Layers of Collectivity: From Joint Attention to

Corporate Actors

Michael SchmitzUni Wien

A framework for CI• to lay foundations for CI in the philosophy of

mind and language!

• to help solve traditional puzzles about CI!

• to integrate and explain empirical data!

• to account for layers of CI in terms of differences in representational format!

• to account for CI-specific (mode) inferences

Layers of CI• preconceptual: joint attention (action &

perception) / e.g. kids kicking a ball around and establishing patterns of joint play!

• conceptual: joint propositional attitudes & speech acts / e.g. negotiating rules for joint play!

• documental: document acts and role attitudes in institutional context / e.g. FIFA issuing rule book, planning World Cup

Three biases • pervade contemporary theories of mental and

linguistic intentionality and representation:!

• a bias for conceptual forms of representation!

• a bias for the invididual over the collective mind!

• a bias for the theoretical over the practical mind

Theoretical mode / position

• e.g. perception, belief, theoretical knowledge hypothesis, assertion!

• mind fits / adapts to world:mind to world direction of fit(DOF; cf. Anscombe, Searle)

Practical mode / position• e.g. action, intention, plan, practical knowledge, order, promise!

• world is adapted / fitted to the mind: world to mind DOF

The ‘theory bias’• e.g. treating actional experience as a kind of

perceptual experience (e.g. Bayne); intention as a form of belief (e.g. Velleman); practical knowledge of what to do and how to do it as theoretical knowledge (e.g. Stanley & Williamson)!

• encapsulated in the standard notion(s) of a proposition and of ‘propositional attitudes’

Against propositions • these are incoherent because the Ps are treated!

• as the content (object) of both practical & theoretical postures (attitudes & speech acts) and thus as neutral between the two!

• and yet at the same time tacitly as theoretical – by ascribing truth values to them, as truth is repre-sentational success from a theoretical position (Schmitz 2013, 2014)

For mode representation• so while the Ps are treated as representing

state of affairs (SOAs) from a theoretical position, this position itself is not taken to be represented!

• representational content of attitude = that of P!

• against this, I argue: we do not just represent SOAs – from nowhere as it were – but our practical or theoretical position relative to them

Attitude and subject mode• attitude and subject mode are

representational:!

• attitude: e.g. intending / believing!

• subject: I-mode / we-mode / role-mode!

• e.g. in action I experience myself as bringing about movements, in perception I experience the world as acting on me

Self- & world-representation

• in intending I have a sense of an action as to be brought about by me!

• not to be confused with a belief that I am intending; nor does it require a concept of intention – just a sense of my position!

• self- and world-representation are two sides of the same coin (e.g. Kant, Goethe, Piaget)

From singular to plural• the key to understanding CI is to understand

how plural selves represent themselves as subjects rather than as objects, as taking up joint practical and theoretical positions:We BEL (we will go to Stadtkind)this is here taken to be an irreducible we-mode form of believing, where the first “we” represents a plural subject of believing!

Against reductionism I• traditional analyses of e.g. common knowledge

(Lewis, Schiffer) let the subject only appear as an object of a report of what is believed / known:x knows that it rainsy knows that it rainsx knows that y knows that it rainsy knows that x knows that it rainsx knows that y knows that x knows that it rains….

Against reductionism II• This attempt to reduce common knowledge to

mutual knowledge cannot be completed!

• The problem disappears if we accept we-mode subject representation! All subjects represent:We KNOW (it rains)!

• Part of the motivation for the analysis of course is a distrust of “we” and collectivity generally

Skepticism about “we”• I won’t further enter into the critique of

individualist analyses (Schmid, Searle)!

• “we” as irreducible and yet non-mysterious:!

• the group of course is not like another member, but the members as related in collective modes from joint attention to role modes in institutional contexts

The background of “we”• So when we say “we” and think “we”-thoughts,

we do this against the background of pre-conceptual modes of relatedness such as:!

• joint attention, joint actional and perceptual episodes and dispositions (skills, habits)!

• and emotional ties!

• which are often connected in sensory-motor-emotional schemata (Schmitz 2013)

Joint Attention

• joint attention (JA): sharing an object for its own sake, often by means of pointing gestures, ‘sharing looks’ etc.!

• typically, perhaps even uniquely human!

• begins around 9-12 months in infants

Experiencing as co-subject

• is subject-mode experience different from experience as object in JA? !

• Campbell: no! – But this is only plausible (if at all) if we disregard the emotional tone of the experience and dispositions for joint action!

• autistic children are experienced differently, we do not to the same degree have a ‘sense of them as potential cooperation partners’ (Searle)

Co-subject & world• I experience things in the world as things I

want to draw your attention to!

• I even begin to see the world with your eyes:I will be drawn to things similar to those you have pointed out to me in the past!

