Joseonjok (Korean-Chinese) Migrants in Japan:

The Influence of Multilingualism and

Transnationalism on their Identity Construction

You Gene KIM

Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies

Waseda University

2021

Abstract

This research aims to investigate the issues that ensued from the migration of Joseonjok

(Korean-Chinese) in the host society of Japan. To begin with, it covers the historical background

of their twice migration from Korea to China, and then to Japan. Joseonjok are the descendants of

Koreans who originally migrated from the Korean peninsula to Northeast China (Manchuria) in

the late 1800s and the early 1900s. Since the 1980s, under the auspices of the Japanese

government’s “100,000 International Students Plan”, Joseonjok as a sub-group of Chinese

migrants have moved into Japan to seek out their better life chances. During the course of their

settlement in Japan, their identity has become multilayered due to the concoction of Korean

ethnicity, Chinese nationality, and Japanese cultural competency. Moreover, their identity has been

reshaped by their multilingual and transnational experiences.

The main purpose of this research is to find out the result of the comprehensive investigation

of Joseonjok’s identity formation based on their multilingualism and transnationalism. On the one

hand, the multilingual ability of Joseonjok has positively affected their social and economic

mobility. Practically, they gain benefits from their trilingual capacity of commanding Korean,

Chinese, and Japanese. On the other hand, transnational activities function as a main factor in

constructing Joseonjok’s positive identity. The confluence of the two features of multilingualism

and transnationalism brings forth the issues of the newly constructed identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

To carry out this research, I implemented a qualitative method of in-depth interviews and

participant observation through my fieldwork conducted in the Tokyo area between May 2016 and

January 2020. I met 55 informants to whom I asked semi-structured interview questions to collect

empirical data. I also performed participant observation by taking part in the events and gatherings

held by Joseonjok communities. As an objective researcher, I interpreted and analyzed the

behaviors and lifestyles of my target subjects. The empirical data gathered from my fieldwork

substantiated my argument that multilingualism and transnationalism are the main constituents of

the multifaceted identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

The findings of this research have mainly been obtained by the extensive review of the literature

and the empirical data collected from the fieldwork. The relationship between identity and

multilingualism is a consequential phenomenon of Joseonjok’s movement into Japan.

Transnationalism, coupled with multilingualism, has also become an indispensable element

leading Joseonjok’s life in this globalized area of Northeast Asia.

All in all, Joseonjok’s trilingual ability and their transnational mobility made Joseonjok

maintain their distinctive lifestyle in the homogeneous and unwelcoming society of Japan. Under

this situation, the identity of Joseonjok in Japan will keep evolving through formation, construction,

and negotiation. Thus, Joseonjok will continue to exist as “transnational multilinguals” (Duff

2015).

Keywords: Migration, Ethnicity, Nationality, Minority, Diaspora, Multilingualism,

Transnationalism, Identity

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION: MIGRATION AND JOSEONJOK 1

1.1.1 JAPAN AS AN IMMIGRATION DESTINATIONS FOR CHINESE 3

1.1.2 JOSEONJOK AND MIGRATION INTO JAPAN 5

1.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 10

1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 12

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 15

2.1 JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 15

2.2 MIGRATION THEORIES 17

2.2.1 THEORY OF PUSH-PULL FACTORS 17

2.2.2 NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY 18

2.2.3 NEW ECONOMICS OF LABOR MIGRATION 20

2.2.4 DUAL LABOR MARKET THEORY 22

2.2.5 SEGMENTED ASSIMILATION THEORY 23

2.3 MULTILINGUALISM 26

2.3.1 DEFINITION OF MULTILINGUALISM AND ITS BENEFITS 27

2.3.2 THE MULTILINGUAL BACKGROUND OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 28

2.4 TRANSNATIONALISM 29

2.5 IDENTITY 32

2.5.1 THEORETICAL REVIEW ON IDENTITY 33

2.5.2 MIGRATION AND IDENTITY 34

2.5.3 IDENTITY ISSUES OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 36

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS AND FIELDWORK 37

3.1 RESEARCH METHOD 37

3.2 RESEARCH SAMPLE 41

3.3 FIELDWORK AND PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AT JOSEONJOK COMMUNITIES IN TOKYO 43

3.4 FIELDWORK IN SEOUL AND NEW YORK 49

CHAPTER 4: MIGRATORY EXPERIENCES OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 54

4.1 THE WAVES OF JOSEONJOK MIGRATION 54

4.2 JOSEONJOK MIGRATION AND NORTH KOREA 57

4.3 IMMIGRATION CONTEXT OF JAPAN AND ITS EFFECTS ON JOSEONJOK MIGRATION IN JAPAN 59

4.4 JOSEONJOK MIGRATION INTO JAPAN 62

4.5 THE MOTIVATION AND ENTRY PROCESS OF JOSEONJOK MIGRATION TO JAPAN 65

4.6 THE LIFE OF JOSEONJOK STUDENTS IN JAPAN 74

4.7 THE SETTLEMENT OF JOSEONJOK STUDENTS IN JAPAN 78

4.8 JOSEONJOK COMMUNITY AND THEIR SOCIAL LIFE 80

4.9 CLOSING 85

CHAPTER 5: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS OF MULTILINGUALISM OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 88

5.1 INTRODCUTION 88

5.2 MULTILINGUAL BACKGROUND OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 89

5.3 MULTILINGUAL PRACTICES OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 92

5.4 MULTILINGUAL EDUCATION OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 97

5.5 MULTILINGUAL IDENTITIES OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 103

5.6 CLOSING 105

CHAPTER 6: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS OF TRANSNATIONALISM OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 107

6.1 INTRODUCTION 107

6.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF JOSEONJOK 108

6.3 TRANSNATIONAL LIFE OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 110

6.4 TRANSNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 112

6.5 TRANSNATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 117

6.6 FAMILIAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 121

6.6.1 TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY 121

6.6.2 TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 122

6.6.3 TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN RELATING TO THEIR CHILDREN’S EDUCATION 123

6.7 CLOSING 126

CHAPTER 7: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS OF THE IDENTITY OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 128

7.1 INTRODUCTION 128

7.2 THE IDENTITY FORMATION OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 129

7.3 THE IDENTITY OF JOSEONJOK IN CHINA 130

7.4THE IDENTITY OF JOSEONJOK IN SOUTH KOREA 132

7.5 THE IDENTITY OF CHINESE MIGRANTS IN JAPAN 133

7.6 COMPARING THE IDENTITY OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN WITH THAT OF ZAINICHI KOREANS 134

7.7 COMPARING THE IDENTITY OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN WITH THAT OF JOSEONJOK IN THE U.S. 138

7.8 THE IDENTITIES OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 142

7.8.1 KOREAN IDENTITY OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 144

7.8.2 CHINESE IDENTITY AMONG JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 147

7.8.3 THE MULTIPLE AND FLUID IDENITTY OF JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 151

7.9 THE IDENTITY OF THE SECOND- GENERATIONS JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 154

7.9.1 THE IDENTITY OF ADOLESCENT SECOND GENRATION JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN 155

7.9.2 THE IDENTITY OF THE SECOND GENERATION JOSEONJOK IN JAPAN OVER AGE 20 158

7.10 THE ROLE OF MULTILINGUALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM IN THE FORMATION OF THE IDENTITY OF JOSEONJOK

IN JAPAN 161

7.11 CLOSING 164

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 167

8.1 SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS 168

8.2 FINDINGS OF THIS RESEARCH 170

8.3 LIMITATION OF THIS RESEARCH 172

8.4 CONTRIBUTION AND SUGGESTIONS 174

8.5 CLOSING 177

REFERENCES 180

APPENDIX 1 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF THE INFORMANTS 225

APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (ENG/KOR) 228

Acknowledgment

In the first place, I would like to show my deep gratitude to my advisor, Professor Gracia

Liu-Farrer for the ongoing support of my Ph.D. study and related research. When I finished my

master’s degree in New York, I was at a crossroads whether I should study more or go to the real

world for my career. Then, I met Prof. Liu-Farrer, and she suggested one particular topic of

Joseonjok in Japan for my future research. The topic struck me on my head, and it gave me fresh

momentum to pursue a Ph.D. at Waseda University. Throughout the course of my research, she

has guided me constantly to put forward this dissertation. Her encouragement and criticism have

acted as a bitter-sweet catalyst in accomplishing my academic goal. Had it not been for her support,

I would not have completed this Ph.D. study.

