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Latin America: The New Neoliberalism and Popular Mobilization (Volume 23, No. 3) November, 2009

Gerardo Rénique The December 1989 uprising in Venezuela’s capital-city of Caracas –known as

the Caracazo – against the free-market reforms of then president Carlos A. Pérez marked

the beginnings of a two-decade wave of militant popular mobilizations against

neoliberalism across Latin America. From the streets of Buenos Aires to the highlands of

Bolivia, from Peru’s provinces to the countryside in Ecuador, direct action brought down

some of the regimes most committed to the “Washington Consensus.” Popular

mobilizations across the region have also defeated attempts to privatize public services,

kept agricultural lands from being taken by multinational mining companies, and

overturned counterrevolutionary attempts as in Venezuela and Bolivia.1 Massive popular

resistance and the firm stand taken by the ALBA countries2 galvanized public opinion

and forced many Latin American governments to reject former President George W.

Bush’s proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas during the November 2005

Presidential Summit of the Americas held in Mar del Plata (Argentina). Shadowed from

the other side of town by a large and festive gathering known as the People’s Summit of

the Americas, a majority of the Latin American leaders humiliated Bush with their

resolute objections to his proposals.

Grassroots movements like Brazil’s Movimento Sem Terra (MST, Landless

Peasant Movement) and the Latin-America created Via Campesina have expanded their

reach to the rest of the world as key protagonists in the struggle against the World Trade

Organization in defense of peasant economies and food sovereignty. Furthermore the

emergence of popular organizations as alternative territorial forms of local and regional

autonomous power has constituted a powerful challenge to neoliberal ideology. Many of

these movements have expanded their reach beyond Latin America to inspire the global

anti-capitalist struggle. These include the Juntas de Buen Gobierno (Good Government 1 Mass mobilization, general strikes, indigenous and popular rebellions toppled corrupt, repressive and pro-US governments in Peru (2000), Argentina (2000), Ecuador (1997, 2000, 2005) and Bolivia. See my Introduction to The Reawakening of Revolution in Latin America, S&D no. 39 (November 2005). 2 Alianza Bolivariana de los Pueblos de las Américas. Details below, note 11.

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Councils) in the autonomous Zapatista-controlled municipalities in different parts of

Mexico; the encampments of the MST in Brazil; worker-controlled factories in

Argentina; the global campaigns of Via Campesina against genetically modified seeds

and food, in defense of peasant economies against free trade, corporate monoculture, and

bio-fuels; the networks woven by Peruvian and Ecuadoran Indigenous with ecologists

across the world in defense of the Amazon rainforest; the Movimiento de Justicia en el

Barrio, a tenant organization of Latin American immigrants in New York City that has

linked up with immigrant neighborhoods in London; the Frente Indígena de

Organizaciones Bi-nacionales to defend indigenous and labor rights on both sides of the

US-Mexican border; and finally the general impact of Latin American immigrant workers

in revitalizing labor and popular mobilization in the United States.

By breaking the spell of neoliberal triumphalist discourse that for almost a decade

paralyzed broad sectors of the left, subaltern mobilization has created the conditions for

the re-emergence of progressive forces. Electoral successes of these forces were the first

victories against neoliberalism on a world scale. Arising out of the global turmoil

triggered by neoliberalism, Latin American popular resistance against unfettered plunder

of resources, intensified exploitation, environmental destruction, and the loss of all forms

of sovereignty, is a transformative anti-systemic force. It is now playing a crucial role in

defining what kind of world will be erected on the ruins left behind by the neoliberal

onslaught. From this perspective popular movements in Latin America

The November 2005 issue of Socialism and Democracy offered a preliminary

survey of these movements and their anti-systemic potential. Four years later a resurgent

and heterogeneous left – dubbed the “pink tide” by the global press – has expanded from

6 to 10 presidents. Paradoxically, however, with the transition from neoliberal to

progressive regimes, popular movements have lost center-stage to the state.

While popular movements celebrate and acknowledge the progressive regimes for

their recognition of labor rights, their expansion of social and educational opportunities

for the poor, and their defense of national sovereignty, these gains have not come without

cost. State attempts to curtail hard-earned political autonomy have become a source of

concern. Incorporation of popular movements into state structures, social programs, and

ruling-party clientelistic networks, and the appointment of some of their leaders to public

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office, mark a difficult transition from the oppositional stance that up to now has shaped

the movements’ organization, culture and identity. With the consolidation of the new

progressive regimes, popular movements at first became more quiescent. The broad and

bold actions of the previous phase of mobilization gave way to local and more limited

measures. But this evolution has also stimulated healthy internal debates and

reassessments of the organizations’ decision-making processes, functioning, and purpose.

The partial cooptation of the movements produced fractures and splits among popular

organizations, turning the initial expectations toward progressive regimes into a

frustrating and debilitating paralysis.3

The uncertainty however did not last long. Galvanized by a second neoliberal

wave aimed at expropriation of natural resources and expansion of export commodities,

and by progressive governments’ loss of steam and transformative will, popular

movements progressively rearticulated their organization and networks and are steadily

recovering political initiative. The recent mobilizations of indigenous peoples and

peasants have taken on a global significance. Three particularly militant struggles have

taken place in countries whose governments have been most faithful to neoliberal

orthodoxy: the 2006 Oaxaca insurgency, Colombia’s 2008 Indigenous Minga, and the

MoAmazonian Indigenous-popular April 2008 strike and May-July 2009 uprising in

Peru.4 Popular mobilization has also been crucial in defending progressive regimes in

Venezuela and Bolivia and, more recently, in resisting the counterrevolutionary coup in

Honduras.

In Venezuela, massive grassroots demonstrations mobilized against – and

reversed in less than 48 hours – the US-supported April 2002 coup. Spearheaded by the

same popular barrios that ignited the 1989 caracazo, popular mobilization also defeated

the 2002-03 “oil strike” led by managers and technocrats of the state-controlled Petróleos

de Venezuela. In Bolivia popular mobilization broke the political paralysis of the Evo

Morales administration in the face of a serious counterrevolutionary attempt. Following

the same pattern as the 2000 “water war” and the 2003 and 2005 “gas wars” and acting 3 An outstanding case being that of the once militant and innovative piquetero movement of unemployed workers in Argentina broken by president Kirchner’s a dual policy of cooptation and judicial clampdown. See, Marisela Svampa. “The End of Kirchnerism.” New Left Review, 53, Sept.-Oct. 2008. 4 The Oaxaca 2006 uprising was examined in S&D no. 44 (July 2007). Colombia’s minga and Peru’s indigenous uprisings are discussed below in this issue.

