LIES AND LEGITIMACY: NORTH KOREAN JUCHE AS MONARCHAL DIVERSION

By

N. Lilka Marino

BA in History and Political Science, Hollins University

2012

Presented in

partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Masters of Arts in Liberal Studies

in Social Sciences

Hollins University

Roanoke, Virginia

May, 2015

Director of Essay: __________________________

Professor Edward Lynch

Department: Political Science

ii

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this work to every North Korean defector, public or not, and to every

victim of the Kim dynasty; I carry your stories and voices in my heart and pray for a future

where you may see your loved ones again and find a peaceful respite after your long march. May

your memories be for a blessing, and know that each of you will remain with me as long as I

live.

I also would like to dedicate this work to Richey James Edwards. Thank you for the sympathy

and education you have instilled in me, both as a political scientist and as a person. I hope you

have found peace wherever you are.

“The slave begins by demanding justice and ends by wanting to wear a crown.” – Albert Camus

iii

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my thanks to the following people, without whom this work would not be

possible.

First, I extend my gratitude to my family. To my father, who taught me to always ask questions,

to my mother, who taught me to always demand answers, and to my brother Jon, who always

reminds me never to settle. Thanks for tolerating all my “fun facts” and outrage, everyone. I love

you.

Secondly, I want to thank my academic advisors during my time at Hollins University. First, to

Dr. Ed Lynch, who taught me to always question mysterious clanging sounds and indulged my

fascination since it started with the former Soviet bloc. To Dr. Joe Leedom, who made me cry

over my rough drafts, and taught me to not rest on my laurels. To Dr. Rachel Nunez, who taught

me to appreciate the human side of history and find the unheard voices. Finally, to Dr. Jong Ra,

who has indulged my odd interest in North Korea and offered the best banter on the topic.

Finally, I want to say thank you to my best helpers. To Bryan McCauley, who challenges my

ideas and shines light on the other side, Stephanie Stassi, Luke Priddy, Philip Johnson, Jennifer

Focht, Mary-Jean Monica, Kaz Armstrong, Jessi Cohen, Lena Katina, and, finally, to Cato, who

taught me to truly appreciate land reform, a crucial step in any revolution.

iv

Table of Contents

Dedication .................................................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iii

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

Chapter One: The Children of Paektu Mountain ..........................................................................7

Shrimp Endurance: Korean Survivalism ..................................................................................8 Protecting Sacred Paektu: Keeping Korea Korean ................................................................. 50 Enter the Whales: Foreign Intervention ................................................................................. 11 Naisen Ittai: Japan and Korea as One .................................................................................... 13 The Rise of Kim Il-sung ........................................................................................................ 15

Chapter Two: "The Specter of Communism" ............................................................................. 19

Marxism ................................................................................................................................ 20 Leninism ............................................................................................................................... 22 Stalinism ............................................................................................................................... 24

Chapter Three: Self-Reliance in the Wake of Imperialist Aggressors ......................................... 27

The Nature of Juche .............................................................................................................. 29 Chaju: Political and Foreign Independence............................................................................ 33 Charip: Economic Self-sustenance ........................................................................................ 39 Chawi: Military Independence .............................................................................................. 42 Kokutai: Occupation as Influence .......................................................................................... 44

Chapter Four: "Let's Eat Two Meals a Day!" ............................................................................. 46

Practical Juche ...................................................................................................................... 47 Strange Bedfellows ............................................................................................................... 50 Arduous Marches and Survival .............................................................................................. 52 The God-Emperor ................................................................................................................. 55 Shifting the Center of the World: Korean Ultra-nationalism .................................................. 64 Wolves and Sheep: Foreign Policy Under Juche .................................................................... 67 Tainted Blood: North Korea's Caste System .......................................................................... 71

Chapter Five: The Korean Wave Comes to Pyongyang ............................................................. 73

The Unknowable Kim Jong-un .............................................................................................. 75 Reign of the Prodigal Grandson ............................................................................................. 78 Tara and Titanic: The Private Sector in Policy-making .......................................................... 84 Unwanted Globalization and Porous Borders......................................................................... 89

The Future of Juche .............................................................................................................. 91

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 96

Works Cited ............................................................................................................................ 101

1

Introduction

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, colloquially known as North Korea, has a

unique reputation among the international community as a holdover from the Cold War, shown

by the few images that make it to foreign media. One of the most memorable images show

columns of female soldiers marching in perfect time in front of tanks that have seen better days.

Another popular image that makes its rounds in the media is that of the Mass Games, colossal

gymnastic displays with thousands of children performing floor routines in complete

synchronization. A potent image that captured international attention was that of numerous

groups of hysterical mourners collapsed in grief after the passing of former leader Kim Jong-il in

2011, with a threat of nuclear war not even two years afterwards by his young and inexperienced

son. All of these images paint a picture of a strange nation that seems more parody than real,

with the incompatible juxtaposition of seeking more and more nuclear capability when people

are starving in the streets after one of the world's largest famines in recent history. It raises

speculation: how does communism thrive in a time after the end of the Cold War? It also begs

the question of how could this tiny country, one that seems obsessed with smiling conformity

and nuclear weapons, could go as far as to be labeled as part of the "axis of evil" by American

president George W. Bush and one of the "outposts of tyranny" by his administration ("President

Delivers...").

It is easy to depict North Korea as a living artifact of an earlier time; any superficial

glimpse of it shows a nation that is frozen in time, such as the bright Soviet-esque kitsch of the

propaganda posters, or the massive devotion to the country's leaders that reminds the observer of

Romania's public devotion to former dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, with names like the "Great

2

Leader" for the all but deified Kim Il-sung, who remains the Eternal President despite his death

in 1994. The closed borders remind observers of a divided Germany, with stories of those trying

to scale the Berlin Wall and trying to escape to the other side. Stories of concentration camps that

occasionally permeate American media remind viewers of Nazi Germany. Virtually any of the

quick glimpses that foreign media gives to the northern half of the Korean peninsula could

immediately bring forth a strange type of nostalgia for the past, where American enemies were

clear cut and definitely "evil". While America now engages in a war on terror, it neglects to face

one important enemy, as North Korea's strange antiquity also hides a forbidding newness in its

sponsoring of terrorist groups abroad such as Hezbollah (Cha 256), not to mention its own

terrorist past with the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 and the kidnapping of Japanese

nationals ("Country Reports..."). North Korea is best summed up according to most media

depictions as simply as Winston Churchill once described Russia: as a riddle, wrapped in a

mystery, inside an enigma. What the outside world does not know about North Korea outweighs

what is known about the reclusive state, and it takes a certain kind of cognitive dissonance for

most to attempt to make sense of its antics.

Beyond a glance, a few questions are raised: what exactly is North Korea? Is it really a

lingering communist state, with a burgeoning cult of personality that Josef Stalin would be proud

of? Why do North Koreans persist with their broadcasted bright smiles and untiring worship of

Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, considering the hardship the average North Korean faces with

malnourishment, while current leader Kim Jong-un appears to be obese and obsessed with

nuclear development? What exactly bonds these people to a state that puts on lavish displays

such as the Mass Games while neglecting food and economic development? What does this state

have to prove in a world with fewer allies and without missiles that hit their intended targets?

3

Finally, why did this tiny state outlive its Soviet satellite allies after the twentieth century’s storm

of fallen communist regimes?

Unlike its foreign comrades, North Korea does not subscribe to communism, outside of

the lip service that allowed endearment to a burgeoning community that no longer exists today.

North Korea's political engagement follows a code known as Juche, or "self reliance", where the

North Korean state would not rely on anyone else to survive, and maintains an autonomy that

trickles into the political, economic, and military of that country. Juche was described by Kim

Jong-il as "socialism in [our] style", and unique in that the particular conditions of Korean

history were applied to create a system of socialism evolved past the type Karl Marx and

Vladimir Lenin endorsed, and unlike the regimes that fell in 1989 and beyond (Shin 91). Juche

was first introduced in 1955 by Kim Il-sung, as the name for the type of socialism Kim wished to

espouse before he ordered a purge of his rivals, and again ten years later in Jakarta, as a socialist

derivation in the same line of Maoism and Stalinism. Kim Jong-il would later call Juche

Kimilsungism, eventually tacking on Kimjongilism after his father's passing in 1994. As time

went on after Juche was adopted, the rhetoric moved away from a socialist view of the future and

revolution and acquired more of an internal focus, with Korean nationalism, unification, and

culture at the forefront rather than the cosmopolitan style of international socialism, which

desires to break down national barriers and unify the world in a communist revolution. Juche,

most defiantly, takes power from the masses and gives it all to the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung,

who thinks and works for the people, and his successors, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, in

communism's only successful hereditary leadership, in what resembles an imperial throwback to

the past more so than it does a socialist remnant of appointed leaders.

In essence, Juche is an ideology created and perpetuated by the Kim family in North

4

Korea solely to keep their power in increasingly troubled times, and the socialist trapping that the

international community cloaked it in has not been true for decades; Juche relies on the Korean

historical experience and geopolitical reality to maintain its unique legitimacy, as well as the

deprivation of its people to maintain the regime's survival. The regime has stopped most

pretenses of following in Stalin's footsteps as a communist dictator, and it is only the narrative

written by those who do not read further into the nation's situation that perpetuates this illusion.

In reality, the Kim family is precisely its own dynasty, in a continuation of an old style East

Asian imperial throne modeled after a reworking of the traditional Phoenix Throne. It is stylized

and maintained through an interesting marriage of the old style monarchy and culture with the

new technology and foreign import of some ideals such as Japanese authoritarianism,

geopolitical sentiment, and cultural ethnocentrism.

This study illustrates every side of this theory. Chapter one is an examination of Korean

history, and the circumstances that led to Kim Il-sung's rise to power. Juche could not have taken

root without a basic understanding of the situation in the northern half of the peninsula, as Kim

himself would explain in 1955 when introducing the term to his administration. An

understanding of why Kim felt his countrymen would embrace ultimate self-reliance illustrates

the centuries-old roots of Juche and its practices. With these roots in mind, Chapter Two is a

brief introduction to Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism, with a review of the basics of these

ideologies, which occupied the world as the Korean War erupted. These are the bases in which

Kim explains his ultimate inspiration for North Korean socialism, as many other nations had

aligned behind the Iron Curtain, and which Kim would try to befriend in a similar community.

Chapter Three then explains Juche in theory, with the basics now in mind. Juche cannot be

understood without knowing the two completely different bases that Kim established it on, and

5

illustrates how this practice of "socialism in our style" grew into a leader-centered policy that

tried to outdo Stalin's cult of personality. Chapter Four is an illustration in Juche in practice, with

an examination in North Korean government, history, and the Kim cult of personality. It is a

summary of how the leaders used Juche to maintain power in a nation that went from succeeding

in the international arena to an outcast as the infamous Arduous March famine began after the

death of beloved Kim Il-sung in 1994. Chapter Five is a look into North Korea's situation after

the death of Kim Jong-il and the rise of his son, the elusive Kim Jong-un, of whom very little

was and still is known. It also examines the implications of globalization making intrusions into

a country with increasing breaches in its wall, which ultimately harms Juche, as this ideology

depends on keeping all of its people isolated and ignorant from the rest of the world.

An understanding of Juche and North Korea is an uncommon examination into one of the

last remnants of a twentieth century style of government, as well as a continuously relevant one.

With the nuclear crisis of 2013, North Korean still manages to strong-arm itself into American

politics, as the United States has always been enemy number one to this tiny nation. No other

nation bases part of its legitimacy on openly reviling another nation in quite the same way as

North Korea does, with the same rhetoric as its threat to bomb the presidential residence of South

Korea into a "sea of fire" via fax message ("N. Korea threatens..."). Much of North Korea's

political reality is lost in the bizarre, as illustrated by American films such as Team America:

World Police, which mocked Kim Jong-il to the point where he demanded it be banned in former

communist Czech Republic ("Team America"). Another such example includes the 2014 film

The Interview, with the plot revolving around two comedians being sent to infiltrate Pyongyang

and kill Kim Jong-un, who was so displeased with this film’s planned release that he threatened

nuclear war over it. The resulting tantrums over these foreign depictions add to the overall sense

6

of international bemusement about North Korea with the result that more focus is given to the

peculiar acts of this nation than its everyday realities, such as the abuses of the reigning leaders.

With the increasing amount of testimony from North Korean “defectors”, a catch-all term for

anyone who leaves North Korea according to North Korean rhetoric, including those leaving

with nonpolitical intentions such as avoiding starvation, more and more comes to light. The

situation in North Korea is no longer a vestigial remnant of the Cold War, but a regime that

routinely commits human rights violations and continues to do so because of its universal

dismissal as a rogue, solitary nation and nothing more. Only those who share borders with North

Korea consider it threat enough to keep an eye on.

As time goes on, however, understanding Juche will become paramount when the regime

ultimately falls. Evidence shown in the fifth chapter illustrates growing discontent with the

nation, and it is entirely possible that Kim Jong-un, with his growing tendency to outshine his

father and grandfather in brutality, may be the last member of the Kim dynasty. With this in

mind, understanding Juche for the inevitable humanitarian crisis and possible regional conflict

will be essential. North Korea simply is not as clear cut as it has been portrayed, with Korean

unification a distant dream for the time being thanks to the work of the Kim dynasty in creating a

Korea that is nationally, culturally, politically, and even linguistically divergent from its southern

counterpart. The future of the Korean peninsula can only be understood in its past, especially

considering Juche.

7

Chapter One: The Children of Paektu Mountain

Juche is a Sino-Korean word most often translated as "self-reliance", but can also mean

"independence", "agency", or even "subjectivity" (Cumings, Korea, p 203. 403-404).The word

was first used by Kim Il-sung in a 1955 speech in order to address a committee known as the

Presidium, who were the highest ranked of contemporary North Korean government officials and

closely related to the Soviet Politburo. That day's agenda covered the failure of propaganda to

rouse the average Korean, both North and South of the Demilitarized Zone, and according to

Kim Il-sung, the problem lay in how the propaganda machine used far too many foreign

references and far too much dogmatism in order to deliver the message of socialist revolution

outside of Pyongyang. It was during a time when purges of Soviet and Chinese officials after the

Korean War were underway; now that the war was over, and socialism was being introduced,

there must be a way to introduce it to Korean people in a manner they would find relevant. The

answer to that, in Kim Il-sung's eyes, was Juche. In his speech, he summed up what would be

become Juche:

"What is Juche in our Party's ideological work? What are we doing? We are not engaged

in any other country's revolution, but precisely in the Korean revolution. This, the Korean

revolution, constitutes Juche in the ideological work of our Party. Therefore, all

ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean revolution...To

make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and geography and know the

customs of the Korean people. Only then is it possible to educate our people in a way that

suits them and to inspire in them an ardent love for their native place and their

motherland. (Kim, I. 593)"

In a nutshell, Juche is an exclusively Korean movement, meant entirely for Koreans. To

8

understand it fully, it is a must to understand what led up to its establishment. In other words,

why did Kim Il-sung deem such severe "self-reliance" necessary, and why separate it from the

communal aspect of socialism? In understanding this, one understands the main thesis of Juche.

The establishment of Juche was only superficially an attempt at following the Marxist-Leninist

model that Soviet premier Josef Stalin ordered for north of the Thirty-Eighth Parallel; Kim Il-

sung would create a movement made to answer what he believed was the unique need of the

North Korean people under his control. This section will illustrate the background that Juche

would borrow from. As Kim himself said in 1955, one must understand the needs of the Korean

for a Korean revolution. These needs erupt from their unique geography, history, and

geopolitical landscape. With this in mind, one will understand that while Juche is a modern

movement, it evolved almost purely to accommodate much older, extremely Korean needs,

especially Kim Il-sung’s.

Shrimp Endurance: Korean Survivalism

The geography of Korea is essential to its historical experience. Korean territory has been

mostly static in terms of borders before the division in 1945, and the establishment of the

Demilitarized Zone in 1953. Korea spanned from the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in the north to Jeju

Island in the south since King Sejong the Great's military campaigns in 1433 (Kim, C. xvii).

Seventy percent of the peninsula is mountainous, especially in the northeast, making intra-

national travel difficult for most of its history. This is where sacred Paektu Mountain is located,

on the Chinese border. Most of the arable land is in the south west, in what is now South Korea,

whereas most of the mineral wealth of the country is in the heavily forested north. This

established a geographically lopsided industry under Japanese rule, which was immensely

9

exacerbated after the division. The climate is mostly continental, with harsh winters in the north

and cyclic monsoon summers all around (Nelson 12-17). Most importantly, the Korean peninsula

is nestled between China and Japan, two states that have fought for control in the region for

centuries, among other powers such as the Mongols, Manchus, and, briefly, Russians.

It is this issue of invasion that shaped both domestic and foreign policy, The first unified

Korean state was Silla, and it was achieved with help from Tang China around 668 CE (Kim C.,

41). The succeeding state, Goryeo, would lose power in the late fourteenth century because of

Mongol expansionism, and the Yi dynasty of Joseon would take power as a result. Joseon would

be the final native Korean fully united state, and it quickly established itself as a tributary state of

the Ming and Qing Dynasties, where it remained until foreign intervention in the nineteenth

century, becoming a short-lived, yet mostly independent empire in 1897 with help from Meiji

Japan. Korean survival, then as it does now in contemporary North Korea, depended entirely on

jockeying among larger powers, which allowed Joseon to flourish for five centuries behind

slowly closing doors.

Understanding Joseon is essential because it is the period that lent itself to much of

contemporary Korean culture, and understanding the native aspects that helped birth Juche.

Joseon's state religion, for example, was Neo-Confucianism, which led to a well intended

meritocracy that was backed behind a strong sentiment for unwavering obedience towards both

the Joseon and Chinese rulers for the sake of social harmony. When it came time for defining

Juche, Kim Il-sung would borrow more from Confucianism than he did from Marxism when it

came time for explaining how the "collective" would function. Instead of serving each other as

comrades, the masses would all directly serve the leaders, much as they did in Joseon, almost in

the same manner a child is expected to serve their parents in Confucian tradition (Cha 40-41).

10

This Neo-Confucianism also lent itself to the system of meritocratic examinations that would

theoretically allow anyone to become a member of the governing body. Much like in North

Korea today, however, only those of means in a special class known as the yangban could even

get the education necessary to take these exams (Lee 219) illustrating the pseudo-meritocracy

that functioned in Korea for centuries, as well as the caste system that flourished during the

Joseon era. This continues in North Korea today, under the name of songbun, where society has

been divided into three categories based on their ancestry, and only those in the top loyal

category could serve the party, as a means to improve one’s standing (Demick28). The other

Confucian contributions to Korean society, particularly those relevant to Juche, was a desire to

venerate the secular, as well as the agency of human beings, traits that Kim would borrow for his

new thesis (Fingarette47).

Protecting Sacred Paektu: Keeping Korea Korean

Confucianism's drive for education and national development served it well at the start of

the Joseon dynasty, but by the nineteenth century, Joseon was stagnating painfully behind its

neighbors both scientifically and economically and was known by then in the West as the Hermit

Kingdom after adopting isolationist policy as a means to recover from a succession of invasions

over time from Ming China, Japan, and the Manchus (Bonsal). The only contact Joseon preferred

to have was a thrice yearly visit to China and some trade on the Japanese island of Tsushima.

Unlike Japan, Joseon adapted isolationism and as a result, some foreign ideas were imported.

This would then result in the creation of movements that advocated adopting foreign ideals, such

as the Silhak movement. Because foreign ideas slipped through over time, the hope was to bar

these foreign influences from crossing into Joseon, as political factions, or bungdang, adopted

11

them as they protested against the rising prices of food and overpopulation. The ideology most

feared was Catholicism, which was accepted at first when it spread to the country via China and

Japan, but would later be outlawed when many rebel groups adopted it as a rallying banner. The

Yi kings were afraid of Catholicism much like they feared the native Donghak religion, which

was a blend of Christianity, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism that was mostly adopted by

discontented peasants. Waves of pogroms and massacres of both native and foreign Catholics

occurred in 1801 and1833 with the largest in 1866, when French missionaries were slaughtered,

resulting in an invasion by the French.

In the same year, the General Sherman, an American merchant ship hoping to begin trade

negotiations, sailed upriver far into the interior of Pyongyang, and ran aground. Its crew was

attacked by a mob of angry Koreans that included, state legend would cite, Kim Il-sung's great

grandfather, who sunk the ship (Martin, p 12). By then, it was too late; while the government

responded by outlawing the building of large ships for travel and drawing further into itself,

Joseon was forced open to the West by 1871 much as Japan was. Monuments were erected all

over the country that said “Western barbarians invade our land. If we do not fight, we must then

appease them. To urge appeasement is to betray the nation” (Lee, p 266). Thus, the seeds of anti-

Western sentiment and the race to preserve what was Korean were sowed. A century later, this

anti-American sentiment would be further nourished when the captured USS Pueblo would be

formally moored in the same spot the General Sherman incident took place, symbolically

indicating that this incident had not been forgotten by North Korea, and American incursion was

not to be tolerated any longer.

Enter the Whales: Foreign Intervention

12

Isolation seemed preferable to falling the same way China did, forced to accommodate

foreign concessions and wars for its long-lived sovereignty. Instead of racing to beat these

Westerners at their own game, like the Meiji administration tried to do in Japan, Korea preferred

to close itself off further, adopting a "no treaties, no trade, no Catholics, no West, and no Japan"

policy. Burying its head in the sand as countless foreigners came to demand treaties and trade

was the preferred method of dealing with a rapidly enlarging world. Joseon would look to China

to help, but with the Qing’s facing their own struggles with the West, Joseon was stuck as many

powers sent ships to demand a slice of the Korean trade market, and a rapidly imperialist Japan

was having designs on the peninsula (Cumings, p 95-108).

Japan forced the Chinese out of Joseon, kept the Russians out when they smelled the

blood on the water and by doing so allowed the establishment of a Korean Empire in 1897

through a series of forced treaties and palace intrigues. By taking advantage of their inability to

defend their former tributary state, China lost influence after the First Sino-Japanese War and the

new empire was free of Chinese ascendency. Korea tried to modernize, much like Japan did, but

because Japan was willing to exert military pressure and fight wars in order to remain the only

power influential in the Korean peninsula, this independence was short lived. Korea became a

protectorate after the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and a full colony in 1910. Much of the anger

that came from this decision was directed at a secret agreement with the Japanese and Americans

to stay out of Japanese imperialist designs over the area, in exchange for their influence in the

Philippines, known as the Taft-Katsura Agreement (Nahm, p 10). Korean historians view the

decision as essential to understanding American sentiment in Korea during the twentieth century,

as Americans promised to protect their interests in the area during an 1882 treaty, and it proved

that the Americans simply did not care to keep their promises, sowing later mistrust and

13

antipathy (Lee, p 309).

