownoff,butIdidn’tputitquitelikethat.Everythingwasquietthen.Hecrawledoveronhishandsandknees,lookingformines.HetriedtobandagemylegandIgavemyselfsomemorphine.Youkeepitonyourdogtag–likealittletoothpastetubewithaneedle.Icouldn’tgettheplasticcoveroffandhadtobiteitoff.Iinjectedmyselfinthemuscleofthethigh.Itdidn’tseemtohaveanyeffectforhalfanhour;thepainhadstartedafterfiveminutes.“Cuth”pickedmeupandcarriedmeout.5

Medical training and toughness helped Curtis stay alive until his comrades could get him to medicalspecialists.Ittookthemsevenhourstocarryhimbacktothefirstaidstation;fromthere,ittookanothereighteenhourstogethimtothefieldhospital.Helosthisfootbutlived.6

CaringforwoundedweighedheavilyonthemindsofmanythroughouttheLandForce.Noonedoubtedthere would be casualties. What concerned everyone was the difficulty of getting casualties off the

battlefield.Whereasthemenwerewelltrainedinkeepingthemselvesandtheircomradesaliveuntilhelparrived, therockyandhilly terrainwouldmake itverydifficult forunits toextractcasualtiesdownthesides of mountains to level locations, from where they could be evacuated further to the rear byhelicopter.Makingmattersworse,hilltopvantagepointswouldenableArgentinestoobservehelicopterslanding and possibly call for fire. Thompson had successfully resisted efforts by the senior doctor atDivisiontoclosedown3CommandoBrigade’ssmallfielddressingstationatTealInletandtoconsolidateitwith theonebeingestablishedatFitzroy tosupport5Brigade, thereby formingone largerdivisionalfieldhospital.7Althoughsuchaproposalseemedadvantageousfromaresourcestandpoint,itdisregardedthe conditions which made evacuation so difficult around the mountains, something which somecommanders had come to experience at first hand in recent days. Foggy weather near the mountainssurrounding Stanley frequently resulted in conditions that prevented helicopters from flying. Medicalevacuationacrossoraroundtheseveralmountainsseparating3CommandoBrigadeunitsfromaFitzroyfield hospital, therefore, became totally contingent uponweather. Of evenmore immediate concern tocombat units was the lack of lightweight but sturdy collapsible stretchers to assist men in carryingcasualtiesfrompointsofinjurytolocationsfortreatmentorfurtherevacuation.Rockyslopeswouldmakeitdifficultenough formen to fight theirway throughArgentinepositions, letalonecarrystretchersupandmendowntheslopesunderfire.Tofacilitatecasualtyevacuation,aswellasforforwardresupplyofammunition and other critical supplies, units organized ad hoc litter-bearer teams from personnel notdirectlyinvolvedinthefight.Theteamswouldshuttlesuppliesforwardonwhateverstretcherstheyhadandcarrycasualtiesback.

By this time, another potential problem needed to be solved. Commando Logistic Regiment and itsMedicalSquadronhadbeenrushingfromemergencytoemergencysinceD-Day,astheyworkedtocareforcasualties.LieutenantColonelHellberghadfoundhimselfunderpressureonalmostadailybasisfromNorthwood to release details of those who had been killed or wounded. To control the flow of suchsensitiveinformation,heestablishedaFieldRecordsandReinforcementHoldingUnitnexttotheRedandGreenLifeMachine,tostayabreastofdevelopments,maintainaccurateinformationaboutcasualtiesandensure thatnotifications tonextofkinwerecompletedbeforedivulgingany information toothers.TheBrigadehadfirstimplementedthiscentralizedoperationduringanexercisethepreviousyear.BeforetheamphibiouslandingsatSanCarlos,ithadearmarkedstaffingforthisunitforcontingencypurposes.Someclerks came from parachute battalions and commandos. After the war, 3 Commando Brigaderecommended that organizations continue fulfilling these very important but easily overlookedrequirements.

Thompson called his commanders together for their ‘OGroup’ briefing on 10 June, the day after hismeetingwithMooreatTealInlet.TheCommandoBrigadeplanpivotedonthreesequentialattacksontheeveningof11June,beginninginthenorthwithMountLongdon:3ParareceivedthemissiontoseizethatkeypieceofterrainandpreparetoexploitforwardontoWirelessRidgetotheeast;45Commandowouldattack to defeat enemy forces on Two Sisters directly to the south of Mount Longdon and prepare toexploit forwardontoTumbledownMountain;and42Commando,furthersouthstill,wouldseizeMountHarrietandpreparetofollow45CommandothroughTumbledowntotakeMountWilliam.Oncethebattlestarted, all units would have to share the single bridge across the Murrell River to shuttle suppliesforward.Thatbridgewouldremaincriticalaslongasfightingcontinued,sinceitenabledtheonlygroundlineofcommunicationbetween3CommandoBrigade’sdistributionpointatEstanciaHouseonthewestsideof theMurrellRiverandcombatunits,whoseobjectiveswereon theeast side.Brigadeobjectiveswere to be taken by first light the next day. Two of the attacks were to be silent in order to achievesurprise,meaning that therewouldbeno artillerypreparation. The attack onMountHarrietwouldbe‘noisy’tocoverthemoveof42CommandoaroundtheflanktohitArgentinesfromtherear.Whenartilleryfirebegan,ArgentinesoccupyingBritishobjectiveswouldfeelthefullweightofmorethan11,000roundsof105mmartilleryammunitionnowpositionedforwardforthisfirstphaseofthebattle.Additionally,someTaskForcewarshipswerededicatedtosupporttheunits:Avengerwouldprovidenavalgunfirefor3Para;Glamorgan for45Commando;Yarmouth for42Commando;andArrow forspecial forces thatwouldbeconductingsomesmalloperationsclosertoStanley.Together,thesefourshipshad1400roundsfortheir4.5-inchgunstosupplementtheartilleryonland.8

Thompson’scommandershadhadplentyoftimetothinkaboutthemissionsbeforethemandtodevelopplansduringthefinaldaysofthesupplybuild-up.Theirunitsneverthelessfaceddauntingtasksastheyattackeduphill,overgenerallyunfamiliarandrockyterrain,andatnight.AlthoughsomehadexperiencedskirmisheswithArgentinesoverthepastweek,thiswouldbethefirstrealfightingformostunitssincearrivingonEastFalkland.Meanwhile,2ParawouldremaintheBrigadereserve.

Ascommandersfinalizeddetailsoftheirrespectiveportionsoftheplan,CommandoLogisticRegimentatAjax,initsnewrolesupportingbothbrigades,andbrigadesupportechelonsatTealInletandFitzroymaintainedaconstantflowofsuppliestoforwardpositions,usingtheDivision’shelicoptersinpreparationfor the finalattack.Therewereabout fortyhelicoptersofall typesavailableat thetime, including fourmoreWessexes that arrived at SanCarlos on 9 June aboard theRFA support shipEngadine.Hopes ofproviding scheduledmaintenance services to them,aswouldhavebeen strictly enforced inpeacetime,had long since vanished.Now, pilots pushed their helicopters to the limits. The single CH47 Chinook,which had been pressed so hard following the loss of the other heavy-lift helicopters aboard AtlanticConveyor, flew 109 hours without servicing.9 Since pilots flew virtually nonstop during the limiteddaylighthours,checksforleaksandstructuralcracksbecamelimitedtothosetimeswhenpilotsbroughttheirhelicoptersinforahotrefuel,oratnight.Checksatnight,madewiththeaidoflow-intensityred-

lensedflashlights,werenotalwayscapableofdetectingseriousfaults.Nonetheless,theBritishsucceededinmaintaininganear100percentoperational rateof theirhelicopters through to theendof thewar.‘Band-Aid fixes’ became more than a figurative expression for many helicopters, as masking tape wasusedtocoverbulletholes.Ifsomethingwasnotdamagedseverelyenoughtopreventtake-off,pilotstooktherisk.

TheBritishhadtakentoheartthesoberinglessonsofGooseGreen.Moorewasresolvednottostarttheattackbeforetherequiredsupportwasinplaceforhisbrigades.ExpectationsforcombatunitswerenodifferentthantheyhadbeenonD-Day.Eachmanwastocarrytwodaysofsuppliesandammunition.Allvehicles were to be topped off with fuel. The major difference was the deliberate build-up of artilleryammunitiontoprovideoverlappingcoverageoffireforbattalions.Previously,2Parahadgoneintobattleman-packingammunitionandonlyaportionof its organicmortars.Unitswouldbringall their organicweaponstobearonobjectivesthistime.Additionally,theBritishwouldpressalloftheir105mmartillerybatteriesintoaction.Theintentwasforeachbattaliontoreceivesupportfromatleastonebatteryofsixguns and possibly from another battery (for a total of twelve guns) at any one time, depending oncommitments.10Mooredirectedthattherebe500roundsofammunitionateverygunposition,backedupby 500 more rounds per gun in forward support areas at Teal Inlet and Fitzroy. Supplementing theartillerywouldbenavalgunfireandHarriergroundattackaircraft.TheRoyalEngineershadcompletedlandingplatformsandjetrefuellingcapabilityatSanCarloson5June.Harrierpilotscouldnowstayonstationlongertoprovidesupportbecausetheydidnothavetoreturntoshipstorefuelasbefore.Theplanwasforcombatunits inbrigadestohavetwodaysofsupply.EachFBMAwouldhaveanadditionaltwodays’onhand.BackingthemupwouldbethesupportareaatAjaxBay,nowthesustainmentbaseashorefor all land forces. Commodore Clapp remained prepared to provide additional resupply from ships inFalklandSoundoratseatotheForceMaintenanceAreaasneeded.HisLSLswouldbepushingsuppliesfromAjaxtotheFBMAsatTealInletandFitzroyonalternatingdaystokeepforwardareaswellstocked.

AconsiderableamountofammunitionhadalreadybeenshiftedforwardtoTealInletandFitzroybythetime the exact plan of attack became clear. Before the build-up was complete, Commando LogisticRegimentwouldmoveover1,000tonsofammunitiontoeachlocation,almostexclusivelybysea.ASeaKinghelicopter,afterall,couldcarryonlyaboutsixtyroundsof105mmammunitionperlift.Helicoptersbecameindispensable,however,inmovingammunitionfromtheforwardsupportareastogunpositions.Itwasaslowprocess.Anditbecameslowerstillattimes,whenunitsonthegroundtriedtoretainslingsandnetsfortheirownuseafterreceivingammunitionandothersupplies.TheBritishhadnotdeployedwithasmuchsling-loadequipmentastheywouldhave liked.Thefrustrationsamong logisticiansofnotgettingsling-loaditemsbackwouldcontinueasattacksstartedanditbecamenecessarytorelocatebothgunsandammunition.

Bythetimethebuild-upwascomplete,TealInletandFitzroyhadbothbecomehubsofactivity.ForwardarmingandrefuellingpointshadbeenestablishedateachlocationtoeliminatetheneedforhelicopterstoreturntoSanCarlos.Localsettlementspressedtheirequipmentintoservicetohelpsoldiers.Beforelong,tractorsandVolvotrackedvehicles,whichhadbecomethemostdesirablemeanstomovesupplies,hadchurnedthepeatintoseasofmud.By11June,thenowfamousRedandGreenLifeMachine,whichhadtaken considerable pride in its inter-service medical teams, had largely disbanded to relocate medicaltroops and surgical teams to Teal Inlet and Fitzroy so that increased lifesaving care and surgicalcapabilitieswouldbefarforwardtocareforcasualties.OnlyasinglesurgicalteamremainedatAjax.ThehospitalshipUgandawouldcomeclosetoshoreinthefinaldays,asaprecaution,toreceivecasualtiesifrequired.

Support plans for the two brigades were based on comparable principles. The bulk of 3 CommandoBrigade stockswould remain at Teal Inlet under control of the Commander, Transport Squadron fromCommando Logistic Regiment. From there, supplies would move, either by Rigid Raider boat or four-wheeldrive/trackedvehiclesfurthereasttoadistributionpointatEstanciaHouse,whereapproximatelysixtytonsofsupplieswerestashedandcamouflagedbeforetheattackcommenced.Combatunitsupportechelons, split between the Teal Inlet support base and the Estancia distribution point, would providesuppliestotheirrespectiveunitsfromthedistributionpoint.Together,theywouldtransportsuppliesbywhatever means they could overland from the distribution point, using the single-width muddy track.Helicopterswouldsupplementuniteffortswheneverpossible,bringingcasualtiesbackfromaidpoststofieldsurgicalteamsonreturnflights.Thebulkofstocksfor5BrigaderemainedatFitzroyundercontroloftheCommander,81Ordnance,whohadfurtherassistancefromasmallcommandpostfromCommandoLogistic Regiment. He and battalion quartermasters from 5 Brigade units would then coordinatemovementofsuppliestoadistributionpointatBluffCove,theinitiallocationoftheScotsGuards.Fromthere,theywouldtakesuppliesforwardtounitlocations.TheintentwastomovesuppliesbetweenFitzroyandBluffCovebothby landand sea. Thebridge crossing the inlet and connecting the settlement anddistributionpoint,however, stillwasunder repair fromdamagecausedbyArgentineexplosives.Roughseasincomingdaysalsowouldlimittheuseoflandingcrafttotransportsuppliestothedistributionpoint.ThesesituationsnecessitatedgreaterrelianceonhelicopterstoshiftsuppliesforwardfromFitzroy.Both5Brigadeand3CommandoBrigadeunitsobtainedsuppliesfromthedistributionpoint.Logisticianswouldattempttoorchestratethethroughputofsuppliesbyhelicopter,directfromtheforwardsupportbasetounitsorgunpositions,basedonhelicopteravailabilityandweather.

Rapierairdefenceswereinplaceandoperationalatbothforwardsupportbaselocationsbythistime,but the Argentines did not take action to disrupt the final build-up, either by air or on the ground.Argentine pilots attempted to attack 3CommandoBrigade’s distribution point at EstanciaHouse on a

coupleofoccasions,but they failed to find targetsbecauseof thecamouflagecommandoshaderected.Although Argentine pilots had inflicted heavy losses on the British Task Force during the past month,serious threats to British ground forces, except that during 2 Para’s fight at Goose Green, failed tomaterialize.ArgentineleadersneveremployedforcesonthegroundtodisrupttheinitialBritishbuild-upintheSanCarlosanchorageaftertheJune8airattacksatFitzroy,ornow,aslogisticianslabouredtogetsuppliestoforwardareas.

Argentina’shopesofdefeatingtheBritish,infact,hadvanished.Somesimplyhadnotrealizedit.Theyhadstartedwithmorethanatwo-to-onenumericaladvantageingroundforces.Nowbothsideshadabout9,000soldiersgettingreadytoconfronteachother.Argentina’sJuntahadforegonemanyopportunities.Itsability to inflict furtherdamagenowwassignificantly lessthan ithadbeen.NavalvesselsremainedberthedinmainlandportsaftertheintimidatingandcostlylossofGeneralBelgranoamonthbefore.Sincethen,ArgentinahadlostnearlyahundredplanesinattemptstobreakthroughBritishairdefences.Itwasbecomingclearthattheprizetheyhadsnatchedsoeffortlesslyfromareinforcedplatoonofmarineson2Aprilwasnowinjeopardy.Menendezhadsenthischiefofstafftothemainlandon8June,thesamedaythatArgentinepilotssetbacktheBritishatFitzroy,toaskGaltieritomakesomemoveattheBritishrearareastillatSanCarlos.WhenGaltierirefused,MenendezurgedhimtoacceptthetermsofUNResolution502 demanding an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands, but Galtieri againrefused.11NowMenendez’stroops,stilllargelyfacingsouthinandaroundStanley,wereabouttofeelthefullstrengthofMoore’s twocombatbrigadesandthesupportingarmsof theentireBritishTaskForce.Theassaultwouldstartwithferocitywhen3CommandoBrigadeunitsattackedinrapidsuccessionnotfromthesouthbutfromthewest.

IthadtakentheBritishalittleovertwomonthstogettothispoint,atacostofahalfdozenshipslostandmanymoredamaged,adozenplanesandhelicoptersdowned,andacouplehundredlives.TheeffortsofeverypersonintheTaskForcehadfocusedonsettingthestageforthebattleforStanley,whichtheBritishhadregardedfromearlyonasthecentreofgravityinwinningthewar.ThoseinvolvedinlogisticsoperationsatAscensionIslandorintheUnitedKingdomwereprobablyunawareofthat,orofwhatwasabout to transpire. Shipbuilders, stock handlers and lorry drivers back in England; frustrated cargohandlersswelteringintheheatofAscensionIsland;pilotsandgroundcrewswhohadkepttankersandresupply planes in the air; crews on a hundred ships both commercial and military; and countlesslogisticiansworkinginandoutoftheirspecialtiesthroughoutthetheatre–allhadcontributedtoalineofcommunicationthatnowstretchedfromdistributionpointsatEstanciaHouseandBluffCove8,000milesbacktotheUnitedKingdomtomakethebattlepossible.Ithadnotbeeneasygettingthisfar,andtheirjobswerenot yetdone,but therewasnodoubt that theyhad contributed immeasurably to theBritishvictorythatwasabouttoarrive.

Fromvantagepointsaway fromtheFalklands,anddecadesafter thewar, theshort-livedgroundwarprovidestheimpressionthattheBritishvictorywasnotonlyswiftbutalsoeasy.Thiscouldnotbefurtherfromthetruth.TheBritishwouldreachtheirplannedobjectives,butnotwithoutheroicfighting.Thus3CommandoBrigadewould not be ready to exploit their first successes uniformly across the front; norwould 5 Brigade be ready to begin its attack in the second phase of the Division’s plan to takeTumbledown Mountain and Mount William. The attack by 3 Para on Mount Longdon provides anillustrationofthedifficultiesthat3CommandoBrigadeunitsfacedthenightof11/12Junebothintermsof tactics and logistics. The fight for control of Mount Longdon would become the costliest groundengagementofthewar.

LieutenantColonelHewPike’splanfortakingMountLongdonwassimpleyetchallenging,andittookintofullaccounttheterrainandanticipatedenemypositions.Becausetherewasalargeminefieldtothesouth of Mount Longdon, it would not be possible for his units to outflank the Argentines from thatdirection without taking considerable risks. The mountain’s summit, on the west side, provided acommandingviewof thesurroundingopenground forseveral thousandmetres,both to thewest, fromwheretheBritishwouldattackundercoverofdarkness,andtotheeast,wheretheBritishwouldhavetoclear Argentines from fighting positions extending eastward to Wireless Ridge. Because the terrainsurroundingLongdonwasopen,paratrooperscouldbecomeexposedoncefightingstarted,particularlyiftheArgentineswereabletoilluminatethearea.TheBritishbelievedthattheArgentineswereholdingthesummitandthenorthridgeofMountLongdon.Pikeplannedtodedicateacompanytotakeeachoftheseareas,toholdhisthirdcompanyinreservetoassistasneededandtobepreparedtoexploitsuccesses.Thesupportcompanywouldestablishabaseoffirefromthewest/north-westtosupportattackinginfantrycompanies with mortars, machineguns and MILAN missiles. Pike’s paratroopers would be going upagainstmenfromtheenemy’s7thRegiment,whichwasknowntobeholdingWirelessRidgeaswell.Thefight for Mount Longdon was anticipated to be a tough one. After action reports indicated that theparatroopersconfrontedstrongdefencesmannedbyacompanyandreinforcedbyengineers,snipersandmachine-guncrews.Thefightforthesummitprovedtobethefiercest.

Logisticssupport for3Para’sattackwasorganizedwithbotha forwardandrearelement.Theunit’sregimentalaidpostwaslikewisesplitintoforwardandrearaidstationstoprovideforcontinuouscaretocasualties.Theforwardlogisticselementwastotravelwiththesupportcompanyonfootasitmovedtoestablish its fire support base. It consisted of stretcher-bearers,who carried ammunition forward atopstretchers,andtheforwardaidstationundercontroloftheRegimentalMedicalOfficer.Therearlogisticselement,undercontrolofthebattalion’sexecutiveOfficer,hadthebenefitoffivetrackedVolvovehicles,threeciviliantractorswithtrailersandfourcivilianLandRovers.Theywouldcarrythebulkofadditionalammunitionandsuppliesaswellastherearaidstation,whichincludedanextradoctoraswellasmedical

specialistsandsupplies.Thevehicleswouldnotgoforwarduntilthefightwasunderway,sothat3Para’sapproachmarchandattackcouldremainsilent.Complicatingmattersfor3Para’srearelementaswellasforothersin3CommandoBrigade,however,wasthelonebridgeovertheMurrellRiver.Thevehiclesof3Paracouldnotcrossthebridgeuntil45Commando,theunittoitsimmediatesouththatwouldattackTwoSistersjust2kmfromMountLongdon,hadcrosseditsstartlineaswell.ThompsonhadprescribedprecisetimesforhisunitstocrosstheirstartlinestosequencetheBrigadeattackproperly:3Para,tobeexact,wasscheduledtocrossitsstartlineat2001hrsthatevening,followedby45Commandoat2100hrs.12

Gettingtherearelementforwarddidnotseemtobeaproblem.Menhadtocarrytheirheavyloads5kmormoreovertheroughEastFalklandterrain inthedark justtoget fromassemblyareastostart lines.Fromstart lines,theyhadseveralmorekilometrestogotofindtheenemy.Needlesstosay,a lotcouldhappentocauseplanstounravelandtodelaysupportfromgettingacrossthebridge.

The bulk of Pike’s supportwas not only contingent upon 45Commando crossing its start line. If 45Commando’sattackonTwoSistersdidnotgofavourably,thenthatalsocouldaffect3Para’sabilitytogetits rear logistics element forward, sinceArgentinedefenders onTwoSisterswouldbe close enough toobserve it and call for fire. Likewise, if 3 Para’s attack on Mount Longdon did not go as planned,Argentinedefenderstherewouldremain inoverwatchpositionstodothesameto45Commando’srearelement.The twounitswereclearlydependentuponeachother forboth timelinessandsuccess.Assooftenhappensonbattlefields,frictiondisruptedplansandtimetables,butitdidnotstopBritishsuccessthatevening.

Pike’s paratroopers forded theMurrell River and crossed their start line only a few minutes behindschedule. As companies started toward their objectives in the dark, their paths inadvertently crossed,creatingsomeconfusion;andthen, lessthananhourafterunitscrossedthestart line,aplatoonleadersteppedonananti-personnelmine.Theexplosionended3Para’shopesofasilentapproachandattack.Withinminutes, as the support company and the forward logistics elementwere still en route to theirpositions, the fight was underway and 3 Para started taking casualties. Fighting would continuethroughout thenightasparatroopers foughtup thecraggyslopesofMountLongdon,oftenexposedbyillumination rounds fired by Argentine artillery. Meanwhile, 3 Para’s rear logistics element wasexperiencingsignificantdelaysgettingacrosstheMurrellBridge.OneofthecompaniesfromLieutenantColonelAndrewWhitehead’s45CommandodidnotreachitsstartlinefortheattackonTwoSistersuntil2300hrs,twohourslaterthanscheduled,whicheventuallyalteredthatcommando’splanforattackinginthesouth.Thedelaynowmeantthat3Para’srearlogisticselementcouldnotgetacrosstheMurrellRiveruntilwellaftermidnight.Bythen,3Parahadbeenfightingforoverthreehours.Whentherearportionofthe regimental aid post managed to join its forward counterpart at the base of Mount Longdon aftermidnight,thebattalionwasindireneedofmedicalsupportandsupplies.Twocompanymedicalassistantshadalreadybeenkilledonthemountainastheytriedtohelpthewounded.

