L a w L i b r a r y J o u r n a L - American Association of Law ...

L a w L i b r a r y J o u r n a LVol. 104, No. 2 Spring 2012

American Association of Law Libraries

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Table of Contents

General Articles

RestoringthePublicLibraryEthos:Copyright, William M. Cross 195E-Licensing,andtheFutureofLibrarianship[2012-18]

Resource-BasedLearningandCourseDesign: Margaret Butler 219ABriefTheoreticalOverviewandPracticalSuggestions[2012-19]

WikiLeaks:AGuideforAmericanLawLibrarians James P. Kelly, Jr. 245[2012-20]

CancellationofPrintPrimarySourcesinCanadian Nancy McCormack 263AcademicLawLibraries[2012-21]

DonatingandProcuringOrgans:AnAnnotated Louis J. Sirico, Jr. 285Bibliography[2012-22]

Review Article

KeepingUpwithNewLegalTitles[2012-23] Creighton J. Miller, Jr. 311 Annmarie Zell

Regular Features

Practicing Reference . . . Mary Whisner 331

FiftyMoreConstitutions[2012-24]

Back and Forth . . . Christine L. Sellers 341

WestlawNextandLexisAdvance[2012-25] Phillip Gragg

Memorial:FeliceSacks(1945–2012)[2012-26] Joan Sherer 349

L a w L i b r a r y J o u r n a LVol. 104, No. 2 Spring 2012

195

LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 104:2 [2012-18]

Restoring the Public Library Ethos: Copyright, E-Licensing, and the Future of Librarianship*

William M. Cross**

Mr. Cross describes the privileged nature of libraries in copyright law and the way that the recent trend toward licensing content undermines that position. In response, he proposes aggressive licensing and library use guided by the public library ethos, the core set of beliefs and practices that justify libraries’ privileged position.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195LibrariesandCopyright. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197ConsequencesofLicensing............................................ 203RestoringthePublicLibraryEthos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207ThePublicLibraryEthosinPractice:StreamingVideoandE-Books. . . . . . . . . 213Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Introduction

¶1Digitalmediapresentbothopportunitiesandchallengesforlibraries.Newtechnology makes traditional library functions such as cataloging and referenceserviceseasiertoofferandmoresophisticatedthanatanytimeinthepast.Atthesametime, thesenewpracticesraisepracticaland legal issues thatcanchallengelibrarianstoadapttheirtraditionalrolestonewcontexts.Asthisprocessoccurs,itisimportantforlibrarianstoremaincognizantandrespectfulofthespecialchar-acter of their work, a respect embodied by what Laura Gasaway has called the“publiclibraryethos.”1

¶2Thisethos,whichinformslibrarypractices,reflectsthespecialnatureofthelibrary in American law and culture that engenders the privileged position oflibrariesinthelaw,particularlyincopyrightlaw.Changesintechnology,however,oftenleadtochangesinlibrarypracticethatinturnproducepressuresonthelegalstatusoflibrariesandthepubliclibraryethositself.

¶3 A recent example of these pressures can be seen in the practice of somelibraries,whichhavebeguntousesubscriptionDVDserviceslikeNetflixtobuttress

* ©WilliamM.Cross,2012.Thisisarevisedversionofthewinningentryinthestudentdivi-sionofthe2011AALL/LexisNexisCallforPaperscompetition. ** Director,CopyrightandDigitalScholarship,NorthCarolinaStateUniversity,Raleigh,NorthCarolina. 1. Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital Environment: Librarians Versus Copyright Holders,24Colum.-VlA J.l. & Arts115,120(2000).

196 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 104:2 [2012-18]

theirfilmcollections.2ThispracticeenablesthelibrarytoofferarobustcollectionofDVDsaswellasasignificantcollectionofon-demandstreamingmediawithoutpurchasinghundredsoffilms,manyofwhichareoflimitedorshort-terminterest.3Unfortunately,Netflixoffersonlypersonaluselicensesandnositelicenses,sothispracticeseemstorunafoulofthetermsofserviceandmaycreatesubstantialliabil-ityfortheseinstitutions.4

¶4Librariesarebeginningtoembraceasimilarmodelofcontentacquisitionfor e-books, licensing digital content rather than purchasing a physical object.There is an ongoing discussion among libraries about how this nascent modelshould operate,5 but, despite many disagreements and uncertainties, as well asrecent evidence that students are ambivalent about e-books and e-textbooks,6libraryadoptionofe-booksisproceeding.

¶5Theseissuescametoaheadinthespringof2011,whenHarperCollins,amajor publisher of e-books, announced that circulation of new e-book titlesacquiredbylibrarieswouldbe“capped”attwenty-six,andthenthebookswouldexpire.7 Despite the publisher’s claims that this expiration reflected the rate ofdecayinphysicalcopies, librarianshaveexpressedoutrageatthisunilateralrevi-sion to the traditional practice of library lending.8 The American LibraryAssociation(ALA)releasedanofficialstatementcriticizingthepolicy9andhascre-atedtwotaskforcestoaddresstheissue.10

2. TravisKaya,Academic Libraries Add Netflix Subscriptions,Wired CAmpus (Sept.18,2010),http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/academic-libraries-add-netflix-subscriptions/27018. 3. See Kent Anderson, Libraries and Netflix—Questionable Borrowing Practices from People Who Know from Borrowing,the sCholArly KitChen(Sept.23,2010),http://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2010/09/23/libraries-and-netflix-do-the-risks-of-abusing-rentals-outweigh-the-benefits. 4. See Terms of Use: Limitations on Use, netflix, https://account.netflix.com/TermsOfUse#limitations(lastvisitedJan.9,2012)(“[T]heNetflixservice,andanycontentviewedthroughourservice,areforyourpersonalandnon-commercialuseonly....”). 5. See, e.g., Jennifer Howard, Librarians Puzzle over E-Books They May Buy but Not Truly Own, Chron. higher eduC., May 20, 2011, at A24; Jennifer Howard, E-Books: What a Librarian Wants, pAgeVieW (Sept. 8, 2010), http://chronicle.com/blogs/pageview/e-books-what-a-librarian-wants/26777. 6. AndreaFoster,Survey Finds That Only Half of College Students Use E-Books,Wired CAmpus(June 24, 2008), http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/survey-finds-that-only-half-of-college-students-use-e-books/4045;JeffreyR.Young,Students Remain Reluctant to Try E-Textbooks, Survey Finds, Wired CAmpus (Oct. 26, 2010), http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/students-remain-reluctant-to-try-e-textbooks-survey-finds/27866. 7. Josh Hadro, HarperCollins Puts 26 Loan Cap on Ebook Circulations, librAry JournAl.Com(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.libraryjournal.com/lj/home/889452-264/harpercollins_caps_loans_on_ebook.html.csp. 8. One library posted video of the HarperCollins books in their collection after circulatingtwenty-sixtimesthatwerestillinexcellentcondition.CoryDoctorow,How a HarperCollins Library Book Looks After 26 Checkouts (Pretty Good!), boingboing (Mar. 3, 2011, 8:24 A.m.), http://www.boingboing.net/2011/03/03/how-a-harpercollins.html. This claim also ignores the sophisticatedpreservationtoolsandtechniquesthat librarianshavedevelopedthroughcenturiesofprofessionalpractice. 9. PressRelease,Am.LibraryAss’n,RestrictionsonLibraryE-BookLendingThreatenAccesstoInformation(Mar.14,2011),http://ala.org/news/pr?id=6517. 10. American Library Association Tackles New Challenges in the E-Environment, distriCt dispAtCh (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.districtdispatch.org/2011/03/american-library-association-tackles-new-challenges-in-the-e-environment/.

197ReStORINg the pUBLIC LIBRARY ethOSVol. 104:2 [2012-18]

¶6Thesenewmodelsofcontentacquisitionareonlythelatestexamplesofalarger trend toward licensing rather than purchasing content, particularly digitalcontentthathasnophysicalartifactforthelibrarytopossess.Thiscontent-licens-ingmodelhassignificant implications for librarypracticeandpatronservice.AsAnne Klinefelter has written: “[T]he copyright and related law of electronicresources is complicating and even compromising some traditional libraryservices.”11 Digital services such as streaming video and e-books are undeniablyattractive,buttheiradoptionhasmajorconsequencesforlibrariesandforthesocialandcivicbenefitslibrariesprovide.

¶7Thisarticleexaminesthelegallandscapeunderwhichlibrariesoperateandhowthatlandscapeisbeingtransformedbythemovetolicenseddigitalcontent.Itbeginswithanoverviewofthecurrentsituation,describingthelibraryasaninsti-tutionthatisprivilegedbythelawanddiscussingthewaylibrariesinteractwiththecopyright law’s fairuseprovisions, the“libraryexception,” the first saledoctrine,andtheeducationalexceptions.Next,itdescribeshoweachofthesecopyrightpro-visionshasbeenaffectedbylibraries’useoflicenseddigitalcontent.

¶8 The adoption of a licensing model does significant harm to libraries andtheirpatrons,reducingorevenobliteratinglibraries’abilitytocarryouttheirtra-ditionalmission.Asillustratedbythechangedapplicationoflibraryrightsunder17U.S.C.§§107–110,librariesarelicensingthemselvesoutoftheirestablishedrole.Reconsideringlibrarypracticeinlightofthepubliclibraryethoscanputlibrariesbackontherighttrack.AfterproposingasetofbestpracticesforlibrarieslicensingdigitalcontentinlightofGasaway’sfour-partpubliclibraryethos,thearticlecon-cludesbyevaluatingpracticesforstreamingmoviesthroughaNetflix-likemodelandmakingtextavailablethroughe-bookmodelsasillustrationsofthesebestprac-ticesinaction.

Libraries and Copyright

Libraries as privileged Institutions

¶9At least since Thomas Jefferson inaugurated the Library of Congress twocenturiesago,Americanlawhasgivenspecialrecognitiontolibrariesinlightoftheunique role that they play in the accumulation, curation, and dissemination ofAmerica’sintellectualandculturalmaterials.12PresidentJohnF.Kennedydescribedthe special nature of educational institutions such as libraries in a 1963 specialaddresstoCongress:

Thedoors...tothelibrary...leadtotherichesttreasuresofouropensociety;tothepowerof knowledge—to the training and skills necessary for productive employment—to thewisdom,theideals,andtheculturewhichenrichlife—andtothecreative,self-disciplinedunderstandingofsocietyneededforgoodcitizenshipintoday’schangingandchallengingworld.13

11. AnneKlinefelter,Copyright and Electronic Library Resources: An Overview of How the Law Is Affecting Traditional Library Services,19legAl referenCe serViCes Q.,nos.3/4,2001,at175,176. 12. SeeJefferson’s Legacy: A Brief History of the Library of Congress,librAry of Cong.(Mar.30,2006),http://www.loc.gov/loc/legacy/loc.html. 13. SpecialAddresstotheCongressonEducation,pub. pApers105,105(Jan.29,1963).


¶10TheSupremeCourthasrecognizedthisspecialroleinnumerouscases.Forexample,inBoard of Education v. Pico14theCourtidentifiedschoollibrariesas“theprincipallocusof[FirstAmendment]freedoms,”15aplaceavailabletothoseseek-ing“self-education and individual enrichment.”16Academic and public librariesservearelatedfunction,andevenprivatelibrariesthatsupportcorporations,lawfirms, or researchers provide enrichment and education that benefit all citizenswithbetter-informedbusiness,legalservices,andresearch,promoting“theprog-ressofscienceandusefularts.”17

¶11Beyondself-improvement,librariesareunderstoodtobeapowerfulengineforthesocialandcivicadvancementofthenationasawhole.Asonecourtwrote,libraries are“a vital institution in the continuing American struggle to create asociety rich in freedom and variety of thought, broad in its understanding ofdiverseviewsandculturesandjustifiablyproudofitsdemocraticinstitutions.”18Inshort, librariesenableself-improvementandsocietaladvancement,andthe legalstructuresrelatingtolibrariesrecognizethisspecialrole.

¶12Librarianstakethisroleextremelyseriously.LauraGasawayhasdescribedthewaylibrariansunderstandtheirroleasthe“publiclibraryethos.”19Sheidenti-fiesfourcorevaluesthatmakeupthisethos:connectingpeopletoideas,offering“unfetteredaccesstorecordedknowledge,”encouraging“[l]earninginallitscon-texts,”andthe“preservationofthehumanrecord.”20Takentogether,thesecouldbedescribed broadly as bringing“information to the people.”21As Gasaway writes,“librariesareasharedintellectualresourcemaintainedatpublicexpensetoprovideresources that will be shared.”22 These values have developed over the course ofmanyyears23andinteractsignificantlywithcopyrightlaw.Asnoted,thelawrecog-nizesthesevaluesand,inthecopyrightcontext,thesespecialexceptionsarecon-tainedinsections107–110oftheCopyrightAct.

Section 107: Fair Use

¶13Fairuseisoneofthemostimportantaspectsofcopyrightlawforlibrarypractice, but also one of the most daunting for librarians to employ. A general

14. 457U.S.853(1982). 15. Id.at868–69. 16. Id.at869. 17. u.s. Const. art. I, § 8. Libraries in for-profit corporations and law firms are distinct inimportant ways. Their interrelationship with for-profit organizations often has an effect on theirpractice,andcopyright lawrecognizes thesedifferences.Someexceptions, suchas theTEACHAct(discussedinfra¶¶ 27–32),aresimplynotavailable,andincaseswheretheselibrariesavailthemselvesoffairuse,theirclaimsmaybesubstantiallyweakenedbychangesinthepurposeandcharacteroftheiruse.Nevertheless,theircoremissionaslibrariesstillrelatestoprovidinginformationinsupportofcreative,oftencivic-mindedexpression.Assuch,thepubliclibraryethosmaystillbeanimportantaspectoftheirpracticeastheymakecopyrightandlicensingdecisionstosupportlibraryusers. 18. Bicknellv.VergennesUnionHighSch.Bd.ofDirs.,475F.Supp.615,619(D.Vt.1979),aff ’d638F.2d438(2dCir.1980). 19. Gasaway,supranote1,at120. 20. Id.at124. 21. Id.at121. 22. Id. 23. Foranoverviewofthehistoricaldevelopmentofthisethos,seeid.at126–31.


defensetoachargeofunauthorizedusebasedonthebenefit tosocietybalancedagainstminimalharmdonetotherightsholder,fairuseisdeliberatelyopen-endedtoaccommodateuseinavarietyofcontexts.

¶14AnnBartowhasdescribedfairuseas“anelasticandevolvingconceptthatperplexes even those charged with applying the doctrine.”24 Kenneth Crews hascalled it simultaneously the most important and most misunderstood aspect ofcopyrightlaw.25Fairuseisdeliberatelyamorphousandundefinedbecauseitmustbemalleableandflexible.Ithasbeencalledthe“safetyvalve”ofcopyright,26andmany scholarshaveargued that theprotectionsof fairusearenecessary tokeepcopyright’scontent-basedrestrictionsofexpressionfromrunningafouloftheFirstAmendment.27

¶15 Originally established in the common law,28 fair use was codified by the1976CopyrightAct.29Althoughitremainsan“equitableruleofreason,”30thestat-uteprovidesfourfactorsforconsideration:

(1) thepurposeandcharacterof theuse, includingwhethersuchuse isofacommercialnatureorisfornonprofiteducationalpurposes;(2)thenatureofthecopyrightedwork;(3)theamountandsubstantialityoftheportionusedinrelationtothecopyrightedworkasawhole;and(4)theeffectoftheuseuponthepotentialmarketfororvalueofthecopy-rightedwork.31

¶16Fairuse isnot a checklistwhereall factorsmustbemet,nor is it a votewhere the majority wins. Indeed, the statute indicates that these factors are notexclusive—otherfactorscanbeandhavebeenincludedinafairuseanalysis.32AsDeborahGerhardtandMadelynWesselobserve,fairuseiscomplexandmultifac-eted,requiringanalysisoflegal,factual,andpolicyconsiderations.33

24. AnnBartow,Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book,48Vill. l. reV.13,28(2003). 25. SeeKenneth d. CreWs, Copyright lAW for librAriAns And eduCAtors39–40(2ded.2006). 26. E.g.,JohnSchulman,Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act,53ioWA l. reV.832,832(1968). 27. See, e.g., dAVid l. lAnge & h. Jefferson poWell, no lAW: intelleCtuAl property in the imAge of An Absolute first Amendment 46–54 (2009); neil WeinstoCK netAnel, Copyright’s pArAdox190–93(2008). 28. SeeFolsomv.Marsh,9F.Cas.342,349(C.C.D.Mass.1841)(No.4901);Lawrencev.Dana,15F.Cas.26,58(C.C.D.Mass.1869)(No.8136).See alsoDanielE.Abrams,Comment,Personal Video Recorders, Emerging Technology and the Threat to Antiquate the Fair Use Doctrine, 15Alb. l.J. sCi. & teCh.127,130(2004)(“Thedoctrinehasexistedincommonlawforsometimeasanequitabledefensedesignedto‘avoidrigidapplicationofthecopyrightstatutewhen,onoccasion,itwouldstifletheverycreativitywhichthatlawisdesignedtofoster....’”)(quoting4melVille b. nimmer & dAVid nimmer, nimmer on Copyright§13.05(1998)). 29. Pub.L.No.94-553,§107,90Stat.2541,2546(1976). 30. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976). But see Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued,44uClA l. reV.1449,1456–58(1997)(attackingwhathedescribesasthe“‘EquitableRuleofReason’canard”). 31. 17U.S.C.§107(2006). 32. JosephJ.Raffetto,Defining Fair Use in the Digital Era,15u. bAlt. intell. prop. l.J.77,80–81(2006);WilliamC.Walker,Jr.,Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for Maintaining Copyright Equilibrium,43lA. l. reV.735,742(1982–1983). 33. DeborahGerhardt&MadelynWessel,Fair Use and Fairness on Campus,11n.C. J.l. & teCh.461,484(2010)(“[F]airuseanalysisisnoteasy.Itisnotneat.Itisnotclear.Itrequiresavigilanteyeovercurrentlegaldecisionsandfactual,case-by-case,intensivereviewoffactorsthatsometimescon-flict.”(footnotesomitted)).


¶17Anexaminationofthesefactorsindicateshowlibraryuseoftenfitscom-fortably under the aegis of fair use.As nonprofit, educational institutions, mostlibraries begin fair use analysis on a firm footing. The first factor, purpose andcharacteroftheuse,almostalwaysfavorslibraries’educational,generallynonprofituse.Thefourthfactor,effectonthemarket,isapointofcontentionformanystake-holders.Publishersoftencharacterizeanylibraryuseasa“lostsale,”butlibrariansmaycounterthatthelibrarypurchasemitigatesthisharm,particularlywhereausefalls below the threshold amount where a user would have purchased an entirework.Factorstwoandthree,thenatureoftheworkandtheamountandsubstan-tialityused,aremorecase-specific,butmostlibrarypracticeistargetedtothetypeandamountsappropriatetothelibrary’sorpatron’sneed.AsGerhardtandWesselnote,“Whenthefirstandfourthfairusefactorsfavorafindingoffairuse,astheywillinmanyeducationalcontexts,afindingoffairuseisnearlyassured.”34

¶18Gasawaydescribeshowlibrarians interpret fairuse in lightofthepubliclibraryethosasa“user’sright”thatgoesbeyondbeingalegaldefense;rather,itisatooltoprotectandempowerindividualsandlibraries.35Thisperspectiveisbut-tressedbytheCopyrightAct’sspecialprotectionfromstatutorydamages,remittingdamagesinsituationswherelibrarians“believedandhadreasonablegroundsforbelieving”thattheirusewasfair.36Fairuseisattheheartoflibraryoperations,andits factors are designed to privilege the sort of use that makes up core libraryfunctions.

Section 108: the Library exception

¶19 Section 108 of the copyright law, colloquially referred to as the“libraryexception,”permitslibrariestoreproducecopyrightedworkswithoutpermissioninsomesituations.37Forexample,undercertaincircumstanceslibraryandarchivalstaffcanmakecopiesforpreservation,38toreplacedamagedorstolenworks,39andto reproduce published works in the last twenty years of their copyrightprotection.40

¶20Librarianscanalsomakecopiesforalibraryuser,reproducingsinglearti-cles for private, noncommercial use by patrons and reproducing an entire workwhereareplacementcopycannotbefoundforafairprice.41Finally,section108permitslendingofreproductionsofcopyrightedworkstousersinotherlibrariesforprivate,noncommercialuse.42

¶21 The library exception codifies libraries’ central role in preserving andcuratinginformation.Thisisparticularlyimportantbecauseinformationisstored

34. Id. at 499 (citing Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,156u. pA. l. reV.549,584(2008)). 35. Gasaway,supranote1,at123(citing17U.S.C.§108(f)(4)(2006):“nothingshallaffecttherightoffairuse....”). 36. 17U.S.C.§504(c)(2)(2006). 37. Id.§108. 38. Id.§108(b). 39. Id.§108(c). 40. Id.§108(h). 41. Id.§108(e). 42. Id.§108(a),(d).


inmediathatareconstantlydeteriorating.43PhysicalartifactsrangingfrombookstoCDstofilmsdecayorbecomeworn,andlibrariesdosubstantialworkpreservingandrepairingthem.Digitalmediapresentdifferentchallengesbutcanbesubstan-tially more costly to preserve than traditional media.44 Section 108 is expresslydesignedtosupportlibrarypractice,andwithoutthesection108exceptions,librar-ieswouldbeunabletodotheirjob,andmanyoftheartifactsofrecordedknowl-edgewouldsimplybelost.45

Section 109: First Sale

¶22ThefirstsaledoctrinehasbeenpresentinAmericancopyrightlawsinceitsinceptioninthecommonlaw46andhasbeenincludedinbothtwentieth-centurycopyrightstatutes.47Itisalsoattheheartoflibraries’day-to-dayoperations.Itpro-videslibraries,andanyonewhoownsaparticularcopyofacopyrightedwork,withanexceptiontothecopyrightholder’sexclusiverights.Anyonewhopurchasesorlawfully acquires a copy of a work can dispose of that copy however they wishundersection109(a).48Thispermitsownerstosell,giveaway,orlendtheircopiesofawork.

¶23Thereareseveral limitationstosection109(a).First,section109protectsonlydistribution;itgiveslibrariesnorighttoreproduce,publiclyperform,oradaptacopyrightedworkwithoutauthorization.49Section109(a)alsolimitsprotectiontothespecificcopyofthework,thephysicalartifactitself.Itgrantsnoprotectiontodistributionoftheunderlyingcontent.50Similarly,worksthataretransferredbyrental,lease,orlendingfordirectorindirectcommercialpurposesalsofalloutsideofthescopeof109(a).51Section109permitsownerstodisplayalegallyacquiredcopy,providedthat,forimages,onlyoneimageisdisplayedatatimeinthesameplacethattheartifactitselfisheld.52

43. robert l. oAKley, Copyright And preserVAtion 1 (1990), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED328263.pdf(“Virtuallyeverymediumofexpressionisthreatenedtodaybythenatu-ralforcesofdeterioration.”). 44. See generallyMargaretHedstrom,Digital Preservation: A Time Bomb for Digital Libraries,31Computers & humAn.189(1998). 45. See generallyLauraN.Gasaway,America’s Cultural Record: A Thing of the Past?,40hous. l. reV.643(2003). 46. See, e.g.,Bobbs-MerrillCo.v.Straus,210U.S.339,351(1908)(holding that thecopyrightowner’srightto“vend”hisbookdidnotgivethecopyrightownertherighttorestrictfutureretailsalesofthebookortherighttorequirethatthebookbesoldatacertainpricepercopy). 47. CopyrightActof1909,ch.320,§41,35Stat.1075,1084;CopyrightActof1976,Pub.L.No.94-553,§109,90Stat.2541,2548. 48. 17U.S.C.§109(a)(2006). 49. SeeKeithKupferschmid,Lost in Cyberspace: The Digital Demise of the First Sale Doctrine,16J. mArshAll J. Computer & info. l.825,832–35(1998). 50. See17U.S.C.§202(2006)(statingthatwhenapartytransfersownershipofamaterialobjectinwhichacopyrightedwork is fixed, suchtransferdoesnot transferanyrights in thecopyrightedworkitself). 51. Foradiscussionofthedevelopmentofthe“rentalright,”seeKupferschmid,supranote49,at833–35. 52. 17U.S.C.§109(c).


¶24Section109isvitalforatleasttworeasons.First,itpermitslibrariestolenditemstousers,facilitatingthe“sharing”functionattheheartoflibraries’mission.Thismaximizestheefficienciesofsharedcopiesaswellasmakingiteconomicallyfeasibleforlibrariestoofferpatronsaccesstoworksforfree,providinginformationtopoorcitizenswhowouldotherwisebeunabletoaccessitandreapthepersonalandsocialbenefitsofbetter-informedcitizenship.

¶25Section109isequallyvitaltothelibrary’sfunctionofpreservinginforma-tionandartifacts.Alongwithmuseums,librariesareoneofthefewpublicorgani-zations that make sure that works that are less popular or are no longer beingcommercializeddonotfadeawayintothedustofhistory.

Section 110: education and Streaming

¶26Finally,section110governsnonprofiteducationalperformancesanddis-plays.Librariesinteractlessdirectlywithsection110,butthesectionstillplaysanimportant role in theeducationalmissionof libraries.Section110contains twosubsectionsgoverningphysicalanddigitalinstructionrespectively.Section110(1)permitspublicperformancesanddisplaysofaworkbyinstructorsorstudentsinthe course of face-to-face teaching activities in a nonprofit educational institu-tion.53Thisistangentiallyrelatedtocorelibraryactivities,butisusedwhenlibrar-iesofferprogrammingorinstructionorwhen,attherequestofafacultymember,forexample,theyshowfilmsinthelibraryforaclassandthelibrarybecomesthe“classroom”forthatpurpose.

¶27Section110(2),theTechnology,EducationandCopyrightHarmonization(TEACH)Act,dealswithinstructionintheonlineenvironment.54Toreassurepub-lishersthatareconcernedabouttheopennessoftheonlineenvironment,TEACHplacesseveralinstitutionalandindividualrequirementsonuniversitiesregardingcopyrightnoticeandprotection.TheseinstitutionalrequirementsincludelimitingTEACH’s application exclusively to “government or accredited educationalinstitutions.”55InordertoqualifyforTEACH,theseinstitutionsmustcreateanddisplayaninstitutionalcopyrightpolicy,publishcopyrightinformation,andofferaspecificnoticetostudentsregardingthecopyrightstatusofmaterialsbeingper-formed or displayed.56 These requirements are generally common sense andimposenoseriousbarrierstostreamingvideoinareasonablefashion.

¶28TEACHalsocreatesasetoftechnologicalrequirementsdesignedtoensurethatthe“classroom”natureoftheonlinespaceisretainedintheopenenvironmentof theweb.These include limitingaccess toenrolled studentsand theestablish-mentoftechnologicalmeasuresthatreasonablypreventretentionorfurtherdis-semination of materials.57 As with the institutional requirements, these do notplaceunduestrainonaninstitutionthatwishestoofferstreamingvideo.Passwordprotectionfulfills the limitedaccessrequirement,andtheactofstreamingfunc-tionallylimitsretentionandfurtherdissemination.

53. Id.§110(1). 54. Id.§110(2). 55. Id. 56. Id.§110(2)(D)(i). 57. Id.§110(2)(D)(ii).


¶29ThethirdsetofTEACHrequirementsplacesrestrictionsonthepracticeofinstruction.Unlike the institutionaland technical requirements,whichprimarilyimplicate the institution’s policies and online architecture, these requirementsnecessitate cooperation between the institution and the individual instructor.Instructorsmustprovidespecificoversight,thatis,itemspostedorstreamedmustbe“at the direction of or under the supervision of the instructor.” Further, thematerialsmustbe“anintegralpartofaclasssession”and“directlyrelatedandofmaterialassistancetotheteachingcontent.”58

¶30Althoughaimedprimarilyatinstructors,TEACHhasimportantimplica-tions for the ways that libraries make information available. As Kenneth Crewswrites,

NothingintheTEACHActmentionsdutiesoflibrarians,butthegrowthandcomplex-ity of distance education throughout the country have escalated the need for innovativelibrary services. Fundamentally, librarians have a mission centered on the managementanddisseminationofinformationresources.Distanceeducationissimplyanotherformofexactlythatpursuit.59

TEACH can be seen as creating a new avenue by which to share informationthroughstreaming.Italsocreatesnewopportunitiesandobligationswhenprovid-inginformationinthedigitalenvironment.

¶31OneimportantlimitationofTEACHisthat,like17U.S.C.§110(1),itonlycoversperformanceanddisplayofworks.Forexample,underTEACH,avideoclipcouldbestreamedbutanarticlecouldnotbeposted,sincethatwouldbeadistribu-tion,ratherthanadisplay.Nonetheless,TEACHremainsanimportantpartoftheinfrastructureoflibrarypractice,facilitatinginstructionandreferenceactivities.

¶32Section110(4)comesintoplayforlibrariesmakingnoncommercial,non-publicperformancesofnondramaticliteraryormusicalworks.Designedtopermitlimited“performances”suchaspoetryreadingsormusicalperformances,section110(4)allowslibrariestoenhancetheirprogrammingandcommunityactivities.

Consequences of Licensing

From Rights of Ownership to terms of Service

¶33Librarieshaveundergoneamajorshiftincollectiondevelopmentpracticeinthelasttwentyyears,movingasubstantialamountoftheircollectionsbudgetsfrompurchasingcontenttolicensingit.Onestudyindicatesthatfrom1994to2005theuseoflicensingagreementsroseby600%.60Theconsequencesoflicensingareimportant and far-reaching. Most obviously, licensing content removes libraryownership from the legal equation, and this has both legal and practicalconsequences.

58. Id.§110(2)(A). 59. Kenneth d. CreWs, neW Copyright lAW for distAnCe eduCAtion: the meAning And importAnCe of the teACh ACt 10 (rev. Sept. 2002), available at http://web2.ala.org/ala/aboutala/offices/oitp/publications/issuebriefs/Teach%20Act%20Summary.pdf. 60. SharonFarb,Libraries, Licensing and the Challenge of Stewardship,11first mondAy,no.7(2006),http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1364/1283.


¶34 Practically speaking, of course, licensed digital content is not physicallystoredinthelibrary.Thishasanenormouseffectontheday-to-dayuseofmaterial,particularlyinthecontextofusesthatarelegallyuncertainbutmaybesubjecttofairuse.Possessionofthephysicalartifactpermitslibrarians,ratherthancontentholders,tomakecopyrightdeterminations,sincetheyhavetheitemin-handtouse,copy,orcirculate.

¶35Licensetermsrestrictlibrarians’abilitytomakecopyrightdeterminations,andinfact,thesetermsareoftencodedintothedigitalmaterial.Asaresult,incasesofcontesteduseorlegalgrayareassuchasfairuse,wherealibrariancoulddecideforhimselftolendorcopyaphysicalobject,thedigitalversionmostoftenfore-closesthisoptionentirely.CoupledwiththeDigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct’sprohibitiononmeasurestocircumventtechnologicalrestrictions,61thecomputercodeofdigitalobjectscanoverridetherightsoflibrariesthatmaybepermittedbytheCopyrightAct.62

¶36Licensingalso transformsaone-timepurchasecost intoarecurringonethat,ifnotpaidinperpetuity,maycausematerialstodisappearfromthecollectionaltogether.63Further,thetermsareoftendifficulttonegotiate,particularlywhereasinglepublisherhasastrangleholdonajournalorsetofmaterialsthatiscentraltoalibrary’smissionorcriticalfortheworkofpatrons.Thisoftenleadstopublishers’“bundling” multiple works into a package that libraries must take or leave.64Negotiating is made even more difficult for libraries because of limitationsimposedbypublishersagainstdisclosureofpricingandterms.Thesenondisclo-sure clauses“allow publishers unilateral control over communication about thepurchaseorthetermsofuseoftheproduct,”65oftenforcinglibrarianstonegotiatewithoutcrucialinformationaboutpeerinstitutionsandthemarketforworks.

¶37Evenwhenlicensesarepurchased,technicaldifficultiesbeyondthelibrary’scontrolmaymakeaworkunavailable.Becauseonlinejournalsarehostedonpub-lishers’servers,anytimethepublisherhastechnicalissueslibrariesandpatronsmayloseallaccesstothelicensedcontent.Unlikeaproprietaryonlinedatabase,physicalbooksnever“godown.”

¶38Beyondthepragmaticconsiderationsofphysicalpossession,themovetolicensed digital content has important ramifications for the legal strictures thatcontrollibraries’abilitytooperateinharmonywiththeirethos.Bartowarguesthatthismove to licenseddigitalcontenthasallowedpublishers to“restructure theirrelationshipwithlibrariesandtoforceabandonmentofallpre-existingnormsinthe new distribution mediums.”66 Each of the copyright exceptions available tolibrariesisaffectednegativelybythisrestructuredrelationship.

61. DigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct,17U.S.C.§1201(a)(1)(A)(2006). 62. See generallylAWrenCe lessig, Code: Version 2.0(2006). 63. Ann Bartow, Some Peer-to-Peer, Democratically, and Voluntarily-Produced Thoughts, 5 J. on teleComm. & high teCh. l. 449, 464–65 (2007) (reviewingyoChAi benKler, the WeAlth of netWorKs(2006)). 64. See, e.g.,KarlaHahn,The State of the Large Publisher Bundle: Findings from an ARL Member Survey,Arl,no.245,Apr.2006,at1,1,available athttp://www.arl.org/bm~doc/arlbr245. 65. Farb,supranote60. 66. Bartow,supranote24,at78.


Section 107: Fair Use

¶39InGerhardtandWessel’sinvestigationofthestateoffairuseoncampus,67theauthorsobservethatevaluatingfairuseisoneofthemostcomplexlegaldeci-sionslibrariansmustmakeandthatthiscomplexityoftenleadslargeinstitutionssimplytodeclinetoexercisetheirfairuserightsatall.68

¶40Thesecomplexitiesaremultipliedexponentiallyinthedigitalenvironment,becausethereislessestablishedlawandpracticeonwhichtorelyandbecausenewusesappearfrequently.Largeinstitutionsarenaturallyriskaverse,andfairusepro-videsnocertainanswersastowhatusesarepermitted,69somanyinstitutionsareextremelyreluctanttoasserttheirfairuserightsexceptinthemostcut-and-driedcircumstances.

¶41Evenmoreproblematicisthatlicensesoftenremovefairusefromtheequa-tionaltogether.Morethanadecadeagoscholarsexpressedconcernthatalicensingregime“couldbedevelopedsothatitdisallowsanyfreeuseofcopyrightedworks,even uses that qualify as fair use.”70A recent study of library licensing practicesconcludedthatroughlyaquarteroflicenseshavemadethisfearareality,expresslyprohibitingfairusebythetermsofthelicense.71

¶42 As the copyright statute makes clear, contracts such as the licenses thatlibraries sign trump copyright exceptions, leaving libraries without the fair use“balancingtest”betweenownersandusers.72Theuniquenatureoffairuseascopy-right’s“safetyvalve”mightsuggestthatcompletelyremovingfairusewouldviolatetheFirstAmendment.73Bylockingupexpression,copyrightisnaturallyinconstanttensionwiththeguaranteesoftheFirstAmendment,whichregardscontent-basedprohibitions on expression as presumptively unconstitutional.74 The SupremeCourt has concluded that copyright is saved by the flexibility of fair use, which

67. Gerhardt&Wessel,supranote33. 68. Id.at465(“Whenanswersarenotclearandpotential liability isthoughttobesignificant,saying‘no’toaproposeduseisoftenconsideredthesafestcourse.Thelegalrisksmaybeperceivedasespeciallythreateningatinstitutionswithlimitedresources.Inseekingclarityandavoidingrisk,thetemptationcanbestrongtoactasiffairusedoesnotexistandtoshiftcampuscopyrightpolicytoasafezonebasedonblanketlicenses,fees,andpermissions,evenwhenlawwouldnotrequiretheseactions.”). 69. LawrenceLessig’sinfamousquipthatfairuseamountstolittlemorethan“therighttohirealawyer,”lAWrenCe lessig, free Culture187(2004),expressesanimportanttruth,butthisgallowshumoralsoindicatesthefatalisticoutlookmanyusershavetowardarightthatshouldbecentraltocopyrightanalysisinthecontextoflibraryuse. 70. GlenM.Secor,Fair Use in a Pay-per-Use World,21libr. ACQuisitions: prAC. & theory53,58(1997). 71. Farb,supranote60,atfig.2. 72. 17U.S.C.§108(f)(4)(2006).See alsoElizabethM.N.Morris,Will Shrinkwrap Suffocate Fair Use?,23sAntA ClArA Computer & high teCh. l.J.237,241(2006–2007). 73. SeeDanL.Burk&JulieE.Cohen,Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems,15hArV. J.l. & teCh.41,43(2001);see alsoDavidLange&JenniferLangeAnderson,Copyright,FairUseandTransformativeCriticalAppropriation134–35(Nov.2001),available athttp://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf(statingthatinacompetitionbetweencopyrightandFirstAmendmentrights,copyrightmustlose). 74. CityofRentonv.PlaytimeTheatres,Inc.,475U.S.41,46–47(1986)(“[R]egulationsenactedfor the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the FirstAmendment.”).


permitstheunfettered,sociallyvaluableexpressionnecessaryforthemarketplaceofideastofunction.75Assuch,aregimethatremovesfairusefromtheequationclosesoffthis“safetyvalve”andmightputtoomuchpressureonfreeexpression,unconstitutionallyviolatingtheguaranteesoftheFirstAmendment.

¶43So far thisargument isuntestedby thecourts,and itsprospectsarenotpromisinginthecontextofcontractlaw.ThereareseveralcasesholdingthatFirstAmendment freedoms can be waived by contracts such as government service76and press confidentiality agreements.77 The chances of a court’s invalidating anegotiatedlicensebasedonviolationoftheFirstAmendmentareextremelyslim.

Section 108: the Library exception

¶44Theproblemsdiscussedregardingfairuseloomevenlargerinthesection108context.Wherefairuseisexpresslyremovedbyaquarteroflicenses,therighttoarchiveisremovedbymorethanhalfofthelibrarylicensessurveyedbyFarb.78Evenincaseswherealicensedoesnotforeclosesection108copying,manyofthesection108protectionsarebluntedinthedigitalenvironment.79Theseproblem-aticareasincludedifficultieswithdefiningwhatconstitutesa“copy,”aswellasthenatureoflending“reproductions”insection108(d)and(e).

¶45 These problems have been identified and discussed by the Section 108StudyGroupthathasworkedtounderstandandaddresstheseproblems.Ina2007articledescribingherexperienceinthestudygroup,LauraGasawayidentifiesfourareaswheresection108challengeslibrarypracticeinthedigitalrealm:institutionaleligibility,preservationandreplacement,digitalcopiesforusers,andspecificprac-ticeissues.80Gasawayproposessolutionsbasedontheworkofthestudygroup,buttheyhavenotyetbeenadopted.Atpresent,ahostofissuesremainunresolved,andevenareasthatmightbepromisingexistatthewhimofrightsholderswholicensecontenttolibraries.

Section 109: First Sale

¶46Evenwithoutexpresslicensinglanguage,firstsalesimplydoesnotapplytolicensingregimeswherethereisno“sale,”butonlylicenseduse.81AsR.AnthonyReesenotes,thefirstsaledoctrineservesseveralimportantinterests,particularlyin

75. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (fair use is a “traditional FirstAmendment safeguard[]”which“affordsconsiderable‘latitude for scholarshipandcomment,’ andevenforparody.”(citationsomitted)(quotingHarper&RowPublishers,Inc.v.NationEnters.,471U.S.539,560(1985))). 76. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that a former CIAemployeecouldberequiredtosubmitmaterialtotheagencyforapprovalpriortopublicationunderthetermsofasignedsecrecyagreement). 77. SeeCohenv.CowlesMediaCo.,501U.S.663,670(1991)(holdingthatenforcementofgen-eralrulesofpromissoryestoppeldoesnotviolatetheFirstAmendment).See alsoG.RichardShell,Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court,81CAlif. l. reV.433,479–82(1993). 78. Farb,supranote60,atfig.2. 79. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Library Reproduction Rights for Preservation and Replacement in the Digital Era: An Author’s Perspective on § 108,29Colum. J.l. & Arts343(2006). 80. Laura N. Gasaway, Amending the Copyright Act for Libraries and Society: The Section 108 Study Group,70Alb. l. reV.1331,1339–44(2007). 81. SeeKupferschmid,supranote49;CharlesA.Masango,The Future of the First Sale Doctrine with the Advent of Licenses to Govern Access to Digital Content,7s. Afr. J. info. & Comm.64(2006).


thecontextof libraryuse,allofwhichare lostwhenworksare licenseddigitallyratherthanpurchased.Firstsaleenableslibrariestoofferworkstopatronsatmini-malcostaswellasprovidingout-of-printworksandworkswithdrawnbythepub-lisher,andtopreserverareworks,butallof these functionsarethreatenedif thefirstsaleexceptionisnotavailable.82

¶47 One author goes further, arguing that this change effectively creates anentirelynewrightforpublishers:the“righttocontrolaccess.”83Somescholarshavearguedthatthefirstsaledoctrinecouldbeupdatedorreinterpretedtoaccommo-datethelibrary’sspecialfunction,84butsofarsuchproposalshavenotledtoanyofficial action. In the present environment, licensed digital items simply do notqualifyasworkslibrariesown,andlibrariesthereforehavenorecoursetosection109’sfirstsaleprovision.

Section 110: Streaming Under teACh

¶48TheTEACHAct is limitedby licensinginseveral importantways.Attheselectionlevel,TEACH’srequirementthatonlylegallyobtainedcopiesbeusedmayprecludetheuseofitemsthatarelicensedbutnotowned.Indeed,collectiondevel-opment decisions are fundamentally complicated by the uncertain nature oflicensedmaterials.LibrariansrelyingonTEACHtostreamtheiraudioandvisualcollectionsmayalsobefrustratedbylicensesthatlimitTEACH-basedactivitiesbycontractorthroughtechnologicallocksonuseandcopying.

¶49 Many librarians rely on TEACH when they engage in online instructionusingmaterialsinthelibrary’scollection.85Whenusinglicensedmaterials,however,librarians may be uncertain whether those library materials qualify as“lawfullymadeoracquired”—asmandatedbytheTEACHAct86—iftheyareworkingwithpatronsnotcoveredbytheirlicense.Aswiththerightsdiscussedabove,ofcourse,explicitlanguageinthelicensemayfurtherrestrictthelibrarian’sactivities,particu-larlyintheonlinecontext.

Restoring the Public Library Ethos

¶50Licensingasitiscurrentlypracticedsignificantlyharms,andinsomecasescompletelydismantles,thecopyrightinfrastructuredesignedtosupportthesoci-etally valuable work libraries perform. In the long run, lawmakers and judges

82. SeeR.AnthonyReese,The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,44b.C. l. reV.577,644–50(2003). 83. EricMatthewHinkes,Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/First Sale Doctrines,23sAntA ClArA Computer & high teCh. l.J.685(2006–2007). 84. See, e.g., Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles ’n Bits: Making a Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasible,9 miCh. teleComm. teCh. l. reV. 1 (2002); Henry Sprott Long III, Comment, Reconsidering the “Balance” of the “Digital First Sale” Debate: Re-Examining the Case for a Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media Markets,59AlA. l. reV.1183(2008). 85. See Kate Irwin, Note, Copyright Law—Librarians Who TEACH: Expanding the Distance Education Rights of Libraries by Applying the Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002,29W. neW eng. l. reV.875(2007). 86. 17U.S.C.110(2)(2006).


evaluatinglibraryusemustconfrontthisproblem,butthereisnoindicationthatchangeisimminent.Indeed,therecenttrendhasbeenintheotherdirection,withrightsholderscarvingoutgreaterandgreaterlimitationsthroughaggressiveprac-tice87andtargetedlobbying.88

¶51Librariesandlibrariansareunlikelytoacquirethewealthorclouttochal-lengeseriouslythetensofmillionsofdollarsannuallyspent89bythecontentindus-trybendingCongress’sear.90Librarianscan,however,beginaggressivelytoasserttheirrightsinwaysthatrespectthelawbutthatalsorecognizetheprivilegednatureoflibraryactivities.

¶52Aggressivedecision-makingnotonlyallowslibrarianstobetterservetheirpatrons,ithasimportantdoctrinalconsequencesaswell.Incopyrightlaw,estab-lishednormshaveapositiveeffectonthelawitself.Thisisespeciallytrueforlicens-ing, where library practice leads to what copyright scholar James Gibson calls“doctrinalfeedback.”91Becausethescopeofcopyrightandparticularlyoffairusecanbeambiguous,andmanylibrariesareriskaverseinthefaceofpotentiallitiga-tion,theyoftenseeklicensesincaseswherenolicenseisneededorwhereliabilityisunlikelytoexist.

Thispracticeofunneededlicensingfeedsbackintodoctrinebecauseofonefinaluncon-troversialpremise:thefairusedefenselookstotheexistencevel nonofalicensingmarketwhendefiningthereachofthecopyrightentitlement.Theresultisasteady,incremental,andunintendedexpansionofcopyright,causedbynothingmorethanambiguousdoctrineandprudentbehavioronthepartofcopyrightusers.92

¶53 Inresponse to this tideofdoctrinal feedback, librariansneed toreclaimtheir rights. To do this safely and credibly, however, library practice must begrounded in thepublic libraryethos that justifies libraries’privilegedposition.93Thisethoshasfourcentralcomponents:theconnectionofpeopletoideas,unfet-

87. See, e.g.,PeterK.Yu,P2P and the Future of Private Copying,76u. Colo. l. reV.653,658–61(2005)(discussingtheRecordingIndustryAssociationofAmerica’s(RIAA)seriesoflawsuitsagainstfile-sharingservicesdespitetheirusefornon-infringingpurposes). 88. SeeLewisKurlantzick&JacquelineE.Pennino,The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the Formation of Copyright Policy,45J. Copyright soC’y u.s.A.497,499–500(1998)(describingthelobbyingeffortsoftheindustryandRIAAtoformcopyrightlegislationinthefaceofoppositionfromtheconsumerelectronicsindustry). 89. In 2009 the RIAA alone spent $17.5 million, and over the past decade the RIAA’s lob-bying efforts totaled more than $90 million. Mike Masnick, RIAA Spent $90 Million in Lobbying the US in the Past Decade, teChdirt (Jan. 7, 2011, 1:04 A.m.), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110106/15414312556/riaa-spent-90-million-lobbying-us-past-decade.shtml. 90. SeeAaronM.Bailey,Comment,A Nation of Felons? Napster, the NET Act, and the Criminal Prosecution of File-Sharing, 50Am. u.l. reV. 473, 485 n.71 (2000) (citing Kurlantzick & Pennino,supranote88, at499–500);Brett J.Miller,Comment,The War Against Free Music: How the RIAA Should Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the MP3,82u. det. merCy l. reV.303,325(2005)(discuss-ingthe“brobdingnagianamountofmoneytheRIAAspendslobbyingCongresseachyear.”). 91. JamesGibson,Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,116yAle l.J.882,885(2007). 92. Id.at887. 93. SeeGasaway,supranote1.Certainlythisisnottheonlyarticulationofcorelibraryvalues.Gasaway’s“publiclibraryethos,”however,offersasetofvaluesspecificallyforaddressingthecopy-rightissues“dealingwithmakingworksandinformationavailabletousers.”Id.at121n.22.


teredaccesstoinformation,supportforlearninginallitscontexts,andpreservationofthehumanrecord.

Connection of people to Ideas

¶54Thefirstprincipleofthepubliclibraryethosistheideaoflibrariesasinsti-tutionsdevotedtoconnectingpeopletoideas.Groundedinthelibrary’sroleasasourceofindividualeducationandpersonalgrowth,thisis,accordingtoGasaway,themostimportantcorevalueofbringing“informationtothepeople.”94

¶55 This value implicates libraries as the source of informational artifacts aswellaseducationalprogrammingandreferenceservices insupportof thepublicgood. Significantly, despite the ways that the Copyright Act often distinguishesbetweennonprofitlibrariesandtruly“educationalinstitutions”suchasuniversities,95librariansgenerallydonotmakethisdistinctionbetweenpurelyeducationalinsti-tutions and libraries that work to educate all citizens whether or not they areenrolledinaspecificcourseofstudy.Thefunctionsofacademicandschoollibrar-iesaredeeplyintermingledwithacademicinstitutions.Publiclibrarieshavebeendescribedas“thepeople’suniversity,”96andlibrariansoftenregardlibraryspaceasanextensionoftheclassroom.

¶56Thisvaluehasbeenexpressedbroadlyinalmosteverystatementofpurposeand values generated by library organizations. The ALA’s Core Values ofLibrarianship,forexample,assertthatlibrariesarean“essentialpublicgoodandarefundamental institutions in democratic societies.”97 TheAssociation of ResearchLibraries’(ARL)IntellectualPropertyStatementofPrinciplessimilarlystatesthatcopyrightexists“forthepublicgood.”98

¶57Allofthesection107–110rights,aswellasthesharedmissionoflibrariesand the Copyright Clause, are involved. Like libraries, copyright law itself existsultimatelytobenefitthepublic,nottorewardauthorsorsupportbusinessmod-els.99 This shared purpose drives the special status of libraries and should guidelibrarypractice.

¶58Inthelicensingcontext,thisvalueshouldleadlibrarianstomakesurethattheyretaintheirtraditionalabilitytoserveallpatrons,notonlythoseregisteredforaspecificclassordoing“official”business.Libraryethosandcopyright lawbothemphasizethedutytoprovideinformationforeducationandpersonalgrowthof“thePeople”inthegrandrepublicansense.

94. Id. at121–22. 95. Id.at121. 96. KathleenBlakeYancey,The “People’s University”: Our (New) Public Libraries as Sites of Lifelong Learning,ChAnge,Mar.–Apr.2005,at12. 97. Core Values of Librarianship, Am. librAry Ass’n. (adopted June 2004), http://www.ala.org/offices/oif/statementspols/corevaluesstatement/corevalues. 98. Intellectual Property: An ARL Statement of Principles,Ass’n of reseArCh librAries(adoptedMay1994),http://www.arl.org/sc/authors/ipprinciples.shtml. 99. TwentiethCenturyMusicCorp.v.Aiken,422U.S.151,156(1975)(“Theimmediateeffectofourcopyrightlawistosecureafairreturnforan‘author’s’creativelabor.Buttheultimateaimis,bythisincentive,tostimulateartisticcreativityforthegeneralpublicgood.”).


Unfettered Access to Recorded Knowledge, Information, and Creative Works

¶59Thesecondprincipleofthepubliclibraryethoscentersonaccesstoinfor-mation.TheFirstAmendmentandcopyrightbothfocusonprotectingandincen-tivizingthecreationanddisseminationofinformation.Librariesmakethistheoryarealitybymakingtheproductofcreationavailabletoallcitizens.

¶60Tofulfillthisfunction,librariesmustacquireandmakeinformationavail-ableinexpensively,broadly,andinasmanyformsandformatsaspossible.Librariesworktoremovebarriersofcost,space,prejudice,andculturesothatthegreatestnumberofpeoplehavethegreatestaccesstoasmuchgoodinformationaspossible.Thismeansmakingworksavailableforaminimalcost,offeringavarietyanddiver-sity of methods for accessing the works, and providing the works in a way thatdiversepatronsarecomfortableusing.Gasawaynotesinparticulartheimportanceoftherighttobrowseandsearchlargebodiesofinformation,100anabilitysignifi-cantly improved by digital search functions but often immediately disabled byrestrictivetermsofuse.

¶61Thisprincipleofaccesshasbeenexpressedinmostlibrarystatementsofpurposeaswell.ALA’sCoreValuesofLibrarianshipstate that“[a]ll informationresourcesthatareprovideddirectlyorindirectlybythelibrary,regardlessoftech-nology, format,ormethodsofdelivery, shouldbe readily, equally, andequitablyaccessibletoalllibraryusers.”101TheARL’sStatementofPrincipleshighlightsthevalue of access and the danger of its disappearance: “Each year, millions ofresearchers,students,andmembersofthepublicbenefitfromaccesstolibrarycol-lections...[t]helossoftheseprovisionsintheemerginginformationinfrastruc-ture would greatly harm scholarship, teaching, and the operations of a freesociety.”102

¶62Thisprincipletiesintomuchofcopyrightlaw,particularlyfairuseandthevalueofthepublicdomain.103Asnewtechnologycomestotheforeinlibraryprac-tice, TEACH also plays an important role in online instruction and reference.Copyright lawand librarypractice also intersect,not always comfortably, in thequestionofhowmuchaccessispermitted.Forlibrarians,theprincipleofaccessisaprincipleofunfetteredaccess.Librarianswanttogivetheirpatronsfullaccesstousematerialswhen,where,andhowtheywant,andoncethelibraryhaspaidthecontentowner,thisiswhatlibrariansexpect.

¶63 In licensing, however, this is hardly the norm. Licensing slices “access”alongnumerous lines and restrictspatrons fromaccessingcontent except at theprescribedtimeorintheprescribedmanner.Even“open”licensescanstillrestrictaccess.104Thisisaproblemfortheaccessprincipletoday,andastechnologyenables

100. Gasaway,supranote1,at122. 101. Core Values of Librarianship,supranote97. 102. Intellectual Property: An ARL Statement of Principles,supranote98. 103. Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 33, at 482 (“the societal benefits that justify a regimeofcopyrightrequirethat‘individualslearnfromthose[copyrighted]works,and[l]earningrequiresaccess to the work in which the ideas to be learned are embodied’”) (quoting Douglas L. Rogers,Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use—Analyzing the Google Litigation to Unleash Developing Countries,10tul. J. teCh. & intell. prop.1,11(2007))). 104. See Brad Frazer, Open Source Is Not Public Domain: Evolving Licensing Philosophies, 45idAho l. reV.349(2009).


evenmoresophisticatedformsofaccess,increasingthenumberofpeoplewhocantake advantage of the services in libraries, these problems can be expected toincrease.

¶64Librarianscanaddresssomeoftheseissuesthroughsavvylicensing.105Thismeans crafting agreements that permit access at all times regardless of place. Alicenseshouldalsopermitdiversepatronstotranslateoraltermaterialstoensuregreateraccess tonon-English speakers, thedisabled, andothers forwhomtradi-tionalaccessisinsufficient.

Learning in All Its Contexts

¶65Thethirdprincipleofthepubliclibraryethosdealswiththecivicnatureoflibraries.Thelearningenabledbylibrarypracticenotonlyservestheindividual,italso helps patrons better themselves and engage thoughtfully in the democraticprocess.

¶66 Libraries offer materials and instruction in a variety of contexts, fromteachingtechnicalskillsandpracticaljob-huntingtechniquestoinculcating“pro-fessional”middle-classvaluesandpractices.106Forthisreason,librarieshaveplayedavitalroleinsocialmobilityandtheintegrationofmarginalizedpopulationsintomainstreamsociety.

¶67Librariesalsoprovide free informationonsocialandpolitical issues thatinformsinterestedcitizensontheissuesoftheday.Theyhavebeendescribedas“amightyresourceinthefreemarketplaceofideas.”107Amateurinventors,proseliti-gants,aspiringwriters,andpatronslookingforthelatestpopularnovelallrelyonthe library tohelp themunderstandtheworldaroundthemandprepare for thefuture.Statementsofpurposeuniformlyexpressthisfunction.TheALAnotesthat“A democracy presupposes an informed citizenry. [Therefore], the publicly sup-portedlibraryprovidesfreeandequalaccesstoinformationforallpeopleofthecommunitythelibraryserves.”108

¶68Thisprinciple,whichGasawaydescribesasa“sharedintellectualresource,”109driveslibrariestoemphasizeusers’rightssuchasfairuseandtopushtoofferinfor-mationfrommanyperspectives,includingtheperspectivesofmultipleauthorsandtheresourcesofmultiplecompaniesandrightsholders.

¶69 In the context of licensing, this principle should encourage librarians toensuretheycanoffercompletematerialthatmeetsboththepracticalandabstractneedsoftheirpatrons.Onearticlehasproposedanewtheoryincontractlawwellsuited to this issue: “public interest unconscionability.”110 This theory would

105. See, e.g., Kristen M. Cichocki, Unlocking the Future of Public Libraries: Digital Licensing That Preserves Access,16u. bAlt. intell. prop. l.J.29(2007–2008). 106. See Elaine Fain, Books for New Citizens: Public Libraries and Americanization Programs,1900–1925,inthe Quest for soCiAl JustiCe255(RalphM.Adermaned.,1983)(examiningpubliclibraryservicesforimmigrantsintheearlytwentiethcentury). 107. Minarciniv.StrongsvilleCitySch.Dist.,541F.2d577,582(6thCir.1976). 108. Core Values of Librarianship,supranote97. 109. Gasaway,supranote1,at121. 110. J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 u. pA. l. reV. 875, 929(1999).


“empowercourtstocontrolnon-negotiabletermsconcerningaccessto,anduseof,computerized information that either party—licensors or licensees—seek toimposeon theotherwithoutany truemanifestationofassent.”111Breakingnewlegalgroundofthissortisintriguingbut,aswiththeproposedFirstAmendmentlimitationonlicensesthatremovefairusediscussedabove,unlikelytoemergeasarealsolutioninthenearterm.Instead, librariansmust licenseandacttoprotectthisrighttothebestoftheirability.

preservation of the human Record

¶70The fourthprincipleof thepublic libraryethos is less focusedonusers’rightsandmorefocusedonhistoricalandsocietalmemoryandreflection.Librariesseekoutandcollectworksbasedonqualityandvaluefortheirpatrons.Librariesalsosupportscholarlypublishingbypurchasingtheseworks.Indeed,manyuniver-sitypresses couldnot function ifuniversity librariesdidnotbuy their scholarlymonographs.112

¶71Librariesalsocuratethesecollections,preservingagingitems,maintainingdigitalfiles,andmakingsurethatworksstoredinobsoletetechnologicalformatsarenotlost.Thisworkentailsevaluatingmaterialsforqualityinlightofnewdevel-opmentsintherelevantfieldsandorganizingmaterialssotheycanbeeffectivelysearchedandretrieved.