Besides my advisor, I would like to pay thanks to my deputy advisor, Professor Glenda S.

Roberts. She always smiles at me whenever I met her. Even Ph.D. students sometimes need nods

and smiles from the professors. She willingly signed the papers for my scholarship applications,

travel funds, journal articles, and more. More importantly, she gave me the chance to foster my

anthropological perspectives on migration studies.

I am also indebted to Professor Mark Caprio at Rikkyo University, from whom I have

learned many things since my undergraduate study. His expertise in Korean studies has helped me

get insights on Joseonjok study in Japan on the basis of the neutralized and objective perspectives

on Korean history. He considerately allowed me to join his seminar in which I had chances to share

intercultural communications with the researchers from diverse academic backgrounds.

I should also thank Professor Kyungmook Kim, who inspired me to expand my research

on Joseonjok to the comparative study with Zainichi Koreans. In particular, I should appreciate the

opportunity to take part in a conference in New Zealand under his supervision. At the conference,

Professor Kim introduced me to Professor Chang Zoo Song who has long been engaged in research

of Joseonjok and became an authority in the field.

Coincidentally, the above four professors have been chosen as my thesis committee. Their

insightful assessment and suggestions on my research have acted as an impetus to improve this

dissertation.

Other than those of four professors, I still have two more professors to whom I have to pay

special thanks. Professor Pyong Gap Min at the CUNY Graduate Center trained me to be a

sociology student specializing in migration studies on the theme of overseas Korean immigration.

Professor Harris H. Kim at Ewha Womans University gave me helpful guidance to start my Ph.D.

and provided me with practical tips on writing my dissertation.

I would also like to extend my hearty thanks to my zemi (seminar) colleagues. They have

usually brought up intriguing discussions and critical feedback on each other’s research topics.

Most of us command English as a medium of communication but sometimes use Japanese for a

routine conversation. The multilingual and multicultural faculty of our members enabled us to

make our seminar a diversified and distinguished one where I could foster interculturally

developed social and human capital. With the heavy workloads of reading, writing, and rewriting,

we often wined and dined together to relieve our stress. The candid talks and complaints against

some harsh professors sometimes even acted as our solace. The multiple function of the zemi has

furnished me with useful resources to apply to my research.

I owe one more thanks to Dr. Jeff Hall, who works as a researcher in Global Asia Research

Center. I have been working as an RA, and Jeff supervised my work to write reports on the events

of inviting scholars from all over the world and letting them present their research topics. His

proofreading on my reports has been a great guidance for my writing training. I also pay thanks to

Professor Naoyuki Umemori, who allowed me to participate in this SGU program. Dr. Thanh Dat

Vo helped me practically to prepare and proceed the events at SGU.

More than anything else, I would not forget the help I got from Joseonjok for this research

project. Without their help, I would never have been able to construct the kernel of this research.

More particularly, the students, parents, and staff members of Joseonjok weekend school in Tokyo

have acted as major research projects to be observed and questioned. Undoubtedly, Joseonjok at

the school have supplied me with a valuable resource to carry out this research. From this center

of my empirical fieldwork, I have expanded the research territory further to other areas thanks to

their help. I should pay special thanks to the principal of this school, Ms. Jeon who arranged the

networks with other Joseonjok communities acting in the Tokyo area. Overall, I sincerely pay my

gratitude to those Joseonjok informants whom I met in Tokyo, Seoul, and New York. They were

all eager to contribute themselves to be part of this research.

My special thanks should go to the “Korea Foundation” for allowing me a generous

scholarship for my second-year Ph.D. I should also appreciate the financial help from the “Young

Scholars Program” which had continuously supplied the fund before I became the age 30. “Study

Korean” program gave me some stipend for my work as a correspondent in the Tokyo area. All

those financial helps supported me to survive in the world’s most expensive city of Tokyo. I must

also say those school officers at Waseda University who always gave a helping hand with their

kindness.

Last but not least, I must say thank you a thousand times to my parents. I am forever

indebted to them for my study from preschool to graduate school for the past 25 years. They are

the perfect example of Korean parents who would do anything for their children’s education. My

parents’ endless supports have buttressed me all the way to arrive at the homestretch of the long

journey of my Ph.D. I dedicate this dissertation to my parents for their sacrifice and love.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“…What made me come to Japan? I came here for my better life. Above all, I didn’t like

my life back in China. There was no vision for the future. Many of my friends, relatives,

and neighbors left home for South Korea to make money. But, they had to suffer from the

harsh discrimination from their South Korean compatriots. That’s why I chose to come to

Japan. In a way, living in Japan is more comfortable than living in South Korea to

Joseonjok like me. You may not know, but I really worked and studied hard to settle in

Japanese society. Finally, I got a decent job and realized my dream. A good thing about

living in Japan is that Japanese people don’t care much about other people as long as they

don’t cause any trouble. However, I am just a foreigner here in Japan. I only have to work

hard and obey Japanese rules to lead a good life here…”

-An extract from the interview with Dojin, male, age 32, corporate employee, arrived in Japan in

2009 (Interview Date: October 4th, 2016)

“I used to be attracted by this country of Japan before I left China. As you know, Japanese

people are well-known for their diligence and sophisticated manner. They seem to be

punctual, polite, and orderly. However, real-life in Japan was different from my

expectations. The kind attitude of Japanese people is just their formality. So, I can’t read

their true mind behind their smiles. At my part-time workplace, Japanese people only say

“Ohayo and Otsukare Sama (おはよう、お疲れ様).” Other than that, nothing really goes

around except for working. I’ve come to realize becoming true friends with Japanese is a

difficult job. Overall, Japan is a clean and rich country, but it is not a humanistic country.

I don’t know how long I will have to live in Japan. Now, I understand why most Chinese

people here prefer getting permanent residency over citizenship in Japan.”

-An extract taken from the interview with Soyeon, female, age 30, graduate student, arrived in

Japan in 2013 (Interview Date: December 27th, 2016).

1.1 Introduction: Migration and Joseonjok1

People have been moving from one place to another since ancient times. Today, more and

more people are moving to other countries for their better life chances. According to the statistics

from IOM 2 (International Organization for Migration), there were 272 million international

1 Joseonjok is a Korean pronoun representing Korean-Chinese people living in the northeastern provinces of China

(Jilin, Heilongjiang, Liaoning). They are called Chaoxianzu in China and Chosenzoku in Japan. In this research, I use

the Korean term of Joseonjok to stand for all Korean-Chinese residing over the world (Kim 2018).

2 It is an inter-governmental organization in the field of migration established in 1951. This organization works on the

four broad areas of migration management known as Migration and Development, Facilitating Migration, Regulating

Migration, and Forced Migration. IOM has published yearly ‘World Migration Report’ since 2000.

2

migrants in 2019 (IOM 2020) the number of which was a considerable increase compared to that

of 155 million in 2000. It is also estimated the number is expected to increase to 405 million by

the year 2050 (IOM 2014). Thanks to the development of transportation and digital technology,

the international movements of migrants have become more feasible and less costly than ever

before. Furthermore, in an era of globalization, people can move freely to other places and travel

across the borders in this interconnected world. Under these circumstances, the increase of

international migrants indicates the simple fact that migrants are expected to get benefits through

relocation for themselves and their families. Migration can also deliver benefits for the sending

and receiving countries. As World Migration Report pointed out, “migration has helped improve

people’s lives in both origin and destination countries and has offered opportunities for millions

of people worldwide to forge safe and meaningful lives abroad” (World Migration Report 2018

IOM: 1). With all those benefits of migration, however, international migrants commonly confront

the unfavorable situations of economic, political, social, cultural, and psychological shifts when

moving to new places. After all, they have to overcome the challenges of relocation procedures

and finally settle in the host countries. The phenomenon has been prevalent in international

migration arising throughout the world.

Migration is a global phenomenon and the highest number of migrants live in Asia (80 million),

followed by Europe (78 million) and North America (58 million) (UN International Migration

Report3 2017). Moreover, there are two Asian “population giants”, China and India, which have

the largest numbers of migrants living abroad (IOM World Migration Report 2018).