Naisen Ittai: Japan and Korea as One

The Japanese occupation of Korea, while only around thirty years in length, left an

enormous mark on the Korean people, one that Kim Il-sung would borrow heavily from and take

advantage of when coming to power. In brief, the occupation was a double edged sword. Korea

was heavily modernized based on Meiji-era models, including rapid industrialization, the mass-

production of factories in the north of the peninsula, the massive expansion of infrastructure such

as railroads and electrical power, and the establishment of mass media and state run schools all

intended for Korea’s eventual integration into Japan. The point was to bring Korea from the

feudal era to the modern one, and quickly, if it was to be brought into the nation of Japan

(Savada). However, most Koreans see these actions by the Japanese not to be entirely selfless,

but for their exploitation (Kim, J. 337).

The other side to this sword, and the one Kim would borrow for his xenophobic rhetoric,

was exactly the fact that Japan seemingly wanted to make the Japanese and Koreans one people;

one interpretation, according to The Cleanest Race, argued that the Japanese advocated the

Koreans and the Japanese as a single "imperial" race, one morally and intellectually superior to

all others. The Japanese would allow for Korean culture to permeate the media, displaying

women in the traditional hanbok, writing about the ancient progenitor of the Korean people

Tan'gun, and the sacred Paektu Mountain, all rhetoric analogous to that of the Japanese divine

ancestor Jimmu-tennou and Mount Fuji. Koreans had languished in China's shadow for too long

in order for them to realize their true potential, and should truly cherish their "region" and

"dialect", by helping them establish national pride via the slogan naisen ittai, or "Interior

14

[meaning Japan] and Korea as one body". (Myers 26-28).

However, the kindness that Myers was quick to illustrate, as well as the national pride,

could not stand up to the practical reality. A Korean author described occupied Korea as a police

state. A single police officer had the power to arrest anyone on suspicion of treason with no

protection of habeas corpus, and numbered one per roughly seven hundred people. The majority

of arrests were deemed political, and those arrested could be sent to work camps (Kim, J. 341).

The new elementary schools were called "citizen schools", and part of the curriculum was the

appropriate reverence for the Chrysanthemum Throne and for State Shinto, as well as appropriate

moral and ethical education based on the Western model that was popular at the turn of the

twentieth century (Herbst 43). The newly introduced media was heavily censored, save for that

praising Japan and the emperor (Caprio129-130). As Japan entered World War II, the pretense of

aligning Korean and Japanese identity together disapated, as Korean schools taught in the

Japanese language only and forebode Korean in public spaces. Korean names were changed to

Japanese ones, and a new law was passed the requiring Koreans to publically venerate the

Japanese imperial cult at publically mandated State Shinto shrines (Cumings). Other atrocit ies

that came to light involved hundreds of thousands of Korean men were shipped to Japan to work

for the war effort where many of whom ended up in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Fukusoka) while

Korean women were kidnapped to become "comfort women" to Japanese soldiers. Starvation

was common as food and resources were primarily shipped to Japan for military consumption

(Kim, J 359). While similar atrocities happened in Japan, such as food shortages and forced

military conscription, the intended erasure of Korean identity on top of all else remained

poignant in the Korean psyche after the occupation ended.

Regardless of how posterity viewed the occupation, it was not soon enough to many

15

Koreans when the Japanese withdrew after the war, leaving room for the Soviets and Americans

to move in. It is here when Kim Il-sung entered the national stage, coming to power as a Korean

member of the Soviet army, trained to fight the Japanese in a battle that would never occur. Kim

was installed in the new government above the Thirty-Eighth parallel, as the chairman of a

provisional committee that would later become the governing body of the country, and what he

found was a people desperately wounded by an occupation, angry at a world that fought over

them, yet never asked them what they wanted for themselves. They had an identity that they

cherished, an old one that would be later described as a "shrimp among whales", and one that

was very good at surviving, as well as hard work. With the Soviets now installing a socialist

government, a figure akin to Stalin was needed, and so the interim Soviet leadership chose the

guerilla fighter Kim Il-sung, a man from a small village outside of Pyongyang, who was quickly

proclaimed a master of socialist thought, as a rallying figure for North Koreans.

The Rise of Kim Il-sung

Kim Il-sung was probably born in 1912, to parents who were both active in the resistance

against Japanese occupation. He would describe himself as a freedom fighter, even at the tender

age of 14, when he left school to fight in Manchuria with the Chinese during World War II,

where he would discover socialism. Eventually, he would be recruited by the Soviets to fight the

Japanese, and when the war was over, he was invited back to help rebuild. According to his

official biography, Kim was idolized as a war hero and a savior, whose expertise of

Marxism/Leninism would liberate the north and eventually the south from foreign occupation.

Kim was also an expert in any subject you could imagine, and had an opinion about virtually

everything, it was said. In his first few years, he would instigate land reform, consolidate his

16

position, try to unify both North and South Korea, fail, and yet still rebuild a country that for two

decades it would outpace its southern counterpart. Behind him, he had a magnificent propaganda

machine, one that worked almost perfectly towards turning him from an obscure figure into a

strange combination of a national founding figure akin to the all-American George Washington

and Jesus Christ, with a cult of personality that reflected the needs of the Korean people after the

cataclysmic events of the first half of the twentieth century (Cha 68-77).

There is not much known about Kim Il-sung for certain; one theory states his name may

not have even been Il-sung to begin with. There may have been another Kim Il-sung in his

guerilla troop who was a well-liked commander in the leader's unit who died while fighting the

Japanese. Kim was picked as a leader for his ignorance, yet enthusiasm for Marxism

(Dolgozhitel). Sources indicate that much of his story was devised as a means to create a leader

that North Koreans would unite around, and one who the Soviets found pliable. This would even

involve creating a back-story that grew fantastical over time. Kim himself, however, seemed to

believe it as he grew older, despite not even knowing the bare minimum of socialism, according

to Soviet witnesses (Tertitskiy). As time went on during the oldest Kim's reign, Kim grew from a

simple freedom fighter from the north to a savior figure who delivered the Koreans from the

Japanese and American imperialists. The official stance of Russian researcher Andrei Lankov, as

well as historian Bruce Cumings, and a generally accepted one by most researchers seems to be

that Kim started as a guerilla fighter, though probably not at fourteen, as he claimed, with his

achievements enough to gather the notice of the Soviets in charge (Becker 55).

Some elements of his story made sense, even without proof. For one, Kim wrote of his

Presbyterian parents, his father as an elder in the church, and his minister grandfather. The extent

of how religious Kim's parents were is up for debate; Kim described his father as one who was

17

only interested in the "modern learning" one could only get in a missionary church (Martin 16),

while other research indicates that the parents may have been missionaries (Lankov50).

Regardless, Kim would repudiate religion entirely in his new regime, since religion was not

compatible with the Marxism-Leninism he was expected espouse. Kim would be an avowed

atheist, claiming he outgrew the notion of a deity very quickly in his upbringing. It would not

mean that he was a fervent atheist; as he obtained power, increasingly he encouraged and

participated in his personal state cult possibly to fill the void left behind by faith in the former

Jerusalem in the East, a moniker that reflected the one hundred mostly Protestant churches in

Pyongyang alone prior to the Korean War. Kim would perpetuate a cult of personality that would

replace Christianity in the hearts of educated Koreans (Lankov), as well as reflect the Confucian

ideals that the last two Korean states operated on, to be described further in the next chapter.

In short, when Kim Il-sung would describe Juche in detail in his 14 April 1965 watershed

speech "On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea", he boiled the idea of self-reliance down to three needs: politics, economics,

and defense, and all must be self reliant. Knowing the history of the region, it is easy to see why

Kim established Juche. After almost a thousand years of jockeying with the whales, the shrimp

must learn to fend for itself, and not worry about the world, especially if spreading Juche, his

personal variety of socialism, was a concern. North Korea, in order to unify the peninsula must

entice the southern half to join with the north, and that would be done by eliminating the foreign

and outside elements. North Korea would not defer to anyone anymore, and with two big allies

such as the Soviet Union and China, they would not have to.

In the next chapter, the other crucial half of understanding Juche, socialism is visited.

Along with this historical background, both important impetuses of Juche are established.

18

Because of the lip service Kim would pay towards establishing a socialist guise for his state, it is

important to keep the goals of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Josef Stalin in mind when

examining Juche both on paper and practically. Also to keep in mind, the typical North Korean,

according to the North Korean government, owes everything not to the socialist collective as

described by Marx, but the Confucian Christ-like father head, Kim Il-sung, as well as the savior

son Kim Jong-il. The mythology behind the intense cult of personality will also be placed against

this background, in order to fully illustrate the insane genius of a totalitarian dictatorship that Jim

Il-sung was able to establish in the ashes of a leveled Korea, all a reaction to the past, and a hope

to avoid the same in the future.

19

Chapter Two: "The Specter of Communism"

When studying Juche, there are two over-reaching themes within the philosophy. One, of

course, is the Korean element; this is the one that Kim Il-sung spoke about in 1955: to

understand the revolution in Korea, one must understand the historical situation in Korea that

was handed down to Kim when he was appointed to rule by the Soviets. He inherited a legacy of

isolationism as an answer to foreign threats, an overwhelming desire for racial and national

homogeneity, a long standing tradition of Confucianism in government, and, rapid modernization

by an occupying nation that wanted to assume total control over every Korean, a formerly

unrealistic goal was now achievable as totalitarianism evolved into the modern political arena.

On top of everything, the ultimate calamity had occurred in 1945: division of the Korean state

by two extremely polarized foreign nations. This all left a stain on the Korean psyche, and Kim

would keep all of this in mind while devising his vision for North Korea, Juche which would

become the sum of North Korean history.

The other important influence on Juche, of course, is Marxism-Leninism. Soviet

occupation across the globe after World War II often resulted in single party communist

governments, and for the beginning years of North Korea, Kim's regime was no exception. Juche

has been and continues to be toted out as either a communist or socialist philosophy even today,

as all but a handful of its fellow regimes have fallen. Even as Juche was beginning to be toted

around the world as its own unique brand of socialism, Kim Il-sung described the importance of

Marxist-Leninist roots alongside the importance of keeping the needs of Korean people in mind

at a lecture in Jakarta in 1965, saying:

"The establishment of Juche means holding fast to the principle of solving for oneself all

the problems of the revolution and construction in conformity with the actual conditions

20

of one's country, mainly by one's own efforts...applying the universal truth of Marxism-

Leninism and the experiences of the international revolutionary movement to one's

country in conformity with its historical conditions and national peculiarities." (Kim 45)

In essence, a proper analysis of Juche requires not only an understanding of the

conditions that North Korea found itself in after the Japanese left the peninsula, but also requires

an understanding of terminology often thrown around by the Kim dynasts. Whenever the

political climate required them to shift in usage of terms and names, even the ones they

substituted for Marxism-Leninism, which was most commonly Maoism or Stalinism, find their

roots in this movement. Juche itself began under the umbrella of Marxism-Leninism as yet

another philosophy designed after the socialist ideal, and would enjoy the protection of that

affiliation in its pupil stages of development.

The term Marxism-Leninism, one that both Kim Il-sung and, later, Kim Jong-il most

frequently preferred to use when regarding the brand of socialism the North Korean government

wished to emulate, was coined by Josef Stalin as a means to assimilate not only a few of his own

views (including his policy of "socialism in one country"), but mainly those of Karl Marx,

Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin in the 1920s after he rose to power in the Soviet Union. It

would be this variety of socialism that was the state ideology of the Soviets as well as the

Communist International, and the one exported to satellite states, including North Korea after

World War II (Lisichkin 59).

Marxism

The socialism that Marx and Engels described would be most concisely illustrated in The

Communist Manifesto in 1848. They described what would come to be listed as part of the basics

of Marxism, such as class consciousness, alienation as a result of capitalism, the means of

21

production, and the desired end result for a global communist society. These points would be

what constituted classical Marxism, and as such had to be included in any future attempt to

create socialist entities on the political stage. At least, they had to be emulated superficially

(Callinicos 246).

The Manifesto describes the class struggle between two classes, the working class

proletarians, who suffer at the hands of a capitalist society headed by the wealthy bourgeoisie,

who own the literal "means of production", the physical materials and machines that produce

wealth. These struggles, according to the treatise, comprise most of human history and usually

resulted in revolution. Eventually, the text predicts that the proletarians would tire of their

constant exploitation and rise against the people who take advantage of them. However, unless

the struggle takes on communist overtures, the revolt would simply redefine who is in the

bourgeoisie class and ultimately improve nothing. A communist movement, however, would

remove all vestiges of the bourgeoisie class and restructure society around the abolition of

private property, especially as wages were the incentive Marx believed that the proletarians were

exploited for. Marx also advocated nationalizing services such as banks and schools, in order to

equalize society. All of these changes would result in a global, utopic, communist society

without division. (Marx)

The root of the issue was capitalism, which Marxism proclaimed it aggravated an already

existing class struggle, and alienation. The cycle of oppression should end, for Marxists, if

humanity was to rise above its own savage history. Social welfare was the heart of the issue, and

ideas such as free love and gender equality would bleed into the ideology after publication of the

Manifesto. This theory inferred that socialism would cure most of society's ills, and advocate the

"New Man", an educated, class conscious, forward, individual dedicated to hard work and

22

advancement of his fellow worker. All of society's "evils" that contributed to capitalism were the

exact opposite of what the New Man should espouse, such as religion, and even marriage in

some cases (Pons 526).

Economics would follow this train of thought, where prices would be regulated and

correlate with the cost of production or scientific value. Profit would no longer be the motivating

factor in the economy (Pons 126). The idea was to liberate the worker from the drudgery of work

and allow him the ability to fulfill his potential. Other socialist thinkers such as Alexandra

Kollontai would advocate that the state, should it adopt socialism, would be natural caretakers

for workers in order to allow for such freedom, the sort not allowed in capitalist societies

(Kollontai).

Those who have been held back by this history would naturally be the leaders of such a

cosmopolitan movement, which at the turn of the twentieth century, would appeal to the

downtrodden in places such as Tsarist Russia, where the domestic wealth was hideously

mismanaged. It was these ideas that Lenin would adopt as his own when he took the reins of the

Bolshevik party. His brand of Marxism, Leninism, would be his interpretation of the inevitable

revolution, led by the communist vanguard.

Leninism

This vanguard would be a physical entity composed of mostly working class people that

would educate others on the necessary revolution and be the party that not only switches places

with the bourgeoisie class, but established a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat". Lenin

did not believe any other form of change was congruent with capitalism; the entire establishment

must be physically overthrown for real change to occur. (Lenin, What is to be Done?). Instead of

23

waiting for humanity to evolve and allow the revolution to happen organically, Lenin called for it

to be pushed through, switching the people in charge rather than trying to change the status quo.

Lenin wanted revolution instead of revolt simply because he did not believe there was any

redemption in the capitalist process.

This also came with a large sentiment of anti-imperialism. In his pamphlet Imperialism,

the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin applied Marxian economics to his socialism with the

analogy of Imperial Russia being an "underdeveloped nation" that could not compete with the

more developed ones, mirroring the struggles the proletarians and bourgeoisie classes in other

states where capitalism was rampant. Because there was rampant exploitation in these

underdeveloped states, the revolution must fall upon the urban working class rather than the

agrarian one that Marx advocated for. Russia was a prime example; much of the industry was put

in place by foreign backers, and was seen as encroachment, both of the national and financial

sort. In essence, to measure up to other states, Russia had to shed a “national” proletarian status.

Accordingly, an important aspect of Leninism was nationalism. Unlike Marx, Lenin

accepted at his convenience that nationalistic sentiment was crucial for the revolutionary

vanguard to get off the ground, as the former Russian Empire was composed of scores of

oppressed, angry nations who resented tsarist rule. Accepting the demands and realities of hurt

nations was essential in order to transcend to the point where nationalism would no longer

matter, as classic Marxism requires. When acknowledging national demands and issues, Lenin

predicted that the affected peoples would then settle happily into a federation (Lenin 393).

However, this was something Lenin would not always commit to: while separating

republics from the Tsar was well and good, by 1917, Lenin had annexed recently independent

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, claiming geopolitical necessity against imperialist

24

"depredations" (Pipes144-166). Advocating nationalism would serve nicely to topple the

Romanovs. At the same time, however, nationalism worked well to counter-act complaints of

imperialism, which was a larger evil than "outdated" modes of nation-building (Fischer 91, 93).

The end goal for a combined Marxism-Leninism was similar to Marxism's: an

international communist state that broke down national barriers (Albert and Hahnel24-25),

accomplished via democratic centralism and a single ruling socialist party with other, often straw

candidate parties that gave the appearance of a plural party system. This ruling party was

intended to be made up of the proletarian vanguard (Pons 751). This system also espoused

atheism at the state level, opposed imperialism and advocated for de-colonization and the so-

called "popular fronts" against fascist leaning parties with the end goal of exporting socialism

across borders (Pons 252).

Stalinism

Stalin's personal contributions to Marxism-Leninism included many policies that would

eventually be the bread and butter of Soviet satellite regimes later on, including Juche. Many

argue that Marxism-Leninism does not include Stalinism and that his regime resembled

totalitarianism more so than socialism (Lee 47); however, when examining many of the regimes

that imported Marxism-Leninism after World War II, it is important to note that the resemblance

to Stalin's Soviet Union was more than cosmetic, and many, including China and North Korea at

varying points in time did not follow suit when de-Stalinization occurred after the leader's death.

Therefore, a brief examination of some of Stalin's policies before returning to Juche provides a

complete picture as to what the regime would inherit in 1945 and what Kim would be claiming

to borrow for his own country.

25

Part of Stalinism reflected the reality of the Soviet Union upon his ascendance to power

in 1929. Rapid industrialization, an essential trait of Soviet satellite states, was one of his first

policies. In order to catch up to the industrialized nations that outpaced them, the Soviets

embarked on what they called "industrial pragmatism" in order to stimulate the economy via

bolstering industrialization and consumerism, the latter a departure from traditional Marxism

(Pons 731). This would be reflected in China and North Korea's many Five and Seven Year

Plans. Another economic push they would adopt from Stalin was the collectivization of private

farms, a form of land reform that essentially punished the few remaining wealthy peasant

farmers, known as the kulaks. In 1930, 23.6% of all farms were collectivized, but by 1941,

almost 98% were collectivized, and the kulaks were ordered from their land, persecuted, and

eventually killed in a process anachronistically called "dekulakization". This forced

redistribution of wealth to a "loyal" class would be seen again and again in plenty of satellite

states (Bottomore 53-54).

Stalin's regime required plenty of the scare tactics that are found in many totalitarian

regimes, including North Korea's. He eliminated dissenters as he saw fit: the Great Terror

programs and Great Purges were such examples, where millions saw their end simply for being

labeled "counterrevolutionary". Secret police, tight control of media, and the gulags were

established to protect Stalin's "interests", as well as to eliminate any rivals such as Trotsky to

ensure his own power, as well as his personal interpretation of Marxism-Leninism was

unchecked (Lee 49).

All of these traits that Stalin's Marxism-Leninism had were results of his main idea,

known as socialism in one country. This theory was first formulated by Stalin as an extension to

both Lenin and Engels' theories in 1924, and states that while the end goal was a global socialist

26

state, socialism could not hope to be accomplished on such a scale until it was established

somewhat securely in one country, namely, the Soviet Union. To do so, the country must be

strengthened internally, and Stalin advocated that much of the focus of his policies were to this

end. Defeating the bourgeoisie that had crippled so much of Russia was more important than

waiting for the rest of the world to become aware of the same realities that were true in Russia;

this, to Stalin, was foolhardy, as many capitalist states had no incentive to do so. This of course,

went against much of what Marx advocated for a global community to emerge at the same time

(Fischer, R. 476).

To fully understand Juche, one must have the background of its formation in hand.

Knowing the geopolitical reality of Korea at the time of Kim Il-sung's ascension into power is

most of the battle, but the other important aspect considered the political inheritance that the

Soviet occupiers tried to hand down to the newly created state above the Thirty-Eighth Parallel.

These were the weapons that the shrimp was given in order to swim with the whales, and to fully

understand the script that this unique player wrote for it, understanding the labels it endorsed for

it was a necessity. What remains to be seen is whether Juche truly is a Marxist-Leninist leftover

from the Cold War, hideously antiquated by the time the young Kim Jong-un came to power in

2010, or whether it is even older, such as a mummified holdout from the Joseon Era with modern

trappings. On paper, it certainly seems so.

27

Chapter Three: Self-Reliance in the Wake of Imperialist Aggressors

For socialist sympathizers, 1989 was a tough year: a global event posthumously termed

the Revolutions of 1989 saw the end of communist government for many countries that

embraced Marxism-Leninism, starting with Poland and continuing with Hungary and the

peaceful Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia by year's end (Nedelmann1). Romania also

experienced regime change in 1989, albeit violently, rather than the relatively peaceful

transitions of power in its Eastern European neighbors. Portions of the Berlin Wall were opened

in Berlin in this year, paving the way for German reunification in 1990. Also in 1989, the

Tiananmen Square demonstrations were aired across the world, reflecting the change that many

under similar regimes sought out. The biggest symbol of the changing tide in 1989 was the

situation in the Soviet Union, where the human Chain of Freedom stretched across three Baltic

republics; the two buzzwords were quickly becoming glasnost and perestroika, and special

referenda were held in many Soviet republics for either greater autonomy or eventual

independence. The Soviet Union could do nothing while its satellite states slipped through its

ideological fingers like sand while experiencing breakdown of its own. The world watched for

the next two years as the Soviet giant was dying, as one would an elderly relative, all while

observing the demise of other regimes. The end result according to Francis Fukuyama would be

the "end of history", or rather, the end of ideological jockeying between states as the world

would settle on one manner of government in liberal democracy, in a cruel echo of Marx's

prediction of a communist world (Fukuyama).