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on their own independent initiative, popular sectors rallied against the violent right-wing

separatist insurrection in the Eastern provinces of the country. In Honduras, the forced

exile of President Manuel Zelaya unleashed a historically unprecedented popular

resistance, which helped radicalize the vacillating early stance of Zelaya. Spearheaded by

labor, peasant and indigenous movements, a broad range of forces have coalesced under a

Frente Nacional de Resistencia Contra el Golpe. This broad front, encompassing center

as well as left parties, is a new phenomenon in Honduras

Globally, with the convergence of capitalist crisis, renewed neoliberal offensives

for control of natural resources, and right-wing attempts to dislodge progressive regimes,

popular movements will likely again occupy center stage in the upcoming cycle of

struggle. The crisis has made painfully evident the vulnerabilities of the Latin American

economies. It has been materially devastating for the large majorities that constitute the

social base of progressive regimes. The erratic behavior of commodity prices presaged

hard times for economies that relied heavily on international markets for their exports and

also for food-imports. Deteriorating market conditions have brought into the open deeper

structural problems and deficiencies in Latin American modernization strategies from the

right to the left. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

(ECLAC) estimates that as a whole the Latin America’s regional economy will

experience by the end of 2009 a GDP contraction of 1.7%. Two cases in point are

Mexico, 80% of whose exports go to the US, and Cuba, which imports approximately

70% of its food supply. State-administered poverty programs in Brazil and Argentina

have not deterred rising unemployment. In Brazil, 800,000 jobs lost in the last quarter of

2008 shattered Lula’s pronouncements that the country could withstand the financial

turbulence thanks to his allegedly successful “decoupling” from the advanced capitalist

world. Falling international demand is also taking its toll on Argentina (whose exports

account for a quarter of its GDP) as well as on other primary export economies.5 More

recently Chile, the emblematic neoliberal success in Latin America, became the first

country in the region to officially declare its economy in recession. Socialist president 5 ECLAC figures from Tony Wood, “Latin America Tamed?” New Left Review 58, July-August 2009. Renaud Lambert. “Brasil: un gigante maniatado,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Mexican edition), no. 10. June 2009; Brazil de Fato, “Movimentos sociais promoven ações em todo pais,” August, 11, 2009. http://www3.brasildefato.com.br/v01/agencia/nacional/movimentos-sociais-promovem-acoes-em-todo-pais

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Bachelet optimistic reassurances of the good stand of the country economy proved false

after the Central Bank president announced on August 18 a negative growth of 4.5% for

the second 2009 trimester.6

Rapidly falling remittances from migrant workers are creating serious problems

particularly in Central America and Mexico – whose peasant economy and food

sovereignty have been virtually destroyed by NAFTA. Under these gloomy

circumstances, many countries –including Cuba7 – have already announced austerity

measures that forecast an unfortunate further divergence between progressive regimes

and subaltern interests.

As this issue goes to press, Latin America is once again rocked by massive

popular mobilization. In mid-July, thousands of Kakchikeles from the eastern part of

Guatemala marched against dam and mining operations that threatened the environment,

indigenous territories, and community autonomy. Joined by labor, student, women’s and

popular organizations from other parts of the country, indigenous protesters led a massive

march to Congress. Together with the indigenous march in the capital city in January this

year, this event marked the recovery of a popular movement devastated by one of Latin

America’s bloodiest countersinsurgencies. In mid-August, Brazil was the scene of

marches, occupations of public offices, and massive rallies in a National Journey of

Struggle against firing of workers, for land reform, and in defense of social programs

threatened by government austerity schemes. In a passionate speech at the closing rally of

a four-day protest in São Paulo, João Stedile, a member of the MST coordinating

committee, called for the unification of labor with the social movements. With the

prominent participation of the labor confederation CUT (a close ally of the PT and Lula’s

government), together with hundreds of peasant, student and popular organizations, the

four-day mobilization marks an important turning in the revitalization of a popular

movement that until now had lacked a unified position toward government policies.

In the immediate future the changing economic and political circumstances

created by the crisis will enhance the centrality of popular mobilization. Only a strong

6 Orlando Caputo and Graciela Galance. “Economia emblematica del neoliberalismo en America Latina, la primera en entrar en recesion.” Argenpress.info, August 18, 2009. http://www.argenpress.info/2009/08/economia-emblematica-del-neoliberalismo.html 7 Juan Balboa. “Cuba. La eterna criris,” Proceso, no. 1709, August 2, 2009.

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and politically autonomous subaltern organization will be capable of redirecting the

current course taken by most progressive governments as “managers of neoliberalism”

into a post-capitalist course.

National-Democratic Modernization and Subaltern Autonomy

More than a circumstantial problem, the tension between progressive regimes and

popular movements is deeply rooted in the complex relationship that since the formation

of the independent nation-state has pitted mostly Creole urban, educated political elites

against mostly non-white (Black, Indigenous, mestizo) subaltern classes. The recent

manifestations of this tension can be traced to the turbulent decade of the 1960s.

The electoral ascendance of the “pink tide” marks the end of a cycle of struggles

that began with the 1952 Bolivian Revolution and the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Driven by

common animosity toward the pro-imperialist oligarchic state, varied social and political

forces coalesced around a democratic and nationalist agenda: both the traditional and

“new” lefts; the labor movement; progressive intellectuals, professionals, the clergy and

in several cases also the military. National-democratic coalitions sometimes also

encompassed those sectors of the entrepreneurial class – the so-called “national

bourgeoisie” – whose accumulation was severely constrained both by the oligarchy and

by imperialist capital. Although the peasantry – made up in a number of countries mostly

of indigenous peoples – played a crucial role undermining oligarchic power through

massive land recoveries and demands for equal opportunity and the expansion of voting

rights (to those “illiterate” in Spanish), its participation in the national-democratic

coalition was politically subordinated to the mostly urban, educated, “white” and mestizo

labor and political elites – of both the right and the left. This condition was shared by all

subaltern groups except for the organized working class, which drew strength from its

place in the economy, its political trajectory, its role in developmentalist modernization

schemes, and the centrality given to workers in revolutionary theories.

Ruling under different political regimes (corporative, populist, democratic-

nationalist, reformist, or revolutionary) extending from Guatemala’s 1944-54

“Democratic Spring” and the 1959 Cuban Revolution to the 1979-90 Sandinista regime,

and encompassing among others the Perón regime in Argentina (1943-55), Bolivia’s

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1952 National Revolution, and Chile’s Allende government (1970-73), national-

democratic alliances played a pivotal role in the modernization of the region. With

different emphasis and degrees – varying with ideological inclinations and political

commitments – these regimes reoriented the Latin American states in a

“developmentalist” direction based on the strategy of modernization propounded by

“dependency theory,” premised on (1) the end of oligarchic rule and imperialist

domination, (2) industrial development and expansion of the internal market, (3) political,

economic and financial autonomy from the United States, (4) land reform, (5) labor and

democratic rights, and (6) a network of social programs and services.

The radicalism of a particular national-democratic regime could be measured by

how it dealt with US domination, how thoroughly it dismantled the oligarchic state, and

how well it promoted subaltern involvement and participation. Oligarchies were

threatened or displaced from power by direct popular mobilization (Bolivia 1952),

insurgent revolutionary forces (Cuba 1959, Nicaragua 1979), parliamentary action

(Allende’s Chile), reformist military intervention (Peru under Velasco, 1968-1975), or

populist nationalist intervention (Peron’s Argentina). Subaltern classes in general

experienced a further loss of political autonomy, however, through incorporation into the

clientelistic networks surrounding government social programs, or into the party or

movement acting as the political arm of the national-democratic regime.

The relationship between national-democratic regimes and popular organization

was not homogenous across the region. The degree of subaltern political autonomy was

determined among other factors by the nature of the regime, the political trajectories of

both subaltern and ruling classes, and the political and ideological centrality of labor.