Notwithstanding the dominance of Asian migration, it is believed that fewer studies were done in

the past on the issues of Asian migration in comparison with North America and Europe (Massey

et al. 1998, Yamashita 2008). Be that as it may, in recent years there have been extensive migration

studies progressing in East Asia as well. More importantly, the great economic and political

impacts of China, Japan, and South Korea have made the research on migration issues arising in

this area of Northeast Asia critically important. China is a major migrant-sending country, and

Japan and South Korea have experienced a transition from migrant-sending countries to migrant-

receiving countries.

In the following sections of this chapter, I will briefly illustrate the background of Chinese

3 This report analyzes the trend in international migration and discusses the contribution of migration to worldwide

population changes. United Nations Statistics Division also keeps a data base on worldwide migration.

3

migration into Japan. I will then explicate the particular cases of Joseonjok migration into Japan

as a subgroup of Chinese newcomers. I will further account for the aims and major themes of this

research. Lastly, I will summarize the chapters of this dissertation and explain its framework.

1.1.1 Japan as an Immigration Destination for Chinese

Due to low fertility rates and ageing population, Japan as well as South Korea has to confront

labor shortages. Japan, in particular, has become an immigration destination from nearby low-

income countries. The labor demand in Japan represents the migration phenomenon arising in

some other advanced countries in East Asia such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. This

reflects Kim’s observation that “uneven development within Asia triggered intra-regional

migratory movement from poorer to richer countries” (Debrah 2002; Hujo and Piper 2000; Kim

2017). Even in a global age of migration (Douglass and Roberts 2000), Japan’s attitude toward

migrants is still in an incomplete stage as an immigration receiving country because of its short

history of immigration. Under this migration context of Japan, a significant number of Chinese

migrants have moved into Japan since the Chinese government relaxed the restrictions on Chinese

citizens’ mobility to travel other countries in 1986 and Japan enacted its “Plan to Accept 100,000

Foreign Students before the beginning of the 21st Century 4” in 1984. The Japanese government

simplified the application procedures for foreign college students or pre-university language

students (Wakabayashi 1990; Liu-Farrer 2011) making it easier for Chinese students to obtain visas.

Many young Chinese students arrived in Japan with the hope of receiving higher education and

achieving career goals. In a way, they utilized the student visa as a practical way to immigrate to

Japan. These changes led to a major increase in Chinese residents in Japan. According to a report

from “The Japan Times”, there were 2,829,416 foreign residents in Japan in the year 2019 with

the largest group being Chinese (786,241) followed by South Koreans (451,543). (Retrieved from

The Japan Times, Oct. 26, 2019).

For the past three decades, a significant number of Chinese migrants through their social

networks and guidance of brokers have migrated into Japan. Among them many are students. As

Liu-Farrer pointed out, “the majority of Chinese students enter Japan with the goal of pursuing an

4 The 100,000 International Students Plan was decided under Prime Minister Nakasone’s government. The plan “set a target in

1983 to increase the number of international students enrolled in Japanese universities and colleges to 100,000 by the beginning of

21st century” (Ota 2003: 27). The principal intention was to foster mutual understanding between Japan and foreign countries,

especially in East Asia. However, the true intention was to internationalize Japanese universities, and the plan was eventually used

to invite highly educated workforce in Japanese labor market (Kim 2018).

4

education and expanding their career opportunities” (Liu-Farrer 2011: 63). Those young Chinese

students work hard to earn their bread and butter while accomplishing their academic goals. They

get accustomed to the Japanese work criteria during their part-time jobs and accumulate human

and social capital for their future careers (Ibid.). In other words, Chinese students also learn

Japanese cultural practices and brush up their Japanese language skill while working as part-time

employees. More importantly, they have chances to learn Japanese work ethics during the initial

stage of their migrant life in Japan. After some time, as self-supporting students, they finally

graduate from schools, find regular employment in Japanese firms, and get away from low-wage

part-time jobs.

Those who find jobs in Japanese corporate companies often make use of their Chinese

language and cultural skill and find themselves engaged in transnational businesses between China

and Japan. They accumulate social and human capital by making the most of their linguistic ability

and transnational connections to promote their business capacity in the global markets (Liu-Farrer

2011). Simply put, they can cultivate their own occupational niche as skilled workers in the

transnational job markets in Japan. With all those advantages in their workplaces, Chinese

employees in Japanese firms tend to be discouraged after a while by the lack of promotions and

managerial responsibility in their workplaces (Duff et al. 2008). It is generally accepted among

Chinese employees that “becoming a transnational entrepreneur is a common aspiration of the

Chinese student migrant in Japan” (Liu-Farrer 2011: 110). China and Japan are ranked respectively

as the world’s second and third most powerful economic country by the total GDP (World GDP

Ranking 2019 Statistics.Times.com). In this context, Chinese migrants in Japan realize that China

will keep acting as a superpower in the world economy, and Japan will also maintain its position

as a world economic leader. Japan used to be the first-comer in economic development in the East

Asian region. As Soysal indicated, “Japan is withdrawing, and China is advancing to play a leading

role in regional and world affairs” (Soysal 2015: 2). Under these circumstances, the transnational

business opportunities among Chinese migrants in Japan have increased for the past two decades

because of the swelling volume of the trade between the two economic giants. Notwithstanding

the active participation of Chinese migrants in the Japanese economy, there is, at the same time, a

negative side of their life in Japan. More than anything else, some low-skilled Chinese migrants

with their severe working conditions (Kodama 2015) tend to lead their hard life. Unlike highly-

skilled Chinese migrants, they show distorted images as foreign workers (Ibid.) because of their

5

low-quality jobs and their low standard of living. However, a significant number of Chinese after

going through the process of settlement tend to follow “Japanese lifestyle and social norms” (Liu-

Farrer 2015: 124) and lead comfortable lives in Japan.

It is clear that Japan seeks both highly-skilled and low-skilled migrants to fill labor shortages

in its diverse industries. In this context, Japan has been an attractive destination for skilled and

unskilled Chinese migrants (Le Bail 2013). Recently, Japan has started the new migration scheme

to accept 345,000 specified skilled workers from April 1, 2019 (The Japan Times, April 26, 2019).

The new plan seems to indicate Japan’s inclination to accept more of blue-collar labor migrants in

its labor market. However, the Japanese government has long been welcoming only highly-skilled

immigrants, setting more generous standards for obtaining working visas (Tsukasaki 2008;

Hashimoto 2017). Under these diverse circumstances, the trends of Chinese migration into Japan

are likely to change depending on the implementation of the Japanese immigration policy. It is also

noteworthy that the Japanese government is still trying hard to attract highly-skilled foreign

workers (Liu-Farrer 2013b). Overall, China has acted as the number one migrant sending country

to Japan and has become the largest foreigner group in Japan since 2007. The migration of Chinese

into Japan will continue to happen to meet the needs of both skilled and unskilled labor markets in

Japan.

1.1.2 Joseonjok Migration History and Their Movement into Japan

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate and discuss the migration issues of

Joseonjok in Japan. To begin with, Joseonjok entered Japan as a sub-group of Chinese migrants

meaning that they have used the same channels and demonstrated a similar trajectory of migration

from China to Japan as that of mainstream Chinese migrants. However, they show their distinctive

traits as migrants in Japan because of their ethnicity inherited from Korea. To examine the issues

of Joseonjok in Japan the question of “Who are Joseonjok?” should be answered. Joseonjok are

the descendants of the Koreans who migrated from the Korean peninsula to Northeast China in the

late 1800s and the early 1900s (Seol and Skrentny 2004, Kim 2018). It has been 150 years since

the first arrival of the Korean farmers in the wilderness of Manchuria5. After a long while, Koreans

5 Manchuria was a former name of the region indicating Northeast China during the Japanese colonial period consisting of

Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. Once, this particular region belonged to the ancient Goguryeo Dynasty (57 BC-668 AD) in

Korean history (Seol and Skrentny 2004). However, Koreans disappeared after the fall of Goguryo Kingdom. Then, in the late 19th

century Koreans started to move in this area. Actually, Japan designated this area as Manchuria and they ruled Manchuria from

1931 to 1945. Many of Koreans moved to this area during this period.