ThebattalionhaddesignatedalandingsitejusttothewestoftheMurrellBridgeforhelicopterstopickup casualties in need of evacuation to 3 Commando Brigade’s field dressing station at Teal Inlet. Theforward aid post had been treating casualties for some time before the rear aid post arrivedwith thevehiclesneeded togetcasualties to thehelicopter-landingsite.Before first light,approximately twentycasualtieshadbeenevacuatedbyvehiclesfromtheregimentalaidpostatthebaseofMountLongdontothe landingsite, fromwhere theywere transported toTeal Inlet, initially in reconnaissancehelicoptersfittedwithnightvisiondevicesforflyinginthedark.EachbrigadehadbeenallocatedWessexhelicoptersspecificallytoassistinevacuationofcasualties.Theycouldcallthesehelicoptersforwardnow,usingtheirown radio nets and without coordinating with a higher headquarters, a different procedure from thatwhich had plagued 3 Commando Brigade during the Goose Green fight. Regrettably, the Wessexhelicopterswerenotequippedforflyingatnight.Byfirstlight,whentheseandotherhelicopterswithoutnight-flightcapabilitiescouldbeused,abacklogofcasualtiesawaitedevacuationatthelandingsite.

None of the helicopters providing evacuation from the battlefield to field dressing stations wereconfigured with equipment or personnel to provide continuous medical treatment for casualties. TheBritish had no pure medical evacuation helicopters with them. The light helicopters like Gazelles andScoutsflewpatientsinrearcompartmentsfromwhichseatshadbeenremoved.Spacewassorestrictedthatstretcherswouldnotfit.Aswasthecasewhentheyhurriedlycametotheaidof5Brigadefollowingair attacks atFitzroy,Britishhelicopterpilots landed, tookon casualtieswherever they couldand flewthemasdirectlyaspossible to thenearestdressingstation.Aircrewmendidwhateverpossible to lookafter casualties en route. Not being trained medics, though, they could render little assistance.Fortunately,distancestofielddressingstationsatbothTealInletandFitzroywerelessthan20km,evenfromthemostdistantofobjectives. (Thebodiesof those less fortunatewhohadbeenkilledoutrightorwhohaddiedfromwoundswereisolatedfromtheinjuredand,astimepermitted,normallyevacuatedonvehiclesheadingoverlandtorearareas.)Evadingartilleryfirebecameachallengeinitselfforhelicopterpilots,asArgentinefieldartilleryobserversatopsurroundinghillsspottedtheminthedaylightandcalledfor fire.Consequently, thesightingofBritishhelicopters landing toevacuatecasualtiesoftenpromptedshellingfromArgentineartilleryabletorangetheMountLongdonareafromStanley.

By late morning, having fought all night over the crags and through the rocky crevasses of MountLongdon in, around and through positions that Argentines had been preparing for over a month, theparatroopershadwon.But3Paranowfounditselfthetargetofwell-plannedanddiscouraginglyaccurateartilleryandmortar fire,making itdifficult toexploit theirhard-fought success towardWirelessRidge.Thebattaliondidnotreceivetheordertocontinuetheattackthatday.Hadtheyreceived it, it is likelythattheywouldhaveadvancedfurtheronlywithdifficultyandaftersomereconstitution.Thefighttotake

MountLongdonhadcost3Para seventeen lives andover fortywounded.Holdingon to it for thenextforty-eighthourswouldcost themanother six lives, asparatroopers fell victim tocontinuingArgentineartilleryattacks.Someof them,ascommonlycited inreports followingthewar,werestretcher-bearersandothermedicalpersonnel tryingtoevacuateortreat thewounded.Theafteractionreportof3Parafollowingthewarrevealsthedifficultyunitsfacedgettingthewoundedfurthertotherear:ofthetwenty-threeparatrooperswhodiedtakingorconsolidatingtheirpositiononMountLongdon,eighteenlosttheirlivesbeforearrivingattheregimentalaidpost.13GiventheremarkablemedicaltrainingtheunitreceivedaboardshipwhenenroutetotheFalklands,whichgaveindividualstheconfidenceandabilitytotakecareofthemselvesandothersonthebattlefield,theexperienceof3ParaonMountLongdonaccentuatesthedifficultyof extractingcasualties frompointsof injury to locations for further treatmentorevacuation,evenwhen the distance to those locations is only amatter of several hundredmetres. The battalion’sforwardmedicalstationwaslocatedagainsttherockybaseofLongdon,justashortwalkfromthesummitonanormalday,perhaps.Thatevening,itprobablyseemedlikemilesaway.

Fights on adjacent mountains had progressed to quicker conclusions than on Mount Longdon thatevening,andlosseswereconsiderablyless.Menin45CommandopreparingtoattacktheadjacentTwoSisterswitnessedthefierceFightingunderwaytotheirnorth,asdidtheArgentinestheywereabouttoassault.LieutenantColonelWhitehead,thecommanderof45Commando,hadplannedtheattackonTwoSisters so that one of his companieswould attack first to seize thehighgroundon thewestern slope,thereby fixing the enemy’s attention on that direction. Once on the high ground there, that companywouldprovideabaseoffireforthecommando’smaineffort,consistingoftwocompaniesattackingfromthenorth-west. The company thatwas to initiate the attack, however,was the same one that failed toreach its start lineuntil threehoursafter theappointed time, therebydelaying logisticalelementsof3Para fromcrossing theMurrellRiverBridge.Themen in that companyhadbeen strugglingunder theweightofMILANmissilelaunchersanddozensofmissilestoreachtheirstartlineattheappointedtime.Theunithadplannedforathree-hourapproachmarch.Insteadittookthemtwiceaslongtotraversetherough Falklands terrain in the dark with their loads. When the company arrived around 2300 hrs,Whiteheadoptedtohavehiscompaniesattacksimultaneously.Theydidsotoverygoodeffect.Withinalittle over four hours, his men had fought their way up the western slope of Two Sisters and clearedArgentines from positions extending eastwards on TwoSisters toward Tumbledown. Artillery fire frombothsideswasheavyduringtheattack.ThecommandosconfrontedpreplannedArgentineartilleryfire,just like that which paratroopers on Mount Longdon were experiencing, once they overran enemypositions.Argentine indirect firehadaparticularlydevastatingeffecton thecommandos, though.FourmendiedduringthetakingofTwoSisters,allfelledbyArgentineartilleryormortarbombardments.TenotherswerewoundedthroughouttheFightingthatnight.

ThesuccessofLieutenantColonelNickVaux’s42CommandoonMountHarriet,2kmto thesouthofTwo Sisters, was no less impressive. After spending nearly two weeks patrolling and battling theelements, men from 42 Commando implemented a bold plan to outflank the Argentine defenders. Hisunitsplannedtocrosstheirstartlineat2030hrs.VauxhadreceivedpermissionfromThompsontoforegoa silent attack by using preparatory artillery fire on enemy positions on the mountain to distract theArgentinesfromhisrealintentions.Asthatwasbeingimplemented,oneofhiscompanieswastocreateadiversion to thewestofMountHarrietashisother two,havingskirted themountain to thesouthonalongapproachmarch,attacked fromtheeast into theenemyrear.Thedistance from itsassemblyareanearMountChallenger to the start lineeastofMountHarriet in theWelshGuards sectorwas7km. Itwouldseemliketwicethatdistance,though,becausetheroutecrossedseverallongstoneruns,slowingmovementconsiderablyandmakingitdifficulttokeepquiet.Toensuremenwouldhaveback-upsuppliesduring the attack, the commando formed a 34-man ‘portage troop’ from its headquarters company tocarry ammunition and critical equipment and to be prepared to backhaul any casualties. The ad hoctransport troop consisted of administrative specialists, cooks and whoever else was available and nototherwisedirectlyinvolvedintheFighting.During42Commando’sFightforMountHarriet,thishumansupplytraintrailedthetwocompaniesinthesouthbyaboutanhourtogetinpositiontosupportVaux’smain effort.14 During that approach march, commando companies would cross 5 Brigade’s boundarybeforeturningnorthtoattackobjectivesonMountHarriet.Accordingly,itwasagreedbeforehandthatareconnaissanceplatoonfromtheWelshGuardswouldsecurethestartlineforthemarinesandguidetheminitiallyontheirfinalapproach.Theguardsmenwerenotattheappointedplaceforthelink-up,though,which delayed the attack for over an hour. Nonetheless, Vaux’s plan worked to perfection. Thediversionary attack from the west fixed Argentine attention, while the other two companies surpriseddefencesfromtherear.Bydaylight,aftereighthoursofFighting,42Commandohadseizeditsobjectiveat the loss of only a single commando and thewounding of twenty others. In attacking from the east,Vaux’smenhadcutofftheescaperouteofthesurpriseddefenders.Asadirectresult,theycaptured300prisonersfromthedefendingArgentine4thInfantryRegiment,includingitscommandingOfficer.15

Bydaylight,3CommandoBrigadehadsecuredallof itsobjectives.Unitshadreceivedsustainedandexceptionally effective naval gunfire from Woodward’s Battle Group. The destroyer Glamorgan andfrigatesYarmouthandAvengerfiredhundredsofhighexplosiveroundsinsupportofthegroundattacks.Unfortunately,thesupportwasnotgivenwithoutsignificantcost.AssomecommandoswereFightinguptheslopesofthemountains,theywitnessedaland-basedExocetmissilefiredfromtheoutskirtsofStanleyslamintothesideofGlamorgan.Althoughtheshipsurvived,adozensailorsdidnotandanotherdozenwerewounded.16 She became the final ship casualty suffered by the RoyalNavy.Woodward had beenconcernedforsometimeabouthisshipsbeingvulnerabletoland-basedExocets.Hisconcernsprovedto

bevalid.Anhourlater,theRoyalAirForcecompleteditsseventhBlackBuckbombingrun.Althoughalltwenty-one bombs missed their intended targets, there can be no doubt that the impacts rattled thenervesofArgentinesinStanley,particularlyamidstthereportsthatLongdon,TwoSistersandHarriethadfallentotheBritish.

Thompsondecidednot tohavehiscommandersexploit theirhard foughtsuccessesbycontinuingtheattack toward their secondary objectives, feeling that they would become unnecessarily exposed ifattackingindaylight.Thebrigadealsoneededtore-stockgunlineswithammunition.Hehadrelocatedhisreservebattalion,2Para,fromitspreviousareanearMountKenttoMountLongdonduringthenight.After a15kmmarchwithequipment, paratrooperswere soondigging inon thewestern sideofMountLongdon. It became clear soon after daylight, though, that Argentines, particularly those atopTumbledown Mountain, had not only spotted the 3 Commando Brigade units but were able to bringeffectivemortarandartilleryfireuponthem.Accordingly,Thompsonorderedhisunitstoconsolidateneartheir objectives andprepare for possible counter-attacks.Although there are some indications that theArgentine Army’s central command post in Stanley ordered several counter-attacks for that day, nonematerialized. That provided units with the opportunity to evacuate their casualties from the threemountains and get their support echelons forward with needed resupply. Additionally, it permittedhelicopterpilotstostartthetime-consumingprocessofrelocatingartillerybatteriesforthenextphaseofthebattleandre-stockinggunlineswithammunitionfromback-upstocksatTealInlet.

Major General Moore had monitored the 3 Commando Brigade engagements closely from the smallforward headquarters he had established at Fitzroy. He had hoped to continue attacks withoutinterruption on to Tumbledown Mountain, Mount William and Wireless Ridge, thereby hastening asituation in which Argentines would be forced to surrender. Meanwhile, 5 Brigade had sought anextensionsothattheycouldcompleteplansforattackandtheforwardstockingofartilleryammunition,whichMooregranted.Forthenextday,effortsrefocusedonshiftingequipmentandsuppliesforthenextphaseofthebattle,andontakingcareofimmediateunitrequirements.Allavailablehelicopterslabouredtoreplenishammunitionforartillerybatteriesdispersedthroughoutthebattlearea.Limitationsoncargoloadswentbythewayside,astheyhaddonesooftenoverthepastseveralweeks.Asonepilotputit,‘Wejustkeptpullingat the stick to see if theaircraftwouldcomeup. Ifnot,we threwoff aboxand triedagain.’17BecausebrigadesupportbasesatTealInletandFitzroyhadestablishedhelicopterarmingandrefuellinglocationsbythistime,pilotsdidnothavetoflythehundredmilestoAjaxandbackforfuel,astheyhadsomanytimestheweekbeforeduringtheinitialforwardbuild-up.

Suppliesmoved forwardon thesurfaceaswell,particularly from3CommandoBrigade’sunits in thenorth, since they had consumed considerable amounts of small arms ammunition and other suppliesduringtheirFights.TheBrigade’ssupportbaseatTealInletcontinuedtomovesuppliesforwardtothedistributionpointatEstanciabothbyvehicleandRigidRaiderboat.Fromthere,unitsupportechelonspickedupsuppliesandtransportedthemtoforwardlocationsalongthesingletrackcrossingtheMurrellBridge.Whileresupplybygroundwasunderway,thebridgeovertheMurrellRivercollapsedundertheweightofanarmouredrecoveryvehicleladenwithammunition,therebyclosing3CommandoBrigade’sonlylandsupplyroute.RoyalEngineershadbeenlabouringinpreviousdaystorepairthebridgeacrosstheinletconnecting5Brigade’ssupplybaseatFitzroywithitsdistributionpointatBluffCove.Now,theyfocusedonthisnewprobleminthenorth.Theengineersbuiltanair-portablebridgeatFitzroytoreplacetheonedamagedacrosstheMurrellRiverandflewittherebyChinooktoreopen3CommandoBrigade’ssupplyroute.

With the local populace continuing to provide tractors andmanpower to shuttle supplies, unitswereagainpoisedtoresumetheoffensive.Argentinepilotsmadetwo lastattemptsduringthefinalhoursofpreparationtodisruptBritishplans,buttheywerenotsuccessful.Inthefirstattempt,duringthedayof13 June,Skyhawksattackedthe3CommandoBrigadeheadquartersnearMountKentand2Paraat itsnewposition nearMount Longdon; they damaged three helicopters but produced no additionalBritishcasualties.Then,laterthatnight,HarriersinterceptedArgentineplanesattemptinganotherraid,downingoneofthem.

Theplan for thenextphasewouldget5Brigade into thegroundwar for the first time.The2ScotsGuardswouldstartitoffbyattackinganestimatedtwocompaniesfromthe5thMarineBattalion,reputedto be the best Argentine unit in the Falklands, on Tumbledown Mountain. Assuming success by theGuards,the1/7GurkhaswouldfollowtoattackMountWilliam.Inthenorth,2Para,stilloperatingunderthe command and control of 3 Commando Brigade, would assault Wireless Ridge. With these threeobjectives taken, theDivisionwould thencontinueattackingArgentine forces intoStanley. If itbecamenecessary,responsibility fortakingthetownwouldshift toThompson.He intendedanothermulti-phaseattack.Itwouldstartwith3ParasecuringareasaroundtheoldracecourseonthewestsideofStanley.Then45CommandowouldseizeSapperHillandpassthrough42CommandotosecureareasimmediatelytothesouthofStanley.TheWelshGuardswouldrevertbacktohiscontrolandsecureareastothesouth-eastof thecapital,cuttingoffaccess to theairport.TheBritishwouldnowhavesurroundedStanleytoforceasurrender,hopefullywithouthavingtoFightinthetownitselfandputciviliansatrisk.

Brigadier Wilson issued orders to his three battalions on the afternoon of 12 June. The timing andsuccessofthefightforTumbledownaffectedtheotherattacks.Argentineforcesonthatmountainwouldbeableto influenceactionontheadjacentMountWilliamandonWirelessRidge, justa fewkilometresnorth. If the ScotsGuards did not achieve their objectives by daylight, then 2 Para onWirelessRidgewouldbeexposedandvulnerable toArgentinemarinesremainingonTumbledown.TheArgentineshadviewed Tumbledown from the start as a key to the defence of Stanley because it so dominated other

surroundinghills.Accordingly,theyhadpreparedastiffdefensivenetworkonthemountainandlitteredapproachrouteswithmines.TheBritishhadlittlehopeofavoidingthefullforceofArgentinedefences.Thenorthfaceofthemountainyieldedsharpdrop-offs,significantlylimitinganyapproachfromthatside.OtherArgentinedefendersonMountWilliamtotheeastprotectedthatflankandmaintainedobservationoverthemoreopenterraintothesouthofTumbledown.All thisenabledtheArgentinestoconcentratetheirdefencesinthewestandsouth.Consequently,LieutenantColonelMikeScott,commanderof2ScotsGuards, planned to attack Tumbledown directly from the west, with three of his companies passingthrougheachotherasthefightprogressedtomaintainmomentuminreachingthetopofTumbledown.His reconnaissanceplatoonreinforcedwitha troopof twoScorpionsand twoScimitarswouldcreateadiversionaryattacktothesouthonthemostlikelyapproachroute.HehadnotreceivedmuchintelligenceaboutArgentinebattlepositions,though.Thediversionwouldstartat1900hrson13June,withthemainattackcommencingtwohourslater.Britishartillery,navalgunfireandHarrierspoundedTumbledownonthedayoftheattack.

When thediversionstarted, theplatoonof slightlymore than thirtyguardsmen initiallyhaddifficultylocating the enemy. Once they did, they encountered fierce resistance from Argentines in dozens ofbunkersdesignedtoblockanyapproachtoStanleyfromthesouth.Beforetheengagementwasover,theywerefightingfortheirlivesastheystruggledtowithdraw,eventuallyfindingthemselvesinaminefield,where Argentines then tried to target them with artillery fire. What was intended as a diversion hadprovenverycostly.Twowerekilled;adozenwerewounded.OneoftheScorpionarmouredvehiclesfromthe Blues and Royals hit an anti-tank mine and had to be abandoned. The next day, sappers woulddiscover fifty-seven mines embedded in the ground near the Scorpion as they tried to recover thevehicle.18

Asthisplatoonwastryingdesperatelytoextricateitselffromtheminefield,themainattackcommencedfrom thewest.Theguardsmenreached their firstobjectivewithoutmuchcontact.Then,as thesecondphasebeganandcompaniesstartedpassingforward,theyencounteredheavydefencesshelteredbyrocksandcragstothetopofTumbledown.TheScotsGuardsdidnotreachthesummituntil0600hrs,atwhichtimetheyfacedmoreArgentinesfiercelyresistingfromotherfightingpositions.Finally,aftertenhoursoftoughcombat,muchofitatclosequarters,theScotsGuardsgainedcontrolofTumbledown.LieutenantColonel Scott had ordered hismennot towear their helmets during the attack, although they carriedthemontheirpacksfortheexpectedartilleryfirethatwouldfollowwhentheyreachedtheirobjectives–his thought being that wearing the more distinctive berets would help morale and also aid inidentification.Atleastoneofhisplatooncommanderssustainedseriousheadwoundsduringthefighting.It is perhaps surprising that many others did not. Although aid stations were echeloned, getting thewoundeddownthemountainsidesothattheycouldbetreatedandevacuatedplaguedtheguardsmenjustas ithadthecommandostwonightsprevious.TheywouldlosetwomoretomortarfireasmentriedtoretrievetheirwoundedcomradesaftertheArgentineshadfled.19Ninemenlosttheirlives;anotherforty-three were wounded. Fully half of all those killed or wounded were Officers, warrant Officers ornoncommissionedOfficers,acleartestamenttothesehavingledfromthefront.20Thisfighthadbeenatoughone,too.

Meanwhile, the men of 1/7 Gurkha Rifles had been freezing as they waited in an area west ofTumbledownthroughoutthenightforwordthattheScotsGuardshadtakentheirobjectives.Theplanhadbeen for them to pass through the guardsmen after Tumbledownwas secure. Although they had beenwithoutrationresupplyfortwodays,theproudGurkhasremainedpoisedtostarttheiradvancetowardMountWilliam.ThedurationoftheScotsGuards’attackmeant,however,thatiftheywaitedmuchlongerthey would be attacking Mount William in daylight. Therefore Wilson ordered them to move out on adifferent route. They were circling Tumbledown under cliffs to the north when they encountered aminefield. An Argentine forward observer detected the formation and called for fire support, whichinjured eight of theGurkhas. As fightingwaned on Tumbledown and daylight approached, they finallyreachedtheeastsideofTumbledownandpreparedtoassaultWilliam,onlytodiscovermostArgentineshad already fled. After brief skirmishes resulting in no further casualties, they soon were atop MountWilliam.Afterthewar,theircommandershowedhisgoodhumourbycreditinghismenwiththecollapseofthedefences:

Ourboyswerenotjust‘disappointed’atnothittingtheenemy,theywerelivid,butitissomeconsolationthatweheardlaterfromseveralsources(rarelyadmittedinthepress)thatitwasourarrivalonthebattlefieldfromthenorthinthewaythatwedidthatcausedthefinalcollapse.Iamnottooconfidentthatthatisso,butwecertainlycontributedtotherout.TheArgieswere scared stupid of the Gurkhas and the former’s rapid disappearance from the battlefield was probably the best, andcertainlythemostnicelytimeddecisionoftheirwar.21

Bythistime,2ParahadoverwhelmedtheArgentinesonWirelessRidge.TheparatroopershadlearnedmanylessonsfromtheirfightatGooseGreen,where,throughnofaultoftheirown,theydidnothavethebenefit of much supporting fire. Lieutenant Colonel David Chaundler could now enjoy an extensiveartillerypreparationtoprecedehisattackingsoldiers.UnlikehispredecessorH.JonesatGooseGreen,hehadtwobatteriesofartillerywiththousandsofroundstosupporthisbattalionforthisfight.Theattackby2Parawouldbe‘noisy’,withpreparatoryfirestartingbeforemencrossedtheirstartlines.Inadditiontotheartillery,thefrigateAmbuscadewithher4.5-inchguns,allofthebattalion’sorganicmortars,supportplatoonswithbunker-bustingMILANmissilesandmachineguns,andarmouredvehicleswouldsupporttheattack,whichwasplannedinfourphases.CompanieswouldstarttheirattacksfrompositionsnorthofWirelessand,after reaching firstobjectives, turneastwardsandcontinueattacking fromthewestovertheridge.PreparatoryfirepoundedArgentinepositionsasparatroopersstartedcrossingstart linesjust

after2100hrson13June.Oneaccountindicatesthattheartilleryfiredsomuchammunitionduringtheparatroopers’ attack that helicopters fitted with night vision devices had to keep ammunition flowingbetweenforwardsupplypointsandgunlines;andthat,asthefightprogressedtothetopoftheridge,thetanks of the Blues and Royals had to go back to rear supply points themselves to replenish the largequantities of ammunition they had expended.22 The barrage of fire demoralized Argentine defenders.Soon theywere abandoningpositions in an attempt to survive, often leaving their equipment in place.Althoughcompaniesfacedsomeresistance,thecombinationofheavysupportingfireandanaggressiveground attack soon overcame Argentine defences. As paratroopers succeeded in closing ranks, theremainingdefendersbrokeandran.Whenthefightingended,2Parahadsufferedthreekilledandelevenwounded.Estimates ofArgentine casualtieswere 25 killed and125wounded, the vastmajority by theeffectivesupportingfire.