However, a handful of so-called communist states still exist today, mostly in the Chinese

sphere of influence, so Fukuyama's prediction has not come to complete fruition. Most of them,

including China, have undergone similar processes as the Soviets to change their policies to

28

reflect changing times and realities, including varying degrees of openness and the adoption of

some amounts of capitalist theory. China is an example of this; after Mao Zedong's death in 1976

came economic reforms and the result of which Forbes describes as one of the leading examples

of state capitalism (Epstein). China is described by the CIA World Handbook as the third largest

economy in the world, behind only the European Union and the United States, and the great

villain of most anti-capitalists according to old Soviet propaganda. Similar free market reforms

were put into place in Vietnam known as Đổi Mới, which transitioned the country from a

socialist minded one towards one whose leaders are often described as "ardently capitalist

communists" by The Economist. Other states such as Cuba survive with their connections with

fellow minded regimes such as the Evo Morales administration in Bolivia.

One of these states is North Korea, a major beneficiary of China's friendship, although at

a declining rate over the past decade. North Korea's propaganda, as well as Kim Il-sung's

speeches, all liberally mention socialism, communism, and Marxism-Leninism at every

opportunity, praising the revolution and the means of production while bemoaning foreign

"imperialism", America, capitalism, and the bourgeoisie. Any superficial glance at the rosy

cheeks of Kim Il-sung in state sponsored art reminds the viewer of Josef Stalin and Chairman

Mao, with the written rhetoric closer to Soviet Russian and Karl Marx than any classical form of

Korean (Lankov). One can even feel the "little brother" vibe that North Korea may give off when

compared to whales such as the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, trying to

impress the local community with the sheer amount of socialist spirit and aspiration the little

shrimp tries to emulate, however outdated.

However, with a closer look, Kim Il-sung's ideology Juche, introduced in 1955 and

formally presented to the world as North Korea's foremost philosophy in 1965, superficially

29

resembled the type of socialism that Stalin was trying to export in his day. However, the

superficial resemblance cannot even live up to the name: Juche translates into "self reliance" and

advocates a tightly closed country, and for people to become as self sustaining as possible

contrary to the global community that state socialism tries to install across the world. Juche

depends on the namedropping of Stalin and socialism in order for the rest of the world to turn a

blind eye from its true nature. In The Cleanest Race, B. R. Myers suggests that this is all

deliberate when one considers that Korean is not a widely known global language, therefore

most of the curious would turn to official state translations of Juche works and the Kims’

speeches. All official translations meant for the international audience in the public domain

sound like plagiarized Soviet propaganda with the appropriate words interchanged, even in

allegory and the stilted phrasing. There is not much effort by the translator to sound at all Korean

or even original (Rank). This smokescreen is not effective if one can do their own amateur

translating: even a rudimentary glance at the current North Korean constitution fails to retrieve

any mention of communism or socialism, only referring to "the dictatorship of the people's

democracy" in Article 12 and repeated demands for loyalty directly to the Kims. Ignorance,

however, of Juche's nature remains endemic, which it fully relies on both from citizen and

observer.

The Nature of Juche

The question then remains: what, then, is Juche? In 1989, Kim Jong-il, son of the Great

Leader, was asked why he believed North Korea endured while other countries failed. He

attributed Juche's longevity to its singularity: instead of merely borrowing from the Soviet

model like the recently fallen regimes in Europe did, North Korea would endure thanks to Kim

30

Il-sung, who "put forward original lines and policies suited to our people's aspirations and the

specific situation of our country" (Shin 92). It survived where other socialist regimes did not

because it was a "socialism in their style" adapted to the unique needs and attitudes of the Korean

people. In essence, to accomplish revolution in Korea, Kim Il-sung took the required Soviet

Marxism-Leninism and built upon it, borrowing Korean history, needs, and attitudes, until the

end result only superficially resembled socialism; ultimately, Juche is an ideology, both in theory

and in practice, that harkens back to Joseon era politics with a twentieth century flavor.

One question remains before engaging in an study of the written form of Juche: do the

Kims themselves believe it is socialist? One name for it is Kimilsungism, coined by Kim Jong-il

in the 1970s during a drive to improve his own standing beside his father upon his introduction

to the Korean people and establishment as Kim Il-sung's heir. One analyst links the term to Kim

Il-sung's thoughts, stating that it is interchangeable with Juche (Lim, North Korea561). In a 1976

speech, Kim Jong-il referred to Juche outside of its contemporary Marxist-Leninist label for the

first time, saying that it was a "far-reaching revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved

from this idea" (Shin 86). By giving it this name, he was trying to elevate Juche to the same level

as Maoism or Stalinism, and said that it had evolved beyond traditional Marxism-Leninism,

adding that "Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the frameworks of

Marxism–Leninism. The ideas of Juche which constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism is

an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind", and finally concluding that Marxism-

Leninism should be replaced with Juche, likening it as revolutionary for socialism as the latter

was for capitalism (Shin 89-90). In other words, it is far beyond socialism, superior, and, most

importantly, distinct.

In her 2003 article "The Political Philosophy of Juche", Grace Lee explains that there are

31

ideological schools of thought to Juche; if one applies them all, a clearer picture as to what it

truly is emerges. One is the instrumental perspective, where one looks at both domestic and

foreign political factors, which is relevant once Kim Il-sung came to power. The second looks at

the traditional political culture of Korea long term, and applies both history and culture to the

development of a modern day tradition, going along with Kim Il-sung's explanation in 1955

before his peers. Finally, the North Korean view presents the idea that Juche is Kim Il-sung's

original thought.

Clearly, the third perspective can be eliminated from consideration right away. Any brief

examination of both the history of Korea and the structure of Juche cannot deny the historic

geopolitical influence the past has on the country in its foreign policy alone; it is as though they

are constantly reliving it. Although domestic propaganda gives the Kim family credit for even

inventing socialism according to a declassified East German report, the regime had to

acknowledge their philosophical fathers in Marx and Stalin. In one recent antedote in an ever-

evolving mythology, Kim Il-sung was seen teaching fourth graders about Marx as an adolescent;

in an earlier one, he belonged to a Chinese Communist group while in exile (Suh, D. p 9-10).

The DPRK government has a history of changing the official story, observed by comparing

outdated editions of any translated biography/history of the Kim family, with one example in the

Kims’ origin stories. Both elder rulers went from humble peasants to nearly divine; Kim Jong-il

has Soviet records placing his birth in village of Vyatskoye in Siberia with the birth name of

Yuri Irsenovich Kim, but North Korean state records places his birth on sacred Paektu Mountain.

Another example involves the most obvious and dramatic homage to foreign influences in the

nation: until 2012, giant statues of Marx and Lenin stood by giant portraits of the older Kim

dynasts in Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang until Kim Jong-un ordered the statues’ removal

32

during the first year of his tenure, as a sign of his increased divergence from his father, Kim

Jong-il. Their removal indicated a greater level of political historical revision of North Korea's

origins that started back in 1947 when the Korean Worker's Party (WPK) banned the distribution

of Marxist, Stalinist, and Leninist writings in the country. The statues’ existence in the capital's

main square meant that the Kims, until recently, had to acknowledge at least the foreign

influences on their ideas (S. Suh 83).

Two other possibilities are plausible. The first theory, however, directly reflects the

second. Lee mentions that Kim used the geopolitical situation in his native North Korea in order

to establish power and as a means to balance the major powers in the region, mostly China and

the Soviet Union. However, looking back on Korean history prior to the arrival of the Soviet

"minders", this was clearly a reaction to centuries of the same old scenario: Korea as a shrimp in

an ocean full of whales, except with younger, more dangerous whales. Kim wanted absolute

power, but he would not be the first ruler to dabble in totalitarianism in the country; Korea had

kings and emperors, with the feudal era still vivid in the minds of the elderly and the occupation

still scarring most Koreans. Kim Il-sung explained back in his 1955 speech to his fellows in the

party that to understand Juche, one must understand the Korean experience: the history,

geography, and culture. Explaining Juche in those terms illustrates just how Korean--but not

unique--Juche is, even just in theory.

One of the biggest indicators of the Korean aspect of Juche starts in the name, and

trickles down to most everything else about the idea. First used publically by Kim Il-sung in

1955, the term was once used by Korean nationalist and first South Korean prime minister Lee

Beom-seok in his writings dating to 1947, where he used the term to describe the Korean

mindset to independence and nationalism, which worked for a nation that always praised ethnic

33

homogeneity and their own state integrity. In a speech later entitled "Let Us Defend the

Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Reliance, and Self-Defense More Thoroughly in All

Fields of State Activities" given two years after his speech in Jakarta to the Supreme People's

Assembly on 16 December 1967, Kim Il-sung illustrated the three guiding principles of Juche,

summed up as chaju (domestic and foreign independence), charip (economic independence), and

chawi (military independence). There were to be the driving forces behind Juche, not just in

Korea, but across the world as it would inevitably spread (Li 157).

Chaju: Political and Foreign Independence

In a nutshell, the names speak for themselves. Chaju refers to both domestic and foreign

independence. In the foreign sphere, this refers to the sentiment that every state has the right to

equality, self-determination, and mutual respect in the international community, with no one

nation superseding another. Of course this also meant never yielding to the demands of the

outside world, not allowing pressure or even foreign intervention to scare them, because

according to Kim Il-sung, it was then impossible to maintain chaju. Absolute political autonomy

and sovereignty over one's own country was essential to maintain both Juche and chaju, and for

the other forms of independence (Li 157-8). Kim Jong-il would later chime in that dependence of

any sort on foreign powers would lead the revolution to a dead end (Kim, J., Accomplishing 47).

While Kim Il-sung would join with the Non-Aligned Movement along with the Josip Tito regime

in Yugoslavia, and also collaborate with the other new Soviet satellite states, it was always from

a distance. North Korea's international participation was minimal, unless it had to do with

sharing the success Juche in some form, such as in the guise of giving visiting leaders a tour of

Pyongyang, lecturing in universities, or placing English ads in the New York Times.

34

In his opus "On the Juche Idea", Kim Jong-il attributes the people's desire for Juche not

for the revolution, but to ensure their perpetual independence and autonomy. It seems their

sovereignty is the first priority, before the socialist revolution. This would link chaju back to the

centuries of foreign subjugation Korea suffered. First, it was with China as a vassal state, who

allowed them their own ruler, but these leaders still had to kowtow when the Ming and Qing

emperors demanded it. Next, it was with Japan with the occupation was still very fresh in every

Korean's minds when Kim Il-sung began speaking of chaju as necessary. The Soviets would then

enter on one side with Americans on the other, and it would seem that the occupation, despite the

Soviets' withdrawal in 1948, would never quite end with the remaining Soviet minders.

Finally, as Kim started speaking about Juche in 1955, he was terrified of the lingering

Soviet influence, as their presence was felt like hot breath on the back of their necks. Kim was

still coming to grips with his own power; while he was appointed to lead the Presidium, he still

feared those who had one hand in Soviet pockets (Lim, Leadership 60). He was terrified of the

foreign influence because he feared losing his own power. It is entirely possible he played up to

the prevalent xenophobia of the day in order to muster support for himself and to keep his

political rivals down. Indeed, Kim would refer to these potential political enemies as "flunkies"

and would advise his people to be careful of the foreign element, telling them that they must

"resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them

mechanically" (Li 159). In 1956, these enemies would rise up, shouting against Kim's anti-Soviet

activity; they were found guilty of treason and purged (Lankov, Crisis249).

Juche and chaju together was meant to drive the Soviets out of North Korea, even at the

expense of shifting towards a pro-China and pro-Mao stance. Regardless, North Korea would be

free of foreigner rule for the first time since the establishment of Joseon (Suh, D. 301). With that

35

in mind, it related more to traditional Korean rule than it does with other socialist states, which

all, willingly or not, became Soviet satellites. North Korea meant to make their own way, once

their government settled down. Instead of participating towards a global socialist revolution,

Juche created their own, evident starting in 1965 when Kim Il-sung travelled to Jakarta to speak

about his new theories, and only to show off Juche's success. While Vladimir Lenin would have

understood the new state's need to repair itself and treat the scars of rapid colonization before

participating in the global revolution, Juche's isolation was excessive, harkening back not to the

closed borders behind the Iron Curtain, but to the closed off ports of Joseon, where only a single

island dealt in international trade, and with only with neighboring Japan. Juche is more about

containment; naturally unrelated to the policy American politicians cited in order to go to war in

Korea in the first place, but a containment of the spread of anything not Korean within North

Korea. This would include the revised histories that would later try to remove Marx and Lenin

and attribute every success to the Kims, which is a throwback to the nineteenth century pogroms

of Catholics when after rebels adopted the religion as their banner for revolts against the Phoenix

Throne. Joseon tried to keep foreign ideas out, much as Juche advocates with the isolation it

enforces. Xenophobia was rampant in Kim Il-sung's speeches, starting with the Soviets, then

their lackeys, and spreading to virtually anyone who is not a Korean located in the north. Juche

was a justification for foreign independence, but went farther than attaining sovereignty; instead,

it rationalized continuing to keep the outside world out as if the Mongols and Manchus were still

trying to invade, which was easily the mentality of the people in one of the most invaded areas in

human history (Yi 41).

Of course, this also ties into the second part of chaju, which is domestic independence.

While the state ought to have no real ties connecting them to another country, this sentiment

36

must also be expressed at home as well as abroad. When reading about chaju, it is usually

affixed with the suffix –song as Juche often is, meaning to act according to chaju. The spirit of

chajusong then is applied to every Korean. In a quote he attributes to his father in his work, Kim

Jong-il repeated both the main thesis of Juche and the epitome of Juchesong: "the Juche idea is

based on the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides

everything". He goes on to state that people are the popular masses, and "the masses are the

decisive factor of everything" (Kim, J. On the Juche Idea 7). This displaced the historic

materialism that socialism places as one of its universal tenets; instead of insinuating that the

physical means of production are the driving forces of history, people are "masters of

everything" and the true driving forces of history. Putting people in their place as masters not

only continued the thread of thought within Juche, it was a reaction based on the rigid class

structure of the formerly Neo-Confucianist Joseon, which was built entirely on societal demands

for total obedience for one towards their betters and leaders. One further analysis describes this

major theme of Juche to differ from socialism in that it "stresses by contrast the ability of the

community to lift itself up and take independent charge of its destiny", a direct nod where most

Koreans would find this impossible to achieve, and a system where the promises of even pseudo-

socialism such as Juche may easily appeal to the underprivileged class (Smart 422).

One relic remained, however: the intelligentsia, known as the samuwon or "working

intellectual". Usually attributed as a social "stratum" in mainstream socialism, the intellectuals

were a leftover from earlier times, when the yangban class were the nobility, and the only

honestly eligible class to sit for government exams. The samuwon were nurtured at the start of

North Korean history, and the country even did its best to seduce South Korean intellectuals to

defect towards Pyongyang. They were credited with helping build the state. When Juche was

37

introduced a decade later, the samuwon were persecuted, but their status as a singled out class

rather than their usual inclusion in either proletarian or bourgeoisie class remains an oddity as

well as a nod to a past where intellectuals were nurtured closely by the Yi Dynasty. Even today,

the flag of the WPK includes not only the red and gold traditional hammer and sickle, but also a

calligraphy brush, continuing to divide society with the inclusion of a distinct, and very Korean

intellectual class.

With all of these groups, unity was required, and in order to produce a society that was

both in concord with Juchesong and chajusong, Kim Jong-il and the WPK established the Ten

Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System in 1967, in response to both

the Cultural Revolution in China and a purge of the rebellious Gapsan faction. During a time

when the Kim family's dominance in the country was being questioned, Kim passed this unitary

ideological system about what it meant to belong to these self-sufficient masses. "Unless this

system was fully established", Kim Il-sung warned in his Works when reflecting on creating the

Ten Principles, “it is not possible to ensure the unity of ideology and will" (Kim, I. Works 21

116). These principles are what give the Kims their absolute power, while giving the semblance

of domestic independence. Every North Korean since has been responsible for memorizing and

being able to recite all ten points on this list. They list the basic requirements for every North

Korean, including giving their absolute obedience to Kim Il-sung, "making absolute his power",

"think as one with the Great Leader", and continue the revolution as long as it takes. It deprived

every North Korean the ability to think for themselves, in order for everything to "think and

move as one" The Great Leader Kim Il-sung became a lightening rod of sorts; while the

revolution occurs, there needs to be a conduit in which good ideas and good deeds come forth,

with good leadership. This conduit is, naturally, Kim Il-sung, through whom anything in North

38

Korea is ultimately possible. Some state imagery goes even further: Kim is the heart and brain,

while the people are the nerves and muscles (Min). In later years, all mentions of "communism"

would be stricken out when these tenets were edited to allow loyalty pledges for Kim Jong-un to

be added.

Not only did this help establish Kim Il-sung's personality cult while giving the semblance

of free will, they establish more ties and reflect more influences from Korea's past. One, of

course, is the undeniable Neo-Confucian legacy which advocated complete obedience, loyalty,

and reverence to the Joseon king rulers as fealty to one's lord was advocated as the natural order

of things dating back to Confucius' Analects (Analects 2:3, 3:16). However, there was actual

room for dissent within traditional Neo-Confucianism where practitioners were encouraged to

write letters of dissent to their local governments. Juche takes this sentiment a step further, and

professed that true "virtue" is following the mandates of the Great Leader, who will care for his

people as a father cares for his children (Baker 150), as evident in his 1967 speech "Look After

the People in a Responsible Manner as a Mother Would Do With Her Children". There, he

advocated that state leaders needed to be more "maternal" in contrast to his "paternity".

This brings to mind Stalin's own personality cult and propaganda, but in reality, the

personality cult of the Kims brings to mind more of a blend of Neo-Confucian, Christianity,

another major influence, State Shinto. The absolute obedience to the emperor-figure resembles

the type that was attributed to the Japanese occupation, including worship at state shrines (much

as North Koreans do today). In his World Philosophies, Smart described State Shinto as the

required reverence for the emperor as "a symbol of Japanese nationhood and the incarnation of

kokutai [national substance]" (Smart 422). When examining the basic "commandments" for

every citizen, in the name of maintaining chaju, it is easy to see how the Kims, especially Kim

39

Il-sung, is installed in place of the Japanese emperor. Kim Il-sung is easily the main hero in the

North Korean epic.

Charip: Economic Self-sustenance

Essential to such heroism in the name of acting with Juchesong is charip: economic

independence, also described as economic self-sustenance. Charip called for a country that did

not depend on another for the necessities; otherwise it would render the state a satellite for others

(Li, p 160). Kim did not discuss the idea of charip until 1963, when addressing senior leaders in

the Korean People's Army, because of his feelings of irritation of running between Beijing and

Moscow, and wanting to avoid the fallout of the Sino-Soviet split in the early sixties (Suh, D., p

307). Kim discussed charip in conjunction with chaju: it is impossible to attain chaju when they

were still so dependent on others; hence charip was just as important.

Establishing a successful socialist republic without an "independent national economy"

was impossible; a heavy industry base with machinery, along with the light industry necessary

for independent food production was what Kim had in mind (Li 160). His son summed up charip

in a vein resembling a socialist train of thought:

"building an independent national economy means building an economy that is free from

dependence on others and which stands on its own feet, an economy which serves one's

own people and develops on the strength of the resources of one's own country and by the

efforts of one's people" (Kim, J. Accomplishing 48).

Kim Il-sung knew that this would be impossible with the devastated country he inherited

after the Korean War, so that he encouraged economic ties and technical cooperation with other

"newly-emerging" nations and other socialist nations (48-52). The eventual goal was to be able

40

to import only what the nation could not produce themselves (Martin 646). Kim would usher in

the Chollima Movement, which was a drive for rapid industrialization throughout the nation

mostly in the building of factories and establishing larger quotas, akin to the Leap Forwards

within China. While successful at first, human exhaustion and unrealistic demands eventually

saw the success of Chollima run out a few years later (Jeffries 60). In conjunction with this, Kim

began his infamous "on-the-spot guidance" visits, where he would visit these factories, in order

to offer his advice on production as Kim was a fountain of knowledge in every subject thanks to

the swift work of propaganda and to be seen by the workers in order to inspire them to produce

more and work even harder. Kim encouraged his cadres to use this method of direct observation

as well, known as the ch'ongson-ni method (Hunter 19).

Charip is entirely contradictory to the socialist ideal. While the Soviets advocated that

Marxism-Leninism allows for building socialism inside of a country is more important before

exporting it, closing one's economy off and failing to expand outside of it is more of another

isolationist policy rather than a socialist one. Chollima is molded after the traditional Asian tale

of a winged horse that could fly a distance of a thousand li in a single day and that no man could

bridle or ride. This connection to nationalism completely disregarded the cosmopolitan nature of

socialism. Charip is about economic self-sustenance for Koreans; nowhere does Kim mention

spreading this sort of expected abundance outside of the state, it is entirely for Korean benefit.

This ties into the nationalistic nature of Juche; the outside is not important, only Korea, and there

is little to no regard in most of the rhetoric for the international community, save for times when

exporting goods would help survival until the Juche ideal of charip was achieved; it is not meant

to be permanent. Economically, Juche cannot match up to socialism simply because the means of

production in North Korea are not the same. Common ownership is impossible if the means are

41

the people who are encouraged to work as hard as they can for the true owner. Kim kept in mind

that his aid from the Soviets and the Chinese depended on whom he wooed at any given moment,

and keeping a balance between the two; this is a very traditionally Korean problem dating back

to Joseon. Korea has always shut its gates and tried to rely on itself in order to maintain its own

unique type of equilibrium in the past; facing an increasingly invasive outside world in the

twentieth century via trade would invite the kind of outsiders that would invite the same kind of

trouble missionaries and European traders brought a century ago, creating strife that allowed the

Japanese to take control and annex the peninsula in the first place. Juche cannot work when the

outside pokes its head in more than necessary, so keeping everything "within the family" so to

speak works for both Juche and charip.

Chollima brings the reader to mind of the rapid industrialization in the socialist world,

especially the type seen in China and with the Soviets. The Japanese Meiji Restoration model has

more in common with Chollima, and not just with a cursory resemblance. Between slogans Meiji

Japan was fond of such as "for the sake of the country" during the occupation, North Korea had

plenty to learn from in ultra-nationalism (Wittner 35). The North Korean drive for

industrialization borrowed Japanese models for factory building once their entire industrial

system in the country was leveled along with most other Japanese installations during the Korean

War. Basically, they were starting over much as the Japanese were when creating their industrial

model. The Meiji rulers called for massive land reform, where all lands were given to the

centralized government in order to start construction of factories. The intent was to build

economic self-substance and a strong economy in order to succeed as a nation. It took only

decades for Japan to establish a highly industrialized model that took the West centuries to

accomplish, in order to develop its military and protect itself against further Western incursion

42

(Yanamura). This drive for protection is connected not only to chaju, but also chawi as well.