Except in Mexico (thanks to its 1910 Revolution), peasants across the region were

politically marginalized and subjected to paternalistic and racist policies. Extreme cases

were the populist-corporative regimes of Perón in Argentina and Vargas (1930-45, 1951-

54) in Brazil, where independent unions were not allowed and Communists and leftists

were repressed. In Argentina labor unions controlled the Labor Ministry; in Brazil labor

leaders were paid government officials. A divided Peronist union leadership remains a

key political player in Argentina. Peronist union bosses in the CGT collaborated with

neoliberal president Carlos Menem (1989-99) and later with progressive presidents

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Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández. In Brazil the state-controlled labor union

structure remained in place through the 1964-85 dictatorship. Peasants were violently and

systematically repressed. On the other hand, in a case like Allende’s Chile, which had

strong party structures, labor militancy, and democratic institutions, the relationship

between the state and labor was more fluid. In other situations, like Peru under Velasco,

the creation of official unions and peasant organizations did not deter the expansion of

the left and the creation of a strong and militant popular movement.

In the context of the Cold War, however, Latin American national-democratic

modernization emerged as a threat to US imperial/geostrategic and corporate business

interests in the region. Through direct military intervention, cooptation, economic and

financial blackmail, or clandestine operations with support of sympathetic military, the

United States led a counterrevolution that – except for Cuba – cut short the life of these

regimes. The 1954 overthrow of democratically elected president Jacobo Arbenz in

Guatemala opened a long-term counterrevolutionary cycle characterized by heavy

repression against popular, progressive and revolutionary forces. But this in turn sparked

the growth of an underground resistance.

The “democratic transitions” of the 1980s arose typically from alliances between

left-wing parties and popular organizations. The re-emergence of progressive forces was

both stimulated and obstructed by the ascendance of neoliberalism and the collapse of the

Soviet Union. In response to the demoralizing effects of “globaloney,” the “end of

history,” and the fall of “really existing socialism,” many left-wing intellectuals and

political parties retreated from the revolutionary aspirations they had once embraced but

which they now dismissed as unrealistic. Turning instead to free markets and electoral

politics, they converted to what Carlos I. Degregori recently described as “progressive

neoliberalism,” taking on the impossible task of conferring a “human face” on neoliberal

“savage capitalism.”8 This put a tremendous strain on the incipient rapprochement

between left-wing parties and popular organizations built in the previous decades. It was

rationalized, however, as a left “reformist” adaptation to neoliberalism. “Reformists”

8 For “globaloney” see David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 1. Pablo Sandoval interviews Carlos I. Degregori, “Nuevo capítulo en la transacción entre estado, elites y sociedad,” Argumentos, vol. 3, no. 3, July 2009. http://www.revistargumentos.org.pe/index.php?fp_verpub=true&idpub=271

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operating within this paradigm were largely responsible for the centrist reconversion that

overtook a number of the recently elected progressive governments.

Most progressive governments, unless they arose out of prior massive

mobilization as in Venezuela and Bolivia, tended to adopt a milder version of the

national-democratic developmentalist strategy of previous decades. But they have often

been more to the left in their foreign than in their domestic policies. This reflects the

weakening global role of the United States relative to the growing economic importance

of China, India, and other countries of the global South. Thus, under “pink tide”

governments, Latin American integration and political autonomy from the United States

have moved closer to realization than during the earlier wave of national-democratic

regimes.

Taking back the “backyard” From the early days of independence to the present, the solidarity and integration

of Latin American countries has proved elusive. The alliances of South American Creole

patriots against Spanish colonialism quickly faded. The efforts of Venezuelan-born

Simón Bolívar to establish a confederation of Andean Republics failed miserably.

Bolívar’s dream would not revive until the late 19th century, when Cuban patriot Jose

Martí, called for a reaffirmation of sovereignty over Nuestra America (Our America) to

build the unity he considered crucial to confront what he perceived as the imperialist

ascendance of the United States (the “other America”) over the region. But the Latin

American oligarchies, unwilling to lose favor with US capital, created the conditions for

transforming their countries into the US “backyard.”

In the early 20th century an emerging left and labor movement infused the vision

of a united Latin America with an unequivocal anti-imperialist content. The US Cold War

offensive against the Cuban Revolution reinforced anti-imperialist feelings among broad

sectors of the population that rallied against the common enemy around the idea of the

Patria Grande popularized by Che Guevara. The deepening subordination of Latin

America to US economic and strategic interests re-ignited the idea of Latin American

integration. In the context of an increasingly internationalized popular resistance against

transnational capital, solidarity and unity became relevant again. Latin American

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integration thus became a crucial goal. Since it could not be attained without breaking

with US domination, it fell to progressive regimes to carry it out.

On June 3, 2009, in an unprecedented vote by acclamation, the General Assembly

of the OAS (Organization of American States) repealed the US-imposed exclusion of

Cuba from the hemispheric organization. Established in 1948, with the alleged goal of

strengthening democracy and fostering continental integration, the OAS acted instead as

an instrument of US imperialist hegemony. During the Cold War – and beyond – through

the OAS the United States ensured its control over one of the key “spheres of influence”

in its imperial scheme of power. Following the approval of the 1962 Declaration of

Punta del Este, banning from its ranks all nations that adhere to Marxism, and branding

all those others establishing partnership with “communist bloc” countries as “enemies of

the unity and solidarity” of the continent, the OAS General Assembly proceeded to expel

Cuba. Furthermore, all the Latin American countries except Mexico then broke relations

with Cuba’s revolutionary regime.9

For an organization that until not so long ago condoned invasions, political

assassinations, human rights abuses, and coups against democratic governments, the

unanimous decision to readmit Cuba marks an epochal change. This breaking of the

longstanding US stranglehold represents the most important collective accomplishment

of current Latin American progressive regimes. The region’s increasingly autonomous

position on the international scene is acknowledged even by the New York Times.

Reporting from the Presidential Summit of the Americas held at Bahia (Brazil) in

December 2008, its correspondent observed that during the meeting the United States

“became a punching bag” of many of the attending leaders as they voiced unrelenting

criticism of neoliberal policies and US responsibility in the global financial crisis. As if

this was not enough, President Obama stood stoically as one by one the Latin American

presidents saluted the presence of Cuba’s President Raúl Castro – attending a Summit for

the first time – in response to US attempts to block his admission. The Times report

quotes Latin America expert Riordan Roett as commenting, “the United States is no

9 A. Boron “Que hacer con la OEA? Rebelion. May 30, 2009. http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=86207

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longer, and will not ever be again, the major interlocutor for the countries in the

region.”10

In sharp contrast to past practice, Latin America during the last decade has

assumed an increasingly independent stance on the international scene. The Unión de

Naciones Sudamericanas (UNASUR) created in 2008 has recently launched the project

of a South American common market. It has started construction of an ambitious network

of highways crisscrossing the continent, and had also established the Banco del Sur that

will finance development projects, handle the reserves of Latin American and Caribbean

Central Banks, and reorient financial flows away from the transnational banking system.