ThelastshotsofthewarwouldcomeonSapperHill.WithTumbledownandWilliamnowsecure,WilsonorderedLieutenantColonelJohnnyRickett,thecommanderof1WelshGuards,toattackandsecurethatpiece of ground. Two companies from 40Commando reinforcedRickett’s battalion.Helicoptersmovedthem to two different landing zones in the vicinity of Sapper Hill. Those landing at the first foundthemselvesonatractoflandsurroundedbyminefields.HelicopterserroneouslylandedotherstoofartotheeastinfullviewofthefewArgentinedefendersstillonthehill.ThreeArgentineswerekilledinabrieffirefight. The rest quickly abandoned their positions and fled toward Stanley. The Welsh Guards andcommandoshadsecuredSapperHilldespitetheerrantlandings.Thefightingwasover.

Bydaylight,Britishunits started to seeArgentines retreating indisarray throughout thebattlefields.TheirattacksclearlyhadsucceededinoverthrowingdefencesandcreatingnearpanicinArgentineranks,despitetheheroicresistanceofsome.AlthoughsomeBritishartillerybatterieswerenowdowntojustafew rounds, they would not need to hurry to re-stock gun lines. Those who could view the groundstretchingfromsurroundinghilltopstoStanleyrealizedthatthefightingwasover.Beforelong,hundredsofArgentinesoldiersweredroppingtheirweapons,discardingotherequipmentandfleeingtowardsthecapital.

FortheinhabitantsofStanley,ithadbeenaterrifyingfourdays.Mosthadfledforsafetytomakeshiftbunkersinbasements,crawlspaces,underporchesorinotherprotectedareas.Althoughtheyknewthebattle for themountainswasunderway, theyhadno ideahow itwasgoing.Argentine155mmartilleryrattledtheirhousesasitfiredlargeshellstowardthemountainsattheadvancingBritish.Thesoundsofbattlehadbecomedeafening.Themountains,quitevisiblefrommanyplacesinStanleyoncleardays,nowwere obscured by smoke and dust from the constant shelling by the opposing forces. Argentines hadtakenuppositionsinandaroundhousesandbuildingsaswellasonrooftopsinStanley.BritishHarriershad become a common sight for residents as pilots flew nearly nonstop trying to destroy or soften upArgentine positions. Naval gunfire had been pounding areas around the town to eliminate other keydefences.Unfortunately,errantBritishshellsalsostrucksomehousesinthetown,killingthreeresidents.

IthadnotbeeneasyforeitherthemilitaryorthepeopleofStanley.FortheBritishTaskForce,thetwomonthssincetheyhaddepartedtheUnitedKingdomhadbeenespeciallydifficult.Hundredsonbothsideshad lost their livesorbeenwounded.Stillmorewoundedwaitedonmountainslopes tobe treatedandevacuated.Now,asvictors,theBritishwereabouttotransitiontooneofthemostdifficultphasesinwar–whenfightingmenhavetoworktoimplementadisciplinedpeaceinacommunityravagedbywar.Theyhadtheadvantageofknowingthat thecitizensofStanleywouldwelcometheirarrival;but thosesamecitizensalsoneededtheirhelp,asdidthousandsofdefeatedanddejectedArgentines.ThetransitionandultimatereturntonormalcyinStanleywouldbringadditionalchallengesandconcernsforthewar-wearyBritishand,inparticular,forthemenoflogisticsandsupportunits.

A

Chapter11

AftertheSurrender

lthoughmilitaryunitswereadheringtoaceasefirebythelatemorningof14June,Argentinahadnotsurrendered.GaltieriwaspressuringBrigadierGeneralMenendeztolaunchacounter-attack.British special forces, however, using the local hospital radio network, had made contact with

Argentines in Stanley in the hope of encouraging a surrender while the battle for the mountains wasraging. Communications eventually reached Menendez, who agreed to discuss matters. Special forcesthereforearrangedasecretsessionlaterthatdaytosetthestageforameetingbetweenMenendezandMajorGeneralMoore.Earlier,perhapsinanticipationofsuchabreakthrough,Moorehadinstructedbothof his brigadiers to halt their brigade movements toward Stanley after securing the high ground. Hewantedtoavoidafightinthecapitalitselfifatallpossible.Thesameafternoon,BrigadierThompsonwithseveral of his staff walked into Stanley from the west and noticed a British helicopter overhead. HerecognizeditascarryingLieutenantColonelMichaelRose,Commander22SASRegiment,andsuspectedthatnegotiationswereunderway.Rose, in fact,wasentering the townonaprearranged route tomeetwithMenendezanddiscussconditionsforsurrender.TheArgentinegeneralunderstoodthehopelessnessofthesituation,andat1830hrsRoseadvisedMoorethatMenendezwaswillingtosurrender.Meanwhile,AdmiralFieldhouseandothersinLondonanxiouslyawaitedtheoutcome.

Afterabreakinthewintrysquallsthatevening,specialforcesspiritedMooreintoStanleytoacceptthesurrender on the second floor of the Secretariat Building, which had been serving as Argentineheadquartersduringthewar.Menendezwaswaitinginneatlypresseduniformandshinedshoeswhenasmallishmanindirtybattleuniformwalkedupthestairs.ItwasMoore,lookingmorelikethevanquishedthanthevictor.Themeetingbetweenthetwogeneralsdidnotlastlong.Menendezobjectedtotheuseoftheterm‘unconditionalsurrender’andsopennedhisowncorrectionbeforefinallysigningthedocument,whichbecameeffectiveat2130hrsthatevening.Accordingtotheagreement,Argentineunitswouldkeeptheir flags, officerswould retain their firearms, commanderswould remain in chargeof their troops, amixedworkinggroupbetweenthetwoforceswould formtoresolvepersonneland logistics issues,andprisoners would be grouped near the airport until they could be transported back to Argentina. TheBritishwouldsoonlearnthatArgentinemilitaryleadersexercisednomoredisciplineovertheirunitsthanthey had during the occupation. Most, in fact, would remove insignias to mask their ranks. Moore’stransmissionbacktoAdmiralFieldhousefollowingthesignaturethateveningwasbrief:

IN PORT STANLEY AT 9 O’CLOCK PM FALKLAND ISLANDS TIME TONIGHT THE 14 JUNE 1982, MAJOR GENERALMENENDESSURRENDEREDTOMEALLTHEARGENTINEFORCES INEASTANDWESTFALKLAND,TOGETHERWITHTHEIR IMPEDIMENTA. ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN HAND TO ASSEMBLE THE MEN FOR RETURN TO ARGENTINA, TOGATHERTHEIRARMSANDEQUIPMENT,ANDTOMAKESAFETHEIRMUNITIONS.THEFALKLANDISLANDSAREONCEMOREUNDERTHEGOVERNMENTDESIREDBYTHEINHABITANTS.GODSAVETHEQUEEN.

ThesuccinctnessofMoore’smessagetoFieldhousebeliedtheenormityofthetasksnowfacinghimandhisseniorcommanders.

Falklanders had no idea that the British Land Force commander was in their midst. Most remainedsecludedintheirhomesorshelters,stillfearfulfortheirlives.Havinggrownaccustomedtothesoundofexplosions for several weeks, they suddenly sensed an eerie silence enveloping Stanley. None graspedwhat had just happened. After the signing, Moore turned to Patrick Watts, who had been in theSecretariatwhenthegeneralarrived,andaskedwherehecouldmeetsomelocals.Wattswastheradiobroadcasterwhohadprovidedupdatesduringtheinvasion,untiltheArgentinesshutdowntransmissions.HetoldMoorethatoverahundredpeoplehadtakenrefugeintheFalklandIslandCompany’sWestStorein the towncentre, thenheadedto thestore to tell themthewarwasoverandMoorewasonhisway.Wattshadbarelyarrived,atabout2220hrs,whenMoorewalkedinandtoldeveryonehewassorryithadtaken him so long to get to Stanley. Soon locals in the store hoisted the smallish general atop theirshoulders and gave him a drink.1 News about the end of the war spread quickly around the smallcommunity.

Aftervisitingthelocalhospitaltomeetmorelocals,MoorementionedtoWattsthathewouldappreciateacupoftea.Theywenttotheresidencethebroadcastersharedwithhismother,whereallrelaxedwithsometeaandcakes.BeforethegeneralheadedtoGovernmentHouseforthenight,hedeclaredittobe‘thebestdammedcuppaI’vehadsinceIsetout’.Thecivilityofthisgatheringbeliedthechaosthatwasbrewingoutsideonthestreetsofthecapital.

By then, a handful of others had arrived in Stanley to join Moore, including Colonel Ian Baxter, hisdeputychiefofstaffforlogistics,whohadtheuniqueexperienceofdraftingthetermsofsurrenderthatMoorepresented toMenendez.Hearrived viahelicopter on the sameprearranged route about twentyminutes after Moore. It would have been a surreal scene had anyone been there to observe the Britsdisembarktheirhelicoptersinbattleuniformsthateveningandwalkacrossthesportsfieldonwhichtheyhadlanded.SomeArgentinesoldiersweremillingaround,stillarmed,asotherscontinuedtostraggleontothestreetsfromthesurroundinghills.Andalthoughtheysurelyanticipatedtheywouldfinddamage,it

musthavebeenparticularlysurrealandunnervingforthenewlyarrivedBritstoseethecarnage,filthanddisorderthencharacterizingthecapital.

Walkingfromthelandingareaacrossthemuddysportsfieldthatevening,Baxtercouldseedozensofshipping containers on side streets, their doors openand their insides stuffedwith things like sides ofbeef and bacon, bottles of olive oil, cases of wine, clothing and other items clearly different from thesuppliesArgentineconscriptsoldiersinthefieldhadbeenreceiving.Butsomecontainersalsowerefilledwithcratesofrationpacksthathadnevermadeittothefrontlines.NowArgentinesoldierswerelootingthese containers, taking whatever they wanted. Vehicles packed streets that were ankle-deep in mud.Weapons,ammunition,deadmen,occasionalbodypartsanddebrislitteredthetown.Evenmorestartling,perhaps,wasthecompletedegradationofsanitation.Argentine leadershadnotenforcedbasicsanitarymeasuresinunitsduringtheiroccupation;forceshadbuiltnofieldlatrinesinthetwoandahalfmonthssincetheinvasion.Soldiersthereforehadbeendefecatingwhereverandwhenevertheypleased–onthestreets,inthetownhall,inthehospital,thepostoffice,onjetties,invirtuallyallpublicplacesaswellasinhouseswhere theywerestaying.Artillery, cannon fireandbombs,coupledwithArgentinesabotage,hadcrippledlocalservices,includingplumbing.Permeatingtheairwasthestenchofgarbage,carcassesrotting in freezers without power at the town’s slaughterhouse, dead bodies and human excrement. Iftherewasanymomentofpeaceandquietinthescenebeforethenewarrivals, itwaswhentheysawawhitehorsetetheredneartheSecretariatBuildingeatinggrass.Thefollowingday,theywoulddiscoverthatsomeonehadshotthehorsedead.Stanleyhadbecomeahorribleplace.

Shelling in past days had left several houses and buildings aflame. Now, as they learned of thesurrender,somefrustratedArgentinesaddedtothechaosbysettingfiretootherhouses,astoreandthedockyard.The local firebrigademannedbyresidentssprang intoactionandtried itsbest todousetheflames.Reportedly,otherfrustratedArgentinessetboobytrapsinhousesandbuildings.Althoughpeacewasathand,orderinthecapitalwasstillfaraway.

WithgovernmentnolongerexistingintheFalklands,responsibilityforcontrollingthesituationandforrestoringordernowfellsquarelyontoMoore’sshoulders.Hewouldbeinchargeforthenearterm,notjust of the needs of his land forces but also of the civilian population throughout the islands and over8,000Argentineprisonerscrowdingintoatownwithanormalpopulationofbarelyathousand.Afterthesurrender that evening, Moore instructed Baxter to coordinate with Menendez for the handling ofprisoners.

Meanwhile, 5 InfantryBrigadeand3CommandoBrigadehad stopped their advanceas theyawaitednewsof the surrender.Someunitswereanxious tobe the first to enter thebeleaguered town.Moore,however,didnotwantthesituationinStanleytobeexacerbatedbyaninfluxofseveralthousandBritishtroops.HehadinstructedWilsontopreparehisunitstoreturntotheFitzroyarea.Thompson’smenhadreachedthe town limitson14 June.Hiscommanders thenstartedseekingshelter for theirmenonthewesternedgeofStanley,and2Paraand3Paratookuppositionsinthegrandstandsoftheracecourseandin huts and houses on the outskirts of town. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux, the Commander 42Commando, discovered a seaplane hangar as he looked for temporary quarters for his men and theremadeagruesomediscovery:

Entering the sea-planehangarwas likewalkingundera vegetable strainer.Everywherenarrow shafts of light speared thegloomthroughmyriadpuncturesfromaclusterbombstrike.Insidewastheanticipatedsqualor.Itbecamequicklyapparentthatthiswouldbeworsethanusualasthetwocompaniesbegantocleanup.Auseful-lookingwheelbarrowunderatarpaulinturned out to contain a dismembered corpse. On a balcony upstairs was a pile of amputated limbs from which the blooddrippeddownontothefloorbelow.Outsidemorebodieswerepiledtogetherinthemud.Wegraduallycametorealizethatthishadbeenamacabremortuary.2

ThehangareventuallyhousedtwoofVaux’scompanies,oncetheyhadcleanedupthemess.Afterweeksof operating in the open, often in harshweather,British troopswelcomedwhatever shelter they couldfind.Thedayafterthesurrender,MooreselflesslydubbedBrigadierThompsonthe‘ManoftheMatch’forhisleadershipthroughoutthecampaign.HealsoinstructedThompsontoassignoneofhisunitstostartdisarmingArgentinesandtoconcentratethemneartheairfield.ThetaskfelltoVauxandhiscommandos.

Although the war on land was officially over now, much had to be done before some semblance ofnormalcycouldreturntotheisland.Argentineshadabandonedmuchoftheirgearuponlearningofthesurrender.Helmets, rifles, ammunitionandotherequipmentnow litteredmountainsidesand trails.ThepeopleofStanleylackedbasicservices.Therewasnorunningwater.Residentswererelyingonthelittlewaterremainingintanksattheirhomes;thetown’swaterpurificationfacilityhadbeenbadlydamagedbyshellfire during the final assault. The sewage pipe to the sea had been severed. Two of the threegenerators in the town’s power stationwere notworking. Inmanyplaces, power lines cut by shellfirewere draped around buildings. Roads remained largely impassable because of mud and abandonedequipment.Surroundingthetownwereminefieldsandboobytraps,complicatingmovementonlandandalso on beaches where the Argentines had anticipated an amphibious assault. And beyond the capital,milesawayinsettlements,theinhabitantsfacedsimilarchallenges.Argentineshadtakenwhatevertheywantedfromthemtoo.Falklandershadbeensurvivingforovertwomonthsonwhattheyhadonhandorwereabletoretain.ThoseinStanleynoweagerlyopenedtheirhomes,tookinasmanyoftheBritishastheycould,and lookedafter them.Localhospitalityof thiskindwouldcontinue formanymonths,untilmorepermanentaccommodation for themilitarybecameavailable.AdaWatts, forexample, turnedherentirehouseovertotheBritishforcesandreturnedseveraltimesaweektocookmealsforthosestayingthere.

OfprimaryimportancetoBritishcommandersatthistime,ofcourse,wasthewelfareoftheirmen,who

hadbeensacrificingsomuchforthepastmonthintheislandsandalsofortheprevioustwomonthstogetthere.Thousandsof troopsremained in field locations,many in theopenwithonlypersonalgear.Mosthadnotenjoyedahotmealindays.Manyhadnotshoweredinweeksorevenchangedtheirunderwearrecently.A commoncomplaint after thewar concerned thepoorquality of the combatboots somehadbeenwearing.ItwasnotunusualformentoremovebootsfromdeadArgentinesoldierstoreplacetheirown.Trenchfootwasacommonailment;sowasthediarrhoea,knownas‘Galtieri’srevenge’,duetothelackoffullysterilizedwater.Thesemenhadbeenstrugglingintoughfieldconditions,alwaysunderthreatof possible attack and the stress of combat. They, too, needed reconstitution as well as a good break.Ordnance Squadron Commander Anthony Welch thought that Brigadier Thompson recognized this andpurposely‘lethiscommandosgoforadayortwotogetitoutoftheirsystem’.Hewasright.Thompsonrealized that his men needed some time to relish their hard-fought victory. Liquor allocations wereestablished,andcelebrationcommencedwithinBritishranks,withthelonepubinStanleyquicklybackinoperation.Butwithallkindsofabandonedequipmentlyingaround,andmanyexuberantmenhappythewarwas over, it is not surprising that looting byBritish troops started aswell.Concerned that troopsmight get their hands on drugs, CommanderRick Jolly of the Medical Squadron smashed hundreds ofcapsulesofArgentinemorphinehydrochloride.3Thompsonwasawareofthepotential forthingstospinout of control after the victory. About forty-eight hours after the surrender, he called his commanderstogetherandtoldthemtore-establishdisciplineintheirunitsandgettheirtroopsbackinproperuniform.Hedeclaredacurfew formilitaryunits from last light to first light,declared the town’spuboff limits,established guards over supply areas and instituted patrols to keep units inside designated areas. Thecelebratingsooncametoanend,andtheimmenseworkofreversingthesupplychainandrestoringorderin the Falklands began. Early decisions to hold many units in field locations outside Stanley certainlylessened congestion in the town as well as easing command and control issues. Shortly after thesurrender, theDivisionrelocatedsoldiers from5Brigadebyhelicopter fromtheir last field locationsatSapperHill,TumbledownandMountWilliamdirectlybacktoFitzroyandGooseGreen,wheretheyvastlyoutnumberedthetinypopulationsofthosesettlements.MostofBrigadierWilson’smenwouldneverwalkthestreetsofStanley.

Without communicationsacross the islandor into all settlements,MooreaskedCommodoreClapp togainabetterappreciationofthesituationandneedsinthesettlements.ClappkepttheLPDIntrepidwithits additional commandand control capabilities nearSanCarlos to assist assessments in that area; herelocatedFearlesstoPortStanleytohelpcoordinatelogisticsrequirements.Atthetime,therewasmuchuncertainly about conditions, including the number of people in settlements outside of Stanley and ofArgentine prisoners on the island. Helicopters went to every settlement in West Falkland and in EastFalkland,includingLafonia,tovisiteachhomeanddetermineneeds.Itwasclearthatlogisticianswouldhave to provide supplies to other parts of the island, but actual needswould remain unclear for days.Concerns also persisted about the attitude of Argentina, given Galtieri’s personal refusal to surrender.Consequently, Woodward kept ships at sea on alert, since the surrender Menendez had signed onlyapplied to land forces.Clappmaintainedprocedures restrictingcoastal shipmovementsoutsideofSanCarlos, Fitzroy and Teal Inlet by day, so that vessels remained protected by at least some Rapier airdefence.TheshiftingofsuppliesfromAjaxBaystartedundercoverofdarkness.4

At the timeofsurrender,Stanleywaswellbeyond thedistributionpoints for land force logistics.Thesupply chain then spreadbackward fromTeal Inlet to thewest andBluffCove to the southacross theislandtoAjaxBay,wherethebulkofCommandoLogisticRegimentandsuppliesremainedat theFMA.LogisticiansnowneededtoreversetheDivision’ssupplychainso that leaderscouldcare for theirowntroops and provide essentials to the Argentine prisoners now concentrated in Stanley. Simultaneously,engineersneededtotackleawiderangeofprojectswithinthecapitaltore-establishbasicserviceslikewater,electricityandsewage.TheairfieldrequiredrepairssothataircraftcouldlandsafelyafterthelongflightfromAscension.TheBritishalsoneededtoconfrontthehorrificchallengeoflocatinganddefusinguntoldthousandsofminesthatArgentineshadburiedandscatteredoutsidethecity,aroundpathsleadingoutward to themountains andonbeaches.Someof these challenges couldbe resolved in short order;otherswouldbemorecomplex.Winterweatherhadprevailedsincemid-May.Freezingtemperaturesandstrongwindswouldcontinuenowforseveralmonths,makingconditionsforrepairandreconstructionfarfromideal.

TheBritishfocusedfastongettingthemanythousandsofprisonersofwarbacktoArgentina.Bythistimetheyhadassumedresponsibilityforover10,000enemyprisonersofwaronshipsandaroundEastFalkland.Withouta fullyuseableairfield,andwithnoport facilitiesasidefromjetties forsmallcraft tohelp shift supplies, the continued presence of prisoners in such large numbers simply prolonged thediscomfortforeveryone,complicatedlogisticsandcreatedthepossibilitythatthesituationwouldworsen.Covered shelterswerenot available toprotect all prisoners from theweather.Their tentshavinggonedownwiththeAtlanticConveyor,theBritishhadnoalternativebuttoresorttopicketsandwiretoconfineandsegregatemostprisoners.Thissituationwasfarfromideal.

TheArgentineswerenotonlydejectedbecauseoftheirdefeat.Somewereangryatthewaytheyhadsuffered on the surroundingmountains as they risked their lives.Conscripts straggled back from fieldpositionsintoStanley,manywithtrenchfootanddiarrhoeathemselves,toseestacksoffoodandclotheswhich they had badly needed in the mountains. It was clear that severe inequities existed in theprovisioningofunitsandranks.Someplatoonsappearedwellfed;othersbeganscavengingforwhatevertheycouldfindwhiletheyhadthechance.Argentineleadershadfailedtogetsuppliestomanyoftheirmen.Returningfromthefield,soldiersprobablyfoundthemselveswithmorerationsthantheyhadseen

inthepreviousmonth.ButfewsuppliesremainedforthethousandsofprisonersnowcrowdedinStanley.TheBritishnavalembargoandthe full retreatof theArgentineNavyafter thesinkingofBelgranohadcrippled Argentina’s ability to keep its large fighting force armed and fed. Supplies arriving by C-130cargoplanesprovedinsufficient.LessthanthreedaysoffoodremainedforArgentineunitsatthetimeofsurrender. The British carefully inspected rations before issuing them to prisoners, withholding thosedesignated for officers since they contained liquor supplements. They strip-searchedprisoners, leavingthemwithenoughclothingandbeddingtocareforthemselves,thenmovedthemintoholdingareasandafewbuildingsneartheStanleyairfield.Onthenightof16June,however,ariotbrokeout,withprisonerssettingfiretoabuildingthat,ironically,heldtheirclothingstores.5

Threedaysafter thesurrender, theBritishmarchedArgentineprisoners fromtheairfieldwhere theywerebeingquarantinedtoboardCanberraandNorlandandsailtoPuertoMadryninsouthernArgentina.Canberra had on board over a thousand prisoners from the San Carlos area; she embarked severalthousand more from Port Stanley before sailing for Argentina on 18 June.Norland and some smallervessels followed with more. By 20 June, the British had repatriated most prisoners, but retained 600Argentineofficersandspecialists,includingMenendez,asaguaranteeagainstGaltierichanginghismindabout the surrender. With the departure of prisoners, one of the most difficult challenges in therestorationof order came toanend, removing thepotential for insurrectionand significantly reducingsupplyrequirements.