Chawi: Military Independence

Chawi is, as a result, the intention of charip and chaju, and the final third element needed

for Juche. Chawi developed last and was first mentioned in 1964 when Kim Jong-il visited the

Korean People's Army (KPA) for the first time on 25 August, which is now a national holiday in

the country. Mentioned at Jakarta a year later, it came developed as a response to the reduced

Soviet military aid, necessitating a jumpstart to the army. Chawi, however, comes across as a

cautionary rather than entirely reactionary policy: Kim Jong-il mentions the need for military

independence as a measure against mostly American imperialists, saying "we do not want war,

nor are we afraid of it, nor do we beg peace from the imperialists" (Kim, J. Accomplishing 53).

Chawi is meant to enforce chaju, political independence, and accordingly, North Korea

militarizes for the occasion. The KPA is fifth in the world for number of troops: over one million

men and women in active service, and five million in reserves, a whopping one sixth of the total

population. 25% of North Korean GDP is spent on the KPA (Hackett). They are held to higher

ideological standards than the civilian population, who are seen as extensions of this army.

While defense against foreign enemies such as imperialists or other "aggressors" was a

factor, Kim Il-sung stated that the purpose of maintaining chawi decisively was for internal

domestic purposes. Thus it was important that the KPA be fully prepared in accordance of

ideology (Li 162-3). Part of the purpose of this heavy militarization was for the event that all

Koreans, both in the North and South, hoped for in Kim's eyes: reunification. Kim Il-sung never

advocated for a peaceful reunification, and had already attempted once to reunify the peninsula

with force, only to be turned back by a coalition of South Koreans, Americans, and other United

43

Nations forces. The division by foreigners, again, never left the minds of most North Koreans;

plenty of talk about the day North Korea would be able to cross the Demilitarized Zone and

reunify the two nations under Juche crossed all three Kims' lips often enough. The military

serves as both a warning and as an eventual hope, one that has yet to be fulfilled after sixty years

(Suh, D. 138).

This sentiment evolved into policy by 1998, after the death of Kim Il-sung, the accession

of Kim Jong-il, and the start of the famine known in North Korea as the Arduous March. Songun,

literally meaning "military first", formulated as a means to appease the military after the passing

of the Great Leader, as well as the strenuous political landscape change after the Soviet collapse

in 1991. Songun allocates most of the food and resources to the military, as well as elevates them

as an official "supreme repository of power" and as a model of Juche for all North Koreans to

emulate. Songun serves to raise the military over all at the expense of the rest of society, and ties

into the increasing nuclear crisis that started after the death of Kim Il-sung (Park).

Chawi exists to keep North Koreans on a permanent war footing. The drive for

militarization in order to keep chaju is closer to Meiji Japan than it is the Soviet model. While

Stalin's policies created many revolutionary militias meant to overthrow imperialist states and

form their own socialist regimes, the WPK's drive to protect itself is closer to what the Japanese

Empire wanted for itself with its similar military first rush. Japan could not rely on anyone else,

because when their neighbors did the same, they fell to Western influence and colonization.

Therefore, a strong Japanese industry and military would protect them from the same fate.

Korea, too, had witnessed the incursion of the West in the area, and suffered greatly when they

collided with traders, missionaries, and soldiers. The kingdom of Joseon could not survive intact

after their borders were forced open by outsiders, and in order to remain behind closed doors and

44

keep their unique form of harmony, keeping the outside where it 'belonged' was the mission of

both Meiji Japan and North Korea, differing only, of course, in approach. Japan invaded and

built an empire of its own, North Korea hopes to intimidate all from daring to venture across its

borders (Wittner).

Kokutai: Occupation as Influence

Juche can be summed up as the total product of chaju, charip, and chawi. An

unmistakable influence on the philosophy is Marxism-Leninism, imported to the country when

the Soviets crossed the border at the Tumen River in 1945. A longer lasting legacy is revealed

from the Japanese occupation, examined through its influences in charip and chawi, from the

Japanese notion of nationalism, known as kokutai or "national essence". It was used to

distinguish all that was Japanese, elevate it above all other cultures and traditions, much as Juche

does, and much of how Korean nationalism worked throughout the Joseon era. This link is even

seen in the characters used to write these words: the final Hanja syllable 'che' corresponds to the

'tai' in Kanji, meaning "basis" (Cumings, Korea 181). This idea is what promoted the ultra

nationalism during prewar Japan, where the government would urge all to "keep kokutai in

spirit" as they built up their empire. Even today, the Japanese custom is to allow both modernity

and the Japanese way into one's heart. Kokutai, as well as Juche, will inevitably elude any

foreigner who tries to grasp it (Cumings, North Korea31).

Kokutai reflected an extreme form of Neo-Confucianism which was coincidentally

imported into Japan during its sixteenth century invasions into Korea. It called for complete

obedience to the Emperor known as the Tennou, reflecting his divine origins, much as Juche

does. The Emperor is the father of his children, much as the Great Leader is, as well as the center

45

of all that is good in political work. All citizens were to perform their work for and by kokutai

thought at the center of their mind. It was kokutai that kept them safe and pure from the outside

world (Koo 203). The resemblance to Juche is not only superficial; it is too similar to ignore,

and is often passed over for the outward resemblance to Stalin's brand of Marxism-Leninism.

Kokutai and Korean history had more to do with the establishment of Juche in the north

than Stalin did. Kim paid the appropriate lip service in order to gain the aid he needed to rebuild

his country in the image he wanted, and when he lost the connection after a combination of his

actions and the ascendance of China, he started doing away with it. Today, socialist terminology

bears virtually no presence in official ideological work outside of what is intended for the outside

world. In practice, Juche continues to resemble typical Asian authoritarianism with a Korean

flavor. As socialism collapsed all over the world, it seemed to remain in North Korea as a near

comical relic of the 1950s. Yet the basis of Juche is much more dated than that; the common

people exist in a state that refuses to allow news of the moon landing to reach public ears,

preferring to keep them in a trapped neologism of Neo-Confucianism, Joseon isolationism, and

Japanese kokutai, with a Soviet flavor thrown in to confuse observers, who ideally will not try to

translate the inner workings of chaju, charip, and chawi, and what it means to work in

Juchesong. Understanding the history of North Korea, and applying the practice of Juche

through two Kim patriarchs and one son illustrates this understanding further.

46

Chapter Four: "Let's Eat Two Meals a Day!"

A common song that North Korean schoolchildren learn in school is "We Have Nothing

to Envy in the World". Taught by a young, fresh faced schoolteacher accompanying on her

accordion, the lyrics are haunting in their utopic vision of the children's place in the world with

mentions of "the power of Chollima", "the spirit of [Mount] Paektu", the infinite goodness of the

country, and the chilling chorus: "Our father is Marshal Kim Il-sung/Our home is the bosom of

the Party/We are all brothers /We envy nothing in the world" ("We have Nothing to Envy...").

Even a superficial note of the song prepared by the Korean Central Television station illustrates

the strange juxtaposition the Kim regime exhibits within the current situation and the principles

of Juche; it is the way that North Koreans will find their coveted revolution, establish their place

in the world, and reunite with South Korea under their much desired system, all while

convincing other states that their way is the best way towards an eternally happy state. Who

could doubt the cheerful youth choir singing? There is no negativity in the lyrics: every child is

safe, warm, and content under the omnipresent eye of the Korea Worker's Party (WPK) and Kim

Il-sung, even after his passing. In fact, there is no room for any sort of dissenting opinion; why

would there be? Kim Il-sung has all the plans and answers. In the background of every re-

broadcast of the video that presents "Nothing to Envy", there are children in brightly colored

traditional hanbok, twirling silk ribbons, gorgeous air views of the mountains and coasts, and

cheerful smiles everywhere.

This picture of happy people singing is much harder to swallow considering that that this

song is still sung in North Korean schools today even after decades of proof of the failure of

Juche to operate as it claims to. The biggest example of failure is the famine of the mid-nineties

known as the Arduous March, which occurred after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. The death

47

toll of the Arduous March ranged from a low of two hundred twenty-two thousand to a high of

over two million (Kang 155). The timing could not have been worse for the legitimacy of the

regime: the famine started not one year after the passing of the now Eternal President, who

promised everything to his people. Under his son Kim Jong-il, the changes from a superficially

socialist state to the strange blend of totalitarian, quasi-fascist, Neo-Confucianism state gone

awry that the current leader, Kim Jong-un, would inherit in 2011. This transformation lit the way

for a variety of reforms that would further deviate from the form of "Korean socialism" that Kim

Il-sung professed and create more need for distractions such as a much more active nuclear

program or a ramped up cult of personality.

Practical Juche

Away from the self reliance on paper, Juche in practice has proven itself to be the

complete opposite of its Marxist-Leninist upbringing. The Kims did away with most public

references to the European mode of socialism over time, dropping all pretenses especially when

the other modes failed and the conduit of this illusion, Kim Il-sung, passed on 8 July 1994. This

illusion converted generations into near-religious veneration of the Kims, established legitimacy

entirely on hatred of other states including Japan, the United States, and South Korea, all while

utilizing the traditional Joseon mode of isolationism and playing local powers against each other.

Juche in practice resembles the traditional Joseon foreign policy with additions by former

Japanese overlords, and even a few borrowed from rulers like Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini.

This is despite all of the lip service to Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Josef Stalin, and even

contemporaries in the socialist world such as Mao Zedong.

The story of North Korea and Juche is a sinister Cinderella story gone wrong, and could

48

easily pass for a political Alfred Hitchcock film. The narrative one often hears of the backwards,

off-kilter renegade state tucked conveniently next to China has not always been its story. For the

first two decades after the Korean War, Pyongyang was able to match and even outpace Seoul in

development. An estimated 76% of the peninsula's mining production, 80% of heavy industry,

and 92% of electricity-generation capability had all been in the north when the Japanese

occupation ended. Even as the southern border slammed shut and this advantage was leveled by

American bombs, subsequent Chinese and Soviet aid helped bring North Korea back on its feet

at its 1949 level of production and gross national product, at a level above South Korea until the

1960s (Cha 22). While charip, economic independence, seemed just around the corner, North

Korea had relied on foreign handouts since the beginning. This continued with gifts from all

other communist states, with medical equipment from Czechoslovakia (Demick 120), crude oil

and food from China, and power plants, hydroelectric dams, and railroads from the Soviets. In

exchange, North Korean launched Three Year Plans much like China had such as Chollima, and

exported the raw materials back to these countries. Economically, North Korea was a reliable

communist vassal, and North Koreans, by 1971, all enjoyed electricity and ate better compared

to their southern neighbors, with plenty of iron and other finished goods to sell in the bloc. A

1972 report by Harrison Salisbury called North Korea "the most heavily industrialized country in

Asia, with the exception of Japan" (Cha 23-25). It was easy for Kim to speak about Juche on the

foreign stage; self-reliance seemed right around the corner and the revolution possible.

Much of North Korean success relied on the successful courting of the two large

Communist powers, a jockeying that was not unseen before in Korean history. The first partial

Korean unification was made possible in Silla only with help from Tang China in 668 CE, and

only before having to fight the Chinese armies off when they finished their advance right outside

49

of where modern Pyongyang is situated (Lee, S. 26). The first power to unify all Koreans,

Goryeo, would play the Khitan Liao and Chinese Song dynasties off of each other, pledging

loyalty to one or the other whenever the political climate shifted, or introduced new threats such

as the Mongols (Franke43-56). Joseon, the power that lasted the longest in a unified Korea, was

founded because the winning faction, what would become the Yi dynasty, supported the rising

native Ming dynasty in China over Goryeo's continued support of the Mongol Yuan regime.

Immediately after defeating the former dynasty, which ruled for almost five hundred years, the

new Yi Dynasty would instantaneously swear fealty to the Mings, a position that changed only

with the arrival of the Qing Dynasty (Lee, et al. 371-375). With frequent invasions of the small

peninsula, Korean powers knew extremely well when their outstretched hands could be empty or

full.

North Korea has been no different; courting other powers was essential to survival. Both

the Soviets and Chinese governments provided massive amounts of aid for post-war

reconstruction for a war that, despite not reunifying the two nations, Kim Il-sung considered a

victory thanks to the losses of the "imperialists" in the south (Suh, p 133-136). Four factions

existed in North Korean politics at the end of the war: Kim's faction of former guerilla fighters,

native Korean communists, Soviet Koreans, and the repatriated Koreans from China called the

Yan'an faction. From 1953 to 1956, many of the leaders found themselves accused of not helping

the cause of reunification and other various crimes of treason, and were executed, imprisoned, or

simply "disappeared". This quickly slimmed the socialist regime in North Korea to Kim's cadre.

One such official was Pak Hon-yong, who was party vice-chairman and finance minister to Kim.

Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev would criticize Kim publically in 1956, calling his regime

"too Stalinist" and demanded that Kim refrain from his excessive purging, cease with publishing

50

falsified texts, and dismantle his cult of personality, which already surpassed Mao Zedong's in

only a few years. Fears that Khrushchev would eliminate Kim and install a far more obedient

puppet in his place were only assuaged by the timely Hungarian Revolution that same year.

During Kim’s visit to Moscow that year, an attempt to topple his regime was attempted, but

swiftly put down (Persons).

Kim's handling of his rivals resembles the systematic execution of opposing factions

resembled the paranoia of later Joseon, where the king would order tighter borders when

foreigners with new ideas presented new figureheads to rally behind, such as the massacres of

French priests in the nineteenth century. Purges of opposing bungdang were also commonplace;

regional-based factions based on minor divergence of the official government’s interpretation of

Neo-Confucianism rival much of modern day Korean politics, in Seoul as it is in Pyongyang.

While many communist states had similar purges, theirs were not tied into regionalism like

Kim's purges were. It was not simply a question of loyalty and eliminating existing rivals, such

as the infamous Trotsky-Stalin split after Lenin's passing. It was all about avoiding ideological

struggles in advance, and catering to the regionalism that Joseon politics had been all about

(Kang 355).

Strange Bedfellows

This first split with Moscow drove Kim to favor Beijing and it seemed he would try to

mimic Chairman Man with both his writings and Chollima. This began a pattern of switching

back and forth; Kim would not be a Soviet satellite ruler, and decided instead to join with Josip

Tito’s Non-Aligned Movement rather than the Warsaw Pact. Kim joined with Mao in criticizing

Khrushchev, clearly on the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. However, by the

51

time of the Cultural Revolution, Kim had switched again to the Soviets, commenting to a visiting

Brezhnev that he did not grasp the "insanity" of Mao's reforms (Radchenko). It was during this

constantly changing climate that Kim would start introducing Juche on the world stage,

advocating for chaju, charip, and chawi, independence in all political, economical, and military

matters. Mao's agreement to meet with President Nixon frightened Kim, and Mao’s refusal to

commit to a second invasion of South Korea in the aftermath of the Vietnam War further divided

his resolve.

Charip never happened. Kim refused to cease his demands for aid, even after surpassing

the south in development. One fallout with Moscow resulted when the Soviets refused to accept

a laundry list of demands from Kim. Their development screeched to a halt when foreign gifts

slowed to a trickle and Pyongyang made poor financial investments that rendered their once

profitable exports virtually worthless. Political isolation among his former socialist peers began

with their own financial issues in the 1970s and 1980s, with Kim’s insistence of dropping

socialism from public texts, and his growing cult of personality, not to mention his declaration of

Kim Jong-il as his successor in 1980. Kim would tour the countries of the Warsaw Pact to garner

support and aid, but to no real avail. The USSR was slowing its flow of support, and China

would renege on its promises and declared its recognition for both South and North Korea in

1990. (Cumings 135-138). Conditions in the North slowly went downhill, and food became

scarce, as well as electricity and other necessities. By the late 1980s, it was suggested that Kim

Jong-il was the true power behind most North Korean politics and deliberately kept his father in

the dark about the true nature of how the people were faring, as by Kim Il-sung's death in 1994,

he seemed to be continuing on as nothing was wrong (Demick 124).

The seamless regime change from father to son further amplifies the monarchal flavor the

52

Kim regime had taken on. With no rivals, no discussion of dissent, and no room for objections

even among the constantly monitored people, it seemed as though a groomed Joseon prince had

taken the Pyongyang throne and issued in a three year long mourning period for their fallen

Great Leader. Politics here had transitioned from attaining a communist revolution to simple

survival as emphasized by what is now called the Arduous March, and nuclear development,

both events that had origins during Kim Il-sung's reign, but came to fruition in his son's.

Arduous Marches and Survival

The Arduous March is the name many North Koreans refer to the famine of the 1990s

which started in earnest a year after Kim's passing in 1995 and ended around 1998. The moniker

references a march Kim Il-sung made on a winter night during the occupation that was twenty

degrees below zero, amid heavy snowstorms and starvation. This terminology led to 1993

propaganda urging the common people to tighten their belts, eat two meals a day, and slog

through the hardships until times were better, much as Kim himself had done for the good of the

Korean people (Demick 63). A nation that proposed economic independence yet exercised none

of it could proclaim itself working in charipsong. Famine was not uncommon in North Korea;

the northern half of the peninsula was better suited for industry, and the majority of arable

farmland was in the south. A bad harvest could send the north into famine easily considering the

economic shutdown of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Another factor was the fall of the Soviet

Union who ceased all trade after a decade of cutting support and demanding reimbursement for

past economic aid. Still other factors included reduced aid from China, horrific flooding "of

Biblical proportions" that destroyed both crops and reserves (UN Department of Humanitarian

Affairs), poor economic and agricultural planning, the co-morbid domestic and economic

53

stagnation that interfered with government food services, and gross misspending of what little

funding the government had left. One defector blamed part of the 1980s economic stagnation on

increased spending on superfluous building for the Kim family cult, such as statues, publications,

and ideological education. All of this resulted in a famine that killed possibly millions of people

in four years (Martin 322-323, Demick 69). Perversely, the government did all that it could to

block foreign aid from entering the country, including banning Korean language education for

aid workers, and showing international officials only the showcase capital of Pyongyang,

purposefully stocked only with well fed people and wax models of food in supermarket windows

(Demick 154).

The Arduous March revealed a reality that the regime could no longer ignore. Survival

had to become a priority. In this time the cult of personality stepped up significantly; up to

38.5% of government spending in 2004 was spent on maintaining the cult which was an increase

from 19% in 1990 (Marquand), indicating a tighter ideological hold on increasingly desperate

people. Small scale free markets known as jammadang were legalized in 1998, which permitted

survivors to sell their produced goods in public, to mitigate famine damage. Songun legislation

was formalized in 1995 in order to maintain the military through the famine and keep both

domestic and international threats at bay (Library of Congress xxxiii). Kim Jong-il had begun

moving away from the Marxist-Leninist legacy that his father tried to pass down in order to

maintain Juche, and to engage in different politics in order to keep his little regime propped up.

At this point, North Korea did not resemble the Stalinist satellite that it was in 1950; now, it was

a rouge state that embraced the past. The legacies that one thinks of when considering North

Korea are the handiwork of the son, Kim Jong-il, rather than the father, who enjoyed his creature

comforts and was content to merely act as state godhead once his industrious son was handed an

54

iota of power. This survivalist instinct is seen in the nuclear development that went into

overdrive after the passing of Kim Il-sung and the Arduous March.

Using terror and intimidation to get what one wants is not a new tactic; others call it

terrorism when small groups are involved. North Korea may be one of the first states to engage

in terrorism on the state level, with incidents including the notorious kidnapping of Japanese and

South Korean civilians for state projects (Cha 86), the bombing of Korean Air 858 in 1988,

various assassination attempts of South Korean presidents Park Hyung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan

(279), and the funding of groups such as the Tamil Tigers and Hezbollah (232). Development of

a nuclear program began during a time of Soviet détente in 1964 when Kim sent scientists to

study at the Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, and it wasn't until the late 1970s and 1980s

when Kim Jong-il was given his first taste of power that nuclear weapon development began in

earnest. As a further delaying tactic, the Kims would drag their feet in complying with

international regulations on weapons, signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but not an

international safeguard treaty until 1992. In the next year, the first missile test was conducted

(Sanger). During the first nuclear crisis between the US and North Korea in 1994, the Kims had

somehow gained enough plutonium for two bombs despite increasing economic setbacks, and

had also increased production in heavily guarded facilities at Yongbyon. After Kim Il-sung's

death in July of 1994, production of nuclear weapons escalated. By Kim Jong-il's own death in

2011, there have been four missile tests and two underground nuclear tests (Cha 249-252). Kim

Jong-il would use these nuclear panics abroad to demand aid, especially food. It seems that

without the successes of the Cold War, keeping with Juche means interaction with the outside

world after all, creating an irreconcilable paradox (Kwak 79). This pattern has only intensified

under Kim Jong-un, relying on the outside's fear of their particular unknown for aid and food

55

without too many questions asked, all maintaining their isolationism and keeping foreign ideas,

even Stalin's, out of the state.

Structurally, the government of North Korea resembles the kind Stalin would have

approved of. Virtually everything is centralized; the WPK is the ultimate authority in the

country, with Kim Jong-un as chairman, as his father and grandfather before him. Two straw

man political parties exist known as the Social Democrats and the religious Chondoist Chongu

Party, but by law they must defer to the wishes of the WPK (DPRK Const. preamble). A

unicameral parliament known as the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) appoints smaller

committees such as the Presidium to assist the WPK's rule over the people. The SPA is

composed of provincial representatives elected by secret ballot and is called "the highest organ

of state power" in state propaganda. Elections are every four to five years depending on the level

of office, and the WPK has local representatives in soviet-like parties everywhere in the state

(DPRK Const., art. 1, § 87, art. 5 § 131). A judiciary system known as the Central Courts exists,

but not separately from the SPA. No provision for civil protest or even judiciary right is given

either in the constitution nor in practice, only lip service to the "collective spirit" and the

"socialist norms of life". Judiciary review is unheard of, judges regularly fail to report to both

civil and criminal court, "disappearances" are common, and punishment is not regulated

(Freedom House). The latest organ to be added to the political body, of course, is the Korean

People's Army (KPA), under songun policy, which has been described as "synonymous with the

people, the state, and the party." (Koh).