6

in this area obtained Chinese citizenship and were accepted as members of the Chinese nation

(Hong 2013).

Joseonjok migration history into Northeast China had the following three stages. In the first

stage, from the 1860s to the 1910s, farmers from the northern part of Korea crossed the border of

the Tumen River6 to search for the arable land in the adjacent area from the perimeter in Northeast

China. In the second stage, from 1910 to 1932, following the annexation of the Korean peninsula

to Japan, political refugees and activists moved to Manchuria to take part in the independence

movement of Korea (Seol and Skrentny 2004). In the third stage from 1932 to 1945, Japan

established a puppet government Manchukuo Regime7 in 1932 and invited and forced a number

of Korean farmers and workers to migrate in this area to build a supply base for Japanese invasion

of China (Lee 1986; Piao 1990; Han and Kwon 1993; Kwon 1997; J. Lee2002; H. Park 2005; Yoon

2012; Hong 2013). Moreover, the Japanese military government at this stage, “established what

they called ‘safe farming villages’ for Koreans in Manchuria” (Mackerras 1994: 116).

During the time of the different stages of the Korean migration in China, the Chinese

government practiced an assimilation policy toward Koreans in Manchuria (Seol and Skrentny

2004). Even though Joseonjok had a different ethnic consciousness from Han Chinese8 , they

supported the Chinese Communist Party because they shared anti-Japanese sentiments from the

history of colonialization (Mackerras 2003; Song 2014). After the establishment of the New China

by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, these Koreans were accepted as legal citizens of China.

In return, many Koreans developed political loyalty to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)9

6 The river located in the national borders among China, North Korea, and Russia. The Tumen River area and the adjacent territories

constitute an important geographic and socio-economic center of Northeast Asia (Karakin 2003). The porous border along the

Tumen River allowed many Koreans to move and settle in Chinese regions by simply wading the river in the late 19th century and

the early 20th century. In a way, this area along the Tumen River is called as ‘Natural Economic Territory’ (Kwon 2015).

7 The colonial state was established in Manchuria by Japanese Imperialists in 1931. The area collectively known as Manchuria was

seized by Japan and pro-Japanese puppet government was installed one year later. Japanese imperialists controlled this puppet

government of Manchuko and used this area as a foothold to invade the mainland China.

8 Han Chinese refers to the mainstream Chinese who consist 92% of the total Chinese population 55 other ethnic minorities compose

only about 8% of the population (Pang 2000; Song 2007). In fact, they are simply called as Han. Joseonjok share the same

nationality as Han Chinese notwithstanding the different ethnicity. Yet, Joseonjok have maintained their own ethnicity despite the

assimilation policy of the Han majority (Choi 2016). In this research, Joseonjok are often compared with those Han Chinese as

disparate groups of migrants in Japan.

9 PRC (People’s Republic of China) is an official name of China. On the 21st of September I 1949 Communist Party chairman Mao

Zedong proclaimed the establishment of PRC. During the Civil War, PRC defeated Kuomintang and drove them out to Taiwan.

Now, PRC is the world’s most influential country. Since economic reform PRC has become the 2nd largest economic giant in the

7

(Yoon 2006). From that time on, Koreans in Manchuria developed their national identity as

Chinese citizens, and they were legally designated to be called as one minority group of

Chaoxianzu (Joseonjok in Korean) (Choi 2006). Joseonjok are often viewed as the model minority

among 55 minorities in China with regard to educational and economic level (Jin 2008, Lee and

Lee 2015, Kim 2018). However, there was also a difficult time for Joseonjok during the turbulent

period from the 1950s to the 1970s. Joseonjok encountered setbacks as an ethnic minority when

the Communist Party of China launched a series of campaigns, including the “Cultural Revolution

(1966-76), in the name of abolishing bureaucracy and feudalism in society” (Yoon 2012: 417).

Approximately two million Joseonjok used to reside in their diasporas in Northeast China.

However, the number of Joseonjok population in this area has sharply decreased due to their

internal migration to the urban and coastal regions of China from the peripheral part of Manchuria

as well as the external migration to other countries since the mid-1980s (Yoon 2006, Kim 2018).

Then, in the late 1980s, a decade after China’s first Open Policy, China’s socio-economic

environment improved allowing people greater opportunity to travel abroad (Song 2007). In

particular, Joseonjok started to visit their relatives in South Korea and found employment

opportunities with substantially higher wages than in China. Not long after, in 1992 China and

South Korea established diplomatic normalization (Kwon 2015), and the full-scale migration of

Joseonjok to South Korea has arisen since then. The Korean Fever10 became widespread among

Joseonjok in China (Park 2010), and it acted as an accelerator for Joseonjok to decide to go to

South Korea. The primary motivation of the Joseonjok movement stemmed from the economic

gains earned from their employment in the South Korean labor market. They were simply attracted

by the prospects of earning almost ten times more income than back in their homes in China.

Another stage of Joseonjok migration which can be designated as the “Post-Joseonjok stage”

arose after the three stages of the former Joseonjok movement into China (Choi 2001). This stage

can be designated as a reverse Joseonjok migration from the destination place of China to the place

world. Historically, Joseonjok have maintained god relationship with PRC government. PRC has treated Joseonjok as one

distinctive ethnic minority among the 55 ethnic minority groups in China.

10 It is a phenomenon of globalization of Korean media culture known as Korean pop music, dramas, and movies as well as Korean

foods. It is a global excitement of Korean culture such as K-pop, K-dramas, K-movies, and K-cuisine. It is also the growing

popularity of all Korean Korean things which are expressed as Korean-wave (Hallyu, 韓流). The popularity of the South Korean

culture first spread in Asia and soon expanded to other parts of the world (Hong 2013). Joseonjok in China have also been crazy

about the Korean culture and it has been infested among Joseonjok and has acted as a great motivator for Joseonjok to move to

South Korea (Park 2010).

8

of origin of Korea. As a result, the direction of the migration became opposite to those earlier

stages. The phenomenon of this Joseonjok movement can be explained in the scope of return

migration (Min 2012). However, not all the Joseonjok migrants in South Korea can be considered

as return migrants because they mostly stay as labor migrants and return to China. Only those who

recover their South Korean nationality and stay permanently are considered to be return migrants

(Ibid.).

Other than the migration of Joseonjok to their ancestral homeland, there have been different

streams of Joseonjok migration since the early 1980s when China adopted an open policy. China’s

open policy coupled with Japan’s relaxation of student visa in the 1980s, furnished unprecedented

opportunities for some of Joseonjok to move to Japan along with the mainstream Chinese

migration (Kwon 2015). However, Joseonjok in Japan have made up a unique ethnic minority

group although they are not physically visible as an independent entity. Joseonjok are registered

officially as Chinese nationals carrying Chinese passports, meaning that they are subsumed inside

Chinese migrant group in the host society of Japan. Nevertheless, the Joseonjok minority group is

treated as an independent entity in China as one of all 56 ethnic groups of “Zhonghua Minzu.11”

(Choi 2006). Thus, Joseonjok are a distinct group of people different from Han Chinese although

they are bound together inside the Great Zhonghua Family (Song 2007).

The migrant status of Joseonjok in Japan is not different from that of the Chinese mainstream,

but Joseonjok in Japan have constructed a distinctive identity different from that of Chinese

migrants in Japan (Kwon 2015). In a way, they already fostered their dual identity in China. Even

after moving to Japan, they still keep their Korean ethnicity as Chinese migrants while adapting

themselves to Japanese society. Some Korean scholars argue that Joseonjok have dualistic

identities (Kang 2008; Song 2014) and a complex notion of homeland (Kim 2006; Song 2014).

What’s more, Choi indicated, “they live with the dual identity of being a Chinese national with

Korean ethnicity” (Choi 2016: 254). They define China as their adoptive mother and the Korean

peninsula as their birth-mother (Kang 2008). Under this complicated migrant situation, Joseonjok

in Japan predominantly maintain their Korean ethnicity while living and working as Chinese

nationals. Although they have Korean ethnicity and Korean cultural traits, Joseonjok usually

11 Zhonghua Minzu (中華民族) is translated as ‘Chinese nation’ which is a key political term indicating Chinese

nation-building and race. The term Zhonghua Minzu includes the mainstream Han Chinese and 55 other ethnic groups

as a huge Chinese family.