¶72Onceagain,mainstreamlibraryorganizationshaveemphasizedthisprin-cipleintheirstatementsofpurpose.TheALA,forexample,hasstatedthat“[t]heAssociationsupportsthepreservationofinformationpublishedinallmediaandformats.Theassociationaffirmsthatthepreservationofinformationresourcesiscentraltolibrariesandlibrarianship.”113Obviously,thisprincipleiscloselytiedtothesection108exceptionsaswellastosection109’sfirstsaleprovisions.Retentionandanalysistendtobefairlystraightforwardincopyrightterms,butthecopyingandupdatingnecessary tokeepacollectionaheadof technologicalobsolescenceandphysicalordigitaldecaycanbeproblematic.

¶73Licensinggenerallymakes thisevenmoreproblematicbecause retentionitself isoftenprohibited.A licensedwork,afterall, ismadeavailableratherthanacquired.Assuch,licensedcollectionscandisappearduetotechnologicalmalfunc-tions,nonpaymentoffees,ordecisionsbythecontentowner.Similarly,theorga-nizationandcurationthatlibrariesdotomaximizethevalueofacollectionmaybeimpededbyrestrictionsonuse.

¶74Inresponse,librariansshouldfightforlicensesthatatleastpermitbackupcopies in case technological problems make legally obtained works unavailable.The larger issue of long-term preservation may require partnerships between

111. Id.at929. 112. Alfred L. Brophy, Mrs. Lincoln’s Lawyer’s Cat: The Future of Legal Scholarship, 39Conn. l. reV. ConntemplAtions 11, 19 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997845 (“[I]n thesedaysofdrastically reduced librarybudgetsandof shrinkingsubsidiesfromuniversitiesfortheirpresses,theeconomicsofpublishingarereallybeginningtohurtopportunitiesforpublishingscholarlymonographs....”). 113. Core Values of Librarianship,supranote97.


authors, publishers, and librarians. New models of practice such as institutionalrepositoriesarepromising,114butasyetfarfromreadytomeetthesechallenges.115

The Public Library Ethos in Practice: Streaming Video and E-Books

¶75Generallythepurposeofstreamingistoprovideaccessbeyondthewallsofthe library, soaccess isbasedonrelationshiporuser status, rather thanphysicallocation.ThisisinlinewithmostlicensesaswellastheboundariesestablishedbyTEACHandbyfairuse’spreferenceforlimiteddistribution.

Movies

¶76Several librarieshavebegunusingcommercial servicessuchasNetflix toofferstreamingmediaandhavewrittenopenlyaboutthispracticeasanewmodelfor librarianship.116 Despite the fact that legal scholars uniformly agree that thispracticeviolatestheNetflixtermsofservice,117librariesseemtoberespondingtopatrondemandinthiswayeitherintentionallyorbasedonmisunderstandingorignoranceofthelaw.LibrarianshavedescribedthewaythatservicessuchasNetflixcreate new expectations that carry over to library services. Netflix and similarmovie services create demand for services that are“personal, easy, fast, and veryconvenientforusers.”118

¶77Streamingiscurrentlydoneinavarietyofways,andpracticesdiffersignifi-cantlyfromlibrarytolibrary.Somelibrariesofferstreamingvideoonlytocomput-erswithinthelibraryortothoseverifiedaspartoftheinstitution’snetwork,suchaswithpasswordprotection.Othersstreammorewidely, toallcomputerswheretheusercanbeauthenticatedwithapasswordorstudentidentificationnumber.

¶78Asstreamingcontinuestobeoffered,thepubliclibraryethosshouldguidelibraries’ response to these “transformative, if disruptive, technologies.”119 UntilNetflixoracompetitoradoptssomeformofinstitutionallicense,librariescannotuse that service, but patron demands can be expected to drive libraries to offerstreaming video in some form. Streaming as part of education and instructionshouldbeguidedbyTEACHandfairuse,butusingstreamingvideotosupportthegeneralcollectionwillrequiresomelicensing,whetherthatcomesfromaNetflixsitelicenseoranotherservicealtogether.

114. On institutional repositories in general, see, e.g., rAym CroW, the CAse for institu-tionAl repositories: A spArC position pAper (2006), available at http://scholarship.utm.edu/20;CliffordA.Lynch,Institutional Repositories: Essential Infrastructure for Scholarship in the Digital Age,3portAl: libr. & ACAdemy327(2003). 115. See, e.g.,DorotheaSalo,Innkeeper at the Roach Motel,57libr. trends98(2008). 116. See, e.g., Ciara Healy, Netflix in an Academic Library: A Personal Case Study, 58 libr. trends402(2010). 117. See, e.g., Peter Hirtle, Using Netflix in a Library, librArylAW blog (Sept. 18, 2010),http://blog.librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2010/09/using-netflix-in-a-library.html. 118. Lori Bowen Ayre, Library Delivery 2.0: Delivering Library Materials in the Age of Netflix,libr. phil. & prAC.,Nov.2006,at1,http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/124. 119. Beth Posner, Library Resource Sharing in the Early Age of Google, libr. phil. & prAC.,June2007,at9,http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/123.


¶79Aslibrariesnegotiatethisproposedlicenseandestablishbestpractices,theyshouldbeguidedbythepubliclibraryethostohelpensurethattheirrulesandprac-ticesareconsistentwithlibraries’highestvaluesassociallyvaluableactorsdeservingof theirprivilegedposition incopyright law.Forexample, librarianscanserve thevalue of connecting people to information by streaming to ensure general, ratherthanlimited,access.Streamingthatservesbroadrepublicanaimsofbringinginfor-mation to the people means licensing that permits this. Streaming also supportsaggressiveapplicationof fairusewhendecidingwhereandhowtostreaminhar-monywith thepointsofconfluenceof librarypracticeand theCopyrightClause,bothofwhicharededicatedtopromotingexpressionandinnovation.

¶80Thevalueofunfetteredaccess,thesecondaspectofthepubliclibraryethos,isservedwhenlibrariesstreaminwaysthatallowallpatronstoviewandusefilmsregardlessoflimitationsbasedonlanguage,location,ordisability.Alibrarycouldworkexplicitlytolicensethatright,butwherealicenseissilent,aggressiveapplica-tionofTEACHandfairuse,bothofwhichexpresslyfavorstreamingmediaasthepreferredmethodofsharing,canalsorestorethisvalue.

¶81 Libraries can support the third value, learning in all of its contexts, bystreaming content that provides a “shared intellectual resource” for the civicaspectsofcitizenship.Licensesthatrecognizethatvaluemaybeuseful,butthisisanotherareawhereremovingcontractualroadblocksmaybesufficienttopermitaggressivefairusebylibraries.

¶82Finally,thelibrary’sroleinpreservingthehumanrecordmustbehonored.Streamingcontentis,byitsnature,shortterm,but licensescanbedesignedthatpermitbackupcopies to fill inwhenthesystemgoesdownorwhenthird-partydisputesovercontentmakeworkunavailable.120Long-termissueswithpreserva-tion must be addressed as well, although they are beyond the scope of librarypracticesincestreamedfilmsaredesignedtobetemporary.

e-Books

¶83 E-books are becoming an increasingly important part of library collec-tions.Althoughthe2009Ithakasurveyoffacultyreportedthat“despitethearrivalof devices like the Amazon Kindle . . . e-books have remained marginal toscholars,”121morethanthirtypercentofrespondentsreportedthate-bookswillbeimportant in their professional lives in five years.122 Numerous libraries havepilotede-bookprograms,123andlibrarianshavedonesignificantresearchonser-vicemodelsinthedigitalenvironment124andonpatrondemands.125

120. See, e.g., Ben Fritz, Warner Extends Delay on DVDs; Netflix Will Observe a 56-Day Wait Before Renting Discs; Redbox Says It Will Reject It,l.A. times,Jan.7,2012,atB1. 121. roger C. sChonfeld, fACulty surVey 2009: Key strAtegiC insights for librAries, publishers And soCieties 23 (2010), available at http://www.ithaka.org/ithaka-s-r/research/faculty-surveys-2000-2009/Faculty%20Study%202009.pdf. 122. Id. 123. See, e.g., Dennis Dillon, E-Books: The University of Texas Experience, Part 1, 19 libr. hi teCh113(2001);MarcLangston,The California State University E-Book Pilot Project: Implications for Cooperative Collection Development,27libr. ColleCtions, ACQuisitions, & teCh. serVs.19(2003). 124. See, e.g., Ronald Jantz, E-Books and New Library Service Models: An Analysis of the Impact of E-Book Technology on Academic Libraries,20info. teCh. & libr.104(2001). 125. See, e.g., Wendy Allen Shelburne, E-Book Usage in an Academic Library: User Attitudes and Behaviors,33libr. ColleCtions, ACQuisitions, & teCh. serVs.59(2009).


¶84 So far, patrons in academic libraries have not yet widely embracede-books.126Thisreflectssomepatronfrustration,particularlywithformatissues,127andthefactthate-bookshavegenerallyincludedsignificantdigitalrightsmanage-ment(DRM)128restrictionsthatcrippletheusesthatpatronsexpect.129Nevertheless,e-booksappeartobeanewmediumthatisgainingtraction.130

¶85 Though the practice of lending e-books is currently in its infancy, somecommon procedures have begun to develop. Most libraries lend a digital copyonlinethatreplicatesthequalitiesofaphysicalbook.Apatrondownloadsthecopytohiscomputer,e-reader,orotherdevice,andthatcopycannotbesharedormovedtoanotherdevicewhilethepatronhasit.Attheendoftheprescribedborrowingperiod,thecopyautomaticallydisappearsfromtheuser’sdevice.Librariesthem-selvesbuymultiple“copies”ofthework,sothatonlyasmanypatronscanusetheworkatatimeasthelibraryhaspurchasedcopies.

¶86RebeccaTushnetdiscussesthisreplicationofthephysical-bookmodelasanimportantdisconnect between libraries,patrons, andpublishers. Sheargues thatpublishersinthisarenahavefailedtodowhatNetflixhasdoneinthepastfewyears:offer service that exceeds the value of physical copies.“The real problem [withe-books],” Tushnet writes,“is that [the publisher’s] argument [for DRM] is liketellingadoctorthatdiseaseanddeatharepartofthehumanconditionandthere-foretobereplicated,notreduced,byanynewtreatments.Permanenceisthepointanddeteriorationistheenemy.”131

¶87Recenteffortstorecognizethisissueandimprovetheexperienceofusinge-booksmaybemoresuccessful.Recently,e-bookshavebeendesignedtointerfacedigitallywithlibraries,availableto“checkout”onlineanddisappearingfromthee-readeroncethee-bookisdue.Someuniversitieshavebegunreplacingphysicaltextbookswithdigitalversions,132arguablythebestcandidatefore-bookdeploy-ment.Theriseofpopulare-readerssuchasAmazon’sKindleandBarnes&Noble’sNookmayalsoofferusersamodelthatshowcasesthevalueofe-books.AmazoninparticularhasreleasedapplicationsfortheKindletomimiclibrarylendingfunc-tions, suggesting that technology may help bridge the divide between publishersandpatrons.133

126. See Alanna Jenkins, What Is Inhibiting the Proliferation of E-Books in the Academic Library?, 1 sCroll 1 (2008), http://fdt.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/fdt/article/view/4905; SarahThomson & Steve Sharp, E-Books in Academic Libraries: Lessons Learned and New Challenges, 22seriAls136(2009). 127. Tushar Rae, E-Books’ Varied Formats Make Citations a Mess for Scholars, Chron. higher eduC.(Feb.6,2011),http://chronicle.com/article/E-Books-Varied-Formats-Make/126246. 128. For a definition and discussion of DRM, see Kristin Brown, Comment, Digital Rights Management: Trafficking in Technology That Can Be Used to Circumvent the Intellectual Property Clause,40hous. l. reV.803,816(2003). 129. Jenkins,supranote126,at3. 130. See, e.g., Steve Kastenbaum, Ebook Lending: Libraries Go Digital, Cnn.Com (Oct. 26,2011),http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/26/living/digital-libraries/index.html. 131. Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institutions in a Peer-to-Peer World,53uClA l. reV.977,1023(2006). 132. Jeffrey R. Young, To Save Students Money, Colleges May Force a Switch to E-Textbooks,Chron. higher eduC. (Oct. 24, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/The-End-of-the-Textbook-as-We/125044. 133. See Steven Matthews, Stepping Stone in E-Book Lending?, slAW (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.slaw.ca/2010/11/04/stepping-stone-in-e-book-lending.


¶88Librarieshavestartedto lende-readers loadedwithbooks,and,as isthecase with Netflix, the practice is currently outpacing legal agreements, placinglibrariesonuncertain,perhapsevenperilous,legalfooting.Licensesmustbedevel-oped and best practices must emerge to govern this activity. As with streamingmedia, however, librarians must develop their efforts to incorporate e-booksaroundthepubliclibraryethos.

¶89First,libraryvaluesrelatedtoconnectingpeopletoideasshouldberetainedwithprovisionsfortheeducationalanddevelopmentalneedsofpatrons.Thismaymeanstrategiclicensing,particularlywithvendorstargetingtheacademicmarket.

¶90Second,unfetteredaccesstorecordedknowledge,information,andcreativeworksmustbeprotected.RebeccaTushnet’sdiscussionaboutreplicatingtheflawsofphysicaldocumentsisespeciallygermanehere.Librarypracticeshouldpushtheaccessprinciplebutshouldalsobetailoredtothespecificissuesofe-books.Unlikestreaming movies, e-books are aimed at providing individual access rather thanongoing availability. Because of this, issues center around formats, translations,andaccommodationsfordifferentlyabledpatrons,suchastherecentexemptiongivenforcircumventionbyvisuallyimpaireduserstoenableread-aloudandspe-cializedformatfunctionality.134

¶91 Activities that protect learning in all its contexts, the third value of thepubliclibraryethos,mustalsobeprotected.Thiscivicvalueimplicateslicensinginwayssimilartothoseforstreamingmedia.Thecontroversyoverthird-partymoni-toringraisesprivacyconcernsthatrunthroughoutthesharednatureof licensedcontent.135

¶92Finally,thefourthvalue,preservationofthehumanrecord,mustalsobeguarded with particular vigilance, given recent bad actions. The ironic case ofAmazon’sremovingGeorgeOrwell’s1984aftercustomershadpurchaseditindi-catestheparticulardifficultiesofpreservationinthecontextofe-books.136Aslongaslibrariesarepiggybackingongenerallyavailabletechnology,theywillstruggletocurate works properly.As e-book vendors begin to offer specialized library ver-sions, licenses must find a way to protect these values, either within individuallibrariesorcollectivelyacrossconsortiaandtheprofession.

134. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention, 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(a) (2010) (“The pro-hibitionagainstcircumventionoftechnologicalmeasuresthatcontrolaccesstocopyrightedworkssetforthin17U.S.C.1201(a)(1)(A)shallnotapplyto....[l]iteraryworksdistributedinebookformatwhenallexistingebookeditionsof thework . . .containaccesscontrols thatpreventtheenablingeitherofthebook’sread-aloudfunctionorofscreenreadersthatrenderthetextintoaspecializedformat.”). 135. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Amazon Spying on Your Ebook Highlighting, teChdirt (May 11,2010,2:53p.m.),http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100511/1018059377.shtml. 136. KenFisher,Why Amazon Went Big Brother on Some Kindle E-Books,Ars teChniCA(July17,2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/amazon-sold-pirated-books-raided-some-kindles.ars.


Conclusion

¶93Fairuse is likeamuscle:137 ifnotused it atrophies,butwhenvigorouslyexercised it grows more powerful. James Gibson’s discussion of doctrinal feed-back138 suggests theways thatcopyright lawfor librarypractice followsasimilarprincipleofuse-it-or-lose-it.Afteradecadeofatrophy, librarycopyright is inertandflabby.Librariansneedtoflexthesemusclesforthegoodoftheprofessionandsocietyasawhole,buttheymustdosoresponsibly.

¶94Negotiating licenseagreements inharmonywith thepublic libraryethoscanhelptoensurethatcorelibraryvaluesarenotlostinthedigitalenvironment.Designing practice based on the public library ethos can empower librarians toaggressivelyasserttheirrightsinawaythatmaximizesthepublicvaluesattheheartof copyright law. By focusing on the shared mission of library practice and theCopyrightClause,librarianscanmakedecisionsthathonorbothvaluesaswellasreinvigoratinglibraries’rightsandtheirplaceattheheartofAmericanintellectualandculturallife.

137. pAtriCiA Aufderheide & peter JAszi, untold stories: CreAtiVe ConseQuenCes of the rights CleArAnCe Culture for doCumentAry filmmAKers 28 (2004), available at http://centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf. 138. Gibson,supranote91.

219


Resource-Based Learning and Course Design: A Brief Theoretical Overview and Practical Suggestions*

Margaret Butler**

Ms. Butler argues that librarians teaching legal research should follow resource-based learning pedagogical strategies. Her article provides a background in constructivist educational theory and resource-based learning before identifying useful instruc-tional strategies regarding course design decisions related to goal setting, assignments, rubrics, and assessment.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219Resource-BasedLearning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221Problem-BasedLearning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223DevelopingMetacognitiveSkills. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224InstructionalStrategies:QuestioningStudentsandScaffolding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225BuildingSchematatoMaximizeWorkingMemory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229BenefitsofResource-BasedLearning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232CourseDesignDecisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

SettingGoals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234InstructionalStrategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

Assignments,Rubrics,andAssessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240Rubrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Introduction

¶1Thebestmethodology for teaching students legal research is a subjectofdebatewithinthelawlibrariancommunity.1Thoughthedebateexistedbeforethecurrent push in legal education to improve law students’ practical and ethical

* ©MargaretButler,2012.Thisisarevisedversionofthewinningentryinthenewmemberdivisionofthe2011AALL/LexisNexisCallforPaperscompetition.Thearticlewaspresentedatthe2010BoulderConferenceonLegalInformation:ScholarshipandTeaching,andIwouldliketothanktheconferenceparticipantsfortheirfeedbackandsupportindraftingit. ** Associate Director for Public Services, Georgia State University College of Law Library,Atlanta,Georgia. 1. Forahistoryofthedebate,seePaulD.Callister,Beyond Training: Law Librarianship’s Quest for the Pedagogy of Legal Research Education,95lAW libr. J.7,8–9,2003lAW libr. J.1,¶4.


understandingsofthelaw,2lawlibrarians’analysisofthebestwaystoteachlegalresearchisseeingmoreprominence.3Likelawprofessors,however,lawlibrariansdo not generally have pedagogical training.4 Most pedagogical training for lawlibrarianscomesintheformofon-the-jobtraining,presentationsatprofessionalconferences,5andprofessionalliterature.

¶2Althoughsomepeoplemaybedescribedas“natural teachers,” thatgift israre.Butteacherscanbetrainedinthemechanicsofteaching,ultimatelyimprov-ing the education delivered.6 Through training, teachers may learn to considerinstructional,orpedagogical,theoryastheydeveloptheircourses.KristinGerdyhassuggestedthatadultlearningtheory—thelearningtheoryrelevanttolawstu-dents,ratherthanelementaryschoolstudents—shouldbeconsideredinthedevel-opmentoflegalresearchcourses.7

¶3Adultlearnerssharesometraitsthatshouldbeconsideredwhendesigningacourse.First,adultlearnersareabletochooseoptionsthatbestsuittheirlearningneeds.8Whenpreparinglessonsforadultlearners,instructorsshouldbrieflypro-videanoverviewandcontext,andsummarizethe“bigpicture”forstudents—this

2. The MacCrate Report and the Carnegie Report both represent efforts to improve legaleducation.Am. bAr Ass’n, seCtion of legAl eduC. & Admissions to the bAr, legAl eduCAtion And professionAl deVelopment—An eduCAtionAl Continuum: report of the tAsK forCe on lAW sChools And the profession: nArroWing the gAp(1992)[hereinaftermACCrAte report];WilliAm m. sulliVAn et Al., eduCAting lAWyers: prepArAtion for the profession of lAW(2007)(CarnegieReport).Thoughnotasadirect resultof those reports, the law librariancommunityhasengagedin conversation about the best way to teach legal research, through debates around bibliographicinstructionandprocess(theBerringandWrendebate)aswellasothertopics.Recently,theBerringandWrendebatewasrevisitedbyBerring:“Almost20yearslater,onemightwonderwhatallthefusswasabout.Inhindsight,theWrensespousedamoreimportantroleforlegalresearchtrainingandtheyfeltitwasbestdoneinanenvironmentwherethestudentwaslearninghowtousetheresearchtools.”RobertC.(Bob)BerringJr.,Twenty Years On: The Debate over Legal Research Instruction,17perspeCtiVes: teAChing legAl reseArCh And Writing1,3(2008). 3. The annual Conference on Legal Information: Scholarship and Teaching, which beganin 2009, is the product of a discussion among librarians about legal information scholarship andinstruction,lookingtowardthedevelopmentofa“theoreticalfoundationofasignaturepedagogyforlegalresearcheducation.”ConferenceonLegalInformation:ScholarshipandTeaching,TheBoulderStatement on Legal Research Education (June 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available athttp://www.colorado.edu/law/events/legalResearchEducation.pdf. The conversation was broadenedbeyondBoulderConferenceparticipantsthroughprogramsattheAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanAssociationofLawLibraries(AALL)in2009and2010. 4. Jobpostingsforacademicreferencelibrarians(whoaregenerallythelibrariansinvolvedinteachinglegalresearch)typicallyrequireaJ.D.degreeaswellasadegreeinlibraryorinformationsci-ence.Degreesineducation(foreitherchildoradultlearners)arenotmentionedinthesejobpostings,andarenotgenerallyrequiredoflibrarianinstructors.See generallyEmployment Opportunities,lAW librAriAn blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/law_librarian_blog/employment_opportunties/(lastvisitedDec.21,2011). 5. TheAALLAnnualMeetingusuallyprovidesseveraltracksofprograms,basedoncompeten-cies,oneofwhichisteaching.See, e.g.,Program Track: Teaching,2011 AAll AnnuAl meeting And ConferenCe,http://aall11.sched.org/subject/Teaching(lastvisitedJan.30,2012). 6. ElizabethGreen,Can Good Teaching Be Learned?,n.y. times,Mar.7,2010,§MM(Magazine),at30. 7. Kristin B. Gerdy, Making the Connection: Learning Style Theory and Legal Research Curriculum,19legAl referenCe serViCes Q.nos.3/4,2001,at71,73–77. 8. Id.at74.

221ReSOURCe-BASed LeARNINg ANd COURSe deSIgNVol. 104:2 [2012-19]

enablesstudents to learnexperientially.Many law librarianshavenotedthatstu-dent interest in “real world” questions is very high;9 this interest is importantbecausestudentslearnbestwhentheyseetherelevanceoftheresearchtothetaskstheyknowtheywillbeexpectedtoperform,whetherassummerassociates,interns,orpracticingattorneys.Accordingly,agoodlegalresearchinstructorshouldcon-textualize legal research and allow students to learn by using legal researchresources—whetherelectronicorprint—toanswerquestions,sostudentscandrawtheirownconclusionsabouttherelevanceorutilityoftheinformationpresentedbytheteacher.

¶4Inotherwords,legalresearchstudentswillbenefitfromaresource-basedora problem-based approach to teaching. These approaches, which are discussedmorefullybelow,requirestudentstoengagewithresources,suchasprimaryandsecondarylegalsources,andproblemstolearntoconductlegalresearch.Buttheseapproachestoteaching,bythemselves,arenotallthatinstructorsshouldconsiderwhen seeking to improve their teaching skills. Teaching strategies; course designdecisions;andassignments,rubrics,andassessmentplansmustbeconsideredwhenonehopestoimproveone’steaching.Thisarticleaddressesthepedagogicalbenefitsofresource-basedandproblem-basedlearninginthelegalresearchclassroomandoffers theoreticalandpractical suggestions forcoursedesigndecisions, includingthe use of teaching strategies, the development of assignments, the benefits ofrubrics,andassessmenttechniques.

Resource-Based Learning

¶5 In the resource-based learning model described in British academic legalliterature,teachersmustpay“carefulattentiontopedagogy,includinglearningout-comestobeachievedbystudentsfromtheprojectandmethodsoffeedback.”10Inthismodel,“studentslearnbyusingresources,”11withinformationandcommuni-cationstechnology“usedtosupportlearninginmoreflexibleways.”12Thelanguageof“resource-basedlearning”andresource-basedlearningasapedagogicalapproacharealsousedintheUnitedStates,thoughnotusuallyinlaw-specificcontexts.13

¶6Resource-basedlearningapproacheshavegreatpotentialtobehelpfulnotonlyinresearchcoursesinwhichstudentsareaskedtoconsiderchallengingprob-lems, but also in clinical work and other project-based law school coursework.“Resource-basedlearninginvolvesestablishingcontextsfor,toolsforactingonandwith,andscaffoldstoguidethedifferentiatedinterpretation,use,andunderstand-ingofresourcesinwaysthatareconsistentwiththeepistemology,foundations,andassumptions of a given learning model.”14“[R]esource-based learning is a peda-

9. Id.at76–77. 10. PaulMaharg&AbdulPaliwala,Negotiating the Learning Process with Electronic Resources,ineffeCtiVe leArning And teAChing in lAW81,84(R.Burridgeetal.eds.,2002). 11. Id.at82. 12. Id.at83. 13. Forexample,a search inHeinOnline’sLawJournalLibrary for“resource-based learning” OR “resource based learning”returnedonlyfiveresults. 14. MichaelJ.Hannafin&JanetteR.Hill,Resource-Based Learning,inhAndbooK of reseArCh on eduCAtionAl CommuniCAtions And teChnology525,528(J.MichaelSpectoretal.eds.,3ded.2008).


gogical approach associated with inquiry- and project-based learning in which[students work with]‘a wide range of learning resources rather than from classexposition.’”15

¶7 Resource-based learning presents an attractive pedagogical approach forteaching legal research for several reasons. First, resource-based learning lendsitselftovirtuallearning,anditisoftenassociatedwithdistanceorvirtuallearningineducationalliterature.16Althoughlawschoolaccreditationruleslimitthewaysin which law schools may implement distance education,17 many law schoolcoursescontainsomevirtualcomponentsiftheyuseTWEN,BlackBoard,orotherwebcoursetechnology.18Resource-basedlearningalsomaybeusedwithavarietyofepistemologicalmodels,ormodelsofpeoples’waysofknowing.19Inparticular,those who oppose the“banking model” of education, in which an all-knowingteacherstandsatthefrontoftheroomand“datadumps”knowledgeintoawaiting(empty) student minds,20 may find resource-based learning appealing, as it “isunderlain by the philosophical assumption that allowing the learner to achievelearningoutcomesinamoreflexibleandindependentmannerisinherentlybetterthanthetraditionallearningmethodology,epitomizedbythe‘banking’conceptofeducationcriticizedby[Paolo]Freire.”21

15. BarbaraA.Greene&SusanM.Land,A Qualitative Analysis of Scaffolding Use in a Resource-Based Learning Environment Involving the World Wide Web, 23 J. eduC. Computing res. 151, 152(2000)(quotingG.C.Rakes,Using the Internet as a Tool in a Resource-Based Learning Environment,36eduC. teCh.52,52(1996)). 16. See steVe ryAn et Al., the VirtuAl uniVersity: the internet And resourCe-bAsed leArning(2000).Becauseofthecorrespondencebetweenresource-basedlearningmaterialsandvir-tualoronlinelearningmaterials,someoftheteachingapproachessuggestedhereareadaptedfrommaterialsthataddressthedevelopmentorteachingofonlineorvirtualcourses. 17. SeeAm. bAr Ass’n, stAndArds And rules of proCedure for ApproVAl of lAW sChools27–28(2011–2012)(Standard306)(requiringdistanceeducationcourses tobeapprovedusing thesameprocessastraditionalcoursesandlimitingstudentstonomorethanfourcredithoursperterm,foramaximumof twelvecredithours,withdistance learning functionallyprohibited in the first-yearcurriculum). 18. FeaturesavailablewithinWestlaw’sTWENsystemincludepolling,onlinediscussionforums,wikipages, anelectronicgradebook,and theability topost filesandexternal links, allowing stu-dentstoaccesspodcastsandexternalvideocontent.AdministrAtor’s guide to tWen,(Aug.2011),available at http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/documentation/2011/adminiguide2011.pdf. The features available through LexisNexis Web Courses include online discussion forums,chat,anonymousgrading,andtheabilitytoaddfilesandexternallinks,allowingstudentstoaccesspodcasts and external video content. instruCtor’s QuiCKguide: lexisnexis Web Courses (2009),available athttp://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/LawSchoolTutorials/20090824041047_small.pdf. 19. Hannafin&Hill,supranote14,at528. 20. A less inflammatory description of this type of teaching would be direct instruction.Teachingmayinvolveavarietyofapproaches,soaconstructivistmightspendfivetosevenminutesofdirectinstructionteachingamini-lessononanarrowtopic,possiblyinresponsetoastudentques-tion;butthebankingmodelofeducationsuggeststhatthebulkoflearningshouldbedonebydirectinstruction. 21. Bernard Lisewski & Chris Settle, Integrating Multimedia Resource-Based Learning into the Curriculum,inresourCe-bAsed leArning109(SallyBrown&BrendaSmitheds.,1996).PaoloFreireisperhapsbestknownforPedagogy of the Oppressed,abriefbutcompellingworkaddressingtheroleofpowerintheclassroom.pAolo freire, pedAgogy of the oppressed(30thanniv.ed.2007).


¶8Resource-basedlearningisonetypeofconstructivistpedagogicaltheory.22Constructivismhas,atitsbase,theassumptionthat“Knowledgeisnottransmitted:itisconstructed.”23Withinconstructionistschools,thereareindividualconstruc-tivists and social constructivists. The individual constructivists generally believethat“Learning results fromapersonal interpretationofknowledge,”while socialconstructivistsgenerallyholdthat“Learningiscollaborativewithmeaningnegoti-atedfrommultipleperspectives.”24Someconstructivistswouldaddanelementofcontextualismtotheirphilosophy,recommending“presentingproblemsinsitua-tionsthatarerealistictolearnersandcommontoeverydayapplicationsofknowl-edge,”thusprovidingstudentswithopportunitiesfor“authenticlearning.”25

¶9Understandingconstructivist theory, itsunderlyingprinciples, andhow itrelatestoresource-basedlearningmayhelpinstructorsincreating,planning,andteaching a course. Resource-based learning may be described as a constructivistapproachincorporatingvaluableinstructionalstrategiesthatshouldbeconsideredintheprofessionaldiscussionofthedevelopmentofapedagogyoflegalresearch.26

Problem-Based Learning

¶10Problem-basedlearningissimilartoresource-basedlearning.Inproblem-basedlearning,“studentsworkinsmallcollaborativegroupsandlearnwhattheyneedtoknowinordertosolveaproblem.Theteacheractsasafacilitatortoguidestudentsthroughthelearningcycle.”27Problem-basedlearningoriginatedinmedi-cal education, though ithasbeenadoptedbyother fields.28Both resource-based

22. Thisarticleis,at least inpart,aresponsetoPaulCallister’scallforincreaseddiscussionofpedagogical theories in lawlibrarianprofessional literature.SeeCallister,supranote1.AsnotedbyNolanWright,however,“fewhavetakenuphiscallandrespondedinscholarlywritingsoftheirown....illustrat[ing]thebasisforthisauthor’sconcernaboutthelackofpubliclyairedscholarlydialoguewithin the profession, let alone between the profession and other disciplines.” Nolan L. Wright,Standing at the Gates: A New Law Librarian Wonders About the Future Role of the Profession in Legal Research Education,27legAl referenCe serViCes Q.305,322–23(2008).Perhapspartofthereasonthattheliteratureismoreheavilyweightedtowardscholarshipdescribingparticularteachingchoicesatparticularinstitutions,ratherthantowardadiscussionbasedinpedagogicaltheory,isthatlibrar-ians—evenlawlibrarians—arenotgenerallytrainedinpedagogicaltheory.SeePaulD.Callister,Time to Blossom: An Inquiry into Bloom’s Taxonomy as a Means to Ordered Legal Research Skills,102lAW libr. J.191,194–95,2010lAW libr. J.12,¶¶8–9. 23. pAtriCiA l. smith & tillmAn J. rAgAn, instruCtionAl design15(2ded.1999). 24. Id. 25. Id.at16. 26. Indescribingapedagogicalmodelforlegalresearch,Callistersuggests

thatacompletemodelrequires(1)anidentifiableandfullyunderstoodobjectiveinteachinglegalresearch(whichobjectivemustdistinguishbetweenthekindsofresearchdonebyattorneys,schol-ars,andlibrarians);(2)atheoryandunderstandingofthenatureoflegalsourcematerials(whichcontemplates changes in volume, accessibility,“gestalt,” etc.); (3) a theory of mathetics, or thenatureofstudentsandhowtheylearn(withemphasisontheprovisionofconceptualmodelsforinternalizingresearchtechniques);and(4)amethodologyconsistentwiththepreviouselements.

Callister,supranote1,at8–9,¶4. 27. CindyE.Hmelo-Silver,Problem-Based Learning: What and How Do Students Learn?,16eduC. psyChol. reV.235,236(2004). 28. Whenstudentsenter themedical school theyaredivided intogroupsof fiveandeachgroup is

assignedafacilitator.Thestudentsarethenpresentedaproblemintheformofapatiententeringwithpresentingsymptoms.Thestudents’taskistodiagnosethepatientandbeabletoprovidearationaleforthatdiagnosisandrecommendedtreatment.

John r. sAVery & thomAs m. duffy, problem-bAsed leArning: An instruCtionAl model And its


andproblem-based learningrelyonstudentexperienceas the locusof learning,treating the teacherasa facilitator, thoughproblem-based learningoftenhasanadditionalexpectationthatstudentsareworkingcollaboratively,ratherthanindi-vidually.29Problem-basedlearningfocusesonthedevelopmentofcriticalthinkingskills,30makingitatemptingpedagogicalapproachinthelegalresearchcontext.However,itisextremelytimeintensiveanddoesnotlenditselftoeasyuseinafirst-yearlegalresearchcourse.31

¶11 For problem-based learning to be effective, the problems generated andusedininstructionshouldmeetseveralcriteria:problemsshouldbecomplexandpresentopen-endedquestions,andtheyshould“berealisticandresonatewiththestudents’experiences”whilealsopresentingstudentswithopportunitiestoevalu-atetheirknowledgeandtheirapproachtotheproblem.32Bydefinition,aneffectiveproblemraisesstudentinterestinthesubjectmatterandengagesstudentswiththeinformationnecessarytosolvetheproblemaswellaswithproblem-solvingstrate-gies. The problem-based learning approach may be particularly successful in anadulteducationcontextbecausetherealisticnatureoftheproblemsservestomoti-vatestudents.

Developing Metacognitive Skills

¶12TheMacCrateandCarnegieReportsbothcallforthedevelopmentoflaw-yeringskillsandvalues.33Resource-basedlearning,aswellasproblem-basedlearn-ing,totheextentthattheycanbeimplementedinalawschoolsetting,canbeusedto advance students’ ability to become effective problem solvers, employing thetoolsthattheywillultimatelyworkwithinpracticeastheydeveloptheskillsneces-sarytoapproachaclient’sproblemfromalegalperspective.Usingresourcesandhypothetical problems can provide instructors with the opportunity, as well, toengagestudentsindialogueabouttheirprofessionalresponsibilitiestoclients.Forexample,aninstructormaymakeanethicalquestionabouttherepresentationofaclient’sintereststhebasisforbotharesearchproblemaboutthestate’sadministra-

ConstruCtiVist frAmeWorK7(Ctr.forRes.onLearningandTech.,Tech.Rep.No.16-01,2001). 29. Hmelo-Silver,supranote27,at239. 30. Id.Aninstructionalstrategythatmightbehelpfulwouldbe“discussingproblemsina[prob-lem-basedlearning]group(beforebeginningtoresearchlearningissues)[to]activate[]relevantpriorknowledgeandfacilitate[]theprocessingofnewinformation.Studentsarebetterabletoconstructnewknowledgewhentheycanrelateittowhattheyalreadyknow.”Id.(citationsomitted). 31. Problemsinthemedicaleducationalcontextmaylastfromonetothreeweeks,andstudentsaretaughtusingproblem-basedlearningfortwoyears.sAVery & duffy,supranote28,at10.Legalresearchcourses,whentheyareseparatefromlegalwritingcourses,areoftenlimitedtoonecredit,whichmeanslawstudentshaveonly700minutesofclasstime,asrequiredunderABAaccreditationstandards.Am. bAr Ass’n,supranote17,at23(Interpretation304-4). 32. Hmelo-Silver,supranote27,at244. 33. TheMacCrateReport identifiesparticular skills andvalues that are integral to lawyering.mACCrAte report,supranote2,at138–41.And,astheCarnegieReportindicates,“‘Studentscannotbecomeeffectivelegalproblem-solversunlesstheyhaveopportunitiestoengageinproblem-solvingactivities inhypotheticalor real legal contexts.’”sulliVAn et Al., supranote2, at95 (quotingroy stuCKey et Al., best prACtiCes for legAl eduCAtion109(2007)).


tivelawandauthorityregulatinglawyers,andatheoreticalquestionaboutlawyers’professionalresponsibilitiestozealouslyrepresenttheirclient’sinterests.

¶13Bothproblem-andresearch-basedlearningmotivatestudentsbyprovidingthemwithreal-life,oratleastrealistic,problems.34Legalresearchinstructionmustpreparestudentstocontinuelearning,evenaftertherequiredlegalresearchcourseiscompleted.35Thedevelopmentofmetacognitiveskills,definedas“executivecon-trol process of planning one’s problem solving, monitoring one’s progress, andevaluatingwhetherone’sgoalshavebeenmet,”36 is a critical function fora legalresearcher.37 Callister notes that“the final skill is meta-cognition—the ability toassess,notonlytheresult,buttheschemata,includingtheprocessesleadingtotheresult. It is a kind of self-awareness and reflection of the research experience.”38Bothproblem-basedandresource-basedlearningencouragestudentstodevelopanawarenessoftheresearchprocessastheymayencounteritinprofessionalpractice.Theabilityof a researcher toexplainhowananswerwas reached—forexample,whyoneresourcewaspreferable—ratherthansimplystatingtheanswerisacriticalmetacognitivetaskdevelopedinresource-basedandproblem-basedlearning.

Instructional Strategies: Questioning Students and Scaffolding

¶14Inboththeresource-basedandtheproblem-basedlearningenvironments,theteacherplaystheroleoffacilitator,modelingappropriatebehaviorforstudentsand guiding students to use learning or instructional strategies such as thinkingaloudwhengeneratinga listof indexorsearchtermsrelatedtoaresearchprob-lem.39 This process of thinking aloud develops students’ metacognition when

34. Hmelo-Silver,supranote27,at236(discussingproblem-basedlearning).ShawnG.NeversandDavidArmondhavedescribedthevaluetheyhavefoundincreatingaPractitioners’Council,asitconnects“realworld”researchingpractitionerswithlegalresearchinstructors,allowingforbettermotivation of students. Shawn G. Nevers & DavidArmond, The Practitioners’ Council: Connecting Legal Research Instruction and Current Legal Research Practice,103lAW libr. J.575,593–94,2011lAW libr. J.36,¶¶68–70. 35. When researching, whether as students or attorneys, motivation to address a researchquestionmaybeeither internal—curiosityor self-interest—orexternal—aclientquestion,aboss’sdemand for an answer, an ethical obligation, etc. Most important is that the researcher performadequatelyregardlessofmotivation.Studentsinlegalresearchclassesmaybemotivatedbylearningoftherisksofmalpracticeforfailuretoperformadequatelegalresearch. 36. Hmelo-Silver,supranote27,at240. 37. SeeKristinaL.Niedringhaus,Teaching Better Research Skills by Teaching Metacognitive Ability,18perspeCtiVes: teAChing legAl res. & Writing113,115(2010)(“Astudentwhoismetacognitivelyawarewillbebetterabletoassesswhatknowledgetheyhavenotlearnedthoroughly.Thesestudentswillbeabletodevelopaplanforrelearningthematerialusingtechniquesthatspeaktotheirpreferredmethodsoflearning.Thesestudents,byreflectingonwhattheyhavelearnedandfillingthegaps,willnotonlybebetterstudentsbutwillbeabletocontributemorefullytotheclassroomexperience.”). 38. Callister,supranote22,at210,¶39.See alsoKristinB.Gerdy,Teacher, Coach, Cheerleader, and Judge: Promoting Learning Through Learner-Centered Assessment,94lAW libr. J.59,64,2002lAW libr. J.4,¶21(notingthattocompletethelearningcycle,“learnersandteachersmustassessandevaluatethe learningthathasoccurred”;withoutthismetacognitivestep, learnersarenotas likelytoretaintheirlearning). 39. Greene&Land,supranote15,at153.TheCarnegieReportstatesthatexpertteachersmay“advancedialogue”intheirclassrooms“bymakingcognitionvisible”throughmodeling.sulliVAn et Al.,supranote2,at61.


addressingtheresearchproblem.Withininstructionalliterature,scaffoldingisusedtodescribe“instructionalproceduresdesignedtosupport learningsothatastu-dentcanimprovebeyondhisorhercurrentlevelofunderstandingwithguidancefromapeer,teacher,orinstructionalaid.”40Aninstructormayprovideproceduralscaffoldsintheformofguidingquestionsforstudentstoconsiderastheyapproachaproblem.41Inalegalresearchcourse,suchquestionsmayencouragestudentstoreflectonwhytheychosetoconsultaprimaryresource,ratherthanasecondaryresource.Anotherexampleofscaffoldingintheclassroomwouldbewhenaclasssolves a problem as a whole group, perhaps with the instructor thinking aloudthroughtheproblem;theclassthengoesontosolveanewproblemwithasimilarstructure.Thesimilarityoftheproblemsandtheopportunitiesforcollaborationarescaffolding—opportunitiesforstudentstoapplytheirknowledgeabouthowtosolveoneproblemtoanotherproblem.

¶15Instructorsmayusedifferentstrategiesofquestioningstudentstoscaffoldstudentlearning.42Ahistoricalreviewofquestioningintheclassroomnotedtheimportanceofquestioninginteaching.Theauthorexplainedthattheteacherhasbeencalled“‘aprofessionalquestionmaker’andclaimedthattheaskingofques-tionsis‘oneofthebasicwaysbywhichtheteachersimulatesstudentthinkingandlearning.’”43

¶16 Many in the law librarian community are familiar with the questioningformatknownas theSocraticmethod, inwhich“the teacherasks students forapositiononanissue,thenasksappropriatefollow-upquestionstoprobethestu-dent’sposition.”44Ofcourse, in theSocraticmethod,“the teacherhas the‘right’answeranditisthestudent’stasktoguess/deducethroughlogicalquestioningthatcorrectanswer.”45Thenotionthattheteacherhasthe“right”answerandisquery-ingstudentstoguidethemlogically46tothatrightanswerisinconsistentwiththe“teacherasfacilitator”modelofbothresource-basedandproblem-basedlearning.Underthosetheories,instructorquestioningshouldpushstudentstothe“leadingedge”oftheirthinking.47However,asCallisterhassuggested,Socraticquestioningmayhaveaplaceinthelegalresearchclassroom,becauseitmayforcethelearnerto examine her own frameworks for how she understands and solves problems.“[T]heSocraticmethodisanappropriateandperhapsevennecessarytooltofacili-tate the learning experience of law students studying legal research.”48 In otherwords,theSocraticmethodmaybeusedtohelpstudentsengageinmetacognition,

40. Greene&Land,supranote15,at153. 41. Id.at159. 42. Hmelo-Silver,supranote27,at246. 43. MeredithD.Gall,The Use of Questions in Teaching,40reV. eduC. res.707,707(1970)(quot-ingM.J.McCueAschner,Asking Questions to Trigger Thinking,NEAJ.,Sept.1961,at44,44). 44. Id.at711. 45. sAVery & duffy,supranote28,at5. 46. ForadescriptionoftheSocraticmethodinalegaleducationcontext,includingadiscussionofitsstrengthsandweaknesses,seePeggyCooperDavis&ElizabethEhrenfestSteinglass,A Dialogue About Socratic Teaching,23n.y.u. reV. l. & soC. ChAnge249(1997). 47. sAVery & duffy,supranote28,at5. 48. Callister,supranote1,at33–34,¶59.


thinkingaboutandunderstandingtheresearchprocess thatwillbestaddress theresearchquestionathand.

¶17TheSocraticmethodmaynotimmediatelycometomindasastrategyonewoulduseinthecontextofresource-basedlearning,asitusuallycaststheinstruc-torasexpertandchallengesthelearner’sgraspofthematerial.However,“thefacili-tatorscaffoldsstudentlearningthroughmodelingandcoaching,primarily through the use of questioning strategies.”49A“goodquestion,”onethatencouragesstudentstolearn,“isalwaysontheedgeofwhatanindividualknows—ontheedgeofone’sconstruct(orschema)ofreality.Tobeabletoseethatedge—torecognizewhenoneisapproachingit—isthebeginningofallinquiryandanecessaryskill.”50Forfirst-yearstudentsinalegalresearchcourse,theedgeoftheirknowledgeonthefirstdayofclassmaybethatGoogleisthebestwaytofindtheanswertoaquestion.AgooddemonstrationofscaffoldingwouldbetotakestudentstothatedgeandteachthemtoseetheresourcesthatexistinadditiontoGoogle,showingthemthatthetheirfamiliarity with using Google may help them learn how to use other researchtools.51

¶18 Teachers can also be trained to improve the questions that they ask stu-dents.52Ofcourse,questionsshouldbealignedwithlearninggoals,andtheyshouldideally enable students to achieve these learning goals.53 Less helpful questionsmight require only that students recall facts, rather than encouraging them toengagemoredeeplywiththematerial.54Gallnotedthatelementaryschoolteacherswho went through a training program had“many highly significant changes in[their]questioningbehavior.”55Someofthepositivechangesincludedanincreasedfrequency of questions“designed to have a number of students respond to onestudent’s original question,” “thought questions,” and “questions which requirestudentstoimproveorelaborateontheiroriginalresponse.”56Teacherscanalsobetaughttominimize“poorquestioninghabits,”suchasrepeatingquestions,repeat-ingstudentanswers,answeringtheirownquestions,andinterruptingstudentsastheyanswerquestions.57

¶19 Teacher questioning may take many forms. One of the most commonlydiscussedmodelsforquestioningisbasedonBloom’staxonomy.BenjaminBloompublishedahandbookin1956classifyingeducationalgoalsandobjectivesinthreeways,cognitive,affective,andpsychomotor.58Inthisarticle,IfocusonthecognitiveskillsdescribedbyBloom,leavingotherstoaddresshiscategorizationofaffective

49. Hmelo-Silver,supranote27,at245(emphasisadded). 50. Callister,supranote22,at200,¶20. 51. AsdescribedintheCarnegieReport,scaffolding“provid[es]supportforstudentswhohavenotyetreachedthepointofmastery.”sulliVAn et Al.,supranote2,at61. 52. Gall,supranote43,at717–18. 53. Id.at711. 54. “About60%ofteachers’questionsrequirestudentstorecallfacts;about20%requirestudentstothink;andtheremaining20%areprocedural.”Id.at713. 55. Id.at717. 56. Id. 57. Id. 58. tAxonomy of eduCAtionAl obJeCtiVes: the ClAssifiCAtion of eduCAtionAl goAls(BenjaminS.Bloomed.,1956).


andpsychomotorskills.SinceBloom’shandbookwasfirstpublished,ithasbeensubjected to discussion, study, and refinement.59 Based on the most recent andwidelyacceptedrefinement,thecognitiveskills,fromthelowestlevelofthinkingto thehighest, are remembering,understanding,applying,analyzing,evaluating,andcreating.60ThefollowinglistshowsBloom’soriginalcognitiveskillsandtheirrevisedcounterparts:61

Original Version Revised VersionEvaluation CreatingSynthesis EvaluatingAnalysis AnalyzingApplication ApplyingComprehension UnderstandingKnowledge Remembering

¶20EducatorsfindBloom’staxonomy(originalandrevised)62usefulforbothquestioningandgoalsetting.63Bloom’staxonomyhelpsteacherstodevelopappro-priate questions for students—questions that will help deepen student under-standingofsubjectmaterial.Inthecontextofalegalresearchcourse,thedeepenedunderstandingmayreflectthedifferencebetweensimplyknowingthatthereisaservice to help legal researchers identify whether a legal opinion remains“goodlaw,”andunderstandingthesignificanceofayellowflaginKeyCiteorShepard’s.

¶21EachlevelofcognitiveskillinBloom’staxonomyisassociatedwithverbsthatmaybeusefulwhenposingstudentquestions.Forexample,thelowest-levelcognitiveskill,remembering(whetherthestudentcanrecallorrememberinfor-mation),canbeassociatedwiththefollowingverbs:define,duplicate,list,memo-rize, recall, repeat, reproduce, and state.64 Higher-order cognition, such asevaluating, may be associated with verbs such as appraise, argue, defend, judge,select,support,value,andevaluate.65

¶22Althoughtheseverbsmaybeusedinquestioningstudents,forexamplebyaskingastudenttodefendadecisiontorelyonacaseforwhichacitatorshowsayellowwarningsignal,studentanswersmaynotrisetothehigherlevelofcognitionsoughtbytheinstructor.66Itisatthispointthatateacher’sabilitytoaskfollow-up

59. SeeMaryForehand,Bloom’s Taxonomy,inemerging perspeCtiVes on leArning, teAChing, And teChnology(M.Oreyed.,2005),http://www.coe.uga.edu/epltt/bloom.htm.CallisterhascalledforaprofessionaldiscussiontorefineBloom’staxonomyforlegalresearchpedagogy.Callister,supranote22. 60. Richard C. Overbaugh & Lynn Schultz, Bloom’s Taxonomy, http://www.odu.edu/educ/roverbau/Bloom/bloomstaxonomy.htm(lastvisitedDec.22,2011). 61. Adaptedfromid. 62. Fromthispointforward,unlessotherwisenoted,thediscussionofBloom’staxonomyrelatestotherevisedtaxonomyofcognitiveskills. 63. TheroleofBloom’staxonomyingoalsettingisdiscussedinfra¶45.Consideringquestioningbeforeconsideringgoalsmaybeputtingthecartbeforethehorse,intermsofcurriculumdesign.Thebestpractice ininstructionaldesignistofirst identifytheeducationalobjectivesandthendevelop“questionswhichenablethestudenttoreacheachobjective.”Gall,supranote43,at711. 64. Overbaugh&Schultz,supranote60. 65. Id. 66. “Aweaknessofthecognitive-processapproachtoquestionclassificationisthatthesepro-cessesareinferentialconstructs.Therefore,theycannotbeobserveddirectly.”Gall,supranote43,at


questionsbecomescritical.A follow-upquestionmaychallengea studentwhoseresponseisatthelevelofrecalltoengagewiththematerialandansweratamorecriticallevel.QuestionclassificationsystemssuchasBloom’staxonomydonotspe-cifically takequestion sequence intoaccount.67Though it is tempting toassumethat an instructor would begin asking questions at the lowest (recall) level andmovethroughthecognitivestagestothehigher-orderthinkinglevels,thelevelsofBloom’staxonomydonotsimplypresentalinearprogressionforinstruction.68Asin research, an instructor may need to loop back and ask simpler questions toensure students all move toward the ultimate goal of full engagement andunderstanding.

Building Schemata to Maximize Working Memory

¶23Adifficultyforinstructorsoflegalresearcharisesfromthelargeamountofinformationthatstudentsmustbeabletorecallinordertolearnhowtoresearcheffectively.69Whenplanningacourse,aninstructormustbalancetheneedtogivestudentsinformationaboutresourceswiththeneedtoteachstudentshowtocon-ductresearch(think,analyze,refinethequery,etc.).70Aresearcherneedsanade-quatetoolboxofresourcesthatmaybeconsultedtoaddressaresearchquestion,butinstructionthatfocusestoocloselyonresourcesmayresembletheworstformofbibliographicinstruction:datadumping.Ontheotherhand,aresearcherfamiliarwiththeresearchprocessisstymiedifshedoesnotknowwhatresourcestoconsult.Legalinformationischanging,anditiscriticalthatstudentsunderstandnotonlythevalueof the information,buthow the resources areused.71BobBerringhasdescribedtheapproachheandKathleenVandenHeuveltaketoteachingadvancedlegalresearchasa“functionalapproach.”72Astudentwhounderstandsthepurposeofacitatorandhowacitatorworks,forexample,willbeabletofigureouthowtouseacitatorthatbecomesavailableinanewformat.73

710.QuestionsdevelopedwithBloom’s taxonomy inmindmaybedesignedashigher-orderques-tions, suchasoneasking students tocompare theLexisNexisandWestlawcitators,buta student’sanswermaydemonstrateonlyrecall(ofmaterialfromatextbookoraclassdiscussion).Id.Inotherwords,thebestlaidlessonplansmaygoawry. 67. Id.at712. 68. Justasresearchdoesnotalwaysfollowalinearpath,sodoesinstructiondeviate. 69. For example, AALL’s Core Legal Research Competencies is 113 pages, not an insignificantvolume of information. reseArCh instruCtion CAuCus, Am. Ass’n of lAW librAries, Core legAl reseArCh CompetenCies: A Compendium of sKills And VAlues As defined in the AbA’s mACCrAte report (Ellen M. Callinan ed., 1997), available at http://www.aallnet.org/sis/ripssis/PDFs/core.pdf[hereinafterCore legAl reseArCh CompetenCies]. 70. Callisternotesthatresearchers’needsmaydiffer,dependingontheirstatus.Studentsresearchdifferentquestions,withdifferentconstraints,thandolawyers,clerks,judges,orlibrarians.Hesug-gests that legal research instruction should prepare students to research effectively in a variety ofcontexts.Callister,supranote1,at23–24,¶¶37–38. 71. Berring,supranote2,at3. 72. Id.“Thoughwecouldnotforeseethefuture,wecouldguessthatnewformatsandnewtoolswerecoming.” Id.Byemphasizing the functionof resources,BerringandVandenHeuvelhoped topreparestudentstocontinuetouseandevaluatenewresourcesandaccessmethodsastheybecameavailable. 73. Id.TheintroductionofBloombergLawtothelegalmarketisjustsuchanexample.AstheyexploretheoptionsavailableonBloombergLaw,studentswillhavetousetheirexistingknowledgeof


¶24 From a learning theory perspective, the challenge of designing a legalresearchcoursethatconveysall that informationisdauntingbecauseofthewaythat knowledge develops in the human brain. According to one explanation ofhumancognitivearchitecture,apersoncangenerallyholdnomorethansevennewpiecesofinformationinworkingmemory.74“[B]ecauseworkingmemoryismostcommonly used to process information in the sense of organizing, contrasting,comparing,orworkingonthatinformationinsomemanner,humansareprobablyonly able to deal with two or three items of information simultaneously whenrequiredtoprocessratherthanmerelyholdinformation.”75

¶25Notonlyistheworkingmemorylimitedinthenumberofpiecesofinfor-mationitcanhold,itisalsolimitedinitsduration.Studiessuggestthatthebrainisabletoholdinformationinworkingmemoryforonlytentotwentyseconds.76Toholdinformationforlonger,theinformationmustmovefromworkingmem-orytolong-termmemory.Thistransferofinformationis“themostcriticalprocessofall the informationprocessing to thosewhoare interested in learning.”77Theprocessofmakingmeaningfrominformationhelpslearnerstoretaininformation.“[T]he more ‘deeply’ information is processed, the more likely it is to beremembered.”78

¶26 How is information processed deeply? According to schema theory, thelong-termmemorystoresknowledgeintheformofaschemathat“categorizesele-mentsof informationaccordingto themanner inwhichtheywillbeused.”79 Inotherwords,forinformationtomovefromworkingmemorytolong-termmem-ory,thestudentneedstodevelopaschemainwhichtostoretheinformation.Theschemamaybenewlycreated,oritmayrelatetoanexistingschema.Thisislikelywhy encouraging students to relate new information to information that theyalreadyknowisaneffectiveteachingstrategy.80Themorecomfortableapersonisusingaschema,themoreautomaticusingthatschemamaybe,themoreworkingmemorymaybeavailablefornewinformationandlearning.81“Fromaninstruc-

citatorsontheLexisNexisandWestlawplatformstolearnandevaluatetheefficacyoftheBloombergLawcitator. 74. JohnSwelleretal.,Cognitive Architecture and Instructional Design,10eduC. psyChol. reV.251,252(1998). 75. Id. 76. smith & rAgAn,supranote23,at21. 77. Id. 78. Id.Somemightsaythatdeeperprocessingofinformationisassociatedwiththehigher-ordercognitiveskillsofBloom’staxonomy. 79. Swelleretal.,supranote74,at255. 80. Theuseofaschemacanbedistinguishedfromthestrategyofscaffolding.Scaffoldinggener-allyreferstothesupportthatalearnermayreceivefromateacherorafellowstudentinlearning.A“student’spartnercouldalsoprovideacoachingandscaffoldingrole....Theteacherdidnottakeanintentionalroleinprovidingconceptualormetacognitivescaffolding,butprovidedsupportwhenit was requested.” Jan Herrington & Ron Oliver, An Instructional Design Framework for Authentic Learning Environments,eduC. teCh. res. & deV.,Sept.2000,at23,40.“Studentsbenefit fromtheopportunitytoarticulate,reflectandscaffoldwithapartner,andtheywillseektheseopportunitiescovertlyiftheyarenotavailablebydesign.”Id.at42. 81. “With automation, familiar tasks are performed accurately and fluidly, whereas unfamil-iar tasks—thatpartially require theautomatedprocess—canbe learnedwithmaximumefficiencybecausetheworkingmemoryisavailable.”Swelleretal.,supranote74,at258.


tional design perspective, it follows that designs should not only encourage theconstruction of schemas, but also the automation of schemas that steer thoseaspectsofataskthatareconsistentfromproblemtoproblem.”82

¶27Another theory isbasedonmentalmodels,whichare like schemata,butwhichalso“containinformationabouttaskdemandsandtaskperformancesthatareusedforproblemsolving.”83Inshort,informationstoredinlong-termmemoryisorganized,andgoodteachingcreatesopportunitiesforstudentstoundertaketheorganizationalprocessofmovinginformationfromworkingmemorytolong-termmemory.Toputthattheoryinthecontextoflegalresearchpedagogy,asstudentsencounterandinteractwithnewresources,whichmayincludelearningnotonlythenamefortheresourcebutalsohowthesourceiscreated,itsauthority,howtoaccessanduse the source,andhowtoproperlycite the source, theyarecreatingschemataormentalmodelsforthenewinformation.