The establishment of a Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa, as part of the integration

process, represents a significant step toward civilian oversight over a military which,

together with the United States, previously stood as a the most formidable obstacle to

democratic transformation. The creation of Telesur, a public television company

sponsored by seven Latin American countries, has proved a valuable counterweight to the

distorted views offered by corporate media conglomerates.11

While these efforts represent an important step toward the economic and political

strengthening of the region, the Alianza Bolivariana de los Pueblos de las Américas

(ALBA), created at the initiative of Venezuela, represents a more radical departure.12

Established in 2006 by Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba, ALBA envisions a regional

economic integration geared toward the improvement of living conditions for the large

majority, eradicating poverty and social inequalities. Unlike the US-sponsored free trade

agreements, ALBA is based on a vision of social welfare, fair trade, and mutual

economic assistance, and aims to forge a path away from free trade. With its emphasis on

integration through cooperation, investments geared to meet people’s needs,

environmentally friendly projects, and participation of social movements (such as the

MST and Via Campesina) in its planning and administration, ALBA represents a major

10 Alexei Barrionuevo, “At Meeting in Brazil, Washington is Scorned,” New York Times, December 26, 2008. 11 Juan Francisco Rojas Penso. “Unasur en construccion”. Tinku. October, 9, 2008. http://www.tinku.org/content/view/3329/96/ 12 Initially called Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas, its name was changed by June 2009 to Alianza Bolivariana de los Pueblos de las Americas. It is popularly known by its acronym ALBA meaning dawn in Spanish. Current membership: Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominica, and Saint Vincent & the Grenadines.

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blow against neoliberalism. The inclusion of popular organizations not only

acknowledges their importance, but also represents an epochal innovation in an area like

foreign affairs which has traditionally been sheltered from broad public inquiry, let alone

popular participation.13

The crucial strides taken toward an independent Latin American integration are

nonetheless clouded by the lingering military presence in the region – an issue whose

definitive resolution shows less progress than others. Through militarization of the anti-

narcotics campaigns – such as Plan Colombia and Mexico’s Plan Mérida – the United

States has granted Latin America more counterinsurgency equipment and military aid

than during the heyday of the Cold War. Since 2006, almost half of this aid has been

directed to Colombia to support an army fighting against both narco-traffickers and at

least two guerrilla armies. Despite the human rights abuses of the Colombian armed

forces and police, the United States recently signed an agreement with rightist President

Uribe to build five military bases, which according to military affairs specialist Lindsay-

Poland will increase US capabilities for intervention throughout Latin America. Ordered

at a moment of heightened tensions with Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador in the aftermath

of the coup in Honduras, these new military bases will further reinforce anti-US

sentiments.14

The United States remains the most important source of military preparation,

mainly through the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation – formerly

School of the Americas (SOAS). Originally established in the Panama Zone in 1948, it

has trained over 60,000 armed and police forces personnel in counterinsurgency

techniques. SOAS graduates are among the most extreme human right violators in Latin

America. Many others, as in the recent coup in Honduras, have also played prominent

roles in plots, coups and conspiracies against democratic regimes. More ominous

however is the desertion of SOAS-trained military personnel toward more profitable

13 Shawn Hattingh. “ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neoliberalism? “ July 2, 2008. MR Zine. (http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/hattingh070208.html) 14 John Lindsay-Polans. “New Military Base in Colombia Would Spread Pentagon Reach Throughout Latin America” May 28, 2009. Center for International Policy-Americas Program (http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6148). See also, “Los Enviados del Pentagono” July 1, 2009 (http://www.cambio.com.co/portadacambio/835/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR_CAMBIO-5569679.html).

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criminal activities such as kidnapping and drug trafficking. One of Mexico’s most deadly

paramilitary organizations – the so-called Zetas – is made up of deserters from special

units in the Army and Navy, as well as former Kaibiles (members of Guatemala’s

dreaded counterinsurgent commando force). Zetas are held responsible for organizing

and running the counterintelligence, surveillance, arms training, communications

networks, tortures and executions of the Michoacán-based drug cartel known as La

Famila – the country’s most rapidly emerging and lethal criminal organization.15 In an

encouraging move, five Latin American countries so far have stopped sending military

personnel for training at the SOAS.16

Latin American integration is also clouded by the hegemonic aspirations of

Brazil. The largest country in South America and tenth-largest economy in the world, its

territory borders all but two of the twelve South American nations. Its expansive

ambitions took shape under the military regime that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985.

Massive colonization projects, highway and dam construction in the Amazon, expanding

military industries, development of nuclear technology, and aggressive nationalist

discourse led to Brazil’s characterization as a sub-imperialist power. The current

expansion of Petrobras (the state-controlled oil company) and agribusiness, as well as the

construction of huge dams in neighboring countries during the last decade, reinforce

these perceptions – as does its recent financial cooperation agreement with its old

competitor Argentina, and also its participation in the G-20 (Group of 20 Finance

Ministers and Central Bank Presidents).

The remarkable reconfiguration of power relations vis-à-vis the United States and

the dramatic advances toward Latin American integration, however, are not matched in

most cases with successful domestic policies and social reforms. Read against this record,

an examination of recent electoral reversals of left forces offers insight into the limits and

possibilities for radical transformation opened by the progressive regimes in Latin

America.

15 Jorge Carrasco. “‘La Familia,’ el cartel del sexenio,” Proceso, no. 1707, July 19, 2009, 14-19. See also Ginger Thompson, "Mexico Fears Its Drug Traffickers Get Help From Guatemalans," New York Times, September 30, 2005. 16 The five countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela.

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Progressive regimes and emergent subaltern and radical challenges The victories of Fernando Lugo and Mauricio Funes in the November 2008 and

March 2009 presidential polls in Paraguay and El Salvador represent the latest

manifestations of the cycle of progressive electoral victories opened with the first 1998

election of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. Supported by the Alianza Patriótica para el

Cambio – a broad coalition of centrist organizations, left-wing forces, grassroots and

indigenous organizations – former Catholic bishop Lugo’s decisive triumph put an end to

more than sixty years of uninterrupted hegemony of the Colorado Party representing the

country’s anachronistic oligarchic interests. The success of journalist and TV personality

Funes – candidate of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) – not only

represents an unprecedented political vindication for a force demonized as a terrorist

organization, but is also invested with extraordinary symbolic resonance for a country not

long ago considered another “banana republic” in a region regarded as the US ultimate

“backyard.” For nearly two decades of struggle against a repressive military regime

defending the interest of a bloody and voracious elite supported by the United States, the

FMLN stood at the forefront of resistance against imperialist domination in Latin

America. The illegal and public participation of Republican Party politicians and public

interventions of State Department functionaries on behalf of the right-wing Arena

candidate spotlighted the high stakes at play with this election, and the geopolitical

importance of Central America for the US imperial state.17

These electoral successes however are counterbalanced by the recent defeat of

progressive forces in mid-term elections in Argentina and Mexico – reversals that have

been interpreted by some analysts as foreshadowing an imminent demise of the

progressive cycle and a swing back to right-wing dominance.18 But although these two

cases represent unequivocal defeats for the electoral left and a comeback for right and

17 See CISPES 2009 Election Analysis. “The Road to Victory and Beyond,” March 7, 2009, http://cispes.org/09electionsblog/; also Marielle Palau & Guillermo Ortega.”Paraguay: el nuevo destino de disputa de los intereses populares,” Observatorio Social Latinoamericano. Vol IX, no. 24, October 2008, 103-112. 18 See Raúl Zibechi, “La irresistible decadencia del progresismo,” La Jornada, July 3, 2009 and Heinz Dietrich, “¿Quien gobernará en América Latina en 2010?” Rebelión, July 3, 2009, http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=88017

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center-right forces, a close reading of the electoral results against signs of rising popular

mobilization suggests a more complex scenario.