The God-Emperor

This system freed the average citizen from political concerns and entitled the government

56

to exist in a state of working in Juchesong. Chaju is the idea that all North Koreans within Juche

act towards a dual ultimate goal of domestic and international autonomy and what enables them

to do this and sets up the unique form of totalitarianism not seen in other so-called socialist states

are the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System, the ten

principles every North Korean, adult and child, are expected to memorize. Some principles are

part of the essential of any dictator's loyalty oath, including respecting and allowing the complete

authority of the Kim dynasts, giving them all of their loyalty, and vowing to give their all to

fulfilling his directions. However, other principles go beyond demanding obedience, such as the

fourth which extols "We must make the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung's revolutionary

ideology our faith and make his instructions our creed". The sixth demands that "we must

strengthen the entire party's ideology and willpower and revolutionary unity, centering on the

Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung", with a recommendation to "learn from the Great Leader" in

all things, "repay [his] trust and thoughtfulness", and "move as one with [him]" (DailyNK,

"What are the Ten Principles?").

Keeping in mind that every North Korean could recite these vows at any time, this goes

beyond people under the thumb of dictatorship. This resembles more the spoken confessions of

an abused spouse, or even a refugee who escaped a religious cult. Indeed, the term "cult of

personality" has been derisively thrown around by leaders such as Khrushchev to describe the

Stalinist/Marxist-Leninist rulers of the twentieth century. The Kims, however, take the unofficial

cult of personality a few levels above the Soviet "Father of Nations", Chairman Mao, and Il

Duce. Kim Il-sung is the center of this quasi-state pantheon, and had it established in conjunction

with Juche, Kim is venerated along with his mother Kang Ban-suk, also known as the "Mother

of Korea" and his father Kim Hyong-jik. Also venerated is first wife Kim Jong-suk, mother of

57

Kim Jong-il, and a "revolutionary immortal", as well as the Dear Leader and beloved son Kim

Jong-il. A recent expansion now includes Kim Jong-un, the Brilliant Comrade. Observers have

compared the veneration akin to worshipping a royal family ("Next of Kim"), much like the

Mandate of Heaven demanded for the Chinese Emperor or the State Shinto for the Showa

Emperor during the occupation. The only difference between them is that no deity provided for

the Kims to come to power, Kim Il-sung did it without the aid of the divine, and only on merit

and his wits.

The official state record of Kim's ascension to power changes with each published edition

of his biographies, to the extent that it is difficult to find truth between the lines. Kim's Christian

influence from his parents bleeds into the official depictions of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to

the extent that some detractors describe the official obedience and reverence due to the Great

Leader as religious. One older story described Kim as a church organist until his late teens who

would eventually go on to attempt to erase all religion on the northern half of the peninsula,

starting in the city once called the "Jerusalem in the East". Clearly, these faithful people felt a

void where religion once fulfilled and Kim was all too happy to borrow from his missionary

upbringing to deliver the propaganda needed to keep Juche going, with himself at the center

rather than God or the Emperor (Martin 12). Instead of memorizing socialist texts, the people

were expected to memorize his life story (261).

This religious legacy loaned much to the official story of the Kims, illustrated by political

art in the bright colors of the socialist kitsch popular in the Soviet Union and China during the

fifties and sixties. In one mural at the Children's Temple in Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung sits with a

gaggle of children at his feet, a boy and girl in traditional hanbok in his arms, and with Kim

Jong-il, also holding a child. Both men have bright, rosy cheeks and wide smiles. The children

58

all play at his feet and look adoringly at him like he is Santa Claus. (Eijkemans). The imagery is

reminiscent of both the jolly fellow made popular by Coca-Cola and also of imagery often

printed in children's bibles of Jesus Christ with adoring children. Unlike Stalin and Chairman

Mao, the Kims do not allow for much deviation from the dimpled, always jovial fellow of girth;

only the enemy is allowed to look dour and skinny, since abundance was a theme the Kims

wanted to resonate most (Myers 84).

The Kim family, especially Kim Il-sung, enjoy a rich mythology of folktales and oral

tradition. The canonical stories were mainly collected and published by Kim Jong-il, who began

his political career in the propaganda department in the 1970s. The tales surrounding Kim range

from the believable, such as his fight against the Japanese in China, or the wild, such as his

teaching children about Marxism at the age of fourteen. Some are obviously embellished or

fabricated, like one story where Kim invented Juche in 1930, at the age of nineteen (Kim and

Kim 10), or were obviously stolen from other sources; one of his often quoted sayings about the

army was taken from Mao’s Red Book (Martin 245). Many stories are still exchanged regarding

Kim's early leadership, usually in the form of "on the spot guidance" stories where Kim dishes

out wisdom and experience to the newly-liberated Korean peasant (Myers 85). These stories,

while never written down formally in the government's canon, are illustrated in official art and

newspaper clippings and enshrined even in public; many benches in cities like Chongjin and

Pyongyang are enshrined in plexiglass; they are said to be benches that the Great Leader has

touched or even sat on. These benches are in a far better condition than the benches that are open

for public use (A State of Mind).

An essential aspect of maintaining practical Juche is the virtual deification of Kim Il-

sung. According to the Ten Principles and state propaganda, all North Korea has accomplished is

59

thanks to the intelligence and hard work of Kim. It is his story, which combined truth and fantasy

in a convenient sugar coating for the typical North Korean to swallow that allowed him to keep

his power. It was simple enough when North Korea outpaced South Korea in development; while

South Korea endured harsh military dictatorships along with slow economic growth, the official

story did not have to exaggerate much to prove to the northern Koreans who survived the Korean

War that they were better off than their southern neighbors, especially when the brief successes

of Chollima were considered. This illustrated a competitive spirit that author Rhie Won-bok

believes to be essential in understanding intra-Korean politics in the aftermath of the war (Rhie

63). Once a generation passed and more North Koreans could not remember the war, a new way

to keep them faithful developed, as Juche was slowly replacing socialism as the official policy.

The first major myth of the Kim dynasty was their natural yet undisputed victory during the

Korean War with all thanks to Kim Il-sung, who came from a long line of leaders destined to

bring Korea to full independence and glory as the eventual center of the world (Cumings 160).

The beginnings of the cult started in 1949 with the first statues of Kim Il-sung, and was

established in full force in 1953, after the first governmental purges. Kim Jong-il was appointed

as head of the propaganda department in 1967, two years after his father's Jakarta speech, and the

rest, as they say, was history once he started to write an official biography of his family. From

there, reverence of the leader would continue in earnest starting with widespread usage of the

term most would refer to Kim: Suryong, or the Great Leader (Lim 40). Other names and titles

included "Heavenly Leader", "Sun", and the "Great Chairman" (Suh320). At his death, he

became the "Eternal President", and is still the nominal head of state in North Korean media.

Kim Il-sung's story is required learning for every North Korean. Defectors reveal that in

every school, a room known as the Kim Il-sung Institute is set aside for a model of Mayongdae,

60

the village in which Kim Il-sung was born. The materials used inside the room must be higher

quality than the rest of the school. Teachers bring their children to the Kim Il-sung Institute to

read from his books and to educate children about the Great Leader much like a catechism

lesson. Children are also taught to read with simplified versions of Kim's exploits during and

right after the Japanese occupation (Demick 120-123). In this way, Kim is said to watch over

every child. While they read about his exploits, which are present in every subject, his name

must not stand alone on a single line of text, or break off onto another page; it must always be

printed as one single word in bold letters ("The Bewildering Cult of Kim").

Similar care is given to portraits. Portraits of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are issued

to every public building and to every family along with a special cleaning cloth meant only for

these portraits, which must be the only artwork on the wall. If a family's house catches on fire,

they are expected to grab these portraits before their valuables; those found not complying with

the "proper respect" for the pictures are often jailed (Demick 57). Portraits and hymns to Kim Il-

sung are presented before the flag and national anthem (Suh 316). Also, newspapers with

portraits of the Kims may not be used for anything other than reading; those found using these

papers for other purposes have been jailed ("The Bewildering Cult of Kim"). Similar respect is

given to the thousands of statues throughout the country; on holidays and before weddings,

citizens are expected to pay their respects and lay flowers at the feet of Kim Il-sung, especially

on the day of his birth, 15 April. Photographs may not be taken with the statue's body without

including the entire body and base in the shot. Any success is credited to the bounty and mercy

of Kim Il-sung, no matter how remotely connected, usually with great public fanfare and noise.

A term most often used in these public thanksgiving ceremonies is mansei, or “a thousand

years”; this term is borrowed from the Japanese banzai, which was directed to the Meiji and

61

Showa emperors (Inside North Korea). The state calendar was even changed in 1997 to start at

the year of Kim Il-sung’s birth in 1912 as year 1, and is known as the Juche Calendar (Lee, Hy-

sang 220).

All of this reverence is a result of Kim Jong-il's propaganda tactics, which were used

even more for himself, starting with his birth story. If Kim Il-sung was the Father, then Kim

Jong-il was the devoted Son, with a birth story to match: the official records place his birth in a

log cabin on the sacred Paektu Mountain. The birth was heralded by a singing sparrow, who

spoke of a great son born to a magnificent father as winter turned to spring, and both a new star

and double rainbow subsequently appeared over the mountain. Throughout his life, claims that

Kim Jong-il controlled the weather based on his mood, inspired international fashion trends, and

even invented basketball were rampant (Suh 284). The stories grew stranger and more farfetched

as time went on, as Kim Jong-il Institutes rose up next to the ones of his father in schools. The

son raised statues of himself after 1996 when his devotion to his father could be transferred to

himself, gave himself up to fifty-three titles, and would lead the country in mourning every year

for Kim Il-sung, to the extent of spending $100 million to renovate his public mausoleum in

1994 despite growing concerns about possible famine (Hassig 53). He did everything in his

power to be the pious son of the magnificent father and the saving grace of the WPK who would,

guided by Kim Il-sung's teachings, save all of Korea, and ultimately the world from imperialism

and capitalism. Some North Koreans even believe Kim Il-sung created the world. It is unclear

whether the religious borrowings from Christianity and Confucianism were entirely intentional;

however it is apparent that the Kims wanted a religious devotion to their family, due to Kim Il-

sung's destruction of two thousand Buddhists temples and Christian churches, as if to eliminate

any other "distraction", other than guise of state atheism (Cha 73).

62

One observation that Rhie made in his opus, Korea Unmasked, is the unusual longevity

of the Kim family, considering the socialist contemporaries they rubbed shoulders with during

the latter half of the twentieth century. Kim Il-sung has ruled longer than any other dictator in

history, and is still thought of positively after his passing by North Koreans, unlike many other

socialist leaders who are vilified after their deaths such as Stalin and Nicolae Ceausescu. Finally,

and most shockingly, Kim Il-sung nurtured his son to rule after him, giving Kim Jong-il

increasing responsibilities within the WPK after matriculation from his namesake university

more like an emperor raising his own heir from his family, and not like the other communists

who raised unrelated party members to the position of leader. Rhie described this as closer to the

Phoenix Throne more than anything else (Rhie 94-96). The Kims can be described as a dynasty,

now that power has passed more or less cleanly from father to son for two transfers of power.

They even follow the traditional merit-based ascension that the Yi Dynasty used; Kim Jong-un

was not the eldest son, but the one that Kim Jong-il appointed as most qualified (72).

The establishment of this cult of personality is a reaction of three factors. One involves

native Korean history and sentiment: their belief in themselves as a good and pure race

necessitates the establishment of something like Juche to protect the people. The next involves

Confucianism, the native ruling philosophy of both Joseon Korea and the Japanese Empire under

the name kokutai. Finally, the remaining factor was distraction; the Kims’ extensive use of

propaganda that intentionally distracts both native Koreans and foreigners from the true nature of

the state during hardship. All three present parts of a whole that paint a different picture of Juche

that is obviously intended by only a superficial glance and attribution to anything Stalin and his

party attempted to import into the divided state. Finally, a quick glance at Korean history allows

for another answer as to why the regime depends on exaggerating their twisted version of the

63

means of production: a Korean leader's fear of the people.

Rhie suggests that part of the Korean identity is linked to its geography. The Korean

peninsula has been invaded over three thousand times in its history, with a fickle royal family

that tended to flee to undisclosed safe places when danger came too close to home, leading to

distrust and outrage at the perceived desertion of their sacred duty to protect the people. Over

time this increased when the Joseon rulers symbolically handed their crowns to the Ming

emperor in China, and when the Japanese took over. Finally, the last outrage towards the ruling

parties in Korea happened during the Korean War, when the Republic of Korea's ruling

government failed to honor its vow to protect Seoul, abandoning both city and people for the

distant Busan on the southern tip of the peninsula. This would lead towards a natural distrust of

the ruling class and a communal bond with neighbors, as Rhie observed (Rhie120-125).

On the other hand, the Soviets did not stay long to help Kim keep the power they helped

him consolidate; in 1956, three years after Stalin's death, Khrushchev denounced Kim for

becoming "Stalinist" in the light of his own Soviet reforms, ordered that he replace pro-Moscow

officials that he displaced in a purge a year earlier, and demanded that Kim dismantle the already

flourishing cult of personality; in fact, the only reason Kim was thought to have been able to

keep his power and not have a different leader installed in his place was the Hungarian

Revolution which required Soviet attention far more than the bothersome satellite state-to-be

(Person 53). In response, Kim stopped aiming for membership in COMECON, the Communist

common market, and pulled away from Moscow, which would then start triggering actions in

Pyongyang that endeavored to keep North Korea from becoming a satellite state, such as

Hungary, by joining the Non-Aligned Movement and taking no concrete sides in the Sino-Soviet

spilt. (Cumings420).

64

Essentially, Kim feared losing his power; the whales that hand delivered his power would

not be assisting the newest shrimp in the ocean. The people had a history of distrust towards their

leaders. He already had to purge his enemies, but what would stop more from sprouting up? He

had to be prepared to play the long game if he wanted to keep his lofty position in a country

entirely existing on Soviet and Chinese handouts, especially with the Americans at his doorstep

in Seoul, barely fifty miles away from the Demilitarized Zone, with only an armistice and no

treaty to end the war. Clearly, Juche had to be more than just self-reliance, it had to tug at the

heartstrings of his people and win their loyalty during trying times. Korea already had a rich

heritage of nationalism, especially after centuries of foreign influence and the last few decades of

foreign occupation. But what if nationalism wasn't enough? Obviously, the Koreans south of the

border were all too happy to enjoy foreigners protecting them from a second war and his

sponsors in Moscow and Beijing would not support a second attempt at liberation; he would

have to invade them through their sentiment and consciences, and first, he had to begin at home.

Not just to bring the errant South back into the fold like the prodigal son, of course, but to keep

his people from leaving the fold. They had to be kept close not just for their sakes, but for the

sake of every Kim in power. That meant more than make-believe socialism, which was

becoming quickly obvious to Kim that it changed with the wind and fortunes of every new

Soviet premier. Kim would not play that game. Rather, he would retreat within his history to

create something new and only play at Marxism-Leninism. He would not fall into the same trap

as the short lived Korean Empire.

Shifting the Center of the World: Korean Ultra-nationalism

Korean national sentiment was a helpmeet for legitimacy that fell into Kim's lap; one

65

only has to read his texts at the superficial level to see that. This ethnic nationalism starts with a

single, mythical ancestor Tan'gun, who founded the first Korean kingdom Gojoseon, "older

Joseon", in 2333 BCE, and whose tomb Kim Jong-il reported was found in 1991. Tan’gun’s

story expands to include him as father of an unbroken line of a pure blooded Korean people who

have endured thousands of years and maintained a racial kind of homogeneity worth being proud

of, which often leads to xenophobia in both sides of the Demilitarized Zone and a common

skepticism of foreigners, even other East Asian peoples. Koreans are a separate race according to

this idea (Shin). South Korean dictator Park Hyung-hee also used this ethnic nationalism to

legitimize his rule in the 1960s (Kim, N. 25). Before the intervention of the Japanese, this

sentiment was called sojunghwa, or "little China-centrism", where China was the center of the

world and Korea was a "little China", until conquest by barbarian Manchus put the "little China"

front and center. Korea was the natural successor to China, having kept the Chinese way better

than those who fell to barbarians (Lee 305-315). Korean nationalism has often been called

"defensive nationalism", which erupted as a means to protect its people from the dangers of

extinction via invasion (Kim, S.)

Japanese occupation brought new ideas, including some that resound eerily with other

World War II players. One such ideal was the "blood and soil" theology of the Nazi regime, used

with the intent of tying the little nation to the Japanese Empire. With kokutai in mind, these Meiji

players tried to remold Korean identity in the image of Japanese identity, introducing terms such

as minjok, "blood" in the racial sense. The Koreans were now "pure" people with sacred ties to

the land, which also reflected the pure qualities of people with the beautiful mountain Paektu,

where the divine Tan'gun lived and raised the ancestors of the Korean people, much like Mount

Fuji and the first emperor Jimmu-tennou, son of the goddess Amaterasu-Omikami. Other

66

national traits the Japanese imported into Korea, in order to maintain their regime, was amae, or

dependence on parents and rulers (Myers 15-19).

It is irresponsible to deny the Confucian influence on Korea, as so many other

publications have noted. Neo-Confucianism was the theology of Joseon, and one of the Five

Principle Relationships of Confucianism is the one between ruler and subject. Kind, considerate,

righteous, benevolent, and gentle treatment must be given from the former to the latter, and this

treatment would result in righteous government. These relationship requirements also extended

to father and son, elder and younger. In return, strict adherence to authority was expected,

including those of differing social castes (Hopfe, p 153-158).

Of course, the Kims ramp all of this up in accordance to Juche. Kim Jong-il, in his

propaganda machine would continue to mix traditional national identity, Japanese kokutai, and

Confucian expectations to create the ultimate in a personality cult that entailed people to seek

chaju via Kim Il-sung and his progeny, and ultimately become the most efficient means of

production. Kim spoke of the people as having a relationship to the land akin to the Nazi

Volksich theory. The Korean people existed with hearts as pure and innocent as the snows in the

winter, with untouched forests and untapped resources, and all of the world’s envy of this

childlike virtue and innocence. In fact, they were the cleanest race of them all. If the people

expected to stay that way, it was possible through Juche with through confidence in and total

obedience to Kim Il-sung, who was painted as a strange cross of a paternal and maternal figure

who knew best how to think and care for Korea. Juche was the way that Korea would seek

reparations for the centuries of atrocities committed by foreigners, who only wanted to exploit

Korea, mix with their pure blood, and tear the nation apart. Only through Kim, who expected

total, childlike obedience, and through his philosophy of Juche could they win over the

67

American "imperialist bastards", who created a "Yankee colony" to the south, and who envied

their abundance, intelligence, greatness, and beauty (Myers 55-75).

Practical Juche, calling upon traditional historical and modern xenophobia and the

inability to keep the world behind a curtain as it did during Joseon times, must find a way to keep

foreigners out. Xenophobia can only go so far in an age when so many whales want involvement

in the aquatic neighborhood where the shrimp lived. Involvement of Soviet Russia and China,

not to mention Japan and the United States, could not be hid from the people as it had been in the

past, so, in another attempt to maintain the regime, an essential part of legitimacy also exists

solely within foreign policy. North Korea continued in that ancient tradition of balancing whale

agendas. Yet in the name of achieving chaju, and for establishing a legitimacy that cannot be

denied by the average North Korean, an important part of maintaining this legitimacy must lie in

the foreign realm.

Wolves and Sheep: Foreign Policy Under Juche

Pyongyang's foreign policy is tied intimately with its "official story", the epic that every

citizen is responsible, and indoctrination begins with children, continuing into public media.

Children learn nursery rhymes about "pathetic Americans kneeling on the ground begging for

mercy" (Noord-Korea), and textbooks include arithmetic problems that teach basic addition and

subtraction via "American imperial bastard" body counts, with snide remarks to South Korean

villages "controlled by American imperial wolves" (Lankov60). Stories of Russian women who

venture to America are immensely popular and usually end with Oscar-worthy tragedy, such as

the story of Katya Sintsova's dalliance with a capitalist that resulted in her leg amputation, which

was published after the fall of the Soviet Union (Lankov 81-82). Xenophobia, even towards their

68

neighbors to the south, comes hand in hand with the idea that their unity would be enough to

scare anyone, even Americans with their devastating atomic bombs, so that nobody would be

brave enough to invade them again, and finally, they would be left alone (Inside North Korea).

All of this, however, is meant in the name of working for chaju, charip, chawi, and, of course,

Juche. Independence and self-reliance are the first steps to reunification. With such heavily

guarded borders, the very idea brings to mind the independent imagery one sees in a Soviet

documentary of people who scoff at anything capitalist, American, or even worse, both.

The statistic of three thousand invasions of the Korean peninsula, foreign wars fought for

control, Japanese occupation, and constant reminders of the horrific, post-occupation division

that occupies the minds of every citizen, all seem like more reasonable precursors as to

Pyongyang's self imposed isolation, combined with their xenophobia. The average North Korean

is simply never allowed to forget with the limited available media full of propaganda. With jabs

at Americans and South Koreans as common as weather forecasts, this reinforces isolationism,

and keeps the citizenry from meeting new people with new ideas. When it was unable to shut the

doors that were forced open by foreigners, one set slid in, and fully annexed a nation that never

had that sort of domination before. Now that the Japanese were gone, it would never happen

again, even with the Americans at the door with the bombs that leveled all of the north. The

recurring sentiment is clear here: the world is out to destroy us; therefore we must keep it out,

and how better than to maintain antipathy with it? Chawi serves to this point, working with the

military first policy songun. The constant war footing is maintained with the large military and

regular blackouts and bomb drills. The expectation is that war could easily break out again and

one has to be ready for it (A State of Mind). All of this paranoia plays a crucial role in

understanding Juche's role in North Korean legitimacy. Part of it is outright hatred and distrust of

69

other groups; North Korea exists because of American ignorance and imperialism, so they reap

what they sowed by their deliberate refusal to help keep the Japanese out thanks to the Taft-

Katsura Agreement and for their part in invading the north. The latter is still a large part of the

national myth that keeps the Kims in power. Americans are blamed for the unreliable electricity

even in the capital; in the 2003 British documentary A State of Mind, the grandmother grumbles

"bloody Americans, it's all their fault" when the lights flicker off during a family dinner. Another

documentary shows an effigy of Barack Obama and other American presidents used for archery

and rifle practice in schools. State propaganda shows American soldiers as tall, impossibly

skinny, with large noses, much like Nazi depictions of Jewish people before the Holocaust.