¶28 Creating opportunities for students to build schemata in which relatedsources are explicitly compared may help students more quickly learn resourcesand move that knowledge from working to long-term memory. Drill problems,thoughgenerallyoutoffavor,84mayalsoallowstudentstopracticeresearchskillssothataspectsoftheuseofparticularresourcesbecomeautomatic,increasingtheavailabilityofworkingmemorytoconsideraresearchproblem.Forexample,afterdevelopingaschemaandabitofresearchpractice,studentsmayautomaticallyseekthe“current-as-of” information for a statute or regulation, while a student justlearning about statutes will more likely have to stop and consider the question:“Whatnext?”beforerememberingtocheckthecurrentnessofastatute.

¶29What does all of this mean for the development of a pedagogy for legalresearch?85Keepinmindthatpedagogyhastwodefinitions.Onerefersto“theartor profession of teaching,” while the second refers to “preparatory training orinstruction.”86 A more complete definition of pedagogy as an art or professiondescribesitasthe“studyofteachingmethods,includingtheaimsofeducationand

82. Id. 83. smith & rAgAn,supranote23,at21. 84. “Allevidence,fromthelaboratoryandfromextensivecasestudiesofprofessionals,indicatesthat real competence only comes with extensive practice. . . . The instructional task is not to‘kill’motivationbydemandingdrill,but to find tasks thatprovidepracticewhileat the sametimesus-taininginterest.”JohnR.Andersonetal.,Applications and Misapplications of Cognitive Psychology to Mathematics Education,tex. eduC. reV.,Summer2000,at21–22. 85. Considerationoflearningtheoryinthelawlibrarianliteratureistypicallydiscussedintermsofstudentlearningstylesorpedagogy,thoughKristinGerdyproperlyusesthetermandragogytoreferspecificallytoadultlearners.Gerdy,supranote7,at73.Lawlibrariansareconcernedaboutwhetherstudentsareabletosuccessfullyintegrateresearchskills.Inherhistoricalreviewofthedevelopmentofthetheoryofandragogy,SharanMerriamexplains:

The fiveassumptionsunderlyingandragogydescribe theadult learneras someonewho(1)hasan independent self-concept and who can direct his or her own learning, (2) has accumulateda reservoirof life experiences that is a rich resource for learning, (3)has learningneedscloselyrelatedtochangingsocialroles,(4)isproblem-centeredandinterestedinimmediateapplicationofknowledge,and(5)ismotivatedtolearnbyinternalratherthanexternalfactors.

SharanMerriam,Andragogy and Self-Directed Learning: Pillars of Adult Learning Theory,inthe neW updAte on Adult leArning theory5(2001). 86. AmeriCAn heritAge diCtionAry of the english lAnguAge1299(5thed.2011).


thewaysinwhichsuchgoalsmaybeachieved.Thefieldreliesheavilyoneduca-tionalpsychology,ortheoriesaboutthewayinwhichlearningtakesplace.”87Thedevelopmentofapedagogyoflegalresearch,then,referstomorethansimplytheteachingoflegalresearch.Itincludesthestudyofteachingmethodsaswellastheinstructionalgoalsthataresetforlawstudents,anditencouragestheconsiderationoflearningtheoryfromotherfields,suchaseducationalpsychology,toensurethatstudentshave thebest learningexperiencespossible.PaulCallisterhascalled foropen dialogue and scholarly engagement within the law librarian professionalcommunity regarding the “underlying pedagogy at the heart of legal researchinstruction.”88

Benefits of Resource-Based Learning

¶30Lawstudentswillbenefitfromtheconstructivist,resource-basedlearningapproach, particularly if elements of problem-based learning are included.Unfortunately, the limited time available for basic or first-year legal researchinstructiondoesnotprovideenoughopportunityforstudentstobeexposedtothenumberandvarietyofproblemsthatwouldbenecessarytomeetfirst-yearlegalresearchrequirements.89However,aresource-basedapproachmayincorporatetheuseoflimitedrealorrealisticproblemstoincreasestudentinterestandthesensethatresearchskillsarerelevanttotheirfutureneeds.Providingstudentswithamixoftasksthatallowsforthepracticenecessarytoautomateresearchskillsandalsoencouragesthedevelopmentofschemataormentalmodelsregardingresearchiscritical.Thosetasksshouldincludeavarietyofinstructionalformatsandtypes—ranging from drill exercises90 to computer-assisted legal instruction to in-classgroupassignmentstoindividualproblems.Themixoftasksshouldoptimallypro-mote“notrotelearningbutlearningwithunderstanding.”91Studentsshouldhaveadequate opportunities to engage with resources, such that the use of thoseresourcesbecomesautomatic.

87. EdwinA.Peel,Pedagogy,enCyClopAediA britAnniCA,http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/448410/pedagogy(lastvisitedFeb.13,2012). 88. Callister,supranote22,at192,¶4.Generaleducationalpedagogicaltheories,suchascon-structivismorbehaviorism,mayunderliealegalresearchinstructor’sdecisiontoemphasizeabiblio-graphicorprocess-basedapproachtolegalresearch(thoughshemaynotrealizeitifshehasnotstud-iededucationalphilosophy).Aconstructivistapproachwouldlenditselftoprocess-basedteaching. 89. SeeNancyP.Johnson,Best Practices: What First-Year Law Students Should Learn in a Legal Research Class,28legAl referenCe serViCes Q.77(2009). 90. So-calledtreasurehuntresearchexercises,inwhichthestudentresearcherisgivenaproblemwithaclearandcorrectanswer, enabling the researcher to self-check theaccuracyof the researchprocess,mayalsobedescribedas“drillandkill.”Forexample,studentresearcherscouldbeaskedtofindparticularcasesfromparticularcourtsanddecidedonparticulardates,tofamiliarizethemwiththedigest system.Proponentsof the treasurehuntpoint to students’ ability togainconfidence intheirskillsaswellastheautomationofresearchskills.Thetreasurehuntexerciseiscomplementedbytheprocess-typeproblem,whichoftendoesnothaveaclear-cutanswer.Proponentsoftheprocessproblembelievethattheproblemspresentstudentswithrealisticresearchexperiences,particularlylearningtoaddresstheindeterminacyoflegalresearch. 91. Andersonetal.,supranote84,at31.


¶31Afulldiscussionoflegalpedagogyshouldincludeamajordeterminantinthesuccessofanypedagogy:themotivationofthelearner.Resource-basedlearningtechniques are particularly appropriate for adult learners, who benefit from themotivationalaspectsofthepedagogy.Studentmotivationisincreased“whentheybelievethattheoutcomeoflearningisundertheircontrol.”92Lawstudentsshould“learn most effectively when new information is connected to and built upon astudent’spriorknowledgeandreal-lifeexperiences,”andstudents“tendtodowellwhenallowed tohave somecontrolover the learningenvironment,andrespondbesttocollaborativelearningenvironments.”93Forapedagogyoflegalresearchtobesuccessful, itmustatahigh levelactivatestudent interest in learning.Interestmaybegeneratedanumberofways,rangingfromexplicitapplicationofproblemsandlearningtoreallifetoinvolvingstudentsinthecreationoftheirowneduca-tionalgoals.94“Studentsencouragedtoaskquestions[whenintroducedtoanewtopic of study] will learn more than a group of students deprived of thisopportunity.”95Mostimportant,“thereisalmostuniversalconsensusthatonlytheactivelearnerisasuccessfullearner.”96

¶32 Resource-based learning reflects elements of both process and biblio-graphic methods of teaching legal research. For example, students may be givenproblem-basedprojects(whichrequirethemtoreadthroughfactsanddeterminewhich resources to consult to answer the question, akin to a process-orientedapproach),97butinstructorsarealsoencouragedto“maketheresourcespartoftheculture of [their] teaching and learning,” advice which would be expected toaccompanyabibliographicapproachtoteaching.98

¶33Resource-basedlearningisapedagogyparticularlysuitedtolegalresearchcourses.Althoughlegalresearchcoursesmaybetaughtwithanemphasisonbiblio-graphic instruction or with an emphasis on the research process, in both casesstudents need to develop and build skills using resources to become successfulresearchers.Theneedtobeconversantwithbasicresourcesexistsforallresearchers,whether they are planning on print or electronic research. Additionally, legal

92. Hmelo-Silver,supranote27,at241. 93. GershonTenenbaumetal.,Constructivist Pedagogy in Conventional On-Campus and Distance Learning Practice: An Exploratory Investigation,11leArning & instruCtion87,90(2001). 94. Goal setting, like asking studentsquestions at thebeginningof a learningexperience, canraisestudentinterest.Unfortunately,instructionaldesigners,“especiallythosewhoholddeterministicbeliefsandsetgoalsaboutlearning,”haveadifficulttimeallowingstudentstogenerategoals.Id.at108.Perhapsthediscomfortexperiencedbyinstructionaldesignersarisesfromdistrustthatstudentswillgenerateadequategoalsandfearthatstudentswillnotbeabletoreevaluateandamendgoalsastheymaybefoundwanting.Thisiscontrarytotheresource-basedlearninggoalofdevelopingstu-dents’metacognitiveskills. 95. Gall,supranote43,at716. 96. Anderson et al., supra note 84, at 32. Though it is tempting for instructors to take theapproachthat“youcanleadahorsetowater,butyoucan’tmakeitdrink,”suchanattitudeisself-defeating and overlooks an instructor’s responsibility to create an educational environment thatmotivatesstudents. 97.Maharg&Paliwala,supranote10,at100. 98. Id.at102.


researchclassesalsoprovideinstructorswithanopportunitytoteachstudentshowtoapproachbothnew,unknownproblemsandnew,unknownresources.99

Course Design Decisions

¶34Whencreatingandteachingaclass,ateacher’spathisfilledwithchoices.Although some of those choices may be dictated—consciously or not—by thepedagogical theory espoused by the instructor, other choices may stem frominstructionalorinstitutionalmandates.Instructionalorpedagogicalchoicesmaybeasbasicaswhethertobeginwithelectronicorpaperresources,ortheymaybemorecomplicated,suchashowtoimplementanelectronicwebcourse.Underlyingteachingdecisionsarechoicesaboutcontent—whatmustbe included,andwhattheteacherbelievesstudentsshould“know”oncompletingthecourse.

¶35Formanycourses,includingresearchcourses,therearetextbooksreadilyavailable.A“good”textbookmaybechosenbasedonpopularity,theinstitutionalaffiliationofitsauthor,ortheinstructionalbiasesunderlyingthetextbook.100Forexample,aprofessormaybetemptedtouseThe Process of Legal Researchbecausethe title suggests a process emphasis, rather than a bibliographic instructionemphasis.Selectinga textbookwithout first consideringcoursedesign,however,mayleadtheinstructortoinvestinabookthatdoesn’tsupporthisinstructionalchoices.

¶36 The following sections describe some of these choices, first addressingtheoreticalconcernsregardingthedevelopmentofinstructionalgoals,theimple-mentationofinstructionalstrategiesthatprovidestudentsguidanceandsupportin their work, and course evaluation, and then offering suggestions regardingpraxis. Suggestions cover syllabus design, assignments, and student assessment.Theanalysisthatfollowspresumesalooselyconstructivistpedagogy.

Setting goals

¶37Thefirststepinplanningacourse,whetheritisdoctrinalorfocusesonaskillsuchasresearchordrafting,istoidentifylearninggoals.Thiscriticalstepisnotasobviousasitsounds.Tobeginwith,whatarelearninggoals?Learninggoalsarethegoalsthatastudentshouldhaveachievedonsuccessfulcompletionofthecourse.Soundslikenonsense,right?Rephrasingthatdefinitionmakesthemeaningabitmoreapparent,andmuchmorehelpful:Astudentshouldbeabletoperform

99. Berring’sdiscussionof the“functionalapproach to legal information,” inwhichresearch-ersunderstandthenatureoftheinformationitself,notthespecificformatinwhichitisdelivered,isgermanetothechangingnatureofthedeliveryofinformationtoday.Berring,supranote2,at3.Studentresearchers—andlawlibrarians—areconstantlyadjustingtochangingformatsandchanginginterfaces.TheWestlawNextplatformandconcomitantdebateareoneexampleoftheongoingnatureofchange.See RonaldE.Wheeler,Does WestlawNext Really Change Everything? The Implications of WestlawNext on Legal Research,103lAW libr. J.359,2011lAW libr. J.23. 100. The commonly used textbooks are identified in the literature. Ann Hemmens, Advanced Legal Research Courses: A Survey of ABA-Accredited Law Schools,94lAW libr. J.209,228–29,2002lAW libr. J.17,¶¶49–50.See alsoNancyP.Johnson,Should You Use a Textbook to Teach Legal Research?,103 lAW libr. J. 415, 428–35, 2011 lAW libr. J. 26,¶¶ 48–85 (reviewing a number of recent legalresearchtexts).


the course learning goals, meeting certain performance standards, on successfulcompletionofacourse.Aninstructorwhoishopefulthat,bytheendoftheclass,studentswillbeabletorecognizethatafederalregulationisthepropersourcetoconsulttoansweraresearchquestionandtolocatetheregulationonpointfortheresearch problem, may have as a learning goal that students will understand theauthority of federal regulations and be able to navigate the Code of Federal Regulations, includingthestepsnecessaryforupdating.Setting learninggoals forstudentsbeforecommencingthecoursewillmorelikelyensurethattheinstructionwillmeetthegoals.Ideally,aninstructor’soverallcoursegoalsaremetbythesub-sidiarygoalsassociatedwithunitsandindividuallessons.

¶38Recognizingtheimportanceofcoursegoalsisrelativelyeasy,buthowdoesonegeneratethosecoursegoals?Itdepends.Theguidingquestioniswhatthestu-dentshouldbeabletodo(orknow)attheendofthecourse.Doesthecoursepre-pare the student for a subsequent course?Are there several sectionsof the samecoursetaught,suchthatthestudentsacrossallsectionsshouldhaveacorecommonexperienceorknowledge?Shouldthestudentswhocompletethecoursebeabletomeetskills/knowledgelevelsofpeersatotherinstitutions?Afirst-yearcriminallawcourse,forexample,raisesallofthesequestions—thecoursemaypreparestudents,atabasiclevel,forasubsequentcriminalprocedurecourse.Theremaybemultiplesectionsofthecourseinoneinstitution,andallthestudentsshouldlikelybeabletodefinemens reaandactus reus,regardlessofthetheoreticalbiasesoftheinstruc-tors.Atleastonemeetingofallthecourseinstructorswillhelpensurethattheyalladdress the basic issues.Additionally, the students are likely paying their tuitionwiththeexpectationthattheywill learnwhattheyneedtoknowtopassthebarexamandsuccessfullypracticelaw;thisexpectationstemsfromareasonablebeliefthatallaccreditedlawschoolswillteachcertaincorematerials.101Thesesameques-tionsariseinthecontextofresearchcourses.

¶39Oneoftheeasiestwaystoidentifylearninggoalsistoconsidereducationalstandards.Althoughstateshavedevelopededucationalstandardsandgoalsforstu-dentsinelementaryandsecondaryeducation,102suchstandardsandgoalshavenotbeendevelopedforlawstudents.103Inthelawschoolcontext,educationalstandards

101. Student expectations are complex. A professor may reasonably guess that students willexpecttolearnmaterialsnecessaryforpassingthebarexamandsuccessfullypracticinglaw.Butotherfactorsmayaffectstudents’expectationsaswell.Astudent’sreasonsandmotivationsforenrollinginacourse—atasbasicalevelaswhetherthecoursewasrequiredoranelective—mayaffectthestudent’senthusiasmandgoals.Forexample,astudenttakingaone-creditweekendresearchcoursebecausethatonecreditwillenablethestudenttograduatethatsemestermaysimplywantto“getthroughit,”whileastudentelectingtotakeanadvancedresearchcoursetoprepareforasummerjoborexternshipmaybringdifferentexpectations. 102. State standards exist for many subjects and for every grade. In New York State, forexample,standardsaremeanttohelpteachersidentifywhattheirstudentsneedtoknowandbeabletodo inorder to succeedonmandatory state testing.New York State Learning Standards and Core Curriculum,nysed.goV(lastupdatedJan.23,2012),http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/ciai/cores.html. 103. One could argue that the minimum standards for law students have been set by themultistatebarexamination,asthattestisthemostcommonsharedexperienceoflawstudentsacrossthecountry.Thatexam,however,doesnotaddressresearchskills.


areintheirinfancy.104Absentexternalstandardsthathavebeenratifiedbyaninsti-tutionsuchastheAmericanBarAssociationortheAssociationofAmericanLawSchools,aninstructorinaresearchcoursemaybeginbyidentifyinganycommu-nitystandardsthatmayexist.105Thankfully,toolsexisttoassistinthedevelopmentofcoursegoalsforresearchcourses.

¶40Professionalassociations,suchasAALL,mayprovideguidance.Followingthereleaseof theMacCrateReport, theAALLResearchInstructionCaucuspro-duced the Core Legal Research Competencies, setting forth the information thatstudents should know about researching by the time they graduate from lawschool.106Anothersourcetoconsiderisprofessionalliteratureonthesubject.Forexample, Nancy Johnson memorialized her view of what first-year law studentsshouldlearn,basedonhertwenty-fiveyearsofteaching.107Onthepremisethatasyllabus will reflect learning goals, one might also consult syllabi for researchcourses.ThesemaybeaccessedbysearchingtheWorldWideWeb,108byconferringwithcolleaguesinperson,orbysolicitingsyllabionalistserv.

¶41Generatinggoalsforafirst-yearlegalresearchcoursedoesnothavetobecomplicated.109Goalsarewrittenwithstudentperformanceinmind.Whengener-atingasetofgoals,startwithanideaofwhatstudentsshouldknow,orwhattheyshouldbeabletodo,andthenconsiderBloom’staxonomyandtheverbsassociatedwiththedifferentcognitivethinkinglevels.Forexample,foralessonaboutusingannotated statutes, a lower-level goal might be that students will be able to“describethetypesofannotationsonemayfindinanannotatedstatute.”Ahigher-levelgoalmightbe that studentswillbeable to“evaluatewhetheranannotatedstatuteoranofficialcodewouldbeamoreappropriateresourcetoconsult,givenavarietyofcircumstances.”

¶42Whendevelopingaclass,aninstructormayfinditeasiertodevelopmicro-levelgoals(e.g.,atthelessonlevel,asintheexampleabove)andthenbuildthemup tomacro-level goals, suchas“studentswillbeable to consult a state statute,usingsearch/indextermstoidentifytherelevantsection(s),andevaluatethestat-utetodetermineitsapplicabilitytoaresearchquestionandthecurrentnessofthestatute.”Othersmayfinditeasiertobeginwithbroadlearninggoalsandbreakthebroad goals down into component goals. However developed, learning goals

104. The American Bar Association sets forth standards and Rules of Procedure forApprovalofLawSchools,whicharerelevantforlawschoolaccreditation,butthosestandardsarenotveryhelpfulfordesigninglearninggoals.SeeAm. bAr Ass’n,supranote17. 105. This discussion presupposes an instructor who is either new to teaching research orwhoisteachinganewcourse.Aveteranteacherwithsignificantexperiencemaybenefitfromconsid-eringinstructionalgoals,butmaynotneedtodomuchworktoidentifycommunitystandards. 106. Core legAl reseArCh CompetenCies, supra note 69. Because the competencies expressidealstudentknowledgeongraduation,theymayhavelimitedvaluefordeterminingwhatshouldbeincludedinafirst-yearlegalresearchcourse.Presumablysomeoftheknowledgeorskillscapturedbythecompetencieswouldbelearnedinlaterlawschoolcoursesoractivities. 107. Johnson,supranote89. 108. E.g., AALL’s Foreign, Comparative, and International Special Interest Section makessyllabiavailable.2011SyllabiandCourseMaterialsDatabase,available athttp://www.aallnet.org/sis/fcilsis/syllabi.html(lastvisitedMar.22,2012). 109. Goals for an advanced legal research course would be different, because students in anadvancedcoursearepresumablymoreexperiencedthanfirst-yearlawstudents.


shouldbemadeexplicittostudents,sotheyknowwhattoexpecttolearn.110Itmaybe thatoneclass sessionhas severalgoals—oreven several separate lessons.Thegoals(andlessons)presentedinonedayofinstructionmayaddressseveraltopics.Ideally,nosingle lessonshouldbebrokenupintotwoclasssessions,buta largergoalmayhavesubsidiarylessonsthatspantwoclasssessions.Insuchacase,spend-ingaminuteortwotoreviewthepriorlessonisagooduseofclasstime.

¶43 Once the learning goals are set, the instructor may engage in backwardplanning, identifying the intermediate steps necessary to reach the educationalgoal.111Forexample,ifstudentsshouldlearnhowtolocatecasesusingadigest,112theinstructorneedstoplanwheninthecoursetointroducethesubjectofdigests.Tounderstandoruseadigest,astudentneedstounderstandtheelementsofacaseandtheworkingofthereportersystems.Consequently,theintroductionofdigestsshouldhappenaftertheintroductionofcases.113

¶44Thelogicalsequencingoflearninggoalsforacoursewillideallybereflectedinacourse syllabus.114Thoughgoalsmaybe inferred fromthe syllabus,abetterpracticeistostatethemexplicitly.Asyllabusmaycontainasectioncalled“CourseGoals,”inwhichtheinstructordescribeswhatstudentswilllearnintheclass.Thesyllabus may then be broken down into units (e.g., cases, statutes, secondarysources), and each unit and individual lesson should have its own objectives.Consistently generating learning goals and expectations regarding what studentswilltakeawayfromaunitorlessonensuresthatstudentsknowhowtomeetthecoursegoals.115

110. When learning goals are made explicit to learners, learners are better able to evaluatetheirprogresstowardreachingthegoalsandmaybeabletoadjustaccordingly. 111. See, e.g., Bay Area School Reform Collaborative, Inquiry in Curriculum Design 3 (Oct.5,1999 rev.),http://www.sfsu.edu/~teachers/download/Inquiryframework.pdf.This isoneexampleoftheabundantpedagogicalmaterialsprovidedforK–12educatorsthatarefreelyavailableontheweb.Thoughsomeadaptationofthematerialsmaybenecessaryforadults,manyofthecoreinstruc-tionalstrategiesorplanningideasaresound. 112. “Unfortunately, most students do not share the professors’ passions for the West keynumbersystem.Somestudentsneverreallyunderstanddigests,whichisunfortunatebecausedigestsprovideaneffectiveandefficientmethodfor findingcases.”Johnson,supranote89,at85.Thoughstudentsmaynotunderstandthedigestsystemasitappearsinprint,studentsusingtheonlineinter-facefortheLexisNexisandWestlawcasedigestsystemsmaystumbleacrossthevalueofthesesystemsbyclickingonthehyperlinks.HowthenewWestlawNextinterfacewillaffectstudentsearchers’useoftheWestdigestsystemremainstobestudied. 113. Students come to research class familiar with the idea of cases, at least, even if they haveneverseenawrittenjudicialopinionpriortotheirfirstdayoflawschool.Theyaremuchlesslikelytohaveinteractedwithadigestsystem.Keepinginmindthatitiseasierforstudentstolearnwhenbuildingonexistingknowledge,beginningwithcasesandfollowingwithdigestsisappropriate. 114. In his interesting discussion of Bloom’s taxonomy, Callister includes a table relatinglearningtypes(Bloom’staxonomylevels)toresearchcompetenciesandactivities.Heexplainsthat“itisthebeginningofasyllabus.”Callister,supranote22,at218,¶43.Thoughhistableisquiteuseful,particularlywithregardtoassessmentideas,othersmightfinditmorehelpfultodevelopasyllabusbeginningwithlearninggoals(closelyrelatedtohisstudentcompetencies),ratherthanwithlearningtypes.Hischart suggests that learning isa linearprocess, inwhichstudentsbeginwith lower-levelthinkingandmoveultimatelytohigher-levelthinkingtasks.Infact,learningofteninvolvesrevisitingpriorknowledgetobuildnewknowledgeandskills. 115. Ontheotherhand,toomuchemphasisoncoursegoalscanbedetrimental.

Publicationofpre-specifiedlearningoutcomesincoursematerialsmayinadvertentlystiflecreativ-ityandoriginalityinbothstaffandstudents.Usedrigidly,thereisadangerthatlearningoutcomes


¶45Bloom’staxonomycanbeusefulwhengeneratinglearninggoalsbecausethecognitiveskills,fromthelowestlevelofthinkingtothehighest,areassociatedwithverbsdescribingstudentlearningbehaviors.116Associatinglearninggoalswithparticular student behaviors will enable both the student and the instructor toevaluate whether the learning goal has been met. For example, the lowest levelcognitiveskillofrememberingcanbeassociatedwiththeverb“recall,”so thatastudentwhohasparticipatedinalessonaboutcaselawresearchoughttobeabletorecallthecomponentpartsofajudicialopinionbytheendofthelesson.Asec-ondary benefit of clearly stated learning goals is that they encourage studentengagementwiththematerial.Learninggoalsmaybothmakecleartostudentsthelacunae in their knowledge and provide students with the ability to assess theirownprogresstowardfillinginthegaps.

Instructional Strategies

¶46Educationaltrainingmaterialssuggestthat,afteridentifyinglearninggoals,aninstructor’snextstepindesigningacourseistheselectionofaninstructionalstrategyorstrategies(alsocalledinstructionalmethods).117Instructionalstrategiesaredescribedinavarietyofways.Abriefandsimpledefinitionis“decisionsaboutteachingsequencesandtactics.”118JohnsonandAragon,whodevelopedanonlinemaster’sdegreeprograminhumanresources,identifiedthefollowingstrategiesasnecessaryincreatinganeffectivelearningenvironment:(1)addressindividualdif-ferences, (2) motivate the student, (3) avoid information overload, (4) create areal-lifecontext,(5)encouragesocialinteraction,(6)providehands-onactivities,and(7)encouragestudentreflection.119Forpurposesofthisdiscussion, instruc-tionalstrategiesaretheapproachesanddecisionsmadebyaninstructortoensurethatstudentsareabletoengagewith,comprehend,andlearnmaterial.

¶47Strategiesused in theclassroommayvarydependingon thegoalof thelesson.120 Although constructivist theory places a premium on the preexistingknowledgeofthelearnerandplacestheinstructorinthepositionoffacilitator,theinstructormaychoosetousedirectinstruction.Anotherstrategymightbetoaskstudentsto“think,pair,share.”Inthistypeofexercise,studentsaregivenaresearch

becomethedriverofclassroominteractionsandpreventdiscussionofideasorquestionsthatdonotclearlyrelatetothesetoutcomesforthecourse/module.

Angela Maher, Learning Outcomes in Higher Education: Implications for Curriculum Design and Student Learning,3J. hospitAlity, leisure, sport & tourism eduC.42,49(2004). 116. Overbaugh&Schultz,supranote60. 117. Seesmith & rAgAn,supranote23,at6. 118. ryAn et Al.,supranote16,at47. 119. Scott D. Johnson & Steven R. Aragon, An Instructional Strategy Framework for Online Learning Environments,100neW direCtions for Adult And Continuing eduCAtion31,34(2003). 120. Searching Google for instructional strategies provides over a million results thatmayinspireinstructorsastheyplantheirclasses.Althoughmanyonlinecoursedesignmaterialsarehostedbyschooldistricts, someuniversitiesandcollegesofeducation,not tomentionothernon-profitsites,makecoursedesignmaterials, includinggoal-settingandinstructionalstrategies, freelyavailable.See generallyGlossaryofInstructionalStrategies,http://glossary.plasmalink.com/glossary.html(lastupdatedAug.28,2010)(containing988instructionalstrategies);SaskatoonPublicSchools,InstructionalStrategiesOnline,http://olc.spsd.sk.ca/de/pd/instr/index.html(lastvisitedJan.3,2011)(linksfromthispagedescribedirect instruction, interactive instruction, indirect instruction, inde-pendentstudy,experientiallearning,andinstructionalskills).


problem and a set amount of time to think about the problem independently.Studentsthenpairuptodiscusstheproblem,andfinallyacoupleofstudentpairsareinvitedtosharetheiranswerswiththeclass.Inaresearchcontext,theanswermight be a research process, such as, “We started with the United States Code Annotated,butwerealizedthatweneededaregulation,soweturnedtotheCode of Federal Regulations,whichhadouranswer.Last,weupdatedtheregulationontheInternet.”

¶48Encouragingstudentstoputtheirunderstandingofasubject intoactionusingagraphicorganizerisanothervaluableinstructionalstrategy.Graphicorga-nizersare“visualdisplays teachersuse toorganize information inamanner thatmakestheinformationeasiertounderstandandlearn.”121AnexampleofagraphicorganizerisaTchart(achartwithtwocolumnsandaheadingorquestionontop),which may be used for comparisons.122 For example, students often wonderwhether LexisNexis or Westlaw is “better.” Asking students to test the services,evaluate theircitatorproducts(ahigher-orderskill),andchart theresults inaTchartallowsthemtomoredeeplyprocessinformation.Assigningstudentstocreateor use a graphic organizer encourages them to develop metacognitive skills—“help[ing]studentsworkthroughtheideasandconnections.”123

¶49Strategiesofteninvolvethecreationofaproduct.Thelearningproductmaybeintangible,suchasthethink-pair-shareresponse,oritmaybetangible,suchasachartcomparingShepard’stoKeyCite.Theselearningproductsmaybeusedbyboththeinstructorandthestudenttoevaluate—orassess—learning.124Thelearn-ingproduct,suchasananswertoaquestionorfollow-upquestion,maybeinfor-mallyassessed.Ananswertoawrittenexammaybeformallyassessed.

¶50 One of the more difficult tasks in teaching is evaluating student under-standing.Amajorsourceofthisdifficultyisthattheprocessofevaluationisnevercomplete. While teaching, whether acting as a facilitator or providing directinstruction, an instructor must continually assess student comprehension andinteractionwiththematerial.Whenthestudentsarequiet,doesthatreflectdeepcontemplationofahigher-orderquestion,ordoesitmeantheyareintentlyreadingthelatestcelebrityanticsonFacebook?Howdoesaninstructorfindtherightbal-ancewhenpartoftheclassunderstandsthelessonandwouldbeabletoperform

121. Gloria A. Dye, Graphic Organizers to the Rescue! Helping Students Link—and Remember—Information, 32 teAChing exCeptionAl Children 72, 72 (2000) (quoting e.l. meyen et Al., strAtegies for teAChing exCeptionAl Children in inClusiVe settings132(1996)).Graphicorganizersmaybeespeciallyusefulforteachingstudentsrelationalknowledge.SeeVonnieM.DiCecco&MaryM.Gleason,Using Graphic Organizers to Attain Relational Knowledge from Expository Text,35J. leArning disAbilities306(2002). 122. Graphic organizers are often used in elementary and secondary education, and manyare freely available on the web. See Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Classroom Resources: GraphicOrganizers,http://www.eduplace.com/graphicorganizer/(lastvisitedNov.30,2011). 123. Niedringhaus,supranote37,at117. 124. The Carnegie Report uses different language; rather than providing interim assess-ment,theinstructorcoachesstudents,“providingguidanceandfeedback.”sulliVAn et Al.,supranote2, at61.Whichever language isused, thepedagogicalpurpose is that students receive feedbackontheirperformanceastheyarelearning,sotheycanengageinthemetacognitiveanalysisnecessarytoimprovetheirperformance.


thelearninggoalandtherestoftheclassdoesnotandwouldnot?Ifaninstructoris not evaluating student success, both informally and formally, she is not evengoingtobegintoaskthesecriticalquestions.

Assignments, Rubrics, and Assessment

¶51Assignments,rubrics,andassessmentare integrallyrelated.Theymaybeimaginedasthreesidesofatriangle:eachsideisnecessaryforthetriangletoexist,andthoughthesidesmaylookalotalike,theyaredistinguishable.

Assignments

¶52 For purposes of this discussion, an assignment is a task assigned by aninstructor,thefunctionofwhichistoreinforcethelearningobjectiveforaparticu-larlessonorunit.Afewexampleassignmentsincludeansweringaresearchques-tion, writing a description of a research process, or participating in an onlinecoursediscussion.Theassignmentshouldreflecttheinstructor’slearninggoals;anassignmentthatrelatestoasubjectorissueunrelatedtothelearninggoalsislikelyawasteoftime.125Assignmentsaretypicallylistedinasyllabus,andtheportionofthecoursegradethatisattributabletoaparticularassignmentisalsomadeclearinthesyllabus.

Rubrics

¶53Instructionalrubricsarerarelyseeninlawschool;126theyare,however,veryhelpful in making clear to students an instructor’s expectations about perfor-mance.Aninstructionalrubricisashortdocument—ideallyoneortwopages—that“giv[es]studentsinformativefeedbackabouttheirworksinprogressand...give[s]detailedevaluationsoftheirfinalproducts.”127Generally,arubricisorga-nizedasatable,withassignmentqualityalongoneaxisandparticularcriteriafortheassignmentalongtheother.Therubricshouldbegeneratedbytheinstructoranddistributedtothestudentsatoraboutthesametimeastheassignment.

¶54Rubricshaveseveralinstructionalbenefits.Thefirstisclarity.Studentsandinstructor alike should see the alignment of the learning goals with the criteriadescribedintherubric.Studentsundertakeassignmentswithaclearerunderstand-ingoftheirinstructor’sexpectations,andtherubricencouragestheinstructortoconsiderwhetherthequestionsaskedbytheassignmentare,infact,thequestionstheinstructorintendsthestudentstoanswer.Studentsappreciateunderstandinginadvancetheissuesofconcernforaparticularassignment.128If,forexample,an

125. In addition to wasting students’ time completing the task and the instructor’s timegradingorreviewingstudents’work,anassignmentunrelatedtocoursegoalsrunstheriskofmakingstudentsthinkofalltheassignmentsinacourseasawasteoftime—eventhosethatareintegraltothecompletionofthecoursegoals. 126. Students in doctrinal courses are more likely to be given model answers or old examsforpractice,ratherthanrubrics. 127. Heidi Goodrich Andrade, What Do We Mean by Results? Using Rubrics to Promote Thinking and Learning,eduC. leAdership,Feb.2000,at13,13. 128. Gerdynotesthat“legalresearchteachersmustnotonlycreate learningoutcomesbutalsopublicizethembyprovidingtheirstudentswithalistofimportantconceptsandskillsthattheywill


instructor isnotconcernedwithcitationstyle for in-classassignments,butcaresdeeplyaboutitonatake-homeassignment(andgradesaccordingly),therubricsforin-classassignmentswouldmakethatcleartostudents,whocouldthenfocustheirlearningenergyappropriately.

¶55Rubricshavealsobeenshowntosupportstudentlearning.Withinthecon-textofaconstructivistpedagogy,arubricencouragesstudentstodevelopmetacog-nitiveskills.Asnotedearlier,studentsmayhavedifficultyrealizingthattheyhavefound“theanswer,”orsometimesevenananswer,toaparticularresearchquestion.Whenusingarubric,studentscanstopandevaluatetheirprogresstowardcomplet-inganassignment,129encouragingthemtomonitortheirownthinkingabouttheassignments130andtheirprogresstowardachievinglearninggoals.131Inadditiontodevelopingmetacognition,rubricshavebeenshowntoimproveboththedevelop-mentofcontentlearningandcriticalthinking,andthedevelopmentofskills.132

Assessment

¶56 The third leg of the triangle is assessment.133 As discussed earlier, aninstructor may assess student progress or understanding formally, with assign-mentsandexaminations,orinformally,throughquestioning.Likeassignmentsandrubrics,assessmentshouldreflectlearninggoals,toensurethatinstructionaltimeandstudentout-of-classworktimearebothbeingusedtopromotestudentlearn-ing.Assessments thatarenotalignedwithgoalsareneither fairnorequitable.134

beresponsibleforandthatwillbemeasuredinanassessment.Presentingthisinformation‘upfront’iskey.”Gerdy,supranote38,at73–74,¶55. 129. Students who have not used rubrics in their prior education will benefit from a brieflessoninhowtoreadandusearubric.Ihaveusedrubricsinanupper-divisionlegalresearchcourse,withoutexplicitlydescribingtostudentshowtheycouldusetherubricstotheiradvantage.Duringanofficevisitregardinganassignment,astudentindicatedthatitwouldhaveaffectedhisperformanceifhehadactuallyreadtherubricinadvanceofcompletingtheassignment.Inalawschoolsetting,studentsmayalsobenefitfromparticipatinginthecreationofarubric. 130. SeeAndrade,supranote127,at15. 131. James W. Pellegrino, Rethinking and Redesigning Curriculum, Instruction andAssessment:WhatContemporaryResearchandTheorySuggests6 (Nov.2006),available athttp://www.skillscommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Rethinking-and-Redesigning.pdf. 132. Andrade, supra note 127, at 16. Although the studies involved middle school students,thereisnoreasontobelievethatrubricswouldnotprovidesimilarvaluetolawstudents. 133. Gerdy describes assessment as answering two questions: “What have my studentslearnedandhowwellhave they learned it?Howsuccessfulhave Ibeenataccomplishing thegoalsandobjectivesIhaveset(forasingleclassperiod,aparticularskillsset,oranentirecourse)?”Gerdy,supranote38,at65,¶25. IdisagreewithGerdy’scharacterizationofbothquestionsas relating toassessment.Inmyview,thequestionofstudentlearningisassessment.Thesecondquestion,abouttheinstructor’ssuccessataccomplishinggoalsandobjectives,iscourseevaluation.Gerdy’sdiscussionoflearner-centeredassessment,however,isenlightening.Id.at68–78,¶¶38–68.

Assessment of learning goals should not be confused with assessment of teaching goals(i.e., course evaluation). If one’s teaching is to be observed and evaluated, whether for an annualevaluation,promotion,ortenure,itisadvisabletoreviewtheevaluationformpriortothescheduledobservation. An example of a form used in the teaching development program at the UniversityofMissouri–KansasCitySchoolofLaw(UMKC) is instructive.UMKCLawTeachingObservationEvaluationForm,http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/profiles/glesnerfines/Classroom%20Observation%20Form.pdf(lastvisitedMar.22,2012). 134. Lisewski&Settle,supranote21,at109;Pellegrino,supranote131,at9.


Additionalfactorstoconsiderwhenplanningassessmentinalegalresearchcourseincludewhetherthemeasurementiseffective(doesitmeasurewhatitpurportstomeasure), whether the assessment may be used to improve both teaching andlearning,andwhethertheassessmentprovidesasnapshotoracontinuingpictureofstudentdevelopmentovertime.135

¶57 Assessment may be used in a legal research class to both excite studentinterestandevaluatestudents’priorknowledgeandunderstanding.Apreliminaryassessment,giventostudentsbeforeclassbegins136oronthefirstdayofclass,offersseveralbenefits.Theassessmentresultscanhelpaninstructorplantheamountoftimenecessarytoadequatelyaddressrequiredtopics.Itmayalsohelpaninstructoridentify students who would be able to explain research process concepts orresearchresourcestootherstudents.137Students,uponrealizingthedepthoftheirignorance,maybemoremotivatedtoactivelyparticipateinacourse.138Aprelimi-naryassessmentmaycomplementacourse’s finalassessment.Bycomparing thetwo assessments for a particular student, it is possible to evaluate the degree ofimprovement—thestudent’ssuccessatachievingthecourse’slearninggoals.139

¶58 Assessment can be used to facilitate individualized instruction. Ideally,studentsshouldreceivefeedbackonall theassessmentstheycomplete.Feedbackcan be verbal correction of a misunderstanding demonstrated by a student’sanswer to an in-class question.140 Alternatively, it can take the form of detailedcomments on a research exercise, perhaps combined with a model answer or arubric.Instructionaltechnologiescanbeespeciallyusefulinthisrespect.141Coursemanagementsystemsenableinstructorstoprovideimmediatefeedbackonassess-mentsbyincludingspecificexplanationsaboutanswersandwhytheyare(orarenot)correct.AnexampleofthisistheexercisesavailableonlineattheCenterforComputer-Assisted Legal Instruction (CALI).142 Additionally, instructors maydirectstudentstoparticularresourcesthatwouldimprovetheirunderstandinginanareainwhichtheyfailedtoachievelearninggoals.

135. Pellegrino,supranote131,at8. 136. By giving an assessment as an assignment prior to the first class session, the instructorcanbettertargettheinitialclasssessiontothestudents.Theassessmentmayalsoincludesomeques-tionsthatwillhelptheinstructorrememberstudents’names. 137. Encouraging students to explain difficult concepts to each other is an effectiveinstructional strategy. Sometimes students are more attentive to and better able to understand anexplanationdeliveredbyapeer,ratherthanbyaninstructor.Conductingapre-assessmentmayhelptargetstudentswhobringvaluable(andaccurate)priorknowledgetoaclassroom.Alternatively,apre-assessmentmayhelpaninstructorcreatelearninggroups.Studentsmaybegroupedandassigneddifferenttasks,dependingonthepriorknowledgetheybringtothecourse. 138. The preliminary assessment may both gain students’ attention and help them to seetherelevanceoftheinstructionalgoals.Theteachinginresponsemaybuildconfidenceandsatisfac-tion.SeeNiedringhaus,supranote37,at115–16. 139. According to Ann Hemmens’s survey, only 26.8% of advanced legal research coursesusearesearchexamtoevaluatestudents.Hemmens,supranote100,at234,¶58.Hemmens’ssurveyisfrom2000though;assessmentstrategiesmayhavechangedsincethen. 140. Green,supranote6. 141. Pellegrino,supranote131,at11–12. 142. CALI makes interactive, online lessons on a variety of topics available to law students.Anumber of research skills lessons are available, some of which are targeted to specific subjects orjurisdictions.SeeCALI,http://www.cali.org(lastvisitedJan.4,2012).


¶59Finalexaminationsareatypicalformoflawschoolassessment.Doctrinallawschoolcourses,particularlythoseinthefirstyear,assessstudentsprimarilybyacomprehensive finalexamat theendof the semester.143Some first-yearcourseprofessorsmayofferstudents in first-yearcoursesanopportunity totakeamid-termexam,thusgivingthemexposuretothehigh-stakestestingthatistypicalinlawschool.

¶60Otheroptionsmayexist forassessingstudents ina legal researchcourse.Nancy Armstrong advocates that instructors of legal research courses considerimplementinganoralfinalexam.Sheexplainsthatthegoalofsuchanexamistohavestudentstalkaboutresearchtechniquesoractuallydemonstratetheirresearchstrategiesandskills.144Sheadvisesinstructorswhowishtotrythismethodthattheyshouldestimatetheamountoftimetheythinkisneededtocompletetheexamandthendoubleit.Whenproctoringherexams,sheusuallyschedulesstudentsforonehour, with forty-five minutes spent working in the library and fifteen minutesdebriefingtheexamtogetherintheoffice.145Suchanexammaypleaselearnerswhohaveavarietyof learning styles,but itmaybemore time-consuming toproctorthanamoretypicaltake-homeresearchproblemsetorpathfinder.

¶61Apedagogicalquestionnotyetdiscussed,butraisedbyassessment,iswhatconstitutesa“right”answer.AssumeaninstructordesignedaquestionthatwouldrequireastudenttoidentifyasectionintheCode of Federal Regulations,readthesection,andprovideananswertoalegalquestion.Iftheinstructor’spedagogicalgoalissimplythatstudentscanidentifyappropriateresourcesandnavigatethoseresourceswhen facedwitha researchproblem, the studentmight earncompletecreditforidentifyingaproperresourceandlocatingtherelevantsection(s)inthesource, regardless of the accuracy of the answer to the legal question. Anotherinstructor,havingdesignedthesamequestion,mightonlygivepartialcreditforthesamestudentanswer,onthebasisthatthestudentfailedtocorrectlyreadandana-lyzethesourcewhenansweringthelegalquestion.Thebetterpracticewouldbetoconsider the accuracy of the analysis, at least in part because the use of legalresourcestoanswerquestionsrequiresanalysisandevaluationatmanystagesintheresearch process (developing the initial research query, reviewing results forresponsivenesstotheproblem,revisingthequery).146Proponentsoftheopposingviewmightarguethatthelegalresearchinstructor’sjobistoteachresearch,ratherthanwritingandanalysis.Regardlessofthepedagogicalperspectiveoftheinstruc-tor,theassessmentisnotcompleteifitdoesnotincludeadequatefeedback.147

143. According to Hemmens, advanced legal research courses are remarkably standardizedintheirmethodsofassessment.Thoughthereareavarietyofassessmentoptionsusedinadvancedlegalresearchcourses,88.7%ofthecoursesuselibraryexercisesorresearchassignments,while69%ofthecoursesrequirestudentstocreatepathfinders.Hemmens,supranote100,at234tbl.15. 144. Nancy A. Armstrong, “Tell Me More About That . . .”: Using an Oral Exam as a Final Assessment Tool,25legAl referenCe serViCes Q.,nos.2/3,2006,at117,119. 145. Id.at119–20. 146. In the interest of transparency, students should understand—from instructions or arubric—whetherornottheaccuracyofanalysiswillbeafactorinthegradingofthequestion. 147. Richard Higgins et al., The Conscientious Consumer: Reconsidering the Role of Assess-ment Feedback in Student Learning,27stud. in higher eduC.53,54(2002).


¶62 Legal research courses are not required to follow the doctrinal coursemodelofformalassessment,inwhichstudentsaregradedbasedsolelyonasum-mative examination at the end of a course; they have a panoply of assessmentoptionsavailable.148Astudentcouldbeassessedbasedonhisperformanceinrela-tiontoinstructorquestioning—thestudent’sanswerscouldbethebasisofahighergradeattheendofthesemester.Theinstructormightalsogiveadditionalassign-mentsthatarethebasisofthestudent’sfinalgrade.Additionalassignmentscouldincludetreasurehuntquestions,process-basedresearchquestions,completionofCALI lessons, or required “lab time” in which students are taught computer-assisted legal research skills. The doctrinal course model provides students withlittleornofeedbackabouttheirprogresstowardachievinglearninggoals;awell-designed legal research course should provide students with ongoing feedback,encouragingthedevelopmentofschemataandmetacognitiveskills.

Conclusion

¶63Thepedagogyoflegalresearchisanimportantissueforlawlibrarianstoconsider, in no small part because law librarians are experts in legal research,includingtheresourcesandstrategiesthatmaybestbeusedtoansweraresearchquestion. Even without formal pedagogical training, law librarians can improvetheir teachingbyreadingprofessional literatureandengaging in theburgeoningconversationaboutteaching.Byconsideringboththetheoryofteachingstrategies,suchastheuseofscaffolding,schematheory,andtheroleofquestioning,aswellasthepracticalapplicationofteachingstrategies,suchasthethink-pair-sharetech-niqueandrelatedquestioningstrategies,lawlibrarianscanimprovetheireffective-nessinthelegalresearchclassroom.Further,byarticulatingcoursedesigndecisionsthrough learning goals and the use of rubrics and assessments, legal researchinstructorscanprovidestudentswithhelpful tools fordevelopingmetacognitiveskills,enablingstudentstocontinuetoimprovetheir legalresearchskills later inlawschool.

148. The options implemented may be limited by the type of class offered; an advancedlegalresearchcoursewithanenrollmentoffourteenstudentslendsitselftodifferentassessmenttoolsthanafirst-yearbasiclegalresearchcoursewithanenrollmentofsixty(ormore)students.

245


WikiLeaks: A Guide for American Law Librarians*

James p. Kelly, Jr.**

In posting confidential and classified information, WikiLeaks has become one of the world’s most controversial web sites. This paper examines the federal law concerning WikiLeaks and the use of WikiLeaks as an information source. It raises questions librarians must ask themselves as technology advances and leaks continue.

Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246LegalTroubles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248FinancialTroubles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

TheEspionageAct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250New York Times Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251United States v. Rosen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

OtherRelevantStatutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25418U.S.C.§641. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25450U.S.C.§421. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25418U.S.C.§1030(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

ProsecutingWikiLeaksUnderCurrentLaw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254ProposedLegislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255CasesInvolvingWikiLeaks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257AHostofResearchProblems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

TheCongressionalResearchServiceandtheLibraryofCongress. . . . . . . . . 258ReliabilityandMoralQuandaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

¶1WikiLeakshasbecomeoneoftheworld’smostcontroversialwebsites.Inpostingconfidentialandclassifiedinformationfromgovernments,businesses,andorganizationsaroundtheworld,ithasbecomeatargetforthoseinpower.Othershavevigorouslydefendedthewebsite,sayingitpromotesanddefendstheidealsofa freepressand free speech thatarevital todemocracy.For librariansgenerally,WikiLeaks represents a new source for information that might otherwise beunavailable.However,howthis informationwasacquiredcanpresentsignificantlegalandethicalproblemsforitsusers.

¶2 This article examines WikiLeaks from a legal and a library perspective.WhilethelegalstatusorproblemsofWikiLeaksinothercountriesisoccasionally

* ©JamesP.Kelly,Jr.,2012. ** AccessServicesResearchLibrarian,AlyneQueenerMasseyLawLibrary,VanderbiltUniversity,Nashville,Tennessee.


mentioned,itisdevotedsolelytothelegalstatusofWikiLeaksintheUnitedStatesandconcernsonlythelegalstatusofthewebsite,JulianAssange,andtheorganiza-tionwith regards to the informationposted there. ItdoesnotaddressAssange’sotherlegaltroublesorthestatusofWikiLeaksinothernations,exceptincidentally.The last part of the article discusses some of the issues WikiLeaks presents forlibrarians,particularlythoseofusingWikiLeaksasasourceforusefulandother-wiseunavailable information.Nosolutionsareoffered—theissuesareraisedforthepurposesofawarenessanddebate.

Background

¶3WikiLeaksdescribesitselfas“anot-for-profitmediaorganisation.”1Formedin2007,theorganizationpublishes“originalsourcematerial”andnewsstoriesonitswebsite.2WikiLeaksclaimsitisbasedon“thedefenceoffreedomofspeechandmediapublishing,theimprovementofourcommonhistoricalrecordandthesup-portoftherightsofallpeopletocreatenewhistory.”3Itseesitselfasanewsorga-nizationandanoutletforwhistle-blowers.AlthoughitpresentsitsnewsstoriesinaWikipedia-likestyle,ithasnorelationtoWikipedia.Despiteitsname,WikiLeaksisnotawiki,sogeneraluserscannoteditdocuments.4

¶4Sinceitsinception,thewebsitehasstirredcontroversyforitspublicationofdocuments“ofpolitical,diplomatic,orethicalsignificance.”5Thishasincluded,inmanycases,publishingdocumentsthathavebeenclassifiedbygovernments.Thewebsiteacceptsanonymoussourcesofinformationandvetsthisinformationforaccuracyandauthenticity.6Thewebsitecontains“ahighsecurityanonymousdropboxfortifiedbycutting-edgecryptographicinformationtechnologies,”7andplacesahighvalueonanonymityandprotectionofitssources:

Weusetraditionalinvestigativejournalismtechniquesaswellasmoremoderntechnol-ogy-basedmethods.Typicallywewilldoaforensicanalysisofthedocument,determinethecostofforgery,means,motive,opportunity,theclaimsoftheapparentauthoringorganisa-tion,andanswerasetofotherdetailedquestionsaboutthedocument.Wemayalsoseekexternalverificationofthedocument.8

¶5OneofthemostimportantfeaturesofWikiLeaks,fromalegalperspective,isthatitclaimsitdoesnotsolicitinformation.Itseesitselfasasiteforenabling

1. About,WiKileAKs,http://www.wikileaks.ch/About.html(lastvisitedJan.4,2012)[hereinaf-terAbout WikiLeaks]. 2. Id. 3. Id. 4. Id. 5. Wikileaks: Submissions,WiKileAKs,archived version available athttp://web.archive.org/web/20080419013425/http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Submissions (last visited Jan. 27, 2012)(asofthiswritingthecurrentWikiLeakssitehasnoactivesubmissionspage). 6. Submissions,WiKileAKs,http://www.wikileaks.org/Submissions(lastvisitedJan.9,2012). 7. About WikiLeaks,supranote1. 8. Id.