To reverse the logistics chain, the British once again relied on sealift to move the bulk of units andsupplies,astheyattemptedtokeepasmuchaspossibleoutofStanleysoasnottoexacerbatecongestionproblemsandinhibittheworkthatwasneededtostartrestoringservicestoresidents.Itwouldtakedays,however, to relocate stocks from Ajax Bay to Stanley, given the long transits around the island. Thesolution became ship-to-shore operations as in the initial amphibious operation three weeks earlier,relying on landing craft and mexeflotes. A couple of days after the surrender, most of the logisticsorganization at Ajax Bay boarded MV Elk, leaving behind a small detachment to handle the severalhundredprisonersofwarremainingthereandtoprovideadistributionpointfor40Commando,stilltheLand Force reserve at the time of surrender. Once arriving in Stanley, logisticians took control offunctioningArgentinevehiclestoassistinthedistributionofsuppliesthroughoutthetown.Notlongafterthesurrender,waterssurroundingtheportofStanleyfilledwithshipsrenderinghelp.Somewereusedfor military accommodation to relieve congestion in the town. As LSLs made it around to Stanley, theBritishstartedrotatingmilitaryunitstothosevesselssothatmencouldshowerandcleanupgear.Forthevastmajority, thiswouldbe the first time theyhad enjoyed a shower of any type since landing on theislandnearlyamonthbefore.SirTristram,badlydamagedduring theairattacksatFitzroy,was towedaroundandanchoredbothforrepairsandtoserveasaccommodationalongwithSirBedivere.TheBalticFerrybecameafloatingworkshop,sourceofsupplyandaccommodationfor81OrdnanceCompany,assheperformedequipmentrecovery,salvageandmaintenanceoperations.Othershipsservedsimilarpurposes.AstheseshipsarrivedoffStanley,theysoonconstitutedthemainlogisticsbasebothforBritishunitsandthecivilianpopulation.WithsuchagatheringofshipsnowoutsideStanley,andtheurgentneedtoshuttlesupplies ashore on to restricted small jetties, it is understandable that someone now was required tocontrol trafficbotharound theanchorageand in the limitedport areas, so that themilitary task forcecould focus on other needs. A Royal Navy commander arrived from the United Kingdom to serve asharbourmasteraboutaweekafterthesurrender.

ForawhiletheforwardsupplybasesatTealInletandFitzroycontinuedtosupplyunitsawayfromthecapital,until remainingstockscouldmove toStanley.Eventually, theDivision leftmuchequipmentandsuppliesat forward support locations so that the futuregarrison force could cleanup thoseareas inamoremethodicalmannerinthemonthsahead.

It didnot take theBritish long to restorebasic services on the island, although the challengesweremany and repairs remained short-term solutions. Work started quickly to repair damage to the watersupplysystem inStanley. It tookRoyalEngineersaboutoneweek.Using theirwaterpurificationunits,theyfirstestablishedwaterpointsonaninterimbasis.Then,withthehelpof flexibledraconebladdersbelonging to the Falkland Island Government, they established direct supply from Fleet bulk watertankerstosupplythetown.PowergenerationcapacityforStanleyhadbeenquitelimitedevenbeforetheinvasion.IttookengineerstwoweekstorepairthemanyoverheadpowerlinesinStanleythathadbeendamaged by shellfire and to complete other quick fixes to re-establish a power grid. That becamesufficientfortownresidents,butpowergenerationforStanleyremainedaslimitedasithadbeenpriortothewar.TheBritisheventuallyinstalledamuchgreatercapacitytogenerateelectricityforthetownandalsoaseparatepowerstationforthemilitary.EngineersinstalledslipwaysattheeasternendofStanleytoenablesoldierstodischargesuppliesandequipmentfrommexeflotesandLCUs.Theymooredadraconeoffueloffshoreandlaidapipelinetothetown’sfueldepotsystem.AndtheyfixedcountlesspotholesintheroadsinandaroundStanley.6

Someofthecivilianpopulationoftheislandshadrunshortoffoodandgeneralsuppliesduringthewar.TheBritishmilitary,however,simplydidnothavesufficientsuppliesonshipstosatisfyalloftheirneedsordesires.Itwasmoreamatterofconductingminorrepairsandcoordinatingdistributionofsuppliestosmall outlying settlements; providing for their needs generally went smoothly. The situation in Stanleywasmorechallenging,though,duetoitslargerpopulation,overallconditionandlackofsuitablefacilities.Thetownofferedfewplaces forthebreakdownandstorageofbulksuppliesonce logisticiansgotthemashore, complicating distribution to both residents and military units. The limited amount of pre-warwarehousing in Stanley for food and other supplies had become living accommodation for Argentine

soldiers.Thosebuildingsnowneededdisinfecting.Consequently,anyresidentshopingforhotrationsandaquickinfluxoffoodsoonbecamedisappointed.Eventually,theBritishwereabletosupplementrationswith fresh fruit, vegetables and eggs. But it was August before British logisticians could offer evengarrisontroopsfreshrations.Thischallenge,andtheconsequentoverallinabilityoftheBritishmilitarytomeeteveryone’sneeds,wassomethingthatsomeciviliansfoundhardtounderstand.

Others focused on expanding medical care for civilians after the surrender. The King Edward VIIMemorialHospitalatPortStanleywasintact. Itwassmallbutofferedarangeofmodernfacilities.TheArgentineshadusedpartof thehospital for theirneeds.Beforethewar, twodoctorsandadentisthadbeenprovidingcareforislanders.On27April,however,Argentinesabductedoneofthedoctorsandhiswife and held them captive at Fox Bay until the surrender. That left one doctor at the hospital. Shereceivedhelp fromanotherdoctorwhohadhadthemisfortuneofbeingonholiday inStanley fromtheUnitedKingdomwhenArgentinainvaded.Undernormalcircumstances,thesedoctorswouldhavefoundthemselvesflyingtooutlyingsettlementsattimestoprovidecaretoresidentswhoweresick.Thatservicestoppedaftertheinvasion.Onoccasion,theirArgentinecaptorspermittedthetwodoctorsinStanleytouse a radio to provide medical advice to others in need. During the war, medical care to those insettlementsscatteredaroundEastFalklandbecamelimitedtowhatevertreatmentmilitarymedicscouldprovide if they were in the vicinity. Teams from 16 Field Ambulance provided additional treatment forresidentsafterthesurrender.TheyoccupiedawinginthehospitalandstartedcollectingandsortingthevastquantityofArgentinemedicalequipmentandsuppliestheyfound.Aweekafterthesurrender,moremedicalelementsarrivedbyship.Amilitarywingbecameoperationalon29June.BythenUgandahadmoved into PortWilliamHarbour to provide back-upmedical care and evacuation facilities. The ship’screwalsodonatedfiftyhospitalbedsandbeddingtoKingEdwardHospital.7

Ofcritical importancefollowingthearrivaloftheBritish inStanleywastherestorationoftheairfieldand jetties, the hubs for aerial and sea delivery of supplies. The air bridge from Ascension remainedactive.C-130cargoplanesair-droppedclothing,boots,sleepingbagsandothersuppliesforthetroops,aswell as nearly a ton of mail daily for both the military and civilians. The British established a snatchprocedureforoutgoingmailwhilerunwayrepairworkwasunderway.Thetechniqueinvolvedtwotwenty-footverticalpolesconnectedbyawireloopholdingabagwithabouttenpoundsofmail.PilotsflewtheirC-130sneartotheground,snatchedthemailfromtheloopwithahookattachedtoahydraulicwinchandthenflewbacktoAscension.Aboutthirtyofthesesnatchestookplacebeforetherunwaywasfinallyfixedsufficientlythatpilotscouldstartlandingtheirplanes.8

By the end of the war, the airfield at Stanley had become a sea of mud. Drainage ditches were notcapableofholdingrun-off.Itwaseverybitasbigamessasthetownitself.TheArgentineshadperformedonly crude repairs to the runway. Of primary concern, other than damage from shellfire, was a largecraterononeside.AlthoughthiscraterdidnotstopC-130sfromlandingandtakingoff, itprovidedanundesirable hazard and required capping before British air cargo operations could begin. The airfielditselfwasfarfromfirst-rate.Builtinthelate1970s,itofferedamere4,000feetoftarmacoverbedrock,making it suitable only for C-130s and smaller aircraft; any bigger planes would require either anextensionoftheexistingrunwayorconstructionofanewone.RoyalEngineerscompletedacleanupandtemporary repair of the existing runway shortly after the departure of Argentine prisoners, includinginstallationofairdefenceradar,airtrafficcontrolandaninstrumentlandingsystem.TheBritishrenamedtheairportRAFStanley,perhapsasignalthattheRoyalAirForcewouldhaveasignificantrolefromthenon in the future protection of the Falklands. The first British C-130 Hercules touched down on therefurbished runwayon24 Junewith airmovement personnel and equipment for cargo operations, justelevendaysafterthelastArgentineC-130hadtakenoff.9Thatsameday,aBritishsubmarinetorpedoedtheLSLSirGalahad indeepwateroutatsea.ThelogisticsshiphadsurvivedseveralbombingrunsbutwasbeyondrepairaftertheattackatFitzroy.ShesanktothebottomoftheSouthAtlantic.

RevampingthePortofStanleybecamekeytosolvingthelong-termsupplyproblemforresidentsofEastFalkland as well as for the future garrison force. There never had been a port facility per se in theFalklands.Afocusforlogisticsplannersinthetwoyearsfollowingthesurrenderwouldbefindingawaytohandlelargevolumesofcargofromthesea.InJune1982,however,fewoptionswereavailable.InitialresupplybysearemainedrestrictedtomexeflotesshuttlingsuppliesashorefromLSLsanchoredoffPortStanley,afterarrivingwithsuppliesfromAjax.ThosesuppliesonlyprovidedtemporaryrelieftoStanley,though. What was needed was a larger, more modern facility to accept ships capable of carryingthousands of tons of cargo. That would take years to achieve, as would the expansion of airfieldcapabilities.Inthemeantime,RoyalEngineershadtofixtheportsufficientlysothatitcouldatleaststartreceivingsuppliesbyseaonacontinuingbasis.

Port Stanley harbour provided adequate anchorage for some vessels, but depths were shallow, onaverageaboutsixmetreswithoccasionalareastenmetresdeep.ThiswassufficientforsmallvesselsbutnotforlargersupplyshipsintheTaskForcethathadbeentakenupfromtradeorothersupplyvesselsneeded in years to come. The port consisted of wooden jetties in poor states of repair, incapable ofsupporting cranes or even heavy load-carrying equipment. Engineers soon built two slipways bybulldozingthecoastalretainingwallandaddingloadsofrock.Thisenabledslowmovementofloadsfromshiptoshore,butlimitedroadsandlackofstoragecontinuedtomakeoffloadanddistributionofsuppliesaverychallengingprocess.Initialsuppliescameofftheshipsinbulk.Logisticiansthenmovedthemoffjettiesand into town forbreakdownandsubsequentdistribution.Lotsof supplies shuttled intoStanleyonlytobereconfiguredintosmallerloads,returnedtoslipwaysandlighteredeventuallytosettlements.

Shortly after the surrender, engineers also started the immense task of clearing minefields and

disposingofordnance.MinefieldswouldhampermovementfordecadesaroundtheoutskirtsofStanley,acrossthecountrysideandonbeaches.TheArgentineshadpurchasedmanyminesfromItaly,IsraelandSpain;mostweremadeofplastic,makingthemespeciallyhardtodetect.TheArgentinedefenceswereawitches’ brew of undetectable and haphazardly laid mines, unmarked minefields and scattered boobytrapsandotherimprovisedcharges.ArgentinawasnotasignatoryoftheGenevaConventionandpaidnoheedtoConventionrequirementsformulti-strandfenceswithwarningsignsforminefields.Moreover,asBritish forces pushed toward Stanley, fleeing Argentine soldiers started, for pure nuisance value,accordingtosomeaccounts,scatteringminesonpathsleadingtotown,onhillsidesandamongrocks.

Mineclearancebecameperhapsthemostchallengingpost-wartaskfacedbytheBritishintheireffortsto restore normalcy to the islands. In the weeks following the surrender, engineers received someassistancefromthirty-fiveArgentineArmyandMarineprisoners,whoagreedtoassisttheclean-upeffortin return for good meals, warm showers and separate accommodation.10 Some had records of theminefields. The British also established a kids’ club for the children in Stanley. If children foundsomething suspicious and reported it to engineers, they were dubbed ‘deputy bomb disposaleers’ andgivenacertificateandapatonthehead.Intheend,237outof280childrenontheislandenrolledintheprogramme. Gradually, other records of the minefields started showing up mysteriously in houses,probably hidden there by Argentine engineers who had been staying in homes before heading to theprisonercamp.Ayearafterthesurrender,clearanceeffortshadrecovered4,500grenades,20,000mortarrounds, 4,000 rockets, 12,000 shells,mostly for aircraft, 2,000unlaidmines, 284 assortedmissiles, 88bombsandlargeamountsofsealedammunition.11Manyminesandthousandsofroundsofunexpendedordnance were recovered around the airfield and the jetty at Stanley, both of which were vital to re-establishingtheairandseabridgetoEastFalkland.Unfortunately,morethanthirtyyearsafterthewar,minefieldsstillrestrictmovementinsomeareasaroundStanley.Visitorswillseeareascordonedoffwithwireandsignagemarkingthepresenceofmines.Clearingoperationscontinue,andsomebeachesnearStanleyremainclosed.

Planning for the unpleasant task of exhuming those killed in action and buried in the field actuallycommencedbeforethesurrenderon14June.CoffinsandembalmingmaterialshadbeenshippedsouthaboardMVStrathewewithaGravesRegistrationpartyfromtheRoyalPioneerCorps,thefirstsuchteamtheBritishhadformedsincetheSecondWorldWar.Theyestimatedtheirtaskwouldtakesixweeks;theycompleted it in two. Inmost instancesexhumationwasbyhand,exceptatSanCarloswheretheywereable to use a mechanical digger. Fourteen of the dead were reburied in the War Graves CommissionCemeteryatSanCarloswithfullservicehonours,including2Para’sCommander,LieutenantColonelH.Jones.Theothersixty-fourbodieswererepatriated.12ItwasthefirsttimeinBritishmilitaryhistorythatrepatriationofthedeadhadtakenplacefromforeignlands.Thenextofkinofthedeceasedwereallgivena choice: to have their loved onesburied in theCommonwealthWarGravesCemetery on theFalklandIslands,ortohavetheirremainsrepatriatedtotheUnitedKingdom.

Muchhadbeenaccomplished in the twoweekssince thesurrender.Waterwasrunningagain.Powerhadbeenrestored.ThemajorityofArgentineshadbeenreturnedtotheirhomeland.Theairfieldwasbackinservice,eveniflandingswereconstrained.Workhadstartedtomaketheportmoreserviceable.Shipshadanchoredoffshoretoprovideaccommodation.Militaryunitshadachievedalotinaveryshortperiodoftime.Butwithoutquestion,manywereweary,tiredofstrugglingintheincreasingcoldofwinterandeagertogethome.

On 25 June, senior British commanders welcomed Governor Rex Hunt back to the Falklands. Heestablished and chaired a Joint Rehabilitation Committee to guide restoration work essential in themonthsahead.13IncludedontheCommitteewereMajorGeneralMooreandCommodoreClapp.Bothhadmoved into Stanley with their staffs. The same day that the Governor returned, the first echelons ofBritishunitsstartedleavingtheFalklandsforthelongvoyagebacktotheUnitedKingdom.Thefirstshipsto depart wereNorland and Europic Ferry with the two parachute battalions. On 26 June, BrigadierThompsonandmuchofhis3CommandoBrigadeheadedtowardshomeonCanberra.CommandoLogisticRegimentfollowedaboardtheLSLSirPercivaleon28June.

Thatleft logisticsunitsfrom5Brigade,including81and91OrdnanceCompanies,10FieldWorkshopandatransporttrooptobuildupontheprogressalreadymadeandtoprovidetheframeworkforalargerlogisticsorganization.Forthecommanderof10FieldWorkshop,thiswouldbethefirsttimehewouldgethisunit togethersincedeparting theUnitedKingdom.Evenat the timeof surrender,hismenandunitequipmentremainedsplitbetweenSanCarlosSettlement,FitzroyandStanley,withmorestillembarkedonNorland,NordicFerry,BalticFerry,SirGeraint,SirPercivaleandprobablyStEdmondandContainerBezant.14 Ithadbeenanunusualwar forhimandhismen.Otherunitsranging frompostalandpaytoNAAFI and veterinary services joined the 5 Brigade logistics units, all formally established into theFalklandIslandsLogisticBattalionon28June.On14July,AdmiralFieldhouse’sCINCFLEETheadquartersissuedalogisticssupportplanforwhatwastobecalledtheFalklandsIslandGarrisonandincludedbothremaininglandforcesandshipsoperatinginthearea.Itdetailedtaskstomilitaryservicesandformallyreverted provisioning of the population to the civil government, except for rations, which the garrisonwould continue to provide until the end of September. Major General David Thorne arrived in July asCommanderBritishForcesFalklandIslands,alongwith1stQueen’sOwnHighlandersandacompanyoftheQueen’sLancashireRegimenttoprovidesomereplacementfor5Brigadeunitsthatwerestartingtodepart.Thelastcombatunitof5BrigadetoleavewastheScotsGuardstheendofJuly.

TheBritishTaskForcehadsucceededinre-establishingorderandbasicservicesintheFalklands.Thework exceeded everyone’s expectations. Lieutenant Colonel Hellberg perhaps best summarized the

feelingsofmanywhenhesaidduringapresentationthreeyearsafterthewar:Wetrainforallphasesofwarbutnottheaftermathofawar–themenareonahighandpsyched-upandthelastthingtheywanttodoiscleanup.Believeme,itrequiresirondisciplinetowindupanoperationofthissort.Thereisamassofworktodo:allstocksandequipmentmadesafeandbrought in,gravesdugandservicesarranged,prisonerofwarcleanupteams,essentialservicestothecommunity,mine/boobytrapclearanceandmassiveregrouping.IbelievemyRegimentworkedevenharderduringthisclean-upthanevenduringthecampaign.It isthereforeinmyhumbleopinionthat ‘aftermath’shouldbestudiedatStaffCollegeasaseparatephaseofwar.15

Afterthesurrender,theBritishfacedachallengecommontoallvictoriousmilitaryforces.Theywerenotstructuredtoassumethebroadarrayoftasksrequiredtorestoreorderandre-establishnormalservices,particularlywhenitcametocaringforandadministeringtothecivilianpopulation.Asforcesstartedtodepart, however, they left behind many improvements and a garrison geared to continue the work foryearstocome.

A decade later, it would be difficult to recall what the area around Stanley and elsewhere on EastFalklandlookedlikeinthewinterof1982.Severalmonthsafterthesurrender,theBritishrentedspeciallydesigned oil-rig support barges, moved them to the Falklands, moored them near the shore andconstructedwalk-onramps toprovideaccommodation forseveral thousandmen.16By theendof1983,theyhadconstructedcampsofportablecabinsashoretohouseagarrisonforceof3,000.Oceanshippinginthefuturewouldrequiremuchmoretosustaintheresidentsandanenlargedgarrisonforce.Uptothistime, residents of Stanley had seen only break-bulk or palletized cargo arriving in their town on smallvesselsfourorfivetimesayear.EnablingthePortofStanleytohandlecontainersbecameessential,andthis brought with it a requirement for cranes, material-handling equipment, container chassis, stagingareasandmore.A littleovera yearafter the surrender, theBritishhadprovideda long-termsolution.Theycontracted for constructionof anewport structure consistingof sixbargebasesproviding1,000feetofberthing,60,000 square feetof cargohandling space, andprefabricated steel-cladwarehousingproviding 1.25 million cubic feet of covered storage. A seventh barge accommodated roll-on roll-offshippingaswell.WorkcommencedinOctober1983andconcludedthreemonthslater.Thefirstshiptoarriveatthisnewportfacilityoffloaded500tonsofgeneralsuppliesandsixtycontainersinthirtyhours.Ontheship’spreviousvisittotheFalklands,offloadingofsuchtonnagehadtakenawhoppingtwenty-onedays.17ThePortofStanleynowwascapableofhandlingtrans-oceansupplyforresidentsoftheFalklandsandthemilitarygarrisonforyearstocome.

Without additional work to the runway, RAF capability beyond resupply by C-130 remain limited,though. What the British needed for the long term was an extended runway and parking areas toaccommodatejetfightersandlargerplanes.PlannersinBritainhadanticipatedthisevenbeforethestartofthe landwar.TheyhadpurchasedaluminumairfieldmattingfromtheUnitedStatestoresurfacetherunawayandextenditfrom4,000feetto6,500feet.WorkwascompletedattheendofAugust, leavingtheairfieldwithmuchmorecapabilitythanithadbeforethewar.Forthenextseveralyears,RAFStanleybecameakeybaseforbothlogisticsandall-weatherfighters.

Anevenbiggerairfieldwas required,however, ifBritainwasever to introduce long-rangecargoandpassenger planes into the South Atlantic and thereby escape the costly air-to-air refuelling missionsneededtokeeptheFalklandssupplied.Debateoverthoseneedscommencedshortlyafterthewar.On1May 1986, an entirely new airport facility capable of taking large Boeing 747-type aircraft becameoperational thirty miles south-west of Stanley, between the capital and Darwin. Named RAF MountPleasant,thiscomplexassuredrapidreinforcementifeverneededtohelpcounterfutureprovocation.

PrimeMinisterThatcherastonishedresidentsofEastFalklandinJanuary1983bylandingunexpectedlyattheStanleyairfield.ItcameasacompletesurprisetothemasshewalkedofftheC-130HerculeswithAdmiral Fieldhouse to greet them. It was the first time that a British Prime Minister had visited theirislands,and theywereecstatic to seeher.Shemade it clear to residents that they shouldneveragaindoubt the British commitment to the future security of the Falklands. She had already instructed hergovernment to dust off the Shackleton Report of the 1970s and to start implementing itsrecommendationstoimproveconditionsandhelpresidentstakeadvantageofpromisingresourcesinandaroundtheirislands.