In Argentina’s June 2009 mid-term elections, the progressive forces represented

by the Frente para la Victoria lost their control of all major electoral districts – including

the president’s strongholds in the province of Santa Cruz (birthplace of her husband

former President Kirchner) – and the capital city of Buenos Aires. Formed in 2003 as a

loose coalition of labor, progressive, and left forces, the Frente backed the left-wing

Peronist husband-and-wife candidates Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández in their

consecutive victories in 2003 and 2007. The defeat of Mexico’s center-left Partido de la

Revolución Democrática in the July 5 midterm elections also marked a serious reversal

for a force whose presidential candidate in the 2006 election was arguably robbed of

victory in an extremely competitive three-way race. With its Congressional

representation reduced from 127 to 72, the PRD fell from its position as the first party in

the opposition to a third place and without any possibilities of effective parliamentary

initiative.

While in Argentina Frente para la Victoria obtained 31% of the vote, almost 36%

of the voters voided or annulled their ballots. Significantly, a third of the registered voters

kept away from the polls – a record figure in a country where voting is mandatory.

Considered as a “punishment vote” against the Kirchners, the results on the other hand do

not represent a clear turn to the right. In Buenos Aires, the largest electoral district in the

country, the vote favored popular filmmaker Pino Solanas, heading the alliance Proyecto

Sur running on a platform to the left of the defeated pro-Kirchner candidate. Working-

class voters – whose vote the Frente took for granted – repudiated the Kirchners’ alliance

with and reliance on the old peronista clientelistic networks manipulated by corrupt

mayors and labor bureaucrats of the right-wing Peronist-controlled Central General de

Trabajadores (CGT). In districts with popularly endorsed candidates, the Frente obtained

better results. That was the case of the elected governor of the populous Province of

Buenos Aires – a former successful mayor and popular union leader affiliated with the

non-legally recognized, anti-bureaucratic, and class oriented Confederación de

Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA).19

19 Guillermo Almeyra. “Argentina, abstención y derrota del gobierno,” La Jornada (Mexico), July 5, 2009.

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In Mexico voters also expressed their discontent with the political establishment,

including progressive parties. On Election Day more than half of the registered voters

stayed at home. In Mexico City, the largest concentration of voters in the country, almost

11% annulled their ballots in response to the call of a progressive citizen movement

asking voters to do this as a protest against the inefficiency and corruption of both the

electoral system and the political parties. An analyst in the left-wing newspaper La

Jornada attributed this outcome to PRD’s estrangement from the grassroots, whose

everyday struggles represent a “broader, more dynamic and more radical” programmatic

alternative than the narrow and unimaginative party [PRD] platform.”20

Progressive candidates in countries that will be holding elections next year have

found similar reactions. In Brazil, despite the high levels of acceptance of the Partido dos

Trabalhadores (PT) administration, its candidate Dilma Rouseef trails centrist candidate

Jose Serra by more than 20%. Significantly, Heloisa Helena, the presidential candidate

for the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) – a splinter party with positions to the left

of the official PT – has shown surprising levels of acceptance despite restricted access to

media and a lack of campaign funds. In the most thorough poll to date contemplating

different possible electoral scenarios Heloisa Helena is placed in first or second position

with 14% to 27% of the intended vote.21

In Chile the centrist Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia faces, for the

first time since the country’s return to democracy, a serious challenge from the left in the

December 2009 general election. Dominated by the Christian Democrat and Socialist

parties, Concertación has ruled the country since 1989. High approval ratings of current

Socialist president Michelle Bachelet for the handling of Chile’s economic crisis,

however, are not reflected in pre-election polls. After 20 years in power, as a result of its

remoteness from the lowest rungs of society and its own party base, the Concertación has

stagnated into “an ossified political institution incapable of responding to social force.”22

Polls show a narrow lead by billionaire right-wing candidate Sebastian Piñera, but also

indicate the surprising surge of Marco Enrique-Ominami – son of legendary MIR 20 Javier Flores Olea. “Que hacer para la izquierda,” La Jornada, July 20, 2009. 21 See, “PT en Brasil entre la reelección y el cáncer,” La Jornada, June 23, 2009, and Data Folha – Opinião Pública – December 8, 2008. http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/po/ver_po.php?session=790 22 Jason Trockman, “Independent Candidate Challenges Chilean Political Establishment,” NACLA OnLine, July 21, 2009 (http://nacla.org/node/6010).

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(Revolutionary Left Movement) leader Miguel Enríquez who was killed resisting the

Pinochet dictatorship – leading the ticket supported by a left-wing split of the Socialist

party and supported also by the Green and Humanist Parties. Although short on specifics

of how to reverse neoliberalism, Marco’s (as he is popularly known) concerns with the

environment and opposition to hydroelectric and mining megaprojects, his support to

indigenous Mapuche peoples and youth, and his pledge to replace Pinochet’s

authoritarian and still-in-force constitution, have won him broad support.

While hailed by the right and the global media as a signal of Hugo Chávez’s

demise, the narrow defeat of his December 2007 referendum on constitutional reforms

lends itself, on closer examination, to a different reading. Compared to the 2006

presidential election, the vote for the right increased by just over a quarter-million votes

while support for Chávez dropped by 3 million in an election otherwise marked by a

record 44% abstention rate. The abstention was significantly higher in the chavista

strongholds of the poor barrios surrounding Caracas and other big cities. For analyst Raúl

Zibechi these results represent “[neither] a victory for the opposition and imperialism, nor

a defeat of chavista popular grassroots.” What it did express was concern about the place

and role of subaltern classes – “los verdaderos motores del proceso” – in deepening and

giving continuity to the ongoing revolutionary transformation. 23

Bolivarian Revolution supporter Edgardo Lander opposed the proposed

amendments, arguing the need for a wider public debate on the future of the revolution.