247Vol. 104:2 [2012-20] WIKILeAKS: A gUIde FOR AMeRICAN LAW LIBRARIANS

whistle-blowing. Rather than go directly to the press, whistle-blowers can go toWikiLeaks,andWikiLeakscanthenleaktothepressandpublicatlarge.9

¶6Thewebsite’s“home,”theInternethostBahnhof,iscurrentlylocatedinabombshelter inthemountainsofSweden.10Becauseof its troublesandinterna-tionalscope,thewebsitehasmultipleURLsandhasmovedovertime,butiscur-rently available at both http://www.wikileaks.org and http://www.wikileaks.ch.Mostnotably,WikiLeaksatonepointmoveditssitetoAmazon.com’sserversfol-lowing an attack by a hacker on its old servers.Amazon then oustedWikiLeaks,claimingWikiLeaksdidnotfollowAmazon’stermsofservice.11

¶7 When Amazon ousted WikiLeaks, a group of hackers calling themselves“Anonymous” targeted the web sites of Amazon and other companies that hadstopped working with WikiLeaks, such as Paypal, MasterCard, and Bank ofAmerica,alongwithcriticsofWikiLeakslikeSenatorJosephLiebermanandformervicepresidentialcandidateSarahPalin,withdistributeddenialofservice(DDoS)attacks,designedtoshutthesitesdown.12TheattackagainstAmazonwasnotsuc-cessful,butPaypalwasdownforatime.13ItdoesnotappearthatWikiLeakswasresponsible,buttheorganizationsaidtheattacksreflectedpublicopinioninsup-portofWikiLeaks.14Indeed,theattacksseemtohavebeenacoordinatedeffortbyhackers who supported WikiLeaks’ cause.15 In July 2011, sixteen people in theUnitedStatesandfiveinEuropewerearrestedfortheirallegedrolesinthecyberattacks.16

¶8ThepublicfaceofWikiLeaksisJulianAssange,anAustralianpublisher,jour-nalist,andformercomputerhacker.HisstatusintheUnitedStatesindicateshowdivisive a figurehehasbecome:U.S.officialshave called forhis arrest, andVicePresident Joseph Biden has characterized him as a terrorist,17 but he was votedReaders’ChoiceforTimemagazine’s2010PersonoftheYear.18Asofthiswriting,heresidesinEnglandwhileappealinganorderofextraditiontoSwedenoncharges

9. Id. 10. W.J.Hennigan,Wikileaks’ New Home Is in a Former Bomb Shelter,l.A. times: teChnology(Dec. 2, 2010, 11:07 A.m.), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/12/wikileaks-bahnhof-amazon.html. 11. Id.; W.J. Hennigan, Amazon Says It Dumped Wikileaks Because It Put Innocent People in Jeopardy, l.A. times: teChnology (Dec. 2, 2010, 6:40 p.m.), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/12/amazon-wikileaks-servers.html. 12. Sean-Paul Correll, ’Tis the Season of DDoS—WikiLeaks Edition, pAndAlAbs blog (Dec. 4,2010),http://pandalabs.pandasecurity.com/tis-the-season-of-ddos-wikileaks-editio/. 13. GeorginaProdhan,WikiLeaks Supporters’ Group Abandons Cyber Attacks,reuters(Dec.11,2010),http://af.reuters.com/article/cameroonNews/idAFLDE6BA05O20101211. 14. David Meyer, Wikileaks Refuses to Back, Condemn Anonymous Attack, zdnet uK (Dec.9, 2010), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/blogs/communication-breakdown-10000030/wikileaks-refuses-to-back-condemn-anonymous-attacks-10021275/. 15. Prodhan,supranote13. 16. PressRelease,Fed.BureauofInvestigation,SixteenIndividualsArrestedintheUnitedStatesfor Alleged Roles in Cyber Attacks (July 19, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/sixteen-individuals-arrested-in-the-united-states-for-alleged-roles-in-cyber-attacks. 17. AndrewRossSorkin,A WikiLeaks Problem for Enforcers,n.y. times,Dec.21,2010,atB1. 18. Megan Friedman, Julian Assange: Readers’ Choice for TIME’s Person of the Year 2010, time neWsfeed (Dec. 13, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/12/13/julian-assange-readers-choice-for-times-person-of-the-year-2010.


of sexual assault.19 Assange claims the charges are false and politically moti-vated.20

Legal troubles

¶9ThenatureofWikiLeaksandtheinformationithaspublishedhasbroughttheorganizationintodirectconflictwithmanygovernments,businesses,andorga-nizations.Accordingtoitswebsite,“sinceformationin2007,WikiLeakshasbeenvictoriousovereverylegal(andillegal)attack,includingthosefromthePentagon,theChinesePublicSecurityBureau,theformerpresidentofKenya,thePremierofBermuda,Scientology,theCatholic&MormonChurch,thelargestSwissprivatebank,andRussiancompanies.”21AmongsomeofthemorecontentiousdocumentspostedonWikiLeaksaremorethan91,000U.S.militaryreportsrelatedtothewarinAfghanistan22andalmost400,000reportsrelatedtothewarinIraq.23OnApril5,2010,WikiLeaksreleasedoneof itsmostcontroversialstories:aclassifiedU.S.militaryvideoofahelicopterattackinIraqin2007thatresultedinthedeathof,amongothers,twoReuterscorrespondents.24

¶10InNovember2010,WikiLeaks,alongwithseveralnewspapersincludingtheNew York Times, released 250,000 U.S. diplomatic cables.25 Prior to the release,however,JulianAssangesentalettertotheU.S.ambassadortotheUnitedKingdom,offering toconsidernotpublishingspecific reportsornames if theU.S.govern-mentbelievedthattheinformationwouldputpeopleatsignificantriskofharm.26TheStateDepartmentrespondedbysayingthatpublicationofanyclassifiedmate-rial would be a violation of federal law and demanded the return of the docu-ments.27 Once the documents were published, U.S. Secretary of State HillaryClintonstatedthat“thisdisclosureisnotjustanattackonAmerica’sforeignpolicyinterests,itisanattackontheinternationalcommunity.”28Asaresultofthisinci-dent and others, many U.S. government officials have condemnedWikiLeaks instronglanguage.OneofthestrongestcondemnationscamefromPeterKing,chair-

19. AlanCowell&RaviSomaiya,Assange’s Appeal Advances,n.y. times,Dec.17,2011,atA11. 20. RaviSomaiya,From WikiLeaks Founder, a Barrage of Media Interviews,n.y. times.Com(Dec.17,2010),http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/world/europe/18assange.html. 21. About WikiLeaks,supranote1. 22. Afghan War Diary, WiKileAKs (July 25, 2010), http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Afghan_War_Diary,_2004-2010. 23. Baghdad War Diary,WiKileAKs,http://wikileaks.org/irq(lastvisitedJan.23,2012). 24. See Collateral Murder, 5 Apr 2010, WiKileAKs (Apr. 5, 2010), http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Collateral_Murder,_5_Apr_2010. 25. ScottShane&AndrewW.Lehren,Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look Inside U.S. Diplomacy,n.y. times,Nov.29,2010,atA1. 26. Letter from Julian Assange to Ambassador Louis B. Susman (Nov. 26, 2010), available athttp://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/11/wl-112610.pdf. 27. LetterfromHaroldHongjuKoh,U.S.LegalAdviser,toJenniferRobinsonandJulianAssange(Nov.27,2010),available athttp://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Dept_of_State_Assange_letter.pdf. 28. StevenErlanger,Many Europeans Find U.S. Attacks on WikiLeaks Puzzling,n.y. times,Dec.10,2010,atA12.


manoftheHomelandSecurityCommitteeoftheHouseofRepresentatives,whocalledWikiLeaksaforeignterroristorganization.29

¶11OnNovember29,2010,U.S.AttorneyGeneralEricHolderannouncedthata criminal investigation was under way.30 A federal grand jury was convened inAlexandria, Virginia, to consider possible charges against WikiLeaks and JulianAssange.31 On December 14, 2010, a court order requested Twitter to turn overrecords“for each account registered to or associated withWikiLeaks,” under theauthorityof18U.S.C.§2703(d)(theStoredWireandElectronicCommunicationsandTransactionalRecordsAccessAct).32TheTwitterorderandrelateddocumentswerefiledunderseal,thusmakingthemunavailablepublicly.However,theorderisavailableonWikiLeaks.33TheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionmovedtounsealthedocuments and vacate the order, citing the constitutional issues involved.34 OnNovember10,2011,thedistrictcourtheldthattheTwitterdisclosureorderdidnotviolatetheFourthAmendmentordueprocess,andthattherewasnoexpectationofprivacy in their Internetprotocoladdressesbecause itsprivacypolicypermitsTwittertoretainusers’IPaddresses.35

¶12 To date, however, there have been noAmerican charges or prosecutionsregardingWikiLeaksitself.ThesuspectedleakeroftheAfghanistanwardocuments,ArmyPrivateBradleyManning,isfacingacourt-martial.36

Financial troubles

¶13Whiletheyhavebeenunsuccessfultodate,thelegalchallengestoWikiLeakshave not been without consequence. The cost of defending the site has placedWikiLeaks in financial straits. According to the site, five major financial institu-tions—Visa,MasterCard,PayPal,WesternUnion,andBankofAmerica—willnolongerallowdonationstoWikiLeaks,blockingoverninety-fivepercentoftheorga-nization’sdonations.37InOctober2011,WikiLeakstemporarilysuspendedpublish-ing operations and announced that without the lifting of the restrictions by

29. DeclanMcCullagh,Congressman Wants WikiLeaks Listed as Terrorist Group,CNET(Nov.28,2010),http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20023941-38.html. 30. Mahmoud Kassem, Attorney General Holder Says U.S. Probing Leaks of Afghanistan Documents, bloomberg (July 28, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/attorney-general-holder-says-u-s-probing-leaks-of-afghanistan-documents.html. 31. EdPilkington,WikiLeaks: US Opens Grand Jury Hearing,guArdiAn(May11,2011),http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/may/11/us-opens-wikileaks-grand-jury-hearing. 32. Order,In reApplicationoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaforanOrderPursuantto18U.S.C.§2703(d),Misc.No.10GJ3793(E.D.Va.,Dec.14,2010),available athttp://mirror.wikileaks.info/leak/twitter-subpoena.pdf. 33. Id. 34. Motion of Jacob Applebaum et al. for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records, Misc. No.10GJ3793,2011WL479748(E.D.Va.,Jan.26,2011);KimZetter,EFF, ACLU Challenge Feds’ WikiLeaks Twitter Probe, Wired.Com (Feb. 8, 2011, 7:47 p.m.), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/groups-challenge-twitter-probe/. 35. In reApplicationoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaforanOrderPursuantto18U.S.C.2703(d),Misc.Nos.1:11-DM-3,10-GJ-3793,1:11-EC-3,2011WL5508991(E.D.Va.,Nov.10,2011). 36. Suspect in Leaks Case Moves One Step Closer to Court-Martial,n.y. times, Jan.20,2012,atA19. 37. Donate,WiKileAKs,http://shop.wikileaks.org/donate(lastvisitedJan.27,2012).


financialservicescompaniestheorganizationwouldshutdownbytheendoftheyear.38Earlierintheyear,thesiteopenedagiftshopwithshirts,bags,andothermerchandisewiththeWikiLeakslogoalongwithpicturesofAssangeandthetag-line“Courageiscontagious.”39Assangereportedlysoldtherightstohisautobiog-raphyforanalleged$1.3milliontokeepthesiteafloat.40However,hesupposedlykepthisadvanceandneverdeliveredafinalmanuscript.41Withthehelpofaghost-writer,theBritishpublisherCanongatereleasedJulian Assange: The Unauthorized AutobiographyinSeptember2011.42

¶14Whether or notWikiLeaks survives or is embroiled in legal turmoil foryearstocome,thequestionsitraisesaboutconfidentialandclassifiedinformationandtheimmediacyofelectronicdisclosureofmaterial,alongwiththeconfidenti-alityofitssources,willcontinuetoberelevant.Infact,althoughnoneofthemhaveyet garnered the attention thatWikiLeaks has, many copycats have sprung up.43Thequestionsofnationalsecurityandmilitarysecrecyversusfreedomofspeechandofthepress,combinedwiththetechnologicaladvancesthatmakeasite likeWikiLeaks possible, should be of great interest to librarians of all sorts and lawlibrariansinparticular.Theapplicablelaw,aswillbeshown,isunsettled,anditsapplicationtoWikiLeaksischallenging.

The Espionage Act

¶15 Known formally as the Barbour Espionage Act, the Espionage Act waspassed in 1917 and is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–798. An extensivestudyof theEspionageActandrelated lawswaspublishedbyHaroldEdgarandBennoSchmidt,Jr.,in1973.44Accordingtothatstudy,theActremainssubstantiallyunchanged since its original adoption.45 There has been little change in theActsincethestudyaswell.

¶16TheportionsoftheEspionageActthatbarthedisseminationofclassifiedgovernmentmaterialarecodifiedat18U.S.C.§793.Thelawspecificallydealsonly

38. Paul Sonne, WikiLeaks Near Closing—Website to Fight Blockade by Financial-Services Companies,WAll st. J.,Oct.25,2011,atB3. 39. Nicholas Jackson, In Need of Cash, WikiLeaks Opens Online Gift Shop, the AtlAntiC(Feb.23,2011,10:17A.m.),http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/02/in-need-of-cash-wikileaks-opens-online-gift-shop/71606. The gift shop can be seen at http://wikileaks.spreadshirt.com(lastvisitedFeb.13,2012). 40. Jeanne Whalen, Branding WikiLeaks—Assange Puts Mug on T-Shirts for Sale on Online Shop, WAll st. J., Feb. 23, 2011, at B6. Cf. David Leigh, Julian Assange: The Unauthorized Autobiography—Review, guArdiAn (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/sep/26/julian-assange-unauthorised-autobiography-review/print(statingthattheadvancewas£412,000,orabout$635,000). 41. Leigh,supranote40. 42. Id. 43. Forexample,OpenLeaks(http://openleaks.net)wasfoundedinSeptember2010byDanielDomscheit-Berg,aformerWikiLeaksspokesperson.SeedAniel domsCheit-berg, inside WiKileAKs239(JeffersonChasetrans.,2011). 44. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information,73Colum. l. reV.929(1973). 45. Id.at939.


withnationaldefenseinformation.Thedescriptionof“information”inthestatuteislengthyandseeminglyexhaustivebutdefinitelywrittenforthepre-Internetera:“anydocument,writing,codebook,signalbook,sketch,photograph,photographicnegative,blueprint,plan,map,model,instrument,appliance,ornote,ofanythingconnectedwiththenationaldefense....”46

¶17 The statute provides for a fine or imprisonment when a governmentemployeeinlawfulpossessionofinformation“relatedtothenationaldefense”that“thepossessorhasreasontobelievecouldbeusedtotheinjuryoftheUnitedStatesortotheadvantageofanyforeignnation”providesthatinformation“toanypersonnot entitled to receive it.” Section 793(c) allows for prosecution of persons whoreceivethisinformationaslongastherecipientknowsorshouldhaveknownthatthesourceviolatedotherportionsoftheAct.Section793(d)prohibitsthewillfuldistributionoftheinformation,whilesection793(f)prohibitsnegligentdistribu-tionoftheinformation.

¶18As somescholarshavepointedout, section793(e) is“oneof the scarieststatutes around.”47 It prohibits distribution of classified defense information toanyonenotentitledtoreceiveit.Thesescholarsnotethatthestatutelacksaspecificintentrequirement—onedoesnotneedtointendtoviolatethelawtohaveviolatedit.48 Theoretically, a person could be charged with a violation of section 793(e)withoutevenknowingorintendingtobreakthelawordistributeclassifieddefenseinformation.Further,section793(e)prohibitstheretentionoftheinformationandfailuretoreturnit.

New York Times Co. v. United States

¶19ThemostsignificanttestoftheEspionageActcameinthePentagonPaperscase,New York Times Co. v. United States.49Inthatcase,theNixonadministrationsoughttoblocktheNew York TimesandWall Street Journalfrompublishingatop-secretPentagondocumentdetailingU.S.involvementinVietnaminthe1960s.Theadministrationarguedthattheexecutivebranchhadsuchauthorityifitcouldshowa“graveandirreparabledanger”inthepublicationofthematerial.50

¶20Thefederaldistrictcourtheldthatthegovernmenthadnotmetthishighstandardforpriorrestraint.51However,theSecondCircuitleftinplaceatemporarystayblockingpublication,remandingtothelowercourtforfurtherexaminationofthedocuments.52TheU.S.SupremeCourt,inapercuriamopinion,agreedwiththedistrictcourtandheldthatthegovernment“carriesaheavyburdenofshowingjus-tificationfortheimpositionofsucharestraint.”53JusticeBlack,inhisconcurrence,

46. 18U.S.C.§793(c)(2006)(sectioncoveringreceivingorobtaininginformation). 47. See, e.g.,StephenI.Vladeck,Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 hArV. l. & pol’y reV. 219, 223 (2007) (quoting susAn buCKley, reporting on the WAr on terror: the espionAge ACt And other sCAry stAtutes9(2ded.2006)). 48. Id. 49. 403U.S.713(1971). 50. Id.at732(White,J.,concurring). 51. UnitedStatesv.N.Y.TimesCo.,328F.Supp.324(S.D.N.Y.1971). 52. UnitedStatesv.N.Y.TimesCo.,444F.2d544(2dCir.1971). 53. N.Y.TimesCo.v.UnitedStates,403U.S.at714(quotingOrganizationforaBetterAustinv.Keefe,402U.S.415,419(1971)).


found thegovernment’sdemandscompletelyatoddswith the intentof theFirstAmendment guarantee of freedom of the press:“The Government’s case here isbasedonpremisesentirelydifferentfromthosethatguidedtheFramersoftheFirstAmendment.”54 Thus, the executive did not have the power or authority to barpublication.

¶21JusticeDouglasfocusedonthelanguageoftheEspionageActandfounditirrelevanttothecaseathand:“ItisapparentthatCongresswascapableofanddiddistinguishbetweenpublishingandcommunicationinthevarioussectionsoftheEspionage Act.”55 Section 793 does not use the word publication, but only barsthosewho“willfullycommunicate.”56Thegovernmentarguedthatpublicationwasimplicit in this wording, but, as Douglas noted, some chapters of the U.S. Codedealingwithnationalsecurityusethetermpublishedwhileothersdonot.57Thisdistinctionevidencedcongressionalintenttoexcludepublicationasprosecutablebehavior.Thedistrictcourthadalsofoundthatthestatutedidnotapplytopub-lishing.58 A previously rejected version of section 793 that appeared in theCongressional Record was cited by the government to show congressional intent,butDouglasnotedthattheprovisionhadspecificallybeendefeatedintheSenate.59Inotherconcurrences,JusticeWhitediscussedthelegislativehistoryandintentofthe Espionage Act, making clear that he was unwilling to proscribe publicationabsentsomelegislationenactedbyCongress,60andJusticeBlacknotedaswellthattherewasnostatutebarringpublication.61

¶22 While the Pentagon Papers case was a loss for the government, DanielEllsberg,aU.S.militaryanalyst,waschargedwith,amongotheroffenses,violatingtheEspionageActforreleasingthematerialtotheNew York Times.Ellsbergturnedhimselfinvoluntarily.62Thetrialjudgeinthecaseeventuallythrewoutthechargesafterrevelations thatWhiteHouseoperativeshadburglarizedEllsberg’spsychia-trist and wiretapped conversations Ellsberg had with others about the PentagonPapers.63ThefailedprosecutionleftthelegalissuesposedbyEllsberg’sdistributionofthedocumentsunresolved.

¶23EllsberghasmetwithJulianAssangeandseemstofavorWikiLeaksanditsphilosophy,claimingitcontributedtotherecentdownfallofdictatorsinTunisiaandEgypt.64

54. Id.at717. 55. Id.at721. 56. Id.at720;18U.S.C.§793(e)(2006). 57. 403U.S.at721. 58. UnitedStatesv.N.Y.TimesCo.,328F.Supp.324,328–30(S.D.N.Y.1971). 59. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,403U.S.at721. 60. Id.at733–34,740. 61. Id.at718. 62. RobertReinhold,Ellsberg Yields, Is Indicted; Says He Gave Data to Press,n.y. times,June29,1971,at1. 63. Judge William Byrne; Ended Trial over Pentagon Papers,WAsh. post,Jan.15,2006,atC9. 64. Henry J. Reske & Kathleen Walter, Ellsberg: WikiLeaks Helped Topple Despots, neWsmAx

.Com, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/Ellsberg-WikiLeaks-Helped-Topple/2011/02/22/id/386924.


United States v. Rosen

¶24ThemostrecentdecisionofnoteregardingtheEspionageAct,United States v. Rosen,comesfromafederaldistrictcourtinVirginiain2006.65Inthatcase,twomembersof theAmerican IsraelPublicAffairsCommittee (AIPAC),apro-IsraellobbyingorganizationinWashington,D.C.,wereprosecutedundertheAct.Whileneitherofthemhadasecurityclearance,theyobtainedapieceofintelligencecon-cerningterroristactivitiesinAsiaandthegovernment’sproposedresponsefromaDefenseDepartmentanalyst.TheyallegedlyorallycommunicatedthisinformationtoamemberofthemediaandwerechargedwithviolatingtheEspionageAct.

¶25Thedefendantschallengedtheconstitutionalityofthestatute,arguingthatthe statute was vague, that it violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freespeech,andthat itwasoverbroad.66Thecourtnotedthat thestatute’s“litigationhistoryissparse,”butthatithadwithstoodconstitutionalargumentssimilartothedefendants’.67Thedefendantsalsoarguedtheoralcommunicationoftheinforma-tiondistinguishedtheircase,sinceearliercasesinvolvedthetransmissionofdocu-ments and other tangible items. The court held that the phrase “informationrelatingtothenationaldefense,”whilenotdefinedbythestatute,hadaplainmean-ingthatincludedorallytransmittedinformation.68Thecourtheldtheprosecutioncouldproceed.69

¶26Thecourt,however,didobserveotherproblemswiththeEspionageActascurrentlywritten:

[T]hebasictermsandstructureofthisstatutehaveremainedlargelyunchangedsincetheadministration of William Howard Taft. The intervening years have witnessed dramaticchanges in thepositionof theUnitedStates inworldaffairsand thenatureof threats toournationalsecurity.TheincreasingimportanceoftheUnitedStatesinworldaffairshascausedasignificantincreaseinthesizeandcomplexityoftheUnitedStates’militaryandforeignpolicyestablishments,andintheimportanceofournation’sforeignpolicydecisionmaking.Finally,inthenearlyonehundredyearssincethepassageoftheDefenseSecretsActmankindhasmadegreattechnologicaladvancesaffectingnotonlythenatureandpotentialdevastationofmodernwarfare,butalsotheverynatureofinformationandcommunica-tion.ThesechangesshouldsuggesttoeventhemostcasualobserverthatthetimeisripeforCongresstoengageinathoroughreviewandrevisionoftheseprovisionstoensurethattheyreflectboththesechanges,andcontemporaryviewsabouttheappropriatebalancebetweenournation’ssecurityandourcitizens’abilitytoengageinpublicdebateabouttheUnitedStates’conductinthesocietyofnations.70

¶27Ashasbeenpointedout, the significanceof theRosen case is thecourt’s“sustaining for the first timethe liabilityof third-party intermediariesunder theEspionageAct...andacknowledg[ing],howeverimplicitly...third-partyinchoateliabilityarisingoutofnewsgathering.”71Accordingtothejudge,“thegovernment

65. 445F.Supp.2d602(E.D.Va.2006). 66. Id.at610. 67. Id.at613. 68. Id.at613–16. 69. Id.at645. 70. Id.at646. 71. Vladeck,supranote47,at224.


can punish those outside of the government for the unauthorized receipt anddeliberateretransmissionofinformationrelatingtothenationaldefense.”72

Other Relevant Statutes

¶28BesidestheEspionageAct,manyofthestatutesintheU.S. Codetodaydeal-ingwiththereleaseanddisseminationofclassified informationareremnantsoftheColdWar.Theyfocusheavilyonthepersonwhoinitiallytakestheinformationfromthegovernment,ratherthansubsequentdistributors.

18 U.S.C. § 641

¶29Section641of title18prohibits theftofgovernmentproperty, includingrecords,“tohisuseortheuseofanother.”Thestatutedoesnotmakespecificmen-tionofclassifiedinformation,butithasbeenusedtoprosecutedisclosersofgov-ernmentinformation.73

50 U.S.C. § 421

¶30Section421of title50proscribes thedisclosureof the identityofcovertintelligenceofficers,agents,informants,andsources.Itallowsfortheprosecutionof three types of persons: (1) those who have access to classified informationregarding covert agents who intentionally disclose information they know willrevealtheagent’sidentity,74(2)thosewholearntheidentityofacovertagentandknowinglydiscloseittopeopleunauthorizedtoknow,75and(3)thosewhothrougha“pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents” learn theidentityofanagentandknowinglydiscloseittoanyonenotauthorizedtoknow.76Eachofthesehasaspecificintentrequirement.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)

¶31Themostrecentstatuterelatedtothisissueis18U.S.C.§1030(a)(1),whichprohibits fraudulently accessinggovernment computers andkeeping, communi-cating,ortransmittinginformationonthemto“theinjuryoftheUnitedStates.”While the definition of information for this statute is broader than that for theEspionageAct,thislaw,aswiththeEspionageAct,focusesprimarilyontheindi-vidualwhotakestheinformationratherthanthereceiveroranysubsequenttrans-mitter. The statute, however, does include a clause related to conspiracy, whichcouldberelevant,dependingonthecircumstances.77

Prosecuting WikiLeaks Under Current Law

¶32Undercurrentlaw,acriminalactionagainstWikiLeaksorJulianAssangewouldbeproblematicatbest.Besidestheproblemsofextraditionandotherjuris-

72. Rosen,445F.Supp.2dat637. 73. See, e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Jones,677F.Supp.238(S.D.N.Y.1988). 74. 50U.S.C.A.§421(a)(WestSupp.2011). 75. Id.§421(b). 76. 50U.S.C.421(c)(2006). 77. 18U.S.C.§1030(b)(Supp.IV2010).


dictionalissues,theFirstAmendmentimplicationsofsuchaprosecutionaretrou-bling. As has been pointed out by government researchers, “Leaks of classifiedinformationtothepresshaveonlyrarelybeenpunishedascrimes[intheUnitedStates],and[weare]awareofnocaseinwhichapublisherofinformationobtainedthroughunauthorizeddisclosurebyagovernmentemployeehasbeenprosecutedforpublishingit.”78

¶33Theunlawfulacquisitionanddivulgenceoftheinformationismoreeasilyprosecutable.Allthestatutesmentionedabovefocusonthepersonwhoacquirestheinformationandthenatureoftheinformationitself.SomeofthelanguageoftheEspionageActindicatesthatthosewhocomeintopossessionofdefensemate-rialmaybeheldaccountable,butwhatWikiLeakshasdivulged,classifiedthoughitmaybe, isnotall likelytobeconsidereddetrimentaltonationaldefense.Forthepurposesoftheotherstatutesmentioned,thematerialmaybegovernmentprop-ertyandtakenfromacomputer,butthosestatutesagainfocusonthepersonwhotakesthepropertyfromthegovernment,notonsubsequentreceiversordivulgers.

¶34Sinceitdoesnotapparentlyrequestorsolicitsuchinformation,WikiLeakswouldnotbethetargetofthoseprosecutions.InthecaseoftheAfghanwardocu-ments that have been released, the divulger, Bradley Manning, has been chargedandarrested.79ThelanguageintheEspionageActthatcouldbeusedtoprosecuteWikiLeaksfornotreturningthedocumentstothegovernment,asrequested,pres-entsconstitutionalproblems.TheRosencasealsoseemstoleaveopenthepossibil-ityofprosecutionundertheAct.Again,todate,noU.S.criminalchargeshavebeenleviedagainstWikiLeaks,JulianAssange,orothermembersoftheorganization.

¶35Inthewakeoftheseproblems,therehavebeencongressionalmovestowardmaking the criminalization and prosecution of actions like those of WikiLeaksmorepossible.However,theseproposedstatutesposeotherproblems.

Proposed Legislation

¶36 On December 21, 2010, the Espionage Statutes Modernization Act wasintroduced in the Senate.80 As the title suggests, the proposed Act attempted torewrite some of the obsolete language of the EspionageAct and to broaden thetypesofinformationcovered.Itwouldhavecoverednotjustdefenseinformation,butallclassifiedinformationrelatedtonationalsecurity.Inthe112thCongress,asimilar bill has been introduced in the Senate and referred to the JudiciaryCommittee,81butasofthiswriting,nofurtheractionhasbeentakenonthebill.

¶37 The proposed Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing LawfulDissemination(SHIELD)Acthasalsobeenproposedinbothchambers.Itwouldprovidepenaltiesfordisclosureofclassifiedinformation,identifyingtwotypesof

78. Jennifer K. elseA, Cong. reseArCh serV., R 41404, CriminAl prohibitions on the publiCAtion of ClAssified defense informAtion14(2011). 79. Suspect in Leaks Case Moves One Step Closer to Court-Martial,supranote36. 80. S.4051,111thCong.(2010). 81. S.355,112thCong.(2011).


informationthatmaynotbedisclosed.82Thefirstisinformation“concerningthehuman intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government.”“Humanintelligence,”forthispurpose,isdefinedas“allprocedures,sources,andmethodsemployedinthecollectionofintelligencethroughhumansources.”Thesecondis“informationconcerningtheidentityofaclassifiedsourceorinformantofanelementoftheintelligencecommunityoftheUnitedStates.”Thedefinitionof“classifiedinformation”isbroadenedanddefinedas“informationwhich...is,for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United StatesGovernmentAgencyforlimitedorrestricteddisseminationordistribution.”83Inshort,thelawwouldcoveranythingnotintendedforpublicscrutinythatisrelatednotonlytodefense,butalsotonationalintelligencegathering.

¶38OnDecember16,2010,theHouseJudiciaryCommitteeheldahearingtodiscusstheEspionageActandthelegalissuesrelatedtoWikiLeaks.84Thecommit-teemembersspokeofthebalancebetweennationalsecurityandconstitutionalfreespeech. Members also questioned whether the WikiLeaks scandal demonstratesthattoomuchgovernmentinformationisbeingclassifiedunnecessarily.85

¶39Expertwitnessesspokeonavarietyofissues.GeoffreyStone,professoroflawattheUniversityofChicago,statedthattheproposedSHIELDActwasuncon-stitutional:“Attheveryleast,itmustlimititsprohibitiontothosecircumstancesinwhichtheindividualswhopubliclydisseminatedclassifiedinformationknewthatthedisseminationwouldcreateaclearandimminentdangerofgraveharmtoourNationorourpeople.”86Inhispreparedremarks,Stoneemphasizedthat“[i]ntheentirehistoryof theUnitedStates, thegovernmenthasneverprosecutedanyone(otherthanagovernmentemployee)forpubliclydisseminatingsuchinformation.”87

¶40AbbeDavidLowell,anattorneyinvolvedintheRosencase,testifiedabouttheflawsoftheEspionageAct.Thelawisalmostonehundredyearsold,andtheconstitutionalityofsomeofitsprovisionsisquestionableinlightofthedecisioninthe Pentagon Papers case.88 If charges were filed against WikiLeaks or JulianAssange,it:

wouldbeunprecedentedbecauseitwouldbeapplying[theEspionageAct]toa(a)non-governmentofficial,(b)whohadnoconfidentialityagreement,(c)whodidnotstealtheinformation,(d)whodidnotsellorpayfortheinformationinvolved,(e)whowasquiteout front and not secretive about what he was doing, (f) who gave the U.S. notice andaskedifthegovernmentwantedtomakeredactionstoprotectanyinformation,and(g)inacontextthatcanbearguedtobenewsgatheringanddisseminationprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.89

82. S.315,112thCong.(2011);H.R.703,112thCong.(2011). 83. Id.(thelanguageinbothbillsisidentical). 84. EspionageActandtheLegalandConstitutionalIssuesRaisedbyWikiLeaks:HearingBeforetheCommitteeontheJudiciary,111thCong.33(2010). 85. Id.at4. 86. Id.at8. 87. Id.at17. 88. Id.at22. 89. Id.at33.


¶41Similarly,otherwitnessesfocusedontheneedforrevisionoftheEspionageActwhilekeepinginmindFirstAmendment–guaranteedfreedomofthepressandthedemandsofnational security.WikiLeaks clearly isnot the first challenge thegovernmenthasfaced,eveninapost-9/11world.90

Cases Involving WikiLeaks

¶42Todate,thereisonlyonereportedcaseinvolvingWikiLeaksasaparty,andit involved corporate rather than government information. In 2008, Bank JuliusBaersuedWikiLeaksanditsdomainregistrarDynadotinfederaldistrictcourtinCalifornia, claiming the site had published confidential and forged bank docu-ments.91Thesuitallegedcausesofactionforunlawfulandunfairbusinessprac-tices,interferencewithcontract,interferencewithprospectiveeconomicadvantage,andconversion.ThebankrequestedaninjunctiontoblocktheWikiLeaksdomainname,thuspreventingaccesstothesite.Thedistrictcourtquestionedwhetherithadsubjectmatterjurisdiction,sinceallthepartiesexceptDynadotwereforeign.92Second, it found that the remedy,an injunction,wasproblematicbecauseof theFirstAmendment implications and because it was likely overbroad. Rather thanshutdownWikiLeaks,thecourtcouldhaveorderedtheremovalofthedocuments.Further, the initial temporary injunction had an effect opposite to what wasintended.Itincreasedinterestinthematerialthathadbeenposted,andmirrorsitesmadeitavailablethroughothersources.93Thustheinjunctionwasdissolved,andfurtherinjunctionsweredenied.94Thebankthendroppedthesuit.95

¶43 While not a party, WikiLeaks played a significant role in another recentfederalcase.Afterbeing fired,RhondaSalmeronbroughtanactionclaimingheremployer,EnterpriseRecoverySystems,committedfraudinitsstudentloancollec-tionpractices.Otherdefendants,includingUSAFunds,Inc.,andSallieMae,Inc.,wereadded.Salmeron’sattorney in thecasewasrepeatedlyadmonishedformis-conductandwaswarnedagainstfuturemisconduct.WhenacopyofaconfidentialGuarantee ServicesAgreement between Sallie Mae and USA Funds appeared onWikiLeaks,bearingstampsthatshowedithadcomefromthelawsuitandwasdes-ignatedfor“attorney’seyesonly,”thedistrictcourtdismissedtheactionasasanc-tion for the disclosure.96 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Salmeron’sattorneyhadbeenwarnedagainstfurthermisconduct.97

90. See id.at52(statementofGabrielSchoenfeld,SeniorFellow,HudsonInstitute). 91. BankJuliusBaer&Co.Ltd.v.Wikileaks,535F.Supp.2d980,983–85(N.D.Cal.2008). 92. Id.at983–84. 93. Id.at984–85. 94. Id.at985. 95. ThomasClaburn,Swiss Bank Abandons Lawsuit Against Wikileaks,info. WeeK(Mar.6,2008,2:38p.m.),http://www.informationweek.com/news/206902154. 96. UnitedStatesex rel.Salmeronv.Enter.RecoverySys.,Inc.,No.05C4453,2008WL3876135(N.D.Ill.Aug.18,2008). 97. Salmeronv.Enter.RecoverySys.,Inc.,579F.3d787,798(7thCir.2009).


A Host of Research Problems

¶44WikiLeakspresentsotherproblemsbesides thedifficultyofprosecution.Fromtheperspectiveoflibrarians,aninterestingquestionistheabilitytouseandaccesstheinformationpostedonWikiLeaks,informationthatmightnototherwisebeavailable.Thefederalgovernment,bywayofthegeneralcounsel’sofficeoftheOfficeofManagementandBudget(OMB),hasbarreditsemployeesfromviewingdocumentsonWikiLeaks,absent“legitimateneed.”Thematerial,despiteitsdisclo-sure,remainsclassified.98

the Congressional Research Service and the Library of Congress

¶45TheCongressionalResearchService(CRS)isalegislativeagencyundertheLibraryofCongress(LOC).ItreportsdirectlytoCongress,providingreportsandanalysisforitspurposes.“ItshighestpriorityistoensurethatCongresshas24/7access to the nation’s best thinking.”99 CRS reports are indeed authoritative andwell researched. In fact,oneof thebest resources I foundwhile researching thisarticlewasaCRSreport,madeavailablebyapublicinterestgroup.100

¶46However,whiletheirresearchandcontentarehighlyregarded,thereportshave also generated controversy. Although they are funded by taxpayer dollars(approximately$100millionannually),101 theyarenotmadegenerally available.Accordingtoa2007memobythedirectorofCRS,theagencydoesnothavethe“authoritytomakeitsproductsavailabletoanyoneotherthantheCongressoftheUnitedStates.”102AnactofCongresswouldberequiredtomakethemgenerallyaccessible. While a number of reports have been placed online by variousorganizations,103 many are still unavailable. As of this writing, WikiLeaks haspostedalmost7000CRSreportsonitswebsite.104

¶47BecauseWikiLeakspostedconfidentialandclassifiedgovernmentinforma-tion,theLOCdecidedtoblockaccesstoWikiLeaksfromitscomputers.Thus,CRS,as part of the LOC, cannot access documents available on WikiLeaks. Severalemployees of CRS questioned whether this was appropriate, and whether CRS’sresearchcapabilitieswouldbedamagedasaresult:

“It’s a difficult situation,” said one CRS analyst.“The information was released illegally,andit’snotrightforgovernmentagenciestobeaidingandabettingthisillegaldissemina-

98. E-mail from OMB General Counsel’s Office to Agency General Counsels (Dec. 3, 2010),available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/documents/2010/12/ombs-email-to-government-agencies-about-wikileaks-access.php[hereinafterOMBMemo]. 99. Congressional Research Service,librAry of Cong.,http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/(lastupdatedJuly6,2011). 100. elseA,supranote78. 101. Jennifer LaFleur, WikiLeaks Publishes CRS Reports; Gov’t Still Doesn’t, propubliCA(Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.propublica.org/article/wikileaks-publishes-crs-reports-govt-still-doesnt-090210. 102. Daniel P. Mulhollan, Director, Cong. Research Serv., Memorandum on Access to CRSReports1(Apr.18,2007),available athttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/crs041807.pdf. 103. See, e.g., openCrs, http://opencrs.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2012); Congressional Research Service [CRS] Reports,fAs [fed’n of Am. sCientists],http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs(lastvisitedFeb.7,2012). 104. LaFleur,supranote101.


tion.Buttheinformationisoutthere.Presumably,anyLibraryofCongressresearcherwhowantstoaccesstheinformationthatWikiLeaksillegallyreleasedwillsimplyusetheirhomecomputersorcellphonestodoso.Willtheybeabletoreferdirectlytotheinformationintheirwritingsforthelibrary?Apparentlynot,unlessasecondarysource,likeanewspaper,happenstohavealreadycitedit.”

“Idon’tknowthatyoucanmakeacredibleargumentthatCRSreportsarethegoldstandardofanalyticalreporting,asisoftenclaimed,whenitsanalystsaredeniedaccesstoinforma-tion that historians and public policy types call a treasure trove of data,” a former CRSemployeesaid.105

CRSisonepartoftheLOC.Accordingtoitswebsite,themissionoftheLOC“istosupporttheCongressinfulfillingitsconstitutionaldutiesandtofurthertheprog-ressofknowledgeandcreativityforthebenefitoftheAmericanpeople.”106LOChasblockedaccesstoWikiLeaksacrossitsnetwork,eveninitsreadingroom.107

¶48AccordingtoanLOCspokesman,WikiLeakswasblocked“becauseappli-cablelawobligatesfederalagenciestoprotectclassifiedinformation”and“[u]nau-thorizeddisclosuresofclassifieddocumentsdonotalterthedocuments’classifiedstatusorautomaticallyresult indeclassificationof thedocuments . . . .”108WhileOMB’smemoindicatedthatcircumstancesmightallowresearchersandotherstoaccessWikiLeaks in pursuit of legitimate government interests,109 LOC does notseemtobeasflexible.Rulingoutoneparticularsourceofinformationmaycom-promisetheintegrityorqualityofanyresearchdonebyCRSorLOC.This,inturn,mayinfluenceandevenjeopardizethegovernment’sdecision-makingfunctionsasitreliesonlessthanalloftheavailableinformation.Further,itmayimpactthosewhousetheinformationCRSorLOCprovides,believingittobeauthoritativeandcomprehensive.

Reliability and Moral Quandaries

¶49Outsidethegovernment,theuseofmaterialfromWikiLeaksmaybelessproblematic,butnotwithoutcontroversy.WikiLeaksclaimstovettheinformationitreceivesforauthenticity,describingitsprocessasfollows:

Typically we will do a forensic analysis of the document, determine the cost of forgery,means,motive,opportunity,theclaimsoftheapparentauthoringorganisation,andanswerasetofotherdetailedquestionsaboutthedocument.Wemayalsoseekexternalverifica-tionof thedocument[.]For example, forour releaseof theCollateralMurdervideo,wesentateamofjournaliststoIraqtointerviewthevictimsandobserversofthehelicopterattack.Theteamobtainedcopiesofhospitalrecords,deathcertificates,eyewitnessstate-mentsandothercorroboratingevidencesupportingthetruthofthestory.Ourverificationprocessdoesnotmeanwewillnevermakeamistake,butsofarourmethodhasmeantthatWikiLeakshascorrectlyidentifiedtheveracityofeverydocumentithaspublished.110

105. Aliya Sternstein, LOC Blocks Analysts from Researching WikiLeaks, nextgoV (Dec. 6,2010,5:50p.m.),http://techinsider.nextgov.com/2010/12/the_library_of_congress_which.php. 106. About the Library, librAry of Cong., http://www.loc.gov/about/mission.html (lastvisitedJan.28,2012). 107. Brian Kalish, OMB: Don’t Look at Leaked Documents, nextgoV (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20101206_5274.php. 108. Id. 109. OMBMemo,supranote98. 110. About WikiLeaks,supranote1.


¶50Sinceitsinceptionin2007,WikiLeakshaspostedhundredsofthousandsofdocuments,andthesheervolumeofdocumentsmightgiveuserspause.Foranorganizationofitssize,whichclaimstoperformsuchscrupulouschecks,WikiLeakshasprovidedamountainofinformationinashorttime.Ontheotherhand,thegovernment’sandothers’dramaticresponsesseemtoindicatethattheinformationisgenuine.Ithasbeencitedandrelieduponbyevensomeofthemostrecognizedandrespectednewsorganizations.111

¶51ThequestionofthelegitimacyoftheinformationcomingfromWikiLeaksmustbemorecarefullyexamined.InamemoirabouthistimeasaspokesmanforWikiLeakspracticallyfromitsinception,DanielDomscheit-Bergclaimsthat,par-ticularly when the organization first started, “authenticity checks” consisted ofhimself and JulianAssange simply reviewing documents to see if they appearedgenuine.112Healsoclaimsthat,whenhelefttheorganizationasaresultofdisagree-mentswithAssange,hetookwithhimthepersonhereferstoas“thearchitect,”theinventor/programmer of WikiLeaks’ submissions system, to start OpenLeaks.113WikiLeaks’ submission system has been down since the architect left, thoughWikiLeaks has said the system was down due to a backlog of documents.114WikiLeakshaspromisedlegalactionconcerningDomscheit-Berg’sbook.115

¶52Thecontroversyalsobringsupthequestionofwhethertoomuchmaterialisclassifiedbythegovernment.116Furthermore,itdemonstratestheobsolescenceof current legislation regarding the release of this kind of information, and thelaw’s inabilitytodealwiththetechnologicaladvancesofthepasthundredyears.Thegovernment’sinterestinnationalsecurityandkeepinggovernmentagentsandotherssafefromharmmustbebalancedwithsupportforfreeaccesstoinforma-tionandotherconstitutionalrights.

¶53Additionally, there are moral and ethical questions regarding the use ofWikiLeaks’ information. At the very least, this material has been designated forlimitedcirculation.Someofitisclassifiedanddesignatedastopsecretandmaybedamagingtothenation’sinterests.Whetherlibrarians,researchers,andotherinfor-mationprofessionals shouldusematerial thathasbeenacquiredordisclosed inviolation of the law is a question individuals and institutions must decide forthemselves,accordingtotheirowncircumstancesandneeds.

¶54Inlate2010,ForbespublishedaninterviewwithJulianAssangeinwhichheclaimedWikiLeakswouldpublishthousandsof internaldocumentsfromalargeAmericanbank.Thearticlepointsoutthat“[m]odernwhistleblowers,oremploy-

111. See, e.g., Times Topics: WikiLeaks, n.y. times.Com, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/w/wikileaks/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=wikileaks&st=cse(lastvisitedFeb.7,2012). 112. domsCheit-berg,supranote43,at217. 113. Id.at239. 114. Kim Zetter, WikiLeaks Defector Slams Assange in Tell-All Book, Wired.Com (Feb. 10,2011),http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/wikileaks-book/all/1. 115. Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Angry About Ex-Staff Member’s Book, n.y. times, Feb. 11,2011,atA8. 116. Interestingly, despite their years of exposure, the Pentagon Papers were only declassi-fiedinJune2011.MichaelCooper&SamRoberts,After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon Papers,n.y. times,June8,2011,atA12.


eeswithagrudge,canzipuptheirtrovesofincriminatingdocumentsonalaptop,USBstickorportableharddrive,spiritthemoutthroughpersonale-mailaccountsoronlinedropsites—orsimplysubmitthemdirectlytoWikiLeaks.”117Thearticlecomparesthisrelativeeaseofdisclosuretodaywiththechallengeofdisclosuredur-ingthePentagonPapersdays.

¶55Themajorfocusofthearticle,though,isthatWikiLeaksisnotcontenttodisclose sensitive government information. Assange said WikiLeaks expects torelease many corporate-sector secrets in the future and that it has a backlog ofinformationithasyettorelease.118Forlawlibrarians,thedisclosureofcorporatesecretsbyWikiLeakspresentsmanyissues.First,ofcourse,iswhethersuchsecretsrelate to illegal and prosecutable activity by companies. WikiLeaks and Assangeimplythattheinformationtobedisclosedrelatestowrongdoingoratleastunethi-calbehavior.Second,andperhapsmorechallenging,istheuseoftheinformationinotherlegalmaneuvering.Evenifthesesecretsdonotleadtocriminalprosecu-tion,theymaycontaininformationthatcouldsupportcivilactionsoraffectalreadypendinglitigationornegotiations.Oncesuchinformationisdisclosed,therewouldbenoneedforsubpoenasorotherorderstoacquiretheinformationorpossiblyeventoenteritintoevidence.Infact,courtsthemselvesmaytakejudicialnoticeofmaterialontheInternet.119Thisincludesmaterialfrompublicrecordsandgovern-ment documents as long as they are from reliable Internet sources.120 WhetherWikiLeaks would qualify as such a reliable source has yet to be judiciallydetermined.

¶56 Finally, there is the question of the motives of WikiLeaks and JulianAssange.AssangeclaimsthatthehighprofilethatboththesiteandAssangemain-tain further the brand, making it seem that much more trustworthy.121 This, inturn,providesmoreopportunitiesforittodisclosewrongdoingandexposeinfor-mationthepublichasarighttoknow.However,theredoesseemtobeasenseofpersonal self-promotion, along with pettiness or vengefulness toward WikiLeakstargets. As with any source of information, particularly those online, librariansmustapproachthissourcewithcaution.Theymustweighitsavailabilityandtruth-fulnessagainstitsintendedpurposesandtheirpatrons’needs.

Conclusion

¶57 Generally, librarians strive for free access to information, andWikiLeaksdoes provide a great deal of information, free to the public. The organization’s

117. Andy Greenberg, Wikileaks’ Julian Assange Wants to Spill Your Corporate Secrets, forbes,Dec.20,2010,at70,74–76. 118. Id.at74. 119. See Wang v. Pataki, 396 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing HotelEmployees&Rest.EmployeesUnion,Local100v.N.Y.Dep’tofParks&Recreation,311F.3d534,549(2dCir.2002)). 120. Foxv.Grayson,317S.W.3d1,18n.82(Ky.2010). 121. AndyGreenberg,An Interview with WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange,forbes (Nov.29,2010,5:02p.m.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/11/29/an-interview-with-wikileaks-julian-assange/.


statedpurposeofaccessanddemocracycomportwithmanylibrarians’ideals,evenifitsmethodsarequestionable.Individualsandinstitutionsdedicatedtoinforma-tionaccessandresearch,suchaslawlibrariansandlibraries,mustbeawareoftheseconsiderations. As technological advances make the instant disclosure of moredocumentspossible,WikiLeaksmaybeonlythebeginning.

263


Cancellation of Print Primary Sources in Canadian Academic Law Libraries*

Nancy McCormack**

Professor McCormack discusses the results of a 2010 survey of academic law library directors in Canada regarding the cancellation of primary source material in their libraries. She identifies the criteria ascertained by the survey for cancellation of print materials and explores whether a shift in format matters to libraries and their users.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263PrintCancellationPolicies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268SurveyResults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

AcquisitionsBudget. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269CollectionDevelopmentPolicies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269PurchasingPrimarySourceMaterials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269PossibleCriteriaforCancellation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272DoesFormatMatter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

Introduction

¶1Libraryliteratureoverthepastfewdecadeshasbeendominatedbydiscus-sionsofwhatwillbecomeofbooks,journals,andothermaterialinprintforminanincreasinglydigitalenvironment.Someauthorshavegonesofarastopredictthe end of print altogether. James Milles, for example, writes:“Libraries in thefuturearegoingtobemostlydigital....[T]hemostheavilyusedresearchsources—statutes,cases,administrativeregulationsandrulings,treatises,andevenlawjour-nals—willbeusedalmostexclusivelyinelectronicformat.”1Incontrast,MichelleWu, in her 2005 study, is not quite as convinced that electronic materials willeclipseprint.Shesays“atwenty-firstcenturyacademic lawlibraryrequiresbothtraditionalprintmaterialsandelectronicresources.”2

* ©NancyMcCormack,2012. ** LibrarianandAssociateProfessorofLaw,Queen’sUniversity,Kingston,Ontario,Canada. 1. JamesG.Milles,Out of the Jungle: How to Get Beyond the Digital v. Print Debate—and Deal with the Fact that Digital Won,AAll speCtrum,Feb.2005,at10,11. 2. Michelle M. Wu, Why Print and Electronic Resources Are Essential to the Academic Law Library,97lAW libr. J.233,235,2005lAW libr. J.14,¶4.


¶2Evenifmodernlawlibrariesdo(asWuasserts)requirebothformats,trendsafootintheseverylibrariesmightwellcausedrasticreductionsinor,insomecases,eventhecompleteeliminationofprint.A2007articlenotedthat“somelawlibrar-iesarecancelingcertainprintservicesentirely,”3whilea2010articleconfirmedthatmostlawfirmsarenow“favor[ing]theelectronicversion[overprintsources]aslongasitiscoveredinaflat-ratecontractwithavendor.”4Inaddition,“[m]anyofthelargelawfirmsaredismantlingtheirhardcopylibrariesandmovingtoatotallydigital environment. Every week on the law-lib listserv [there are] offers of lawlibrariesavailableforthecostofshipping.”5

¶3Thesechangesare,infact,notjustrestrictedtolawfirms.But,asMichaelChiorazzi writes,“While academic law libraries tend to have a broader missionthanlawfirmlibraries,lawfirmlibrariesareourcanaryinthemine.”6Lawfirms,inotherwords,maybeleadingthechargeonthisfront,buttheywillnotbealone.Asurveyoflawschoollibrariesonthequestionofhowacquisitionsexpenditureson electronic resources changed between 2002–03 and 2006–07 revealed that in2002–03, law libraries spent10.4%of theirbudgetonelectronicresources.Thathadalmostdoubledby2006–07to19.8%.7Theadditionalmoney forelectronicmaterialsclearlyhadtocomefromsomewhere,andthereisnodoubtprintmateri-alswerethecasualties.

¶4Perhapsmostsurprisingwasthenewsin2010thattheHarvardLawLibraryhad revised its collection development policy and made several “digital only”changestoitscollectionspractices.8Forexample,printreporterswouldnolongerbecollectedforlowerfederalcourtsifstableaccessonlineinPDFwasavailable.Inaddition, state reporters would no longer be collected; instead, LexisNexis andWestlawwouldbeusedtoprovideaccess.9Ofcourse,Harvardisnotthefirstlawlibrarytoimplementthistypeofcollectionspolicy;however,astheLawLibrarianBlognoted,“whenHarvarddoesit,folkstakenotice.”10

¶5Whileitisclearfromtheabovethatcollectionsarechangingfundamentallyandradically,therehavebeenfewstudiesonexactlywhatmaterialacademiclibrar-iesarekeepingorcancelingintermsoftheirprimarysourcematerial(i.e.,legisla-

3. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Ask the Same Questions? The Triple Helix Dilemma Revisited,99lAW libr. J.307,314n.43,2007lAW libr. J.18n.43. 4. LeslieA.Street&AmandaM.Runyon,Finding the Middle Ground in Collection Development: How Academic Law Libraries Can Shape Their Collections in Response to the Call for More Practice-Oriented Legal Education,102lAW libr. J.399,427,2010lAW libr. J.23,¶59. 5. MichaelChiorazzi,Books, Bytes, Bricks and Bodies: Thinking About Collection Use in Academic Law Libraries,21legAl referenCe serViCes Q.,nos.2/3,2002,at1,17. 6. Id. 7. AmandaM.Runyon,The Effect of Economics and Electronic Resources on the Traditional Law Library Print Collection,101lAW libr. J.177,185,2009lAW libr. J.11,¶22. 8. Joe Hodnicki, Digital-Only: The Shed West Era Has Been Officially Institutionalized in the Legal Academy,lAW librAriAn blog(Feb.5,2010),http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/law_librarian_blog/2010/02/the-shed-west-era-has-been-officially-institutionalized-in-the-legal-academy.html. 9. Id. 10. Id.See alsoDianeRaper,40 Years On—Ensuring an Academic Law Library Is Fit for Purpose,9legAl info. mgmt163,166(2009)(discussingtheKentLawSchoolattheUniversityofKent:“WenolongerprovideBlackstone’sStatutesforstudentuse.Ourstudentshaveaccesstoalternativesonlineandareexpectedtousethem.”).

265CANCeLLAtION OF pRINt pRIMARY SOURCeS IN CANAdIAN ACAdeMIC LAW LIBRARIeSVol. 104:2 [2012-21]

tionandcaselaw),andwhichfactorsmightbeguidingtheirdecisions.ThisarticlediscussestheresultsofasurveyofacademiclawlibrarydirectorsinCanadacon-ducted in 2010 regarding the cancellation of primary source material in theirlibraries.Itidentifiesanddescribesthecriteriaascertainedbythesurveyforcancel-lationofprintmaterials.Theroleofbarassociationstandardsinthecancellationof print resources is briefly discussed. Finally, the article looks at the issue ofwhether formatdoes indeedmatter to libraries and libraryusersorwhether thedifferencesbetweenprintandelectronicaresominimalastobeunproblematicinlawlibraries.

Print Cancellation Policies

¶6Primarysourcesinlawarethecomponentsofthelawitself––constitutions,statutes,courtdecisions,regulations,andrules.Theiroriginsarethelegislaturesorcourts.Thesematerials,therefore,mustformthebedrockofanylawlibrarycollec-tion.Onecould(albeitwithsomedifficulty)imaginealawlibrarywithoutsecond-arysources(whichcommentonthelaw),butonecouldnotimaginealawlibrarywithoutprimarysources(i.e.,thelawitself).

¶7Giventhevitalimportanceofsuchmaterialtoalawlibrary,itissurelysur-prisingthatnotagreatdealhasbeenwrittenaboutthecriteriausedbylawlibrariestomakecancellationdecisions.Thisisinmarkedcontrasttothevastamountwrit-teninotherlibraryliteratureonthecriteriausedbylibrarianstomakecancellationdecisionsforprintsourcesgenerally.11

¶8 A relatively early survey, for example, conducted by the library at SaintMary’sUniversityofSanAntonio,Texas,in1994,proposedanumberoffactorstotake into account when considering replacing print with electronic sources.12Amongthesecriteriawereprice(i.e.,buying/maintainingprint13versusthecostsassociatedwithelectronicproducts14),easeofaccess,15usagepatterns,16endresults/

11. See Paul E. Howard & Renee Y. Rastorfer, Do We Still Need Books? A Selected Annotated Bibliography,97lAW libr. J.257,2005lAW libr. J.15,foracomprehensivelistofbooksandarticlespublishedbetween1995and2005onthesubjectofwhetherornottocancelprintresources. 12. MargaretSylvia&MarcellaLesher,Making Hard Choices: Cancelling Print Indexes,online,Jan. 1994, at 59. The print indexes under consideration for cancellation were the Social ScienceCitationIndex(SSCI),theIndexMedicus,andtheEngineeringIndex. 13. Thisincludestheadditionalcostsofpreservationandthereplacementoflostprintvolumes.Therearealsopersonnelcostsinvolvedwhencheckinginpocketparts.Id.at60. 14. Theseincludethecostsofhardwareandsoftwareandanyongoingsubscriptioncosts,aswellascostsassociatedwithtrainingstaffandusers.Id.at59–60.Additionalcostscanbeincurredintheinstallationprocessandwhenfixingbugs. 15. Generally, print sources can be used by only one person at a time and searched only onevolume at a time.Where space is at a premium, print sources might be off-site in a storage facil-ity.Incontrast,electronicsourcesareoftenavailabletomorethanoneuseratatime,althoughthismightbelimitedbythenumberofworkstationsonehasavailableinthelibrary,orbynetworkissues.Availabilityalsodependsonthetypeoflicensethelibraryhassignedwiththevendor;somelicensesallowforonlyalimitednumberofusersatanyonetime.Id.at60. 16. Astudyofusagepatternsinvolvesdetermininghowtheprintisusedcomparedtoelectronicsources,andwhetheritisbeingusedforacourseorforindividualresearch.Italsoinvolvesdetermin-ingwhetheruserswantprintorelectronicsources.See id.Avarietyofstudieshaveshownthatpatronsgenerally prefer electronic access to print access. See, e.g., Sanford N. Greenberg, Legal Research


retrieval,17 quality of content (is the online source an exact copy or somethingless?),18andownership(i.e.,wouldyouliketoownthematerialyoupurchased,orispayingasubscriptionfeefromyeartoyearsufficient?).19

¶9In2002,KarenRupp-Serrano,SarahRobbins,andDanielleCainprovidedwhatappearedtobeanear-exhaustivelistofcriteriatobeusedwhenconsideringwhether to cancel print sources in favor of electronic.20 They included thefollowing:

●● Licensingrestrictions(Doesthelicenseallowforthecancellationofprint?)• Accessibility(Canusersaccessthissourceanywhereandatanytime?)• Archiving(Howwilloldermaterialbeaccessed—onlineorinprint?)• Providerreliability/stability• Aggregatorduplication(Areyoupayingforcertaintitlesinmorethanone

source?)• Availability in local consortia (Has the library made an agreement with

otherlibrariestokeeptheprint?)• Discipline/curriculum/researchimportance• Facultyinput(Whowantsprint?Whowantselectronic?)• Institutional commitment (Does the institution have a commitment to

keeptheprint?)• Subject(Isitonethatrequiresthelibrarytokeeptheprintsource?)• Userpreference/usage• Completeness(Istheelectronicsourcereproducedexactlythewayitwas

printed?)• Natureofpublication(Istheonlineinformationlargeinsize?Willprint-

ingfromtheonlinesourceproveaburden?)• Reproduction capabilities (Is equipment available for color or oversized

reproductions?)• Authentication (If a subscription uses IP recognition, is a proxy service

available?)

Training: Preparing Students for a Rapidly Changing Research Environment,13legAl Writing: J. legAl Writing institute241,242(2007).Forlongstretchesofreading,though,thereissomeevidencethatstudents,inparticular,stillpreferaccesstoprint.SeeRaper,supranote10,at165. 17. PaperdoesnotallowforBooleansearching,butdoespermiteasierbrowsingandreadingincontext.ElectronicresourcesallowBooleansearching,butcanresultinmoreunwantedresults. 18. In1997,TrishaDaviscautionedthatelectronicproductsthatreproducedprintproductshadtobe scrutinizedcarefully tomakesure that thecontentwas the same.Shenoticed thatoften thescopeandbreadthofelectronicsourcesweredifferent fromtheirprintcounterparts,andthatthisinformationwasmissingfrommarketingbrochuresandotherinformationofferedbythepublisher.Shealsosuggestedthatthereputationoftheproduceranddistributoroftheelectronicproductwasanimportantcriterioninchoosingtheelectronicsourceoveritsprintcounterpart.Otherconsider-ations included theuser-friendlinessof theelectronicproduct, the typeof softwareandhardwarerequired,andhowtheinformationwouldbeaccessedbypatrons.TrishaL.Davis,The Evolution of Selection Activities for Electronic Resources,45libr. trends391(1997). 19. Forasuccinctdiscussionofthisconsideration,seeEbook Economics: Are Libraries Screwed?,librArything blog (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.librarything.com/blogs/thingology/2009/10/ebook-economics-are-libraries-screwed/. 20. KarenRupp-Serranoetal.,Canceling Print Serials in Favor of Electronic: Criteria for Decision Making,26libr. ColleCtions, ACQuisitions, & teCh. serVs.369(2002).


• Hardware,software,etc.(Canthesebeupgradedonaregularbasis?)• Monetarysavings• Spacelimitations

●● Staffing(Whatstaffingneedsarepartoftheshiftfromprinttoelectronicresources?)21

¶10Nonetheless,sincethattimelibrarianshaveproposedadditionalcriteria.A2005surveythatexploredcancelingprintjournals,lookedattheadditionalcrite-rionofusagestatistics(howfrequentlythesametitlesavailableinbothprintandelectronicwereusedduringagiventime,annualphotocopyingstatisticsforcopieswithin the library, gate counts of patrons entering the library, and shelvingstatistics).22Finalconsiderationsincludedarchivalaccess,reliabilityoftheinterface,and“allowancesforscholarlysharing.”23

¶11 Looking at the few studies specific to law libraries, decisions to cancelappeartobebasedlargelyoncostandalsoonefficiencyofinformationretrieval.In a study conducted by Leslie Street andAmanda Runyon, for example, surveyrespondentslookedatfactorssuchasuser-friendlinessofthedatabaseinadditiontopublisher,format,anddependability.24Price,however,wasthemajorfactor(i.e.,whethertheresourcewasavailableinaflat-feedatabase).Thecancellationofprintmaterials in law libraries seemedtobecausedprimarilybystagnantacquisitionsbudgetsandcostsofmaterialsrisingwellaboveinflation.