LifeforFalklanderswasgettingbacktonormal,butnormalcywasfarawayformanyothersinvolvedinthewar.Britainhadmadeimmensesacrificestopreservetherightofself-determinationforthoselivingintheFalklands–255Britishservicemenkilled,777woundedwithabout10percentofthesepermanentlydisabled, 6 ships lost, many other ships damaged and 20 aircraft destroyed. The cost of the war hadapproached£1billion.Constructionprojectsoverthenextfewyearstoenhancedefencecapabilitiesforthe future would consume several billion more. The cost to Argentina was enormous, including anestimated750killed,1100woundedandvastamountsofequipmentlost.Itsmilitarywasinashambles.Galtieri and his Junta had been removed, but a new democratic government was now confrontingeconomicconditionsfarmorecalamitousthanbeforetheinvasion.

Thishadbeenawarquiteunlikeanyotherinthehistoryofeithercountry.Logisticschallengesbeforethewarhadbeenunimaginabletomost.TheArgentineshaddoubtedthatBritainwouldtakesuchrisksinthe southern hemisphere.Many in theUnitedKingdomhaddoubted their own ability to deploy forcesoversuchvastdistancesandthensustainthemsufficientlytowin.Thatcher,manyinhergovernment,theBritishTaskForceandthousandsofmenandwomenprovidingsupportprovedthemwrong.

I

Chapter12

AReflectionontheBritishExperience

tmightseemastatementoftheobviousthatthestrategicmobilityofanation’smilitarybeginswiththe ability to move a force to where it is needed. It may be less apparent that that mobility isdeterminedbythecomprehensivereadinessofanation’stransportationnetwork,depotsandportsto

respond to the crisis within the time frame necessary. As these capabilities decline, or some becomeweakerthanothers, thentheabilityofanationtorespond isreducedgenerally tothereadinessof theweakest component. Generating military force results from the synchronization of several activitiestowardacommonend.Itisnoteasy.Anoverridingreminderabout theFalkland IslandsWar is thatwarssometimesoccurat timesand inplacesleastexpected.Sincethe1960s,financialconstraintshadreplacedacomprehensivestrategywithregardtotheUnitedKingdom’soverseascommitments.Suchclearlywasstillthecasein1982.Notonlydid Britain underestimate Argentina’s resolve to take the islands by force if necessary; it appeared tomiscalculate the seriousness behind rumblings in themedia and elsewhere leading up to the invasion.Fortunately, its armed forces were reasonably well prepared for deployment at the time, even thoughtherewerevastdifferencesbetweenthereadinessof3CommandoBrigadeRoyalMarinesand5InfantryBrigade.Had the invasionoccurred later in theyear,aswasoriginallyplannedby theArgentine Junta,someoftheRoyalNavyshipswhichprovedsovaluablewouldhavebeenoutoftheinventory.Thatspring,itstworemainingaircraftcarrierswerestillavailableandallofitsamphibiousships,includinglogisticsships,werebasically ready.Depotswere filledwithsupplies,manyconfiguredon topallets for specificunitsandperiodsoftime.ButBritainlackedtrooptransportcapabilities,supplyships,ahospitalshipandawide variety of other support vessels to sustain a task force over long distances for severalmonths.Movement assets became the weakest component in deploying a force quickly. The speed with whichcommercial shippingcompanies freedupvessels, the synchronizationofactivitiesandsupplychains toconvert dozens of ships tomeetmilitary needs, and the responsiveness ofwork forces throughout theUnitedKingdomtogetjobsdonealmostbeliebeliefoverthirtyyearslater.TheBritishmilitarycouldnothavedeployedacredibleforce,letalonewontheFalklandsWar,withoutindustryandthousandsofpeopleworkingbehindthescenes.Fortunately,thegovernmenthadproceduresinplaceforsucheventualities.TheQueenapprovedtheordersquickly,industrycooperatedfullyandtheresultwaslast-minutemobility.Thesuccessof theseeffortsunderscores thepowerofnational resolve, something that isoften lackingwhenpoliticianscommitcountriestowar.Despiteitseventualabilitytodeployataskforce,however,theBritishmilitaryhadnoplansinplacetocounter a full-scale invasion of the Falklands. As a result, and given the vast distances to the SouthAtlantic,itisnotsurprisingthatsomanyintheMoDandthegovernmentremainedhesitantabouttakingon such a challenge. Fortunately, the RoyalNavy recognized the need to bridge the gap to the SouthAtlanticearlyanddispatchedahandfulofmentoAscension Islandtosetupsupplyoperations thedayaftertheinvasion,assomesupportshipswerealreadyheadinginthatdirection.EarlyestablishmentofthatforwardsupportbasebetweentheUnitedKingdomandtheFalklandsremainsoneofthemostcrucialdecisionsbehind theeventual victory.The small islandand the supportpersonnelwhoarrivedearly tostartoperationstherewereasvitaltothevictoryasthebravemenonshipsorfightingupthemountainssurroundingStanley.ItwouldbequiteanoverstatementtosaythatoperationsatAscensionwentsmoothly.Likemanyotherthings in theFalklandsWar, arrangementsandoperations therewereadhoc.The supportunithadnovisibilityoverwhatwascomingintotheairfieldonanygivenday,orevenoverwhatwasshowingupofftheisland’sshores.Manytimesitwasnotclearwheresuppliesweredestined,otherthanfortheSouthAtlanticgenerally. It justsohappenedthatwithfurtherBritish ingenuityAscensionbecamemuchmorethanasupplybase.Itprovedanessentialtrainingareafortroopstopractiselandingfromlandingcraftandhelicopters,tozerotheirriflesandgunsandforshipstoprepareandsharpendamagecontrolteams,while others degaussed Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and merchant ships to make them less susceptible tomagneticmines. It also became a launch pad for dozens of planes to extend the reach of the nation’ssupply lines and for Vulcan bombers to demonstrate their ability to strike deep into the southernhemisphere.TheMoDhadnohopeofestablishingandmaintaininglogisticstoitstaskforcewithoutsomesuchplaceen route. Just aweekafterThatcher’sdecision todeploy forces, fully converted shipswereleavingtheshoresofEnglandasothershipswerestartingtoarriveatAscensiontoreceivesupplies.Andalthough theAmphibiousTaskForcewas stillworkingatAscension to reconfigurecargoonshipsby1May, other parts of the Task Force by then were fully engaged in combat in the South Atlantic.DeploymentscontinuedfromtheUnitedKingdomasthe first troopswerehittingthebeachesnearSanCarlos. Ships were still being requisitioned and converted in May. Supplies continued to funnel intoAscensionand from thereon to shipsheaded south.Cargoplanes fromAscension completed their lastairdropsofsuppliestotheTaskForceattheendofJune.Evenafterthesurrender,thesmallislandhelpedtheBritishmaintainlogisticsmomentum.

As ships were being modified in the United Kingdom and support operations were commencing atAscension, a host of other activities began to prepare weapons systems for long voyages south andeventualbattle,aswellastoobtainotherequipment.TheRoyalNavy’sFleetAirArmandtheRoyalAirForce, for example, rushed to modify aircraft for added protection against potential corrosion duringocean travel in rough seas. The Fleet Air Arm adapted Harriers to use the latest model SidewindermissilesreceivedfromtheUnitedStates,andmodifiedSeaKinghelicoptersfortheuseofPassiveNightGoggles; the Royal Air Force enabled its Vulcan bombers to handle laser-guided bombs. Procurementcommenced immediately of air-to-air refuelling equipment so that Vulcans, Nimrods and C-130s couldperformtheirmissionsatlongdistancessouthofAscension.Thisincludednotonlyprobesfortheaircraftbutnewnavigational systems, so thatpilots could linkup theirplaneswith tankers to takeon fuel.Assome focused on such equipment issues, other staff initiated procurement of shipping containers thatcouldwithstandairdropsatseaorworkedtosolvearangeofotherchallenges, like the fuelandwaterstoragelimitationsatAscension,whichledeventuallytotheconstructionofanewfuelpipelinefromtheshore toWideawakeAirfield.All such efforts andmany others behind the sceneshelped to ensure theTaskForcehadwhatitneededtogettotheSouthAtlanticwithreadinesstofight.Whenthecalltoarmswentout,Britishmenandwomenworkedeighteenhourdaysorlongertoensuretroopshadwhattheyneeded. Things came together quickly and effectively, obviously the combined result of effective staffwork, streamlined procedures and willing workers. The Second World War was the last time militaryactionofanytypehadproducedsuchoverwhelmingnationalunity.TheFalklandsWarclearlyhighlightsthedifficultyofexecutinganamphibiousassault,stillprobablythemost challenging of military operations. Some of the Royal Marines involved had spent most of theircareerstraininginamphibiousoperations,butnoneoftheRoyalNavyorBritishArmyhad.TosaythattheTaskForcewaswellpreparedforsuchanoperationwouldbequiteanoverstatement.CommodoreClapp’ssmall amphibious staffwas newly assembled;most had to learn their jobs as theywent. Prior to theirdeployment, theRoyalNavy,RoyalFleetAuxiliaryand logisticsunitshadneverhad theopportunity toparticipateinexercisesrequiringlarge-scalelogisticssupportoverbeachesinpeacetime,exceptthroughsimulations.Budgetssimplydidnotallowforsuchcostlytraining.Consequently,muchoftheiroperationalexperiencewas limited to fixed facilities and robust infrastructures. Although they surely had thoughtaboutthechallengesof‘goinglive’,theirprevioustrainingprovidednosubstituteforhands-onexperienceinwhat are commonly termed logistics-over-the-shore operations.Air attacks shredded their plans andforcedabiggerbuildupashore.Forthefirstweekonland,theyfoundthemselvesreactingtoconditionsathand and simultaneously moving and issuing supplies as they continued struggling to build up moresuppliesashoreso thatcombat forceseventuallycouldbreakaway frombeachareasandpursueotherobjectives.Thenetresultwasthat frustrationsdevelopednotonly for thosewaiting forrucksacksnearthe beach but all theway back to London. The services often did not understand each other’s needs.ExceptforthoseatSanCarlostryingtoexecutetheamphibiousoperationwhilewithstandingwitheringattacksfromtheair,fewifanyintheBritishmilitarygraspedthecomplexityofthoseoperations.Oftenregardedastheuniquespecialityofmarines,amphibiousoperationsareinherentlyjointinnatureand not exclusive to any service. The navy’s role is undisputedly large, and the responsibilities of theCommanderAmphibiousTaskForceinprotectingforcesandgettingthemandtheirsuppliestotherightplacesontimearecomplextosaytheleast.AndyetbeforetheFalklandsWar,therewerefewintheRoyalNavy who had a full understanding of the array of challenges underlying such operations. Britishamphibious operations had been limited to peacetime ‘administrative landings’, with host nationsprovidingprotectionandnecessaryfacilities.Staffingandtraininghadtakenabackseat tootherNavypriorities. Commodore Clapp himself had never practised such operations before taking overresponsibility fortheAmphibiousTaskForce.It isunderstandablewhyothersoutsideSanCarlosWaterbecameanxiousattimesaboutdevelopments.Itisalsoquiteremarkablethat,withsuchlimitedtrainingbeforehandandpersistent threats from theArgentineAirForce, theamphibiousoperation cameoff sosuccessfully.Establishinglogisticscapabilityremainsessentialinamphibiousoperationsbeforeforcescanpursueobjectivesbeyondbeaches.Althoughthatcapabilitycanremainafloat,itmustberesponsivetotheneedsofthelandforce.Some have concluded rightly from the Falklands War that the integration of logistics and combatoperationsisessential.Nationshavelostwarsinthepastwhentheyfailedtointegratethetwo.Britaindid not come close to that in the Falklands, thanks to some luck and to the fact that its commandersgenerallywere focused onmaking sure logisticswherewithal was in place. Suchwas their focus bothduringamphibiousoperationsandafter thebreakout.Forexample,3CommandoBrigadeunits startedtheirmarchesacrossEastFalklandas logisticsshipswerepreparing tomovesuppliesaroundthewestsideoftheislandfromAjaxBaytoTealInlettojointhem.Thatbuild-upwasunderwaybythetimeMajorGeneralMoore and 5 Infantry Brigade arrived at the end ofMay. Carewas taken to get supplies andfirepower in place before the battle for the mountains. Brigadier Thompson altered plans and haltedforces after the first phaseof attacks, tomake sure that sufficient supportmoved forward tomaintainmomentum.ThebattleforthehighgroundsurroundingStanleyremainedeffectivebecauseofbothheroicfightingandwell-executedplanstoensureunitscontinuedtoreceivethesupporttheyneeded.Thecostlyeffectsofnotfullyintegratinglogisticsandtacticsbecameevidenttwiceduringthewar.AtGooseGreen,2Parawentintobattlewithlesssupportthanitneeded.Afewdaysafterwinningthatfight,thesameparatroopersseizedanopportunitytoadvancequicklytoFitzroyandintheprocessdiscovereditwouldtakenearlyaweektogetsuppliesandservicestothem.Thissituationwasquitedifferenttothedelayedbuild-upaftertheamphibiouslandingandthemovementofsuppliesbyLSLtotheothersideof

EastFalkland.OntheisthmusleadingtoGooseGreen,3CommandoBrigademisjudgedthesituationandthe support needed by 2 Para.When2 Para then seized an opportunity to advance, 5Brigade did notconsider theeventualdifficultyofsustainingabattalionofparatroopersonce itarrivedatFitzroy.Bothsituationsproducedconsequences,butneitherjeopardizedtheoutcomeofthewar.HadcommanderslikeClappandThompsonnotremainedfocusedonintegratinglogisticsandcombatoperations,however,thewarmighthaveturnedoutdifferently.ThelongdistancetotheFalklandswasanotherconsiderationfortheBritish,especiallywhenitcametosupporting their forces.Given threeweeks toget suppliesbysea from theUnitedKingdom,andabouthalfaslongjustfromAscension,theydidnothavethecapabilitytomakeupforlossesquicklybyoceanshipping. Although C-130s could airdrop many things to the Task Force, these cargo planes wereinsufficienttoreplacelargequantities.Consequently,BritaintookstepsearlytoprotectitsfragilesupplychaintotheSouthAtlantic,startingatAscensionwithsurveillanceandcontinuingthroughoutthewarastheRoyalNavymoveditsshipsdayandnightaroundtheFalklandstokeepthemassafeaspossible.ItwiselymaintainedmanysupplyshipsbeyondthereachofArgentinepilots.EventhoughtheBritishwenttogreatlengthstoprotecttheirsupplychain,theywerenotalwayssuccessful.AlthoughtheTaskForcesufferedsignificantsetbacksdueto its inabilitytocontroltheskies,thosesetbackswerenotenoughtocrippletheforce.Somehaveproposedthatthetwoaircraftcarriers,HMSsHermesandInvincible,constitutedthecentreof gravity of the Task Force. It is true that the British would have had a much more difficult timecountering the persistent attacks by Argentine fighters without the majority of its Harriers. But suchbeliefswouldhavetoconsiderthetimingofanypossiblesuccessfulhitonacarrier.Onceengineersandlogisticianshadestablishedlandingstripsandrefuellingashore,theeffectsofthelossofacarrierwouldhavebeen less.AdmiralHenryLeach, theheadof theRoyalNavyat the time, admitted inhismemoirafterthewarthathebelievedtheywouldlosetwiceasmanyships;yetheneverwaveredinhisbeliefthattheBritishwouldwin.1Onecanmakeamorecompellingargumentthatthe logisticscapabilitiesof theTaskForceconstitutedthecentreofgravityofthecampaign,atleastthrough1JunewhentheForcehadbuiltupsuppliesonlandandstartedmovingthemforward.Priortothat,severedamagetotheirsupplieswould have either stopped or significantly delayed the British capability to generate combat powerashore.HadbombsexplodedonimpactwhentheyhittheLSLsGalahad,LancelotandBediverejustafterthe landings, the British could have lost half of the logistics vessels able to approach shallowwaters,hamperingnotonlytheinitialbuild-upbutalsotheforwardpositioningofsuppliesbythoseshipslateron.Alloftheseshipswerepackedwithsupplies,equipmentand,attimes,men.IftheArgentineshadbombedthemerchant shipMVElk, theymighthavedestroyed themajority of theLandForce’s ammunition. Iftheyhadhit ships carrying fuel, they couldhavegroundedhelicopters andmore.Hits oneither of theconverted transportsNorlandorCanberra,bothmassive targets thatdwarfed thewarships inFalklandSound,couldhavebeencatastrophiconD-Daybecauseofthetroopsandsuppliesonboard.ItisnothardtoimaginethedifficultiessuchlosseswouldhavecreatedfortheTaskForce.Commanders were justifiably concerned about their lack of air superiority and the ability of theArgentinestolaunchExocetmissiles.TheTaskForceremainedvulnerabletotheinterdictionofitssupplylinesforalmosttheentirethewar.Itsohappenedthat,beforetheinvasion,Argentinepilotshadtrainedprimarilyonattackinggroundtargetsratherthanshipsatsea.Makingsplitseconddecisions,afterflyinghundredsofmiles fromArgentinaand thenavoidingBritishairdefenceswhen reaching theFalklands,challenged pilots evenmore. Years later, it now appears that these pilots oftenwere not following theinstructionsof theirsuperiors,whohadtold themto target transports, landingcraftand logisticsshipsinstead of warships.2 There can be little doubt that the outcome of the war might have been quitedifferenthadArgentinepilotsfollowedthoseordersandmoreoftheirbombshadexploded.Fightingoverlong distances with little forward support, as the British did, makes a force more susceptible tointerdiction.Itmightsurprisesometodiscoverthatsupplywasneveraseriousproblemduringthewar,though.TheBritishreturnedhavinglearnedmanylessonsaboutthequalityofsomesuppliesandscalesofallocationforothers, suchasammunition.Andalthough therewere instanceswhere troopssuffered in theroughweatherwithoutsupplies,theTaskForcehadtheessentialsitneededthroughoutthewar.TheArgentinesneverseriouslycrippled its logisticscapabilities,despitecausinghugelossesattimes. It is truethatasthe war was coming to an end, the Royal Navy was running out of some ammunition. At other timesduringthegroundwar,asduringthebattleforGooseGreen,gunnersstoppedfiringbecausetheyhadnomoreammunition.By the time theArgentines surrendered inStanley, someartillerybatterieswereontheir last rounds as well. But plenty of ammunition remained elsewhere, and it would have reachedfightingpositionsafterapause.ThesameisgenerallytruefortheArgentinemilitary.Althoughsoldiersinthefieldoftensufferedfromlackoffoodandsupply,asteadyflowofsuppliescontinuedfromthemainlandtoStanleyrightuptotheend of the war. Navy and merchant shipping stopped supplying the Falklands after the sinking ofBelgrano,buttheArgentineAirForce,Navyandcivilianaircraftwerelandingmultipletimesdailyfromthe invasion until the day before the surrender, often backhauling casualties. Flightswere aborted onthreedays inMayduetocrosswinds.Otherwise,bravepilotsguidedtheirplanes intoStanley,avoidingBritishradarwhileunderconstantthreatofHarrierattack.Theycompiledanimpressiverecordofflying2,356hourstotheislands.Britishpilotstriedrepeatedlytostoptheflow,buttheyonlysucceededonce,whenon1JuneaHarrierpilotsuccessfullydownedaC-130withaSidewindermissile.3Operational-levellogisticsremainedeffectivefortheArgentinemilitarydespitenothavingoceanshippingat itsdisposal.

PlentyofsupplieswereinStanleyatthetimeofsurrender.ThebreakdownintheArgentinesupplychainoccurredoutwardfromStanleyatthetacticallevel,ascommanderssimplyfailedtogetsuppliesforwardtounits.TheArgentineArmyhadbeenrelyingonhelicopterresupplyaswell.AftertheBritishdestroyedten of their helicopters, forward distribution of supplies became more difficult, and commanders inStanley failed to find other solutions to get supplies to their men in field locations, even though thesurroundingmountainswereonlyamatterofadozenkilometresorlessfromthecapital.ThechallengeforBritishlogisticians,dayafterday,wasalsotogetsuppliestowheretheywereneeded.Events largely outside their control, coupledwith a lack of dedicated transportation, initially inhibitedtheir ability to supply units. As casualties occurred, logisticians had to compete, quite understandably,withmedicalevacuationrequirements.Itjustremainedaslowprocess.Intheend,itwasthemovementofsuppliesandequipmentthatdictatedthepaceofthegroundwar.Theseissueswerenotlimitedtothebattlefield.ProblemsstartedwhenshipswereloadedintheUnitedKingdominarushtogetsouth.Supplytroopsstruggledtodeterminewhatcargotheyhadandwhereitwassupposedtogo.AtAscension,theytriedtheirbestoveracoupleofweekstosortthroughstacksofsupplies in the cargo holds of ships and re-stow them so that access would be easier and dischargequicker during the assault. Just getting cargo out of ships was a challenge at times. When QE2disembarkedtroopsatSouthGeorgiaandheadedbacktoEngland,forexample,shesailednorthwithtonsof supplies simply because of the difficulty of removing them from the bottom of the ship. South ofAscension,plansforthedischargeofLSLschanged,preventinglogisticiansfromoffloadingsuppliesfromthem on to beaches and therefore requiring double handling of stocks. At other times after D-Day,logisticianswaiteddayandnight for supply ships toarrive in theanchorage, only to learn those shipswereneededelsewhere.Allthesethingscombinedtoaffectthepaceofoperations.Fuel, inparticular,plaguedlogisticiansafterthelandingsbecauseofthelargeamountofdailyneeds.Lackof fuelhandlersandthe largedailyrequirements for jerrycanswerepartof theproblem.Anotherchallengewastheneedtokeepaircraftflying.Eventually,theBritishestablishedrefuellingpointsashore.ThefirstwasinoperationatPortSanCarlosforhelicoptersbytheendofMayandeventuallyincludeda10,000litrepillowtank.AnotherwascompletedatSanCarlosshortlyafter5Brigadearrived.Therewasplentyof fuel aboard ships.Logisticiansandengineers filleda floating tankcalledadracone,pulled itnear shorewith small boats, then piped fuel from it to refuelling locations on land.Establishing thesecapabilitiestooktime,though.MuchfuelhandlingequipmenthadgonedownwiththeAtlanticConveyor.It did not help matters that Argentine pilots shot holes in a collapsible pillow tank for fuel as it wasmovingashoreatopamexeflote.Untilthecompletionoflandingstripsandrefuellingsitesandthearrivalofqualifiedpetroleumexpertsfrom5Brigade,HarrierpilotsneededeithertolandonthecrampedandoftenbusyflightdecksofFearlessorIntrepidorreturntoaircraftcarrierssometimesasfaras200milesaway fromEast Falkland to rearm and refuel before providing additional air cover or ground support.Beforethefinalbattle,forwardarearearmingandrefuellingsiteshadalsobeenestablishedatTealInletand Fitzroy. Those sites were resupplied occasionally by LSLs, but primarily by helicopters with slingloadsofjerrycansandportablefuelbladders,includingeighteencapturedfromArgentines.Helicoptersremainedvitaltologisticsoperationsduringthewarbecauseoftherough,tracklessterrainofEastFalkland.Muchhasbeenwrittenabout the effects of the loss of threeout of fourCH47cargohelicopters,sixWessexhelicoptersandothersuppliesaboardtheAtlanticConveyoron26May.Thatwasclearlyquiteasetbackforlogisticians,especiallytheCH47swiththeir20,000lbcargocapacities.Therecanbelittledoubt,however,thatlogisticianswouldhavestruggledtokeepallofthesehelicoptersflyinghadtheyarrivedatSanCarlosasplannedattheendofMay.ACH47,asanexample,typicallyconsumesmorethan300gallonsoffuelperhour.Withfourflyingdaily,logisticianswouldhaveneededalotoffuelonland.Itwouldhavebeenquiteadistributionchallenge.Asitwas,duringthepeakofoperationsduringthebattle for themountains, helicopters andHarriers drank fuel from just the installation at PortSanCarlosattherateof42,000gallonsperday.4OnonedaytheBMA/FMAatAjaxBaywasdowntoasingledayoffuelremaining,asitstruggledtomeetrequirements.Command and control presented a host of challenges as well, starting with the lack of a jointoperational headquarters in the South Atlantic. With greater appreciation of the situation as it wasdeveloping, a senior headquarters in theatre could have relieved some pressures on all task forcecommanders.NightlycallsfromthebattlefieldbacktotheUnitedKingdomwerehardlyasubstituteforreal-timesituationalawareness,communicationanddecision-making.Suchaseniorheadquartersmighthave set different priorities for supply ships too. Logisticians became frustrated when ships theyrequested failed to show up as anticipated because of needs elsewhere. Their frustrations wereunderstandable,sinceno-showsdelayedsuppliesforatleastanotherday.Butsuchfrustrationswerealsoinevitable, since many supplies for the entire task force were commingled as a result of the rushedoutload.Asitwas,RearAdmiralWoodwarddirectedshipmovementsbasedonhisviewofprioritiesandoverallneedsatthetimefortheentireTaskForce.Thereisnothingtosuggestthoseprioritieswerenotthebest;butduringandafterthewar,othersbelievedthemnottobe,whichisnotnecessarilysurprising.Communications issuesmadethe lackofsuchcommandpresenceevenmorepronounced.During thecriticalperiodoftheamphibiouslandingsandbuild-up,BrigadierThompsonwasoftenoutoftouchwithCommodoreClappandhisstaff,andbothremainedoutoftouchwithMajorGeneralMoore,whowasthensailing south on QE2, which was experiencing prolonged communication problems. Signal trafficoverwhelmed thesystem,andonlyhighpriority signalswould reach theirdestination.Communicationsalso plagued logisticians, but in different ways. STUFT ships did not have the same communicationcapabilities as military ships. Logisticians frequently had no communication with ships, landing craft,