• the mere sense of your presence impacts on my perceptual sensitivity, and I also have a sense of you having this impact on me

JA and autism• more than half of the children with autism, but

not a single non-autistic child, never indicated the place where a sticker should go by pointing to their own bodies (co-subjectively!) rather than at the other's body (Hobson & Meyer 2005)!

• "Participants with autism...[showed] lesser degrees of (a) emotional engagement with the testers, (b) forms of JA that implicated sharing of experiences...(d) role shifting… from...learner to teacher (Hobson & Hobson 2012)

JA and autism• correlation between "sharing looks" and role

reversals, such that "the mode of social percep-tion that involves sharing looks [also] gives rise to self-other transpositions in imitation" (ibd.)!

• autistic children: deficits in affirmative nodding!

• only 3 of 16 children with autism showed a concerned look when the drawing of the tester (with whom they were in a JA situation) was torn (Hobson et al. 2009)

Co-subjectivity as "like-me" intentionality

• I experience somebody as like me, when I experience her as s.b. who:!

• can take on any role she can (role reversal)!

• feel with her (affective, affirmative)!

• refer to her through sameness (imitation)!

• then I experience her as co-subject

Co-subject experience as relational and causal

• there is a special way of experiencing the other as CA (even if the physical features are identical)!

• it is relational & (ideally) reciprocal: we experience her as enabling, providing access to the world (and ourselves as enabling access for her)!

• it is causal: drawing attention is a causal notion, so we experience active & passive roles!

• it is affectively charged and this charge is the ground of the disposition to act jointly

From JA to we-mode I• at the JA level the representational format is

pre-conceptual, non-propositional, gestaltlike!

• joint patterns, habits, games are created through sensory-motor-emotional interactions!

• by learning to say “we”, we transpose the co-subjectivity experience to the conceptual, propositional level of thought and language

From JA to we-mode II• joint attitudes can now be reflected upon

and negotiated: what should we think?!

• a joint subject of conceptual level attitudes is established in this way!

• individuals are connected by joint attitudes against a background of joint skills, habits & emotional ties

Groups are free!

• Searle: “we” conceptually irreducible, but no group logical subject!

• but if “we” is conceptually irreducible, the group is free ontologically!

• a “we”-group is an entity capable of re-presenting itself as such, just like an “I”

Groups & Representation• the “we”-group is not created out of thin air, but

by establishing “we”-attitudes, a new level of collectivity is established!

• misrepresentation is still possible, I can misre-present myself as a group member in we-attitudes - if the others do not accept me!

• this account is representationalist, but: caveat re the status of representationalism about emotions

We-mode representation• at this level, representation is conceptual,

propositional, reflective!

• representations show role-differentiation (logical & grammatical role)!

• logical operations such as negation, conditionalization, disjunction etc. apply and therefore there are deductive inferences

Mode & inference• if mode as representational, we can account for

mode-sensitive inference, e.g. deductive imperative inference (Schmitz, Mode Logic)!

• deductive inference is also we-mode sensitive:We’ll take a walk on the Donauinsel if the sun shines.We Bel (sun shines) ➔ We Int (take walk)We Bel (sun shines)We Int (take walk)

We-mode inference

• but we-attitudes do not entail I-attitudes, not even for group members, e.g.:“We Int (send a man to the moon)” does not entail “I Int (send a man to the moon)”“We know (when the show will start)” does not entail “I know (when the show will start)”

From we-mode to role-mode • the position vis-à-vis a SOA can also be an

institutional position or role!

• e.g. a functionary in an organisation has power over certain domains and stands in power relations to other members in his role!

• just like in the we-mode, representation is constitutive for roles in institutions, but misrepresentation is still possible

From we-mode to role-mode

• e.g., I might represent myself as being chancellor of Austria…!

• If the other members of the relevant group would all so represent me, I would be!!

• Or one might represent oneself as acting in one’s role, though one isn’t, e.g.: is the policeman on duty?

From role-mode to we-mode • The powers of office do not belong to the (private,

I-mode) person, but only to the person in his or her role, in accordance with the relevant procedures!

• Likewise, the person will hold certain attitudes only in his or her role:!

• As party chairman I believe…!

• As members of the conference committee we plan…

Role-mode and inference• Corresponding failures of entailment:In my role as a policeman I am obligated to arrest criminals vs. as a private person I am obligated to arrest criminals!

• In the role, the person is subject to the coherence constraints of the role, which are different from her personal ones

Creating institutional identity

• She inherits certain attitudes from former role bearers and must come up with a policy as coherent with those as possible!

• Corporate attitudes are constituted by individuals and groups holding them in their institutional roles!

• Again, corporations are not created out of thin air, but they are created through representation: just like a “we”-group, a corporation is essentially something that represents itself and is represented in a certain way

Institutions & representation

• Representational format: codified, standardized, high degree of role differentiation, externalised (documental) !

• For organizations / institutions to function, their members must represent themselves as co-subjects rather than as mere objects

Thank you for your joint attention!