¶12Ina2007study,IanGallacherprovidedsomeexamplesofthemoreoutra-geous price increases for legal materials in the United States between 1999 and2003:

The price of the Atlantic Reporter, Second series, increased by more than 77 percentbetween1999and2003,butsubstantiallymoredisturbinghasbeenthe increase inprintdigestcost.ThepriceoftheHawaiidigest,forexample,was$312in1999andwas$1,371.50in2003,andtheRhodeIslanddigestrosefrom$432in1999to$1,272.50in2003.Addedtothecostsofthebooksthemselvesisthecostofstoringandmaintainingtheminlibrariesthatcontributenothingtoalawfirm’sbottomline.25

Asof2008,priceincreaseswerestillwellabovetherateofinflation.IntheUnitedStates, annual increases for legal materials were “running at least 8%.” As RitaReuschcommented,“thiseffectivelymeansan8%cutonaflatbudget,andcollec-tiondecisionsareallaboutwhattocancelnext.”26

¶13Harvard’s2010changetoitscollectiondevelopmentpolicy,whichimple-mented a digital-only standard for many of its law reports, was also, in part, aresponsetodrasticpriceincreases.Asonecommentatornoted,“WhenHarvard’s

21. Id.at372–77. 22. JohnGallagheretal.,Evidence-Based Librarianship: Utilizing Data from All Available Sources to Make Judicious Print Cancellation Decisions,29libr. ColleCtions, ACQuisitions, & teCh. serVs.169(2005). 23. Id.at177–78. 24. Street&Runyon,supranote4,at417,¶38. 25. IanGallacher,Mapping the Social Life of the Law: An Alternative Approach to Legal Research,36int’l J. legAl info.1,13(2008)(footnotesomitted). 26. RitaReusch,By the Book: Thoughts on the Future of Our Print Collections,100lAW libr. J.555,556,2008lAW libr. J.25,¶4.


LawSchoolLibrarycan’taffordtopayformaintainingthestatusquoinprimaryandsecondarymaterials,theduopolistsbettertakenotice.”27

¶14InCanada,averageannualpriceincreaseshavealsobeenacauseforcon-cern.Thenationallawlibraryjournal,Canadian Law Library Review,periodicallypublishessurveysoflegalresourcepricesandhasdiscoveredincreasesthatrunwellabove the inflation rate. For example, the average price increase for the trackedtitlesfrom2005to2006was5.4%,28for2004–2005itwas6.3%,29for2003–2004itwas9.5%,30 for2002–2003 itwas3.8%,31 and for2000–2001 itwasawhopping19.48%.32

¶15Clearly,lawlibrariesofallsizesinbothCanadaandtheUnitedStatesarefeelingthepinchintermsofpriceincreasesandarerespondingbycancelingprintmaterials.33Thesecuts includeprimary sources inprint.Asa recentU.S. surveydiscovered,38.7%ofrespondentshadcanceledstatereporters,25.8%hadcanceledstateannotatedcodes,6.5%hadcanceledfederalannotatedcodes,25.8%hadcan-celedsessionlaws,and9.7%hadcanceledtheCode of Federal Regulations.34

¶16InCanada,asthesurveyresultsthatfollowindicate,priceiswithoutques-tion a major factorwhen considering the cancellationofprimaryprint sources.Notsurprisingly,however,giventhelibraryliteratureoncancellationcriteriadis-cussedabove, severalother factors also come intoplaywhenmaking suchdeci-sions.Thesefactors,too,arediscussedbelow.

Method

¶17Atpresent,Canadahastwentylawschools.35OnJune29,2010,eachofthetwenty law librarydirectors receivedacopyof the surveyon thecancellationofprintprimarysources.36OfthetwentyacademiclawlibrarydirectorsinCanada,fifteenresponded,foraseventy-fivepercentresponserate.

27. Hodnicki, supra note 8. See also Sarah Robbins et al., The Changing Format of Reference Collections: Are Research Libraries Favoring Electronic Access over Print?,35/36ACQuisitions libr.75,76(2006)(“Librariansmustaskthemselveswhetheritisworthwhiletopurchaseaseldomusedprintcopyofatitleforarchivalpurposeswhenthelibraryisalsopayingformoreheavilyusedelectronicaccesstothesametitle.”). 28. SoniaPoulin&AnnaHoleton,Tracking the Cost of Canadian Legal Subscriptions—2006,32CAn. l. libr. reV.87,89(2007). 29. Id. 30. SoniaPoulin&AnnaHoleton,Tracking the Cost of Canadian Legal Subscriptions—2004,30CAn. l. libr. reV.104,105(2005). 31. Id. 32. PeggyNeal,Tracking the Cost of Canadian Legal Subscriptions—Report for 2001,27CAn. l. libr. reV.85,85(2002). 33. SeeRunyon,supranote7,at199–200,¶54. 34. Id.at190tbl.6. 35. TheyareattheUniversityofAlberta,UniversityofBritishColumbia,UniversityofCalgary,Dalhousie University, Laval University, University of Manitoba, McGill University, University ofMoncton, Université de Montréal, University of New Brunswick, University of Ottawa, Universitédu Québec à Montréal, Queen’s University, University of Saskatchewan, Sherbrooke University,UniversityofToronto,UniversityofVictoria,UniversityofWesternOntario,UniversityofWindsor,andYorkUniversity. 36. Foracopyofthesurveyquestions,seeinfra app.


¶18 The survey itself contained twenty-seven questions or statements withwhichparticipantscouldagreeordisagree,anditwascompiledusingSurveyMonkey,aweb-basedinterfaceforcreatingandpublishingcustomwebsurveys.Participantswereaskedabouttheirlibraries’spendingonprintandelectronicsources,aswellasspecificprimarysourcestowhichtheirlibrariessubscribed;theywerealsoaskedaboutcancellationsofprimarysources,collectiondevelopmentpolicies,andfac-torsthatmightfigureintothecancellationofthesesources.ThesurveywasclosedonOctober31,2010.

Survey Results

Acquisitions Budget

¶19Librarydirectorswereasked,firstofall,aboutthestateoftheiracquisitionsbudgets, inordertoprovidesomebackgroundinformationoncancellationdeci-sionsandthegeneralabilityofthelawlibrarytoaffordthepurchaseoflegalmateri-als.Theanswerstothissectionwerenotbyanymeansuniform.Oftherespondents,53.3%hadseenanincreaseintheiracquisitionsbudgetoverthelasttwenty-fourmonths,while26.7%indicatedthatthebudgethadstayedthesame.Twentyper-centreportedadecrease.

¶20 As for what was being purchased, most law library acquisitions budgetswere still spent primarily on print. But even though thirteen out of fifteen lawlibrarydirectorsspent thirtypercentor lessof theiracquisitionsbudgetonelec-tronic sources,37 the percentage was rising; eighty percent of law libraries hadincreased the amount they spent on electronic products in the last twenty-fourmonths.38

Collection development policies

¶21Aquestiononcollectiondevelopmentpolicieswasincludedinthesurveytodeterminewhetherthosedocumentsguidedformatchoiceforlawlibrarypur-chases.Theresponseswererevealing.Seventy-threepercentofthelawlibrarypoli-cies did not specify the format in which material was to be acquired. Of theremaininglibrarieswhosepoliciesdidspecifyformat,onlyonepolicyspecificallystatedthatelectronicmaterialwastobepreferredtoprintinthosecaseswheretheelectronicmaterialwasavailable,stable,andcouldprovideperpetualaccess.

purchasing primary Source Materials

Statutes and Regulations

¶22AcademiclawlibrariesinCanadacontinuetobuyprintcopiesofstatutesformost jurisdictions.Thestatutesof ten jurisdictionsoutofapossible thirteenwere collected by all of the respondents.39 Only one respondent had canceled a

37. Onerespondentspentbetween31and40%andanotherspentbetween51and60%. 38. Theamountspentonelectronicresourcesdecreasedin6.7%ofthelibrariesandin13.3%itstayedthesame. 39. Canadahasfourteenjurisdictions:thirteenprovinces/territoriesandthefederalgovernment.


print subscription to statutes in the last twenty-four months. Print regulationswerenotcollectedquiteaswidely;nonetheless,theregulationsofeachofthethir-teen jurisdictions were purchased by no fewer than half the respondinglibraries.40

¶23Two-thirdsoflibrarydirectorssaiditwasunlikelythattheywouldcancelasubscriptiontoprintstatutesorregulationsfromanyCanadianjurisdictioninthenexttwenty-fourmonthsandrelysolelyonelectronicsources;26.7%repliedthatitwassomewhatlikely.Only6.7%saidthatitwasverylikely.

Law Reports

¶24Mostacademic law librariescontinuedtosubscribe toprint lawreports.Thetitlesofforty-sixnational,regional,andtopicalreportersweresupplied,andlibrarieswereaskedwhichofthesetheysubscribedto.Onlyoneofthetitleswassubscribedtobylessthanhalfoftherespondentlibraries.Eightypercentormoreofthelibrariessurveyedsubscribedtothirty-sixoutoftheforty-sixtitles.

¶25Even so, sixtypercentof librarieshadcanceleda subscription tooneormore Canadian print reporters in the last twenty-four months. Reasons for thecancellations includedhavingaccesstothematerial throughanonlinesubscrip-tion,orbecausedecisionsbecamefreelyavailableinsomeotherway(e.g.,viaafreesourceontheweb).Anotherreasonwastheattempttofreeupmoneytobuydif-ferent resources such as monographs. Forty percent of law libraries said it wassomewhatlikelytheywouldcancelmoreprintreportersinthenearfuture,whileone-thirdsaiditwasverylikely.

possible Criteria for Cancellation

Price

¶26Pricewasnotamajorfactorinanydecisionstocancelprintlegislation.Ascanbeseenintable1,inresponsetothestatement“Thepriceofprintlegislationisaconcern for the library”only26.6%ofacademic law libraries said that theyagreed or somewhat agreed. In contrast, 80% of law library directors agreed orsomewhatagreedwiththestatement,“Thepriceofsubscribingtoprintreportersisaconcernforthelibrary.”

Nunavut,however,doesnotprintstatutes;theyareonlyavailableelectronically.ThetenareAlberta,Manitoba, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island,Quebec,Saskatchewan,andtheYukon.Federalstatutesweresubscribedtoby80%oflawlibraries,BritishColumbiaby93.3%,andNewBrunswickby86.7%. 40. To the question, For which jurisdiction does your law library currently buy print regula-tions (either as part of the Gazette or in some other form, e.g., looseleaf), the responses wereFederal,86.7%;Alberta,73.3%;BritishColumbia,66.7%;Manitoba,73.3%;NewBrunswick,53.3%;Newfoundland, 66.7%; Northwest Territories, 66.7%; Nova Scotia, 73.3%; Ontario, 80%; PrinceEdwardIsland,73.3%;Quebec,80%;Saskatchewan,66.7%;Yukon,73.3%.Almostall(93.3%)librar-ieshadnotcanceledasubscriptiontoprintregulationsfromanyCanadianjurisdictioninthelasttwenty-fourmonths.


Table 1

Is price a Consideration When Subscribing to print Legislation or Reporters?

Agree Somewhat Agree

Neither Agree nor Disagree

Somewhat Disagree

Disagree Not Applicable

the price of print legislation is a concern for the library.

13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 20.0% 40.0% 0%

the price of subscribing to print reporters is a concern for the library.

60.0%

20.0%

6.7%

6.7%

6.7%

0%

Duplication of Materials

¶27Theoverlappingofprintandonlinesourceswasalsoofgreaterconcernforprintreportersthanitwasforprintlegislation.Inresponsetothestatement“Theduplicationofprintandonlinelegislationisaconcernforthelibrary,”fortypercentsaid that they agreed or somewhat agreed compared with eighty percent whoagreedorsomewhatagreedtothesamequestioninvolvingreporters.

Ease of Use

¶28 In the caseofboth legislationandcase law, themajorityof law librariesagreedthatonlinesourceswereeasiertouse,althoughhere,too,theresponseswerequite varied.Fifty-three percent of law libraries agreedor somewhat agreed that“researchinvolvinglegislationiseasierwithonlinesources,”41while93.3%agreedthat“research involving case law is easier withonline sources.”Forty-sixpercentagreedorsomewhatagreedthat“facultymemberspreferonlinesourcesforlegisla-tive research” while all agreed that“students prefer online sources for legislativeresearch.” In contrast, two-thirds agreed that “faculty members prefer onlinesourcesforcaselaw”and,onceagain,allagreedthat“studentspreferonlinesourcesforcaselaw.”

Personnel

¶29Mostoftherespondentsfeltthatpersonnelcostswerelowerwithelectronicresources.Eightypercentagreedwiththestatement,“Personnelcostsarelowerwithelectronic sources for legislation than with print” while 93.3% of respondentsthoughtthiswastrueforcaselawinelectronicformversusprintform.

41. Cf.Reusch, supranote26, at557,¶ 12 (“Among theprintpublications thatwehavebeencommittedtokeepingarethestatecodes,foracoupleofreasons.First,wecontinuetosubscribetothegeneralconsensusamongseriouslegalresearchersthatstatutoryresearchworksbetterintheprintversionofcodes—evenwithimprovedbrowsingcapacityandotherdevelopmentsintheonlinever-sions.Thisisavaluewetrytoimpressuponlawstudents,thoughitusuallydoesn’tstick.Second,ourcollectionofstatecodesisverypopularwithlawreviewcitecheckersandpractitioners,anditdoesgetused.Nevertheless,aftersomedebate,werecentlycancelledupkeeponcodesforselectedremote,smallerstates.We’llseewhetherwegetpush-backonthatone.”).


Reliability

¶30Therewas far less trust in thereliabilityofonlinesources for legislationthan for case law. Only 26.6% of respondents thought that online sources werereliableenoughtocancelprintlegislationsourcescomparedwithseventypercentwho thought electronic sources were reliable enough to support cancellation ofprintsourcesofcaselaw.

Space

¶31Thespacetohouseprintsourcesforlegislationdidnotseemtobeapress-ing problem for academic libraries. Thirteen percent of respondents agreed orsomewhatagreedwiththestatement“thelibraryisrunningoutofspaceforprintlegislation,” compared with fifty percent of respondents who thought that thelibrarywasrunningoutofspaceforprintreporters.

Use

¶32Astable2shows,closetothree-quartersofrespondents(73.3%)agreedorsomewhatagreedwiththestatement“printlegislativematerialsareusedonaregu-lar basis.” This is in contrast to 53.3% of respondents who agreed or somewhatagreedthat“printlawreportersarenolongerused.”

Table 2

Are print Materials Used Regularly?



Somewhat Disagree


print legislative materials are used on a regular basis.

40.0% 33.3% 6.7% 13.3% 6.7% 0%

print law reporters are no longer used.

20.0% 33.3% 6.7% 6.7% 26.7% 6.7%

Teaching and Research

¶33 Seventy-three percent of respondents agreed or somewhat agreed thatprint legislation supported curriculum/teaching needs, while 93.3% agreed orsomewhat agreed that this material supported research needs. In contrast, sixtypercentagreedorsomewhatagreedwiththestatement“print lawreporterssup-portcurriculum/teachingneeds,”andtwo-thirdsagreedorsomewhatagreedthat“printlawreporterssupportresearchneeds.”

Discussion

¶34ThesurveyresultsshowacleardistinctionbetweenhowlegislationandlawreportsareviewedbylawlibrarydirectorsinCanada.Farmoredirectorsappear


confidentaboutcontinuingtosubscribetolegislationinprintthantheyareaboutcontinuingtosubscribetoprintreporters.Thepriceofreporters,alongwiththeduplicationofcontent,theirrelativelackofeaseofuse,thespacethattheytakeupinalibrary,andthepersonnelrequiredtodealwiththemareamongsomeofthekeyconcerns.

¶35Barassociationstandardsdonotandhavenotfiguredprominentlyinthediscussion on what to cancel in Canada. In the United States, theAmerican BarAssociationstandardssetoutcriteriaforlawlibrarycollections,andgosofarastodiscusswhattypesofmaterialsmustbeincludedina lawlibrarycorecollection.Theseinclude

1. all reported federal court decisions and reported decisions of the highest appellatecourtofeachstate;

2. all federal codes and session laws, and at least one current annotated code for eachstate;

3. allcurrentpublishedtreatiesandinternationalagreementsoftheUnitedStates;4. allcurrentpublishedregulations(codifiedanduncodified)ofthefederalgovernment

andthecodifiedregulationsofthestateinwhichthelawschoolislocated;5. thosefederalandstateadministrativedecisionsappropriatetotheprogramsofthelaw

school;[and]6. U.S.Congressionalmaterialsappropriatetotheprogramsofthelawschool;....42

¶36Thereisnocomparablenationalstandardsetoutbythebarassociations/lawsocietiesforlawlibrariesinCanada.Theclosestthingappearedin1969,inasingle sentence dealing with standards required for law schools in Canada:“TheLawSocietyrequirestobeassuredthatadequatefacilities,includinglibrarybooksandreadingspace,areavailabletothestudentsandthefaculty.”43

¶37 The national coordinating body of Canada’s fourteen law societies, theFederation of Law Societies of Canada, appointed a task force in June 2007 toreviewexistingrequirementsthathadcomeintoeffectfortyyearsearlierbuthadneverbeenexplicitlyagreedtobylawsocietiesacrossCanada.44Italsosetoutto

42. Am. bAr Ass’n, 2011–2012 stAndArds for ApproVAl of lAW sChools47(2011)(Interpretation606-5). 43. Attachment to letter from Kenneth Jarvis, Secretary, Law Society of Upper Canada, toThomasG.Feeney,Dean,UniversityofOttawa(Apr.15,1969),infed’n of lAW soC’ys of CAnAdA, tAsK forCe on the CAnAdiAn Common lAW degree: ConsultAtion pAperapp.3,at5(Sept.2008),available at http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/Common-Law-Degree-Consultation-Paper-2008.pdf[hereinafterConsultAtion pAper].In1957,aspecialCommitteeofBenchers(thenamefortheindi-vidualswhoruntheLawSocietyofUpperCanada,Ontario’sBarAssociation)workingwithasmallgroup of lawyers and professors drafted a memorandum outlining the academic requirements foranyonewhowishedtoearnaCanadianlawdegree.Theseincludedtheminimumamountofschool-ingonewouldneedtogetintoalawschool,thetypesofcoursesthatwouldbetaughtinauniversitylaw program, and the bar admission course requirements after the university law school trainingcomponenthadbeencompleted.TheReport of the Special Committee on Law SchoolofFeb.14,1957,setouttherequirementsfor“anapprovedlawcourseinanapprovedUniversity”;theserequirementsweremodifiedsomewhatin1969andincludedthesentenceonlibrariesquotedinthetext.SeeLetterfromKennethJarvis,Secretary,LawSocietyofUpperCanada,toDavidH.Jenkins(Feb.20,1984),inConsultAtion pAper,supra,atapp.2. 44. Seefed’n of lAW soC’ys of CAnAdA, tAsK forCe on the CAnAdiAn Common lAW degree: finAl report 4 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/Common-Law-Degree-Report-C.pdf[hereinafterfinAl report].


proposenationalacademicrequirementsnecessaryforanylawschooltograduatestudentseligibleforentryintoabaradmissionprogram.Inthedocumentspecify-ingtherequirements,itisstatedthateachlawschoolmustmaintain“alawlibraryinelectronicand/orpaperformthatprovidesservicesandcollectionssufficientinquality and quantity to permit the law school to foster and attain its teaching,learningandresearchobjectives.”45

¶38TheCanadianCouncilofLawDeans46respondedtotheFederation’srathergeneralcommentthus:“Weurgeyoutoaddressinyourfinalreporttheessentialnatureofawellequippedlawlibrary. . . .”47Sincethattime,animplementationcommittee(establishedbytheFederationtodeterminehowcompliancewiththenewnationalacademicrequirementscouldbemeasured)hasalsourged,amongotherthings,thatstandardsforlawlibrariesbemademoreconcrete.Thecommit-tee,whichpresenteditsfinalreportinAugust2011,insertedanoteinparenthesesalongwithseveralrecommendationsaftersection2.4,whichdealswiththematteroflawlibraries:

(AusefulreferenceforthisrequirementistheCanadianAcademicLawLibraryDirectorsAssociation’sstandards.)

TheImplementationCommitteerecommendsthatthefollowinginformationbepro-videdinthissection:

• Overviewoflibrarystaffcomplement,qualificationsandreportingstructure.• Overviewoflibraryfacilitiesanddescriptionofcollectionandcollectionspoli-

cies.• Overviewoflibraryacquisitionsbudget.• Generaldescriptionofsupportservicesavailable to faculty,studentsandother

libraryusers.48

In2012,theFederationbeganimplementingtheCommittee’srecommendations,and the first step was to ask Canadian law schools to report back on how theyplannedtomeetthenewrequirements.Adescriptionofcurrentlibrarystaff,facili-ties,andbudgetswastobeincludedinthereportfromeachschool.WhatusetheFederationwillmakeofthisinformation,however,orhowitwilldetermineifalawschoollibraryfailstomeetwhatis,atpresent,alargelyunarticulatedstandard,isstillunclear.

¶39 As a result, when Canadian academic law library directors were askedwhich individuals or bodies they were likely to consult when making decisionsaboutcancellationofprintsubscriptions,theygaveavarietyofanswersincludingthedeanofthelawschool,theuniversitylibrarian,therelevantlibrarycommittee,law faculty, law librarypersonnel, librariansworking ingovernmentdocuments,and“all of the above.” Bar associations were, not surprisingly, absent from thediscussion.

45. Id.at11(emphasisomitted). 46. TheCanadianCouncilofLawDeansisanindependentassociationmadeupoftheheadsofalllawschoolsanddepartmentsoflawacrossCanada. 47. Letter from W. Brent Cotter, Canadian Council of Law Deans, to John Hunter (June 29,2009),infinAl report,supranote44,atapp.6. 48. fed’n of lAW soC’ys of CAnAdA, Common lAW degree implementAtion Committee: finAl report 29 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/Implementation-Report-Aug-2011-ECC.pdf.


Does Format Matter?

¶40LeslieStreetandAmandaRunyonhavenotedthat:“Collectionsarefunda-mentally changing because of new technologies and a growing reliance on elec-tronicmaterials.Facedwiththisnewreality,though,lawlibrariesandscholarshavedone little research examining the impact of potential cancellations on legalresearcheducation.”49Weareinthedark,forexample,aboutthelong-termstabilityofvarioustitlesinvariousdatabasesandareunlikelytobeabletopredictthefutureherewithanyrealaccuracy.

¶41 In Canada, for example, in April 2008, the publisher Canada Law BookremoveditspublicationsfromtheLexisNexisQuicklawdatabase.Untilthattime,the Canada Law Book content available via LexisNexis Quicklaw included keyreporters suchasCanadian Criminal Cases,Canadian Patent Reporter,Dominion Law Reports, and Labour Arbitration Cases, along with additional key referenceresourcessuchastheCanadian Law List.50ThereasonforremovingthesetitleshadtodowithCanadaLawBook’spromotionofitsowndatabase,BestCase,whichwastobetheonlyonlinesourceforthesematerials.Thoselibrariesthattookitallinstride and subsequently bought a subscription to Canada Law Book’s BestCasedatabasewereastonished to learn in2010 thatCarswell (ThomsonReuters)hadpurchasedCanadaLawBook.Itremainsuncleartothisday,giventheduplicationof content in various publications by the two companies, whether Carswell willceasetopublishsomeoftheCanadaLawBook’sresources(includingBestCase).51Clearly, five years ago, only the most astute and precognitive of librarians couldhaveaccuratelypredictedanyofthis.Giventhatthesandshiftscontinuallybeneathourfeetinthisway,canwe,asRitaReuschasks,“cancelprintwithconfidencethatthecontentwillremainavailableundertheeducationalcontractlicense?”52

¶42Inadditiontoproblemsinvolvingthestabilityoftitlesinvariouselectronicdatabases, we also know little about how the electronic model versus the printmodelwillchangetheservicesprovidedbyacademiclawlibraries.Print,oncepur-chased,belongs toa library foras longas itexistsphysically. Itcanbe loaned toborrowers,placedonreserve,andsenttootherlibrariesthroughinterlibraryloan.Critics of reliance on electronic resources that are not owned but only provideaccessnotethat“likerent,moneyspenton[electronic]accessisgone.Thelibraryhasnothingconcretetoshowforthedollarsexpended. . . .Mostalarmingofthemanycriticismsofaccessisthatifeveryonemovedtotheaccessparadigm,nocol-lectionsfromwhichtoborrowwouldexist.”53Thelicensingagreementsthataca-

49. Street&Runyon,supranote4,at400,¶2(footnoteomitted). 50. Additional resources included Alberta Civil and Criminal Cases, All Canada Weekly Summaries, B.C. Civil Cases, B.C. Criminal Cases, B.C. Labour Arbitrations, B.C. Labour Relations Board Decisions,Canadian Labour Arbitration Summaries,Charter of Rights Decisions,Saskatchewan Civil and Criminal Cases,Supreme Court of Canada Decisions,andWeekly Criminal Bulletin.SimonChester,CLB to Leave Lexis—Tectonic Shift in Canadian Legal Online,SLAW(Sept.26,2007),http://www.slaw.ca/2007/09/26/clb-to-leave-lexis-tectonic-shift-in-canadian-legal-online. 51. See Gary P. Rodrigues, CR + CCC = CRCC?, SLAW (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.slaw.ca/2010/09/19/cr-ccc-crcc. 52. Reusch,supranote26,at560,¶22. 53. RonaldF.Dowetal.,Academic Collections in a Changing Environment,inACAdemiC librAries103,120(GerardB.McCabe&RuthJ.Personeds.,1995).


demiclibrariessigngenerallyprohibitthoselibrariesfromprovidinginterlibraryloanaccesstothecontentofthatdatabase.Forsomelibrarians,thissoundslikethedeathknellforinterlibraryloan:asmoreandmorematerialisavailableelectroni-cally,lessandlesswillbeavailabletolendtootherlibraries.54

¶43 Finally, there is little information available on whether providing accessonlytoelectronicsourceswillaffecttheworkofstudentsandresearchers,thoughtherearerecentindicationsthatthelegalcommunityappearstohavecertainres-ervations about law libraries that are entirely electronic. In a 2005 survey ofChicago-area lawyers, for example, a significant number of respondents agreedthatmoretimeshouldbespenttraininglawstudentswhilestill inschooltouseprint resources. Print resources, according to respondents, were not only moreeconomical, but were necessary since not everything was available online.55 Inaddition, the librarians who answered a 2007 survey discussed above were nothappy about what they saw as“too much reliance on electronic [databases].”56Lawyerswhorespondedtoacompanionstudycommentedthatwhenyoungasso-ciatesreliedsolelyonelectronicresourcesandfailedtoconsultprintsources,theyalso failed to develop key legal concepts “as a result of their myopic use ofkeywords.”57Seasonedlawyerswhorespondedhadasensethatsomethingimpor-tantwasmissingfromresearchbasedsolelyonelectronicsources.58

¶44 Clearly more work needs to be done in this area. While the survey ofCanadian law library directors reveals a likelihood of cuts to print resources—particularlylawreports—inthefuture,therearenoaccompanyingstudiestotelluswhetherthisisgoodforpatrons,badforpatrons,orunlikelytoaffectthematall.Thereisalsolittletoindicatewhetherlibrarycollectionswillsuffernoilleffectsfrom the move toward electronic resources, or if the practice will indeed leavelibrariesinafarworseposition.

54. SeeChiorazzi,supranote5,at25(“[U]ltimately,wewillneedtoreexamineoursocietalmis-sion.Ifwedonotcollectthelessheavilyusedmaterials,...ifwedonotpreserveourculturalheritage,whowill?Weruntheriskofrelyingonothersuntiltherearenootherstorelyupon.Ifeverylibraryweretorelyoninterlibraryloantosupplementitsowncollections,thesystemcollapses.”). 55. Greenberg,supranote16,at251–53. 56. Gallacher,supranote25,at13n.47(quotingrespondenttoTomGaylord’s2007surveyoflawlibrarians). 57. Id.at14n.47(quotingrespondenttoauthor’s2007surveyofattorneys).Theremaybemoretothisthanmeetstheeye.KatrinaFischerKuh,citingworkintheareaofmediumtheory,positsthatthe way in which“information is communicated—for example, oral versus print—is not neutral.Insteaditsignificantlyshapeshowtheconveyedinformationisunderstood.”SeeKatrinaFischerKuh,Electronically Manufactured Law,22hArV. J.l. & teCh.223,229(2008).Evenifthisideaisnotunder-stoodovertly,itseemstobeunderstoodintrinsicallyonsomelevelbypeoplewhohavespenttimedoinglegalresearch.Usingprintversusonlinesourcesmaynotjustbeamatterofdifferentresearchpractices,itcouldalsoaffecthowweresearchand,inturn,theresultsofthatresearch.See generally,BarbaraBintliff,Context and Legal Research,99lAW libr. J.249,2006lAW libr. J.15. 58. Somewritershavetriedtoexplainthisawayas“generational.”AsIanGallacherexplains,lawstudentsandnewassociatesare“comfortablewiththeinternet,uncomfortablewithbooksandlibrar-ies,andareheadedforanunpleasantrendezvouswiththetraditionalistswhostillinhabitlawfirms,andwhohaveverydifferentideasabouttherelativemeritsofbooksandelectroniclegalresearch.”IanGallacher,Forty-Two: The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Teaching Legal Research to the Google Generation,39AKron l. reV.151,166(2006).


Conclusion

¶45JohnBuddnotesinThe Changing Academic Library:“Foralmostaslongasacademiclibrarieshavebeenin[existence],theyhavebeenassociatedwiththecol-lectionstheyhaveselected,acquired,organizedandhoused.”59Thereis,hecontin-ues,“somedisputeregardingthepurposeofthelibrary.Ontheonehand,therearethosewhoadvocatebreakingthroughtheconstraintsaphysicalcollectionimposesonlibraryservices.Ontheotherhandarethosewhomakethecaseforthepreserva-tionofrecordedknowledge.”60ThelatterstatementwouldincludethesixtypercentofCanadianlawlibrarydirectorswhoagreedorsomewhatagreedwiththestate-ment:“Thelibraryinitsroleasrepositoryshouldmaintainaprintreportercollec-tion.”Twenty-sixpercentdisagreedorsomewhatdisagreed.

¶46Yet Budd may also be correct when he comments that“both points arecorrect; what is constricting is a narrowness of vision that puts libraries in aneither/orstance.”61Nonetheless,asnotedabove, law librariesarenownearingan“either/orstance.”Certainly,lawfirmlibrarieswillgettherefirst,drivenbylawyers’demands for libraries to eat up less office space, and for libraries to provideresourcesthatcanbeaccessedfromavarietyoflocations.Howthiswillmanifestitself in academic law libraries in the future is unclear, but as this survey clearlyreveals, thewritingcouldalreadybeon thewall forprint reporters, andwhat istobecomeofprintlegislationoncereportershavebeendealtwithstillremainstobeseen.

59. John m. budd, the ChAnging ACAdemiC librAry: operAtions, Culture, enVironments180(2005). 60. Id. 61. Id.


Appendix

primary Sources Cancellation Survey

1. Pleaseidentifyyourlawlibrary:

2. What percentage of your total law library acquisitions budget is spent ononline/electronicresources?

___0–10%___11–20%___21–30%___31–40%

___41–50%___51–60%___61–70%___71–80%

___81–90%___91–100%

3. Whatpercentageofyourtotallawlibraryacquisitionsbudgetisspentonprintresources?

___0–10%___11–20%___21–30%___31–40%

___41–50%___51–60%___61–70%___71–80%

___81–90%___91–100%

4. Hasyourtotallawlibraryacquisitionsbudgetincreased,decreased,orstayedthesameduringthelasttwenty-fourmonths?

____Increased____Decreased____Stayedthesame

5. Has the amount that the law library spends on online/electronic sourcesincreased,decreased,orstayedthesameduringthelasttwenty-fourmonths?

____Increased____Decreased____Stayedthesame

6. Forwhichjurisdictionsdoesyourlawlibrarycurrentlybuyprintstatutes(i.e.,boundannualvolumes,consolidatedstatutes,orsomethingsimilar)?

____Federal____Alberta____BritishColumbia____Manitoba____NewBrunswick

____Newfoundland____NorthwestTerritories____NovaScotia____Ontario____PrinceEdwardIsland

____Quebec____Saskatchewan____Yukon____Noneoftheabove

7. HaveyoucanceledasubscriptiontoprintstatutesfromanyCanadianjurisdic-tioninthelasttwenty-fourmonths?

____Yes____No

Ifyes,pleasespecifyjurisdiction(s):


8. Forwhich jurisdictionsdoesyour lawlibrarycurrentlybuyprintregulations(eitheraspartoftheGazetteorinsomeotherform,e.g.,looseleaf)?

____Federal____Alberta____BritishColumbia____Manitoba____NewBrunswick____Newfoundland

____NorthwestTerritories____NovaScotia____Nunavut____Ontario____PrinceEdwardIsland


9. HaveyoucanceledasubscriptiontoprintregulationsfromanyCanadianjuris-dictioninthelasttwenty-fourmonths?

____Yes____No

Ifyes,pleasespecifyjurisdiction(s):

10. Howlikelyisitinthenexttwenty-fourmonthsthatyouwillcancelasubscrip-tion toprint statutesor regulations fromanyCanadian jurisdictionandrelysolelyononline/electronicsourcesinstead?

____Verylikely____Somewhatlikely____Notatalllikely

11. Ifyouhavetomakecutstoprintlegislationsubscriptionsinthenexttwenty-fourmonths,whichjurisdiction(s)areyoulikelytocancel?

____Federal____Alberta____BritishColumbia____Manitoba____NewBrunswick

____Newfoundland____NorthwestTerritories____NovaScotia____Ontario____PrinceEdwardIsland


12. Areyouplanninginthenexttwenty-fourmonthstoweed(eitherdisposingofpermanentlyorplacinginstorage)anyofthefollowingCanadianprintsourcesfromyourcollection?

____Statutes____Regulations____Lawreports____Noneoftheabove

13. Towhichprintnationalandregionalreportersdoesthelawlibrarysubscribe?(Chooseallthatapply)

____DominionLawReports(D.L.R.)____FederalCourtReports(F.C.R.)____FederalTrialReports(F.T.R.)____NationalReporter(N.R.)

____SupremeCourtReports(S.C.R.)____AtlanticProvincesReports(A.P.R.)____WesternWeeklyReports(W.W.R.)____Noneoftheabove


14. Towhich jurisdiction-specificprintreportersdoes the law librarysubscribe?(Chooseallthatapply)

____AlbertaLawReports____AlbertaReports____Annuairedejurisprudence

etdedoctrineduQuébec____BritishColumbiaLawReports____BritishColumbiaAppealCases____ManitobaReports____NewBrunswickReports____NewfoundlandandPrince

EdwardIslandReports

____NovaScotiaReports____OntarioAppealCases____OntarioReports____QuebecAppealCases____Recueilsdejurisprudencedu

Québec____SaskatchewanReports____Noneoftheabove

15. To which print topical reporters does the law library subscribe? (Choose allthatapply)

____AdministrativeLawReports____BusinessLawReports____CanadaTaxCases____CanadianBankruptcyReports____CanadianCasesonEmployment

Law____CanadianCasesontheLawof

Insurance____CanadianCasesontheLawof

Torts____CanadianCriminalCases____CriminalReports____CanadianEnvironmentalLaw

Reports____CanadianHumanRights

Reporter____CanadianLabourLawCases

____CanadianPatentReporter____CanadianRightsReporter____Carswell’sPracticeCases____ConstructionLawReports____DominionTaxCases____EstatesandTrustsReports____ImmigrationLawReporter____LabourArbitrationCases____MotorVehicleReports____MunicipalandPlanningLaw

Reports____PersonalPropertySecurityAct

Cases____RealPropertyReports____ReportsofFamilyLaw____Noneoftheabove

16. Has the law library canceled a subscription to one or more Canadian printreportersinthelasttwenty-fourmonths?

____Yes____No

17. Howlikelyisitinthenexttwenty-fourmonthsthatthelawlibrarywillcancelallorsomeprint lawreportsandrelysolelyononline/electronicsourcesforthatcontentinstead?

____Verylikely____Somewhatlikely____Notatalllikely


18. Does the law library’s collection development policy specify which statutes,regulations,andreportersaretobepurchased?

____Yes____No____Wedon’thaveacollectiondevelopmentpolicy

Ifyes,whatdoesthepolicysay?

19. Does the law library’s collection development policy specify the format (i.e.,printorelectronic)inwhichtobuylibrarymaterialsandresources?

____Yes____No

Ifyes,whatdoesthepolicysay?

20. Whichelectronic resourcesdoyou thinkmightadequately replaceCanadianprintlegislationinthelawlibrary?(Chooseallthatapply)

____WestlawCanada____LexisNexis____Governmentwebsites____CanLII____Other

If“Other,”pleasespecify:

21. Whichelectronic resourcesdoyou thinkmightadequately replaceCanadianprintlawreportsinthelawlibrary?(Chooseallthatapply)

____WestlawCanada____LexisNexis____Governmentwebsites____CanLII____Other


22. Wouldadecisionbythe lawlibrarytocancelprint legislationor lawreportsrequireconsultationwithanyofthefollowing?(Chooseallthatapply)

____Dean____UniversityLibrarian____LibraryCommittee____LawLibrarypersonnel____Noneoftheabove____Other



23. Inthepasttwenty-fourmonths,hasthelawlibrarycanceledanyonline/elec-tronicproductinfavorofkeepingtheprintequivalent?

____Yes____No

Ifyes,pleasespecify:

24. Towhatextentdoyouagreeordisagreewiththefollowingstatementsaboutprintandelectronicsourcesforlegislation?



Somewhat Disagree


Thepriceofprintlegislationisaconcernforthelibrary.

Theduplicationofprintandonlinelegislationisaconcernforthelibrary.

Researchinvolv-inglegislationiseasierwithonlinesources.

Facultymemberspreferonlinesourcesforlegis-lativeresearch.

Studentspreferonlinesourcesforlegislativeresearch.

Personnelcostsarelowerwithelectronicsourcesforlegis-lationthanwithprint.

Electronicsourcesforlegis-lationarereliableenoughtocancelprint.

Thelibraryisrunningoutofspaceforprintlegislation.

Printlegislativematerialsareusedonaregularbasis.




Somewhat Disagree


Printlegislationsupportscurriculum/teachingneeds.

Printlegisla-tionsupportsresearchneeds.

25. Towhatextentdoyouagreeordisagreewiththefollowingstatementsaboutprintandelectroniccaselawreports?



Somewhat Disagree


Thepriceofsubscribingtoprintreportersisaconcernforthelibrary.

Theduplicationofprintandonlinesourcesforcaselawisaconcernforthelibrary.

Researchinvolv-ingcaselawiseasierwithonlinesources.

Facultymemberspreferonlinesourcesforcaselaw.

Studentspreferonlinesourcesforcaselaw.

Personnelcostsarelowerwithelectronicsourcesforcaselawthanwithprint.

Electronicsourcesforcaselawarereliableenoughtocancelprint.

Thelibraryisrunningoutofspaceforprintlawreports.




Somewhat Disagree


Printlawreportsarenolongerused.

Printlawreportssupportcurriculum/teachingneeds.

Printlawreportssupportresearchneeds.

Thelibraryinitsroleasrepositoryshouldmaintainaprintreportercollection.

26. Intheeventofafollow-upstudyonthistopic,isthereaquestionthatyoufeelisimportanttoasktheCanadianLawLibraryDirectors?(optional)

27. Final comments on the cancellation of print primary sources in your lawlibraryorgenerally?(optional)

285


Donating and Procuring Organs: An Annotated Bibliography*

Louis J. Sirico, Jr.**

This annotated bibliography surveys recent law review articles dealing with proposed systems for increasing the availability of organs for transplantation as well as related topics.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286ProposedSolutionstotheOrganShortage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

MotivatingPotentialDonors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289NoncompensatoryOrganProcurementSystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292CompensatoryOrganProcurementSystems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

MarketSystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294FinancialIncentives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

Ethical,Moral,andLegalConcerns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301EthicalConcerns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301AlternativeSourcesofTransplantableOrgans:“Strangers” andChildren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304WhentoHarvest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305LegalRightsofNextofKin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307LegalRightsoftheCadavericOrganDonor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308HumanTrafficking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

TheFutureofOrganTransplantation:Xenotransplantation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

Introduction

¶1 The need for organs and the inadequate supply present a life-and-deathtragedy for those who must have organ transplants in order to live.1 Academicresponsestotheproblemhavetakentwoavenues.Oneavenuelookstopracticalsolutions, ranging from compensating donors to establishing systems in whichindividualsarepresumedtoconsenttodonatingtheirorgans.Thesecondavenuehasfocusedonthejurisprudentialprinciplesunderlyingthevariousproposals.

* ©LouisJ.Sirico,Jr.,2012.Mythanksgotomyresearchassistants:ReginaNelson,MichaelPassaretti,andTimothyBerger. ** ProfessorofLaw,VillanovaUniversitySchoolofLaw,Villanova,Pennsylvania. 1. SeesCientifiC registry of trAnsplAnt reCipients,http://www.srtr.org(lastvisitedFeb.29,2012)(containingreportsonsizeofwaitinglists,numberoftransplants,andnumberofdeathsofpatientsonwaitinglists).


¶2 With respect to the latter, Guido Calabresi has identified four dominantapproaches:(1)Doctrinalist:Thisapproachlookstoexistingrulesanddoctrines,which hold that individuals own their own bodies and make their own choicesconcerningwhethertodonatetheirbodyparts;(2)“Lawand”viewpoint:Schoolssuchas“lawandeconomics”and“lawandphilosophy”andgroupswithinthoseschoolsanalyzetheissuefromdifferentperspectivesandcometodifferentresolu-tions;(3)Legalprocess:Thisanalysisfocusesonthesuitabilityofdifferentinstitu-tionstodetermineownershipofbodyparts,particularly in lightof therangeofvaluesandrightsthattheissueraises;and(4)Lawandstatus:Inassessingrulesforallocationofbodyparts,scholarsfocusontheimpactongroupssuchaswomen,racialminorities,thepoor,andthosewithminoritysexualorientations.2Mysurveyindicatesthatintheacademicliterature,alawandeconomicsapproachtotheissuedominatesthescholarship.

¶3Thisannotatedbibliographyoffersa surveyof lawreviewarticlesdealingwithproposedsystemsforincreasingtheavailabilityoforgansfortransplantationaswellasrelatedtopics.ThearticleswerelocatedbyconductingaWestlawsearchusing the search terms“transplant”and“transplantation.”Becausemedicinehasadvancedsorapidlyinthisfield,almostallincludedarticlesarefrom2000orlater.Fromthattimeperiod,allarticlesrelevanttothetopicwereincluded.

Background

¶4ThefollowinglawsandorganizationscomprisethecurrentlegalframeworkgoverningorgandonationintheUnitedStates.

¶5Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).Originallypromulgated in1968bythe National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, this Actaddresses the critical organ shortage by providing additional ways for makingorgandonations.3TheActisdesignedtoencourageindividualstomakeanatomicalgifts;tohonorandrespecttheautonomyinterestofindividualstomakeornottomakeananatomicalgiftoftheirbodyorparts;andtopreservethecurrentaltruis-ticanatomicalgiftsystembyrequiringapositiveaffirmationofanintenttomakeagiftandprohibitingthesaleandpurchaseoforgans.In1968,allstatespromptlyenactedthelaw.Thecurrent2006revisionhasbeenadoptedbyforty-fivestates.4

¶6 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA). Passed by Congress in 1984 toincreasethesupplyoftransplantableorgansandensurefairnessintheallocationand distribution of organs, this Act established the Organ Procurement andTransplantation Network (OPTN) and the formation of Organ ProcurementOrganizations(OPOs).5TheActisnotableforexpresslyforbiddingtheexchangeofhumanorgansfor“valuableconsideration.”6

2. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts,55stAn. l. reV.2113(2003). 3. unif. AnAtomiCAl gift ACt(rev.2006),8AU.L.A.63(Supp.2011). 4. Id.at42–43. 5. 42U.S.C.§§273–274g(2006). 6. Id.§274e(a).

287Vol. 104:2 [2012-22] dONAtINg ANd pROCURINg ORgANS

¶7United Network for Organ Sharing(UNOS).Aprivate,nonprofitorganpro-curementorganizationthatadministerstheOPTN.UNOSlocates,tracks,procures,and allocates organs on a national level; maintains a national database of allpatientsawaitingorgantransplants;andcarriesoutthemandatesoftheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices(DHHS)andNOTA.7

¶8 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN). Created byNOTA and operated by UNOS under contract with DHHS, OPTN is a private,nonprofitorganization thatmaintains thenationalwaiting list fororgans,estab-lishes medical criteria for organ allocation, and sets standards of quality for theacquisitionandtransplantationofdonatedorgans.8

¶9Organ Procurement Organizations(OPOs).Private,nonprofitorganizationsresponsible for therecovery,preservation,andtransportationofdonatedorgans,andthemaintenanceofasystemtolocateprospectiverecipientsforallrecoveredorgans.9

¶10Thefollowingarticlesofferbackgroundinformationonalternativeorganprocurementsystemsandthecurrent legal frameworkfororganprocurement intheUnitedStates.

Barnett,A.H.,andDavidL.Kaserman.“TheShortageofOrgansforTransplantation:ExploringtheAlternatives.”Issues in Law and Medicine9(1993):117–37.

Thisarticleoffersabriefoverviewandcomparativeevaluationof severalalter-nativeorganprocurement systems.Theauthorsalsodiscuss thevariousethicalissuesinvolvedineachsystem.

Chen,RoderickT.“OrganAllocationandtheStates:CantheStatesRestrictBroaderOrganSharing?”Duke Law Journal49(1999):261–96.

TheFinalRule,announcedbytheDHHS,declaresthatorgansmaynolongerbedistributedaccordingtogeographicdistinctions.10TheauthorofthisnotebelievesthattheFinalRuledoesnotpreemptstatelaw.HefurtherarguesthatstatelawsrestrictingthetransferoforgansoutsidethestateviolatethedormantCommerceClause.HethenquestionswhethertheapplicationoffederalpreemptionandthedormantCommerceClausemayfailtoachieveasoundorganallocationpolicy,raisespolicyquestionsnotconsideredbytheseconstitutionaldoctrines,andcon-cludesthatCongressshouldprovideclearerinstructionsforallocatingorgans.

Grandtham,DulcineaA.“TransformingTransplantation:TheEffectoftheHealthandHumanServicesFinalRuleontheOrganAllocationSystem.”University of San Francisco Law Review35(2001):751–82.

This comment examines organ allocation, focusing primarily on the debatebetweenthestates,whichfavorlocaldistributionoforgans,andtheFinalRule,whichfavorsanational,need-basedsystem.Theauthorcallsforaquasi-national,need-basedsystemoforgandistribution,managedbyUNOS,withlimitedover-

7. SeeAbout Us,united netWorK for orgAn shAring,http://www.unos.org/about/index.php(lastvisitedFeb.3,2012). 8. SeeAbout OPTN,optn: orgAn proCurement And trAnsplAntAtion netWorK,http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/(lastvisitedFeb.3,2012). 9. SeeAbout AOPO,Aopo: Ass’n of orgAn proCurement orgs.,http://www.aopo.org/about-aopo(lastvisitedFeb.3,2012). 10. 42C.F.R.pt.121(2011).


sightbytheDHHS.Shearguesthatsuchasystemisnecessarytoovercomethedeficienciesinherentinalocaldistributionsystemandtoprovideformoreequi-tableorganallocation.

Gross,JedAdam.“EPluribusUNOS:TheNationalOrganTransplantActandItsPostoperative Complications.” Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics 8(2008):145–252.

Employing a narrative account of documentary sources, this note offers thesocial and legislative history of NOTA. It focuses on the concerns, aspirations,and effects that are most prevalent in the source materials. The author arguesthatNOTAwastheproductofaspecifictechnological,economic,political,andculturalcontextandanalyzesthemotivesbehindbanningcommerceinhumanorgansandNOTA’simpactonorganprocurementandallocation.Accordingtotheargument,NOTAfailedtoalleviatetheorganshortageandthuscreatedpres-suresforfurtherinnovationsinorganallocationpolicy.Theauthorcontendsthatnewscientifictechnologieswilllargelygovernthefutureoforganallocation,andhopesthattheywilllessentheorganshortage.

McDaniel, Jeffrey A. “A Decent Proposal? Fundamental Fairness in an‘Un-Commercial’ Organ System.” Journal of Law and Commerce 19 (2000):327–48.

Accordingtothiscomment,stateshaveattemptedtocircumventexistingregula-tionsunderNOTAtoexertcontrolovertheflowandnumberofviableorganspresentinthefederallycontrolled“pool”ofcommerce.Theauthorexploreslegalissues regardingwhether theconstitutional rightsofpotentialorgan recipientsareadequatelyprotectedbytheAct.HearguesthattheActisinadequate,becauseit has indirectly created a national commerce in organs, resulting in citizens’being denied access to a federally controlled product. The author proposesreworkingfederallaw,includingtheAct,toavoidinequityinallocation,andtomorestrictlyregulateUNOS.

Sirico,LouisJ., Jr.“APrimeronOrganDonation.”Journal of Law and Health17(2003):1–10.

Thisarticleprovidesbackgroundinformationonorgandonationandencourageseducationofattorneysandpotentialdonorsonthelawsregardingorgandona-tion. It also discusses the difficulties in organ allocation faced by UNOS. Theauthorarguesthatitisanattorney’sresponsibilitytoensure,throughknowledge-ableandcompassionatediscussionswiththeclientandthefamily,thattheclienthastheopportunitytochoosetobecomeadonorwhilealive,whileneardeath,andafterdeath.

Weimer,DavidL.“PublicandPrivateRegulationofOrganTransplantation:LiverAllocation and the Final Rule.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 32(2007):9–49.

Here, the rule-makingprocess fororgan allocation policyundergoes examina-tion.Theauthorarguesthatprivaterule-makingappearstoberelativelyeffectivein tapping into the technical expertise and tacit knowledge of stakeholders toallowfortheadaptationofrulesinthefaceofchangingtechnologyandinforma-tion.Accordingtotheanalysis,however,thesystemofrepresentationemployedgiveslessinfluencetosomestakeholdersthantheywouldhaveinpublicregula-toryarenas,thusgivingthemanincentivetoseekpublicrule-makingasaremedyfortheirpersistentlosseswithintheprivateframework.


Zee, Jacqueline.“The Revised UniformAnatomical GiftAct: Bringing CaliforniaDonationLawUptoContemporaryMedical,Legal,andBioethicalPractices.”McGeorge Law Review39(2008):529–43.

AtissueishowthestateshaveappliedtheUniformAnatomicalGiftAct.Accordingtothearticle,itisessentialtocoordinatethestates’organtransplantefforts.Theauthorarguesthatthestates,Californiainparticular,mustcontinuetorevisetheirlawstoprotectthesegoalsinthefaceofongoingmedicaladvancements.

Proposed Solutions to the Organ Shortage

Motivating potential donors

¶11 The following terms describe several proposals to motivate potentialdonorsinordertoincreasethesupplyoftransplantableorgans.

¶12Express Consent.Thesystemoforganprocurementcurrentlyemployedinthe United States. The organ donor must give written consent before death orexpresslyauthorizeanotherpersontogiveconsentwhenthatperson,usuallyafam-ilymember,isqualifiedtomakethedecisionafterthedonor’sdeath.Acontrastingsystemwouldpresumeconsentabsentaclearcontrarystatementfromthepotentialdonor.11

¶13Nonfinancial Incentives.Alsoreferredtogenerallyasnonmonetaryornon-compensatoryincentives,nonfinancialincentivesattempttoincreaseprivatemoti-vation to donate organs through such incentives as paired organ exchanges12 ormutual insurance pools.13 Included in this category are priority incentives andreciprocal altruism. Priority incentives reward living organ donors with priorityrecipientstatusifthedonorneedsanorganinthefuture.Reciprocalaltruismisbestexplainedbythedefinitionof“pairedorganexchange”below.

¶14Mutual Insurance Pool.Atypeofpriorityincentivethatcreatesa“pool”ofwilling,livingorgandonorsandrewardsmemberswithpriorityrecipientstatusinthefutureifdonorsagreetomaketheirorgansavailabletoothermembersofthepoolupondeath.14

¶15Paired Organ Exchange.Atypeofreciprocalaltruismthatcreatesanorgantransplantfacilitationsystemtomatchlivingdonorswithrecipients.Forexample,PatientAandPatientBbothneedkidney transplantsbutbothare incompatiblewiththeirrespectiverelativeswhoarewillingtodonate.PatientA’srelativeiscom-patiblewithPatientB,however,andPatientB’srelativeiscompatiblewithPatientA. PatientA’s relative then agrees to donate to Patient B, and Patient B’s relativeagreestodonatetoPatientA.15

11. KieranHealy,The Supply and Demand of Body Parts: Do Presumed-Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?,55depAul l. reV.1017,1020–21(2006). 12. MichaelT.Morley,Note,Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation Through Paired Organ Exchanges,21yAle l. & pol’y reV.221,223–24(2003).See also infra¶15(offeringadefini-tion). 13. SeeGilSiegal&RichardJ.Bonnie,Closing the Organ Gap: A Reciprocity-Based Social Contract Approach,34J.l. med. & ethiCs415,417–18(2006).See also infra¶14(offeringadefinition). 14. Id. 15. Morley,supranote12,at224.


¶16 The articles described below discuss ways to expand the scope of organprocurement through statutory modifications and nonfinancial incentives whilemaintainingthecurrentsystemofexpressconsent.

Derco,LisaM.“America’sOrganDonationCrisis:HowCurrentLegislationMustBeShapedbySuccessesAbroad.”Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy27(2010):154–82.

Accordingtothisnote, legislationinothercountriesmayofferguidancetotheUnitedStatesinimprovingitsregulatorysystem.Theauthorsuggeststhreeele-ments that legislation should contain: (1) the recipient should pay for out-of-pocketexpenses;(2)organprocurementorganizationsshouldbeexpanded;and(3)incentivesotherthandirectcompensationshouldbemadeavailableinordertoenticeotherstodonate,forexample,travelandaccommodationexpenses,taxcreditsformedicalexpenses,andemploymentinsurance.Thenotealsodiscussesalternativewaystoincreasethenumberofdonors.

Gallagher, Sean T. “The Spanish Model’s Capacity to Save Lives by IncreasingOrganDonationRates.”Temple International and Comparative Law Journal18(2004):403–29.

This comment discusses Spain’s response to its organ donation shortage andanalyzesthepossibilityofapplyingthatpolicytoothercountries,includingtheUnitedStates.TheauthorarguesthatSpain’spresumedconsentlawsdonotgen-erateasmanydonationsasmostbelieve.Spain’ssuccessinprocuringorgans,theauthorbelieves,isattributabletoitssystemofdirectlyencouragingorgandona-tionsamongpotentialdonors.HesuggeststhatifsuchelementsoftheSpanishmodelwereadoptedintheUnitedStates,theorgan-donationratewouldlikelyincrease.

Healy, Kieran.“The Supply and Demand of Body Parts: Do Presumed-ConsentLawsRaiseOrganProcurementRates?”DePaul Law Review55(2006):1017–43.

Thissurveyanalyzesthelawsrelatingtocadavericorganprocurementandhowtheyaffectedprocurementratesinseventeencountriesbetween1990and2002.Theauthorconcludesthatnodistinctivelegalconceptofconsentisresponsiblefor countries’ achievinghighorgan-procurement rates.According toHealy,noresearchdemonstrates thatpresumedconsent lawsachieve theirexpectedgoal.Hefurtherarguesthatcontemporarydebatesaboutaltruismversusself-interestanddisputesoverpresumedandinformedconsentmasktherealsolution,whichliesinorganizationalreform,specificallyinlogisticsandprocessmanagement.

Hurley, Jennifer L. “Cashing In on the Transplant List: An Argument AgainstOfferingValuableCompensationfortheDonationofOrgans.”Journal of High Technology Law4(2004):117–37.

Atissueistheefficacyofrepealingthebanonofferingvaluableconsiderationfororgansandpossibleconsequencesof repeal.Thisnotearguesagainst repealingthebanandadvocatespromotingorgandonationwithintheexistingregulatoryframework. Hurley argues that offering financial consideration for organs willlead to exploitation of underprivileged groups and will result in unnecessaryethical and moral problems. The note instead suggests providing nonfinancialincentives.

Kielhorn, Kristi L.“Giving LifeAfter Death: The 2006 Revision of the UniformAnatomicalGiftAct.”Drake Law Review56(2008):809–28.

ThisnoteexaminestheinterplayoffederallawandcomplianceissuesresultingfromIowa’sadoptionofthe2006revisionoftheUniformAnatomicalGiftAct.


Theauthorarguesforthenecessityofhavinguniformitybetweenstateandfed-eral laws.Accordingtotheauthor, theorganshortagewillnever lessenwithoutauniformlawthatcomplieswithandsupplementsfederallawwhiletakingintoaccountchangesintechnologyandmedicalscience.

Kolber, Adam J. “A Matter of Priority: Transplanting Organs Preferentially toRegisteredDonors.”Rutgers Law Review55(2003):671–739.

Here, several proposals to increase organ donation undergo examination. Theauthoradoptselementsoftheseproposalstoformulateapriorityincentivesys-tem which, he argues, should encourage people to donate without financial ornonfinancialincentivesandshouldreduceeveryone’swaitingtimeforanorgan.The author also argues that the current altruistic system leads to unnecessary,preventablepainanddeath.

Morley,MichaelT.“IncreasingtheSupplyofOrgansforTransplantationThroughPairedOrganExchanges.”Yale Law and Policy Review21(2003):221–62.