American soldiers are alternatively the bogeymen used to scare children into compliance and a

sort of disdain for the media to use to compare with North Koreans, who have naturally better

character. News about American aggression abroad is usually promptly aired on television, while

most positive global news rarely does at all. The Iraq War in 2002, for example, terrified many

North Koreans that they, as a part of the infamous "Axis of Evil", would be next (Demick 37, A

State of Mind).

Both America and South Korea were, at varying points, portrayed as poverty-stricken,

South Korea especially, as a morally bankrupt puppet state that allows their American overlords

to kill innocent Korean children. South Korea is seen as a violated maiden in portrayals, which

suffered even more from the tragedy of division than North Korea did. North Koreans routinely

see recycled footage of student riots from the time of the Park regime in the 1970s, and continue

with rebellious South Korean images even though they've had to admit South Korean prosperity

after it became too hard to deny (Myers 152). The ultimate goal of the KPA is to re-unite the two

divided countries, as the poor innocents in South Korea all naturally want under the auspices of

70

Juche. Most propaganda speech regarding the army revolves around this ultimate desire; the

army must be trained in ideology in order to educate the South Koreans who are hungry for this

knowledge and had been led astray by Japan and America, in order to bring them back into the

proper Korean fold. The militarization, of course, is in case their evil American imperialist

overlords cross the border (Myers 155).

This reminds the casual reader of 1984, in which the citizens of Oceania engaged in

"daily hates" decrying whoever was the enemy at war with them at the time, Eurasia or Eastasia.

The novel illustrated early on that the hysterical pitch these public hates reach to the point where

all emotional rationale is discarded and absolute loyalty to Big Brother is given. This is similar in

North Korea, where the Kims ensure the loyalty of their people via this xenophobic daily ranting

via propaganda. If this hate starts early, it is easy to ensure the loyalty of the people; if it reaches

this fever pitch, people would be more willing to contribute to the Juche cause which requires

complete independence from others, and therefore, in the eyes of the regime requires this

constant regurgitation of history. Angry people are more willing to work in accordance to chawi;

they need to be reminded of these atrocities that happened before they were born. In this sense,

like Joseon in the nineteenth century, Pyongyang governs a place lost in time. Joseon was so

closed off and xenophobic that scientifically it was behind the foreigners who pried it open.

Fashion, music, and plenty else reminds one of the 1950s. The glorious Technicolor of North

Korean film harkens us back to another time, as do the perms and bright cherry red lipstick of

North Korean women. North Korea must live in the past in order to stay propped up, which is the

side effect of closing your doors to the world and living like a hermit. To fully embrace Juche

practically, one must become agoraphobic and relive old wounds of past generations. Otherwise,

why would you accept a regime that allowed your family to starve to death while building statues

71

to deceased leaders and who simply fed you lines such as "let's eat two meals a day" in response

(McNeill)?

Tainted Blood: North Korea's Caste System

North Korean society also reflects both Orwell and traditional Confucian society,

structured along a sort of caste system known as the songbun, or "origin". It is the idea that one's

ancestors are directly responsible for the "class" they belong to in North Korean society, an

officially "classless" state that does not officially discriminate on the basis of one's "station".

Three generations are often affected by one's actions; grandchildren could be arrested for a single

person's actions, as well as the rest of one's extended family for political crimes. These classes

are described as "tainted", "loyal", and "wavering" (Collins). Defectors report that one's class,

while usually kept secret from an average citizen, is kept on their official state file and can

directly affect how much food a person can receive in exchange for work, whether they can join

their local cadre of the Worker's Party, punishment, employment, and education opportunities.

Advancement is rare and demotion is permanent; anyone who lands in the "tainted blood" class

can remain there, as well as their children and grandchildren (Demick28). Those in the tainted

classes include those whose ancestors worked with the Japanese or South Korean armies, and

those whose ancestors had undesirable occupations, such as actors, tanners, prostitutes,

missionaries, ministers, landlords, lawyers, or merchants or kisaeng, performers analogous to the

Japanese geisha. Those in the loyal class gain privileges such as the ability to live in Pyongyang,

and to join the Worker's Party, which would then lead to opportunities to become a civil servant

(Hunter 3-11).

This sort of caste system is not unknown to Korea; the 'bone rank' system existed in the

72

Three Kingdoms period in Silla, of which only those of the "sacred bone" could rule (Kim, J.

56). In Joseon, the yangban class of the nobility were the only ones academically prepared to

take civil examinations, coexisting with the baekjeong class who, like the dalit of India, lived in

segregated areas in town, and usually took only the occupations that other classes would not,

such as their namesake butchers. There was massive discrimination against them and the slave

class, known as the nobi, and advancement above their birthright was rare. Essentially,

baekjeong have continued being baekjeong in North Korea (Passin).

Juche on paper and Juche in practice have neither been remotely congruent: North Korea

is hardly independent when it continues in the same tradition as its past and allows its fears of

foreign occupation to rule its future. The cult of personality rules that the individual must

relinquish all fears and individualism to the collective. This type of total surrender required in

North Korea is not to each other, but to a god-like leader who, despite his 1994 death, still rules

with an iron fist and a legacy of irrational, even dangerous neglect via his son. Another smooth

transition of power occurred at the end of 2011, with the rise of Kim Jong-un, the third son of

Kim Jong-il, as nominal President and de facto ruler of North Korea in a tradition that dates back

to their Kim ancestors in the small kingdom of Silla, who united most Koreans under one throne.

Kim Jong-un faces a country that remains closer to the Cold War and memories of prosperity as

well as many crisises of power. His rule will determine the future of both Juche and North

Korea.

73

Chapter Five: The Korean Wave Comes to Pyongyang

When Kim Jong-il died on 17 December 2011, a fierce snowstorm that was falling upon

the northern provinces of North Korea paused for a moment. In the area around sacred Paketu

Mountain, the sky glowed a fierce red and the ice in a frozen lake cracked so loudly it shook both

Heaven and Earth, according to the Korean Central News Agency report ("Kim Jong-il

Death..."). For those old enough to remember, it felt like a repeat of 1994; their Dear Leader was

dead, taken before he could finish his great work towards a Juche revolution. When Kim Il-sung

died, it was a genuine loss to many people, some of whom did not know what would happen to

them next, even speculating whether the world would end (Demick 91). The KCNA footage of

Kim Il-sung's funeral procession shows reporters barely able to continue the broadcast in their

hysterical despair. However, what comforted some North Koreans after the death of their

beloved Great Leader was the son, whose story and mythology was almost more fanciful than his

father’s, and who was groomed for twenty years to succeed his father in what was the first

successful hereditary communist succession. While everyone was genuinely feeling a void that

Kim Il-sung left behind, Kim Jong-il was prepared to continue his father's work.

However, this comfort did not exist in 2011. The KCNA would air similar footage of

mourning people in Pyongyang, but the mourners seemed less than sincere and more forced; at

one point, the camera focused on a man who was simply staring ahead who, after noticing the

camera, contorted his face in exaggerated grief and started wailing like a banshee as he pounded

his fists to the cobblestone. The resemblance to a toddler who has fallen down when their parents

did not observe their tumble was extremely uncanny ("North Koreans Weeping...”). The heir

apparent, Kim Jong-un, was the third, relatively unknown son who still has no official biography

as of 2014. As he was still young and an enigma even to his countrymen, foreign North Korea

74

observers and native Koreans alike did not know what to expect from the fresh faced young man

who was only officially presented to the people two years prior to Kim Jong-il's passing in 2009

as the "Brilliant Comrade" with Kim Jong-il's insistence of pledges of loyalty and the general

expectation he would be named successor. However, when former American president Jimmy

Carter visited Pyongyang in September of 2010, Kim Jong-il told him that this new lipservice

towards his son was merely rumor (The Carter Center). Even at his father's death in 2011,

speculation as to what Kim Jong-un's role in government would be, as to whether there would be

a regent or even if he would even rule at all ran wild internationally. A feeling of general unease

was felt all over the Korean peninsula, to the extent that Seoul declared a state of emergency

right after the news of Kim's passing broke south of the Demilitarized Zone (Branigan).

Regardless, the situation was sober in comparison to the passing of Kim Il-sung; no three year

mourning period was enacted, and nobody knew what to expect from a young man who would

be the world's youngest head of state.

Juche after the death of the Dear Leader continues to face challenges, both internally and

externally. After the famine many holes in the metaphorical barriers that protect North Koreans

from the outside world exposed the issues to even the most sheltered North Korean and the

outside world. Outside culture, particularly media, has begun to creep in with a relaxing of laws

prohibiting private enterprise after the famine. As a result, it is smuggled-in foreign influence

such as exports and media that has exposed North Korea to the realities of the world around

them. Love for the younger Kim dynasts has not been as sincere as it has been for the Great

Leader and Juche creator Kim Il-sung despite Pyongyang's insistence that admiration for the

Kims is genuine hero worship and not a personality cult. With the advance and intermitting

allowance of social media platforms such as Instagram and Twitter, North Korea has gone from a

75

statistical black hole to an oddity most can observe on the Internet. Defectors share their stories

freely and now report a change in the North Korean social climate as a result. As a result, North

Korea has started to look more human rather than old Soviet automaton. The unchangeable

North Korea has to face the unknown factor that is Kim Jong-un and the introduction of

modernity and foreign culture into the nation, which may be the undoing of an ideology such as

Juche that depends on keeping the state and people frozen in time and regurgitating the past

The Unknowable Kim Jong-un

Little is known about Kim Jong-un; in fact even his birth year is up for dispute. The

Worker’s Party (WPK) record states his birthday as 8 September 1982, however reports from

both South Korean intelligence and a visiting Dennis Rodman claim that he was born a year later

in 1983 (Choe). Much of what is known about Kim's younger years is often confused with the

few facts about his older brother, Kim Jong-chul. It is known that Kim Jong-un has a younger

sister, Kim Yo-jong, who serves as a senior official in the WPK’s supervisory body, the Central

Committee. Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un has a Western education, having attended school in

Switzerland at least from 1998 to 2000 under an assumed name; it is entirely possible that, given

his classmates’ accounts, he may have started Swiss education sooner, in 1991 at nine years of

age. He was described as a shy boy who had trouble with girls and poor grades. (Plattner). Until

2010, before his father's growing political notice, Kim Jong-un only had one confirmed

photograph, dating from childhood, released to the public, so even his appearance was mostly a

mystery.

His place in the succession was not even intended from his birth; Joseon did not always

follow cognatic primogeniture inheritance; however, the previous power transfer in North Korea

76

had as Kim Il-sung never considered his second son, Kim Pyong-il, as a potential leader. Kim

Jong-un is the third and youngest son of Kim Jong-il. His eldest half-brother, Kim Jong-nam,

was groomed as the future leader until his 2001 arrest in a Japanese airport for an attempt to

sneak into the country with a forged passport in order to visit Tokyo Disneyland with his young

son ("Japan expels..."). The two younger boys next in line seemed unlikely as their mother, Ko

Yong-hui, was never an official wife of Kim Jong-il, and her real name was never publically

revealed, as it was suspected that her background was a pro-Japanese family and therefore part of

the "hostile" class (Ko). Her first son, Kim Jong-chul, had no stated official reason to be passed

over outside of a report from Kim Jong-il's personal sushi chef, Kenji Fujimoto, who claimed

Kim Jong-il described his middle son as "no good, because he is like a little girl" ("North Korea's

Secret Family"). Fujimoto predicted Kim Jong-un, a boy he claimed was "just like his father"

and best suited to rule, would reign next; this claim was universally ignored by watchers until it

became reality (Lynn 122). Foreign speculation observed Ko Yong-hui's increased veneration

towards the end of Kim Jong-il's reign, much as it happened for Kim Il-sung's wife at the end of

his reign, as indication that Kim Jong-chul would reign after their father. In 2008, according to

South Korean intelligence reports Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke, and the Dear Leader would

hastily marry Kim Jong-un to his current wife, Ri Sol-ju, and started showering his third son with

honors and praise the next year.

Kim Jong-il's passing of a heart attack at seventy years old, only two years after his

public notice of his third son as possible successor, was completely unexpected compared to the

circumstances of his father's death. Kim Il-sung had a noticeable goiter, and had lived to the age

of eighty-two, older than the son whom he prepared for two decades, compared to Kim Jong-un's

estimated two years of preparation. This was a man who was concealed from public notice for

77

most of his life, unlike his father, who entered it immediately after completing college and going

straight to work in the government's propaganda section. With no official story and only one

picture, nobody knew what to expect. Not even North Koreans knew how to consider an

unknown entity as their next ruler. He had a Western education where his father had stayed for a

domestic one; so what would this mean for them? Would he stand down to American

aggression? Was he spoiled for true Juche rule, having known true luxury and decadence while

his father’s tastes for imported cognac and airlifted lobster were all kept secret? One clue came

later from a Vice reporter who accompanied Dennis Rodman in one of his visits; he reported to

the Daily News that the young Kim was socially awkward and avoided eye contact when shaking

hands (Silverman). He lacked his grandfather's charisma and his father's talent for intimidation.

Kim Jong-un was a batboy who was handed a ball and a glove and marched to the pitcher's

mound during the World Series.

Kim Jong-un was an unknown element entering an already volatile laboratory of the

North Korean reality. The country had not recovered from the Arduous March famine in the mid

1990s, and relied heavily on shipments of aid from other countries that government workers

would later abscond with and sell on the rapidly growing black markets known as the

jammadang. Holes by the Tumen River border with China opened to defectors leaving and

foreign items coming in, with no way to plug these holes without starving the survivors of the

famine. Kim Jong-il had already gone farther than Kim Il-sung in nuclear development and state

terrorism, earning the country a spot on George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil" list which in turn fed

into the already native violent anti-American sentiment as the United States engaged in their

campaigns in Iraq, also on Bush’s list. Economically, the country continued on the downward

spiral that started in the 1980s. North Korean GDP was at a low of $40 billion in 2011, with

78

suspicions that North Korean diplomats engaged in illegal activities such as money laundering,

selling illegal drugs as well as counterfeits of prescription drugs such as Viagra and counterfeit

cigarettes and circulating counterfeit American currency to help bolster the economy. Kim Jong-

un inherited a country in trouble (Cha 8).

Many international observers believed that Jang Sung-taek, Kim Jong-un's paternal uncle,

would succeed instead, due to Kim's lack of experience and Jang's appearance in a general

uniform on KCNA television after Kim Jong-il's death on 25 December 2011. This illustrated

Jang's growing support until the military swore allegiance to Kim Jong-un instead. Kim did not

immediately rule on his own; officials close to Kim Jong-il were picked to form an agency

council and groom the young Jong-un into his new role (Shim). Most visible and outspoken of

this group of regents was Jang, who was the true power behind the Kim throne for the first few

months, until April 2012, when Kim Jong-un made his first public speech and was showered

with titles similar to his predecessors', such as First Chairman of the National Defense

Commission, and Wonsu, one military rank below Dae Wonsu, or "Generalissimo". Most

importantly, Kim was appointed Chairman of the Worker's Party on 11 April 2012 ("WPK

Conference...").

Reign of the Prodigal Grandson

Kim was the first North Korean leader born after the country's founding, and as such,

represented not only a new beginning for North Korea but a link to the past; his taking full power

in 2012 coincided with what would have been his grandfather, Kim Il-sung's one hundredth

birthday. The comparisons between grandfather and grandson were to be further emphasized; the

young Kim would return to making New Year's addresses to his people, a tradition that Kim

79

Jong-il avoided when he gained power, as the Dear Leader avoided making televised

appearances and completely restricted his public appearances. Kim would also go out far more

often for "on the spot guidance" giving plenty of praise to his grandfather and Juche ideals while

doing so directly attributing the work to Kim Il-sung's great vision. (Mullen). In the tradition of

Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-un began publically alluding to the possibility of adapting Chinese

economic policies, in order to not only endear himself to their whale of a neighbor and for Kim

to continue to distance himself from his reclusive, unpopular father, according to a visiting Kenji

Fujimoto, now a family friend (Firm). The resemblance goes skin deep: Kim Jong-un, who looks

nothing like his father, clearly resembles his grandfather and encourages that small link with the

media. Rumors spread in Chinese media that Kim Jong-un even had plastic surgery to further

his resemblance to the beloved Kim Il-sung, who his people still seemed to love. However, these

rumors were never addressed, outside of a sudden order from the Chinese government to not

report on the Kims' personal lives. Regardless of their leader's face, it seemed as though North

Korea was trying to regain "face" in the eyes of their people with young Kim Jong-un, and return

to basics.

Of course, a return to basics also meant that the young Kim would emulate his

grandfather's first few years in power in a much stronger manner than simply pacifying his

subjects. Kim Il-sung spent time consolidating his power much like many totalitarian leaders had

in the first years of their reign purging anyone who might pose ideological or other issues to his

rule. Like his grandfather, Kim Jong-un wasted no time in establishing his way once accepting

full control of the state. By November of his first year, four of the senior officials that were

generally accepted to be his regent council had been replaced, demoted, executed, or simply

'disappeared', according to the Chosun Ilbo. These four men were all highly close to Kim Jong-il,

80

and some of them were highly ranked generals in the KPA. According to an analysis by a South

Korean official, Kim Jong-un was actively trying to erase traces of his father's rule ("Top 4...").

Of his senior advisors, only Jang Sung-taek remained by the end of 2012, and it was generally

accepted that he was safe, because he was family. Jang had even survived a previous attempt at

purging under Kim Jong-il in 2004, and was quietly reinstated, one of few North Korean officials

to do so (Demick, "Kim Jong-il..."). He was considered untouchable. One of the few "safe"

places to be in the chaebol-esque Kim government was to be related to the ruling Kim dynasts.

While Jang was not related by blood, his marriage to Kim Jong-un's beloved aunt Kim Kyong-

hui, also active in the WPK, was his safety net. After all, Jong-un's older half brother, Jong-nam,

escaped his father's anger after being disowned, and lived a life in relative peace in exile. Jang

was rescued from his purge in 2004, and had even met with then-Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in

August 2012, a few months after his regency ended (Choe, "North Korea..."). He would escape

this series of purges with a quiet promotion to chair of the National Sports Commission,

replacing Kim Kyong-hui. While this seemed like the start of a forced retirement, Jang seemed

safe, even as his peers would be dismissed in favor of much younger officials.

However, his execution in December 2013 shocked North Korea and the world alike.

After of year of slowly being excluded from public events, Jang Sung-taek was stripped of all

titles and positions and arrested at the 8 December Presidium meeting, part of which was

broadcast live on state television, in the most public arrest in North Korean history and the first

televised one in decades ("Jang Arrested..."). He would be accused of illicit activities such as

affairs with other women, deliberately obstructing relations with China, and even treason, in the

context of either trying to grab power for himself, or for Kim Jong-nam, who was now estranged

from Kim Jong-il ("Report..."). Finally, his trial and execution was reported by the KCNA on 13

81

December, presumably by machine gun like his peers. In fact, rumor had it that the man in

charge of delivering Jang to his trial was none other than Kim Jong-un's older brother, Jong-chul

himself. He was perceived by international observers to have been Kim Jong-un's second in

command to his death ("N. Korea..."). Yonhap would later report in the new year that Jang's

execution unleashed a damnation memoriae not unlike commoners punished for political crimes;

every trace of his political existence was excised from public records, and his extended family

was rounded up and executed, even the elderly and children, as if not only to kill the man, but his

family's continued existence. Only Kim Kyong-hui, already separated from Jang, survived ("All

relatives...").

The purpose of examining these purges is to further illustrate just how far Kim Jong-un

wants to separate his reign from his father's; purges are more associated with Kim Il-sung, who

had disposed of competing socialist leaders as to prevent their ideologies from taking hold. The

Kims could not continue if those who were more loyal to Moscow or Marx stayed in power

alongside them. Juche could not operate if any man in power felt more loyalty to Josef Stalin

than Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-il spent the majority of his reign isolated from his people, rarely

going on "on the spot guidance" tours, rarely giving public addresses, showering honors upon his

recently deceased father such as the title "Eternal President", expanding the Kim cult of

personality, and promoting Kimilsungism, later tacking on Kimjongilism after the passing of his

father. Kim Jong-il never had to prove himself, because he had been writing his own addition to

the Kim saga since his father appointed him head of the propaganda after graduation. He was in

his middle age when he came to power. The people did not have to like him to accept him; Kim

Il-sung, who could do no wrong, had fostered respect and the proper fear for his son among the

populace. In comparison, Kim Jong-un, who was a virtually unknown third son, did not have this

82

as a young man, in his twenties, virtually unprepared. Jong-un had plenty to prove. There could

be no second coming of Kim Il-sung, but unlike Kim Jong-il, the beloved Great Leader had no

counterpart in earning the people's respect. Kim Jong-il's funerary footage, and the lack of

genuine mourning, could not have escaped Kim Jong-un's notice. If he could prove himself a

leader who was able to consolidate himself as Kim Il-sung had, then perhaps one day, he could

settle into the same groove as his father was able to afford. Purges were a good way to send

messages and instill fear.

The death of his uncle Jang Sung-taek quelled any argument of possible scruples to

power. If you could send your own uncle to death, a respected general who was a sign of the old

regime, then you could send anyone to death, even your older brothers. Kim Jong-un had to send

a message that he would stand on his own two feet, and the barely thirty year old ruler had done

so in a manner that might be considered overkill, since Kim Il-sung never touched family. For a

young man that wanted to be taken seriously, having his uncle executed was enough, but the

damnatio memoriae and the execution of his family on top of it was akin to killing a cockroach

with a nuclear warhead. This kind of punishment, once limited to those outside of the ruling

party, showed that Kim is stepping away from the confines of Kim Il-sung's boundaries.