9

regard themselves as Chinese when it comes to talking about their nationality (Kwon 2015).

In most cases, Joseonjok come to Japan as Chinese students. Liu-Farrer indicated this

phenomenon of Chinese student migration to Japan as “educationally channeled international

migration” (Liu-Farrer 2011: 3). Japan is particularly attractive because they can work their way

through school. The cultural and linguistic similarities of Japan also make it easy for Joseonjok to

adapt themselves to Japanese social life. More importantly, Japan is geographically accessible and

cost-efficient for their relocation (Kwon 2015). It is a well-known fact that Joseonjok have retained

considerable historical influence from Japanese culture due to pre-1945 Japanese imperialism in

Manchuria (Choi 2001). Moreover, many Joseonjok have learned Japanese as a foreign language

subject in their ethnic schools in China. It is also notable that older generations of Joseonjok still

keep their Japanese language competence and try to hand it down to their grandchildren (Park

2006). With all the advantages of language skill and cultural competence, Joseonjok students tend

to succeed in Japanese school life and the job market. In general, many Joseonjok come to Japan

as students, and over time, they turn into immigrants by securing highly-skilled jobs or engaging

in transnational businesses.

The primary purpose of Joseonjok’s coming to Japan does not seem for them to immigrate

to become Japanese citizens. Rather, they intend to get desirable jobs and build promising careers

while working in Japanese corporations. Then, they try to obtain promotion by performing

transnational business function in the Japanese corporations, or they leave the corporations to

engage in transnational entrepreneurship between China, Japan, and South Korea. Thus, it can be

said that the ultimate goal of Joseonjok migration to Japan is to lead a prosperous and comfortable

life in their new settlements. However, there is no clear preference when it comes to deciding

whether to live in Japan permanently or return to their home places. In some cases, Joseonjok even

consider moving to other advanced countries in the Western world. Besides, the advent of a second-

generation has also brought up new issues for their migrant lives in Japan. The complex aspects of

Joseonjok migration in Japan make it hard to explain their future situation. There are also some

other Joseonjok migrants in Japan who are low-skilled and unskilled laborers coming legally or

illegally into Japanese labor markets. This group of Joseonjok migrants is mostly struggling due

to their language deficit and low education (Kwon 2015). Some of them even overstay and turn

themselves into undocumented status in Japanese society (Ibid.).

Overall, Joseonjok are not considered as an independent minority group in Japan. Rather,

10

the Joseonjok entity is hidden in the statistics of foreigners in Japan (Kim 2018). The Joseonjok

community is substantially invisible in Japanese society. Although they have constructed their

virtual communities through social networks in Japan, they do not have physical enclaves in Japan

(Kwon 2015; Kim 2018). Geographically, Joseonjok are mostly scattered around the Kanto12 area

and other big cities following their workplaces and businesses. They tend to lead individual lives

without clustering in their own neighborhoods. However, through virtual communities, they firmly

maintain close relationships with their ethnic compatriots (Kwon 2015). In this situation, it is

almost impossible to pinpoint the exact number of Joseonjok living in Japan on the ground that

there is no official statistics of the Joseonjok population. An unofficial estimate placed the

Joseonjok population at around between 60,000 to 70,000 people (Overseas Korean Times 2016).

On the other hand, one Joseonjok media outlet, Shimto13, has reported a research estimating the

number of Joseonjok in Japan at around 100,000, including undocumented Joseonjok (Kim 2018).

Evidently, Joseonjok are continuously coming to Japan in pursuit of their academic goals and better

life chances, leading to new situations and issues that warrant academic attention.

1.2 Research Aims and Research Questions

This research aims to present the issues of Joseonjok migration occurring in Japan and to

promote the scholarly debates on Joseonjok identity concerning multilingual and transnational

aspects of their migrant life in Japan. In particular, it examines how Joseonjok migrants in Japan

understand and express their multifaceted identity. As mentioned earlier, Joseonjok have arrived

in Japan as Chinese migrants. They are legally registered as Chinese nationals when they arrive in

Japan. However, Joseonjok in Japan still hold Korean ethnicity and maintain their lifestyle with

Korean cultural heritage. A good number of them speak Korean although they grew up in China

as Chinese citizens. In this reality, the dual identity of Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality is

sustained in their new life in Japan. After they arrive in Japan, they further achieve Japanese

12 Kanto (関東) region indicates the eastern area of Honshu, the largest island of Japan. It includes the Greater Tokyo

Area and encompasses seven prefectures such as Gunma, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Saitama, Tokyo, Chiba, and Kanakawa.

One third of the total Japanese population live in this area. It is the center of Japan.

13 Shimto (쉼터) is the most frequently viewed community portal site among Joseonjok in Japan. This is the most

powerful media that influence Joseonjok life in Japan (Kwon 2015). It shows every aspect of Joseonjok life, from

political concerns to trivial matters of lost dogs. It is a virtual center for Joseonjok community. (Kim 2018).

11

cultural competence with their Japanese language skill and adaptation to the social norms and

values of Japan. Consequently, the identity of Joseonjok in Japan is “floating in between

Chineseness and Koreaness with cosmopolitan outlook by adding Japaneseness” (Lee and Lee

2015:37; Kim 2018:58). During the migration process in Japan, the identity of Joseonjok has been

constructed and transformed by the social, economic, cultural, and political shifts throughout their

new life. In this context, they can be categorized as one distinct minority group holding a diverse

background of identity (Kim 2018).

Investigating how Joseonjok in Japan identify themselves, how others identify them, and

how they construct their identity as ethnic migrants is the central theme of this research. The

primordial makeup of Joseonjok identity has been modified since Joseonjok arrived in Japan.

Other than the new addition of Japanese culture, Joseonjok identity has significantly been affected

by their multilingualism and transnationalism embedded in their migrant life. Under these

circumstances, Joseonjok in Japan keep asking questions regarding their status of identity. “Am I

Korean or Chinese? Or am I Japanese? Or am I just a global citizen?” These multiple questions

inevitably bring forth the tangled issues of identity explanation of Joseonjok in Japan. Their

complex identity inherited from the three nations may lead to marginalization in their migrant life,

but, at the same time, it can make Joseonjok change into “competitive hybrid citizens” (Slade 2014;

Lee and Lee 2015; Kim 2018). It is noteworthy to understand that Joseonjok in Japan have

constructed their multilingual and transnational identity which acts as a driving force to gain

upward mobility. Indeed, identity has become an important topic in the field of migration studies

and beyond. Bhugra and Becker note that “racial, cultural, and ethnic identities form part of one’s

identity, and identity will change with development at a personal as well as at social level along

with migration and acculturation” (Bhugra and Becker 2005:18; Kim 2018:58). La Barbera also

indicates that migrants’ identities are fluid and multiple (La Barbera 2015; Kim 2018). Joseonjok

in Japan, too, have fostered a multifaceted and fluid identity, which was inherited from Korea,

constructed in China, and later blended with Japanese cultural fabric. During the course of their

life in Japan, Joseonjok have filled the multilingual and transnational traits in their dual identity

brought from their natal homeland China (Kim 2018). The research argues that the identity

formation of Joseonjok in Japan has been significantly affected by the attributes of their

multilingualism and transnationalism (Ibid.).

The primary research problem in this thesis stems from the fact that Joseonjok in Japan have

12

inherent difficulty in identifying themselves while living in their host society of Japan. Their

multifaceted and fluid identity makes them struggle to define themselves. Thus, they often ask

themselves who they are, and they come to realize they do not know who they really are. The

primordial dual identity, which was shaped before they left China, turned into a more complicated

one due to their multilingual and transnational lifestyle in Japan. Above all, their identity does not

solely belong to China, nor to Korea, or even to Japan. In other words, they do not belong totally

to any one of the three countries, or conversely, they belong partially to all of these three countries.