Thisnoteexaminespairedorganexchangesandarguesforamendingfederallawtoallowthealready-existingregistryofpatientsinneedoforgantransplantstobeusedtobringtogetherthefamiliesandfriendsofdifferentpatientsonthewaitinglistinordertosavelives.Theauthorcontendsthatthissystemwillincreasethenumberoforgansavailable,andthatitisthebestwaytosupplementthecurrentprocurementsystem.

Morris,Brian.“You’veGottoBeKidneyingMe!”Brooklyn Law Review74(2009):543–80.

At issue here are the deficiencies in and lack of remedies available to plaintiffsassertingvalidclaimstotheorgansofacadavericorgandonor,theeffectoftheseshortcomings on organ donation generally, and potential solutions. This notearguesthatasimpleandeffectivesteptowardresolvingtheorganshortagewouldbetoprovideameanstoenforceandthusprotectandexpandtheminimalrightsthat are granted under the current regulatory framework for organ donation.Morriscontendsthatthesestepswouldhaveapositiveeffectonorgandonation.

Morrissey, Rebeckah.“Giving Life: Increasing Organ Donation and Creating anAltruisticOrganDonationRegistry.”McGeorge Law Review42(2011):635–40.

ACaliforniastatuteestablishedadonorregistrytopermitsharingofinformationabout willing donors with procurement organizations and transplant centers.This registry (theAltruisticLivingDonorRegistrar) allowsaltruisticdonationsandthusincreasestheavailabilityoforgans.Thisarticleadvocatesrequiringthemotor vehicles department to ask anyone seeking a driver’s license to make anaffirmativedecisionastowhethertheywouldliketobecomeorgandonors.

Nadel, Mark S., and Carolina A. Nadel. “Using Reciprocity to Motivate OrganDonations.”Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics5(2005):293–325.

Areciprocity-basedsystemrewardsindividualswhosignuptobeorgandonorswithpriorityrecipientstatusiftheyeverneedanorgan.TheauthorsarguethatthissystemwouldnotviolateNOTA,andthatitismoreethicalthanapresumedconsentsystem,becauseitdoesnotviolateindividualautonomy.

Siegal,Gil, andRichard J.Bonnie.“Closing theOrganGap:AReciprocity-BasedSocialContractApproach.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics34(2006):415–22.

Inthisarticle,theauthorssuggestpromotingareformulatedsocialunderstand-ingofthemoralpremiseoforgandonationbyemphasizingreciprocalaltruism,establishing a national plan for organ transplantation insurance, and gradually


shiftingsocialexpectationsinthedirectionofassumingthateveryoneisapoten-tialdonor.

Stimson,DanielT.“PrivateSolicitationofOrganDonors:AThreattotheFairnessof the U.S. Organ Transplant System, or a Solution to the National OrganShortage?” Michigan State University Journal of Medicine & Law 10 (2006):349–68.

Private solicitation of organ donations is this article’s proposal. The authorwould encourage donations from individuals who are neither related to, norclosefriendswith,therecipient.Theauthoraddressescritics’concernsregardingcommodificationofthehumanbodyandexploitationofthepoorandcontendsthatpermittingprivatesolicitationwillincreasethesupplyoforgansandremedyinequitiesthatexistinorganallocation.

Undis,DavidJ.“ChangingOrganAllocationWillIncreaseOrganSupply.”DePaul Law Review55(2006):889–96.

Writtenby theExecutiveDirectorofLifesharers, anonprofitorganization thatpromotesaquidproquosystemoforgandonation,thisarticleproposesanorganallocationsystemofreciprocalaltruism.

Noncompensatory Organ procurement Systems

¶17 Noncompensatory organ procurement includes four proposed systems:presumed consent, required response, routine request, and conscription. Underpresumedconsent(oropt-out),everyoneispresumedtobeanorgandonorupondeath, unless the person had registered a dissent to organ donation. Requiredresponse(ormandatedchoice)requiresadultstoregistertheirconsentorobjec-tion.16Routinerequestrequireshospitalpersonneltoaskpotentialdonorsiftheyobject to transplantable organs being removed after death.17 Under a system ofconscription(orroutinesalvaging)“physiciansdonothavetoaskforconsent,andsurvivingfamilymembersarenotallowedtoobjectposthumously.”18Thefollow-ingarticlesexploretheseproposals.

Borry, Pascal, et al. “Donation After Uncontrolled Cardiac Death (uDCD): AReviewoftheDebatefromaEuropeanPerspective.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics36(2008):752–58.

This article reviews some of the medical and ethical issues surrounding theprocurementofuncontrolleddonationaftercardiacdeath(uDCD)organs,withemphasisontheEuropeansituation.TheauthorsaddressthesystemofpresumedconsentinuseinmostEuropeancountries,aswellastheInstituteofMedicine’sposition on uDCD organs. They argue that the Institute of Medicine, whichacceptedtheuseofpreservationtechniques,shouldhavegonefurtherinpursu-ingapresumedconsentsystem.

Glaser,SheriR.“FormulatoStoptheIllegalOrganTrade:PresumedConsentLawsandMandatoryReportingRequirementforDoctors.”Human Rights Brief12,no.2(Winter2005):20–22.

Presumed consent finds an advocate in this student article. The author argues

16. AbenaRichards,Comment,Don’t Take Your Organs to Heaven . . . Heaven Knows We Need Them Here: Another Look at the Required Response System,26n. ill. u. l. reV.365,378(2006). 17. Id.at379. 18. Id.


thatthissystemisthebestmethodofincreasingthelegalorgansupply,andthatitencouragesnationstoadoptmandatoryreportingrequirementsfordoctorswhosuspecttheorganstheyreceivefortransplantsareproductsoftrafficking.

Liddy, Maryellen.“The‘New Body Snatchers’:Analyzing the Effect of PresumedConsentOrganDonationLawsonPrivacy,Autonomy,andLiberty.”Fordham Urban Law Journal28(2001):815–53.

At issue is whether presumed consent organ donation laws are ethical or con-stitutional. The author analyzes anatomical gift statutes and the ways in whichthecurrentsystemintheUnitedStatesalreadyencompassespresumedconsent;examinestheSupremeCourt’sconceptionsoftherightsofindividualandfamily-based privacy, autonomy, and liberty; and analyzes presumed consent laws inlight of the donors’ and their families’ privacy, autonomy, and liberty interests.SheconcludesthatcurrentpresumedconsentorgandonationlawsintheUnitedStatesarebothunethicalandunconstitutional. (cross-referencedunderEthical,Moral,andLegalConcerns:EthicalConcerns)

Mehlman, Maxwell J.“Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: A Reevaluation.”Health Matrix1(1991):31–66.

Thisarticlewasthefirsttoproposeasystemoforganprocurementcalled“routinerequest,”whichrequireshospitalpersonnel toaskpotentialdonors if theyhaveanyobjectiontotheremovaloftransplantableorgansafterdeath.

Morris, Emily Denham.“The Organ Trail: ExpressVersus Presumed Consent asPathstoBlazeinSolvingaCriticalShortage.”Kentucky Law Journal90(2002):1125–50.

The express consent system of organ procurement used in the United Statesis compared with the various presumed consent systems used in several othercountries.Theauthorarguesthatthepresumedconsentsystemislikelythemostsuccessful approach worldwide. She examines the viability of implementing apresumedconsentsystemin theUnitedStatesandthepotential legalandethi-calbarriers to suchachange.Theauthorproposes that theUnitedStatesplaceagreateremphasisonorgandonationbymovingtowardavariationofthepre-sumedconsentapproach.

Orentlicher,David.“PresumedConsenttoOrganDonation:ItsRiseandFallintheUnitedStates.”Rutgers Law Review61(2009):295–331.

ThisarticlereviewsthehistoryofpresumedconsentintheUnitedStatesandcon-cludesthatpresumedconsentfailedbecauseitcouldnotovercometherefusaloffamilymemberstogiveconsenttodonation.Theauthorarguesthatthishistorywithpresumedconsentindicatesthatotherproposedreformswillbeneededtoaddresstheorganshortage.

Richards,Abena.“Don’tTakeYourOrganstoHeaven...HeavenKnowsWeNeedThemHere:AnotherLookattheRequiredResponseSystem.”Northern Illinois University Law Review26(2006):365–412.

In this comment, seven alternatives to the current organ donation system areanalyzed.Theauthorarguesthatthebestsolutiontothecurrentorganshortageis to implement a required response system because (1) it could eliminate theproblemsofthepresumedandinformedconsentsystemswhilestillhonoringthewishesof thedeceased,(2) itwouldnotraise thesameconstitutionalormoralissuesasapresumedconsentsystem,and(3)ithasthebestchanceofeliminatingtheorganshortage.


Spellman, David. “Encouragement Is Not Enough: The Benefits of Institutinga Mandated Choice Organ Procurement System.” Syracuse Law Review 56(2006):353–81.

Afterexaminingtheorganshortagecrisis, theevolutionofanatomicalgift law,andthecurrentsystemofencourageddonation,thisnoteevaluatesfivealterna-tiveorganprocurementsystems.Theauthorconcludesthatamandatedchoicesystem is the best alternative because it best protects both the legal rights andthe social values of donors. He also argues, however, that this system must beimplementedalongwithanationwideeducationprograminordertosuccessfullyincreasetheorgansupply.Spellmanfurtherproposesimplementinganeffectiveorganallocationsystemthatwouldallowforthemostrationaluseoforgans.

Wilcox,SamanthaA.“PresumedConsentOrganDonationinPennsylvania:OneSmallStepforPennsylvania,OneGiantLeapforOrganDonation.”Dickinson Law Review107(2003):935–51.

This comment advocates implementing a presumed consent law. The authoremphasizesthesimilaritybetweenapresumedconsentlawandotherPennsylvaniastatutesanddemonstratesthattheimportationofapresumedconsentlawfromabroad isnotunconstitutional.Afterexaminingthedifferencesbetweenstrongandweakpresumedconsentstatutes,shesuggeststhatPennsylvaniashouldadoptastrongpresumedconsentstatute.

Compensatory Organ procurement Systems

Market Systems

¶18Marketproposalsfororgandonationrangefromunregulatedfreemarkets(alsoreferredtoasopenmarketsorintervivossalesinwhichdonorsandpatientscan buy and sell organs freely) to various types of regulated markets to futuresmarkets. A futures market permits individuals to sell the right to remove theirorgans upon death, creating a contractual relationship.19 The following articlesdiscussthedifferenttypesofmarketsystems.

Aziz,Peter.“EstablishingaFreeMarket inHumanOrgans:EconomicReasoningand thePerfectlyCompetitiveModel.”University of La Verne Law Review31(2009):67–108.

Inthisnote,theauthorexplorestheeconomicsofafreemarketinhumanorgansandarguesthatsuchasystemisthebestsolutiontotheorganshortage.

Cherry, Mark J. “Embracing the Commodification of Human Organs: Trans-plantationandtheFreedomtoSellBodyParts.”Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy2(2009):359–77.

Theauthordefendstheintroductionofamarketinhumanorgansfortransplan-tationtocompensatedonorsandtheirfamilies.Hearguesthathumankidneysarecommodities.Denyingthatfact,hemaintains,encouragesthecontinuationofdishonestpublicpolicy.Next,theauthorarguesthatindividualspossessauthorityovertheirownbodies,andthatevenif financial incentivesdonot increasetheorgansupply,an insurmountableburdenofproofmustbeovercometo justifyforbiddingindividualsfromsellingtheirorgans.

19. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America’s Organ Shortage,13geo. mAson l. reV.69,108–09(2004).


Epstein,RichardA.“TheHumanandEconomicDimensionsofAltruism:TheCaseofOrganTransplantation.”Journal of Legal Studies37(2008):459–98.

Inthisarticle,Epsteindevelopsaneconomictheoryofaltruisminordertobet-terunderstandtheorganshortageintermsofsupplyanddemandandtopredictfuture demand for organs. He argues that altruism operates like ordinary eco-nomicmarkets,butproducesanequilibriumpositioninwhichmoreorgansaretransferredatlowercashprices.Theauthordefendsthiseconomicmodelagainstbehavioralandtraditionalobjections.AccordingtoEpstein,thismodelproperlypredictsthattheuseoffinancialincentiveswillnotdisrupttheoperationoforganmarketsandshouldbeusedtoredresstheworseningorganshortage.Hefurthercontendsthatrepealingthetotalprohibitionagainstorgantransfersforvaluableconsiderationwillnotconstricttheorgansupplyordistorteithersocialpracticesordonativebehavior.

Goodwin, Michelle. “The Body Market: Race Politics and Private Ordering.”Arizona Law Review49(2007):599–636.

This article discusses the flaws in theAmerican altruistic system of organ pro-curementandadvocatesamarketsystem.Theauthorproposesahybridsystemthat would preserve the altruistic system, but would decriminalize exchanging“valuableconsideration”fororgans.Shealsoproposesadoptingapairedkidneyexchangeandreallocatinggovernmentspending.

Harris,CurtisE.,andStephenP.Alcorn.“ToSolveaDeadlyShortage:EconomicIncentivesforHumanOrganDonation.”Issues in Law and Medicine16(2001):213–33.

Toincreasethesupplyoftransplantableorgans,thisarticleproposesestablishingagovernment-regulated,posthumousorganmarket,witheconomicincentivesforthedonors.Theauthorsexamineandrejectseveralalternativestoafreemarket,includingpresumedconsent, altruism, andChina’s systemofprocuringorgansfromexecutedprisoners.Theyjustifyafreemarketapproachbymakingananal-ogytothemarketforeggdonations.

Hughes,J.Andrew.“YouGetWhatYouPayFor?RethinkingU.S.OrganProcurementPolicyinLightofForeignModels.”Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law42(2009):351–81.

This note analyzes other nations’ successes and failures with alternative organprocurementsystems,particularlypresumedconsentmodels.Theauthorrecom-mendscreatinga trialprogramofregulatedopenmarkets forcadavericorgansin one or several states and suggests that the United States use a combinationnational donor registry with priority for recipients who are also registered asdonors.According to the author, these measures would best address the organshortagewithintheexistinglegalandethicalframework.

Kaserman, David. “Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions.” Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy18(2002):567–81.

According to this article, thereare economicmisconceptionsaboutaproposedfinancialmarketfororgans.Theauthorexploresthedefinitionandmeasurementoftheshortage,thelikelihoodoftheemergenceofablackmarketasaresultoflegalizing organ sales, and the distinction between the use of market forces toprocureorgansandtheuseofmarketforcestoallocateorgans.Accordingtotheanalysis,thealtruisticsystemoforganprocurementisthereasonfortheshortageandthusitneedstobechanged.


Love, Andrew J.“Replacing Our Current System of Organ Procurement with aFutures Market: Will Organ Supply Be Maximized?” Jurimetrics Journal 37(1997):167–86.

Althoughafuturesmarketusingindirectfinancialincentiveswillincreasedonorincentive and donor autonomy, it will not maximize the supply of organs,accordingtothisnote.Theauthorargues,however,thatsuchafuturesmarketiscurrentlytheonlypracticalproposaltoincreasesupply.(cross-referencedunderFinancialIncentives)

Pattinson, Shaun D.“Organ Trading, Tourism, and Trafficking Within Europe.”Medicine and Law27(2008):191–201.

Organ-tradingtourismcanbedefinedasthetradingoforgans involvingmorethan one jurisdiction. According to the author, when European policy makersadopted blanket prohibitions on organ trading, they overreacted to legitimatepublic health concerns and the evils of organ trafficking. Pattinson advocatesa trialofaregulatedsystemoforgantrading,whichcouldeventually leadtoalimitedsystemoforgantourism.

Ryan,ChristopherJ.“TheAnatomicalWealthofNations:AFreeMarketApproachtoOrganProcurement.”Michigan State University Journal of Medicine & Law13(2009):427–47.

This student article advocates a quasi–free market organ procurement systemconsistingofanetworkoforganprocurementagenciesthatwouldfacilitatethesharingofinformationbetweenbuyersandsellers.Afterexploringotherpropos-als,suchasinmatedonations,presumedconsent,conscription,routinerequest,andtaxincentives,theauthorconcludesthatalthoughthesesystemswouldlikelyreduce the organ shortage, they also raise serious ethical considerations andhencearelesspreferred.

Sobota,MargaretR.“ThePriceofLife:$50,000foranEgg,WhyNot$1,500foraKidney?AnArgumenttoEstablishaMarketforOrganProcurementSimilartotheCurrentMarketforHumanEggProcurement.”Washington University Law Quarterly82(2004):1225–49.

Thisnoteadvocatesanorganprocurementsysteminwhichrecipientsgivefinan-cialcompensationtodonors.Theauthorjustifiesthisapproachbycomparingittothecurrentfinancialcompensationsystemforeggdonors.

Steinbuch,Robert.“Kidneys,Cash,andKashrut:ALegal,Economic,andReligiousAnalysisofSellingKidneys.”Houston Law Review45(2009):1529–1607.

The author proposes a kidney procurement system that would pay donors fortheir kidneys. He analyzes religious thinking on paying kidney donors, with afocusonJudaism,anddiscussesothersignificantmedical,ethical,andeconomicargumentsboth for andagainst thisproposal. Steinbuchdetails aproposal forcreatingasystemtoregulatethesaleofkidneysthatenliststheexistingnonprofitkidney distribution organization to serve as a clearinghouse for both the pur-chase and distribution of commercial kidneys, without modifying the currentsystemofkidneydistribution.

Watkins, Christy M. “A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations’ OrganProcurementSystemsandPotentialReformAlternatives.”Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law5(2005):1,http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2005/s2005_christy_watkins.pdf(lastaccessedFeb.6,2012).

Sixalternativeprocurementsystemsundergoanalysishere.Theauthorproposes


that two—financial incentivesandanorganmarket—areworthyofa trial.Sheconsiders theadvantagesanddisadvantagesof these twoproposedsystems, theeffectoftheblackmarketonorgandonation,thedifferenttypesoforgansales,andtheenhancementofdonationthroughinternationalcooperation.

Woan,Sunny.“BuyMeaPoundofFlesh:China’sSaleofDeathRowOrgansontheBlackMarketandWhatAmericansCanLearnfromIt.”Santa Clara Law Review47(2007):413–44.

Thiscommentproposesthelegalizationoforgansalesaswellastheestablishmentofaprivatizedinstitutiontosupervisethetrade.WoanexaminesChina’sformersystemofharvestingorgans fromprisonerswhoareexecutedasa lessonaboutwhyindividualrightsmustbeprotected.AlthoughthesystemintheUnitedStatesispurelyaltruistic,commercial transactionsnevertheless takeplace.Theauthorarguesthatthealtruisticsystemhasfailedandcontendsthattheonlyreliablewaytoreducethegrowingshortageisthroughfinancialincentives.

Financial Incentives

¶19Financialincentives,alsocalledindirectfinancialincentives,offervaluableconsiderationfororgans,butarenotmarket-based.20Financialincentivesattemptto motivate private organ donation by offering organ donors tax credits, collegescholarships,health-carecoverage,anddeathbenefits,suchasestatetaxdeductionsandfuneralexpenseallowances.Thefollowingarticlesexploreproposalsforfinan-cialincentivesasameansofincreasingthesupplyoftransplantableorgans.

Boyd, S. Gregory. “Considering a Market in Human Organs.” North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology4(2003):417–73.

Thiscommentadvocatesanorganmarketemployingindirectfinancialincentivesalongsidethecurrentaltruisticsystemasasolutiontotheorganshortage.

Calandrillo,SteveP.“CashforKidneys?UtilizingIncentivestoEndAmerica’sOrganShortage.”George Mason Law Review13(2004):69–133.

HeretheauthordescribesthegrowingorganshortageinAmerica,analyzescurrentdonationandprocurement law,andexploresbothmonetaryandnonmonetaryincentives aimed at eliminating the shortage. He discusses notions of morality,distributive justice, imperfect information,andnegativeexternalities,which,henotes,areroutinelyoffered to justify the lawprohibitingsales.Calandrillopro-poses financial incentives, nonfinancial incentives, and aggressive educationalprogramstosolvetheorganshortage.

Carlson, Patrick D.“The 2004 Organ Donation Recovery and ImprovementAct:HowCongressMissedanOpportunitytoSay‘Yes’toFinancialIncentivesforOrgan Donation.” Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy 23 (2006):136–67.

ThiscommentexaminestheeffectofNOTAonthepossibilityofimplementingalternativesystems.TheauthorcriticizestheActforfailingtoauthorizedemon-stration projects utilizing financial incentives in cadaveric organ donation, andforfailingtoclearlydefinethescopeofthefederalprohibitionontheexchangeoforgansforvaluableconsideration.Hearguesthatadeathbenefitsystemisanacceptablecomplementtoaltruismandoffersseveralreasonswhyitisworkablewithintheframeworkoffederallaw.

20. Id.at107–08.


Chandis,Vanessa.“AddressingaDireSituation:AMulti-FacetedApproachtotheKidneyShortage.”University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law27(2006):205–72.

AfterexaminingthekidneyshortageintheUnitedStatesandtheemergenceofthe black market, this comment’s author argues that the current altruistic andcadaveric donation systems are ineffective. She criticizes several proposals—anopenmarket,afuturesmarket,andpresumedconsent—andarguesthattheyarenotfeasibleduetoethicalproblemsandaninabilitytosupplyenoughkidneys.Theauthorproposesacombinationofpresumedconsent,anexpandededuca-tionandawarenesscampaign,andweakeconomicincentivesasaneffectiveandethicallypermissiblesystemforincreasingthekidneysupply.

Clamon, Joseph B. “Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and OrganDonationThroughTaxCredits.”Annals of Health Law17(2008):67–99.

Here, tax credits are proposed to compensate living organ donors for theexpensesrelatedtodonation.Theauthorarguesthatthisapproachwill lightenthefinancialburdenoforgandonationwithoutusingtheethicallycontroversialmechanismofdeterminingwhether aperson’sbody ispropertyor themarketvalueoforgans.Hecriticizesmarketsystemsforcommodifyingthehumanbodyandforthehighpotentialofabuse.Theauthoralsocriticizesnoncompensatorysystemsfortheirinabilitytosupplyenoughorgans.

Flamholz, David I. “A Penny for Your Organs: Revising New York’s Policy onOfferingFinancialIncentivesforOrganDonation.”Journal of Law and Policy14(2006):329–75.

ThisnoteexaminesandproposessolutionstotheorganshortageinNewYork.Theauthorarguesthattheonlysolutionistoincreasethenumberofdonors.Hesuggestsmoralincentives,directeconomicpayment,andindirectfinancialincen-tives,withemphasisonthelatter.

Goodwin,Michele.“EmpiresoftheFlesh:TissueandOrganTaboos.”Alabama Law Review60(2009):1219–48.

Inthisarticle,tissueandorgandefaultrules,particularlypresumedconsent,facecriticism.First, theauthorarguesthatpresumedconsentraisespragmaticcon-cerns,includinginformationproblemsandopt-outconstraints.Next,shenotesthatpresumedconsentmaybemoresusceptibletofraud,corruption,andabusethanotherprocurementsystems.Theauthorthendiscussesincentiveapproachestoorganprocurementandevaluatesethicalobjectionstomonetaryprocurementstrategies. She suggests that states experiment with procurement protocols byseekingexemptionstotheNationalOrganTransplantAct.

Graham,WalterK.,andJasonP.Livingston.“PerspectivesonFinancialIncentivestoInduceLiveDonorKidneyDonation:ScholarshipsinExchangefortheGiftofLife.”Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy2(2009):347–58.

Thisarticleprovidesageneraloverviewoftheargumentsforandagainstfinan-cialincentivesforliveorgandonationwithaparticularfocusonofferingcollegescholarshipsasan incentive topotentialdonors.Thearticlediscussesprosandcons,buttakesnoposition.

L’Hospital, Dean. “The Medium-of-Exchange Paradigm: A Fresh Look atCompensated Live-Organ Donation.” Human Rights and Globalization Law Review2(2009):1–22.

This article examines the organ procurement systems of India, Iran, and theUnitedStatesandproposesanalternativeapproachthatcombineselementsofa


paired-exchangesystemandanopenmarketsystem.Theauthorcontendsthathisproposalwouldincreasethesupplyoftransplantableorganswhilepreservingthealtruisticaspectsofthecurrentsystemandthedignityofhumanlifeandhealth.

Linford,Jake.“TheKidneyDonorScholarshipAct:HowCollegeScholarshipsCanProvideFinancialIncentivesforKidneyDonationWhilePreservingAltruisticMeaning.” Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy 2 (2009):265–326.

Theauthorproposesmotivatingpotentiallivingkidneydonorsbyofferingthemacademicscholarships.Accordingtotheauthor,thisproposalwouldreducethekidneyshortageandprotectthebestaspectsofthecurrentaltruisticregime.

Little, J.Alex.“TheANGELAct:AProposal toEncourageOrganDonationAfterDeath.”Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy3(2005):685–709.

Inthisnotetheauthorproposesusingtaxcreditsasincentives,creatinganationaldonorregistry,enhancingregulationofhospitalsandotherhealth-careprovid-ers toensuretheyareprocuringorgans,andfacilitatingdecision-makingaboutmedicalcarewhensomeoneisveryill.Hedefendstheproposalagainstethicalandpoliticalconcerns,andcontendsthatitwillprocuremoreorgansthanthecurrentaltruisticsystem.

Love, Andrew J. “Replacing Our Current System of Organ Procurement with aFutures Market: Will Organ Supply Be Maximized?” Jurimetrics Journal 37(1997):167–86.(seeentryunderMarketSystems)

Markmann,AliciaM.“OrganDonation:IncreasingDonationsWhileHonoringOurLongstandingValues.”Temple Journal of Science, Technology & Environmental Law24(2005):499–518.

This comment focuses on the need to increase the organ supply while honor-ing the altruisticnatureof the current organ donor system. The author arguesfor the importance of respecting the ethics and morals underlying the ban onsellingorgans.SheproposesthatCongressnarrowlydefinetypesofpermissibleconsideration and thus provide guidance for states and federal organ donationorganizationstodeveloppilotprogramsandlegislation.Theauthoralsosuggeststhatstatesshouldprovideincentivesthatwouldnotbeamaterialelementintheultimatedecisiontodonateorgans,and, inthisway,bothincreaseorgandona-tionsandhonorthealtruisticnatureofthedonations.

Milot,Lisa.“TheCaseAgainstTaxIncentivesforOrganTransfers.”Willamette Law Review45(2008):67–90.

The arguments for creating tax incentives for organ donations are analyzed inlight of the goals, principles, and practices of the U.S. tax system. The authorarguesthattaxincentivesareaninefficientandinappropriatemeanstoencourageincreased donations of organs. Using tax incentives to encourage organ dona-tions,shecontends,underminesthegoalsandprinciplesofthetaxsystem.

Molen,M.Lane.“Recognizing theLargerSacrifice:Easing theBurdensBornebyLivingOrganDonorsThroughFederalTaxDeductions.”BYU Journal of Public Law21(2007):459–93.

This note advocates changing federal tax law to compensate living donors forexpensesrelatedtodonation.Theauthorarguesthatthecurrentsystemofcom-pensationforexpensesisineffectiveandthatafederaltaxcreditwouldassistmorelivingdonorsandprovidefaircompensationforexpenses.


Parker, Frederick R., Jr., William J. Winslade, and Charles J. Paine. “OrganProcurementandTaxPolicy.”Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy2(2002):173–85.

Theauthorsproposeasystemoftax incentivestomeetthe increasingdemandfor transplantable organs. They argue that providing tax incentives for organdonations will increase the number of transplantable organs and drive downAmericans’involvementintheillegalorgantrade.Theauthorsproposetwomea-sures:first,offertaxpayersarefundableincometaxcreditduringlifeinexchangefortheiragreementtobecomeorgandonorswhentheydie;andsecond,clarifythelawtoremoveanypotentialtaxdisincentivestoorgandonors.

Robinson, Shelby E. “Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems forCompensatingOrganProviders.”University of Colorado Law Review70(1999):1019–50.

Thiscommentanalyzes threemodels forcompensatingorganproviders—intervivos payments, a futures market, and a death benefits system—as possiblealternativestoAmerica’saltruisticorganprocurementsystem.Theauthorrejectsnoncompensatory systems as viable alternatives and evaluates the ethical andpractical criticisms of compensation systems. The author argues that, ethicallyandpracticallyspeaking,thedeathbenefitssystemisthemostviableofthethreeproposals.

Siegel,LaurenR.“Re-EngineeringtheLawsofOrganTransplantation.”Emory Law Journal49(2000):917–55.

Here the proposal is for an incentive-based system. The comment examinesseveralproposedsystems,includingpresumedconsent,mandatedchoice,insur-ancebenefits,openandfuturesmarkets,anddeathbenefits.Theauthorproposesa two-part solution. For the present, she advocates weak economic incentives,increasededucationandawareness, andavoidanceof anopenmarket.For thefuture,shestatesthatsciencewilladvancefarenoughtocreateorgansoutofstemcells,effectivelyrenderingdonatedorgansobsolete.

Smith,JenniferM.“‘DirtyPrettyThings’andtheLaw:CuringtheOrganShortageandHealthCareCrisesinAmerica.”Chapman Law Review12(2008):361–87.

This article proposes compensating organ donors with long-term health-carecoverage. Smith argues that this proposal would reduce the organ shortage,reducethenumberofAmericanswithouthealthcare,andpreventfurtherexploi-tationofthepoor.

Statz,SarahElizabeth.“FindingtheWinningCombination:HowBlendingOrganProcurementSystemsUsedInternationallyCanReducetheOrganShortage.”Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law39(2006):1677–1709.

This note proposes combining different elements of international organ pro-curementsystemstoforgeanewsystemthatgreatlyreducesillegalandethicallyunsoundmethodsofdonation.Statzsuggestsahybridframeworkof increaseddonations,weakeconomicincentives,andpairedorganexchanges.


Ethical, Moral, and Legal Concerns

ethical Concerns

Barshes,NealR.,etal.“Justice,AdministrativeLaw,andtheTransplantClinician:The Ethical and Legislative Basis of a National Policy on Donor LiverAllocation.”Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy23(2007):200–30.

Theauthorspresentanethicalframeworkforallocatingliversandthedevelop-mentofa liverallocationpolicy.Theyarguethatthecurrentallocationsystem,whichgenerallygivesliverstothesickestpeople,shouldbereplacedwithamoreutilitariansystem—distributingthemtothosepeoplewhowouldbenefitthemostfromtransplantsintermsoflifeyearsgained.

Beard, T. Randolph, and David L. Kaserman. “On the Ethics of Paying OrganDonors:AnEconomicsPerspective.”DePaul Law Review55(2006):827–50.

Some of the more common ethical arguments against donor payments receivecriticismhere.Theauthorspresentanapproachusingthetraditionalcost-benefitmethodology of economics. They argue that ethical issues cannot be resolvedon the basis of a cost-benefit analysis alone, but that important public policyquestionscannotbeansweredorethicallyevaluatedwithout such information.Because most of the ethical objections to donor payments are illegitimate, theauthorsargue,thecost-benefitcalculationsassumeheightenedimportance.

Childress, James F. “Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs forTransplantation.”Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law14(1989):87–113.

Various proposals for organ procurement and distribution undergo an ethicalanalysis and assessment in light of moral principles already embedded in U.S.institutions,laws,policies,andpractices.

Dooley,LauraG.,andRobertS.Gaston.“StumblingTowardEquity:TheRoleofGovernment in Kidney Transplantation.” University of Illinois Law Review,1998,703–25.

According to the authors, the kidney donation and transplantation system isfraughtwithracialinequity,andamarketinkidneyswillexacerbatethisinequity.Topreventtheexclusionofthepoor,thegovernmentmustplayacriticalroleintheallocationofkidneys.Theauthorsexaminexenotransplantationandafinan-cialmarketforkidneys,butarguethattheseoptionseitherraiseintractableethicalconcerns or are unavailable in the short term. They propose a modification ofthekidneywaitingliststorecognizetheracialinequityofkidneydistributionbymakingAfricanAmericansapriority.

Evans, John H. “Commodifying Life? A Pilot Study of Opinions RegardingFinancial Incentives forOrganDonation.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law28(2003):1003–32.

Evans presents the findings of a pilot study conducted to determine whetherpeoplethinkthatfamiliesshouldendlifesupportofafamilymemberinordertoharvestorgansifvariousincentivepoliciesareinplace.Inreviewingtheethicalandpolicyimplicationsofthestudy’sfindings,heconcludesthattheamountofmoneyreceivedfromorgandonationisaconsiderationinmakingthedecisionwhethertoendlifesupport.


Fauci, Cara A.“Racism and Health Care in America: Legal Responses to RacialDisparities in the Allocation of Kidneys.” Boston College Third World Law Journal21(2001):35–67.

Thisnoteaddressesthe issueofracialdisparity intheallocationoftransplant-ablekidneysandofferspossiblelegalsolutions.Faucianalyzesvariousresponsestodisparities inkidneyallocationonthebasisofrace, includingpubliceduca-tion,organdonationpublicitycampaigns,presumedconsenttodonation laws,thecreationofcriteriaforplacementonaUNOSkidneyallocationwaitinglist,alteration of kidney allocation guidelines, and litigation under both the EqualProtectionClauseandTitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof1964.

Fry-Revere, Sigrid, Thomas Reher, and Matthew Ray. “Death: A New LegalPerspective.”Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy27(2010):1–75.

Theprecisedefinitionofdeathcontinuestobeanunsettledissue.Accordingtotheauthors,thelawshouldnotdeclareapatientdeaduntilallintegratedcircula-toryandbrainfunctionshaveceased.However,theyargue,individualsortheirsurrogatesshouldbeabletodecidewhentoendcareordonateorgansbasedontheirownconceptofdeath.

Jacob, Marie-Andree. “On Silencing and Slicing: Presumed Consent to Post-MortemOrganDonationinDiversifiedSocieties.”Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law11(2003):239–79.

Inexaminingtheissueofpresumedconsentasanorganprocurementstrategy,the author considers whether it is an ethically sound policy for diverse societ-ies.Afterconsideringjurisdictionalissues,ethicalconcerns,andsocietalfactors,Jacobarguesthatapresumedconsentsystemisnotaneffectivemethodofhar-vestingorgansinadiverseandheterogeneoussociety.Instead,sheadvocatesaninformedconsentsystem.

Lee,EmilyC.“TradingKidneysforPrisonTime:WhenTwoContradictoryLegalTraditions Intersect, Which One Has the Right-of-Way?” University of San Francisco Law Review43(2009):507–57.

Underanalysishere is abillproposedby state senators inSouthCarolina thatwouldhavegivenstateprisonerstheopportunitytoreducetheirprisonsentenceby180daysbydonatingakidney.Leeseesthisproposalas initiatingaconflictbetween the criminal justice“market” (plea bargaining) and the human body“market”(prostitutionandorgandonation),which, theauthorargues,are twolong-standingAmericanlegaltraditions.Sheanalyzesthese“markets”andtheirrespectiverules, theorizesontheassumptionsunderlyingeach,andapplies therulesandassumptionstothebilltodeterminewhichlong-standingtradition,asalegalmatter,shouldgovern.AlthoughLeeiscriticaloftheproposal,shecon-cludesthattheruleofthecriminal justice“market”wouldprevailandsupportthebill’sunderlyingconcept.

Liddy, Maryellen.“The‘New Body Snatchers’:Analyzing the Effect of PresumedConsentOrganDonationLawsonPrivacy,Autonomy,andLiberty.”Fordham Urban Law Journal 28 (2001): 815–53. (see entry under NoncompensatoryOrganProcurementSystems)

Mahoney, Julia D. “Altruism, Markets, and Organ Procurement.” Law and Contemporary Problems72,no.3(Summer2009):17–35.

Here,implementingfinancialincentivesistheproposalforincreasingtheorgansupply. The author evaluates several arguments against compensating organ


donorsandcontendsthatsuchargumentsareeitherhighlycontestableordemon-strablywrong.Shefurtheraddressesquestionsofinstitutionaldesign,examinesthemostpopularcompensationproposals,andofferspreliminaryassessmentsoftheirpromiseandfeasibility.

McKinney, E. Bernadette, William J. Winslade, and T. Howard Stone.“OffenderOrgan Transplants: Law, Ethics, Economics, and Health Policy.” Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy9(2008):39–69.

Conflictingconcernsbeset the issueofprovidingTexascriminaloffenderswithaccess toorgan transplants.Thisarticle examines theperspectivesof attorneys,ethicists,andhealthpolicyscholars.Itconsidersthelegalandethicalobligationsundercorrectionalhealthpolicies,economicfactors,andassociatedethicalcon-siderations.Theauthorsconcludethatorgantransplantsshouldbemadeavail-abletomedicallyqualifiedoffendersatpublicexpense.

O’Keeffe, Carrie Parsons. “When an Anatomical ‘Gift’ Isn’t a Gift: PresumedConsentLawsasanAffronttoReligiousLiberty.”Texas Forum on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights7(2002):287–316.

Thisnoteanalyzesthescopeandimplicationsofnonconsensualorgan-harvestingstatutes inTexas.Theauthorexamines theconstitutionalityof these statutes inlightoftheTexasReligiousFreedomRestorationAct,theTexasConstitution,andtheU.S.Constitution.Itfurtherexploresinternationalnormsconcerninghumanrightsandorganharvesting.Theauthorconcludesthatpresumedconsentisbothunconstitutionalandimmoral.

Price,David.“End-of-LifeTreatmentofPotentialOrganDonors:ParadigmShiftsinIntensiveandEmergencyCare.”Medical Law Review19(2011):86–116.

Toincreasethenumberofavailableorgans,theauthorcallsforaculturalandcon-ceptualshiftthatwouldexpectmedicalpersonneltodiscussorgandonationwithapatientearlieronthepatient’strajectorytowarddeath.Whethersuchanearlierdiscussionwouldincreasedonations,Priceadmits,isnotcertain.

Raza, Omar. “Understanding Islam: A Comparative Analysis of the Ethical andLegalStandardsofOrganDonation.”Windsor Review of Legal & Social Issues1(2010):133–63.

This article surveys fundamental principles of Islamic law and jurisprudenceregarding organ donation, contrasts them with Western tradition, and delin-eates theprospectsofpractical applicationsof Islamic law inOntario,Canada.TheauthorhighlightsthestatusofOntario’sTrilliumGiftofLifeNetworkandcontrastsbenchmarkswiththeIraniancompensatedorgandonationmodel.Heargues that thedisparitybetween the supplyanddemandofbothmodelspro-videsstrongargumentsforrevisitingOntario’s“altruismonly”approachtoorgandonation.

Satel, Sally L., and Benjamin E. Hippen. “When Altruism Is Not Enough: TheWorsening Organ Shortage and What It Means for the Elderly.” Elder Law Journal15(2007):153–204.

Renalfailureisamajorproblemamongtheelderly.Yet,accordingtotheauthors,thecurrentsystemofkidneyallocationdiscriminatesagainstthisgroupofpoten-tialrecipients.Theauthorsdiscussthedynamicsofallocatingthescarcesupplyoftransplantableorgansandthevariousschemesfordoingso,examinerenalfailureasamajorproblemaffectingtheelderly,explainhowdonatedkidneyscanensurebetterclinicaloutcomesfortheaffectedelderlycomparedwithdialysis,consider


theimplicationsoforgandonationforMedicare,andevaluatecurrenteffortstorestructuretheallocationsystemofdonatedkidneys.Theyconcludethatallow-ingsomeformofcompensationfororgandonorswouldincreasethesupplyoftransferablekidneys.

Smith,JenniferM.“KidneyTransplantation:OnlyfortheWell-to-Do?”Campbell Law Review31(2009):333–59.

According to this article, the kidney shortage has a disproportionally negativeeffecton low-income individuals.Theauthorargues thatpoorpeoplewillnotmeet the financial criteria necessary to qualify to receive a kidney transplantbecausetheycannotaffordthehighcostofmaintainingatransplantoveralife-time.Alongwithseveralotherproposals,theauthorsupportsabillintroducedinCongressthatwouldrequirethegovernmenttopayeightypercentofthelifetimecostforthepost-transplantmedications.

Wilson, Chad J. “Working the System: Should Patients in Need of an OrganTransplantBeAbletoJoinMultipleWaitlists?”Indiana Health Law Review8(2011):229–58.

This note states that transplant wait times are decreased when patients are onmultiplelists;thesepatientsaremostlikelytobefinanciallywealthy.Despitetheperceived inequality, theauthoradvocatescontinuingtopermit thepracticeofmultiplelistingsbecauseitdecreasesthelikelihoodthatanorganwillbewastedand offers more suitable matches between organ and recipient. In addition,thepatient’sabilitytochoosetobeonmultiplewaiting listsrecognizespatientautonomyandtranslatesintoabetterchanceofsurvival.

Alternative Sources of transplantable Organs: “Strangers” and Children

Hartman, Rhonda Gay.“Gault’s Legacy: Dignity, Due Process, and Adolescents’Liberty Interests in Living Donation.” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy22(2008):67–106.

This article applies the due process framework prescribed in In re Gault21 topotential adolescent recipients. In Gault, the Supreme Court held that theConstitutionrequiresthegovernmenttotreatminorsfairlywhentheyarefacedwithdeprivationoftheir libertyinterestsandtofacilitatetheirparticipationindecision-makingprocesses.Theauthorseeks toascertain theprecise impactofGault’sdueprocessrequirementonanadolescent’slivingdonationandaddressesthe state’s role in structuring a decision-making process compatible with theunifyingprinciplesderivedfromGault.Shearguesthatstatesshoulddevelopastatutory scheme in which the adolescent’s donative desires are heard, and theadolescentisgivenanopportunitytoexplorethosedesiresalongwithallinfor-mationpertinenttodonativedecision-making.

Herbert,Nicole.“CreatingaLifetoSaveaLife:AnIssueInadequatelyAddressedby the Current Legal Framework Under Which Minors Are Permitted toDonateTissueandOrgans.”Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal17(2008):337–79.

Thisnoteaddressestheethicallyquestionablepracticeofconceivingachildforthepurposeofdonatinghisorherorganstoasibling.Thecurrentlegalframe-workpermitschilddonorstodonatetissueandorgans.Accordingtotheauthor,thisframeworkdoesnotadequatelyprotectchildrenandrequiresmodification.

21. 387U.S.1(1967).


Kahn,Jeffrey.“Commentary:MakingtheMostofStrangers’Altruism.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics30(2002):446–47.

Atissuehereareethicalconsiderationsinaltruisticorgandonationbystrangers.Althoughtheauthorwouldpermitanyone tobeadonor,anydonationshouldnotexceedacertainthresholdofrisk.Theauthoradvocatesanationalallocationsystemtoensurethatstrangerdonationswillgotothehighestprioritypatient,ratherthanaccordingtothepriorityofthedonationcenter.

Ross,LainieFriedman.“SolidOrganDonationBetweenStrangers.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics30(2002):440–43.

This article discusses the ethical and policy considerations of altruistic organdonation by donors who have no relationship to the recipients. The authorsupportsorgandonationsby strangers,but advocates strict regulation toavoidunethicalandarbitraryresults.

Schenberg, Beth A. “Harvesting Organs from Minors and Incompetent Adultsto Supply the Nation’s Organ Drought:A Critical Review of the SubstitutedJudgmentDoctrineandtheBestInterestStandard.”Indiana Health Law Review4(2007):319–59.

Courtsusetwocommonlawapproachestodeterminewhetheraminororincom-petent adult may donate: (1) the substituted judgment standard, a subjectivedeterminationofwhattheindividualwoulddoifheorshewascompetent;and(2)thebest intereststandard,anobjectivedeterminationofwhetherthedonorwillbenefitfromtheprocedure.Thisnotearguesthatthecommonlawstandardsareinadequateandrecommendsseveralcriteriathecourtsshoulduseinstead.

When to harvest

¶20TheUniform Determination of Death Act(UDDA)wasdraftedin1980bytheUniformLawCommissionersandadoptedbymoststates.Itsgoalis“toprovideacomprehensiveandmedicallysoundbasisfordeterminingdeathinallsituations.”Itrequiresthe“irreversible”cessationofthefunctionsofeithertheentirebrainorthe heart and lungs before a person can be considered dead.22 For purposes oforganprocurement,determining themomentwhenaperson is considereddeadhascriticalimplicationsforthesupplyoftransplantableorgans.

¶21Donation After Cardiac Death(DCD)isanorgan-harvestingpracticethatuses adonor’sorganswhen thedonor isnotyetbraindead,butheart and lungfunctionshaveceased.ControlledDCDinvolvesprocuringorganswhencircula-toryarrestfollowstheremovalofmechanicalventilationfromacriticallyillpatientafter the familyrefuses further treatment.23UncontrolledDCD(uDCD)involvesprocuring organs from a patient who dies following unsuccessful resuscitativeefforts.24 DCD is also referred to as donation after circulatory determination ofdeath.25

22. uniform determinAtion of deAth ACt(1980),12U.L.A.777(2008). 23. SeeSuzanneA.Fidler,Implementing Donation After Cardiac Death Protocols,J. heAlth & life sCi. l.,Oct.2008,at123,125,128. 24. See Christopher James Doig & David A. Zygun, (Uncontrolled) Donation After Cardiac Determination of Death: A Note of Caution,36J.l. med. & ethiCs760,761(2008). 25. SeeFidler,supranote23,at131–32.


¶22 Donation After Brain Death (DBD) is an organ-harvesting practice thatusesadonor’sorganswhenthedonorisdeclaredbraindead,evenwhenartificialsupportenablesthedonor’scardiopulmonaryfunctiontocontinuetoperfuseandmaintainthedonor’sorgans.26

Childress, James F.“Organ DonationAfter Circulatory Determination of Death:LessonsandUnresolvedControversies.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics36(2008):766–71.

UnderconsiderationherearethelessonsanddebatesaboutthekindsofconsentnecessaryandsufficientfortemporaryorganpreservationinthecontextofDCDandorgandonationitself;onconflictsofobligation,loyalty,andinterestindona-tionaftercardiacdeathandwaystoaddressthoseconflicts;andonbenefit,cost,andriskassessmentsofuDCDprograms,includingmeasurestoachieveamorefavorablebalanceofbenefits,costs,andrisks.

Doig, Christopher James, and David A. Zygun.“(Uncontrolled) Donation AfterCardiacDeterminationofDeath:ANoteofCaution.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics36(2008):760–65.

ThisbriefarticlearguesthatorganrecoveryfromuDCDisunlikelytoresultinasignificantnumberoforgansandthatthissmallgainmustbebalancedagainstsignificantriskofundulyinfluencingthedecisiontoresuscitateandjeopardizingpublictrustintheproprietyoforgandonationandtransplantation.

Fidler, Suzanne A. “Implementing Donation After Cardiac Death Protocols.”Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law2(2008):123–49.

Thisarticlediscusses the legalandethical issuesrelatingtothetransplantationprocessofDCD,includingdeterminingadonor’sdeathbasedontheirreversiblecessationofcardiopulmonaryfunction,proceduresconductedonthedonorforthebenefitoftherecipient,informedconsentandthesurrogatedecisionmaker,choosingappropriateDCDcandidates,andconflictsofinterest.Theauthorsum-marizes general recommendations for donor candidate selection, consent andapproval,withdrawaloflife-sustainingmeasures,criteriafordeterminingdeath,organrecovery,andfinancialconsiderations.

Harrington,MaxineM.“TheThinFlatLine:RedefiningWhoIsLegallyDeadinOrganDonationAfterCardiacDeath.”Issues in Law and Medicine25(2009):95–143.

Under examination here is the practice of donation after cardiac death. Thisarticle examines whether these donors are legally dead under the UniformDeterminationofDeathAct.Itfurtherexploreswhetheritisappropriatetoapplydonation after cardiac death as it is currently practiced, addresses the concernthat donation after cardiac death is causing the death of donors, and suggestsseveralapproachestoresolvethecontroversyoverthedeterminationofdeathinthesesituations.Theauthorarguesthatthisdebateshouldmovebeyondschol-arlyjournalsandintothepublicarena.

Light,JimmyA.“TheWashington,D.C.ExperiencewithUncontrolledDonationAfter Circulatory Determination of Death: Promises and Pitfalls.” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics36(2008):735–39.

Theauthorargues thatalthoughchallengesarenumerous,uDCDisapromis-ingsourceoforgans.Hewouldrequireasystemthatpromptly initiates insitupreservationpendinglocationoffamiliesandauthorizationfororgandonation.

26. See id.at125,131.


McGregor,Joan,JosephL.Verheijde,andMohamedY.Rady.“DoDonationsAfterCardiac Death ProtocolsViolate Criminal Homicide Statutes?” Medicine and Law27(2008):241–57.

Afteranalyzinghomicidelaws,theUDDA,andtheprotocolsforDCD,theauthorsconcludethatDCDlikelyviolatescriminalhomiciderules.

Rutherford-McClure, Jennifer.“To Donate or Not to DonateYour Organs: TexasCan Decide forYouWhenYou Cannot Decide forYourself.” Texas Wesleyan Law Review6(2000):241–64.

AprovisionoftheTransportationCodeofTexaspermitsamedicalexaminertoauthorizeremovalofadecedent’smajororgansifthenextofkincannotbecon-tactedwithinfourhoursofdeath.Theauthorofthiscommentarguesthatthisstatuteinterfereswiththequasi-propertyinterestinacorpse,violatestheUniformAnatomicalGiftAct,andviolatestheAmericannotionofpersonalautonomy.ShefurtherarguesthatAmericansshouldenjoythefreedomtodonateorgans,muchliketherighttocontract,marry,andhavechildren.Sherecommendsseveralsolu-tionstocomplywithfederallawandtoavoidviolatingthepersonalchoicesoftheindividualandnextofkin.

Legal Rights of Next of Kin

Bonnie, Richard J., Stephanie Wright, and Kelly K. Dineen. “Legal Authority toPreserve Organs in Cases of Uncontrolled Cardiac Death: Preserving FamilyChoice.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics36(2008):741–49.

Apotentialdonormaydieunexpectedlywithoutanyrecordedexpressionofhisorherwishesaboutbeingacadavericorgandonor.Theauthorsarguethatit isethicallypermissibletopreserveadeceasedperson’sorgansforareasonabletimewhileseekingaresponsiblefamilymembertomakeadecision.Theauthorsfindthe authority for this step already implicit in most, if not all, governing statestatutes. They note that the UniformAnatomical GiftAct implicitly authorizesthiswaitingperiod.Even ifcourtswere toconcludethatstatutesdonotconferthenecessaryauthority,theyargue,preservingorganswithoutexplicitstatutoryauthorityneverthelesswouldnotviolatetherightsoffamilymembersandwouldnotposeanymeaningfulriskofliability.

Janssen,Anke,andSjefGevers.“ExplicitorPresumedConsentandOrganDonationPost-Mortem:DoesItMatter?”Medicine and Law24(2005):575–83.

Thisarticlesurveysthedifferentexplicitandpresumedconsentorganprocure-mentsystemsusedforpostmortemdonationintenWesternEuropeancountries,withafocusonthelegalroleofrelativeswithintheconsentprocessandtheroleofrelativesinpractice.Theauthorsfindthatthedifferencebetweenthesystemsofexplicitconsentandpresumedconsentislessimportantthanitseemstobeatfirstsight.

Peterson,KathrynE.“MyFather’sEyesandMyMother’sHeart:TheDueProcessRights of the Next of Kin in Organ Donation.” Valparaiso University Law Review40(2005):169–221.

Thisnoteanalyzesthevariouscommonlawandstatutoryrightsheldbynextofkin,considerswhethertheserightscreateanysortoflibertyorpropertyinterestprotectedbytheDueProcessClause,andifso,determineswhatsortofprocessthestatemustprovidebeforeitcandeprivefamilymembersofanyrighttheymayhaveinmaking,orrefusingtomake,ananatomicalgiftofabodyorganofadece-


dent.PetersonproposesamendingtheUniformAnatomicalGiftActtounilater-allyestablishthattherelativesofadecedenthavealegitimateclaimofentitlementtocontrolthedispositionofthedeceased’sbodyorgansandtoestablishaproperproceduralframeworktoensurethatfamilymembersarenotunjustlydeprivedoftheirestablishedconstitutionalrights.

Wolfman, Samuel. “Live Donor Transplantation—The Incompetent Donor:ComparativeLaw.”Medicine and Law27(2008):859–98.

Informedconsent isadifficult issue inemergencycases involving incompetentdonors,thatis,donorswhoseconsentcannotbeconsideredlegalconsentbecauseitisnotgivenwithfullunderstandingandoutoffreewill.Theauthorcomparesthreedifferentapproaches—Israelicivillaw,theU.S.legalsystem,andthetradi-tionalJewishlawsystem—andarguesthatnoneoffersaclearsolution.

Legal Rights of the Cadaveric Organ donor

Baginski, Wojciech.“Hastening Death: Dying, Dignity, and the Organ ShortageGap.”American Journal of Law & Medicine35(2009):562–84.

Accordingtothisarticle,thedonordoesnotreceivesatisfactoryprotectionunderthecommonlawandexistingstatutoryregulationsthatfocusonincreasingthenumberoforgansavailablefortransplantation.Theauthorarguesthatrespectingadonor’sdignityattheendoflifeshouldbeagoalsuperiortothatofincreasingthe number of organs available for transplantation. He proposes several solu-tionssuchasenactingastatutetoprotectdonors’rightsandimposingliabilityfor breach of those rights, creating a broad cause of action for breach of thephysician’sdutiestowardapatient,andintroducing“enterpriseliability”intothehealth-caresystem.

Cronin, Antonia J., and James F. Douglas.“Directed and Conditional DeceasedDonorOrganDonations:LawsandMisconceptions.”Medical Law Review18(2010):275–301.

Directedorconditionaldeceasedorgandonationpermitsdonorstodictatewhowillreceivetheirorgans.AtissueiswhetherthesedirectivesarepermissibleintheUnited Kingdom. The authors state that overruling such an individual requestconflictswiththe“appropriateconsent”principlethattheU.K.’sHumanTissueActof2004seekstoadvance.Appropriate consentmeansallowinganindividualtoconsentorrefusetobeanorgandonor.Theauthorsalsoarguethattoignoretherestrictions imposedbythedonormaysubject thetransplantteamtocriminalliability.

Nwabueze, Remigius N. “Donated Organs, Property Rights and the RemedialQuagmire.”Medical Law Review16(2008):201–24.

Thisarticleexplorestheremedialchallengefacedinissuesregardingorgansdur-ingtheperiodbetweenharvestingandtransplantation.Theauthorsuggeststhataproperty-basedapproachtoorganlitigationwouldbeuseful.

Powhida,Alexander.“ForcedOrganDonation:ThePresumedConsent toOrganDonation Laws of the Various States and the United States Constitution.”Alabama Law Journal of Science and Technology9(1999):349–74.

Does the FourteenthAmendment impose substantive limits on a state legisla-ture’spowertoauthorizepresumedconsenttoorgandonation?Thiscommentargues that presumed consent statutes would violate the interest of personalautonomyprotectedbytheDueProcessClause.


human trafficking

Khan, Fazal, and Brian Lea. “Paging King Solomon: Toward Allowing OrganDonation from Anencephalic Infants.” Indiana Health Law Review 6 (2009):17–45.

Ananencephalic infant isonebornmissingamajorportionof thebrain.Thisarticlearguesthatanorgandonationfromsuchaninfantcanbebothbeneficialandmorallyjustifiable.Forthesakeofinfantsinneedoforgantransplants,theauthorsadvocateaproperlytailoredtransplantpolicypermittingparentsofanen-cephalicinfantstodonatetheirchildren’sorgansforuseintransplants.

Morelli, Maria N. “Organ Trafficking: Legislative Proposals to Protect Minors.”American University Journal of International Law and Policy10(1995):917–54.

In this comment, the author provides background on the international organtradeandcriticizesexistingsourcesofregulationthatattempttoprotectchildrenfrom being involuntary donors in organ trafficking. Morelli endorses severalproposalsthat,sheargues,shouldincreasethesupplyoforgansanddiminishtheneedtoturntoundergroundchannelsfororganprocurement.Theseproposals,along with stricter restrictions in international treaties and domestic laws, shecontends,willbetterprotectchildren.

Panjabi, Ranee Khooshie Lal. “The Sum of a Human’s Parts: Global OrganTrafficking in the Twenty-First Century.” Pace Environmental Law Review 28(2010):1–144.

Thesaleofbodyorgansisoftenmotivatedbythepovertyofpotentialdonors.Theauthorexplainsthatthepoorareput intosituationsinwhichtheyarecoerced,duped,orevenkilledfortheharvestingoftheirorgans.

Teagarden, Erica.“Human Trafficking: Legal Issues in Presumed Consent Laws.”North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 30(2005):685–732.

This comment examines the prevalence of organ trafficking in impoverishedcountries and recommends several solutions. The author compares the organdonationsystemsofthird-worldcountrieswiththeUnitedStatesandarguesthattheU.S.systemistoorestrictive.Shearguesthatclosingthegapbetweensupplyand demand for organs in the United States is one of the most effective waystoendorgan trafficking.According toheranalysis, apresumedconsent systemcoupledwithamodicumofdueprocessoffersthebestwayforward.

The Future of Organ Transplantation: Xenotransplantation?

¶23Xenotransplantationconsistsoftransplantingintoapatientlivetissuesororgansretrievedfromanimals.27Otherbiotechnologiesarecurrentlyunderconsid-eration,forexample,artificialorgans,butthesetopicsareveryexpansiveandout-sidethescopeandpurposeofthisbibliography.Thefollowingarticlesexplorethelegalissuesregardingxenotransplantationresearchandclinicaltrials.

27. SaraFovargue&SuzanneOst,When Should Precaution Prevail? Interests in (Public) Health, the Risk of Harm and Xenotransplantation,18med. l. reV.302,305–06(2010)(providingthedefini-tionemployedintheUnitedKingdomandmuchofEurope).