mexeflotesorhelicopters.Although theycouldcommunicategenerallywithunit supportechelons, theylackedaseparateradionettorelaylogisticsinformationhigher.Consequently,face-to-facemeetingshadto become the norm so as not to clog up the operations net. As forces advanced inland, othercommunications challenges arose aswell,most noticeably around Fitzroy,whenmany discovered theycould not communicate with 2 Para once it advanced to the settlement, and when 5 Infantry Brigadebecameseparatedfromitscommunicationvehicles.Intoday’sworldofconstantsatellitecommunications,instantmessagingand tweets, itcanbedifficult toappreciate themanydifficulties theBritish faced incommunicatingintheFalklands.Seniorcommanderswereoftenoutoftouchwitheachother.Logisticianscommonlylackedtheabilitytocommunicatealtogether.Afterthewar,LandForcelogisticiansrecognizedthatasignificantoversighthadbeenthelackofaseniorlogisticsstaffofficertoworkwithCommodoreClapp’sstaffaboardFearlessfollowingtheamphibiouslandings.5Suchaliaisonofficerlikelywouldhaveprevented many frustrations about decisions affecting the offload of supplies, and provided a clearerunderstanding of joint requirements. With the arrival of 5 Brigade, Headquarters LFFI designated anofficertoserveinthatcapacity,establishprioritiesandcoordinaterequirementswithnavalstaff.Thisdidnoteliminateallconfusionandfrustration,buthispresencecertainlyreduceditfromwhatithadbeeninMay.Mattersmighthavebeenworsehaditnotbeenforthelogisticsorganizationandstaffsthatdeployedinitially.TherewasadramaticdifferencebetweenCommandoLogisticRegiment,whichwasanintegralpartof3CommandoBrigade,andtheassortedlogisticsunitsassembledatthelastminutetosupport5InfantryBrigade.Thosesmallunitsfor5Brigadecertainlyknewwhattheyweredoing,butwithoutmorecapabilities and a command and control headquarters to guide support, they never were capable ofproviding support to a brigade force on the battlefield. Onewould think that thosewho formed the 5Brigade team knew of these shortfalls and understood the challenges of providing logistics on thebattlefield.Perhapstheyanticipatedthattheassortedlogisticsunits in5Brigadewouldbecome‘plugs’for Commando Logistic Regiment when they arrived, so that the Regiment would bemore capable ofprovidingsupportforatwo-brigadedivision.Ifthatwerethecase,nooneapparentlytold3CommandoBrigade.ItisremarkablethattheRegimentwasabletomaintainthequalitysupportitprovided,givenhowoftenplans changed because of air attacks and damage to ships. And yet these logisticians and the staffssupporting themwereable tobounceback fromsetbacksandrefocusongettingsuppliesandservicesforwardforthemainattackonStanley,whileintegratingnewlyarrived5Brigadeunitsintotheirplans.TheseachievementsareallthemoreimpressivewhenoneconsidersthatmostoftheirtrainingpriortothewarremainedrestrictedtofixedinfrastructuresinNATOscenarios,whichborelittlerelationshiptoanassaultonahostilecoast.Keytosomeofthisperformanceatleastwastheorganizationitself,amulti-functionalmulti-serviceunittrainedinbothitslogisticmissionandsurvivalskills,eachmemberbeingcommando-trainedlikeothersin3CommandoBrigade.CommandoLogisticRegimentwasstructuredtoenablecontinuoussupportonthebattlefield.Itcouldtailormulti-functionalsupportteamstomeetchangingconditions.Therewasprobablynootherunit like thisRegiment in1982.Back then, logistics support forground forces typically camefromseparatesupply,maintenance,transportationandmedicalunits,oftenstove-pipedforcommandandcontrolfromlowertohigherlevels.OnlyseveralyearsaftertheFalklandsWardidothermilitariesstartformingmulti-functionallogisticscommandstoprovidesupporttocombatunits.Andalthoughthistypeofsupportorganizationisquitecommontoday,branchesofthemilitarystillhavenotmigratedtowardmorejoint organizations for providing logistics, except at installation level. Logistics in the USmilitary, forexample,remainverymuchservice-centric,eventhoughsomeintegrationhasstartedatinstallationlevel.CommandoLogisticRegimentcontinuestowarrantcloserexaminationbythoseinterestedintherangeofpossibilitiesofjointlogistics,especiallyinexpeditionary-typewarfare.Within the Commando Logistic Regiment there was no better example of successful support on thebattlefield thantheachievementsof itsMedicalSquadron. Initialplansdidnotenvisage theneed forahospital ashore. As Argentine planes threatened shipping, it became essential to establish thosecapabilitiesonlandquickly.ThechoicebecameAjaxBay,theareaplannedfortheanticipatedsmallbuild-upofsupplies;italsoprovidedshelterforasmallhospitalintheoldsheepprocessingplant.Intherushtorelocateships,however, theSquadronwasunable todisembarkallofwhat itwanted.Nonetheless, themakeshiftfieldhospitalatAjaxsoonprovedvitalinsavinglives.BythetimeArgentinasurrendered,theRedandGreenLifeMachinehadtreatedover1,000casualtiesandperformedover300majorsurgeries.Remarkably,onlythreeBritishsoldiersdiedafterreachingthishospital,eventhoughsomearrivedinsuchbadconditionthattheyrequiredfiveunitsofbloodtostabilizethembeforesurgerycouldtakeplace.6TheastoundingsuccessofdoctorsinmendingsoldierswasdueinparttopracticesusedbysurgeonsasfarbackasNapoleon’sarmy,butnotthatcommonelsewhereatthetime.Theyremoveddeadtissue,cleanedwoundsasbesttheycouldandappliedloosewraps,butkeptwoundsopenfordaysafterwardsuntiltimeorconditionsenabledmorethoroughexamination.Thebraveryandskillofdoctorswasonlypartofthereasonforthesemedicalsuccesses,though.TheBritishanticipatedthatEastFalklandwouldpresentchallengesgreaterthantheirrecentexperiencesinNorthern Ireland at that time, where evacuation from point of injury was easy and transportationplentiful.MedicaltrainingprovidedtounitsenroutetotheFalklandsprovedinvaluableonthebattlefield.It consistedof severalblocksof instruction toenablemen todealwithavarietyof combatwounds, toadministerdripsandmorphine,toapplyfirstaiddressingsandprovide immediateresuscitation,andtohelpevacuatecasualties.Medicationsanddressingsissuedbeforelandingshelpedmentoalleviatepain

andstopbleeding,sothattheycouldcareforthemselvesorassistcomradeswithoutimmediatelycallingformedicalassistance.Abovethesoldierlevelwithincompanies,otherleaderscarriedstillmoresupplies,to include intravenous fluids and extra drugs and dressings. Such preparation proved invaluable atDarwin/GooseGreenandinthemountainssurroundingStanley,whererockycragssloweddownadhocstretcherteams.The FalklandsWar also demonstrated again the importance of evacuation helicopters and echelonedlevelsoftreatmentfrompointofinjurytosurgery.Althoughevacuationwasrudimentarymostofthetime,itremainedeffectiveinsavinglivesbecauseoftreatmentcapabilitiesatmultiplelevels.Itisworthnotingthat thirty per cent of all the casualties the British treated were Argentines. British doctors wereoverwhelmed at times by the need to tend to Argentine casualties and provide continuing care toprisoners. Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly became the only member of the Task Force to receivedecorationsfromboththeBritishandArgentinegovernments.Manylikelydonotknow,however,thatthevastmajorityofcasualtiesduringthewaroccurrednotonlandbutatsea,nearlyseventypercentifonecountstheSeaKinghelicoptercrashduringcross-loadingpriortoD-Day.Casualtiesonshipswereoftenquiteseverebecauseofexplodingfuelandthedifficultyofreaching injured sailors inburningpassagewaysandcompartments.There canbenodoubt thatbattledrills andmedical training for sailorsandcrewsen route to theSouthAtlantichadanequallypositiveeffectonsavinglivesatseaaswell.PerhapsthemostlastingimpressiononegetsfromtheFalklandsWar,though,isthattheBritishweresimply better than the Argentines they fought. From bottom to top ranks, therewere vast differencesbetweenthemilitariesofthetwonations.Britain’sarmedserviceswerevoluntaryandprofessional,andhadtrainedunderdifficultconditionsinthepast.Argentina’sconsistedmostlyofconscripts,manywithlittletrainingandwithoutthecamaraderieofunitswithheritagescenturiesold.ManyhadcomefromthewarmerareasofnorthernArgentina.Dozensdiednotinbattlebutfromexposure,becausetheywerenotadequatelypreparedorequipped.Britishseniorleadersmaynothaveheldacommonviewofeventsonadailybasis,buttheysharedavisionofwheretheymustwinthewarandwhatcouldcausethemtoloseit.TheArgentineJuntamisjudgedBritishresolve,anditscommandersfailedtodevelopacoherentstrategytodefeattheTaskForceortotakeadvantageofopportunitiesonthebattlefield.Britishleadersledfromthefrontandtookcareoftheirmen.ManyofArgentina’sneverleftStanleyastheirmensufferedinthefield.Someleadersdisciplinedsoldiersbywithholdingrations.ResidentsofStanleywitnessedonesoldierhavingtostriptothewaistandstandalldaybytheTownHallinfreezingrainbecausehehadreturnedfromthefieldonhisownsimplytogetmorerationsforhismen.7WhenBritishleadersdied,otherstooktheir place and executed plans because they understood what had to be done and were capable ofassuming responsibility. Overall, British troops were better trained and tougher thanmost Argentinestheyfaced,aswasdemonstratedonmultipleoccasionsfromGooseGreentoMountLongdonandbeyond.Whensetbacksoccurred,theseunitswereabletobounceback.Britain’scommandos,paratroopers,soldiers,sailorsandairmenallhadtheirmomentsofgloryundertough fighting conditions in the Falklands War. They were simply more professional than those theyfought.Allofthemwerebackedupbythousandsofmenandwomenworkingbehindthescenes,attimesthousandsofmilesaway,tryinggetthemwhattheyneeded.Togethertheymadethevictorypossible.

Notes

Chapter1:PreludetoWar1.MartinMiddlebrook,TheFightfortheMalvinas:TheArgentineForcesintheFalklandsWar,London:

Viking,1989,p.252. JohnNott,HereTodayGoneTomorrow:RecollectionsofanErrantPolitician,London:Politico’s,2002,

p.2453. The FalklandsWar Then andNow, ed. Gordon Ramsey, Essex, UK: Battle of Britain International,

2009,pp.19–204. LawrenceFreedmanandVirginiaGamba-Stonehouse,SignalsofWar:TheFalklandsConflictof1982,

London:FaberandFaber,1990,p.12–135. Ibid.,p.256.MargaretThatcher,TheDowningStreetYears,NewYork:Harper,1993,p.1777.Middlebrook,pp.5–68. Ibid.,p.139. SandyWoodward,OneHundredDays,Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,1992,p.7210. ChrisHobson,FalklandsAirWar,Hinckley:Midland,2002,p.1711. Ibid.,p.1912. FreedmanandGamba-Stonehouse,p.1613.MaxHastingsandSimonJenkins,TheBattlefortheFalklands,NewYork:Norton,1983,p.5614. JohnNott,‘AViewfromtheCentre’,inTheFalklandsConflictTwentyYearsOn,eds.StephenBadsey,

RobertHaversandMarkGrove,NewYork:FrankCass,2005,p.6315. Nott,HereTodayGoneTomorrow,p.25716. Ibid.,pp.233–417. Thatcher,p.17918. HenryLeach,EndureNoMakeshifts,Barnsley:LeoCooper,1993,p.22119. Nott,HereTodayGoneTomorrow,p.25820. Ibid.,p.21121. Leach,p.22322.MartinMiddlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,Barnsley:Pen&Sword,2012,p.4323. Ibid.,p.4724. JohnSmith,74Days:AnIslander’sDiaryoftheFalklandsOccupation,OldBasing:Quetzal,2002,p.

3125. Ibid.,pp.55,5926. HastingsandJenkins,pp.76–727.Woodward,p.7328. JulianThompson,ThreeCommandoBrigadeintheFalklands:NoPicnic,Barnsley:Pen&Sword,2008,

p.129. MichaelClappandEwanSouthby-Tailyour,AmphibiousAssaultFalklands:TheBattleofSanCarlos

Water,Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,1996,p.21

Chapter2:MobilizationandDeployment1. M. J. Wellings, Post Operational Report, The Role of the Defence Operational Movement Staff in

OperationCorporate,pp.4–52. ‘TheUKLFAspectsofMountingtheFalklandIslandOperation’,TheRoyalCorpsofTransportReview,

March1983,p.113. Nott,HereTodayGoneTomorrow,p.2384.M.J.Wellings,PostOperationalReport,p.115. RogerVillar,MerchantShipsatWar,Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,1984,p.236. KeithSpeed,SeaChange:TheBattle for theFalklandsand theFutureofBritain’sNavy,Bath,UK:

Ashgrove,1982,p.67.Wellings,PostOperationalReport,p.128. Villar,pp.19–209. Speed,p.12310. Villar,p.2511. M.J.Wellings,‘TheRoleoftheDefenceOperationalMovementsStaffinOperationsCorporate’,The

RoyalCorpsofTransportReview,March1983,p.1012.Wellings,PostOperationalReport,p.1813. Villar,p.2914. DavidBrown,TheRoyalNavyandtheFalklandsWar,London:LeoCooper,1987,pp.72–515.Wellings,PostOperationalReport,pp.11,1716. OrdnanceReportonOperationCorporate,HQCommandoForcesRoyalMarines(Undated),p.A-217. ‘TheUKLFAspectsofMountingtheFalklandIslandOperation’,p.1118. Ibid,pp.11–12;TheBritishArmyintheFalklands,London:MinistryofDefence,1983,p.25

19. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.1020. EwenSouthby-Tailyour,ReasonsinWriting:ACommando’sViewoftheFalklandsWar,Barnsley:Leo

Cooper,2003,p.11321. Southby-Tailyour,creditbyThompsononrearofdustjacket22. AndrewVine,AVeryStrangeWaytoGotoWar,London:Aurum,2012,p.49–5023. LieutenantColonelIvarHellberg,‘AnExperiencewiththeCommandoLogisticRegiment’,TheRoyal

CorpsofTransportReview,March1983,p.1324. OrdnanceReportonOperationCorporate,p.B-225. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.1226. Villar,p.1027.Wellings,PostOperationalReport,p.1328. Brown,p.6929. Ibid.,p.7330. Ibid.,p.7231. Vine,pp.57–832. NickVaux,MarchtotheSouthAtlantic:42CommandoRoyalMarinesintheFalklandsWar,Barnsley:

Pen&Sword,2007,p.1533. 3CommandoBrigade received ungriddedmaps before they departed andwere prepared to create

theirowngriddedmapsifnecessary.TheseungriddedmapswerethesametypethatArgentinesusedduringthewaras theyreliedonreferencepoints to locate targetsrather thantheprecisionofgridcoordinates

34. Brown,p.78

Chapter3:InitialPlanningandPreparationatSea1.FalklandsArmoury,Dorset,UK:BlandfordPress,1985,pp.26–72. Clapp,p.503.Woodward,pp.77–94. Ibid,p.845. Clapp,p.486. Ibid.7. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.328. Lieutenant Colonel IvarHellberg, Post Operational Report, ‘An Experiencewith the RoyalMarines

FalklandsCampaignApril–July1982’,p.39. Ibid.10. HughMcManners,FalklandsCommando,London:WilliamKimber,1984,p.3811. Vaux,p.2712. Ibid.13. Vine,p.7014. Ibid.,p.8115. RickJolly,TheRedandGreenLifeMachine:ADiaryoftheFalklandsFieldHospital,London:Century,

1983,p.4316. Southby-Tailyour,p.127,132–317.Woodward,p.9218. HastingsandJenkins,p.12119. Ibid.

Chapter4:SupportOperationsatAscensionIsland1. AirMarshalSirJohnCurtiss, ‘OperationCorporate:TheRAFintheFalklandsCampaign’,AirClues,

December1982,p.4502.‘AscensionIslandApril1982’,ArmedForces,July1984,p.2743.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.914.‘AscensionIslandApril1982’,p.2755. Captain Bob McQueen, Island Base: Ascension Island in the Falklands War, Dunbeath, Scotland:

WhittlesPublishing,2005,p.146. Brown,p.70;Curtiss,p.4527.‘AscensionIslandApril1982’,p.2768.‘OperationCorporate:AfloatwiththeTaskForce’,TheRoyalNavySupply&TransportServiceJournal,

46,January1983,pp.27–309. TonyEvans,‘BritishAirlift:YesterdayandToday’,Airlift,Fall1991,p.410. ‘HerculesintheRAF…TheFalklandsandBeyond’,AirInternational,February1983,p.74;Evans,p.411. ‘HerculesintheRAF…TheFalklandsandBeyond’,pp.89–9012. CaptainR.N.Whittaker, ‘CombatLogistics:TheSouthAtlantic’,AirForce JournalofLogistics, Fall

1984,p.613. MajorR.C.Gardner,‘47AirDespatchSquadronRCT’,TheRoyalCorpsofTransportReview,March

1983,p.26;NevilleTrotter,‘TheFalklandsandtheLongHaul’,Proceedings,June1983,p.11114. Gardner,pp.26,38–915. ‘AscensionIslandApril1982’,p.27516.McQueen,pp.15,11017. ‘AscensionIslandApril1982’,p.275

18. ‘TheAscensionIslandBase’,DefenceLooksattheFalklandsConflict,ADefenceSpecial,November1982,p.70

19. Curtiss,p.45120. Major P. M. R. Hill, ‘Operation Corporate – Sappers on Ascension’, The Royal Engineers Journal,

March1983,p.22621.Whittaker,p.522. ‘AscensionIslandApril1982’,p.27523. ‘TheAscensionIslandBase’,p.71;Hill,p.22724. ‘TheAscensionIslandBase’,p.7125. ‘AscensionIslandApril1982’,p.27626. ‘TheAscensionIslandBase’,p.7127. Vine,p.13128. SSGTD.S.Boultry,‘PersonalAccount’,TheRoyalCorpsofTransportReview,March1983,p.2129. Brown,p.9230. JulianThompson,TheLifebloodofWar,London:Brassey’s,1991,p.26131. Ibid.,p.26332. LawrenceFreedman,TheOfficial History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol II, Revised andUpdated

Edition,Abingdon,Oxon:Routledge,2007,p.19733. Clapp,p.74

Chapter5:FinalPreparationsfortheAmphibiousAssault1.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.1202. HughBicheno,Razor’sEdge,London:Weidenfeld&Nicholson,2006,pp.125–73. Admiral Henry Leach, ‘CrisisManagement and the Assembly of the Task Force’, in The FalklandsConflict Twenty Years On:Lessons for the Future, eds. Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, Mark Grove,SandhurstConferenceSeries,Abingdon:FrankCase,2005,p.72

4. Nott,p.3055. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,pp.79–806. Jolly,p.397. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.55–68. Ibid.,p.54.LogisticsplansaredetailedfurtherinOrdnanceReportonOperationCorporate9. South Atlantic Conflict: Lessons Learned, Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations. Report of the

FalklandIslandStudyGrouptoSecretaryoftheNavy,8March1983,p.XIV-310. R. F.Grevatte-Ball, ‘OperationCorporate byHQ3 TransportGroup (Line ofCommunication)’,The

RoyalCorpsofTransportReview,March1983,p.1911. HastingsandJenkins,p.18512. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,pp.59–60

Chapter6:D-DayandtheStruggletoBuildupLogistics1. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.652. Ibid.,p.663. Geoffrey Underwood,Our FalklandsWar: TheMen of the Task Force Tell Their Story, Devonport:

MaritimeBooks,1983,p.634.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.2085. Underwood,p.106. Interestingly,the1,000lbbombsweretheBritish-madeMark17.SomeotherbombswereAmerican-

made. One account indicates that the Argentines were furious to learn later that only modestimprovementswereneededtofuseAmericanbombstoexplodeonimpact.TheUSembargo,though,prevented Argentina from getting manuals with this information from the American manufacturer.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.220andHastingsandJenkins,TheBattlefortheFalklands,p.228