Yet, they are just Joseonjok themselves. Under these circumstances, Joseonjok in Japan have but

to confront a hard time identifying themselves. This unclear situation is the main problem of

Joseonjok in Japan, particularly relating to their identity. The mixed up and hybrid identity with

Korean ethnicity, Chinese nationality, and Japanese cultural competence has even further evolved

into being more multifaceted identity once it was mixed with multilingualism and transnationalism

during the course of their migrant life in Japan (Kim 2018).

As mentioned, there is a lack of research on Joseonjok migration, let alone the issues of their

identity in Japan. This research, therefore, aims to fill the gap by asking the following questions:

How do Joseonjok experience their migrant life in the economic, social, and cultural

context of Japan?

How do they form and negotiate their identity as ethnic Joseonjok with Korean ethnicity

and Chinese nationality in the host society of Japan?

How do multilingualism and transnationalism influence on the formation of Joseonjok

identity in Japan?

What are the difficulties and struggles of Joseonjok concerning their identity in Japan?

What are the prospects of the migrant life of Joseonjok in Japan?

1.3 Organization of the Thesis

There are eight chapters, including this introductory chapter. The later chapters are as

follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to this research including the general issues of

migration studies, the historical background of Joseonjok migration from Korea to China and then

to Japan, the status quo of Joseonjok migration in Japan, theoretical review of migration,

13

multilingualism and transnationalism, multilingual and transnational circumstances of Joseonjok

life in Japan, and most importantly the identity issues of Joseonjok in Japan. Overall, the

framework of Chapter 2 (Literature Review) goes together with the thesis structure.

Chapter 3 details the research methodology of this dissertation. The research design is

primarily displayed on how the research has been performed. Findings reflect fieldwork, including

in-depth interviews and participant observation. Thus, the conversation and narratives in my

interviews are scripted, and they become the basis of the empirical information in this research.

Data was collected from the various sources, including my participation in Joseonjok community

meetings, surfing Joseonjok cyberspace, and reading Joseonjok on-line newspapers. The analysis

of Joseonjok migrants in South Korea and the U.S. has been reinforced as a comparative analysis

method in the last part of this chapter.

Chapter 4 describes the Joseonjok migratory experiences in Japan in the historical context

of their migration. In this chapter, I trace the Joseonjok movement to Japan, and I focus on the

process of their settlement in the host society. Their life experiences are illustrated in the scripts of

the interviews. Their experiences of education and career development in Japan are specifically

dealt with in this chapter. Moreover, the issues of second-generation Joseonjok in Japan are also

explored. Overall, this chapter illustrates the findings garnered through the vivid oral testimony of

my informants as well as my observations from my fieldwork.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are the main chapters in which I put emphasis on investigating the

major issues of Joseonjok identity relating to multilingualism and transnationalism.

Chapter 5 primarily investigates the issues and prospects of multilingualism as a function

for Joseonjok to practice in their life in Japan. In particular, this chapter ultimately explains how

multilingualism affects the identity formation of Joseonjok in Japan. To this end, the theoretical

analysis of multilingualism is supplemented for more explanation of the formation of the identity

of Joseonjok in Japan. I also analyze the multilingual environments of Joseonjok life in Japan

based on their migration history and their life experiences. Furthermore, I bring up the issues of

multilingual education as a growing concern among Joseonjok in Japan.

Chapter 6 examines the issues and prospects of transnationalism pervaded in the life of

Joseonjok in Japan. This chapter explains how transnationalism affects the identity of Joseonjok

in Japan. Transnationalism is one major component of Joseonjok identity in Japan. The theoretical

analysis of transnationalism is examined to explain the identity formation process of Joseonjok in

14

Japan. This chapter further investigates the transnational practices performed by Joseonjok

employees and entrepreneurs in Japan. The impact of transnationalism on the identity of Joseonjok

in Japan is the major theme in this chapter.

Chapter 7 investigates the major issue of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. The confluence

of the two features of multilingualism and transnationalism brings forth the main theme of identity

in this chapter. First of all, I review the theories of identity to explain the phenomenon of Joseonjok

migration in Japan. Secondly, the historical background of Joseonjok migration is delineated

according to the sequence of the different stages of time frames of the initial movement to China

from the Korean peninsula and then to up-to-date migration to Japan. Thirdly, I investigate the

characteristics of the identities of Joseonjok in Japan through the analysis of their Korean ethnicity,

Chinese nationality, Japanese culturalization process, and the amalgamation of all the ingredients

into the multifaceted identity of Joseonjok in Japan. Lastly, most importantly, this chapter

investigates the impact of multilingualism and transnationalism on the formation and

transformation of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

Chapter 8 discusses and concludes the findings and the results of this research. In discussion

section, I go over the structure of this research to consolidate the major points as follows: 1) aims

of this research, 2) identity construction and negotiation of Joseonjok in Japan, 3) impact of

multilingualism and transnationalism on the identity of Joseonjok in Japan, 4) problems and

limitation of this research, 5) the results and significance of the research, 6) the key achievement

of the research, 7) suggestions for future study on Joseonjok migration. For further discussion, I

reaffirm the main goal of this research and the contribution of my research to migration studies

progressing in East Asia. In the part of the conclusion, once again, I review the main components

of the thesis such as literature review, methodology, and the body chapters of 5, 6, 7 to summarize

the key findings. Most of all, the answers to the research questions are given by synthesizing the

issues of multilingualism, transnationalism, and identity. I also suggest further research on the

topic of the migration phenomenon on the newly arrived Joseonjok and the issues of the second

generatoin.

15

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This literature review starts with the overview of the features of Joseonjok migants in Japan

and then moves onto the related theories to explain their migration phenomenon. In particular, it

covers the main themes on multilingualism, transnationalism, and identity.

2.1 Joseonjok in Japan

Joseonjok have moved to Japan together with the Chinese student migration wave that began

in the late 1980s. Japan attracts Joseonjok because “the Chinese and Korean(s) have the relative

advantage of cultural affinity with Japan, at least in terms of language” (Liu-Farrer 2015: 130: Kim

2018: 59). Kwon, on the other hand, points out that Japan is the most accessible and cost-efficient

country in which Joseonjok can start a new life (Kwon 2015; Kim 2018). Under these

circumstances, many Joseonjok have ventured to come to Japan for their better life. The entity of

Joseonjok is not classified as an independent minority group in Japanese official statistics. It is

roughly and unofficially estimated that between 70,000 to 100,000 Joseonjok currently reside in

Japan (Park 2006).

Despite their “invisibility” in the statistics, Joseonjok are a distinct migrant population in the

host society of Japan. Researchers often depict Joseonjok as a people with both Koreaness and

Chineseness. The dual identity of Joseonjok in Japan is an essential element of its complexity. Lee

and Lee further account for Joseonjok’s complex diasporic experiences in Japan, which have been

ensued from their double movements from Korea to China and then to Japan (Lee and Lee 2015;

Kim 2018). They also point out that “the meanings of being Korean-Chinese in Japan will

continuously change by negotiating and reconstructing their multiple identities in a double

diasporic and deterritorialized context” (Lee and Lee 2015:37; Kim 2018: 60). Because of their

scattered workplaces and habitats, Joseonjok in Japan do not have distinct immigrant enclaves that

can be identified as collective Joseonjok diasporas (Ibid.). However, they have established lively

online communities.

Joseonjok are distinct from other Chinese migrants in Japan by their multilingual ability.

Throughout the migration and resettlement process, the multilingual ability of Joseonjok has

affected their social and economic mobility in Japanese society. They speak at least three languages,

including Korean, Chinese, and Japanese, and they gain benefits from the three countries by

utilizing their trilingual capacity (Ibid.). Lee and Lee argue that “the importance of language

16

depends on their identity and future plan, and language is their resource to compete in the host

society and a tool for self-enhancement” (Lee and Lee 2015: 37; Kim 2018: 61). They also argue

that Joseonjok’s multilingual ability influences their identity reconstruction during the course of

resettlement in Japan (Ibid.). However, there is also a negative side of being multilingual as

Joseonjok migrants in Japan. For instance, they have peculiar accents from their regional dialect

when speaking the Korean language, while their Chinese and Japanese language skills do not reach

a high enough level to command perfect proficiency (Kim 2018). This negative phenomenon is

called “Jack of all trades, master of none” (Kim 2018: 1), which means someone who attempts to

do many things without one expertise. Nonetheless, on the positive side, the majority of Joseonjok

in Japan seem to experience benefits from multilingualism (Ibid.). It is obvious that societies

around the world are becoming increasingly more diverse and multilingual due to globalization.