Florencio,PatrikS.,andErikD.Ramanathan.“AreXenotransplantationSafeguardsLegallyViable?”Berkeley Technology Law Journal16(2001):937–77.

According to the authors, legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantationsurveillancesystemshouldwithstandconstitutionalscrutinybecause(1)itwouldnotbediscriminatory,and(2)althoughitwouldviolatefundamentalrightsofrecipients,theseviolationswouldbejustifiedunderexistingconstitutionaldoc-trine.

Florencio,PatrikS.,andErikD.Ramanathan.“LegalEnforcementofXenotrans-plantation Public Health Safeguards.” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32(2004):117–21.

Enforcingcompliancewiththepublicsafeguardsnecessaryinxenotransplanta-tionwouldrequire lifelongcollectionof tissueandbody fluid specimens fromxenotransplantrecipients.Theauthorsfindlegalauthorityforsuchsurveillancein informed consent, the law of contracts, and public health legislation. Theyalsobrieflycommentontheconstitutionalityofxenotransplant legislationandconcludethat it shouldbefeasible tocraft legislationthat isbotheffectiveandconstitutional.

Fovargue,Sara.“‘OhPickMe,PickMe’—SelectingParticipantsforXenotransplantClinicalTrials.”Medical Law Review15(2007):176–219.

Atissuearetheregulatoryissuesregardingxenotransplantationandtheethicalandlegalguidanceonselectingpeopleforexperimentaltreatmentsandresearch.The author explores the propriety of selecting those who are competent, butdesperatelyill,forthefirstgeneticallyengineeredwhole-organxenotransplants.Sheseeksabalancebetweentheopportunityforpotentialsubjectstoextendorimprovetheirqualityoflifeandtheneedtolimitparticipationtopreventexploi-tationforthepurposeofprovidinginformationtofuturegenerations.

Fovargue,Sara,andSuzanneOst.“WhenShouldPrecautionPrevail? Interests in(Public) Health, the Risk of Harm and Xenotransplantation.” Medical Law Review18(2010):302–29.

Acknowledgingtherisksofxenotransplantationwhileadvocatingitsuserequiresa challenging analysis. Here, the authors conclude that the potential risks ofxenotransplantationaretoogreattoconsidertheprocedureaviableoptionfortheorganshortageprobleminlightofothersolutions—forexample,stemcellsandareformationofthetransplantrecoverysystem.

Holland, Jocelyn A. “The ‘Catch-22’ of Xenotransplantation: Compelling Com-pliancewithLong-TermSurveillance.”Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy7(2006):151–82.

This commentanalyzes the legal issues regarding informedconsent and xeno-transplantation.Theauthorarguesthattherisksassociatedwithxenotransplan-tationrequirerecipientstoconsenttolong-termsurveillance.

Spillman,MoniqueA.,andRobertM.Sade.“ClinicalTrialsofXenotransplantation:Waiverof theRight toWithdrawfromaClinicalTrialShouldBeRequired.”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics35(2007):265–71.

Federal regulation imposes a life-long surveillance requirement on xenotrans-plantrecipientsand,accordingtotheauthors,effectivelyabrogatestherighttowithdraw from a clinical trial after the transplantation has taken place. Theyarguethatrecipientsshouldreceivefulldisclosureofthisregulation.

311


Keeping Up with New Legal Titles*

Compiled by Creighton J. Miller, Jr.** and Annmarie Zell***

Contents

Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315Legally Poisoned: How the Law Puts Us at Risk from Toxicants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Inside the Castle: Law and the Family in 20th Century America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future

of the Great Writ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320Ducktown Smoke: The Fight over One of the South’s Greatest

Environmental Disasters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322Discretionary Justice: Looking Inside a Juvenile Drug Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323Fan Fiction and Copyright: Outsider Works and Intellectual

Property Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325Information and Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

List of Contributors

ValerieR.AggerbeckResearchLibrarianSchoeneckerLawLibraryUniversityofSt.ThomasSchoolofLawMinneapolis,MinnesotaLegally Poisoned: How the Law Puts Us at Risk from Toxicants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

* ©CreightonJ.Miller, Jr.,andAnnmarieZell,2012.Thebooksreviewed in this issuewerepublishedin2011.Ifyouwouldliketoreviewbooksfor“KeepingUpwithNewLegalTitles,”pleasesendane-mailtocreighton.miller@[email protected]. ** Librarian forResearchandBibliographic Instruction,WashburnUniversitySchoolofLawLibrary,Topeka,Kansas. *** ReferenceLibrarian,NewYorkUniversityLawSchoolLibrary,NewYork,NewYork.


MatthewS.CooperReferenceLibrarianMichaelE.MoritzLawLibraryMoritzCollegeofLawTheOhioStateUniversityColumbus,OhioDucktown Smoke: The Fight over One of the South’s Greatest

Environmental Disasters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

LeslieJ.KallasCoordinator,ResearchSystemsandServicesNilanJohnsonLewisMinneapolis,MinnesotaThe Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

BenjaminJ.KeeleReferenceLibrarianWolfLawLibraryWilliam&MaryLawSchoolWilliamsburg,VirginiaReclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

MikhailKoulikovReference/ResearchLibrarianNewYorkLawInstituteNewYork,NewYorkFan Fiction and Copyright: Outsider Works and Intellectual

Property Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

CatherineA.LemmerHeadofInformationServicesRuthLillyLawLibraryIndianaUniversityRobertH.McKinneySchoolofLawIndianapolis,IndianaDiscretionary Justice: Looking Inside a Juvenile Drug Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

ToddG.E.MelnickAssociateLibrarianforPublicServicesFordhamLawSchoolLibraryFordhamUniversitySchoolofLawNewYork,NewYorkInformation and Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

313KeepINg Up WIth NeW LegAL tItLeSVol. 104:2 [2012-23]

ReneeY.RastorferHeadofResearchServicesWesternNewEnglandUniversitySchoolofLawLibrarySpringfield,MassachusettsHabeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future

of the Great Writ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

EllenM.RichardsonReferenceLibrarianColemanKareshLawLibraryUniversityofSouthCarolinaSchoolofLawColumbia,SouthCarolinaInside the Castle: Law and the Family in 20th Century America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

Aufderheide,Patricia,andPeterJaszi.Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2011.199p.$50.

Reviewed by Benjamin J. Keele

¶1Theaffirmativedefenseoffairuseisoneofthemostvexingaspectsofcopy-rightlaw.Thoughcodifiedinastatutorysectionthatisonly175wordslong,1thedoctrinehasgeneratednumerous lawreviewarticles2andamajortreatise3dedi-catedtoanalyzingitshistoryandjudicialapplication.Whenfairusesooftenbaffleslegalprofessionals,itseemsunfairtoexpectlaycitizenstorelyonitasjustificationfor the use of copyrighted works in their own creative endeavors. AmericanUniversityprofessorsPatriciaAufderheide(SchoolofCommunication)andPeterJaszi(WashingtonCollegeofLaw)offercodesofbestpracticesasonesolutiontothisproblem.Developedbyindividualcreativecommunities,thesecodes“represent...thecommunity’scurrentconsensusaboutacceptablepracticesforthefairuseofcopyrightedmaterials”4andfunctionastoolsthatcanhelpusersgaugewhetheraparticularuseofcopyrightedmaterialqualifiesasfair.AufderheideandJaszi’snewbook,Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright,servesbothasamanual for developing these codes of best practices and as a readable story thatrecountsthehistoricaldevelopmentoffairuse.

¶2Thefirsthalfofthebooksummarizestheoriginsandthehistoryoffairuse.Inlargepart,thisaccountisalsothemoregeneraltaleofU.S.copyrightlaw.Overthecourseofthelasttwocenturies,Congresshasgraduallybutsteadilyexpandedthe scope of works protected by copyright and extended the term of copyrightprotection, all to safeguard the interests of businesses in politically influential

1. 17U.S.C.§107(2006). 2. See, e.g.,NeilWeinstockNetanel,Making Sense of Fair Use, 15leWis & ClArK l. reV. 715(2011); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J.Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 Cornell l. reV. 91 (2010);MatthewSag,The Prehistory of Fair Use,76brooK. l. reV.1371(2011). 3. WilliAm f. pAtry, pAtry on fAir use(2011). 4. The Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Media Literacy Education, Ctr. for soC. mediA,http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use/related-materials/codes/code-best-practices-fair-use-media-literacy-education(lastvisitedFeb.6,2012).


industries.Thishasproduceda“LongandStrongCopyright”(partofthetitleofchapter2) that stifles thosecreativeefforts that relyonpreexistingcopyrightedworksforrawmaterials.

¶3 Conventionally, the authors’ narrative would veer off here in one of twoopposingdirections,eitherdenouncingcopyrightinfringersasthieveswhodepriveauthors and publishers of hard-earned income or demanding that copyright bereformed—orevenabolished—toremoveamajorobstacletofreedomofspeechandaccess to information.Fortunately,AufderheideandJaszieschewthesewell-wornpaths.Theyadvocate,instead,forthewidespreaduseofcollaborativelydevel-oped codes of best practices that can provide content creators with practicalguidanceonfairuseandestablishindustrynormsthatcanbeconsultedbylawyers,judges,fundingagencies,andinsurancecompanies.Suchcodescanboostthecon-fidencethatcontentcreatorshaveintheirowndecisionsaboutfairuse,thuspro-moting the generation of new creative works, even in political environmentshostiletothelegislativereformofcopyrightlaw.

¶4Arecentshift inthecourts’applicationof the fairusedoctrinehasmadedevelopmentofthesecodesmoreuseful.Thecopyrightactestablishesafour-factortestforanalyzingquestionsoffairuse.Inthe1970sand1980s,undertheinfluenceof the law-and-economicsmovement, judgesgenerallytreatedonefactor,ause’seffectonthemarketforthecopyrightedwork,asthemostcritical.“Sincefairuseinevitably involvesnotpayinga license fee”(p.82), this focus left fairuse largelyirrelevantasacopyrightdefense.Inthe1990s,however,courtsshiftedtheirempha-sistofocusontheoverarchingissueoftransformativeness,whetheraparticularuse“repurpose[s]”(p.80)acopyrightedworkforanewcontext.Inaninfluentiallawreviewarticle,JudgePierreLevalarguedthatfairuseshouldfavortransformativeuses,5andthe1994U.S.SupremeCourtdecisioninCampbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. endorsed this approach.6 This emphasis on transformation was“the key toopen the fair-use door” (p.93). Now, when considering a question of fair use,courts ask three questions:“Was the use of copyrighted material for a differentpurpose,ratherthanjustreusefortheoriginalpurpose?Wastheamountofmate-rialtakenappropriatetothepurposeoftheuse?Wasitreasonablewithinthefieldordisciplineitwasmadein?”(p.135).Byspecifyingtheusesthatacreativecom-munityconsidersreasonable,codesofbestpracticescanhelptoanswerthefinalquestion.

¶5 At the time of the book’s publication, eight “communities of practice”(p.155)hadadoptedcodesprovidingguidanceonfairuse,includingdocumentaryfilmmakers, poets, and media literacy educators. (The Association of ResearchLibrariessubsequentlyadoptedacode.7)Thesecondhalfofthetextdiscussesthedraftingandadoptionofthesecodesandtherolethatthebook’sauthorsplayedinthese developments. With funding provided by major foundations, AufderheideandJasziorganizedmeetingsofvariouscreativecommunities,beginningwiththe

5. PierreN.Leval,Toward a Fair Use Standard,103hArV. l. reV.1105(1990). 6. 510U.S.569(1994). 7. AssoC. of reseArCh librAries et Al., Code of best prACtiCes in fAir use for ACAdemiC And reseArCh librAries (2012), available at http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/code-of-best-practices-fair-use.pdf.


documentary filmmakers. At each meeting, participants discussed the situationscommonly giving rise to issues of fair use within their particular community.Alegaladvisoryboardthenvettedgeneralprinciplesregardingtheappropriatescopeoffairusewithinthesesituationsandpresentedacodecompilingtheprinciplesforpotentialadoptionbyorganizationsrepresentingthecreativecommunity.Severalcasestudiesdemonstratethatthecodesofbestpracticesresultingfromthesepro-cesseshelptoclarifywhatconstitutesfairuse,givingcreatorsandcopyrightownersabetterideaofwhichusesareappropriateandwhichshouldbelicensed.

¶6Reclaiming Fair Useisaninformativeandreadablecallforcontentcreatorstoworkcollectivelyinestablishingfairusenormsandassertingtheirfairuserights.It would make an excellent acquisition for any academic or public library thatserves patrons who rely on fair use. In addition to their substantive material,AufderheideandJasziprovideanumberofusefulappendixes,including“TemplateforaCodeofBestPracticesinFairUse,”“DocumentaryFilmmakers’StatementofBest Practices in Fair Use,” and“Myths and Realities about Fair Use.” Sprinkledthroughout the book are a number of text boxes labeled“Fair Use: You Be theJudge”thatpresentscenariospromptingreaderstoevaluatethereal-worldapplica-tionoffairuseprinciples,andthebook’sfinalappendixprovidesthe“answers”tothesescenarios.

Barton, Benjamin H. The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System. NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2011.303p.$90.

Reviewed by Leslie J. Kallas

¶7 The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System, by University ofTennesseeCollegeofLawprofessorBenjaminH.Barton,isanexplorationoftheintimaterelationshipbetweenthenation’slawyersanditsjudges.Thesimplefactthatnearlyalljudgesarealsolawyersestablishestheinnatepossibilityofbias,both“conscious/crass”and“unconscious/subtle”(p.14),ineveryaspectofthelaw,fromlegaleducationtoprofessionalstandards,attorney-client interactions,andcourt-room dynamics. Barton’s study exposes the systems and situations that promotethis bias, the consequences that flow from the underlying relationship, and theobstaclesthatimpedereform.

¶8Bartonbeginsbydescribingthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenlawyersandjudges.Heemphasizestheiridenticaleducationandtraining,participationinajointprofessionalcommunity,andrelianceonacommonintellectualapproachtoproblemsolving.Whocanbetterunderstanda lawyer’sperspective thana judge,andwhobutanattorneycanfullyappreciatetheinnerworkingsofthejudiciary?Bartonmaintainsthatthisconnectioncontributestoanunnecessarycomplexityinlegalproceedingsandtoapatternofallowancesandexemptionsforlawyers.Atitsworst,thedynamiccanproducemalpractice.

¶9Theproblem,Bartonsuggests,stemsinpartfromthemannerinwhichthelegalprofessionisregulated,andhedevotestwoofhisbook’stwelvechapterstothistopic.Chapter5recountsthehistoryoflawyerregulation,reachingasfarbackasthe courts that preceded the Norman Conquest of England, while chapter 6addressesthecurrentstateofthatregulation.AccordingtoBarton,thenumberof


lawyersintheUnitedStatesincreasedrapidlyfollowingtheAmericanRevolution,spurringearlybarassociations toestablish training standards, licensing systems,and codes of professional behavior. Barton’s criticism is that bar associations—groupsmanagedbyattorneysandjudgesthemselves,withnoexternalcontrolsoroutsideinput—formulaterulesandproceduresthatprimarilybenefitlawyers,notthecommunityatlarge.Citingtheneedtostandardizeeducationalrequirementsand improve technical skills, modern bar associations have, in fact, made legaleducationmoreexclusiveandexpensive,institutedbarexamsthataremorechal-lenging than law school, and created intense competition for entry-level place-mentsinfirms.Suchchangescouldbeportrayedasimprovementstoprofessionalstandards that benefit clients, but Barton takes the contrary view. He submits,“Lawyerspushforstricterentryrequirementstosuppresscompetitionandincreasetheirwages;judgesdosotoeasetheirjobs”(p.151).Whenconsumerchoiceislost,thesepurportedreformsdonotbenefitthepublic—theyjustleavetoomanylaw-yersrepresentingthewealthyandwell-connectedand“toofew . . .willingtodoeverythingelse”(p.145).

¶10Tofurtherillustratetheimpactofthecloserelationshipbetweenlawyersand judges, Barton presents the example of legal malpractice, a cause of actionsignificantlymoredifficulttoprovethanisitscloseanalogue,medicalmalpractice.Indeed,“AlthoughtortliabilityhasgrowninalmosteveryotherareaofAmericanendeavor,judgeshavekepttheoperationoftheirowncourtsfreefromthedistract-ing threatofpossible liability”(p.187).Powerful legal toolsexist foravoidingordefeating professional malpractice claims, and they are available only to protectlawyersandjudges.Inthisregard,theexampleoftheEnronscandalreceivesspecialattention. Barton labels the lawyers who aided and defended Enron as “SoleSurvivors”(p.243),theonlyactorstoemergelargelyunscathedfromthecompany’sdisastrous collapse.Accountants andexecutives,by contrast,were fined,decerti-fied,andimprisoned.Bartonwrites,“Thetakeawaypointisquitesimple:toaccom-plishitsmassivefraud,Enronneededalotofhelp.Muchofthathelpcamefromlawyers” (p.246).Yet, no lawyers or law firms were sanctioned as a result of theEnrondebacle.

¶11Barton’sfinalcriticismofthelawyer-judgeconnectionaddressesthecom-plexityoflaw.Hesuggeststhatthisattributebenefitslawyersandjudgesinvariousways,evenwhileitproduces“anopaquelegalsystemthatthepubliccannotdisen-tangle” (p.272). For instance, complexity creates more demand for the technicalexpertisethatlawyerspossess,yieldinganeconomicbenefitforattorneys.Judgesalsogain,inpartbecause“[c]omplexitymakesiteasiertodecidealmostanycasein line with the judge’s other preferences” (id.). The link between lawyers andjudges,andthereforethelawyer-judgebiasinthelaw,persistsbecausethosewhocanandshouldreformthesystemareitscreatorsandretaindirect,personalinter-estsinitsunderlyingflaws.

¶12The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal Systemisprovocativeinbothtone and approach. Professor Barton’s study should stimulate conversation onlawyersandjudges,howtheyworktogether,andwhethertheyworkforthepublicgood.Andtheremaybesomecauseforoptimism.Awarenessofaproblemisanessentialprecursortochange,andBartonseesthisbookasonesteptowardthat


goal.Thevolumewillmakeaninterestingadditiontolawschoolandcourtlibrar-ies,aswellasthecollectionsofbarassociations.

Cranor, Carl F. Legally Poisoned: How the Law Puts Us at Risk from Toxicants.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,2011.315p.$35.

Reviewed by Valerie R. Aggerbeck

¶13 If you have read a newspaper within the past year, you have probablynoticedarticlesonBisphenolA(orBPA)anditspotentialtocauseendocrinedis-ruption.8Ifyouareaparent,youmayhaveseenstoriesaboutharmfultoxicantsinJohnson&Johnsonbabyshampoos.9And,ifyouareinterestedinlawspertainingtomanufacturingorindustry,youmayalreadybefamiliarwiththeproposedSafeChemicals Act of 2011,10 intended to modernize and improve the regulation ofindustrialchemicals.Withinthiscontext,CarlCranor’sLegally Poisoned: How the Law Puts Us at Risk from Toxicantstakesonatimelyandcomplexissue.Cranor,whoholdsaMasterofStudiesinLawfromYaleandaPh.D.inphilosophyfromUCLAandwhohasservedontwoNationalAcademyofSciencecommitteesandvariousscientificadvisorypanels,providesasoberinglookatboththescienceandthelawrelatedtoindustrialcompounds.

¶14Legally PoisonedbeginswithageneraloverviewofCranor’spositions.Hesubmitsthathumansareexposedtotoxicantsonadailybasis;tryaswemight,wesimplycannotescapethem.Thesechemicalscanadverselyaffectourhealth,acon-cernthatisinsufficientlyreflectedbycurrentlawsthat“donotrequiretestingorapublichealthagency’sreviewingof industrialcompoundsfortoxicitybefore theyenterthemarket”(p.6)(emphasisadded).

¶15Inthefirsthalfofthebook,Cranorprovidesthescientificbackgroundforthisargument.Hedescribesthehealtheffectsofbothwell-andlesser-knowntoxicsubstances, such as lead, mercury, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and BPA.According toCranor, thesechemicals canbe found inmanycommonsources—plasticbottles,cosmetics,nonstickfryingpans,couches,televisions,carpets,andsoon—andcanenterourbodiesviaingestion,inhalation,orthroughcontactwiththeskin.Childrentendtoreceivegreaterexposureandbemoresusceptibletotoxicantsthanadults,pointsofparticularconcernforCranor.Tosupporthisclaims,Cranorreliesheavilyonrecentscientificdata(mostofitpublishedafter2008),includingstudies in respected academic journals, reports from government agencies, andpapersproducedbynationalandinternationalorganizations.Hesubtlyintertwinestechnicaldescriptionsof toxicchemicalswithaccountsofactual incidents stem-mingfromexposure,whichmakesthissometimescomplicatedmaterialengagingandaccessibletoageneralreadership.

8. See, e.g.,MegKissinger,Agencies Fail to Address BPA, Report Says,milWAuKee J. sentinel,Jan.26,2012,atA3. 9. See, e.g.,LindaA.Johnson,Johnson & Johnson Baby Shampoo Has Cancer-Causing Chemicals, Group Says, huffington post (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/01/johnson-johnson-baby-sham_n_1069123.html. 10. S.847,112thCong.(2011).


¶16ThesecondhalfofLegally Poisonedaddressestheregulationoftoxicchemi-cals.Currently,toxicsubstancesareregulatedprimarilyundertheToxicSubstancesControlAct(TSCA).11TSCAisa“postmarketlaw”(p.135)thatallowsmost“com-mercialchemicalproducts(80 to90percent) . . . [into] themarketwithoutanyrequired testing for their toxicity” (p.132). This effectively places the burden ongovernment agencies to identify the risks and make a case for regulation“aftersubstances are in commerce” (p.136)—thus, after the public may have beenharmed.

¶17Cranorbelievesthelawneedstochangetoreflecta“moreprudent,sensiblelegalandregulatoryapproachtoprotectusfromtoxicchemicals”(p.12).Hetakessides,stronglyadvocatingthedevelopmentandimplementationoflegislationthatwould require testing of chemical products prior to their introduction into themarketplace. His approach relies heavily on Europe’s REACH (Registration,Evaluation,Authorization,andRestrictionofChemicals)legislation,12onexistingpremarkettestingandlicensingrulesforthepharmaceuticalandpesticideindus-tries,andonthebasic“ethicsofresearchonhumansubjects”(p.178).Thissection,probablyoneof thebook’s strongest, introducesCranor’sAmericanaudience tomethods of comparative reasoning and to European primary law concepts thatmaybenewtomanyreaders.

¶18Legally Poisonedissometimesrepetitive,asseveralkeypointsandexamplesare reused in different chapters; Cranor’s prose style can also be distracting attimes.Thebooklacksnuance,andanovicereadermaycomeawaywiththenotionthatscientists,governments,andcompaniesaresimplycarelesswithhumanhealth.The actual problems are far more complex than that impression suggests, andaddressingthemdemandsacarefulbalancingofrisksandbenefits.Inspiteoftheseflaws, the book offers a valuable starting point for those interested in the topic.Extensivenotesciterelevantprimaryandsecondaryauthorities,andtheserefer-enceswillprovehelpfultoreaderswhowishtopursuethetopicingreaterdepth.More important, Cranor’s work raises critical questions regarding our society’smoralandethicalvaluesandoursenseofpersonalresponsibility.Growingpublicawarenessandconcernsabouttoxicchemicalshavenowbroughttheseissuestotheforefrontofnationalattention,andwearelikelytohearmoreaboutsuchcontro-versiesassciencecontinuestoadvance.Legally Poisonedisrecommendedforpur-chasebygeneralacademicandpubliclibrariesaswellaslawlibrariessupportingeducationalprogramsandscholarlyresearchonenvironmental issues.Thebookrepresentsanoptionalpurchaseformostlawfirmandgovernmentlibraries.

Grossman,JoannaL.,andLawrenceM.Friedman.Inside the Castle: Law and the Family in 20th Century America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,2011.443p.$35.

Reviewed by Ellen M. Richardson

¶19WithInside the Castle: Law and the Family in 20th Century America,Hofstralaw professor and family law expert Joanna L. Grossman has joined forces with

11. 15U.S.C.§§2601–2697(2006&Supp.IV2010). 12. CouncilDirective2006/121/EC,2006O.J.(L396)850;CouncilRegulation1907/2006,2006O.J.(L396)1(EC).


LawrenceM.Friedman,apreeminentlegalhistorianandprofessoratStanfordLawSchool, toproducea fascinating social and legalhistoryofAmerican family law.TheirworkskillfullyinterweavestraditionallegalsourceswithstatisticsandmediareportstoproduceatapestrythatchroniclesthedevelopmentoffamilylawintheUnitedStates.Astheauthorsnote,theyattemptednottopredictthefutureoffam-ilylaw,butrather“toexplainhowwegottowhereweare,andwhy,andwhatthestepswerealongtheway”(p.331).

¶20Thebookisdividedintofourparts.Part1,“TyingtheKnot:MarriageandPromisestoMarry,”addressesthehistoryofmarriageintheUnitedStates.Specifictopicscoveredincludechangingrestrictionsontherighttomarry,thedemiseofcommonlawmarriage,andthedramaticdeclineinso-called“heartbalm”causesofaction(e.g.,alienationofaffectionorbreachofpromise).Throughoutpart1,theauthorstracetheeffectsthatdevelopmentsinthelawandshiftingsocialmoreshavehad on society’s fundamental understanding of the institution of marriage.GrossmanandFriedmanreportashiftatthebeginningofthetwentiethcenturyfromafocusontraditional marriage,arelationshipconsistentwith“theoldideaof‘separate spheres’ for men and women” (p.57), to companionate marriage, one“based on ‘the importance of emotional ties between wife and husband—theircompanionship, friendship and romantic love’” (id.).13 The end of the twentiethcenturysawtheevolutionofanewconception,expressive marriage,anenterprisethroughwhichspousesseekpersonalfulfillment,“‘elevat[ing]maritalaffectionandnuclear-familytiesabovecommitmentstoneighbors,extendedkin,civicduty,andreligion’”(p.58)14—“aheavyburdenforamarriagetobear”(id.).

¶21Part2,“AnythingGoes:LoveandRomanceinaPermissiveAge,”detailstheconnectionbetweenevolvingAmericanattitudestowardsexualbehaviorandU.S.SupremeCourtdecisionsrecognizingconstitutionalrightstoprivacy.Inparticular,GrossmanandFriedmanreviewlandmarkcasesoncontraceptives,abortion,andsexualactivity.Onechaptercoverscohabitation,andanotheraddressesthehistoryandcurrentstatusofsame-sexmarriageintheUnitedStates.

¶22Part3,“WhentheMusicStops:DissolvingaMarriageandtheAftermath,”considersthelegalandpracticalconsequencesofdivorceandannulment.Here,aswellasinpart1,GrossmanandFriedman’sresearchandwritingtrulyshine.Inonechapter,“DollarsandSense:TheEconomicConsequencesofDivorce,”theauthorsseamlesslyblendtogethercaselaw,statistics,socialscienceresearch,andreal-worldanecdotes to paint a comprehensive picture of what happens when a marriagebreaksdown,detailingtheeffectsofthiscollapseonboththecoupleandsocietyatlarge.

¶23Finally,part4,“TheOldandtheNewGeneration,”offersastarklookatlawand the realityofmodern family life.Onechapterbrieflyexaminesmajor issuesconcerningtheelderly—inheritanceandestateplanning;elderabuse,neglect,andcompetency;increasedlifeexpectancy;andtherisingimportanceofSocialSecurityandMedicare.Theauthorsnotethattheburdenofcaringfortheelderlyhaslargelyshiftedfromthefamilytothestateoverthecourseofthetwentiethcentury.The

13. QuotingAndreW J. Cherlin, the mArriAge-go-round68(2009). 14. QuotingStephanieCoontz,Too Close for Comfort,n.y. times,Nov.7,2006,atA21.


chaptersonchildrenandparentingare twoof themost interesting in thebook.Amongothertopics,GrossmanandFriedmanexaminewho,exactly,canbecon-sideredaparent,giventhecomplexitiesofmodernlife.Forexample,“Inmodernsurrogacy,itmaytakeasmanyasfivepeopleto‘procreate’:aspermdonor,aneggdonor, a gestational carrier—and two intended parents” (p.301). Divorce andremarriageaddfurtherconfusion, includingthepotential forde factoparents—shouldthesestepparentsbeentitledtovisitationrightswhenthemarriageends?Nodoubttechnologicaladvancesandchangesinfamilydynamicswillcontinuetopresentsuchchallengesforthecourts.

¶24Inside the Castleisawell-writtenandthoroughlyresearchedworkoflegalhistory that touchesonnearlyeveryaspectofAmerican family life.Thebook isalsowellorganized,withacogentarrangementoftopics.Usefulsummariesattheend of each chapter list significant points and note questions that remain to beanswered.Thebook’sindexisthorough,anditscomprehensiveendnotesshouldprovevaluableforthoseinterestedinfurtherresearch.Inside the Castleisrecom-mendedforallpublic,academic,andlawlibrariesandforanyonewithaninterestinfamilylaworsocialhistory.

King,NancyJ.,andJosephL.Hoffmann.Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writ.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2011.255p.$45.

Reviewed by Renee Y. Rastorfer

¶25 The unique purpose behind Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writisforeshadowedbythework’stitle.Ratherthanbeinganexclusivelyhistoricalaccountofthewritofhabeascorpus—ajudi-cialmechanism“used. . . to inquire intothe legalbasis foraperson’s imprison-ment” (p.vii)—thebook also represents a call for refocusing the so-calledGreatWrittoavoidthetrivializationofhabeasreviewthroughoveruse.AuthorsandlawprofessorsNancyKing(VanderbiltUniversity)andJosephL.Hoffmann(IndianaUniversity–Bloomington) have crafteda legislativeproposal for addressingwhattheyseeasthesteadydevaluationofhabeas,andtheirbookisintendedlargelytopresentargumentsinsupportofthisplan.

¶26CentraltoHabeas for the Twenty-First Centuryisitsauthors’understandingoftheproperrolesthathabeashasplayedwithintheAmericanpoliticaldynamic:to reimpose constitutional norms during times of perceived threat to nationalsecurityand to restorebalancebetween the stateand federal systemsasneeded.Correctlyapplied, the judiciary’srelianceonhabeashasyieldedexecutiveobedi-encetoconstitutionalprinciplesandappropriatelegislativeresponsestounderly-ingproblems.However,ifhabeasis“routinelyinvoked”(p.167)aftertheoriginalneedforreviewhaspassed,thewrit“transforms...intoaburdensomeandevendespisedsourceofwastefullitigation”(p.168).Tosupporttheirclaimthathabeasreview can become unwieldy and inefficient, the authors rely heavily on a 2007empirical study of habeas filings in federal district courts, a study they believedemonstratesthatuseofthewritincertaintypesofcasesisuselessasameansforaccomplishing the ends sought but still an enormous drain on limited judicialresources.


¶27KingandHoffmannanalyze theuseof thewritofhabeascorpus in fivedifferent types of cases, weighing the benefits and costs associated with each.Perhaps theirmostdramaticrecommendation for the futureofhabeas,however,fallsinthecontextofstatenoncapitalcases.Theauthorsinsistthattheneedforawidescopeofhabeasreviewinthisareahas“comeandgone”(p.106).Moreover,theynotethat,evenforthosepetitionerswhosuccessfullynavigatethemanyhur-dlestoahearingonthemerits,thechancesofobtaininghabeasreliefinthesecasesare“veryclosetozero”(p.81).Accordingly,theauthorsrecommendlimitinghabeasreviewinstatenoncapitalcasestoonlythoseinstanceswhen

(1)thepetitionerisincustodyinviolationofanewruleofconstitutionallaw,maderetroac-tivetocasesoncollateralreviewbytheSupremeCourt;or(2)thepetitionerisincustodyinviolationoftheConstitutionorlawsortreatiesoftheUnitedStates,andhasestablishedbyclearandconvincingnewevidence,notpreviouslydiscoverablethroughtheexerciseofduediligence,thatinlightoftheevidenceasawhole,noreasonablefactfinderwouldhavefoundhimguiltyoftheunderlyingoffense(pp.91–92).

¶28Ofcourse,KingandHoffmannofferrecommendationsapplyingtoothercontexts as well. They suggest, for example, that sentence-administration issues(“challengesto...decisionsrevokinggood-timecreditsfollowingprisondisciplin-ary proceedings and decisions denying, deferring, or administering release onparole”(p.154))beaddressedunderaseparatestatutoryschemecompletelydiscon-nectedfromhabeasreview,andtheyurgeamodestincreaseintheuseofhabeasreviewforfederalnoncapitalcases,asthisreviewmaybeaprisoner’s“firstandonlybiteattheapple...for...claimsthatcouldnotberaisedondirectappeal”(p.170).

¶29Theauthorssubmittheirproposalspartlyasajumping-offpointformorecomprehensivediscussionofreformstohabeascorpus;hopefully,theirbookwillspark exactly this kind of conversation. However, the proposal from King andHoffmanntolimithabeasreviewofstatenoncapitalcasesistroublinginlightofthe experiences of Bruce Lisker, a state noncapital habeas petitioner recentlyreleasedfromnearlythirtyyearsofwrongfulincarcerationfortheallegedmurderofhismother.Lisker’scasepresentsableakstoryofstateobstructionism,shoddyandperhapsdeceitfulpolicework,andineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.YetLisker,an innocentman,wouldnothave receivedhabeas reliefunder theauthors’pro-posedstatutoryreforms.Perhapsthisdisquietingresultdemonstratesthatreviewofstatenoncapitalcasesshouldnotbelimitedtoquitetheextentthattheauthorssuggest.

¶30Habeas for the Twenty-First Centuryisaworkperfectlysuitedforacademiclibraries,anditwouldmakeasolidadditiontoanysuchlibrarysupportingpro-gramsinlaw,politicalscience,criminaljustice,orpublicpolicy.Throughouttheirbook,KingandHoffmannhaveprovidedsufficientbackground for readerswithlimited knowledge of the subject area to follow their arguments and reasoning.Theyalsoclaimtohaveincludedenoughsophisticatedmattertoengageexpertsinthefield,thoughthisisdifficulttojudge.Fornonspecialists,however,Habeas for the Twenty-First Century offers an exciting take on an important societal problem,argumentswellsupportedbyempiricalresearch,andintriguingproposalsthatmayspurchangesinthelaw.ThebookfollowscloselyontheheelsofPaulD.Halliday’sHabeas Corpus: From England to Empire,whichKingandHoffmannclearlyrecog-


nize as the authoritative historical work in the area. By contrast, the worth ofHabeas for the Twenty-First Centurydoesnot lieexclusively in thequalityof thebookitself,butalsointheimpactitmayhaveonthisimportantareaoflaw.

Maysilles, Duncan. Ducktown Smoke: The Fight over One of the South’s Greatest Environmental Disasters.ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2011.333p.$39.95.

Reviewed by Matthew S. Cooper

¶31InDucktown Smoke: The Fight over One of the South’s Greatest Environmental Disasters,historianandpracticingattorneyDuncanMaysillesskillfullydocumentsthelandmarklitigationthataroseinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcentu-ries over pollution from copper mining in Tennessee’s Ducktown Basin (alsoknownastheCopperBasin).AsMaysillesdescribes,sulfurdioxidesmokeemittedbycoppersmeltingoperationsinthebasincreated,overthecourseofmanyyears,a barren, desert-like landscape in the middle of an otherwise verdant southernAppalachian hardwood forest. The toxic smoke spread south across the nearbyGeorgiaborder,destroyingvegetationandaffecting the livelihoodsofnumerousfarmersandloggers.Followingyearsofmarginallysuccessfulstatecourtlawsuitsinstituted by Georgia citizens, the state itself filed an original action in the U.S.SupremeCourtseekinginjunctivereliefagainstthetwominingcompaniesactiveinthebasin.ThecaseeventuallyresultedinanopinionfromJusticeOliverWendellHolmesthatreformedtheminingcompanies’practicesandprovidedstateswithanewtoolforaddressingcross-borderpollution.

¶32MaysillessituatestheDucktownsmokelitigationasaclassicenvironmentallawcontroversyarisingbeforeitstime.Afederalpollution-controlregimeandtheestablishment of the Environmental Protection Agency would not arrive fordecades,andwithnostatutoryremediesavailable,plaintiffsseekingredressforthesmoke could file only common law nuisance actions for individual damages orinjunctiverelief.Theprimaryconcernsoftheseplaintiffswerenotforthequalityoftheairperse,butfortheeffectsofthesmokeonfarmingandlogging.Meanwhile,manyofthoseaffectedbythepollution,includingthestateofGeorgiaitself,under-stoodthatthoughthesmokewasharmful,drivingoutthecoppercompaniesthatprovidedsomanyGeorgianswithalivelihoodwouldbeequallyundesirable.Asaconsequence, the state ultimately sought and the Supreme Court carefully fash-ionedreliefthatdelayedenforcementsothatindustrycoulddevelopatechnologi-calsolution.

¶33ThescopeofMaysilles’snine-chapterworkisfairlybroad,rangingfromthetragic1838removaloftheCherokeesfromtheregiontopresent-dayreclamationeffortsinthebasin.However,thebulkofthebook(chapters2–8)focusesonthesmoke litigation that occurred between the 1890s and 1916. Maysilles first dis-cussestheearlylawsuitsfiledbynorthernGeorgiafarmersandthencoversindetailthestate’sSupremeCourtaction.Hecontinueswithadiscussionoftheaftermathto Justice Holmes’s 1907 opinion and of cooperative efforts to postpone theenforcementofinjunctiverelief.


¶34Throughout,Maysillessupportshislegalandhistoricalanalysiswithexhaus-tiveresearch,documentinghissourceswithcopiousendnotesandanineteen-pagebibliography. Maysilles notes the preservation efforts of the Ducktown BasinMuseuminhisbook’sacknowledgments,andhemakesextensiveuseofpreviouslyunexaminedminingcompanydocumentsrescuedbymuseumemployeesfromanabandoned warehouse near one of the former mining sites. These documentsincludecorrespondencebetweenthevarious“attorneys,corporateofficers,farmers,loggers, and others on both sides of the litigation” (p.ix). Through the GeorgiaDepartmentofArchivesandHistory,MaysillesalsogainedaccesstomaterialsfromthestateofGeorgia,includingtheofficialcorrespondencefortheperiodofboththestate’sgovernorandattorneygeneral.

¶35Ducktown Smoke’schiefstrengthslieinMaysilles’shighlyinformedanalysisof the legal strategies employed by various litigants and in his discussion of thegradual changes to nuisance law that occurred over the course of the litigation.NeithersuccessshouldbesurprisinggivenMaysilles’sdualbackgroundasahisto-rian (he has a Ph.D. from the University of Georgia) and as a King & Spaldingattorneyspecializinginenvironmentalandtoxictortlitigation.Drawingoncorre-spondence and court filings, Maysilles describes in exacting detail the litigationtacticsusedbyboththeminingcompaniesandtheiropponents.Hediscussestheflateither/orchoicefacedbyTennesseenuisanceplaintiffsbetweenseekingmone-tarydamagesincircuitcourtorinjunctivereliefinchancerycourt.Hedocumentsthe efforts of mining company attorneys to defeat or stall opposing litigantsthroughproceduralmotionsfiledinthecourtsandlobbyingeffortsappliedtothelegislature.Healsoaddressesbroader legal topicsaffecting the litigation, suchasjurisdictionalissuesandtheeffectsofastatebanoncontingencyfees.Substantively,MaysillestracesthedevelopmentofTennesseenuisancelawfromastrict liabilityanalysis to a balancing test that weighs individual harms against social and eco-nomicbenefits.Onabroaderscale,hedescribestheevolutionofnuisancefromaprivatelawdoctrinegoverningdisputesbetweenneighborstoapowerfulenforce-menttoolavailabletothestatesunderfederalcommonlaw.

¶36Thoughhediscussesrathercomplexlegalandscientifictopics,Maysilles’swritingisalwaysclearandaccessible.Hecapablynavigatestheintricaciesofnui-sancedoctrine,miningprocesses,scientificreports,andsimilartechnicalmatters.He has produced an interesting and unique work that explores in considerabledepthanimportantenvironmentallawcontroversythatarosebeforeenvironmen-tal lawwasevenrecognizedasa field.Ducktown Smokewouldmakeanexcellentadditiontoacademiclawlibraries.Thoughthebookwillprobablybemoreacces-sibletoreaderswithabackgroundinthelaw,itwouldalsobeappropriateasahis-toryselectionforundergraduateacademiclibrariesandpubliclibraries.

Paik, Leslie. Discretionary Justice: Looking Inside a Juvenile Drug Court. NewBrunswick,N.J.:RutgersUniversityPress,2011.226p.$25.95,paper.

Reviewed by Catherine A. Lemmer

¶37Inhernewlypublished“ethnography”(p.7)ofasouthernCaliforniajuveniledrugcourt,sociologistLesliePaikconteststheunderlying“‘therapeutic’orientation”


(p.41)ofwhathasbecomeawidelyacceptedmodelofalternativejustice.Paikspentmorethanayearpersonallyobservingoperationsandinterviewingparticipantsinacourtdesignedtosendjuvenilesubstanceabuserstotreatmentratherthanprison.InDiscretionary Justice: Looking Inside a Juvenile Drug Court,shepresentstheresultsof her study and challenges readers to consider whether such“courts [are] trulytherapeutic or . . . simply a new form of punishment under the guise of help”(p.173).

¶38 Juvenile drug courts seek to modify the behavior of youthful offendersthroughanemphasisonindividualaccountabilityandtheuseof“BigBrother”–stylemonitoringmechanismstomeasurecompliancewithprogramrequirements.Paikmaintainsthatthisemphasisonaccountabilityignoresreal-life“socialstruc-turalbarriers”(p.14)thatcanshapeajuvenile’sabilitytocontrolhisorherownactions.Paikultimatelyargues thatdeterminationsofparticipantcomplianceorsuccess based on concepts of individual accountability actually veil“differentialtreatmentbasedonrace,class,andgender”(p.14).

¶39 In the course of making this argument, and as promised by the book’ssubtitle,Paiktakesherreaders insidetheday-to-dayworkingsofa juveniledrugcourt.Shedescribesindetailtheoperationofthecourt’sentiresystemofactivity,includingexternalfactorssuchasoffenders’familiesandschools,localpoliceandsheriffdepartments,probationoffices,residentialprograms,drugtreatmentcen-ters,andfundingmechanisms.At thecenterof thebehind-the-scenesactionarethedrugcourtstaffandtheweeklymeetingsatwhichtheyassessoffenders’adher-encetoprogramrequirementsandnegotiateproposedstrategiesfordealingwithnoncompliance.Whilethesestaffdiscussionsfocusondeterminingtheindividualcomplianceandpersonalaccountabilityofthejuvenileoffenders,Paik’sfieldworkexposesandunderscorestheimpactofother,largelyunacknowledgedfactors,lead-inghertocharacterizethestaffassessmentsasmerely“socialconstructions”(p.4).Examples of characteristics that influence staff decisions on compliance andaccountabilityincludethejuvenile’sraceandgender,thespecificcourttowhichanoffenderisassigned,parentalandfamilyinvolvement,andstaff interpretationofdrugtestresults.

¶40 Previous juvenile drug court researchers have largely ignored such staffdecision-making practices (p.7).Yet it is precisely these practices, Paik suggests,thatrevealapersistenttendencytowardoverreachingbythelegalsystemandthatindicatethe“reintroductionofdiscretionintolegaldecisionmaking”(p.173).Theassessmentsandthenegotiatedstrategiesthatunderliethemalsoservetoestablishanoffender’s“workability”(p.5)—thestaff ’s“continuouslyrevised”(p.6)senseofthe youth’s potential for achieving success through drug court intervention—a measure that can have a detrimental impact lasting even beyond the youth’sparticipationinthedrugcourtprogramitself.

¶41 Despite her critique, Paik neither dismisses the work of juvenile drugcourtsnoradvocatesfortheirdemise.Rather,sheendorsesashiftawayfromtheexistingfocusonindividualaccountabilityandurgesanewemphasisonthedutythatsocietyandthejudicialsystemhavetoprovideaframeworkforsuccessfullyrehabilitatingyouthoffenders.Inthisvein,Paikmakesfivespecificpolicyrecom-mendations intended“to mitigate the unintended punitive consequences of . . .drugcourtinterventionandtofacilitateitsstatedtherapeuticgoals”(p.177).


¶42ThroughoutDiscretionary Justice,Paikdoesanexcellentjoboforganizingandpresentingthewealthofdatafromherfieldwork.Thebookiswellfootnotedandincludesacomprehensiveindex,anextensivebibliography,andthreehelpfulappendixes—“Methods,” “Concepts and Terms,” and “Additional Resources.”Althoughdifficulttoread,duebothtothetechnicalnatureofthestudy’scontentand thehuman impactof thepersonal stories it tells, this isan importantwork.Federalandstatesupportforjuveniledrugcourtsissubstantial,andtheyarelikelyto remain one of the key institutional weapons for combating drug abuse. It isimperative that practitioners, politicians, and other policy makers appreciate theconsequencesofprogramsbasedonpersonalaccountability.Paik’sworkmayalsohelp inform the development of other alternative courts, such as mental healthcourtsandveteranstreatmentcourts.

¶43 Though Paik is presently an assistant professor of sociology at the CityCollege of New York and the Graduate Center City University of New York,Discretionary Justicestemsfromquestionsshefirstencounteredpriortograduateschool while“work[ing] at a nonprofit legal organization that designed, imple-mented,andevaluateddrugcourtsandotherproblem-solvingcourts”(p.vii).TheresultofPaik’spursuitofthoseinitialquestionsisatextthatshouldproveinstruc-tive for anyone interested in drug courts or similar alternative forms of justice.Discretionary Justice isrecommendedforacademicandgovernmentlawlibraries,librariesservingprivatepractitionersworkinginorwithdrugcourts,andnonlegalacademiclibrariesthatsupportgraduateorundergraduateprogramsintheareasofcriminalorjuvenilejustice.

Schwabach, Aaron. Fan Fiction and Copyright: Outsider Works and Intellectual Property Protection.Burlington,Vt.:Ashgate,2011.177p.$89.95.

Reviewed by Mikhail Koulikov

¶44Worksthatdrawonestablishedsettingsandcharactersareastapleofliter-ary traditions around the world. The Hollywood adaptation of a classic novel, abooksequelpublishedlongaftertheoriginal,anamateurstorybasedonapopulartelevisionshowandpostedonline—eachisaworkofimagination,butnoneistrulyoriginal. Under modern intellectual property law, though, each example raisescomplexissuesofcopyright, licensing,adaptation,andfairuse.Indeed,sincetheidea of creative works as commodities first emerged, questions surrounding therightsofcreatorsandownerstocontrollaterusesoftheirintellectualpropertyhavegrownmoreandmorecomplicated.

¶45 One contemporary area of particular tension concerns fan fiction—frequently contracted to one word, fanfiction, or even further to fanfic—that is,creativework,generallyawrittennarrative,thatusesspecificelementsfromapre-existingstorywithoutexplicitpermissionfromthepriorwork’scopyrightholder.Scholarsfromfieldsoutsideoflawhavebeenlookingatfanfictionforatleasttwodecades,15andthetopichasseensomecoverageinlawreviewarticles.16However,

15. See, e.g.,rebeCCA W. blACK,AdolesCents And online fAn fiCtion(2008);fAn fiCtion And fAn Communities in the Age of the internet(KarenHellekson&KristinaBusseeds.,2006);HenryJenkins,“At Other Times, Like Females”: Gender and StarTrek Fan Fiction,inJohn tulloCh & henry JenKins, sCienCe fiCtion AudienCes: WAtChing Doctor Who And Star trek173(1995). 16. See, e.g.,StevenA.Hetcher,Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture,157u. pA. l. reV.1869(2009);StaceyM.Lantagne,The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True


Aaron Schwabach’s Fan Fiction and Copyright: Outsider Works and Intellectual Property Protectionisthefirstbookthatattemptstosummarizethefullscopeoftherelationshipbetweencopyrightlawandfanfiction,tosubjectthetopictorigorouslegalanalysis,andtodiscussspecificareasofpotential legalconflictbetweenfanfiction authors and those who hold rights in underlying works of intellectualproperty.

¶46 The broad sweep of Schwabach’s book is best reflected by its subtitle—Outsider Works and Intellectual Property Protection.Written fanfiction isnot theonlykindofworkthatthebookcovers,andcopyrightisnottheonlyareaoflaw.Yet,theauthor’srealgoalisnotmerelytosurveysuchbroadissues,buttoresolvebasic misconceptions about the links between copyright law and fan fiction.Schwabachbeginsinchapter1byintroducingreaderstotheconceptoffanfiction,toitshistoryasaformofcreativity,andtothereactions,bothpositiveandnega-tive,thatittendstoprovokeinauthorsandevenotherreaders.Thisintroductorymaterialconcludesbyidentifyingapairoffundamentalissuesthatmustalwaysbeaddressedwhenthinkingaboutfanfiction:“firstwhethertheunderlyingworkorelement(suchasacharacter)isprotectedbycopyrightand,second,ifso,whetherthefanficorotherfanworkviolatesthatcopyright”(p.20).ThebulkofSchwabach’sanalysis, found in the two chapters that follow, directly addresses these basicquestions.

¶47 First of all, in chapter 2, Schwabach considers whether a conflict evenexists—whethercopyright lawactuallycovers thepreexistingelementsused inaparticularworkoffanfiction.Thiscallsforabriefandnecessarilysimplisticsurveyon changes to the term of copyright protection under U.S. law—from theCopyrightActof1909throughtheCopyrightTermExtensionActof1998—andfor a significantly more in-depth treatment ofhowcopyrightprinciplesoperatewhenappliedtoindividualcharactersinawork,ratherthantotheworkasawhole.Although this latter discussion includes extensive analysis of relevant case law,mostofthecasesSchwabachcitesinvolvedisputesbetweencompetingauthorsorproduction companies, not between rights holders and fans. Nonetheless, theinformationaddsimportantbackgroundthatisvaluableforfurtherdiscussionoffanfictionconcepts.

¶48Chapter3dealswithanissuethatismoredirectlyconnectedtothethemeofthebookasawhole.When,thechapterasks,doesfanfictionactuallyconstitutecopyrightinfringement?Muchoftheanalysisinthissectionrevolvesaroundtheconceptofderivative works—permittedonlywhenauthorizedby theunderlyingcopyrightowner—andthefarmorecomplexideaofatransformative work—onethatisbasedonapreexistingcreation,butnonethelessqualifiesas“anew,originalwork,commentingonandcritiquingtheoriginal”(p.68).Theauthorarguesthatunderstandingtheseconcepts iscritical toproperlyappreciatingtherelationshipbetweenworksof fan fictionand thecopyrightedmaterialuponwhich theyarebased. He also extends his analysis in this chapter beyond written fan fiction toaddressotherfan-createdworks,suchasvideos,illustrations,andsongs.

and Logical Precedent,33hAstings Comm. & ent. l.J.159(2011);RebeccaTushnet,Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,17loy. l.A. ent. l. reV.651(1997).


¶49Fromthesegeneralquestions,thebookmovesintoamorespecificdiscus-sionoftheconflictsthatcanarisebetweenthecreatorofanoriginalworkandthosewhocreatefanfictionbaseduponit.Thisisprobablythestrongestofthebook’sfive chapters, largely because Schwabach uses real-world disputes as examples tosupporthisanalysis.Unfortunately,twoofthesedisputesneveractuallyreachedthelitigationstage,andthethird,althoughresolvedinareporteddecision,involvedafan-created work (The Harry Potter Lexicon) that strains the definition of fanfiction.17

¶50 Schwabach concludes his study with a speculative section—“Fanfic: TheNewVoyages”—onlegalissuesthatfanfictionmayfaceinthefuture,suchasthepossibility for conflicts between competing fan fiction writers and the blurringdistinctionbetweenauthorsandfans.Threeshortappendixes(aG.K.Chestertonexcerptdiscussingparody, copiesof theprincipalUnited States Code sectionsoncopyright,andaverybrieflistofwebsitesrelevanttofanfictionauthors)accom-panythemaintext.Lastly,thebookoffersanextensivebibliographyofbooksandlawreviewarticlesrelevanttothesubjectmatter.

¶51Overall,Fan Fiction and Copyrightisaveryusefulintroductiontoamar-ginalbutemergingareaofintellectualpropertylaw.Auniqueandrelativelyinex-pensive book, it is definitely appropriate for most law school library collections,especiallythosethatsupportresearch,teaching,orclinicalprogramsinentertain-ment,publishing,intellectualproperty,orcopyrightlaw.Lawfirmswithpracticesintheseareasmayalsowanttoconsideracquiringthistitle,thoughwiththecaveatthatthisisamonograph,notapracticeguide.Readerswillnotfinddirectanswersor practical guidelines for litigating cases that involve fan fiction and copyrightissues.Onefinalnote:Schwabachseemstobeafanfictionenthusiast.Thisleaveshimvery familiarwiththecommunityand its language,butheoccasionallygetscarried away and veers off on tangents that, though interesting in and of them-selves,donotreallybelonginabookonthelegalaspectsoffanfiction.

Strahilevitz, Lior Jacob. Information and Exclusion. New Haven, Conn.: YaleUniversityPress,2011.255p.$50.

Reviewed by Todd G.E. Melnick

¶52Exclusionisfundamentaltotheconceptofproperty—toownathingistoenjoytherighttokeepothersfromusingit.Eliminatingtheideaofexclusionisasimpossibleaseliminatingproperty.However,thestrategiesofexclusionemployedby property owners vary widely, ranging from the subtle to the overt, from thepermissibletotheproscribed.Societywouldbenefitbyprivilegingstrategiesbasedonreliableinformationoverthosethatdependonrumor,innuendo,orprejudice.Inhisnewbook,Information and Exclusion,UniversityofChicagoLawSchoolpro-fessorLiorJacobStrahilevitzexaminesthelinkbetweentheavailabilityofinforma-tionaboutpeopleandthemethodsusedtoexcludeorincludetheminavarietyofsocialarenas.Hisgoalistoinvestigatewaysinwhichsocietymightactuallybecome

17. WarnerBros.Entm’tInc.v.RDRBooks,575F.Supp.2d513(S.D.N.Y.2008).


morejustthroughthewiderdisseminationofinformationthatisconventionallyconsideredprivate.

¶53Inthefirstportionof thebook,Strahilevitz lays thegroundworkforhisideas by identifying three fundamental strategies of exclusion and coining threenewtermstodescribethem.Somepropertyownerssimplywieldtheir“bouncer’sright”(p.4),invokingprinciplesoftrespasstokeepcertainpeopleoutwhileallow-ingothersin.Anightclubownercanselectwhoisadmittedtodanceintheclubandwhomustremainbehindthevelvetrope.Likewise,Googlecandisregardjobapplicants who do not ace its test of I.Q. and computational skill, and TrumpTower can reject a would-be tenant based on a suboptimal credit report. Otherowners use subtlermeans to exclude. Someusedesignandmarketing to imbuetheir property with “exclusionary vibes” (p.4) meant to discourage disfavoredapplicants from seeking entry. Thus, a bar owner might keep out suburbanitepatronsbypromotingtheestablishmentasahavenforbikers.Evenmoresubtly,owners sometimes attach“exclusionary amenities” (p.5) to their property in anattempttoexcludethosewithnouseforthesefeatures.Anyonecanlivehere,saysabuilding’sowner,butthosewhodosomustcontributefortheupkeepofadaycarecenter,anevangelicalchapel,orabowlingalley.Nonparents,atheists,orthosewhohatebowlingwillprobablystayaway.

¶54 In the middle section of his book, Strahilevitz briefly describes how thechoices property owners make between these strategies are influenced by theamountofinformationgenerallyavailableabouttheprivatethoughts,inclinations,andpersonalhistoriesofpotentialentrants.Underaregimeinwhichinformationof this sort is plentiful—perhaps because the privacy of arrest records or creditreports is unprotected—owners exercise their bouncer’s right and exclude orincludeasthedatadictate.Whenthisinformationisscarce—wheretheprivacyofsuch records is protected by law—subtler, less justifiable, and more difficult toregulateexclusionstrategiesprevail.

¶55Strahilevitzdevotesthefinalandmostinterestingpartofthebooktodis-cussingsomequiteunexpectedwaysthatinformationcandiscourageorpromoteexclusionstrategies.Hepresentsthe“reputationrevolution”(p.6),theever-increas-ing ubiquity of easily obtainable and endlessly concatenated online reputationinformation,asasolutiontotheproblemofimproperraciallyandculturallymoti-vatedexclusion.AfricanAmericans,heargues,areoftendiscriminatedagainstinemploymentdecisionsbecausemisguidedemployersuseskincolorasaproxyforsuchundesirablecharacteristicsasacriminalbackground, indebtedness,or infe-rior education. If, rather thanprotecting theprivacyof job seekers, governmentpromotedabsolutetransparencyandprovidedaccesstoreliableinformationaboutthe criminal history, financial status, and educational attainment of applicants,employerswouldbeabletomakeconfidenthiringdecisionsbasedonactualriskfactorsinsteadofhistoricallydisfavoredproxieslikerace,gender,orage.Or,gov-ernment might provide trial lawyers with a deep file of conventionally privateinformationaboutprospectivejurorspriortovoirdire,thusencouragingattorneysto stop issuing challenges on the basis of race and to exclude would-be jurors,instead,on thebasisofactual, justifiable facts.Leave it toanacolyteof lawandeconomicslikeStrahilevitztoproposeasolutiontotheproblemofdiscrimination


thattakesadvantageoftheinherenthumantendencytodiscriminate.Thoughwemaywishthatthelawwouldteachustoloveourfellowman,perhapsthebestitcando,Strahilevitzsuggests,ishelpustohatemorefairly.