7. Jolly,p.528. Grevatte-Ball,p.209. Ibid.10. Brown,p.21611. Thompson,TheLifebloodofWar,p.27212. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.7513. Thompson,TheLifebloodofWar,p.27614. OrdnanceReportonOperationCorporate,pp.K2–K315. G. W. Field, ‘Operation Corporate –The Falkland Campaign’, The Royal Engineers Journal, March

1983,p.23416. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.7517. Brown,p.18918. Villar,p.9719. W.J.Tustin,‘TheLogisticsoftheFalklandsWar–PartII’,TheArmyQuarterlyandDefenceJournal,

October1984,p.40820. Afterthewar,539AssaultSquadronwasformed,whichcentralizedcontroloflandingcraft(LCU,LCV,

andLCP)andRigidRaidersunderasinglecommanderinCommandoForces.Thiswouldmeanthat,for any future contingency operations, the deployed marines would control their landing craftimportantforship-to-shoreoperations,unlessofcourseahigherauthorityintervened

21. HastingsandJenkins,p.22022.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.241–223. FreedmanandGamba-Stonehouse,p.36124. Underwood,p.5125. Brown,p.22326. Thompson,TheLifebloodofWar,p.278

Chapter7:TheBreakoutandBattleforGooseGreen1. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.852. NoraKinzerStewart,Mates&Muchachos:UnitCohesionintheFalklands/MalvinasWar,Washington,

DC:Brassey’s,1991,p.413. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,pp.66–74. Ibid.,p.755. Freedman,OfficialHistoryoftheFalklandsCampaign,Vol.II,p.5576. Ibid.,p.5587. Ibid.,p.5628. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.909. HastingsandJenkins,pp.237–810. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.11011. JohnFrost,2ParaFalklands–TheBattalionatWar,London:Buchan&Enright,1983,p.8412. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.10313. Underwood,p.11014. Hellberg,‘AnExperiencewiththeCommandoLogisticRegiment’,p.1715.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.25716. Ibid.,p.26217. RobertFox,EyewitnessFalklands,London:Methuen,1982,p.17618. PatrickBishopandJohnWitherow,TheWinterWar,London:Quartet,1983,p.9219. HastingsandJenkins,p.24520. Ibid.,p.24421. Frost,p.9322. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.9423. Fox,p.18824. Jolly,RedandGreenLifeMachine,p.9225. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,pp.100–126. Ibid.,p.10427. Ibid.28. Fox,p.21829. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.10330. Ibid.31. Brown,p.23132. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.113

Chapter8:MoreForcesandChallenges1. Southby-Tailyour,p.2542. Major A. D. Ball, ‘Operation Corporate, Part 2 –10 Field Workshop REME’, Journal of the RoyalElectricalandMechanicalEngineers,33,April1983,p.7

3. HastingsandJenkins,p.2684. SeveralsourcesindicatethatsomedoubtsstartedsurfacingatthistimeaboutWilson’ssuitabilityfor

the job, which led to the decision to deploy Brigadier John Waters as the deputy to Moore ifreplacementofabrigadecommanderbecamenecessary

5.5InfantryBrigadeReportonOperationCorporate1982(undated),p.26. ArmyManagementService,ReportNo.392,TheOutloadingandDeploymentbySeaofStockpilesin

SupportofOOAOperations–PartI,p.147. OrdnanceReportonOperationCorporate,p.G-2-18. ArmyManagementService,ReportNo.392,p.249. Ball,p.710.WilliamH.MillerandDavidF.Hutchings,TransatlanticLinersatWar,NewYork:Arco,1985,p.13711. NicholasvanderBijlandDavidAldea,5th InfantryBrigade in theFalklands,Barnsley:LeoCooper,

2003,pp.45–612.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.29513.MillerandHutchings,p.13714. HastingsandJenkins,p.26815. HQLFFIRecordofProceedings,AnnexT[Logistics],18October1982,p.T-416.MillerandHutchings,p.13917. Ibid.,pp.145–618. Brown,p.243–519. Southby-Tailyour,p.25420. OrdnanceReportonOperationCorporate,p.1421. Brown,p.274

22.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.29523. Ball,p.924. LieutenantColonelIvarHellberg,FalklandsLogisticsPresentationtoStaffCollege,28June198525. Brown,p.26826. Underwood,p.8027. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,pp.121,124

Chapter9:ProblemsatFitzroy1. HastingsandJenkins,p.2602. Jolly,p.953. VanderBijlandAldea,p.704. Ibid.,p.76;Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.1445. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.1256. BishopandWitherow,p.1117. Ibid.,p.1178. VanderBijlandAldea,p.879. HastingsandJenkins,p.27310. FreedmanandGamba-Stonehouse,p.38611. Southby-Tailyour,p.25712. VanderBijlandAldea,p.9413. Ibid.14. Ibid.,p.9615. Ibid.,p.9716. Plans for reinforcing Fitzroy changed several times. A good discussion of the complexity of the

situationiscontainedinvanderBijlandAldea,pp.103–26,supplementedbyaccountsinClapp,pp.219–52andSouthby-Tailyour,pp.252–311

17. Southby-Tailyour,p.26318. Clapp,p.23319.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.30020. VanderBijlandAldea,p.11221. Ibid.,pp.112–1322.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,pp.301–223. HastingsandJenkins,p.27324. BishopandWitherow,p.114.TwoothereventsthatdayrestrictedthepossibleresponsebyHarriers

evenmore.AHarrierhadcrashedontake-offfromthenewlyestablishedrefuellingsiteonlandatSanCarlos,stoppingfurtherrefuellingforawhile.Alsothatday,WoodwardhadmovedHermesanother100milesfurthereasttocleanherboilers,limitingthetimeonstationofHarrierstolessthanfifteenminutesuntiltherefuellingstationcouldbecleared.Southby-Tailyour,p.300

25. Underwood,p.1226. Thompson,TheLifebloodofWar,p.28427. BombslodgingintheLSLsdidnotexplodeinsidetheircasingsasnormallyhappens.Theydeflagrated

withcasingsburstingopenandcontentsburning.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.30028. Jolly,p.12329. Freedman,OfficialHistoryoftheFalklandsCampaign,VolII,p.61330. Ibid.,p.606

Chapter10:TheBattleforMountainsSurroundingStanley1. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.1392. Vaux,p.1313. Ibid.,p.1304. Ibid.,p.1515.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.3226. Ibid.7. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.140.Itisimportanttonotethatatonepointinthefinalbattle,

theonlydressingstation in theentiredivision thatwasreachablebyhelicopterbecauseofweatherwas3CommandoBrigade’satTealInlet

8.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.3299. Thompson,TheLifebloodofWar,p.27810. Fox,pp.229–3011.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.31412. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.14813.3ParaPostOperationalReport,p.L-314. Thompson,3CommandoBrigade,p.16315. Ibid.,p.16916. Brown,p.31817. Underwood,p.3518. VanderBijlandAldea,p.19119.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,pp.357,36620. VanderBijlandAldea,p.202

21. Letterdated4November1982fromLieutenantColonelDavidMorgantoPatrickBishop,co-authorofTheWinterWar,offeringsometongue-in-cheekcorrectionstothebook

22.Middlebrook,TheFalklandsWar,p.369

Chapter11:AftertheSurrender1. Smith,p.1852. Vaux,p.2023. Jolly,TheRedandGreenLifeMachine,p.1424. Clapp,pp.268–95.TheBritishArmyintheFalklands,London:MinistryofDefence,1983,p.276. Operation Corporate Lessons Learned and Reconstitution of Stocks, 10 August 1982, pp. 6, 9;

OperationCorporate:RoyalEngineersPostOperationReport,18December1982,p.37. OperationCorporate,HQLandForcesFalklandIslandsMedicalReport,pp.15,238.TheFalklands:TheAftermath,ed.PeterWay,London:MarshallCavendish,1984,p.54.Onpage210of

hisbook,74Days,JohnSmithprovidesillustrationsofthisinnovativesnatchtechniquethattheRoyalAirForceusedtopickupmail

9.TheFalklands:TheAftermath,p.5210. J.G.Mullin,‘PortStanleyMinefields’,BritishArmyReview,December1983p.5211.TheFalklands:TheAftermath,pp.86,89–9012. Op Corporate: Report on Army Graves Registration Work and Repatriation of Bodies (August-

November1982),10January198313. Clapp,p,27314. Ball,pp.7–815. Hellberg,FalklandsLogisticsPresentationtoStaffCollege,28June198516. PapersontheFalklandsWarsandContainerization,ScriptofPresentationtoITCHA,September12,

1985,p.417. Ibid.,pp.8–10

Chapter12:AReflectionontheBritishExperience1. Leach,EndureNoMakeshifts,p.2272. ReneDeLaPedraja,‘TheArgentineAirForceVersusBritainintheFalklandIslands,1982’inWhyAirForcesFail:TheAnatomyofDefeat,eds.RobinHighamandStephenJ.Harris,Lexington:UniversityPressofKentucky,2006,pp.253–55

3. JeffEthell,‘TheMakeshiftWar’,MilitaryLogisticsForum,March1985,pp.46–74. HQ,LFFIRecordofProceedings,AnnexT[Logistics],p.T-315. Ibid.,p.T-226. Rick Jolly, ‘TheRedandGreenLifeSupportMachine’,TheGlobe and Laurel, November/December

1982,p.4127. Smith,p.107

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Index

1InfantryBrigade,1491Troop,51Squadron,RE,701WelshGuards,148,160–1,165,192,206–7,210,213arrivalatSanCarlos,165,169–72,175casualties,185–6,191movestoBluffCove/Fitzroy,176–87SapperHill,213

1stQueen’sOwnHighlanders,2301/7GurkhaRifles,147–8,161arrivalatSanCarlos,165,169,172,175GooseGreenandFitzroy,165,173–4,183MountWilliam,209,211–12

2Para,80–2,93,147–8,150,160,165,169–71,174,192,196,221,230,244amphibiouslanding,103–5,110BluffCove,176,181casualties,138–42,171,213fightforGooseGreen,121,127–33,135–43,146,197,199,238–9Fitzroy,173–7,181,187,189WirelessRidge,210,212–3

2PostalRegiment,732ScotsGuards,148,160,230arrivalatSanCarlos,165,169,172,175casualties,211movetoBluffCove,176,178–81,199TumbledownMountain,209,210–12

3 Commando Brigade, see also Brigadier Julian Thompson and specific units, 31, 34, 73–4, 76, 80,89–90,95–7,98,128,131,134–5,146–8,150–4,156–60,162,165,167,170,184,187,195–6,233,238–9,245,251,256aftersurrender,218,230amphibiouslandings,102–22battleformountains,190–2,194–6,198–203,207–9fightforGooseGreen,126–32,135–43,141,144–5organization,47planninginUKanddeployment,18–19,28,35,37,42–3preparationenroute,54–6

3Para,38,93–4,98–100,130–5,145–7,150,163,167,169,190,210,230amphibiouslanding,103–4,109–10casualties,203–6MountLongdon,170,195–6,201–5

4thInfantryRegiment(Argentine),2075 InfantryBrigade,seealsoBrigadierTonyWilsonand specificunits, 80,90–2, 118–19, 126, 128–9,131,141,170–2,191–2,199,218,233,238–9,243,244–5activationanddeployment,147,153–6aftersurrender,218,221,230arrivalatSanCarlos,165–6battleformountains,191,199,201,207–9Fitzroy,178–87,189,204lossofheadquartersequipment,185organization,148–50preparationenroute,156–60traininginUK,151–3,155

5thMarineBattalion(Argentine),2096thFieldCashOffice,RAPC,1507thInfantryRegiment(Argentine),2019OrdnanceBattalion,7310FieldWorkshop,150,155,166,23012PetroleumSquadron,7216FieldAmbulance,RAMC,150,161,179,181,183,185,187,22617PortRegiment,RCT,3122SpecialAirService,100,21525thInfantryRegiment(Argentine),1630SignalRegiment,72

38AirSupportGroup,RAF,6340Commando,RM,35,93,98–100,130,169–70,192,213,224amphibiouslanding,103–4,110casualties,134

42Commando,RM,33,35,42,94,98,141,163,210amphibiouslanding,103–4,109–10casualties,193,207MountHarriet,170,195–6,206–7MountKent,130–1,146,169,192

42Squadron,RAF,6545Commando,RM,35,93,95,98–100,127,130–5,144–6,163,167,169,210,218amphibiouslanding,103–4casualties,134,206TwoSisters,170,195–6,202–3,205

47AirDispatchSquadron,RCT,68–959IndependentCommandoSquadron,76,16481OrdnanceCompany,149,155–6,158–60,162,165–6,199,224,23091OrdnanceCompany,149,159,160,162,164–5,230160ProvostCompany,RMP,150407TransportTroop,RCT,159,166539AssaultSquadron,253846NavalAirSquadron,100AdmiraltySurfaceWeaponsEstablishment,13Aeromacchitrainer,106Aidpostorstation,seealsofelddressingstationandregimentalaidpost,138,193–4,199,202–3,205,211

AirattacksbyArgentines,107,113,123–4,127,133–4,138–40,158–9,164,183–5,187,191,209,237,253

AirattacksbyBritish,83,85,107,137,139,209–10,214Airdefence,seealsoRapier,39,80,87,108,130,142,175,199,221,240Airsuperiority,40.44,47,53,79,90–1,102,240Air-to-airrefuelling,seealsoHerculesC–130,67–9,232,236Aircraft,seespecificaircraftAircraftcarriers,seespecificshipsAirdrops,64,68–9,96,239Airfieldsandairstrips,4,12–13,22,85,127,136,164,174,222,227AjaxBay,seealsoBrigadeandForceMaintenanceArea,93,95,129,134,138,160,162,171,174,178,186,198,208,243,246aftersurrender,221,223–4forwardresupply,167,190–1,196,238logisticsbuildupashore,105,109–12,114–15,121,123–4,126,133,144,163

Alacrity,HMS,41,68Alexandria,29Ambuscade,HMS,212Ammunition,51–2,80–1,90,94,97,128,145,190,217,219,229atAscension,72,74–8inUK,31,34–5,38onships,24,29,41–2,54,66,77,90,103,122,124,154–6,161,166,185,240resupply,131–5,137,142,144,146,172,176,179,183,190–1,195,202,206,208–9,213,241

Amphibiousoperations(general),91–2,237–8AmphibiousOperationsArea,108AmphibiousTaskForce/Group,seealsoCommodoreMichaelClapp,79–80,82,100–1,154,167,236amphibiouslandings,101–22enroutetoFalklands,45–7,49–50,53–4,57–8,84,88shipsdamagedorlost,107,113,185–7

Anaya,AdmiralJorge,5–6Antelope,HMS,41,68,114,161Antrim,HMS,43,45,65,83,103,106–7,160,162Appleleaf,RFA,20Ardent,HMS,103,106–7,109,16Argentina,seealsoJuntaclaimstoFalklands,3economicconditions,1,17invasionofFalklands,1,9,16–18militarycapabilities,11planninginvasionofFalklands,5–6,7,9surrender,215–16,221

Argonaut,HMS,103,106–7

ArmyAirCorps,141Arrow,HMS,43,66,131,136–8,140,196Artillery,48,50,51,56,59,80–1,88,91,94,103,105,130,134–5,137–9,141–2,146,148,156,174,196,203–5,206,210–14,218,241relocationof,122,127,145–6,169,190–1,197,208

AscensionIsland,seealsoair-to-airrefuelling,supplies,WideawakeAirfield,13,21,43,60,87–9,94,96–9,102,111,115,153–8,171,200,226cargooperations,66,68–76,242climateandconditions,60–4,70–2fuelandfuelpipeline,71–2,77importanceforlogistics,64,235–6,239

Assaultpacks,34Astronomer,STUFT,31AtlanticCauseway,STUFT,31,118,157,172,186AtlanticConveyor,STUFT,30–1,80,119,126,146,243sinkingof,122–4,127–8,132,134,166,170,196,222

Avenger,HMS,179,196,207

BEchelon,94–5,100BahiaBuenSuceso,8–9BahiaParaiso,97,112BalticFerry,STUFT,155–7,164–6,224,230bakery,149BandofCommandoForces,RM,39BandwagonBV202,118Banjal,Gambia,71Baxter,ColonelIan,32–3,39,49,59,75,80–1enrouteonQE2,159–60inFalklands,164,179,184inStanley,217–18

Belize,5,41BerkeleySound,82,102Bicesterdepot,34BickleighBarracks,RM,33BlackBuckbombings,85,207Blowpipemissile,48,80,106,131BlueBeach,93,109BluesandRoyals,38,145,211,213BluffCove,seealsodistributionpoint,158,170,178,180–3,199–200,209BoardofTrade,seeDepartmentofTradeBocaHouse,136–7Boeing747,232Bramall,GeneralEdwin,9BreconBeacons,Wales,151BrigadeMaintenanceArea(BMA),seealsoRedandGreenLifeMachine,48,95,97,130–1,134,162,164,178airattack,133–5,140,144logisticsbuildupashore,105,109,111–21,124prisonersofwar,143–4supportofgroundoperations,133–5,141

Brilliant,HMS,43,66,103,106–7Britannia,HMS,29BritishAntarcticSurveyParty,7–8BritishArmy,23,38,48–9,80–1,129,149,237BritishBroadcastingCorporation(BBC),61,123,135–6,168BritishEsk,STUFT,161BritishForcesSupportUnit(BFSU),63–6,69–72,77–8BritishTay,STUFT,161Broadsword,HMS,83,103,106–7,123BrodieCreekBridge,136BuenosAires,1–2,5,8,17,43,63,122BurnsideHouse,136Busser,RearAdmiralCarlos,16

Cable&Wireless,61,72–3CamillaCreekandCamillaCreekHouse,130–3,135–8CanadianPacific,29Canberra,STUFT,96,98–100,223,230,240aroundFalklands,103–5,107,109–11,122,164–5,172

enroutetoSouthAtlantic,41–2,52–3,73requisitionandconversion,28–9

SouthGeorgia,160–1CapeHorn,3Cardiff,HMS,180–1CarrierBattleGroup,seealsospecificships,RearAdmiral

SandyWoodward,18,57,79,81,83,85–7,92,102–3,106–7,116,119,128,173,207shipsdamagedorlost,87,123–4

Carrington,SecofStateLord,9Casualties,seealsospecificshipsandunits,87,100,105,108,112,123,134,138,141,143,161,171,181,185–8,191,193–5,198–9,203–6,209,211,213,217,219,233,242,246–7

Casualtyevacuation(casevac),seealsohelicopters,52,55,96–7,138,140–1,156,185–6,190,193–5,202–6,226,242,246–7

Catherine’sPoint,71CentralDefenceStaffs,22Centreofgravity,200,239–40ChancoPoint,103,105,107Chatham,24,31Chaundler,LtColDavid,172–3,176,212Chicago’sO’HareAirport,65ChiefofDefenceStaff,9ChiefsofStaff,10ChiefsofStaffCommittee,21–2Chinookhelicopter(CH47),30,77,157onAtlanticConveyor,119,124,126,128–9,166,243useinFalklands,146,174–5,196,209,243

ChoiseulSound,183Clapp,CommodoreMichael,19,35,41,46–7,89,90–1,99,159–60,197,238–9,244aftersurrender,221,230amphibiouslandings,105,107,109,113–14,121–2,124–5designationasCAG/CATF,19,45–6

Fitzroymoves,178–80,182,184meetingaboardHermes,80–1pickingupMooreandWilson,162planningenroute,49–51,53,57–8,76,82,88,98staff,47,92,94–5,118,144,155,183,237,244

Clothingandkit,132,135,144,152–3,201,193,217,223,226Command,controlandcommunications,45,50,90,96–7,116,120,123,129, 140, 144, 158–9, 162,176–7,192,243–5,253

CommandoForces,RoyalMarines,19,33,35,253CommandoLogisticRegiment,seealsoLtColIvarHellberg,34,49,82,89,92,94–7,99,133–5,143,149–50,156,159,162–3,169,195,230integrationof5

Brigadelogistics,159,163–6logisticsbuildupashore,103,105–6,109–15,117,119,121,141,146,166organization,48–9,245–6planningenroute,46,51–3,94–8planninginUKanddeployment,35,38–9,41supportinforwardsupportareas,167–8,190,196,198–9

CommonwealthWarGravesCemetery,229Containers,30,35,118,120,154,165,217,231–2,236ContenderBezant,STUFT,31,155,230Conqueror,HMS,86Cooper,Frank,PermanentSecretaryatMinistryofDefence,15Cordella,HMS,161CoronationPoint,136–7Coventry,HMS,43,66,123,161CowBay,82Crombie,34Cumberland,Bay,160CunardSteamShipCompany,30Curacao,20Curtis,Mark,RM,193

Dagger,107,113DailyCombatSupplyRate(DCSR),52DailyMirror,16Dakar,Senegal,21,63,71Darwin,93,102–4,121,130,136–7,139,143,173,232,247DarwinHill,130,136,138

Davidoff,Constantino,8Davis,CaptainJohn,3Daysofsupply,51–2,76,80,94–5,103,132–3,140,144,151,197DefenceOperationsExecutiveCommittee,21–2DefenceOperationsMovementsStaff(DOMS),22,27,32,40,42DefenceReview1981,10,24DefenceSituationCentre,22Denmark,19,35DepartmentofTrade,25–6,29,32,42,154,165DeploymentsfromUK,40–2,153–6Depots,seealsospecificdepots,22,25,31,33–6,38,67,69,96,234Devonport,25,30–1,41Dingemans,CaptainPeter,RN,180DirectorateofNavalOperations,27Distances,61aroundFalklands,7,29,115,157,174–9,180,186,191,200,205–6,243toFalklands,5–6,14,84

Distributionpoint,222,224BluffCove,199–200,209EstanciaHouse,190,196,198–200

Docks,dockworkers,anddockyards,seealsospecificdockyards,22–4,30–1,38,120,156Donningtondepot,34DouglasSettlement,126–7,130–2,145Dracone,119,124,225,242

EasternTestRange,62–3EagerBeaverforklift,38ElephantIsland,179–80,182Elk,STUFT,42,52,73,76–7,103,122,144,240Emergencyfuel–handlingequipment,119,124,242–3Endurance,HMS,5–6,8–9,20,65–6Engadine,RFA,196EngineeringWing,Lyneham,RAF,67EnglishBay,61,72–3EnglishChannel,28Estancia/EstanciaHouse,145–6,190,196,198–200,209Europe,4,12,23,26,98,148EuropicFerry,STUFT,103,105,230ExerciseSpringtrain,18,23,46ExerciseWelshFalcon,151–3Exocetmissile,6,11,45,51,86–7,115,123–4,178,207,240

FalklandIslands,seealsoStanleyandspecificlocationsbeachesandcoastlines,55–6climateandweather,2–3,37,56government,7–8history,3–6populationandinhabitants,2,4SouthAtlanticseas,4,16terrain,2,12,37,145