Transnationalism is also one major phenomenon among the Joseonjok migrants in Japan. It

is obvious that transnationalism has constituted an element in constructing migrants’ identities. As

Levitt indicates, “many people maintain ties to their countries of origin at the same time as they

become integrated into the countries that receive them” (Levitt 2009: 1225; Kim 2018: 61). In

addition, Waldinger (2003) notes that transnationalism plays a critical role in identifying the social

connections between receiving and sending countries (Kim 2018). Joseonjok, in general, entered

Japan as a subgroup of Chinese students, joined the Japanese labor market upon graduation, and

often develop good careers in Japan’s transnational economy (Kwon 2012). The human and social

capital Chinese migrants accumulate during their corporate careers are essential resources that

enable them to be transnational entrepreneurs (Liu-Farrer 2011: 113; Kim 2018: 61). Joseonjok in

Japan are in the same position, and they go through the same route as Chinese migrants. However,

the transnational movement of Joseonjok in Japan is somewhat more diversified than that of

Chinese in that Joseonjok also travel to South Korea for their business or family meetings. In this

circumstance, transnationalism has acted as a means for Joseonjok in Japan to gain a positive

identity. This is because the transnational activities of Joseonjok provide chances to enhance their

economic and social standing in Japan (Kim 2018). As Kim points out, “Joseojok’s transnational

identity will keep evolving to show cosmopolitan outlook” (Lee and Lee 2015:35; Kim 2018: 61).

Indeed, Joseonjok in Japan is a distinctive group of ethnic minorities despite the concealment of

their entity in Japanese society. In this situation, Joseonjok in Japan will continuously undergo

changes by negotiating and reconstructing their identity (Lee and Lee 2015).

17

2.2 Migration Theories

There are a variety of theories which attempt to explain the reasons why people migrate to

other countries. To explain the specific case of Joseonjok migration in Japan, I reviewed some

theories from the stock of numerous migration theories. The theories can give rationales for the

understanding of various aspects of Joseonjok migration arising in Japan. Without a doubt, the

reviewing of the migration theories is necessary when discussing the topics of the Joseonjok

movement into Japan, their settlement in the host society, and the prospects of their migrant life in

Japan.

Five theories were selected as the most relevant theories out of diverse migration theories

presented in migration studies. By applying these chosen theories, I will explicate the migration

phenomenon of Joseonjok in Japan in relation to their origin and flow of their migration as well as

the socio-cultural adaptation (Portes et al. 1999; Kurekova 2011) in Japanese society. Overall, the

migration theories use different hypotheses and seem to be exclusive, but they are, in fact,

complimentary with each other (Kurekova 2011). In a similar vein, the five theories here are

interrelated, and their different viewpoints are, one way or another, synthesized to explain the

phenomenon of Joseonjok migration in Japan.

2.2.1 Theory of Push-Pull Factors

As there are such diverse strains of migration theories, it can be challenging to figure out

how to best utilize these theories into my research on migration. After all the concoction of the

literature review on the variety of migration theories, I come to notice that there is no almighty

theory that can explain all the diverse phenomena of the migration that have occurred in this fast-

changing world. A useful course is to go back to one of the earliest theories in migration field. It

was Ravenstein’s “law of migration.” He attempted to reveal the fact that people tend to move in

the direction of density to less populated areas, poor to wealthier countries, and from low-wage to

higher-wage areas (O’Reilly 2007). The basic concept of Ravenstein’s theory furnished the

ongoing foundation of push-pull factors of migration. Subsequently, the theory of push-pull factors

has been adapted to the newly emerging migration theories coming after that. The assumptions of

push-pull factors are still valid, although they are criticized by post-modern scholars14 (de Haas

14 Postmodernism is a broad movement that developed in the mid-to late 20th century across philosophy, arts,

architecture and criticism that marked a departure from modernism. In migration studies, post-modern scholars are

considered as those who criticized the conventional migration theories developed in the 19th century concepts, methods,

18

2014).

Push factors are caused by poverty, low income, unemployment, no economic opportunities,

and political oppression of the sending countries, while pull factors arise from favorable

circumstances of the receiving countries such as high income, higher living standards, better

economic opportunities, and political freedom. As de Haas indicated, “the idea that migration is a

function of spatial disequilibria constitutes the cornerstone assumption of so-called ‘push-pull’

models which still dominate much gravity-based migration” (de Haas 2010: 4). In short, the

framework of push-pull factors continues to emphasize the economic context of the flow of

workers (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999; Kurekova: 2011).

The theory of push-pull factors can be applied to explaining the motivation of Joseonjok

migration into Japan. The pull factors of the high-quality Japanese economy and the push factors

of the comparatively low standard of the Chinese economic life have concurrently acted as an

incentive to initiate the Chinese migration into Japan. Both the push and pull factors of the two

reciprocal countries have spurred the “migration stream of Joseonjok along with the mainstream

Chinese migrants into the receiving country of Japan” (Kwon 2015). It is noteworthy that the

theory of push-pull factors is the basic principle to understand the comprehensive phenomenon of

Joseonjok migration incurred in the host society of Japan. The pull factors of Japan encourage

Joseonjok to move there while they seize the opportunities to study and later secure their stable

jobs or engage in their own entrepreneurship. All in all, reviewing the theory of push-pull factors

gives insights to understand the fundamental motivation of Joseonjok migration into Japan.

2.2.2 Neo-classical Theory

Among various possible reasons, most migrants choose to move to another country for better

economic conditions. Migrants usually come from impoverished developing countries to earn a

higher income in the wealthier developed countries. To explain this phenomenon of migration,

Neo-classical theory has long been referred to as a fundamental principle of migration theory

(Kuerkova 2011). The basic concept of this theory is quite similar to that of push-pull factors.

However, Neo-classical theorists emphasize the income disparity between sending and receiving

countries. This theory states that the main reason for labor migration is the wage difference (Ibid.)

and assumptions such as push-pull or neo-classical theories. They define human mobility as people’s capability

(freedom) to choose where to live. They see the migration in non-linear ways in which structured conditions shape

migration aspirations and capabilities (de Haas 2014).

19

and asserts that migrants move permanently to maximize their income in the host society.

Massey et al. indicated “international migration, like its internal counterpart, is caused by

geographic differences in the supply and demand for labor” (Massey et al. 1993: 433). Thus,

countries with high labor supply and poor capital have low market wages, while countries with

short labor supply and affluent capital have high market wages (Ibid.). The labor force tends to

flow not only from labor abundant to labor scarce countries, but also from capital-poor to capital-

rich countries (Ibid.). de Haas (2010) also indicated, “Neo-classical migration theory perceives

migration as a form of optimal allocation of production factors to the benefit of both sending and

receiving countries” (5). As a result of the migrants’ movement caused by wage differentials, the

supply of labor decreases and wages rise in the sending country while the supply of labor increases

and wages fall in the receiving country (Massey et al. 1993).

More particularly, Neo-classical theory explains what the main driving force in making the

decision of migration is and how it affects the labor migration. This theory also foresees the change

in labor migration because of the reduced differentials of the wages between sending and receiving

countries. According to this theory, the stream of labor migration is expected to be reduced when

the economy of the sending country continues to develop. As a result, the emigration rates diminish

and the incentives to migrate change (Kurekova 2011). However, this theory has been subject to

critique in that it has been viewed as “mechanically reducing migration determinants, ignoring

market imperfections, homogenizing migrants and migrant societies” (Ibid., 7).

The primary principle of Neo-classical theory at least explains the initial phenomenon of

Joseonjok migration in Japan. In this context, the comparison of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

per capita between the sending country of China and the receiving country of Japan is meaningful

to find out the justification of Joseonjok migration based on the perspectives of Neo-classical

theory.The disparity of the personal income between the two countries is a well-grounded reason

for Joseonjok still come to Japan. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to look back at the time when

Joseonjok started to migrate en masse in the late1990s and the early 2000s. The income disparity

at that time was beyond imagination if we look through it with today’s standpoint. In the year of

1990, GDP per capita in China was only $349 while that of Japan was $25,196 (IMF Estimates

1990). This humongous discrepancy of the personal income between the two countries would not

make any Joseonjok young students reluctant to come to Japan at any cost at the time of the 1990s.