He also criticized the lack of political will on the part of the state to make this happen.24

Instead of a referendum that required voters to vote no or yes on a total of 72

constitutional amendments (33 introduced by Chávez and 39 by the National Assembly,

comprising a 31-page text) divided in two blocs, Lander advocated a more democratic

and participatory mechanism through the election of a Constituent Assembly. Others

proposed that the vote be article-by-article rather than in two blocs.25 For Heinz Dietrich

23 Raúl Zibechi, “La revolución bolivariana sigue adelante,” La Jornada, December 7, 2007. Certain of victory, Chavista analysts projected a win of around 60 to 70% in case of a high turnout, and a closer victory in case of a low turnout, around 50% or less. See Gregory Wilpert, “Making Sense of Venezuela’s Constitutional Reform,” December 1, 2007, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2943 24 Edgardo Lander, “Contribución al debate sobre la propuesta de Reforma Constitucional.,” September 19, 2007, www.aporrea.org 25 For a summary of the proposed constitutional reforms and analysis of their relevance from a state

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the demonization of critical voices within the broad Bolivarian camp was symptomatic of

several weaknesses of the Bolivarian Revolution – among other things, in the economy

and in “the lack of give-and-take (falta de dialéctica) in the ruling bodies of the

country.”26 He also stated that whatever the outcome of the vote, neither of the two

options “empower the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist interests of the Venezuelan

people and the Latin American revolution.”27

Besides disagreements on procedural aspects of the referendum, democratic left-

wing criticism focused on issues of strategic importance for the Bolivarian Revolution:

the autonomy of popular organization, the nature and particularities of 21st-century

socialism, and the centralizing characteristics of the Partido Socialista Unificado de

Venezuela (PSUV). Even though the proposed constitutional reforms were not approved,

they reveal the nature of state-building envisioned by chavista leadership. The proposed

territorial restructuring entailed recentralization through the reduction of municipal and

regional powers, while the reconfiguration of the mechanisms of popular power

suggested a state structured as a pyramid with a high concentration of power at the top –

a state that, in Lander’s words, resembled more the “twentieth-century socialism”

epitomized by the Soviet Union than the creative “twenty-first-century socialism”

envisioned by the Venezuelan majorities. A similar trend is observable, according to

critics, in the evolution of many popular organizations and communal councils into

appendices of the state, in which only chavistas are allowed to participate. Under these

circumstances, they argue, a broad and exhaustive public discussion of the proposed

reforms would have helped clarify goals, steering the outcome more in the direction of a

radical democracy.28

perspective see, Gregory Wilpert, “Venezuela’s Constitutional Reform: An Article-by-Article Summary” November 23, 2007. Venezuelanalysis.com. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2889; Heinz Dietrich, “Chavez-Baduel, y el “falso remedio” de H. Dietrich.”Kaos en la Red. Nov. 20, 2007. http://www.kaosenlared.net/noticia/chavez-baduel-falso-remedio-heinz-dieterich.

26 Heinz Dietrich, “La ruptura Chávez-Baudel: impedir el colapso del proyecto popular,” Rebelión, November 8, 2007. www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=58708 27 Dietrich. “, “Chavez-Baduel, y el “falso remedio” de H. Dietrich.”” 28 Lander, Dietrich and Zibechi, “La revolución bolivariana sigue adelante.”op. cit [See note 22]See also Margarita López Maya interview, “La reforma se traducirá en inestabilidad,” November 25, 2007, http://www.el-nacional.com/www/site/detalle_noticia.php?q=nodo/3602; Marc Saint-Upéry interview,

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Chávez’s constitutional reversal nevertheless did not represent a victory for the

right. Despite a scurrilous multi-million-dollar media campaign and active support from

the United States as well as the global media, the right wing only marginally surpassed its

previous vote. The approximately 3 million nonvoters – mostly from the poor barrios –

did not migrate to the right as many pollsters predicted. It was not right-wing propaganda

that cut into the revolution’s hardcore social base, nor distaste for Chávez or unhappiness

with the Bolivarian Revolution. Figures from ECLAC indicate that between 2002 and

2006 poverty in Venezuela dropped by 16%. An opinion poll from Latinobarómetro

months before the election estimated that 61% of Venezuelans approved Chávez policies.

The same poll indicated that Venezuela ranked second in Latin America in popular

satisfaction with its democracy.29

With their abstention, the chavista grassroots loudly called attention to their

frustration with Chávez’s unclear definition of his proposed “21st-century Socialism” and

with his excessive reliance for the administration of government programs on right-wing

and opportunist Chavistas – popularly dubbed Boliburguesía (“Bolivarian Bourgeoise”).

They were also signaling their uneasiness with the dissolution of popular organizations

into the PSUV and state-sponsored institutions, and their lack of conviction that socialism

can be built by decree or though constitutional reform. The path to socialism should

respect the identity and historical trajectory of a population that has already shown its

capacity for self-organization in its resistance to neoliberalism, its defense of Chávez

against right-wing reaction, its communal committees, and its many other ways of giving

life meaning and dignity under harsh material conditions and endemic social/racial

marginalization and exploitation. The success of the Bolivarian Revolution will lie not in

the halls of power or in Chávez’s entourage of advisers and functionaries, but rather in

the plazas and streets of the poor barrios – the repository of transformative energies since

before Chávez arrived on the scene.

As in Venezuela, so in the rest of Latin America the resurgence of the right is still

tentative. Despite the unrestrained support it receives from all-powerful media “Chávez, en fuga hacia adelante,” November 12, 2007, La Insignia. http://www.lainsignia.org/2007/noviembre/ibe_005.htm; Narciso Isa Conde, “Venezuela: posibles causas del revés del SÍ,” www.aporrea.org 29 Polls quoted in Luis Hernández Navarro. “Venezuela: Remar contra la corriente,” La Jornada, December 4, 2007.

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conglomerates, the international technocracy, transnational interests, and agencies of the

US government, its appeal to the electorate is uncertain. As the 2009 political crisis in

Honduras shows, given the changing political landscape both at the grassroots and at the

top, subaltern mobilization has a wide potential to enact change – or, as in this case, to

deter reaction. This would have been inconceivable in much of Latin America until quite

recently, as US imperialism ruled uncontested, Latin American states lacked unity, and

popular resistance and mobilization were held in check by relentless and brutal

repression.

Given the magnitude of the environmental, economic, political and moral crisis

confronting Latin America, its resolution cannot be confined to the terms of the electoral

calendar. The electoral cycle traps its protagonists in an iron cage. In order to survive

until the next election, they must sacrifice strategic visions in favor of spurious

concessions and political alliances. Electoral processes are overdetermined by broader

political conditions informed in turn by political mobilization. Mobilization is what is

decisive.

Nature, Indigenous Resistance and the Emerging New Neoliberal Consensus

By the mid-1980s indigenous organizations across Latin America described the

neoliberal onslaught as a “third conquest.” Coming from a population whose existence

and identity have been shaped by the legacy of a brutal European conquest and three

centuries of colonial marginalization and exploitation, the indigenous assessment

underlined the epoch-making nature of neoliberalism. Informed by historical memory

going back more than 500 years, the indigenous appreciation of the present moment was

indeed not only accurate, but also indicative of the acumen that would enable them to

become major political actors.

In a similar fashion to what Marx called original or primitive accumulation,

plunder stands also at the core of the process characterized by David Harvey as

“appropriation by dispossession” – the defining characteristic of neoliberal modernity.30

As Marx put it, the “discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement

and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent,” together with

30 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

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the colonization of Africa and India, were “pivotal to the primitive accumulation

sustaining the creation of a world capitalist market.”31 In Europe primitive accumulation

led to the almost total privatization of the “common goods” (land, forest, water and

pastures) and the obliteration of the peasantry as an independent class. In contrast, the

process in what today is Latin America was rather incomplete. Even though the original

inhabitants of the region lost important resources to mines, plantations and haciendas, the

loss was not total. Resistance was particularly intense in the Andean countries, southern

Mexico and Central America, where indigenous peoples managed to preserve relatively

autonomous communal organization and control of diminished but valuable resources. To

the conquerors’ chagrin, by resisting expropriation indigenous peoples averted also their

complete proletarianization. This indigenous resilience, manifested through everyday

forms of resistance, accommodation, and rebellion, turned “primitive accumulation” into

a recurrent and ever-present feature of Latin American capitalism until the present.