FalklandIslandsCompany,160,216FalklandSound,88,94,101–3,106–9,114–15,124,127FanningHead,101,103–4Farnella,HMS,161Fearless,HMS(LPD),23,41,96,99,173,221,243,244aroundFalklands,103–5,108,110,113,116,121,122,141,145,160,162,189–91enroutetoSouthAtlantic,47,49,51–2,57–8,68,73,76,88,90–2Fitzroymoves,176–8,181,184,186

Fielddressingstation,48,52,97,111,194,203–4,207,236FieldRecordsandReinforcementHoldingUnit,195Fieldhouse,AdmiralJohn,33,39,69,80,88,99,102,108,121,127–9,141,147,157,178,215–16asCINCFLEET,14–15,22–3,44designationasCINC,45headquartersandstaff,22–3,152,159,162,230meetingaboardHermes,57–8,80–1orders,directivesandguidance,44,90visittoStanley,232

Fitzroy,157,160,170,192,204,221,224,230advancesto,173–84,189,244,256

airattacksonSirGalahadandSirTristram,184–7asForwardBrigadeMaintenanceArea(FBMA),179,191,194,196,198,208

Foodandrations,4,30–1,34,38,41,43,51–4,56,61,66,76–7,85,94,111,131–2,143–4,149,154–5,165,179,192,217,223–5,230,236,247,254,280

ForceMaintenanceArea(FMA),164,174,197,222FortunaGlacier,83ForwardBrigadeMaintenanceArea (FBMA), seealso Fitzroy andTeal Inlet, 131, 133, 169–70, 174,190–1,197

FortAustin,RFA,20,65–6,103,114–15,123FoxBay,114,226France,11,87Freetown,73,157Fuelandrefuelling,seealsoair-to-airrefuelling,4,11,21,28,38,71,76,85,149,240,243atAscension,63,71–2,77,236inFalklands,95,114,117–19,131–2,144,154,164–5,174,179,185,197–8,208,242–3

G3TransportandMovementBranch,UKLF,34Galtieri,GeneralandPresidentLeopoldo,1,5–6,17,200,215,221,223,233Garcia,MajGenOsvaldoJorge,17Gazellehelicopter,48,105,108,148,181,186,204GeneralBelgrano,11,85–7,200,223,241GenevaConvention,29,52,96–7,112,142–3,228Georgetown,61,72Gibraltar,20–1,24,28–9,31,41,63,70–1,82Glamorgan,HMS,43.196,207Glasgow,HMS,43,66GooseGreen,seealso2Para,85,93,102,106,122,126,146,148,157–8,160,167,169–74,176–8,182–3,185,187,212,221,247–8fightfor,127–32,135–43,171–2,197,199,204,238–9,241

GovernmentHouse,16,217GranthamSound,138Gravesandgravesregistration,163,171,229GreenBeach,93–4GreenMountain,60,105Greenpatchsettlement,55Grytviken,7–9,83–4,160

Haig,GeneralAlexander,43,63,71HamoazeHouse,35–6,37–9Harrier,30,40–1,44,78,86,95,106–8,112,115,119,124,127,131,140,164,184,197,209,236,239,243,256airattacks,85,87,137,139,210,214,241

Hecate,HMS,97Hecla,HMS,97Helicopters,seealsospecifictypes,79–80,83,95,98–100,113–14,122,126,128,132,161,172,175,181casualtyevacuation,138–40,186,203–4,256commandandcontrolof,120,141forwardresupply,127,131,134–5,138,140,142,145,167,169,178,192,196,197,198,243losses,84,127,243

Hellberg,LtColIvar,seealsoCommandoLogisticRegiment,150–9,163–4,166,184,195,231logisticsbuildupatAjaxBay,105,112–17,121,133–5planningandpreparationenroute,51–2,80,82,92planningandpreparationinUK,37,49

Herbert,ViceAdmiralPeter,45Hercules,C–130,seealsoairdrops,13,16,21,63,65–7,158,223,227,232,239,241air-to-airrefueling,67–9,236snatchtechnique,226,257

Hermes,HMS,10,14,23–4,100,239,256enroutetoSouthAtlantic,40–1,43,73,79–81,100inSouthAtlantic,123–4,147,162

Hexamine,192HighFrequencychannel,49,51Hospital and field hospital, seealso Red andGreen LifeMachine, 112–13,138, 149, 186, 194, 215,217–18,225–6,246

Hospitalships,seealsospecificships,14,29,52,97,110,141,234HouseofCommons,5,13–4HouseofLords,153Hunt,GovernorRex,8,16,39,230

Hydra,HMS,97

IdentificationFriendorFoe,181InternationalCourtofJustice,TheHague,4Intrepid,HMS,24,57,80,99–100,103–5,141,167,221,243Fitzroymoves,177–83,186

Invincible,HMS,10,40–3,68,123,239

JanesFightingShips,46Jerrycans,38,94,118,131,154,164–5,242–3Jolly,SurgeonCdrRick,seealsoRedandGreenLifeMachine,39,93,110–1,134,141,186,220,247Jones,LtColHubert‘H,’seealso2Para,173,212,229fightforGooseGreen,127–31,136–8killedinaction,138

Junella,HMS,161Junta,1,5–7,9–10,17–18,87,200,233–4,248

Keeble,MajorChris,138–9,141–2,171–3Kinetondepot,34KingEdwardVIIMemorialHospital,225–6Knott,MajorTerry,93

LaPrensa,6LabourParty,14Lafonia,58,175–7,179–80,183,221Lamb,MajorPeter,184LandForceFalklandIslands(LFFI),seealsoMajGenJeremyMoore,90,157,159,174,187,191,244LandRover,118,149,185Landingcraft,1,23,76,162,186,235,240,244,253–4amphibiouslandings,47,50–1,78–9,82,91–4,98–9,100,103–5,109,111,112–13,115,118,120beachconsiderations,36–7,55,61,84,88Fitzroymoves,175,177–8,180,182,184resupplyoperations,159,170,199,223

LandingCraftUtility(LCU),56,76,100,132,167,225,253Fitzroymoves,178–84

LandingPlatformDocks(LPD),seealsospecificships,23,25,99–100,103–4,176Fitzroymoves,178–86

LandingShipLogistic (LSL),seealso specificships,24–5,31,41,51–2,77,82,88–9, 92, 95–8, 132,154,224,227damageorloss,113,183–7,256Fitzroymoves,178–87forwardresupply,131,144–6,169,186,197,239,243logisticsbuildupatAjax,103–5,109,115–16,113,120

Larken,CaptainJeremy,RN,181–2Laundryandbath,73,149Leach,AdmiralHenry,20,40,128,240disagreementswithNott,13–14meetingswithThatcher,13–15,19ordersfordeployment,14,22

LearJet,123Leasebackconsiderations,4–5LeedsCastle,HMS,161Leith,8–9,83–4Lewin,AdmiralTerence,9,22–3,81,128Line(s)ofcommunication,49,66,190LivelyIsland,180–2Liverpool,30,35LogisticsAnnex(tooperationsorder),94–7LogisticsLoiteringArea(LLA),84,95,103,115LogisticsSupportGroup,UnitedKingdomMobileForce,149Lombardo,ViceAdmiralJuan,5–6London,8–9,18,22,39–40,63,82–3,90,98–9,125,128–9,158,162,169,171,177,188,215,237LongRange2and4(C–130),66–7Lycaon,STUFT,161Lyneham,RAF,65,69Lynxhelicopter,65

Mailandcourierservice,73,95,157,226,257Maintenance,23,48,63,67,79,84,118,149–50,166,196,224,245

Maps,36,42,59,162,251MarchwoodMilitaryPort,31,41MaritimeExclusionZone,43MarshallofCambridgeEngineering,LTD,67Materiel-handlingequipment,74–5,120–4,186McQueen,CaptainRobert,RN,63,69,70,75Medicalcare,seealsoRedandGreenLifeMachine,39,96–7,131,143,185–6,188,194–5,204,220,246–7inStanley,225–6

Medicalevacuation,seecasualtyevacuationMedicalSquadron,seealsoCommandoLogisticRegiment,48,97,110–11,195,220,246

MediterraneanSea,7,14,18,23,28,30Menendez,BrigGenMario,17,88,102,106,142,147,176–7,200,215–18,221,223Merchantships,seealsoships,25–9,40,55,60,78,86,103,235,272Mexeflote,25,51,53,76–7,88,98,113,118,120,170,177,179,183,223,225,227,242,244MILANmissile,48,78,134–5,144,201,205,213Militaryunits,seespecificunitsMineCounterMeasuresTeam,179Minesandminefeilds,115,220,222,228–9MinistryofDefence(MOD),12,15,18,22,23–4,27,40,42,44,59,63,69–71,80,98,148–9,151–3,173,235–6

Mirage,108MobilizationinUK,18–40Monsoonen,176,183Montevideo,29,40,97,144MoodyBrook,16Moore,MajGen Jeremy, 33,39, 44, 75, 80, 128–31, 141, 153, 157–9, 164, 167, 170–1, 173, 175–7,169–71,195,238,244,255arrivalatSanCarlos,161–3battleformountains,188,190–2,197,208designatedCommanderLandForceFalklandIslands,157enroutetoFalklands,129,141,157–162Fitzroymoves,178–9.182,184–5,187,189inStanley,215–19,221,230meetingsaboardHermes,79–81,162ordersanddirectives,90–2,157,171,191–2,195southernapproach,157–8,171,177,188–9surrender,215–19transferstoAntrimandFearless,160,162

Morgan,LtColDavid,257Morphine,53,96,156,221Mortars,48,131,137,141–2,155MountChallenger,145,175,192–3,206MountEstancia,145,190MountHarriet,170,175,189,191–2,195–6,206–7MountKent,126–7,130–1,140,145–6,158,169,184,192,208–9MountLongdon,170,189–91,195,201–9,248MountRosalie,94,103,114MountVernet,145,190MountWilliam,170,189,192,195,201,208–10,212–13,221MountainandArcticWarfareCadre,174MulletCreek,16MurrellRiverandbridge,195–6,202–3,205,209

NationalSecurityDirective1/82,6NavalOverseer,28NavalStaffAdvisoryGroup,24–5Navy,ArmyandAirForceInstitution(NAAFI),73,163,230NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA),61Nimrodsurveillanceplane,65,85,236NordicFerry,STUFT,155–7,164,166,230Norland,STUFT,30,82,96–7,103–5,109–11,120,122,160–1,164–5,172,223,230,240NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),9,12,18,21,23,25,33,44,47,56,67,89,147–8,245

North,CaptainIan,123–4Northella,HMS,161Northwood,22–3,88,121,141,152,157,159,163,178,195Norway,25,33,35,37,47,149Nott,DefenceSecretaryJohn,9–10,13–14,87

logisticsconcerns,11–3,15militaryreductions,5,9,24

No.1MedicalTroop,96–7,111No.2SurgicalSupportTeam,97No.3MedicalTroop,97

Olmeda,RFA,57OperationAzul,1OperationCorporate,18OperationParaquet,45,65,83OperationRosario,1OperationSutton,91,100OrdersGroup(OGroup),94,122,157,195OrdnanceSquadron,seealsoCommandoLogisticRegiment,48,51,53,75,89–90,97–8,112,114,116,120,132–3,163–4,184

OverseaandDefence(SouthAtlantic)Committee,21–2

P&O,29,42PanAmericanAirlines,61,65,70PanamaCanal,4ParachuteBrigadeandParachuteLogisticsRegiment,48ParachuteClearingTroop,96–7,111,150ParachuteRegiment,38,172Parliament,5,20PassiveNightGoggles,119,236Patagonia,6PebbleIsland,97,100,110Penelope,HMS,179Pentagon,67,71Peron,ColonelJuan,4Peru,87Petroleum,oil,lubricants(POL),35PetroleumTroop,CommandoLogisticsRegiment,119Phantominterceptor,78Pict,HMS,161Pike,LtColHugh,132,201–3Pillowtanks,72,118–19,242Pitt,CaptainTony,RN,167Plymouth,19,30,33–5Plymouth,HMS,43,65,93,103,105,107PlazadeMayo,17PortHarriet,102PortPleasant,172,175,184–5PortSalvador,146PortSanCarlos,93,105,109,124,132,164,169,243PortStanley,22,81,216,221,223,225,227,231–2,242PortWilliam,226Portland,41Ports,seealsospecifcports,22,25–8,38,40,61–2,74,155,200,266Portsmouth,24,31,40–2Potter,Private,164Prioritiesandproceduresforresupply,51–2,68,96,113,167,176Prisonersofwar,97,142–4,160,163,166,207,216,218,221–4,227–8,247Procurement,6,11,31,87,236Pucara,85,106,108,138–9,142PuertoBelgrano,1,5,9PuertoMadryn,223PuertoRivero,17Pumahelicopter,16Pushversuspulllogistics,95

QueenElizabethII(QE2),STUFT,30,85,90,162challengeforlogisticians,154–6enroutetoSouthAtlantic,121,129,154–8,160,162,244SouthGeorgia,160–1,242

Queen,HMElizabethII,26,29,235Queen’sLancasterRegiment,230

Railandrailways,31,34,38,39

RapidDeploymentJointTaskForce,72Rapiermissile,80,94,103,105–6,108,112,119,167,179,181,183,199,221andlogistics,39,75,108,117–18,184

RedandGreenLifeMachine,112,114,133–4,186,195,198,246RedBeach,93,95,105,111RedCross,29RedCrossbox,97,110,112ReaganAdministration,13,43Regimentalaidpost,48,96,202–3,205RegimentalMedicalOfficer,202ReplenishmentandConsolidationArea,84Replenishmentatsea,66Resource,RFA,161Rickett,LtColJohnny,177,213RigidRaiderboat,118,121,145,198,209,253Rivero,Antonio,17Roberts,CaptainP.J.G.,RN,183Roll-onroll-offships,120,155Rose,LtColMichael,215Rosyth,31,34RoyalAirForce(RAF),10,74,85,149,207,232,236,257EngineeringWingatLyneham,67TacticalSupplyWing,71UnitedKingdomMobileAirMovementsSquadron,63

RAFKinloss,65RAFMountPleasant,232RAFStMawgan,65RAFStanley,227,232RoyalArmyOrdnanceCorps,34,70,72RoyalCorpsofTransport,31,33,68,132,150,182RoyalEngineers,48,149,179,209,224,227RoyalFleetAuxiliary(RFA),seealsospecificships,24–5,47,53,65,235,237RoyalMarines,seealso,BrigadierJulianThompsonandspecificunits,19,27,33–6,134,236enroutetoFalklands,53,66,74–5,79,83Falklands,118–19,184,237garrisonatStanley,2,5,8–9,12,16–18,40,48–9,60,65

RoyalMarineCommandoCourse,134RoyalMarineMappingCentre,36RoyalNavy,seealsoAmphibiousTaskForce/Group,CarrierBattleGroup,CommodoreMichaelClapp,RearAdmiralSandy,Woodward,andspecificships,49,54,237–8,240AscensionIsland,63,73–4,82,235deployment,18,27,29,31,24forcereductions,10–11,13,23–4,234logistics,84,95,103,115–17,198,236operationsinSouthAtlantic,34–5,123,156,128–9,171,178,186,207,224,239,240–1

RoyalPioneerCorps,229

StEdmund,STUFT,155,230StHelena,60–2SanCarlos,82,88,92–4,96,99–101,126–8,130–1,133,136,138,146,157–61,164,166,169–73,176,179–85,187,192,195–9,221,223,229,242,236–7,243,256amphibiouslandings,102–22

SanCarlosSettlement,93,109,121,133,162SanteFe,1,16,83SapperHill,170,189,192,210,213,221Saxonia,STUFT,161Scimitar,38,80,104–5,210Scorpion,38,104–5,210–11Scotland,35,37–8Scott,LtColMike,210–11Scouthelicopter,48,138,148,174Scrapmetalworkers,8–9,83SeaDartmissile,88SeaKinghelicopter,40–1,77,119,128,167,172,184–5,198,204,236,244,247SeaSkuamissile,65,88SecretariatBuilding,215,218Sennybridgetrainingarea,151Shackleton,LordEdward,andShackletonReport,4–5,230Sheffeld,HMS,43,66,87–8

Shetlands,37ShipDepartmentatBath,RN,28–9,40Ships,seespecificshipsShipsTakenUpFromTrade(STUFT),seealso specificships,26–31,53,79,244

ShortBelfastcargoplane,65Sidewindermissile,236,241SirBedivere,RFA(LSL),25,113–14,224,240SirGalahad,RFA(LSL),25,76,96–7,105,112–14,144,191,227,240Fitzroymoves,179,182–6

SirGeraint,RFA(LSL),25,34,105,230SirLancelot,RFA(LSL),25,49,51–2,77,105,111,113–4,132,167,187,240SirPercivale,RFA(LSL),24–5,53,76,105,144,167,230SirTristram,RFA(LSL),25,105,191,224Fitzroymoves,179–81,183,185–7

Skyhawk,107–8,113–14,133–4,185,209Snocats,BV202,38,118,131–2,146,152,166,198,202SouthAfricaCable,61SouthGeorgia,6–9,43,45,56,65,99–100,158,160–1,242Argentinecaptureof,2,16arrivalofQE2,160–1Britishrecaptureof,83–4,87

SouthSandwichIslands,2,5–6Southampton,28,41,154–6Southby-Tailyour,MajorEwen,104Fitzroymoves,180–5planningandtrainingenroute,55–6,58,105planninginUK,36–7,39

SovietUnion,23,44,78SpecialAirService(SAS),103SpecialBoatService(SBS),103–4,179Specialforces,seealsoSASandSBS,46,83–4,114,119,127,130,140,153,167,196,215Stanley,2,7–8,13,16,104,106,126–8,145,147,157,163,165,168–70,172–3,177–8,184,188–92,194,196,200,204,209–11,214,241,245,247–8conditionsaftersurrender,217–21duringinvasionandoccupation,16–18,85,214,218–20restoringorderandservices,221–9RoyalMarinegarrison,2,5,7–9,12–13,16–18,230

StonehouseBarracks,35Strathewe,229Stromness,84Stromness,RFA,41,52,73,76,100,103–5,109,119,161,165SuezCampaign,7,26Submarines,seealsospecificships,59,85SuperEtendard,6,11,123Supplies,stocksandstores,98,132,149,152–4,155–6,159,161,164,166,221,223,225,240–2atAscension,64–9,74–77inFalklands,105,109–20,128,141,144–6,163,165,167,174,176–8,180,183–4,186–7,189–90,192,196,198–9,213

inUK,12,34–6restowingships,53,76–9,81,88–9

SussexMountain,93,127,130,132,139,177SwanInlet,172–3

TacticalSupplyWing,RAF,71TaskForce40,1TaskForce317,45–6,50TealInlet,126–7,130–2,145,163,189,224asForwardBrigadeMaintenanceArea(FBMA),131,133,144,146,167–8,169–70,175,178,187,190,194,196–8,208–9,238,256

Thatcher,PrimeMinisterMargaret,19–20,42,99,125,236decisiontodeploytaskforce,15–16,20,40despatchessubmarines,9–10discussionofoptions,7,9–10,13–15,18visittoStanley,232WarCabinet,21–2,81,128

Thomas,MajorGeoff,160,162Thompson, Brigadier Julian, see also 3 Commando Brigade, 18–19, 70, 75, 79, 89–90, 95, 99, 147,152–3,159,162–4,167–8,176,184,215,239,244aftersurrender,218–21,230

amphibiouslandings,104,106,108,116–17,121–2,125battleformountains,170,178,190–2,194,196,206–209designatedCLF,18–9,45fightforGooseGreen,126–9,140–2meetingaboardHermes,79–80ordersanddirectives,90–7,121,127,129,142,171,195,208,238planningenroute,47,49–51,53,56,58,82,92preparationinUK,32–3,36,38–9,41

Thorne,MajGenDavid,230ThuleIsland,5Tidespring,RFA,65,83Todd,MajorTony,182Tonsandtonnages,24,29,33,35,41,68,74,76,120,161,163,167TotalExclusionZone(TEZ),43,52,76,79,84–5,90,95,100,103,109,116,132TownsendThoresen,105TransitiontoWarCommittee,21TransportandMovementsBranch,UKLF,22,34TransportSquadron,seealsoCommandoLogisticRegiment,48,51Trant,LtGenRichard,129Trucksandvehicletransportation,34–5,38,113,149,209Tug,Repair,andLogisticsArea(TRALA),84,115TumbledownMountain,170,189,191,195,201,206,208–9,221TwoBoats,61,73TwoSisters,170,189,191,195,202–3,205–7,210–13Typhoon,RFA,40

Uganda,STUFT,29,97,110,112,123,141,143,186,198,226UltraHighFrequencychannel,27UnionFlag,41,171UnitedKingdomLandForce(UKLF),22,32,153UnitedNations,7,50,115UNResolution502,200UnitedStates,4,9,12–13,48,62,72,246diplomacy,43,63,71logisticsassistance,63,72,236

Uruguay,1,29

Vaux,LtColNick,42,192–3,206–7,219VeinticincodeMayo,11,43,85–6VerdeMountains,93VeryHighFrequencychannel,121ViceChiefofDefenceStaffforPersonnel&Logistics,63Victortanker,10,68–9,85ViscountFalkland,3VolunteerBay,51,82VosperThornycroft,28Vulcanbomber,10,67,85,236

Wales,151,153,155WarCabinet,21–3,81–2,128,171WarMaintenanceReserveandreservestocks,33,38,74,76,117,163,165WarsawPact,12WashingtonDC,43,70,83Water,29atAscension,61–2,70inFalklands,37,95,111,131,165,192,219,222,224–5

Waters,BrigadierJohn,255Watts,Ada,220Watts,Patrick,216–17Weapons(smallarms),27,48,131,138,152,161,201–2,213,217,219,229,235Weinberger,SecretaryofDefenceCaspar,70Welch,MajorAnthony,89–90,164,184,220Wells-Cole,MajorGerry,94–5,105,133,144Wessexhelicopter,41,65,77,84,103,119,124,167,172,204,243Whitehead,LtColAndrew,127,132,203,205–6WideawakeAirfeld,61–5,70–2,74,76–7,236Wilson,BrigadierTony,seealso5InfantryBrigade,150–3,171,177,218,221,255battleformountains,191

enrouteonQE2,157–8Fitzroymoves,172–6,181,184,187,189ordersanddirectives,176,173,179,210preparationandtraininginUK,151–6transfertoAntrim,141,160

WirelessRidge,170,189,191,195,201,204,208–10,212–13Woodward,RearAdmiralSandy,seealsoCarrierBattleGroup,19,22,43,73,86–7,91,95,115,117,119,128–9,132,178,180–1,187,207,244,256designationasCommanderCBG,18meetingaboardFearless,57meetingsaboardHermes,80–1,162planningenroute,46–9,57

WorkshopSquadron,seealsoCommandoLogisticRegiment,48,96

Yarmouth,HMS,103,106–7,180,196,207YorkBay,16Young,CaptainBrian,RN,45