Kim Jong-un bucked against Kim Il-sung's boundaries in the past. While he had his own

chaju at home, he also needed to work in chajusong abroad and thus the 2013 nuclear crisis came

about. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2087 on 22 January 2013, condemning the

previous year’s launches of the failed Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 artificial satellites, as well as future

nuclear testing in North Korea (United Nations). Pyongyang announced it would conduct another

test regardless, and did so on 12 February, even warning China that it planned to conduct one or

two more in 2013. This test received widespread condemnation even from an allied China

83

(Chance). North Korea escalated further by abandoning the Korean Armistice Agreement on 13

March, drawn up in 1953 after the Korean war, and threatening "merciless" military retribution

towards enemies; Japan and South Korea responded by raising military readiness, and the United

States announced plans to fly over South Korean air zones and planned to send more troops to

nearby bases in the Pacific. On 23 March North Korea severed shared telephone hotlines

between them and South Korea, and declared a state of war between the two peninsular entities

four days later (Choe). Foreigners were asked to leave embassies and the Kaesong Industrial

Zone, a joint North-South Korean factory in the DMZ, was evacuated by both parties (Kim).

Pyongyang went as far as to point missiles in an launching position, shooting several into the Sea

of Japan, and refusing calls for talks until late June 2013, when it began demanding both a

continuation of the failed Six-Party Talks with Russia, China, the US, Japan, and South Korea as

well as new individual talks with the United States to garner recognition as a nuclear state. The

hostilities would soon tire out: a meeting at Panmunjom at the DMZ with South Korea reinstated

the hotlines, and eventually, agreements in August to re-open Kaesong. Relations between North

and South Korea then reverted to "normal", save for the still unreplaced Armistice.

Again, this proved Kim Jong-un as a leader who believes he has a lot to prove as he tries

to fit into the gigantic shoes his father and grandfather passed down to him. Pyongyang

constantly threatened war but never instigated it directly, as it has done since the end of the

Korean War. This conflict, however, escalated closer to full-blown war farther than any North

Korean international incident before or since. Usually, deals made with North Korea to stop

nuclear development or testing from other Six-Party Talk nations would usually result in

increased food aid, fuel aid, trade deals, or other gifts, such as a 2007 agreement with the United

States to shut down a nuclear facility in Yongbyon for increased food aid (Cha 270). However,

84

this 2013 nuclear crisis in North Korea resulted in food aid being cut off while Kim Jong-un

went on to prove his point, because of his going against the 2007 agreement with the US when

launching Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3. With these nuclear tantrums in mind, Kim Jong-un deliberately

cutting off food to his people in order to escalate this conflict is reminiscent of a toddler who

throws their toys on the floor when not paid sufficient attention; Kim would escalate by moving

missiles to a launching position, then firing some into the ocean whenever there was no reaction

to his threats. Kim as a young man wanted to be taken seriously, and how better than to threaten

war? If he was aiming to go farther than his predecessors, pointing missiles as if to fire them and

almost shoot them at Japan was a step farther than his father's kidnapping of Japanese nationals

and his grandfather's clandestine meetings with other leaders. Kim Jong-un got what he wanted

when other countries went into states of emergency: to be taken seriously, to prove that he was

not afraid to do what the other Kims would not dare to do, either in a state of young hubris,

inexperience, or desperation. Regardless, Juche must adapt to a ruler who behaves in such a

manner; the climate in North Korea, for Kim Jong-un to go so far beyond what his family has

already done, was already in trouble.

Tara and Titanic: The Private Sector in Policy-making

Part of the trouble started with the Kims' method of slowing down economic decline,

with an interesting legal tactic beginning after the Arduous March. One important piece of

legislation that passed during Kim Jong-il's tenure were the ones that legalized the jammadang

open air black markets in 2002 in a twist that took the nation further away from the socialist

roots that it was supposedly founded on. Until then, private markets were illegal in North Korea

until then, with defectors reporting that those caught selling any kind of goods outside of the

85

state stores risked time in one of the rumored reeducation camps, along with their families. Once

the Arduous March happened, however, more and more older women nicknamed the ajumma, or

aunties, started businesses to make extra money to buy the UN food donations that somehow

ended up in stalls next to theirs. Private transactions went from meeting in deserted alleyways to

sprawling open air markets with venue organizers who charged rent. Women sold assorted goods

they made at home, mostly food, hosted primitive outdoor cafes, or sold services like

hairdressing; women often scrimped for a perm even right after the Arduous March. People who

used to provide legitimate services through the state found themselves unemployed when their

employers could not afford to pay them; they simply left their state jobs and went to the growing

jammadang to work instead, to trade their services for goods. While money was never required

for food rations in the past, the state had stopped giving the required amounts of food for

preformed services prior to and during the Arduous March. This led to an increase in black

marker activity for basic survival; food was often traded even before the jummadang. In fact,

legalization of these markets happened in 2002 simply because there was no stopping the

ajumma from showing up at their stalls; perhaps the ailing state economy could simply help

themselves to some of the profits of private enterprise to bolster an ailing economy. After all,

people used hard currency more often now than ever before (Demick, p 154-159).

What makes this sort of private enterprise fascinating is that it shows further cracks in

Juche that the government must address. First of all, an estimated 80% of North Koreans during

the early 2000s conducted some sort of business in the jammadang before and after their

legalization regardless of government retribution; this was considered a political crime and, in

the past, resulted in the punishment of your entire extended family up to three generations.

However, after a period of slight economic recovery, Pyongyang tried to shut these markets

86

down starting in 2005 by imposing legal restrictions on who could sell goods, when, or of what

quantity. The first law was a ban on selling grain. A few years later in 2009, Pyongyang went

further and enacted currency revaluation laws to ensure that those who saved a small fortune

basically lost it overnight; the won was revalued and new bills handed out, and everyone with

illicit savings were expected to exchange their old bills for new ones for a maximum amount of

$250. Many lost thousands, which equaled life savings and small fortunes, overnight. Instead of

leaving the markets, more people started flocking to them again, and the difference led to new

legislation passed in 2010 removing these restrictions and leaving the jammadang all but

unregulated. During this time, state police stopped dragging entire families to prison when one

member engaged in political crimes; probably because if the ajumma were gone, so were their

wares. Apparently the threat of sending your family to prison was not as terrifying as starving to

death, as millions had barely a decade prior. The state had to adapt to that sort of apathy towards

punishment. The famine had turned people from loyal socialists to hardened survivors, which

creates a different sort of mindset that does not go along with relinquishing one's will to the

Great Leader and his family (Lankov).

A second, far more serious implication of these markets were the wares themselves. As

foreign aid piled in, so did other sorts of unexpected aid at the tail end of the Arduous March.

One defector, a former ajumma, included in her story how one day in 1998, she started seeing

foreign fruit at the jammadang, including bananas, which she had not seen in twenty years,

oranges, which she could only identify from illustrations in old book, and pineapples, which she

had to ask a friend about. Along with the fruit came Chinese clothing, which were softer and in

more vibrant colors than the dull North Korean clothing made from vinalon, a cheap dye-

resistant synthetic fiber made from coal. Sometimes strange clothing appeared from "the village

87

below". Other goods included manufactured goods that were rare in North Korea in recent days,

such as toothbrushes and razor blades (Demick 155). Another defector reported seeing pirated

DVDs and cheap DVD players. These DVDs were both Hollywood movies, Titanic being one of

the more popular films traded, and episodes of South Korean dramas, which sold quickly

(Demick 255). A market grew from the demand for these dramas in particular; by 2013, brokers

would wait in markets for buyers, who would ask them for the next episodes, waiting only a few

weeks after their initial airing in South Korea. Neighbors often traded disks amongst each other

which increased their impact (Je).

Undoubtedly, what helped push a demand for these foreign goods, was the government's

response to the appearance of James Cameron's film and Mickey Mouse shirts in small markets,

where not too long ago, people seemed content with the native cinema before electricity was

reverted from movie theaters, of course and their state issued uniforms when they used to be

issued. The party’s daily lectures to workers now included warnings against buying these goods

which, combined with the already increasing apathy towards total obedience to the law, probably

only piqued curiosity further. One lecture warned:

"Our enemies are using these specially made materials to beautify the world of

and to spread their utterly rotten, bourgeoisie lifestyles. If we allow ourselves to be

affected by these unusual materials, our revolutionary mind-set and class awareness will

be paralyzed and our absolute idolization for the Marshal [Kim Il-sung] will disappear"

(Demick 255).

It did not help that the Marshal was dead for years at the time these lectures started.

Despite being a sort of messiah for the North Korean people, his son did not stop the famine. Not

one North Korean survivor of the Arduous March could have been isolated enough to not know

88

at least one victim, and all but the soldiers and Kims themselves had to feel their belts tighten

beyond the existing holes in the leather. The first true test to their loyalty came with the famine,

and the formerly all but divine regime could not save them or their families from

malnourishment or illness. Starving people could not put all of their will to the Great Leader who

died, or his son, the Dear Leader that hid away when they needed him most. It was not by either

of their graces that they finally had rice to eat; it was the UN and their sacks of rice with Roman

letters. That had to make a startling impression on angry people who could not express their

anger or face punishment for political crimes.

These items also started creating more of a crisis of faith which started with starvation.

Countless defectors who escaped North Korea credits foreign items or media as the reason they

started doubting their status quo. One defector credits Titanic as starting a moral crisis as the idea

of a man sacrificing his life for a woman and the economic development of the early twentieth

century being far more advanced than what she had in the twentieth-first century in North Korea

later aided her family's decision to leave (Thompson). Another claimed it was a set of smuggled

American nail clippers; if Americans could made a superior nail clipper, just how were their

weapons, and what else was the Kim regime lying about? One fisherman accidentally picked up

a South Korean radio program with two women arguing over a parking spot, which was an

inconceivable notion to him, as how could there be so many cars that parking was that scarce

enough to cause an argument? A student read a translated book from Russia on how capitalism

had evolved since Marx wrote his Manifesto, and realized he was being kept in the dark on

purpose. How could South Korea and China be worse off than North Korea if all of these goods

were pouring into their markets? (Demick 260). Fashion became a huge demand in cities outside

of Pyongyang as secondhand clothes from Japan and South Korea grew in demand. Those who

89

could not afford these expensive commodities altered their own clothing to match; the irony of

North Koreans emulating foreign fashion was not lost on defectors (Je). Dramas were especially

powerful; the sheer beauty in the clothing of the actors and the bustling streets with healthy

looking actors and flashy billboards advertising all sorts of goods made watching more addictive;

it was fun to picture living in a trendy Seoul apartment until one realized that the Pyongyang

government was feeding them lies. No, they had plenty to envy and they were not better off than

everyone else. The famine did not affect everyone in the world, look at the meat on the bones of

those who lived in Korean communities right across the border; dogs ate better than North

Korean doctors, one other defector noted after her crossing (Demick 221).

Unwanted Globalization and Porous Borders

In the end, what led plenty of people to distrust the government was not foreign

propaganda directed at this purpose, it was what one popular South Korean export would later

be called "Gangnam Style", a feeling and lifestyle of luxury that would later inspire a song

mocking it that would take over global Billboard charts in 2012. However, North Koreans

wanted more than the excessively lavish trappings described in PSY's music video; they wanted

more of the mundane that poured across the border. They wanted to see what else the

government hid from them. In the end, Kim Jong-un would do nothing directly to stem the flow

of these goods through these jammadang, enacting no legislation. After all, North Korea never

lost dependence on these markets for survival, but one has to take the good with the bad.

The isolation that kept people faithful to Juche has been broken by the holes in the wall

keeping people safe inside. Border patrols, suffering from famine as well as his fellow

countrymen, routinely accept bribes to turn the other way. Many reports from defectors claim

90

this, from the early defectors in Barbara Demick's Nothing to Envy, from the more recent USB

stick and laptop smugglers observed in the documentary Kimjongilia, from the stories published

by NK News by translators; all it cost to cross the Tumen River border was a few cartons of

cigarettes, a hundred dollars, or a week's worth of meals. The holes in this fence allows for more

movement. Before the Arduous March, barely a thousand people left North Korea after its

founding, but after the famine, as guards became just as "corrupt" as their fellow North Korean

after losing state benefits, thousands are crossing the borders yearly. (Demick 184). Not only

does this mean more smuggled goods go in, desperate people can go out. So many North

Koreans have left that China signed an agreement to return defectors to North Korea to face

punishment, which could result in forced abortions for pregnant women suspected to have

Chinese husbands, imprisonment in work camps, and the rounding up of families who remain, as

defection is one of the few crimes that still warrants this type of punishment (Harden 58). South

Korea has a program called Hanawon to take in defectors and educate them on how to live in the

modern world with services such as ATM machines, how to make even little decisions such as

what to wear, and give them an allowance to start their new lives (Demick 203).

Many defectors stay in the background to avoid drawing attention to themselves and

raining punishment down on their remaining families, but many such as Shin-Dong-hyuk, the

first North Korean defector to be born in and escape from a prison camp, draw international

attention for sharing their stories. The result of this has created more awareness for what happens

in North Korea when previous knowledge of North Korea remained scarce. While there is still

plenty that the rest of the world does not know, and even some that will always remain unknown,

the fact remains that North Korea's isolation has failed on both sides of the wall. People are

gaining more and more knowledge of the outside world, leave, and share what they know. News

91

sites such as NK News have sprouted up for international watchers, KCNA footage is published

on YouTube, and guess work as to what happens inside the reclusive country has become easier

than ever thanks to social media. There is plenty of increasing documentation that demonstrates a

growing trend of resistance in smuggled secret footage; one video from Pyongyang shown on a

2014 PBS Frontline documentary shows a woman stopped in the streets by police for wearing

trousers to work instead of the state mandated skirt. Instead of meekly submitting, she shouts at

the officer until he shrugs his shoulders and walks away. Another video published by New York

magazine shows a woman refusing to pay a police officer an outrageous and unwarranted bribe

for her seat in a truck for her daily commute. Social media has just illustrated further, like Kim

Jong-un's posturing and the inflow of foreign goods after a famine and the cracks in the Juche

system. It is unclear that the lack of belief towards the Kim regime is as widespread as the

average defector admits in their testimonies, but it is clear that more and more people are

struggling enough to consider leaving the bosom of the Great Leader for the great unknown

beyond the Tumen and Yalu Rivers.

The Future of Juche

Juche cannot survive this way and is on a downwards spiral when compared to the

successes of the reign of Kim Il-sung during the 1960s. After twenty years of economic

stagnation, the death of the Great Leader, the Arduous March, the rise of Kim Jong-un, an

uncertain, inexperienced ruler, and the continued traffic across the northern border, clearly

something must change in order to maintain the homeostasis that Juche seems to depend on.

While faith in Kim Il-sung's glory and continued blessings remains the story of the day in

propaganda, the fact remains that an issue grows for Kim Jong-un, much as it did for Kim Il-

92

sung: as time goes on, fewer citizens remember the good times associate with Kim Il-sung, just

as fewer in his grandfather's time could remember the devastating split along the thirty-eighth

parallel, or the war that came after. As such, Kim Il-sung found forging history to meet his needs

simpler, and in the end, this cognitive dissonance was easier to perpetuate for his personality cult

when things were going well for North Korea. However, the reverse is true for Kim Jong-un. As

much of his legitimacy depends on the filial devotion to his grandfather, those who cannot

remember the good times associated with his reign will have a much harder time as the rest of

the world opens to them. How can any young person grow to believe in giving their wills and all

to a deceased Great Leader that helped their grandparents and let their parents starve? How can

anyone have ultimate faith in the "communist spirit" and belief in the evils of capitalism when

their ajumma were selling copies of Boys Over Flowers for enough rice? Is that not the

government's job? Where are the pineapples in the state stores? Why does the government report

on the poverty in South Korea if their dramas show a bustling Seoul where people generally

seem happy with fighting over boys and parking spaces? Cognitive dissonance can only be

pulled off for so long, and currently, the tactics of Pyongyang seem to be failing in order to

combat it.

Also, the siren call of the outside world, proven by the movies and increase in foreign

media in North Korea, is definitely the antithesis of self reliance. The most popular novel in

Pyongyang is Gone With the Wind, to the extent that the new Samjiyon tablets, North Korea's

answer to the iPad, come preloaded with a copy of the novel. A similar project, called Airyang, is

a native smart phone that comes with the popular American application Angry Birds (FlorCruz).

Instead of relying on its own rich heritage of folklore, songs, cinema, and products, North

Koreans are no longer satisfied; they wish to join the rest of the world in their consumption of

93

globalized fashion and media. The regime can no longer claim as they did with Kim Jong-il that

the rest of the world considered their Dear Leader a fashion icon with his pompadour and Mao

jacket, or an innovator. This window to the rest of the world reveals just how behind they are

when their coveted clothing are many seasons behind everyone else in their geopolitical

neighborhood. As ordinary as that sounds, it is an eye opener to the common person, who may

not watch the carefully selected international news that the KCNA splices together of the world's

woes. The superficial is what the average person takes notice of first, and now that the illusion of

having "nothing to envy" is gone, resentment can take root. Before, it was easy to ignore the rest

of the world, but no longer. Juche cannot satisfy the typical North Korean when their children

wear knockoff Nike shirts and the women covet South Korean makeup and lingerie. Even double

eyelid surgery, a vastly popular surgery in South Korea, is gaining popularity in North Korea,

albeit illicitly (Lee). It is incredibly hard to be obedient and purchase only North Korean goods

when the wife of the Brilliant Comrade herself, Ri Sol-ju, publically wears Chanel suits and

gives Christian Dior bags as gifts, when the regime not long ago tried to paint Kim Jong-il as a

man capable of sacrifice who ate just a single bowl of rice a day during the Arduous March

(Choe).

It is this disregard for the law and the growing resentment over a still insecure food

supply and intermittent famine, as well as the current insecure leader and a growing penetration

of foreign media that will all be Juche's undoing should it not adapt to face these troubles. Kim

Jong-un is a ruler that has yet to pass a law cracking down on trading the contraband that aids in

underlying dissent and a one that seems not care as he gives permission for smart phones and

tablets all while toting his new iPhone 6. It seems unlikely that he can maintain the same kind of

power his grandfather and father did. The people love Kim Il-sung, that much was certain when

94

he passed. While the same sentiment of love may not have extended to Kim Jong-il, people

respected him enough to maintain the resemblance of his personality cult after his death, and to

start veneration for his pensive third son, who seemed more eager to prove himself than to fix the

growing schism between the common people and the ruling class in North Korea. With more

footage of people shouting back at the police, the government passing laws to accommodate

crimes being committed in the name of survival, and more people escaping and drawing

attention to these issues internationally with book deals and columns, more needs to be done if

Kim expects to rule to a similar age as his predecessors. People are only capable of standing so

much when their ability to ensure the next meal is compounded by obvious hypocrisy.

Juche relies entirely on keeping the people loyal, but is not congruent with expanding

that loyalty to accommodate the massive globalization of the twenty-first century. People cannot

rely entirely on the leaders to give them everything they need, so they get them elsewhere,

creating an independence that defies the ideal of chaju, political independence. It is clear that the

North Korean illicit markets contain items from all across the world, these items replacing ones

the North used to be able to manufacture on its own, eliminating the common person's ability to

work according to charip, economic independence, a tendency that will spread to the ruling class

when the rest of the world eventually cuts off the aid that keeps the ruling elite able to afford

their luxuries through increasing sanctions. While military independence, chawi, has yet to be

seriously affected, North Korea uses their widely disputed nuclear capabilities to barter for what

they want, as evident by the 2013 nuclear crisis. However, this use of chawi has not been

enabling the other two principles. Hence, true Juche has failed. For North Korea to continue,

massive changes that the elite, so far, have been unwilling to make have to happen. Isolation in

the style of Joseon kings cannot continue, as foreign ideas helped overthrow the small Korean

95

Empire before, and can definitely aid in overthrowing the Kims one day. Hermit Kingdoms

cannot endure with twenty-first century globalization.

The reign of Kim Jong-un, his failure to address a massively growing issue regarding

contraband, and the growing importation of foreign culture all chip holes in the Juche structure.

Simply put, the farther away North Korea gets from the golden years of Juche, Kim Il-sung, and

North Korea, the less the people will want to continue on that train. The regime cannot continue

in the same vein with the advances of the twenty-first century, with the internet spreading

information faster than ever before, and cannot help the regime hold itself up to international

scrutiny, and it is all of these factors that could endanger the state if left unchecked. With the

current trend of non-confrontation with elements such as the burgeoning jammadang and people

talking back to law enforcement, so far, it appears the state will not address these issues.

96

Conclusion

There are plenty of monikers that are given to North Korea, all of them referring to the

leadership. Victor Cha called it "the impossible state", President George W. Bush once called it

part of an "axis of evil", President Bill Clinton, a "rogue state", and former Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice "an outpost of tyranny". All of these phrases refer to the leadership and history

of this small nation, and at times are fitting. North Korea has defied all odds to survive when

many of its contemporaries behind the Iron Curtain did not; it broke away and tried to carve its

own path, contributed to acts of violence internationally, and still props up a family of tyrants at

the expense of its own people. North Korea's true intentions hide behind the shadows of bizarre

innuendo, of leaders who live in almost obscene decadence, try to horde nuclear missiles, and

ignore the fact that scores of its own people die of starvation. It is a parody of a country that most

people do not want to pay attention to unless necessary.

North Korea’s many unique features are the result of their policy of Juche, which

depends on an appearance of socialism in order to hide its true form as a totalitarian monarchy.

This new Phoenix Throne derives more from its native Korean past than it does the Marxist-

Leninist style of socialism it claims it descends and improves upon. An integral part of Juche is a

fanatical veneration of leaders. With superficial resemblance to socialism, such as atheism, an

anti-imperialist stance, and a ruling single party, Juche has altered the modes of socialism in

order to create an unusual form of monarchy that most other countries have stamped out,

modeled on the Joseon Dynasty's Phoenix Throne, with ideas imported from Japan and Germany

more than Soviet Russia.

Juche endures because of the Great Leader's important position as the replacement for the

means of production, rather than the masses who traditionally serve this role in most other modes

97

of socialism. The Kim family has explained their policy as an improved form of socialism, one

that caters to the needs of Koreans more so than traditional socialism does, and ergo has survived

this long because of it. The Great Leader, Kim Il-sung, is at the center of it all as the creator of

Juche, for who the rest of North Korea works for so he may save his energy for thinking of ways

to move the Juche revolution forward internationally, with a unified Korea at the center. It is this

blend of hyper nationalism and devotion to history that legitimizes the Kims' rule, and it is the

great love for Kim Il-sung that gives him the position of Eternal President, and also gives his

heirs the continued tolerance of the people. Juche, in practice, is a method of blinding the people

into obedience by raising the Kims into semi-divine figures on the same level as the Trinity of

Christianity, using pseudo-Christian methods to replace religion with the cult of personality.