The 18th-/19th-century North Atlantic Industrial Revolution and its demands for

raw materials and food crops triggered a “second conquest.” In many areas, through legal

trickery, war, and genocide, the modern nation continued the dispossession and

expropriation started by Spanish colonialism. But militant resistance persisted into the

early 20th century. The 1910 Mexican Revolution, described by Eric Wolf as a modern

“peasant war” and made up of a myriad of peasant rebellions, marked the apex of

subaltern resistance to expropriation. The land reform of the post-revolutionary regime

and the incorporation – albeit rhetorically – of indigenous culture and history in its

cultural policies were important for the reproduction and modernization of indigenous

resistance across Latin America. Some indigenous peoples nonetheless were eliminated;

others retreated into inaccessible mountains and forest, others migrated to the cities,

while yet others managed to preserve their autonomy defending their besieged and

impoverished territories and resources. Although the “second conquest” took a heavy toll,

overall indigenous peoples managed again to forestall a total defeat.

With the Cold War structure of global domination now in disarray, Latin America

– together with Africa – has again become a battleground for the control of strategic

31 Karl Marx. Capital, vol. 1, Chapter XXXI, “Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist," in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 35 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2005), 738.

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resources. Following multinational capitalist pillaging of public services in the 1980s-

90s, the recent frantic race for control of Latin American bio-resources underlines

neoliberalism’s second stage. With the most coveted resources – water, minerals, fossil

fuels, forests, bio-diversity, and land for bio-fuels – located in indigenous and public-

domain territories, capitalism continually reasserts its inherently colonialist character.

The defense of basic resources against such appropriation has become the rallying point

of popular democratic resistance.

In response to demands from several major popular organizations including the

MST, the most recent World Social Forum – held in the Brazilian city of Belem – did not

invite Lula to attend the event. This broke with precedent, as the WSF had been closely

associated since its creation with both the figure of Lula and the movements and

organizations with which he had been identified. The organizations opposing his presence

argued that it would contradict the goals of an event especially dedicated to discussing

Amazonia’s devastation. In effect, Lula’s policies since 2003 have engendered

deforestation in the Amazon over an area almost equal to that of Venezuela. His

agricultural policies based on export-promotion, beef production, transgenic soy

cultivation, and sugar cane for ethanol, are predicated upon further expansion in an

already embattled Amazonia. His recently approved law (the infamous medida provisoria

458) granting property titles over 67 million hectares mostly to speculators eyeing timber

and cattle-raising prospects will have devastating consequences for the land.32

Marking his centrist conversion, Lula proclaimed himself a “social-democrat” at a

dinner organized in his honor by a business magazine and attended by the Brazil’s most

prominent entrepreneurs. He further remarked that anyone over 60 who “remains loyal to

left-wing ideas” must have “some sort of [mental] problem.”33 His popular and relatively

successful poverty programs and equal-opportunity educational policies have failed to

make inroads against one of the most unequal income distributions in the world. Equally

glaring is the abandonment of his promises for land reform in a country that together with

32 WSF participant, political analyst and anti-capitalist activist Eric Toussaint called Lula’s stance closer to the liberal social model of British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Spain’s Rodriguez Zapatero than to the democratic anti-neoliberal model favored by social movements. Pauline Imbach. “An Interview with Eric Toussaint: A New Start with the 2009 World Social Forum,” ALAI, February 3, 2009. http://alainet.org/active/29226. 33 “Lula genera malestar,” La Jornada, December 14, 2006.

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South Africa has the highest levels of land concentration. Contrary to the participatory

democratic principles of his own party, Lula’s policies are oriented to the creation of a

vast clientelistic political/electoral network. Managed through thousands of NGOs spread

across the country, his social programs are essentially an expression of neostructuralism

– a technocratic project involving higher spending on basic social programs and

education as a means to increase the productivity of the poor. Neostructuralists oppose

state interference with market forces and embrace globalization.34

Like Obama’s social and economic proposals, Lula’s neostructuralism presents

itself as a “high road” to globalization, in contrast to the “low” road of the first hard-core

neoliberal generation. Grounded in the belief that globalization is essentially beneficial

for the world, Obama’s approach considers that effective global market integration entails

the reduction of inequalities both within and across countries. It also contemplates

massive North-to-South environmentally oriented aid programs aimed at promoting a

“second green revolution” through the introduction of genetically modified seeds,

particularly to Africa. According to Walden Bello, these two sets of measures among

others – including those sketched by President Sarkozy of France in his speech declaring

the death of laissez-faire capitalism – are converging in a project of “global social

democracy”: a new capitalist consensus aimed at solving the current crisis through

technocratic relief and equity programs of social management.35

Environmental issues have also become a testing ground for progressive

governments, such as those of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia,

both of which are being challenged by their mostly indigenous political base over issues

of the environment and natural resources.

On January 20, 2009, thousands of indigenous peoples and their supporters from

the Andean highlands to the Amazonian lowlands to the coastal regions of Ecuador, took

34 An elite academic organization supporting this approach is the so-called Latin American Alternative group. Led by New York University professor Jorge Castañeda, a former Mexican political adviser to the center-left PRD and later Foreign Secretary for right-wing president Vicente Fox (2000-2006), it also includes the Brazilian progressive social theorist and Harvard Law School professor Roberto Mangabeira, who is currently Minister of Strategic Affairs for Lula and responsible for policies turning Amazonia into a fiefdom of multinational interests. 35 Walden Bello, “The Post-Washington Dissensus,” Foreign Policy in Focus. September 24, 2007 and “The Coming Capitalist Consensus,” Foreign Policy in Focus, December 27, 2008.

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to the streets protesting the passage of a new Mining Law favorable to transnational

corporations. Not since the mobilizations that brought down two consecutive

governments paving the road to Correa’s election had the popular movement confronted

as violent a repression as the one inflicted by Correa himself – an advocate for the “21st-

century socialism.” Protesters questioned the constitutionality of the law, which had been

rushed through the Congress’s Legislative Commission without an ample national debate.

Popularly known as the “Little Congress,” the commission was created as a transitory

body until the April general election under the new Constitution of October 2008.

The confrontation was presaged by Correa’s intense campaign in favor of open-

pit mining. In public speeches he derided those opposing his schemes as “dumb leftists”

and “infantile extremists,” even suggesting that they were receiving support from the

right-wing opposition. In commentaries oddly closer to those of Peru’s Alan Garcia than

to those of his allies Chávez and Morales, he suggested the existence of preparations for

an “uprising against mining companies” promoted by “the left, the indigenous and

ecological movements.” Following the approval of his Mining Law, he sternly warned

that “we will not allow these abuses, we cannot allow uprisings which block roads,

threaten private property, and impede the development of a legal activity: mining.”

Correa’s hostility toward environmentalists and indigenous organizations

opposing mining goes back to more than a year ago, when after intense exchanges on the

desirability of extractive industry for the country’s development, he broke with former

President of the Constituent Assembly, Alberto Acosta. An activist of Acción Ecológica

with close ties to the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador

(CONAIE), Acosta presided over the writing of the new Constitutional text inspired by

the indigenous principle of Sumak Kausay (to live well in Quichua) and the rejection of

neoliberalism. Also incorporated into the new Bolivian constitution (Andean indigenous

populations of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia shared a common quechua or quichua culture),

this principle establishes balance and harmony with nature and with all other human

beings as the guiding logic ruling both social and economic organization and

development strategies. The Constitution also incorporates the right of indigenous

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peoples to be consulted and to veto projects considered harmful to their interests, and it

prohibits activities that would infringe on the right to water and a clean environment.36

Both indigenous and ecological organizations saw Correa’s Mining Law as an

alarming turn to the right. On the positive side they also remarked that the mobilization

and associated public denunciations and debates were important in forging a new alliance

between indigenous peoples and urban citizens around the defense and protection of the

environment, a shared mistrust of multinational corporations, and insistence on the right

to consultation.

From a broader historical perspective the Ecuadoran conflict raises serious

concerns regarding the divide between urban Creole elites and indigenous populations

underlying modern nation-states in the Andean countries. The conflict has also shown the

incapacity of revolutionary populism to think beyond an anachronistic – and failed –

state-centered strategy of development based on environmentally destructive mining.

More disturbing is the fact that Correa was willing to override the new democratically

crafted Constitution whose text contemplates public debate of environmental issues – a

text whose Sumak Kawsay principle Correa is glad to quote for foreign audiences in his

tirades against US imperialism and neoliberal exploitation.

Bolivia’s indigenous President Evo Morales is also facing a growing resistance to

new oil and mining developments. In a widely attended meeting held in La Paz on July 7-

8, 2009, delegates of peasants, women, indigenous and Afro-Bolivian peoples – all

supporters of his government – demanded an immediate end to new oil and mining

operations, which they denounced as threats to the environment and to the health of

nearby communities. They also deplored the fact that the President had authorized the

extractive operations without the prior discussion that is customary among indigenous

peoples and provided for in the Constitution. Finally the delegates called upon the

government to define a strategy of sustainable development in a broad national debate

36 Rachel Godfrey Wood. “Colombia and Ecuador: Two Different Countries, Two Mining Futures,” Council of Hemispheric Affairs. August 10, 2009. http://www.coha.org/2009/08/colombia-and-ecuador-two-different-countries-two-mining-futures/; Raúl Zibechi. “Ecuador: The Logic of Development Clashes with the Movements,” Center for International Policy – Americas Program. March 17, 2009. http://americas.irc-online.org/am/5965

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that would also determine the fairest way to distribute the profits of already existing gas

and mining operations.37

In a detailed Public Manifesto, the delegates announced the creation of a

Committee of all the attending organizations, charged with overseeing the negotiations

with the government and the discussion of environmental issues. It also would establish

permanent mechanisms for participation in the proposed national debate and for

community supervision of state-controlled enterprises involved in the extraction of gas

and oil – Bolivia’s most important economic activity. Morales dismissed his critics as

“influenced and manipulated” by environmentalist NGOs and has so far not responded to

the call to a national debate.

A few weeks earlier, more than 5,500 delegates from the Arctic Circle to

Patagonia and the Amazon (including North Americans), gathered in the Peruvian city of

Puno in the Fourth Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya

Yala.38 The event was preceded by the First Indigenous Women’s Summit and the

Second Encounter of Indigenous Youth and Children. Sociologist Aníbal Quijano

described the Continental Summit as “the most important political act of the year in Latin

America” – significant not only for indigenous peoples but “also for the rest of humanity”

since it “called into question the role of capital in its worst moment as it threatens the

survival of the planet.”39

In its final declaration the Indigenous Summit agreed “to offer an alternative of

life instead of the civilization of death” manifested today in the capitalist world through

the overlapping environmental, cultural, food and social exclusionary crises. The

proposal sketched in the Declaración de Mama Qota Titikaka aims at radically

transforming the current dominant way of living through indigenous ways grounded in

the Sumak Kawsay principle (also called Buen Vivir). The Declaration calls also for a

37 “Indígenas defienden la Amazonia y enojan a Evo,” Econoticias de Bolivia. July 13, 2009. http://www.econoticiasbolivia.com/. See also, R. Godfrey. “Colombia and Ecuador: Two Different Countries, Two Mining Futures,”op. cit. [See note 35]

38 Abya Yala is the term the Kuna people of Panama use to describe the Americas. Indigenous activists have increasingly embraced it as an alternative to Eurocentric language. 39 Quoted by Marc Becker, “Moving Forward: The Fourth Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples,” NACLA OnLine. June 12, 2009; see also “Alternativa de Buen Vivir. Ofrecimiento de la IV Cumbre Indigena,” La Jornada del Campo, no. 22, July 22, 2009.

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“global mobilization in defense of Mother Earth and the world’s peoples” against the

commodification of life, contamination of the environment, and the criminalization of

social and indigenous movements.40

Among its main points the Titikaka Declarations calls for:

– communitarian multinational states based on “self-government, self determination, and

the territorial reconstitution of the first peoples”

– the establishment of “intercultural legislative, judiciary, and electoral systems, and

public policies with direct political representation as peoples without the

mediation of political parties”

– the “reconstitution of indigenous ancestral territories as a source of identity, spirituality,

history and future” and the recognition that that all different “peoples and

territories are only one”

– “the rejection of all forms of privatization, concession, depredation and contamination”

and the creation of an “international tribunal of climate justice” to try the

transnationals and governments that deplete Mother Nature, loot natural resources

and violate indigenous rights

– rejection of free trade agreements between the United States, Europe, Canada and

China and the “broken Latin American economies”

– the strengthening of “intercultural systems of bi-lingual education and indigenous health care and the decolonization of knowledge”

Together with the Zapatista VI Declaration of the Lacandon Forest, this

Declaration reflects the political maturity of indigenous peoples, challenging not only

neoliberalism but also the principles of western paternalistic and elitist modernity in both

their capitalist and socialist formulations. Indigenous peoples and struggles will thus be

crucial to a new counterhegemonic bloc whose mobilization will affect not only the

coming social struggle, but also the fate of even the most promising progressive regimes,

which, with their concessions to capital, are further widening their divergence from a

40 See the Declaration at http://www.ivcumbrecontinentalindigena.org/?p=239.

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popular path.41 As Bolivia’s Accion Ecologica observes, a government that turns to the

right will find it extremely difficult to turn back again to the left.

41 See the Zapatista VI Declaration at http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/especiales/2. Both movements share a similar conceptualization of politics and power informed by the principles of self-determination and self-government, communitarian organization, and direct forms of representation without mediation of political parties. Informed by indigenous communal democratic traditions and attitudes this conceptualization entails a political praxis and the construction of forms power in which organized society takes command over politics and the state – in the manner of Chiapas indigenous zapatista rebel communities principle of “leading by obeying” (mandar obedeciendo). For an examination and assessment of the form of power built in Zapatista-held territories in Chiapas see Pablo Gonzalez Casanova. “The Zapatista ‘Caracoles”: Networks of Resistance and Autonomy.” S&D no. 39 (November 2005). For a discussion of the relevance of indigenous struggle and its relevance for Latin America’s fin-de-siecle crisis see, Anibal Quijano. “The Challenge of the “Indigenous Movement.” S&D no. 39