This indicates that Joseonjok as a subgroup of Chinese migrants have come to Japan due to the

20

strong pull factors of the Japanese economy, and it also gives the ground for explaining the

adaptability of this theory to Joseonjok migration studies. After all, the decision making of

Joseonjok to come to Japan stemmed from the economic motivation demonstrated in Neo-classical

theory. In this context, Joseonjok have moved to Japan where they can be most productive with

higher wages (Massey 1999).

Most Joseonjok experience the low-wage status of part-time laborers while pursuing their

academic goals. They eventually become highly-skilled migrants in Japan after finishing schools.

Contrary to the explanation of Neo-classical theory, some Joseonjok return to China for their better

economic opportunities or a number of them engage in transnational employments and

transnational entrepreneurship by moving back and forth between the two countries. Thus, many

of them forge and maintain transnational lifestyle instead of being permanently assimilated to

Japanese society. In this context, Neo-classical theory would not fit for the overall explanation of

the Joseonjok migration phenomenon arising in Japan except the initial stage of Joseonjok

migration. However, the prediction of Neo-classical theory is worth to be considered in explaining

the future Joseonjok migration in Japan. This theory predicts the decrease of the stream of labor

migration when the economy of the sending countries improves to reduce the income disparity

(Kurekova 2011). As the economy of China progresses, its emigration rates are predicted to

diminish gradually in the future. In this regard, Joseonjok will take the same course as mainstream

Chinese migrants. To sum up, Neo-classical theory is useful in its own way to explain the influx

of Joseonjok into Japan, but does not provide a comprehensive explanation for their settlement

in Japanese society.

2.2.3 New Economics of Labor Migration

New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory was developed with the purpose of

challenging many of assumptions and conclusions of Neo-classical theory (Stark and Bloom 1985;

Massey et al. 1993). As one of the oldest theories, Neo-classical models cannot pertinently explain

the ongoing changes of migration phenomena. Massey et al. already predicted the emergence of

the new theories that would supplement the old theories, and one of them was the New Economics

of Labor Migration. The critical insight of this theory lies in the fact that the migration decisions

are made not by individual factors, but within larger units or interrelated groups of families or

households (Massey et al. 1993; Kurekova 2011). To this end, Stark (1991) argued that the decision

21

to become a labor migrant could not be explained only at the level of individual works, so broader

social entities have to be considered as well. Thus, migration decisions are often made by the

migrant and by some groups of non-migrants (Stark 1991). This involves the collective decision

of families to have income and manage the risk of failure in their local economy by sending family

members to earn money in receiving countries. The remittances sent by the migrants are used to

secure fluctuation in the local communities of sending countries (Kuerkova 2011). This theory

further explains that most households rely on the remittances from their migrant family members

to overcome the difficult life at home. Evidently, remittances of the migrants play an important

role in improving the economic conditions of the sending society (Ibid.).

There is one more indispensable perspective in NELM theory. As was indicated earlier, Neo-

classical theory argues that migrants move permanently to maximize their wages in the receiving

countries. In contrast, NELM theory contends that migrants move on a temporary basis to achieve

their economic goal of saving enough money to return to their home country. In this context, return

migration is deemed as a success story from an NELM viewpoint, although it is viewed as a failure

in the perspective of Neo-classical theory (Porumbescu 2015). Unlike the Neo-classical view, the

return of migrants is considered to be a valuable capital in the country of origin in NELM theory.

When it comes to applying NELM theory to the explanation of Joseonjok migration in Japan,

there is no general background of this theory to be related to this specific case of Joseonjok

migration in Japan. Above all, most Joseonjok come to Japan as students and settle in the host

society as highly-skilled migrants in the long run. More than anything else, they decide to come to

Japan based on their individual life goals. Contrary to the NELM principle of sending remittances

to the family, Joseonjok in their initial stage of migration in Japan receive some help from their

family until they are fully independent financially. It seems that the economic phenomenon of

Joseonjok migration in Japan does not go together with the perspectives of NELM theory.

According to NELM theory, migrants move to the receiving countries following the family

decisions and engage in low-skilled job markets to earn money to send home (Kuerkova 2011).

After sending enough remittances, they come back to the place of origin. This phenomenon does

not coincide with the case of Joseonjok migration in Japan. Rather, the perspectives of this theory

go opposite to the aspects of Joseonjok migration in Japan. Joseonjok, in general, make their

individual decision to migrate to Japan, and they do not stay in Japan temporarily only to earn

wages to send home. Moreover, they do not return to their home places. Instead, they mostly

22

maintain a transnational relationship with their family after they become residents in Japan.

Despite the discordance of NELM theory concerning the explanation of the Joseonjok

migration phenomenon in Japan, there is still some applicability of this theory to the case of

Joseonjok in Japan. In particular, Joseonjok are very much family tied as an ethnic minority, and

their familial relationship prevails all through their life even after they settle in the host country of

Japan. Family members have affected the decision making for Joseonjok students to come to Japan

in a different standpoint from that of NELM migration motivation. Sometimes, Joseonjok in Japan

even make remittances to home to invite their family members, mostly parents, to live together

temporarily or permanently. In this context, NELM theory can give some clues to explain the

similarities between Joseonjok and South American migrants in practicing familial relationships.

However, there are some young Joseonjok who look for the independence from their family, and

they often move away in an attempt to dissociate themselves from familial and traditional bondage.

2.2.4 Dual Labor Market Theory

In 1979, Michael J. Piore introduced a new theory of migration, Dual Labor Market theory.

He argued that international migration is caused by a permanent demand for immigrant labor which

is inherent to the structure of developed nations (Massey et al. 1993). In other words, the leading

cause of migration is not the push factors in sending countries but the pull factors in the receiving

countries (Wickramasinghe and Wilmalarantana 2016). Kurekova further indicated “Dual Labor

Market theory posits a bifurcated occupational structure and a dual pattern of economic

organization in advanced economics” (Kurekova 2011: 9). To this end, this theory introduces the

division of the economy in developed nations into two sectors which are called primary and

secondary sectors in the job markets. The description of these terms also indicates the duality of a

capital-intensive high-quality job market and a labor-intensive low-quality job market (Ibid.,).

People in developed countries do not want to engage in bottom-level jobs in the lower rung

of the labor market because the primary labor market attracts them with higher wages, security,

and prospects for advancement. As a consequence, domestic workers avoid working in the

secondary sectors, and the vacancies are filled with international migrants (Massey et al. 1993).

This leaves ample job vacancies in the secondary sectors of developed countries. Such vacancies

of the receiving countries create the employment chances for foreign migrants who are willing to

work for the money without considering the status hierarchy of low-quality jobs in the secondary

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sector. In a dual labor market structure, secondary sector jobs are characterized by short-term

employment with no prospect of promotion. The unskilled jobs in the secondary sector are usually

linked to low wages and no returns to education or experiences. It is clear that international labor

migrations, in most cases, start from the labor demand of the dual market structure in developed

countries. Thus, the Dual Labor Market theory sees immigration “as a natural consequence of

economic globalization and market penetration across national boundaries” (Massey et al. 1993:

432).

This theory appropriately explains the dichotomous structure of the labor markets in

developed countries which demand labor force in the secondary sector from the underdeveloped

countries (Kuerkova 2011). The dual labor market theory is appropriate for supporting the

explanation of the labor market conditions in Japan and also useful for looking over how Joseonjok

adapt themselves to the Japanese labor market structure. Under the dual labor market situation, the

Japanese employers in the secondary sector tend to attract foreign workers (Kodama 2015),

including Joseonjok, to their workplaces. Japanese employers usually seek foreign nationals who

would accept low wages, and Joseonjok satisfy these needs at least at the beginning stage of their

migration. Joseonjok initially fill up this demand of the secondary sector of the Japanese labor

market when they work as students or trainees. Even so, they leave the secondary sector after they

achieve their educational goal and look for highly-skilled jobs in the primary sector. In the long

run, most of the Joseonjok migrants successfully move upward to the primary sector in Japanese

job markets. