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Data tal-ħolqien : 30-07-2022

Single Resolution Board: Accountability arrangements (9th parliamentary term)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-07-2022Awtur MAGNUS Marcel

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix attività istituzzjonali | kontroll finanzjarju | kooperazzjoni interistituzzjonali (UE) | kumpanija f'diffikultajiet | Parlament

Ewropew | smigħ pubbliku | solvenza finanzjarja | tqassir | Unjoni Ekonomika u Monetarja | ħatra tal-membriSommarju This document provides an overview of public hearings and exchange of views with the Chair of the Single Resolution

Board (SRB) in the ECON Committee since July 2019. It also provides an overview of all external papers requested bythe ECON Committee by a standing panel of banking experts. Lastly, the annex contains an overview of the respectivelegal bases for these hearings as part of the accountability framework of the SRB. For an overview of public hearingsduring the 8th parliamentary term, please see here.

Briefing EN

Single Supervisory Mechanism: Accountability arrangements (9th parliamentary term)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-07-2022Awtur MAGNUS Marcel

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew | intervent finanzjarju | intervent fis-suq | istituzzjoni finanzjarja | kompetenza istituzzjonali

(UE) | smigħ pubbliku | stabbiltà finanzjarja | superviżjoni finanzjarja | tqassir | unjoni bankarja tal-UESommarju This document provides an overview of public hearings and exchange of views with the Chair of the European Central

Bank (ECB) Supervisory Board in the ECON Committee since July 2019. It also provides an overview of all externalpapers requested by the ECON Committee by a standing panel of banking experts. Lastly, the annex contains anoverview of the respective legal bases for these hearings as part of the accountability framework of the SingleSupervisory Mechanism (SSM). For an overview of public hearings during the 8th parliamentary term, please see here.

Briefing EN

The digital dimension of the National Recovery and Resilience PlansTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-07-2022Awtur LILYANOVA Velina

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitSommarju The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the core element of the EU's largest and most innovative financing

instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU), created to help the EU's economies and societies recover from the globalpandemic. The facility is structured around six pillars representing policy areas of European relevance, identified by theRRF Regulation as vital for strengthening the EU's resilience. The pillars define investment priorities and the scope ofapplication of financing under the RRF. This briefing is dedicated to one of them – the digital transformation pillar – forwhich, along with the green transition, the RRF Regulation sets a specific spending target. The briefing aims to give anoverview of why the digital transition is one of the key policies in focus under the RRF, what the RRF Regulationrequires in that respect, and the approach taken by EU Member States. To receive funds from the RRF, MemberStates have drawn up individual national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs), laying down a number of reforms andinvestments. Funds are released based on performance, upon successful implementation of relevant milestones andtargets set out in the plans. Each national plan has to earmark at least 20 % of its resources for achieving digitaltargets. Digitalisation has been under way for a long time and the EU's response to this process, even before thepandemic, has been indicative of the high priority it gives to this policy area. The digital transition, one of the 'twintransitions', is not only considered key to a faster economic recovery, but also to enhanced security and resilience, andto the EU's achieving strategic autonomy. NGEU provides an opportunity, among other EU policy tools, to contribute toprogress in that area. While the RRF's time scope is relatively limited, as investments are due to be completed by2026, it falls within the recently declared EU Digital Decade 2020-2030. The NRRPs are aligned with the overarchingpriorities to achieve the EU's digital objectives by 2030. Digital investment is urgently needed across Europe, and asubstantial investment gap in digital infrastructure and services has been estimated between the EU and its globalcompetitors. Thus, funding for digital targets in the RRF is expected to complement funding from EU and nationalbudgets and address this challenge.

Briefing EN

EU economic developments and projectionsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-07-2022Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | VEGA BORDELL Javier María

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix Eurostat | inflazzjoni | kriżi monetarja | politika fiskali | politika monetarja unika | prodott domestiku gross | rkupru

ekonomiku | sitwazzjoni ekonomika | statistika tal-UE | tbassir ekonomikuSommarju This briefing provides a summary of the recent economic developments in the EU Member States and gives an

overview of relevant economic projections forecasted by major international and EU institutionsBriefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 1

Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-07-2022Awtur D'ALFONSO Alessandro

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix aġġustament strutturali | epidemija | għajnuna tal-UE | investiment | l-Italja | marda tal-coronavirus | rakkomandazzjoni

(UE) | riforma ekonomika | rkupru ekonomiku | Semestru EwropewSommarju In absolute figures, Italy's Recovery and Resilience Plan is the largest national plan under the unprecedented EU

response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. Italy has decided to use its entire national allocationunder the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), including its loan component (€122.6 billion). Totalling €191.5billion, these resources represent 26.5 % of the entire RRF, equal to 10.7 % of the country's gross domestic product(GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). In June 2022, Italy's grant allocation was revisedupwards slightly to €69 billion (+0.2 %). In addition, Italy has earmarked national resources worth €30.6 billion tofurther strengthen a vast programme of reforms and investments that aims to promote the recovery of the Italianeconomy, while addressing a number of structural weaknesses as well as pursuing major objectives such as the greentransition and the digital transformation. Measures under the plan are to be completed by 2026. Italy has so farreceived 24 % of the resources (in the form of pre-financing and first payments for grants and loans); this is above theEU average. A further nine payments each for grants and loans will depend on progress made in implementing theplan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EU recovery instrument,participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation and scrutinises the work ofthe European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fourth edition. The 'NGEUdelivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN

EU carbon border adjustment mechanism: Implications for climate and competitivenessTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-07-2022Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE | TITIEVSKAIA Jana

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | L-Ambjent | L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix bejgħ u xiri ta' emissjonijiet | gass serra | importazzjoni (UE) | karbonju | newtralità karbonika | pajjiż terz | permess

negozzjabbli tal-emissjonijiet | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | sorveljanza b'rabta mal-importazzjoni | tibdilfil-klima

Sommarju The EU has implemented the world's largest carbon-pricing system, the emissions trading system (ETS). While pricingemissions can encourage industrial decarbonisation, it also risks carbon leakage, whereby EU companies move theirproduction abroad. To date, the EU has mitigated carbon leakage through free allocations to certain industries, but withrising climate ambition and higher carbon prices, the Commission seeks to phase out free allocations. In parallel, anovel carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) would be introduced, requiring EU importers, as of 2026, topurchase certificates equivalent to the weekly EU carbon price. The CBAM would initially apply to imports in fiveemissions-intensive sectors deemed at greater risk of carbon leakage: cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers,and electricity. The CBAM charge would cover imports of these goods from all third countries, except thoseparticipating in the ETS or a linked mechanism. The CBAM aims to contribute to the EU's climate neutrality objectives,and encourage partner countries to decarbonise their production processes by levelling the playing field in carbonpricing between the EU and third-country producers; less developed countries could be supported in their climatetransitions. Following publication of the Commission proposal on the CBAM in July 2021, Parliament referred the file tothe Environment Committee. On 22 June 2022 the Parliament adopted its position, while on 15 March 2022 theCouncil had adopted its general approach. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Data actTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-07-2022Awtur DALLI HUBERT

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of theCouncil on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (data act), submitted on 23 February 2022 and referredto the European Parliament's Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The IA explains that the data act'complements the two other major instruments shaping the European single market for data': the Data Governance Actand the digital markets act. 'While the Data Governance Act focuses on trusted mechanisms for data sharing and thedigital markets act on fair competition between gatekeepers and other market players, also in relation to the use ofdata, the data act would enable wider data use across the economy, notably by regulating the fundamental questionsof who can use the data generated by connected products and related services, and what are the conditions for suchuse' (IA, p. 1). The initiative is among the new initiatives included in the Commission's 2021 work programme and inthe working document accompanying the joint declaration on EU legislative priorities for 2022.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 2

A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2022Awtur SAJN Nikolina

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaKelma għat-tiftix akkumulatur elettriku | approvazzjoni ta' bejgħ | armonizzazzjoni tal-istandards | proposta (UE) | standard Ewropew |

standard tal-kummerċjalizzazzjoni | standard tekniku | tagħmir tat-telekomunikazzjoni | telefon ċellulariSommarju On 7 June 2022, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement on the legislative

proposal to amend the 2014 Radio Equipment Directive. The amended directive, proposed by the EuropeanCommission on 23 September 2021, is a first step towards mandating a common charger for mobile phones and othersmall portable devices, which will have to be equipped with a USB Type-C receptacle and will have to incorporate theUSB Power Delivery communication protocol. A separate initiative on the eco-design of external power supplies isexpected to ensure that the receptacle and the communication protocol for both ends of charger cables is harmonised.Consumers would have the option to buy devices with or without a charger (unbundling). Amendments to the proposalagreed by the co-legislators would require consumers and other end-users to be informed by a pictogram whether acharger is included with a device, while information on the charging capabilities and compatible charging deviceswould be provided on a label. The Commission will be required to request the creation of harmonised standards forwireless charging within two years of the adoption of the directive, and will have to regularly assess whether thecommon charger should be made mandatory for additional devices. The text agreed in trilogue now needs to beformally adopted by the Parliament in plenary and then by the Council. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment Directive

Aviation's contribution to European Union climate action: Revision of EU ETS as regards aviationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2022Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku It-Trasport | L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix bejgħ b'irkant | gass serra | l-ammont permess ta' emissjonijiet tal-UE | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | Organizzazzjoni

għall-Avjazzjoni Ċivili Internazzjonali | permess negozzjabbli tal-emissjonijiet | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta(UE) | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | trasport bl-ajru

Sommarju As part of the 'Fit for 55' package, the Commission is proposing a revision to the EU's emissions trading system (ETS)as regards carbon dioxide emissions from aviation. The proposal seeks to ensure that the sector contributes to theEU's climate targets through increased auctioning of allowances, with an end to free allowances from 2027, and byapplying the linear reduction of aviation allowances. The proposal will also integrate, into the revised ETS, theInternational Civil Aviation Organization's agreed global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme forInternational Aviation (CORSIA) and apply it to international flights departing from or arriving at an airport inside theEuropean Economic Area (EEA). For domestic flights in the Member States or flights within the EEA, the ETS wouldcontinue to apply. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Environment, PublicHealth and Food Safety (ENVI), with Sunčana Glavak (EPP, Croatia) appointed rapporteur. Parliament adopted itsposition during the June I 2022 plenary session. The Council adopted its general approach during its meeting of 28June 2022. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Revision of EU ETS as regards aviation: 'Fit for 55' package

Regional and local participation in the EU project: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens'expectations

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 13-07-2022

Awtur CIRLIG Carmen-Cristina | DEL MONTE MicaelaQasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE

Sommarju The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) has now concluded its work. Originally conceived in May 2019 froman idea France's President Emmanuel Macron put forward in his 'letter to the citizens of Europe', the CoFoE wasintended to 'propose all the changes our political project needs, with an open mind, even to amending the Treaties',particularly on the basis of citizens' proposals. Citizens 'should play a leading and active part in setting our prioritiesand our level of ambition', as stated in European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's political guidelines.From September 2021 to February 2022, eight hundred randomly selected citizens coming from all Member Statesmet to debate and brainstorm about the future of the European project. In addition, citizens and organisationssubmitted their ideas and contributions to the broader discussion on the multilingual digital platform, where they alsopublicised events, seminars and conferences taking place around Europe. Over 17 000 ideas and 21 000 commentswere submitted on the platform, and more than 6 000 events organised throughout Europe. The result of thisunprecedented, colossal exercise in direct democracy involving EU citizens is a set of many (more than 170),sometimes ambitious, citizens' recommendations. This is the sixth briefing in a series looking at citizens' expectationsin the context of the CoFoE.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 3

Understanding Loss and Damage: Addressing the unavoidable impacts of climate changeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2022Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku L-Ambjent | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaSommarju Many consequences of climate change are already hard to reverse, and extreme weather events will become more

frequent in the future. That shows a need to discuss which climate impacts are difficult or impossible to adapt to, and aneed to address losses and damages. All regions will be affected by climate change, but the extent of loss anddamage will vary between locations. Although the concept of Loss and Damage (L&D) is not new, it is still quite vagueand not well defined in climate policy. It has been discussed at many United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of Parties (COP), and some mechanisms to support countries facing lossesand damages have been established. One of the biggest challenges with L&D is the framing of the concept itself.Developing and developed countries have differing views on its definition as well as its urgency, which has resulted inlimited progress on the issue. A key issue on which stakeholders find it hard to agree is financing L&D. Developedcountry stakeholders tend to argue that L&D could be financed by existing climate funds, insurance schemes,humanitarian aid, or risk management, while many developing countries call for financial mechanisms directedspecifically towards L&D. At the UNFCCC climate conference in Glasgow in November 2021 (COP26), the EuropeanUnion was open to discussing L&D as a topic but hesitant about creating a dedicated L&D fund. The topic is expectedto be one of the main focus areas on the agenda of the forthcoming COP27 in Egypt.

Briefing EN

Schengen reform: Key challenges and proposalsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2022Awtur DUMBRAVA Costica

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaSommarju The Schengen area without internal borders has been under stress over the past decade owing to several successive

crises, including the sudden arrival of large numbers of people across the EU's external borders, persistent threats tointernal security, and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Although according to the Schengen rules thereintroduction of border controls at internal borders should be a temporary and exceptional measure, several MemberStates have maintained internal border controls uninterruptedly for more than six years. The massive and largelyuncoordinated internal border controls and other restrictions to freedom of movement imposed at the beginning of thepandemic revealed several shortcomings in the Schengen systems. These shortcomings concern Schengen'snormative framework (gaps in the legal framework), implementation and enforcement (at internal borders and in themanagement of external borders), and governance (including evaluation and strategic direction). Building on previousattempts to reform the Schengen system, and responding to renewed calls for reform, in December 2021 the EuropeanCommission presented a new Schengen strategy. This was accompanied by several proposals and measures aimedat revising the Schengen rules, enhancing police cooperation, reinforcing the management of external borders andstrengthening the overall governance of Schengen. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need tosafeguard the Schengen area, urging the Member States to remove all unjustified controls at internal borders andasking the Commission to enforce the Schengen rules properly. In the context of the pandemic, Parliament called for a'recovery plan' for Schengen and for 'truly European governance of the Schengen area'.

Briefing EN

Culture and regional developmentTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2022Awtur PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena | WIDUTO Agnieszka

Qasam tematiku Il-Kultura | L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliSommarju Culture plays a fundamental role in human life. It is also an essential source of identity, at local, regional, national and

European levels, while making a significant contribution to the EU economy. EU cultural policy relates to culturalheritage, i.e. cultural sites and museums, but also to the cultural and creative sector, for instance the audiovisual anddesign sectors. The EU supports culture through a variety of initiatives, including the European Capitals of Culturescheme. A number of EU programmes also offer funding for cultural projects, for instance the Creative Europeprogramme, Horizon Europe and New European Bauhaus. Several regional policy funds meanwhile provide supportfor cultural events, the regeneration of cultural sites, the preservation of cultural heritage, cultural tourism, and culturaland creative sector businesses. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the cultural and creativesector, as repeated lockdowns saw the closure of cultural institutions and infrastructure. As one of the worst affectedsectors of the economy, the EU included culture in its coronavirus response investment initiatives and the REACT-EU(Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe) programme aimed at dealing with the consequencesof the pandemic. Local and regional authorities have a role to play in supporting cultural life and participation in theircommunities. Arts and cultural facilities are usually associated with urban centres, though they also have potential innon-urban areas, small towns and rural communities. The presence of cultural sites increases the attractiveness of aregion, while well-developed cultural and creative sectors help to enhance the regional economy. Culture can also playan important role in the regeneration of disadvantaged and post-industrial areas. The European Parliament has calledfor increased support for culture as part of the post-pandemic recovery efforts. As Europe emerges from the crisis,culture can help to strengthen regional development.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 4

NATO and European defence [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-DifiżaSommarju The thirty NATO member states agreed on 29 June to invite Finland and Sweden to join the Western military alliance,

accepting the Nordic countries' accession bids, which came after Russia launched its war on Ukraine nearly fivemonths ago. The June NATO Summit in Madrid also endorsed a new Strategic Concept and branded the RussianFederation as 'the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlanticarea'. NATO also agreed to boost significantly its defence capabilities and offer more support for Ukraine. This notegathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the NATO Summitand on European defence.

Briefing EN

Revising the Effort-sharing Regulation for 2021-2030: 'Fit for 55' packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-07-2022Awtur YOUGOVA Dessislava

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | gass serra | kontroll tat-tniġġis | l-ammont permess ta' emissjonijiet tal-UE | monitoraġġ

ambjentali | newtralità karbonika | proposta (UE) | strateġija tal-UESommarju The EU's effort-sharing legislation covers greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in sectors not included in the EU

emissions trading system. A wide range of sources account for these emissions, such as petrol and diesel used forroad transport, energy used for heating and cooling in buildings, animal digestion and fertilisers used in agriculture,waste treatment, and small industries. To cut the emissions in these sectors, the EU effort-sharing legislationestablishes binding targets and sets up annual emissions allocations for each Member State for the 2013-2020 and2021-2030 periods. On 14 July 2021, the European Commission submitted a proposal on a regulation amending thebinding annual emissions reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030. It reviews the collective and nationaltargets set up in the Effort-sharing Regulation (ESR). The proposal is part of the 'fit for 55' package, which aims toadapt EU climate and energy legislation to the new EU objective of an at least 55 % reduction in net GHG emissionsby 2030 compared to 1990, in accordance with the recent European Climate Law. In order to contribute to the newclimate ambition, sectors covered by the ESR should achieve a collective reduction of 40 % in their emissions by 2030compared to 2005. The European Parliament adopted its position on 8 June 2022, while the Council agreed its generalapproach on 29 June 2022, enabling the launch of interinstitutional negotiations (trilogues). Third edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Tenth NPT review conference: Nuclear weapons threat at an all-time highTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-07-2022Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity. Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons in the context of its

war on Ukraine has been a stark reminder that this threat is real. At present, nine states are known to have militarynuclear programmes. Over recent years, tensions among nuclear-armed states have increased, leading to 'outrightstrategic rivalry and competition' among several of them. Moreover, experts are concerned that the 'fabric ofinternational institutions, treaties, and norms that has historically contributed to predictable and more stablerelationships among nuclear-armed States is deteriorating'. Experts also point to technological developments thatheighten uncertainties and unpredictability in the strategic relationships among nuclear-armed states. In January 2021,the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the doomsday clock to 100 seconds tomidnight and warned that the world is 'sleepwalking its way through a newly unstable nuclear landscape'. In 1968, thefive states that possessed nuclear weapons at the time signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT), intended to lead to the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons and control their proliferation. However, ratherthan fulfilling the pledge to disarm that they made when they signed the NPT, nuclear weapon states are investingmassive sums in more modern nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Moreover, an additional four states haveacquired nuclear weapons since the NPT came into force in 1970, and a fifth, Iran, is getting dangerously close tobuilding its own nuclear bomb. The Tenth NPT Review Conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 1 26August 2022, will review progress on the implementation of the treaty. The conference is taking place at a time offundamental divides between NPT member states over key aspects of the treaty. Moreover, Russia's invasion of anon-nuclear weapon state and its reckless nuclear rhetoric pose particular challenges for the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. The EU remains fully committed to the NPT as the cornerstone of the globalnuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and recentlycalled on all parties to work towards a positive and substantive outcome of the conference.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 5

Rules for exercising the Union's rights in implementing and enforcing EU UK agreementsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-07-2022Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Id-Dritt Internazzjonali Pubbliku | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Both the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and the UK

allow a party to adopt measures in order to induce the other party to comply with a ruling delivered by an arbitraltribunal. Both agreements also allow the implementation of measures without having first to resort to the relevantdispute settlement mechanism, and the TCA provides for compensatory measures if a party has been found to haveapplied remedial measures that are inconsistent with the applicable provisions. The proposed legislation empowers theCommission to act by means of implementing acts for implementation and enforcement of the two agreements. Firstedition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

The EU chips act: Securing Europe's supply of semiconductorsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-07-2022Awtur RAGONNAUD Guillaume

Qasam tematiku L-IndustrijaSommarju Semiconductors (or chips) are the engines of the digital transition. Their production relies on complex and vulnerable

global supply chains. Against the backdrop of global chip shortages, of a global 'subsidy race' in the world's mainproducing regions, and of a renewed EU industrial policy, in February 2022 the Commission presented a proposal foran EU chips act aimed at reinforcing the whole EU chips value chain. The chips act is based on a three-pillar structure:pillar 1 aims to bolster large-scale technological capacity building and innovation in the EU chips ecosystem, improvingthe transition 'from lab to fab'; pillar 2 focuses on improving the EU's security of supply, by attracting investment andenhancing production capacities in the EU; pillar 3 aims to set up a monitoring and crisis response mechanism. In theevent of supply crises, the Commission would be allowed to implement three types of emergency measures (requestinformation from companies, request companies to accept and prioritise orders of crisis-relevant products, and carryout common purchasing on behalf of Member States). The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In theEuropean Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file and plans toconsider its rapporteur's draft report in autumn 2022. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Towards carbon neutrality through ambitious transformation of the EU energy systemTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-07-2022Awtur HEFLICH ALEKSANDRA | SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | Il-Valur Miżjud Ewropew | L-Ambjent | L-Enerġija | L-Industrija | L-Ippjanar bil-Quddiem

Sommarju According to a recent European Parliamentary Research Service Cost of Non-Europe (CONE) report, ambitious andunited European Union (EU) action in climate and energy policy could be very beneficial, bringing gains of up to 5.6 %of gross domestic product (GDP), equal to €1 trillion additional GDP per year in 2050, compared to a continuation ofthe status quo (see Figure 1). However, failure to arrive at a common approach, in particular by collectively addressingvolatile energy prices and systemic risks emerging from EU dependency on external suppliers such as Russia, couldresult in the EU missing out on some, or the entirety, of these potential benefits. In this briefing we confirm that the EUhas a key role to play to attenuate and eliminate the related risks and in making the transformation possible andsuccessful. We also confirm that fragmentation driven by low ambition and muddling through, or even worst casescenarios of fragmentation, would result in relatively high negative impacts.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board - 13 July 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-07-2022Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiSommarju This note is prepared in view of an ordinary public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Elke

König, which will take place on 13 July 2022. During the hearing, the Chair of the SRB will notably address theinstitution’s 2021 annual report, published on 27 June 2022. This briefing also addresses the Sberbank resolutioncase, developments on MREL build-up and in relation to the Banking Union, and it presents a summary of some recentinstitutional policy papers relevant for resolution.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 6

EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-07-2022Awtur DAMEN Mario

Qasam tematiku L-Ippjanar bil-QuddiemSommarju EU strategic autonomy (EU-SA) refers to the capacity of the EU to act autonomously – that is, without being dependent

on other countries – in strategically important policy areas. These can range from defence policy to the economy, andthe capacity to uphold democratic values. In order to structure the debate on strategic autonomy into analyticalcategories, this briefing assumes that by and large there have been several phases to the debate about EU-SA, eachwith a different focus. From 2013 to 2016, it was mainly seen as an approach to security and defence matters. From2017 to 2019, EU-SA was considered as a way to defend European interests in a hostile geopolitical environment,marked by Brexit, the Trump Presidency and China's growing assertiveness. In 2020, the Covid 19 pandemic shiftedthe focus to mitigating economic dependence on foreign supply chains. Since 2021, the scope of EU-SA has beenwidened to virtually all EU policy areas, including that of the EU's values, while the expression 'strategic autonomy' wasparadoxically used less and was often replaced by similar concepts, such as 'open strategic autonomy', 'strategicsovereignty', 'capacity to act' and 'resilience'. This briefing uses 'strategic autonomy' and 'strategic sovereignty' asequal and interchangeable terms. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, steps towards achievingEU-SA are being taken, while the concept nevertheless remains blurred by the variation in terminology. Achieving EU-SA will require a common vision, political will and capabilities to implement it, and a distinct role for the EU, betweenMember States and global players. Visual tools, such as the 360° strategic autonomy wheel (in Annex 1), can help toidentify dependencies and understand complex interdependencies between policy areas. Political will was expressedin the European Council's Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, which aims at greater EU-SA in defence, energysupply and the economy. However, EU-SA can be constrained by Member States and non-EU (third) countries orinternational organisations that challenge the EU. This EU strategic autonomy monitor is the first in a series on thestate of play in the debate and implementation of EU-SA. It will be complemented by thematic papers in the 'strategicautonomy 360°' series.

Briefing EN

Towards new rules on transparency and targeting of political advertisingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-07-2022Awtur DIAZ CREGO Maria

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UESommarju Political advertising is central to influencing how people vote, and may affect citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of

their own political system, particularly when published in the run-up to elections. Rules governing political advertisingare therefore key to guaranteeing citizens' fundamental rights and the integrity of democratic processes. So, it is notwithout reason that regulating political propaganda during electoral periods is one of the common focal points ofelectoral law. However, traditional rules on campaigning may either be ineffective or difficult to enforce in an onlineenvironment where new techniques are used to target potential voters with tailored political messages based on largeamounts of personal data revealing their sensibilities and vulnerabilities. To address the new challenges posed byonline electoral campaigns, the European Commission presented a proposal that aims to build a harmonised set ofrules on transparency and targeting of political advertising, and would apply to both online and offline politicaladvertisements. The proposal is currently under discussion by the European Parliament and the Council through theordinary legislative procedure. In the Parliament, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)is responsible for the file. The rapporteur presented his draft report to the committee on 16 June 2022. First edition.The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Strengthening EU chip capabilities: How will the chips act reinforce Europe's semiconductor sector by2030?

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 07-07-2022

Awtur VAN WIERINGEN KJELDQasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Industrija

Sommarju The proposed European chips act, presented by the European Commission in February 2022, aims to mobilise €43billion in 'policy-driven investment' for the EU's semiconductor sector by 2030. The Commission expects long-termprivate investment to exceed this. The plan serves to enable immediate EU coordination against supply disruptions,strengthen and scale up production and innovation throughout the EU semiconductor value chain, and further enhancethe Union's technological leadership, practical applications and digital sovereignty in this crucial field. The globalsemiconductor value chain is characterised by chokepoints and critical dependencies, including on more advancedchips from Taiwan and South Korea, US intellectual property in chip design automation, Japanese wafers and Chinesechip assembly. Europe has strong capacities in research and equipment manufacturing, in addition to some productioncapacity of (less advanced) chips with larger transistors, often destined for the automotive sector, as well as (chemical)inputs. The future effectiveness of the EU chips act could benefit from further emphasis on certain key challenges tostrengthen and safeguard Europe's position in the global chip value chain. Internally, reinforcing European chemicalinput and back-end manufacturing could be advanced by protecting European chemical suppliers against Chinesesubsidies and by reshoring back-end facilities to Europe. Bilaterally, attracting and engaging in foreign semiconductorinvestment could see the use of relevant forums, partnerships and agreements, as well as relevant fast-track permits.Globally, enhancing foreign dependencies on the EU would require further reinforcement of existing European centresof excellence including in innovative research and equipment manufacturing. The EU chips act, if provided with theright resources, could help to improve the EU's position in the global semiconductor value chain significantly by 2030.Meanwhile, Intel's €33 billion investment and Taiwanese interest in European chip manufacturing are also cause foroptimism.

Briefing EN

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Climate change [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-07-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju Russia’s war on Ukraine has reduced supplies of gas and oil to the European Union and other regions, increasing

energy prices and complicating efforts to cut emissions of greenhouse gases. Faced with oil and gas shortages, somecountries have started to fire up polluting coal power plants which had previously been shut down, or have postponedtheir planned closure. Burning coal or lignite emits much more carbon dioxide than using oil and gas to produceelectricity. Scientists and analysts are urging swift, radical action on climate change, pointing to this and last year’sextreme weather – severe floods, fires, and more frequent hurricanes. Governments across the world are preparing forthe next climate change conference, to be held in Sharm El-Sheikh at the end of 2022. The meeting is to provide moredetails of how countries plan to achieve the agreed goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,as set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports frominternational think tanks on climate issues. More papers on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What ThinkTanks are Thinking.

Briefing EN

Strengthening Europol's mandateTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-07-2022Awtur CIRLIG Carmen-Cristina

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix big data | Europol | innovazzjoni | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tad-data | rapport | riċerka u żvilupp | tħaddim tal-

IstituzzjonijietSommarju On 9 December 2020, along with its counter-terrorism agenda, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a

regulation to reinforce the mandate of Europol, the EU law enforcement cooperation agency. The proposed regulationaims principally at rendering Europol's cooperation with private parties more effective; responding to the agency's 'bigdata challenge', by providing a legal basis for processing large and complex datasets, including personal data of datasubjects not related to a crime; and reinforcing Europol's role in relation to research and innovation for lawenforcement. The legislative proposal, which would amend the existing Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794, isaccompanied by another legislative proposal to modify Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the Schengen informationsystem (SIS), to allow Europol to issue alerts in SIS under a new category. On 1 February 2022, the EuropeanParliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement on the proposal for a regulation, which was formallyadopted by each institution on 4 May and 24 May respectively, and signed into law on 8 June. The regulation enteredinto force on 28 June 2022. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Establishing the Union secure connectivity programme for the period 2023-2027Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-07-2022Awtur VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-RiċerkaSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, adopted on 15 February 2022 and referred to theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The proposal, which is included in the2022 Commission work programme (see Annex I – New initiatives) and in the EU Legislative Priorities for 2022 (seethe Commission's working document), seeks to establish a Union secure satellite communication system. This systemwould ensure highly secured connectivity and communication to the Union and Member States' governmental entities,also with a view to making sure that the EU remains connected in case of cyber-attacks, or in case of natural disastersleading to the breakdown of terrestrial communication networks (IA, pp. 10-11). In addition, the system would allow forconnecting key infrastructure better, supporting crisis management, surveillance and potential mass-market broadbandapplications, and ensuring the provision of high-speed, flexible and resilient satellite communication services. Theproposed regulation sets out the objectives of the programme, the rules governing the envisaged activities and itsimplementation, its infrastructure and services, the participants, the EU budget for the 2023-2027 period, the forms ofUnion funding and the rules for providing such funding.

Briefing EN

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Ensuring the safety of machines in the digital age: Revision of the Machinery DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-07-2022Awtur RAGONNAUD Guillaume

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaSommarju The current Machinery Directive (Directive 2006/42/EC) was designed to allow the free movement of machinery within

the internal market, while ensuring a high level of protection of health and safety of users. To reduce the occurrence ofaccidents, it promotes inherently safe design and construction of machinery, and proper installation and maintenance.On 21 April 2021, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on machinery products, part of a wider'artificial intelligence package'. The need for an update stemmed in particular from recent developments in digitaltechnologies, such as artificial intelligence, the internet of things, and robotics, which have raised new safetychallenges. The proposed revision also intends to ensure more coherent interpretation of the scope and definitions,enhance safety for traditional technologies, reassess machines considered as 'high risk' and the conformityassessment procedures, reduce paper-based requirements for documentation, ensure coherence with other productsafety legislation and avoid divergences in interpretation stemming from transposition. On 3 May 2022, Parliament'sCommittee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) adopted its report, along with the decision to enterinto interinstitutional negotiations, with the committee report as mandate. The plenary endorsed that decision on 20May 2022, opening the way for the committee to start interinstitutional negotiations with the Council. First edition. The'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

The EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region (EUSAIR)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-07-2022Awtur D'AMBROGIO Enrico | VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliSommarju Launched in 2014, the EU strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region (EUSAIR) is the third macro-regional strategy

(MRS) to have been set after those for the Baltic Sea region and the Danube region. With the recent inclusion of NorthMacedonia and San Marino, the strategy now covers four EU Member States and six third countries, mostly from theWestern Balkans, one of its goals being to facilitate the EU enlargement process of countries from this region. TheEUSAIR is unique in that it is the only EU macro-regional strategy in which EU candidate and potential candidatecountries outnumber the participating EU Member States. The Adriatic and Ionian region faces a number ofchallenges, including environmental degradation, inefficient transport connections and insufficiently close cross-bordercooperation. To help address these challenges jointly, the strategy has been shaped around four pillars: blue growth;connecting the region; environmental quality; and sustainable tourism. As with other macro-regional strategies, theEUSAIR does not have its own budget. Its implementation therefore depends on the mobilisation of funds from otherrelevant sources (EU, national, regional and private) and on the well-coordinated use of available funding instrumentsat different levels, in particular the European structural and investment funds for EU countries and the Instrument forPre-accession Assistance for non-EU ones. To fully harness this potential, the process of embedding the MRSpriorities in the 2021-2027 national/regional EU funding programmes is key to its successful implementation. Recentyears have seen a number of developments that could strengthen the EUSAIR. In particular, the post-2020 cohesionpolicy framework has introduced measures such as new thematic concentration requirements, Interreg-specificobjectives and rules on the participation of MRS players, which can deliver more targeted funding, boost administrativecapacity and increase political ownership and awareness. Yet, while MRS initiatives remain relatively unknown, theirimportance should not be under-estimated. The events of recent months in Ukraine have only served to highlight thebenefits of cooperation between neighbouring countries. This Briefing updates one of October 2015 by VasileiosMargaras.

Briefing EN

Reporting on SDG implementation: UN mechanisms and the EU approachTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 05-07-2022Awtur PICHON Eric

Qasam tematiku Il-Governanza Dinjija | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix ONU | rwol internazzjonali tal-UE | ġbir ta' dejta | żvilupp sostenibbli

Sommarju Adopted in 2015 by the United Nations (UN), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – 'the blueprint to achievea better and more sustainable future for all' – clearly links the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) that itintroduced to a series of targets to be reached by 2030. The 2030 Agenda includes a detailed mechanism to monitorprogress with regard to these targets. At the core of this mechanism are a number of quantified indicators for eachtarget that are regularly revised by the UN and other international agencies. These agencies and the EU providesupport to national statistical services across the world in collecting data for the SDG indicators in order to gatherreliable and comparable datasets. These data feed the voluntary national reports that countries prepare to exchangegood practices and advice on tackling the challenges they encounter in implementing their SDG strategies. High-levelforums take stock of both progress and weaknesses in implementation, so as to ensure that everybody is on track inpursuing the SDGs. The EU has long experience in collecting consistent data from its Member States. The EuropeanUnion Statistical Office (Eurostat) has created a set of sustainable development indicators that provide a goodoverview of progress within the EU. EU development cooperation services have devised a framework of indicators toassess how EU support contributes to other countries' implementation of the SDGs. However, the EuropeanParliament and other stakeholders regret that the spill-over effect of EU policies on third countries remains a blind spotin the evaluation of the EU's contribution to the SDGs. Although technical in nature, SDG indicators and data also havea political dimension, as they clearly measure countries' and other stakeholders' achievements against their owncommitments. This is an update of a Briefing published in December 2019.

Briefing EN

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Revision of the LULUCF Regulation: Strengthening the role of the land use, land-use change and forestrysector in climate action

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 05-07-2022

Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTEQasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix effett serra | impatt ambjentali | monitoraġġ ambjentali | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | regolament (UE) | strateġija tal-UE

| tnaqqis tal-emissjonijietSommarju To align regulations and policies with the legally binding goals – delivering, by 2030, a 55 % net greenhouse gas

emissions reduction compared to 1990, and reaching climate neutrality in Europe by 2050 – on 14 July the EuropeanCommission presented its first proposals under the 'fit for 55' package. One of these proposals involves amendingRegulation (EU) 2018/841 on emissions and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry (the LULUCFRegulation). Among the main changes envisaged are to merge, as of 2030, the LULUCF sector with the non-CO2agricultural sector in a new climate pillar, which would have to achieve climate neutrality by 2035. Moreover, by 2030,LULUCF carbon removals would have to increase to 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e). For the post-2025period, the Commission would set individual targets for each Member State. The proposal was referred to theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed VilleNiinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland) as rapporteur. ENVI adopted its report on 17 May 2022, and Parliament adopted itsposition in plenary on 8 June. The Environment Council adopted its general approach during its meeting of 28 June2022. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Review of the EU ETS: 'Fit for 55' packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 05-07-2022Awtur ERBACH Gregor

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix gass serra | l-ammont permess ta' emissjonijiet tal-UE | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | permess negozzjabbli tal-

emissjonijiet | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | riżervi | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE | tnaqqistal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis mill-vapuri | trasport marittimu

Sommarju As part of the 'Fit for 55' package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal to review the EU EmissionsTrading System (ETS). The aim of the review is to align the EU ETS Directive with the EU target set out in theEuropean Climate Law to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. Tothis end, the amount of emission allowances would be reduced, fewer allowances would be allocated for free, and theETS would be extended to maritime transport. This would reduce emissions in the ETS sectors by 61 % by 2030,compared to 2005. A separate new emissions trading system would be established for fuel distribution for roadtransport and buildings. The Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund would be enlarged, and Member Stateswould be obliged to spend all of their ETS revenues on climate action. In the European Parliament, the proposal hasbeen referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), with Peter Liese (EPP,Germany) as rapporteur. The Parliament adopted its position in the June II 2022 session, and the Council adopted itsgeneral approach on 29 June 2022, enabling the launch of trilogue negotiations. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Review of the EU ETS: 'Fit for 55' package

CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans: 'Fit for 55' packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 05-07-2022Awtur ERBACH Gregor

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | karburant sostitut | karozza | konsum tal-enerġija | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE |

proposta (UE) | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis mill-vetturi motorizzati | veikolu li ma jniġġisx | vettura motorizzata |vetturi ħfief

Sommarju On 14 July 2021, as part of the 'fit for 55' package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal for a revision ofthe Regulation setting CO2 emission performance standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (vans).To raise the contribution of the road transport sector to the EU's climate targets, the proposal sets more ambitious2030 targets for reducing the CO2 emissions of new cars and vans and allows only zero-emission vehicles from 2035.In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and FoodSafety (ENVI), with Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands) as rapporteur. The Parliament adopted its position duringthe June I 2022 plenary session, and the Council adopted its general approach on 29 June 2022, meaning triloguenegotiations can commence. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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Peace, justice and strong institutions: EU support for implementing SDG 16 worldwideTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-07-2022Awtur ZAMFIR Ionel

Qasam tematiku L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix demokrazija | drittijiet tal-bniedem | integrazzjoni soċjali | politika regolatorja | politika tal-UE | tħaddim tal-Istituzzjonijiet

| żamma tal-paċi | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju The 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG16) to 'Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable

development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'represents a new milestone compared with the earlier millennium development goals. While several of its targets (suchas peace, corruption-free institutions and freedom from violence) were once seen as prerequisites of sustainabledevelopment, the adoption of SDG16 marked the first time that they were globally recognised as developmentobjectives in themselves. To achieve universal recognition, SDG16 leaves out explicit reference to internationallyrecognised political and civil rights norms, attracting some criticism. Its very general scope has also stirred controversyregarding the type of data required in order to assess progress rigorously. The state of play with regard to theimplementation of SDG16 indicates that substantial progress is still needed in order to achieve the SDG targets by2030. Violent conflicts continue to affect many parts of the world, societal violence remains widespread in manycountries and violence against children in particular remains a pervasive phenomenon, especially in developingcountries. The pandemic has erased much previous progress on the SDGs, and led to restrictions on freedoms andmore limited government accountability. The war in Ukraine, meanwhile, with its negative spill-overs on other SDGsdemonstrates once more the crucial role of peace. The EU has committed to contributing to the achievement of all theSDGs, and the specific targets of SDG16 have been given special recognition. From the Global Strategy to the 'newconsensus on development', various policy documents acknowledge the crucial role of peace, democracy, humanrights and the rule of law for sustainable development. The interconnection between the pursuit of these fundamentalvalues and EU efforts to help developing countries achieve the SDGs is obvious in numerous measures undertaken inthe framework of EU external action. The European Parliament is a strong champion for these values in the world. Thisis an update of a Briefing published in February 2020.

Briefing EN

New EU scheme of generalised preferencesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-07-2022Awtur ZAMFIR Ionel

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliKelma għat-tiftix aċċess għas-suq | għajnuna għall-iżvilupp | pajjiżi fil-fażi tal-iżvilupp | politika kummerċjali komuni | preferenza tariffarja

| proposta (UE) | sistema ta' preferenzi ġeneralizzati | Soċjetà ċivili | suq tal-UE | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju On 21 September 2021, the Commission published its proposal for a new EU scheme of generalised preferences

(GSP). Two of the current scheme's three components are due to expire at the end of 2023, which would deprivedeveloping countries of a vital opportunity to trade under preferential terms with the EU. Therefore, renewing thescheme appears to be both a necessity and an opportunity to strengthen its conditionality in the light of lessonslearned and the increased urgency for dealing with the climate. The Commission considers that the scheme hasdelivered on its objectives, and proposes some 'fine-tuning'. To ensure that its benefits remain broadly shared, itproposes changes to the economic vulnerability criteria for the special incentive strand of the scheme GSP+ and to theproduct graduation threshold for Standard GSP. Taking on board proposals from civil society, but also from theParliament, the Commission proposes to extend negative conditionality to environmental and good governanceconventions, and to improve monitoring and stakeholders' involvement overall. Civil society organisations and otherstakeholders have put forward some more ambitious proposals, such as making the monitoring fully transparent andrewarding countries that fulfil jointly agreed benchmarks related to the conventions under the GSP with additionalpreferences. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

The political system of the Republic of KoreaTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-07-2022Awtur JOCHHEIM Ulrich

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Following the division of the Korean peninsula into a southern and a northern part at the end of the Second World War,

the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established in its southern part in 1948. The 1950 attack by the communistregime established in the northern part provoked a three-year war, which completely devastated the peninsula. Whenan armistice was signed in 1953, the Republic of Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. Its politicalsystem was marked by a very strong attitude of anti-communism, which manifested itself in the strict application of the1948 National Security Law. Following the military coup of 1961, two successive presidents – Park and Chun –focused on the promotion of the country's economic development, while suppressing civil liberties and politicalfreedoms. The end of authoritarianism in 1987 and the successful transition to a well-functioning democracy weremarked by the rewriting of the Constitution and the democratic transfer of power to an opposition candidate in 1997-1998. The Constitution of the Sixth Republic gives a very strong role to the office of the president, who not only has theright to introduce bills but also has very extensive powers in cases of an emergency. The legislative branch ofgovernment is incarnated by the unicameral Parliament, the Korean National Assembly (NKA). Among itscompetences is the right to launch an impeachment motion against the president, a right the KNA successfullyexercised in December 2016. The judicial power is held by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, both ofwhich in March 2017 upheld the impeachment, leading to the removal of President Park and new presidentialelections. The rising importance of women in the National Assembly and the peaceful character of the 2016-2017events are a sign of the maturity of Korea's democracy, but the role of the chaebol (industrial conglomerates) inparticular remains a challenge to the smooth functioning of Korea's democratic order.

Briefing EN

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Energy poverty in the EUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-07-2022Awtur WIDUTO Agnieszka

Qasam tematiku L-EnerġijaSommarju In 2020, about 36 million Europeans were unable to keep their homes adequately warm. Energy poverty is a multi-

dimensional phenomenon, considered to be caused by a combination of low income, high energy expenses, and poorenergy efficiency in buildings. The EU has been addressing this issue in various legislative and non-legislativeinitiatives, most recently in the context of its climate policies and energy transition. The Gas and Electricity Directivescall for the protection of vulnerable consumers, and the Energy Efficiency and Energy Efficiency of Buildings Directivesrequire measures to alleviate energy poverty alongside efficiency efforts. The 'renovation wave' initiative under theEuropean Green Deal aims to boost structural renovation in private and public buildings, while the Social Climate Fundincludes households in energy poverty among its main beneficiaries. The 2020 European Commissionrecommendation on the topic defines energy poverty as a situation in which households are unable to access essentialenergy services. It also provides a set of indicators relating for instance to the inability to keep a home adequatelywarm, arrears on utility bills, and a high share of income spent on energy bills. At the same time, no binding EU-leveldefinition currently exists, and the proposed indicator set is not monitored systematically by Eurostat. A number ofpossible policy options exist to address energy poverty under energy policy, social policy, or a mix of various regulatorysolutions. Specific measures range from price regulation and tax breaks, to limits on disconnection, to social tariffs,energy efficiency improvements, and energy savings. Against the backdrop of security of energy supply concerns, theexpected further rise in energy prices, and the ongoing EU transition to climate neutrality, the issue of energy povertywill be a crucial one in the months and years to come.

Briefing EN

The European Parliament and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-07-2022Awtur KAISER WOLFRAM KARL WILHELM | VINTILA NICOLAE-SERGIU

Qasam tematiku Il-Kultura | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Looking back on the implosion of the Soviet Union in late 1991, this Briefing reflects on the debate in the Parliament

about its possible consequences at the time. It shows that a clear majority of MEPs initially remained keen on thetransformation of the Soviet Union into some kind of 'new Union'. They were concerned both about the dire economicsituation in several Soviet republics, and about the maintenance of effective control over the Soviet Union's hugenuclear arsenal. Since 1988 the EP, like the European Community in its entirety, had treated the case of the threeBaltic republics as distinct. After all, Western countries had never recognised their illegal occupation and integrationinto the Soviet Union by Stalin. In contrast, the EP debates and resolutions hardly addressed the long-term future ofthe remaining post-Soviet space, including Ukraine and Moldova, which was not yet seen as a direct or primaryconcern of the Community at the time of the negotiations leading up to its transformation into the European Union withthe Maastricht Treaty. As this Briefing also shows, however, some MEPs across the political divide were alreadyexpressing their deep concerns about the possible revival of Russian imperialism as a threat to its neighbours and achallenge to the European Community / European Union.

Briefing EN

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in EU regionsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-06-2022Awtur WIDUTO Agnieszka

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix koeżjoni ekonomika u soċjali | konverġenza ekonomika | ONU | politika tal-UE | Semestru Ewropew | strateġija tal-UE

għat-tkabbir | tkabbir ekoloġiku | żvilupp reġjonali | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju The Sustainable Development Goals were established in 2015 as part of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for

Sustainable Development. The signatories adopted a policy framework with 17 goals, addressing issues such aspoverty, hunger, health and wellbeing, education, gender equality, environment and climate, strong institutions, peaceand justice. Sustainable development aims at balancing social, economic and environmental aspects, seeing them asinterconnected. The European Union (EU) has contributed to both setting and implementing the SDGs. It hascommitted to deliver on the 2030 Agenda through its internal and external policies, as outlined in the Towards aSustainable Europe by 2030 reflection paper, the European Green Deal and the European Commission's politicalpriorities and work programme. To measure their progress towards achieving the goals, EU Member States preparevoluntary national reviews, in line with UN guidelines. EU-level progress is measured through a set of indicatorsadapted to the EU context, and Eurostat publishes annual monitoring reports on the results. The objectives of theSDGs were integrated into the European Semester in 2019. The SDGs also have a regional dimension, sometimescalled 'localisation'. Achieving around 65 % of the targets is estimated to depend on input from local and regionalauthorities. Numerous regions and cities, including in the EU, have expressed support for the SDGs and many haveintegrated them in their policy frameworks. Efforts to localise the SDGs are ongoing and regional achievements arefeatured in the national reviews presented at international conferences. Monitoring SDGs at the regional level can thushelp support the overall implementation of the SDGs, reinforce national efforts, support regional developmentstrategies, and provide a broader picture of within-country trends. The European Parliament has expressed its supportfor an EU sustainable development strategy and enhanced involvement of regional, local and civil society stakeholdersin SDG implementation. This is an update of an earlier briefing published in December 2020.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Sustainable Development Goals in EU regions

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Setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable productsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-06-2022Awtur VIKOLAINEN Vera

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 30 March 2022 and referred to theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The proposal aims torepeal the Ecodesign Directive 2009/125/EC, which establishes a framework for adopting product-specificrequirements set out in implementing measures (usually regulations) by the European Commission. Until recently, thedirective focused mainly on the energy efficiency of products and since 2019 also on their lifetime (e.g. availability ofspare parts for a certain number of years after the last item has been placed on the market). It currently covers 29energy-related product groups, ranging from ventilation systems to high-pressure cleaners. The new proposal for aRegulation would establish a framework for setting Ecodesign requirements that would apply to all physical productson the internal market (with a few exceptions), with the aim of making them more durable, reusable, reparable,upgradeable, recyclable and generally less harmful to the environment. Product specific requirements would be set outlater, in delegated acts, for each product group separately. The proposal was first announced in the European GreenDeal, and then confirmed in the Circular Economy action plan, alongside a communication on making sustainableproducts the norm and a proposal for a directive empowering consumers for the green transition. The Commissionincluded the present proposal in Annex I of its 2021 work programme (new initiatives) and the 2022 joint declaration onlegislative priorities.

Briefing EN

Priority dossiers under the Czech EU Council PresidencyTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-06-2022Awtur NADKARNI ISABEL

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UESommarju Czechia is a parliamentary republic with a head of government – the prime minister – and a head of state – the

president. The current Prime Minister is Petr Fiala, from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). He has been in office sinceNovember 2021 and was preceded by Andrej Babiš (2017-2021), the founder of the party ANO 2011. Czech PresidentMiloš Zeman was first elected to the post in 2013 and had previously served as prime minister, from 1998 to 2002. Thesupreme executive body is the government. It is led by the prime minister and appointed by the president of therepublic. The president also appoints other government members based on the prime minister's recommendations.Before it is installed, the government must win a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies. The Spolu alliance,formed for the 2021 legislative election, was composed of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), KDU-ČSL (Christian andDemocratic Union), and TOP 09 (Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity). It currently governs the country in a coalitionwith the Pirates and Mayors' alliance. The Czech Parliament is bicameral. The upper house is the Senate (81members elected for six years) and the lower house is the Chamber of Deputies (200 members elected for four years).There are currently seven parties in the Chamber of Deputies. All of these parties except the SPD also have seats inthe Senate, where the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Green Party (Z) also have seats. TheCommunist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) holds no seats in the Chamber or the Senate but has one electedmember of the European Parliament and representatives at regional level. Czechia will hold the Presidency of theCouncil of the EU for the second time. The previous time was in the first half of 2009, coinciding with the last months ofthe sixth legislative term of the European Parliament and with the European elections, held between 4 and 7 June2009. The programme of the Trio formed together with France and Sweden has as its thematic priorities to protectcitizens and freedoms; to promote a new growth and investment model for Europe; to build a climate-neutral, green,fair and social Europe; and to promote Europe's interests and values in the world.

Briefing EN

Russia’s war on Ukraine and food security [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-06-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Is-Sikurezza tal-Ikel | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Russia’s war on Ukraine has sent global food prices soaring. It has fuelled inflation in the European Union, the United

States and many other countries, while threatening hunger in some poorer regions. Russia and Ukraine play a majorrole in food and fertiliser supply. They export about 30 per cent of the world’s wheat and 75 per cent of its sunflower oil.Some countries in Africa and the Middle East are nearly 100-per cent dependent on Russian or Ukrainian food.According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, food prices in May were up by nearly 30 per centfrom a year earlier. Western countries are debating a plan to open up supply chains, for example by unblockingUkrainian ports on the Black Sea, and to provide food financing to developing countries. This note gathers links to therecent publications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and Europeanfood markets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications for the energy market can be found in a previousedition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

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Better regulation in the EU: Improving quality and reducing delaysTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-06-2022Awtur estern Siôn Jones, Greta Dohler, Luke Pate

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | Il-Baġit | Il-Governanza Dinjija | Il-Kontroll Baġitarju | Il-Liġital-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti Legali | Il-Petizzjonijiet lill-Parlament Ewropew | Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Il-Valutazzjonital-Impatt Ex-Ante | Is-Semestru Ewropew | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | It-Tassazzjoni | It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-Liġi | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Ippjanar bil-Quddiem | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja

Sommarju This briefing, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and ConstitutionalAffairs at the request of the JURI Committee, provides recommendations for better regulation in the EU by improvingquality and reducing delays. It points at significant actual and potential benefits from EU legislative initiativesamounting to over €2,200bn as well as costs of slow Europe of €319 billion in lost annual benefits.

Briefing EN

European Council: facts and figuresTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-06-2022Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaSommarju The European Council brings together the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States in regular

'summit' meetings which seek to define the overall political direction and priorities of the European Union. This Briefingoffers a selection of key facts and figures about this institution, detailing its membership, role, work and developmentover time.

Briefing EN

Revision of the EU legislation on blood, tissues and cellsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-06-2022Awtur BACIAN Izabela Cristina

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa PubblikaSommarju Since its adoption, EU legislation on blood, tissues and cells has ensured an upward convergence in the quality and

safety of these substances from donation to human application. Following an evaluation of the legislation,shortcomings have become apparent, primarily in light of scientific and technical developments in this area. Socio-demographic trends and new epidemiological risks have further consolidated the view that certain provisions of thislegislation need to better reflect the current landscape. Moreover, effective protection of donors needs to be placed onthe same level as that of recipients, in particular in the case of medically assisted reproduction. Finally, in light of thecoronavirus pandemic, ensuring sufficient supplies of these substances has become all the more significant. On thisbasis, the European Commission launched a revision of this legal framework, which is expected to be adopted in thesecond quarter of 2022.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Industrial Emissions DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-06-2022Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju Covering some 52 000 large agro-industrial installations EU-wide, the Industrial Emissions Directive is the main EU

instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry. The proposal for a revision tabled by the EuropeanCommission on 5 April 2022 aims to bring it into line with the EU's zero pollution ambition, energy, climate and circulareconomy policy goals under the European Green Deal. The main changes include expanding the scope (in terms ofsectors covered and thresholds), strengthening permit requirements to authorise installations to operate, andmeasures to promote innovation. Stakeholders' reactions to the text were mixed. Industry and farming representativesexpressed strong concerns about the added complexity, timeliness and practical implementation of the proposal. Whilewelcoming many improvements, non-governmental organisations criticised the missed opportunity to make thedirective fit for climate protection, and the proposed new regime for intensive livestock rearing. In Parliament, the filehas been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointedRadan Kanev as rapporteur. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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Establishing an industrial emissions portalTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-06-2022Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju The European Green Deal envisages a review of measures addressing pollution from large industrial installations, with

a view to aligning existing legislation with the EU's zero pollution ambition, as well as its energy, climate and circulareconomy policy goals. On 5 April 2022, the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise the Industrial EmissionsDirective, the main European Union instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry, together with a proposal torevise the Regulation establishing the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, related to environmentalinformation. The proposal aims at upgrading the existing register to a more comprehensive and integrated industrialemissions portal, enabling more accurate monitoring of the environmental performance of large industrial activities.The main changes proposed include better alignment with the Industrial Emissions Directive, both in terms of activitiescovered and reporting level; inclusion of reporting on the use of resources; and integration in the database of additionalrelevant environmental data reported under other related EU legislation. In Parliament, the file has been referred to theCommittee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The same rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs willhandle the revision of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register Regulation and that of the IndustrialEmissions Directive. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 June 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-06-2022Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaSommarju The June 2022 European Council meeting marked a potentially historic moment: EU leaders granted Ukraine and

Moldova candidate status and also confirmed Georgia's European perspective. Although highly anticipated, this majorstep was neither obvious nor uncontroversial, as for the first time it concerned a country still at war, generating intensediscussions both within the European Council and with partner countries. On Ukraine, EU leaders took stock of thesituation in the country, confirmed their commitment to increased military support and financial assistance, and calledon like-minded partners to align with EU sanctions. Regarding relations with non-EU partners in Europe, the EuropeanCouncil had its first strategic discussion on the 'European political community' concept (EPC), with a possible first EPCsummit to take place under the upcoming Czech Presidency. Turkey's assertiveness in the eastern Mediterranean andthe Belarus people's right to 'free and fair elections' were also discussed. On other topics, however, not least on theConference on the Future of Europe, the results were underwhelming, as EU leaders took no concrete follow-updecision, simply leaving it to each EU institution to do so within its own sphere of competence. Moreover, nobreakthrough was possible regarding the Western Balkans – neither at the leaders' meeting nor at the EuropeanCouncil itself. The last component of the two days of meetings saw a Euro Summit in inclusive format. EU leadersdiscussed two major issues, the current economic situation, notably the rise in prices of energy, food and commodities,and the EU's financial architecture, reiterating their commitment to the completion of the banking and capital marketsunions.

Briefing EN

Croatia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-06-2022Awtur MILEUSNIC MARIN

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitSommarju Croatia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is an ambitious outline of reforms and investment designed

to mitigate the pandemic's socio-economic fallout. Compared with the size of its economy, Croatia is the largestrecipient of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds, with a total financial allocation of €6 295 million, or 11.6 %of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). The allocation corresponds to 0.9 % of the total RRF volume, and isentirely grant-based. The use of the loan component under the facility is currently not envisaged, but may be requestedby 31 August 2023 at the latest. The measures in the plan aim to help Croatia overcome the socio-economicramifications of both the pandemic and the two devastating earthquakes from 2020, while fostering the green anddigital transition. The post-earthquake recovery measures, in particular, are among the NRRP's major objectives, andcontribute to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The plan's implementation is to be concluded by 2026. After theCouncil's positive NRRP assessment, Croatia received €818 million in pre-financing, or 13 % of the country's totalfinancial allocation under the RRF. Arrangements between the European Commission and Croatia were signed inFebruary 2022, and the country's first €700 million payment request submitted the following month. The requestreceived a positive preliminary opinion from the Commission following the assessment of 34 milestones and targets.RRF funds, combined with others from the Next Generation EU instrument and the EU's multiannual financialframeworks (2014-2020 and 2021-2027), will put at Croatia's disposal roughly €30 000 million by the end of thedecade, an unprecedented chance to boost socio-economic development. The European Parliament continues toensure transparency and accountability through interinstitutional dialogues on RRF implementation, and scrutiny of theCommission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN

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Sweden's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-06-2022Awtur BINDER ECKHARD

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitSommarju With a total volume of €3 289 million, Sweden's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is of comparatively

limited scope, and exclusively in the form of grants, as Sweden did not apply for loans. This amount represents 0.5 %of the entire Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), equal to 0.7 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). 'Sweden's recovery plan' – the Swedish NRRP – is financed bythe Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument. Sweden will receive payments in five instalments, which willdepend on progress in implementing the plan. The total amount of grants under the RRF is subject to revision in June2022, which might affect the final amount allocated to Sweden. Sweden indicated in its NRRP that it would not requesta 13 % pre-financing, which would not have been granted as a result of the adoption of the Council implementingdecision after 31 December 2021. The plan is estimated by the Commission to contribute to climate–relevantobjectives at 44.4 %, and complies with the minimum climate target of 37 % set in the RRF Regulation. At 20.5 %, italso exceeds the threshold of at least 20 % of NRRP allocation for digital expenditure. At the time of publication, theoperational arrangement for monitoring had not been signed, and the disbursement of grants had not yet started. TheEuropean Parliament has been a major supporter of establishing a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part ininterinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss and scrutinise implementation of the European Commission's work. Thisbriefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

The UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable Development Goals, 5-15 July 2022, New YorkTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-06-2022Awtur estern Sarah Franklyn, Nora Hiller and Antoine Oger (IEEP)

Qasam tematiku L-Ambjent | L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaSommarju The purpose of this briefing is to provide support to the European Parliament delegation prior to the 10th session of the

United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) between 5 – 15 July at the UnitedNations (UN) Headquarters, New York, under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council. It provides anoverview of key issues at stake in the meeting and progress made on the implementation of the SDGs by the EU, witha particular focus on the SDGs to be reviewed in depth at the Forum. It also provides an overview of tools andpathways available to accelerate the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda, which has relevance for all areas of DGENVI's Committee, on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The link to policy priorities include SDG 4 (QualityEducation) and SDG 5 (Gender Equality), with the former linking to all of the SDGs. SDG 14 (Life Below Water) andSDG 15 (Life on Land) connect to the European Green Deal, Biodiversity, the Circular Economy, public health, foodsafety, air and water quality, the use of chemicals and pesticides, and SDG 17 (Partnerships) encompasses the theexternal dimensions and impacts of EU policies on the EU's global partners.

Briefing EN

Amendments to MiFID II and MiFIR: The EU's markets in financial instrumentsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-06-2022Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiSommarju The second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation

(MiFIR) are the principal texts regulating investment services and activities in the EU. Following an extensiveconsultation and in light of the recent developments in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, the EuropeanCommission proposed the establishment of an EU-wide consolidated tape for shares, bonds, exchange-traded funds(ETFs) and derivatives, as well as making targeted changes to market structure, so as to increase transparency andstrengthen the competitiveness of EU financial markets. Consolidated tape is a high-speed electronic system thatreports the latest price and volume data on sales of exchange-listed stock. The files are currently under review by theco-legislators. Within the European Parliament, they have both been assigned to the Committee on Economic andMonetary Affairs. The draft reports are expected soon. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with A. Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory BoardTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-06-2022Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiSommarju This note is prepared in view of a regular public hearing with the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European

Central Bank (ECB), Andrea Enria, which will take place on 30 June 2022. The briefing addresses: 1) latestdevelopments regarding completion of the Banking Union, 2) excessive leverage, 3) the ECB’s Annual Report onsupervisory activities 2021, 4) conduct risk, 5) a snapshot of the euro area banking sector one quarter after the start ofthe war in Ukraine, 6) statistics on loans subject to COVID-19-related measures, and 7) a summary of an externalbriefing paper on financial institutions' exposures to fossil fuel assets.

Briefing EN

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Public finances in Euro Area Member States: Selected indicators - May 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-06-2022Awtur TURCU OVIDIU IONUT | ZOPPÉ Alice

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiSommarju This document presents selected indicators on public finance for the Euro Area Member States and the Euro Area as a

whole. For each indicator, it provides a short explanation and the data sources. The final section presents a shortoverview of the main indicators used by the European and other international institutions to assess debt sustainability.

Briefing EN

ReFuelEU Aviation initiative: Sustainable aviation fuels and the fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-06-2022Awtur SOONE Jaan

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix bijokarburant | enerġija rinnovabbli | karburant tal-avjazzjoni | kwalità tal-arja | mobilità sostenibbli | politika tal-ambjent

tal-UE | proposta (UE) | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | trasport bl-ajruSommarju On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of proposals to make the EU's climate, energy, land

use, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, comparedwith 1990 levels – the 'fit for 55' package. The package includes a proposal to ensure a level playing field forsustainable air transport, also known as the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative. In the draft regulation, the Commissionproposes obligations on fuel suppliers to distribute sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), with an increasing share of SAF(including synthetic aviation fuels, commonly known as e-fuels) over time, in order to increase the uptake of SAF byairlines and thereby reduce emissions from aviation. The proposal also includes obligations on airlines to limit theuptake of jet fuel before departing from EU airports to what is needed for safe operation of flights, with the aim ofensuring a level playing field for airlines and airports, and avoiding additional emissions related to extra weight ofaircraft carrying excessive amounts of fuel. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee onTransport and Tourism (TRAN) as the lead committee. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and FoodSafety (ENVI) and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) are associated under Rule 57. Thirdedition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Metaverse: Opportunities, risks and policy implicationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-06-2022Awtur CAR POLONA | MADIEGA Tambiama André | Niestadt Maria

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-RiċerkaSommarju One of the most talked about concepts in modern technology, the metaverse can be described as an immersive and

constant virtual 3D world where people interact by means of an avatar to carry out a wide range of activities. Suchactivities can range from leisure and gaming to professional and commercial interactions, financial transactions or evenhealth interventions such as surgery. While the exact scope and impact of the metaverse on society and on theeconomy is still unknown, it can already be seen that the metaverse will open up a range of opportunities but also anumber of risks in a variety of policy areas. Major tech companies are scaling up their metaverse activities, includingthrough mergers and acquisitions. This has given impetus to a debate on how merger regulations and antitrust lawshould apply. Business in the metaverse is expected to be underpinned largely by cryptocurrencies and non-fungibletokens, raising issues of ownership, misuse, interoperability and portability. Furthermore, the huge volume of data usedin the metaverse raises a number of data protection and cybersecurity issues (e.g. how to collect user consent orprotect avatars against identity theft). There is considerable scope for a wide range of illegal and harmful behavioursand practices in the metaverse environment. This makes it essential to consider how to attribute responsibility, interalia, for fighting illegal and harmful practices and misleading advertising practices, and for protecting intellectualproperty rights. Moreover, digital immersion in the metaverse can have severe negative impacts on health, especiallyfor vulnerable groups, such as minors, who may require special protection. Finally, the accessibility and inclusivenessof the metaverse remain areas where progress has still to be made in order to create an environment of equalopportunities.

Briefing EN

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China's strategic interests in the Western BalkansTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-06-2022Awtur STANICEK BRANISLAV

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju The six Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,* Montenegro, North Macedonia and

Serbia) are all countries with substantial economic catch-up potential. The EU-led Berlin Process estimated an annualinvestment need of some €7.7 billion, which would provide the region with an additional 1 % GDP growth and apositive employment effect of up to 200 000 people. However, quality investments are scarce, or often attached topolitical, environmental and social conditionalities; China took the initiative to benefit from this opportunity. According tothe Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), China invested €32 billion in the region in 2009-2021. In Serbiaalone, Chinese investment reached €10.3 billion. However, despite inflows of Chinese capital, the EU remains theleading economic partner, with 70 % of total foreign direct investment and 81 % of exports. China has endeavoured toportray itself as a strategic investor, who does not intervene in internal political affairs and is willing to close its eyes tosome aspects such as State aid, corruption or labour laws. An early focus on transport infrastructure (through Piraeusand Belgrade to reach Duisburg) has expanded to industry, energy and communications/IT. The Belt and RoadInitiative (BRI) serves as the main framework for expanding China's economic presence in the region and enables it toaccess key land and maritime routes. Loans and investments in undertakings further enhance China's position andcreate dependencies, even debt-traps, for the six Western Balkan states. An increasing number of Balkan countriesnow perceive the limits of China's presence, and are concerned regarding public procurement, environmentalprotection, human rights violations, and promotion of the authoritarian model, which all limit cooperation and impact EUaccession prospects.

Briefing EN

The return of inflation [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-06-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiSommarju Inflation has risen to levels not seen in 40 years in the euro area or in many other countries, forcing some central

banks to raise interest rates in a context that bodes ill for economic growth. Initially driven by post-pandemic supplyshortages and then by soaring energy prices, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, inflation is now becomingincreasingly broadly based, affecting everything from food and services to household goods. Dissatisfaction with therising cost of living is leading to social protests, increasing political risks for many countries. In the euro area, pricegrowth was 8.1 % in May year-on-year, more than four times the European Central Bank's target. This note gatherslinks to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on resurgent inflation. Manyearlier publications on inflation can be found in a previous edition of the 'What Think Tanks are Thinking' series.

Briefing EN

Review of rules on financial market dataTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-06-2022Awtur KRAMER Esther

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiSommarju The IA is based on solid internal and external sources, in particular several ESMA review reports, and stakeholder

consultations. However, the definitions of both the problems and the objectives lack consistency and coherence, as thelines between problems, their drivers and consequences are blurred and objectives seem to overlap (and shift). Thisweakens the IA's intervention logic. The policy options presented to tackle the problems are assessed against twobaseline scenarios, which is unusual. Considering the technicality of their implementation – and of the whole IA, moreexplanatory information would have increased transparency, accessibility and accountability of the analysis, which isalso affected by insufficient information on the methods, data and assumptions underlying it (namely regardingquantified estimations drawn from other sources). Finally, the effects of the preferred options combination could havebeen discussed in more depth.

Briefing EN

Revision of Directive 2008/99/EC: Protection of the environment through criminal lawTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-06-2022Awtur CIRLIG Carmen-Cristina

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaSommarju The European Commission proposed a revision of Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through

criminal law in December 2021. The proposal intends to clarify some of the terms contained in the directive andincludes an updated list of environmental crime offences, harmonised sanction types and levels, measures tostrengthen international investigation and prosecution, improvements to the collection of statistical data and measuresto improve national enforcement chains. Ultimately, the revision aims to increase the effectiveness of investigation andprosecution of environmental criminal offences across the European Union. Parliament's Legal Affairs (JURI)Committee is the committee responsible for drawing up the draft report on the proposal. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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EU customs control mechanisms and their possible improvementTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-06-2022Awtur HAASE Diana

Awtur estern Diana HAASEQasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll Baġitarju | L-Ippjanar bil-Quddiem

Sommarju The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) decided to organise a workshop with the aim to get a betterunderstanding about customs control practices in Member States and their possible improvements. This briefingprovides background information to this event that took place the 15th June 2022.

Briefing EN

What if care work were recognised as a driver of sustainable growth?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-06-2022Awtur FERNANDES MEENAKSHI | NAVARRA Cecilia

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-Diversità | Il-Politika SoċjaliSommarju Care work provided in homes and institutions is a public good that is under-valued by society. Care workers are more

likely to have low earnings and precarious working conditions. About 9 in 10 care workers are women. Most unpaidcare work within households is carried out by women. The 'unpaid care penalty' for women in the EU, which isequivalent to the earnings they lost because of this unbalanced distribution of care responsibilities, is estimated toreach €287 billion per year. EU action in the care sector has the potential for high returns for society. Fostering the'equal earner – equal carer model' could generate benefits of between €29 and €57 billion a year. EU action topromote affordable, high-quality care could produce an additional €100 to €180 billion in benefits each year.

Briefing EN

Labour market integration of asylum-seekers and refugeesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-06-2022Awtur ORAV Anita

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix awtomatizzazzjoni | aċċess għal kariga tax-xogħol | integrazzjoni fl-impjieg | integrazzjoni soċjali | integrazzjoni tal-

migranti | intelliġenza artifiċjali | migrant | persuna li tfittex asil | rifuġjat | statistika dwar l-impjiegi | statistika tal-UE |tnaqqis fl-impjiegi

Sommarju Migration to the European Union from third countries has been substantial over the past few decades, as Europe hashistorically been considered a continent of relative economic prosperity and political stability. While many foreign-bornindividuals arrive in the European Union (EU) to work, pursue studies or join family members, the EU also receives alarge number of asylum-seekers and refugees, not least in the context of the war in Ukraine since February 2022. Ashost societies, EU Member States are required to facilitate the integration of migrants, i.e. their acceptance in societyand ability to access different services and the labour market. EU law envisages access to employment for refugees assoon as they are granted refugee status, or for asylum-seekers at the latest within nine months of lodging an asylumapplication. Ukrainians can rely on immediate protection upon registering for temporary protection in one of the EUMember States. However, employment rates for migrants in general, and refugees and asylum-seekers in particular,are persistently lower than those of native-born population. Moreover, they are more likely to be employed in low-skilled occupations that have high automation potential in the future. If this potential is exploited through the use ofartificial intelligence and digitalisation, the European economy is expected to see a decline in low-skilled employment.To ensure that migrants' skills will match the future EU labour market and fill its gaps, focus should be turned tofacilitating the proper recognition of their qualifications, as well as to upgrading their education and skills as needed.The EU supports Member States' integration efforts through its EU action plan on integration and inclusion. In addition,the European Commission is launching a new EU 'talent pool' platform in summer 2022. This Briefing updates andexpands a previous edition, from June 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Empowering migrants into the EU labour market

Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 June 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-06-2022Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaSommarju A series of sensitive topics feature on the agenda of the last regular European Council meeting before the summer

break, taking place on 23-24 June. Considering the magnitude of the issues at stake, this European Council meeting –if successful – could become a milestone summit. Notably, EU leaders are expected to consider granting candidatecountry status to Ukraine and Moldova, most probably with certain specific conditions, to reaffirm the Western Balkans'European perspective, and to consider the proposal put forward by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, tocreate a European Political Community. They will also discuss developments in and support for Ukraine followingRussia's military aggression, as well as the broader consequences of the war, including food security. As at pastmeetings since the outbreak of the war, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, may once again address theEuropean Council. EU leaders could also consider the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, a topic they lastdiscussed at the request of the President of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiades, at the special European Council meeting of30-31 May 2022. To what extent EU leaders will discuss the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europeremains uncertain.

Briefing EN

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The European Parliament commemorates John Hume: Speeches at the inauguration of a memorial bust,Strasbourg, 7 June 2022

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 22-06-2022

Awtur estern DG, EPRSQasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE

Sommarju A commemorative bust of John Hume (1937-2020) – awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998 for his tireless efforts tobring peace to his native Northern Ireland – was unveiled in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Tuesday 7June 2022. Having served as an MEP from 1979 to 2004, John Hume understood the European Parliament as a forumin which to raise attention to the problems of Northern Ireland and build European support for resolving the conflict.And it was also – with a measure of seclusion not available to them in Belfast – a place where he and the unionistMEPs from Northern Ireland could work together to improve Northern Ireland's situation. The bust of John Hume,representing him at the age he was first elected to the European Parliament, is by Northern Ireland-born sculptorElizabeth O'Kane, and has been donated to the Parliament by the Irish government. The bust was unveiled by the IrishTaoiseach, Micheál Martin, and the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. Before the ceremony,Chris Patten, former European Commissioner, delivered a lecture, in which he paid tribute to John Hume's work aspeace-maker and his commitment to democratic values. This Briefing brings together the texts of all three speeches.

Briefing EN

Fit for 55 package: Energy performance of buildings (recast)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-06-2022Awtur FRIZBERG DIETER

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju After two negative opinions from the Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board and without making adaptations in the

IA itself after the second negative opinion, the Commission adjusted its legislative proposal: the legislative frameworkfor new buildings would conform largely to the preferred PO3 ('High ambition I'), while changes for existing buildingswould conform broadly to PO2 ('Medium ambition'). The IA analyses the problem, the problem drivers and the likelyimpacts of the proposed policy options, based on sound research and reliable data. However, although interlinkageswith other legislative proposals of the 'fit for 55' legislative package are described, the size of the problem is not fullyclear and could have been better explained. The IA draws a clear logic between the problems, the problem drivers andthe specific objectives. It provides realistic alternative options. However, the multitude of measures, with varying levelsof policy intensity for each of the options, lacks clarity and therefore weakens the IA's ability to inform decision-makingeffectively. The presentation of the options and the description of the baseline as the 'starting point' for comparison ofoptions is at times unclear, which makes it difficult to follow the reasoning as to why PO3 ('High ambition I') waschosen as the preferred option. Finally, the IA provides a detailed description of the stakeholder consultations.However, the IA presents the views of stakeholder groups (including SMEs) in relation to specific measures rather thanto the proposed policy options. It is therefore unclear what support the preferred option of the IA enjoys amongstakeholders, in particular SMEs.

Briefing EN

Russia's war on Ukraine: Timeline of cyber-attacksTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-06-2022Awtur PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Russia launched its war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, but Russian cyber-attacks against Ukraine have persisted

ever since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, intensifying just before the 2022 invasion. Over this period,Ukraine's public, energy, media, financial, business and non-profit sectors have suffered the most. Since 24 February,limited Russian cyber-attacks have undermined the distribution of medicines, food and relief supplies. Their impact hasranged from preventing access to basic services to data theft and disinformation, including through deep faketechnology. Other malicious cyber-activity involves sending of phishing emails, distributed denial-of-service attacks,and use of data-wiper malware, backdoors, surveillance software and information stealers. Organisations andgovernments around the world have not been indifferent to the hybrid risks thus posed. EU-, US- and NATO-ledinitiatives have been carried out with the aim of neutralising cyber-threats and protecting essential infrastructure. Aspart of these initiatives, the EU has activated its Cyber Rapid Response Teams (a project under Permanent StructuredCooperation (PESCO) in the area of security and defence policy), to support Ukraine's cyber-defence. Non-government and private players have supported Ukraine through various cyber-resilience activities. Since thebeginning of the invasion, a significant number of counter-attacks have been launched by independent hackers,affecting the Russian state, security, banking and media systems. The European Parliament has called for stepping upcybersecurity assistance to Ukraine and for making full use of the EU's cyber-sanctions regimes against individuals,entities and bodies responsible for or involved in the various cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine.

Briefing EN

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The EU's global approach to research and innovationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-06-2022Awtur EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Enerġija | L-IndustrijaSommarju International cooperation has been a key feature of modern and contemporary scientific and technological activities.

The magnitude of global challenges, such as the climate crisis and the coronavirus pandemic, has shown therelevance of joining forces and pooling resources to facilitate the creation and dissemination of knowledge andinnovative solutions. In 2021, the European Commission adopted a communication on a global approach to researchand innovation – the new European strategy for international cooperation. In 2022, the European Parliament and theEU Member States responded to the communication with respectively a resolution and a declaration tabled by theCouncil presidency. The two documents took into account the growing geopolitical tensions, caused, among others, bythe Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, and identified the investment and policy initiatives needed to ensure thatEurope's openness to the world will safeguard EU strategic autonomy, interests and values. Following the launch ofHorizon Europe in 2021, the EU is expected to intensify international cooperation, including by extending the scope ofcountries associated to the programme to new non-European partners such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.Investment under Horizon will support EU research and innovation players in cooperating with global partners, but isalso expected to continue contributing to making the EU attractive for international scientists and innovators. Theparticipation of stakeholders in international cooperation activities is key to Europe's capacity to expand its scientificand technological leadership – thus far established in the domain of joint exploratory scientific activities, includingtransdisciplinary initiatives – to also cover technological development and standardisation. European research andinnovation players are unambiguously supporting international cooperation for global goods, such as knowledge, theenvironment and global health. They also express hopes that the United Kingdom would swiftly join Horizon Europe asan associated country.

Briefing EN

Slovenia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-06-2022Awtur CAR POLONA | SAPALA Magdalena

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiSommarju EU support for the implementation of Slovenia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) amounts to €2 482.3

million, and includes €1 776.9 million in grants and €705.4 million in loans. This amount should be committed by theend of 2023, and paid out to Slovenia by the end of 2026. While the overall allocation represents only 0.3 % of the totalRecovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), it stood at 5.1 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (theRRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). Slovenia, one of the seven Member States that have already requestedloans, decided to use 22 % of the maximum amount of loans available; it can request the remaining €2 900 million upto the end of August 2023. While in nominal terms, Slovenia is among the Member States with the smallest totalallocation, it ranks much higher per capita. With €1 185 per citizen (grants and loans), Slovenia is among the tenbiggest RRF beneficiaries. On 17 September 2021, Slovenia received €231 million in pre-financing, equivalent to 13 %of the grant allocation. Slovenia did not ask for a pre-financing of the loan component. Further payments – teninstalments for grants and six for loans – will depend on progress in implementing the plan. Slovenia's NRRP includes34 reforms and 58 investments, designed to tackle both the Covid-19 pandemic's socio-economic consequences andmore long-standing challenges facing the country and identified in the Slovenian development strategy 2030. The planis strongly focused on the green transition and digital transformation. Planned spending on these areas exceeds thecompulsory targets, totalling 42.4 % for climate and 21.4 % for digital. Other priority areas include smart, sustainableand inclusive growth, and health and welfare. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums forcooperation and discussion on RRF implementation, and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing isone in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the lifecycle

Briefing EN

Amendments to AIFMD and UCITSD: Managing risks and protecting investorsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-06-2022Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiSommarju Two European Union (EU) directives regulate the EU collective investment funds industry, the Directive relating to

undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and the Alternative Investment FundsManager Directive (AIFMD). The UCITS, which covers mutual funds, lays down uniform rules, allowing their cross-border offer, while the AIFMD, which covers hedge funds and private equity, lays down the rules for authorising,supervising and overseeing the managers of such funds. While reviewing the application of the scope of the AIFMD(as mandated), the European Commission considered that a number of issues highlighted in the AIFMD review wereequally relevant for the activities of UCITS. As a result, it proposed to amend both directives, to better align theirrequirements. The file is currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, it has beenassigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which is now considering the draft report. First edition.The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons – First meeting of States PartiesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-06-2022Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju From 21 to 23 June 2022, the 61 States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will meet

for the first time. Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons in the context of its war on Ukraine has given new relevance –and some will argue urgency – to the initiative launched a decade ago to prohibit nuclear weapons. The TPNW enteredinto force on 22 January 2021. On that day, nuclear weapons development, testing, production, possession,stockpiling, use and threat of use, as well as the stationing or deployment of another country's nuclear weapons on astate party's national territory became prohibited under international law. The TPNW has been hailed as historic bysupporters of the initiative, which has gained ground in recent years, to rid the world of the most destructive weaponknown to humankind. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which spearheaded theseefforts, was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. Supporters hope that the TPNW will strengthen the internationallegal framework and gradually advance the political norm against possession and use of nuclear weapons. However,opponents of the Treaty argue that the conditions for disarmament do not currently exist and that promoters of theTPNW fail to recognise this. Arguably, their position has been strengthened by recent developments. The nine statesknown to have military nuclear programmes have not signed the TPNW. Nor have Member States of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO), which re-confirmed its commitment to nuclear deterrence in 2016. This raises doubtsabout the impact of this new instrument and its ability to create normative values. Most EU Member States, 21 of whichare members of NATO, oppose the TPNW, and only three have ratified it. The European Parliament has noted that theTPNW provided evidence of the desire to achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons-free world. This is an updatedversion of an earlier briefing, from January 2021.

Briefing EN

Artificial intelligence act and regulatory sandboxesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-06-2022Awtur MADIEGA Tambiama André

Qasam tematiku L-IndustrijaSommarju The artificial intelligence act envisages setting up coordinated AI 'regulatory sandboxes' to foster innovation in artificial

intelligence (AI) across the EU. A regulatory sandbox is a tool allowing businesses to explore and experiment with newand innovative products, services or businesses under a regulator's supervision. It provides innovators with incentivesto test their innovations in a controlled environment, allows regulators to better understand the technology, and fostersconsumer choice in the long run. However, regulatory sandboxes also come with a risk of being misused or abused,and need the appropriate legal framework to succeed. In April 2021, the European Commission presented a proposalfor a regulation laying down harmonised rules on AI (the 'artificial intelligence act' or 'AI act'). Academics andstakeholders have commented on the proposal, touching, in particular, on issues regarding the lack of liabilityprotection for sandbox participants, the need for a more harmonised approach to AI regulatory sandboxes, and theinterplay between AI sandbox and EU data protection rules. The European Parliament has called for introducingregulatory sandbox instruments in several resolutions. Its April 2022 committee draft report on the AI act argued formore transparency on the implementation and use of AI sandboxes.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with Christine Lagarde, Chair of the European Systemic Risk BoardTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-06-2022Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiSommarju This note is prepared in view of a regular public hearing with the Chair of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),

Christine Lagarde, which will take place on 20 June 2022. The aim of the meeting is to discuss recent developments inmacroprudential policy field, potential systemic risks looming ahead, notably the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.The briefing provides (i) summaries of the issues highlighted by the ESRB in its letters to the European Parliament; (ii)the risks building-up in housing markets; (iii) summarises the ongoing macroprudential policy framework re-view; and(iv) dwells deeper into the cyber risks. It should be noted that various institutions, including the ESRB, are pointing outthat there are potentially systemic risks building-up in the commercial real estate sector. Neverthe-less, as the FirstVice-Chair of the ESRB Stefan Ingves pointed out in his hearing in the European Parliament, there is a lack ofharmonised commercial real estate sector data, which makes the analysis complicated and therefore, commercial realestate risks are not covered in this briefing.

Briefing EN

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The NIS2 Directive: A high common level of cybersecurity in the EUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-06-2022Awtur NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Qasam tematiku L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix direttiva (UE) | gwerra tal-informazzjoni | konsultazzjoni pubblika | L-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għaċ-Ċibersigurtà |

proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tad-data | sigurtà Ewropea | sikurezza infrastrutturali kritika | sikurezza tal-informazzjoni |studju tal-impatt | ċiberkriminalità

Sommarju The Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive is the first piece of EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, and itsspecific aim was to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Member States. While it increased theMember States' cybersecurity capabilities, its implementation proved difficult, resulting in fragmentation at differentlevels across the internal market. To respond to the growing threats posed with digitalisation and the surge in cyber-attacks, the Commission has submitted a proposal to replace the NIS Directive and thereby strengthen the securityrequirements, address the security of supply chains, streamline reporting obligations, and introduce more stringentsupervisory measures and stricter enforcement requirements, including harmonised sanctions across the EU. Theproposed expansion of the scope covered by NIS2, by effectively obliging more entities and sectors to take measures,would assist in increasing the level of cybersecurity in Europe in the longer term. Within the European Parliament, thefile has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. The committee adopted its report on 28October 2021, as well as a mandate to enter into interinstitutional negotiations. For its part, the Council agreed itsposition on 3 December 2021. The co-legislators reached a provisional agreement on the text on 13 May 2022. Thetext now needs to be adopted formally by both institutions, with the Parliament due to vote on it in plenary in thecoming months. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Distortive foreign subsidies regulation: A level playing-field for the single marketTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-06-2022Awtur SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix akkwist pubbliku | għajnuna għall-impriżi | il-politika ta' kompetizzjoni tal-UE | investiment barrani | kapital barrani |

pajjiż terz | proposta (UE) | rapport | restrizzjoni tal-kompetizzjoni | superviżjoni tas-suq | suq unikuSommarju Public financing of enterprises, which has been on the rise globally, can have a distortive effect on competitive

markets. In response to this trend, in May 2021 the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation totackle foreign subsidies with a distortive effect on the EU single market. It would enable the Commission to investigatesubsidies granted by non-EU public authorities to companies operating on the single market, and to applycountervailing measures, should these subsidies be found to be distortive. The Commission would have three tools atits disposal: two are notification-based, allowing it to investigate foreign subsidies in companies' mergers andacquisitions, and to investigate the bids in large public procurement procedures involving third-country governmentsupport. The acquirer or bidder would have to give ex-ante notification of external financial contribution. The thirdwould enable the Commission to investigate other market situations. The Parliament adopted its position in plenary inMay 2022, and trilogue negotiations have since commenced. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Proposed anti-coercion instrumentTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-06-2022Awtur SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliKelma għat-tiftix politika ekonomika | politika kummerċjali | politika tal-UE | relazzjonijiet internazzjonali | relazzjonijiet tal-UE |

sitwazzjoni ekonomikaSommarju It is widely held that geopolitical tensions in the world are on the rise. One of the clear indicators of this phenomenon is

the increasing use of economic tools for the pursuit of strategic and geopolitical aims. This can take the form ofcoercion used by one country against another through restrictions on trade or investment in order to interfere with theirsovereign choices. In response to the EU and its Member States becoming the target of deliberate economic coercionin recent years, on 8 December 2021 the Commission published a proposal for the adoption of an anti-coercioninstrument that would allow the EU to better respond to such challenges on a global scale. While the new framework isprimarily designed to deter economic coercive action through dialogue and engagement, it also allows – as a lastresort – to retaliate with countermeasures comprising a wide range of restrictions related to trade, investment andfunding. While there is broad support for creating a legislative tool to address the growing problem of economiccoercion, opinions are divided as regards the severity of countermeasures and the manner of establishing when theyshould kick in. Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on International Trade(INTA). The draft report was published in April and the committee is expected to vote its report in autumn 2022.Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

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A sustainable blue planet – The international ocean governance agenda: Pre-legislative synthesis ofnational, regional and local positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 16-06-2022

Awtur MARGARAS Vasileios | SCHOLAERT FREDERIKQasam tematiku Is-Sajd | L-Ambjent

Sommarju This Briefing provides a pre-legislative synthesis of the positions of national, regional and local governmentalorganisations on the European Commission's recent initiative, 'Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet –Update on the international ocean governance agenda'. It forms part of an EPRS series offering a summary of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advance consultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during its five-year term in office. It seeks to present the current state of affairs, to examine how existing policy is working on theground, and to identify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels ofthe European system of multilevel governance. This analysis of the positions of partner organisations at EuropeanUnion (EU), national, regional and local levels suggests that they would like the following considerations to be reflectedin the discussion on the forthcoming initiative on 'Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet – Update on theinternational ocean governance agenda'. There is an overall consensus that many environmental challenges pose athreat to the marine environment and require further action. The EU has had a profound impact on European oceansand coastal areas by adopting relevant legislation and providing funding for a number of projects contributing to theirsustainability. EU support in addressing environmental challenges should be further enhanced. In addition, seas andoceans are seen as an important element of economic growth. A number of 'blue growth' measures are beingdeveloped by national, regional and local entities in order to explore this sometimes untapped potential in a way thatcan further contribute to their economic sustainability. Knowledge and innovation are prerequisites for oceanmanagement and ensuring the long-term, sustainable development of maritime industries. Cross-border and globalcooperation on ocean governance issues is taking place in various European and international fora and should befurther reinforced. There is also broad consensus on the need to improve multi-level governance within EU MemberStates through the establishment of participatory bodies where institutions, research centres, NGOs and citizens caninteract with each other.

Briefing EN

Understanding SDGs: The UN's Sustainable Development GoalsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-06-2022Awtur LATEK Marta | PICHON Eric

Qasam tematiku Il-Governanza Dinjija | L-Ambjent | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaSommarju In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to be attained by 2030, as a follow-

up to the Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015) and the Rio+20 Summit (2012). Unlike their antecedents, theSDGs commit both developed and developing countries, and embrace the economic, environmental and socialaspects of development. The SDGs and the broader 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, of which they form thecore, are based on findings that human activities have triggered dramatic changes in the conditions on Earth (climatechange and biodiversity loss), which in turn have contributed to the deterioration of human wellbeing. To reverse thetrend, there is an urgent need to simultaneously address the multiple causes and consequences of environmentaldepletion and social inequalities, by developing synergies and managing trade-offs between the SDGs. Challenges inpursuing the SDGs include the fact that countries do not necessarily have an equal starting point and, even moreimportantly, that regardless of their stage of development, they can no longer afford to apply the current developmentmodel, where production and consumption happen at the expense of natural resources. According to many observers,this model creates unsolvable tensions between SDGs, notably between the safeguarding of natural resources and theaspirations for improved wellbeing. The structural transformation that would bring about the desired change requires ajoint effort by the international community, but equally so from natural and public or private legal persons, to speed upthe process. The European Union has been a leader in drafting the SDGs; it is also a frontrunner in mainstreaming theSDGs in all its policies. The European Parliament regularly assesses the EU commitments on achieving the SDGs.This briefing updates a previous edition by Marta Latek and Eric Pichon, published in December 2019.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Understanding SDGs: The UN's Sustainable Development Goals

Ukraine’s application to join the EU [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-06-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju EU Heads of State or Government will discuss war-torn Ukraine’s bid to join the EU when they meet at a regular

European Council meeting in Brussels next week. The leaders are expected to discuss Ukraine’s request to gain thestatus of official EU candidate along with French President Emmanuel Macron’s plan to create a ‘European PoliticalCommunity’, with Ukraine as a member, as news media have reported, quoting draft Council conclusions. The meetingon 23-24 June is unlikely to make any firm decisions on either of the two proposals, the quoted draft conclusionssuggest. EU enlargement, which had been on the backburner for some years, returned to the spotlight after Russiaattacked Ukraine on 24 February. Having failed to conquer Ukraine quickly, Russia is now concentrating its war effortin the south-eastern provinces of the country. This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries frommany international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be foundin a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

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Empowering consumers for the green transitionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-06-2022Awtur SAJN Nikolina

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaSommarju On 30 March 2022, the Commission published a proposal for a directive empowering consumers for the green

transition, through better protection against unfair practices and better information. The proposal is designed toenhancing consumer rights in making informed choices in order to play an active role in the transition to a climate-neutral society. It proposes new rules to provide consumers with information on products' sustainability, in particulartheir durability and reparability, at the point of purchase. It also aims to promote commercial guarantees exceeding thetwo-year legal guarantee, as well as to ban false and misleading green claims ('greenwashing') and certain types ofpremature obsolescence of products. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on theInternal Market and Consumer Protection. In the Council, discussions have started in the working party on consumerprotection and information. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Research for REGI Committee: Cities and the Ukrainian RefugeesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-06-2022Awtur estern PPMI: Iselin Mulvik, Hanna Siarova

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliSommarju This briefing summarizes the implications of the influx of refugees from Ukraine for European cities, and how cities can

navigate challenges to continue being a positive factor in the support of Ukraine. The briefing is based on availableofficial sources and expert commentaries and written in the context of the study ‘Social challenges in cities’ contractedby the European Parliament . The PPMI research team conducted desk research in English, Lithuanian, Hungarian,Romanian and Polish languages. National experts supported the search for information on the situation in Estonia,Finland, France, Germany, Slovakia, Spain, and Malta.

Briefing EN

Social climate fund: Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-06-2022Awtur PARI MARIANNA | WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | fondi (UE) | gass serra | għajnuna finanzjarja | impatt soċjali | kriterji ta' eliġibbiltà |

newtralità karbonika | proposta (UE) | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UESommarju On 14 July 2021 the European Commission adopted the 'fit for 55' package, a set of legislative proposals to meet the

new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030. The fit for 55 package ispart of the Commission's European Green Deal, which aims to set the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHGemissions (climate neutrality) by 2050. The fit for 55 package includes a regulation establishing a new social climatefund (SCF). The aim of the SCF is to help vulnerable households, micro-businesses and transport users meet thecosts of the green energy transition in the buildings and road transport sector. The SCF is designed to counter theadditional costs that vulnerable consumers may face when the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive isrevised to cover these two sectors, as proposed in the fit for 55 package. The SCF aims to provide over €72 billion inEU funding over the 2025-2032 period, to be paid for mainly by ETS credits in the buildings and road transport sectors.The SCF funds will need to be matched by equivalent social climate funding from Member States, which must preparesocial climate plans. As a new budget line to be financed from EU 'own resources', the SCF will require amendmentsto the Own Resources Decision and the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The file was referred to theCommittee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and to the Committee for Employment and SocialAffairs, which produced a joint report in May 2022. While the amendments were voted in plenary in the June I session,the final plenary vote was delayed due to political disagreements over the wider Fit for 55 package. Second edition.The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Social climate fund: Fit for 55 package

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New EU regulation on gas storageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-06-2022Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix awtosuffiċjenza enerġetika | gass naturali | importazzjoni (UE) | ir-Russja | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | proposta (UE) |

provvista tal-gass | riżervi strateġiċi | sigurtà tal-provvista | ħżin tal-idrokarburiSommarju The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered serious concerns about EU energy security. The

problem is particularly acute in the gas sector, where Russia is the leading third-country supplier, on which severalMember States are heavily dependent. To ensure the EU is prepared for the risk of an interruption of gas supplies nextwinter, the Commission has proposed an urgent regulation on gas storage, requiring Member States to: fill in at least80 % of their storage capacity by 1 November 2022 (rising to 90 % in subsequent years); carry out the certification ofall gas storage system operators; and provide a 100 % tariff discount on entry and exit points into gas storage. TheCommission proposed that this urgent regulation be agreed under an expedited procedure by the Parliament and theCouncil, so that it could start taking full effect from summer 2022. The co-legislators proceeded to swiftly negotiate atext, with agreement reached after trilogue negotiations on 19 May 2022. The agreed text was endorsed in the ITREcommittee on 2 June 2022 and is to be voted during the June II plenary session. It must also be adopted by theCouncil of the EU, before it can enter into force. The agreed text endorses the core tenets of the Commission’sproposal but also takes account of national variations and the need for flexibilities in the gas market. Second edition.The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Revision of Directive 2010/40/EU on the deployment of intelligent transport systemsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-06-2022Awtur TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportSommarju The IA provides a qualitative and quantitative assessment, which is based on the evaluation of the existing ITS

Directive, the external supporting study, extensive stakeholder consultations, and various data sources. The IA informsopenly about uncertainties and limitations in the analysis, for instance regarding estimates of administrative costs. Theproblem definition would have benefited from a further description of the expected consequences and evolution of theproblem, and it would have been useful if the findings of the evaluation had been explained in more detail. The IAcomprehensively presents three policy options, which are cumulative and not actual alternatives. With regard tosubstantiating the preferred option, a further clarification of proportionality aspects, and more detailed information onthe stakeholders' views would have been useful. Stakeholder views are referred to in the context of policy measures,but the views of different stakeholder groups on the fully fledged policy options have not been presented. The IA refersto 'wide support' of stakeholders, while pointing to 'some reservations', without however explaining which stakeholdergroups have doubts, to which extent the views diverge, and whether all stakeholders find the measures of the policyoptions proportional. Moreover, the description of the stakeholder consultation results is limited, with the IA referring tothe IA supporting study, which does not appear to be publicly available. Overall, this transparency issue weakens theIA's quality.

Briefing EN

Path to the digital decade programmeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-06-2022Awtur NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Qasam tematiku L-IndustrijaSommarju In its digital decade strategy, the European Commission has put forward its vision for new strategic digital objectives

for 2030. These should prepare Europe for the roll-out of the next generation of broadband infrastructure with gigabitspeeds, including 5G, for the digital transformation of the public and private sectors, and to improve the digital divide.To measure progress towards the digital decade, the Commission proposes a 'digital compass' with indicators basedon four dimensions: improved digital skills, secure and sustainable digital infrastructures, digital transformation ofbusinesses, and digitalisation of the public sector. The decision will establish the 'Path to the digital decade' policyprogramme, which aims to set up a governance framework and funding to help achieve the 2030 digital decadetargets, including multi-country projects and cooperation mechanisms between the Commission and Member States.At the European Parliament, the file has been allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, whichadopted its report on 17 May 2022 and also agreed to enter into negotiations with the Council. The mandate wasendorsed by Parliament during the June plenary session. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

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Directive on adequate minimum wagesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-06-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | L-ImpjiegiSommarju Wage policy in the EU is a patchwork of different national traditions and legal frameworks. As a result, minimum wage

levels diverge considerably, and leave many workers unprotected. While setting minimum wages is the competence ofEU Member States, the EU has a supporting and complementary role. In October 2020, the European Commissionproposed a directive seeking to improve the adequacy and increase the coverage of minimum wages, while alsostrengthening collective bargaining as the main instrument to ensure fair wages and working conditions. It is the firsttime that the Commission has initiated legislative action on minimum wage protection, leaving Member States to definethe specific minimum wage levels. The ensuing debate focused on how far-reaching and binding the concrete EUrequirements for national minimum wages should be. The European Parliament adopted its position in November2021, and the Council in December 2021. Interinstitutional negotiations concluded on 6 June 2022 with a provisionalagreement that must now be confirmed by the Parliament and Council. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Russia's war on Ukraine: Implications for transportTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-06-2022Awtur KISS Monika

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportSommarju The unjustified Russian invasion of Ukraine has damaged transport infrastructure, caused major transport disruptions

and led to a massive flow of refugees into the EU and neighbouring countries. In response, the EU has adoptedseveral sets of sanctions, leading to the closure of EU airspace to Russian aircraft, the closure of EU ports to Russianvessels, a ban on Russian transport operators and a ban on exports of goods and technology in the aviation, maritimeand space sectors. Designed to undermine Russia's economic and financial ability to sustain its war effort, thesanctions have also impacted on transport in the EU, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks and theneed to bypass traditional routes, thereby lengthening journey times and increasing costs. In order to monitor and dealwith these negative impacts and humanitarian crises, the EU has introduced measures to support traffic flows andsupply chains, securing the swift and safe transfer of people trapped in war zones and the transfer of essential goodsand commodities. The European Commission has devised a dedicated contingency plan for transport to strengthencoordination in the event of emergencies. It introduces guiding principles for implementing crisis response measures,and contains a number of initiatives intended to remedy the difficulties encountered following the war. The EuropeanParliament is meanwhile playing an active role by closely monitoring and evaluating the situation, including the EUaction taken so far, while also proposing the adoption of additional EU measures to support passenger and freighttraffic flows. This briefing updates an 'at a glance' note on the same topic, published in March 2022.

Briefing EN

The United Nations Ocean Conference, 27 June -1 July 2022, Lisbon, PortugalTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-06-2022Awtur estern Argyro Kepesidi, Panagiota Pavlou, Isa Vroom, Tony Zamparutti (Milieu Consulting)

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | L-AmbjentSommarju Pollution, ecosystem decline, climate impacts and overfishing threaten the health of the world’s ocean. The 2022

Ocean Conference provides an opportunity to strengthen synergies among stakeholders to achieve SustainableDevelopment Goal (SDG) 14, ‘Life Below Water’. The targets set under SDG 14 have largely not been achieved on aninternational level. Marine pollution remains a major issue, while increasing deoxygenation and acidification is puttingmarine species and coastal communities alike in danger. Existing and emerging economic activities (such as shippingand seabed mining) are competing for the use of marine space and are threatening ecosystems and biodiversity. Fishstocks continue to be overexploited. The economies of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and many LeastDeveloping States (LDS) depend on the health the ocean.

Briefing EN

Fit for 55 package: Reducing methane emissions in the energy sectorTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-06-2022Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju The IA clearly identifies the problem that needs to be addressed and details the problem drivers. Furthermore, the IA

discusses the evolution of the problem if the EU were to take no action. The IA relates the objectives with theproblem/problem drivers in a supported manner. The options for the different policy areas to tackle appear to besufficient and justified against the objectives. The assessment of the options retained for their economic, environmentaland social impacts is thorough, but could have benefited from the availability of more complete data, and from theapplication of the Better Regulation Guidelines in assessing impacts on SMEs and on competitiveness. The indicatorsfor monitoring and evaluating the success of the initiative are supported by existing frameworks and can be consideredto be sufficient and effective. Consultation of interested parties occurred through an open public consultation and threestakeholder meetings, the findings of which are in line with the preferred options in the IA. The analysis performed inthe IA seems to be well supported, and the comments from the RSB were addressed. In conclusion, the IA and theproposal are consistent.

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The Czech Parliament and EU affairsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-06-2022Awtur RITTELMEYER Yann-Sven

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UESommarju The Czech Republic (Czechia) has a parliamentary system of government. The Czech Parliament consists of

Poslanecká sněmovna (the Chamber of Deputies) and Senát (the Senate), both elected directly. It is considered animperfect bicameral system, with the Chamber of Deputies able to overrule the Senate in most instances (Chapter II ofthe Czech Constitution adopted in 1992). Equal powers between the two chambers are limited to constitutional andelectoral laws, the ratification of international agreements, and certain cases pertaining to defence and security. In2012, the Czech Parliament gave up its competence to elect the President of the Republic in order to introduce directpresidential elections. This did, however, not lead to a semi-presidential system, even if evolution in this directioncannot be excluded. The President appoints the government, led by the Prime Minister, which must gain a vote ofconfidence in the Chamber of Deputies at the beginning of its term (Article 68 of the Constitution). The governmentremains accountable to the Chamber of Deputies. The President can, under specific circumstances (Article 35),dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, while the chamber has the power to override presidential vetoes. The Senate is apermanent institution that cannot be dissolved. The members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected every four yearsaccording to the principle of proportional representation by a universal, equal, direct and secret vote. Senators areelected for a six-year term, with one third of them being renewed every two years by a universal, equal, direct andsecret vote in the form of a plurality voting system. This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments(NPs) and EU affairs. It aims to provide an overview of the way the NPs of EU Member States are structured and howthey process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also provides information on relevant NP publications.

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EU support for human rights defenders around the worldTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-06-2022Awtur ZAMFIR Ionel

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju More than two decades after the United Nations General Assembly adopted its Declaration on Human Rights

Defenders (HRDs) to enhance recognition of their role and encourage states to create a more protective environment,many human rights defenders face an increasingly hostile environment, with both repressive governments and somenon-state actors, such as economic interest or criminal groups, opposing their work and posing a serious threat.Support for human rights defenders is a long established component of the European Union's external human rightspolicy and one of its major priorities. The EU guidelines on HRDs, adopted in 2004, outline concrete measures forprotecting HRDs at risk, including the provision of emergency aid. They also encourage EU diplomats to take a moreproactive approach towards HRDs. The European Commission manages a financial instrument in support of HRDsworking in the world's most dangerous situations. The EU has continually adapted and extended its actions to take thenew challenges into account. The European Parliament is a long-standing advocate of a comprehensive EU policy onHRDs, and has actively contributed to its shaping. Its urgent resolutions on human rights breaches around the world,some of which have focused on individual HRDs and the particular threats they face, have drawn attention to thedifficulties facing HRDs in many countries. Parliament has also organised hearings with HRDs, issued statementsabout cases of HRDs at risk, and highlighted the plight of HRDs during its delegations' visits to the countriesconcerned. The Parliament's Sakharov Prize is the EU's most visible action in favour of HRDs. It has a significantimpact on laureates, providing them with recognition and, in many cases, indirect protection. This a further updatedversion of a briefing from December 2018.

Briefing EN

IMF special drawing rights allocations for global economic recoveryTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-06-2022Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaSommarju On 2 August 2021, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that an exceptionally large allocation of special

drawing rights (SDRs), worth US$650 billion (€550 billion), had been approved with effect from 23 August 2021. TheSDR allocation, the largest in the IMF's history, would serve to 'boost global liquidity' and help all members 'addressthe long-term global need for reserves'. The initiative complies with the IMF's mission of monitoring and promotingstability on the international monetary markets and mitigating balance-of-payment crises. SDRs are not a currency perse, but a 'reserve currency', the value of which is determined by a basket of the five freely and most traded currencies;SDRs can be exchanged for currencies among the IMF member countries. The SDR allocation is made in proportion tothe IMF quotas of the individual member countries. Interest is paid on SDRs utilised, and the rate is calculatedaccording to the interest rates paid on the currencies included in the SDR basket; it is thus substantially lower than thatotherwise charged for a riskier country. Even before this approval, concerns were raised that the funds may not bechannelled to those countries – especially highly indebted and less wealthy ones – that are most in need of support tofight the pandemic and recover from it. For this reason, an initiative was launched to help re-channel the SDRs to suchcountries, and the IMF is setting up a Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) that IMF members may stock up withfunds, using their SDR allocations on a voluntary basis. The IMF will monitor these funds and ensure that these SDRsare distributed to members on the condition that they implement the necessary economic policies. The EU supportsthe re-channelling process, in the awareness of the looming risks for the stability of the international monetary systemif highly indebted and less wealthy countries are not supported in fighting the pandemic and attaining economicrecovery.

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Russia's war on Ukraine: Investigating and prosecuting international crimesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-06-2022Awtur NEVILLE ANN

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-BniedemSommarju Since the start of Russia's war on Ukraine there has been mounting evidence of what may constitute violations of

international criminal law in the conduct of the war. Active investigations into alleged core international crimes (whichare classified as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) have begun, with the involvement of theUkrainian authorities, the International Criminal Court, and other international organisations. The EU is playing anactive role in this process, with Eurojust assisting a Joint Investigation Team established by Ukraine, Poland andLithuania, and with the participation of a number of other Member States. The Office of the Prosecutor of theInternational Criminal Court is also participating, the first time it has joined a Joint Investigation Team. However,investigations of the crime of aggression, relating to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, are hampered by the fact that neitherRussia nor Ukraine are signatories of the Statute of Rome, which established the International Criminal Court andbrought this crime within its jurisdiction. This briefing discusses investigations into core international crimes in Ukraine.It looks at the identification, gathering and assessment of information to ensure that it is admissible as evidence intrials of those accused of these crimes. It also analyses the specific challenges involved in the assessment of digitalinformation and how to ensure that it is properly evaluated in an era of deepfakes and digital manipulation.

Briefing EN

The Conference on the Future of Europe and the European Council: How far is there a shared policyagenda for the future?

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 09-06-2022

Awtur DRACHENBERG RalfQasam tematiku Coronavirus | Id-Demokrazija | Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Kultura | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Il-Politika Soċjali | Is-

Saħħa Pubblika | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | Is-Sikurezza tal-Ikel | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp Reġjonali |L-Ambjent | L-Edukazzjoni | L-Enerġija | L-Impjiegi | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja

Sommarju After one year of deliberation, the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) delivered its first result in the form of49 proposals, including concrete objectives, and more than 320 potential measures on ways of achieving them. As afollow up to the CoFoE, the European Parliament called on 4 May 2022 for the launch of a Convention under Article 48TEU; this request has also received the support of some EU leaders, notably the French President, EmmanuelMacron, the Italian Prime Minister, Mario Draghi, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von derLeyen. The 23-24 June 2022 European Council meeting is expected to discuss the results of the CoFoE, and EUHeads of State or Government are likely to lay out their views on its possible follow-up. In this context, this EPRSBriefing addresses two complementary aspects of the discussions in the European Council. Firstly, it compares andanalyses, based on the annexed table, the objectives set by the CoFoE in its proposals with the Strategic Agenda2019-2024, as well as subsequent conclusions of the European Council, and identifies the areas of convergence anddifferences as well as ‘blank spots’. It thereby locates the potential common ground for (inter-)institutional follow-up tothe CoFoE. Secondly, it provides an overview of initial views on the possible follow-up to the CoFoE, by outliningrecent positions of EU leaders and EU institutions on the need for Treaty change.

Briefing EN

Ecodesign for sustainable productsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-06-2022Awtur SAJN Nikolina

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaSommarju On 30 March 2022, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation establishing a general

framework for setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, repealing rules currently in force whichconcentrate on energy-related products only. The regulation would lay down rules that would apply to all products onthe internal market, with the aim of making them more durable, reusable, reparable, upgradable, recyclable andgenerally less harmful to the environment. The regulation would include rules on a digital product passport, greenpublic procurement and banning the destruction of unsold goods. Within the European Parliament, the file has beenreferred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The proposal is in line with previousrequests by Parliament to broaden the scope of the ecodesign legislation to cover all main product groups, and tointroduce a digital product passport and green public procurement criteria. Reactions of stakeholders to the proposalvaried, from calling it a 'game-changer' and appealing for swift action on product-specific rules, to worries aboutpossible overlapping requirements and warnings about significant investments that would be required from businesses.First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

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EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-06-2022Awtur SCHOLAERT FREDERIK | SMIT-JACOBS KARIN

Qasam tematiku Is-Sajd | It-Trasport | L-AmbjentSommarju The United Nations 2030 Agenda and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, set the global

roadmap for achieving sustainable development. It includes SDG 14 on 'life below water', which focuses on thesustainability of the oceans, thereby recognising their essential role in life on our planet. Oceans contain 80 % of all lifeforms, produce more than 50 % of the Earth's oxygen and play a central role in regulating the climate. In addition, the'blue economy' provides 4.5 million direct jobs in the EU. It covers traditional sectors, such as fisheries, maritimetransport and coastal tourism, as well as innovative sectors, such as renewable ocean energy and the bluebioeconomy, which show great potential for sustainable blue growth. However, human activities threaten the health ofour oceans. The effects of climate change are devastating, resulting in rising water temperatures, acidification,increased flooding and loss of marine biodiversity. The combination with other man-made stressors, such as pollution,including from land-based resources, and overexploitation of marine resources exacerbates the problem, reduces theresilience of oceans and poses a serious threat to the planet as a whole. To manage maritime activities sustainablyand cope with different environmental pressures, the EU has implemented a wide range of policies. This includesestablished policies, such as the common fisheries policy, the marine strategy framework directive and the maritimespatial planning directive, as well as specific legislation related to marine litter. Other new initiatives under theEuropean Green Deal also play an important role in relation to ocean governance and sustainable blue growth, suchas the 2030 biodiversity strategy, the offshore renewable energy strategy, the 'Fit for 55' package and the newguidelines on aquaculture. The external dimension of EU policies, its international ocean governance agenda and itsglobal commitments make the EU a global player in shaping ocean governance and contribute to its commitment todeliver fully on SDG 14. On the occasion of World Oceans Day on 8 June 2022, this publication provides an overviewof the main EU policies and initiatives in the field of ocean governance.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14

European declaration on digital rights and principlesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-06-2022Awtur CAR POLONA

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti LegaliSommarju Digital transformation concerns us all, in every aspect of our lives, from learning, working, communicating, doing

business, to interacting with administrations, shopping and enjoying culture. The online environment has become veryoften our first and sometimes our only space for interaction. To steer this process so that no one is left behind, theEuropean Commission tabled a draft declaration on digital rights and principles for a human-centred digitaltransformation. The declaration would serve as an overarching reference framework for the digital transformation,based on the principle that European Union rights and freedoms, as well as European values, should be respectedonline in exactly the same way as they are offline. The declaration is built around six themes: 1. people at the centre ofdigital transformation; 2. solidarity and inclusion; 3. freedom of choice; 4. participation; 5. safety and security; and 6.sustainability), and derives from primary and secondary EU law and EU case law. It does not confer new rights, asfundamental rights already apply online, nor does it replace existing proposals, but rather complements them instead.As such, it is not legally binding; it has primarily an advocacy role aimed at raising public awareness as well aspromoting digital rights worldwide. The three EU institutions, Commission, Council and Parliament, must now agree ona common text and sign it in the form of a solemn declaration.

Briefing EN

Bans on conversion 'therapies': The situation in selected EU Member StatesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-06-2022Awtur DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàSommarju LGBTI conversion 'therapies' are practices that can be defined as 'any treatment aimed at changing a person's sexual

orientation or gender identity'. Ways to implement them include psychotherapy, medication, electroshock therapy,aversive treatments and exorcism. An alternative term used to describe these practices is sexual orientation andgender identity-expression change efforts (SOGIECE). They can bring about suicidal thoughts but also permanentphysical harm, suicide attempts, depression, anxiety, shame, self-hatred and loss of faith. The World HealthOrganization declassified homosexuality as a pathology or disease in 1990 and transsexuality in 2019. In their 2020report, the independent expert mandated by the United Nations Human Rights Council recommended that states banconversion 'therapy'. The European Parliament has strongly condemned all forms of discrimination against LGBTIpeople, including LGBTI conversion 'therapies'. Moreover, it has also made repeated calls on the Member States toban such practices. Within the European Union (EU), four Member States – Malta, Germany, France and Greece –have banned these practices, and many regions in Spain have placed administrative bans on them. Several otherMember States have proposed bills in this regard. While the various laws have a comparable structure, there arevariations in terms of whICH LGBTI+ groups are protected and what entities are covered by the bans and thesanctions imposed. Moreover, the definition of conversion 'therapy' differs slightly from one Member State to another.This briefing looks at the laws on conversion 'therapies' that are already in place or are proposed for adoption in someMember States. It then compares them, among other things, based on the definition of the practice, the scope ofprotection offered and the sanctions envisaged.

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John Hume: Northern Ireland's peace-maker and committed EuropeanTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-06-2022Awtur CHRISTIE Aidan

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UESommarju Throughout his life, John Hume (1937-2020) sought to improve the circumstances of the people of Northern Ireland,

beginning in his home city of Derry (Londonderry to its unionist residents). Born just a decade and a half after partition,and in a city whose hinterland had been divided by the border, he naturally wished for the unification of Ireland. But hesaw that that could not be achieved without realistic plans, nor without a partnership between the two majorcommunities in Northern Ireland, unionist and nationalist. While working as a school-teacher, in the belief that theycould themselves better their lot, he drove forward a wide range of actions to improve the economic circumstances ofhis community – which was far from the priority of the unionist government in Belfast. A nationalist community that wasincreasingly vocal in calling for fairer treatment brought him a leading role in the civil rights movement in NorthernIreland, before he made the switch to elected office in the Northern Ireland Parliament. The Social Democratic andLabour Party (SDLP) that he co-founded was part of a short-lived power-sharing government in 1974, but it was to bea false dawn, followed by direct rule from London for more than two decades. With killings a part of everyday life inNorthern Ireland during the Troubles, John Hume argued incessantly that violence was not the means to bring aboutthe unification of Ireland, but rather that understanding and respecting each other's differences was the key to findingpeace. He worked continuously to bring together the different parties and governments, all of which needed to beinvolved to resolve the conflict, as shown by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In that, he was inspired by the model ofpost-war European integration. His own experience as a Member of the European Parliament for 25 years (1979-2004)confirmed that a more collaborative approach to addressing differences could pay off. The design of the structures inthe Good Friday Agreement owes much to his European experience, but it is thanks to his perseverance – in the faceof considerable risks to both him and his family – in persuading those wedded to violence that there was a peacefulsolution, that those institutions became reality.

Briefing EN

Safety of journalists and media freedom: trends in non-EU countries from a human rights perspectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-06-2022Awtur estern Jackie HARRISON, Sara TORSNER

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaSommarju Since 2012 media freedom has been in general decline. While statistics for the 2002-2021 time-period show that the

number of killings of journalists has declined somewhat in recent years (since 2013), there has been a marked erosionof legally enabling environments and an increase in other damaging forms of targeted attacks on the media. Theseinclude non-lethal physical violence; legal, digital, psycho-social, gender and identity-based intimidation; and state-ledcapture of the media landscape, often accompanied by politically-motivated denigration and exclusion of critical mediavoices. Our findings show: (i) political journalism remains most at risk; (ii) major social shocks or crisis (exemplified bythe COVID-19 pandemic) have been widely used as pretexts for intrusive government measures to constrain mediafreedom; and (iii) media pluralism and independence are declining. Impunity remains unacceptably high with mostcases of killings remaining unresolved. Imprisonments are on the rise while online spaces are becoming increasinglyhostile and replete with gender-based hate speech. Countering the wide range of overt and covert threats will requirean unequivocal reversal of global trends towards authoritarian controls and suppression of independent media. Toundertake this, the European Parliament and concerned institutions need access to reliable data which reflects therealities of the multiple threats that impede the work of journalists globally.

Briefing EN

Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-06-2022Awtur ERBACH Gregor | JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju The 'fit for 55' package, presented in July and December 2021, is designed to realise the European Climate Law

objectives: climate neutrality by 2050 and a 55 % reduction of net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030,compared with 1990 levels. It consists of 13 interlinked proposals to revise existing EU climate and energy laws, andsix proposals for new legislation. The proposals aim to accelerate emission reductions in the sectors covered by theEU emissions trading system (ETS) and the sectors covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation, and to increase carbonremovals in the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector.

Briefing EN

Domino effects of the warTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-06-2022Awtur BOEHM Lasse | LAZAROU Eleni | SABBATI Giulio

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju The war Russia unleashed on Ukraine has global repercussions, beyond the death toll and the human tragedy in

Ukraine itself, and the resulting refugee flows and wider destabilising effects on Europe's east. This infographic depictssome of the economic consequences of the war, for Europe, but also the rest of the world.

Briefing EN

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Austria's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-06-2022Awtur HOFLMAYR MARTIN | KOWALD KAROLINE

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Is-Semestru Ewropew | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Ambjent | L-ImpjiegiSommarju On 30 April 2021, Austria submitted its National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) to the European Commission,

in accordance with Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 on the Recovery and Resilience Facility, RRF ('RRFRegulation'). The estimated total cost of the NRRP is €4 499 million. The maximum amount of grants available forAustria is €3 461 million, which corresponds to 0.9 % of Austria's gross domestic product (GDP). To implement theplan, Austria is therefore leveraging further amounts beyond the EU support, which will be supplied by the nationalbudget. The coronavirus crisis led to a reduction of real Austrian GDP by 6.6 % in 2020. As many other EU MemberStates, Austria has requested the maximum amount of available grants (non-repayable support). No loans have beenrequested. Requesting such loans – possible until 31 August 2023 – is not envisaged, as the Austrian NRRP notes.The current maximum financial allocation is indicative, based on the European Commission's autumn 2020 economicforecast for real GDP growth in 2020 and 2021. It will be revised by June 2022, based on actual out-turn data fromEurostat. In the Austrian NRRP, 58.7 % of EU resources will be allocated to actions intended to achieve a greentransition (RRF Regulation: 37 %), and 52.8 % will be allocated to the digital transformation; this is more than twice asmuch as the minimum target set by the RRF Regulation. The Austrian NRRP includes a significant number of reformsthat have the potential to support lasting structural changes also in other areas, such as the primary healthcaresystem, the reduction of red tape for businesses, and the modernisation of public administration. On 28 September2021, Austria received €450 million pre-financing, or 13 % of the financial contribution, according to Article 23(1) RRFRegulation. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

Climate Change and International Security Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-06-2022Awtur LAZAROU Eleni

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju The risks climate change poses to global stability and international security are becoming increasingly palpable.

Today, in Europe and beyond, countries are increasingly aware of the challenges entailed by global warming andenvironmental degradation. The European Union has been at the forefront of raising climate concerns for over twodecades. Among the sectors affected, security and defence is not spared: climate change not only acts as a threatmultiplier, but also impacts capabilities and operational considerations. In the field of security and defence, thechanging environmental conditions are creating a necessity for international actors, including the EU, to expand theirconflict prevention tools, including defence-related instruments, and reassess existing policies in the light of newrealities. In that context, the EU is in a process of reconceptualising the link between climate change and defence, andis endeavouring to increase renewable energy use, foster energy efficiency, reduce the carbon footprint of the defenceforces, and avoid exacerbating climate-induced conflicts and crises. The European Green Deal, along with the 'conceptfor an integrated approach for climate change and security', the climate change and defence roadmap and initiativeslike the Strategic Compass, are setting ambitious goals for the EU's external and climate action for years to come. TheEuropean Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs has adopted a report welcoming the climate change and defenceroadmap. Among other things, the report underlines the link between climate change and state fragility; emphasisesthat the armed forces need to be more energy efficient; and calls for the climate-security nexus to be included as anew priority area for the United Nations–European Union strategic partnership on peace operations and crisismanagement. Members are due to vote on the report during Parliament's plenary session in June.

Briefing EN

The Jean Monnet House: A place of European memoryTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-06-2022Awtur DESCHAMPS ETIENNE

Qasam tematiku Il-KulturaKelma għat-tiftix abitazzjoni individwali | promozzjoni tal-kunċett Ewropew | storja tal-Ewropa

Sommarju In keeping with the wishes of Jean Monnet and his closest colleagues, who dreamt of seeing his family hometransformed into a place in which young people could come together to discuss and share ideas, the EuropeanParliament has made this public place of memory a venue of choice for people seeking to learn more about the waythe European Union works and discover the environment in which one of the architects of today's Europe lived andworked. It was here that many plans which would have a decisive bearing on the future of France and Europe weredrawn up. In this place which was close to Paris, but which at the same time offered a refuge from the clamour of theFrench capital, Jean Monnet developed his vision of peace and European unity. The European Parliament bought thehouse in 1982. Today, managed on a day-to-day basis by the House of European History, the Jean Monnet Houseoffers, through a permanent multimedia exhibition, an insight into both the private world of Jean Monnet and his careerand political ideals. Since 2013, the Jean Monnet House has been officially recognised by the French Government asa 'Maison des illustres' and is also part of the Network of Political Houses and Foundations of Leading Europeans, aninitiative behind which the European Parliament is a driving force. Today, Parliament is breathing new life into the JeanMonnet House, in order to raise awareness of Monnet's work and to pass on his values of peace and solidarity to awider public by organising new activities and hosting numerous events in Houjarray. This is an updated version of abriefing published in September 2019.

Briefing ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, PL

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Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 30-31 May 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-06-2022Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena | TORPEY REBECCA MARY

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Russia's continuing war on Ukraine was central to the EU leaders' debates at their special meeting on 30-31 May

2022. Closely linked to Ukraine, food security, security and defence, and energy were also high on the agenda. EUleaders approved €9 billion in special macro-financial assistance for Ukraine and agreed on a sixth package ofsanctions against Russia, including a ban on seaborne oil (two-thirds of imports) with a temporary exemption forpipeline oil imports. On food security, the European Council strongly condemned the impact of Russia's war on theglobal food supply chain and focused on ways to coordinate with international partners to ensure the global security offood supplies. In security and defence, the focus was on consolidation, rather than new strategic guidelines. EUleaders examined, but did not endorse, the 'investment gaps' analysis prepared, at their request, by the EuropeanCommission and the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell. They called onthe Council to take forward work on specific items, not least developing a 'joint EU defence strategic programming andprocurement' function. On energy, the EU leaders took stock of progress made since their Versailles meeting, onphasing out the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels. After presentation of the REPowerEU plan, they agreed thatwork should continue on supply diversification, renewables, energy efficiency, interconnection, infrastructure andpreparedness, including gas storage, price affordability and electricity market optimisation. The President of Cyprus,Nikos Anastasiades, briefed his colleagues on Turkey's assertive behaviour in the area of Varosha.

Briefing EN

Combating violence against women and domestic violenceTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-06-2022Awtur ZANDERSONE Laura

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 8 March 2022 and referred to theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). European Commission PresidentUrsula von der Leyen announced in her political guidelines for the Commission's 2019-2024 term that the EUaccession to the Council of Europe's Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women anddomestic violence remains a key priority, and that the EU should do all it can to prevent domestic violence, protectvictims and punish offenders (IA, p. 6). The proposal is included in the 2022 Commission work programme and in thejoint declaration on EU legislative priorities for 2022. The EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025 reiterates thatgender-based violence and harassment have reached alarming levels, and remain under-reported and overlooked. Itannounces that action will be taken to tackle violence against women (VaW) and domestic violence. According to theCommission, the proposal sets out targeted rules for the protection of victims of VaW and domestic violence in order tostrengthen the actions taken by the Member States. The proposal aims to ensure minimum rules on the level ofprotection across the EU against such violence, regardless of whether it takes place online or offline.

Briefing EN

EU regional policy in the ArcticTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-06-2022Awtur D'AMBROGIO Enrico

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliSommarju Local communities in the Arctic face a unique set of challenges, including remoteness, depopulation and a severe

climate and topography. EU regional policy can support development in the European Arctic through investmentsunder the European structural and investment funds, delivered through regional development and European territorialcooperation programmes, with further support also available in the form of a special aid allocation for northern sparselypopulated regions. Structural funds represent an important source of funding for regional development in the EuropeanArctic and have helped regenerate the regional economy and create jobs through the development of new activitiessuch as high-tech innovation and tourism. Numerous challenges remain, however, with critics pointing to a limitedfocus on transport infrastructure, weak complementarity between EU funds in the region and problems in terms ofparticipation, with small organisations often lacking the necessary know-how or resources. Taken together with theregion's growing strategic importance and the continued need to tackle climate change, this has led to increasedefforts to formulate a policy outlining the EU's approach towards the Arctic. The joint communication on 'a stronger EUengagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic', adopted in October 2021, confirms the Union'sengagements stated in the 2016 communication: the three overarching priorities (peaceful cooperation, tacklingclimate change and environmental threats, and sustainable development) remain, and most of the measures that itoutlines continue pre-existing activities. Meanwhile there is an accent on stimulating an innovative and green transition,in line with the EU's 'Fit for 55' policy. The prospects for peaceful development of the Arctic will have to take account ofan increasingly challenging geopolitical situation in the region, exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and thesuspension of cooperation with Moscow.

Briefing EN

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Russia's war on Ukraine: Reflections on European security, neutrality and strategic orientationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 31-05-2022Awtur CLAPP SEBASTIAN

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-DifiżaSommarju The Russian war on Ukraine has shattered long-held views that war was 'a thing of the past' on the European

continent. The new security situation has sparked debates in capitals all over Europe on security and defencearrangements, policies and strategic orientation. While it has become commonplace to argue that the EU has madesubstantial progress on European defence cooperation since 2016, the Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022,represents a 'sea change' in EU defence landscape, according to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairsand Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell. The return of war to Europehas given Member States the strongest push in decades to make progress on common European security anddefence. The Versailles Declaration promised significant progress and all eyes subsequently turned to the defence-focused European Council meeting in May 2022, to see whether EU leaders would take the first steps to live up tothese expectations. Following a request from Member State leaders at Versailles, the Commission has presented adefence investment gap analysis, to be endorsed at the May 2022 meeting. Following the Russian invasion, a long-held taboo was also broken when Member States agreed to finance the provision of lethal arms to Ukraine with fundsfrom the European Peace Facility (EPF). The war has also been a wake-up call for many EU countries when it comesto their defence policies and budgets. Many Member States announced significant increases in their defence budgetsand U-turns in their defence policies, perhaps most notably Germany, which appears to be entering a new era in itssecurity and defence policy. Moreover, Denmark is seeking to scrap its EU common security and defence policy(CSDP) opt-out. The war has also sparked debates in neutral and non-aligned states. Finland and Sweden haveofficially decided to apply for NATO membership, and countries such as Austria, Ireland and Malta have also started areflection process on security, defence and neutrality.

Briefing EN

Technical support provided to EU Member StatesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 31-05-2022Awtur HAASE Diana

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuSommarju The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) organised a public hearing with the aim to get a better understanding

about technical support and related challenges, especially concerning the areas of better administration, digitalisationand EU funds implementation. This briefing provided background information to this debate that took place 21 April2022. It examines technical support as well as relevant technical assistance activities and provides a short insight intolinks between such support and administrative capacity building. The theme of this hearing is technical support; theinstruments set up for this purpose are relatively new and, as it will be explained later, the availability of coherent andall encompassing lessons drawn from their experience is still limited. There are however possible overlaps, or rathersynergies and complementarities with technical assistance activities in different policy areas. The author chosecohesion policy where technical assistance activities have been pursued for decades, and co-financing of projectsaiminig at administrative capacity building has been prominent for several programming periods. Lessons learnt in thecohesion area can also feed the debate, as it is also obvious from the strong interservice cooperation among thedifferent Commission services involved in technical support or assistance and administrative capacity building.

Briefing EN

The European Council and defence cooperation: Overview of debates and way forwardTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-05-2022Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-DifiżaSommarju European defence cooperation has been a 'rolling' item on the European Council's agenda for the past decade and will

continue to feature high as the new Strategic Compass is being implemented. Russia's war on Ukraine has altered theEuropean security architecture, accelerating cooperation in defence, a policy area where the European Council hasshown both commitment, by issuing periodic policy guidelines and following up on them, and continuity, by maintainingthe topic on its agenda on a regular basis. With the adoption of the Versailles declaration of 10 11 March 2022, EUleaders positioned investment, capabilities, the defence industry and the defence market at the core of their currentdebate on European defence cooperation.

Briefing EN

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Monitoring the EU's economic recovery: A promising start threatened by an unstable backdropTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-05-2022Awtur D'ALFONSO Alessandro | DELIVORIAS Angelos | SABBATI Giulio

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiSommarju The Covid-19 pandemic was a severe blow to EU Member States. Thanks to rapid and resolute responses at Member

State and EU level, the economic impact of the pandemic was less severe than initially forecast and – at least untilearly 2022 – the economy seemed on the way to recovery. New challenges, both external (such as Russia’s war onUkraine) and internal (such as inflation) could jeopardise this, however. In its Spring 2022 Economic Forecasts, theEuropean Commission has revised the EU’s growth outlook downwards, and inflation forecasts upwards. In thatcontext, this publication, the first in a series to be updated twice a year, aims to track the state of the EU economy andthe trend of the recovery. It partly follows Eurostat’s ‘recovery dashboard’, in choosing GDP, inflation, theunemployment and ‘not in employment, education or training’ (NEETs) rates, as well as the deficit and debt indicators.The unemployment and NEETs rates, however, are broken down by gender, to highlight the significant differencesfaced by women in the labour market. Similarly, the publication focuses on the main components of the harmonisedindex of consumer prices (HICP), to show the various trends and their evolution over the past three years. In addition,it provides information on the use of the extraordinary tools the EU created to mitigate the socio-economic impact ofthe pandemic and promote a quality recovery: the three safety nets initially established for workers, businesses andsovereigns, as well as the subsequent ground-breaking Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument with itsRecovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).

Briefing EN

ReFuelEU Aviation initiative: Summary of the Commission proposal and the Parliament's draft committeereport

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 30-05-2022

Awtur SOONE JaanQasam tematiku It-Trasport

Sommarju On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented the fit for 55 package – including a number of proposals to helpcut emissions from transport. The package includes a proposal to increase production and use of sustainable aviationfuels (SAF), also known as the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative. In this proposal, the Commission puts forward obligationson fuel suppliers to distribute SAF when supplying fuel at EU airports, in order to enhance SAF uptake by airlines andso help reduce emissions from aviation. The Commission also wants to ensure that jet fuel uptake does not go beyondwhat is needed for safe operation of flights, to prevent additional emissions related to extra weight of aeroplanescarrying excessive amounts of fuel. This, in conjunction with the SAF supply obligation, is intended to ensure that allflights departing from larger EU airports carry a minimum amount of SAF. In the European Parliament, the Committeeon Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is responsible for the file. In his draft report, the rapporteur Søren Gade (RenewEurope, Denmark) has proposed several changes to the Commission's approach. The TRAN committee draft reportaims, inter alia, to provide aircraft operators and fuel suppliers with more flexibility to arrange SAF distribution, initiallyextending the transition period. Moreover, it suggests widening the rules' scope to encompass more airports; wants toencourage investment in electric and hydrogen propulsion technology; and calls for the development of anenvironmental labelling scheme to further encourage SAF use. The vote in the TRAN committee is tentativelyscheduled for June 2022.

Briefing EN

Revision of Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime and proposalfor a new directive on asset recovery offices

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 30-05-2022

Awtur HUEMER MARIE-ASTRIDQasam tematiku L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix dipartiment tal-investigazzjoni kriminali | konfiska ta’ proprjetà | kriminalità organizzata | Kunsill tal-Ewropa | ONU |

prevenzjoni tad-delinkwenza | profitt | programm tal-UE | sekwestru ta’ beniSommarju Confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime is a key tool for depriving criminals of ill-gotten gains that could

be reinvested in further criminal activities. Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalitiesand proceeds of crime was adopted in 2014 to harmonise the rules by introducing minimum standards. In 2019,following a joint statement by the Parliament and Council, a dedicated staff working document on non-conviction basedconfiscation measures in the EU was prepared by the Commission, followed in June 2020 by a report, Asset recoveryand confiscation: ensuring crime does not pay, assessing the opportunity to introduce new rules. In its 2021 workprogramme, the Commission announced its intention to revise the 2014 Directive, as well as Council Decision2007/845/JHA on asset recovery offices, both being closely interlinked. This implementation appraisal looks at thepractical implementation of the directive in light of the expected Commission proposal for its revision. The Commissionwork programme had planned the proposal for the fourth quarter of 2021; it was postponed to the second quarter of2022.

Briefing EN

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Fit for 55: EU framework to decarbonise gas markets and promote hydrogenTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-05-2022Awtur TENHUNEN Susanna

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix enerġija rinnovabbli | gass naturali | grilja enerġetika | idroġenu | newtralità karbonika | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE |

proposta (UE) | provvista tal-gass | sigurtà tal-provvista | studju tal-impatt | suq tal-enerġija | suq unikuSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA), accompanying the above-mentioned proposals, adopted on 15 December 2021 and referred to theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. The Commission proposals to recast the 2009Gas Regulation (EC) 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and Directive2009/73/EC on common rules for the internal market in natural gas are underpinned by the need to decarbonise EUenergy systems and to respond to significant market changes.

Briefing EN

PETI Fact-finding visit to Hauts-de France - 23-25 May 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-05-2022Awtur HEEZEN JOHANNES

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix Franza | ir-Rumanija | netwerk stradali | parkeġġ | petizzjoni | sikurezza stradali | trasport bis-superfiċje | ġarr ta’

merkanzijaSommarju The PETI Committee decided to organise a fact-finding visit to Hauts-de-France (France) from 23 to 25 May 2022

concerning petition 549/2021 by Romanian Asociatia civica Voluntari in Europa on the poor safety conditions in carparks for trucks and commercial vehicles on the European road network. This briefing, written by Policy DepartmentC, describes the general and legal background.

Briefing EN

FEMM mission to The Hague, Netherlands - 23-25 May 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-05-2022Awtur MAZZINI MARTINA

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-Diversità | Il-Politika Soċjali | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix dipendenza fuq id-droga | l-Olanda | politika Ewropea tad-difiża | prostituzzjoni | traffikar tal-bnedmin | vjolenza

sesswali | Żona ta' libertà, sigurtà u ġustizzjaSommarju The Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee decided to send a delegation to The Hague on 23-25 May 2022

to find out what is being done to prevent and combat human trafficking. This Briefing written by the Policy DepartmentC describes the actions undertaken by the National Government, the Judiciary, the European Commission, theEuropean Parliament, the European agencies and the United Nations. It provides also experts' opinions.

Briefing EN

Václav Havel: Advocate of an undivided EuropeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-05-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix iċ-Ċekja | kap ta' Stat | moviment tad-drittijiet umani | rendikont storiku | Ċekoslovakkja

Sommarju Despite a 'bourgeois' family background, which was a disqualification in communist-led Czechoslovakia, Václav Havelrapidly became an internationally acclaimed playwright. However, his unequivocally proclaimed ethical principles soonput him at odds with the communist regime, resulting in several prison sentences. Havel nevertheless held fast to hisbelief that moral integrity was a question of necessity, not choice, and attempted to live up to this ideal. The 1989collapse of the regime made Havel a hero and, shortly after, an unlikely President. During his years in office, hemanaged to drive his country through the challenges of moving to a free market democracy, while maintaining hispersonal moral convictions and tirelessly advocating for larger issues of human rights, peace and democracy,underpinned by an active civil society. While Havel and his collaborators recast the foundations of today's Czech andSlovak democracies, his achievements in foreign policy have perhaps been even more important. Reminding Westerncountries of the dangers of a Europe that continued to be divided even after the removal of the Iron Curtain, Havel wasinstrumental in anchoring the new Czech Republic in western Europe, through its membership of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). He both recognised and emphasised the importance ofcloser European cooperation based on shared values, which for Havel constituted the core of relations amongEuropean countries. A firm advocate of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, he supported the United States of America, even onoccasions when some other western European countries were reluctant to do so. With his political writings reaching farbeyond the circumstances in which they were written, Havel is considered one of the most important intellectuals of the20th century. He has received numerous honours and awards. One of the European Parliament's buildings inStrasbourg has borne Václav Havel's name since 2017. This is an update of a Briefing published in May 2020.

Briefing CS, DE, EN, FR

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Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanismsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-05-2022Awtur LECERF Marie

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni ekonomika | diskriminazzjoni sesswali | kundizzjonijiet tax-xogħol | paga ndaqs | politika tal-impjiegi

tal-UE | proposta (UE) | rimunerazzojni għax-xogħol | trattament indaqs | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessiSommarju Equal pay for equal work is one of the European Union's founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on

the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, the implementation and enforcement of this principle remaina challenge. Due to a lack of pay transparency, pay discrimination often goes undetected and victims face difficulties inmaking a claim for redress. On 4 March 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal on bindingpay transparency measures. The proposed directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equalwork or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanismsfocuses on measures to ensure pay transparency, and better access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. TheCouncil agreed its approach on the proposal on 6 December 2021. On 15 November 2021, the joint committee –Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Committee on Employment and Social Affairs(EMPL) – started taking stock of the 1 090 amendments tabled to the draft report. On 17 March, the EMPL and FEMMcommittees jointly adopted the report on the proposed directive, and voted in favour of entering into interinstitutionalnegotiations. Nevertheless, after its announcement in plenary on 23 March, a plenary vote was requested on thedecision. On 5 April 2022, the Parliament voted to confirm the committees' negotiating mandate on the proposal with aview to informal trilogue negotiations with the Council. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Multimedia Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms

EU secure connectivity programme: Building a multi-orbital satellite constellationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-05-2022Awtur EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | L-Ambjent | L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix bidla teknoloġika | infrastruttura tar-riċerka | politika tal-komunikazzjoni | satellita | sikurezza tal-informazzjoni |

teknoloġija spazjali | trasformazzjoni diġitaliSommarju In the context of the twin digital and ecological transition, satellite communication is becoming a strategic asset for

governments and civil society alike. Complementary to terrestrial networks, it can contribute to seamless digitalcommunication, even when such networks are absent or disrupted. It builds on technological advances to ensure bothlow latency and global coverage, and the deployment of other emerging technologies such as quantum-basedcybersecurity. Today, the EU does not have the dedicated infrastructure (including space and ground segments) tooffer satellite communication services to governments, the economy, and civil society. Several EU global partners andcompetitors are investing in parallel in such capabilities. On 15 February 2022, the European Commission presented aproposal to improve the resilience of EU communications services by developing and operating multi-orbitalconnectivity infrastructure (with both space and ground segments) based on a public-partnership model. Governmentalservices would be operational from 2025, and private services at a later stage. In the European Parliament, theCommittee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file; rapporteur is Christophe Grudler(Renew Europe, France). In the Council, work is ongoing in the working party on space. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

International Agreements in Progress: Economic Partnership Agreement with the East African CommunityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-05-2022Awtur PICHON Eric

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliKelma għat-tiftix Assoċjazzjoni Ewropea taċ-Ċentri Nazzjonali tal-Produttività | aċċess għas-suq | eżenzjoni mid-dazji doganali | Il-

Komunità ta’ l-Afrika tal-Lvant | klawżola ta' allokazzjoni | l-ammont permess ta' emissjonijiet tal-UE | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | sħubija internazzjonali tal-UE

Sommarju The current partnership between sub-Saharan African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) and the EU (the CotonouPartnership Agreement) has a provision making it possible for the EU to negotiate different economic partnershipagreements (EPAs) with regional ACP sub-groups. This provision was needed for the partnership to be aligned withthe World Trade Organization's rules. Negotiations for an EPA with the partner states of the East African Community(EAC) – at the time: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda – were finalised in October 2014. South Sudanand the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which joined the EAC in 2016 and 2022 respectively, did not take part inthe negotiations, but can join the agreement once it enters into force. As soon as this happens, the EU-EAC EPA willimmediately provide duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market to all EAC exports, combined with partial andgradual opening of the EAC market to imports from the EU. The EPA contains detailed provisions on sustainableagriculture and fisheries, rules of origin, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The parties are committed toconcluding additional negotiations within five years of the entry into force of the agreement. The signing of the EPA hasbeen stalled because of discussions within the EAC. Except for Kenya, all EAC partner states are least developedcountries, and still enjoy duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market. Some of them have pushed for furtherclarifications on the consequences of the EPA for their economies before the EAC endorses the agreement. Kenya isthe only EAC country to have ratified the agreement, in order not to lose free access to the EU market. It has nowentered negotiations to implement a bilateral interim EPA with the EU. Second edition. The 'International Agreementsin Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the process, from initial discussions through to ratification.To view the previous edition of this briefing, please see: PE 620.218, April 2018.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 37

Revision of Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs and of Regulation(EC) No 6/2002 onCommunity designs

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 23-05-2022

Awtur HUEMER MARIE-ASTRIDQasam tematiku L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika

Sommarju There are two types of intellectual property rights (IPRs): industrial property, which includes patents, trademarks,industrial designs and models, and designations of origin; and copyright, which includes artistic and literary property.Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs and Regulation (EC) 6/2002 on Community designs (hereinafterCommunity design legislation or CDL when both texts are addressed simultaneously) are the backbone of EU law onCommunity designs. The directive set up the underlying principles for a harmonised legal framework, so that theconditions for obtaining protection of registered designs became equivalent in all Member States. Shortly afterwardsthe regulation was adopted to complement national systems, establishing an EU autonomous unitary system and,along with registered Community designs (RCDs), creating a new protection regime for unregistered Communitydesigns (UCDs). The Community design system is conceived to be easily accessible and affordable for all designrights holders throughout the EU. The CDL has proven its effectiveness in design protection and has helped to fosterinnovation and competition in this field (more than 1.4 million designs had been filed by the end of 2019 and more than813 000 RCDs were in force on 1 January 2020, with an increase of 6.5 % annually between 2003 and 2019). Incontrast, failure to apply the same protection to spare part designs resulted in adverse consequences on the singlemarket where there is no uniform system. Furthermore, with rapid technological progress and the green transition, thelegislation needs to be modernised in order to retain its added value. This implementation appraisal looks at thepractical implementation of Community design legislation in light of the expected Commission proposal for its revision.

Briefing EN

The revision of the Schengen Borders CodeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-05-2022Awtur EISELE Katharina

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix fruntiera esterna tal-UE | fruntiera interna tal-UE | Ftehim ta’ Schengen | kontroll fuq il-fruntiera | persuna ta'

nazzjonalità barranija | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | proposta (UE) | studju tal-impatt | vjaġġarSommarju The Commission demonstrates that the Schengen area has experienced considerable challenges in recent years and

makes a convincing case for the need to act. It made an effort to substantiate the initiative and to consult widely. TheIA is transparent about the lack of data, which results in a predominantly qualitative analysis. However, thepresentation of options leaves, in fact, only the choice of the preferred option. Moreover, one would have expected amore in-depth assessment of impacts – a point that was already highlighted by the RSB. The Commission did notprovide a comparative analysis between the 2017 proposal and the preferred option of the IA. The proposalcorresponds mostly to the preferred option, but includes some changes not reflected in the IA.

Briefing EN

The EU’s digital market [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-05-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaSommarju The European Union's governments, the European Parliament and European Commission have agreed on key

regulations that will overhaul the EU’s digital market and increase the Union’s digital sovereignty in a field dominatedby big US companies. The Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act aim to make the digital market in Europe moretransparent, safe and accountable. The planned legislative changes will introduce new rules for online digital players,such as intermediary services, hosting services and large online platforms. Big Tech companies – those designated as‘gatekeepers’ - will have to moderate their content more actively, stop targeting minors with manipulative advertisingand give more access to their systems to smaller competitors. The reforms, which still need final sign-off by the EU'sco-legislators, would force the companies to make their terms and conditions easily understandable. Other debates inthis field include cyber-security, digital currencies and artificial intelligence. This note gathers links to the recentpublications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the European digital market.

Briefing EN

Economic Dialogues and Exchanges of Views with Member States under the European Semester Cycles- State of play May 2022

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 20-05-2022

Awtur HAGELSTAM KajusQasam tematiku Is-Semestru Ewropew | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix baġit nazzjonali | bażi legali | makroekonomija | patt ta' stabbiltà | politika baġitarja | regolament (UE) | sorveljanza

multilaterali | spariġġ ekonomiku | Stat Membru tal-UE | żona tal-euroSommarju This table provides a regular update on Member States invited for an Economic Dialogue in the competent Committee

of the European Parliament and an overview of the respective legal base.Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 38

Economic Dialogue with the other EU Institutions under the European Semester Cycles during the 9thlegislative term - State of play May 2022

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 20-05-2022

Awtur HAGELSTAM KajusQasam tematiku Coronavirus | Is-Semestru Ewropew | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix Eurogrupp | governanza ekonomika (UE) | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea | il-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea | kooperazzjoni

interistituzzjonali (UE) | Kumitat tal-PE | Semestru EwropewSommarju This document provides an overview of Economic Dialogues with the other institutions of the European Union that has

taken place in the competent committee(s) of the European Parliament since September 2019 under the EuropeanSemester for economic policy coordination. It also lists the Recovery and Resilience Dialogues with the EuropeanCommission as undertaken by the competent committee(s) since the entry of force of the Recovery and ResilienceFacility in 2021. It also includes an overview of the respective legal bases for these dialogues.

Briefing EN

Alternative fuels in transport: Targets for deployment of recharging and refuelling infrastructureTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-05-2022Awtur SOONE Jaan

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportSommarju The European Commission's 'fit for 55' package, adopted on 14 July 2021 under the European Green Deal, includes a

proposal to revise the 2014 EU framework for the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure. The proposal putsforward binding targets for electric vehicle charging and hydrogen refuelling points, electric charging for stationaryaeroplanes at airports, and on-shore power supply for ships at ports. It also includes rules on refuelling points forliquefied natural gas for heavy-duty vehicles and in maritime ports. The European Parliament's Committee onTransport and Tourism (TRAN) is responsible for the file, with the rapporteur Ismail Ertug (S&D, Germany). His draftreport puts forward several amendments to strengthen the Commission proposal, including in terms of power outputtargets and implementation dates for electric charging infrastructure for cars and trucks, and targets for hydrogenrefuelling stations and shore-side electricity supply in ports. The vote on the draft report in TRAN is tentativelyscheduled for July 2022.

Briefing EN

Intelligent road transport systemsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-05-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportSommarju This initiative concerns proposed changes to the existing EU rules on the deployment of intelligent transport systems

(ITS) in road transport. The objective of the proposal is to expand the scope of the existing EU rules to cover new andemerging challenges and to make essential ITS services mandatory across the EU. The proposal seeks to resolveproblems stemming from the lack of interoperability and continuity of the existing applications and services, but alsofrom the low level of availability and sharing of the data supporting ITS services. Finally, it aims to ensure effectiveconcertation and cooperation among stakeholders. The European Commission put forward the proposal on 14December 2021. Preparatory work in the Council is being handled by the Working Party on Transport – IntermodalQuestions and Networks. At the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism has taken the lead onthe file. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 39

Towards a binding treaty on business and human rights: Despite progress, still no final outcome in viewTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-05-2022Awtur ZAMFIR Ionel

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju With its extended value chains, economic globalisation has brought numerous opportunities while also creating specific

challenges, including in the area of human rights protection. Loose regulatory frameworks in developing countries,corruption, and a lack of accountability resulting from legal rules shielding corporate interests have facilitated humanrights abuses related to operations of transnational corporations, their subsidiaries and supply chains. This situationhas created a pressing need to establish an international normative framework for business operations in relation tohuman rights. So far, the preferred approach has been 'soft', consisting of the adoption of voluntary guidelines forbusinesses, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Nevertheless, while suchvoluntary commitments are clearly useful, they cannot entirely prevent gross human rights violations. To address theshortcomings of the soft approach, an intergovernmental working group was established on Ecuador's initiative withinthe United Nations framework in June 2014, with the task of drafting a binding treaty on human rights and business.The EU became more actively involved in the negotiations once its initial concerns with regard to the type ofbusinesses covered were taken into consideration, but lacks a formal mandate from the Council and therefore has torely on ad hoc consensus among its Member States. After seven sessions, the negotiating process remains divisive forparticipating states, despite continuing strong support from civil society. Disagreements also run deep among legalexperts on the technical merits of the current approach. The European Parliament supports this initiative and hasencouraged the EU to take a positive and constructive approach. This is a further update of a briefing the last edition ofwhich was published in October 2018.

Briefing EN

Russia's war on Ukraine: The situation of children in and outside UkraineTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-05-2022Awtur DEL MONTE Micaela | MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-Margarita

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaSommarju Russia's invasion of Ukraine has forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee the country and seek shelter, mostly

in neighbouring EU countries, namely Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia and Moldova. Children andwomen are bearing the most adverse consequences of the war. According to UNICEF, almost half of those fleeing areminors and in need of enhanced protection, as they run a bigger risk of falling victim to trafficking and exploitation. Inresponse to the plight of Ukraine's civilian population, which is being subjected to shelling and violence, theinternational humanitarian community has quickly mobilised efforts and resources to provide support. As thehumanitarian situation deteriorates, children are particularly vulnerable. Children are at high risk of falling through thecracks of the system, going missing or being subjected to violence. This includes children in institutions,unaccompanied minors, children nearing the age of transition to adulthood, children from Roma or other minoritygroups or who are asylum-seekers, refugees or migrants and were residing in Ukraine and were stateless beforeleaving their countries of origin. In and outside of Ukraine, children are in urgent need of protection, including access topsychosocial and social support, health, nutrition, education and housing, protection against trafficking, sexual andlabour exploitation and abuse. The European Parliament, as well as its Coordinator on Children's Rights, have beenactive in defending the rights of the children fleeing the war in Ukraine since its beginning. This briefing updates andexpands on an 'At a glance' note written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou and Micaela Del Monte in March 2022.

Briefing EN, FR

Rules on export and import authorisations and transit measures for firearmsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-05-2022Awtur AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Qasam tematiku L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-PrattikaSommarju Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 lays down procedural rules at EU level for export, import and transit of firearms, their

parts and components and ammunition. Its overall strategic objective is to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking in firearmsfor civilian use by ensuring coherence across EU Member States with regard to rules on external trade. The regulationis part of an overall legal and operational framework intended to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute firearmstrafficking. In this regard, the regulation implements Article 10 of the United Nations (UN) Firearms Protocol, a keyinternational agreement adopted in 2001 and ratified by the EU, to ensure firearms traceability. Neither the legislativeproposal reviewing the regulation, mentioned in the 2021 Commission work programme, nor the impact assessmentare available yet. However, the 2017 Commission evaluation of the regulation had already found scope to address anumber of shortcomings. Based on this evaluation, the Commission established that these shortcomings were mainlyderived from a lack of clarity in certain parts of the regulation, and legal mismatches generating security risks. Thereview of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 also aims to align the regulation's scope with that of Directive (EU) 2021/555(the 'Firearms Directive'), already revised, and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (as amended), in order toclose the gaps between diverging procedures – in particular, gaps concerning diverging import procedures forconvertible alarm and signal weapons, and semi-finished unmarked essential components – which cause thesmuggling of these weapons and components to prevail.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 40

The latest on Russia's war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-05-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Russian President Vladimir Putin used his speech at the annual Victory Day over Nazi Germany, on 9 May, to mobilise

support among the country's citizens for its 11-week-old war on Ukraine, claiming that Moscow had to defend itselfagainst imminent attack. Recently, Russia has shifted its military efforts towards the east and south-east of Ukraine, aswell as to the bombing of critical infrastructure, after it failed to capture Kyiv, the capital. In some areas abandoned bythe Russian forces, Ukrainian troops and journalists found many dead civilians and other evidence of war crimes. TheUnited States and European Union countries have increased military aid to Ukraine. Finland and Sweden are to applyfor membership of the NATO military alliance. Russia has cut gas deliveries to Bulgaria and Poland, escalating itsconflict with the EU, which in turn is pondering an embargo on imports of Russian energy to deprive Moscow of fundsneeded to finance the war, on top of a wide range of existing sanctions. This note gathers links to the recentpublications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia's war on Ukraine, its implications for thetwo countries, for the European Union and for the world. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found ina previous edition of the 'What Think Tanks are Thinking' series.

Briefing EN

Corporate sustainability due diligence: Could value chains integrate human rights and environmentalconcerns?

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 16-05-2022

Awtur SPINACI STEFANOQasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji

Sommarju Companies can play a key role in building a sustainable economy and society, and in furthering environmental goals.At the same time, their global value chains may pose risks to human rights and the environment. Civil society,governments and companies are increasingly aware of the issue. A growing number of EU companies have takeninitiatives to deploy due diligence processes, often using the existing international voluntary standards on responsiblebusiness conduct. Some Member States have started developing their own legal frameworks on corporate duediligence. To avoid fragmentation and to provide legal certainty to business and citizens, the Commission hasproposed a directive laying down rules on corporate due diligence obligations (including on climate change), directors'duties, civil liability and protection of persons reporting breaches. Supervisory authorities designated by the MemberStates would be in charge of enforcing the new directive. It would be aligned with international standards on humanrights and environmental protection. The Parliament had already called on the Commission to introduce mandatorydue diligence legislation in a legislative-initiative resolution of March 2021. It will now examine the Commissionproposal following the ordinary legislative procedure. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Proposal to amend Directive (EU) 2019/1153: Single access point to bank account registriesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-05-2022Awtur NEVILLE ANN

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UESommarju Financial information is vital for the investigation of serious crime and for the freezing of the proceeds of crime, but EU

investigators often lack the tools for effective investigation, especially when dealing with cross-border crime. Theproposed amendment to Directive (EU) 2019/1153 would allow designated competent authorities responsible for theprevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences to access and search Member States’centralised bank account registers through a single access point. This would enable them to establish almostimmediately whether an individual holds bank accounts in other Member States and identify to which Member Statesthey should make a formal request for additional information. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 41

The rights of LGBTI people in the European UnionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-05-2022Awtur DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni abbażi tal-orjentament sesswali | drittijiet tal-bniedem | drittijiet tal-minoranzi | identità tal-ġeneru |

trattament indaqsSommarju The prohibition of discrimination and the protection of human rights are important elements of the EU legal order.

Nevertheless, discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people persiststhroughout the EU and takes various forms, including verbal abuse and physical violence. Sexual orientation is nowrecognised in EU law as grounds of discrimination. However, the scope of the provisions dealing with this issue islimited and does not cover social protection, health care, education or access to goods and services, leaving LGBTIpeople particularly vulnerable in these areas. Moreover, EU competence does not extend to recognition of marital orfamily status. In this area, national regulations vary, with some Member States offering same-sex couples the right tomarry, others allowing alternative forms of registration, and yet others not providing any legal status for same-sexcouples. Same-sex couples may or may not have the right to adopt children and to access assisted reproduction.These divergent legal statuses have implications, for instance, for partners from two Member States with differentstandards who want to formalise/legalise their relationship, or for same-sex couples and their families wishing to moveto another Member State. Combating discrimination has become part of EU internal and external policies, and is thesubject of numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. However, action in this area remains problematic when ittouches on issues pertaining to areas traditionally the preserve of Member States, such as marital status and familylaw. This is a further updated version of a briefing the previous edition of which was from May 2021.

Briefing EN

Screening of third-country nationals at the EU's external bordersTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-05-2022Awtur DUMBRAVA Costica

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix bijometrika | Frontex | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | kontroll fuq il-fruntiera | migrazzjoni illegali | pajjiż terz | persuna ta'

nazzjonalità barranija | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | proposta (UE) | Sistema ta' Informazzjoni ta' SchengenSommarju In September 2020, the Commission put forward a new pact on migration and asylum, setting out a comprehensive

approach to European Union (EU) migration policies that links external borders, asylum, return systems, the Schengenarea of free movement and the external dimension of migration. The pact includes a proposal for a new regulation onthe screening of third-country nationals at external borders aiming to clarify and streamline the rules on dealing withthird-country nationals who are not authorised to enter or stay in the EU. The proposal would introduce a pre-entryscreening procedure allowing national authorities at external borders to channel irregular third-country nationals to theappropriate procedure, i.e. asylum or return procedures. The screening would start with preliminary health andvulnerability checks and finish with the transmission of a debriefing form to the appropriate authorities. The proposalwould provide for the establishment, by each Member State, of an independent monitoring mechanism for fundamentalrights. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Review of the regulation on fluorinated greenhouse gasesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-05-2022Awtur HAHNKAMPER-VANDENBULCKE Nora

Qasam tematiku L-Ambjent | L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-PrattikaSommarju Fluorinated gases ('F-gases') are potent greenhouse gases (GHGs), with a global warming potential (GWP) up to 25

000 times higher than that of CO2. Used in a wide range of appliances – such as refrigerators, air conditioners, foamsand fire extinguishers – F-gas emissions occur throughout appliances' life cycles. Today, F-gas emissions amount to2.5 % of the EU's total GHG emissions, levels having doubled between 1990 and 2014, in contrast to those of otherGHG emissions, which fell. The steep increase was due mainly to the substitution of ozone-depleting substances(ODS) – to be phased out under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer – with F-gases in areas where ODS were prohibited under the protocol. Since 2006, the EU has taken action to reverse theincreasing trend of F-gas emissions. At present, Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases (the'current F-gas Regulation') is one of the EU's main instruments to fight F-gas emissions, contributing to the EU's widerefforts to combat climate change by, in particular, introducing an EU-wide phase-down scheme for hydrofluorocarbons(HFCs). The EU is also committed to reducing F-gas emissions at international level, notably under the 2015 ParisAgreement and the 2019 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. Between 2015 and 2019, F-gas emissions in theEU decreased steadily. However, in light of the EU's increased climate ambition, as set out in the 2019 EuropeanGreen Deal (EGD) and the 2021 European Climate Law, the Commission decided to review the F-gas Regulation, asone of the policy reforms under the 'fit-for-55' package. To this end it launched an ex-post evaluation. Under the ex-post evaluation presented on 5 April 2022, together with the proposal for a new F-gas Regulation, the Commissionfound that, while the regulation had worked relatively well, there were several shortcomings relating to the regulationitself and to its implementation (regarding, for instance, illegal HFC imports and insufficient monitoring).

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 42

Review of Directive 2002/65/EC on distance marketing of consumer financial servicesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-05-2022Awtur WUKOVITS NORA ANDREA

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-Liġi | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiSommarju Adopted in 2002, Directive 2002/65/EC on Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services introduced a legal

framework for governing the distance marketing of financial services, such as banking, loans, insurance andinvestment. Back then, when relevant legislation was limited at Member State level, the directive aimed to improveconsumer protection rules for financial services sold at a distance and to consolidate the internal market by aligningrules in this area. Since its adoption, however, the legal framework and digital landscape for retail financial serviceshas evolved significantly. A 2020 Commission ex-post evaluation of the directive highlighted that it has been effectivein strengthening consumer protection and largely remains relevant through its safety-net function. However, theoverlap of its provisions with product-specific and horizontal EU legislation, as well as changes to the financial servicesmarket have decreased the EU added value and relevance of the directive over time. In addition, digitalisation is foundto have amplified some of its practical weaknesses. Subsequently, a review of the directive was included among theREFIT initiatives of the Commission's 2020 work programme, and an inception impact assessment was published inMay 2021.

Briefing EN

Towards a new regulatory framework for European population statisticsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-05-2022Awtur ANGLMAYER Irmgard | HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-LiġiKelma għat-tiftix liġi tal-UE | migrazzjoni | popolazzjoni dinjija | programm tal-UE | statistika tal-popolazzjoni | tixjiħ tal-popolazzjoni |

ċensiment tal-popolazzjoniSommarju Census data and demographic statistics are of great relevance for policy-making at the European, national, regional

and local levels. At a time where the European Union (EU) is undergoing major demographic changes, driven by anageing population, low fertility rates and increased migration flows, demand for accurate and timely populationstatistics rises. In parallel, owing to progress in digitalisation, statistical data collection methods are shifting fromtraditional population censuses and surveys towards the use of administrative data. Such register-based datacollection methods bear great potential in terms of improved data frequency, granularity and burden reduction. Themodernisation of European population statistics is one of the action points included in the European statisticalprogramme 2021-2027, and part of a wider programme to modernise social statistics. Under the current regulatoryframework, Eurostat collects population data under a number of separate legal acts, covering demographic, censusand migration data. One of them, Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 on European demographic statistics, is set to expirein 2028. According to the 2022 Commission work programme, the Commission will present a legislative proposal onpopulation statistics in the second quarter of 2022. The new proposal should integrate, in a single legal act, annualdemographic and migration statistics and decennial census data, as well as regional and geo-referenced populationdata. It should provide for timelier, more coherent and more specific population statistics that reflect migration moreadequately and facilitate the use of administrative data sources.

Briefing EN

EU response to economic coercion by third countriesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-05-2022Awtur GIRARD VERONIQUE

Qasam tematiku Id-Dritt Internazzjonali Pubbliku | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | Is-Sigurtà u d-DifiżaKelma għat-tiftix grupp interessat | metodu ta' finanzjament | pajjiż terz | penali (UE) | politika ekonomika | strateġija tal-UE | studju tal-

impattSommarju This initiative focuses specifically on the issue of economic coercion and the EU's possible response, aiming to

preserve the EU's open strategic autonomy and policy-making space. The IA clearly defines the problem, its underlyingcauses, and the objectives to address it. The creation of a new legal instrument to deter and counteract economiccoercion is the only type of option retained for analysis. This presumably follows on from the political commitmentmade in early 2021 (although this is not stated explicitly in the IA). This option was broken down into several policyoptions based on possible parameters used for the design of the instrument. The IA is substantiated by academicwork, stakeholders' contributions and examples. The majority of stakeholders support a new policy instrument and theirinput contributed to the design of the proposed instrument. The IA focuses mostly on economic impacts, while socialand environmental impacts are assessed briefly. Important benefits are expected from the instrument. Costs areexpected only from its use, in particular from the application of countermeasures. The IA focuses on a qualitativeassessment of impacts linked to the instrument's creation and existence, acknowledging that the impacts linked to theinstrument's use are difficult to estimate at the design stage. Adequate monitoring and evaluation of the use of theinstrument and of progress made against the objectives will therefore be important aspects that would have benefitedfrom further detail in terms of indicators and provisions. The proposal generally reflects the preferred option of the IA,although some elements differ from the IA, such as the objectives and definition of economic coercion.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 43

Monetary policy issues in the context of the war in UkraineTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-05-2022Awtur RAKIC Drazen

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | gwerra | inflazzjoni | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | marda tal-coronavirus | politika monetarja | relazzjonijiet tal-UE |

rkupru ekonomiku | stabbiltà finanzjarja | żona tal-euroSommarju On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine. The war itself, as well as related sanctions and

countersanctions are expected to have a significant impact on the euro area economy. This paper summarises therecent monetary policy decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s Governing Council and outlines some policyissues and challenges that might arise in the context of the war, related to price stability, financial stability, climate andenergy policies, ECB/Eurosystem staff projections and public trust in the ECB.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Eurovignette DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-05-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku It-Tassazzjoni | It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix infrastruttura tat-trasport | netwerk trans-Ewropew | pedaġġ | proposta (UE) | proċedura leġislattiva ordinarja | Stat

Membru tal-UE | studju tal-impatt | taxxa fuq il-vetturi | taxxa skont il-fus | veikolu kummerċjali | vettura motorizzataSommarju The European Parliament and the Council as co-legislators have adopted changes to Directive 1999/62/EC on the

charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructure (known as the Eurovignette Directive). Vignettesfor heavy goods vehicles will have to be phased out across the core trans-European transport network from 2030 andreplaced by distance-based charges (tolls). With a number of other changes, this should help make road pricing fairerand more efficient. The European Commission put forward a legislative proposal to amend the directive in May 2017,as part of its first 'mobility package' seeking to modernise mobility and transport. The aim of the proposal was to moveaway from a time-based model of charging (vignettes) to a distance-based one – that better reflects the polluter-paysand user-pays principles – and to include other vehicles. In Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism(TRAN) took the lead. Parliament adopted its first-reading position in October 2018, without agreement with theCouncil. After the 2019 European elections, Giuseppe Ferrandino (S&D, Italy) took over as rapporteur. The Counciladopted its position in December 2020. Interinstitutional negotiations in the first half of 2021 paved the way for anagreement, subsequently approved formally by both the Council and the Parliament. Sixth edition of a briefingoriginally drafted by Ariane Debyser and updated by Damiano Scordamaglia. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Research for CULT Committee: Esports - Policy RecommendationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-05-2022Awtur estern Tobias M. SCHOLZ, Nepomuk NOTHELFER (Esports Research Network)

Qasam tematiku Il-Kultura | L-EdukazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix gvern elettroniku | il-Kunsill Ewropew tar-Riċerka | impatt tat-teknoloġija tal-informatika | logħba onlajn | sport | studju

tal-każijiet | teknoloġija diġitaliSommarju KEY FINDINGS This Policy Recommendation Briefing is based on the study on “Esports - Background Analysis”. •A

suitable and functioning strategy requires a shared understanding/definition of what esports is. It is important todifferentiate esports from traditional sports. This can have an impact on the system of traditional sports as well. •Esports is constantly and rapidly evolving, making it necessary to address it as soon as possible. Creating a workinggroup regarding a holistic esports strategy is highly recommendable. •The EU needs to foster interdisciplinaryresearch on esports to gain a better understanding of the industry and on how to utilise esports for the Europeancommunity. This knowledge can help to solve digital challenges in general. •The creation of a dedicated researchcentre for esports at the European level is required. •Esports-specific laws are needed just as they are in traditionalsports. •The issue of where the regulatory authority concerning esports lies (or should lie) should be resolved. Intraditional sports, this tends to be local, but esports is much more international and heterogeneous. •Esports standsfor digital communication and innovation. In esports, Europe as a whole is more important than the individual MemberStates. Therefore, esports can be utilised for the creation of a (digital) European identity.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 44

Portugal's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 05-05-2022Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitSommarju Portugal is set to receive €16.6 billion in both non-repayable support and loans from the Recovery and Resilience

Facility (RRF), the unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. This amountcorresponds to 2.3 % of the entire RRF, and to 7.8 % of Portugal's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). There is astrong focus on the country's social, economic and environmental resilience, with measures targeting culture, housing,health, broad social responses, and forest and water management. Measures relating to climate transition – includingkey actions on industry decarbonisation and energy efficiency of buildings – reach just over 38 % of the allocation. Thedigital transition focus area of the Portuguese National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) amounts to just over 22% of the allocation, with measures and reforms aimed at public administration and finances, education, andbusinesses. Following the Council's approval of the Commission's positive assessment of the plan, Portugal received€2.2 billion pre-financing in August 2021. Further payments, in 10 instalments for grants and seven for loans, willdepend on progress in implementing the plan. In January 2022, Portugal submitted a first payment request worth €1.16billion in grant and loan instalments (€0.55 billion in grants and €0.61 billion in loans). The Commission made apositive preliminary assessment of Portugal's payment request. The European Parliament is a major supporter of thecreation of a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part in interinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss andscrutinise implementation of the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU MemberStates.

Briefing EN, PT

Luxembourg's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 05-05-2022Awtur LILYANOVA Velina

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitSommarju Luxembourg's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is set to be financed by the Recovery and Resilience

Facility (RRF) with a total of €93.4 million, consisting of grants alone. While under Article 14 of Regulation (EU)2021/241 (RRF Regulation) Member States can request RRF loans until 31 August 2023, Luxembourg has not yetdone so. The €93.4 million requested is slightly less than the maximum RRF contribution available to the country(around €93.5 million). Luxembourg's RRF allocation is not only the smallest in absolute figures, but also the lowest asa share of grants in relation to both gross domestic product (GDP) (0.15 % of GDP in 2019) and per capita (with €158per citizen). The Luxembourgish NRRP includes measures for a total estimated value of €183.1 million: the RRF's€93.4 million cover 51 % of the costs, while the remainder will benefit from national (around 46 %) and other EU co-financing (the remaining 3 %). The plan aims to address Luxembourg's structural issues, aggravated by the pandemic.The measures included complement and build on priorities laid out in the national economic stimulus package fromMay 2020 (i.e. the Neistart Lëtzebuerg programme). The central objective is to support social cohesion and thepromotion of a modern and attractive economic environment, while responding to climate and environmentalchallenges. With 60.9 % of the funds allocated to climate objectives and 31.6 % to the digital transition – well abovethe RRF Regulation's minimum targets – the NRRP will contribute to common European efforts in these areas. Theclimate and environmental policy guidelines in the NRRP are consistent with Luxembourg's integrated national energyand climate plan (NECP) for 2021-2030. The Luxembourgish NRRP's components relating to skills, health, housingand governance also support cohesion and growth potential significantly in the long term. The European Parliamentparticipates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF, andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Revision of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) RegulationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-05-2022Awtur FRIZBERG DIETER

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix infrastruttura tat-trasport | ippjanar tat-trasport | karburant sostitut | mobilità sostenibbli | netwerk tat-trasport | netwerk

trans-Ewropew | newtralità karbonika | politika komuni tat-trasport | proposta (UE) | proġett ta' interess komuni |sikurezza tat-trasport | studju tal-impatt

Sommarju The IA provides a comprehensive problem analysis, based on the evaluation of the current TEN-T Regulation, a publicconsultation, and targeted consultations with stakeholders and Member States. It is transparent about the methods anduncertainties (e.g. long-term funding) and limitations. The objectives and the policy options have a clear link to theproblem definition. The IA comprehensively analyses the economic, social and environmental impacts of the policyoptions. However, territorial impacts linked to the shift to more sustainable modes of transport could have beenexplained in more depth. Costs and benefits are assessed and quantified. It could have been explained in more detailhow funding will be mobilised. All in all, the IA provides useful information for policy-makers and future policy choices.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 45

EU legislation and policies to address racial and ethnic discriminationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-05-2022Awtur DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni etnika | diskriminazzjoni razzjali | drittijiet tal-individwu | grupp etniku | ksenofobija | l-Aġenzija tal-

Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali | statistika tal-UE | trattament indaqs | ġbir ta' dejtaSommarju Racial and ethnic minorities face discrimination and its consequences on a daily basis. The exact scale of the problem

is hard to gauge due to a lack of data and general under-reporting of racist incidents. The coronavirus pandemic hasseen a major increase in reports of racist and xenophobic incidents, and the crisis it triggered has had adisproportionately large negative effect on racial and ethnic minority groups, in the form of higher death and infectionrates. Although since 2000 the European Union (EU) has introduced legislation to combat racial and xenophobicdiscrimination, the problem persists, with the need for new measures recently highlighted by the global Black LivesMatter protests. A number of studies also point to the cost of racial discrimination not only for the individuals concernedbut also for society as a whole. For instance, a 2018 EPRS report argued that the loss in earnings caused by racialand ethnic discrimination for both individuals and societies amounts to billions of euros annually. EU citizens alsoacknowledge this problem: a 2019 survey found that over half of Europeans believe racial or ethnic discrimination to bewidespread in their country. To address racial discrimination and the inequalities it engenders, the EuropeanCommission has put forward a number of equality strategies and actions. One such action, the second Europeansummit against racism, was held on 21 March 2022. The European Parliament, meanwhile, has long been demandingan end to racial discrimination. In recent resolutions, the Parliament has called for putting an end to structural racism,discrimination, racial profiling and police brutality; for asserting the right to protest peacefully; and for boosting the roleof culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. This updates a briefing from March 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination

Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system: Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-05-2022Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix bejgħ b'irkant | gass serra | l-ammont permess ta' emissjonijiet tal-UE | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | politika tal-

ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | riżervi | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijietSommarju The proposal to revise the market stability reserve (MSR) for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) consists of

prolonging its current parameters. Under the current rules, the intake rate of allowances to the MSR and the minimumallowances placed in the reserve have been doubled until the end of 2023, to allow for a quick removal of surplus EUETS allowances. The proposal is aimed at maintaining the current doubled intake rate (24 %) and minimum number ofallowances placed in the reserve (200 million) until 31 December 2030, the end of Phase IV of the EU ETS. InParliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).The committee adopted its report on 15 March 2022, with 65 votes in favour, 20 against and one abstention. Duringthe plenary sitting of 5 April 2022, the Parliament adopted, with amendments to the recitals, the institution's position fornegotiations, by 490 votes in favour, 127 against and seven abstentions. The Council is currently debating theproposal. Its December 2021 progress report notes delegations' differing views. Third edition. 'EU legislation inprogress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

The EU's zero pollution ambition: Moving towards a non-toxic environmentTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-05-2022Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju In the European Union (EU), one in eight deaths is linked to environmental pollution. Pollution is also one of the five

main causes of biodiversity loss, representing a significant cost for society. The EU has set the goal of achieving zeropollution for a non-toxic environment by 2050. This would mean reducing air, water and soil pollution to 'levels nolonger considered harmful to health and natural ecosystems and respecting the boundaries the planet can cope with'.Achieving this long-term ambition will mean updating the comprehensive legal framework currently in place at EU levelto address pollution in order to keep up with the latest scientific evidence. In 2022, the EU is expected to review its airquality standards to align more closely with the recently updated World Health Organization recommendations, and tolook into pollutants affecting surface and groundwater. Additional areas that should be revised in parallel include keylaws designed to tackle pollution at source, setting requirements for pollutant emissions from industry and vehicles, forurban wastewater treatment and sustainable use of pesticides. The key challenges in achieving the zero pollution goalremain to ensure policy coherence, compliance and enforcement. Other issues to monitor include liability for pollutionand related costs, with recent assessments pointing to the need to be consistent and rigorous in implementing the'polluter pays' principle. Parliament has pushed for ambitious action to protect people's health and the environmentfrom pollution. It has argued that air quality legislation should also cover non-regulated pollutants with demonstratedadverse impacts, such as ultrafine particles, black carbon, mercury and ammonia. It has also called for decisive actionon pollutants of emerging concern in water, such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, microplastics, endocrine-disrupting chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Finally, it has urged the Commission to design a dedicated legal frameworkfor soil protection, equivalent to that existing for water and air. Recently, steps have been taken at global level to curbplastic pollution through legally binding means and to form a science-policy interface body on chemicals and waste.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 46

Textiles and the environmentTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-05-2022Awtur SAJN Nikolina

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix ekodisinn | prodott riċiklat | prodott tessili | strateġija tal-UE | teknoloġija tar-riċiklaġġ | tkabbir ekoloġiku | tnaqqis fil-

prezzijiet | ħwejjeġ | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju The amount of clothes bought per person in the European Union (EU) has increased by 40 % in just a few decades,

driven by a fall in prices and the increased speed with which fashion is delivered to consumers. Clothing has the fourthhighest impact on the environment of all categories of EU consumption. This impact is often felt in non-EU countries,where most production takes place. The production of raw materials, spinning them into fibres, weaving fabrics anddyeing require enormous amounts of water and chemicals, including pesticides for growing raw materials such ascotton. Consumer use also has a large environmental footprint, owing to the water, energy and chemicals used inwashing, tumble-drying and ironing, and microplastics shed into the environment. Less than half of used clothes arecollected for reuse or recycling when they are no longer needed, and only 1 % are recycled into new clothes, sincetechnologies that would enable clothes to be recycled into virgin fibres are only now starting to emerge. Various waysto address these issues have been proposed, including developing new business models for clothing rental, designingproducts in a way that would make re-use and recycling easier (circular fashion), convincing consumers to buy fewerclothes of better quality (slow fashion), and generally steering consumer behaviour towards choosing more sustainableoptions. The European Commission laid out its vision for the textiles sector for 2030 in the March 2022 EU strategy forsustainable and circular textiles. The Commission has proposed a regulation on ecodesign requirements forsustainable products and a directive on empowering consumers for the green transition. The package will aim to makeall products on the internal market more sustainable, while providing consumers with information on sustainability. Theapplication of these rules to textiles will be specified in delegated acts, largely planned for 2024. This briefing expandson and updates a 2019 EPRS briefing Environmental impact of the textile and clothing industry: What consumers needto know.

Briefing EN

Roaming Regulation reviewTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-05-2022Awtur NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar | Niestadt Maria

Qasam tematiku L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix fluss ta’ data transfruntier | netwerk tat-trażmissjoni | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur | regolament (UE) |

regolamenti dwar il-prezzijiet | regolazzjoni tat-telekomunikazzjoni | roaming | tariffa tal-komunikazzjonijiet | telefonċellulari

Sommarju The Roaming Regulation established the 'roam like at home' (RLAH) rule that mandated the end of retail mobileroaming charges as of 15 June 2017 in all EU Member States and EEA countries. The regulation is currently in forceuntil 30 June 2022. The application of the RLAH rule has been a success, boosting the use of mobile devices whiletravelling to other EU/EEA countries. For instance, the use of data roaming increased 17 times in the summer of 2019compared with the summer preceding the abolition of roaming surcharges. Nevertheless, five years after itsimplementation, the Commission needed to review the Roaming Regulation, with a view to extending the roamingmarket rules for a further 10 years. The Commission also sought to continue lowering wholesale roaming charges,improve the quality of roaming services, and provide access to all available network generations and technologies,including free access to emergency services, and information on any cost incurred in accessing value added services.Within the European Parliament the file was allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). Thecommittee report was adopted on 14 October 2021, and the mandate for trilogue negotiations approved in plenary thefollowing week. For its part, the Council agreed its position on 16 June 2021. The co-legislators reached a provisionalagreement on the text on 9 December 2021. According to the final text, which was published in the Official Journal ofthe EU on 13 April 2022 and enters into force on 1 July 2022, the RLAH regime will be renewed for a further 10 years.

Briefing EN

Towards new rules for European elections?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-05-2022Awtur DIAZ CREGO Maria

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix approssimazzjoni tal-liġijiet | dritt tal-vot | elezzjoni Ewropea | il-Membri tal-PE | kandidat | proposta (UE) | riżulatat tal-

votazzjoniSommarju During the May I plenary session, Parliament is expected to vote on a legislative-initiative report proposing to repeal

the 1976 European Electoral Act and replace it with a new Council Regulation on the election of the Members of theEuropean Parliament (MEPs) by direct universal suffrage. Since the first European elections in 1979, the rulesapplying to the election of MEPs combine the common principles established in the European Electoral Act, asmodified in 2002, and the different national rules implementing them. As a result, important elements of the electoralprocedure remain in the hands of the national legislatures and there is no harmonisation across the Member States.Following the proposals in Parliament's (26 November 2020) resolution on stocktaking of European elections, thereport proposes to further harmonise the rules applicable to European elections in areas such as the age for voting orstanding as a candidate; postal voting; the electoral calendar for European elections; the principles applicable to theselection of candidates, including from a gender perspective; and the electoral threshold. In addition, the reportproposes to establish a common electoral system and procedure for the election of 28 MEPs in a Union-wideconstituency comprising the territory of all the Member States. Once finalised by Parliament, the proposal istransmitted to the Council for its adoption, with the EP required to consent to the final text. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 47

EU gas storage and LNG capacity as responses to the war in UkraineTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-04-2022Awtur BOEHM Lasse | WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix effiċjenza enerġetika | gass naturali | iffrankar ta' enerġija | importazzjoni (UE) | ir-Russja | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE |

prezz tal-enerġija | sigurtà tal-provvista | ħażna tal-enerġija | żieda fil-prezzSommarju Russia remains Europe's largest supplier of coal, oil, and gas. This poses a particular difficulty for the EU and its

Member States, which are urgently seeking to reduce their energy dependence. This is not only necessary to pressureRussia economically to end its invasion of Ukraine, but also to prevent Russia from weaponising its energy suppliesand threatening Europe’s energy security in future. Replacing Russian natural gas will be much more difficult thanreplacing oil and coal, due to differences in supply infrastructure, transportation and storage. While part of the long-term solution lies in the promotion of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency savings, the EU willnevertheless require large volumes of natural gas imports in the short and medium term. Since most of Europe’spipeline infrastructure is organised to import Russian gas, alternative supplies will mostly have to come by sea in theform of liquefied natural gas (LNG). To guarantee security of supply, the EU will also need to ensure gas storage levelsremain high so Member States can cope with a sudden interruption of gas supplies. However, both LNG terminals andgas storage capacity are unevenly spread across Europe, with important policy implications. There is a clear need tofrontload investment to diversify supplies and fill storage, but uncertainty as to who can or should finance thesechanges. There is also the question of how to coordinate policy action at EU level, how to buffer against negativesocial and economic consequences, and how to ensure coherence of security of supply with the 'fit for 55' packageand the European Green Deal.

Briefing EN

Important projects of common European interest: State of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-04-2022Awtur EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | L-Ambjent | L-Edukazzjoni | L-Enerġija | L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix cloud computing | diġitalizzazzjoni | newtralità karbonika | proġett ta' interess komuni | strateġija tal-UE | teknoloġija |

tkabbir ekoloġikuSommarju The concept of important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) is enshrined in Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty

on the Functioning of the European Union. It enables the Commission to allow Member States to design andimplement national investments targeting important market failures or societal challenges that could not otherwise beaddressed. In November 2021, the Commission adopted a communication updating a 2014 communication thatestablished the first set of guidance to be used for the assessment of IPCEIs. The revision is designed to align thecriteria more closely with EU political priorities, in particular the European Green Deal and the digital strategy, whilealso making the setting up of IPCEIs more transparent and open to new participating Member States and economicplayers. In the context of the twin digital and ecological transition, IPCEIs are expected to boost the EU's strategicautonomy by ensuring Member States' capacity to invest together in technological development, and by encouragingthe dissemination of solutions and promoting cooperation across the EU and the economy. As of February 2022, threeIPCEIs have been approved by the Commission: one on microelectronics and two on batteries (with up to 12participating Member States). A further initiative on microelectronics, with 20 participating Member States, was notifiedto the Commission in December 2021 and is awaiting approval. Other initiatives, on clean hydrogen, next generationcloud and health, are being explored.

Briefing EN

Digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-04-2022Awtur EISELE Katharina

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaSommarju While the Commission makes the case for advancing the digitalisation of judicial cooperation, and while the IA

supporting this initiative received a positive opinion from the RSB, it does nevertheless appear weak on several points.The Commission corroborates its problem definition using several recent sources and data. The Commissionconducted several stakeholder consultation activities, for some of which, more specific information would have beenuseful. Stakeholder views are reflected in the IA report. It appears, however, that the main source, an external study, isavailable only in the interinstitutional database of EU studies and not available to the wider public at the time of writing.Moreover, it appears that the range of options is very limited, with seemingly no real alternative to the preferredlegislative, Option 2 (the voluntary approach under the Option 1 is not considered as effective). It is notable that thedescription of impacts relating to data protection and data security is very limited for all options, despite their likelyrelevance.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 48

Review of rules for alternative investment fundsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-04-2022Awtur KRAMER Esther

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju The IA supports the proposal for the review of the AIFMD in an overall effective and transparent manner. It is based on

solid internal and external expertise, including an array of technical recommendations from the relevant EU andinternational bodies in charge of monitoring and supervising investment funds. While the intervention logic of themostly qualitative IA is clear, some aspects could have been substantiated in a more precise way. The highly technicalanalysis would have been more accessible to non-expert readers if interdependencies and links between the problemsand drivers, and between objectives, options and monitoring indicators, had been indicated more clearly. The IAjustifies limited quantification by a lack of data, providing quantified estimates (only) for the expected potential REFITcost savings in the area of depositary services. The IA favours, for the time being, less prescriptive solutions in order torespect proportionality and subsidiarity. It highlights the need of additional targeted expertise for a number ofquestions, including as regards harmonisation of reporting requirements.

Briefing EN

Completing the single market for servicesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-04-2022Awtur SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaSommarju The pandemic and the negotiations following Brexit have been a serious challenge for the integrity of the single

market. Growing world tensions and the military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation are furtheremphasising the benefits of unity between Member States. Faced with this extremely difficult environment, the EU hasresponded with unprecedented determination, developing a series of new tools and coordination mechanisms, such ascommon procurement and fiscal support, to rapidly address weaknesses. This is, however, not the time forcomplacency, as the international environment continues to be increasingly uncertain, complex and rapidly-changing.Common and long-term strategic ambition at EU level is required more than ever. Previous evaluations by DG EPRSconcluded that completing the single market for services could be instrumental in that respect. In this briefing, ouranalysis confirms that barriers in service sectors and distortions induced by state involvement continue to significantlyhinder free movement of services within the EU. Further ambitious action would be beneficial, with between €279billion and €457 billion of additional GDP per annum in the long term. We thus conclude that completing the singlemarket for services is an integral part of the path towards more strategic autonomy, more resilience, more security, andmore rapid, broad-based and sustainable development.

Briefing EN

Improving working conditions in platform workTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-04-2022Awtur TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | L-ImpjiegiSommarju The IA presents a qualitative and partially quantitative assessment in support of the proposal on working conditions in

platform work. The problem definition would have benefited from further clarification, in particular of the target group,as it refers to 'some people', whilst the IA describes more widely problems faced by all of the people working throughplatforms. The IA openly explains the difficulties relating to the lack of data on platforms, an issue that the authors ofthe IA tried to address by making great efforts to collect relevant data, for example, through a survey and broadstakeholder consultations. The IA provides a sufficient range of options to address the defined problems and clearlydescribes the stakeholders' views, which appear to diverge, for example regarding the rebuttable presumption withreversed burden of proof of an employment status. In the impacts assessment, the proportionality criterion was notused in the comparison of the options, contrary to the recommendations of the Better Regulation Guidelines.Moreover, the IA openly indicates that it was not possible to quantify some costs (e.g. risk assessment, dataportability). Despite its weaknesses, the IA is able to provide a useful information package for decision-making. As atechnical point, to facilitate reader-friendliness, part of the information included in the extensive annexes could havebeen included in the main analysis.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 49

Completing the single market for goodsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-04-2022Awtur SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaKelma għat-tiftix moviment liberu tal-merkanzija | ostaklu nontariffarju | politika fiskali | suq tal-komoditajiet | suq uniku | żvilupp

sostenibbliSommarju The pandemic and the negotiations following Brexit have been a serious challenge for the integrity of the single

market, in particular regarding free movement. Growing world tensions and the military aggression against Ukraine bythe Russian Federation are now further emphasising the benefits of unity between Member States. Faced with thisextremely difficult environment, the EU has responded with unprecedented determination, developing a series of toolsand coordination mechanisms, such as common procurement and fiscal support, to rapidly address weaknesses. Asthe situation remains uncertain and as risks accumulate, continued common action and long-term strategic planning atEU level is required more than ever to significantly reduce harmful dependencies. Previous evaluations by EPRSstressed that the single market for goods could be instrumental in this respect. In this briefing, our updated simulationsconfirm that the untapped potential from the single market for goods is still substantial. In particular, as barriers to tradefacilitation and complexity of regulatory procedures continue to hinder the free movement of goods, further action inthis area could significantly boost intra-EU trade, with potential economic benefits of between €228 billion and €372billion per annum. We therefore conclude that completing the single market for goods is an integral part of the pathtowards more strategic autonomy, more resilience, more security, and more rapid, broad-based and sustainabledevelopment.

Briefing EN

Thematic Digest - the EU value added of a set of Recovery and Resilience PlansTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-04-2022Awtur DE LEMOS PEIXOTO SAMUEL | GRIGAITE KRISTINA | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiSommarju This briefing provides a summarised comparative analysis of three papers prepared by external experts at the request

of the ECON Committee on the value added of a number of national Recovery and Resilience Plans. It further containsa summary of each of the three papers provided. Both the comparative analysis and the summaries are preparedunder EGOV responsibility; assessing and evaluating the integral views of the authors require a read-through of the fullpapers.

Briefing EN

Protecting EU shared values: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-04-2022Awtur DIAZ CREGO Maria | MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti LegaliSommarju This is the fourth briefing within a series exploring citizens' expectations and recommendations in the context of the

Conference on the Future of Europe, and presenting the European Parliament's response. The briefing focuses oncitizens' proposals relating to EU common values, especially the rule of law. Citizens have placed EU values, includingdemocracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, at the core of a common European identity, anddiscussed ways to enhance and protect these values. They have highlighted the need to deepen people's awarenessand understanding of these values, and encourage dialogue on them. They believe that democratic culture and respectfor fundamental rights and the rule of law should be strengthened, and that Member States' performance should bemonitored closely against the benchmark of EU values. They have called for the procedure under Article 7 of theTreaty on European Union (TEU) to be made more effective, and for the General Conditionality Regulation to beapplied without delay. Parliament's resolutions and input to the legislative process leading to the adoption of theGeneral Conditionality Regulation are largely in tune with citizens' sentiments. Parliament has called repeatedly for theestablishment of a comprehensive EU pact on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. In its feedback to theCommission's annual rule of law reports, Parliament has called for more country-specific recommendations with a clearblueprint for action. Parliament has been very critical of the Commission for unnecessarily delaying the application ofthe General Conditionality Regulation. It has also firmly upheld the primacy of EU law: the cornerstone of the rule oflaw in the EU and the key prerequisite for EU integration.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 50

The future of data protection and privacy: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens'expectations

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 27-04-2022

Awtur MILDEBRATH Hendrik AlexanderQasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaKelma għat-tiftix bijometrika | data personali | dritt informatiku | konferenza Ewropea | protezzjoni tad-data | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur |

protezzjoni tal-privatezza | regolament (UE) | ġbir ta' dejtaSommarju This is the fifth briefing within a series benchmarking Parliament's activities against citizens' expectations submitted to

the Conference on the Future of Europe. In a number of different ways, citizens seized the opportunity to call for a highlevel of data protection and privacy, as well as their rigorous implementation. They recommend measures promotingindustry compliance, increasing citizens' control over data, enhancing enforcement and limiting the monitoring, profilingand manipulation of citizens by private and public actors. As this briefing demonstrates, Parliament has largely keptpace with citizens' concerns by taking initiatives in areas where contributing citizens identified a need for action.

Briefing EN

Environmental crime directiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-04-2022Awtur HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix dritt ambjentali | dritt kriminali | kooperazzjoni transfruntiera | kooperazzjoni ġudizzjarja tal-UE | offiża ambjentali | piena

| proposta (UE) | protezzjoni ambjentali | responsabilità kriminali | statistika ambjentali | studju tal-impatt | ġlieda kontral-kriminalità

Sommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impactassessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, which was submitted on 15 December 2021 andreferred to the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). Despite the lack of systematic statisticaldata, environmental, social and economic damage caused by environmental crimes has been widely documented.Directive 2008/99/EC (the Environmental Crime Directive, ECD) was aimed primarily at improving environmentalprotection by means of harmonised criminal legislation. In 2020, the evaluation of the ECD showed that legalshortcomings and enforcement gaps had affected its effectiveness in deterring environmental crime in all its forms. Itsrevision, planned in the 2021 Commission work programme, underpins the Commission's priorities around the GreenDeal and the biodiversity strategy The European Parliament has called on the Commission to tackle environmentalcrime in its 2014 resolution on wildlife crime and its 2013 resolution on organised crime and corruption. The proposal isaccompanied by a communication on stepping up the fight against environmental crime.

Briefing EN

Nutrient profiles: A 'farm to fork' strategy initiative takes shapeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-04-2022Awtur LAANINEN Tarja

Qasam tematiku Is-Sikurezza tal-IkelKelma għat-tiftix denominazzjoni tal-prodott | informazzjoni għall-konsumatur | nutrizzjoni | prodott alimentari | saħħa pubblika |

strateġija tal-UE | tikkettar | vitamina | xaħam | zokkorSommarju The European Commission is planning to establish 'nutrient profiles', that is, maximum amounts for nutrients such as

fat, sugar and/or salt in foods, above which the use of nutrition or health claims would be restricted or forbidden. Forexample, breakfast cereals exceeding a sugar limit could no longer advertise their fibre or vitamin content. TheCommission was already tasked with setting nutrient profiles to restrict the promotion of food high in fat, sugar and/orsalt under the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulation ('Claims Regulation') adopted in 2006. Now, in accordance withthe action plan accompanying the EU's 'farm to fork' strategy, the Commission will submit a proposal on nutrientprofiles by the end of 2022. The proposal will form part of a wider package revising EU legislation on food informationsupplied to consumers, together with proposals on front-of-pack nutrition labelling, origin labelling, date marking, andlabelling of alcoholic beverages. In the same package, the Commission also intends to solve a problem that has longbeen puzzling manufacturers and consumers in the herbal and plant products market, namely, that the same productcan be classified both as a herbal medicine and as a food, depending on the Member State in which it is sold. Whilemost consumer organisations and health advocates strongly support the idea of introducing nutrient profiles,opponents caution against overly simplistic labels that punish certain food groups and lead health-consciousindividuals to avoid them. The European Parliament has stressed that food information is a potent tool for empoweringconsumers.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 51

Asylum, borders and migration: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-04-2022Awtur ATANASSOV Nikolai | MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-Margarita | ORAV Anita

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix dritt għall-ażil | Ewropa taċ-ċittadini | Frontex | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | integrazzjoni tal-migranti | konferenza Ewropea

| kontroll fuq il-fruntiera | kontroll tal-migrazzjoni | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | tfal mhux akkumpanjati | ċittadintal-UE

Sommarju The Conference on the Future of Europe was designed to give citizens a say about their vision for the EU, by means ofa multilingual digital platform and citizens' panels. The panels are transnational forums, gathering citizens from the EUMember States to discuss their ideas for the future of the Union and make recommendations on how the EU could beimproved. The resulting proposals are diverse and constructive. The suggestions for the future range from adjustmentsof legislation in force to complete overhaul of current systems in an effort to build a more efficient, integrated Union thatis closer to its citizens. This briefing focuses on some of the recommendations made by Panel 4 (EU in theworld/migration), suggestions and comments uploaded onto the multilingual digital platform, and proposals broughtforward by the European Youth Event. The topics cover EU policy on asylum, irregular migration and border protection,and the role of EU agencies in this area. Participants also considered the future of legal migration and integration ofmigrants in the EU. The second part of the briefing gives and overview of the European Parliament's position on thesetopics, and its call for change in the fields where citizens have asked for more EU action. This is the briefing in a serieslooking at citizens' expectations in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe. The first briefing looked atexpectations having mainly a constitutional and institutional impact, i.e. suggestions to reform the EU institutional set-up, improve the EU decision-making process, achieve closer cooperation among Member States, and strengthenParliament's prerogatives. The second one looked at proposals to enhance citizens' participation to the Europeanproject, through consultations, petitions, European Citizens Initiatives and referendums.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Schengen Borders CodeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-04-2022Awtur DUMBRAVA Costica

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti LegaliKelma għat-tiftix fruntiera esterna tal-UE | fruntiera interna tal-UE | Ftehim ta’ Schengen | kontroll fuq il-fruntiera | migrant | migrazzjoni

illegali | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | proposta (UE) | vjaġġarSommarju In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code, which

lays down the rules governing controls at the EU internal and external borders. While debates on the reform ofSchengen have been going on for a while, recent challenges related to the coronavirus pandemic on the one hand,and attempts to instrumentalise migrants as a way to put pressure on the EU's external borders, on the other, havecreated new momentum for reform. The Commission's proposal aims to improve the Schengen system's resilience toserious threats, and to adapt it to new challenges. It introduces a new coordination mechanism to deal with healththreats at the external borders and a new Schengen safeguard mechanism to provide a common response at theinternal borders in situations of threats affecting Member States, including the possibility to directly transfer irregularmigrants apprehended at the internal borders back to the competent authorities in the EU country from which it isassumed they just came, without undergoing an individual assessment. The proposal, which falls under the ordinarylegislative procedure, is at the initial stage of the legislative process. In the European Parliament, the proposal hasbeen assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Preliminary discussions have alsotaken place in the Council. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Article 17 TFEU: Dialogue with churches, and religious and philosophical organisationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-04-2022Awtur PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Qasam tematiku Il-Kultura | L-EdukazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix faqar | grupp reliġjuż | istituzzjoni reliġjuża | knisja | relazzjonijiet bejn il-knisja u l-Istat | Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament

tal-UESommarju The EU institutions engage in regular structured dialogue with representatives of churches, and religious, non-

confessional and philosophical organisations, on the basis of Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union (TFEU). This dialogue, which takes the form of high-level meetings or working-level discussions, isfocused on policy issues on the European agenda. It traces its origins to earlier initiatives, such as that launched in1994 by Jacques Delors – 'A soul for Europe' – which aimed to find ways to build an ethical, moral and spiritualdimension into European integration and policy-shaping. The draft Constitutional Treaty of 2004 included provisions onregular, open and transparent dialogue between EU institutions, and representatives of churches and religiouscommunities, and of non-confessional or philosophical communities. Although the Constitutional Treaty was rejected inreferendums in France and the Netherlands, its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2007 and in force sinceDecember 2009, preserved the same provisions in its Article 17 TFEU. The European Parliament has stressed theimportance of constant dialogue among, and with, religious and non-confessional and philosophical communities.Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it sought to give substance to the provisions of Article 17 TFEU,primarily through organising dialogue on subjects of interest for the EU and its citizens. The European Commissionand the Council also hold regular Article 17 TFEU dialogue sessions and high-level meetings. This is a further updatedversion of a briefing last issued in November 2020.

Briefing EN, FR

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 52

Human development in Putin's Russia: What the data tell usTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-04-2022Awtur PICHON Eric | RUSSELL Martin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix benesseri soċjali | il-kwistjoni tal-Krimea | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | żvilupp ekonomiku | żvilupp tal-

bniedemSommarju While the UN Human Development Index, which assesses progress in the standard of living, health and education,

ranks Russia among the 'very high human development' countries, other data suggest a more nuanced reality. Russiahas gone from Soviet-era egalitarianism to extremes of wealth and poverty. Economic growth during the first decadeunder Vladimir Putin's leadership slightly reduced the gap between rich and poor, but inequality is still higher than inmost developed countries. Factors such as corruption and low taxes for the rich exacerbate the income gap. Freepublic healthcare and a relatively inclusive education system apparently mitigate inequality. However, many hospitalsare ill-equipped, and universities struggle to compare with foreign counterparts. Since 2014 and the invasion ofCrimea, Russians' living conditions have deteriorated. Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and the imposition ofWestern sanctions is already placing a burden on the poorest members of Russian society, as prices increase andstaple goods begin to run out. The social contract between Russians and Putin, often considered as one in whichcitizens ceded certain freedoms and civil liberties in exchange for stability and prosperity, is now under strain. Thisbriefing is partly based on and updates previous EPRS publications on socioeconomic inequality and on the educationsystem.

Briefing EN

Multilateral initiatives for upholding human rights in digital technologies: A task for the UN or for liberaldemocracies?

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 21-04-2022

Awtur ZAMFIR IonelQasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Drittijiet tal-BniedemKelma għat-tiftix drittijiet tal-bniedem | impatt soċjali | impatt tat-teknoloġija tal-informatika | intelliġenza artifiċjali | teknoloġija diġitali |

teknoloġija tal-informazzjoni | teknoloġija ġdidaSommarju With their rapid advancement in recent times, digital technologies have undeniably had major positive and also

negative impacts on human rights. They have offered people better opportunities to communicate and exchangeinformation, thereby empowering them to exercise their right to freedom of expression and association, among others,and to draw public attention to human rights violations. On the other hand, they have enabled disinformation, cyber-surveillance and abusive behaviour, such as hate speech, cyber-crime and misuse of personal data. There is a broadconsensus that the same human rights and human rights obligations that apply offline also apply in the digitalenvironment. However, new technologies are creating a fundamentally different paradigm for human interaction, andthe current international human rights framework has conceptual gaps. The main question for the international debateis how to fill these gaps. Through soft ethical standards or binding rules? What is the best forum for this? While the UNis best placed, given its universal scope, it has been weakened by the actions of authoritarian states. Multilateralcoalitions of democratic states are an alternative avenue, but they bring a risk of fragmentation of the global space fordigital technologies. When looking at how human rights play out in the digital context, it is important to carefullybalance the benefits and risks of new technologies, to apply a multi-stakeholder approach, and to bear in mind thathuman rights obligations, while still incumbent on states as the main duty bearers, also apply to businesses,particularly those behind new technological developments. The EU is involved in the discussions on the above issues,both in the UN and in coalitions of liberal democracies. In parallel, the EU is working on developing guidance andbinding norms on how human rights obligations apply at EU and national level with respect to the digital environment.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Ecodesign DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-04-2022Awtur BACIAN Izabela Cristina

Qasam tematiku It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-Liġi | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Ambjent | L-Enerġija | L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika

Kelma għat-tiftix dritt ambjentali | ekodisinn | ekonomija ċirkolari | ekotikketta | impatt ambjentali | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | tikketta tal-enerġija tal-UE

Sommarju Ecodesign and energy labelling policies play an important role in the decarbonisation of the energy system. Ecodesignbans the least-efficient products from the market, while energy labelling guides consumers towards the most energyefficient products. While the Ecodesign Directive focused largely on energy aspects, its revision became necessary inlight of the transition to a circular economy where the use of natural resources is reassessed to maximise their valueand minimise their waste. The recently proposed regulation on ecodesign for sustainable products will extend thescope to a wider range of products, strengthen sustainability and circularity criteria, and introduce new informationrequirements for products. Following the adoption of the regulation, the Ecodesign Directive will be repealed. The newlegal framework aims to put in place a harmonised set of rules for sustainable products across all Member States andensure a level-playing field for businesses.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 53

Situation in Lebanon: Severe and prolonged economic depressionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-04-2022Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix | JONGBERG Kirsten

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix il-Libanu | impatt soċjali | kundizzjoni soċjoekonomika | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | reċessjoni ekonomika | sitwazzjoni

ekonomika | sitwazzjoni finanzjarjaSommarju The Lebanese government's decision to impose new taxes in October 2019 sparked nation-wide protests by a

population exhausted by poor public services, worried about increasing national debt and frustrated by widespreadcorruption. Since then, Lebanese politics have been marked by political deadlock that has prevented successivegovernments from implementing urgent reforms. The devastating explosion in the port of Beirut on 4 August 2020 onlyexacerbated the situation. By the time Prime Minister Najib Mikati presented his new government on 10 September2021, the country had sunk deeply into a financial and economic crisis. Lebanon's severe and prolonged economicdepression is, according to the World Bank, 'likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top 3, most severe crisis episodesglobally since the mid-nineteenth century'. Poverty in Lebanon has spread dramatically over the past year and nowaffects about 74 % of the population. Lebanon is host to approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 90 % of whom livein extreme poverty. There are also over 210 000 other refugees. The Lebanese pound has lost 90 % of its value in thepast two years, most people have only two hours of electricity per day, and the healthcare sector is at breaking point.The middle class has been decimated, with many leaving the country or planning to do so. There is concern thatparliamentary elections scheduled for May 2022 may be postponed, further prolonging the political deadlock that ispreventing the implementation of critical reforms. The war in Ukraine is meanwhile expected to have a serious impacton Lebanon, which imports around 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia. The EU has supported Lebanon with€2.77 billion over the past decade, to help the country However, in July 2021, the Council adopted a framework fortargeted restrictive measures, offering the possibility to impose sanctions on persons and entities responsible forundermining democracy or the rule of law in Lebanon. The European Parliament has called Lebanon's presentsituation a 'man-made disaster caused by a handful of men across the political class'.

Briefing EN, FR

Minimising the risk of deforestation and forest degradation associated with products placed on the EUmarket and exported from the EU

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 13-04-2022

Awtur VIKOLAINEN VeraQasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix agrosilvikultura | bijodiversità | deforestazzjoni | impatt ambjentali | silvikultura | strateġija tal-UE

Sommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impactassessment (IA) accompanying the proposal for an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven globaldeforestation, submitted on 17 November 2021 and referred to the European Parliament's Committee on Environment,Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The proposal was first announced in the 2019 Commission communication onStepping up EU action to protect and restore the world's forests, and then confirmed in the European Green Deal, the2030 EU biodiversity strategy and the 'farm to fork' strategy. On 22 October 2020, on the basis of an own-initiativereport, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, which was accompanied by a European added valueassessment. The resolution calls on the Commission to submit a proposal for an EU legal framework to halt andreverse EU-driven global deforestation. Following up on this request, the Commission included the present proposal inits 2021 work programme and the 2021 joint declaration on legislative priorities.

Briefing EN

Nominations for Members of the European Court of Auditors (Cyprus and Malta)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-04-2022Awtur FRANKE Michaela

Awtur estern Michaela Franke Adam NugentQasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuKelma għat-tiftix aġent (UE) | il-Polonja | Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri | kandidat | l-Awstrija | l-Irlanda | Malta | uffiċjal Ewropew | Ċipru

Sommarju As set out in Article 285 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the European Court ofAuditors (ECA) shall consist of one national of each Member State. Article 286 (2) TFEU further specifies that eachMember State has the right to propose its candidate. The Council then adopts the list of Members as proposed by theMember States. Often, this is a partial renewal of the Court - only one or a few Members are appointed, as themandates of the Members may expire at different points in time. The Council can only act after consulting theEuropean Parliament; in practice, the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) is responsible and the Member-designate of the ECA makes a statement before the committee and has to answer its questions. CONT then votes onthe nomination and thus issues a recommendation to plenary, which votes within two months of receipt of thenomination. In case of an unfavourable opinion, the President shall ask the Council to withdraw its nomination and tosubmit a new nomination (Rule 129 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure). However, Parliament’s opinion is not binding forthe Council.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 54

Solidarity and wealth taxTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-04-2022Awtur SCHWARCZ András

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | faqar | klassi soċjalment żvantaġġata | konsegwenza ekonomika | marda tal-coronavirus | politika fiskali |

riżorsi proprji | rkupru ekonomiku | taxxa fuq il-ġid | ġidSommarju In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic costs of the lockdown became apparent. Most countries needed

to step up health and social spending, while also introducing stimulus packages as their tax revenues fell. This has ledto increased budget deficits and sovereign debt. Additional revenue streams need to be found in the near future inorder to pay back this debt.

Briefing EN

PETI Fact-finding visit to Baleares, Spain - 11 - 13 April 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-04-2022Awtur FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | HEEZEN JOHANNES

Qasam tematiku Il-Petizzjonijiet lill-Parlament Ewropew | Il-Politika Soċjali | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix direttiva (UE) | dritt nazzjonali | drittijiet ta-tfal | Gżejjer Baleariċi | pedofelija | protezzjoni tat-tfal | Spanja | vjolenza

sesswali | ġlieda kontra l-kriminalitàSommarju The PETI Committee decided to organise a fact-finding visit to Palma de Mallorca, Baleares (Spain) from 11 to 13 April

2022 concerning several petitions on alleged mistreatment of minors under foster care in Mallorca. This briefingdescribes the legislation in place, the system of guardianship of minors in Spain, the Majorcan Institute of Socialaffairs, the Natzaret Foundation, the timeline of events and the Report of the Commission of Experts on cases ofsexual abuse and exploitation and Sexual Exploitation of Children of minors with a legal measure of protection ofMallorca.

Briefing EN

Sustainable maritime fuels - 'Fit for 55' package: the FuelEU Maritime proposalTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-04-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku It-Trasport | L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix fjuwil fossili | fjuwil marin | newtralità karbonika | proposta (UE) | strateġija tal-UE | tniġġis mill-vapuri | traffiku marittimu

Sommarju In July 2021, the European Commission put forward the 'fit for 55' package of legislative proposals, aimed at ensuringthe success of the European Green Deal. The FuelEU Maritime regulation is one of these proposals and, together withfour other proposals, it seeks to steer the EU maritime sector towards decarbonisation. In the European Parliament,the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) leads the work on this file. On 4 April 2022, the rapporteur JörgenWarborn put forward his draft report which will be considered during the TRAN meeting later in April. To support theuptake of sustainable maritime fuels, the Commission proposes to limit the carbon intensity of the energy used onboard ships. Accordingly, the proposal sets up a fuel standard for ships and introduces a requirement for the mostpolluting ship types to use onshore electricity when at berth. It puts the responsibility for compliance on the shippingcompany. The legislative outcome of this proposal will be closely linked to the simultaneously proposed rules onincluding the maritime sector in the EU emissions trading system, as well as those on alternative fuels infrastructure,energy taxation and renewable energy. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Sustainable maritime fuels - 'Fit for 55' package: the FuelEU Maritime proposal

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 55

Towards deforestation-free commodities and products in the EUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-04-2022Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix bestjam | bijodiversità | bijoenerġija | deforestazzjoni | esportazzjoni (UE) | fażola tas-sojja | kafè | kawkaw | prodott tal-

injam | proposta (UE) | suq tal-komoditajiet | żejt veġetaliSommarju On 17 November 2021, the European Commission tabled a legislative proposal aimed at curbing deforestation and

forest degradation driven by the expansion of agricultural land used to produce specific commodities, namely cattle,cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soya and wood. Following up on a 2020 European Parliament resolution, which called forregulatory action to tackle EU-driven global deforestation, the proposal would impose due diligence obligations onoperators placing these commodities and some derived products on the EU market, or exporting them from the EU.Member States would be responsible for enforcement, and for setting penalties in case of non-compliance. To facilitatedue diligence and control, a benchmarking system would identify countries as presenting a low, standard or high risk ofproducing non-compliant commodities or products. Obligations for operators and national authorities would varyaccording to the level of risk assigned to the country of production. While generally supporting the proposal,stakeholders have raised some issues, regarding for instance the commodities covered, the protection of humanrights, the impacts of the country benchmarking on trade relationships, and the role of third-party certification. In theParliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, responsible for the file, is expected toconsider its rapporteur's draft report in April 2022. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Review of the Waste Shipment RegulationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-04-2022Awtur VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix ekonomija ċirkolari | esportazzjoni (UE) | immaniġġjar tal-iskart | importazzjoni (UE) | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni

ambjentali | saħħa pubblika | skart tal-esportazzjoni | studju tal-impatt | trasport transfruntier | trasport ġewwa l-UESommarju The IA convincingly illustrates the identified problems, although their scale is not always supported by estimates, or the

source of some of the estimates is not provided. When discussing how the situation would evolve without furtheraction, the IA neither discusses the evolution of each problem identified nor any other existing or upcoming EUinitiatives that could lead to improvements. The general objectives appear to be consistent with the problems identified,and the specific objectives comply broadly with the SMART criteria. The retained options tackle the problems' driversidentified progressively, although it is unclear why some of the policy measures identified under Options 2 or 3 werenot taken up under the preferred Option 4. The IA appears to assess the main economic, social, and environmentalimpacts for each policy measure comprehensively, quantifying them whenever possible, and otherwise providing aqualitative assessment. However, the analysis on SMEs is quite limited, and the IA does not provide any explanationas to why competitiveness was not considered. Moreover, despite it likely being relevant, the IA does not appear tohave dealt with the impact on third/developing countries sufficiently and systematically. Overall, the monitoringframework envisaged appears to be adequate, although more clarity as to the choice of identifying indicators for onlytwo specific objectives would have been beneficial. Stakeholders were consulted extensively and their opinionssystematically reported. The efforts undertaken to provide quantitative support for the analysis performed appear to beconvincing, and the IA appears to have addressed the RSB's comments satisfactorily. Finally, the proposal appears tobe consistent with the analysis carried out in the IA.

Briefing EN

Greece's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-04-2022Awtur PARI MARIANNA

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix il-Greċja | investiment tal-UE | politika ekonomika | politika finanzjarja | riforma ekonomika | rkupru ekonomiku

Sommarju Before the pandemic, the Greek economy was just getting back onto a positive path, following reforms implementedunder the macroeconomic adjustment programmes. Action to address the country's specific characteristics is now allthe more important since the -8.2 % downturn of 2020. Greece was among the first four countries to submit its nationalrecovery and resilience plan (NRRP) in April 2021. The plan envisages investments and reforms totalling €30.5 billion,to be implemented up to 2026, with €17.8 billion to be financed from non-repayable financial support (grants) and€12.7 billion, the maximum possible allocation, from loans. The plan corresponds to 4.2 % of the €723.8 billionRecovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and represents 16.7 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019(the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). The grants alone represent 9.7 % of the country's GDP, and overall thisis the sixth biggest national plan. Greece is the biggest per capita grant beneficiary, receiving €1 666 in grants perperson. The Greek plan was approved by the Council on 13 July 2021, which allowed the disbursement of the pre-financing payment of €4 billion to Greece on 9 August 2021. Further disbursements will be made up until 2026, uponfulfilment of the agreed milestones and targets. Grants are scheduled in nine equal instalments, and loans in six equalinstalments. A first payment request was submitted by Greece on 29 December 2021 for the fulfilment of 15milestones. On 7 January 2022, implementation had begun of 103 measures, corresponding to €6.1 billion. TheEuropean Parliament, which supported an EU recovery instrument from the start of the pandemic, is involved througha regular, structured dialogue with the Commission and the Council, and is competent to scrutinise its implementation.This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updatedat key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EL, EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 56

Solvency II reviewTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-04-2022Awtur GIRARD VERONIQUE

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | KwistjonijietFinanzjarji u Bankarji

Kelma għat-tiftix Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u tal-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol | investiment tal-UE | kumpanija tal-assigurazzjoni |solvenza finanzjarja | studju tal-impatt

Sommarju The IA covers two Commission proposals representing the biggest amendment to date of the Solvency II framework,which came into force in the EU in 2016. Important parts of the framework laid down in delegated and implementingacts will be updated by the Commission at a later stage. This IA builds on a broad consultation of stakeholders, and onextensive advice from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). In addition to variousreports from EIOPA including a holistic IA, the IA draws on a technical report from the JRC and an external study,which are adequately referenced and publicly accessible. The objectives are directly linked to the problems identified inthe IA and their consequences. The Solvency II review aims to increase policyholders' protection as well as theinsurers' contribution to the long-term green financing of the economy, to contribute to financial stability, and topreserve the international competitiveness of the EU insurance industry. The preferred options are in line with EIOPA'sadvice, except for the policy dimension related to proportionality, where the IA explains why the preferred optiondeviates from EIOPA's recommendation. The IA shows how the combination of preferred options is expected tocontribute to the achievement of the objectives identified. The IA assesses and compares the potential impacts of theoptions presented to achieve these objectives in a systematic way. In addition, the IA describes the potential positiveimpact of the preferred options on SMEs. The IA also explains how the proposed Solvency II review is expected toimprove proportionality and to simplify the regulatory framework. The IA mainly focuses on the economic impacts ofthe initiative. The main social impact assessed by the IA concerns the expected improvement of policyholderprotection. Potential environmental impacts relating to enhanced green financing, could have been more clearlyaddressed in the IA.

Briefing EN

Multilingualism: The language of the European UnionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-04-2022Awtur KATSAROVA Ivana

Qasam tematiku Il-Kultura | L-EdukazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix il-politika lingwistika | lingwa Ewropea | lingwa uffiċjali | multilingwiżmu

Sommarju Some 7 000 languages are spoken globally today. However, half of the world's population shares just six nativelanguages, and some 90 % of all languages may be replaced by dominant ones by the end of the century. Theharmonious co-existence of 24 official languages is one of the most distinctive features of the European project.Multilingualism is not only an expression of the EU countries' cultural identities, it also helps preserve democracy,transparency and accountability. No legislation can enter into force until it has been translated into all official languagesand published in the Official Journal of the EU. Crucially, the provisions relating to the EU language regime can only bechanged by a unanimous vote in the Council of the EU. The EU is committed to promoting language learning but haslimited influence over educational and language policies, as these are the responsibility of the individual EU countries.In 2016, over one third (35.4 %) of adults in the EU-28 did not know any foreign languages. A similar proportion (35.2%) declared that they knew one foreign language, while just over one fifth (21 %) said they knew two foreignlanguages. The European Parliament is committed to ensuring the highest possible degree of multilingualism in itswork. Based on the 24 official languages that constitute the public face of the EU, the total number of linguisticcombinations rises to 552, since each language can be translated into the 23 others. Currently, over 600 staffemployed in translation and over 270 in interpreting take care of the translation and interpretation needs of the 705Members of the European Parliament. Internally, the EU institutions mostly use just three working languages: English,French and German. The overall cost for delivering translation and interpreting services in the EU institutions is around€1 billion per year, which represents less than 1 % of the EU budget or just over €2 per citizen. Following the successof the European Year of Languages (2001), the Council of Europe designated 26 September as the European Day ofLanguages. This is an update of a briefing published in 2019.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 57

Strengthening citizens' participation: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-04-2022Awtur DEL MONTE Micaela | KOTANIDIS Silvia

Qasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaKelma għat-tiftix Inizjattiva taċ-ċittadini Ewropej | Parlament Ewropew | promozzjoni tal-kunċett Ewropew | rakkomandazzjoni | ċittadin

tal-UESommarju Aiming to forge a closer relationship between EU citizens and the EU integration project, the Conference on the Future

of Europe gave 800 citizens gathered in four panels the opportunity to discuss and formulate recommendations for theEU institutions to follow up. Debated in both the conference plenary and the conference working groups, theserecommendations are intended to permeate the whole discussion within the conference. With Panel 2 having issuedthe first set of recommendations in December 2021, the debate has begun, with a focus on how to meet citizens'expectations. It will also discuss how to take the EU project forward in a way that is supported by the variousinstitutions involved in the conference, including representatives of Member States and EU institutions, and membersof national parliaments. A closer look at these recommendations reveals that some of the citizens' panelrecommendations address matters that have already been tackled by European Parliament resolutions. Others arequite close to positions and ideas expressed by Parliament in other ways. This briefing focuses on recommendationswhich propose enhanced public participation in the European project, through consultations, petitions, Europeancitizens' initiatives and referendums. This is the second in a series of briefings looking at citizens' recommendations inthe context of the Conference on the Future of Europe. The first looked at recommendations with an institutionalimpact, i.e. ways to reform the EU's institutional set-up, improve the EU decision-making process, achieve closercooperation among Member States and strengthen Parliament's prerogatives.

Briefing EN

Russia’s war on Ukraine in international law and human rights bodies: Bringing institutions back inTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-04-2022Awtur LERCH Marika

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Governanza Dinjija | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix dritt internazzjonali dwar id-drittijiet tal-bniedem | dritt kriminali internazzjonali | gwerra | ir-Russja | Kunsill tad-Drittijiet

tal-Bniedem tan-NU | l-Ukraina | OSKE | Qorti Ewropea tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Qorti Internazzjonali Kriminali |ġuriżdizzjoni

Sommarju In the midst of war, human rights and international law institutions have responded with unprecedented speed to theunfolding crisis, not least due to the strong engagement of the Ukraine government in multilateral fora. While theseinstitutions can deliver little immediate relief for Ukraine citizens, the initiatives have important political functions: theyshow the political and legal alternatives to the logic of war chosen by the Russian government; they contribute toformalising international consensus and providing independent legal assessments of the attack; and, most importantly,they prepare the ground to ensure accountability for crimes committed in the context of the war. .

Briefing EN

Bosnia and Herzegovina - Electoral and constitutional reforms: Political and legal analysis of the Ljubićcase and related legal decisions

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 07-04-2022

Awtur STANICEK BRANISLAVQasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ftehim ta' stabbiliment u assoċjazzjoni | il-Bożnja u Ħerzegovina | integrazzjoni Ewropea | riforma elettorali

Sommarju Stabilisation of the internal political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that celebrated the 30th anniversaryof its independence on 1 March 2022 but risks internal implosion, remains a priority for the European Union. To thisend, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, called for ‘urgent progress in the electoral andconstitutional reforms’ that are also important ahead of the general elections scheduled for 2 October 2022. This viewechoed the European Parliament’s resolution on the 2019-2020 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina,adopted on 24 June 2021, that called on Bosnia’s authorities ‘to resume inclusive negotiations on electoral reforms’,and regretted the ‘reluctance to implement these rulings by eliminating all forms of inequality and discrimination in theelectoral process’. In the context of the current political crisis that is threatening the constitutional settlement in Bosniaand Herzegovina (BiH), an analysis of the Ljubić case (2016) and associated cases, in particular the Sejdić-Finci case(2009) and the Zornić case (2014), can be of great relevance. Such analysis leads to new ways of understanding thecountry at a time of increased international interest in it, not least in the context of international support for its Europeanperspective and for regional cooperation. The Ljubić case’s relationship to other legal decisions by the ConstitutionalCourt of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CC BiH) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) connects the rights ofconstituent peoples with universal human rights. The analysis of the political and legal context of the CC BiH andECtHR decisions makes it clear that effective implementation of these decisions depends on resolving the internalpolitical stalemate in BiH that currently makes any amendment of the Dayton Constitution an unattainable objective.

Briefing DE, EN, FR, HR

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 58

The Ukraine war and energy supply [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-04-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix awtosuffiċjenza enerġetika | grupp ta' riflessjoni | gwerra | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | miżura restrittiva tal-UE | prezz tal-

enerġija | provvista tal-enerġijaSommarju Russia’s war on Ukraine has boosted the already high prices of oil and gas in the European Union, posing a question

mark over sustainable deliveries of energy to the bloc. The EU is heavily dependent on Russia for its oil and gas. In2021, two-fifths of the gas Europeans burned came from Russia. More than a quarter of the EU’s imported crude oilcame from the country. The European Commission has announced plans to cut the EU’s dependence on Russian gasby two-thirds this year. Meanwhile, Russia has demanded that it is paid for its gas in roubles, rather than in euros ordollars, as stated in the contracts. The G-7 industrialised countries have dismissed the plan. EU Member States aredivided over including a ban on energy imports from Russia among sanctions imposed on Moscow. Such an embargowould put a squeeze on European households, probably leading to gas rationing. However, it would cut Russia offfrom a major source of the hard currency that it uses in part to finance the war. This note gathers links to the recentpublications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and European energymarkets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanksare Thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

EU-Ukraine trade and investment relations and the impact of Russia’s warTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-04-2022Awtur IGLER WOLFGANG | KRAMER Lorenz

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliKelma għat-tiftix danni tal-gwerra | gwerra | impatt soċjali | katina tal-provvista | konsegwenza ekonomika | l-Ukraina | relazzjonijiet

kummerċjali | relazzjonijiet tal-UESommarju The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together: it promotes

deeper political ties, stronger economic links and the respect for common values. The Agreement was negotiatedbetween 2007 and 2011, signed in 2014, and entered into force on 1 September 2017 after unanimous ratification byEU Member States. The Association Agreement includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)between the EU and Ukraine that has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016. By 2020, the EU had becomeUkraine’s most important export market and principal source of imports, dwarfing Ukraine’s second partner – China –and placing Russia a distant third. Since the Russian Federation launched its military invasion of Ukraine on 24February 2022, EU-Ukraine trade and investment relations have started to experience constraints, with someEuropean (car) manufacturers reporting disturbances and temporarily halting production due to a lack of Ukrainiancomponents. Ukraine’s future trade prospects will depend not only on its trade partners, but also on rebuilding thephysical damage the country has suffered, and on the status of its ports

Briefing EN

Digital services actTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-04-2022Awtur MADIEGA Tambiama André

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaKelma għat-tiftix cloud computing | direttiva (UE) | internet | kummerċ elettroniku | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur |

provdiment ta’ servizzi | suq uniku diġitali | teknoloġija diġitali | tixrid ta' informazzjoniSommarju The rules governing the provision of digital services in the EU have remained largely unchanged since the adoption of

the e-Commerce Directive in 2000, while digital technologies and business models continue to evolve rapidly and newsocietal challenges are emerging, such as the spread of counterfeit goods, hate speech and disinformation online.Against this backdrop, the European Commission tabled a new legislative proposal on a digital services act inDecember 2020. The proposal aims at amending the e-Commerce Directive and sets out a horizontal framework forcontent moderation of the EU online space. Interinstitutional negotiations between the Commission, the EuropeanParliament and the Council seeking to reach an agreement on a compromise text started in January 2022.Controversial issues currently being discussed by the co legislators include the scope of the new regulation, theenforcement mechanisms proposed, and to what extent targeted advertising and techniques to influence users'behaviour such as 'dark patterns' should be curbed. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 59

Unaccompanied migrant children in GreeceTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-04-2022Awtur MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-Margarita

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix dritt għall-ażil | drittijiet ta-tfal | għajnuna lir-refuġjati | il-Greċja | migrant | persuna li tfittex asil | politika dwar il-

migrazzjoni tal-UE | protezzjoni tat-tfal | risistemazzjoni ta’ persuni | tfal mhux akkumpanjatiSommarju Since the beginning of the migratory crisis in 2015, growing numbers of unaccompanied children have been seeking

protection in Europe. With increased migratory pressure in Greece along the EU's external border with Turkey at thebeginning of 2020, and following the Greek government's official request for support, the European Commissionlaunched a relocation scheme to speed up relocation of unaccompanied minors from the Greek islands to other EUMember States. Human rights organisations had denounced the precarious and difficult conditions in whichunaccompanied minors had been living in the Greek hotspots, calling for structural solutions in the form of moresolidarity and responsibility sharing among EU Member States, and a coordinated, child rights-based approach toaddressing the many gaps in the protection afforded to unaccompanied children arriving in Europe. However, recentlegislative changes in Greece, such as the establishment of the Special Secretariat for the Protection ofUnaccompanied Minors (SSPUAM) and a new relocation scheme, have served to improve the situation ofunaccompanied minors in the country drastically. Measures include the creation of an effective and sustainable childprotection system, better reception conditions, and changes to the accommodation system for unaccompanied minors.At the end of 2020, a new law put an end to the practice of detaining unaccompanied children on the sole grounds thatthey were homeless. This was followed in January 2021 by the introduction of an emergency response mechanismthat offers children support and a safety net. This publication is an update of a briefing of May 2020 by Ingeborg Odink.

Briefing EN

Goods vehicles hired without driversTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-04-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix kiri ta’ veikoli | proposta (UE) | proċedura leġislattiva ordinarja | rapport | Stat Membru tal-UE | trasport stradali |

trasport ġewwa l-UE | ġarr ta’ merkanzijaSommarju The current EU rules provide to haulage companies the possibility to use hired vehicles, but also allow Member States

to restrict this. As part of the 2017 road transport mobility package, the European Commission proposed to soften theexisting restrictions and establish a uniform regulatory framework, which would give transport operators across the EUequal access to the market for hired goods vehicles. As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council haveagreed new rules in October 2021. Member States will not be allowed to restrict, on their territories, the use of avehicle hired by a haulage company established in another Member State. However, they will still be able to restrict, toa certain degree, the use of vehicles that their own companies hire in another Member State. EU Member States willhave 14 months to adapt their legislation before the rules enter into force. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Understanding EU action on Roma inclusionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-04-2022Awtur LECERF Marie

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix azzjoni tal-UE | diskriminazzjoni etnika | diskriminazzjoni razzjali | integrazzjoni soċjali | marġinalizzazzjoni | rapport |

Rom | Soċjetà ċiviliSommarju The Roma are Europe's largest ethnic minority. Out of an estimated total of 10 to12 million Roma in Europe as a

whole, some 6 million live in the European Union (EU), most of whom are citizens of an EU Member State. Asignificant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discriminationand segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education, and difficulties in entering thelabour market, result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people. Since the mid-1990s, theEuropean Union has stressed the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, a key EU initiative emerged with theadoption of an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020, aimed at tackling the socio-economic exclusion of, and discrimination against, Roma by promoting equal access in four key areas: education,employment, health, and housing. As the framework had come to an end, the Commission adopted 'A union ofequality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation' (2021 2030) in early October 2020.Through this new strategy, Member States are invited to tackle the disproportionate impact of the pandemic. In March2021, the Council adopted a recommendation on Roma equality, inclusion and participation, replacing an earlier onefrom 2013. This recommendation encourages Member States to adopt strategic frameworks for the inclusion of Romacommunities. The EU also supports Member States in their duty to improve the lives of all vulnerable people, includingRoma people, through the European structural and investment funds and other funding instruments. Issues relating tothe promotion of democratic values and practices towards Roma, as well as their economic, social and cultural rights,have received particular attention from civil society organisations, while Parliament has been advocating for Romainclusion since the 1990s. This is an update of a Briefing published in May 2021.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 60

Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience FacilityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-04-2022Awtur SAPALA Magdalena

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-Diversità | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | għajnuna sensittiva għall-ġeneru | marda tal-coronavirus | pjanar nazzjonali | rkupru ekonomiku | strument

finanzjarju tal-'UE | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessiSommarju The negative impact of the Covid-19 crisis on women's social and economic situation triggered a debate on the urgent

need for a gender-sensitive policy response to the pandemic. In this context, the establishment of the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF) – the EU's biggest financial instrument supporting recovery in the Member States – is anopportunity to channel extraordinary resources toward measures that take into account the principles of genderequality. It is also a chance to put into practice the EU's long-standing commitments to mainstream gender acrossdifferent policies and apply gender budgeting principles to EU spending. Offering an overview of how gender equalityhas been built into the RRF Regulation, this briefing explains what was expected from the Member States when theywere preparing their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) as regards gender equality. It also providespractical examples of reforms and investments where gender equality has been taken into account, from the 22NRRPs approved by the end of 2021 (Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France,Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia andFinland). In keeping with the RRF Regulation, all the NRRPs analysed declare gender equality to be a horizontalobjective, to be given consideration in all measures. However, not all Member States have included dedicated reformsor investments addressing gender-related challenges explicitly or indicating women as the main beneficiaries. Ouranalysis shows that the most numerous and innovative measures are present in the plans of Belgium, Spain, Italy andAustria. This is an update of a Briefing published in October 2021.

Briefing EN

Single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the EU - Directive 2011/98/EUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-04-2022Awtur AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | Il-Valur Miżjud Ewropew | L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtàu Ġustizzja

Kelma għat-tiftix direttiva (UE) | każistika (UE) | permess ta' residenza | permess tax-xogħol | persuna ta' nazzjonalità barranija | politikadwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | trattament indaqs | ħaddiem migrant

Sommarju The Directive 2011/98/EU on a single permit for third-country nationals (non-EU nationals) to reside and work in theEuropean Union (EU) has two main objectives. The first objective is to facilitate the procedure for a third-countrynational to be admitted to work in an EU Member State, by introducing a single application procedure for a combinedwork and residence permit. The second objective is to ensure equal treatment between third-country workers andnationals of the permit issuing Member State, by providing a common set of rights regarding working conditions,education and training, access to goods and services, and social security.

Briefing EN

Inflation explained: What lies behind it and what lies ahead?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-04-2022Awtur HOFLMAYR MARTIN

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew | inflazzjoni | kontroll tal-prezzijiet | politika monetarja | prezz għall-konsumatur | sitwazzjoni

ekonomika | żieda fil-prezzSommarju Understanding inflation dynamics requires an understanding of the underlying concept and how it is measured.

Inflation is defined as a process of continuously rising prices and falling purchasing power. In other words, a generaland broad-based increase in the price of goods and services over an extended period. The main objective of centralbanks is to keep prices stable, to preserve the integrity and purchasing power of people's money. The most commoninflation indicator measures the average change in the price of a basket of consumer goods and services over time.The closest approximation of what people intuitively understand by the term inflation is the change in their cost ofliving. The Harmonised Indicator for Consumer Prices (HICP), against which the European Central Bank (ECB)assesses the achievement of its price stability objective, is based on this concept. Highlighting the principles ofoptionality, gradualism and flexibility in a recent speech, ECB President Christine Lagarde reflected upon the currentuncertainty. After several years of inflation rates significantly below the inflation target, the ECB is now facingconsumer price increases not seen since the launch of the euro. In February 2022, inflation rates hit an annual rate of5.9 % in the euro area and 6.2 % in the EU. The Russian war on Ukraine is now likely to cause inflation to increasefurther, with underlying price pressure broadening and lingering supply-side bottlenecks. The ECB's monetary policydecision of March 2022 confirmed the previously announced acceleration of monetary tightening, reflecting concernregarding second-round effects and inflation expectations becoming unanchored (when long-run inflation expectationsdiffer significantly from a central bank's inflation target). These concerns outweigh uncertainty over the economic falloutfrom Russia's war and its economic consequences. To react to rising prices, the ECB has therefore prepared theconditions for policy rate increases once asset purchases end.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 61

Russia's war on Ukraine: Speeches by Ukraine's President to the European Parliament and nationalparliaments

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 01-04-2022

Awtur DEL MONTE MicaelaQasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix diskors | gwerra | għajnuna umanitarja | intervent militari | ir-Russja | kap ta' Stat | l-Ukraina | miżura restrittiva tal-UE |

sanzjonijiet internazzjonaliSommarju On 24 February 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine threw the international status quo into disarray by violating the

country's sovereignty and integrity. Since then, over 1 000 civilian casualties have been reported and over 3.8 millionpeople have been forced to flee the country. Many others are displaced within Ukraine's borders, while civilianinfrastructure, including hospitals, schools, roads and buildings, is being targeted by Russian military action. Theshelling of civilians and the alleged use of chemical and/or biological weapons by Russian military forces have spurredthe international community to accuse Russia of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Against thisbackdrop, Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been addressing parliaments around the world to plead thecause of the Ukrainian people and ask for both military and humanitarian help. He began by addressing the EuropeanParliament, before continuing with many others, both in Europe and further afield. The latest in a line of historicalleaders mobilising rhetoric in times of war, Zelenskyy's speeches have each been tailor-made to their specific audienceand have been consistent in reminding policy-makers around the world of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding as aresult of the war and of the Ukrainian people's military needs. Taking a look at speeches given by Zelenskyy to theEuropean Parliament and several national parliaments between 1 and 24 March 2022, in the month after Russiainvaded Ukraine, this briefing summarises the Ukrainian president's main messages and offers some thoughts aboutthe narrative used by Zelenskyy to keep Russia's war on Ukraine at the top of national and international agendas.

Briefing EN

EU-China ties and Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 31-03-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix grupp ta' riflessjoni | gwerra | ir-Russja | iċ-Ċina | l-Ukraina | laqgħa għolja | relazzjonijiet bilaterali | relazzjonijiet tal-UE

Sommarju EU officials say that the 23rd summit between the European Union and China on Friday 1 April will focus on Russia’swar on Ukraine, the engagement of the international community to support Ukraine, the dramatic humanitarian crisiscreated by the conflict, its destabilising nature for the international order and its inherent global impact. The meeting, tobe conducted by video-conference, is also expected to discuss bilateral issues and areas of shared interest, such asclimate change, biodiversity and health, as well as ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship.The EU is also likely to urge China to end its trade ban on imports from Lithuania, which followed the country’sdecision to open a de facto Taiwan embassy in its capital. In recent years, China has become more of a rival for theEU than a declared strategic partner. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from manyinternational think tanks on EU-China relations, the country’s attitude to the war on Ukraine and its policies on otherissues. Analyses on the war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks areThinking’ series.

Briefing EN

China-Russia relations: A quantum leap?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 31-03-2022Awtur JOCHHEIM Ulrich

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix intervent militari | ir-Russja | iċ-Ċina | l-Ukraina | Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà Komuni | relazzjonijiet internazzjonali |

relazzjonijiet tal-UESommarju Hours before the Beijing Winter Olympics officially opened on 4 February 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping had a

long meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, the Chinese leaderfor the first time voiced his country's outright opposition to NATO enlargement and support for Russia's 'proposals tocreate long-term legally binding security guarantees' in Europe. This stance might be seen as the culmination of arelationship, formed in 1992, between the newly proclaimed Russian Federation and a China that had just startedemerging from the stupor following the Tiananmen Square massacre. This relationship has seen major shifts since1992. At the outset, China's population was greater than Russia's and both countries had a very similar level of GDP.Nowadays, thanks to China's exceptional growth performance, its economy is more than eight times bigger thanRussia's. Similarly, trade with Russia is not of major importance to China in terms of value. However, the high share ofraw materials (including food) in Russian exports and the transfer of Russian military technology are of strategicimportance to China in these relations. Since 2012, the relationship has evolved into an informal alliance in the face ofwhat both countries consider a rising threat from the West to their regimes. At present, China's response to Russia'sfull-scale invasion of Ukraine seems to be more favourable to Russia than it was in 2014 when Russia annexedCrimea. China has been critical of NATO's enlargement to central and eastern Europe, and less insistent about respectfor the territorial integrity of nations – something that it has traditionally upheld in light of the 'open Taiwan question'.On 30 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in China to discuss thebilateral relationship. Experts posit that China is likely to support the kind of solution to the Ukraine war that would bethe least likely to challenge the power monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 62

Transparency and targeting of political advertisingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-03-2022Awtur ZANDERSONE Laura

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix demokrazija | dimensjoni transnazzjonali | elezzjoni | partiti politiċi | propaganda politika | proposta (UE) | provdiment

ta’ servizzi | reklamar | studju tal-impatt | suq unikuSommarju The proposal on political advertising aims to require online platforms to also provide information about the political

affiliation and on the funding of the ads. Binding EU harmonised rules on political advertising will help companies,especially the SMEs, to enter the internal market of cross-border advertising services, as well as promote transparencyof political ads.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive and update of the European Pollutant Release and TransferRegister (E-PRTR)

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 28-03-2022

Awtur KARAMFILOVA EkaterinaQasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix aċċess għall-informazzjoni | ekonomija ċirkolari | immaniġġjar tal-iskart | monitoraġġ ambjentali | politika tal-ambjent

tal-UE | prevenzjoni tat-tniġġis | protezzjoni ambjentali | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis industrijali | tniġġis minngħejun agrikoli | ġbir ta' dejta

Sommarju Industrial pollution is regulated by the EU directive on industrial emissions (IED). It lays down rules designed toprevent, or, if impracticable, to reduce emissions into air, water and land and to prevent the generation of waste, inorder to achieve a high level of protection of the environment taken as a whole. The European Pollutant Release andTransfer Register (E-PRTR) ensures public access to data on emissions from major industrial activities. The ex-postevaluations of the directive and the regulation setting the register show they are generally performing well in practice.However, there are implementation issues, including inconsistences between the directive and the register. Thisbriefing presents findings of publicly available sources on the implementation of both pieces of EU law and thus aimsat informing their upcoming revision in the context of European Green Deal, in which Parliament will be a co-legislators.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 24-25 March 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-03-2022Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Is-Semestru Ewropew | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | indipendenza ekonomika | intervent militari | ir-Russja | kooperazzjoni Ewropea | Kunsill Ewropew | l-

Ukraina | laqgħa għolja | marda tal-coronavirus | Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà Komuni | politika tal-enerġija tal-UESommarju Russia's war on Ukraine and the linked issue of energy security constituted the clear focus of the European Council

meeting held on 24 25 March 2022. The meeting included a joint session with the President of the United States ofAmerica, Joe Biden, and it formed part of a trilogy of summit meetings in Brussels (NATO, G7 and EU) demonstratingWestern unity in support of Ukraine and in response to President Vladimir Putin's unacceptable violation ofinternational law. The main outcomes of the meeting were: i) the creation of a new Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund; ii) avoluntary EU joint purchasing scheme for gas, similar to that put in place for coronavirus vaccines; and iii) theendorsement of the new EU 'Strategic Compass'. However, no further steps were taken with regard to Ukraine's EUmembership application, no common EU approach was found to address increased energy prices and no furthersanctions were imposed on Russia at this stage, despite calls by some EU leaders for energy and/or transport bans. Ingeneral, the conclusions reiterated, or built further upon, the Versailles Declaration of 11 March. Important elementsincluded the need to further reduce the EU's strategic dependence in energy and other sensitive areas, notably criticalraw materials, semi-conductors, health, digital and food security. The meeting also saw Charles Michel re-elected asPresident of the European Council for a second term of 30 months.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with A. Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board - 31 March 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-03-2022Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiSommarju This note is prepared in view of a regular public hearing with the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European

Central Bank (ECB), Andrea Enria, which will take place on 31 March 2022. The briefing addresses: 1) the ECB’srecent report on Disclosure of Climate risks, 2) the ECB’s presentation on banks’ exposures to Russia, 3) the waiver ofbank transfer costs to support people in the Ukraine, 4) the ECB’s presentation of Aggregated Results of theSupervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), 5) the situation reflected in the ECB’ Supervisory BankingStatistics for the third quarter 2021, 6) the ECB’s feedback to the EP’s Banking Union INI report, and 7) a summary ofexternal briefing papers on banking supervision in Croatia and Bulgaria.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 63

Inflation in the wake of coronavirus and war [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-03-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | grupp ta' riflessjoni | gwerra | inflazzjoni | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | marda tal-coronavirus | sitwazzjoni

ekonomika | żieda fil-prezzSommarju Inflation has reached the highest level in decades in the European Union, United States and many other countries, with

the Ukraine conflict adding upward pressure on prices of energy and food. The Russian invasion has intensified thealready near-record growth of consumer prices resulting from the coronavirus pandemic and broken supply-chains.The war has sharply curbed supply of energy, wheat and other products from Russia and Ukraine, their majorproducers. The countries' exports look set to dwindle further if the war continues and the EU imposes a ban on itsmassive gas and oil imports from Russia, adding to the already strict sanctions on Moscow. Some central banks havesignalled that they will further increase interest rates, and 'stagflation', or high inflation coupled with economicstagnation, could follow. Before the invasion, many experts had expected rapid price growth to be temporary. Now,they believe inflation could become more entrenched, further squeezing households' real income in coming months.This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on resurgentinflation. Analyses on the war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the 'What Think Tanks areThinking' series.

Briefing EN

Digital Services Act & Digital Markets Act - Collection of studies for the IMCO committeeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-03-2022Awtur KAISER KEVIN PAUL | RATCLIFF Christina

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-KunsillKelma għat-tiftix impatt tat-teknoloġija tal-informatika | internet | kontenut diġitali | kummerċ elettroniku | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur |

reklamar | suq domestiku | suq uniku diġitaliSommarju This collection of studies presents expert studies and workshop proceedings related to relevant topics of the DSA and

the DMA, focusing on opportunities and challenges for the digital single market and consumer protection. The studiesresult from the ongoing interest of the IMCO committee in improving the functioning of the digital single market anddeveloping e-commerce rules based on scientific evidence and expertise.

Briefing EN

Review of the capital requirements frameworkTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-03-2022Awtur KRAMER Esther

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju The IA follows a clear intervention logic, with objectives and options deriving from the problems to tackle. It is

transparent about limitations and uses estimates with the appropriate caution. The range of options is predeterminedby the outstanding Basel III standards, which the IA prefers to implement with adjustments reflecting specificities of theEU banking sector and potential consequences of the Covid-19 crisis. The qualitative assessment is complemented byselective pertinent quantification. The IA’s focus is on economic impacts for banks, with limited consideration of socialor environmental effects and little differentiation of effects on banks’ customers. Macroeconomic impacts and effectson SMEs and on the competitiveness of EU banks are assessed only for the preferred options in an annex.

Briefing EN

Amending the rules governing the statute and funding of European political parties (recast)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-03-2022Awtur ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix finanzjament tal-partit | finanzjament tal-UE | fondazzjoni | libertà ta' assoċjazzjoni | libertà ta' espressjoni | partit

Ewropew | proposta (UE) | status ġuridiku Ewropew | studju tal-impattSommarju Ahead of the 2024 European elections, the European Commission has presented a proposal to amend Regulation

1141/2014 governing the statute and funding of European political parties (EUPPs) and foundations. The proposedamendments concern, inter alia, the funding provisions, transparency requirements and enforcement of the rules. Thisbriefing examines the quality of the supporting impact assessment (IA), which outlines the problems encountered inapplying the regulation, as identified in recent EU-level reports and through stakeholder input. The range of policyoptions presented in the IA to address the identified shortcomings is rather limited, although under each option, and foreach problem, several alternative measures are considered. Elements of the parallel initiative on political advertising -also part of the European democracy action plan - were integrated into the amending EUPP proposal; however, the IAremains vague on the link between these two initiatives.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 64

Charles Michel as President of the European CouncilTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-03-2022Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaKelma għat-tiftix kooperazzjoni interistituzzjonali (UE) | Parlament Ewropew | president tal-istituzzjoni | President tal-Kunsill Ewropew |

rappreżentanza politikaSommarju Charles Michel's (first) term as European Council President comes to an end on 30 May 2022. In advance of his

potential re-election by EU Heads of State or Government to that function, this paper looks at his activities during thecourse of his 30-month mandate to date, with a special focus on the institutional and inter-institutional dimension of hisrole. In practice, the coronavirus pandemic has dictated the agenda of the European Council from almost the beginningof Mr Michel's time in office. The resulting need to concentrate on ‘crisis management’ provided him, as it had hispredecessors, with the opportunity to show leadership, applying a careful balance between the role of facilitator andthat of agenda-setter. Despite the challenging circumstances he has faced, Mr Michel has managed to make his markon the European Council's agenda, notably on external relations, championing the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. Hedemonstrated strong activism both prior to and after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, playing an important role inEuropean Union mobilisation to support the country. He has also adjusted the European Council's working methods, inparticular with the use of video-conferences of small groups of EU leaders to better prepare full European Councilmeetings. Cooperation between the European Council President and the European Parliament has increased incomparison to previous years, particularly regarding activities not required of the President by the Treaties. Mr Michelhas also innovated in communications, notably through a newsletter aimed at EU citizens.

Briefing EN

Construction products Regulation: Revision of Regulation (EU) No 305/2011Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-03-2022Awtur TENHUNEN Susanna

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaKelma għat-tiftix armonizzazzjoni tal-istandards | ekonomija ċirkolari | immarkar ta' konformità CE | materjali tal-bini | moviment liberu

tal-merkanzija | politika ta’ kostruzzjoni | regolament (UE) | servizzi tal-bini | speċifikazzjoni teknika | standard EwropewSommarju Designed to improve the free movement of construction products in the EU internal market, the Construction Products

Regulation (CPR) lays down harmonised conditions for the marketing of those products, provides a framework for acommon technical language to assess their performance and sets out provisions on the use of CE marking. TheCommission is planning to issue a proposal for a revision of the CPR by the end of March. The revision is expected toaddress the regulation's suboptimal performance and implementation difficulties revealed in the implementation andevaluation reports. The sustainability goals set in the Green Deal and circular economy action plan give further causeto revise the CPR. The construction sector has high potential for circularity and could therefore play an important rolein the transition towards a resource efficient economy built on a regenerative growth model. In a recent resolution onthe revision of the CPR, the European Parliament welcomed the goals of the circular economy action plan and calledfor an ambitious revision of the CPR. The recommendations made by the European Parliament have some points incommon with those of other EU institutions and stakeholders, such as those underscoring the importance of afunctioning harmonisation system and a comprehensive common technical language, the need for sustainability criteriafor construction products and enhanced clarity of CE marking, and the need for more effective market surveillance.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-03-2022Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Is-Semestru Ewropew | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | indipendenza ekonomika | intervent militari | ir-Russja | kooperazzjoni Ewropea | Kunsill Ewropew | l-

Ukraina | laqgħa għolja | marda tal-coronavirus | Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà Komuni | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE |relazzjonijiet tal-UE

Sommarju On 24-25 March 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for the third time in five weeks. In the presence ofthe United States President, Joe Biden, they will discuss developments in and support for Ukraine, in the context of theunprovoked Russian invasion of the country. Building on their Versailles Declaration of 10-11 March, EU leaders willtake further steps aimed at strengthening European sovereignty in the field of security, defence and energy security.As regards security and defence, the European Council will endorse the EU Strategic Compass, call for itsimplementation, and give further guidelines for the deepening of European defence cooperation. With respect toenergy, EU leaders will consider means to counter the current spike in energy prices, consider gas storage capacitiesand planning in view of the next winter and resume discussions on phasing out EU dependence on Russian fossilfuels. Furthermore, the European Council will take stock of coordination efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic,appraise the European Semester, and review initiatives designed to build a more robust economic base and reducethe EU's strategic dependence in the most sensitive areas. Under external relations, items on the agenda will includethe preparation of the forthcoming EU-China Summit and the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EuropeanCouncil will be followed by a Euro Summit meeting on 25 March.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 65

Temporary Protection DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-03-2022Awtur LUYTEN KATRIEN

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix assistenza ta' emerġenza | Direttiva tal-KE | drittijiet tal-frustieri | gwerra | għajnuna lir-refuġjati | għajnuna tal-UE |

intervent militari | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | migrazzjoni forzata | moviment migratorju | persuna ta' nazzjonalità barranijaSommarju Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, over 3.4 million people have already been forced to seek

refuge, mostly in neighbouring countries. The European Commission estimates that Russia aggression may havedisplaced up to 6.5 million people. In response, the European Union swiftly decided to grant EU-wide temporaryprotection to people arriving from Ukraine. The EU Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) enables EUMember States to move rapidly to offer protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection and to avoidoverwhelming national asylum systems in cases of mass arrivals of displaced persons. Although invoked several timesin the past, the directive has never been activated before. Russia's military aggression prompted a unanimous decisionin the Council to grant temporary protection (for an initial period of one year) to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. Thistemporary protection may be extended automatically by two six-monthly periods, for a maximum of another year. TheEU's decision to grant temporary protection has been widely welcomed and the directive is considered the mostappropriate instrument under the current exceptional circumstances. There are, however, still many open questions asto its practical implementation in the EU Member States. The scale of the arrivals entails many immediate as well aslonger-term challenges. On the other hand, and in spite of accusations of double standards in favour of 'white' or ethnicEuropean refugees, the demonstrations of EU-wide solidarity with the Ukrainian people raise hopes for concreteprogress on overall reform of the EU's migration and asylum rules. At the time of writing, the conflict has alreadycaused civilian casualties and the destruction of hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, creating ahumanitarian catastrophe both within Ukraine and beyond its borders.

Briefing EN, FR

Multimedia Temporary protection directive

Access to justice in environmental matters: Amending the Aarhus RegulationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-03-2022Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix aċċess għall-informazzjoni | aċċess għall-ġustizzja | dritt ambjentali | Konvenzjoni Internazzjonali | monitoraġġ

ambjentali | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | regolament (UE) | trasparenza fit-teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet | komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoni

Sommarju The European Union is party to the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. The Aarhus Regulation applies the Convention's provisions toEU institutions and bodies. In 2017, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, reviewing implementation by theparties, found that the EU fails to comply with its obligations under Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the conventionconcerning access to justice by members of the public. To address this non-compliance issue, on 14 October 2020 theEuropean Commission put forward a legislative proposal to amend the Aarhus Regulation. The Council and Parliamentadopted their positions on 17 December 2020 and 20 May 2021, respectively. Interinstitutional negotiations, launchedon 4 June 2021, concluded on 12 July with a provisional agreement. Parliament approved the agreed text on 5October 2021. The regulation was published in the Official Journal on 8 October 2021, and entered into force on 28October 2021. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Latest analyses of Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-03-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix grupp ta' riflessjoni | gwerra | intervent militari | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | miżura restrittiva tal-UE

Sommarju Russia’s armed forces have increased their bombardment and shelling of Ukrainian cities, stepping up the warlaunched on 24 February. However, new talks between Moscow and Kiev about a future status for Ukraine outsideNATO have raised hopes about a possible breakthrough in the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has renewed calls on NATO to establish a ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine.Instead, the West has imposed tough sanctions against Russia, and many companies are withdrawing from thecountry, pushing it towards a default, emptying its shops and sending the rouble into freefall. Russian PresidentVladimir Putin said on 16 March that Russia was ready to discuss Ukraine's neutrality, but added that Moscow wouldstill achieve the goals of its military operation. Ukraine says it is willing to negotiate to end the war but will not surrenderor accept Russian ultimatums. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from manyinternational think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine, its implications for the two countries, for the European Union andfor the whole world. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What ThinkTanks are Thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 66

Revision of the EU's Waste Shipment RegulationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-03-2022Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix ekonomija ċirkolari | esportazzjoni (UE) | immaniġġjar tal-iskart | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni ambjentali | saħħa

pubblika | skart tal-esportazzjoni | trasport transfruntier | trasport ġewwa l-UESommarju On 17 November 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise EU rules governing shipments of waste.

The proposed regulation aims at easing shipments of waste for reuse and recycling in the EU, to support the transitionto a circular economy; ensuring that waste exported from the EU is managed in an environmentally sound manner inthe destination countries; and stepping up enforcement to counteract illegal shipments of waste. While supporting theproposed streamlining and digitalisation of procedures, stakeholders have stressed the need for significantimprovements to ensure that the new regulation fulfils its objectives, in particular as regards exports of waste. Theproposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Environment,Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, plans to consider its rapporteur's draft report in May2022. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Revision of the EU's Waste Shipment Regulation

EU Taxonomy: Complementary delegated act covering nuclear and gasTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-03-2022Awtur CHAILLET GAELLE CHARLOTTE | DIAS FERNANDES LUCIE | HONNEFELDER Stephanie

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u Bankarji | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | enerġija nukleari | fjuwil fossili | industrija nukleari | industrija tal-gass | regolament

delegatSommarju This briefing has been prepared to support the parliamentary scrutiny of the delegated act (DA) amending Delegated

Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 (‘Climate delegated act’) as regards economic activities in certain energy sectors andDelegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 (‘Disclosure delegated act’) as regards specific public disclosures for thoseeconomic activities. In accordance with the empowerments set out in Articles 10(3) and 11(3) of the TaxonomyRegulation , the Commission shall adopt a DA to establish technical screening criteria (TSC) determining theconditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to climate change adaptation ormitigation. In addition, the Commission is empowered to adopt a DA on disclosure obligations under Article 8(4).

Briefing EN

Deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure: Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-03-2022Awtur SOONE Jaan

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix fjuwil | fjuwil tal-magni | infrastruttura tat-trasport | netwerk trans-Ewropew | newtralità karbonika | proposta (UE) |

riżorsi tal-enerġija | vettura elettrikaSommarju On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of proposals to equip the EU's climate, energy, land

use, transport and taxation policies to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, compared with1990 levels – the 'fit for 55' package. The package includes a proposal to revise the 2014 directive on alternative fuelsinfrastructure and turn it into a regulation. In the draft regulation, the Commission proposes binding targets for electricvehicle charging points and hydrogen refuelling points, electric charging for stationary aircraft at airports and on-shorepower supply for ships at ports. It also contains provisions for EU Member States to ensure coverage of refuellingpoints for liquefied natural gas (LNG) dedicated to heavy-duty vehicles, and LNG refuelling points in maritime ports. Inthe European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Transport and Tourism. Second edition. The'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 67

EU international procurement instrumentTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-03-2022Awtur SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliKelma għat-tiftix akkwist pubbliku | ftehim dwar il-prokura tal-gvern | ftehim kummerċjali (UE) | għoti ta' kuntratt | l-OrganizzazzjoniDinjija

tal-Kummerċ | OECD | pajjiż terz | proposta (UE) | sottomissjoni ta’ offerti | suq internazzjonaliSommarju Government procurement forms an important part of national economies. The EU has opened up its public

procurement markets to third countries to a large degree, while many other economies have had limited appetite toliberalise market access. In 2012, the European Commission tabled a proposal for an international procurementinstrument (IPI). The IPI would give the EU leverage in negotiating the reciprocal opening of public procurementmarkets in third countries. The Commission revised the proposal in 2016, taking on board some recommendationsfrom the Council and the European Parliament. However, the revised proposal did not advance owing to differences inMember States' positions. In 2019, discussions in the Council gathered new momentum in the context of a growingrecognition of the need to level the playing field in international trade. In June 2021, the Council adopted a negotiatingmandate that added the threat of market exclusion to the price adjustment mechanism. The Parliament adopted itsposition on the revised IPI proposal in December 2021, modifying its design, scope and application. The triloguesconcluded successfully on 14 March 2022. Third edition of a briefing, the previous editions of which were drafted byJana Titievskaia. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Amending the European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs) RegulationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-03-2022Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix finanzjament ta’ terminu twil | il-Fond Ewropew tal-Investiment | kumpanija ta' investiment | promozzjoni ta' investiment

| proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tal-investiment | proġett ta' investiment | regolament (UE) | regolamentazzjoni tal-investimenti

Sommarju European long-term investment funds (ELTIFs) invest on a long-term basis in infrastructure projects, real estate andSMEs, among others. While the legislative framework – the ELTIF Regulation – for these funds was adopted six yearsago, their market remains small. For this reason, the Commission has proposed amending the ELTIF Regulation tomake it more appealing to investors. The key mulled changes involve differentiating between ELTIFs marketed toprofessional investors and those to which retail investors can have access; removing barriers to retail investor accessto ELTIFs; and establishing an optional liquidity window mechanism for redemptions, for cases where investors needto exit early. The file is currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, it has beenassigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The draft report is expected soon. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Revision of Regulation (EC) 1005/2009 on substances depleting the ozone layerTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-03-2022Awtur KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix gass serra | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | niġġies stratosferiku | ożonu | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | prodott kimiku |

Regolament KE | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis stratosferikuSommarju The depletion of the ozone layer affects negatively both humans and the natural environment. It is provoked by

chemicals known as 'ozone depleting substances' (ODSs), which are also potent greenhouse gases. They have beensubject to legal regulation at international level for several decades (the Vienna Convention and its Montreal Protocol,adopted in the second half of the 1980s under UN auspices). EU has always spearheaded global efforts in the field ofODSs, adopting its first rules in the early 1980s and later addressing them specifically through Regulation (EC)1005/2009. The ex-post evaluation of the implementation of the regulation published at the end of 2019 shows thatoverall performance matches expectations and that the regulation is thus fit for purpose, despite some aspects in needof improvement. A Commission proposal for revision of the regulation is expected in the spring of 2022. Thisimplementation appraisal presents findings on the implementation of the regulation.

Briefing EN

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Understanding COVAX: The EU's role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-03-2022Awtur PICHON Eric

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix donazzjoni | epidemija | kooperazzjoni internazzjonali | marda tal-coronavirus | negozju distributtiv | sorveljanza tal-

mard | tilqima | vaċċinSommarju In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, 'nobody is safe until everybody is safe'. On this basis, the EU, along with the

World Health Organization (WHO) and other public and private partners, set up a global initiative to facilitate thedevelopment, production and global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX was initially designed to pool funds andvaccine doses in order to ensure an equitable distribution between all participating economies until all of them –higher- and lower-income alike – reached a threshold of 20 % of their populations vaccinated. The COVAX mechanismdoes not, however, prevent high-income economies from striking bilateral agreements with vaccine manufacturers orselected beneficiary countries. In this context, self-financing economies have secured several times more vaccinedoses than their populations need, widening the vaccine supply gap for poorer economies. The EU and participatingMember States have contributed nearly a third of COVAX funding, however, as is the case for most donors, theirvaccine donations have fallen short of the levels needed. The new rise in cases shows that 'vaccine nationalism' is nota viable policy. The European Parliament has welcomed the EU's participation in COVAX and expects the Commissionto publish an assessment of this participation. To achieve the objective of immunising 70 % of the world population bymid-2022, the WHO has called on the EU, other donors and manufacturers to deliver on their pledges. In parallel, theplan is to develop vaccine manufacturing capacities in lower income economies, and devise a fair solution for sharingCovid-19-related knowledge and patents.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the informal European Council in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-03-2022Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix awtosuffiċjenza enerġetika | interdipendenza ekonomika | intervent militari | ir-Russja | Kunsill Ewropew | l-Ukraina |

Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà Komuni | politika tad-difiża | relazzjonijiet tal-UESommarju At the informal European Council of 10-11 March 2022, EU leaders adopted the Versailles declaration condemning the

‘unprovoked and unjustified’ Russian military aggression against Ukraine. They set strategic guidelines for security anddefence, energy and economic and financial affairs.

Briefing EN

Revision of the trans-European transport network guidelinesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-03-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku It-Trasport | L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix infrastruttura tat-trasport | ippjanar tat-trasport | mobilità sostenibbli | netwerk tat-trasport | netwerk trans-Ewropew |

politika komuni tat-trasport | proposta (UE) | proġett ta' interess komuniSommarju To support its economy, provide mobility for people and goods and ensure connectivity of all regions while also limiting

negative impacts on climate and environment, the EU has been building a multimodal transport network across itsterritory: the trans-European transport network (TEN T). The TEN T policy is based on 2013 Union guidelines thatdefined the technical requirements for the planned transport infrastructure and the network layout. Networkconstruction is also supported through EU funding, including the dedicated Connecting Europe Facility programme.Having evaluated the progress in TEN T implementation, the European Commission put forward revised TEN Tguidelines in December 2021, to ensure sustainable connectivity through a reliable and high-quality infrastructurenetwork, aligned with the objectives of the European Green Deal. As co-legislators, the European Parliament and theCouncil will have to agree on the final form of the proposed regulation. In the Parliament, the Committee on Transportand Tourism will lead the file. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 69

Reforming the European Union: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-03-2022Awtur DIAZ CREGO Maria | KOTANIDIS Silvia

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix Ewropa taċ-ċittadini | konferenza Ewropea | Moviment Ewropew | viżjoni tal-Ewropa | ċittadin tal-UE

Sommarju The Conference on the Future of Europe was designed to give the general public a say about their vision for the EU,by means of a multilingual digital platform and citizens' panels. The panels are transnational forums, gathering citizensfrom the EU Member States to discuss their vision for the future of the Union and make recommendations on how theEU could be improved. The resulting proposals are diverse but constructive. They include interesting, sometimesambitious, suggestions for the future and in many respects are geared towards building a more efficient, integratedUnion that is closer to its citizens. This briefing focuses on the recommendations made by Panel 2 (Europeandemocracy / values, rights, rule of law and security), and recommendations uploaded onto the multilingual digitalplatform (under European democracy). The latter are predominantly constitutional and institutional in nature andtherefore tackle broader issues, such as reform of the EU institutional set-up, improvements to the EU decision-makingprocess, closer cooperation among Member States and a stronger European Parliament. In many respects, theoverview given in this briefing shows how Parliament has been very active in making proposals and endorsingchanges in almost all the fields where citizens have expressed the need for the EU to take action. While the citizens'panels have been an interesting and innovative exercise in participatory democracy, the outcome of the conferencehas still to take shape, and will be captured in a final report to be issued when its work ends in spring 2022. This is thefirst in a series of briefings that will look at citizens' expectations and recommendations in the context of theConference on the Future of Europe, and the European Parliament's response.

Briefing EN

Denmark's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-03-2022Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix id-Danimarka | reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju In absolute figures, the Danish National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is the sixth smallest national plan (orthird smallest as a share of gross domestic product, GDP) under the unprecedented EU response to the crisistriggered by the coronavirus pandemic. To date, Denmark has decided not to request any loan, and its Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF) allocation therefore consists solely of a non-repayable grant (see figure below). Denmark isset to receive the maximum allocation of €1 551.4 million from the RRF, which corresponds to 0.2 % of the entire RRFand to 0.5 % of Denmark’s 2019 GDP. The country’s NRRP amounts to €1 615 million, which means that Denmark willadd €63.6 million in national funding towards the total resources of the plan. According to Article 18 of the RRFRegulation, measures under the NRRPs are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council’s approval of the plan,Denmark received €201 million in pre-financing in September 2021. Subsequent payments, to be distributed over sixinstalments, will depend on achieving milestones and targets identified in relation to RRF implementation. The Danishplan is centred around reforms and investments early in the period, and the last instalment is planned for June 2026.The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EU recovery instrument,participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation and scrutinises the work ofthe European Commission.

Briefing DA, EN

Legal issues surrounding compulsory Covid-19 vaccinationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-03-2022Awtur DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA | DIAZ CREGO Maria | DUMBRAVA Costica | KOTANIDIS Silvia |

MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-MargaritaQasam tematiku Coronavirus | Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | marda tal-coronavirus | saħħa pubblika | sorveljanza tal-mard | tilqima | vaċċin | ċertifikat tas-saħħa

Sommarju The authorisation of the first Covid-19 vaccines by the European Commission in December 2020 dovetailed with EUMember States' efforts to roll out mass vaccination campaigns to halt the spread of the coronavirus. Amid risingnumbers of Covid-19 cases and fears surrounding what might be the impact of the Omicron variant, those efforts wererenewed at the end of 2021, including the roll-out of booster doses and vaccines for children. However, despiteprogress in some Member States, as of March 2022, only 72 % of the EU population is fully vaccinated (primarycourse). Low vaccination rates have sparked debates around how to increase vaccine uptake. On 1 December 2021,European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said it was time for the EU to 'think about mandatoryvaccination'. Two weeks later, the European Council reiterated the 'vital importance of vaccination in the fight againstthe pandemic', suggesting the need to step up vaccination campaigns and address vaccine hesitancy. Although thereis no common approach to mandatory vaccination against Covid-19 at EU level, some Member States are trying toincrease vaccine uptake among their populations by making vaccination compulsory. For the time being, only threeMember States are imposing a vaccination mandate on all adults (Austria) or on specific age groups (Greece andItaly), although Austria has just decided to postpone the application of the obligation. Other Member States requirecertain categories of workers, e.g. in healthcare or public services, to get vaccinated so as to be able to continueexercising their professional activities (Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia and Hungary), or allow employers toimpose such a mandate on their employees (Estonia and, until 6 March 2022, Hungary). Finally, in some otherMember States, access to certain public spaces is only possible for those fully vaccinated or having recovered fromCovid-19 (Germany, France, Italy and Latvia). This briefing looks at the experiences of selected Member Statesimposing compulsory vaccination for Covid-19 and analyses the EU legal framework applicable to those national rules.It has been written with the contribution of the Directorate for Legislative Acts within the Directorate-General for thePresidency.

Briefing EN

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Czechia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-03-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix għajnuna tal-UE | investiment tal-UE | iċ-Ċekja | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju To benefit from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered bythe coronavirus pandemic, Czechia has decided to use the grant component of its national allocation, withoutrequesting loans. The targeted resources total €7 036 million and represent 1 % of the entire RRF. They amount to 3.1% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). To receivethis support, Czechia has prepared a National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), a broad programme of reformsand investments that seeks to underpin the recovery of the Czech economy, while advancing the green and digitaltransition and addressing a number of existing structural weaknesses. In addition to the EU support, Czechia hasincluded in its plan a subset of reforms and investments equal to €449 million, which, while integrated into the structureof the plan, are not included in the RRF financing and will be financed from national resources. Measures under theplan are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council’s approval, Czechia has received €915 million in pre-financing, equivalent to 13 % of its total financial allocation. The next payments, divided into nine six-monthlyinstalments, will depend on progress in implementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a strongadvocate for a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on itsimplementation and scrutinises the work of the European Commission.

Briefing CS, EN

Il-Pjan Nazzjonali għall-Irkupru: Il-qagħda bħalissaTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-03-2022Awtur LILYANOVA Velina

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix Malta | reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju Il-Pjan Nazzjonali għall-Irkupru u r-Reżiljenza (NRRP) ta' Malta għandu valur totali ta' €344.9 miljun. Madankollu, fl-ambitu tal-Faċilità għall-Irkupru u r-Reżiljenza (RRF) tal-UE, li hija fil-qalba tal-istrument innovattiv tal-UE NextGeneration EU, Malta hija mistennija tirċievi madwar €316.4-il miljun, ftit inqas mill-valur tal-pjan, u kompletamentf'għamla ta' għotjiet. S'issa, Malta ma talbet l-ebda self. Skont ir-Regolament dwar l-RRF, l-għażla li jintalab appoġġgħal self sa massimu ta' 6.8% tal-introjtu nazzjonali gross tal-2019 hija disponibbli sal-31 ta' Awwissu 2023. Filwaqt lif'termini nominali, Malta għandha t-tieni l-iżgħar allokazzjoni wara l Lussemburgu, f'termini tal-għotjiet tal-RRF percapita, tikklassifika f'pożizzjoni ogħla: il-valur tal-għotjiet ta' Malta fl-ambitu tal-RRF huwa ekwivalenti għal madwar2.3% tal-prodott domestiku gross (PDG) tagħha fl-2019, inqas mill-medja ġenerali tal-UE (b'paragun, l-RRF huwaekwivalenti għal 5.2% tal-PDG tal-UE-27 fl-2019). F'Diċembru 2021, Malta rċeviet €41.1 miljun fi prefinanzjament. Il-pjan Malti jieħu inkunsiderazzjoni r-rakkomandazzjonijiet speċifiċi għall-pajjiż tal-Kunsill tal-2019 u l-2020, u huwaallinjat kemm mal-pjanijiet ekonomiċi u ta' investiment nazzjonali kif ukoll mal-finanzjament fl-ambitu tal-programmi tal-politika ta' koeżjoni tal-UE għall-perjodu 2021-2027. L objettiv ġenerali huwa l-kontribut għal irkupru sostenibbli, ekwu,ekoloġiku u diġitali. B'mod partikolari, il-pjan għandu l-għan li jiddiġitalizza lill-intrapriżi żgħar u medji u lill-amministrazzjoni pubblika, jippromwovi t-trasport pubbliku sostenibbli u l-vetturi elettriċi, u jsaħħaħ il-ġlieda kontra l-ħasil tal-flus. Huwa jħaddan it-tranżizzjonijiet ekoloġiċi u diġitali – sfidi Ewropej komuni ewlenin – u jipprevedi 53.8%tal-allokazzjoni totali għall-objettivi klimatiċi, filwaqt li 25.5% se jikkontribwixxu għall-mira diġitali. Is-sehem mill-allokazzjoni ddedikat għat-tranżizzjoni ekoloġika jagħmel lill-NRRP ta' Malta fost l-aktar ekoloġiċi. Il-ParlamentEwropew jipparteċipa f'fora interistituzzjonali għall-kooperazzjoni u d-diskussjoni dwar l-implimentazzjoni tar-RRF, ujeżamina bir-reqqa l-ħidma tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea. Dan il-briefing huwa wieħed minn sensiela li tkopri l-IstatiMembri kollha tal-UE. L-ewwel edizzjoni. Il-briefings "L-implimentazzjoni tal-NGEU" jiġu aġġornati fi stadji ewleninmatul iċ-ċiklu ta' ħajja tal-pjanijiet.

Briefing EN, MT

Fit for 55 package: Reducing methane emissions in the energy sectorTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-03-2022Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix gass serra | gass | idrokarbur | importazzjoni (UE) | industrija tal-faħam | industrija taż-żejt | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE |

politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | proposta (UE) | suq tal-enerġija | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijietSommarju On 15 December 2021, the Commission presented a proposal to regulate methane emissions reductions in the energy

sector. The proposal is part of the second batch of proposals in the 'fit for 55' package, aiming to align EU climate andenergy laws with the EU Climate Law's 2030 target. The proposal aims to address gaps in current legislation: thoserelating to methane emissions from upstream exploration and the production of oil and fossil gas, but also those fromthe gathering and processing of fossil gas, the transmission, distribution and underground storage of gas, and liquidgas terminals operating with fossil and/or renewable methane. The proposal furthermore introduces provisions onmethane emissions from coal mines and those originating from outside the EU in relation to importer informationrequirements, the methane transparency database and the methane-emitters monitoring tool. Similarly, it sets outrequirements for methane emissions reduction, monitoring and reporting, leak detection and repair, and limits toventing and flaring. In Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health andFood Safety (ENVI), with the rapporteur still to be appointed. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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Il-Parlament Ewropew Fatti u ĊifriTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-03-2022Awtur SABBATI Giulio

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix elezzjoni Ewropea | grupp politiku (PE) | il-Membri tal-PE | Kumitat tal-PE | mandat elettorali | sessjoni parlamentari |

sistema elettorali Ewropea | statistika tal-UE | tfassil tal-liġi tal-UE | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessiSommarju Dan il-Briefing, ippubblikat mis-Servizz ta' Riċerka tal-Parlament Ewropew, huwa mfassal biex jipprovdi fatti u ċifri

ewlenin dwar il-Parlament Ewropew. Huwa jħares kemm lejn il-leġiżlatura kurrenti (Lulju 2019 sa Ġunju 2024) kif ukollit-tmien leġiżlaturi ta' ħames snin preċedenti sa minn meta ġew introdotti l-elezzjonijiet diretti f'Ġunju 1979. Fil-paġni liġejjin se ssib grafiki ta' diversi tipi li: • jiddeskrivu l-kompożizzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew bħalissa u fil-passat; • isegwuż-żieda fl-għadd ta' partiti rappreżentati fil-PE u l-evoluzzjoni tal-gruppi politiċi; • juru l-età tal-Membri u juru ż-żieda fl-għadd ta' nisa li għandhom siġġu fil-Parlament; • jispjegaw is-sistemi elettorali użati fl-elezzjonijiet għall-Parlament fl-Istati Membri; • juru kif il-parteċipazzjoni elettorali fl-elezzjonijiet Ewropej inbidlet matul iż-żmien u varjat bejn l-IstatiMembri; • jiġbru fil-qosor il-ħidma tal-Parlament fil-leġiżlaturi ta' ħames snin kurrenti u preċedenti; • jiddeskrivu l-kompożizzjoni tal-kumitati, id-delegazzjonijiet u l-korpi ta' governanza tal-Parlament; • jispjegaw ir-rwol leġiżlattiv tal-Parlament u l-interazzjoni tiegħu mal-Kummissjoni Ewropea. Il-Briefing qed jiġi aġġornat regolarment matul il-leġiżlatura 2019-2024 biex jiġu kkunsidrati l-aħħar żviluppi.

Briefing BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV

Recast EU Regulation on Gas and Hydrogen NetworksTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-03-2022Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | gass | idroġenu | industrija tal-gass | newtralità karbonika | proposta (UE) | provvista

tal-gassSommarju On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas

Regulation, as part of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU's growing climateambitions, outlined in the European Green Deal and its 'Fit for 55' package. The Commission's legislative proposalaims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases andhydrogen across the EU, and facilitating their integration in existing or new gas networks. It would create an EUlegislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity. Itwould also oblige existing natural gas infrastructure to integrate a higher share of hydrogen and renewable gases, bymeans of high tariff discounts; provisions to facilitate blending of hydrogen with natural gas and renewable gases; andgreater EU cooperation on gas quality and storage. The Commission's legislative proposal likewise includes a targetedrevision of the 2017 Security of Gas Supply Regulation. This aims to foster greater regional cooperation on gasstorage, facilitate the (voluntary) joint procurement of strategic stocks, and encourages Member States to takemeasures to address the growing risk of cyber-attacks on EU energy networks. First edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

EU directive on gas and hydrogen networksTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-03-2022Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix enerġija rinnovabbli | gass naturali | grilja enerġetika | idroġenu | kooperazzjoni fl-enerġija | newtralità karbonika |

politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | proposta (UE) | provvista tal-gass | sigurtà tal-provvista | suq tal-enerġija | trasportenerġetiku

Sommarju On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Directive,as part of the proposed hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU's growing climateambitions, set out in the European Green Deal and its 'Fit for 55' package. The Commission's proposal aims to supportthe decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen, andfacilitating their integration in EU energy networks. The recast directive would become a core component of a new EUlegislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity. TheCommission's proposal would refine the principles of the existing Gas Directive and fully extend their scope to coverhydrogen networks. This includes an important set of consumer rights, provisions relating to transmission anddistribution system operators (including their unbundling), third-party access and integrated network planning, andindependent regulatory authorities. In the Parliament, the file was attributed to the Committee on Industry, Researchand Energy (ITRE), which appointed Jens Geier (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur on 7 February 2022. First edition. The'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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EU economic and financial developments: Weekly Picks - 11 March 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-03-2022Awtur HAGELSTAM Kajus | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA | TURCU OVIDIU IONUT | ZORPIDIS

ANDREAS | ZSITNAK ALEXANDRAQasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix impatt soċjali | ir-Russja | konsegwenza ekonomika | prezz tal-enerġija | provvista tal-enerġija | statistika tal-UE | studju

tal-impatt | tbassir ekonomiku | żieda fil-prezzSommarju This paper provides a summary of recent analyses of the economic, financial and budgetary developments in the EU

and the Euro, notably following the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the outbreak of the war. It also highlights relatedpolicy recommendations made in the public domain to mitigate any adverse effects and support sustainable recovery.

Briefing EN

Role and election of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-03-2022Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix attività istituzzjonali | Istituzzjoni tal-UE | mandat elettorali | organizzazzjoni tal-UE | president tal-istituzzjoni

Sommarju The first term of Charles Michel, the incumbent European Council President comes to an end on 31 May 2022. Basedon previous examples, the (re-)election of the European Council President for the period July 2022 to November 2024is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before the end of the current mandate. Thisbriefing provides answers to some of the most Frequently Asked Questions regarding the office of European CouncilPresident, notably the role of the position and the election process. It also provides concrete examples from themandates of the three different office holders to date.

Briefing EN

France's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-03-2022Awtur RAGONNAUD Guillaume

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix Franza | reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | strateġija tal-UE għat-tkabbir | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju France's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is a subpart of 'France Relance', a larger recovery strategyadopted by France at national level, worth €100 billion in total (4.1 % of France's gross domestic product (GDP) in2019). The implementation of France's NRRP will be supported by €39.4 billion in grants under the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF). France has decided to use its entire national allocation for grants and not to request loans.The resources allocated to France represent 5.4 % of the entire RRF resources for the EU, and 1.6 % of the country'sGDP in 2019 (the RRF representing 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). Measures under the plan are to be completed by2026. Following the Council's approval of its RRP in July 2021, France received €5.1 billion in pre-financing in August2021 (13 % of France's financial allocation). The next payments, in five yearly instalments, will depend on progress inimplementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.Second edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN, FR

EU strategic autonomy in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-03-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix awtosuffiċjenza enerġetika | grupp ta' riflessjoni | gwerra | intervent militari | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | politika Ewropea tad-

difiża | politika ta' sigurtà u ta' difiża komuni | sigurtà pubblika | ġeopolitikaSommarju Many politicians and analysts have been arguing in recent years that, being highly vulnerable to external shocks, the

European Union should boost its ‘strategic autonomy’ and/or develop a higher degree of ‘European sovereignty’.These concepts encompass a greater potential for independence, self-reliance and resilience in a wide range of fields– such as defence, security and trade, as well as in industrial, digital, economic, migration and health policies. Russia’smilitary offensive in Ukraine gives this issue great urgency. In energy, the European Commission has now publishedplans to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds this year and end its reliance on Russian supplies of the fuelwell before 2030. And the debate is moving on to ideas and projects involving significantly more integration, solidarityand stronger joint security and defence. The EU’s strategic compass, a medium-term defence and security strategy, isbeing quickly updated to take into account the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II. This note offerslinks to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the European issues related toEuropean strategic autonomy and sovereignty.

Briefing EN

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Public hearing with Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board - 14 March 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-03-2022Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA | SLOCOCK OLIVER

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix bank | depożitu bankarju | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | maniġġar tal-kriżijiet | riżoluzzjoni bankarja | solvenza finanzjarja |

stabbiltà finanzjarja | unjoni bankarja tal-UESommarju This note is prepared in view of an ordinary public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Elke

König, which will take place on 14 March 2022. This briefing (1) addresses mainly the situation of Sberbank Europethat has been declared failing-or-likely-to-fail, giving background information (i) on the bank, (ii) the process, (iii) theactions taken, (iv) the public interest assessments made, and (v) the implications for deposit guarantee schemes. Inview of the current situation, this briefing (2) also summarises some information on the European banks’ exposures toRussia and Ukraine, as well as (3) some information on Russian banks operating in Europe.

Briefing EN

'Foreign agents' and 'undesirables': Russian civil society in danger of extinction?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-03-2022Awtur RUSSELL Martin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix dritt għall-ġustizzja | drittijiet tal-bniedem | ir-Russja | moviment tad-drittijiet umani | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | Żona ta'

libertà, sigurtà u ġustizzjaSommarju After a period of relative freedom in the 1990s allowed the emergence of civic activism in Russia, repression has now

come full circle. Under Vladimir Putin's power vertical, space for independent voices has narrowed. Like the politicalopposition and the media, civil society is now increasingly subordinate to the state. Repressive legislation hasgradually circumscribed the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As part of a more general drive toexclude external influences after a wave of post-election protests in 2011, in 2012 Russia adopted a Foreign AgentLaw, whose scope since then has been progressively expanded to include media and individual activists as well asNGOs. A second Undesirable Organisations Law from 2015 excludes numerous international NGOs from the country.While the Foreign Agent Law does not actually ban Russian NGOs from receiving foreign support, it makes it muchharder for them to operate and has forced many to close down. The number of organisations concerned is relativelysmall, but it includes many of the country's most prominent activists. Vaguely worded legislation puts large swathes ofcivil society at risk of falling foul of the law, a significant deterrent to activism. Repressive legislation has created adivide between officially tolerated 'social' NGOs, whose activities and values are more closely aligned with theKremlin's agenda, and 'political' NGOs. Conditions for the latter have become increasingly hostile, leaving little roomfor political activism.

Briefing EN

Implementation of macro-regional strategiesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-03-2022Awtur VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix Baħar Baltiku | Baħar Jonju | finanzjament tal-UE | It-Transdanubia Ċentrali | koeżjoni ekonomika u soċjali |

kooperazzjoni reġjonali | politika reġjonali tal-UE | Stat Membru tal-UE | Strument Ewropew ta' Viċinat u Sħubija |ġeografija reġjonali

Sommarju While each macro-regional strategy is unique in terms of the countries it brings together and the scope of its policies,they all share a common aim: to ensure a coordinated approach to issues that are best tackled together. Building onthe success of the pioneering 2009 European Union strategy for the Baltic Sea region, this form of cooperation hassince become firmly embedded in the EU's institutional framework, with four strategies now in place, covering 19Member States and 10 non-EU countries. Every two years, the European Commission publishes a report to assess theimplementation of the macro-regional strategies, most recently in 2020. With the views of stakeholders and otherplayers helping to complete the picture, it is possible to identify a number of challenges common to all macro-regionalstrategies in areas such as governance, funding, political commitment and the need to be more results oriented. Thishas helped focus discussions on the future role of macro-regional strategies within the post-2020 cohesion policyframework. Introducing a number of measures to strengthen macro-regional cooperation and increase alignmentbetween funding and macro-regional strategy priorities, the post-2020 cohesion policy architecture has the potential toestablish closer links between Interreg programmes and macro-regional strategies and to facilitate the embeddingprocess, whose importance has been brought into even sharper focus in view of the reduction in the Interreg budgetfor 2021 2027. Yet with countries currently focusing much of their attention on their recovery and resilience plans andthe conflict in Ukraine, many Member States have still not presented their cohesion investment plans to the EuropeanCommission, raising fears that valuable cohesion funding could be lost as a result, which could have seriousconsequences for the future implementation of macro-regional cooperation. Organised from 7 to 11 March 2022, andproviding an opportunity for macro-regional strategy stakeholders from across the EU to engage with EU institutionsand raise awareness of macro-regional cooperation, the EU's third macro-regional week could arguably not have comeat a better time. This is a further update to a 2017 briefing, the previous edition of which dates from February 2020.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 74

Revision of the eIDAS Regulation: Findings on its implementation and applicationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-03-2022Awtur TENHUNEN Susanna

Qasam tematiku L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-PrattikaKelma għat-tiftix gvern elettroniku | identità Ewropea | kontenut diġitali | suq uniku diġitali | ċittadin tal-UE

Sommarju The European Commission’s proposal (June 2021) for a European Digital Identity Framework would provide a trustedand secure way to authenticate and share qualified data attributes online through a ‘digital wallet’ ensured by MemberStates and allowing transactions across the EU. If put into effect, it would aim to achieve the target set in Europe’s‘Path to the Digital Decade’, which envisages 80 % of EU citizens using digital ID by 2030. It would also execute theEuropean Council’s vision and explicit request for EU-wide secure public electronic identification (eID), which wouldinclude interoperable digital signatures and give EU citizens control over their online identity and related data. TheCommission proposal amends and updates the existing eIDAS Regulation by responding to the challenges raised byits structural shortcomings and limited implementation and to technological developments since its adoption in 2014.The findings of the ex-post evaluation of the eIDAS Regulation shed light on the various limitations preventing thecurrent act from reaching its full potential, while the ex-ante impact assessment of the amending proposal examinesthe different options, their estimated impact, and the reasoning behind the preferred option. Together, they establishthe context for the eIDAS revision, the pitfalls that need to be overcome, and targets. EU institutions have largelywelcomed the Commission proposal in terms of its objectives and concept. However, concerns remain, notably when itcomes to finding the right scope for the act, defining the roles and liabilities of various public and private sector actors,ensuring high data protection, and building an inclusive system that leaves no one behind.

Briefing EN

New EU regulatory framework for batteries: Setting sustainability requirementsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-03-2022Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-AmbjentSommarju Given the important role they play in the roll-out of zero-emission mobility and the storage of intermittent renewable

energy, batteries are a crucial element in the EU's transition to a climate neutral economy. The proposal presented bythe European Commission is designed to modernise the EU's regulatory framework for batteries in order to secure thesustainability and competitiveness of battery value chains. It would introduce mandatory requirements on sustainability(such as carbon footprint rules, minimum recycled content, performance and durability criteria), safety and labelling forthe marketing and putting into service of batteries, and requirements for end-of-life management. The proposal alsoincludes due diligence obligations for economic operators as regards the sourcing of raw materials. In the EuropeanParliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) adopted its report on 10February 2022. The report is expected to be voted at the March I plenary session, and would constitute Parliament'smandate for interinstitutional negotiations. The French Presidency of the Council aims to reach agreement on ageneral approach at the Environment Council on 17 March 2022. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Fit for 55 package: revising the EU Emissions Trading System as regards aviationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-03-2022Awtur VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix bejgħ b'irkant | gass serra | l-ammont permess ta' emissjonijiet tal-UE | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | permess

negozzjabbli tal-emissjonijiet | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE |studju tal-impatt | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | trasport bl-ajru

Sommarju The IA identifies three problems that need to be tackled, but the analysis regarding how to promote broad and effectiveparticipation by states in CORSIA would have benefited from further explanation. The section of the report dealing withthe objectives seems less than comprehensive and insufficiently developed. While the options considered appear to besufficiently broad, a clear and transparent ranking based on the various elements considered is missing. The IAappears to reflect a satisfactory analysis of the main impacts of the retained options. The indicators proposed do notappear fully convincing in measuring the success of the initiative. The stakeholders' preferred option for implementingCORSIA is different from the one selected by the IA. Overall, the reasoning of the IA appears to be well grounded, andthe IA appears to have addressed most of the RSB's comments. Finally, the proposal envisages an increase in theshare of auctioned allowances that does not correspond to any of the retained options

Briefing EN

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War in Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-03-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix grupp ta' riflessjoni | gwerra | intervent militari | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | miżura restrittiva tal-UE | sanzjonijiet

internazzjonali | tagħmir militariSommarju Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, launching the biggest military offensive in Europe since World War II.

Moscow's incursion into the territory of its south-western neighbour and attempts to capture major cities – notably Kyiv,the capital – have met with firm resistance, thwarting President Vladimir Putin's reported plans for a quick conquestand installation of a subservient government. The United States, the European Union and many other countries haveimposed harsh sanctions on Russia, including attempting to cut some Russian banks off from international paymentssystems and limiting the Russian central bank's access to financial markets, as well as launching trade curbs, assetsfreezes and other restrictions. Many NATO countries have promised to deliver weapons to support Ukrainian fighters.For the first time, the EU has announced plans to send military equipment to a third country. Putin has moved Russia'snuclear force on to 'special alert', sparking fear and renewed condemnation across the world. Hundreds of thousandshave already fled Ukraine to escape the war. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries frommany international think tanks on Russia's attack on Ukraine. Reports from before the invasion can be found in aprevious item of the 'What think tanks are thinking' series.

Briefing EN

Lithuania's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-03-2022Awtur SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix għajnuna tal-UE | il-Litwanja | investiment tal-UE | riforma ekonomika | rikostruzzjoni ekonomika | rkupru ekonomiku |

tranżizzjoni ekonomikaSommarju Lithuania's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) sets out the package of reforms and investment measures

designed by the country in the context of the EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. Inabsolute figures, Lithuania has decided to use its full grant allocation of €2 224 million under the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF), while declining to avail of the loan component. These resources represent 0.3 % of the entireRRF, equal to 4.6 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in2019). In addition, Lithuania is naturally pursuing national reforms and investments that aim to further promote thedynamism of its economy, while addressing a number of structural weaknesses. It is also pursuing major objectivessuch as convergence towards higher standards of living, the green transition and the digital transformation. Measuresunder the NRRP are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council's approval of the plan, Lithuania received €289million pre-financing in August 2021. The next payments, in nine six-monthly instalments, will depend on progress inimplementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN, LT

Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 24 February 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-02-2022Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix dritt internazzjonali | għajnuna tal-UE | intervent militari | ir-Russja | Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti | l-Ukraina |

penali (UE) | politika tad-difiżaSommarju On 24 February 2022, at a special European Council meeting following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders

delivered a message of unity and determination, acknowledging 'the European aspirations and the European choice ofUkraine' and reiterating the EU's support to the territorial integrity of the country. They condemned Russia's continuedviolation of international law, and stressed that Russia 'will be held accountable for its actions'. EU leaders alsoapproved politically a new package of sanctions, which 'bites but does not deter'. Key restrictions linked to gas supplyand to access to the SWIFT payment system, a measure supported by the European Parliament, did not find aconsensus. The EU institutions were also asked to prepare a new set of 'individual and economic sanctions' targetedat Belarus.

Briefing EN

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EU international investment policy: Looking aheadTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-02-2022Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Id-Dritt Internazzjonali Pubbliku | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ftehim internazzjonali | investiment barrani | investiment dirett | investiment internazzjonali | investiment tal-UE | politika

kummerċjali | politika tal-investimentSommarju The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, providing the European Union (EU) with exclusive competence in the

area of 'direct investment', as part of the common commercial policy. This covers the conclusion of internationalinvestment agreements (IIAs), which typically aim to protect and/or liberalise foreign direct investment. Since then, theEU has ratified protection IIAs (or provisions in trade agreements) with Canada, Singapore and Vietnam. Early on,concerns were raised as to the specific EU competence. Opinions requested from the Court of Justice of the EU(CJEU) established that the EU had neither exclusive competence in portfolio international investments (which, unlikedirect investments, provide limited control over a firm) nor in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism –two domains covered by EU protection IIAs. EU Member State approval on these provisions was therefore needed.Moreover, to tackle stakeholders' general misgivings about the ISDS system – currently based on arbitral tribunals andperceived by some as insufficiently transparent and predictable – the EU is actively contributing to the multilateral talksto reform the current system, the objective being to establish a fully fledged 'multilateral investment court' with anappeal tribunal and its own judges. Furthermore, EU Member States have protection IIAs with other Member States inplace (intra-EU IIAs), which envisage arbitral ISDS mechanisms. However, the CJEU ruled in 2018 that arbitraldecisions between Member States are incompatible with EU law, and most Member States have agreed to terminatetheir intra-EU IIAs, raising major stakeholder concerns; the European Commission has launched an initiative toaddress these with a proposal for a regulation. Finally, for security reasons, the EU has also implemented EU- anddomestic-level mechanisms to screen, coordinate and exchange information about direct investment entering the EU.The European Parliament is preparing an own-initiative report on EU international investment policy.

Briefing EN

Renewed EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-02-2022Awtur D'AMBROGIO Enrico | VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix finanzjament tal-UE | Ir-Reġjun tad-Danubju | politika makroreġjonali tal-UE | reġjun ta’ żvilupp | strateġija tal-UE għat-

tkabbirSommarju Spanning a prominent geopolitical area between Germany's Black Forest and the Black Sea, the EU strategy for the

Danube region (EUSDR) is the largest and most diverse among the four EU macro-regional strategies (MRS). Itstarted its existence in 2010, was overhauled in 2020, and covers 14 EU and non-EU countries. It is structured aroundfour pillars: connecting the region; protecting the environment; building prosperity; and strengthening the region.Similar to the other macro-regional strategies, the EUSDR does not have its own budget. Its implementation dependson the mobilisation of funds from other relevant sources (EU, national, regional, private) and on well-coordinated use ofavailable funding instruments at different levels. The principle of embedding the MRS priorities within the 2021-2027national/regional EU funding programmes, in particular the European structural and investment funds (ESI), is gainingprominence. The EUSDR faces a number of issues. Large dissimilarities persist both between and within the EUSDRcountries, further exacerbated by the economic difficulties linked to the coronavirus pandemic. A shortage of funding, agap in the alignment of funds and weak political commitment among the countries involved also pose difficulties for thestrategy's implementation. Furthermore, these countries have to contend with broader global challenges such as thepost-pandemic recovery, climate change and the digital transition, all of which have the potential to divert theirattention away from their efforts to improve EUSDR implementation. With several Ukrainian regions participating in theDanube MRS, the impact of the rapidly unfolding conflict in the country remains unclear. Despite the many positivenew elements introduced by the EUSDR's revised action plan and the post-2020 cohesion policy framework, it remainsto be seen how efficient they will be in addressing the core challenges facing the EUSDR.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 77

Finland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-02-2022Awtur PARRY Matthew | TENHUNEN Susanna

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix il-Finlandja | reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju Finland's €2 085 million National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) makes use of the grants component of thecountry's national allocation under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), with no contribution from the loancomponent. The share of the NRRP equals 0.9 % of Finland's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 and represents atotal of 0.3 % of the entire RRF. In this respect, Finland's plan is relatively big compared to Member States ofcomparable population size and economy, such as Denmark (€1 500 million in grants). Finland has allocated 50.4 % ofits national plan to the green transition, in the service of its ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2035, while digitalexpenditure accounts for 27.1 % of the overall resources in the plan. Thus, Finland exceeds the minimum allocationsrequired by the RRF Regulation, which are 37 % for the green transition and 20 % for digital transformation. TheSustainable Growth Programme for Finland presents the NRRP and is financed by the Next Generation EU (NGEU)recovery instrument. Finland received its first payment of about €271 million in pre-financing, representing 13 % of itsplan, on 21 January 2022; the next payments, in six instalments, will depend on progress in implementing the plan.The total amount of grants under the RRF is subject to revision in June 2022, which might affect the final amountallocated to Finland. In addition to the RRF, Finland's plan draws on other EU funding instruments, such as theConnecting Europe Facility, to finance a cross-border electricity transmission project in partnership with Sweden insupport of the green transition RRF pillar; the Digital Europe and Horizon Europe programmes, to support initiativesunder the digitalisation pillar; and the European Social Fund and European Regional Development Fund for theeconomic cohesion pillar. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN, FI

Budgetary transfers in the EP in 2021 - still in the wake of the crisisTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-02-2022Awtur FRANKE Michaela

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuKelma għat-tiftix baġit tal-UE | epidemija | immaniġġjar finanzjarju | impenn ta' nfiq | konsegwenza ekonomika | marda tal-coronavirus |

nefqa baġitarja | Parlament Ewropew | statistika finanzjarjaSommarju This briefing analyses transfers in the EP's budget during 2021. It differentiates between transfers that were directly or

indirectly linked to the EP's response to the COVID-19 crisis and those that dealt with other, unrelated, needs,including the EP’s building policy. A comparison between the main tendencies observed in 2020 and 2021 sheds lighton how COVID-19 impacted budget implementation in both years touched by the crisis so far.

Briefing EN

Domestic use of EU Digital Covid CertificatesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-02-2022Awtur CLAROS GIMENO Eulalia | Niestadt Maria

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | It-TuriżmuKelma għat-tiftix dijanjożi medika | epidemija | kontroll tas-saħħa | marda tal-coronavirus | moviment liberu tal-persuni | sorveljanza tal-

mard | Stat Membru tal-UE | tilqima | ċertifikat tas-saħħaSommarju Just before summer 2021, the EU adopted in record time (see timeline below) two regulations on the EU Digital Covid

Certificate (EUDCC). The certificate with a QR code shows if a person has been vaccinated, tested negative orrecovered from Covid-19. It is free of charge, available on paper or on a smartphone, and valid in all EU MemberStates. The two regulations apply from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022. Currently, 35 non-EU countries have signed abilateral agreement with the EU, to accept each other’s Covid-19 certificates. The aim of the EUDCC is to facilitatesafe cross-border movement during the Covid-19 pandemic. Member States remain free to use it for other purposes,according to national law. They can also not require it at all. In February 2022, the Commission presented a proposalto extend its use by one year, while making some amendments (e.g. to accept more types of tests). This overviewshows which Member States are using the EUDCC for purposes other than cross-border travel (data as of 22 February2022). It indicates where and from whom it is required, as well as which proofs are accepted. Some countries use adifferent name for the certificate: e.g. CovidCheck, SafePass, Corona/health pass(port). In all Member States, theEUDCC is accepted, but not all accept the three types of certificates: vaccination, test and recovery.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 78

HERA, the EU's new Health Emergency Preparedness and Response AuthorityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-02-2022Awtur EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea | maniġġar tal-kriżijiet | marda tal-coronavirus | riżoluzzjoni bankarja | tqassim tal-

finanzjament tal-UESommarju The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic exposed the weaknesses in the EU's preparedness and planning capacities

as well as its lack of funding, with much of the EU's initial response being on an ad-hoc basis. Coordination andcooperation between EU Member States was initially often difficult, and took time to get established and startfunctioning in a structured way. The EU's Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) wasestablished by a Commission decision of 16 September 2021, as part of the European health union initiative that alsoincludes legislative proposals reinforcing the roles and mandates of the European Centre for Disease Prevention andControl and the European Medicines Agency. Set up within the European Commission and endowed with €6 billionfrom the EU's long-term budget, the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, HERA is expected to strengthen EUhealth security coordination during the preparedness phase, shorten crisis response times, and reinforce the EU'soverall health emergency preparedness and response architecture. While the creation of HERA has been welcomedby European stakeholders active in research, innovation and healthcare, they stress their preference for inclusivegovernance, and the need to harness the activities so that they reflect the public good dimension of HERAinvestments. Since HERA is a European Commission entity and not an EU agency, the European Parliament's role,and in particular that of its relevant committees, in assessing and monitoring HERA's effectiveness and efficiency hasyet to be defined.

Briefing EN

Canada's Parliament and other political institutionsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-02-2022Awtur PARRY Matthew

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix awtodeterminazzjoni | dritt territorjali | il-Kanada | parlament nazzjonali | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | sistema politika

Sommarju The contemporary federal state of Canada was formed in 1867, when the Province of Canada merged throughconfederation with two other British colonies in North America, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Canada's 1867constitution sets out the rules by which the country is governed and divides government responsibilities into threeseparate branches: parliament, executive and judiciary. In addition to being a federation, Canada is also arepresentative democracy and a constitutional monarchy. Queen Elizabeth, who resides in the United Kingdom (UK),is Canada's head of state. Canada's system of government is modelled on the UK's Westminster system. Canada'sfederal parliament, made up of the Queen and the two houses of Parliament, is both the legislature and the source ofexecutive power: in the tradition of 'responsible government', government ministers are responsible and accountable toparliament, and must answer to it for their actions. There are three levels of government within Canada: federal,provincial and territorial, and the local levels. Under Canada's federal system, the powers of government are dividedbetween the federal level and the 10 provincial governments, with federal responsibility for the three territories de factodevolved to them. The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court in the judicial system. Canada's political systemas a federal constitutional monarchy and its Westminster-style democracy resembles that of Australia. Accordingly, thisbriefing is similar in structure to the February 2020 EPRS briefing 'Australia's Parliament and other political institutions'.

Briefing EN

An ambitious future for Europe's women after COVID-19: mental load, gender equality in teleworking andunpaid care work after the pandemic

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 24-02-2022

Awtur FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | SCHONARD MartinaQasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix bilanċ bejn il-ħajja privata u x-xogħol | epidemija | għajnuna d-dar | impatt soċjali | marda tal-coronavirus | pożizzjoni

tan-nisa | statistika tal-UE | telexogħol | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi | xogħol mhux bi ħlasSommarju The COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic crisis have impacted women differently than men in the

European Union. Even if gender issues have never been so high-up in the European political agenda, the effects of theCOVID-19 crisis are putting in jeopardy the progress achieved in the past decade in terms on the reduction of genderinequalities in European member states. The effects of the COVID-19 sanitary crisis have also served to highlight theneed for member states to develop proactive – rather than reactive – gender mainstreaming policies. This year’sInternational Women’s Day is a perfect opportunity to look back on the past EU initiatives and reflect how to addressthe future, post-COVID- 19, challenges.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 79

'Fit for 55' package: Revising the Regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-02-2022Awtur VIKOLAINEN Vera

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | gass serra | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | monitoraġġ ambjentali | newtralità karbonika |

politika forestali Ewropea | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | settur tal-koltivazzjoni | studju tal-impatt | użutal-art

Sommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s impactassessment (IA) accompanying the proposal to amend the land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF)Regulation (EU) 2018/841. Despite the effort involved, the IA contains a number of shortcoming that significantly limitits potential to usefully inform policy-making. The impacts of the preferred option, its costs and benefits remain unclear,despite the estimates provided in the IA. Moreover, the baseline used in this IA does not appear to be dynamic orharmonised with the 'fit for 55' package, while one of the options does not appear to be a real alternative. Finally, theproposal does not seem to follow the recommendations of the IA, which suggests that relatively less ambitiousLULUCF targets under Option 2 combined with ESR-LULUCF flexibility would be more coherent if the ESR targets aresignificantly raised (which is the preferred option in the ESR IA and the proposal for ESR revision).

Briefing EN

PETI Fact-finding visit to Mar Menor, Spain - 23 - 25 February 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-02-2022Awtur FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | HEEZEN JOHANNES

Qasam tematiku Il-Petizzjonijiet lill-Parlament Ewropew | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix bijodiversità | ekosistema | finanzjament tal-UE | Murcia | reġjun tal-Mediterran (UE) | Spanja | tniġġis tal-ilma | żona

protettaSommarju The PETI Committee decided to organise a fact-finding visit to the Mar Menor in the Murcia Region in Spain. Over the

years, the PETI Committee has received a significant number of petitions on the pollution and deterioration of theenvironmental conditions of the Mar Menor. The aim of the mission is to visit the affected areas, hear the petitioners,and investigate and discuss the subject matter of the petitions with the regional and local authorities, as well as withthe Spanish competent authorities, scientists, representatives of social, business and trade union organisations.

Briefing EN

Transport trends in national recovery and resilience plansTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-02-2022Awtur PAPE Marketa

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | għajnuna għall-modernizzazzjoni | investiment tal-UE | konsegwenza ekonomika | marda tal-coronavirus |

organizzazzjoni tat-trasport | politika tat-trasport | rkupru ekonomiku | tkabbir ekoloġiku | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE

Sommarju To address the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU has put in place an unprecedented temporaryrecovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). Its main spending tool is the Recovery and Resilience Facility,worth €723.8 billion (in current prices). While EU countries differ both in terms of their pre-coronavirus situations and interms of Covid-19-related impacts, they can all seize the opportunity to kick-start their economies with this financialinjection. To access funding under the facility, EU countries have had to preparef their recovery and resilience plans inline with a number of requirements, such as earmarking a certain minimum share for investment in the green anddigital transitions. The plans have to be endorsed by the European Commission and approved by the Council. ByJanuary 2022, 70 % of the plans had been approved. While governments are receiving their first allocations of fundingand a full analysis is still out of reach, it has been possible to get an initial glimpse of the plans' contents. This briefingaims to give a flavour of the elements that EU countries want to take up to revive their transport and mobility systems.As all the projects financed have to be implemented by 2026, careful consideration has been needed to determinewhat is feasible and how it can fit in with long-term national greening efforts. Most governments want to invest inmodern trains, clean vehicles and recharging infrastructure as well as improving public transport. While digitalisation isalready significantly present across all transport modes, strategies for reducing car use and promoting active mobilityare taking hold only gradually. While the planned reforms and investments combine many elements and varyconsiderably, their collective completion could bring a step change towards a clean and modern European transport.This is an update of a Briefing published in October 2021.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 80

EU taxonomy: Delegated acts on climate, and nuclear and gasTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-02-2022Awtur SPINACI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix monitoraġġ ambjentali | newtralità karbonika | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | protezzjoni ambjentali | strateġija tal-UE |

tibdil fil-klima | tkabbir ekoloġikuSommarju The EU's commitment to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and the ambitious European Green Deal, require

significant investment. It is estimated that hundreds of billions of euros are needed in the current decade to reach thecarbon reduction targets. The EU taxonomy is a classification system that aims to channel public and privateinvestment into environmentally sustainable economic activities in order to achieve environmental objectives, such asthose in the fight against climate change. It establishes a dynamic list of economic activities considered to beenvironmentally sustainable, provided they contribute substantially to at least one environmental objective and do notsignificantly harm any other. The European Commission claims that such a common understanding of what constitutesenvironmentally sustainable investment can facilitate the funding of the transition to a more sustainable economy bybringing clarity to investors, avoiding market fragmentation and reducing the risk of greenwashing. While the basiclegal act for the taxonomy is already in force, the process of establishing detailed criteria on how to classify activitiesas green is ongoing. A first delegated act on reporting obligations of companies was adopted on 6 July 2021. Thefocus of this briefing is the two delegated acts determining which activities should be considered as sustainable andcontributing to the fight against climate change, and be reported as such. The first climate delegated act came intoforce on 1 January 2022, establishing criteria for activities helping to mitigate or adapt to climate change. Activities inthe nuclear and gas sectors are the subject of a complementary delegated act proposed by the European Commissionon 2 February 2022.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU taxonomy: Delegated acts on climate, and nuclear and gas

European defence and security [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-02-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-DifiżaKelma għat-tiftix grupp ta' riflessjoni | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | politika Ewropea tad-difiża | politika ta' sigurtà u ta' difiża komuni | sigurtà

pubblikaSommarju Russia’s military build-up around Ukraine, as well as fears of an armed conflict between the two countries, have

highlighted the importance of the on-going debate about how to strengthen the European Union’s Common Securityand Defence Policy (CSDP). On 17 February, the European Parliament adopted resolutions calling for a moreambitious CSDP, to counter threats such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, exploitation of migration for political purposes,and foreign interference. The Parliament has also welcomed the work of governments on the Strategic Compass, along-term plan for the EU to become a better provider of security, to act faster and more decisively to protect EUvalues and interests, and to contribute to international peace. The adoption of the Compass would also help the EU toachieve a stronger degree of strategic autonomy. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentariesfrom many international think tanks on European defence and security. Recent reports on the Ukrainian crisis can befound in a previous item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

‘Fit for 55’ package: Fuel EU MaritimeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-02-2022Awtur TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Qasam tematiku It-Trasport | L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix fjuwil marin | gass serra | infrastruttura tat-trasport | karburant sostitut | proposta (UE) | riżorsi rinnovabbli | studju tal-

impatt | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis mill-vapuri | trasport marittimuSommarju The impact assessment (IA) supporting the proposal 'Fuel EU Maritime' provides a qualitative and quantitative

analysis, which is based on sound and recent data. It also explains some uncertainties in the analysis of impacts. TheIA presents a well-evidenced problem definition and a sufficiently broad range of policy options. The quality of the IA isweakened by some inconsistencies in the comparison of options. In addition, the IA does not assess to what extentSMEs are effected of this proposal and the stakeholders' views on the fully fledged options are not indicated. It can benoted also that the open public consultation period does not meet the 12 week-requirement.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 81

Belgium's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-02-2022Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix il-Belġju | reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) of the European Union (EU) is the core component of Next GenerationEU, a temporary recovery instrument which allows the Commission to raise funds to help the economic and socialrecovery after the coronavirus pandemic. By promoting the sustainable and inclusive recovery that ensures the greenand digital transitions make progress, the RRF is consistent with the Commission's priorities. Belgium has decided touse its entire grant allocation under the RRF and, with a total amount of €5 924 million. Belgium's National Recoveryand Resilience Plan (NRRP) ranks 14th among the NRRPs in absolute budget value. Belgium's NRRP is entirelyfunded through non-repayable grants, which represent 0.8 % of the entire RRF and 1.24 % of Belgium's grossdomestic product (GDP) in 2019. The measures envisaged by the Belgian NRRP should be completed by 2026.Following the Council's approval of the plan, Belgium received €770 million (13 %) of pre-financing in August 2021.The next 10 instalments will depend on 210 intermediate milestones and targets in the implementation of the plan. TheEuropean Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EU recovery instrument, participatesin interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation and scrutinises the work of the EuropeanCommission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN, FR, NL

Fair and simpler taxation supporting the recovery strategyTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-02-2022Awtur SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Qasam tematiku Il-Valur Miżjud EwropewKelma għat-tiftix evitar tat-taxxa | reat tat-taxxa | taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud | taxxa korporattiva

Sommarju Two European Added Value Assessments (EAVAs) studies on Value Added Tax (VAT) and Corporate Income Tax(CIT) for the European Parliament's subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC), identified the gaps in EU legislation in theseareas and evaluated the European added value of various policy options to address these gaps.

Briefing EN

EU space policy: Boosting EU competitiveness and accelerating the twin ecological and digital transitionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-02-2022Awtur EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | L-Ambjent | L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix dritt tal-ispazju | navigazzjoni satellitari | politika dwar l-ispazju | politika ekonomika | settur ekonomiku | teknoloġija

spazjaliSommarju Over the past decade, space has gained increasing importance as an economic sector offering opportunities for

established and emerging markets. Space policies and their applications have also gained in political relevance due totheir capacity to tackle global challenges, such as the climate and biodiversity crises, but also due to the growingreliance of the EU economy and society on space infrastructure, services and data. Pursuant to Article 189 of theTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), space is a shared competence of the EU and its MemberStates. EU space policy has two overarching goals: on the one hand, promoting scientific and industrialcompetitiveness with a view to nurturing EU spatial ecosystems and ensuring EU autonomy in space; on the other,increasingly harnessing space investments and services to address key EU political priorities such as the EuropeanGreen Deal and the Digital Decade. This briefing focuses on the state of play in regard to the EU's space economy,while also examining the EU's reliance on space services. Specifically, it highlights the relevance of the EU in theglobal space market and looks at the ways the EU could boost its use of space data and services to deliver on its mainpolitical priorities.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU space policy: Boosting EU competitiveness and accelerating the twin ecological and digital transition

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 82

The Ukrainian crisis: Military threats and diplomacy [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-02-2022Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix forzi armati | grupp ta' riflessjoni | gwerra | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | relazzjonijiet diplomatiċi | sanzjonijiet internazzjonali |

ġeopolitikaSommarju Russia continues to strengthen its military presence around the Ukrainian border, despite intensive diplomatic activity

to ward off a feared armed conflict between the countries. Russia has amassed more than 100 000 troops, as well asships, aircraft, rocket launchers and other heavy weaponry near Ukraine, prompting some politicians and analysts tosay that war may be imminent. Others believe Russian President Vladimir Putin is still playing a diplomatic game,aimed, among other goals, at bringing Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence. The United States, the EuropeanUnion and other countries have threatened severe sanctions against Russia should it start new hostilities, following itsannexation of Crimea in 2014 and the destabilisation of some eastern Ukrainian provinces. This note gathers links torecent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the crisis and its implications forneighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics. More reports on the issue can be found in aprevious item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

Understanding the EU's approach to a new partnership with AfricaTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-02-2022Awtur PICHON Eric

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix kooperazzjoni internazzjonali | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | sħubija internazzjonali tal-UE | Unjoni Afrikana

Sommarju Africa has been put at the core of the Commission's geopolitical work programme and of the French Presidency of theCouncil of the EU. In February 2022, a summit between EU and African Heads of State and Government will discussways to build a new and comprehensive partnership, based on five pillars put forward by the EU: green transition andenergy access, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance, and migration and mobility.Although the proposal mainly builds on existing frameworks, its high profile and clear commitment to the African Union(AU) make it an important milestone in an effort for a deeper relationship and strengthened partnership in multilateralfora, initiated several years ago. In order to preserve its own economic and security interests in the face of increasedgeopolitical competition, the EU intends to continue to be an important player on the African continent. The EU and theAU have converging interests in a number of areas, such as the fight against climate change and the promotion of asustainable, job-creating African economy. However, they still have to find common ground on migration, securitymanagement, and fundamental values. The comprehensiveness of the proposed strategy is challenged by the gapsand overlaps of the current variable-geometry partnerships. The coronavirus outbreak delayed the adoption of acommon strategy. At the same time, it clearly highlighted the need to strengthen the links between the two continentsin order to tackle the most urgent global issues. Measures to fight the current pandemic and to prevent future oneshave reframed the priorities and will give new impetus to partnerships in areas such as health, the fight against climatechange, and promoting the digital transformation. This briefing updates 'Towards a new EU strategy with Africa',published in June 2020.

Briefing EN

La société civile et le futur accord entre l'Union européenne et les pays d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et duPacifique

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 11-02-2022

Awtur PICHON EricQasam tematiku L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u Umanitarja

Sommarju Près d'un cinquième de la population mondiale est concerné par le partenariat entre l'Union européenne (UE) et 78pays d'Afrique subsaharienne, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP). Les organisations de la société civile ont suiviavec intérêt les négociations qui ont abouti en avril 2021 à la proposition d'un nouvel accord entre l'UE etl'Organisation des États ACP. Cet accord négocié couvre des champs de première importance pour la société civile,tels que les droits de l'homme, les enjeux climatiques, le développement durable, la paix et la sécurité. Le textenégocié reconnait l'importance de renforcer les capacités, d'informer et de consulter les organisations de la sociétécivile afin qu'elles participent à la mise en œuvre de la coopération ACP-UE dans leur domaine d'action. Cependant, lenouvel accord laissera aux futures institutions du partenariat le soin de décider des structures et mécanismes quipourraient contribuer à l'expression de la société civile. Le Parlement européen a regretté que les organisations de lasociété civile aient été peu impliquées dans l'élaboration des politiques ou le suivi des activités du partenariat actuel. Ilsoutient leur souhait d'être associées à l'élaboration et à la mise en place des politiques qui découleront du futuraccord.

Briefing FR

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 83

Common chargers – Revision of the Radio Equipment DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-02-2022Awtur DALLI HUBERT

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix apparat elettroniku | armonizzazzjoni tal-istandards | informazzjoni għall-konsumatur | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni

ambjentali | skart elettroniku | standard Ewropew | standard tekniku | studju tal-impatt | tagħmir radjo | tagħmir tat-telekomunikazzjoni | telefon ċellulari

Sommarju The Commission is proposing a new directive on consumer credits to amend the Radio Equipment Directive byintroducing provisions regarding common mobile phone chargers. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impactassessment accompanying the proposal finds that the impact assessment appears to provide a comprehensiveassessment, based on a sound evidence base, of the impacts of the policy options, though the assessment wouldhave benefited from a more thorough discussion of the alignment of the initiative with the proportionality principle andthe impacts accruing to SMEs.

Briefing EN

Media environment in BelarusTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-02-2022Awtur PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix demokrazija | diżinformazzjoni | elezzjoni presidenzjali | il-Belarus | libertà ta' espressjoni | libertà tal-istampa | media

soċjali | media tal-massa | priġunier politiku | professjoni fil-komunikazzjoni | Soċjetà ċivili | ċensuraSommarju The media situation in Belarus has never been easy. With Aliaksandr Lukashenka being elected president of the

country for the first time in 1994, the necessary reforms to provide media freedom have never materialised. Instead,over the years various laws have lessened the rights of independent journalists and imposed limits on both traditionaland electronic media. Following the August 2020 presidential election, which ignited a brutal crackdown against thedemocratic opposition, the situation has worsened. Harassment, a hijacking, and politically motivated jail terms, bothshort and long, intimidate Belarusians who want to exchange ideas, report wrongdoing or fight for freedom ofexpression and freedom for the country. In January 2022, the Belarusian Association of Journalists confirmed thepresence of at least 32 journalists in Belarusian jails. On the positive side, new electronic media cannot be bannedeffectively and absolutely. While the regime slowly expands its presence on the internet, Belarusians trust independentmedia more and use it more eagerly. However, society’s distancing of itself from traditional state-controlled media isincreasingly met with an angry reaction from the state apparatus, which in turn further tightens related laws. TheEuropean Union, and the European Parliament in particular, actively support independent media and civil society inBelarus, and the Council of the EU and the Parliament both address the challenges to media freedom in the country.Financial help is also provided to Belarus and was even increased at the end of 2021, with priority areas of supportincluding ‘systematically repressed’ independent media.

Briefing EN

Improving the working conditions of platform workersTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-02-2022Awtur KISS Monika

Qasam tematiku L-ImpjiegiKelma għat-tiftix kundizzjonijiet tax-xogħol | liġi tax-xogħol | persuna li taħdem għal rasha | persunal | politika tal-impjiegi tal-UE |

proposta (UE) | sigurtà soċjali | trasformazzjoni diġitali | ħaddiem ta' pjattaforma onlineSommarju Platform work is an umbrella concept covering a heterogeneous group of economic activities completed through a

digital platform. As platform workers' rights are not enshrined in EU labour law, this increasingly leads to problemsrelated to various aspects of their work (working conditions, healthcare, unemployment, pensions) and humandevelopment (education, training, recognition of skills). To remedy this situation, the European Commission hassubmitted a proposal for a directive aimed at improving the working conditions of platform workers, clarifying theiremployment status and supporting the sustainable growth of digital labour platforms in the EU. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 84

Limits on exposure to carcinogens and mutagens at work: Fourth proposalTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-02-2022Awtur AMAND-EECKHOUT Laurence

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | Is-Saħħa PubblikaKelma għat-tiftix marda okkupazzjonali | saħħa okkupazzjonali | sustanza karċinoġenika

Sommarju In September 2020, as part of the fight against cancer and to protect the health of workers in a number of industries,the European Commission proposed to amend the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive (Directive 2004/37/EC),expanding its scope and including and/or revising occupational exposure limit values for a number of cancer- ormutation-causing chemical agents. The initiative is proceeding in steps and has now become a continuous process.Following on from three previous legislative amendments, which covered a total of 26 priority chemical agents, thefourth proposal addresses an additional three. On 16 December 2021, after interinstitutional negotiations, the Counciland the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the proposal. The agreed text was endorsed byCoreper, for the Council, on 22 December 2021 and then approved by Parliament's Committee on Employment andSocial Affairs on 25 January 2022. Under the agreement, workers will benefit from greater protection, owing to thesetting of exposure limits for acrylonitrile and nickel compounds and the lowering of the limits for benzene. The scopeof the proposed directive would include reprotoxic substances (which have adverse effects on reproduction and cancause impaired fertility or infertility). Workers who deal with hazardous medicinal products would receive better trainingon how to handle them safely. A vote in plenary is expected in February 2022. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Digital markets actTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-02-2022Awtur MADIEGA Tambiama André

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaKelma għat-tiftix data personali | ekonomija diġitali | id-dritt tal-kompetizzjoni | kummerċ elettroniku | oġġetti u servizzi | proposta (UE) |

protezzjoni tad-data | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur | provdiment ta’ servizzi | suq uniku diġitaliSommarju In December 2020, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation on contestable and fair markets in

the digital sector, otherwise referred to as the digital markets act (DMA). The proposed legislation lays downharmonised rules aimed at regulating the behaviour of digital platforms acting as gatekeepers between business usersand their customers in the European Union (EU). This approach entails a shift from ex-post anti-trust intervention to ex-ante regulation, and would enshrine within EU law a set of ex-ante rules that would radically change how large digitalplatforms are allowed to operate in the EU. The Council and the European Parliament agreed their positions on theDMA proposal in November and December 2021, respectively. While endorsing the proposal, both institutions adopteda number of amendments to the Commission's text. Trilogue negotiations aiming to reach a compromise text began inJanuary 2022. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Digital markets act

Child migrants: Irregular entry and asylumTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-02-2022Awtur DIAZ CREGO Maria | MACSAI GYORGYI

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix dritt għall-ażil | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | migrant | migrazzjoni forzata | migrazzjoni illegali | migrazzjoni ta’ ritorn |

persuna ta' nazzjonalità barranija | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | rifuġjat | tfal | tfal mhux akkumpanjatiSommarju The number of migrant children has been rising globally since the turn of the century. According to estimates by the

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in 2020, 35.5million children were living outside theircountry of birth, 11.5 million more than in 2000. Child migration takes many forms, from regular family reunification toforced and traumatic migration. This infographic focuses exclusively on forced and irregular movements of migrantchildren to the EU.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 85

Australia's strategic view of the Indo PacificTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-02-2022Awtur PARRY Matthew

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ASEAN | ftehim internazzjonali | l-Awstralja | Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà Komuni | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | sħubija

internazzjonali tal-UESommarju Australia, which is bordered to its west by the Indian Ocean and to the east by the Pacific Ocean, and lies in close

proximity to members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its north, can be described as acentral Indo-Pacific state. Since 2012, the idea of the Indo-Pacific has become a point of reference for Australiangovernments to define the country's foreign and security policy interests. Throughout the post-war period, Australia hassought to meet its conventional security needs primarily by way of its mutual defence pact with the United States (US),the 1951 Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), as well as the 'Five Eyes' signalsintelligence sharing agreement with the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and New Zealand. In turn, the latter isunderpinned by the 1946 United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA). In terms of its tradeinterests, however, Australia has looked increasingly to markets in Asia and proportionally less to traditional Westernallies. As China has risen and grown more assertive, setting up a strategic rivalry with the US and its regional partners,Australia has begun to find it harder to insulate its commercial interests from regional geopolitical tensions. Therecently forged 'AUKUS' security and technology partnership with the US and the UK reflects both the pace ofgeopolitical change in the Indo-Pacific and the enduring centrality of the US to Australia's defence strategy. Havinginitially determined that the lack of a domestic civil nuclear industry precluded the use of superior nuclear propulsiontechnology in Australia's submarine fleet, the current government has re-assessed its security strategy and re-calibrated its defence procurement arrangements, with potentially far-reaching diplomatic implications.

Briefing EN

Inland waterway transport in the EUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-02-2022Awtur SMIT-JACOBS KARIN

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix infrastruttura tat-trasport | karburant sostitut | mobilità sostenibbli | netwerk trans-Ewropew | politika komuni tat-trasport

| tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE | trasport fuq mogħdijiet tal-ilma naviġabbli | ġarr ta’merkanzija

Sommarju Inland waterway transport (IWT) is one of the most CO2-efficient transport modes per tonne of goods carried, usingonly 17 % of the energy needed by often-congested road transport and 50 % of rail transport. The sector already playsan important economic role in transporting both goods and passengers in Europe. However, it has an untappedpotential for increasing its capacity, which warrants the renewed attention it has recently attracted, in the light ofsustainable development. Despite support from the side of the European Union and at national levels, the modal shareof inland navigation in the overall EU transport sector has long remained more or less stable at 6 %. During the Covid19 crisis, the sector lost a little of its share to the benefit of road transport. To reduce CO2 emissions from EUtransport, the European Commission is seeking to increase the shift of freight transport to rail and inland shipping. Bothrecent Commission strategies – the European Green Deal and the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – reflectthis intention, and outline the steps needed to achieve an increased use of IWT, as well as of short sea shipping. Toplay its role to the full, the sector has to overcome important challenges and become digital, greener and resilient. Nextto new or adapted rules, this will require substantial and additional investment into modern infrastructure, digitaltechnologies and greener vessels, as well as a qualified workforce to ensure the sector's future development. Thisbriefing provides an insight into recent EU policy developments related to inland navigation and includes the views ofthe European Parliament and the main sectoral stakeholders. In addition, it looks at existing financial support from theEU, the new NAIADES III support programme, and offers a short outlook for future reform of and changes to the EU'sIWT network.

Briefing EN

US-Russia relations: Geopolitical, security, economic and human dimensionsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-02-2022Awtur RUSSELL Martin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ir-Russja | l-Istati Uniti | Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà Komuni | relazzjonijiet tal-UE

Sommarju After a period of détente, tensions are rising between the two former Cold War enemies again. Fundamentaldifferences were already apparent during the Yeltsin years and have increasingly strained relations since 2000, underVladimir Putin. There are few issues that Washington and Moscow agree on, but none is more divisive than Ukraine.Russia is determined to prevent further NATO expansion into post-Soviet eastern Europe, which it still sees as a bufferzone vital to its security and as a sphere of influence. Since late 2021, there are signs that Russia is planning renewedaggression against Kyiv; the US has promised a robust response if that happens. Both sides are likely to avoid directconflict at all costs. Russia is not the military superpower that the Soviet Union was, but it is still a formidableadversary. Most of the bilateral arms control agreements that helped to maintain the fragile military balance have nowgone, but talks launched at the first Biden-Putin summit in June 2021 aim at maintaining strategic stability. Economicsplay a much lesser role in US-Russia relations than geopolitics. Trade and investment between the two countries arelimited, and since 2014, they have been constrained by sanctions. Washington's economic superiority gives it a certainamount of leverage over Moscow; however, the Russian economy has proved more resilient to US restrictions thanmight have been expected. People-to-people contacts could help mitigate geopolitical tensions, but there is littleinteraction. Few Russians travel, study or work in the US, and the same applies vice-versa. Surveys show thatdiplomatic tensions are reflected in the generally negative views that Americans and Russians have of each other'scountries. This is an update of a Briefing published in October 2018.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 86

Social Economy in SpainTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-02-2022Awtur KONLE-SEIDL REGINA ANNA

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | L-ImpjiegiKelma għat-tiftix azzjoni tal-UE | ekonomija soċjali | għajnuna tal-UE | integrazzjoni soċjali | intrapriża soċjali | organizzazzjoni mingħajr

skop ta' qligħ | responsabbiltà ambjentali u soċjali | servizzi soċjali | Spanja | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju The concept of the "social economy" has gained attention and momentum in recent years although the degree of

recognition varies largely from one Member State to another.Spain is an example where the social economy benefitsfrom wide recognition. It is the first European country to enact a law on the social economy concept in 2011. In view ofthe EMPL delegation visit to Madrid, this briefing elaborates first on the concept applied in the SEAP - presented by theCommission on 9 December 2021 - and on the historical development of the social economy concept across Europe.The second part of the briefing focusses on social economy’s historical and legal evolution in Spain. Key aspects ofimplementation of legal provisions in practice are presented and discussed. Inter alia, we look at factors which eitherenable or constrain the proper development of the Spanish social economy sector and draw some conclusions forcreating a European social economy framework.

Briefing EN

Understanding EU policy on firearms traffickingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-02-2022Awtur NEVILLE ANN

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix arma projbita | armi tan-nar u munizzjonijiet | kriminalità | kummerċ tal-armi | negozju illiċitu | reat | sigurtà pubblika |

statistikaSommarju Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators

point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimatedtotal number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had nocriminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands ofcriminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. Theycan be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in theEU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicitfirearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons alsofrequently appearing. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engagein firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threatprecisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminalconnections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy to convertweapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative andpolicy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking.The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN)in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN’s global firearmsprogramme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governingthe control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed assource or transit countries for illicit firearms.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Understanding EU policy on firearms trafficking

Horizon Europe research and innovation missions: State of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-02-2022Awtur EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Is-Sikurezza tal-Ikel | L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix finanzjament għar-riċerka | investiment tal-UE | prodott ġdid | Programm Kwadru RTD | programm tal-UE

Sommarju Following the adoption of the United Nations sustainable development goals in 2015, research and innovationinvestment strategies worldwide are increasingly geared towards the twin green and digital transitions, in a bid toreinforce the impact of public investments in science and technology by improving their capacity to pool resources andrally various actors, including citizens, behind a specific goal (also known as 'directionality'). Horizon Europe, the 9thEU framework programme for research and innovation (2021-2027), establishes five 'missions' to be achieved by2030. These are the EU's long-term, cross-cutting research priorities, namely: adaptation to climate change; cancer –improving the lives of more than 3 million people; restore our oceans and waters; 100 climate-neutral and smart cities;and a soil deal for Europe. On 29 September 2021, the European Commission presented a communication in which itset out the missions' goals by 2030, and outlines their early implementation phase from 2021 to 2023 throughdedicated calls for funding adopted and published through Horizon Europe. The missions echo calls from theEuropean Parliament to support transnational cooperation in research and innovation through EU investment. The fivemission goals cut across the EU's political priorities, including the Europe's Beating Cancer plan and the EuropeanGreen Deal. The initiative's progress is followed by several of Parliament's committees. Research and innovationactors across Europe have welcomed the missions as important enablers of the twin digital and ecological transitions.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 87

What is new in the Commission's 2021 Better Regulation Guidelines?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-02-2022Awtur ANGLMAYER Irmgard | VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti Legali | Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-PrattikaKelma għat-tiftix Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea | liġi tal-UE | politika regolatorja | tfassil tal-politika

Sommarju This briefing examines the revised Better Regulation guidelines and toolbox the European Commission presented inNovember 2021, which translate the Commission’s communication ‘Joining forces to make better laws’ into practice.Compared to the previous edition, many tools and principles are just validated and adjusted, such as the three pillarsof ex-ante impact assessment, ex-post evaluation and stakeholder consultation, or the evaluate-first principle. Twomajor innovations stand out: the introduction of a new 'one in, one out' approach and the mainstreaming of strategicforesight in policy-making. The former aims at offsetting new administrative burdens (i.e. costs resulting fromadministrative requirements contained in legal acts by reducing an equivalent amount of existing burden on businessesand citizens. The latter aims at generating more resilient and future-proof policies by anticipating trends, risks andemerging issues, in particular in areas that are subject to rapid change.

Briefing EN

EU-Ukraine relations and the security situation in the countryTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-02-2022Awtur PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix delitt tal-gwerra | ftehim ta' assoċjazzjoni (UE) | il-kwistjoni tal-Krimea | intervent militari | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina |

okkupazzjoni militari | Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà KomuniSommarju Since the beginning of 2021, Ukraine has struggled with Russia's attempts to further destabilise the country and

intensify tensions in Europe's east, including through repetitive military build-ups along Ukraine's borders. Russia'smost recent threatening troop manoeuvres, together with its unsupportable security demands, met with a unitedresponse from Western countries, making it clear that a very high price will be paid if Russia attacks Ukraine. The EUand its institutions, including the European Parliament, have been clear in their response to Russia's aggression onUkrainian territory. The EU does not recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and regularly calls on Russia to de-escalate and withdraw its forces, and urges Moscow and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine to adhere tothe ceasefire agreement. Currently the situation remains very volatile. Relations between the European Union andUkraine continue to be shaped by the 2014 Association Agreement, which includes the Deep and Comprehensive FreeTrade Area. The long-term relationship between the EU and Ukraine covers a broad range of areas including trade,providing assistance to the country's health sector, support for the country's reform agenda, and support for the fightagainst hybrid attacks against Ukraine that have been perpetrated by Russia ever since Ukraine made its firm pro-European choice in 2014. Russia decided to respond aggressively to the Revolution of Dignity – a revolution whosemain aim was the signature of the Association Agreement – and immediately after the change of power in Ukraine in2014 it annexed Crimea and moved to actively support Donbas separatists. Intensive fighting in Donbas in 2014 andearly 2015 led to the Minsk agreements, but limited progress in implementing the agreements on the Russian sidehave led to the prolongation of Western sanctions against Russia. Russia continues its bullying policy towards Ukrainewith a wide range of instruments, including disinformation, blackmail and cyber-attacks.

Briefing EN

Rights of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the EU - Directive 2003/109/ECTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-02-2022Awtur AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Qasam tematiku L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix ammissjoni ta’ stranġieri | Direttiva tal-KE | każistika (UE) | permess ta' residenza | persuna ta' nazzjonalità barranija |

politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | status legali | studju tal-impatt | trattament indaqsSommarju Directive 2003/109/EC (the Long-term Residents Directive, or LTRD) sets out the conditions under which a non-EU

citizen ('third-country national') who has legally and continuously resided in a European Union (EU) Member State forat least five years can acquire 'EU long-term resident status'. This residence status is permanent, grants theseindividuals equal treatment rights with EU citizens in several areas, ensures reinforced protection against expulsion,and gives them the (conditional) possibility to move and reside in other Member States. In 2019, the EuropeanCommission published its second implementation report on the directive. It also finalised a fitness check on EU legalmigration legislation evaluating the effectiveness, coherence, and grounds for improvement of the existing EU laws inthe field. These reports found shortcomings both in the EU legal migration framework and in the directive itself. Thelimitations identified mainly concerned the implementation of legislation by EU Member States. The subsequentEuropean Commission proposals under the 2020 new pact on migration and asylum seek to address theseshortcomings by, for instance, revising the LTRD. The LTRD is currently under-used, as most Member States continueto issue almost exclusively national long-term residence permits. Many third-country nationals who could benefit fromthe rights of the EU status do not have access to it. The Commission has received numerous complaints from citizens,and has launched several infringement procedures pursuing legal action against EU Member States. The revision ofthe LTRD aims to improve the directive's implementation and functioning by establishing a 'true EU long-termresidence status' – with a particular focus on strengthening long-term residents' right to move and work in otherMember States (intra-EU mobility).

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 88

Revision of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive: Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-02-2022Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix bini | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | iffrankar ta' enerġija | konsum tal-enerġija | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE

| politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | proposta (UE) | servizzi tal-bini | standard ambjentali | titjib fl-abitazzjonijiet | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet

Sommarju On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a major revision (recast) of the Energy Performance ofBuildings Directive (EPBD), as part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package. The latter consists of several legislative proposals tomeet the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared to1990. It is a core part of the European Green Deal, which aims to set the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHGemissions (climate neutrality) by 2050. The recast EPBD aims to accelerate building renovation rates, reduce GHGemissions and energy consumption, and promote the uptake of renewable energy in buildings. It would introduce anew EU definition of a ‘zero emissions building’, applicable to all new buildings from 2027 and to all renovatedbuildings from 2030. Zero-emissions buildings would need to factor in their life-cycle global warming potential. Therecast EPBD would accelerate energy-efficient renovations in the worst performing 15 % of EU buildings, and wouldset minimum energy performance standards. In due course, every building would need to achieve at least a Class E ona revised A-G scale of energy performance certificates (EPCs). EPCs would be included in linked national databases.Other provisions introduce building renovation passports and a smart readiness indicator, end subsidies for fossil fuelboilers, and make building automation and control systems more widespread. The file has been referred to theCommittee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which will in due course appoint a rapporteur, who will producea draft report. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

'Fit for 55' legislative package: Deployment of alternative fuels infrastructureTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-01-2022Awtur NAVARRA Cecilia

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix idroġenu | infrastruttura tat-trasport | karburant sostitut | mobilità sostenibbli | proposta (UE) | provvista tad-dawl | studju

tal-impatt | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis mill-vetturi motorizzati | vettura elettrikaSommarju The present IA supports the proposal for a Regulation on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure. It seems

quite robust especially in the connection between problem analysis, specific objectives, and measures proposed, andin the quantitative analysis. Still it is complex and not fully accessible to a non-expert reader and it lacks clarity andexhaustive explanations in some points.

Briefing EN

Understanding EU data protection policyTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-01-2022Awtur MILDEBRATH Hendrik Alexander

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix data personali | datatrażmissjoni | dritt informatiku | politika tal-UE | protezzjoni tad-data | protezzjoni tal-privatezza |

regolament (UE)Sommarju The datafication of everyday life and data scandals have made the protection of personal information an increasingly

important social, legal and political matter for the EU. In recent years, awareness of data rights and expectations forEU action in this area have both grown considerably. The right to privacy and the right to protection of personal dataare both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in the EU Treaties. The entry into force of theLisbon Treaty in 2009 gave the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties and abolished the pillar structure,providing a stronger basis for a more effective and comprehensive EU data protection regime. In 2012, the EuropeanCommission launched an ambitious reform to modernise the EU data protection framework. In 2016, the co-legislatorsadopted the EU's most prominent data protection legislation – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – andthe Law Enforcement Directive. The framework overhaul also included adopting an updated Regulation on DataProtection in the EU institutions and reforming the e-Privacy Directive, which is currently the subject of negotiationbetween the co-legislators. The European Parliament has played a key role in these reforms, both as co-legislator andauthor of own-initiative reports and resolutions seeking to guarantee a high level of data protection for EU citizens. TheEuropean Court of Justice plays a crucial role in developing the EU data protection framework through case law. In thecoming years, challenges in the area of data protection will include balancing compliance and data needs of emergingtechnologies, equipping data protection authorities with sufficient resources to fulfil their tasks, mitigating complianceburdens for small and medium-sized enterprises, taming digital surveillance and further clarifying requirements of validconsent. This is an updated edition of a briefing written by Sofija Voronova in May 2020.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 89

‘Fit for 55’: Revision of the EU Emissions Trading SystemTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-01-2022Awtur VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix gass serra | l-ammont permess ta' emissjonijiet tal-UE | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | permess negozzjabbli tal-

emissjonijiet | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | riżervi | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE | studjutal-impatt | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet

Sommarju The IA identifies in a clear manner the problems, which are clearly linked to the objectives of the initiative, as well astheir likely evolution without intervention. The range of options considered seems to reveal an intended path of action,namely the upward revision of the ETS ambition, in line with the political determination already laid out in the 2030CTP. The IA does seem to provide a good account of the key impacts of the retained options, while taking into accountSMEs and suggesting measures to address the social or distributional impacts of carbon pricing. However, not allpolicy options or supporting elements were assessed individually and the IA does not systematically contemplate theimpacts of a scenario more reliant on carbon pricing, nor the interplay between policy areas. The IA’s reasoning issupported by various sources which appear to provide a reliable basis for analysis and which are, overall, dulyreferenced, with the exception of supporting work concerning carbon leakage; however, for most models, theuncertainties and limitations were only vaguely indicated. Overall, the IA does seem to have addressed most of theRSB’s recommendations. The proposal appears to be consistent with the IA’s analysis, although the Commission’sintention to increase the Modernisation Fund share is not assessed under the retained options. Moreover, the choicesregarding the market stability reserve and the Innovation Fund (both left by the IA to be decided politically) do notcorrespond to any of the options assessed in the IA.

Briefing EN

The role (and accountability) of the President of the EurogroupTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-01-2022Awtur HAGELSTAM Kajus | LEHOFER WOLFGANG | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix Eurogrupp | governanza | l-Ombudsman Ewropew | Parlament Ewropew | trasparenza fit-teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet | Unjoni

Ekonomika u MonetarjaSommarju This note provides an overview of the role and mandate of the Eurogroup and the role and accountability of its

President, including the procedures for his/her appointment. In addition, this note refers to the debate around thetransparency of Eurogroup proceedings. The paper will be updated in light of relevant developments.

Briefing EN

Holocaust denial in criminal law: Legal frameworks in selected EU Member StatesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-01-2022Awtur BAKOWSKI Piotr

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix analiżi komparattiva | diskriminazzjoni etnika | dritt komparat | dritt kriminali | Konvenzjoni Ewropea dwar id-Drittijiet tal-

Bniedem | ksenofobija | razziżmu | reat kontra l-umanità | Stat Membru tal-UESommarju The Holocaust ('Shoah' in Hebrew) – the state-sponsored, systematic persecution and mass murder of Jews, whom

the Nazi regime and its collaborators sought to annihilate along with other persecuted groups, such as Roma and Sinti– took place in Europe. It is therefore not surprising that a trend to address negationism – i.e. unfounded theoriesquestioning certain historical events – by means of criminal law, originated in Europe. With time, the scope ofcriminalisation has been extended to cover not only the Shoah, but also other internationally recognised crimes. Suchprohibition is, however, not without controversy as it may interfere with fundamental rights, such as freedom ofexpression and academic freedom. The Council of Europe has played a major role in addressing Holocaust denial, inparticular through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights pertaining to the limits of freedom ofexpression. The Court has consistently excluded negationism from the protection of the European Convention onHuman Rights, pointing to the antisemitic nature of the prohibited statements and qualifying them as abuse of rights. Inthe European Union (EU), a 2008 Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia sought to align national legislationon historical denialism. Yet, national laws still differ in many respects, such as the definition of offences and the rangeof historical events, the memory of which they serve to protect. This Briefing looks at criminal provisions in 17 selectedEU Member States: Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary,Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. It attempts to identify the main elements ofthe criminal conduct and of the corresponding punishment. The following EPRS policy analysists have contributed tothe country analyses: Piotr Bąkowski (Poland), Carmen-Cristina Cirlig (Romania), David De Groot (Netherlands),Micaela Del Monte (Luxembourg and Portugal), Angelos Delivorias (Greece), Fabiana Fracanzino (Spain and Italy),Fruzsina Fuzesi (Hungary), Vilma Karvelyte-Shetty (Lithuania), Karoline Kowald (Austria), Katrien Luyten (Belgium),Hendrik Mildebrath (Germany), Marketa Pape (Czechia), Anja Radjenovic (Slovenia), Branislav Stanicek (Slovakia),and Sofija Voronova (France). This is an update of a Briefing published in September 2021.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 90

SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutritionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-01-2022Awtur CAPRILE ANNA | PICHON Eric

Qasam tematiku L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp Reġjonali | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix agrikoltura sostenibbli | FAO | għajnuna għall-ikel | għajnuna għall-iżvilupp | malnutrizzjoni | nutrizzjoni tal-bniedem |

Programm Dinji tal-Ikel | sigurtà tal-ikel | ġuħ | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju At least one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations (UN) will be missed in 2030 –

SDG 2 – 'zero hunger' – also endangering the accomplishment of the rest of the SDG goals under Agenda 2030.Hunger and malnutrition are rising dramatically across the world, a trend aggravated by the pandemic. In 2020, 811million people in the world were facing hunger, the highest level since 2014, and 3 billion people were without accessto a healthy diet. The fight against hunger and malnutrition has been the focus of two global summits, namely the UNFood Systems Summit (September 2021), which committed to a deep reform of global food systems, and the Nutritionfor Growth Summit (December 2021), which saw the biggest pledge since 2013. In the EU itself, considered one of themost food-secure regions in the world, nearly 7 million people were already experiencing severe food insecurity beforethe pandemic, and malnutrition is on the rise, as demonstrated by obesity and pre-obesity prevalence rates. SDG 2aims not only at achieving food security but also at improving nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture. Theseobjectives have been mainstreamed in the recently reformed common agricultural policy and the 'farm to fork' andbiodiversity strategies. In developing countries, the EU is strongly committed to achieving SDG 2. The EU institutionsand Member States, which collectively provide more than half of official development assistance worldwide, havereaffirmed this commitment in the new European 'consensus on development'. Alongside development aid, the EU hasseveral levers at its disposal to act on food insecurity causes, such as security and defence missions andcomprehensive strategies in conflict areas, as well as substantial research capacities. The fact that its internal policies,in particular agricultural, climate and trade policies, have a spill-over effect on other food systems in the world, inparticular in poorer countries, also make the EU a significant player.

Briefing EN

Multimedia SDG 2 – zero hunger and EU action against hunger and malnutrition

The European Commission’s annual rule of law reports: A new monitoring toolTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-01-2022Awtur MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix demokrazija | korruzzjoni | pluraliżmu fix-xandir | rakkomandazzjoni (UE) | rapport tal-attività | sistema ġudizzjarja |

skambju ta' informazzjoni | Stat Membru tal-UE | stat tad-dritt | ġbir ta' dejtaSommarju The annual rule of law reports, launched by the Commission in September 2020, are a new addition to the European

institutions’ rule of law toolbox. The exercise can be described as a monitoring tool, as it collects data on the state ofthe rule of law in each of the 27 EU Member States but without drawing legal conclusions or giving specificrecommendations. The second rule of law report was published in July 2021 and the third is expected in 2022, with theannual exercise becoming a permanent mechanism. The methodology adopted by the Commission provides forreporting on four subject areas in all 27 Member States: (i) justice systems; (ii) the anti-corruption framework; (iii)media pluralism; and (iv) other institutional issues related to checks and balances. This methodology underlines theclose involvement of Member States in the preparation of the annual reports and their follow-up. The Member Statesare involved throughout the process by way of: (i) a network of contact persons on the rule of law that meets regularlywith the Commission; (ii) contact persons providing written contributions to the report; (iii) dialogue between theCommission and Member States through the network of contact persons, the group of contact persons on nationaljustice systems, the national contact points on corruption, and bilaterally at political and technical level; (iv) countryvisits; and (v) the opportunity for each Member State to comment on the part of the report concerning them. Thereports have met with some criticism from academics, who draw attention to the purely descriptive, rather thanprescriptive nature of the reports and the lack of concrete follow-up.

Briefing EN

Cyprus's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-01-2022Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika | Ċipru

Sommarju In absolute figures, Cyprus's National Recovery and Resilience Plan amounts to €1.2 billion. Cyprus decided to use itsallocation under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) predominantly in grants (€1.005 billion), with €200.3million in loans. These resources represent around 0.2 % of the entire RRF, but are equal to 5.2 % of the country'sgross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). They will underpin a vastprogramme of reforms and investments that aims to promote the recovery of the Cypriot economy (Cyprus's GDPdropped by 5.2 % in 2020), while addressing a number of structural weaknesses as well as pursuing major objectivessuch as the green transition and the digital transformation. Measures under Cyprus's plan are to be completed in 2026.Following the Council's approval of the plan, Cyprus received a €157 million pre-financing, disbursed in September2021. The next payments, in ten instalments for grants and four instalments for loans, will depend on progress inimplementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Firstedition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EL, EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 91

Estonia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-01-2022Awtur Niestadt Maria

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix l-Estonja | reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju Estonia's Recovery and Resilience Plan – one of the last such plans submitted to the European Commission – sets outthe reforms and public investment projects that Estonia intends to implement with the support of the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF). The RRF is one of the main components of Next Generation EU, an EU instrument tocounter the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Estonia's plan is one of the smallest in the EU in terms of the totalamount allocated. However, when taking into account its number of inhabitants, the country is a medium-sizedbeneficiary. Initially, Estonia requested €982.5 million in grants (so far, it has not requested RRF loans); the Councilagreed to make €969.3 million available to Estonia, of which the allocation for 2021 and 2022 is €759.5 million and isalready final. However, the remaining amount of money that is available might still change until June 2022, dependingon the updated data on Estonia's gross domestic product (GDP) compared to other EU countries. Estonia's planrepresents 0.1 % of the entire RRF, equal to 3.5 % of the country's GDP in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDPin 2019). The reforms and investments included in Estonia's plan should be completed by 2026. Its key focus is on thegreen and digital transitions, the resilience and accessibility of the healthcare system, and social inclusion. The plancould increase Estonia's GDP by between 0.8 % and 1.3 % and help to create up to 4 000 additional jobs by 2026. TheCouncil approved Estonia's plan on 25 October 2021. The European Commission disbursed €126 million in pre-financing on 17 December 2021. The next payments, in seven instalments, will depend on progress in implementingthe investments and reforms. The European Parliament, which was a great supporter of the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on its implementation, and scrutinisesthe work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition.The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing ET, EN

Latvia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-01-2022Awtur SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix il-Latvja | reflazzjoni | rkupru ekonomiku | tranżizzjoni ekonomika

Sommarju Latvia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) sets the package of reforms and investment measuresdesigned by the country in the context of the European Union (EU) response to the crisis triggered by the coronaviruspandemic. In absolute figures, Latvia has decided to use €1 826 millions of grant allocation under the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF), while declining to avail of the loan component. These resources represent 0.3 % of the entireRRF, equal to 6 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU 27 GDP in2019). Through these resources, Latvia is naturally pursuing national reforms and investments that aim to furtherpromote a dynamic Latvian economy, while addressing a number of structural weaknesses. Latvia is also striving toattain major objectives such as convergence towards higher levels of standard of living, the green transition and digitaltransformation. Measures under the current plan are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council's approval of theplan, Latvia received €237 million in pre-financing in September 2021. The next payments, in a total of six instalments,will depend on progress in implementation. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation ofa common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on itsimplementation and scrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EUMember States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of theplans.

Briefing EN, LV

Research for REGI, CONT and BUDG Committees - Cohesion Policy Calendar (2021-2027 and 2014-2020 Programming Periods)

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 21-01-2022

Awtur HAASE DianaQasam tematiku L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix koeżjoni ekonomika u soċjali | Kumitat tal-PE | politika reġjonali tal-UE | relazzjonijiet interistituzzjonali (UE) | tfassil tal-

liġi tal-UESommarju The implementation timetable for cohesion policy is defined largely by its legislative framework. In order to be able to

plan parliamentary work and exercise systematic scrutiny of policy implementation and of the Commission’s work, it isessential to have an overview of the timing of different steps in policy implementation in the coming years. This type ofbriefing was first published (and subsequently updated) in 2014 covering the 2014-2020 programming period. Thisversion includes the policy actions of the 2021-27 period, while still indicating the last steps of the 2014-20 period. Itincludes a detailed (but non-exhaustive) timetable of policy actions in 2022, together with an overview of major actionsfor the remainder of the programming period, from 2023. Policy actions related to budgetary and budgetary controlaspects are coloured green (for the year 2022).

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 92

Post-Brexit fishing quota changes: 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-01-2022Awtur POPESCU Irina | SCHOLAERT FREDERIK

Qasam tematiku Is-SajdKelma għat-tiftix ftehim kummerċjali (UE) | ftehim ta' kooperazzjoni (UE) | ir-Renju Unit | koservazzjoni tal-istokkijiet tal-ħut | kwota ta'

qbid | qabda ħut | Stat Membru tal-UE | ħruġ mill-UESommarju From 2021 to 2025, the EU is gradually transferring part of its fishing quota shares to the UK, in line with the EU-UK

Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). In total, 55 shared stocks are concerned, and 60 % of the overall Brexitquota transfer occurred in 2021. This infographic illustrates the EU quota transfer that year for some of the mostaffected fish stocks. The quota transfer in 2021 for the selected stocks totals 62 211 tonnes, with an estimated overallvalue of €103 million.

Briefing EN

Yiddish language and culture and its post-Holocaust fate in EuropeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-01-2022Awtur PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Qasam tematiku Il-Kultura | L-EdukazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix kultura | Lhudi | lingwa minoritarja | użu ta' lingwi

Sommarju Yiddish is a language once spoken by Jews in an area spreading from Alsace to the Urals, influenced by andinfluencing local languages and cultures. It neared extinction in the 20th century when it lost the majority of itsspeakers, mostly – but not only – through the Holocaust. Yiddish is part of European folk culture, contributing to theworks of great writers and musicians and broadening European culture more generally. Successive waves of Jewishmigration provoked by poverty, persecution, pogroms, Stalinism and Nazism, war and all forms of antisemitism, havedrastically reduced the Jewish population across Europe and, with it, the number of Yiddish speakers. The Holocaust –referred to in Yiddish as Khurbn (destruction) – was an ethnic and cultural cleansing process designed to erase anytrace of Jewish life from European culture, including Yiddish, a language perceived as 'bad German'. Some Holocaustsurvivors tried to recreate their pre-war lives and cultivated their language and culture. Others, however, traumatisedby the war, wanted a new beginning, often far from home and their children wanted to fit in and speak the locallanguage. As the use of Yiddish continues to diminish, its speakers are growing older, and its transmission amonggenerations was interrupted, Unesco has put Yiddish on the definitely endangered languages list. However, the fate ofYiddish as a dead or stifled language is not yet sealed. Traditional religious Jewish communities, mostly in Israel, andNorth and South America, but also in Europe, still use Yiddish and contribute to Yiddish culture. Moreover, Yiddish isenjoying a revival as a language and culture among both young secular Jews and the non-Jewish population, andYiddish language and culture courses, studies, and traditional Jewish Klezmer music festivals abound in Europe andbeyond. Whether this will be enough to keep this European heritage alive and what might be the EU's role in bringingthis once vibrant European culture back to life remains to be seen.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Jewish art collections – Nazi lootingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-01-2022Awtur PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Qasam tematiku Il-KulturaKelma għat-tiftix arti | il-Ġermanja | impriża artistika | It-Tieni Gwerra Dinjija | Lhudi | oġġett kulturali | protezzjoni tal-patrimonju | serq |

Soċjaliżmu Nazzjonali | ĠudaiżmuSommarju When the Nazis grabbed power in Germany, they had clear ideas about what art is. The persecution of Jews allowed

them to seize Jewish property, forbid Jews from running art galleries, push them out of their countries to exile, andsend them to camps and death. All this enabled some prominent Nazis to start their own art collections. However, mostof the looted valuable classical artworks were destined for existing or planned museums. Nazis and their collaboratorslooted art collections and moved them from annexed or occupied countries most often to Germany and Austria. Thishelped trade in looted art flourish not only in Paris but also in the United States. Due to cataloguing needs, storagerequirements and Allied Forces' bombings, looted cultural property was displaced many times and finally moved tocellars and salt caves in southern Germany and Austria. Similar developments took place at the Eastern Front, leadingto double looting. The Soviet army seized art looted by the Nazis in the territories it conquered and occupied, claimingthem as war trophies, and further displaced artworks across the parts of eastern Europe it held. The division ofGermany among the four occupying forces and the establishment of the Iron Curtain further complicated the task oflocating looted art, as catalogues were scattered across the continent. Due to the huge efforts of the liberating armies,works of art found in Western-occupied zones were returned to the countries from which they had been seized. In theirturn, the governments were expected to hand these items over to their rightful owners. However, this did not alwayshappen; owners and their heirs, or the artworks they were searching for, were not always located. More than 50 yearsafter WWII, to address the fact that the owners of many artworks had still not been identified, the internationalcommunity adopted the Washington Principles, the Vilnius Forum Declaration and the Terezin Declaration, as a signalthat progress towards resolving this difficult task requires museum searches and international cooperation. The aim isto help the few Holocaust survivors still alive, or their heirs, retrieve their artworks. Restitution of cultural propertylooted by Nazis and their collaborators is not only an act of justice. It is also a gesture of recognition of the Jewishcontribution to flourishing cultural and artistic life in Europe.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 93

Ireland and Denmark in the EU: Fiftieth anniversary of accessionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-01-2022Awtur NEVILLE ANN | PERCHOC Philippe

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix adeżjoni fl-Unjoni Ewropea | esklużjoni fakultattiva | euro | Ftehim ta’ Schengen | id-Danimarka | integrazzjoni

ekonomika | It-Trattat ta' l-Adeżjoni (UE) | kommemorazzjoni | Komunità Ewropea | l-IrlandaSommarju This year marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the accession treaties to the former European Communities by

Ireland and Denmark. The path to membership was not smooth for either country, with their first two applications madein 1961 and 1967, together with the United Kingdom, effectively blocked by French opposition. With a change ofgovernment in France, the six members of the European Communities reaffirmed their agreement to the enlargementof the Communities, and negotiations on membership began with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom(UK). In Denmark, Ireland and Norway, referendums were held to decide on possible membership. The Danish andIrish people voted 'yes', while citizens in Norway narrowly rejected membership, with 53.5 % voting 'no'. On 1 January1973, Denmark and Ireland (along with the UK) officially became members of the European Communities after morethan a decade of negotiations. Over time, Treaty ratification referendums took place in other countries too, but weremost concentrated in Ireland (7) and Denmark (4). In fact, Ireland remains unique in this sense as the only MemberState that has held a referendum on every major Treaty revision since voting in 1972 to become a member. This wasthe first enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC), bringing membership from the original six to ninemembers. It also meant that the number of Members of the European Parliament rose from 142 to 198, whichrepresented an increase of nearly 40 %. This paper looks at the background to the decision to seek membership of theEuropean Communities, examining the economic and political conditions that caused Ireland and Denmark to seek tobecome Member States. It also discusses key features of EU membership: for Ireland, the decision to join the euro andits relationship with the Schengen Agreement; and for Denmark, the opt-outs introduced with the advent of theMaastricht Treaty.

Briefing DA, EN, GA

Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive: Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-01-2022Awtur KARABOYTCHEVA Miroslava Kostova

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix enerġija elettrika | politika fiskali | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | prodott għall-ġenerazzjoni tal-

enerġija | proposta (UE) | sistema ta' tassazzjoni | taxxa ambjentaliSommarju The revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) is part of the 'fit for 55' package. The current ETD (Directive

2003/96/EC) is outdated and out of sync with the EU's climate and energy objectives. It favours the use of fossil fuelsand no longer contributes to the proper functioning of the internal market. The aspects of energy taxation requiringmost urgent revision are the level and structure of minimum rates, replacement of the volume-based approach toenergy taxation with one based on energy content and environmental performance, and the introduction of anindexation mechanism. The effectiveness of the current directive is further limited by outdated coverage of energyproducts, specifically biofuels, and a series of tax differentiations, reductions and exemptions. In July 2021, theCommission presented a proposal for the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive. Its objective is to align the taxationof energy products with EU energy and climate policies by promoting clean technologies, removing outdatedexemptions and reducing rates that de facto encourage the use of fossil fuels. The ETD revision is a consultationprocedure. It requires unanimity in Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the European Economic andSocial Committee. Parliament has assigned the file to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, whichappointed a rapporteur in September 2021. The ITRE committee is associated with the procedure under Rule 57. Firstedition. 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

‘Fit for 55’ package: Carbon border adjustment mechanismTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-01-2022Awtur KRAMER Esther

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix bejgħ u xiri ta' emissjonijiet | gass serra | importazzjoni (UE) | karbonju | permess negozzjabbli tal-emissjonijiet | politika

tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | sorveljanza b'rabta mal-importazzjoni | studju tal-impatt | teknoloġija nadifa | tibdilfil-klima | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet

Sommarju The IA is based on extensive internal and external research and modelling and covers a lot of ground relating to avariety of potential impacts, both in the main text and the annexes. It is also transparent with regard to the limitationsand uncertainties of the analysis. While not all aspects could be assessed in depth, in the interest of proportionality, theIA considers the relevant impacts of the retained options, with a focus on the industrial sectors that were selected forcoverage; it addresses the electricity sector much more briefly in an annex. Although the definition of the objectiveshas some weaknesses, the intervention logic of the IA is clear. The IA could, though, have highlighted more clearly thetrade-offs between the various options in relation to different stakeholders. Furthermore, to reach non-expert policy-makers the complex and technical analysis could have been made more accessible through additional explanationsand precise links to the ETS revision. At the end, the IA highlights the relevance of political decision-making and‘weighting’ of the criteria it has presented, pointing to the need for coherence with the other initiatives in the ‘Fit for 55’legislative package.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 94

Parliaments in emergency mode: Lessons learnt after two years of pandemicTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-01-2022Awtur DIAZ CREGO Maria | MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | kontroll tas-saħħa | marda tal-coronavirus | parlament nazzjonali | prevenzjoni tal-mard | regoli proċedurali

parlamentari | sessjoni parlamentari | telekomunikazzjoni | telexogħol | votazzjoni elettronikaSommarju The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020 presented parliamentary institutions around the world with a

new and unprecedented scenario. Parliamentary rules of procedure in representative democracies are commonly builtupon the principles of pluralism, deliberation and transparency, aiming to provide an arena in which representatives ofthe people have the opportunity to publicly confront each other's points of view in a free and fair setting. It is, therefore,safe to say that ordinary parliamentary practice and procedures are essentially incompatible with measures seeking tominimise social contacts and discourage − or directly forbid − mass gatherings. As a logical result of the adoption ofthe first restrictive measures aiming to limit the spread of the virus adopted in EU Member States in the first months of2020, parliaments followed suit and implemented specific measures aiming to ensure the continuity of parliamentarybusiness while limiting the spread of the virus and protecting the health of their members and staff. In the early days ofthe pandemic, the European Parliament, together with some other EU national parliaments rushed to digitaliseparliamentary activities in an attempt to ensure that all members could take part in parliamentary proceedings despitethe crisis situation. Some EU national parliaments opted to adopt decisions with a reduced number of members andothers decided to adopt social distancing measures, while at the same time ensuring that all members could continueto take part in parliamentary activities. Nearly two years on from the beginning of the pandemic and with Covid-19infection rates spiking all over Europe due to the Omicron variant, it is time to take stock of the lessons learnt from thishealth crisis from the point of view of parliamentary law. In this vein, this publication updates a previous briefing of April2020 and analyses the modifications in the working methods of the European Parliament and selected EU nationalparliaments throughout the pandemic, aiming to show the advantages, but also the possible drawbacks of the newpractices.

Briefing XL, EN

Review of the medicated feed legislationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-01-2022Awtur ROJEK Beata | VINCI CLAUDIA

Qasam tematiku L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix Direttiva tal-KE | għalf tal-annimali | ikel tal-annimali domestiċi | industrija farmaċewtika | kummerċ ġewwa l-UE |

leġiżlazzjoni veterinarja | prodott veterinarju | reżistenza għall-antimikrobiċi | suq uniku | tfassil tal-liġi tal-UESommarju In 2014, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on medicated feed with the aim to update and

harmonise rules that dated from 1990 and were laid out in a directive. Patchy national implementation was causingdifficulties for producers, animal holders and the single market. Due to the strong correlation between the proposal onmedicated feed and the draft regulation on veterinary medicinal products, legislative work on both acts was beingcoordinated to assure consistency between their provisions. Parliament and Council reached agreement on the text ofthe proposal in June 2018. The final act was signed in December 2018 and entered into force on 27 January 2019.The new rules apply from 28 January 2022. Regulation (EU) 2019/4 of 11 December 2018 on the manufacture, placingon the market and use of medicated feed lays down updated rules for the production, use and marketing of medicatedfeed; these rules apply across the EU. An important aim is to help tackle the issue of antimicrobial resistance, agrowing threat to human health worldwide. The regulation introduces stronger requirements for producers and animalkeepers, prohibits the preventive use of antibiotics in healthy animals and reiterates that antibiotics should not be usedto enhance the performance of animals – a stance that the Parliament has strongly upheld. Second edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Artificial intelligence actTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-01-2022Awtur MADIEGA Tambiama André

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix innovazzjoni | intelliġenza artifiċjali | proposta (UE) | robotika | teknoloġija diġitali | teknoloġija ġdida | ġestjoni tar-riskju

Sommarju The European Commission unveiled a new proposal for an EU regulatory framework on artificial intelligence (AI) inApril 2021. The draft AI act is the first ever attempt to enact a horizontal regulation of AI. The proposed legalframework focuses on the specific utilisation of AI systems and associated risks. The Commission proposes toestablish a technology-neutral definition of AI systems in EU law and to lay down a classification for AI systems withdifferent requirements and obligations tailored on a 'risk-based approach'. Some AI systems presenting 'unacceptable'risks would be prohibited. A wide range of 'high-risk' AI systems would be authorised, but subject to a set ofrequirements and obligations to gain access to the EU market. Those AI systems presenting only 'limited risk' would besubject to very light transparency obligations. While generally supporting the Commission's proposal, stakeholders andexperts call for a number of amendments, including revising the definition of AI systems, broadening the list ofprohibited AI systems, strengthening enforcement and redress mechanisms and ensuring proper democratic oversightof the design and implementation of EU AI regulation. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Artificial intelligence act

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 95

Spain's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-01-2022Awtur KARABOYTCHEVA Miroslava Kostova

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix aġġustament strutturali | epidemija | għajnuna tal-UE | investiment | marda tal-coronavirus | rakkomandazzjoni (UE) |

riforma ekonomika | rkupru ekonomiku | Semestru Ewropew | SpanjaSommarju Spain’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is one of the biggest financed by the Next Generation EU

(NGEU) recovery instrument. It contains the largest amount, in terms of grants, under the unprecedented EU responseto the crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. For the time being, Spain has decided to use its national allocationfor grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). The proposed and approved amount (€69.5 billion)represents 9.6 % of the entire RRF, equal to 5.6 % of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRFbeing 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). In addition, Spain’s general state budgets plan investment of €27 billion, alignedwith the NRRP. The RRF funding will be supplemented by €12.4 billion from the REACT-EU funds, mainly forinvestment in health and education, and by the structural funds set out in the 2021-2027 Multiannual FinancialFramework. Measures under the plan are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council’s approval of the plan on 17August 2021, the European Commission disbursed €9 billion to Spain in pre-financing, equivalent to 13 % of thecountry’s financial allocation under the RRF. The next payments, in eight instalments, will depend on progress inimplementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument and was co-legislator for the adoption of the RRF, participates in the interinstitutional fora forcooperation and discussion on its implementation and in scrutinising the work of the European Commission.

Briefing ES, EN

Labour rights in EU trade agreements: Towards stronger enforcementTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-01-2022Awtur ZAMFIR Ionel

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliSommarju Since 2008, when the European Union introduced elaborate sustainable development provisions into its agreement

with the Cariforum group of states, provisions on labour rights and the environment have become a central part of mostof the EU's subsequent trade agreements, the one with South Korea (2011) being the first to contain a dedicatedchapter. These provisions continue to evolve: for instance, recent agreements with some of the EU's developedpartners, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, now include additional obligations on safety and health at work.The enforcement of these provisions has, however, numerous weak points, as exposed through the extensiveinvolvement of civil society in the monitoring of trade agreements. There have been isolated cases of weakened socialprotection, despite the provisions on sustainable development that seek to prevent this from happening. A moresystematic and broader problem is that some countries have not ratified the relevant International Labour Organization(ILO) conventions and have failed to apply the ILO fundamental principles in their national legislation and practice.Whether the lack of recourse to withdrawal of trade preferences in cases of breaches contributes to the persistence ofthis problem, remains however disputed. The recently concluded dispute settlement procedure with South Korea helpsclarify the legal implications of the relevant provisions contained in this agreement, and possibly in others. The reportdrawn up by the panel handling the dispute highlights the obligations of the parties to apply the ILO fundamentalprinciples irrespective of their impact on trade, but takes a soft approach towards the obligation to ratify outstandingILO conventions. Proposals by Member States and various stakeholders include more precise and effectivemechanisms such as phased tariff reduction linked to compliance with sustainable development objectives. Thepossibility of trade sanctions has not gained traction, as it does not fit well with the EU's emphasis on consultations anddialogue with its trade partners.

Briefing EN

Right to repairTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-01-2022Awtur SAJN Nikolina

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-KonsumaturKelma għat-tiftix dritt tal-konsumatur | ekonomija ċirkolari | imġiba tal-konsumatur | informazzjoni għall-konsumatur | manutenzjoni

Sommarju The European Commission has announced the establishment of a 'right to repair', with a view of saving costs forconsumers and facilitating the development of a circular economy. The right to repair may refer to different issues andsituations: repair during the legal guarantee, the right to repair after the legal guarantee has expired, and the right forconsumers to repair products themselves. Rates of repair depend on the type of a product, with the cost of repair beingthe most important reason consumers avoid repair. Research shows that consumers favour products that are easilyrepaired, but their willingness to pay for such products depends on the type of product and the way information on thereparability is presented to them. Currently, EU contract laws give consumers a right to have faulty products repairedduring the legal guarantee, while the new generation of ecodesign rules require the availability of spare parts for acertain time, at least for some products. Repair-related requirements are also present in the rules on the EU Ecolabel.The Commission is now planning a number of initiatives to improve reparability of products, including legislation on theright to repair, on empowering consumers for the green transition, a sustainable products initiative, designrequirements for electronics, and measures making the broader economic context more favourable to repair. TheEuropean Parliament has been in favour of improving consumers' right to repair for over a decade, and has in thisparliamentary term adopted two resolutions that contain a number of concrete proposals to make repairs systematic,cost-efficient and attractive. Consumer organisations and associations advocating for easier repair have called forrules to facilitate repair for non-professionals, and to guarantee consumers access to spare parts and repair manuals.Business organisations favour professional repairs, and have warned that any information requirements should notinfringe on companies' intellectual property.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Right to repair

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European green bonds: A standard for Europe, open to the worldTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-01-2022Awtur SPINACI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | bond | newtralità karbonika | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | strument

ekonomiku għall-ambjentSommarju Green bonds are committed to financing or re-financing investments, projects, expenditure or assets helping to

address climate and environmental issues. Both governments and companies use them to finance the transition to amore sustainable and low-carbon economy. Since the EIB inaugurated the green bond market in 2007 with its ClimateAwareness Bond, the market has grown very fast, but it still represents only about 3 to 3.5 % of overall bond issuance.The green bond market needs to grow more quickly to achieve the targets in the Paris Agreement. The Commission'sproposal aims to establish an official EU standard for green bonds aligned with the EU taxonomy for sustainableactivities, based on a registration system and supervisory framework for external reviewers of European green bonds.The proposal is currently being examined by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, the file has beenassigned to the ECON committee. In the Council, the working party on financial services is meeting to discuss thedossier. First edition. The ‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia European green bonds: A standard for Europe, open to the world

Democracy and human rights in Latin America: Is democratic erosion gathering pace?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-01-2022Awtur GOMEZ RAMIREZ Enrique

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju Since the mid-1980s, Latin America has enjoyed long and broad democratic expansion, and has made considerable

progress with regard to free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As the 'most democratic emerging-marketregion in the world', over 80 % of the Latin American population enjoy democracy, a proportion surpassed only inwestern Europe and North America. Standards vary widely however: while Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile stand out inall classifications as the most free and democratic, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba remain at the bottom of the table.However, the tide may be turning for this successful 'third democratic wave' in Latin America, as many countries sufferdemocratic erosion or even backsliding. The progressive decline of democratic indicators in the region has beenexacerbated by factors such as the self-interest of the ruling elites or rampant corruption in some countries, and mayhave been accelerated by the Covid 19 pandemic, which has justified the implementation of freedom-restrictingmeasures and has facilitated human rights abuses. The human rights situation in Latin America and the Caribbean hasindeed deteriorated more generally, with an increase in poverty, inequality, violence, and rising migration from theworst affected countries. The EU has contributed to democracy and human rights in the region by sending electionobservation missions, participating in initiatives such as the Colombia peace process and its implementation or in thecreation of the International Contact Group on Venezuela, and financing projects. The European Parliament hasmeanwhile accompanied democratic developments and crises closely through its resolutions, the Sakharov Prize andother initiatives.

Briefing EN

The French Parliament and EU affairsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-01-2022Awtur RITTELMEYER Yann-Sven

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix Assoċjazzjoni Ewropea għall-Koperazzjoni | Franza | Kamra Superjuri | parlament nazzjonali | politika tal-UE | sistema

parlamentariSommarju The role of the French Parliament has varied under successive French Republics. The Constitution of the Fifth

Republic, adopted in 1958, was amended by referendum in 1962 to establish the direct election of the President byuniversal suffrage. This created a hybrid political regime with some presidential and some parliamentarycharacteristics, sometimes described as a 'semi-presidential regime' or a 'hyper-presidential' regime. The governmentis responsible to Parliament, but contrary to classical parliamentary regimes, the President plays an important role. ThePresident has the power to dissolve the National Assembly (Assemblée nationale). He or she appoints the PrimeMinister, as well as – on the recommendation of the Prime Minister – the other members of the government.Traditionally, the Prime Minister makes the government's programme or a general policy statement an issue of a voteof confidence before the National Assembly. The latter can overthrow the government, but is largely subordinate to theexecutive – consisting of the President and the government placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. In periodsof 'cohabitation', the National Assembly plays a greater role in supporting the Prime Minister, who in this specificconfiguration acts as leader of the majority. Legislative powers are exercised by the two houses, who vote on laws,monitor government action and assess public policy. The National Assembly (Assemblée nationale) is elected for fiveyears by direct universal suffrage. The indirectly elected Senate (Sénat) represents the 'territorial communities of theRepublic' (Article 24 of the Constitution) and shares legislative power with the National Assembly. It embodiescontinuity, as it cannot be dissolved and half of its Members are renewed every three years. However, in cases ofdisagreement, the National Assembly has the final say. This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments(NPs) and EU affairs. It aims to provide an overview of the way the NPs of EU Member States are structured and howthey process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also provides information on relevant NP publications.

Briefing EN, FR

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Priority dossiers under the French EU Council PresidencyTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-01-2022Awtur ATTARD LUCIENNE

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix Franza | kap ta' Stat | konferenza Ewropea | politika dwar il-bidla fil-klima | politika tal-UE | Presidenza tal-Kunsill (UE) |

proposta (UE) | riforma tat-taxxa | rkupru ekonomiku | suq uniku diġitaliSommarju France will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2022. It will initiate the work of the Trio

Presidency composed of France, Czechia and Sweden. Executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic,who is elected by direct, popular vote, and the Government. The Prime Minister, appointed by the President, togetherwith the Ministers, is answerable to the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, and they can be removedby a vote of censure. Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly is theprincipal parliamentary body, composed of 577 members, who are elected directly for five-year terms. The Presidentialelection will coincide with the French Presidency, in April 2022. France is a founding Member State of the EuropeanUnion, and has already held the rotating Presidency of the Council 13 times. The French President, EmmanuelMacron, will present the political priorities of the Presidency to the European Parliament during the January plenarysession in Strasbourg. While the last French Presidency, in 2008, was characterised by the global financial crisis, theforthcoming one is expected to be dominated by the ongoing Covid pandemic, the cost of energy crisis and theaftermath of Brexit. The French Presidency will very likely give special impetus to the conclusion of the Conference onthe Future of Europe, which should take place in the first half of 2022. The plan is for the Trio Presidency, in its role asmember/observer in the Executive Board of the Conference, to draw on the outcomes of the various activities andcitizens’ recommendations, outline how they define the future of the Union, and start the implementation process.

Briefing EN, FR

CAP horizontal regulation: Financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy for2023-2027

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 21-12-2021

Awtur ROSSI RacheleQasam tematiku L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix awditjar tal-immaniġġjar | EAGGF | FAEG | FAEŻR | għajnuna finanzjarja | għajnuna għall-agrikoltura | nefqa agrikola |

Politika Agrikola Komuni | produzzjoni agrikola | proposta (UE) | rapport | żvilupp ruraliSommarju As part of the preparation of the EU budget for 2021-2027, the European Commission put forward a new set of

regulations to shape the future EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on 1 June 2018. The proposal for a regulationon the financing, management and monitoring of the CAP provides the legislative framework for adapting the financing,management and monitoring rules to a new CAP delivery model. This seeks to achieve more subsidiarity andsimplification, with greater responsibility given to Member States, a shift from ensuring single transaction compliance tomonitoring system performance in each Member State, and reduced 'red tape', among other things. Following theiradoption in December 2021, the new CAP regulations will apply from 1 January 2023.

Briefing EN

CAP strategic plansTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-12-2021Awtur ROSSI Rachele

Qasam tematiku L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix agrikoltura sostenibbli | bidwi | għajnuna finanzjarja | għajnuna għall-agrikoltura | negozju agrikolu | Politika Agrikola

Komuni | politika dwar il-bidla fil-klima | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni ambjentali | settur tal-koltivazzjoni | simplifikazzjonital-formalitajiet | skema ta' ħlas uniku | żvilupp rurali

Sommarju The Commission's legislative proposals on the future of the common agricultural policy (CAP) were published on 1June 2018. They comprise three proposals: a regulation setting out rules on support for CAP strategic plans; aregulation on the single common market organisation (CMO) and a horizontal regulation on financing, managing andmonitoring the CAP. The proposal for a regulation on CAP strategic plans introduces a new delivery model, describedby the Commission as a fundamental shift in the CAP, involving a move from compliance towards results andperformance. It includes a new distribution of responsibilities between the EU and Member States. A new planningprocess is proposed that will cover all the CAP measures, previously covered by different regulations and policydesigns. Following its adoption in December 2021, the CAP strategic plans regulation will apply as of 1 January 2023.Fourth edition of a briefing originally drafted by James McEldowney and Patrick Kelly. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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CAP Amending Regulation (CMO): Amending regulations on the CMO for agricultural products, qualityschemes and measures for remote regions

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 21-12-2021

Awtur ROJEK BeataQasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp

ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix denominazzjoni tal-oriġini | denominazzjoni tal-prodott | inbid | organizzazzjoni komuni tas-swieq | prodott agrikolu |

tikkettarSommarju As part of the work on the EU's 2021-2027 budget, the European Commission proposed a set of regulations with the

aim of reshaping and modernising the EU's common agricultural policy (CAP). Put forward on 1 June 2018, the 'CAPreform package' was finally adopted in December 2021. One of these regulations, the Amending Regulation,introduces changes to rules governing the common market organisation (CMO) in agricultural products (including therules on wine), the EU quality schemes (geographical indications) and the support measures for remote regions. Theaim is to equip agricultural markets and support measures to face new challenges, update provisions, simplifyprocedures and ensure consistency with other regulations on the future CAP. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Proposal for a regulation to fight money laundering and counter terrorist financingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-12-2021Awtur BAKOWSKI Piotr

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaSommarju On 20 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals in the area of anti-money-

laundering efforts and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The package includes a proposal for aregulation on preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing. The proposedregulation would be the central element of what is commonly referred to as an EU 'single rulebook' on AML/CFT. Itsdetailed and directly applicable provisions would replace the minimum rules of the EU AML directives currently in force.The package has been adopted in response to repeated calls by the European Parliament and the Council of theEuropean Union to enhance the EU's regulatory framework on AML/CFT. The aim is for the framework to becomemore coherent, keeping in step with technological innovations and related new forms of crime, as well as remaining inline with international standards in the field. In Parliament, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and onCivil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs are jointly responsible for the file. First edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Fighting money laundering and counter terrorist financing

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders of 16 December 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-12-2021Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaSommarju 'The European Council will revert to the issue' or 'reiterates' its view, were probably the most used sentences in the

conclusions issued following the 16 December 2021 meeting of the Heads of State or Government. For many of theissues on the agenda, such as energy, where the geopolitical stakes are high, differences in position remain in theEuropean Council; achieving consensus is therefore part of a longer process. On security and defence, no bigdecisions, but specific guidelines and targeted requests, defined this summit. As regards the discussions on bothCovid-19 and migration, the conclusions mainly include reiterations of previous commitments. Within the broadbouquet of external relations topics, EU leaders warned Russia of 'massive consequences' in case of further militaryescalation in Ukraine. They also denounced the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees by the Belarusian regimefor political purposes, and called for 'the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners'. EU leaders alsoreaffirmed the Union's commitment to cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood, calling to speed up work on thenew Agenda for the Mediterranean, praised the mediation efforts of the African Union (AU) in Ethiopia, calling for 'anunconditional ceasefire' and dialogue, and prepared for the 17-18 February 2022 EU-AU Summit. President CharlesMichel recalled EU Member States' solidarity when mentioning the unacceptable pressure exerted by China onLithuania. As for the Euro Summit, it called again for the completion of Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union.

Briefing EN

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Anti-money-laundering packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-12-2021Awtur GIRARD VERONIQUE

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u Bankarji | L-Ispazjuta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja

Kelma għat-tiftix finanzjament tat-terroriżmu | istituzzjoni finanzjarja | munita virtwali | proposta (UE) | reat ekonomiku | skambju ta'informazzjoni | studju tal-impatt | superviżjoni bankarja | superviżjoni finanzjarja | tranżazzjoni finanzjarja | ġlieda kontral-kriminalità | ħasil tal-flus

Sommarju The IA covers four Commission proposals on anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism. Thislegislative package includes major changes designed to strengthen and tackle shortcomings in the current regulatoryframework, such as the creation of a new AML authority. This briefing analyses the strengths and weaknesses of theimpact assessment accompanying the proposed revisions. The Commission consulted a wide range of stakeholders tosupport the initiative. The IA clearly defines the problem and the objectives that are directly linked to the problemdrivers. However, the IA does not identify any operational objectives that would have facilitated the monitoring of thepreferred options. Moreover, some options could have been refined to be more specific, such as for example on theexact criteria for selecting 'risky entities' subject to direct supervision at EU level. Finally, improvements requested bythe RSB appear to be only partially addressed in the final IA.

Briefing EN

The EU and Russia: A fragile neighbourhood [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-12-2021Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix forzi armati | grupp ta' riflessjoni | il-Belarus | intervent militari | ir-Russja | l-Ukraina | migrazzjoni | ġeopolitika

Sommarju Russia’s military build-up along its border with Ukraine, and its masterminding – alleged by many politicians andanalysts – of the refugee crisis on the borders of Belarus with Poland and Lithuania, have sparked concerns over theimplications of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. Russia has amassed nearly 100 000 troops near the Ukrainianborder, provoking renewed fears that Moscow is about to invade, seven years after it annexed the Crimean peninsulaand destabilised the eastern regions of Ukraine. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of RussianPresident Vladimir Putin, has allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them on toBelarus’s borders with neighbouring EU Member States. This note gathers links to recent publications andcommentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s foreign and security policy and its implications forneighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics.

Briefing EN

The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar: Turning the spotlight on workers’ rightsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-12-2021Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-BniedemKelma għat-tiftix avveniment sportiv | drittijiet tal-bniedem | il-Qatar | korp sportiv | kundizzjonijiet tax-xogħol | liġi tax-xogħol |

Organizzazzjoni Internazzjonali tax-Xogħol | paga minima | skjavitù | sponsorizzazzjoni | ħaddiem migrantSommarju Enormous natural gas resources have turned Qatar into one of the world's richest countries. The 11 610 km2 nation

currently has the fourth highest GDP per capita in the world. The absolute monarchy's estimated 340 000-350 000citizens benefit from free education, free healthcare, virtually guaranteed – and well paid – employment, and payalmost no taxes. However, the great majority of the emirate’s nearly 3 million inhabitants live in very differentconditions. Qatar has the highest ratio of migrants in the world: 85 % of its population are migrants and 94 % of itsworkforce comes from abroad, mostly from south Asia and Africa. In contrast to the small percentage of expatriatesfrom the West and other Gulf States, Asian and African migrants live and work in harsh conditions. Around 1 millionare employed in construction, and 100 000 are domestic workers. In December 2010, FIFA, world football's governingbody, granted Qatar the right to host the 2022 World Cup, which is scheduled to take place from 21 November to 18December. Expanding on an existing development programme enshrined in the Qatar National Vision 2030, thecountry embarked on an extensive building programme to prepare for the World Cup, involving an estimated 1 millionmigrant workers. However, these preparations placed the spotlight on Qatar’s poor treatment of migrant workers. Inresponse to international pressure, Qatar has introduced important legal changes to improve the situation of theseworkers, which the EU has welcomed. However, according to human rights organisations, the country needs to takefurther steps to stop abuses. Of particular concern is the kafala sponsorship system, which is widely used throughoutthe six Gulf Cooperation Council States and gives disproportionate power to employers, leading to widespread abuseof migrant workers’ rights. Even though Qatar has started to dismantle the kafala system, important elements remain inplace. Moreover, ensuring compliance with more favourable labour laws remains a challenge. Since 2008, theEuropean Parliament has adopted four resolutions addressing the situation of migrant workers in Qatar; it has calledon Qatar to end the 'deplorable situation' of migrant workers and prevent preparations for the 2022 World Cup frombeing 'overshadowed by allegations of forced labour'.

Briefing EN

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Towards a new Generalised Scheme of Preferences regulation for developing countriesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-12-2021Awtur IOANNIDES Isabelle

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u Umanitarja

Kelma għat-tiftix eżenzjoni tariffarja | importazzjoni (UE) | pajjiżi fil-fażi tal-iżvilupp | politika tariffarja komuni | preferenza tariffarja |regolament (UE) | studju tal-impatt

Sommarju The European Commission is proposing a new General Scheme of Preferences regulation to replace the current onethat expires at the end of 2023. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment (IA) on the proposal findsthat the IA logically links the problems, their drivers, the objectives and the policy interventions under consideration.However, the IA remains evasive on the impacts of crucial aims of the regulation -- poverty eradication and advancingsustainable development and good governance. Additionally, when presenting pro and con arguments, it is not alwaysapparent where the IA stands on the issues. Moreover, only some of the operational objectives are specific andmeasurable, raising questions as to the feasibility of those that are not. It is also important to note that on productcoverage, a key issue raised in the EP’s 2019 resolution, there seems to be a discrepancy between therecommendations analysed in the external study and their interpretation in the IA.

Briefing EN

Nominations for Members of the European Court of AuditorsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-12-2021Awtur FRANKE Michaela

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuKelma għat-tiftix il-Latvja | il-Polonja | is-Slovenja | iċ-Ċekja | kompetizzjoni (UE) | membru tal-Qorti tal-Awdituri (UE) | regoli ta'

proċedura | ħatra tal-membriSommarju The Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs in the European Parliament (EP) is about to draw up an in-house briefing

on national nomination procedures for Members of the European Court of Auditors (ECA). The purpose of the briefingis to provide relevant information to the Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) ahead of hearings ofMembers-designate of the ECA (of which there will be 8 in the course of 2022). In order to develop a betterunderstanding of the national procedures, we are interested to see if and how national chambers are involved in thenomination process.

Briefing EN

Participatory foresight: Preventing an impact gap in the EU's approach to sustainability and resilienceTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-12-2021Awtur KONONENKO Vadim

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | L-Ippjanar bil-QuddiemKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | strateġija tal-UE | tibdil fil-klima

Sommarju The concepts of 'sustainability' and 'resilience' have been steadily gaining prominence in the EU's political discourse.Most recently in 2019, the von der Leyen Commission placed the goal of increased sustainability – environmental,social and economic – at the heart of its European Green Deal set of policy initiatives. As the EU achieves higherlevels of sustainability, it will be more resilient, that is, capable of better withstanding a future crisis or shock, whether inthe form of another pandemic, an economic downturn or a climate emergency. By putting sustainability and resilienceat the centre of its strategic foresight framework, the EU can anchor specific policy objectives in broader narrativesabout its future. However, this may also carry a risk of creating an 'impact gap' – a mismatch between citizens' andstakeholders' expectations, on the one hand, and actual outcomes of policies, on the other. This briefing examines howparticipatory foresight can help to address a potential impact gap in the EU's endeavours related to sustainableresilience and strategic autonomy.

Briefing EN

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Désarmement, démobilisation, réintégration : Émergence du concept dans la communauté internationaleTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-12-2021Awtur estern Bilquin, Bruno

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju La Commission européenne et le Haut représentant de l'Union européenne (UE) devraient adopter le 22 décembre

2021 une communication conjointe sur une approche stratégique de l’UE pour soutenir, dans les pays tiers, ledésarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration (DDR) des ex-combattants issus de groupes armés rebelles. Il s'agitd'aligner le concept et les programmes DDR sur les défis sécuritaires, géopolitiques et de politique de développementdes pays partenaires, en tenant compte des approches évolutives des autres acteurs majeurs du secteur dans lacommunauté internationale. Parmi ces acteurs, l'ONU paraît incontournable, qui a développé depuis longtemps desapproches DDR et soutient ou pourrait soutenir de nombreux programmes DDR dans le monde. Le concept DDRstratégique de l'UE remontant à 2006, son actualisation s'impose. La nouvelle stratégie DDR devrait aussi permettre àl'UE de renforcer sa crédibilité comme pourvoyeuse de sécurité sur le plan mondial. Dans ses relations avec ses payspartenaires les plus fragiles, dans son voisinage comme au-delà, l'UE se mobilise pour une nouvelle stratégie DDRdes groupes armés qui soit à la hauteur du rôle qu'elle entend assurer, aux côtés de la communauté internationale etde ses alliés comme acteur majeur de pacification et de stabilisation au plan mondial. Le Parlement européen soutientles projets DDR de l'Union et demande que la future stratégie DDR soit cohérente avec les instruments de la politiquede sécurité et de défense commune ainsi qu'avec son aide au développement.

Briefing FR

Emergency measures on migration: Article 78(3) TFEUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-12-2021Awtur DEL MONTE Micaela | LUYTEN KATRIEN

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix deroga mil-liġi tal-UE | dritt għall-ażil | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | il-Belarus | il-Latvja | il-Litwanja | il-Polonja | kontroll tal-

migrazzjoni | persuna li tfittex asil | persuna ta' nazzjonalità barranija | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | Trattat dwaril-Funzjonament tal-UE

Sommarju On 1 December 2021, the Commission proposed a Council decision on emergency measures to help Latvia, Lithuaniaand Poland face the complex migratory situation at their respective borders with Belarus. The measures provide for anextension of the registration period for asylum applications; the application of the border asylum procedure to processall asylum claims; reception conditions covering only basic needs; and simplified and quicker national returnprocedures for rejected asylum-seekers. The proposal is based on Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEU (TFEU), which provides for the adoption of provisional measures in the event of a 'sudden increase of arrivals ofthird-country nationals'. Article 78(3) TFEU was first used during the 2015 migration crisis to help Greece and Italy. Onthe basis of this article and in line with Article 80 TFEU, the Council of the EU at the time adopted binding decisionsproviding for the relocation from these two countries of 160 000 people so as to ensure a fair and balanced distributionof, and sharing of responsibility for, asylum-seekers who were already present in the EU. Despite most Member States'willingness to relocate asylum-seekers, some challenged the Council decision before the Court of Justice of the EU(the Court) or refused to implement the decision. As a result, the Court's jurisprudence helped to clarify the conceptand scope of 'provisional measures' within the meaning of Article 78(3) TFEU. Greece was the first EU Member Stateto unilaterally invoke Article 78(3) TFEU, in response to a sudden increase of arrivals of third-country nationals fromTurkey in March 2020. The Greek emergency legislative act was heavily criticised because Article 78(3) TFEU is notintended to enable Member States to take emergency measures unilaterally. It requires the Council to take a decisionon a Commission proposal and after consulting Parliament. This Briefing expands on and updates an 'at a glance' notefrom March 2020, written by Anja Radjenovic.

Briefing EN

'Fit for 55' package: Revision of the Effort-Sharing RegulationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-12-2021Awtur KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effett serra | impatt ambjentali | newtralità karbonika | strateġija tal-UE | tibdil fil-klima

Sommarju The IA analyses the nature and scale of the problem, which triggers the revision of the Effort Sharing Regulation. Whilesubsidiarity is suffiicently addressed, the proportionality aspects of the revision are not addressed by the IA. Onegeneral and three specific objectives, clearly deriving from the problem, were set up. Three policy options wereidentified and analysed in detail. The options (and their sub-options) were compared in terms of their potential toachieve the specific objectives, in particular, regarding their scope, environmental integrity, distribution of efforts (interms of fairness and cost-efficiency) and flexibility offered. The options have been analysed mostly for theirenvironmental, economic and administrative impacts. Stakeholder views are abundently used and transparentlyreferenced throughout the analysis of impact. The IA is based on a solid knowledge base combining the use ofqualitative and quantitiave methods.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 102

The EP’s response to the COVID-19 crisis: budgetary impactTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-12-2021Awtur FRANKE Michaela

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuKelma għat-tiftix baġit tal-UE | epidemija | immaniġġjar finanzjarju | implimentazzjoni tal-baġit | konsegwenza ekonomika | maniġġar tal-

kriżijiet | marda tal-coronavirus | nefqa tal-UE | Parlament Ewropew | tfaddilSommarju The EP’s budget is drawn up during the year n-1, with the preparations in its Directorates General already starting in

the last quarter of the year n-2. The budgetary procedure - first inside the EP for the institution’s own budget, then forthe budget of the EU as a whole in the interinstitutional part of the procedure - lasts throughout the year n-1, with anagreement usually reached during the last quarter of year n-1. For example, the preparations for the 2020 budget inthe Directorates General started towards the end of 2018, with the main budgetary process taking place in 2019.

Briefing EN

Bronisław Geremek: In search of a united EuropeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-12-2021Awtur PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | Il-KulturaKelma għat-tiftix bijografija | il-Polonja | membru tal-Unjoni Ewropea | personalità storika | persunaġġ politiku

Sommarju From his childhood in the Warsaw Ghetto to his tragic death in a road accident while working at the EuropeanParliament in 2008, Bronisław Geremek faced many personal, professional and political challenges during a period ofconstant turbulence. A world-renowned historian, he was interested in the poor, the excluded and the marginalisedduring the Middle Ages, mainly working as a researcher at the Sorbonne and Warsaw University. The Soviet army’sinvasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 marked the start of his political involvement with those opposing the communistregime. He secretly gave history lectures, spoke in defence of workers persecuted following the cost-of-living riots in1976, and went to Gdańsk in August 1980 to support the strike led by Lech Wałęsa. Geremek subsequently becamean adviser to the founder of the Solidarność trade union. His involvement led to his imprisonment following the militarycoup in December 1981 and the loss of his position as a professor, but guaranteed his place in negotiations betweenthe communist regime and the democratic opposition in 1989. As a member of the first semi-democratic parliament inthe Soviet bloc, he subsequently became Foreign Minister and started the negotiations for Poland’s accession to theEuropean Union. He was elected as a Member of the European Parliament in 2004. His research as a historianfocused on Europe as a civilisation, on questions of European identity and integration, and on civil society. Due to hishistorical research, he had a capacity for in-depth analysis that he used in his European political work and involvement.He concluded that a European public space was essential in order to encourage European civic engagement andawareness.

Briefing DE, EN, FR, PL

Climate action in the European Union: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-12-2021Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effett serra | newtralità karbonika | strateġija tal-UE | tibdil fil-klima

Sommarju At a time when the European Union (EU) is preparing a major revision of its climate and energy framework in line withthe objectives of the European Green Deal and the targets set in the European Climate Law, this briefing looks atoverall progress on climate action. Although the EU met its 2020 targets for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) andincreasing renewable energy use and energy efficiency in the extraordinary context of the coronavirus crisis, pandemicrecovery led energy consumption and emissions to rebound in 2021. Member States are required to invest 37 % of EURecovery and Resilience Facility Funds on climate objectives. The European Climate Law sets the targets of reducingnet GHG emissions by 'at least' 55 % by 2030, compared with 1990, and achieving climate neutrality by 2050.However, current climate and energy legislation for the 2021-2030 period is still based on a lower 2030 target of 40 %emission reduction, as are Member States' national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period,required by the Governance Regulation. With the 'fit for 55' package presented in July 2021, the Commission is aimingto bring EU climate and energy legislation in line with the new targets. Member States need to update their NECPs byJune 2024.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 103

Ireland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-12-2021Awtur LILYANOVA Velina

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix aġġustament strutturali | epidemija | għajnuna tal-UE | investiment | l-Irlanda | marda tal-coronavirus |

rakkomandazzjoni (UE) | riforma ekonomika | rkupru ekonomiku | Semestru EwropewSommarju Ireland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is relatively small compared to the plans of most Member

States. In absolute terms and per capita, Ireland has the second smallest allocation (after Luxembourg) under theRecovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) €989 million entirely in grants. So far, it has not requested any loans (themaximum available loan amount is estimated at €18.7 billion). Most of the funds (€914.4 million) are expected to belegally committed by December 2022. A further set of grants (the remaining amount) will be allocated in 2023,depending on economic developments. Ireland has not requested pre-financing; its grants are planned to be disbursedin five instalments. Relative to the size of the Irish economy, its RRF grants are not large: these are equivalent toaround 0.3 % of the country's 2019 GDP, while the total RRF amounts to 5.2 % of 2019 EU-27 GDP. Given also thatspending will be spread over the years up to 2026, the RRF is not expected to have a significant direct impact onIreland's key macroeconomic indicators. The European Commission estimates that it could increase Ireland's GDP by0.3-0.5 % by 2026. А more significant indirect impact is expected from the overall boost to the EU economy and theassociated cross-border spillover effects. The plan's overall objective is to contribute to a sustainable, equitable, greenand digital recovery. It complements the government's broader domestic recovery efforts under the economic recoveryplan, underpinned by the national development plan (NDP) of €165 billion, for 2021-2030. Although the RRF allocationamounts to less than 1 % of the total NDP investment, it will contribute to key reforms and investments. With 41.9 % offunding allocated for climate and 31.5 % for digital measures, the NRRP's16 investment and 9 reform projects will alsofocus on strategic EU priorities. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation anddiscussion on the implementation of the RRF, and scrutinises the work of the European Commission.

Briefing EN, GA

Germany's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-12-2021Awtur JOCHHEIM Ulrich | MILDEBRATH Hendrik Alexander

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix aġġustament strutturali | epidemija | għajnuna tal-UE | il-Ġermanja | investiment | marda tal-coronavirus |

rakkomandazzjoni (UE) | riforma ekonomika | rkupru ekonomiku | Semestru EwropewSommarju Germany is set to receive €25.6 billion in non-repayable support from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the

unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. This amount corresponds to 3.7 % ofthe entire RRF and to 0.7 % of Germany's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). The National Recovery and ResiliencePlan (NRRP) for Germany amounts to €27.9 billion (0.81 % of 2019 GDP) and does not include requests for loans.Excluding value-added tax, this corresponds to a net amount of at least €26.5 billion, slightly above the maximumfinancial contribution of €25.6 billion (0.74 % of 2019 GDP) that Germany can expect. For most of the measures,additional funding will also come from national sources. There is a strong focus on the green transition. Measuresrelating to climate protection –including key actions on mobility and housing – reach at least 42 % of the allocation. TheGerman RRP shows an even stronger digital ambition, reaching at least 52 % of the allocation and ranging fromindustry, to education, social policy and healthcare, to public administration. Following Council approval of the plan, theEuropean Commission, on 26 August 2021, disbursed €2.25 billion to Germany in pre-financing, equivalent to 9 % ofthe country's financial allocation under the RRF. (Germany did not ask for a higher share of pre-financing because the€2.25 billion was already reflected in budgetary acts adopted earlier). The remaining 91 % will be paid in fiveinstalments once Germany has satisfactorily fulfilled the milestones and targets identified in relation to RRFimplementation. An amount of €16.3 billion will be available to be legally committed by 31 December 2022. TheEuropean Parliament strongly advocated the establishment of a common EU recovery instrument. Parliamentparticipates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on its implementation and scrutinises the EuropeanCommission's work.

Briefing DE, EN

Fit for 55 package: Recasting the Energy Efficiency DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-12-2021Awtur EISELE Katharina

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix effiċjenza enerġetika | iffrankar ta' enerġija | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | proposta (UE) |

studju tal-impatt | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | użu tal-enerġijaSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Commission’s impact assessment (IA)

accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 14 July 2021 and referred to the European Parliament’sCommittee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The proposal for a recast Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) ispart of the Commission’s ‘Fit for 55’ package that aims to adapt EU law to the new EU objective of a minimum 55 %reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030. This objective was laid down in the new European ClimateLaw, adopted in June 2021, which puts the EU on the path to achieving climate neutrality (net zero GHG emissions) by2050. As originally enacted, the EED (Directive 2012/27/EU) established a common framework for promoting energyefficiency to reach the EU’s 20 % energy efficiency target by 2020 (the target was set in the directive itself). The EEDwas amended by Directive (EU) 2018/2002, which set the more ambitious EU goal of improving energy efficiency by atleast 32.5 % by 2030 and extended its validity beyond 2020 to help achieve the new goal.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 104

Revision of the third energy package for gas: Decarbonising the gas market. Regulation 715/2009/EU andDirective 2009/73/EU

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 13-12-2021

Awtur TENHUNEN SusannaQasam tematiku L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix enerġija rinnovabbli | gass naturali | grilja enerġetika | idroġenu | newtralità karbonika | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE |

politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur | provvista tal-gass | riżorsi rinnovabbli | suq tal-enerġija | suquniku

Sommarju Decarbonisation of the internal gas market is necessary for attaining the EU's climate target of reducing greenhousegas emission by 55 % by 2030 and reaching net zero emissions by 2050. The revision of the current Gas Regulationand Gas Directive, adopted in 2009 for the natural gas market, is underpinned by the strategies on energy systemintegration and on a hydrogen economy. Introduction of renewable and low-carbon gases to the energy systemrequires a profound transformation of the gas market, as announced in the 2021 Commission work programme and the'fit for 55' package. Different alliances and common projects bringing together regulators, civil society and stakeholdershave quickly emerged to tackle various aspects of this transformation and to open new partnerships. The EuropeanParliament supports the creation of a competitive decarbonised internal energy market. It supports energy efficiencyand encourages decarbonisation primarily through direct electrification using renewable sources. However, it also seesa role for renewable-based fuels for hard-to-abate sectors, such as heavy vehicle transport, aviation, steel and thefertiliser industry. In line with other EU institutions, it considers low-carbon gases as an intermediate solution, andunderlines the importance of taking into account the diversity of national energy systems.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the meeting of EU leaders on 16 December 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-12-2021Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Id-Demokrazija | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Enerġija | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja

Kelma għat-tiftix aġenda | epidemija | Kunsill Ewropew | marda tal-coronavirus | migrazzjoni | politika ta' sigurtà u ta' difiża komuni |prezz tal-enerġija | relazzjonijiet tal-UE

Sommarju The last regular European Council meeting of 2021, on 16 December, will discuss a broad range of topics, notably thecoronavirus pandemic, crisis management and resilience, energy prices, security and defence, migration, and externalrelations. In the context of the worsening epidemiological situation and the emergence of the Omicron variant, EUleaders will address progress in vaccination across the EU and the impact of new restrictions on the single market.They will also discuss international solidarity and ways of ensuring global vaccine coverage. Their debate on securityand defence will probably focus on two intertwined outstanding issues, the Strategic Compass and the forthcomingcooperation declaration with NATO. On migration, EU leaders are expected to review the follow-up to their previouscommitments and address the migration situation in the English Channel. In the external relations field, they will mostlikely discuss the situation in Ukraine and at the Belarus border, the developments in Ethiopia as well as preparationsfor the EU-African Union summit. As the European Council meeting will take place back to back with the EasternPartnership Summit, EU leaders could take stock of the outcome of the latter. The Euro Summit directly after theEuropean Council meeting will focus on the Covid recovery and review progress on the Banking and Capital MarketsUnions

Briefing EN

'Fit for 55' legislative package: ReFuel EU AviationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-12-2021Awtur TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix bijokarburant | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | karburant tal-avjazzjoni | kwalità tal-arja | mobilità sostenibbli |

proposta (UE) | studju tal-impatt | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | trasport bl-ajruSommarju The impact assessment (IA) accompanying Commission's ReFuelEU Aviation proposal provides a qualitative and

quantitative analysis, which is based on sound and recent data. The IA presents clearly described policy options andopenly explains uncertainties in the analysis. However, contrary to the Better Regulation Guidelines, the IA does notassess the impacts on SMEs. In addition, the assessment would have benefited of further clarification in thecomparison of options, the scale of the defined problems, and monitoring and evaluation plans. Moreover, thedescription of stakeholder consultation lacks some transparency.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 105

Boosting cooperation on health technology assessmentTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-12-2021Awtur AMAND-EECKHOUT Laurence

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa PubblikaKelma għat-tiftix apparat mediku | drittijiet tal-pazjent | innovazzjoni | kooperazzjoni transfruntiera | kooperazzjoni xjentifika | kura tas-

saħħa | proposta (UE) | saħħa pubblika | skambju ta' informazzjoni | valutazzjoni teknoloġika | xjenza medikaSommarju The European Commission has proposed a regulation on health technology assessment (HTA). HTA is a research-

based tool that supports decision-making in healthcare by assessing the added value of a given health technologycompared to others. The proposal would provide the basis for permanent EU-level cooperation in four areas. MemberStates would still be responsible for assessing the non-clinical (economic, ethical, social, etc.) aspects of healthtechnology, and for pricing and reimbursement. While Member States could choose to delay participation in the jointwork until three years after the rules enter into force, it would become mandatory after six years. The EuropeanParliament adopted its final position at first reading on 14 February 2019. In the Council, work was carried out underseven consecutive presidencies. On 22 June 2021, the co-legislators reached a provisional agreement ininterinstitutional trilogue negotiations. The Council's Permanent Representatives Committee endorsed the provisionalagreement on 30 June 2021. Parliament's ENVI committee voted in favour of the text on 13 July 2021. The Councilformally adopted its first-reading position on 9 November 2021. On 30 November 2021, ENVI adopted itsrecommendation for second reading, which is to be debated and voted during the December plenary session. Theregulation, once adopted, will start to apply three years after its entry into force. Fifth edition of a briefing originallydrafted by Nicole Scholz. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Migration: Latest challenges [What Think Tanks are Thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-12-2021Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix grupp ta' riflessjoni | kontroll tal-migrazzjoni | migrant | moviment migratorju | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | rifuġjat

Sommarju The current crisis on the Poland–Belarus border and renewed attempts by migrants to cross the Channel from Franceto the United Kingdom have put a new spotlight on the dilemma of how the European Union should deal with refugeesescaping repression and poverty in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, and some parts of Africa. InBelarus, authorities have allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them to their borderswith the neighbouring EU Member States of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Meanwhile, London and Paris arediscussing ways to clamp down on migrants’ attempts to cross the Channel. The Turkish and Mediterranean migrationroutes from Africa to Italy and Spain also remain active. This note gathers links to the recent publications andcommentaries from many international think tanks on migration in Europe and on debates on how to reform its rules.

Briefing EN

WTO negotiations on fishery subsidiesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-12-2021Awtur SCHOLAERT FREDERIK

Qasam tematiku Is-SajdKelma għat-tiftix FAO | l-OrganizzazzjoniDinjija tal-Kummerċ | politika komuni tas-sajd | prodott tas-sajd | qabda ħut

Sommarju Accounting for 17 % of the global average per capita intake of animal protein, fisheries products support many people'slivelihoods and make a significant contribution to food security. However, more than a third of world stocks are fishedat biologically unsustainable levels. Economic losses from the depletion of fish stocks are estimated at US$83 billion. Areduction in fishing capacity and effort would contribute to the recovery of stocks, yet many governments of fishingcountries continue to support the sector with harmful fishery subsidies. Subsidies that directly increase fishing capacityand may lead to overfishing are estimated at about US$22 billion worldwide. Although there are no specific global ruleson fisheries subsidies, they are currently governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidiesand Countervailing Measures. However, subsidy rules in this agreement are geared towards trade distortion asopposed to the adverse effects on the environment. While new fisheries subsidies disciplines have been part of WTO-level negotiations since 2001, the negotiating mandate was rewritten in 2005 with the aim of eliminating subsidies thatcontribute to overcapacity and overfishing, while also taking into account special and differential treatment fordeveloping countries. Negotiations stalled in 2011, but were revived thanks to the 2015 UN sustainable developmentgoals, whereby government leaders committed to ban harmful fisheries subsidies by 2020, including those thatcontribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The negotiations have been very difficult because they bringtogether two very different worlds, namely fisheries management and the WTO rules system. More specifically, not allmembers consider certain subsidies to be equally harmful, as views and practices in fisheries management varywidely. On 24 November 2021, a draft agreement was submitted to ministers ahead of the upcoming 12th MinisterialConference (MC12). The text includes a ban on subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing, such assupport for the construction of vessels and for operational costs. A number of exemptions would apply, e.g. for certaindeveloping countries and, important for the EU, where fish stocks are exploited at biologically sustainable levels.MC12, which was set to start on 30 November 2021 and had already been postponed from 2020, was put off againbecause of renewed travel restrictions. New dates have yet to be set.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 106

Building up resilience to cross-border health threats: Moving towards a European health unionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-12-2021Awtur AMAND-EECKHOUT Laurence

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Is-Saħħa PubblikaKelma għat-tiftix assistenza ta' emerġenza | epidemija | epidemjoloġija | kooperazzjoni transfruntiera | maniġġar tal-kriżijiet | marda tal-

coronavirus | prevenzjoni tal-mard | proposta (UE) | saħħa pubblika | skambju ta' informazzjoniSommarju On 11 November 2020, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on serious cross-border

threats to health. In the light of lessons learned from the coronavirus crisis, it aims to strengthen the EU's healthsecurity by revising Decision 1082/2013/EU (the 'Cross-Border Health Threats Decision'). The proposal was presentedin a package that also includes proposals to strengthen the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control(ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), as first steps towards a European health union. Stakeholderswidely welcomed the proposal and the package. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for strongercooperation on health. Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety is responsible forthe file. The Council agreed its position on 23 July 2021. Parliament voted the committee report in plenary on 14September 2021, thereby setting its negotiating mandate and opening the way for interinstitutional negotiations. On 11November 2021, Parliament voted again on the proposal, to update its negotiation mandate to ensure coherencebetween the EU Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and the proposed regulation oncross-border health threats. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by Nicole Scholz. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The future of EU borders in times of pandemic

Japan's global vision: Tokyo's evolving foresight practices, Indo-Pacific strategy and EU-partnershipTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-12-2021Awtur NOONAN EAMONN

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Ippjanar bil-QuddiemKelma għat-tiftix il-Ġappun | Politika Estera u ta' Sigurtà Komuni | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | sħubija internazzjonali tal-UE

Sommarju Since 1970, Japan has developed a world-leading capacity for foresight. At the outset, the focus was on technologyand socio-economic development. Broader geopolitical and security aspects have become more pronounced in thepast decade. Concerns about global political changes have given rise to an enhanced strategic partnership betweenJapan and the European Union. Common challenges include shifts in global economic power, the emergence ofChina, and uncertainties around the United States' international engagement. While Japan and the European Unionhave differing security policy perspectives and capabilities, joint efforts can have a positive impact in areas such asinfrastructure, digital connectivity, overseas development assistance and energy sustainability. A shared vision oncommon challenges and responses is at the heart of the partnership between the European Union and Japan. Jointstrategic foresight activities, building on existing foresight capabilities on each side, could be considered as a means ofupdating and strengthening this shared vision.

Briefing EN

Improving the working conditions of platform workers: Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional andlocal positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 08-12-2021

Awtur KISS Monika | RITTELMEYER Yann-SvenQasam tematiku Il-Politika Soċjali | It-Trasport | L-ImpjiegiKelma għat-tiftix kundizzjonijiet tax-xogħol | liġi tax-xogħol | persuna li taħdem għal rasha | persunal | politika tal-impjiegi tal-UE | sigurtà

soċjali | suq tax-xogħol | ħaddiem ta' pjattaforma onlineSommarju This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advance

consultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter’s five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. An EPRS analysis of the positions of partner governmental organisations at EU,national, regional and local levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in thediscussion on the working conditions of platform workers: The employment status of platform workers has to beclarified. The binary system (employed or self-employed) is challenged by the specific characteristics of platform workand bogus self-employment. To give some examples, Ireland classifies workers on the basis of a series of tests, whilePortugal enacts a legal presumption that transport sector platform workers are employees. Platform workers have theright to be correctly informed. This can be facilitated by transparency, designated advisory services, informationcampaigns and communication channels among workers. Platforms must protect privacy, share information and datawith relevant (local) authorities, while artificial intelligence-based algorithms should be controlled by a humanapproach. Local and regional authorities are witnessing the negative social consequences of the limited rights ofplatform workers. Social measures should cover the specific needs of these workers in relation to sickness, accident,unemployment, protection at work and pension benefits. More investment should be made in skills development andrelevant training for platform workers. Transferability and certification of competences would, for example, supportcareer development. The asymmetry between national legislation and issues faced locally and regionally can bemitigated by complementary EU action and strong cooperation between the levels of governance. The role of cities inparticular should be acknowledged. Negotiation frameworks and charters, for example, can help all levels share goodpractices and learn about the impact of the measures taken.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 107

Revision of Annexes IV and V to the EU Regulation on Persistent Organic PollutantsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-12-2021Awtur KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix applikazzjoni tal-liġi tal-UE | leġiżlazzjoni | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | tniġġis

Sommarju At the end of October 2021, the European Commission submitted a proposal for the revision of Regulation (EU)2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), and in particular its Annexes IV and V, which determine how wastecontaining POPs must be treated, i.e. whether waste could be recycled or must be destroyed or irreversiblytransformed. The proposal updates the concentration limits of certain (groups of) POP substances already regulated inAnnexes IV and V of the regulation, and also establishes concentration limits for substances that have not yet beenregulated by these annexes. The proposal thus ensures, on the one hand, implementation of the EU's commitments atinternational level (alignment of the EU legislation with developments at international level in the field of POPs, e.g.under the Stockholm Convention on POPs), and, on the other, alignment of the EU legislation with scientific andtechnical progress. It also aims to achieve an optimal balance between the ambitions of the European Green Deal notably, to ensure that human health and the environment are protected from the adverse effects caused by POPs,while also achieving toxic-free material cycles, more recycling and circularity, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions.The recast of the regulation in 2019 envisaged that Annexes IV and V would be revised following the ordinarylegislative procedure. This briefing presents the findings of publicly accessible sources on the implementation of theEU legislation in terms of its scope and subject to revision.

Briefing EN

Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-12-2021Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix bank ċentrali | il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew | munita virtwali | politika monetarja unika | sistema ta' pagamenti

Sommarju Payment systems are of vital importance for today's economies and are the core activity of central banks. To adapt torecent trends – including the decline in cash usage, the surge in online commerce and contactless forms of payment,and the creation of cryptocurrencies – central banks have, in recent years, explored the possibility of issuing digitalcurrencies themselves. Proponents of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) note that, among other things, they can:alleviate the problem of concentration of the payments infrastructure; facilitate instantaneous and cheaper execution ofpayments; discourage illicit activity and rein in the shadow economy; spur competition in the payment industry; reducethe problem of banks being ‘too big to fail’; promote financial inclusion; contribute to financial stability; preserve theEU’s sovereignty over transactions; help facilitate monetary policy; and support the international role of the euro.Critics of CBDCs range from those who question the need for such currencies altogether, to those who point out therisks, including the possibility that CBDCs could: amplify the international spillover effects of shocks; curtail theautonomy of less powerful economies in their monetary policy, and even substitute their domestic currency; facilitatetax avoidance or a loss of domestic oversight capabilities; put at risk the variety of payment instruments available tohouseholds; create undesired volatility in exchange rates; and put banks’ deposit bases under threat, with negativeimplications for credit provision and output. The European Central Bank (ECB) is involved in the general discussionabout the design and launch of CBDCs. In October 2020, it published a report on a digital euro, identifying anddiscussing features of and options for a euro-area CBDC. In July 2021, the ECB launched an investigation phase,which should last 2 years and aims to address key issues of design and distribution. The European Parliament, as wellas other stakeholders, is expected to participate actively in this phase.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?

Including the costs of owner-occupied housing in inflation measurementTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-12-2021Awtur HOFLMAYR MARTIN

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix abitazzjoni | armonizzazzjoni tal-prezzijiet | baġit ta’ unità domestika | indiċi tal-prezzijiet | prezz għall-konsumatur |

unità domestikaSommarju Housing costs make up a significant part of households' final consumption expenditures. However, these costs are

only partially captured by the inflation indicator on which the European Central Bank (ECB) bases its monetary policydecisions. While the costs of paying rent feed into the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) – the indicatorused to assess the achievement of the ECB's price stability objective – the costs of living in a home owned by theoccupier do not. Instead, only expenditure for maintenance and minor repairs is currently included. More than twothirds of the EU population live in a home owned by their household. At the same time, house prices surged by 19 %between 2010 and 2019, with particularly large increases in the last 4 years. In its monetary policy strategy review, theECB outlined a roadmap to take owner-occupied housing into account in its inflation target. However, severalconceptual and methodological questions need to be answered, from the measuring approach to the collection ofreliable data at an adequate frequency. Academic research suggests that the inclusion of costs of owner-occupiedhousing in the inflation index would only lead to a marginal deviation in the price measure. However, owing to the oftenprocyclical and volatile nature of such costs, their inclusion does not always drive inflation. Moreover, because of theasynchrony of housing-market cycles, inflation levels would likely be more dispersed across EU Member States onceowner-occupied housing costs are included in the HICP. As a first step, the European Parliament stressed in itsresolution on the ECB's 2020 annual report that the HICP is a 'very narrow concept of inflation measurement' thatunderestimates inflation in the euro area. While stronger methodological harmonisation efforts are needed to establishan augmented HICP, the inclusion of owner-occupied housing costs in the inflation measure would better reflect actualand perceived price dynamics, even though the overall effects are likely to be marginal.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 108

Public finances in Euro Area Member States: Selected indicators - November 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-12-2021Awtur TEIXEIRA DA CUNHA INES | ZOPPÉ Alice

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix dejn pubbliku | pajjiż parteċipi | prodott domestiku gross | stabbiltà finanzjarja | statistika finanzjarja | statistika tal-UE |

tbassir ekonomikuSommarju This document presents selected indicators on public finance for the Euro Area Member States and the Euro Area as a

whole. For each indicator, it provides a short explanation and the data sources. The final section presents a shortoverview of the main indicators used by the European and other international institutions to assess debt sustainability.

Briefing EN

Towards a joint Western alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-12-2021Awtur GRIEGER Gisela

Qasam tematiku Il-Governanza Dinjija | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix interkonnessjoni ta’ sistemi | iċ-Ċina | relazzjonijiet internazzjonali | relazzjonijiet tal-UE

Sommarju Since the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, President Xi Jinping'ssignature foreign policy project has drawn widespread criticism, including for challenging the traditional model ofmultilateral infrastructure financing. Western-led bilateral and plurilateral infrastructure and connectivity initiativesdesigned as alternatives have remained fragmented and have been dwarfed in scope and scale by a geographicallyand thematically rapidly expanding BRI, which has thrived on an attractive brand and a streamlined authoritarian one-stop-shop project management system. In contrast to Japan, it has taken the EU and the US years to respond withseparate regional strategies reflecting their distinct geopolitical outlook and economic relations with the PRC. Themanifold implications of the PRC's use of physical and digital infrastructure projects as a foreign policy tool to expandits sphere of influence both across the world and within international organisations have been widely under-estimated.At their 2021 G7 Summit, however, leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US agreedon a global 'values-driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership', known as the 'Build Back BetterWorld' (B3W) initiative, which echoes US President Joe Biden's 2020 'Build Back Better' campaign trail slogan. It is thefirst collective attempt of major democracies to craft a sustainable and targeted alternative to the BRI and to addressthe challenges it poses to the rules-based international order. It seeks to help fill, by 2035, an infrastructure gap in lowand medium-income countries estimated at US$40+ trillion, by leveraging public development finance to mobiliseuntapped private-sector funds. Trends in the flows of global private infrastructure investment suggest that the initiativewill face opportunities and challenges. The European Parliament's 2021 resolution on connectivity and EU-Asiarelations calls for an EU global connectivity strategy as an extension of the 2018 Europe-Asia connectivity strategy, inorder to strengthen the EU's role as a geopolitical and geo-economic actor with a single narrative, and to broadenpartnerships with democracies across the world that share the EU's fundamental values.

Briefing EN

EU action plan for the social economy: Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positionson the European Commission's initiative

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 01-12-2021

Awtur COLLOVA Claudio | MILOTAY NoraQasam tematiku Il-Politika SoċjaliKelma għat-tiftix ekonomija soċjali | għajnuna tal-UE | immaniġġjar finanzjarju | inizjattiva tal-UE | integrazzjoni soċjali | intrapriża soċjali

| istituzzjoni pubblika | responsabbiltà ambjentali u soċjali | servizzi soċjali | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advance

consultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter's five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. An EPRS analysis of the positions of partner organisations at European Union (EU),national, regional and local levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in thediscussion on the forthcoming European action plan for the social economy. There is broad consensus that access tofinance requires diversified funding options and that synergies should be established between regional, national andEU funds. Funding under Next Generation EU has the potential to be a positive game-changer for the social economyin Europe. When it comes to framework conditions, the need to increase the visibility of the social economy is widelyrecognised. Public authorities particularly suggest visualising the impact of social economy enterprises and setting upan online platform where social actors can interact. Access to markets could benefit from strengthening the business-to-government channel. Regional governmental organisations advocate stronger inter-regional cooperation within theEU. As an example of good practice, the European Committee of the Regions identifies the social economy thematicplatform under the smart specialisation strategy, which comprises seven regions in six Member States. According topublic authorities, some tools, the European social economy regions (ESER) scheme for example, could be furtherpromoted to strengthen the global dimension of the EU's neighbourhood policy. There is also further potential to link upwith the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN). Somegovernmental organisations signalled their intention to invest in new technologies, such as cloud computing, big data,blockchain and robotisation. Finally, new business models could be created by paying attention to cross-cutting issuessuch as gender equality and the ability of the social economy to find solutions adapted to rural areas. Overall, thesocial economy is seen as a way to solve local problems, including employment, inclusion, care and education, with abottom-up approach.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 109

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: The optimist of the European integration processTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-11-2021Awtur PERCHOC Philippe

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix Franza | kap ta' Stat | Moviment Ewropew | personalità storika | persunaġġ politiku | promozzjoni tal-kunċett Ewropew |

rendikont storiku | Sistema Monetarja Ewropea | storja tal-Ewropa | unjoni monetarjaSommarju Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was one of Europe's leading figures in the generation which came after that of the founding

fathers. He was close to Jean Monnet, but he himself said that his main source of inspiration was Robert Schuman.For both Schuman and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, their relationship with Germany was a thread running through theirlives. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was born in Koblenz, Germany, where his father had been posted in the Frenchadministration after the First World War. Giscard d'Estaing was involved in the liberation of Paris at a very young ageand then in military operations at the end of the Second World War. After studying engineering, he chose a career inpublic administration, going on to be an economic adviser in various post-war French governments. He was laterelected as an MP in Auvergne, where his family had roots, and was then appointed Secretary of State for Finance atthe very young age of 32. He held various ministerial positions in this field, moving in European circles and spendingtime with colleagues from other European Community Member States. Elected French President in 1974, he favoureda policy of economic and social liberalism. His main accomplishments came in the areas of women's, young people'sand disabled persons' rights. At international level, he drew on the support of the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt,to develop political and monetary initiatives. Defeated in the 1981 elections, he continued his political career atregional, national and European level. He carried on working to bring about monetary union and develop the Franco-German partnership, before chairing the Convention on the Future of Europe, which culminated in the drafting of theConstitutional Treaty. Despite his disappointment at the rejection of that treaty, he continued to serve Europe until theend of his life.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Prospects for EU economic recovery [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-11-2021Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | grupp ta' riflessjoni | marda tal-coronavirus | pubblikazzjoni | reċessjoni ekonomika | rkupru ekonomiku |

tbassir ekonomikuSommarju Uncertainty is growing over the recovery of the European economy from the recession generated by the Covid-19

pandemic. The European Commission has painted an optimistic growth scenario in its most recent forecast, with theeconomy expected to expand by 5 per cent and 4.3 per cent in 2021 and 2022 respectively. However, an increasingnumber of analysts see the potential for growth dampened by new restrictions in the run-up to Christmas this yeargiven a fourth/fifth wave of the pandemic currently gripping Europe, compounded by the discovery of a new variant ofthe coronavirus. Higher inflation, partly resulting from high energy prices and disrupted supply chains, is also seen as athreat to the economy of the euro area and the wider EU, as are high public debt levels in many countries. This notegathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the state of the Europeaneconomy and on debates on how to reform it.

Briefing EN

Rights of women and gender equality with regard to pay, treatment at work, labour market and careeropportunities in Iceland

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 30-11-2021

Awtur FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | SCHONARD MartinaQasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix abort | bilanċ bejn il-ħajja privata u x-xogħol | drittijiet tan-nisa | l-Iżlanda | liv tal-ġenituri | paga ndaqs | pożizzjoni tan-

nisa | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi | ħaddiemaSommarju The Republic of Iceland is one of the smallest European countries, with a population of 370,000 inhabitants in 2021 . It

is an island state and its official language is Icelandic. Historically, geographically and politically, Iceland is connectedto the Scandinavian countries and is part of the Nordic countries, but does not belong to the EU. Iceland is a part of theEEA Agreement, which enables the country to enjoy the benefits of the EU’s single market without the full privilegesand responsibilities of EU membership. The country is also a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 110

'Fit for 55' legislative package: Strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for newpassenger cars and new light commercial vehicles

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 29-11-2021

Awtur VIKOLAINEN VeraQasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix gass serra | karozza | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | newtralità karbonika | proposta (UE) | standard ambjentali | tniġġis

mill-vetturi motorizzati | vettura motorizzata | vetturi ħfiefSommarju The IA undertakes a quantitative assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts of strengthening the

CO2 targets for cars and vans, using modelling tools with proven track record in supporting EU policy-making. Itidentifies and quantifies the costs and benefits of the combination of preferred options and qualitatively describesindirect costs and benefits. Despite the related considerable effort, the IA seems to define the problem at a ratheraggregated level and does not provide further details as to which consumers, which parts of the value chain in whichMember States are affected and at what scale. Furthermore, the IA does not explain how the CTP scenarios - whichdefine the level of ambition increase for light- and heavy duty vehicles broadly as 'low', 'medium' or 'high' - resulted inthe CO2 emission target levels for 2035 and 2040.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board ECON on 1 December 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-11-2021Awtur DIAS BORGES FARRAJOTA CATARINA | GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | SLOCOCK OLIVER | TEIXEIRA

DA CUNHA INESQasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix awtorità nazzjonali kompetenti | bank | Istituzzjoni tal-UE | koperazzjoni istituzzjonali | pajjiż terz | riżervi | smigħ

pubbliku | solvenza finanzjarja | stabbiltà finanzjarja | superviżjoni bankarja | superviżjoni finanzjarja | unjoni bankarjatal-UE

Sommarju This note is prepared in view of an ordinary public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), ElkeKönig, which will take place on 1 December 2021. This briefing addresses the following topics: (i) cooperation withother authorities, (ii) home/host authorities and the issue of internal MREL, (iii) evolution of MREL stock and shortfalls,(iv) contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, and (v) summaries of external papers on the status quo ofimpediments to resolvability.

Briefing EN

European Commission Work Programme for 2022Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-11-2021Awtur HAHNKAMPER-VANDENBULCKE Nora | VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix demokrazija | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea | newtralità karbonika | programm ta’ azzjoni | promozzjoni tal-kunċett Ewropew

| rwol internazzjonali tal-UE | suq uniku diġitaliSommarju On 19 October 2021, the European Commission presented its work programme for 2022 (CWP 2022), setting out its

legislative and non-legislative intentions for 2022. The CWP 2022 perpetuates the CWP 2021's twofold ambition (i.e. torecover from the pandemic and to boost the Commission's transformative agenda). A special emphasis is put onhelping the Union emerge stronger and more resilient. This should be achieved by implementing the measures agreedover the last year, and through additional investments and reforms in order to 'accelerate the twin green and digitaltransitions, and build a fairer, more resilient and more cohesive society'. The briefing is intended as a backgroundoverview for parliamentary committees, explaining the CWP 2022’s structure and key aspects, and providinginformation on two types of EPRS publications of interest with a view to the upcoming legislative proposals: initialappraisals of Commission impact assessments and implementation appraisals.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 111

Resilience of global supply chains: Challenges and solutionsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-11-2021Awtur SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliKelma għat-tiftix awtoforniment | ekonomija fi tranżizzjoni | epidemija | ftehim kummerċjali (UE) | globalizzazzjoni | katina tal-provvista |

kooperazzjoni internazzjonali | kummerċ internazzjonali | marda tal-coronavirus | pajjiż terz | sigurtà tal-provvistaSommarju The growing importance of global supply chains has fundamentally changed the way the global economy and goods

manufacturing are organised. While trade conducted through global supply chains has fallen somewhat as a share oftotal trade since the 2008-2010 global financial and economic crisis, more than two-thirds of international trade stillinvolves transactions made possible by such chains. The EU is profoundly involved in these production chains, moreso than most other countries, and significantly more than both the United States and China. The pandemic disruptedmany supply chains at its outbreak, and the subsequent economic recovery, the strongest on record, led to enormousfurther strain on the global supply system; surging demand, coupled with shortages of workers, ships, containers, aircargo space and clogged ports, created a 'perfect storm'. Supply chain bottlenecks are starting to weigh on theeconomic recovery, slowing growth and leading to delays, holding back the manufacturing sector and fuelling inflation.The EU had recognised its strategic dependence on some foreign inputs even before the pandemic, and had started toseek ways to increase its autonomy – a quest which has been accelerated by the impact of the coronavirus. Toimprove the resilience of supply chains, the EU is applying a policy mix that aims to increase domestic capacity,diversify suppliers and support the multilateral rules-based trade environment; it has also enhanced its cooperationwith the US on supply chains. Other like-minded countries apply a similar policy mix, focusing on supporting reshoringor nearshoring. While this situation is not ideal, global supply chains are hard to reconfigure, and increasing theirresilience is a time-consuming and costly process. Moreover, most experts predict that reshoring or nearshoring will beof limited importance. With time, though, resilience may improve through international cooperation, diversification andthe accelerated uptake of digital technologies.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Resilience of global supply chains: Challenges and solutions

European Parliament scrutiny of FrontexTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-11-2021Awtur DEL MONTE Micaela | LUYTEN KATRIEN

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix drittijiet tal-individwu | Frontex | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | kontroll fuq il-fruntiera | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE |

tneħħijaSommarju Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 transformed Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and gave the

European Parliament a range of tools affording it oversight of the agency's activities. In addition to budgetarydischarge, these include an obligation for the agency to provide information to the Parliament, a key role for theParliament in appointing the agency's executive director, and attendance on invitation by a Parliament expert atFrontex management board meetings. These tools effectively make the Parliament the key player in terms ofdemocratic oversight of the agency. In 2020, amidst allegations of Frontex's possible involvement in pushbacks andviolations of fundamental rights by Member States' authorities at the EU's external borders, the Parliament'sCommittee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) decided to investigate the allegations. The Parliamentused both ex-ante and ex-post accountability instruments, as part of which it asked questions demanding oral andwritten answers, requested the Frontex executive director to appear before the LIBE committee to answer Members'questions, and decided to postpone the discharge of Frontex' accounts in respect of the financial year 2019 (dischargewas subsequently given in October 2021). In January 2021, LIBE decided to step up its action and established theFrontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG) to monitor all aspects of the functioning of the agency, including compliancewith fundamental rights, and transparency and accountability towards Parliament. The FSWG conducted a fact-findinginvestigation, collected evidence and presented its final report in July 2021. While the report 'did not find evidence onthe direct performance of pushbacks and/or collective expulsions by Frontex in the serious incident cases that could beexamined', it found 'serious shortcomings'. This briefing looks at the accountability mechanisms at Parliament'sdisposal and how they have been used to ensure that migrants' fundamental rights are respected and upheld at theEU's external borders.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 112

Violence against women in the EU: State of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-11-2021Awtur SHREEVES Rosamund

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni sesswali | drittijiet tal-bniedem | drittijiet tan-nisa | epidemija | għajnuna għall-vittmi | inugwaljanza

soċjali | Konvenzjoni Internazzjonali | mara | marda tal-coronavirus | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi | vjolenza domestika |vjolenza sesswali

Sommarju Violence against women is a violation of human rights and a form of gender-based discrimination. Rooted ininequalities between men and women, it takes many forms. Estimates of the scale of the problem are alarming. Suchviolence has a major impact on victims and imposes a significant cost burden on society. The instruments put in placeby the United Nations and Council of Europe, including the latter's 'Istanbul Convention', to which the EU plans toaccede, are benchmarks in efforts to combat violence against women. The EU is tackling the problem in various ways,but has no binding instrument designed specifically to protect women from violence. Although there are similaritiesbetween national policies to combat violence against women, the Member States have adopted different approachesto the problem. Parliament's efforts have focused on strengthening EU policy in the area. Parliament has repeatedlycalled for a European Union strategy to counter violence against women, including a legally binding instrument.Stakeholders have expressed a range of concerns, including regarding the impact of the coronavirus pandemic andthe related need to expand and adapt support for victims, and have highlighted the need for a comprehensive EUpolitical framework on eliminating violence against women. They have also launched new initiatives of their own. Thisis a further update of an earlier briefing by Anna Dimitrova-Stull, of February 2014. The most recent previous editionwas from November 2020.

Briefing EN

Understanding EU policies for persons with disabilitiesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 24-11-2021Awtur LECERF Marie

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni abbażi ta' diżabilità | epidemija | kura għad-diżabbli | marda tal-coronavirus | persuna b'diżabilità |

statistika tas-saħħa | trattament indaqs | ġbir ta' dejta | ħaddiem diżabbliSommarju Both the EU and its Member States have signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and use

its definition of disability as a common reference at EU level. Bearing in mind that there is no other harmoniseddefinition of disability in the EU, and that there is a wide variety of statistical surveys in terms of questions asked andpopulation surveyed, a complete statistical assessment of disability in the EU does not yet exist. However, the annualEurostat statistics on income and living conditions survey reveals that, in Europe, the prevalence of disability is higheramong female, older and less educated respondents. Furthermore, studies show that the coronavirus pandemic hasaffected people with disabilities disproportionately more than others. The EU combats all forms of discriminationalongside and in support of its Member States. To improve the situation of disabled people, it has introduced a seriesof initiatives, programmes and strategies over a number of decades. The European Parliament has been highly activein the bid to end all forms of discrimination against disabled people since the start of the 1980s. In 1997, Article 13 ofthe European Community Treaty, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, (now Article 19 of the Treaty on theFunctioning of the EU) on the human right not to suffer from discrimination on the grounds, in particular, of disability,paved the way for a genuine disability policy. The first step in this regard was the adoption of a 2001-2006 actionprogramme to combat discrimination. Later, the 2010-2020 European disability strategy sought to enable disabledpeople to exercise their rights and participate fully in society and the economy. A new 2021-2030 strategy,incorporating the lessons learned from its predecessor, seeks to ensure that all persons with disabilities in the EU,regardless of their sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation enjoy their human rights; haveequal access to participation in society and the economy; are able to decide where, how and with whom they live;move freely in the EU regardless of their support needs and, no longer experience discrimination.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 113

EU-Belarus relations: State of play - Human rights situationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-11-2021Awtur PRZETACZNIK Jakub | RUSSELL Martin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix demokratizzazzjoni | elezzjoni presidenzjali | il-Belarus | ir-Russja | kap ta' Stat | migrazzjoni illegali | miżura restrittiva

tal-UE | moviment tad-drittijiet umani | reġim awtoritarju | ripressjoni | sanzjonijiet ekonomiċi | sanzjonijietinternazzjonali

Sommarju Over the summer and autumn of 2021, in what is increasingly viewed as a hybrid warfare tactic aimed at destabilisingEurope, Aliaksandr Lukashenka's Belarussian regime has instrumentalised migrants, manipulating the organisation offlights from the Middle East to Minsk and deliberately orchestrating migrants' onward travel to the EU-Belarus border.With weather conditions endangering migrants' lives, the situation has also led to serious humanitarian consequences.This activity – which many argue also aims at distracting attention from the worsening situation of freedom in thecountry, with attacks against independent society, journalists and electronic media users – is only the latest in a stringof events underlining deteriorating EU relations with Belarus. The Lukashenka regime has been isolated since thefalsified presidential elections of August 2020, and the brutal crackdown against peacefully protesting Belarusians.Instead of embracing dialogue with the democratic opposition and wider Belarusian society, Lukashenka choseanother path, involving continued brutal repression of the country's citizens. The worsening human rights situation andhijacking of Ryanair flight FR 4978, in June 2021, provoked a response from the EU. This includes a ban on Belarusianair carriers landing in or overflying the EU, a major extension of the list of people and entities already subject tosanctions, and the introduction of sanctions on key sectors of the Belarusian economy. The European Parliament playsan active part in shaping this EU response. Parliament does not recognise Lukashenka's presidency and has spokenout on human rights abuses in Belarus. Awarded Parliament's 2020 Sakharov Prize, the Belarusian democraticopposition is frequently invited to speak for the Belarusian people in the European Parliament. Following the recentdevelopments, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya will make a formal address to the European Parliament in plenary session,on 24 November 2021. This Briefing updates a previous edition, published in July 2021.

Briefing EN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): The EU's strategic partner in AsiaTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-11-2021Awtur RUSSELL Martin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ASEAN | kooperazzjoni ekonomika | kooperazzjoni internazzjonali | kooperazzjoni kulturali | kooperazzjoni politika |

pajjiżi tal-ASEAN | relazzjonijiet internazzjonali | sigurtà reġjonali | sħubija internazzjonali tal-UE | żamma tal-paċiSommarju Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often compared with the EU. Both

organisations brought together former adversaries and successfully resolved tensions through cooperation, helping tobring peace and prosperity to their regions. However, the EU and ASEAN operate in very different ways. ASEAN is astrictly intergovernmental organisation in which decisions are based on consensus. While this approach has made itdifficult for south-east Asian countries to achieve the same level of integration as the EU, it has also enabled ASEAN toaccommodate huge disparities among its 10 member states. In 2003, south-east Asian leaders decided to takecooperation to another level by setting up an ASEAN Community. To this end, they adopted a charter in 2007, thoughwithout fundamentally changing the nature of the organisation's decision-making or giving it stronger institutions. Thecommunity has three pillars: political-security, economic, and socio-cultural. ASEAN's impact has been uneven. Theorganisation is an effective platform for cooperation between its member states and the wider Indo-Pacific region, butits goal of promoting peaceful cooperation is undermined by growing geopolitical tensions, especially in the SouthChina Sea. There has been significant economic integration, even if the goal of an EU-style single market is a longway off. On the other hand, south-east Asians still perceive ASEAN as an elite project with little impact on their dailylives. EU-ASEAN relations span four decades and have steadily deepened, building on common values as well asbooming trade and investment. In 2020, the two sides upgraded to a strategic partnership. This Briefing updates aprevious one, published in November 2020.

Briefing EN

The public sector loan facility under the Just Transition MechanismTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-11-2021Awtur MAZUR Sidonia

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix ekonomija ċirkolari | għajnuna reġjonali | għajnuna tal-UE | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | self tal-UE |

settur pubbliku | tibdil fil-klima | tkabbir ekoloġiku | żvilupp reġjonaliSommarju The public sector loan facility (PSLF) is the third pillar of the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), along with the Just

Transition Fund and just transition scheme under Invest EU. The facility consists of a grant and a loan component.With the contribution of €1.525 billion for the grant component from the Union budget (including assigned revenues)and EIB lending of €10 billion from its own resources, the aim is for the public sector loan facility to mobilise between€25 and 30 billion in public investment over the 2021-2027 period. Funding will be available to all Member States,while focusing on the regions with the biggest transition challenges. In the European Parliament, the Committee onBudgets (BUDG) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) had joint responsibility for this file.Their report was adopted at a joint sitting of the two committees on 16 October 2020. The provisional agreement onthe proposal reached after trilogue negotiations with the Council was confirmed in plenary session of the Parliament on24 June 2021. The Council adoption followed on 13 July, the Regulation was then signed on 14 July and published inthe Official Journal on 30 July 2021. Second edition of a Briefing originally drafted by Christiaan Van Lierop andSidonia Mazur. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism

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Stablecoins: Private-sector quest for cryptostabilityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-11-2021Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix applikazzjonijiet tat-teknoloġija informatika | flus elettroniċi | munita virtwali | riskju finanzjarju | settur privat | sistema ta'

pagamenti | stabbiltà finanzjarjaSommarju In just over a decade, the payment industry has seen the launch of cryptocurrencies and their explosive growth, driven

by progress in digital technology applications. However, owing to a range of factors, not least their significant volatility,cryptocurrencies have not been adopted on a massive scale, but instead are used largely for speculative purposes.Both national authorities and the private sector have attempted to tackle volatility. The private sector's answer wasstablecoins, that is, cryptocurrencies that aim to keep a stable value relative to a specified asset, or a pool of assets.There are currently three means by which stablecoins achieve this: legal assets, crypto-assets and algorithms. Theuse of stablecoins may enhance financial inclusion, both in developed and developing markets, and might boostoverseas payments in general and remittances in particular. Stablecoins may also have a positive impact oninternational trade, and may contribute to the development of global payment arrangements. There are potentialeconomic risks, however, stemming either from stablecoins' legal characterisation or from governance matters or thecoins' operational resilience. Further concerns are that stablecoins may be used for money laundering or terroristfinancing activities, that consumers may not be adequately protected, and that stablecoins may impede monetarypolicy or propagate financial shocks and generate financial contagion. To tackle these issues, national authorities inmajor economies are taking two complementary approaches: having central banks establish central bank digitalcurrencies ('public stablecoins') and regulating stablecoin use. In the EU, the centrepiece is the European Commissionproposal for a regulation on markets in crypto-assets, adopted in September 2020 and currently under review by theco-legislators – the European Parliament and the Council.

Briefing EN

Femicide, its causes and recent trends: What do we know?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-11-2021Awtur estern Consuelo, CORRADI

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni sesswali | drittijiet tan-nisa | drittijiet ċivili | mara | omiċidju | pożizzjoni tan-nisa | vjolenza domestika |

vjolenza sesswaliSommarju Femicide is a violation of the basic human rights to life, liberty and personal security, as well as an obstacle to social

and economic development. The term indicates the act of intentionally killing a female person, either woman or girl,because of her gender, and it is the end-result of combined risk factors existing at the level of the individual,interpersonal relations, community and society. This crime displays three prominent characteristics: women aredisproportionately killed by men; victims have previously experienced non-lethal violence; the rate at which women arekilled tends to remain steady over time. Estimates indicate that 87 000 women were intentionally killed in 2017, but theexact number is unknown and suspected to be higher. The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the situation andreduced access to services. Femicide’s classification differs according to context, but most significantly includes:killing by an intimate partner or family member; honour, dowry and witch-hunting deaths; femicide-suicide; pre- andpost-natal excess female mortality; infanticide; and deliberate neglect, rooted in a preference for sons over daughters.Collecting accurate data is a strategic goal and necessary to facilitate the design of effective policies.

Briefing EN

Preventing, protecting, providing access to justice: How can states respond to femicide?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-11-2021Awtur estern Tamsin BRADLEY

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix aċċess għall-ġustizzja | diskriminazzjoni sesswali | drittijiet tan-nisa | mara | omiċidju | pożizzjoni tan-nisa | studju

komparattiv | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi | vjolenza sesswaliSommarju Growing awareness of femicide has not universally translated into effective policy and programming. Though

legislation relating to gender-based violence and/or femicide exists in many countries, both persist. A combined social,cultural, political and economic approach situates femicide prevention and responses at various levels, includingchanges in individual behaviour. Using the term ‘femicide’ more frequently at international forums is crucial not only tofocus attention on the gendered nature of violence but also to act as a call for action. Situational studies reveal thatpolitical will to end femicide differs from country to country. Femicide together with the patriarchal norms and misogynythat precipitate it are not just extra-EU problems. Rather, they are of global concern, demanding a global response; innon-EU countries this response is often dependent on donor funding. We now know more than ever what works toreverse patterns of violence. These patterns can be broken by developing the capacity of women’s organisations andstrengthening global feminist movements that work with national and local activist networks. Additionally, engagingmen and boys in this process of transformation is vital if we are to address violence against women and girls andultimately end femicide.

Briefing EN

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Revision of Regulation (EU) 913/2010 concerning a European rail network for competitive freightTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-11-2021Awtur BACIAN Izabela Cristina

Qasam tematiku It-Trasport | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-KunsillKelma għat-tiftix Ftehim ta’ Pariġi dwar il-Klima | gass serra | infrastruttura tat-trasport | metodu ta' evalwazzjoni | netwerk ferrovjarju |

netwerk tat-trasport | newtralità karbonika | politika komuni tat-trasport | regolament (UE) | ġarr ta’ merkanzijaSommarju Boosting rail freight transport is an essential pillar of the European Union's long-term policy to make transport more

sustainable by cutting greenhouse gas emissions and decarbonising the sector. However, rail freight transport hasfaced numerous barriers in its development, and its growth is held back by its lack of competitiveness with othermodes of transport such as road transport. Regulation (EU) 913/2010 was designed to facilitate rail freight transportacross the EU rail network, through the creation of rail freight corridors, but the potential of those corridors has notbeen fully exploited. While the regulation was conducive to enhanced cooperation across borders, its implementationdid not lead to an increase in rail freight transport along the corridors, with insufficient coordination on trafficmanagement and infrastructure works. Against this backdrop, the Commission has launched a two-step revisionprocess for Regulation (EU) 913/2010. The first step consists of a limited revision, in conjunction with a revision of theTrans-European Transport Network Regulation, focused on aspects of geographical alignment, governance andinvestment planning. The second step will be a wider revision leading to a recast proposal scheduled for the lastquarter of 2022.

Briefing EN

Fit for 55 package: Energy from renewable sourcesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-11-2021Awtur DALLI HUBERT

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-Ambjent | L-Enerġija | L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | konsum tal-enerġija | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | produzzjoni tal-enerġija |

proposta (UE) | riżorsi rinnovabbli | studju tal-impatt | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijietSommarju The Commission is proposing a new directive to amend the 2018 directive on the promotion of energy from renewable

sources. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposal finds that the impactassessment draws a clear logic between the problems, their drivers, the objectives and the policy interventions underconsideration. However, the the vast amount of work which must have gone into such an assessment is to someextent impaired by the inconsistent, unclear presentation of options and the equivocal identification of preferredoptions. Also, the IA is not clear as to how it ultimately settles on the specific target of 40%. While the IA was clearly anextremely complex exercise and appears to be based on reliable data, analysis and modelling, different choices as toits organisation and presentation would have likely considerably improved the IA’s clarity and readability and its abilityto support the policy choices made in the proposal.

Briefing EN

Alternative fuel vehicle infrastructure and fleets: State of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-11-2021Awtur SOONE Jaan

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix fjuwil | infrastruttura tat-trasport | karozza tal-linja | riżorsi tal-enerġija | tibdil fil-klima | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis

mill-vetturi motorizzati | veikolu kummerċjali | veikolu li ma jniġġisx | vettura motorizzataSommarju In December 2019 the European Commission published a communication on the Green Deal, in which it outlined its

priorities to transform the EU into a resource-efficient and competitive economy and to meet the EU's climatecommitments. Subsequently, in line with the Green Deal, the European Climate Law was adopted in July 2021, settingin law the EU target for 2030 of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % compared with 1990 levels. Todeliver the targets agreed in the European Climate Law, the Commission adopted a set of legislative proposals knownas the 'Fit for 55' package on 14 July 2021. To speed up emissions reductions in transport, the package includesproposals to tighten the emissions trading scheme and widen its scope, proposals to increase the use of alternativefuels in aviation and shipping, stricter CO2 emissions standards for road vehicles, and a proposal to amend theAlternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive (AFID) and transform it into a regulation. This briefing provides a snapshot ofthe current state of play in alternative fuels recharging and refuelling points, and in the number of alternative fuelvehicles in circulation in EU countries. Since the adoption of the AFID in 2014, infrastructure deployment for thevarious alternative fuels in road transport has grown, however differences persist between Member States. Similarly,the uptake of alternatively fuelled vehicles differs between Member States, and petrol and diesel engines continue todominate vehicle fleets. Nonetheless, the market for electric vehicles has strongly matured, and the market forhydrogen fuel cell vehicles has also developed. The market for natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) vehiclesis mature and has seen slow growth, but vehicles have remained concentrated in a few Member States. The briefingalso summarises recent projections for future take-up of these vehicles. See also the EPRS 'EU Legislation inprogress' briefing on the revision of the Directive on the Deployment of Alternative Fuels Infrastructure (AFID).

Briefing EN

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Sustainability provisions in EU free trade agreements: Review of the European Commission action planTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-11-2021Awtur TITIEVSKAIA Jana

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ftehim kummerċjali (UE) | ftehim ta’ kummerċ ħieles | il-Korea t'Isfel | negozjar ta' ftehim (UE) | pajjiż terz | politika dwar

il-bidla fil-klima | ratifika ta’ ftehim | riżoluzzjoni ta' tilwimiet | Soċjetà ċivili | sħab soċjali | trasparenza fit-teħid ta'deċiżjonijiet | żvilupp sostenibbli

Sommarju Sustainability-related provisions are a key part of international trade negotiations. Since the free trade agreement(FTA) signed with South Korea in 2009, EU trade deals each include dedicated trade and sustainable development(TSD) chapters encompassing issues such as environment, labour rights, climate change and responsible businessconduct. In an effort to step up implementation and enforcement of these chapters, in 2018 the Commission publisheda non-paper setting out a 15-point action plan. In the new trade strategy, the 2021 Trade Policy Review, theCommission signalled the early launch of a review of the action plan and held an exchange of views with the EuropeanParliament in July 2021. Parliament has long been an advocate for stronger enforcement and implementation of TSDcommitments. In the three years since the action plan's launch, the Commission – in cooperation with Member States,EU institutions, stakeholders and international organisations – has advanced on many of the proposed actions. Forinstance, EU funding was mobilised to support civil society engagement and responsible business conduct. Assertiveenforcement of TSD commitments materialised in the form of a concluded dispute with South Korea on labour issues.The establishment of the EU chief trade enforcement officer has strengthened the Commission's enforcementcapabilities. Provisions on climate change, including a reference to the Paris Agreement, and widened labourprovisions are all part of recent trade negotiations. However, the action suggesting extending the scope of civil societyinput beyond the TSD chapters to trade agreements as a whole has so far mainly only been reflected in the Trade andCooperation Agreement between the EU und the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the objective of early ratification of thefundamental International Labour Organization conventions continues to be challenging with many partner countries.

Briefing EN

Revision of the TEN-E Regulation: EU guidelines for new energy infrastructureTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-11-2021Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix emenda ta' liġi | enerġija rinnovabbli | grilja enerġetika | kooperazzjoni fl-enerġija | netwerk trans-Ewropew | newtralità

karbonika | provvista tad-dawl | provvista tal-gass | proġett ta' interess komuni | regolament (UE)Sommarju On 15 December 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal to revise the 2013 regulation on trans-

European networks in energy (TEN-E). This proposal is currently the subject of interinstitutional 'trilogue' negotiations,which started after both the European Parliament (October 2021) and the Council of the EU (June 2021) had adoptedformal negotiating positions. The 2013 TEN-E Regulation sets out EU guidelines for cross-border energy infrastructure,and outlines the process for selecting projects of common interest (PCI). PCIs are infrastructure projects consideredessential for delivering on EU objectives in the energy field, including improved interconnection between nationalmarkets, greater competitiveness, security of supply, and promotion of renewable energy sources. The list of PCIs isupdated every two years. Certain PCI projects are eligible for EU financing from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).The revised TEN-E Regulation would align closely with the climate neutrality objectives of the European Green Deal:supporting energy infrastructure that consolidates new and existing clean energy technologies, and ending policy andfinancial support for fossil fuel projects. The latter would no longer be included on PCI lists and therefore unable toreceive CEF funding.

Briefing EN

United Nations Food Systems Summit 2021: Process, challenges and the way forwardTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-11-2021Awtur CAPRILE ANNA

Qasam tematiku Is-Sikurezza tal-Ikel | L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp Reġjonali | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix abitudnijiet alimentari | konferenza tan-NU | konsum tal-ikel | laqgħa għolja | nutrizzjoni | produzzjoni alimentari

Sommarju The culmination of two years' preparatory work and worldwide mobilisation events, the United Nations Food SystemsSummit took place on 23 September 2021. The idea behind the summit, initiated by United Nations Secretary-GeneralAntónio Guterres, was to start a process of transforming the way the world produces, consumes and thinks about food– as a crucial step in progressing on all 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). The summit was announced inOctober 2019 – before the Covid 19 pandemic became a hunger crisis in many parts of the world – and the stakeshave since risen acutely, bringing a new sense of urgency and creating an opportunity to boost the level of reformambition for global food systems. More than 150 countries took part in the event, which took place entirely on line,wrapping up a process that has generated a remarkable level of mobilisation and public debate through multipleplatforms. Although the summit revealed ample consensus on the need for a radical reform of food systems, it alsoevidenced profound divergences as to how to approach the daunting tasks ahead. A follow-up mechanism has beendesigned to advance the national and global transformative actions announced at the summit, and the United NationsSecretary-General will convene a global stock-taking meeting every two years to measure progress. This briefingupdates an earlier edition, published in September 2021 ahead of the Summit.

Briefing EN

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The United Kingdom's possible re-joining of the 2007 Lugano ConventionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-11-2021Awtur MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti LegaliKelma għat-tiftix adeżjoni fi ftehim | dritt privat internazzjonali | eżekuzzjoni ta’ deċiżjoni | ir-Renju Unit | Konvenzjoni Internazzjonali |

kooperazzjoni ġudizzjarja ċivili tal-UE | kunflitt ta’ ġuriżdizzjoni | Pajjiżi u territorji barranin Britanniċi | ħruġ mill-UESommarju The 2007 Lugano Convention is an international treaty that regulates the free movement of court judgments in civil

cases between the Member States of the EU, on one hand, and the three EFTA states (Switzerland, Norway andIceland), on the other. The convention effectively extends the regime of quasi-automatic recognition and enforcementof judgments that was applicable between EU Member States at the time under the Brussels I Regulation (No44/2001). Whereas the EU rules currently in force regulating the free movement of judgments in civil cases betweenthe EU Member States – the 2012 Brussels I-bis Regulation (1215/2012) – bring about an even higher level ofintegration and presume, therefore, a very high level of mutual trust between the national judiciaries of the MemberStates, relations between the EU and EFTA Member States remain at the level of integration prescribed in 2001 by theBrussels I Regulation. Following the expiry of the transition period provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement betweenthe United Kingdom (UK) and the EU, the UK is no longer bound by either the Brussels I-bis Regulation or the 2007Lugano Convention. Given the fact that the latter is open not only to EU and EFTA Member States, but also explicitlyto third countries, the UK has made a bid to re-join the Lugano Convention. For a third country to become part of thislegal regime, all parties to the convention must give their explicit consent. Whereas this has been the case withSwitzerland, Norway and Iceland, the European Commission, acting on behalf of the EU as a party to the 2007 LuganoConvention, has indicated that it is not prepared to grant such consent, effectively blocking – for the moment – theUK's reintegration within the Lugano regime of mutual recognition of civil judgments. For the Commission, accession tothe Lugano regime is bound up with the notion of close economic integration with the EU, presupposing a high level ofmutual trust. Participation in the Lugano system should not therefore be offered to any third country that is not part ofthe internal market.

Briefing EN

Intelligent transport systems and multimodal ticketing - Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional andlocal positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 16-11-2021

Awtur PAPE Marketa | RITTELMEYER Yann-SvenQasam tematiku It-Trasport | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix biljett | data libera | infrastruttura tat-trasport | interkonnessjoni ta’ sistemi | protezzjoni tad-data | sistema ta' pagamenti

| sistemi ta' trasport intelliġenti | teknoloġija tal-informazzjoni | trasport stradali | ġbir ta' dejtaSommarju This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advance

consultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter's five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. An EPRS analysis of the positions of partner governmental organisations at EU,national, regional and local levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in thediscussion on the revision of the Directive on Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), including a multimodal ticketinginitiative: * The current ITS framework, developed through delegated regulations, has to be evaluated and gapscorrected. The new rules' coherence with existing European Union legislation (e.g. competition law, public serviceobligations, data sharing, passenger rights) should be ensured. Future ITS developments should take better account ofregional and local authorities' experience, as exemplified here. * ITS services' interoperability, based on common EU-wide standards and cooperation, should be ensured, given that current ITS standards differ greatly between and withinEU Member States. Best-practice solutions from the local level should be replicable and systems better shared. Cross-border continuity must be guaranteed. * The role of public authorities in the provision of multimodal transport servicesthrough digital platforms needs to be clarified (legal framework, involvement in privately driven initiatives, etc.). The ITSframework should propose an attractive environment for investment and innovation to all stakeholders, especiallythose operating at local and regional levels. * Governmental organisations favour open data and digitalisation, but warnof related costs. Rules are needed on data management, opening access to data and sharing the costs that arise fromthe production of transport-related public sector data. Security and privacy must be preserved. * Before expanding datacollection obligations, the extent to which the (often locally) collected data is actually reused and how ITS services helpimprove mobility should be evaluated. Any new obligations placed on the local and regional levels should beaccompanied by financial support.

Briefing EN

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Climate change [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-11-2021Awtur CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix dokument | konferenza tan-NU | politika dwar il-bidla fil-klima | tibdil fil-klima

Sommarju The 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties, also known as COP26, held in Glasgow, madelimited progress on measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Leaders and government officials did agreeon plans to limit deforestation and emissions of methane, one of the gases responsible for global warming, but theymade little headway on curbing CO2 discharges. Notably, the leaders of China and Russia did not attend. Before theconference, scientists, analysts and many politicians had urged swift and radical action on climate change, pointing tothis year’s weather anomalies - severe floods in Europe and China, fires in the United States, Australia and many othercountries, and more frequent hurricanes. This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports frominternational think tanks on climate issues, notably the European Green Deal, a set of policy initiatives by the EuropeanCommission with the overarching aim of making Europe climate neutral by mid-century. Links to more studies onCOP26 will be published in a forthcoming item in this series in the next few weeks.

Briefing EN

Global human rights sanctions - Mapping Magnitsky laws: The US, Canadian, UK and EU approachTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-11-2021Awtur RUSSELL Martin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix dritt nazzjonali | drittijiet tal-bniedem | il-Kanada | ir-Renju Unit | l-Istati Uniti | miżura restrittiva tal-UE | moviment tad-

drittijiet umani | sanzjonijiet internazzjonaliSommarju Human rights sanctions are nothing new, but the death in 2009 of Russian whistle-blower Sergei Magnitsky in

detention resulted in calls for more vigorous action to counter continuing abuses in many countries. Adopted by the USin 2016, the Global Magnitsky Act was the first of a new generation of human rights sanctions programmes, which, incontrast to traditional sanctions targeted at individual countries, can be flexibly applied to perpetrators from all over theworld, regardless of their geographical location. This briefing compares four such programmes: the US GlobalMagnitsky Act, Canada's Sergei Magnitsky Law, the UK's Global Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Regulations, andthe EU's restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, the most recent of the four to beadopted. All of these are inspired by the ambition to tackle serious human rights crimes from around the world, butthere are also significant differences, for example, in terms of the threshold for human rights offences, the inclusion ornot of corruption-related offences, and the role played by parliaments and civil society. In terms of practical application,Global Magnitsky is by far the most active of the four programmes for the time being, targeting over 300 individualsand entities from 40 countries. Traditional geographical sanctions still predominate in all four jurisdictions;nevertheless, restrictive measures applied under global programmes to Chinese, Russian and Saudi officials highlightthe role that such sanctions can play in furthering Western cooperation on human rights. This briefing has been writtenas part of a collaborative project between the European Parliament's Research Service and Directorate-General forExternal Policies on mapping best practices in global human rights sanctions regimes.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Global human rights sanctions - Mapping Magnitsky laws: The US, Canadian, UK and EU approach

Key figures of 2022 Draft Budgetary PlansTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-11-2021Awtur ANGERER Jost | TEIXEIRA DA CUNHA INES

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix abbozz ta' baġit (UE) | baġitjar tal-programmi | defiċit baġitarju | dejn pubbliku | Eurogrupp | prodott domestiku gross |

tbassir ekonomikuSommarju This document compares key figures included in the 2022 Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs), as submitted to the

European Commission (EC) by the Euro Area Member States by mid of October 2021, with those of the autumn 2021forecasts by the EC and the key figures included in the 2021 Stability Programmes (SPs), as submitted by the EuroArea Member States by end of April 2021, with the those of the 2021 spring forecasts by the EC. The EC is expectedto adopt its opinions on the 2022 DBPs by end of November and the Eurogroup is expected to discuss these opinionson 6 December 2021.

Briefing EN

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The level playing-field for labour and environment in EU-UK relationsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-11-2021Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ftehim kummerċjali (UE) | ftehim ta' kooperazzjoni (UE) | ftehim ta’ kummerċ ħieles | ir-Renju Unit | politika kummerċjali

komuni | protezzjoni ambjentali | standard ambjentali | standard tax-xogħol | tibdil fil-klima | ħruġ mill-UE | żviluppsostenibbli

Sommarju The level playing-field (LPF) provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union(EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) constitute a key part of the agreement, and are the product of some of the morechallenging issues in the negotiations. The LPF provisions seek to safeguard fair competition between the parties. Anotable component are the rules on social provisions, labour, environment and climate change, often referred to as the'trade and sustainable development' (TSD) chapters in other free trade agreements. The trading relationship betweenthe EU and the UK is fundamentally different from that between the EU and other countries. Indeed, not only was theUK a Member State of the EU until 31 January 2021 and (almost all) EU laws applied to the UK until the end of thetransition period on 31 December 2020, but the two economies are also close and strongly-interconnected neighbours.The TCA was therefore designed to ensure that a LPF continues post-Brexit. This could be achieved by maintaininglevels of protection at the end of the transition period, as well as by either avoiding significant divergences in the futureor by taking appropriate (rebalancing) measures. To this end, the TCA requires that parties do not weaken or reducetheir levels of social, labour and environmental protection below those in place at the end of 2020 (non-regression).Existing commitments and ambitions on climate change, in particular on climate neutrality by 2050, remain in place forboth parties. In addition, the TCA introduces a mechanism whereby a party can take appropriate rebalancingmeasures to offset any (adverse) 'material impacts on trade or investment' arising from 'significant divergences'between parties. It also allows either party to request a review with a view to amending the agreement, and either partycan opt to terminate the trade chapters if the envisaged amendment is not satisfactory. The TCA LPF provisions onlabour and environment, in view of the LPF focus, strengthen the enforcement of non-regression provisions by allowingfor remedial measures in the event of non-compliance, and also reinforce the precautionary approach. The TCA alsorepresents a notable innovation with its rebalancing and review provisions. This Briefing updates an earlier one,published in April 2021.

Briefing EN

Review of the Intelligent Transport Systems DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-11-2021Awtur HAHNKAMPER-VANDENBULCKE Nora

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix direttiva (UE) | metodu ta' evalwazzjoni | politika komuni tat-trasport | sikurezza stradali | sistemi ta' trasport intelliġenti |

trasport stradaliSommarju Free movement of people and goods is a fundamental freedom of the EU and its single market. While a well-

functioning EU transport system is critical for the EU economy and growth, the negative externalities associated withtransport in the EU today (emissions, noise, road crashes and congestion) need to be tackled as a matter of urgency.Intelligent transport systems (such as, journey planners, travel information services, intelligent message signs andtraffic lights, safety applications and traffic management) can help to make transport safer, more efficient and moresustainable. A 2019 ex-post evaluation of Directive 2010/40/EU on the framework for the deployment of IntelligentTransport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport (the 'ITS Directive')identified a clear need for further action on interoperability, cooperation mechanisms and data sharing. In view of therevision of the ITS Directive, expected at the end of 2021, the briefing looks at the implementation and functioning ofthis Directive in the past.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Renewable Energy Directive: Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-11-2021Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-Ambjent | L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix direttiva (UE) | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | iffrankar ta' enerġija | konsum tal-enerġija |

politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | produzzjoni tal-enerġija | proposta (UE) | riżorsi rinnovabbli |tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet

Sommarju On 14 July 2021 the European Commission adopted the 'fit for 55' package, adapting existing climate and energylegislation to meet the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030.The fit for 55 package is part of the European Green Deal, a flagship of the von der Leyen Commission that aims to putthe EU firmly on the path towards climate neutrality by 2050, as set out in the recently agreed European Climate Law(July 2021). One element in the fit for 55 package is the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II), to helpthe EU deliver the new 55 % GHG target. Under RED II, the EU is currently obliged to ensure at least 32 % of itsenergy consumption comes from renewable energy sources (RES) by 2030. The revised RED II strengthens theseprovisions and sets a new EU target of a minimum 40 % share of RES in final energy consumption by 2030, togetherwith new sectoral targets. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee for Industry,Research and Energy, with the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety as associatedcommittee under Rule 57. Discussions on the file have also begun in the Council of the EU.

Briefing EN

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Research for CULT Committee - The role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight againstracism – policy recommendations

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 12-11-2021

Awtur estern Bert-Jan Buiskool and Andrea Giannetto (Ockham IPS)Qasam tematiku Il-Kultura | L-EdukazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix edukazzjoni | kultura | media tal-massa | moviment antirazzista | programm tal-UE | razziżmu | sport

Sommarju This document includes recommendations developed based on a study on ‘The role of culture, education, media andsport in the fight against racism': to provide the Members of the European Parliament's Committee on Culture andEducation (CULT) with expertise for an own-initiative report (INI) on “The role of culture, education, media and sport inthe fight against racism” (concomitant expertise).

Briefing EN

Revision of Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of environment through criminal lawTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-11-2021Awtur HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti Legali | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix Direttiva tal-KE | dritt kriminali | metodu ta' evalwazzjoni | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | offiża ambjentali | protezzjoni

ambjentali | responsabbiltà għall-ħsara ambjentali | responsabilità kriminaliSommarju Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law – the Environmental Crime Directive

(ECD) – was aimed primarily at improving environmental protection by means of harmonised criminal legislation.Despite noticeable progress on setting up a common legal framework and the undisputed relevance of the directive,there are shortcomings with regard to the uncertain scope of application of the directive, the uneven system forsanctions and the fact that implementation is still lagging behind. In addition, the increasing involvement of organisedcriminal networks calls for a wider recognition of the problem, enhanced tools, specialisation and engagement from allrelevant stakeholders. This implementation appraisal looks at the practical implementation of the ECD in light of theexpected Commission proposal for its revision.

Briefing EN

Rules of origin in EU trade agreementsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-11-2021Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | It-TassazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix esportazzjoni (UE) | ftehim kummerċjali (UE) | ftehim preferenzjali | importazzjoni (UE) | nomenklatura tariffarja |

prodott oriġinarju | sistema ta' preferenzi ġeneralizzatiSommarju The European Commission is currently in the process of simplifying and harmonising the rules of origin for EU trade

agreements, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the latter. Indeed, there is a general perception that thecomplexity of the rules and their lack of harmonisation across EU trade agreements, together with burdensomecertification procedures, may be deterring some business managers from making use of the preferential trade tariffsallowed by the agreements. Rules of origin govern the conditions under which an imported good is recognised as'originating' in a preference-given country and eligible for preferential trade tariffs. Provisions on rules of origin covertwo major areas. First, the conditions for conferring origin are designed on a product-by-product basis, followingprinciples typically based on processing operations and/or share of input. An essential part of this process alsoconsists of determining to what extent origin rules may 'cumulate' materials and operations, not only in the parties totrade agreements, but also in third countries (under specific conditions). A second aspect is the certification procedurefor origin, including product consignment conditions. The EU's reform process touches on all of these areas. It startedwith the reform of the generalised scheme of preferences in 2011, a unilateral trade arrangement designed by the EUfor developing countries that inspired the EU's subsequent trade agreement negotiations. In some cases, the EU alsopromotes a more advanced cumulation system, particularly within the pan-Euro-Mediterranean system, to promoteeconomic integration with neighbouring trading partners. Finally, the EU supports the use of flexible consignment rulesthat take into account increasingly globalised inventory management. It also encourages the use of self-certification byexporters as opposed to exporting authorities. Rules of origin are complex and rely on negotiations with partnercountries, and their harmonisation poses a genuine challenge for the EU. In its latest trade policy review published inFebruary 2021, the Commission announced that policy actions on rules of origin are still needed. The modernisation ofthe rules of origin is supported by the European Parliament, which has argued that they determine the 'true extent oftrade liberalisation'.

Briefing EN

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Mechanism to resolve legal and administrative obstacles in a cross-border contextTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-11-2021Awtur VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix koeżjoni ekonomika u soċjali | kooperazzjoni legali | kooperazzjoni reġjonali | kooperazzjoni transfruntiera |

koperazzjoni amministrattiva | Kumitat tal-PE | politika reġjonali tal-UE | proposta (UE) | reġjun tal-fruntiera | spariġġreġjonali | Stat Membru tal-UE | żvilupp reġjonali

Sommarju Often isolated, and with generally poorer access to public services, the EU's border regions face a unique set ofchallenges. This has been recognised under Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, whichprovides that particular attention should be paid to cross-border regions when developing action to strengthen the EU'seconomic, social and territorial cohesion. Yet while the EU has provided significant support over the years, particularlywithin the framework of European territorial cooperation, helping to strengthen connectivity and create new growth andjobs, numerous obstacles continue to hamper cross-border cooperation. The Commission's 2015 cross-border reviewrevealed legal and administrative barriers to be the main obstacle to cross-border cooperation while, in parallel, the2015 Luxembourg Presidency put forward plans for an EU cross-border mechanism, with both processes feeding intodiscussions on a mechanism for cross-border areas, culminating in the present proposal. The EP adopted its first-reading position on the proposal in February 2019, yet progress has been slow, with the Council's Working Party onStructural Measures deciding to cease work on the proposal in May 2021.

Briefing EN

Brexit Adjustment ReserveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-11-2021Awtur VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Is-Sajd | L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix allokazzjoni tar-riżorsi | baġit ġenerali (UE) | għajnuna finanzjarja | implimentazzjoni tal-baġit | ir-Renju Unit |

konsegwenza ekonomika | proposta (UE) | riżerva baġitarja (UE) | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE | ħruġ mill-UESommarju As part of the preparations for the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, the European Council

agreed in July 2020 to create a Brexit adjustment reserve within the special instruments outside the budget ceilings ofthe European Union's multiannual financial framework, with a budget of €5 billion to counter unforeseen and adverseconsequences in Member States and sectors that are most affected. The Commission adopted a proposal for aregulation on the Brexit adjustment reserve on 25 December 2020. The reserve will support public expenditureincurred by Member States from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023 for eligible measures, which include support foraffected sectors, training, and new border facilities. Funding will be available for all Member States, distributed inseveral allocation tranches, with 80 % of the resources due to be allocated to Member States in the form of pre-financing, to be disbursed in 2021, 2022 and 2023, and the remainder to be made available in 2025, where applicable.Each country's allocation is calculated based on the importance of its trade with the UK and, where applicable, itsdependence on fisheries in UK waters and the size of the population of maritime border regions with the UK. Followingthe agreement on the final text between Council and Parliament on 17 June 2021, Parliament adopted its first-readingposition on 15 September 2021, with the act adopted by Council on 28 September. The regulation was published in theOfficial Journal on 8 October 2021. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Evacuation of Afghan nationals to EU Member StatesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-11-2021Awtur MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-Margarita

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix evakwazzjoni tal-popolazzjoni | għajnuna lir-refuġjati | l-Afganistan | persuna ta' nazzjonalità barranija | refuġjat politiku

| rifuġjat | risistemazzjoni ta’ persuniSommarju At the end of August 2021, the United States and coalition forces completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the

Taliban took control of the country after 20 years of conflict. The crisis in Afghanistan has prompted a global responsebased on humanitarian support on the ground, evacuations and resettlement of those in need of internationalprotection, and support for neighbouring countries hosting refugees. Afghanistan has long been a priority for the EU,even before the most recent developments regarding migration and forced displacement. Afghan nationals have beenamong the largest groups of asylum-seekers and refugees hosted on European territory since 2014. Both the EUinstitutions and the EU Member States have been following the recent situation in Afghanistan closely. The EU'sresponse has prioritised completing the evacuation of EU citizens, local staff and Afghan citizens. More specifically, theEU institutions have called for extended cooperation on the evacuations from Afghanistan and the setting up of legalpathways for Afghans at risk, while examining the future engagement with Afghanistan and regional partners. At thesame time, the European Commission has presented a new 'Afghan support package' and held two high-level EUforums focusing on Afghans at risk and stressing the need for increased resettlement pledges from EU MemberStates. In a September 2021 resolution, the European Parliament called for a coordinated response to protect thosemost vulnerable, reiterating its call to the Commission for a legislative proposal on humanitarian visas, and to MemberStates to share responsibility for offering protection.

Briefing EN

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Voting and candidacy rights of mobile EU citizens in municipal elections under Directive 94/80/ECTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-10-2021Awtur ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-Liġi

Kelma għat-tiftix Direttiva tal-KE | domiċilju legali | dritt tal-vot | elezzjoni lokali | eliġibbiltà | liġi elettorali | reġistrazzjoni tal-votanti |trattament indaqs | ċittadin tal-UE | ċittadinanza Ewropea

Sommarju An estimated 13.3 million European Union (EU) citizens live in an EU Member State that is not their country of origin.Of these, over 11 million are of voting age. Under Council Directives 93/109/EC and 94/80/EC, these 'mobile'Europeans are entitled to participate in European and municipal elections in their country of residence. While MemberStates have successfully transposed both directives, voter turnout among mobile citizens remains low compared tonationals. In its 2020 citizenship report, the European Commission announced a strengthening of electoral rights inEuropean and municipal elections. According to the Commission's 2021 work programme (Annex II), amendingproposals are envisaged for the fourth quarter of 2021, as part of the 'Transparency and democracy package'. Thisbriefing explores the operation of Council Directive 94/80/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate inmunicipal elections and discusses obstacles to citizens' effective exercise of their rights. It also analyses theimplications of Brexit on local election rights for both United Kingdom (UK) citizens residing in the EU 27 and EUcitizens living in the UK. The resulting post-Brexit status quo is a complex patchwork governed by national law andbilateral agreements. A separate briefing examines the implementation of Directive 93/109/EC regarding Europeanelections.

Briefing EN

Voting and candidacy rights of mobile EU citizens in European elections under Council Directive93/109/EC

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 29-10-2021

Awtur ANGLMAYER IrmgardQasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-

LiġiKelma għat-tiftix approssimazzjoni tal-liġijiet | dritt tal-vot | elezzjoni Ewropea | eliġibbiltà | il-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea | Inizjattiva taċ-

ċittadini Ewropej | liġi elettorali | Parlament Ewropew | sistema elettorali Ewropea | traspożizzjoni tad-direttivi EwropejSommarju Under the arrangements set out in Council Directives 93/109/EC and 94/80/EC, EU nationals who live in a Member

State other than their own are entitled to participate in European and municipal elections, respectively, in their countryof residence. This concerns an estimated 11 million EU citizens of voting age (post-Brexit data). Even if MemberStates have successfully transposed both directives, voter turnout among mobile citizens remains low compared tonationals. Similarly, only a fraction of candidates standing for European elections is made up of non-nationals (slightlyover 1 % in the 2019 elections). The European Commission has announced its intention to update both directives;according to its 2021 work programme (Annex II), amending proposals are envisaged for the fourth quarter of 2021,forming part of the 'transparency and democracy package'. This briefing looks into the operation of Council Directive93/109/EC on the right to vote and stand as candidate in European elections. It discusses obstacles that hinder mobileEU citizens from effectively exercising their electoral rights, such as registration and communication issues, and looksinto the problem of double voting. The implementation of Directive 94/80/EC regarding municipal elections is examinedin a separate briefing.

Briefing EN

Establishing a framework for a European digital identityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-10-2021Awtur TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix data personali | firma elettronika | formalitajiet amministrattivi | gvern elettroniku | intrapriżi żgħar u ta' daqs medju |

protezzjoni tad-data | provdiment ta’ servizzi | regolament (UE) | studju tal-impatt | suq uniku diġitali | teknoloġija diġitali| komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoni

Sommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s impactassessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 3 June 2021 and referred to theEuropean Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The proposal seeks to amendRegulation (EU) No 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internalmarket (the eIDAS Regulation) in order to better meet the new market and societal demands for trusted governmenteID linked solutions and for attributes and credentials provided by the public and private sector, which would berecognised across the EU for accessing both public and private services. This proposal would also address users’expectations to have more control over their personal data. This initiative, which European Commission PresidentUrsula von der Leyen announced in her State of the Union speech of 16 September 2020, is included in theCommission’s 2021 work programme and is part of the strategy on shaping Europe’s digital future. In its conclusions of1-2 October 2020, the European Council invited the Commission to come forward with a proposal for a Europeandigital identity framework by mid-2021.

Briefing EN

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Security situation in Afghanistan: Implications for EuropeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-10-2021Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix | LATICI Tania

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-DifiżaKelma għat-tiftix għajnuna umanitarja | kunflitt reliġjuż | l-Afganistan | politika Ewropea tad-difiża | politika ta' sigurtà u ta' difiża komuni |

sigurtà reġjonali | Stat Iżlamiku | terroriżmu | ġlieda kontra l-kriminalitàSommarju Just over two months after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, the movement remains

politically isolated. So far, no country has recognised the caretaker government that the new leaders announced on 7September 2021. The humanitarian situation in a country that largely depended on foreign aid to survive isdeteriorating rapidly, so much so that international aid organisations describe the situation as a 'humanitarianmeltdown'. Aware that the collapse of the economic and financial system in Afghanistan would impact heavily on thestability of the country, the region and beyond, the international community has mobilised large amounts of funds,including €1 billion in humanitarian aid from the EU budget. While no major population movements out of Afghanistanhave been detected so far, the EU is determined to avoid a crisis reminiscent of the 2015 refugee crisis prompted bythe Syrian civil war. EU assistance is partly destined for countries in the region hosting Afghan refugees. In the longerterm, the EU is concerned that Afghanistan could revert to being a safe haven for international terrorists who mighttarget EU countries. The EU's preparedness to deal with the threat from terrorism has evolved significantly over thepast decade. In response to events in Afghanistan, the Council published a counter-terrorism action plan onAfghanistan in September, setting out four clear objectives, and making 22 recommendations for action. The UnitedStates government's determination to leave Afghanistan according to a set timetable, irrespective of allies'reservations, has reignited the debate over the need for greater EU strategic autonomy. The EU's 'strategic compass'process provides a framework for these discussions, including negotiations over a potential future rapid reaction or'initial entry' force, able to provide a European capability to react to events such as those that unfolded in Afghanistan.Members of the European Parliament have called on the EU to reinforce significantly its capacity to act autonomouslyand for the strategic compass to address the terrorist threat from Afghanistan.

Briefing EN

Updating the European digital identity frameworkTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-10-2021Awtur NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Qasam tematiku L-IndustrijaKelma għat-tiftix firma elettronika | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tad-data | provdiment ta’ servizzi | proċessar tad-data | sikurezza tal-

informazzjoni | suq uniku diġitali | teknoloġija diġitaliSommarju The 2014 Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market

(eIDAS Regulation or eIDAS) was the first digital identity legislation to provide the basis for cross-border electronicidentification, authentication and website certification throughout the EU. Application of eIDAS has been mixed.However, the pandemic increased the need for such solutions to be put in place to access public and private services.On 3 June 2021, the Commission put forward a proposal building on the eIDAS framework, with the aim of giving atleast 80 % of citizens the possibility to use a digital identity to access key public services by 2030 and to do so acrossEU borders. The updated European digital identity framework would also allow citizens to identify and authenticatethemselves online without having to resort to commercial providers, a practice that raises trust, security and privacyconcerns. In parallel, the Commission adopted a recommendation to design a toolbox supporting the framework so asto avoid fragmentation and barriers due to diverging standards. Within the European Parliament, the file has beenassigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE).

Briefing EN

Revision of the EU legislation on geographical indications of agricultural and food productsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-10-2021Awtur KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Qasam tematiku L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix denominazzjoni tal-oriġini | denominazzjoni tal-prodott | kontroll tal-kwalità tal-prodotti agrikoli | prodott agrikolu |

prodott alimentari | tikkettar | valur ekonomikuSommarju The EU implements a quality policy (quality schemes) aimed at protecting the names of certain agricultural and food

products. The objective is to promote the unique features of these products linked to their geographical origin(geographical indication) as well as the traditional know-how behind their production (traditional speciality guaranteed).The EU rules on quality schemes have been established by a number of regulations adopted by the EuropeanParliament and the Council of the EU. Recently published studies show that, although the implementation of the EUlegislative framework is assessed positively, certain shortages need to be addressed so that the quality schemes candeliver to their full potential and support the achievement of the objectives of the 'farm to fork' strategy adopted by theEuropean Commission in May 2020 as a cornerstone of the European Green Deal. The Commission work programmefor 2021 therefore envisages the submission of a proposal for a revision of the legislative framework in the fourthquarter of the year. This briefing presents the findings of publicly accessible sources on the implementation of the EUlegislative framework that will be revised.

Briefing EN

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Revision of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databasesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-10-2021Awtur HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi dwar il-Proprjetà Intellettwali | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-DwanaKelma għat-tiftix bażi ta’ data | Direttiva tal-KE | metodu ta' evalwazzjoni | proprjetà intellettwali | protezzjoni tad-data | strateġija tal-UE |

suq uniku diġitali | teknoloġija diġitaliSommarju Following the adoption of the 2015 strategy for a digital single market in Europe and the 2020 communication on a

European strategy for data, both of which sought to establish the right conditions for developing the EU data economy,several additional policy and legislative initiatives were undertaken. Their common goal was to provide the necessarylegal, technological and economic conditions so data access, data-sharing and data re-use could foster innovation,business competitiveness and public interest. One of these initiatives resulted in the adoption of Directive 96/9/EC onthe Legal Protection of Databases (the Database Directive), which is among the legal instruments to be revised as partof the development of an EU data act. As the Database Directive provides rules on intellectual property rights attachedto databases, its revision is also part of the Commission’s intellectual property action plan, adopted in 2020 Thisimplementation appraisal looks at the practical implementation of the directive in light of the expected Commissionproposal for its revision. According to the 2021 Commission work programme, the proposal will be submitted in thethird quarter of 2021, after having initially been part of the 2020 Refit programme.

Briefing EN

The 2021 G20 Summit: Bridging global rifts for a greener and more sustainable futureTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-10-2021Awtur ZAMFIR Ionel

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix belt kapitali | ekonomija dinjija | il-G20 | kooperazzjoni ekonomika | l-Afganistan | l-Italja | laqgħa għolja | Lazjo | marda

tal-coronavirus | politika dwar il-bidla fil-klima | politika fiskali | rkupru ekonomikuSommarju The 2021 G20 Summit, to be held in Rome on 30 and 31 October, was expected to bring together the major

economies' leaders in a physical meeting for the first time since the pandemic began. However, several leaders (ofRussia, Japan, Mexico and China) have announced that they will not attend in person, limiting opportunities to holdinformal bilateral meetings in the margins of the summit. Important decisions designed to put the global economy andsociety on course towards a greener and more sustainable future have already been sketched out at ministerial levelmeetings. These now need to be endorsed by the heads of state or government. With its informal nature, the G20 is avital global platform, bringing together the leaders of all the major developed and emerging economies, regardless oftheir political systems. In a global context characterised by growing rifts between the major geopolitical powers, the USand China in particular, the 2021 summit will be an opportunity to show how committed countries still are to multilateralrules and cooperation, but also how much trust remains to sustain the G20's customary voluntary commitments. Theleaders at the summit are expected to reaffirm their commitments to boosting economic recovery, while mainstreaminggreen and digital objectives. They may also discuss more ambitious climate objectives than their ministers havemanaged to agree. The summit should take the final decision on the historic reform of global taxation, agreeing on aglobal minimum tax rate for firms operating multinationally. Vaccine equity and other health challenges relating to thepandemic will also figure on the agenda. For the EU, the summit is an opportunity to reaffirm its unabatedly strongsupport for multilateralism. The European Parliament has expressed support for the tax reform debated at G20/OECDlevel.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Sweden: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-10-2021Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | l-Iżvezja | tibdil fil-klima |

tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Sweden submitted its NECP in January 2020. A high proportion of Swedes (76%) expectnational governments to tackle climate change. Sweden accounts for 1.4 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slightly faster pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbonintensity of Sweden's economy is the lowest in the Union and continues to decrease faster than the EU-wide average.Sweden's transport sector has the highest share of total emissions, but reduced its levels by over 23 % from 2005 to2019. The sector with the greatest percentage reduction in emissions between 2005 and 2019 – 56.4 % – was wastemanagement. Under the Effort-sharing Decision (2013 2020) Sweden needs to reduce its emissions in sectors notincluded in the EU emissions trading system by 17 % compared with 2005 levels. The 2030 target under the Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030) is a 40 % reduction. The country is well placed to achieve both the 2020 and 2030targets. The country's share of renewable energy sources was 56.4 % in 2019 and is predicted to reach 65 % by 2030,mainly through wind farms and solar power.

Briefing EN

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Climate action in Poland: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-10-2021Awtur ERBACH Gregor

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | il-Polonja | tibdil fil-klima |

tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment ofeach NECP. Poland's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Poles (62 %) expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. The country generates 10.5 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions. Emissions were stable over the 2005-2019 period, with only small annual variations. The carbon intensity ofthe Polish economy fell by 44 % over the same period, but remains the second highest in the Union. The energyindustries sector, heavily reliant on coal, is the country's largest GHG emitter, with 38 % of total emissions. Whileenergy industry emissions fell by 17 % in the 2005-2019 period, the transport sector emissions increased by 84 %,reaching a 17 % share in 2019. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Poland was permitted to increase its emissions by14 % compared with 2005 levels by 2020 and now needs to achieve a 7 % reduction by 2030. Poland reached a 12.2% share of renewable energy sources in 2019, and aims to reach a renewables share of at least 23 % by 2030, byfocusing on biomass, offshore wind and biofuels. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Slovakia: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-10-2021Awtur ERBACH Gregor

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | is-Slovakkja | studju tal-impatt

| tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Slovakia's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Slovaks (63 %)expect national governments to tackle climate change. Slovakia accounts for 1.1 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions and reduced emissions at a similar pace as the EU average between 2005 and 2019. The carbonintensity of Slovakia's economy is significantly above the EU average, but has fallen faster than the EU average.Industry is responsible for the largest part of Slovakia's GHG emissions, with a 37 % share of total emissions. Energyindustry emissions fell by 41 % between 2005 and 2019, and accounted for 16 % of Slovakia's emissions in 2019.Emissions from transport and from waste management increased over the same period while emissions fromagriculture remained stable. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Slovakia was allowed to increase its emissions by 13% by 2020, compared with 2005, and will have to reduce them by 12 % by 2030, but is aiming for 20 %. Slovakiaachieved a 16.9 % share of renewable energy sources (RES) in 2019, exceeding its 14 % target for 2020. The countryaims to reach its 2030 target of a 19.2 % share with onshore wind, photovoltaics and bioenergy. Energy efficiencymeasures focus on buildings, public sector, industry and transport.

Briefing EN

Taxing the digital economy: New developments and the way forwardTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-10-2021Awtur SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku It-TassazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix ekonomija diġitali | OECD | Stat Membru tal-UE | tassazzjoni tal-ekonomija diġitali | taxxa nazzjonali

Sommarju On 8 October 2021, the OECD announced that, following years of intense negotiations, 136 countries had finallyreached an agreement on how to tackle the tax policy challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. Agrowing realisation that these challenges cannot be addressed by the existing tax system – over a century old – helpedachieve the breakthrough. With this, one of the main questions pertinent to the digital economy – how to fairly taxbusinesses that rely on intangible assets and have no or only an insignificant physical presence in the tax jurisdictionswhere they operate – seems to have been answered. The EU and other international bodies have been discussingthese issues for some time. In March 2018, the EU introduced a legislative package on the fair taxation of the digitaleconomy. It contained proposals for an interim and a long-term digital tax. However, there was no immediate politicalagreement in the Council. As finding a global solution at the OECD level or a coordinated EU approach was not yetfeasible at the time, some Member States started designing or implementing their own digital taxes, which gave rise totrade tensions. The two-pillar solution agreed under the auspices of the OECD will put an end to this fragmentation.Pillar One would reallocate taxation rights concerning the largest and most profitable multinationals, and Pillar Twowould introduce a global minimal corporate tax rate. While the consensus has been broadly welcomed, the new ruleshave also sparked controversy, particularly regarding their impact on developing countries, their complexity and theirresilience to possible circumvention. The agreement will be presented for endorsement during the G20 Leaders'Summit scheduled for 30-31 October 2021 in Rome. This Briefing updates a previous one from March 2020.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Taxing the digital economy: New developments and the way forward

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Domestic use of EU Digital Covid CertificatesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-10-2021Awtur CLAROS GIMENO Eulalia | Niestadt Maria

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | It-TuriżmuKelma għat-tiftix analiżi komparattiva | dokument elettroniku | epidemija | marda tal-coronavirus | Stat Membru tal-UE | tilqima | vaċċin |

ċertifikat tas-saħħaSommarju Just before summer 2021, the EU adopted in record time (see timeline below) two regulations on the EU Digital Covid

Certificate. The certificate with a QR code shows if a person has been vaccinated, tested negative or recovered fromCovid-19. It is free of charge, available on paper or on a smartphone, and valid in all EU Member States. In total, 43countries in the world are connected to the EU Digital Covid Certificate system. Its aim is to facilitate safe cross-bordermovement during the Covid-19 pandemic, but Member States are also free to use it for other purposes. This overviewshows which Member States are using Covid-19 certificates for other purposes than cross-border travel (data as of 25October 2021). It indicates where and from whom it is required, as well as which proofs are accepted. Some countriesuse a different name for the certificate: e.g. CovidCheck, SafePass, Corona/health pass(port). In all Member States,the EU Digital Covid Certificate is accepted as proof of vaccination, test or recovery. Some (like Austria) also acceptother proofs, such as proof of neutralising antibodies.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-10-2021Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Id-Demokrazija | Is-Saħħa Pubblika | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Enerġija | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà uĠustizzja

Kelma għat-tiftix epidemija | Kunsill Ewropew | laqgħa għolja | marda tal-coronavirus | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | politikakummerċjali komuni | prezz tal-enerġija | stat tad-dritt | suq uniku diġitali

Sommarju The regular European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021 dedicated significant time to discussing the rule of lawand the rise in energy prices – which have become particularly salient topics at national and European level – as wellas to migration. On the rule of law, EU leaders had a political discussion, underlining the importance of the rule of lawfor the EU, but did not adopt concrete conclusions. Regarding the recent spike in energy prices, they agreed onpursuing short-term, tailored and targeted national measures, and will continue to look for a consensus on long-termmeasures at the next European Council meeting. Leaders also took stock of the coronavirus pandemic, reviewedprogress on the digital agenda and related key legislative files, and held a strategic debate on trade.

Briefing EN

United States Congress: Facts and FiguresTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-10-2021Awtur BENTZEN Naja | SABBATI Giulio

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix l-Istati Uniti | metodu tal-votazzjoni | parlament nazzjonali | sistema bikamerali | sistema elettorali

Sommarju The Congress is the legislative branch of the US system of government. It is divided into two chambers: the House ofRepresentatives (lower chamber) and the Senate (upper chamber). The formal powers of Congress are set out inArticle 1 of the US Constitution, and include making laws, collecting revenue, borrowing and spending money,declaring war, making treaties with foreign nations, and overseeing the executive branch. Elections to the USCongress occur in November every second year, with the Congress convening the following January. The current,117th, Congress was elected in November 2020 and was convened in January 2021. The US has a long-standing two-party system, which means that nearly all members of Congress belong to either the Republican or Democratic parties,while independent members (if any) generally align or sit with one of the two main parties. At the most recent,simultaneous US Presidential and Congressional elections, in November 2020, the Democratic party won the WhiteHouse. The Democrats retained a reduced majority in the House of Representatives, whilst both parties got the samenumber of seats in the Senate (including two Independent Senators who sit with the Democrats), where the Democratsnow enjoy a de facto majority because of the casting vote of the US Vice-President, Kamala Harris. This EPRSBriefing is designed to provide key facts and figures about the US Congress as an institution, including relevantcomparisons with the European Parliament (EP). The back page contains a map showing the location of the variousCongressional buildings on Capitol Hill, home to the Congress in Washington DC. This updates previous EPRSBriefings on the 115th Congress and 116th Congress, which are available online.

Briefing EN

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Introducing the European Union agency for asylumTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-10-2021Awtur ORAV Anita

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix dritt għall-ażil | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | kompetenza tal-UE | l-Uffiċċju Ewropew ta’ Appoġġ fil-qasam tal-Asil | politika

dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | proposta (UE)Sommarju The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is a European Union agency that provides tools to help the EU Member

States prepare for an influx of asylum applicants and implement EU legislation on the ground. The Malta-based agencywas established in 2010 as an impartial centre of expertise, with the objective of developing practical cooperationbetween the Member States, offering support in the event of particular asylum-related pressures and providingevidence for EU policy-making. In 2016, EASO played a major role in implementing the immediate actions outlined inthe European agenda on migration, which focused on strengthening the EU's emergency response to the migrationcrisis. The European Commission has also called for a strengthened role for EASO in other related areas. To enablethe agency to fulfil its new tasks, build up staff, and deliver operational and technical support to Member States,EASO's budget has seen a nearly tenfold increase over the past seven years, from €14.6 million in 2014 to close to€140 million in 2021. However, concerns have been voiced regarding the way EASO's mandate has expanded inpractice, without the necessary legal basis, and regarding the lack of transparency or appropriate monitoringmechanisms vis à vis its activities. In 2016, as a response to the shortcomings revealed in the EU's migrationmanagement, the Commission presented a proposal to amend and expand EASO's mandate, also changing its nameto the European Union agency for asylum to reflect its stronger powers. As part of the asylum reform package, theproposal was put on hold, but was then relaunched as part of the new pact on asylum and migration in September2020. On 29 June 2021, the European Parliament and the Council reached a political agreement on the agency. Toenter into force, the agreement now needs to be endorsed formally by the co-legislators. The text agreed was debatedin plenary session on 7 October 2021, and the Parliament is expected to vote on it during November 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Introducing the European Union agency for asylum

New genomic techniques: European Commission study and first reactionsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 25-10-2021Awtur LAANINEN Tarja

Qasam tematiku Is-Sikurezza tal-IkelKelma għat-tiftix innovazzjoni | organiżmu ġenetikament modifikat | rapport ta' istudju tal-UE | teknoloġija ġdida | ġenetika

Sommarju On 29 April 2021, the European Commission presented a study on the status of new genomic techniques (NGTs)under EU law. The Council had asked for this study in the context of a 2018 European Court of Justice judgment andthe practical questions raised by it. The Commission study examines the implementation of EU legislation on NGTs,based on consultations with the Member States and stakeholders. It provides information on the status and use ofNGTs in plants, animals and micro-organisms for agri-food and for industrial and pharmaceutical applications. Thestudy defines NGTs as ‘techniques capable of changing the genetic material of an organism and that have emerged orhave been developed since 2001’, that is, after the existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms wasadopted. The main conclusions of the study point to ‘limitations as to the capacity of the legislation to keep pace withscientific developments’, stating that this causes implementation challenges and legal uncertainties. According to thestudy, there are strong indications that the legislation is not fit for purpose for some NGTs and their products, and thatit needs to be adapted to scientific and technological progress. According to the Commission, the study confirms thatNGT products have the potential to contribute to sustainable agri-food systems in line with the objectives of theEuropean Green Deal and the ‘farm to fork’ strategy. Stakeholders have mixed reactions to the study: while someindustry associations and researchers welcome its content and conclusions, others appear more cautious, and someenvironmental NGOs strongly oppose it. In the European Parliament, the Environment and Agriculture Committees(ENVI/AGRI) have organised public hearings, and the initial views of the Parliament are taking shape in the context ofthe ‘farm to fork’ strategy.

Briefing EN

PRIIPs: Revised DA/RTS on improved disclosure rules for retail investment productsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-10-2021Awtur CHAILLET GAELLE CHARLOTTE | HONNEFELDER Stephanie | SLOCOCK OLIVER

Qasam tematiku It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-Liġi | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix informazzjoni għall-konsumatur | kumpanija ta' investiment | leġiżlazzjoni finanzjarja | proposta (UE) | regolament (UE)

| regolamentazzjoni tal-investimenti | servizzi finanzjarji | standard tekniku | komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoniSommarju This briefing has been prepared to support ECON’s work on scrutiny of the Delegated Regulation amending the RTS

laid down in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 on Key Information Documents (KIDs) as foreseen byRegulation (EU) No 1286/2014 on Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs Regulation) .The Delegated Regulation was adopted by the Commission on 7 September 2021 together with two quick fixamendments of the PRIIPs Regulation and the Directive 2009/65/EC on Undertakings for Collective Investments inTransferable Securities (UCITS Directive).

Briefing EN

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Il-Parlament Ewropew Fatti u ĊifriTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-10-2021Awtur SABBATI Giulio

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix attività istituzzjonali | elezzjoni Ewropea | mandat elettorali | Parlament Ewropew

Sommarju Dan il-Briefing, ippubblikat mis-Servizz ta' Riċerka tal-Parlament Ewropew, huwa mfassal biex jipprovdi fatti u ċifriewlenin dwar il-Parlament Ewropew. Huwa jħares kemm lejn il-leġiżlatura kurrenti (Lulju 2019 sa Ġunju 2024) kif ukollit-tmien leġiżlaturi ta' ħames snin preċedenti sa minn meta ġew introdotti l-elezzjonijiet diretti f'Ġunju 1979. Fil-paġni liġejjin se ssib grafiki ta' diversi tipi li: * jiddeskrivu l-kompożizzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew bħalissa u fil-passat; * isegwuż-żieda fl-għadd ta' partiti rappreżentati fil-PE u l-evoluzzjoni tal-gruppi politiċi; * juru l-età tal-Membri u juru ż-żieda fl-għadd ta' nisa li għandhom siġġu fil-Parlament; * jispjegaw is-sistemi elettorali użati fl-elezzjonijiet għall-Parlament fl-Istati Membri; * juru kif il-parteċipazzjoni elettorali fl-elezzjonijiet Ewropej inbidlet matul iż-żmien u varjat bejn l-IstatiMembri; * jiġbru fil-qosor il-ħidma tal-Parlament fil-leġiżlaturi ta' ħames snin kurrenti u preċedenti; * jiddeskrivu l-kompożizzjoni tal-kumitati, id-delegazzjonijiet u l-korpi ta' governanza tal-Parlament; * jispjegaw ir-rwol leġiżlattiv tal-Parlament u l-interazzjoni tiegħu mal-Kummissjoni Ewropea. Il-Briefing qed jiġi aġġornat regolarment matul il-leġiżlatura 2019-2024 biex jiġu kkunsidrati l-aħħar żviluppi.

Briefing BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV

Multimedia European Parliament legislative activity, 2004-2020: Co-decision procedure

European green bond standardTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-10-2021Awtur KRAMER Esther

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix bond | Eurobond | leġiżlazzjoni finanzjarja | metodu ta' evalwazzjoni | newtralità karbonika | standard Ewropew |

strateġija tal-UE | strument ekonomiku għall-ambjent | tkabbir ekoloġiku | żvilupp sostenibbliSommarju The IA assesses elements to be added to the 2019 TEG report on a European Green Bond Standard (EU-GBS). The

range of options is therefore limited to these additional aspects and does not cover the entire set of rules for greenbonds. The IA is based on reliable internal and external research, international data and several stakeholderconsultations. While the definition of the objectives could have been more specific, the problem analysis and theassessment of options are overall logical and thorough, even if their structure could have been more straightforward.Some valuable information - and explanation - featured in the annexes could have made the main text of the IA moreaccessible, especially relating to the technical aspects and current market practices. Despite some weaknesses, the IAmakes a convincing case for a voluntary EU-GBS, with some flexibility for sovereigns, taking into account theirinstitutional specificities, but respecting the screening criteria of the EU-taxonomy.

Briefing EN

The SURE: ImplementationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-10-2021Awtur PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA | TEIXEIRA DA CUNHA INES

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix applikazzjoni tal-liġi tal-UE | epidemija | finanzjament tal-baġit | għajnuna tal-UE | marda tal-coronavirus | nefqa tal-UE |

qgħad | regolament (UE) | strument finanzjarju tal-'UE | ġlieda kontra l-qgħadSommarju Council Regulation 2020/672 established SURE, the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate

unemployment risks in an emergency, which has been in force since 20 May 2020. This note provides an overview intabular format of the SURE implementing decisions as adopted by Council, of Commission issuances under SURE andof disbursements. It will be regularly updated.

Briefing EN

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Lobbying and foreign influenceTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-10-2021Awtur BAUER Elisabeth | THIEL Marie

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix diżinformazzjoni | grupp interessat | interferenza | trasparenza amministrattiva | trasparenza fit-teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet |

xejriet tal-opinjoniSommarju Lobbying and foreign influence are normal, integrated activities in modern public policy-making and geopolitics. When

these influencing activities are covert or illicit in nature, however, they can be damaging to public image and levels ofpublic trust in our democratic societies and their institutions, including those of the EU. Although not a modern concept,the frequency and extent of covert influence activities by third countries have been increasing since the mid-2010s. Inthe EU, this has taken the form of disinformation attacks on the EU, hidden agendas pushed by foreign fundedacademic think-tanks and funding of Member State political parties by authoritarian regimes, all with the aim ofundermining the legitimate decision-making processes and political structures in and of the EU. The term foreigninterference is often utilised to differentiate between legitimate influencing activities, such as diplomatic relations, andactivities with the intention to disrupt. As this is not an exact science, however, it is also often difficult to distinguishbetween foreign influence and foreign interference activities. While interference tactics are often coercive, covert,deceptive, and clandestine in nature, influence activities can be made more transparent, thereby making it easier todifferentiate between interference and the more legitimate influence activities. In light of the aforementioned growingforeign interference efforts, the EU considers foreign interference tactics as a serious threat and is taking steps tomonitor and mitigate them, by, for example, setting up specific bodies or committees, especially in the context of EUelections. In parallel, the EU is also trying to improve the transparency of foreign influence activities. One suchmeasure is broadening the scope of the Transparency Register, a public database of the European Parliament, theCouncil of the European Union and the European Commission, for the registration of transparent and ethical interestrepresentation activities. According to the latest OECD report on lobbying, only three OECD nations (the USA,Australia and Canada) have rules in place that cover foreign influence. On the back of a new InterinstitutionalAgreement (IIA) on a mandatory Transparency Register, however, the EU looks set to join those three nations.

Briefing EN

The concept of 'climate refugee': Towards a possible definitionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 18-10-2021Awtur APAP Joanna

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | L-Ambjent | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix diżastru naturali | epidemija | Grupp ta' Esperti Intergovernattiv dwar it-Tibdil fil-Klima | għajnuna lill-vittmi tad-diżastri |

marda tal-coronavirus | migrazzjoni forzata | persuna spostata internament | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | rifuġjat| tibdil fil-klima

Sommarju According to statistics published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, since 2008 over 318 million peoplearound the world have been forcibly displaced by floods, windstorms, earthquakes or droughts, 30.7 million in 2020alone. This is equivalent to one person being displaced every second. Depending on the frequency and scale of themajor natural disasters occurring, there are significant fluctuations in the total number of displaced people from oneyear to the next, yet the trend over recent decades has been a growing one. Many find refuge within their own country,but some are forced to go abroad. In the summer of 2021, Europe witnessed heavy and unprecedented flooding,particularly in Belgium and Germany, and heat domes in the Mediterranean region. Scientists relate this directly toclimate change. All things considered, the number of 'climate refugees' looks set to rise. So far, the national andinternational response to this challenge has been limited, and protection for the people affected remains inadequate.What adds further to the gap in protection of such people – who are often described as 'climate refugees' – is thatthere is neither a clear definition of this category of people, nor are they covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Thelatter extends only to people who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their race, religion,nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, and who are unable or unwilling to seekprotection from their home countries. While the EU has not so far recognised climate refugees formally, it hasexpressed growing concern and has taken action to support the countries potentially affected by climate-related stressand help them develop resilience. This briefing is an update of an earlier one from January 2019.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Climate refugees

Rising sea levels

The concept of 'climate refugee': Towards a possible definition

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Updating the framework for the safety of non-food consumer products on the internal marketTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-10-2021Awtur VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix armonizzazzjoni tal-istandards | kummerċ elettroniku | oġġetti għall-konsumaturi | proposta (UE) | sikurezza tal-prodotti

| standard Ewropew | standard tal-kummerċjalizzazzjoni | standard tas-sikurezza | superviżjoni tas-suq | suq unikuSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the impact assessment (IA) accompanying

the Commission proposal for a regulation on general product safety aimed at ensuring that EU consumers areprotected from dangerous non-food products. The IA defines clearly the problems to be addressed and their analysisappears to be satisfactory but the description of how they would evolve without any EU intervention is limited. The IAdoes not compare the retained options in terms of efficiency, and proportionality. The IA appears to have done aconvincing analysis of the economic and social impacts of the options retained for assessment. The IA includes a verycomprehensive reports of the consultations held, specifically referring to the received feedback in several parts of thereport. Overall, the analysis carried out in the IA appears to be well grounded. The IA appears to have addressed theRSB's comments. The proposal appears to be largely consistent with the analysis provided in the IA.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-10-2021Awtur DRACHENBERG Ralf | TORPEY REBECCA MARY

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Enerġija | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtàu Ġustizzja

Kelma għat-tiftix epidemija | Kunsill Ewropew | laqgħa għolja | marda tal-coronavirus | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | prezz tal-enerġija | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | trasformazzjoni diġitali

Sommarju The regular European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021 will discuss the coronavirus pandemic, digital policy,migration, energy prices and external relations. Regarding the coronavirus pandemic, EU Heads of State orGovernment will focus on EU coordination, resilience and readiness in terms of health crises and the EU's futurepreparedness for the short and medium terms. The discussions at the meeting on both digital policy and on migrationare expected to be stock-taking exercises, assessing the implementation of previous European Council decisions andpossibly adding further specifications to them. If the update of the Schengen Borders Code were to be addressed inthe context of migration, this could generate a strong debate, since despite overall support for strong external EUborders, Member States have diverging views on how border protection should be assured. EU leaders could alsodebate energy prices at length, as the issue has become high profile in many Member States. Regarding externalrelations, discussions in the European Council will focus on preparations for forthcoming international events, notablythe ASEM and the Eastern Partnership summits, and the COP26 climate conference. In addition, the Presidents of theEuropean Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, may brief EU Heads ofState or Government on the recent EU-Ukraine Summit, held on 12 October 2021.

Briefing EN

European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA): Pre-legislative synthesis ofnational, regional and local positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 15-10-2021

Awtur COLLOVA Claudio | QUAGLIO GianlucaQasam tematiku Is-Saħħa PubblikaKelma għat-tiftix assistenza ta' emerġenza | awtoritajiet pubbliċi | awtorità nazzjonali kompetenti | kooperazzjoni transfruntiera | kura

tas-saħħa | maniġġar tal-kriżijiet | organizzazzjoni tal-UE | saħħa pubblika | sistema tal-kura tas-saħħa | tmexijab'setgħat ta' emerġenza | trattament mediku ta’ emerġenza

Sommarju This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advanceconsultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter’s five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. This analysis of the positions of partner organisations at EU, national, regional andlocal levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in discussion of thelegislative proposal to establish an emergency framework for a European Health Emergency Preparedness andResponse Authority (HERA): * Governmental organisations at all levels advocate a robust operational andinfrastructural framework, with a long-term vision, a coherent legal structure and efficient decision-making procedures.They generally favour a comprehensive impact assessment in advance of the establishment of HERA. * Publicauthorities at national, regional and local levels suggest that the HERA should develop a strong relationship with theWorld Health Organization (WHO). Some governmental organisations especially stress the need for robust links withdeveloping countries. * Public authorities agree on the need for a clear interface between HERA, the European Centrefor Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). A further issue is therelationship between HERA and existing EU operational crisis management mechanisms, where national authoritiesrecommend avoiding duplication of work. They also suggest taking into account regional and local circumstances in acoordinated crisis response. * Many governmental organisations hold a rather positive view of the interaction betweenthe EU and the national levels, where HERA could have a beneficial coordinating role, although some publicauthorities have expressed concern about possible conflicts of competence between national and EU levels in thehealth sector.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The future of EU borders in times of pandemic

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Looking to Glasgow: A scene-setter ahead of COP26Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-10-2021Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | Ftehim ta’ Pariġi dwar il-Klima | Grupp ta' Esperti Intergovernattiv dwar it-Tibdil fil-Klima

| Il-Protokoll ta' Kyoto | konferenza tan-NU | konvenzjoni tan-NU | Skozja | tisħin globali | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijietSommarju Adopted in 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has gathered the nations

of the world with the common goal to limit dangerous global warming. In December 2021, after having been postponedfor a year due to the coronavirus crisis, world leaders will meet in Glasgow for the 26th Conference of the Parties to theUNFCCC (COP26) to continue negotiations on the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The latest assessmentreport of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underscores the of role human activities in causingglobal warming. The UNFCCC-commissioned IPCC special report on impacts of global warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) alsooutlines the risks of current trajectories. There is therefore strong pressure on world leaders to deliver progress inGlasgow. Parties to the Paris Agreement were required to update their nationally determined contributions to fightclimate change and its impacts before COP26. Some Parties are yet to do so, while analysis of submitted contributionsas of July 2021, shows action to reach the agreed targets remains insufficient. Most key emitting nations continue torate poorly on their climate action performance. While COP24 and COP25 both failed to finalise the Paris Agreementrulebook, and developed nations so far fall short of fulfilling their climate finance promises, expectations are mountingfor Glasgow to finish the job. At the same time, Covid 19 restrictions and impacts continue to create challenges toparticipate in person, especially for developing countries' delegations. Recent Eurobarometer surveys show citizenshave a clear expectation that their governments should handle the climate change challenge, with research alsopointing to a growing acceptance of the need to change personal habits in view of transitioning to more sustainableeconomies. The European Parliament will vote on a motion for a resolution on COP26 at the October II plenarysession in Strasbourg. The draft highlights the urgency of action and calls upon leaders to ensure a just transition andadequate support for areas and states vulnerable to climate change impacts.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU Climate Action: Responding to the global emergency

EU-China relations in challenging timesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-10-2021Awtur JOCHHEIM Ulrich

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix diżinformazzjoni | investiment tal-UE | iċ-Ċina | kooperazzjoni ambjentali | kooperazzjoni ekonomika | kooperazzjoni

kummerċjali | marda tal-coronavirus | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | strateġija tal-UESommarju Following the 1975 establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the European Economic Community (EEC)

focused its strategic approach – in line with its competences at the time – on support for China's economic opening,launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping. While this approach resulted in a swiftly expanding trade and investmentrelationship, results in other areas are rather mixed. By most accounts, the strategy also failed to contribute to makingsignificant progress on the rule of law in China and there were no visible results of the EU's human rights engagement.Given that, at the beginning of Deng's reforms, China was very poor, the EEC/European Union (EU) de facto agreed toan arrangement for special and differential treatment, linked to China's status as a developing country. However, withChina having become an upper-middle income country and the bilateral trade relationship still characterised byconsiderable asymmetries, the existing lack of reciprocity in market access and of a level playing field in general haveattracted increasing attention. At the same time, China has been regressing in terms of human rights. Furthermore, thecountry has become much more assertive in the regional context, is fast improving its (offensive) military capabilitiesand has started to engage in global disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks. As a consequence, the EU haschanged its strategic approach considerably, as exemplified by the 2019 Joint Communication, which proposeddifferent legal instruments to ensure a level playing field in trade, and to fend off Chinese attempts to gain access tocritical infrastructures. Relations with the European Parliament have deteriorated, pushing Parliament to put thecomprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) – which had been agreed on 30 December 2020 – on ice.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders in Brdo pri Kranju on 5-6 October 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-10-2021Awtur ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix Gorenjska | il-Balkani tal-Punent | is-Slovenja | Kunsill Ewropew | laqgħa għolja | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE |

politika ta' sigurtà u ta' difiża komuni | prezz tal-enerġija | rwol internazzjonali tal-UESommarju The EU leaders met on 5 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, Slovenia, to discuss informally the Union's role in the world

over a working dinner. The meeting was coupled with an EU-Western Balkan Summit the next day. The focus at thedinner was on security and defence in the context of the 'Strategic Compass' process, to be finalised by March 2022,with EU leaders agreeing to continue deepening defence cooperation, not least by strengthening the alliance withNATO. The leaders also confirmed their 2019-2024 strategic agenda commitment to strengthen the EU's capacity to'act autonomously', albeit without agreeing on the modalities. Building unity was central to this preparatory summit.Migration and energy were also raised briefly, but will be addressed in greater detail at future meetings. The EU-Western Balkans Summit on 6 October highlighted the strategic importance of the region for the Union. The focus wason the common commitment to socio-economic recovery and the development of the Western Balkans in the post-pandemic phase, with €30 billion mobilised for investment as part of the economic and investment plan for the WesternBalkans. EU leaders also focused on ways to strengthen political dialogue and security cooperation. The 'BrdoDeclaration' reaffirmed the region's European perspective and the EU's commitment to enlargement, with the caveatsof 'credible reforms', 'rigorous conditionality' and that the assessment of individual countries' progress on the basis ofthe 'principle of own merits'.

Briefing EN

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Research for REGI Committee - Cohesion Policy and support to healthTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-10-2021Awtur DIETZEN Stephan Klaus

Qasam tematiku L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix Fond Ewropew għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali | Fond Soċjali Ewropew | investiment tal-UE | koeżjoni ekonomika u soċjali |

marda tal-coronavirus | politika tas-saħħa | Stat Membru tal-UE | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UESommarju As the EU’s main investment policy, Cohesion Policy can play a key role in promoting health and in reducing health

inequalities. This briefing reviews the role of Cohesion Policy with regard to health in the 2014-2020 period andexplores the prospects and challenges that lie ahead. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the COVID-19pandemic.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Hungary: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-10-2021Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | l-Ungerija | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE | tibdil

fil-klima | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Hungary submitted its NECP in December 2019. A high proportion of Hungarians (60 %)expect national governments to tackle climate change. Hungary accounts for 1.7 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbon intensity ofthe Hungarian economy decreased by 35 % between 2005 and 2019, at a faster rate than the EU-27 average.Transport emissions increased by just over 19 % in the 2005-2019 period in Hungary, bringing their share of totalemissions up to over 22 %. Reductions are expected as the country proceeds with its electromobility measures. Thegreatest percentage reduction in emissions between 2005 and 2019 – 37.5 % – was made by the energy industriessector. Under the Effort-sharing Decision for the 2013 2020 period, Hungary was allowed to increase its emissions insectors not included in the EU's emissions trading system by 10 %, compared with 2005 levels, and is on track toachieving that target. Under the Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030) Hungary must reduce its emissions by 7 %compared with 2005. The share of renewable energy sources in Hungary reached 12.6 % in 2019. The country's 2030target of a 21 % share is focused mainly on changes to the transport and heating and cooling sectors, where changesto the existing district heating networks are expected.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Slovenia: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-10-2021Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | is-Slovenja | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE |

tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Slovenia submitted its NECP in February 2020. More than half (52 %) of Sloveniansexpect national governments to tackle climate change. Slovenia accounts for 0.5 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbon intensity ofthe Slovenian economy decreased by 36 % between 2005 and 2019, a higher rate than the EU average. Energyindustry emissions fell by 29.5 % in the 2005-2019 period in the country. Measures, such as coal phase-out, areexpected to further decrease these emissions. The sector with the greatest percentage reduction in emissions between2005 and 2019 – 45.2 % – was 'other emissions' (buildings and tertiary sector). Under the Effort-sharing Decision(2013 2020), Slovenia was allowed to increase emissions in sectors not included in the EU emissions trading systemby 4 %, compared with 2005 levels, and is on track to achieve this target. The Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030)requires Slovenia to reduce these emissions by 15 %. The share of renewable energy sources in the country reached22 % in 2019. For 2030 the target is 27 %, to be reached mainly through solar and hydro power, and through the useof wood biomass.

Briefing EN

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Egypt's foreign policy within a challenging regional contextTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-10-2021Awtur STANICEK BRANISLAV

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix bastimenti tal-gwerra | Baħar Mediterran | dinja għarbija | kooperazzjoni internazzjonali | l-Eġittu | politika estera | żona

ekonomika esklużivaSommarju In the post-Arab Spring period, Egypt's foreign policy has largely been shaped by the state of affairs in the Middle East

and the eastern Mediterranean. Civil wars and unrest have proliferated in the region, creating a knock-on effect felt firstby Iraq and then by Syria, Lebanon and Libya. Conflicts in neighbouring countries, often fought by proxies, haveaffected Cairo's internal political and security interests and influenced Egyptian foreign policy. One such conflict has todo with the persistence of Islamic terrorist networks, such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), in northern Sinai. Another isbetween the Palestinian factions and between Hamas and Israel, in both of which Egypt has been a mediator. Fightingagainst groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-Sinai Provincehas been a key reason for Egypt's interest in reinforcing alliances with Israel, the Arab Gulf countries, the UnitedStates, Russia and the European Union. Following Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's re-election for a secondterm in 2018, competition with regional players, such as Turkey, and the role of political Islam, have become moredominant and intertwined with Egypt's geopolitical and economic interests. In 2020-2021, Egypt successfully mitigatedthe impact of the coronavirus pandemic on its economy and was the only Middle East and North Africa (MENA)country with a positive GDP growth (3.6 %). Despite declining revenues in some sectors, such as tourism, ratingsagencies predict that the country will continue to score the highest levels of GDP growth in the MENA region in 2021-2024. Reinvigorated, Egypt seems to be looking for greater strategic influence and power. The country aims tocontinue partnering with the EU in areas of strategic importance and is likely to play a decisive role in Libya and theeastern Mediterranean. Some initiatives, such as its mediation in the Libyan civil war, participation in the EastMediterranean Gas Forum, and joint military naval exercises with EU Member States, speak of the main prerogativesof Egyptian foreign policy and its incremental alignment with EU interests. The European Parliament supportsenhanced EU-Egypt cooperation but has raised red flags with regard to the situation of human rights in the country.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Malta: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-10-2021Awtur ERBACH Gregor

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | Malta | newtralità karbonika |

tibdil fil-klima | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Malta's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Maltese people (75 %)expect national governments to tackle climate change. Malta, which generates less than 0.1 % of the EU-27's totalgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, has reduced its emissions at a faster pace than the EU average since 2012.However, according to Malta's NECP, the country's geography and demographics, combined with rising grossdomestic product (GDP), will make it difficult to continue this trend. Energy industries account for 28 % of Malta's totalemissions. While energy industry emissions dropped by 63 % between 2005 and 2019, emissions in the transportsector grew by 22 % over the same period. Malta's NECP outlines policies and measures to increase the share ofrenewable energy and reduce transport emissions. However, Malta does not expect to meet its emissions reductiontargets under the Effort-sharing Regulation domestically, but intends to make use of flexibilities, including the transferof annual emissions allocations from other Member States. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU MemberStates.

Briefing EN

Working towards a macro-regional strategy for the MediterraneanTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-10-2021Awtur VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix attività tal-UE | kooperazzjoni territorjali Ewropea | politika makroreġjonali tal-UE | reġjun tal-Mediterran (UE)

Sommarju A rich tapestry of nations and cultures, the Mediterranean has always been a strategic area for the European Union(EU) and there is much mutual benefit to be garnered from closer cooperation with the countries of the southern andeastern Mediterranean. As a geographical region whose countries face many shared challenges given their jointproximity to a common sea, the idea of establishing a macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean region has beenpresent in EU discourse from the very beginning, drawing support from institutions such as the European Committee ofthe Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), with Parliament also contributing.Discussions on the development of a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean have explored a variety of differentscenarios, from an overarching strategy encompassing the whole region, to three separate macro-regional strategiesor a combination of both approaches. Progress towards greater macro-regional cooperation in the region has,however, been slow. This situation has arguably been compounded by the challenges facing the region in general,which include issues such as digital transformation, climate change, migration and mobility, and environmentalprotection. Whereas a large number of territorial cooperation initiatives have developed over the years to helpcountries work together to address these issues, the developmental differences between the countries of theMediterranean are such that the priorities of the countries of the southern Mediterranean differ significantly from thoseof their northern neighbours, making it difficult to agree on a set of common priorities for a possible macro-regionalstrategy in the Mediterranean. This lack of consensus could ultimately prove to be the most difficult challenge of all.For while the European Council remains open to new macro-regional strategies, the lack of any agreement among thecountries concerned regarding priorities or indeed geographical scope raises serious questions as to the prospects forthe implementation of a macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean.

Briefing EN

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Review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework -Summary of some related issuesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-10-2021Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix konsultazzjoni pubblika | kontroll tal-likwidità | likwidità tas-settur privat | maniġġar tal-kriżijiet | riżoluzzjoni bankarja |

solvenza finanzjarja | unjoni bankarja tal-UESommarju In February 2021, the Commission launched a consultation that sought to gather stakeholders’ experience with the

current crisis management and deposit insurance framework as well as their views on the revision of the framework.The results of that consultation were published in a summary report. As the experience with the application of thecurrent framework indicates that some adjustments may be warranted, this briefing summarises some of theunderlying issues.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with A. Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board ECON on 14 October 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 11-10-2021Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea | epidemija | Eurogrupp | il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew | korp ta' sorveljanza | marda tal-

coronavirus | rekwiżiti finanzjarji | sistema bankarja | smigħ pubbliku | statistika ekonomika | superviżjoni bankarja |superviżjoni finanzjarja

Sommarju This note is prepared in view of a regular public hearing with the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB), Andrea Enria, which will take place on 14 October 2021. The briefing addresses: 1) Emergingrisks in the banking group, as presented to the Eurogroup, 2) results of EBA’s and ECB’s 2021 stress test exercises, 3)the Basel Committee report on early lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic on the Basel reforms, 4) the ECB report onsanctioning activities, 5) the ECB Supervisory Banking Statistics for the first quarter 2021, and 6) summaries ofexternal papers on long-term effects of the pandemic on the banking sector.

Briefing EN

The European Green Deal and cohesion policyTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-10-2021Awtur WIDUTO Agnieszka

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix Fond ta' Koeżjoni | Fondi Strutturali | koeżjoni ekonomika u soċjali | miżuri ta' kontroll tat-tniġġis | newtralità karbonika |

strateġija tal-UE | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UESommarju In line with its commitments under the Paris Agreement on climate change, in 2019 the EU adopted an ambitious

strategy for reaching climate neutrality by 2050: the European Green Deal. The significant reduction of greenhousegas emissions needed to achieve it will require profound social and economic changes, while ensuring a socially fairand just transition. As climate change is linked to the greenhouse effect, the EU's actions for reducing emissionsinvolve greening high-emissions sectors such as fossil fuels-based energy, transport, agriculture, manufacturing andwaste management. Triggered by climate change, heatwaves, water stress, wildfires, coastal flooding and extremeweather events affect EU regions with varying degrees of severity and will require a tailored approach to mitigation.The transition towards climate neutrality cannot be achieved through environmental policies alone. Cohesion policy,which accounts for about one third of the EU budget, supports this process by earmarking funding for climate action,for 'climate proofing' investments and for implementing specific actions in EU regions. In addition to the traditionalcohesion policy funds (European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund and European Social Fund Plus), anew Just Transition Fund will support the transition in regions relying on fossil fuels and high-emissions industries overthe period of 2021-2027. Moreover, one out of the five cohesion policy objectives in the current funding period isentirely dedicated to a greener Europe and fosters investment in clean energy, the circular economy, climate changemitigation and sustainable transport. As the main goal of cohesion policy is to prevent the widening of disparities, it canthus help support those regions that bear the heaviest burden of the transition and make sure that no region is leftbehind. Local and regional authorities across the EU are also working together to tackle climate challenges byparticipating in the European Climate Pact and in initiatives such as the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy,Mayors Alliance for the European Green Deal, and Green Deal Going Local.

Briefing EN

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Where will the EU's Strategic Compass point?Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-10-2021Awtur LATICI Tania | LAZAROU Eleni

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix difiża strateġika | maniġġar tal-kriżijiet | politika Ewropea tad-difiża | politika ta' sigurtà u ta' difiża komuni | sigurtà

Ewropea | strateġija tal-UE | sħubija internazzjonali tal-UESommarju As Member States encounter increasingly complex security threats, momentum to push for EU initiatives to deliver on

the Union's level of ambition in defence has emerged. A process aimed at bringing clarity, guidance and incentives tocompleting the common security and defence policy, the Strategic Compass is a first for the European Union.Announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2021 State of the European Union speech, aEuropean Defence Summit is expected to take place in February 2022. It is envisaged that, following its much-anticipated presentation, EU leaders will endorse the Compass in March 2022. European Council President CharlesMichel branded 2022 'the year of European defence'. Launched in 2020, developing the Strategic Compass entails acomplex strategic reflection, threat analysis and strategic dialogue among Member States. It is structured around fourinterlinked thematic baskets: crisis management, defence capabilities, resilience, and partnerships. Unlike the 2016 EUGlobal Strategy, which saw the EU institutions take the lead, this process is Member State-led, with the institutionsplaying a supporting and coordinating role. The main challenge of the Strategic Compass appears to be, on the onehand, providing clarity in the EU's objectives (defining the ends, the ways and the means), and on the other, ensuringMember State 'buy-in'. The latter is essential for the follow-up to the process, the findings from which should ideally bereflected in national defence planning processes. The process provides opportunities to improve links between theoperational and capability dimensions of EU defence initiatives and external crisis management, to consolidate existingstrategic partnerships and rethink the configuration of new ones, and to provide a concrete vision for the commitmentsmade since 2016 to boost the EU as a defence actor. However, experts caution that the Compass risks remaining apaper exercise, should the political will to follow up not materialise.

Briefing EN

Consumer Credit DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 05-10-2021Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix kreditu għall-konsumatur | kuntratt | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur | suq uniku

Sommarju Consumer credit is a type of loan allowing consumers to purchase consumer goods and services for which they do nothave the funds. It is regulated at national and EU level. The Consumer Credit Directive (CCD), in force since 2008, isthe relevant EU-level legislation. The CCD has undergone several revisions over the past decade, yet growingdigitalisation, insufficient harmonisation and issues affecting consumer protection, among other things, have promptedthe Commission to publish a proposal for a new directive. This proposal brings crowdfunding into the scope of theCCD, expands and clarifies the definitions, and adds new articles relative to, among other things, new obligations forcreditors, tying and bundling practices, ancillary services, advisory services, unsolicited credit sale, conduct ofbusiness obligations for creditors and requirements for their staff. The proposal is part of the Commission's NewConsumer Agenda aimed at updating the overall strategic framework of EU consumer policy. The proposal is currentlyexamined by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the IMCO committee. Atthe moment, no date has been announced for the publication of a draft report. First edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

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Improving the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanismTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-10-2021Awtur VIKOLAINEN Vera

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix ażil politiku | Ftehim ta’ Schengen | kontroll tal-UE | metodu ta' evalwazzjoni | programm tal-UE | proposta (UE) | studju

tal-impattSommarju The European Commission proposed to improve the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism established by

Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013. The accompanying impact assessment (IA) provides a well defined problem definition,substantiated with evidence. Furthermore, the stakeholder opinions are reported consistently throughout the IA and areused as input for the combination of measures under the preferred option. Moreover, the data sources underpinningthe IA are recent, reliable, consistently referenced and publicly available at the time of writing. However, the focus ofthe IA analysis is predominantly on the administrative costs and benefits, while the assessment of economic, socialand fundamental rights impacts of the Mechanism’s functioning remains very limited and their quantification was notpossible.

Briefing EN

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Consumer CreditTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-10-2021Awtur DALLI HUBERT

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteKelma għat-tiftix kreditu għall-konsumatur | politika ta' kreditu | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur | studju tal-impatt | suq uniku

Sommarju The Commission is proposing a new directive on consumer credits to replace the Consumer Credit Directive of 2008.This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposal finds that the impact assessmentestablishes a logical chain between the problems identified and the policy options considered, which are presented in aclear and balanced way. The options appear to be realistic and feasible, using the existing policy framework as adeparture point and offering a range of interventions with scaling levels of intensity. The impact assessment makes useof a number of visual aids, which are especially valuable in providing the reader with a clear overview of the problemsand their drivers, policy objectives and policy options, and help illustrate the complex links between them.

Briefing EN

Effective remedies for asylum-seekers at EU external borders: A new pact on migration and asylumTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 04-10-2021Awtur RADJENOVIC Anja

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix Frontex | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | kontroll fuq il-fruntiera | Konvenzjoni Ewropea dwar id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | liġi tal-

UE | moviment migratorju | persuna li tfittex asil | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | tneħħija | trattati EwropejSommarju The European Union's objectives in the field of external border protection are to safeguard freedom of movement

within the Schengen area (an area without internal borders) and to ensure efficient monitoring of people who cross theEU's external borders. To strengthen its external borders and prevent irregular migrants from reaching EU territory, theEU has focused on extending its partnerships with third countries as well as on reinforcing and providing its borderagencies with stronger means and powers. Furthermore, a new pact on migration and asylum, presented in 2020 butstill the subject of negotiations between the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, introduces a new set ofborder procedures as a key 'migration management tool' in the event of the arrival of a large number of asylumapplicants from third countries. When conducting border management and immigration control, states' authorities needto respect international legal requirements that protect the human rights of non-nationals who are subjected to borderchecks, by providing effective remedies for human rights violations at borders, such as a possibility to lodge an appealagainst a decision before a competent, independent and impartial national authority. At the European and EU level, arange of human rights standards have been developed that regulate the powers of individual states when allowing orrefusing entry to irregular immigrants and asylum-seekers and when implementing their expulsion to countries fromwhich they have come or transited on their way.

Briefing EN

ECB monetary policy: Strategic reviewTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 01-10-2021Awtur HOFLMAYR MARTIN

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix analiżi komparattiva | il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew | politika monetarja unika | prezz għall-konsumatur | stabilità tal-

prezzijiet | tibdil fil-klimaSommarju In July 2021, the European Central Bank (ECB), the central bank of the 19 European Union countries that have

adopted the euro, completed its first monetary policy strategic review for 18 years. The key change, after 18 months ofconsultation, was a new interpretation of price stability (the ECB's primary objective) as a symmetric inflation rate of 2% over the medium term. The aim of this year's review was to adapt monetary policy and central banking to broadermacroeconomic trends, such as digitalisation, globalisation and demographic change, while also giving considerationto the implications of climate change and the carbon transition, in line with the EU's climate goals and objectives. Theresult will have substantial implications for the primary objective (price stability), for the ECB's monetary policyassessment and for its monetary policy operational framework. In short, the revised monetary policy strategy brings theECB's overall strategic orientation closer to its central bank peers, shifting away from curbing high inflation towardsensuring it does not dip too low, while also building climate considerations into the policy framework.

Briefing EN

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Alcohol labellingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-09-2021Awtur LAANINEN Tarja

Qasam tematiku Is-Sikurezza tal-IkelKelma għat-tiftix denominazzjoni tal-prodott | informazzjoni għall-konsumatur | kanċer | konsum tal-alkoħol | nutrizzjoni | prevenzjoni tal-

mard | regolament (UE) | saħħa pubblika | tikketta ta’ kwalità | tikkettar | xarba alkoħolikaSommarju In its Europe's Beating Cancer plan, published in February 2021, the European Commission suggests – among other

initiatives concerning cancer prevention – several actions concerning alcoholic beverages, such as limiting onlineadvertising and promotion, and reviewing European Union (EU) legislation on the taxation of alcohol. Also among theproposals is mandatory labelling of ingredients and nutrient content on alcoholic beverages by the end of 2022. Healthwarnings on labels should follow by the end of 2023. First attempts to label ingredients of alcoholic drinks were alreadymade in the late 1970s, however the Council was not able to agree on any of the proposed models. Furthermore,alcoholic drinks containing more than 1.2 % by volume of alcohol (ABV) are exempted from the obligation, set on otherdrinks and foodstuffs, to list the ingredients and make a nutritional declaration on the label. The European Commissionadopted a report in 2017, concluding that it had 'not found objective grounds that would justify' the absence ofinformation on ingredients and nutritional information on alcoholic beverages. Following on from the Commission'sreport, the European associations representing the alcoholic beverages sectors presented their self-regulationproposal in March 2018, suggesting that some sectors would list all ingredients on labels, while others could use onlinemeans of communication instead. Stakeholders have differing views on the desirability and feasibility of listings on-label; some would prefer this information to be allowed to be given off-label through QR-codes, apps or websites, whileothers absolutely insist that alcoholic drinks should be no different from other sectors of the food and drink industry.The European Parliament has called on the European Commission to consider a health warning and calorie content onalcoholic beverage labels. This is an update of a Briefing published in April 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Alcohol labelling

Jihadist networks in sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, patterns and responsesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-09-2021Awtur STANICEK BRANISLAV

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix Afrika sub-Saħarjana | kunflitt reliġjuż | missjoni militari tal-UE | prevenzjoni tal-kunflitti | sigurtà reġjonali | Stat Iżlamiku

| taħriġ militari | terroriżmuSommarju Sub-Saharan Africa has become a new global hotspot for jihadist activity. Armed groups have increasingly developed

strong Salafi jihadist ideologies and forged ties with jihadist movements predominantly active in the Middle East,namely Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known by its Arabic acronym, Da'esh. Therise of jihadist activity in the region of the Sahel, Lake Chad, the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, and more recentlyin northern Mozambique, cannot be attributed solely to the influence of jihadist ideology from the Middle East. Anumber of factors have contributed to the deterioration of security, among them poverty, corruption, various localgrievances, separatist movements, pre-existing intercommunal violence between herders and farmers over land rights(exacerbated by the consequences of climate change), weak state presence, and lack of prospects for young people.In Mali, jihadist groups emerged from the conflict triggered by the separatist Tuareg movement. More recently, inMozambique, grievances and poverty in one of the country's poorest provinces, Cabo Delgado, provided fertile groundfor jihadist ideology, nurtured further by foreign preachers and returning students. The spike in violence attributed tojihadist groups and their ties to foreign movements has prompted international stakeholders, including the EuropeanUnion, to launch counterterrorism operations, also involving local actors. The European Parliament has condemnedthese terrorist groups on several occasions and supported EU military and civilian missions in the region.Nevertheless, the military approach that the international community has preferred up to now has not succeeded inaddressing deeper community grievances and strengthening state presence.

Briefing EN

Revising the Energy Efficiency Directive: Fit for 55 packageTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-09-2021Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku L-EnerġijaKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effiċjenza enerġetika | iffrankar ta' enerġija | konsum tal-enerġija | kooperazzjoni fl-

enerġija | newtralità karbonika | politika tal-enerġija tal-UE | proposta (UE) | strateġija tal-UE | użu tal-enerġijaSommarju On 14 July 2021 the European Commission adopted the 'fit for 55' package with a view to adapting existing EU climate

and energy legislation to the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by2030, in accordance with the new European Climate Law. The fit for 55 package is part of the European Green Deal, aflagship of the von der Leyen Commission that will involve further climate-related legislation and other new initiatives toset the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHG emissions (climate neutrality) by 2050. The fit for 55 packageincludes a recast of the energy efficiency directive (EED), aligning its provisions to the new -55 % GHG target. TheEED currently sets out the level of energy savings that the EU needs to make to meet the agreed goal of 32.5 %energy efficiency improvements by 2030. The recast EED would require Member States to almost double their annualenergy savings obligations, leading the way by means of action throughout the public sector, action to address energypoverty, and other measures to help to deliver 9 % more energy savings than envisaged by the existing EED and inthe 2021-2030 national energy and climate plans. The file has been referred to the ITRE committee, where therapporteur is still preparing his draft report. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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Argentina's Parliament and other political institutionsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 29-09-2021Awtur GOMEZ RAMIREZ Enrique

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix awtorità nazzjonali kompetenti | grupp politiku | korp eżekuttiv | l-Arġentina | parlament nazzjonali | setgħa eżekuttiva |

setgħa leġiżlattiva | setgħa ġudizzjarja | sistema politikaSommarju Argentina is Latin America's second-largest country in terms of size, fourth-largest in terms of population, and third

most important in economic terms. It is a federal republic, composed of 23 autonomous provinces plus theautonomous (capital) City of Buenos Aires. It is an electoral democracy with universal adult suffrage, a presidentialsystem of government and separation of powers. Executive power is vested in the President of the Republic, legislativepower in the bicameral National Congress, and judicial power in the Nation's Judiciary, headed by the Supreme Courtof Justice. Provinces are headed by a governor and have their own legislatures and provincial courts. Argentina hasalways had a multilateral vocation, maintaining a wide presence in global and regional organisations. It has closehistorical and cultural ties with the EU, with which it shares fundamental values. Relations between the EuropeanParliament and the Argentinian National Congress are mainly maintained through the Delegation for Relations withMercosur and the Euro Latin America Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat). In its resolution of 13 September 2017 on EUpolitical relations with Latin America, the Parliament called for 'Argentina to be granted EU strategic partner status asan outstanding player in the (Latin American) region, and a member of Mercosur and the G20'.

Briefing EN

Understanding the EU's response to illicit drugsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-09-2021Awtur LUYTEN KATRIEN

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix dipendenza fuq id-droga | Eurojust | kooperazzjoni bejn il-pulizija tal-UE | kooperazzjoni internazzjonali | narkotiku |

negozju illiċitu | politika tal-UE-politika nazzjonali | traffiku tad-droga | ġlieda kontra l-kriminalitàSommarju The EU is an important market for illicit drugs, both in terms of consumption and production. An estimated 28.9 % of

European adults aged 15-65 have used illicit drugs at least once in their lifetime, a majority of them being men.Cannabis remains by far the most used drug, followed by cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy or molly) and amphetamines. Illicitdrugs have been claiming an increasing number of lives in the EU since 2012, but their impact goes far beyond theharm caused by their use. The illicit drugs market is the largest criminal market in the EU, with an estimated minimumretail value of €30 billion per year in the EU alone. Over a third of the organised crime groups active in the EU areinvolved in the trade in illicit drugs, which, besides generating massive criminal profits and inflicting substantial harm,incites associated violence. Drug markets furthermore have links with wider criminal activity, including terrorism; theyhave a negative impact on the legal economy and communities, cause environmental damage and can fuel corruptionand undermine governance. Illicit drugs have been trafficked into and through the EU for decades, but they are alsoproduced in the EU, for both local and global markets, as is the case of cannabis and synthetic drugs such asamphetamines. In fact, the trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is unique compared to other substances as theproduction of these drugs and new psychoactive substances in most cases takes place in the EU. In 2019, around 1.1million seizures of illicit drugs were reported in the EU-27 plus Norway, Turkey and the UK. The European drug markethas been remarkably resilient to disruption caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Although the EU Member Statescarry the primary responsibility for developing their drug policy and legislation, cross-border cooperation is paramountin the fight against illicit drugs. With the problem constantly expanding in scale and complexity, the EU has beenincreasingly active since the early 1990s, in particular with respect to law enforcement, health-related issues and thedetection and risk assessment of new psychoactive substances.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU action against serious crime

Understanding the EU's response to drugs

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EU-US Trade and Technology Council: New forum for transatlantic cooperationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-09-2021Awtur SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ InternazzjonaliKelma għat-tiftix ekonomija diġitali | katina tal-provvista | kooperazzjoni ekonomika | kummerċ barra l-UE | l-Istati Uniti | organizzazzjoni

internazzjonali | relazzjonijiet kummerċjali | relazzjonijiet transatlantiċi | teknoloġijaSommarju In December 2020, the European Commission proposed the creation of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council

(TTC), to facilitate trade, expand investment, develop compatible standards, boost innovation and strengthen thepartners' technological and industrial leadership. The TTC also aims to 'lead values-based digital transformation'.Meanwhile, trade between the EU and US continues and is as important as ever, manifested in the fact that, together,they form the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world, with the largest global data flows across the Atlantic.However, in recent years, transatlantic trade and technology policy relations have been marked by low levels ofcooperation and a number of sources of tension. The 2021 change of administration in Washington neverthelessreinvigorated the relationship between the two. The TTC was formally launched during the EU-US Summit on 15 June2021. High-level politicians will guide the Council, while the groundwork will be carried out in ten working groups,comprised of experts from both partners. They will cover issues such as common standards, resilient supply chains,tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green tech as well as investment screening and export controls.The establishment of the TTC has been widely welcomed by stakeholders and the think-tank community as animportant step towards bridging existing gaps and moving on with a forward-looking agenda, focused on strategicareas and new ways of cooperation. While there is a genuine will to work together on common challenges, somedifficult issues such as unresolved issues from the past and different approaches to regulating digital markets persist,and it remains to be seen whether the TTC will lead to the creation of an ambitious joint policy that influences tradeand technology worldwide. The first meeting is due to take place on 29 September 2021 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The EU-US Trade and Technology Council

European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund 2021-2027Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-09-2021Awtur WIDUTO Agnieszka

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix Fond Ewropew għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali | Fond ta' Koeżjoni | għajnuna għall-impjieg | għajnuna reġjonali | kriterji ta'

eliġibbiltà | politika reġjonali tal-UE | proposta (UE) | reġjun anqas vantaġġat | spariġġ reġjonali | tkabbir ekonomiku |żvilupp reġjonali

Sommarju In the context of the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, the European Commission published a proposalfor a regulation on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) on 29 May 2018.The new single regulation on the ERDF and CF (previously covered by two separate regulations) identifies the specificobjectives and scope of support for both funds, including non-eligible activities. The majority of ERDF funding will focuson smart growth and the green economy, while the fund will also support other activities such as connectivity, socialissues and local development. The CF will continue to focus predominantly on environmental and transportinfrastructure. Special provisions were proposed for territories such as urban areas and outermost regions. Theindicator framework for monitoring progress will include new common results indicators. On 28 May 2020, theCommission amended the proposal to better support recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. A final political triloguemeeting took place on 9 February 2021, sealing agreement between the Council and the European Parliament. TheParliament voted on the draft regulation at its June II plenary session. The final act was signed 24 June and publishedin the Official Journal on 30 June 2021. Fifth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia European Regional Development: Fund and Cohesion Fund 2021-2027

European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture FundTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-09-2021Awtur SCHOLAERT FREDERIK

Qasam tematiku Is-SajdKelma għat-tiftix ekosistema marina | Fond Ewropew għall-Affarijiet Marittimi u s-Sajd | konservazzjoni tar-riżorsi | politika marittima |

politika tas-sajd | proposta (UE) | rapport | reġjun periferiku | riżorsi tal-baħar | riżorsi tas-sajd | sikurezza marittima |studju tal-impatt | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE | żvilupp sostenibbli

Sommarju As part of the budget framework for the 2021-2027 period, the European Union has adopted new rules on fundingdedicated to the Common Fisheries Policy and the Integrated Maritime Policy. Based on a Commission proposal ofJune 2018, Parliament adopted its first reading position in April 2019. After lengthy interinstitutional negotiations,started after the 2019 elections, political agreement was reached on 4 December 2020. Compared to the previousperiod, the new fund gives Member States more flexibility in defining their own measures, as long as they support thepriorities and are not part of a list of ineligible measures. Departing from the Commission proposal, the co legislatorshave extended support for the small-scale fleet to vessels between 12 and 24 metres in length. The fleet aid provisionsallow support for the first acquisition of a vessel by a young fisherman, for the modernisation of engines, and foroperations that improve safety, working conditions or energy efficiency. A greater focus on aquaculture is reflected inits inclusion in the name of the fund. Preferential aid is provided for outermost regions. At least 15 % of Member States'allocations should be spent on control and data collection. Following its adoption by the Council, Parliament adoptedthe agreed text in plenary on 6 July 2021, closing the procedure at second reading. The new regulation entered intoforce on 14 July and applies retroactively from January 2021. Sixth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure

Briefing EN

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Update on recent banking developmentsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-09-2021Awtur GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u BankarjiKelma għat-tiftix Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea | epidemija | konsegwenza ekonomika | marda tal-coronavirus | Stat Membru tal-UE |

statistika ekonomika | superviżjoni bankarja | superviżjoni finanzjarja | unjoni bankarja tal-UESommarju This briefing summarises recent publications that are particularly relevant in the context of bank supervision, namely:

1) the Basel Committee Interim report on early lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic on the Basel reforms, 2) the EBApeer review report on the prudential assessment of the acquisition of qualifying holdings, 3) the ECB SupervisoryBanking Statistics for the first quarter 2021, and 4) the EBA report on High Earners.

Briefing EN

Participation in early education and careTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-09-2021Awtur CHIRCOP Denise | CLAROS GIMENO Eulalia

Qasam tematiku L-EdukazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix edukazzjoni obbligatorja | edukazzjoni primarja | il-bidu tat-tfulija | indukrar tat-tfal | skola tan-nuna | Stat Membru tal-

UE | studju komparattiv | tfalSommarju Following research findings on the positive impact of early childhood education, EU education ministers set a

participation target for 2030 at 96 % of all children three years and over. This will depend on having enough places thatare accessible and affordable. At the same time, the quality of the provision is just as important to reap the potentialbenefits. This infographic looks at the current participation of young children in early childhood education and whatMember States are doing to improve upon it.

Briefing EN

European Parliament involvement in scrutinising the Recovery and Resilience FacilityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-09-2021Awtur PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix ftehim interistituzzjonali | għajnuna tal-UE | kontroll baġitarju | kooperazzjoni interistituzzjonali (UE) | politika baġitarja |

regolament (UE) | rkupru ekonomiku | Semestru Ewropew | skambju ta' informazzjoni | trasparenza finanzjarjaSommarju This note provides a brief overview of Parliament involvement in scrutinising the Recovery and Resilience Facility (and

the European Union Recovery Instrument). It is based on Regulation 2021/241 of 21 February, setting out theRecovery and Resilience Facility, and the relevant parts of the new Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary mattersestablished between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission. It does not cover nor discusses in detail otherinstruments or frameworks for scrutiny, namely those relating to the European Semester, EU budgetary procedures,written or oral questions or any discharge procedures. This paper updates an earlier one initially published on January2021.

Briefing EN

International Agreements in Progress - After Cotonou: Towards a new agreement with the African,Caribbean and Pacific states

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 21-09-2021

Awtur PICHON EricQasam tematiku L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix Il-Ftehim ta' Cotonou | negozjar ta' ftehim (UE) | pajjiżi AKP | relazzjoni AKP-UE | reviżjoni ta’ ftehim

Sommarju After two years of negotiations, the text of a renewed partnership agreement between the European Union (EU) andthe African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states was initialled in April 2021. The current partnership agreement(‘Cotonou’) was due to expire in February 2020. The then ACP Group of States – which later became the Organisationof the ACP States (OACPS) – and the EU started negotiations on a 'post-Cotonou' agreement in September 2018. TheEU and the OACPS agreed on the principle of a common foundation complemented by three regional protocols. Themulti-level negotiations, the coronavirus crisis and difficulties in reaching agreement on sensitive issues, such asmigration management and sexual and reproductive health and rights, prevented the new agreement from beingfinalised by the initial expiry date set in the Cotonou Agreement. Thus, to avoid a legal vacuum in relations, theprovisions of that agreement were extended until the end of 2021. The European Parliament insisted on maintainingthe ACP-EU joint parliamentary assembly and was successful in this endeavour; in addition, three regionalparliamentary assemblies will be created in the future institutional set-up of the partnership. The new agreement stillneeds to be signed by the parties, and further legal procedures will be required before it can be provisionally applied orenter fully into force. Seventh edition. To view earlier editions of this briefing, please see the EPRS blog.

Briefing EN

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General product safety regulationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 21-09-2021Awtur SAJN Nikolina

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-KonsumaturKelma għat-tiftix armonizzazzjoni tal-istandards | oġġetti għall-konsumaturi | proposta (UE) | sikurezza tal-prodotti | standard Ewropew |

standard tas-sikurezza | standard tekniku | superviżjoni tas-suqSommarju On 30 June 2021, the Commission adopted a proposal for a general product safety regulation, which would replace the

current General Product Safety Directive, as part of the regulatory fitness-check programme (REFIT). The proposalseeks to address the challenges of product safety of emerging technologies, including use of artificial intelligence (AI)and connected devices, and to establish clear obligations for online marketplaces, which consumers increasingly usefor their online purchases. The proposal would create a single set of market surveillance rules for both harmonised andnon-harmonised products, including by aligning the provisions with the Market Surveillance Regulation, and wouldimprove the effectiveness of product recalls. For non-harmonised products where neither manufacturers nordistributors are established in the European Union, it would introduce a requirement for a person to be responsible forthe product in the Union. The proposal would clarify consumer remedies and harmonise maximum penalties forinfringements. In the European Parliament, the file has been provisionally referred to the Committee on the InternalMarket and Consumer Protection. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia General product safety regulation

Common Provisions Regulation: New rules for cohesion policy for 2021-2027Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-09-2021Awtur WIDUTO Agnieszka

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix dritt għall-ażil | Fond Ewropew għall-Affarijiet Marittimi u s-Sajd | Fond Ewropew għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali | Fond Soċjali

Ewropew | Fond ta' Koeżjoni | fruntiera esterna tal-UE | immaniġġjar finanzjarju | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE |proposta (UE) | sigurtà Ewropea | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE

Sommarju For the EU budget covering the 2021-2027 period, the European Commission proposed to update EU cohesion policywith a new set of rules. The proposal for a Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) set out common provisions for eightshared management funds: the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Social FundPlus, the Just Transition Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, the Asylum and Migration Fund, theInternal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument. Additional specific regulations add certainprovisions needed to cater for the particularities of individual funds, in order to take into account their differentrationales, target groups and implementation methods. The new CPR is of the utmost importance as it sets the mainrules that govern the above-mentioned funds for the 2021-2027 period. While it builds upon the previous sets of rulescovering the 2014-2020 period, it nevertheless introduces a number of innovations. It aims, amongst other things, tosimplify and improve synergies between the different EU policy tools. On 23 June 2021, the Parliament voted to adoptthe text of the regulation agreed with the Council. The final act was published in the Official Journal on 30 June 2021.Fifth edition of a briefing originally drafted by Vasileios Margaras. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

European territorial cooperation (Interreg) 2021-2027Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-09-2021Awtur VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix Fond Ewropew għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali | Fondi Strutturali | Ftehim ta’ Schengen | Il-Politika Ewropea għat-Tħaris tal-

Inħawi fil-Qrib | kooperazzjoni Ewropea | kooperazzjoni reġjonali | kooperazzjoni territorjali Ewropea | kooperazzjonitransfruntiera | proposta (UE) | statistika tal-UE | valutazzjoni | żvilupp reġjonali

Sommarju On 29 May 2018, the European Commission adopted several proposals aimed at defining the EU cohesion policy forthe post-2020 programming period. The package includes a proposal for the new generation of European territorialcooperation (ETC) programmes, commonly referred to as 'Interreg'. The proposed regulation would bring significantchanges to the architecture of ETC, with the reshaping of the three traditional cooperation strands (i.e. cross-border,transnational and interregional cooperation) and the creation of two new components, one dedicated to outermostregions, the other to interregional cooperation on innovation. Another major novelty is the incorporation of cooperationwith countries other than EU Member States. The proposal was examined simultaneously by the Council and theEuropean Parliament. In Parliament, the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) was responsible for the file.Parliament adopted its legislative resolution on the proposal at first reading on 26 March 2019, enabling triloguenegotiations to get under way with the Council. Agreement on the text was reached at the trilogue meeting of 2December 2020, with Parliament adopting the draft regulation on 23 June 2021. Signed on 24 June 2021, the final actwas published in the EU Official Journal on 30 June 2021.

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Just Transition FundTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-09-2021Awtur JOURDE PERNILLA | WIDUTO Agnieszka

Qasam tematiku Coronavirus | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Enerġija | L-Iżvilupp Reġjonali

Kelma għat-tiftix fondi (UE) | politika tal-ambjent tal-UE | proposta (UE) | tibdil fil-klima | tkabbir ekoloġiku | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet |tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE

Sommarju The EU aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. Thiswill require a socio-economic transformation in regions relying on fossil fuels and high-emission industries. As part ofthe European Green Deal, on 14 January 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation tocreate the Just Transition Fund, aimed at supporting EU regions most affected by the transition to a low carboneconomy. In the context of recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, an amended proposal on the Just Transition Fund(JTF) was published on 28 May 2020. The JTF is set to have a budget of €17.5 billion (€7.5 billion from the core EUbudget under the Multiannual Financial Framework and €10 billion from the Next Generation EU instrument, in 2018prices). Funding will be available to all Member States, while focusing on regions with the biggest transition challenges.The budget for the Just Transition Fund may be complemented with resources from cohesion policy funds and nationalco financing. The Fund will be part of a Just Transition Mechanism, which also includes resources under InvestEU anda public-sector loan facility. In the European Parliament, the file was entrusted to the Committee on RegionalDevelopment (REGI). A provisional political agreement was reached in trilogue on 9 December 2020, with theParliament adopting the draft regulation on 18 May 2021. The final act was published in the Official Journal on 30 June2021. Fifth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

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Just Transition Fund

Machinery Directive: Revision of Directive 2006/42/ECTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-09-2021Awtur ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Qasam tematiku Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | It-Traspożizzjoni u l-Implimentazzjoni tal-LiġiKelma għat-tiftix approvazzjoni ta' bejgħ | armonizzazzjoni tal-istandards | Direttiva tal-KE | inġinerija mekkanika | makkinarju | sikurezza

tal-prodotti | standard Ewropew | standard tal-kummerċjalizzazzjoni | standard tas-sikurezzaSommarju The Machinery Directive establishes a regulatory framework for mechanical engineering industry products. It regulates

the harmonisation of essential health and safety requirements for machinery in order to ensure the free movement ofmachinery products within the internal market on the one hand, and a high level of protection for machinery users onthe other. The European Commission's Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) evaluation of 2018concluded that the directive has generally remained relevant and effective. However, it pointed at certain shortcomingsin the enforcement of the directive (mainly related to market surveillance, a Member State responsibility), and foundthat despite its technology-neutral design, the directive might not sufficiently cover new risks stemming from emergingtechnologies (in particular robots using artificial intelligence technologies). Furthermore, it identified the potential foradministrative simplification. The Commission issued its new proposal for a regulation on machinery products(COM(2021) 202) on 21 April 2021, as part of the 'artificial intelligence package'. In particular, the change of instrument(regulation instead of a directive) aims at ensuring a uniform implementation in the Member States and avoiding therisk of 'gold plating'.

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The situation in Afghanistan: Essential benchmarks for EU engagementTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-09-2021Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix fundamentaliżmu reliġjuż | għajnuna għall-iżvilupp | għajnuna umanitarja | l-Afganistan | l-Istati Uniti | migrazzjoni |

NATO | rifuġjat | sigurtà reġjonali | stabiliment tal-paċi | żamma tal-paċiSommarju The departure of United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from Afghanistan marks the

end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban's ability to provide sanctuary forinternational terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically electedgovernment. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military aeroplane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firingrockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fledabroad or were in hiding, and the Taliban had taken back control of most of Afghanistan. On 7 September 2021, theTaliban announced an all-male caretaker government drawn entirely from the Taliban movement, contrary to earlierpromises that the new government would be 'inclusive'. So far, no country has recognised the interim government.There have been reports of reprisals against security personnel, individuals with links to the previous administrationand foreign forces, journalists and minorities, in particular. The rights to education and employment that women haveenjoyed for the past 20 years are meanwhile being curtailed. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the countryis increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, whileforeign assets have been frozen. Many Afghans have fled to neighbouring countries, joining the estimated 3-4 millionAfghan refugees already living there, mainly in Iran and Pakistan. The EU has expressed concerns over thecomposition of the interim government, noting that an inclusive and representative government – which the interimgovernment is not – is an essential benchmark for EU engagement. The EU has made available large amounts ofhumanitarian and development aid and is hoping to establish a diplomatic presence on the ground in Kabul. The EU isalso planning to set up a regional platform for cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbours on issues includingpopulation flows from Afghanistan, terrorism, organised crime and drugs. This Briefing expands and updates an ‘At aglance’ note published on 2 September 2021.

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Citizens' engagement and expectations of the Conference on the Future of EuropeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-09-2021Awtur KOTANIDIS Silvia

Qasam tematiku Id-DemokrazijaKelma għat-tiftix demokrazija parteċipattiva | Ewropa taċ-ċittadini | proċedimenti tal-konferenza | relazzjonijiet bejn iċ-ċittadin u l-awtorità

Sommarju What sort of European Union do we want to see in the future? What is working well in the EU and what could beimproved? These are just two examples of the kind of questions that the European citizens' panels, part of theConference on the Future of Europe, will have to answer. The Conference on the Future of Europe marks the first timein the history of the EU that citizens have been included in a consultative process in such a structural and innovativemanner. The conference, first announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, is now entering itskey phase, with the first European citizens' panel meeting taking place on 17 September 2021. The widening gapbetween citizens and institutions is a known pattern, not only at EU level but also at national level in many countries.Against this backdrop, some forms of participatory democracy – such as citizens' assemblies – already successful inIreland and elsewhere in recent years, promise to provide a format that allows an open exchange of views in acollaborative environment. The citizens' panels were proposed and designed to give a voice to citizens in the mostinclusive way possible. As such, the panels' key requirement is that they represent the EU population faithfully. Theresult is that 800 EU citizens, equally distributed into four citizens' panels, will be called upon to discuss issues andconcerns that they may themselves identify. The debate is supported by a multilingual digital platform, the main hub ofthe conference. The citizens' panels are not meant to replace representative democracy however, but rather tocomplement it. The Conference on the Future of Europe is a complex democratic exercise in which the multilingualdigital platform gathers ideas from citizens and civil society, citizens' panels give recommendations, and theconference plenary makes proposals on the basis of which the executive board of the Conference will draft the finalreport. The contribution of the citizens' panels will feed into the proposals of the conference plenary and, ultimately,into the final report of the conference that the executive board will present at the end of the conference for theinstitutions to follow up.

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Long-term vision for rural areas: European Commission communicationTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 17-09-2021Awtur MCELDOWNEY James

Qasam tematiku L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix komunità rurali | politika reġjonali tal-UE | reġjun rurali | studji previżjonarji | żvilupp rurali

Sommarju In June 2021, the European Commission published a communication setting out a long-term vision for the EU's ruralareas. The range of challenges facing such areas is acknowledged. They include issues relating to demographicchange, such as the loss of population from remote rural areas, lower levels of gross domestic product (GDP) percapita, poor access to services, and issues concerning connectivity. A lower proportion of households in rural regionshave access to next generation broadband compared to the EU average. Tertiary education and basic digital skilllevels are lower in rural areas and a significant gap exists between male and female employment rates. The share ofyoung people aged 15 to 29 years neither in employment nor in education or training is higher in rural areas. Theresponse set out in the Commission's communication includes proposals for a rural pact engaging actors at EU,national, regional and local levels to support the vision and an action plan to support stronger, connected, resilient andprosperous rural areas. A rural observatory will be established to improve data collection and analysis on the situationof rural areas. In support of its proposals, the Commission will put in place a rural proofing mechanism to assess theanticipated impact of major EU legislative initiatives on rural areas. Offering an initial analysis of the communicationand its implications for future policy for rural areas, this briefing examines the challenges and opportunities these areasface. It summarises the views and responses of stakeholders regarding the Commission's long-term vision and thefindings of the public consultation launched by the Commission in September 2020. Evidence is also presented on thelevels of trust rural dwellers have in the different levels of governance. The key drivers that will shape rural areasbetween now and 2040 are identified from the findings of a foresight analysis undertaken by the Joint Research Centre(JRC), which is included in the communication. Lastly, consideration is given to the experience of applying the ruralproofing mechanism, including perspectives on its utility and application in practice.

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Japan's 2050 goal: A carbon-neutral societyTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-09-2021Awtur D'AMBROGIO Enrico

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix Ftehim ta’ Pariġi dwar il-Klima | gass serra | il-Ġappun | konsum tal-enerġija | kooperazzjoni ambjentali | kooperazzjoni

internazzjonali | newtralità karbonika | tibdil fil-klimaSommarju In October 2020, Japan's Prime Minister, Suga Yoshihide, declared that by 2050 the country would aim to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions to net zero and to realise a carbon-neutral, decarbonised society. In December, theCabinet adopted the green growth strategy, an industrial policy aimed at generating a virtuous cycle of economicgrowth and environmental protection, together with the business community. A €15.4 billion fund is to be created, topromote ecological businesses and innovation to achieve the goal, offering tax credit of up to 10 %. A carbon tax isbeing considered. The strategy recognises that it would be unrealistic to cover all electricity demand with renewablesonly. So, by 2050 Japan's energy mix will comprise renewable energy (50-60 %), hydrogen and ammonia (10 %), andenergy generated by nuclear and thermal power plants (30-40 %). The strategy acknowledges that promotingelectrification in all sectors will boost electricity demand by 30-50 %. To decarbonise electricity, in addition to usingrenewables and nuclear, Japan wants to further develop its hydrogen technology (in which it is a front-runner) in thedirection of CCUS (carbon capture, utilisation and storage technology). It also wants to focus on tapping into thepotential of ammonia. Meanwhile, prospects for nuclear are unclear, as the sector has been deeply impacted by the2011 Fukushima disaster. Doubts have been raised about the technology necessary for achieving coal substitution andCCUS. Japanese business, while already engaged in innovation projects to achieve net-zero carbon emissions, hasexpressed reservations about some elements of the strategy and the proposed carbon tax. Japan is actively involvedin international cooperation on green technologies and could be an ideal partner to the EU, which, through itsEuropean Green Deal (EGD), also aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. During their May 2021 summit, the EUand Japan adopted the declaration ‘Towards a Green Alliance to protect our environment, stop climate change andachieve green growth’.

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Russia's 2021 elections: Another step on the road to authoritarian ruleTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-09-2021Awtur RUSSELL Martin

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix elezzjoni nazzjonali | elezzjoni parlamentari | elezzjoni reġjonali | ir-Russja | kap ta' Stat | libertà tal-istampa | moviment

tad-drittijiet umani | oppożizzjoni politika | pluraliżmu fix-xandir | reġim awtoritarju | ripressjoni | sistema elettoraliSommarju On 17-19 September, Russia will hold elections at local, regional and national level, most importantly to the State

Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly. Four hundred and fifty deputies will be elected for a five-year term.Ever since 2003, the State Duma has been dominated by the pro-Putin United Russia party, which currently holds athree-quarters supermajority. With the ruling party clearly in charge, the parliament serves as little more than a rubberstamp for Kremlin and government initiatives. In Russia's system of managed democracy, the main role of theparliamentary opposition is to preserve an appearance of political pluralism, while carefully excluding most regimecritics. Following the June 2020 constitutional referendum, which opened the door to President Vladimir Putinpotentially staying on until 2036, the authorities moved to eliminate the few remaining pockets of resistance.Opposition activist Alexey Navalny is now in jail, and many other regime opponents are either facing criminal chargesor have left the country. Even though United Russia faces no real electoral competition, it may struggle to repeat its2016 performance. Voters are alienated by the party's reputation for corruption and the generally unpromising contextof political and economic stagnation. Opinion polls suggest that its majority will be reduced, possibly below the two-thirds threshold needed to adopt constitutional changes; nevertheless, the party is virtually guaranteed to win. Manyobservers see the elections, and the wave of repression preceding them, as the latest stage in Russia's transition fromflawed democracy to fully fledged authoritarian state.

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Recovery plan for Europe: State of play, September 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 14-09-2021Awtur SAPALA Magdalena

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitKelma għat-tiftix finanzjament tal-baġit tal-UE | għajnuna finanzjarja | qafas finanzjarju pluriennali | rkupru ekonomiku | Stat Membru tal-

UE | strument finanzjarju tal-'UE | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UESommarju Since the beginning of 2021, Member States and EU institutions have been preparing intensively to launch the

recovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). In order to make this unique financial stimulus package fullyoperational, many conditions have needed to be met and preparatory steps completed. First, preparations have beenongoing for the spending of the biggest part of NGEU (90 %) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Thisprocess includes the drawing up of national recovery and resilience plans by the Member States, their evaluation bythe European Commission, and approval by the Council of the EU. Up to 15 September 2021, most of the nationalplans submitted have been positively assessed by the Commission and approved by the Council (18). Based on this,the Commission concluded agreements with those Member States on a legal commitment authorising the financialcontribution to be made, and the first transfers of EU aid (pre-financing) were made on 3 August. In the case of somecountries, however, the assessment procedure has been delayed. In parallel, the system for financing NGEU had to becreated almost from scratch. It is based on borrowing operations carried out by the European Commission on behalf ofthe European Union. These operations could start only once all Member States had ratified the Own ResourcesDecision (ORD), which was done by the end of May 2021. In the meantime, the Commission was preparing for its roleof borrower on an unprecedented scale. At the beginning of the summer, it started implementing its diversified fundingstrategy for the financing of NGEU. In three issuances successfully conducted so far, the Commission has raised €45billion in total out of the €80 billion planned for 2021. This is an update of a Briefing of 7 June 2021.

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Trends in Chinese reporting on the European Union: Xinhua's coverage of EU affairs, 2012-2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 10-09-2021Awtur NOONAN EAMONN

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Governanza Dinjija | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | KwistjonijietEkonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Ippjanar bil-Quddiem

Kelma għat-tiftix aġenzija tal-istampa | epidemija | marda tal-coronavirus | politika dwar l-informazzjoniSommarju The main Chinese news service, Xinhua, has steadily expanded its coverage on the European Union over the past

decade. The main challenges facing the Union have featured strongly, from the refugee crisis to Brexit to the impact ofCovid 19. The tone of the coverage in this period has been neutral, rather than negative, and has not become morecritical during the pandemic. Internal EU policies are often put in a favourable light, although internal divisions alsofeature in Xinhua's reporting. Xinhua tends to emphasise EU cooperation with China and EU divisions with the UnitedStates. It also criticises EU sanctions and human rights complaints, both about China – for example on Xinjiang andHong Kong – and about countries including Russia and Turkey. These trends are in line with China's long-standingstated preference for the EU to become a pole in a multipolar world order that is able to balance US power, despite itsdisapproval of the EU's pursuit of human rights issues. Xinhua's coverage emphasises both the opportunities and thechallenges facing European integration. This dual approach tends to support the view that China is ambiguous aboutthe EU's ability to become a more influential and more useful strategic partner on the world stage. This briefing isbased on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Chinese-language online articles by the state-affiliated Xinhua NewsAgency since 2012, as well as a selection of secondary sources.

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China's compliance with selected fields of international lawTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-09-2021Awtur PARRY Matthew

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix diżarmament | dritt internazzjonali | dritt internazzjonali dwar id-drittijiet tal-bniedem | ftehim kummerċjali | il-Filippini | il-

Korea ta' Fuq | iċ-Ċina | kwistjoni tal-Baħar tan-Nofsinhar taċ-Ċina | l-OrganizzazzjoniDinjija tal-Kummerċ | politikadwar il-bidla fil-klima | sanzjonijiet internazzjonali | Ħong Kong

Sommarju China has ratified numerous legally binding international agreements. Like other countries, it has a strong incentive tocommit itself in this way: international agreements are a means of binding other treaty parties; strengtheninginternational standing; creating a favourable legal framework for trade and investment; and, such as with the 1984Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong, settling territorial questions. At the same time, China has been careful to avoidmaking commitments in two areas in particular: questions of national security and sovereignty, where it recalls ahistory of mistreatment by outside powers; and human rights, where its political and cultural traditions differconsiderably from those of Western democracies. China has often included reservations precluding internationalarbitration in the international agreements that it has ratified. One notable exception to this rule is China's membershipof the WTO and conclusion of trade and investment agreements, where arbitration is such a core part of the system asto be unavoidable. To the extent that China is accused of breaching its international commitments, these tend toconcern its perceived national security interests and territorial sovereignty, as in the case of the governance of HongKong, and maritime and territorial rights in the South China Sea. In other areas, such as human rights and climatechange agreements, China is typically careful to limit its commitments so that it does not formally breach them.

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State of the Union address, European Parliament, 2021Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-09-2021Awtur MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UEKelma għat-tiftix diskors | President tal-Kummissjoni | programm leġiżlattiv (UE) | setgħa ta' valutazzjoni

Sommarju European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's second State of the Union address, scheduled for 15September 2021, will be delivered at a time when the coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges for theEuropean Union and its Member States. At the same time, thanks to the adoption of the multiannual financialframework for the 2021-2027 period, new opportunities lie ahead – the recovery plan for Europe and Next GenerationEU. Furthermore, the Conference on the Future of Europe was finally launched on 9 May 2021. Nevertheless, anumber of unresolved issues and new challenges remain. These include ensuring that EU values (Article 2 TEU) areupheld in the Member States, including through the application of the recently adopted Conditionality Regulation,addressing the threat of climate change, and equipping Europe for the digital age. The tradition of EU State of theUnion addresses, delivered to the European Parliament by the President of the European Commission, dates back to2010. The address takes stock of the achievements of the past year and presents priorities for the year ahead. Itconstitutes an important instrument for the European Commission's ex-ante accountability vis-à-vis Parliament and isalso aimed at rendering the definition of priorities at EU level more transparent, and at communicating those prioritiesto citizens. The event chimes with a similar tradition in national democracies. The United States, for instance, has along-standing tradition of presidential State of the Union addresses, in which the President speaks in the Capitol to ajoint session of Congress, thus fulfilling a constitutional obligation. In contrast to the US Constitution, the EU Treatiesdo not prescribe a State of the Union address; the EU version was established by the 2010 Framework Agreementbetween Parliament and the Commission. This briefing further updates an earlier one from September 2016, originallywritten by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

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'Global Britain' and 'Europe of Defence': Prospects, challenges and opportunitiesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 06-09-2021Awtur LATICI Tania

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ir-Renju Unit | politika estera | politika ta' sigurtà u ta' difiża komuni | politika tad-difiża | relazzjonijiet tal-UE | ħruġ mill-

UESommarju Since the referendum to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) has been rethinking its role

in world affairs. Under the 'Global Britain' banner, the UK sees itself as a force for multilateralism, a strong militarypower with global presence and reach, and a strong pillar of the transatlantic alliance. Reflection on the implications of'Global Britain' for the UK's future foreign, security and defence policy has resulted in two strategic documents, theIntegrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, which outline policy priorities and the government's strategicvision. Although the EU as such is to a large extent absent from these strategic documents, there are implications tobe considered, particularly as the EU has taken significant steps towards defence and military integration and as it iscontinuing to deepen its relationship with NATO. Although foreign, security and defence policy were excluded from theformal negotiations on a new EU-UK partnership, at the British government's request, it appears that the EU and UKforeign policy positions, strategic considerations, and security interests remain largely aligned. Various expertstherefore argue that it is worth considering options for flexible engagements and for cultivating a new relationshipthrough other common multilateral, bilateral and international forums.

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European Union Solidarity FundTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-09-2021Awtur VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Qasam tematiku L-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix assistenza ta' emerġenza | diżastru naturali | Fond ta’ Solidarjetà tal-Unjoni Ewropea | għajnuna lill-vittmi tad-diżastri |

implimentazzjoni tal-baġit | qafas finanzjarju pluriennali | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE | żona ta’ diżastruSommarju Established in 2002 to support disaster-stricken regions, the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) complements the

efforts of public authorities by helping to fund vital emergency and recovery operations in areas affected bycatastrophes such as flooding, earthquakes and forest fires. EUSF funding is granted following an application from aMember State or candidate country, and may be used to finance measures including restoring infrastructure to workingorder, providing temporary accommodation and cleaning up disaster areas. Although the EUSF Regulation wasrevised in 2014, simplifying rules and clarifying eligibility criteria, several problems still remain. European Commissionreports on the EUSF have drawn attention to the long waiting time countries still face before receiving EUSF funding,while industry experts also point to the risk that the EUSF could run out of funding in the event of several largedisasters taking place within a short space of time. The coronavirus pandemic has placed the EUSF under the spotlightonce again, with the scope of the EUSF Regulation extended in March 2020 to cover support in the event of a majorpublic health emergency, and 17 Member States plus three candidate countries receiving vital assistance. TheEuropean Parliament has been actively involved in recent discussions on the EUSF, adopting a resolution on thereview of the EUSF in May 2021 which included several measures aimed at improving its operations, and preparing areport on the effectiveness of Member States' use of EUSF money in cases of natural disasters. While the 2014revision of the EUSF Regulation and the widening of its scope in 2020 have borne fruit, allowing the EUSF to provideunprecedented levels of support after the 2016/2017 earthquakes in Italy, ensuring much needed assistance inresponse to the coronavirus pandemic, the EUSF will undergo a number of changes during 2021-2027. In particular,the merger of the EUSF with the Emergency Aid Reserve as part of the new Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserveunder the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, with a combined budget of €1.2 billion for both instruments,raises questions as to whether the EUSF will be able to continue to provide such effective levels of disaster recoveryassistance in future. The July 2021 floods in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and therecent forest fires in Cyprus, Greece and Italy are a potent reminder of the EU's vulnerability in the face of theunpredictable forces of nature.

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Climate action in Latvia: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-09-2021Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | il-Latvja | tibdil fil-klima |

tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) to cover the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessmentfor each NECP. Latvia submitted its NECP in November 2019. More than half (56 %) of Latvians expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Latvia accounts for 0.3 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and itsemissions increased between 2005 and 2019, in contrast to the average EU trend. The carbon intensity of Latvia'seconomy is higher than the EU average, but has declined since 2005. Emissions from the transport sector increasedby 6.9 % between 2005 and 2019, accounting for 27.8 % of total emissions. The manufacturing industries andconstruction sector showed the biggest percentage reduction (42 %) in emissions over the period. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Latvia was allowed to increase its emissions by 17 % by 2020, compared with 2005, and in 2019was on track to achieving the target. Latvia achieved a 41 % share of renewable energy sources in 2019 and aims toreach 50 % by 2030. The European Commission regards this ambition as adequate, but warns of possible hurdles.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Cyprus: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-09-2021Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix adattament għat-tibdil fil-klima | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | newtralità karbonika | tibdil fil-

klima | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġija | ĊipruSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the 2021 to 2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Cyprus submitted its NECP in January 2020. A high proportion of Cypriots (70 %) expectnational governments to tackle climate. Cyprus accounts for 0.26 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions andhas reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbon intensity of the Cyprioteconomy decreased by close to 25 % between 2005 and 2019, at a rate slower than the EU average. Energy industryemissions fell by 3.7 % in the 2005 to 2019 period in Cyprus. Further emissions reductions are expected as the countryshifts its electricity production from heavy fuel oil to natural gas by the end of 2021. Transport and industrial processesand product use were the sectors with the smallest reductions. Under the Effort-sharing Decision for the 2013 2020period, Cyprus needed to reduce its emissions in sectors not included in the EU's emission trading system by 5 %,compared with 2005 levels. For the Effort-sharing Regulation period (2021-2030) the target is set at -21 % comparedwith 2005 levels. The share of renewable energy in Cyprus reached 13.8 % in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a22.9 % share is focused on changes in the heating and cooling, and electricity sectors.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 148

Climate action in Portugal: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 03-09-2021Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | il-Portugall | pjanar nazzjonali | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-

Emissjonijiet tal-UE | tibdil fil-klima | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet | tniġġis industrijali | tranżizzjoni tal-enerġijaSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Portugal submitted its NECP in December 2019. More than half (57%) of Portuguesepeople expect national governments to tackle climate change. Portugal generates 1.8 % of the EU's total greenhousegas (GHG) emissions. In 2019, the carbon intensity of Portugal's economy was 22 % above the EU average, and fell ata slightly slower pace than the EU average over the 2005-2019 period. The transport sector reduced its emissions by10.3 % between 2005 and 2019 and is the sector with the highest emissions, accounting for 26 % of Portugueseemissions in 2019. Energy sector emissions, accounting for 19 % of total emissions in 2019, fell by 50 % between2005 and 2019 – the largest reduction in emissions of all sectors. Under EU effort-sharing legislation for the 2013-2020period, Portugal was allowed to increase its non-ETS GHG emissions by 1 %, compared with 2005, and neversurpassed its allocated emissions The share of renewable energy sources in 2019 was 30.6 %. The country's 2030target of a 47 % share is one of the highest in the EU, with a renewable energy in electricity target of 80 % by 2030.

Briefing EN

The Organization for Security and Co operation in Europe (OSCE) : A pillar of the European securityorder

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 02-09-2021

Awtur RUSSELL MartinQasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix drittijiet tal-bniedem | kwistjoni internazzjonali | monitoraġġ tal-elezzjoni | OSKE | prevenzjoni tal-kunflitti | sigurtà

EwropeaSommarju The OSCE's origins go back to 1975, when the countries in the two opposing blocs in the Cold War signed the Helsinki

Final Act, enshrining principles such as territorial integrity and respect for human rights. The act was followed by aseries of follow-up meetings to monitor implementation, in a process known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Following the adoption of the 1990 Paris Charter envisaging a new post-Cold WarEuropean order, in 1995 the CSCE was put on a more permanent, institutional basis and renamed the OSCE. TheOSCE, like the CSCE before it, is based on a vision of 'comprehensive security' that encompasses human rights andeconomic cooperation, as well as traditional 'hard' security. However, hopes that the OSCE could become the centralpillar of a new post-Cold War order faded as divisions re-emerged, between an enlarged EU and NATO on the onehand, and Russia on the other. The OSCE lacks the legal powers and the resources needed to live up to its ambitionof becoming a platform for pan-European/trans-Atlantic cooperation. With decisions taken by consensus,disagreements between participating states hamper decision-making and prevent the organisation from becomingmore effective. The OSCE plays a useful though limited role in several areas. The organisation has been powerless toresolve conflicts in the post-Soviet region, but its observers are the main source of detailed and reliable information onthe situation in eastern Ukraine. OSCE agreements, such as the Vienna Document, help to promote militarytransparency, and election observation missions have advanced democratic reforms in several countries.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): A pillar of the European security order

Corruption and human rights in third countries: developments in EU external action since 2017Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-09-2021Awtur estern Rosana GARCIANDIA

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix drittijiet tal-bniedem | frodi kontra l-UE | is-Servizz Ewropew għall-Azzjoni Esterna | kompetenza esterna (UE) |

korruzzjoni | moviment tad-drittijiet umani | pajjiż terz | Soċjetà ċivili | komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoniSommarju In 2017, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on corruption and human rights in third countries (hereinafter

‘EP 2017 Resolution’) which included a set of practical recommendations on corruption and human rights in EUexternal relations. This briefing analyses the progress made by EU actors in implementing those recommendations. Itfocuses on development and human rights tools addressed in the EP 2017 Resolution, including EU funded projectsand programmes, technical cooperation, EU human rights dialogues and public diplomacy, as well as support forwhistle-blowers and civil society organisations exposing corruption. It concludes that, while action has been taken onvarious fronts to support anti-corruption efforts in third countries following the recommendations, a more systematicapproach to corruption and human rights could be taken in some areas. Cooperation between EU actors andenhanced capacity building on corruption and human rights are also key elements for a successful anti-corruptionstrategy in EU external action.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 149

Biometric Recognition and Behavioural Detection Assessing the ethical aspects of biometric recognitionand behavioural detection techniques with a focus on their current and future use in public spaces

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 02-09-2021

Awtur estern Christiane WENDEHORST, Yannic DULLERQasam tematiku Id-Dritt Kuntrattwali, id-Dritt Kummerċjali u d-Dritt Soċjetarju | Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Governanza Dinjija | Il-

Petizzjonijiet lill-Parlament Ewropew | Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | Is-SuqIntern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà uĠustizzja

Kelma għat-tiftix bijometrika | data personali | intelliġenza artifiċjali | protezzjoni tad-data | protezzjoni tal-privatezza | xjenzi tal-imġibaSommarju This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional

Affairs at the request of the JURI and PETI Committees, analyses the use of biometric techniques from an ethical andlegal perspective. Biometric techniques raise a number of specific ethical issues, as an individual cannot easily changebiometric features, and as these techniques tend to intrude into the human body and ultimately the human self. Furtherissues are more generally associated with large-scale surveillance, algorithmic decision making, or profiling. The studyanalyses different types of biometric techniques and draws conclusions for EU legislation

Briefing EN

European climate lawTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 31-08-2021Awtur ERBACH Gregor

Qasam tematiku L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix gass serra | proposta (UE) | tibdil fil-klima | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijiet

Sommarju On 4 March 2020, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a European climate law, setting theobjective for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050 and establishing a framework for achieving that objective. On17 September 2020, the Commission amended the proposal to introduce the updated 2030 climate target of a netreduction of at least 55 % of the EU's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to 1990 levels. In the EuropeanParliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. TheParliament adopted its position on 6 October 2020, calling for a 60 % emissions reduction by 2030 and for anindependent, inter-disciplinary scientific advisory panel. Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement onthe proposal on 21 April 2021. The agreement sets a 55 % net GHG emission target for 2030 (to be complemented byadditional removals from the upcoming review of the LULUCF Regulation), an EU-wide climate neutrality target for2050, and the aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter. It envisages the use of a GHG budget for setting the 2040target and establishes a European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change. Parliament approved the agreed texton 24 June 2021. The regulation was published in the Official Journal on 9 July 2021 and entered into force on 29 July2021. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

The EU digital decade: A new set of digital targets for 2030Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 31-08-2021Awtur NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Qasam tematiku L-IndustrijaSommarju As part of its digital decade strategy, the European Commission's March 2021 communication puts forward its vision

for new strategic digital objectives for 2030. These should prepare Europe for the roll-out of the next generation ofbroadband infrastructure with gigabit speeds, including 5G, as well as for the digital transformation of public andprivate sectors, to enable an array of new innovative services that should transform the manufacturing, energy, vehiclemanufacturing, digital government services and health sectors. Given its importance for European Union (EU)competitiveness, the European Commission is speeding up the digital transformation by co-financing research,development and deployment of innovative technologies in 2021 2027, under the €7.5 billion digital Europeprogramme, the first EU programme fully dedicated to the EU's digital transformation. Other EU programmes will alsoplay a major role in funding digital infrastructure, including the Connecting Europe Facility and cohesion policy.Furthermore, at least 20 % of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility funds received by each EU country should bededicated to the digital transition. There is some concern that not all consumers and businesses in Europe will benefitfrom the digital transformation, given the current and future digital divide between urban and rural areas and across EUcountries. Given the current climate, the high level of investment needed to achieve the transformation might provedifficult to raise. To measure progress towards the digital decade, the Commission is working on a digital compassmethod with indicators, which should be put forward for this task later in 2021. This would enable measurement of fourdimensions (or 'cardinal points'): improved digital skills, secure and sustainable digital infrastructures, digitaltransformation of businesses and of the public sector.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 150

Regulating targeted and behavioural advertising in digital services. How to ensure users’ informedconsent

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 31-08-2021

Awtur estern Giovanni SARTOR, Francesca LAGIOIA, Federico GALLI,Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UE | Id-Dritt Kuntrattwali, id-Dritt Kummerċjali u

d-Dritt Soċjetarju | Il-Governanza Dinjija | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti Legali | Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-Ante | Is-Suq Intern u Unjoni tad-Dwana | KwistjonijietEkonomiċi u Monetarji | Kwistjonijiet Finanzjarji u Bankarji | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill | L-Evalwazzjoni tal-Liġi u l-Politika fil-Prattika | L-Ippjanar bil-Quddiem | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja

Sommarju The study addresses the regulation of targeted and behavioural advertising in the context of digital services. Marketingmethods and technologies deployed in behavioural and target advertising are presented. The EU law on consent to theprocessing of personal data is analysed, in connection with advertising practices. Ways of improving the quality ofconsent are discussed as well as ways of restricting its scope as a legal basis for the processing of personal data.This study is commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and ConstitutionalAffairs at the request of the JURI Committee...

Briefing EN

Climate action in the Netherlands: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-08-2021Awtur MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija eolika | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass naturali | gass serra | immaniġġjar tal-iskart | l-

Olanda | rapport | Skema ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE | tibdil fil-klima | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijietSommarju The EU binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. The Netherlands submitted its NECP in November 2019. A high proportion of Dutchpeople (73 %) expect national governments to tackle climate. The Netherlands accounts for 5.2 % of total EUgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005.The carbon intensity of the Dutch economy decreased by 29 % between 2005 and 2019, a slower rate than the EU-wide average. Energy industry emissions fell by 15 % in the 2005-2019 period in the country. Measures such as theintroduction of carbon pricing, are expected to further decrease these emissions. The sector with the greatestpercentage reduction in emissions between 2005 and 2019 – 55 % – was waste management. Under the Effort-sharing Decision (2013 2020) and Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030), the Netherlands needs to reduce itsemissions in sectors not included in the EU emissions trading system by 16 % and 36 % respectively, compared with2005 levels. The share of renewable energy sources in the country reached 8.8 % in 2019, and for 2030 the target is27 %, to be reached mainly through solar power and offshore and onshore wind farms.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Romania: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-08-2021Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Romania's final NECP is from April 2020. More than half (51 %) of Romanians expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Romania generates 3 % of the EU-27's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissionsand reduced emissions faster than the EU average between 2005 and 2019. With several energy-intensive industriespresent in Romania, the country's carbon intensity is much higher than the EU average, but decreasing rapidly. Energyindustry emissions fell by 46 % between 2005 and 2019, reducing the sector's share of total emissions by eightpercentage points. Conversely, emissions from the transport sector increased by 40 % over the same period, doublingthat sector's share of total emissions. Romania relies to a great extent on fossil fuels. Renewables, along with nuclearenergy, but also gas as a primary energy source, are seen as essential to the transition process. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Romania was allowed to increase emissions until 2020 and must reduce these emissions by 2 %relative to 2005 by 2030. Romania achieved a 24.3 % share of renewable energy sources in 2019. The country's 2030target of a 30.7 % share is focused mainly on wind, hydro, solar and fuels from biomass. Energy efficiency measurescentre on heating supply and building envelopes along with industrial modernisation.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 151

Climate action in Austria: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-08-2021Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Austria's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Austrians (60 %) expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Austria generates 2.2 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissionsand has reduced emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The country's carbon intensity is lowerthan the EU average, following a similar steady downward trend. The transport sector accounted for 30 % of Austria'stotal emissions in 2019 and its share is continuing to rise, whereas in 2019 the energy industries accounted for just 13% of the total emissions share. Austria is aiming to reach carbon neutrality by 2040. Under EU effort-sharinglegislation, Austria was required to reduce non-ETS emissions by 16 % before end 2020, compared with 2005, andmust achieve a 36 % reduction by 2030; this outcome currently seems unlikely. Austria achieved a 33.6 % share ofrenewable energy sources in 2019. The country's 2030 target of 46-50 % renewable energy has a strong focus ondelivering 100 % renewable electricity generation. The bulk of the measures planned to achieve the energy efficiencytargets focus on buildings' heating needs and transport sector transition.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Finland: Latest state of playTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 30-08-2021Awtur JENSEN LISELOTTE

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentKelma għat-tiftix bijoenerġija | effiċjenza enerġetika | enerġija nukleari | enerġija rinnovabbli | gass serra | il-Finlandja | rapport | Skema

ta' Kummerċ tal-Emissjonijiet tal-UE | tibdil fil-klima | tnaqqis tal-emissjonijietSommarju The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Finland's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Finns (61 %) expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Finland generates 1.5 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissionsand has reduced emissions at a faster pace than the EU average since 2005. The country's emissions intensity islower than the EU average, and following a similar downward trend. The energy industry and transport are the mainemitting sectors in Finland, together accounting for 50 % of total emissions in 2019. With a coal phase-outcommitment, and new nuclear facilities starting operations this decade, energy industry emissions will drop. Finlandhas identified additional measures to reduce transport sector emissions. Biomass will be used for biofuels in transportas well as heat and electricity generation. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Finland was required to reduce non-ETSemissions by 16 % by 2020, compared with 2005, while for the year 2030 the reduction must reach 39 %. Finlandachieved a 43.1 % share of renewable energy sources in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a 51 % share is focusedmainly on wind and biomass. Energy efficiency measures centre on building stock renovation and voluntary energyefficiency agreements across industry and households.

Briefing EN

Sino-Japanese controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands: An imminent flashpoint in theIndo-Pacific?

Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni BriefingData 30-07-2021

Awtur GRIEGER GiselaQasam tematiku L-Affarijiet Barranin

Sommarju The 50-year-old controversy between Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan over the sovereigntyof a group of tiny, uninhabited islets and rocks in the East China Sea, administered by Japan and referred to as theSenkaku Islands in Japan, as the Diaoyu Islands in the PRC and as the Diaoyutai Islands in Taiwan has become aproxy battlefield in the growing Sino-US great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, against the backdrop of awidening Sino-Japanese power gap. Since 1971, when the PRC and Taiwan laid claim to the contested islets androcks for the first time, challenging Japan's position of having incorporated them into Japanese territory as terra nulliusin 1895, possible avenues for settling the controversy have either been unsuccessful or remained unexplored. ThePRC's meteoric economic rise and rapid military modernisation has gradually shifted the Sino-Japanese powerbalance, nourishing the PRC leadership's more assertive, albeit failed, push for Japan to recognise the existence of adispute. Two incidents in the 2010s, perceived by the PRC as consolidating Japan's administrative control, led to thePRC starting to conduct grey-zone operations in the waters surrounding the islets and rocks with increasing frequencyand duration, to reassert its claims and change the status quo in its favour without prompting a war. The EU has held aposition of principled neutrality as regards the legal title to the disputed islands. However, the risk of unintendedincidents, miscalculation and military conflict arising from the unresolved dispute poses a challenge to regional peaceand stability and to the EU's economic and security interests. The EU's 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy takes a cooperativeand inclusive approach, to promote a rules-based international order and respect for international law. This mayinclude a greater Indo-Pacific naval presence under the strategy's maritime security dimension.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 152

Peace and security in 2021: The EU's evolving relations with TurkeyTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-07-2021Awtur AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix demokratizzazzjoni | Ftehim Ewropew ta’ Assoċjazzjoni | għajnuna lir-refuġjati | it-Turkija | kooperazzjoni kummerċjali |

stat tad-dritt | tkabbir tal-Unjoni | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE | unjoni doganaliSommarju Turkey first sought cooperation with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 (European Union (EU) as of

1992), and has since been key partner of the EU on matters relating to migration, counter-terrorism and trade. The EUand Turkey have been linked by an Association Agreement since 1964, and a Customs Union Agreement since 1995.However, in recent years, EU-Turkey relations have been suffered from Turkey's lukewarm adoption of EU standardsand democratic principles and Ankara's actions in the EU neighbourhood..

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Development of organic production in the EU: 2021-2027 action planTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-07-2021Awtur CAPRILE ANNA | MCELDOWNEY James

Qasam tematiku L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliSommarju In May 2020, the European Commission published its 'farm to fork' strategy – 'for a fair, healthy and environmentally

friendly food system' – along with the EU biodiversity strategy, as part of the implementation of the European GreenDeal. In those strategies the Commission set a target of 25 % of the EU's agricultural land to be under organic farmingby 2030, as well as a significant increase in organic aquaculture. These targets aim to contribute to improving thesustainability of the food system, to reverse biodiversity loss and to reduce the use of chemical substances in the formof pesticides and fertilisers. The Commission's 2021 work programme set out its intention to prepare an action plan forthe development of organic production for the 2021 to 2027 period, and the action plan was published on 25 March2021. Offering an initial analysis of the action plan, this briefing outlines the measures envisaged and the implicationsfor different stages of the food chain in the EU. It also examines the results of the public consultation launched by theCommission in September 2020 to gather stakeholders' views on the challenges and opportunities for the organicsector. The views of key stakeholders in response to the publication of the action plan are also covered, along with theinitial views expressed by the advisory committees.

Briefing EN

Multimedia 5 facts about organic farming

Development of organic production in the EU: 2021-2027 action plan

European Union data challengeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 28-07-2021Awtur estern Olga BATURA and Roel PEETERS

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | L-Ippjanar bil-QuddiemSommarju The exponential growth and importance of data generated in industrial settings have attracted the attention of

policymakers aiming to create a suitable legal framework for its use. While the term ‘industrial data’ has no cleardefinition, such data possess certain distinctive characteristics: they are a subset of big data collected in a structuredmanner and within industrial settings; they are frequently proprietary and contain various types of sensitive data. TheGDPR rules remain of great relevance for such data, as personal data is difficult to be filtered out from mixed datasetsand anonymisation techniques are not always effective. The current and planned rules relevant for B2B sharing ofindustrial data exhibit many shortcomings. They lack clarity on key issues (e.g. mixed datasets), increase theadministrative burden for companies, yet not always provide the data protection that businesses need. They do notprovide an additional value proposition for B2B data sharing and hinder it in some cases. While this situation warrantspolicy intervention, both the instrument and its content should be carefully considered. Instead of a legal instrument,soft law could clarify the existing rules; model terms and conditions could be developed and promoted and datastandardisation and interoperability efforts supported.

Briefing EN

Improving corporate sustainability reportingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-07-2021Awtur VIKOLAINEN Vera

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju The European Commission proposed to improve sustainability reporting by revising the non-financial reporting

directive 2014/95/EU. The accompanying impact assessment (IA) provides a well-defined problem that is substantiatedwith evidence, a clear set of objectives that correspond to the problems identified and makes effort to cover SMEs inthe consultation strategy. Overall, the evidence used in the IA seems recent and reliable. However, the IA has not setany concrete targets, indicators or timelines for achieving its objectives. The range of options in the IA appears ratherimbalanced, the analysis has been predominantly economic and has focused on the effectiveness of meeting thespecific objectives and their costs, while the discussion of benefits has remained rather descriptive. Environmentalimpacts seem to have been completely excluded, the costs of indirect effects on SMEs in the supply chains of largecompanies have not been quantified and the benefits for listed SMEs have not been elaborated on.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 153

Budgetary control of the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU budgetTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 27-07-2021Awtur MONTVAI DAVID

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuSommarju As of July 2021, only very limited conclusions can be drawn about the performance of EU policies and programmes

towards the Sustainable Development Goals. With only nine years left until 2030, this raises the question as to whetherthe EU budget is used efficiently via the many spending programmes. This briefing explores what kind of measures arein place to ensure that the implementation of the EU budget contributes effectively to the SDGs at both the EU- andMember States level.

Briefing EN

Artificial intelligence actTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 26-07-2021Awtur DALLI HUBERT

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju The Commission is proposing a new Artificial Intelligence Act laying down rules harmonised rules on AI. This initial

appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposal notes how the impact assessment the impactassessment banks on a wealth of available research on the topic at hand and uses numerous sources to underpin thediscussion. It observes that the impact assessment offers a diverse and realistic range of options and traces a clearintervention logic connecting the problems and their drivers with the specific objectives and the policy options.

Briefing EN

Artificial Intelligence in smart cities and urban mobilityTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 23-07-2021Awtur estern Devin DIRAN, Anne Fleur VAN VEENSTRA, Tjerk TIMAN, Paola TESTA and Maria KIROVA

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | Il-Politika Soċjali | Is-Saħħa Pubblika | Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji | L-Ambjent | L-Enerġija | L-Ippjanar bil-Quddiem

Sommarju Artificial Intelligence (AI) enabling smart urban solutions brings multiple benefits, including more efficient energy, waterand waste management, reduced pollution, noise and traffic congestions. Local authorities face relevant challengesundermining the digital transformation from the technological, social and regulatory standpoint, namely (i) technologyand data availability and reliability, the dependency on third private parties and the lack of skills; (ii) ethical challengesfor the unbiased use of AI; and (iii) the difficulty of regulating interdependent infrastructures and data, respectively. Toovercome the identified challenges, the following actions are recommended: •EU-wide support for infrastructure andgovernance on digitalisation, including high performance computing, integrated circuits, CPUs and GPU’s, 5G, cloudservices, Urban Data Platforms, enhancing efficiency and ensuring at the same time unbiased data collection. •Inclusion of urban AI in EU research programs addressing data exchange, communication networks and policy onmobility and energy, enhancing capacity building initiatives, also through test and experimentation facilities. •Harmonising AI related policies in the EU, taking into account the context specificity: necessary research. •Adoption ofinnovative procurement procedures, entailing requirements for technical and ethically responsible AI.

Briefing EN

Application of the equal pay principle through pay transparency measuresTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-07-2021Awtur VETTORAZZI STEFANO | ZANDERSONE Laura

Qasam tematiku Il-Kwistjonijiet dwar il-Ġeneru, l-Ugwaljanza u d-DiversitàKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni ekonomika | diskriminazzjoni sesswali | kundizzjonijiet tax-xogħol | paga ndaqs | proposta (UE) |

rimunerazzojni għax-xogħol | studju tal-impatt | trattament indaqs | ugwaljanza bejn is-sessiSommarju This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the impact assessment (IA) accompanying

the Commission proposal for a directive aimed at strengthening the application of the principle of equal pay for equalwork or work of equal value between men and women, enshrined in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. Following twonegative opinions of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and an exceptional third positive one, the IA provides a goodproblem definition. The IA coherently identifies the problem drivers and makes a compelling case for theconsequences should situation remain unchanged. The options retained for assessment seem built around a pre-selected preferred option package. The analysis regarding the impact on SMEs appears to be insufficiently developedwhile the one on competitiveness is missing. The proposal includes all the measures presented in the IA's preferredpackage as well as two extra measures which were suggested, but not explicitly included in the preferred package.

Briefing EN, IT

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 154

EU-Belarus relations: State of play - Human rights situation and Ryanair flight diversionTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-07-2021Awtur PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju The falsified presidential elections of August 2020, and the brutal crackdown against peacefully protesting Belarusians,

led to the isolation of the Aliaksandr Lukashenka regime. Despite the possibility of starting dialogue with thedemocratic opposition and Belarusian society, Aliaksandr Lukashenka chose another path, involving continued brutalrepression of the country's citizens. The worsening human rights situation and hijacking of Ryanair flight FR 4978provoked a response from the EU, including a ban on Belarusian air carriers landing in or overflying the EU, a majorextension of the list of people and entities already subject to sanctions, and the introduction of sanctions on keysectors of the Belarusian economy. The EU policy also demonstrates a readiness to support a future democraticBelarus. In this respect, the European Commission presented the outline of a comprehensive plan of economic supportfor democratic Belarus, worth up to €3 billion. The European Parliament is playing an active part in shaping the EU'sresponse. Parliament does not recognise Lukashenka's presidency and is speaking out on human rights abuses inBelarus. The Belarusian democratic opposition, which was awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize, is frequently invited tospeak for the Belarusian people in the European Parliament.

Briefing EN

Artificial Intelligence and public servicesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 22-07-2021Awtur estern Tjerk TIMAN, Anne Fleur VAN VEENSTRA and Gabriela BODEA

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-Riċerka | L-Ippjanar bil-QuddiemSommarju AI has become a key enabling technology in public services and its use has increased over the past two

years.Ensuring explainabilty of AI systems in public services is crucial but difficult to achieve in case of black-boxalgorithms. In AI applications in public services, focus is on law enforcement, surveillance and process optimisation. AIfor front-end public services seems less of a priority. There is a growing public concern over the development and useof AI in society. With the increase of its use, the potential for errors and harms also increases.The public sector shouldlead the way in creating trustworthy AI. Regulatory sandboxing and pre-procurement are key for creating trustworthy AIfor public services.

Briefing EN

Review of dual-use export controlsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-07-2021Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Qasam tematiku Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem | Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Adozzjoni tal-Leġiżlazzjoni mill-PE u mill-Kunsill

Kelma għat-tiftix arma ta' qerda massiva | esportazzjoni (UE) | kompetittività | Kumitat tal-PE | kummerċ ġewwa l-UE | liċenzja tal-esportazzjoni | monitoraġġ tal-esportazzjoni | negozju illiċitu | nonproliferazzjoni nukleari | oġġett bifunzjonali |Regolament KE | restrizzjoni kummerċjali | sigurtà pubblika | statistika | tranżitu

Sommarju Certain goods and technologies have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used for military purposes; so-called 'dual-use' goods are subject to the European Union's export control regime. The regime has just been revised,mainly to take account of significant technological developments, increase transparency and create a more levelplaying field among EU Member States. The proposed regulation will recast the regulation in force since 2009. Amongother elements, the proposal explicitly defines cyber-surveillance technology as dual-use technology and introduceshuman rights violations as an explicit justification for export control. It also includes provisions to control emergingtechnologies. The proposed regulation introduces greater transparency into dual-use export control by increasing thelevel of detail Member States will have to provide on exports, licences, licence denials and prohibitions. On 17 January2018, based on the INTA committee's report on the legislative proposal, the European Parliament adopted its positionfor trilogue negotiations. For its part, the Council adopted its negotiating mandate on 5 June 2019, and on the basis ofthis mandate, the Council Presidency began negotiations with the European Parliament's delegation on 21 October2019. Trilogue negotiations ended on 9 November 2020, with agreement on a final compromise text. Endorsed by theINTA committee on 30 November, the Parliament formally voted on the text in plenary on 25 March 2021. TheRegulation was published in the Official Journal on 11 June 2021 and enters into force on 8 September 2021. Seventhedition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 155

A new neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instrument – Global EuropeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-07-2021Awtur IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Qasam tematiku L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix għajnuna ta’ qabel l-adeżjoni | Il-Politika Ewropea għat-Tħaris tal-Inħawi fil-Qrib | integrazzjoni Ewropea | pajjiż terz |

pajjiżi u territorji barranin | politika ta' kooperazzjoni | proposta (UE) | sikurezza nukleari | strument finanzjarju tal-'UE |studju tal-impatt | żvilupp sostenibbli

Sommarju In the context of the Commission's proposal for a multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period, on14 June 2018 the Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing the Neighbourhood, Developmentand International Cooperation Instrument. Council and Parliament agreed in trilogue negotiations, which ended inMarch 2021, that Parliament would have an enhanced role in defining the main strategic choices of the instrument,through a delegated act and twice-yearly geopolitical dialogue. The Commission also committed to inform Parliamentprior to any use of the 'emerging challenges and priorities cushion', and take its remarks into consideration. Parliamentinsisted that any activities related to migration had to be in line with the objectives of the instrument, and also securedsafeguards on the amounts for capacity-building, election observation missions, local authorities, Erasmus, the Pacificand the Caribbean. Negotiators also agreed to include a reference, in a recital, to existing EU financial rules that allowfor the suspension of assistance if a country fails to observe the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule oflaw. As a final step, negotiators agreed to change the name of the instrument to the Neighbourhood, Development andInternational Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe. After formal adoption by Council and Parliament the regulationwas signed on 9 June 2021, and it entered into force on 14 June 2021. The regulation applies retroactively from 1January 2021. Sixth edition. The 'Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Strengthening Europol’s mandateTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 20-07-2021Awtur EISELE Katharina

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju Europol has been at the forefront of fighting serious and organised crime in the EU. However, with digital

transformations and a global interconnectedness emerging, security threats have become more complex. Against thisbackground, the Commission has published a recast proposal of the Europol Regulation with the objective of, inter alia,(1) enabling Europol to support Member States and their investigations through big data analysis; (2) enabling Europolto directly exchange data with private parties; and (3) strengthening Europol's role on research and innovation. Whilethe Commission made efforts to analyse the problems at hand in the accompanying Impact Assessment, more detailedinformation on the scale and size of the different problems would have been useful. The Commission conductedseveral targeted consultations for this initiative, but did not carry out a mandatory 12-week open public consultation.The IA assesses relevant impacts, including fundamental rights impacts.

Briefing EN

'Future proofing' EU policies-The why, what and how of stress testingTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-07-2021Awtur FERNANDES MEENAKSHI | HEFLICH ALEKSANDRA

Qasam tematiku Il-Valur Miżjud EwropewSommarju Governments and policymakers around the world are increasingly stress testing policies to get ‘ahead of the curve’ and

to be better equipped in response to plausible futures that may include disruptive events. This EAVA in Action providesan introduction to stress testing and how it could support the work of the European Parliament. The use of stresstesting could add value at all stages of the EU legislative cycle and complement existing regulatory policy tools such asex-ante assessment and ex-post evaluation. It could be applied as an anticipatory governance tool across all policyareas to identify weaknesses and opportunities to reinforce the legislative framework.

Briefing EN

Tackling distortions of foreign subsidiesTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-07-2021Awtur KRAMER Esther

Qasam tematiku Il-Valutazzjoni tal-Impatt Ex-AnteSommarju The IA underpinning the proposal to tackle foreign subsidies is based on solid internal and external research, which

compensates an admitted lack of data. It is transparent about methods, underlying assumptions and certain limitations.The intervention logic of the IA is clear, even if the complex set-up of the policy options and their assessment couldhave been more structured and coherent. The IA does not present operational objectives and few, yet pertinent,monitoring provisions. While the mostly qualitative assessment is thorough and contains selective quantitativeinformation, total cost and benefits could not be estimated. Potential negative effects in case of a significant drop offoreign investments, for instance on employment or prices, could have been addressed in more detail.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 156

European Court of Justice case law on judicial independenceTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-07-2021Awtur MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti LegaliSommarju Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lists the values upon which the Union is founded. According to this

Article, these values are shared by the Member States and form the axiological backbone of EU law. The rule of law islisted, alongside democracy and fundamental rights, among the crucial values underpinning the Union. However,Article 2 TEU is more than just a mere declaration; it is also a source of binding obligations upon the Member States touphold the Union's values, and therefore also the rule of law. The latter concept, despite broad discussions as to itsexact content, undoubtedly entails such elements as judicial independence, understood in particular as theindependence of the judiciary from other branches of government (legislative, executive). All other elements of the ruleof law, such as the principle of legality, whereby government may act only on the basis of law and within itsboundaries, or the principle of constitutionalism, whereby the parliament's law-making powers must be exercised withinthe limits of the constitution, or the existence of judicial review to enforce those principles – all depend on judicialindependence as their fundamental pre-condition. Recently, however, faced with challenges to judicial independencein certain Member States (as evidenced by on-going Article 7 TEU proceedings), the European Union has starteddeveloping its own standards in this area. Examples include the Commission's rule of law framework (adopted in2014), its two communications on the rule of law, and the annual rule of law report, the first of which was adopted inSeptember 2020. The case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) plays a crucial role in this respect, and scholarspoint out that the Court has been the most effective EU institution with regard to safeguarding judicial independence inthe Member States. The present briefing provides a concise chronological overview of the Court's recent case law onjudicial independence – described by scholars as 'truly revolutionary' – starting from the 2018 Portuguese Judgescase.

Briefing EN

EU-Swiss trade relations and the institutional framework agreementTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-07-2021Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | L-Affarijiet BarraninSommarju On 26 May 2021, the Federal Council of Switzerland (Swiss executive authority) announced that the country will not

formally sign the institutional framework agreement (IFA) agreed at political level with the European Union (EU) in2018, thereby ending the negotiation process. The objective of the IFA was to create a horizontal governanceframework that would have covered five major EU-Swiss trade-related bilateral agreements signed in 1999, part of the'Bilaterals I' package. It also provided for dynamic alignment of standards in the domains covered by the IFA, a disputesettlement mechanism with jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU on EU law, and State aid rules. The EUconsiders that Switzerland does not respect all of its commitments in the existing agreements, which give the countryaccess to parts of the EU's single market; it perceives the current situation as unbalanced, partly due to the absence ofdispute settlement mechanisms in the existing agreements. In addition, the dynamic alignment and State aid rulesenvisaged in the IFA would have enhanced fair competition between EU and Swiss businesses ('level playing field').Switzerland, although it aims to 'deepen' its relations with the EU by means of new sectoral agreements, is concernedby the potential application of the EU Citizens' Right Directive, as well as the potential future removal of the labourmarket exemptions provided by the IFA protocols. To a lesser extent, it is also concerned with the IFA's State aid rules.Switzerland consequently requested 'explicit clarification' from the EU on these points in 2019, then resumed talks in2021. According to the European Commission and European Parliament, 'the door is always open', but newagreements are unlikely to be signed without a framework agreement. The Commission has also emphasised that theupgrading of existing agreements – necessary whenever new EU standards are adopted to maintain their applicability– will be assessed on a case-by-case basis to prevent unintended effects. Medical device equivalence, previouslycovered by provisions of the EU-Swiss Mutual Recognition Agreement, is the first no longer to be applied as aconsequence of changes in EU standards.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 157

Protecting pollinators in the EUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 19-07-2021Awtur HALLEUX Vivienne

Qasam tematiku L-AmbjentSommarju Europe hosts a rich diversity of wild pollinators, including over 2 000 species of bees, more than 480 species of

butterflies, almost 1 000 species of hoverflies and thousands of other insect species. In the European Union (EU), 78% of native flora and 84 % of crops are either partially or fully dependent on insects for pollination. Significant pollinatorloss has been documented over time across the EU. According to the European Red List of Bees, around 9 % of allbee species are threatened in the EU. The EU grassland butterfly indicator has recorded a 39 % decline in grasslandbutterfly abundance since 1990. Studies in selected European countries have provided further examples of pollinatordeclines. Such loss entails risks for both societies and ecosystems. EU legislation relevant to pollinator protectionincludes the Habitats Directive; the regulatory framework on pesticides; and the common agricultural policy (CAP). TheEU rules governing the approval of pesticides require consideration of pesticide effects on honeybees. The EuropeanFood Safety Agency (EFSA) is currently reviewing its 2013 guidance on the risk assessment of pesticides on bees,which was never formally adopted due to insufficient support from Member States. One key aspect of the reviewprocess is the setting of specific protection goals, defining the maximum acceptable level of harm to bees, on whichEU ministers have recently agreed. Assessments of action at EU level identified gaps in the key EU policiesaddressing the main threats to wild pollinators. Although progress has been made in the implementation of the EUpollinators initiative (EPI), adopted in 2018 to tackle the decline of wild pollinators, more needs to be done, in particularto address the loss of habitats in farming landscapes and the impacts of pesticides. The EU Biodiversity and the Farmto Fork strategies set out specific targets that can help advance pollinator conservation. Integrating them into the newCAP however remains a major challenge. Pollinator protection is a key issue for the European Parliament, which madeclear that the revision of the EFSA bee guidance document should ensure a level of protection at least equivalent tothat laid down in 2013. Parliament also called for an urgent revision of the EU pollinators initiative, a ban on allneonicotinoid-based pesticides and the inclusion of EU-wide binding pesticide reduction targets in the upcomingrevision of the directive on the sustainable use of pesticides.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Protecting pollinators

National budgets and the European Union budget since 2007Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-07-2021Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos | DOBREVA Alina | KRESNICHKA-NIKOLCHOVA NADEJDA

Qasam tematiku Il-BaġitSommarju National budgets are a competence of the national governments of the Member States. However, EU countries

adopting the euro have to meet specific conditions designed to ensure economic convergence, known as theconvergence criteria or Maastricht criteria (agreed by the Member States in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992). Theyinclude conditions on sound and sustainable public finances, along with the macroeconomic indicators - price stability,durability of convergence, and exchange rate stability.

Briefing EN

Committee hearings in the European Parliament and US CongressTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 16-07-2021Awtur DEL MONTE Micaela | DIAZ CREGO Maria

Qasam tematiku Id-Demokrazija, il-Liġi Istituzzjonali u Parlamentari tal-UESommarju Hearings are used by parliamentary committees as a way to obtain evidence on specific subjects to inform their work

and as public forums to give citizens access to information on policy issues. Committee hearings take different formsdepending on their specific purposes. Oversight and legislative hearings are frequently used to hold the executive toaccount and to inform parliaments' choices as regards proposed or adopted legislation. Investigative hearings, usuallyheld in the context of parliamentary inquiries, often have distinctive features, with some parliaments granted the right tosummon witnesses and take testimony under oath. Finally, some parliaments have relevant appointment powers asregards key positions in the executive or the judiciary and may use pre-appointment hearings to test the suitability ofcandidates or extract commitments from them. The European Parliament's committees frequently organise publichearings with experts for oversight and legislative purposes. They also hold public hearings on European citizens'initiatives, once a given initiative has gathered the necessary public support. Also relevant in the EuropeanParliament's committee work are pre-appointment hearings, in particular those held as part of the procedure forappointing the members of the European Commission. European Parliament committees of inquiry can also invitedifferent categories of witnesses to provide evidence. US Congressional committees, meanwhile, hold oversight,investigative, legislative and confirmation hearings, the latter being peculiar to the Senate, as the President has thepower to nominate people to key positions in the executive and judiciary branch 'with the advice and consent of theSenate'. In the context of the ongoing internal discussion launched by the President of the European Parliament, DavidSassoli, on how to make the Parliament a more resilient and effective institution in the wake of the coronaviruspandemic, this Briefing provides an overview of how committee hearings are organised and conducted in both theEuropean Parliament and the US Congress.

Briefing EN

30-07-2022 Sors : © Unjoni Ewropea, 2022 - PE 158

Revision of the EU Blue Card DirectiveTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-07-2021Awtur LECERF Marie

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix eżodu ta' mħuħ | fruntiera interna tal-UE | liġi tax-xogħol | migrazzjoni okkupazzjonali | mobilità tas-suq tax-xogħol |

pajjiż terz | permess tax-xogħol | persuna ta' nazzjonalità barranija | politika dwar il-migrazzjoni tal-UE | relazzjonijietinternazzjonali | studju tal-impatt | vot parlamentari | ħaddiem migrant | ħaddiem tas-sengħa

Sommarju Attracting highly qualified immigrants to Europe has been one of the EU's key priorities for several years. However, upuntil now the EU has not been as successful as other OECD countries. This demand for workers is expected toincrease due to the increasing shortage of certain skills and the aging of the EU's population. The proposed directive,which would replace the 2009 Blue Card Directive, increases the attractiveness of the EU highly skilled migrationscheme by expanding its scope, lowering criteria for admission or expanding the rights of beneficiaries. On 15 June2017, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) adopted its report, and voted to openinterinstitutional negotiations. After the Council agreed its mandate, trilogue meetings started in September 2017, butlittle progress was made before the end of the 2014-2019 parliamentary term. In October 2019, Parliament decided toresume work on the file in the context of ‘unfinished business’ to be carried over to the new legislature. The EuropeanCommission’s ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’, presented on 23 September 2020, stressed the need to finalisethe negotiations. On 17 May 2021, the Parliament and the Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council finally reached aninterim agreement on the revision of the directive. On 21 May, Member States’ ambassadors, in the Committee ofPermanent Representatives, endorsed the agreement. And on 3 June, the LIBE committee also endorsed theagreement reached with the Council. Parliament is expected to vote on adopting the agreed text during the September2021 plenary session. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by Martina Prpic. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Addressing the dissemination of terrorist content onlineTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-07-2021Awtur LUYTEN KATRIEN

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix aċċess għall-informazzjoni | internet | radikalizzazzjoni | servizz ta' data online | terroriżmu | tixrid ta' informazzjoni

Sommarju Dissemination of terrorist content is one of the most widespread and most dangerous forms of misuse of onlineservices in the field of internal security. In line with the 2015 European agenda on security, and taking into account theimpact of this propaganda on the radicalisation, recruitment and training of terrorists, the European Commissionlaunched a voluntary system for tackling terrorism online, based on guidelines and recommendations. However, giventhe limitations of self-regulation, in September 2018 the Commission proposed a regulation on preventing thedissemination of terrorist content online through the removal of such content within one hour of being posted. While theCouncil rapidly reached a position on the proposal, the European Parliament adopted its first-reading position in April2019. Following the European elections, and the appointment of a new rapporteur, interinstitutional triloguenegotiations on the proposal began in autumn 2019. The trilogue meetings were delayed several times, because of thecoronavirus pandemic among other reasons. After a new series of terrorist attacks hit Europe in autumn 2020,Parliament and Council reached political agreement on 10 December 2020. The most contentious issues related to thecross-border effect of withdrawal orders and to the use of automated filters to detect terrorist content online. After theCouncil adopted the text on 16 March 2021, Parliament adopted it in plenary on 28 April. The Regulation entered intoforce on 6 June and will apply as of 7 June 2022. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by François Théron. The'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Tackling online terrorist propaganda

European Court of Justice and international agreementsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-07-2021Awtur CIRLIG Carmen-Cristina | MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti LegaliSommarju As a subject of public international law, the European Union (EU) concludes international agreements with other

subjects of international law, i.e. international organisations and states. The EU may enter into such treaties on its own,or jointly with its Member States – depending on the area of competence (exclusive EU competence or sharedcompetences) to which the treaty in question applies. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) enjoys specificcompetences with regard to the conclusion, interpretation and application of international treaties to which the EU is aparty. The ECJ can verify the compatibility of an international agreement with the EU Treaties either ex ante or ex post.Furthermore, international treaties concluded by the EU are considered as acts of the institutions and may be subjectto interpretation by the Court, especially in the preliminary reference procedure. As a rule no ECJ jurisdiction isenvisaged in EU free trade agreements (FTAs), as dispute settlement is carried out through a joint committee, followedby arbitration. In certain specific cases, such as in the European Economic Area and the EU-Turkey Customs Union,the ECJ may have direct involvement in the enforcement of the agreement. The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and theEU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), however, diverge on dispute settlement rules and the role of theECJ. In the former, the ECJ maintained its jurisdiction during, as well as beyond, the transition period with regard tospecific chapters; the ECJ also has the final word on interpreting EU law applied in virtue of the agreement.Conversely, the TCA includes a role for the Court only in regard to the United Kingdom's participation in EUprogrammes, and its dispute settlement rules vary throughout the agreement.

Briefing EN

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The Sustainable Development Goals in the EU budgetTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 15-07-2021Awtur KALLQVIST TILDA MARIA ELISABETH

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll BaġitarjuSommarju This briefing will present an overview of the implementation of the SDGs in the EU long-term budget.

Briefing EN

Re-starting tourism in the EU amid the pandemicTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2021Awtur Niestadt Maria

Qasam tematiku It-Turiżmu | L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaKelma għat-tiftix epidemija | għajnuna mill-Istat | il-Bank Ewropew tal-Investiment | inizjattiva tal-UE | konsegwenza ekonomika | marda

tal-coronavirus | moviment liberu tal-persuni | prevenzjoni tal-mard | rapport | rkupru ekonomiku | turiżmuSommarju Tourism plays an enormously important role in the EU economy and society. It generates foreign exchange, supports

jobs and businesses, and drives forward local development and cultural exchanges. It also makes places moreattractive, not only as destinations to visit but also as locations to live, work, invest and study. Furthermore, as tourismis closely linked with many other sectors – particularly transport – it also affects the wider economy. The coronaviruspandemic has hit the tourism sector hard. The impact on various tourist destinations in the EU has been asymmetricaland highly localised, reflecting differences in types of tourism on offer, varying travel restrictions, the size of domestictourism markets, level of exposure to international tourism, and the importance of tourism in the local economy. At thebeginning of summer 2021, several EU Member States started to remove certain travel restrictions (such as therequirements for quarantine or testing for fully vaccinated travellers coming from certain countries). However, allcontinue to apply many sanitary and health measures (such as limits on the number of people in common areas, andcleaning and disinfection of spaces). Such measures and restrictions change in line with the evolving public healthsituation, sometimes at short notice, making recovery difficult for the sector. The EU and its Member States haveprovided the tourism sector with financial and other support. Some measures were already adopted in 2020. Otherswere endorsed only shortly before the beginning of summer 2021. One flagship action has been the speedy adoptionof an EU Digital Covid Certificate. This certificate harmonises, at EU level, proof of vaccination, Covid-19 test resultsand certified recovery from the virus. However, it does not end the patchwork of travel rules. Despite efforts toharmonise travel rules at Council level, Member States still apply different rules to various categories of traveller (suchas children or travellers arriving from third countries).

Briefing EN

Understanding initial coin offerings: A new means of raising funds based on blockchainTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2021Awtur DELIVORIAS Angelos

Qasam tematiku Kwistjonijiet Ekonomiċi u MonetarjiKelma għat-tiftix Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq | blockchain | finanzjament tat-terroriżmu | investiment fil-fażi inizjali | kapital ta'

riskju | munita virtwali | negozju ġdid | ħasil tal-flusSommarju Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a relatively new method of raising capital for early-stage ventures. They allow

businesses to raise capital for their projects, by issuing digital tokens in exchange for crypto assets or fiat currencies.They constitute an alternative to more traditional sources of start-up funding such as venture capital (VC) and angelfinance. ICOs can potentially offer advantages in comparison with traditional ways of raising capital. At the same time,their opacity and the general tendency for issuers to exploit regulatory loopholes can carry significant risk for investors,may make ICOs vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing, and could even create financial stabilityconcerns. ICOs have been met with a wide range of initial regulatory responses: from an outright ban in the case ofChina and South Korea, to more supportive approaches in other jurisdictions, with Singapore in Asia and Switzerlandin Europe leading the way. As for the European Union (EU) and the United States, the relevant regulatory agenciesinitially published warning notices, reinforced by statements that securities laws could apply and registration benecessary. The EU went a step further and is currently seeking to partially regulate ICOs, with a proposal for aregulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA regulation). Meanwhile, some Member States are currently implementingregulatory sandboxes, to provide an impetus for innovation without imposing the immediate burden of regulation.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Understanding initial coin offerings: A new means of raising funds based on blockchain

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Towards a common EU approach to lifting coronavirus-related restrictions on freedom of movementTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 13-07-2021Awtur DUMBRAVA Costica

Qasam tematiku L-Ispazju ta'' Libertà, Sigurtà u ĠustizzjaSommarju To reduce the spread of the coronavirus, Member States have taken a wide range of measures, which have

significantly affected the free movement of people in the EU. Restrictions on freedom of movement have varied in timeand across countries – following generally but not strictly – successive 'waves' of coronavirus infections. Since thebeginning of the pandemic, the EU and the Member States have been active in developing a coordinated response tothe pandemic, starting from emergency measures to mitigate the effects of the sudden introduction of border controlsin the early days of the pandemic to establishing common approaches on risk indicators, interoperable contact tracingapps, vaccination and digital certification. This briefing provides an overview of the main restrictions on free movementadopted by the EU and Schengen countries focusing on control measures at the internal borders introduced betweenMarch 2020 and July 2021. It then discusses the key steps taken by the EU and the Member States to develop acommon approach to lifting restrictions on freedom of movement. The briefing also places the coronavirus-relatedrestrictions of movement in the context of broader efforts to update and strengthen the Schengen system, which hasbeen under stress for at least a decade. This is an updated edition of an EPRS briefing published in November 2020.

Briefing EN

Rail passengers' rights and obligations in the EUTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-07-2021Awtur Niestadt Maria | SCORDAMAGLIA Damiano

Qasam tematiku Il-Protezzjoni tal-Konsumatur | It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix każistika (UE) | kumpanija tat-trasport | liġi tal-UE | obbligazzjoni | persuna b'diżabilità | politika komuni tat-trasport |

proposta (UE) | protezzjoni tal-konsumatur | studju tal-impatt | tariffa għall-passiġġieri | trasport ferrovjarju | trasport ta’veloċità qawwija | ġarr ta’ passiġġieri

Sommarju In 2007, the EU established a set of basic rights for rail passengers, which became applicable at the end of 2009.These rights provide for all passengers, including those with reduced mobility, a harmonised minimum level ofprotection, information and assistance. Reports have concluded that the implementation of these rights, althoughrelatively smooth, is not done uniformly across the EU. Moreover, other shortcomings have prevented these rights frombeing used to their full potential. In September 2017, the European Commission presented a new proposal to addressthese issues and to strike a new balance between keeping rail operators competitive and providing adequatepassenger protection. The European Parliament adopted its first-reading position on this proposal on 15 November2018. For its part, the Council adopted its general approach on 2 December 2019, under the Finnish Presidency.Interinstitutional negotiations began at the end of January 2020, and on 1 October 2020, under the GermanyPresidency, Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the text. On 29 April 2021, the EuropeanParliament voted in favour of the agreed text as adopted by the Council. The new rules were published in the OfficialJournal of the EU on 17 May 2021. They will apply in principle to all international and domestic rail journeys andservices in the EU from 7 June 2023. However, Member States may exempt domestic rail services for a limited time.Seventh edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Single European Sky 2+ package: Amended Commission proposalTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 12-07-2021Awtur Niestadt Maria

Qasam tematiku It-TrasportKelma għat-tiftix Ajru Uniku Ewropew | ajruspazju | Eurocontrol | kontroll tat-traffiku tal-ajru | l-Aġenzija Ewropea dwar is-Sigurtà fl-

Avjazzjoni | politika komuni tat-trasport | proposta (UE) | protezzjoni ambjentali | sikurezza tal-ajruSommarju The Single European Sky (SES) initiative aims to make EU airspace less fragmented and to improve air traffic

management in terms of safety, capacity, cost-efficiency and the environment. Its current regulatory framework isbased on two legislative packages: SES I (adopted in 2004), which set the principal legal framework, and SES II(adopted in 2009), which aimed to tackle substantial air traffic growth, increase safety, and reduce costs and delaysand the impact of air traffic on the environment. Nonetheless, European airspace remains fragmented, costly andinefficient. The European Commission presented a revision of the SES in 2013 (the SES 2+ package). While theParliament adopted its first-reading position in March 2014, in December 2014 the Council agreed only a partialgeneral approach, owing to disagreement between the UK and Spain over the application of the text to Gibraltarairport. With Brexit having removed this blockage, the Commission has amended its initial proposal. The Council andthe Parliament have both adopted their positions on the revised proposal, and can thus start trilogue negotiations.Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

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EU-UK relations: Difficulties in implementing the Northern Ireland ProtocolTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-07-2021Awtur HALLAK ISSAM

Qasam tematiku Il-Kummerċ Internazzjonali | L-Affarijiet BarraninKelma għat-tiftix ftehim (UE) | għalf tal-annimali | Irlanda ta’ Fuq | kontroll fuq il-fruntiera | moviment liberu tal-merkanzija | prodott

alimentari | prodott mill-annimali | prodott tal-laħam | produzzjoni tal-għelejjel | rapport | suq uniku | ħruġ mill-UESommarju On 3 March 2021, the United Kingdom (UK) Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Brandon Lewis, announced in a

written statement to the UK Parliament, and without consulting the European Union (EU) in advance, that the graceperiod on border controls on a series of food and live products shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland would beextended. This meant that products of animal origin, composite products, food and feed of non-animal origin and plantsand plant products could continue being shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland without the official certification,such as health and phytosanitary certificates, required by the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland (the Protocol) ofthe Withdrawal Agreement (WA). In response to the UK's decision, the EU launched legal action against the UK forbreaching the provisions of the Protocol, as well as the good faith obligation under the WA. According to the Protocol,the UK must establish border controls on goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland according to EUlaw. The application of EU law to Northern Ireland, together with the conduct of border controls within the UK, wasdesigned to prevent the establishment of physical border controls (a 'hard border') on the island of Ireland, so as tosafeguard the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement which brought peace in Northern Ireland, while preserving the integrityof the EU's single market. The grace period on border controls was agreed by the EU and the UK in December 2020as a temporary solution to problems raised by the UK. The UK government has reiterated that it intends to implementthe Protocol, but that the border controls are causing trade disruption between Great Britain and Northern Ireland andrequire time to be resolved. It has also mentioned other issues involving areas as diverse as medicinal supplies andparcel shipments, as well as the complexity of customs systems and implementation of exchange of informationbetween the EU and the UK. On 30 June 2021, the EU and the UK reached an agreement on some solutions,including the extension of the grace period on meat products, conditional on tight controls.

Briefing EN

New EU strategic priorities for the Sahel: Addressing regional challenges through better governanceTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-07-2021Awtur PICHON Eric

Qasam tematiku Is-Sigurtà u d-Difiża | L-Affarijiet Barranin | L-Għajnuna għall-Iżvilupp u UmanitarjaKelma għat-tiftix demokrazija | drittijiet tal-bniedem | governanza | is-Saħel | kolp ta' stat | migrazzjoni forzata | Politika Estera u ta'

Sigurtà Komuni | rapport | Soċjetà ċivili | stat tad-dritt | strateġija tal-UE | terroriżmuSommarju Recent events have shown that the Sahel region remains highly politically unstable. The military takeover of the

Chadian government following President Idriss Déby's sudden death in April 2021 and the repercussions of the August2020 and May 2021 military coups in Mali are worrying signs of weak democratic governance structures. BurkinaFaso's transitional democracy has also been severely destabilised by the activities of extremist groups and internalconflicts. This political fragility and the lack of government legitimacy have made the responses to the Sahel's securityand humanitarian issues all the more challenging. The continued threat posed by terrorist armed groups and risingintercommunal violence over land and resources have led to both internal and cross-border displacements in Sahelcountries. Meanwhile, the inadequacy of governance mechanisms for managing this displacement, compounded byenvironmental degradation, resource scarcity and population growth, has created a severe humanitarian crisis. Since2011, the European Union (EU) strategy for the Sahel has focused on both security and development to address thesenumerous and interconnected challenges. However, EU efforts have remained dominated by a military approach totackle rising terrorist activity, achieving concrete results but ultimately falling short of long-term regional stability. Thenew EU integrated strategy in the Sahel aims to strengthen action at the political level, focusing on governancemechanisms, human rights, and collaboration with civil society and local authorities, while maintaining securitycooperation with states in the region.

Briefing EN

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Fighting discrimination in sportTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-07-2021Awtur KATSAROVA Ivana

Qasam tematiku Il-KulturaKelma għat-tiftix diskriminazzjoni abbażi tal-orjentament sesswali | diskriminazzjoni etnika | diskriminazzjoni sesswali | Eurostat | It-

Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea | kampanja għall-għarfien pubbliku | Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea| programm tal-UE | razziżmu | sport | statistika tal-UE | Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-UE

Sommarju Even though the European Union (EU) has built an extensive framework of legislation, instances of racism andhomophobia in sport are still rife. Interestingly, Eurostat surveys reveal that the feeling of discrimination is morewidespread than actual discrimination. Although there are some variations, discrimination in sport very frequentlyinvolves stigmatisation on the basis of external characteristics such as skin colour, body shape and gender. Data from2017 show that some 3 % of respondents claimed to have experienced racist violence in the previous year, withanother 24 % being exposed to racist harassment in that period. Worryingly, the results of a 2018 poll confirm that thevast majority of respondents (90 %) perceive homo/transphobia to be a problem in sport, with gay men feelinghomophobia to be a bigger problem than lesbian/gay women and bisexual people. Action against discrimination at EUlevel is grounded in an established EU legal framework, based on a number of Treaty provisions – in particular Articles2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union, and Articles 10, 19 and 67(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union. The general principles of non-discrimination and equality are also reaffirmed in the Charter ofFundamental Rights of the EU. This legal arsenal is completed by a number of directives and framework decisions –such as the Racial Equality Directive, the Victims' Rights Directive and the Framework Decision on Combating Racismand Xenophobia, to name but a few – aimed at increasing individual protection. The objectives of the sports strand ofthe Erasmus+ programme include combatting violence, discrimination and intolerance in sport and providing fundingfor various projects such as the setting up of LGBTQI+ sports clubs in central and eastern Europe, increasing inclusionin sport, and by bringing together partners who traditionally face barriers to participation, such as women, the LGBTQI+community and people with disabilities. In addition, since 2016, the European Commission has supported the Councilof Europe in promoting safety and security at sports events. In recent years, the Gay Games and the European Gayand Lesbian Multi-Sports Championships have helped raise awareness, build self-esteem and change perceptionsbased on prejudice.

Briefing EN

Mental health and the pandemicTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 09-07-2021Awtur SCHOLZ Nicole

Qasam tematiku Is-Saħħa PubblikaKelma għat-tiftix azzjoni tal-UE | epidemija | marda mentali | marda tal-coronavirus | OECD | Organizzazzjoni Dinjija tas-Saħħa |

persuna żagħżugħa | rapport | saħħa mentaliSommarju While the pandemic is primarily a physical health crisis, it has also had widespread impact on people's mental health,

inducing, among other things, considerable levels of fear, worry, and concern. The growing burden on mental healthhas been referred to by some as the 'second' or 'silent' pandemic. While negative mental health consequences affectall ages, young people, in particular, have been found to be at high risk of developing poor mental health. Specificgroups have been particularly hard hit, including health and care workers, people with pre-existing mental healthproblems, and women. The pandemic has also appeared to increase inequalities in mental health, both within thepopulation and between social groups. To address the population's increased psycho-social needs, the World HealthOrganization Regional Office for Europe established an expert group on the mental health impacts of Covid-19 in theEuropean region. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has issued analyses and guidanceon mental health in general and the pandemic's impact on mental health in particular. At European Union level, aDecember 2020 European Commission communication addressed the pandemic's impact on mental health. In May2021, the Commission organised a major online stakeholder event, and published best practice examples of solutionspresented. A July 2020 European Parliament resolution recognises mental health as a fundamental human right,calling for a 2021-2027 EU action plan on mental health. Members of the European Parliament have also called on theCommission to put mental health at the heart of EU policymaking. Stakeholders broadly rally around calls forprogrammes and funding to improve citizens' mental health, not least to respond to the pandemic's long-termimplications.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Mental health and the pandemic

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EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlookTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-07-2021Awtur AUGÈRE-GRANIER Marie-Laure | MCELDOWNEY James

Qasam tematiku L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliKelma għat-tiftix depopolazzjoni | insedjament rurali | komunità rurali | migrazzjoni rurali | popolazzjoni rurali | rapport | reġjun rurali |

ħabitat rurali | żvilupp ruraliSommarju On 30 June 2021, the European Commission adopted a communication on its long-term vision for the EU's rural areas.

The communication identifies areas of action with a view to creating new momentum for the EU's rural areas, whilerecognising their diversity. In recent decades, in many Member States rural areas have experienced depopulation.Such regions face a range of environmental and socio-economic challenges. These include, for example, lower incomeper capita, a higher percentage of the population at risk of poverty and social exclusion, a lack of access to basicinfrastructure and services, and lower levels of access to fast broadband internet. The EU's rural development policyhas sought to help address these challenges. Evaluation evidence is emerging on the impact of the commonagricultural policy (CAP) on the territorial development of the EU's rural areas. Measures relating to village renewal andLEADER (Liaison entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie rurale) measures are considered to be well-targetedand relevant to local needs, although they represent a small proportion of CAP financing. Administrative burdens havebeen raised as an issue that can impact on the developmental process. Recommendations from this evaluationevidence point to the need for better integration of funding streams, the need to maintain a dialogue across theEuropean structural funds, and all the implications this may have for the new CAP strategic plans. The Commission'srecommendations to Member States on their CAP strategic plans highlight a number of recurring themes relating to theemployment, education and training needs of rural areas, including the need to address rural depopulation, promotegenerational renewal, improve connectivity, and address the role played by action taken at local level. TheCommission's communication on a long-term vision for rural areas includes provision for a 'rural pact' to engage actorsat EU, national, rural and local levels and an EU rural action plan, setting out a range of initiatives and actionableprojects. The vision and its supporting analyses will provide a framework for addressing the future of the EU's ruralareas.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook

The financial management of visitor groups to the national parliamentsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 08-07-2021Awtur POUWELS Alexandra Cynthia Jana

Qasam tematiku Il-Baġit | Il-Kontroll Baġitarju | L-Ippjanar bil-QuddiemKelma għat-tiftix gratifiki u spejjeż | il-Ġermanja | immaniġġjar finanzjarju | ir-Renju Unit | l-Ungerija | Parlament Ewropew | parlament

nazzjonali | rapport | vjaġġarSommarju In most Member States, visitor’ groups are not sponsored to visit the national parliament. A visit to the national

parliament is free of charge, and all the costs related to the visit, for example travel costs, accommodation and localminor expenses, need to be paid by the visitors themselves. Germany is the only country which has various kinds ofprogrammes where visitors can be reimbursed. Members of Parliament can invite up to 200 people a year of which thetravel costs are partially covered by the German Bundestag. There is also a programme which consists of more daysfor which all the costs related to travel and accommodation are covered by the German government. The GermanBundesrat has a programme in which the 16 federal states can invite people for a visit of multiple days to Berlin. In thiscase the travel costs and accommodation are paid for by the Bundesrat. For all reimbursements, the rules apply thatthe receipts and underlying documents need to be provided to the Bundestag and Bundesrat after the visit. Alldocuments and receipts are checked through an ex-post control. The United Kingdom has a programme in whichcosts are reimbursed, and this programme is funded by the commercial tours of the parliament. In this case, it can beMPs, Peers or the House of Commons or Lords who can invite visitors who are eligible for reimbursement. InHungary, only schools can get reimbursement for their travel costs and the entry fee for the national parliament. All thereceipts need to be provided to the visitor service of the parliament. Some countries do have other schemes in whichthey provide coverage for schools or costs are covered by the MPs’ own funds. The Council of the EU does notsponsor visitor groups. All visits are requested by visitors themselves and they need to cover all the costs related to thevisit themselves. The questions were also sent to the European Commission but no answer was received.

Briefing EN

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Protection of animals during transport: Data on live animal transportTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-07-2021Awtur ROJEK Beata

Qasam tematiku L-Agrikultura u l-Iżvilupp ReġjonaliSommarju Each year, millions of live animals are transported by road, sea, rail and air within, and to and from, the European

Union, for a number of reasons, such as slaughter, fattening or breeding. To protect their welfare during thosejourneys, the EU adopted Regulation 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport. An evaluation of theregulation showed that, when correctly implemented and enforced, it had a positive impact on animal welfare.However, in some areas weaknesses still persist, largely due to insufficient implementation. In the light of theseconclusions, and bearing in mind its 2012-2015 animal welfare strategy, the European Commission announced itsintention to revise the animal welfare legislation, including legislation on animal transport. Despite the action taken,however, in recent years, repeated breaches of the rules, resulting in accidents and severe animal welfare crises, havebeen highlighted by EU and national control bodies and by animal welfare organisations. On 19 June 2020, theEuropean Parliament set up the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT). The workof the committee focused on investigating how EU rules laid down in Regulation 1/2005 are being implemented byMember States and enforced by the European Commission. It held public hearings with the participation ofstakeholders, representatives of national authorities and experts. Insight from these debates fed into the committee'sreport and recommendations to Council and the Commission. This briefing is one of four requested by the ANITcommittee to provide research and analysis following the results of a questionnaire sent out by the committee toMember States. It gives an overview of available data on the transport of live animals.

Briefing EN, FR

Understanding delegated and implementing actsTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 07-07-2021Awtur DEL MONTE Micaela | MAŃKO Rafał

Qasam tematiku Il-Liġi tal-UE: Is-Sistema u l-Atti LegaliKelma għat-tiftix It-Trattat ta’ Liżbona | liġi tal-UE | rapport | Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-UE

Sommarju Law-making by the executive is a phenomenon that exists not only in the European Union (EU) but also in its MemberStates, as well as in other Western liberal democracies. Many national legal systems differentiate between delegatedlegislation − adopted by the executive and having the same legal force as parliamentary legislation − and purelyexecutive acts −aimed at implementing parliamentary legislation, but that may neither supplement nor modify it. In theEU, the distinction between delegated acts and implementing acts was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Thedistinction, laid down in Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), seemsclear only at first sight. Delegated acts are defined as non-legislative acts of general application, adopted by theEuropean Commission on the basis of a delegation contained in a legislative act. They may supplement or amend thebasic act, but only as to non-essential aspects of the policy area. In contrast, implementing acts are not defined as totheir legal nature, but to their purpose − where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts areneeded. Under no circumstances may an implementing act modify anything in the basic act. Delegated acts differ fromimplementing acts in particular with regard to the procedural aspects of their adoption − the former after consultingMember States' experts, but their view is not binding; the latter in the comitology procedure, where experts designatedby the Member States, sitting on specialised committees, can object to a draft implementing act. In the case ofdelegated acts, however, the Parliament and Council can introduce, in the delegation itself, a right to object to a draftact or even to revoke the delegation altogether. Both delegated and implementing acts are subject to judicial review bythe Court of Justice of the EU which controls their conformity with the basic act.

Briefing EN

Erasmus 2021-2027: The Union programme for education, training, youth and sportTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 05-07-2021Awtur CHIRCOP Denise

Qasam tematiku L-EdukazzjoniKelma għat-tiftix aġenzija eżekuttiva | edukazzjoni | kooperazzjoni fil-qasam tal-edukazzjoni | politika tal-edukazzjoni | politika taż-

żgħażagħ | programm tal-UE | proposta (UE) | rapport | sport | studju tal-impatt | taħriġ vokazzjonaliSommarju The Erasmus 2021-2027 proposal was published on 30 May 2018. Establishing a new programme ensures the

continuation of the Erasmus+ funding programme for education, training, youth and sport. While Erasmus+ 2014-2020offered mobility opportunities to more than 4 million people, the new programming period aims to reach up to 12 millionparticipants. The new generation programme maintains a lifelong learning approach and works towards the adoption ofa European Education Area by 2025. Flagship initiatives include the European University Networks and the EuropeanStudent Card. The new regulation also focuses on inclusion and aims at greater simplification for end-users. Itincorporates sports in the main structure of the programme, expands the use of digitalisation, supports new areas ofknowledge and introduces DiscoverEU, a new mobility initiative. Stakeholders agree that the previous programme hasbeen highly beneficial but lessons need to be learnt to help the next generation programme run more efficiently andeffectively. The Parliament and Council reached agreement on the proposal following the overall agreement on the2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, and it was adopted in May 2021. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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Horizon Europe: Framework programme for research and innovation 2021–2027Tip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-07-2021Awtur WILSON Alex Benjamin

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-RiċerkaKelma għat-tiftix diffużjoni tal-innovazzjoni | innovazzjoni | KEEA | kooperazzjoni xjentifika | politika tar-riċerka tal-UE | Programm

Kwadru RTD | proposta (UE) | riċerka nukleari | sikurezza nukleari | studju tal-impatt | taħriġ vokazzjonali | tfassil tal-liġital-UE | tqassim tal-finanzjament tal-UE

Sommarju In June 2018, the European Commission proposed a total budget allocation of €100 billion to finance science, researchand innovation projects during the 2021-2027 period, of which the vast majority, €94.1 billion in current prices, wouldbe allocated to the Horizon Europe framework programme. The main aims are to strengthen science and technology,to foster industrial competiveness, and to implement the sustainable development goals in the EU. Horizon Europeintroduces new features such as the European Innovation Council, missions to promote research results, and newforms of partnerships. Horizon Europe also aims at reducing administrative burdens and promoting the concept ofopen science. More operational synergies are expected through better linkage with other EU programmes. In March2019, Parliament and Council reached a partial agreement on most aspects of Horizon Europe. However, the financialaspects were only settled in December 2020 as part of the broader MFF negotiations, together with the sensitive issueof third-country association. The final text was adopted in April 2021 and entered into force retroactively from 1January 2021. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by Cemal Karakas. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Horizon Europe – Specific programme: Implementing the framework programmeTip ta’ pubblikazzjoni Briefing

Data 02-07-2021Awtur SPINACI STEFANO

Qasam tematiku Il-Politika dwar ir-RiċerkaKelma għat-tiftix diffużjoni tal-innovazzjoni | innovazzjoni | kompetittività | kooperazzjoni xjentifika | organizzazzjoni tal-UE | politika tar-

riċerka tal-UE | Programm Kwadru RTD | programm tal-UE | proposta (UE) | rapport | riċerka u żvilupp | studju tal-impatt

Sommarju In June 2018, the European Commission proposed a total budget allocation of €100 billion to finance science, researchand innovation projects during the 2021-2027 period, of which the vast majority, €94.1 billion in current prices, wouldbe allocated to the Horizon Europe framework programme. The main aims are to strengthen science and technology,to foster industrial competiveness, and to implement the sustainable development goals in the EU. Horizon Europeintroduces new features such as the European Innovation Council, missions to promote research results, and newforms of partnerships. While the proposal for the framework programme set out the general and specific objective ofHorizon Europe as well as the structure and the broad lines of the activities to be carried out, the specific programmeaims to define the operational objectives and activities, especially for missions, the European Research Council, theEuropean Innovation Council, work programmes, and the committee procedure. In April 2019, Parliament and Councilreached a partial agreement on the specific programme. However, the financial aspects were only settled in December2020 as part of the broader MFF negotiations. The final text was adopted in April 2021 and entered into forceretroactively from 1 January 2021.

Briefing EN

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