With this devotion, the people suffered a devastating famine after the passing of the Great

Leader, which created a crisis as illustrated in many defectors' accounts. The smuggling of

foreign goods and media into the once completely isolated Hermit Kingdom has alerted the

average North Korean to the lies that the Kim administration has pushed for decades. The regime

depends on warping reality, and because of increased traffic across the border, the rest of the

world creeps in. It is Juche's insistence on keeping to traditional modes without bending to the

increased attention that globalization demands in an increasingly smaller world that will be

Juche's downfall, should it go unaddressed.

The broader implications of these conclusions may indicate that North Korea is

mishandled when continued to be regarded as a remaining Soviet relic, since it has not been so

since the 1970s and the increased attention to Korean nationalism and the Kim personality cult.

The media does the North Korean people a massive injustice when persisting to treat it as a

fossil, as Juche's true meaning is buried under layers of pompous pseudo-socialist terminology

98

for this very purpose. One fact that illustrates this is the current North Korean constitution: it has

not mentioned the word “communism” in its latest incarnation. When examined, North Korea

has no real intention on continuing in the Stalinist model, with moves such as taking down

statues and portraits of Karl Marx from their places next to Kim Il-sung's in Pyongyang. Since

Marx and Stalin no longer have a place in the official story, it should have no place in our

rhetoric regarding this state. Regarding North Korea for what it is would serve to change foreign

policy, as well as the public's attitudes, though not drastically. Allowing the regime time to self

implode does not require much active deviation.

However, in the aftermath of this collapse should the regime fall within the next decade

or two of Kim Jong-un's reign, the implications would depend on how those aiding in creation of

a new Korean state, unified with Seoul or not, regard the former Kim state. The resulting crisis

would take delicate consideration, as the vast majority of those involved have been in a lifetime

of servitude to a depraved personality cult that has failed them more than helped. The correct

type of aid is necessary to alleviate the pain, suffering, and utter disappointment of surviving

North Korean nationals. South Korea, China, and Japan would have to work in tandem to

reconstruct. Because of the United States' position in the Six-Party Talks and its large military

garrison by Panmunjom, it too would take a role in peninsular politics, and the correct type of aid

would go a long way in changing the geopolitics of the region. The situation is incomparable to

the German or Yemeni reunifications, and the United States would be embarking in a terra

incognita of sorts. American intervention may either be asked for by Seoul, or it may be asked to

stay out of a direct role, as American involvement in the Korean War has led to the legitimacy of

the Kims for decades. Correct action here is a delicate balance, but in order to find it, governing

bodies need to stop making the mistake of underestimating this tiny, yet feisty nation as a relic. It

99

has grown organically into a geopolitical cobra, with drastic implications in global policy if not

handled correctly. The need for appropriate and thoughtful American action in this area has not

been more necessary since the term containment was coined to describe why Americans joined

in the United Nations coalition for the Korean War. This superpower will find itself at a

crossroads once North Korea implodes.

Americans must to consider the role they want to take when regarding the inevitable

collapse of an unsteady regime, the end of an era on dictatorship, and the strange new world that

would create once it does. Because of the current American tendency of political intervention in

plenty of international affairs, the correct action to prevent a resurgence of hostilities in East Asia

has never been more vital, with China on one side. A good start would be to do the suffering of

North Koreans justice and poke holes in the fabrication that is the Kim regime and Juche, which

it has depended on alongside its intentional isolation since day one. Former president George W.

Bush started on this path with his endorsement of noted defector Kang Chol-hwan's account

Aquariums in Pyongyang, urging others to start seeing North Koreans as human rather than

smiling automatons blindly devoted to their Dear Leader. While governments starve the regime

out with sanctions, they are also starving the people.

Examining North Korea is often more exhausting than rewarding, as what is generally

known by the outside world is vastly outweighed by what is not. Only the fall of the Kim regime

and the opening of the last remaining vestiges of the Hermit Kingdom will reveal some of the

truth to the world. Delegating the interim as unexplainable does a great disservice to the people

affected by the Kim regime. While research and study is undeniably limited by the unknown,

what is known provides a wealth of unique experience that further study in the area could

provide, for the first "communist" hereditary dictatorship, for the division of a close knit nation

100

into two drastically divergent nations in only a few decades, and speculation into what it might

take for reunification. Nowhere else has a division created such a separate, yet utterly similar

culture. The biggest struggle for North Korea may ultimately be not at division, but at

unification, with the first independent and fully restored Korean state since the Japanese

occupation over a century ago. The drive to return to former glory, however, has not been

diminished, but emphasized by Juche, and it is that legacy that may remain with North Korea

after the remaining vestiges are long gone.

101

Works Cited

"A Bit of Everything: Vietnam's Quest for Role Models." Economist 26 Apr. 2008. Print.

A State of Mind. Kino on Video, 2005. DVD.

Albert, Michael and Hahnel, Robin. Socialism today and tomorrow. Boston, Massachusetts,

USA: South End Press, 1981. pp. 24–25.

"All relatives of Jang executed too': KCNA." Yonhap News Agency 26 Jan 2014.

Becker, Jasper. Rogue regime: Kim Jong Il and the looming threat of North Korea. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.

Bonsal, Stephen. "THE OBLITERATION OF THE KINGDOM OF KOREA; With Complete

Disregard of Her Promises Preceding the Russian War, Japan Abolishes the Emperor of That

Nation and Places a Marionette Upon the Throne. THE VANISHING "LAND OF THE

MORNING CALM" The Exiled Monarch Will Probably Join the former King of Foo-Choo

Islands in Tokio.." The New York Times 28 July 1907: SM1. Print.

Bottomore, T. B. A Dictionary of Marxist thought. Malden, Massachusetts, USA; Oxford,

England, UK; Melbourne, Victoria, Australia; Berlin, Germany: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991

Branigan, Tania. "Kim Jong-il, North Korean Leader, Dies." The Guardian 19 Dec. 2011. Web.

13 Nov. 2014. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/19/kim-jong-il-north-korean-leader-

dies>.Breen, Michael. Kim Jong-il North Korea's Dear Leader. Rev. and Updated ed. Singapore:

J. Wiley & Sons, 2012. Print.

Callinicos, Alex. The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket, 2011.

Print.

102

Caprio, Mark. Japanese assimilation policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945. Seattle: University

of Washington Press, 2009. Print.

Cha, Victor D.. The impossible state: North Korea, past and future. New York: Ecco, 2012.

Print.

Chance, David, and Jack Kim. "North Korean Nuclear Test Draws Anger, including from

China." Reuters. 12 Feb. 2013. Web. 18 Nov. 2014.

Choe, Sang-hun. "North Korea May Take Action to Jolt Economy, Analysts Say." The New York

Times 5 Sept. 2012. Web. 18 Nov. 2014.

Choe, Sang-hun. "Rodman Gives Details on Trip to North Korea" The New York Times 9 Sept.

2013. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.

Choe, Sang-hun. "North Korea Cuts Off the Remaining Military Hot Lines With South Korea".

27 March 2013. The New York Times. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.

Choe , Sang-hun. (26 July 2012). "That Mystery Woman in North Korea? Turns Out She's First

Lady". The New York Times. Retrieved 26 July 2012.

"Country Reports on Terrorism 2004". State Department. April 2005. Retrieved 25 November

2014.

Collins, Robert. Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System.

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. June 6, 2012.

Cumings, Bruce. Korea's place in the sun: a modern history. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.

Print.

Cumings, Bruce. North Korea Another Country. New York: New, 2011. Print.

103

Cumings, Bruce. "North Korea - THE RISE OF KOREAN NATIONALISM AND

COMMUNISM." North Korea - THE RISE OF KOREAN NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM.

Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 16 July 2014. <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-

9508.html>.

Demick, Barbara. Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea. New York. Spiegel and

Grau, 2009. Print.

Demick, Barbara. The Seattle Times 9 Dec. 2004. Web. 18 Nov. 2014.

<http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2002113774_kim09.html>.Dolgozhitel, D.. "Soviets

Groomed Kim Il Sung for Leadership." Vladivostok News 10 Jan. 2003: n. pag. Print.

Epstein, Gady. "The Winners And Losers In Chinese Capitalism". Forbes. 31 August 2010.

Retrieved 11 July 2013.

Fischer, Louis. The Life of Lenin. London: Phoenix, 2001. Print.

Fischer, Ruth; Leggett, John. C.(2006). "Socialism in one country". Stalin and German

Communism: A Study in the Origins of the State Party. Social Science Classics (2nd reprint ed.).

Transaction Publishers. pp. 471–496

FlorCruz, Michelle. "North Korea's IPad: The Samjiyon Tablet Comes With 'Angry Birds' And

'Gone With The Wind'" International Business Times 6 Nov. 2013. Print.

Franke, Herbert. The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368.

Ed. Denis Twitchett. Vol. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.

Fukuoka, Yasunori. "Koreans in Japan: Past and Present." Saitama University Review 31: n. pag.

Web. 10 July 2014.

104

Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?", The National Interest (Summer 1989).

Hackett, James, ed. The Military Balance 2010. Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2010. Print.

"Happy Birthday, Koh Young Hee." DailyNK. 26 June 2012. Web. 18 Nov. 2014.

<http://dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=9418>.'

Harden, B. (2013). Escape from camp 14: One man's remarkable odyssey from North Korea to

freedom in the West. New York: Penguin Books.Hassig, Ralph C., and Kong Dan Oh. The

Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom. Lanham, Md.: Rowman

& Littlefield, 2009. Print.

Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper, 1972).

Holt, Alix. Selected Writings of Alexandra Kollontai. Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1977. Print.Kim,

Chun. The history of korea. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005. Print.

Hopfe, Lewis M. (2006). Religions of the World. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

Hunter, Helen. Kim Il-song's North Korea. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. Print.

Inside North Korea. Perf. Lisa Ling. National Geographic, 2007. Film.

"Jang Arrested on Stare Television." NKNews. 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 18 Nov. 2014.

<http://renewal.dailynk.com/english/read_photo.php?num=11248&cataId=nk03100>.

"Japan Expels N Korean Leader's 'son'" BBC News. BBC, 5 Apr. 2001. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1310374.stm>.

105

Je, Son-lee. (2014, October 13). Ask a North Korean: How fashion works in North Korea.

Retrieved November 19, 2014, from http://www.nknews.org/2014/10/ask-a-north-korean-how-

fashion-works-in-north-korea/.

Je, Son-lee. (2014, November 13). How to get whatever you want in North Korea. Retrieved

November 19, 2014, from http://www.nknews.org/2014/11/how-to-get-whatever-you-want-in-

north-korea/

Jeffries, Ian. North Korea: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments. London:

Routledge, 2006. Print.

Kang, David C. "They Think They're Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North

Korea—A Review Essay." International Security: 142-71. Print.

Kang, Jae-un, and Suzanne Lee. The Land of Scholars: Two Thousand Years of Korean

Confucianism. Paramus, N.J.: Homa & Sekey, 2006. Print.

Kim, Christine. "North Korea workers don't report for work at joint industrial park: report". 9

April 2013. Reuters. 18 Nov. 2014.

Kim, Hyung-chan and Kim, Tong-gyu. Human Remolding in North Korea: A Social History of

Education. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 2005.

Kim, Il-sung. "On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche in ideological

work." Kim Il Sung: Selected Works. : Foreign Language Publishing House, 1971. . Print.

Kim, Il-sung. Works 21. January-December 1967 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing

House, 1985).

106

Kim, Il-sung, and Yuk-Sa Li. Juche! The speeches and writings of Kim Il Sung. New York:

Grossman, 1972. Print.Kim, Jin-wung. A history of Korea: from "Land of the Morning Calm" to

states in conflict. : , . Print

Kim, Jin-wung. A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict.

University of Indiana Press. 2012.

"Kim Jong-il Death: 'Nature Mourns' N Korea Leader." BBC News. BBC, 22 Dec. 2011. Web. 13

Oct. 2014.

Kim, Jong-il. Accomplishing Juche Revolutionary Cause. Pyongyang. Foreign Languages

Publishing House. 1990.

Kim, Jong-il, and Il-sung Kim. On the Juche Idea: Treatise Sent to the National Seminar on the

Juche Idea Held to Mark the 70th Birthday of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, March

31, 1982. Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1982. Print.

Kim, Nadia Y.. Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to L.A. (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 2008)

Kim, So-yeol. "North Korean Intellectuals Oppressed and Watched." DailyNK. 20 Oct. 2008.

Web. 12 Sept. 2014. <http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=4198&cataId=nk02500>.

Kim, Sok-soo, cited in Park Chung-a, Myth of Pure-Blood Nationalism Blocks Multi-Ethnic

Society. The Korea Times, August 14, 2006.

107

Koh, Byung-chul. "Military-First Politics and Building a ‘Powerful and Prosperous Nation' In

North Korea" Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online, 14 April 2005,

<http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0532AKoh.html> 20 March 2007.

Koo, Hagen. State and Society in Contemporary Korea. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993. Print.

Korean Central Television (조선중앙방송)" We have Nothing to Envy in the World." YouTube.

YouTube, LLC, 15 September 2014. Web. 30 September 2014.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tXKe8rZ89MA >.

Kwak, Tae-hwan, and Seung-Ho Joo. The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers.

Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003. Print.

Lankov, Andrei. Crisis in North Korea the Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956. Honolulu: U of

Hawaii :, 2005. Print.

Lankov, Andrei. From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: the formation of North Korea, 1945-1960. New

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002. Print.

Lankov, Andrei. 22 September 2011. "It's not all doom and gloom in Pyongyang". The Asia

Times. Retrieved November 19, 2014.

Lankov, Andrei. "North Korean Dialect as a Soviet Russian Translation." NK News North Korea

News. 21 Aug. 2014. Web. 8 Sept. 2014. <http://www.nknews.org/2014/08/north-korean-dialect-

as-a-soviet-russian-translation/>.

Lankov, Andrei. "North Korea's missionary position." Asia Times Online :: Korea News and

Korean Business and Economy, Pyongyang News. Asia Times Online, 16 Mar. 2005. Web. 11

July 2014. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GC16Dg03.html>.

108

Lankov, Andrei. The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. New

York: Oxford UP, 2013. Print.

Legge, Jason. "The Analects." Chinese Text Project. 1 Jan. 2006. Web. 15 Sept. 2014.

<http://ctext.org/analects>.

Lee, Grace. "The Political Philosophy of Juche." Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3.1

(2003): 105-12. Web. 9 Sept. 2014. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf>.

Lee, Hy-sang. North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001.

Print.Lee, Ki-baik (1984). A New History of Korea.

Lee, Hyun-hee, Park, Sung-soo , and Yoon, Nae-hyun . New History of Korea. Paju:

Jimoondang, 2005. Print.Lee, Stephen J. European dictatorships, 1918–1945. 2nd edition.

London, England, UK; New York, New York, USA: Routledge, 2000

Lee, Sunny. 23 July 2011. "Pyongyang waitresses sliced to perfection". The Asia Times.

Retrieved November 19, 2014.

Lenin, V.I. (1914) The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, from Lenin’s Collected Works,

Progress Publishers, 1972, Moscow, Volume 20, pp. 393-454. Available online at:

http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm

Lenin, Vladimir. "Lenin's What Is To Be Done?: Trade-Unionist Politics And Social-Democratic

Politics." Lenin's What Is To Be Done?: Trade-Unionist Politics And Social-Democratic Politics.

1 Jan. 1902. Web. 13 Aug. 2014.

Lim, Jae-Cheon. Kim Jong-il's Leadership of North Korea. Routledge, 2008. Print.

109

Lim, Jae-cheon (May–June 2012). "North Korea's Hereditary Succession Comparing Two Key

Transitions in the DPRK". Asian Survey (University of California Press) 52 (3): 550–

570. doi:10.1525/as.2012.52.3.550.

Lisichkin, G. (Г. Лисичкин), Мифы и реальность, Новый мир (Novy Mir), 1989, № 3, p. 59

Lynn, Hyung-gu. Bipolar Orders: The Two Koreas since 1989. Halifax: Fernwood Pub. ;, 2007.

Print.

Marquand, Robert. "N. Korea Escalates 'cult of Kim' to Counter West's Influence;." Christian

Science Monitor 3 Jan. 2007. Print.

Martin, Bradley K.. Under the loving care of the fatherly leader: North Korea and the Kim

dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004. Print.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. New York, NY: Signet Classic,

1998. Print.

Mcneill, David. "Kim Jong-Il: Leader of North Korea Who Deepened the Cult of Personality in

His Country following the Death of His Father." The Independant 20 Dec. 2011. Print.

Min, Nam-gung. "Kim Jong Il's Ten Principles: Restricting the People." DailyNK. 13 Oct. 2008.

Web. 14 Sept. 2014. <http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=4162>.

Mural with Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Dear Leader Kim Jong Il (Children's Palace,

Pyongyang). 2011. World Trip. By Paul Eijkemans.

Myers, B. R. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters.

Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House, 2010. Print.

110

Nahm, Andrew. "The impact of the Taft-Katsura Memorandum on Korea: A

reassessment," Korea Journal. October 1985,

Nedelmann, Birgitta. Sociology in Europe: In Search of Identity. Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1993.

Print.

Nelson, Sarah M.. The archaeology of Korea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Print.

"Next of Kim". The Economist. The Economist Group. September 23, 2010.

"N. Korea threatens to turn presidential office into 'sea of fire'". Yonhap News Agency.

November 22, 2013. Retrieved November 25, 2014.

"North Korea." Freedom House. 1 Jan. 2006. Web. 1 Oct. 2014.

"North Korean Leader's Son Is 'Brilliant Comrade'" The Jakarta Post 13 June 2009. Web. 13

Nov. 2014.

"North Korea's Secretive 'first Family'" BBC News. 13 Dec. 2013. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.

"North Korea – A Country Study". Library of Congress Country Studies. 2009.

"N. Korea Executes Leader's Uncle for 'treason': KCNA." Yonhap News Agency 13 Dec. 2013.

Ogle, Alex. "North Koreans Weeping Hysterically Over the Death of Kim Jong-il." YouTube.

YouTube, LLC, 19 December 2011. Web. 11 November 2014.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pSWN6Qj98Iw >.

111

Park, Jae-kyu."North Korea since 2000 and prospects for Inter Korean Relations" Korea.net, 19

Jan 2006, <http://www.korea.net/News/Issues/IssueDetailView.asp?board_no=11037> Retrieved

September 15, 2014.

Passin, Herbert. "The Paekchŏng of Korea: A Brief Social History". Monumenta Nipponica. 12

(3/4): 211. 1957.

Person, James (August 2006). "“We Need Help from Outside”: The North Korean Opposition

Movement of 1956". Cold War International History Project Working Paper. Retrieved 3

October 2014.

Pipes, Richard. Russia under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: Vintage, 1995. Print.

Plattner, Titus. "Kim Jong-un Est Resté Neuf Ans En Suisse." Le Matin. Tamedia Publications,

21 Apr. 2012. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.

Pons, Silvio. A Dictionary of 20th-century Communism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 2012.

Print.

"President Delivers State of the Union Address." President Delivers State of the Union Address.

29 Jan. 2002. Web. 25 Nov. 2014. <http://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

Radchenko, Sergey. "The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo:

Evidence from Russian Archives". Cold War International History Project Working Paper (47).

"Report on Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau of Central Committee of WPK". Korean

Central News Agency (North Korea). 8 December 2013. Retrieved 8 December 2013.

112

Sanger, David E. (June 12, 1993). "Missile is Tested by North Koreans". New York Times.

Savada, Andrea and Shaw, William. "THE JAPANESE ROLE IN KOREA'S ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT." . Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 16 July 2014. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-

bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kr0086)>. Tertitskiy, Fyodor. "Soviet Officer Reveals

Secrets of Mangyongdae." . DailyNK, 2 Jan. 2014. Web. 10 July 2014.

<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=11335&cataId=nk03600>.

"Secret State of North Korea." PBS. PBS. Web. 19 Nov. 2014.

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/secret-state-of-north-korea/>.

Shin, Gi-wook. Ethnic nationalism in Korea: genealogy, politics, and legacy. Stanford, Calif.:

Stanford University Press, 2006. Print.

Shin, Gi-wook. "Korea's Ethnic Nationalism Is a Source of Both Pride and Prejudice, According

to Gi-Wook Shin." Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Stanford University, 2

Aug. 2006. Web. 3 Oct. 2014.

Smart, Ninian, and Oliver Leaman. World Philosophies. Rev. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2008.

Print.

Suh, Dae-sook. Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader. New York: Columbia UP, 1988. Print.

Suh, Jae-Jung. Origins of North Korea's Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development. Lexington,

2012. Print.

"'Team America' Unsettles Team Kim in Pyongyang." World Tribune.com. 9 Feb. 2005. Web. 25

Nov. 2014.

<http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/05/breaking2453411.0520833335.html>.

113

Tiku, Nitasha. "Citizen Journalists Offer Disturbing Video From Inside North Korea." New York

Magazine 29 Nov. 2010. Print.

"Top 4 N.Korean Military Officials Fall Victim to Shakeup." The Chosun Ilbo 30 Nov. 2012.

Chosun Media. Web. 18 Nov. 2014.

<http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/11/30/2012113001209.html>.

"Trip Report by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to China, Sept. 4–10, 2010". The Carter

Center. 28 September 2010. Retrieved 28 September 2010.

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “United Nations Consolidated UN Inter-Agency

Appeal for Flood-Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) 1 July 1996-31 March 1997” April 1996, reproduced on

http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/appeals/96appeals/dprk/prk_atxl.html#top

United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 2087. New York: United Nations, 2013. Web. 18

Nov. 2014.

"What Are the 'Ten Principles'?" DailyNK. 9 Aug. 2013. Web. 1 Oct. 2014.

<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900&num=10829>.Wittner, David G.

Technology and the Culture of Progress in Meiji Japan. Routledge, 2007. Print.

"WPK Conference Elects Kim Jong Un as First Secretary of WPK". KCNA, April 11, 2012.

Retrieved November 17, 2014.

Yamamura, Kozo. "Success Ill-gotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan's Technological

Progress." The Journal of Economic History 37.1 (1977). Web.

114

Yi, Won-bok, and Louis Choi. Korea Unmasked. Gyeonggi-do Paju-si: Gimm-Young

International, 2002. Print.

Yi, Ki. A new history of Korea. Cambridge, Mass.: Published for the Harvard-Yenching Institute

by Harvard University Press, 1984. Print.