¶56Information and Exclusion isnotaworkofpresent-tensepracticality,butratheronefirmlyembeddedintherealmofprovocation,elaboration,andforward-lookingabstraction.Nopresentgovernmentwillactonthebook’sinsights,sacrific-ingcitizens’cherishedprivacyprotectionsinordertofosterbouncer’srights.NordoesStrahilevitzsuggestthatgovernmentsshoulddoso.Hismissionistoquestionfamiliarassumptions,nottoprescribe.Thisbookbelongs inanacademiccollec-tion,notalawfirmorcourtlibrary.Legalscholarswillfinditpleasurablycounter-intuitive and mind expanding, but the text holds little value for firm and courtlibrarians looking formaterials to supportpracticing lawyers. Strahilevitz’s ideasmayverywellinfluencefuturelegaldoctrine,butthespeculativeandhypotheticalnatureofhisbooksuggeststhatitisbestsuitedtothelegalacademicmarket.

331


Practicing Reference . . .

Fifty More Constitutions*

Mary Whisner**

The U.S. Constitution may get all the attention, but as Ms. Whisner points out, state constitutional law is also important to legal researchers. Unfortunately, the sources for researching state constitutions are more limited and difficult to find. She describes a web site created by the Gallagher Law Library at the University of Washington School of Law that makes available sources of Washington State constitutional history.

¶1Askapersononthestreetaboutconstitutionallawand—assumingyou’vemet up with a fairly knowledgeable person1—you’re likely to hear about equalprotection,theBillofRights,orperhapstheseparationofpowers.Heorshemightmention some of the great constitutional cases: Brown v. Board of Education,2Gideon v. Wainwright,3Miranda v. Arizona.4 (Thesewill alsobe themainpointsmentionedifyouaskmostlawstudentsorattorneys.)Ifyouprowlaroundalargebookstore,you’llseebooksabouttheframersoftheConstitution—the“FoundingFathers” or, as one author dubbed them, the“Founding Brothers”5—as well asrecentworksontheroleoftheSupremeCourtininterpretingtheConstitution.6Ifyou’vebeenatouristinPhiladelphia,youmighthavevisitedIndependenceHall,wheretheConstitutionalConventionmetinthesummerof1787.AsamemberoftheaudiencethatreadsLaw Library Journal,youlikelyknowmuchmorethanthe

* ©MaryWhisner,2012.IamgratefultoRonCollins,PennyHazelton,andHughSpitzerforreviewingandcommentingonadraftofthispiece. ** ReferenceLibrarian,MarianGouldGallagherLawLibrary,UniversityofWashington,Seattle,Washington. 1. Ignoranceofhistoryandgovernment iswidespread.See, e.g.,Americans’ Knowledge of the U.S. Constitution,ColumbiA lAW sChool(May2002),http://www2.law.columbia.edu/news/surveys/survey_constitution/introduction.shtml;The Coming Crisis in Citizenship,interCollegiAte studies institute(2006),http://www.americancivicliteracy.org/2006/summary.html;MaxFisher,Americans vs. Basic Historical Knowledge,AtlAntiC Wire,June3,2010,http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2010/06/americans-vs-basic-historical-knowledge/19596/. 2. 347U.S.483(1954). 3. 372U.S.335(1963). 4. 384U.S.436(1966). 5. Joseph J. ellis, founding brothers: the reVolutionAry generAtion(2000).OtherrecentbooksabouttheFoundersincludeglenn beCK, originAl Argument: the federAlists’ CAse for the Constitution, AdApted for the 21st Century(2011);riChArd brooKhiser, JAmes mAdison(2011);ron ChernoW, WAshington: A life(2010);WAlter isAACson, benJAmin frAnKlin: An AmeriCAn life(2003);dAVid mCCullough, John AdAms(2001);pAuline mAier, rAtifiCAtion: the people debAte the Constitution, 1787–1788(2010). 6. E.g.,stephen breyer, ACtiVe liberty: interpreting our demoCrAtiC Constitution(2005);Antonin sCAliA, A mAtter of interpretAtion(1997).


averagepersonaboutthedraftingandadoptionoftheConstitutionanditsamend-ments,aswellasthedebatesaboutitsinterpretationandapplicationinthelast225years.Andofcourseyoucandirectresearcherstoprintandonlineresourcesfordiggingdeeper.7

¶2ButtheU.S.Constitutionisnottheonlyconstitutioninoursystem.Eachstatehasaconstitution,andthereforeabodyofstateconstitutionallaw.8Yetstateconstitutionallawislargelyneglected.Idon’thaveasourcetocite,butIthinkit’safairbetthatthehighschoolsthatexposetheirstudentstothefederalconstitutionseldomsaymuch(ifanything)abouttheirstates’constitutions.Evenlawschoolsrarelyteachstateconstitutionallaw.9Thenationalpress,whichplaysanimportantrole in educating the public about constitutional issues, focuses on the U.S.SupremeCourt,andhenceonthefederalconstitution.10

¶3Butdespiteourgeneral ignorance, statecourtshavebeenpluggingalong,applyingtheirstateconstitutionstoimportantissues,oftenprovidingprotectionsgreaterthanthoseaffordedbytheU.S.Constitutionasinterpretedbythefederalcourts.AprominentsupporterofusingstateconstitutionswasJusticeWilliamJ.Brennan.Inaninfluentialarticle in1977,11herecountedvictoriesforindividualrightsinthe1960sandearly1970s,12andthen“atrendinrecentopinionsoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourttopullbackfrom,orat leastsuspendforthetimebeing...applicationofthefederalBillofRightsandtherestraintsoftheduepro-cessandequalprotectionclausesofthefourteenthamendment.”13Brennanher-aldedrecentstatecourtdecisionsthatinterpretedprovisionsofstateconstitutions

7. E.g., the Constitution of the united stAtes of AmeriCA: AnAlysis And interpretAtion(JohnnyH.Killianetal.eds.,2004),available athttp://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/browse2002.html#2002;the founders’ Constitution(PhilipB.Kurland&RalphLernereds.,1987)aswellasannotatedcodes,treatises,monographs,andlawreviewarticles. 8. Indiantribesalsohaveconstitutions,butIndianlawisatopicforanotherday. 9. StateconstitutionallawisnotapartoftheacademiccultureofmostAmericanlawschools,espe-

ciallythenation’sleadinglawschools.Inthe2007–2008academicyear,noschoolrankedinthetopfifteenofferedsuchacourse,andonlyoneofthetoptwentylawschoolsofferedacourseinstateconstitutionallaw.

Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism,62stAn. l. reV.1629,1639(2010)(footnotesomitted). 10. Localpapersdocoverstateconstitutionalissues,suchascasesonmotorvehiclefueltaxoreducation.Butstateconstitutionallawdoesn’thaveitsNinaTotenberg,letalonethejournalistswhohavewrittenbook-lengthaccountsofconstitutionalstruggles,e.g.,riChArd Kluger, simple JustiCe: the history of BroWn v. BoarD of eDucation And blACK AmeriCA’s struggle for eQuAlity(rev.ed.2004);Anthony leWis, gideon’s trumpet(1964),orbiographiesofJusticeswhoshapedconstitu-tionallaw,e.g.,lindA greenhouse, beComing JustiCe blACKmun(2005). 11. WilliamJ.Brennan,Jr.,State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,90hArV. l. reV.489(1977).Brennan’svoicewasprominent,butitwasnotthefirsttocallfortheuseofstatecon-stitutions.SeeHughD.Spitzer,New Life for the “Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall Is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!,”37rutgers l.J.1169,1172n.12(2006).Statecourtjudgesalsoadvocateforgreateruseofstateconstitutions.NotableamongthemisJusticeHansLindeoftheOregonSupremeCourt.See, e.g.,intelleCt And CrAft: the Contributions of JustiCe hAns linde to AmeriCAn ConstitutionAlism (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995) (containing edited versions of sevenlawreviewarticlesandthirteenopinions);see alsoStatev.Ochoa,792N.W.2d260,264–65n.2(Iowa2010)(citinglawreviewarticlesbyLindeandfiveotherstatesupremecourtjustices). 12. Brennan,supranote11,at493–94. 13. Id.at495.

333FIFtY MORe CONStItUtIONSVol. 104:2 [2012-24]

more liberally than the Supreme Court had construed parallel—or sometimesidentical—provisionsinthefederalconstitution.Forinstance,ArticleI,Paragraph7,oftheNewJerseyConstitutionwasidenticaltotheFourthAmendment,butin1975 the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected U.S. Supreme Court precedent inordertoprovidemoreprotection—inthiscase,requiringtheprosecutiontoshowthatconsenttoasearchwasvoluntary.14

¶4U.S.SupremeCourtcasesmaydominate theheadlines,butstatesupremecourtcasesoutnumberthem—byalot.

Statesupremecourtsdecidemorethantenthousandcaseseachyear,roughlytwentypercentofwhichinvolvestateconstitutionalissues.TheU.S.SupremeCourt,bycontrast,nowissuesaroundseventy-fivedecisionsayear,aroundfortypercentofwhichinvolveconstitutionalissues....[T]heCaliforniaSupremeCourtnowissuesmoreopinionsaboutstateconstitu-tionallawthantheU.S.SupremeCourtissuesdecisionsaboutfederalconstitutionallaw.15

Some of those constitutional decisions relate to matters unique to state govern-ment—forexample,whetheraninitiative’sballottitleisacceptable,16whetherthegovernorcancompel theattorneygeneral towithdrawanappeal,17orwhetheraparticular means of funding public education satisfies the state’s duty“to makeampleprovision”fortheeducationofallchildren.18Othercasesaddressissuesthatare common to the federal and state systems. As in the examples discussed byJusticeBrennan,statecourtshaveprovidedprotectionsabovethe levelsetbytheU.S.SupremeCourton“schoolfinance,disparateimpactproofsofdiscrimination,voter registration laws, abortion funding, religious liberty protections, takings,same-sexsodomy,andahostofcriminalprocedureprotections.”19

¶5It’sworthnotingthattheincreasedactivityinstateconstitutionallawinthelatetwentiethcenturywasarebirth,notabirth.Infact,stateconstitutionallawhadbeenverymuchalivebeforethat.“Throughoutthenineteenthcenturyanduntilthegrowth of the national government during and after the New Deal, the focus ofAmericanconstitutional lawwasat thestate level.”20AndstatecourtsconsideredthemselvesfreetodifferfromtheU.S.SupremeCourtininterpretingstateconsti-tutionalprovisionssimilartothoseinthefederalconstitution.21Somestateswerefar ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court in certain areas of individual rights. Forinstance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the Wisconsin Constitutionrequiredcountiestoprovidelawyersforpoordefendantschargedwithfeloniesin1859,overacenturybeforeGideon v. Wainwright.22

14. Id.at499–500(citingStatev.Johnson,346A.2d66(N.J.1975)).BecauseBrennanservedontheNewJerseySupremeCourtfrom1952to1956,StephenJ.Wermiel,William Joseph Brennan, Jr.,inbiogrAphiCAl enCyClopediA of the supreme Court57,58(MelvinI.Urofskyed.,2006),Ismiledathisremark:“EnlightenmentcomesalsofromtheNewJerseySupremeCourt.”Brennan,supranote11,at499. 15. Devins,supranote9,at1635(footnotesomitted). 16. Crochetv.Priest,931S.W.2d128(Ark.1996). 17. Perduev.Baker,586S.E.2d606(Ga.2003). 18. SeattleSch.Dist.No.1v.State,585P.2d71(Wash.1978). 19. Devins,supranote9,at1636.Between1977and1988,therewerefourhundredstatecourtinterpretationsgivinggreaterprotectiontoindividualsthanU.S.SupremeCourtcasesdid.Id.at1638. 20. Spitzer,supranote11,at1171. 21. Id.at1171–72. 22. SeeShirleyS.Abrahamson,Reincarnation of State Courts,36sW. l.J.951,957(1982)(citingCarpenterv.DaneCnty.,9Wis.274(1859)).


¶6Whenstatecourtsrelyonstateconstitutions,theirdecisionsaregenerallyinsulatedfromreversalbytheSupremeCourt.23AsBrennanputit:“thestatedeci-sionsnotonlycannotbeoverturnedby,theyindeedarenotevenreviewableby,theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates.Weareutterlywithoutjurisdictiontoreviewsuchstatedecisions.”24There’saslightqualification:thestatecourtmustdomorethanmentionthestateconstitution.Forinstance,inMichigan v. Long,theSupremeCourtheldthatithadjurisdictiondespitethestatecourt’sstatement,“Wehold...that the deputies’ search . . . was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to theUnitedStatesConstitutionandart.1,§11of theMichiganConstitution.”25TheMichigancourt’sopinionhaddiscussedtheFourthAmendmentandcitedSupremeCourtcasesontheFourthAmendment,butcitedthestateconstitutiononlytwice,without analysis.26 The state court apparently “decided the case the way it didbecause it believed that federal law required it to do so.”27 Deciding that it hadjurisdiction“intheabsenceofaplainstatementthatthedecisionbelowrestedonanadequateandindependentstateground,”theCourtcouldreview(andreverse)theLongdecision.28Ofcourse, statecourtsrespondedto theCourt’s instructionandbeganmakingtheirrelianceonstategroundsexplicit.29

¶7Despitestateconstitutions’typicallylowprofile,theydosometimeslandinthespotlight.Thepublicmightnotcaremuchaboutthefinepointsofsearchandseizurelaw,butwhentheHawaiiSupremeCourtsaidthatthestatutedefiningmar-riagewassubjecttostrictscrutinyunderthestate’sconstitution,30peopledefinitelynoticed.Within the state, the reaction was to undo the ruling by amending theconstitutiontoempowerthelegislaturetobansame-sexmarriage.31Andtherewasastrongreactionbeyondthestate,too:between1998and2009,thirty-oneotherstates also adopted constitutional amendments limiting same-sex marriage and

23. Noteveryoneseesthisasagoodthing.“Sincetheearly1970’s,whathastroubledthecriticsoftheonce‘newjudicialfederalism’isthestrategicuseofstateconstitutionallawinawaythatexpandstherightsdomainwhile insulatingsuchstatecourtdecisionsfromotherwiseadversefederalcourtreview.”RonaldK.L.Collins,Foreword: The Once “New Judicial Federalism” & Its Critics,64WAsh. l. reV.5,6(1989). 24. Brennan,supranote11,at501. 25. 463U.S.1032,1037n.3(1983)(quotingPeoplev.Long,320N.W.2d866,870(Mich.1982)). 26. Id.at1043. 27. Id.at1041. 28. Id.at1044.FormoreontheissueoftheSupremeCourt’slackofjurisdictionwhenastatedecisionrestson“independentandadequatestategrounds,”see16BChArles AlAn Wright et Al., federAl prACtiCe And proCedure§§4019–4032(2ded.1996).Thesequenceofdecidingstateandfederalclaimsisdiscussedin1Jennifer friesen, stAte ConstitutionAl lAW,at1-18to1-41(4thed.2006). 29. See Patricia Fahlbusch & Daniel Gonzalez, Case Comment, Michigan v. Long: The Inadequacies of Independent and Adequate State Grounds,42u. miAmi l. reV.159,188n.200(1987)(“Atonetimeoranother,allofthestatecourtssurveyedinthisstudyplacedintheiropinionsthedec-larationthattheirdecisionsrestedonbonafide,separate,adequateandindependentstategrounds.AndinallcasestheSupremeCourtdeniedreview.”). 30. Baehrv.Lewin,852P.2d44(Haw.1993)(remandingtotrialcourtforfindingwhetherstatutewasjustifiedbyacompellingstateinterest).SeeBaehrv.Miike,Civ.No.91-1394,1996WL694235(Cir.Ct.Haw.Dec.3,1996)(onremand,findingnocompellingstateinterest,andthusthatthestatuteviolatedHawaii’sequalprotectionclause). 31. hAWAii Const.art.I,§23(ratifiedNov.3,1998).


oftenothertypesofsame-sexunions.32Bythelateryears,thestatesadoptingcon-stitutionalamendmentswerereactingnotjusttothecasefromHawaii,butalsotocasesfromotherstates,includingVermont,33Massachusetts,34andCalifornia.35

¶8Advocatesforsame-sexcouplesmadetheircasesusingthedistinctiveprovi-sions of state constitutions. For example, compare the equality provisions fromConnecticut, Iowa, and Massachusetts with the equal protection clause of theFourteenthAmendment:

Connecticut Allmenwhentheyformasocialcompactareequalinrights;andnomanorsetofmenareentitledtoexclusivepublicemolumentsorprivilegesfromthecommunity.36Nopersonshallbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelawnorbesubjectedtosegregationordiscriminationintheexerciseorenjoy-mentofhisorhercivilorpoliticalrightsbecauseofreligion,race,color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mentaldisability.37

Iowa All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; theGeneralAssemblyshallnotgranttoanycitizen,orclassofcitizens,privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall notequallybelongtoallcitizens.38

Massachusetts Allpeoplearebornfreeandequalandhavecertainnatural,essen-tial and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned theright of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that ofacquiring,possessingandprotectingproperty;infine,thatofseek-ingandobtaining their safetyandhappiness.Equalityunder thelaw shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color,creedornationalorigin.39

UnitedStates No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge theprivilegesorimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnitedStates;norshallanyStatedepriveanypersonof life, liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflaw;nordenytoanypersonwithinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotectionofthelaws.40

Clearly,equalityprovisionsarenotcreatedequal.41Thestatecasesmayalsoinvolveconstitutional provisions that have no parallel in the federal constitution. For

32. peter niColAs & miKe strong, the geogrAphy of loVe: sAme-sex mArriAge & relAtionship reCognition in AmeriCA (the story in mAps)24 (2ded.2011) (listingAlabama,Alaska,Arizona,Arkansas,California,Colorado,Florida,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Kansas,Kentucky,Louisiana,Maine,Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,Oregon,SouthCarolina,SouthDakota,Tennessee,Texas,Utah,Virginia,andWisconsin). 33. Bakerv.State,744A.2d864(Vt.1999). 34. Goodridgev.Dep’tofPublicHealth,798N.E.2d941(Mass.2003). 35. In reMarriageCases,183P.3d384(Cal.2008). 36. Conn. Const.art.I,§1. 37. Id.§20. 38. ioWA Const.art.I,§6. 39. mAss. Const.pt.1,art.I. 40. u.s. Const.amend.XIV,§1. 41. “Theequalityprovisionscontainedinthestates’billsofrightsareamongthemostdiverseguarantees found in American constitutions.” Ronald K.L. Collins, Bills and Declarations of Rights Digest,inthe AmeriCAn benCh: Judges of the nAtion2483,2491(3ded.1985–1986).


instance,inAndersen v. King County,42theWashingtonSupremeCourtdiscussedthestateconstitution’sprivacyprovision43andEqualRightsAmendment44aswellasequalprotectionanddueprocess.

¶9Theabilityofastate’slegislatureandvoterstoamendtheirconstitutiontoundoacourtdecisionwithwhichtheydisagreeillustratesonesignificantwayinwhichstateconstitutionsdifferfromthefederalconstitution:theyaremucheasiertochangeinresponsetopoliticalmoodorchangingcircumstances.45Moststateshavehadatleastthreeconstitutionssincetheirfounding;altogetherthestateshaveadoptedmore than7000constitutional amendments.46Marriage isnot theonlyareainwhichvotershaverespondedtoanunpopularrulingbyamendingthecon-stitution.AftertheCaliforniaSupremeCourtheldthatthedeathpenaltywaspro-hibitedbytheCaliforniaConstitution’scruelorunusualpunishmentclause,47thestateadoptedanamendmentreinstatingthelawsthathadbeenstruckdown.48Andafter theFloridaSupremeCourt interpreted its constitution’s searchandseizureprotections more liberally than the federal courts interpreted the FourthAmendment, the legislature and the voters amended the constitution to addexplicit instructions to the courts:“This right shall be construed in conformitywiththe4thAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution,asinterpretedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt.”49

42. 138P.3d963(Wash.2006)(upholdingstatutedefiningmarriageasonlybetweenamanandawoman). 43. Id.at986,¶84(citingWAsh. Const.art.I,§7:“Nopersonshallbedisturbedinhisprivateaffairs,orhishomeinvaded,withoutauthorityoflaw.”). 44. Id.at988,¶96(citingWAsh. Const.art.XXXI,§1:“Equalityofrightsandresponsibilityunderthelawshallnotbedeniedorabridgedonaccountofsex.”). 45. g. AlAn tArr, understAnding stAte Constitutions 23 (1998); robert f. WilliAms, the lAW of AmeriCAn stAte Constitutions29(2009). 46. Devins,supranote9,at1640. 47. Peoplev.Anderson,493P.2d880(Cal.1972)(enbanc). 48. CAl. Const.art.I,§27(adoptedNov.7,1972).Overadecadelater,votersunseatedthreejus-ticesoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourt,atleastpartlybecausetheywereperceivedashavingundercutthedeathpenalty.SeeFrankClifford,Bird Calls Opposition’s Attack “Mean-Spirited,”l.A. times,Nov.6,1986,at3. 49. flA. Const.art.I,§12(asamendedNov.2,1982).AsimilarprovisionensuresthatFloridawillstayinstepwiththeSupremeCourt’sEighthAmendmentrulings:“Theprohibitionagainstcruelorunusualpunishment,and theprohibitionagainst cruelandunusualpunishment, shallbecon-struedinconformitywithdecisionsoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwhichinterprettheprohibi-tionagainstcruelandunusualpunishmentprovidedintheEighthAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution.”Id.§17.

TheFloridaConstitutionreferstotheSupremeCourtinanothercontext:ThelegislatureshallnotlimitordenytheprivacyrightguaranteedtoaminorundertheUnitedStatesConstitutionasinterpretedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Notwithstandingaminor’srightofprivacyprovidedinSection23ofArticleI,theLegislatureisauthorizedtorequirebygen-erallawfornotificationtoaparentorguardianofaminorbeforetheterminationoftheminor’spregnancy.TheLegislatureshallprovideexceptionstosuchrequirementfornotificationandshallcreateaprocessforjudicialwaiverofthenotification.

Id.art.X,§22(addedNov.2,2004).SearchingWestlaw’sST-CONSTdatabaseforte(“united states” /2 “supreme court”), I found no other state constitution that makes a similar reference to U.S.Supreme Court decisions. I did find an example of a state legislature going the other direction: aconcurrentresolutionpassedbytheLouisianalegislaturestatedthat“thecitizensofLouisianahavechosenahigherstandardofindividuallibertythanthataffordedbytheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandthejurisprudenceinterpretingthefederalconstitution”andthattheSupreme


¶10Stateconstitutionsareimportant.AsJusticeBrennanadvised,“althoughinthe past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutionalissuesinstatecourts,plainlyitwouldbemostunwisethesedaysnotalsotoraisethe state constitutional questions.”50 Therefore, lawyers, law students, and othersinterestedinthestateconstitutionneedtofindrelevantsources.Thefirstsource,ofcourse,istheconstitutionitself,andthatiseasilyfound—instatecodesandoftenonstatewebsites.Researchers thenwillwantcases interpretingtheconstitution,and cases are also easily found, using annotated codes, digests, and full-textsearching.

¶11Whatismoredifficulttofindisthehistoryofastateconstitution,whichisoften an important source in interpretation.51 Researchers can often turn to thepublishedproceedingsoftheirstate’sconstitutionalconvention.Itisnotsurprisingtofindgoodrecordsforrecentconventions,52buttherearepublishedproceedingsevenforveryearlyconventions—forinstance,Maryland’s,from1776.53

¶12Washington,however,isamongthefewstateswhoseproceedingshavenotbeenpublished.Themembersoftheconventionin1889hiredcourtreporterstorecorddebatesinshorthand,butCongressdidnotappropriatethemoneytopaythem—and their notes are lost.54 In the early 1960s—decades after the conven-tion—the University of Washington’s School of Law (with “the active personalinterest”ofthelawlibrary’sdirector,MarianGouldGallagher)andDepartmentofHistoryfundedaprojecttofillthisgap.55BeverlyPaulikRosenow,thenalawstu-dent,editedatranscriptofthehandwrittenminutebook;anindexpreparedbyahistorystudentprovidedreferencesfromconstitutionalprovisionstothedatesinthejournalwhentheywerediscussed,alongwithcitationstocontemporarynews-paperarticlesthatreportedontheconvention.56Aftertheprojectwascompleted,photostaticcopiesofthenewspaperarticlesweredepositedwiththeUniversityofWashingtonlawlibrary,whereresearchersoccasionallyrequestedthem.

CourtofLouisianashouldgivecarefulconsiderationtotheU.S.SupremeCourt’sinterpretationsbut“shouldnotallowthosedecisionstoreplaceitsindependentjudgment”inconstruingtheLouisianaConstitution. S. Con. Res. 39, 1997 Leg. (La. 1997), reprinted in lA. reV. stAt. Ann. Const., art. I(preceding§1). 50. Brennan,supranote11,at502.Insomecircumstances,itmightevenbemalpracticeorinef-fectiveassistanceofcounselforalawyertofailtobriefastateconstitutionalclaim.See, e.g.,Claudiov.Scully,982F.2d798(2dCir.1992)(findingineffectiveassistanceofcounsel);Statev.Lowry,667P.2d996,1013(Ore.1983)(Jones,J.,concurring)(“AnydefenselawyerwhofailstoraiseanOregonConstitutionviolationandreliessolelyonparallelprovisionsunderthefederalconstitution,excepttoexertfederallimitations,shouldbeguiltyoflegalmalpractice.”),overruled on other grounds byStatev.Owens,729P.2d524(Ore.1986). 51. See generallyWilliAms,supranote45,at318–30. 52. See, e.g., proCeedings of the ConstitutionAl ConVention of hAWAii of 1978 (1980);proCeedings of the ConferenCe for delegAtes to the 1977 tennessee ConstitutionAl ConVention, mAy 20–21, 1977(BobbyN.Corcoran&DavidH.Grubbseds.,1977);reCord of proCeedings, sixth illinois ConstitutionAl ConVention(1972). 53. the deCisiVe bloW is struCK: A fACsimile edition of the proCeedings of the ConstitutionAl ConVention of 1776 And the first mArylAnd Constitution(1977). 54. Charles M. Gates, Foreword, in the JournAl of the WAshington stAte ConstitutionAl ConVention, 1889,atiii,vii(BeverlyPaulikRosenowed.,1962). 55. Id.atviii. 56. Id.at491–885.


¶13Bythe late1990s,Rosenow’sbookwasoutofprint,andthesepia-tonedphotostatswereveryhardtoread.Thelawlibrary,nownamedforMarianGouldGallagherandledbyPennyHazelton,againundertookaprojecttoimproveaccess.Securing the copyright from the original publisher, the library arranged for theWilliamS.HeinCompanytoreprintthebook,sothatanewgenerationoflawyers,historians,andotherresearcherscouldacquireit.57Studentsandstaffreturnedtothemicrofilmofthenewspaperarticlestomakenewcopies,whichHeinpublishedinaboundvolume.58Nowit’savailableatallthreestatelawschoolsandthestatelawlibrary,notjustthelibrarywhereitwascompiled,andit’sonacid-freepaper,notthefadingphotostatscomprisingthefirstset.

¶14EventhoughthereprintsbyHeinimprovedaccess,therewasmoretodo.HughSpitzer,whoteachesWashingtonStateconstitutionallawattheUniversityofWashington,wasconcernedaboutthesituationofapractitionerinasmalltown,hundredsofmilesfromabiglawlibrary:stateconstitutionallawissuesareimpor-tant,andthestatesupremecourtsaysthatlawyersshouldbriefthehistoryofcon-stitutional provisions;59 yet that small-town lawyer wouldn’t have easy access tomanyoftheimportantsources.Forinstance,theWashingtonSupremeCourthascited an unpublished dissertation that was available until recently in only a fewlibraries.60DavidHancock,astudentinSpitzer’sclassandtheeditor-in-chiefoftheWashington Law Review in 2008–2009, began a project to post materials online,acquiringHein’sdigitalversionsofthenewspaperarticlesandscanningorlocatingpreviouslyscannedcopiesofothertexts.AfterHancock’sgraduation,theprojectlayfallowforawhile,untilthelawlibrarytookitupinthesummerof2011.Wehaveorganized thedigitalmaterialsHancockgatheredandadded links tomanymoresourcesfromacentralpage:Washington State Constitution: History(http://lib.law.washington.edu/waconst).61

¶15Likethedraftersofmanystateconstitutions,Washington’sdelegatestotheconstitutional convention borrowed from other states’ constitutions. Many usedcompilations,sothatthedelegateshadmanytextsbeforethem.62TheindexintheJournal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention cites various constitu-tionsthatwereinfluential,includingtheCaliforniaConstitutionof1879andthe

57. the JournAl of the WAshington stAte ConstitutionAl ConVention, 1889(BeverlyPaulikRosenowed.,WilliamS.Hein&Co.1999)(1962). 58. WAshington stAte ConstitutionAl ConVention, 1889: ContemporAry neWspAper ArtiCles(StaffoftheMarianGouldGallagherLawLibrary,Univ.ofWash.SchoolofLawed.,1999). 59. See, e.g.,Statev.Gunwall,720P.2d808,812(Wash.1986). 60. Wilfred J.Airey,A History of the Constitution and Government ofWashington Territory(1945) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington), available at http://lib.law.washington.edu/waconst/sources/airey.pdf#page=1. The dissertation was cited in Cox v. Helenius,693P.2d683,684(Wash.1985)andatleastfivelateropinions. 61. For other law school state constitution projects, see New Jersey Constitutional Documents,rutgers sChool of lAW, CAmden, http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/new-jersey-constitutional-documents(lastvisitedFeb.9,2012);Pennsylvania Constitution,duQuesne uniV.,http://www.duq.edu/law/pa-constitution(lastvisitedFeb.9,2012). 62. SeeMarshaL.Baum&ChristianG.Fritz,American Constitution-Making: The Neglected State Constitutional Sources,27hAstings Const. l.Q.199,199(2000).Thecompilationswerenotalwaysaccurate.HorstDippel,The Trap of Medium-Neutral Citation, or Why a Historical-Critical Edition of State Constitutions Is Necessary,103lAW libr. J.219,2011lAW libr. J.14.


OregonConstitutionof1857.63Nowthewebsitelinkstothem.64Thesitealsolinkstoavarietyofcommentary,includingarticlesinthestate’shistoricalsocietyjournalwrittenbyformerdelegates,65theunpublisheddissertationmentionedabove,66andmanylawreviewarticlesfromthelastthreedecades.Aseparatepageliststhecon-stitutionalamendments,alongwithlinkstovoters’pamphletsdescribingtheballotmeasureswhentheywereadopted.67

¶16Stateconstitutional lawdoesnotalwayshaveahighprofile,andyetstateconstitutionsareimportantauthority,asarethecasesinterpretingthem.Statecon-stitutionsprovideforthestructureandoperationofstategovernment.Theyalsohave provisions to protect individual rights and liberties—provisions that aresometimes interpreted to offer more protection than the federal Bill of Rights.68Historicalmaterialsmaynotalwaysbeeasytolocate,butmakingthemavailableisaworthyprojectforlawlibraries.Wecanservenotjustthepatronswhocanvisitourbuilding,butamuchwideraudienceofresearchers.69

63. In 1939, Dr. Arthur S. Beardsley, then the director of the University of Washington LawLibrary, prepared a list of constitutional provisions with their antecedents in other constitutions.Beardsley’slistisreprintedeachyearinthestate’slegislativemanual.ArthurS.Beardsley,Sources of the Washington State Constitution,instAte of WAsh., 2011–2012 legislAtiVe mAnuAl385(2011–2012),available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/LIC/Documents/SubscriptionsEndOfSessionHistorical/LegMan.pdf. 64. Wesoughtsourcesthatseemedofficialorquasi-official—e.g.,fromarchives,legislatures,andstatehistoricalsocieties.SometimeswefoundseparatelypublishedconstitutionsinGoogleBooks.Inafewinstanceswelinkedtocompilations.Aseparatesectionoftheguidelinkstocompilationsavail-ableonline. 65. JohnR.Kinnear,Notes on the Constitutional Convention,4WAsh. hist. Q.276(1913),avail-able at https://digital.lib.washington.edu/ojs/index.php/WHQ/article/view/5060/4137; Theodore L.Stiles,The Constitution of the State and Its Effects upon Public Interests,4WAsh. hist. Q.281(1913),available athttps://digital.lib.washington.edu/ojs/index.php/WHQ/article/view/5061/4138. 66. Airey,supranote60. 67. MaryWhisneretal.,Washington State Constitution: Amendments,gAllAgher lAW librAry, uniV. of WAsh. sChool of lAW,https://lib.law.washington.edu/content/guides/waconstAmend(lastupdatedFeb.10,2012). 68. SeeRobertF.Williams,Why State Constitutions Matter,45neW eng. l. reV.901(2011).ThearticleincludesasanappendixaresolutionfromtheConferenceofChiefJustices,encouragingalllawschoolstoofferacourseinstateconstitutionallaw.Id.at912. 69. ArecentbrieftotheWashingtonSupremeCourtcitesthewebsiteforbothStiles,supranote65,andAirey,supranote60.BriefforAppellant,In re:BondIssuanceofGreaterWenatcheeRegionalEventsCenterPublicFacilitiesDistrict,No.86552-3(Wash.Nov.15,2011),2011WL7005433,at*24n.9,*28n.12.Itisgratifyingtoseethatthewebsiteisalreadybeingusedbythebar.

341


Back and Forth . . .

WestlawNext and Lexis Advance*

Christine L. Sellers** and phillip gragg***

The columnists discuss and debate the emergence of WestlawNext and Lexis Advance, and consider their impact on legal research, law school instruction, and the practice of law.

¶1CS:Forthiscolumn,wedecidedtotakea lookatWestlawNextandLexisAdvance—andwhat’sfunnytomeiswhatIfoundinmyresearch:thevolumeofopinionsonWestlawNextgreatlyoutnumbersLexisAdvancebyanalmostunbe-lievableamount.Solet’sgetstartedandperhapsaddabittotheliteratureonbothsystems.IthinkwecanprobablyagreethatRonWheeler’sarticleonWestlawNextinLaw Library Journalisanexcellentplacetostart.1

¶2PG:Definitely.Asyousaid,thereismuchmorewrittenaboutWestlawNext,andthesystemisoutfrontinotherwaysaswell.Forone,itwaslaunchedearlier,soithasalltheadvantagesofbeingfirst(aquestionableadvantage,astheywerenotverylikelytotakemarketsharefromLexisNexis),andallofthedisadvantages.IwishwecouldhavebeenfliesonthewalloftheplanningmeetingssurroundingWestlawNextandLexisAdvance.IimagineLexisNexismusthaveseenWestlawNextasashotacrossthebow,andinitiallytheremusthavebeengreatconcern.

¶3LexisNexishastakenamorelimitedapproachthanWestlawtodevelopingLexis Advance, probably due to cost. And since they are offering it as a freeenhancement to LexisNexis, the development model is necessarily different.LexisNexis has also had the advantage (and maybe LexisNexis should changeAdvance toAdvantage)ofwatching theverymixedreactiontoWestlawNextandthe heavy-handed way in which West attempted to foist it upon the masses—althoughIthinktheyusedtheword“launch.”

¶4 CS: Actually, LexisNexis already has a product called atVantage, so that’sout.2Iwenttoa“launch”forWestlawNextandthoughtatthetimethatLexisNexis

* ©ChristineL.SellersandPhillipGragg,2012. ** ResearchSpecialist,NelsonMullins,Charleston,SouthCarolina. *** AssociateDirectorforPublicServices&AdjunctProfessorofLegalResearch,LouisianaStateUniversityPaulM.HebertLawCenterLibrary,BatonRouge,Louisiana. 1. Ronald E. Wheeler, Does WestlawNext Really Change Everything? The Implications of WestlawNext on Legal Research,103lAW libr. J.359,2011lAW libr. J.23. 2. atVantage: Legal Prospects,lexisnexis,http://law.lexisnexis.com/atvantage(lastvisitedFeb.10,2012).LexisNexisdescribestheproductas

apowerfullawfirmbusinessdevelopmenttoolthathelpsyouanalyzeandtrackyourfirm’sgrowthopportunitieswithclientsandprospects,researchindustryandmarkettrends,andevaluatecom-petingfirms.Youcandothisallfromasingle,intuitiveWebinterfacedesignedaroundthewaymarketersandbusinessdevelopmentprofessionalsperformtheirdailytasks.


was unlucky to be going second. However, I think that LexisNexis learned fromWestlaw’s mistakes with WestlawNext, and that was strongly encouraged andnoticedbybothlibrariansandbloggers.3

¶5PG:Myimpression,nothavingreadanyoftheliterature,isthatWestlawisattemptingtoforcethisonus,whetherwelikeitornot,andnotinasubtleway.WhentheveryearlyobjectionstotheintroductionofWestlawNextweremade,thecompanymerelydelayedtheirtimelineforrollout.Then,whenitstartedtomoveforwardagain, thecompanyused the same tactics—aclumsy, forcible introduc-tion. (This is a tacticoftenemployedbygovernments—wearpeopledownuntiltheyaccepttherealitythatyouforceonthem.)IevenhadthesensethatpeopleworkingatWestlawhadtogrinandbearthetransition.

¶6LexisNexismayormaynothaveplannedamoreaggressiveapproachthatmirroredWestlaw’s,butifmemoryserves,duringthebetaphase,whentheyfirstgot some push-back, they stopped, reevaluated, and came back with a cleaner,moreuser-friendlyenhancementtotheirplatform.TheimpressionIgotfromourLexisNexisrepresentative,andothersI’vemetatconferences,isthattheemphasisseemstobeonthecustomer.I’veneverhadthatfeelingwithWestlawNext.Now,letmegoreadtheliterature![Dayspass,houseplantsgounwatered,andtheeditorofLaw Library Journalgraciouslyenduresanothermisseddeadlinebytheauthors.]

¶7 CS: I think Westlaw had a very “Apple-like” mind-set when launchingWestlawNext.WhileIwasreadingtheliterature,theSteveJobsquotethatcametomindwas:“Youcan’tjustaskcustomerswhattheywantandthentrytogivethattothem.Bythetimeyougetitbuilt,they’llwantsomethingnew.”4Idon’twanttodeemphasizethatWestlawNextwasinnovative,butaproducthastobemorethanjustinnovativetowinoverlibrarians.

¶8PG:You’vedrawnaparallelbetweenSteveJobsandWestlaw;butSteveJobsre-createdaworld,whereasWestlawservicesaworldthatisoldandintransigent.NomatterhowmuchWestlawchangesthings,itwillnotfundamentallyalterthepractice of law or legal research. After all, some thought and reflection is stillrequiredofthelawyer,andthisisthecruxoftheproblem:aproductthatdoesnotrequirethoughtasaninputintheresearchphasewillleavethelawyercaptivetotheautomated,thoughtlessresultsthatflowoutofsuchasystem.

¶9We’reinaninterestingsituationwiththecommercialvendors.Therearefewvendors, so we have few alternatives. Our relationship can span the spectrumbetweenpartnershipandanimosity.Irealizeacademicinstitutionsareasmallpartofthemarket,butwealsoofferthekeystothekingdom—accesstonewlawyers—andweshouldbemindfulofthis.

3. See Carol Ebbinghouse, New Platform, New Product Mix, New Market, New Pricing—LexisNexis Advance, info. todAy (Oct. 18, 2010), http://newsbreaks.infotoday.com/NewsBreaks/New-Platform-New-Product-Mix-New-Market-New-PricingLexisNexis-Advance-70706.asp; GregLambert, Open Letter to “New Lexis.com”—Learn from WestlawNext Mistakes, 3 geeKs And A lAW blog (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.geeklawblog.com/2010/03/open-letter-to-new-lexiscom-learn-from.html. 4. BoBurlingham&GeorgeGendron,Entrepreneur of the Decade: An Interview with Steven Jobs, Inc.’s Entrepreneur of the Decade,inC.(Apr.1,1989),http://www.inc.com/magazine/19890401/5602.html.

343Vol. 104:2 [2012-25] WeStLAWNext ANd LexIS AdVANCe

¶10 CS: What I really noticed was the positive response WestlawNext firstreceivedfromthebloggers invitedtoEagan,Minnesota,topreviewtheproduct.5The shine wore off fairly quickly though. Information Today summed up West’smistakes,“whichinvolvedtellingeveryoneatthesametimeaboutanewproductwhileonlyprovidingittoonemarketandleavingothermarketstotheguesswork;not tellinganyone theprice; andgenerally irritating librariansbypromoting thenewbutoftenunavailableservicedirectlytopatrons.”6GregLambertalsopointedout the uncertain prices and mixed messages that characterized the time periodafterthelaunch.7

¶11PG:Ifquestionedabouttactics,Westwouldprobablyengageinsomerevi-sionisthistory,butIhavelittledoubtthattheobscuritywithwhichWestlawNextwaslaunchedwasintendedtotestthemarketandseeiftraditionalWestlawcouldbepulledout fromunderusandprices increased.Either thator the launchwasham-handed.Iseenootheralternatives—anditdidn’thelpthatthiswasdonedur-inganeconomicdownturn.Thelaunchfeltlikeatop-downdecision.West’sman-agement would have done well to listen to their soldiers in the field, and mostimportant, their customers who spend enormous sums for access to theirproducts.

¶12CS:GettingbacktoRonWheeler’sarticleonWestlawNext,Ithoughthedidanexcellentjobofsummarizingtheprocessoflegalresearchandthendiscussingthepotentiallynegative impactofWestlawNexton thatprocess.8 Issueshehigh-lighted included the “crowdsourcing” algorithm of WestlawNext’s new searchengine,whichcouldmakeesotericmaterialsmoredifficulttofind;9thelackoftheabilitytostartwithabroadsearchstrategythatthencanbenarrowed;10andsearch-ing without first choosing a database, which could impact users’ knowledge ofsources.11Hedidpointoutpositive impactsaswell,which includeusers findingandusingpreviouslyunknownsourcesanddocuments.12HenotedthatWestlawNextwillchangethewaylegalresearchistaughtinlawschools.13Willitchangehoworwhatyouteach?

5. See, e.g.,RobertAmbrogi,A First Look at WestlawNext,lAWsites(Jan.26,2010),http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2010/01/first-look-at-westlawnext.html;DavidJ.Bilinsky,Dave’s Top 10 List About WestlawNext,thoughtful legAl mAnAgement(Jan.27,2010),http://thoughtfullaw.com/2010/01/27/daves-top-10-list-about-westlawnext; Simon Chester, The Future of Westlaw—A First Glimpse(Plus Update 1), slAW (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.slaw.ca/2010/01/28/the-future-of-westlaw-a-slaw-canadian-exclusive; Jason Eiseman, 5 Random Thoughts About WestlawNext, JAson the Content librAriAn(Jan.29,2010),http://www.jasoneiseman.com/blog/?p=383;GregLambert,WestlawNext—A Study in Applying Knowledge Management & Crowdsourcing, 3 geeKs And A lAW blog (Jan. 28,2010), http://www.geeklawblog.com/2010/01/westlawnext-study-in-applying-knowledge.html; LisaSolomon,WestlawNext Preview: Product and Pricing,legAl reseArCh & Writing pro(Jan.27,2010),http://legalresearchandwritingpro.com/blog/2010/01/27/westlawnext-preview-product-and-pricing. 6. Ebbinghouse,supranote3. 7. Lambert,supranote3. 8. Wheeler,supranote1. 9. Id.at366,¶20. 10. Id.at371,¶36. 11. Id.at374,¶46. 12. Id.at373,¶44. 13. Id.at376–77,¶¶55–56.


¶13PG:Yesandno.The“Googlization”oflegalresearchhasafewbenefits,buttheeaseofsearching,whileimpressive,expectslessoftheuser.Itassumesalackofskillandunderstandingofmaterial,andattemptstoreducecomplexandnuancedproblemstothelowestcommondenominator.Iflegalresearch,analysis,andwrit-ingeverbecomefullautomated,lawyerswillbecomelittlemorethanclerks.

¶14Wemustholdourstudents tohigherstandardssothatasearchproductthatresultsinananswerofthelowestcommondenominatordoesnotresultinastudentwhoseskillapproximatesthelowestcommondenominator.Iexpectintel-ligentinquiryfrommystudents,flexible,creativeresponsestodifficultsituations,andanunderstandingofthe“howandwhy.”Inshort,Idon’tfeelWestlawNextisathreat to librarians; it’sa threat to lawyers.Toansweryourquestion,Iwill teachWestlawNextandLexisAdvance,butitwillnotchangetheexpectationIhaveofmystudentstobeknowledgeableandprofessional.Whateffectshaveyouseeningovernmentandlawfirms?

¶15CS:AttheLawLibraryofCongress,Westlawwasonlyusedforcongres-sionalinquiries.Idon’tforeseeaswitchtoWestlawNextanytimesoon,especiallywiththepricingissuesandloomingbudgetcuts.AsforthelawfirmwhereInowwork,wedon’tuseWestlawNext. I’mnot surewhatwillhappen in thenext fiveyearsasmoreandmore lawstudentsuseWestlawNext in lawschools.BasedondiscussionsI’vehadwithlibrariansandattorneys,itseemsthestudentswhohaveaccessloveitandcan’timagineusinganythingelse.However,therealityofpayingforthisservicemightchangethat,asitchangesallthingsinlegalpractice.

¶16PG:IhavestudentswholoveWestlawNext,butalsorecognizesomeofitslimitations related to both cost and how it is structured. At the start of ourAdvancedLegalResearchclassinJanuary,astudentsaidheusedWestlawNextallthetime,buthesignedupfortheclassbecausehewantedtoknowhowtofindthingshimself. InLouisiana, as in somanyother states, there arematerials thatonlyexist inprintorhaveonlyrecentlybeenaddedtoagencyorlegislaturewebsites.

¶17 CS: So what do you think of your own use of WestlawNext or LexisAdvance?Ifoundmyself...frustrated.Forthoseofuswhoareadvancedsearchersandknowwheretolookforthings,aresultslistwitheverythinginitistoomuch.Idon’twanttohavetodigwhenIknowwhatsourcetheanswerwillbein.Ontheotherhand,Ithinkthereisasteeplearningcurvewitheachproduct,andIdon’tthinkI’veusedeitherproductlongenoughtoadjustmymentalmapofhowmyresearchshouldproceed.

¶18PG:Themain,Google-likesearchboxistomelikestaringintotheabyss.Youdon’treallyknowwhat’sdownthereandwhat isgoingtocomeback.Everysearchseemstoresultin10,000results—asifthiswereagoodthing.ItmakesmepineforthegoodolddaysoftraditionalLexisNexisandWestlawwhereyouwouldgeterrormessagessaying,“Thissearchhasresultedinexcessof10,000hits.”Thesubtextwas,thankyouforplaying,youmaywanttotryagain.Perhapstheshotgunapproach ispreferredbysome.Afterretrievingtheuniverseof information,youcanpickthroughtheresultstofindafewgoodresources.Thefilteringnowhastooccurattheendoftheprocess.


¶19I’lladmitthatwhenIwasalawstudent,Iwouldwantonlyandindiscrimi-natelysearchintheAllFedsorevenAllCasesdatabases.Butmydaysofrecklessyoutharepastme,andInowtrytoteachmystudentsthatthebestfilteristheirownmind.SeveraldaysagoIdemonstratedthedeficiencyoftheshotgunapproach.Sidebyside,astudentandIlookedfortheelementsofkidnappinginaparticularsecondaryresource.IntraditionalWestlaw,wewentrighttothenarrowerandlessexpensive database containing only the individual volumes in question. TheWestlawNextsearchrequiredasearchoftheuniverseandthennarrowingseveraltimes,andthenrevertingtoatableofcontentsviewtounderstandthefullcoverageoftheresource.14TheWestlawNextsearchalsofailedtoretrieverelatedhitsinsur-rounding sections within the given resource. In print or in traditional Westlaw,readingthetableofcontentswouldhaveresolvedthisissuequickly.Itisironicthatallofthistechnologycannotfullysupplantthesimpleactofreading.However,itisnot lost on me that many people, students and lawyers in particular, findWestlawNexttobeagodsend.15

¶20CS:Iwasalsowantonandindiscriminateinmyyouthwiththesearching.Ishuddertothinkofthosesearchesnow.Iwouldcharacterizebothofusasgoodresearchers—weusuallyknowwhere to findwhatweare looking forand find itthere.Whenoursearchresultsarebroaderthanwhatwewant,itcancomeacrossasnoiseanddistractus.

¶21PG:True.Perhapsthisisnotnoisetotheyounglawyerswearetraining,buttheyarenotbeyondhope.Inanotheramusingincident,Iwalkeduptotherefer-ence desk one day and greeted the reference librarian and the student receivinghelp.WegotintoaconversationaboutWestlawNext,andIexpressedmyconcernsaboutit,includingitslimitations.“Oh,ithaseverything!”thestudentreplied.Ithenaskedhimwhathewaslookingfortodaythatrequiredtheassistanceoftherefer-encedesk.Heloweredhisheadandsheepishlyadmittedthathecouldn’tlocatethefederal legislative material he sought through his iPad app. He had spent aboutthirtyminutessearching,andcouldn’tbelieveitwasnotonWestlawNext.WeratherquicklylocatedthematerialforfreethroughTHOMAS(thomas.loc.gov).

¶22CS:Ah,youknowIloveagoodTHOMASstory!Ontheotherhand,partof the concern I have with librarians’ reactions to WestlawNext is that they cansometimesseemslikejustagutreactionagainstchange.Arewefuddy-duddies?Dosomeofusresistchangejustbecauseitischange?Isatonapanelforanearlyver-sionofLexisAdvance.WhileI’mnotthatyoung,Iwasoneoftheyoungerlibrariansintheroom,andIrememberthinkingthatsomeofthelibrarianswereonlycom-plainingbecausethingsweren’tliketheyusedtobe.OneofthelibrarianswantedtomakesureshecouldstilluseDOS-typecommands—tomethisseemedlikeanirrationaldesiretokeepthingsthesame,evenifnewmethodsarebetter.

14. WhilesomesourcescanbesearchedindividuallyinWestlawNext,theonethestudentneededcouldnot.Itshouldbenoted,though,thatWestlawNexthasrecentlybeenmakingchangestoallowspecificsourcestobesearchedindividually. 15. See, e.g.,JeffRichardson,Review: WestlawNext—Legal Research on the iPad,iphone J.d.(Dec.1,2011),http://www.iphonejd.com/iphone_jd/2011/11/review-westlawnext-ipad.html.TheauthorisapracticingattorneyinNewOrleansandgivesacompellingaccountofhowthenewproductaug-mentshistrialpractice.


¶23 I firmlybelieve thatbeingagood librarian involves adapting to change.Heck,Ithinkbeingagoodpersoninvolvesadaptingwelltochange,eventhoughIadmittostrugglingwithit.Ifweholdontothingsthatarearchaic,whatdoesthatsayaboutusasaprofession?Doesthisinfluencethewaylibrariansareperceived—rigidandsilence-enforcingratherthaninnovativeandforward-thinking?Ithinktheanswercansometimesbeyes.Ialsothinktheansweristhatwecan’tholdontothepastjustbecauseitworkedforusbefore.That’sthepast.Thingschange.Getusedtoit.Beflexible.Beadaptable.Makesurewhenyoucomplainorresistsome-thingit’sactuallyforagoodreason.Idon’twanttosuggestthateveryonesuffersfromthis,butIdothinkit’ssomethingweneedtobecognizantofinourprofes-sionandourlives.

¶24I’mnotsayingtochangejusttochange,noramIsayingadoptanewtech-nologyjusttodoso.Technolustforitsownsakeisnevergood.However,Idothinkmoreempiricalresearchontheeffectsof thesenewsystemsonresearch,asRonWheelercalledfor,16isneeded.Thiscolumnwasnottheplaceforit,butthisjour-nalis.

¶25 PG: Let me go back to your earlier question and say: yes, we are beingfuddy-duddies. Although I have previously expressed suspicion of and cautionabout new technologies,17 sometimes tongue in cheek, my skepticism is oftenlegitimate (hey, remember RFID tags?). For me, there are two central issues:(1)Doesthecostofanewproductortechnologyoutweighthebenefits?Wehavelimitedbudgetsandafiduciaryresponsibilitytoourinstitutions.And(2)Doesthenew technology produce a better, more well-rounded and practice-readyattorney?

¶26Perhapseveryone is going thewayofWestlawNext,but letmepose thissimplequestion:Woulditbeeasiertotrainapersonwhohadbeenthroughacom-prehensiveadvancedlegalresearchclass(coveringbooksaswellasdatabasessuchasHeinOnline,CCH,BNA,etc.)touseWestlawNextortotrainsomeonewhohasonlyreliedonWestlawNexttouseavarietyofnewsources?Theformerpersonisby far the more flexible and adaptable. If my question seems a bit simplistic orridiculous,considerthatWestlawNextseemstobeaskingusersthequestion:“Whydoyouneedknowledgeandunderstandingwhenyouhaveme?”Icannotingoodconscienceabdicatemyresponsibilitytoteachastudentasmanypathstoinforma-tion as possible. Lay your burdens down and seek redemption at the temple ofsimplesolutions?No,thelawdemandsmore,andIcan’tignorethat.

¶27CS:Iagreethattheformerpersonismoreflexibleandadaptiveand,there-fore,abetterresearcher.Idon’twanttocomeacrossasthoughIthinkskepticismisn’tvalid,becauseIgreatlyadmireeachandeverylibrarianwhoquestionsboththestatusquoandchange.Ithinkit’spartofourprofessionalresponsibilitytocre-ateadialogueaboutnewproducts.Hopefully,wehavecontributedtothathere.

¶28PG:Well,formypart,Ipledgetocontinuetoscrutinizenewtechnologiesandnotdismissthemoutofhand.Electroniccatalogs,digitalanddigitizedbooks,andtechnologiessuchasopticalcharacterrecognition(OCR)havebroughtabout

16. Wheeler,supranote1,at376,¶55. 17. SeePhillipGragg&ChristineL.Sellers,Twitter,102lAW libr. J.325,2010lAW libr. J.19.


awelcomeandmassiveshiftinthewaywecanaccessandlocateinformation.Iwillwelcomeanytechnologythatpromotesaccessandeaseofuse,combinedwithintel-ligentinquiryandresults.Ifmyassessmentofthisnewdirectioninlegalresearchisinerror,thenitisforevermemorializedhere.Icanlivewiththat.I’llchalkituptoprofessionalvigilance.

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Memorial: Felice Sacks (1945–2012)*

¶1FeliceSacks,DirectorofLibraryServicesatLionel,Sawyer&CollinsinLasVegas,passedawayonJanuary5,2012,whileundergoingaheartvalvereplacement.Feliceexperiencedseveralhealthissuesduringthelastfewyears,butshedidnotletthatinterferewithherzestforlife.SheissurvivedbyherhusbandSteven,hertwodaughters,ErikaandMarni,herson,Kenneth,andfivegrandchildren.

¶2AlthoughshegrewupinNewYork,Washington,D.C.,washometoFeliceformostofhercareerasalawlibrarian.ShewasalibrarianattheEnvironmentalProtection Agency and at the law firm Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (nowWilmerhale),andLibraryDirectoratthePensionBenefitGuarantyCorporation(PBGC).FeliceretiredfromPBGCafewyearsagoandmovedtoLasVegas,butshedidnotstayretiredforverylong.

¶3 I met Felice when we both worked at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Shestunnedmeonedaybyannouncingshehadjoinedadancetroop.GrowingupinNewYork, she had taken tap dance lessons and over the years had developed arenewedinterest.WhateverFeliceparticipatedin,shealwaysgave100%,andtapdancewasnodifferent.Duringherfirstrecital,shewasdancingherheartout,notrealizingshewasnearingtheedge—andthenshe felloff thestage!Typically forFelice,shegotrightupandcontinuedtodance.

¶4Felicemayhavebeenalawlibrarianbyprofession,butatheartherrealpas-sionwasart.Whenevertheopportunityarose,shewouldcallonherartisticskillstodesignnewslettersandwebsites.InhersparetimeFelicewasasilk-screenartistand had a penchant for interior design. Her philosophy of art was simple:“Artenablesmetointerpretthepatterns,textures,linesandcolorsfloatingaroundmeon a daily basis. Through various medi[a] I express my own individuality andcreativity.”1

¶5DuringhertimeinWashington,D.C.,FelicestudiedscreenprintingattheCorcoranSchoolofArt.This ledtoanopportunityin2001toparticipateintheschool’sannualPortfolioProject.Thethemewas“911,”andFelice’sprintwasoneoftheentriesacquiredbytheLibraryofCongress.Asastudentofinteriordesignat the Fashion Institute of Technology in Manhattan, Felice began working oninteriordesignprojectsinwatercolor,markers,andcomputergraphics.EvenaftermovingtoLasVegas,shecontinuedtotakeclasses,enrollingintheUniversityofNevada, LasVegas, art program and focusing on areas as diverse as typography,animation,digitalimages,illustration,andwebdevelopment.

¶6HercareerandartistictalentswereimportanttoFelice,butnothingwasasimportant as her family. Her face would light up when she talked about their

* ©JoanSherer,2012. 1. Felice Sacks,VegAs Artists guild,http://www.vegasartistsguild.com/apps/profile/69333548/(lastvisitedFeb.27,2012).


accomplishments. When her daughter Marni developed Crohn’s disease, Felicebecame an advocate, familiarizing us with its adverse affects. She was happiestwhenherfamilywasalltogether.

¶7 What I will remember most about Felice was her generosity of spirit,herkindness,herlaughter,andherunwaveringfriendship.Thisstatementfromherweb site to me invokes the perfect picture of Felice:“[O]n Sunday mornings inhersilkscreenartstudio,youcanalwaysfindFelicebusydevelopingandimple-mentingnewideasforprints,withtheradioblastingandthesunlightofanewdaystreaminginthroughthetinywindow.”2Shetrulywasoneofakind.Shewillbemissed.—Joan Sherer3

2. Id. 3. Senior Reference Librarian, Legal, U.S. Department of State, Ralph J. Bunche Library,Washington,D.C.

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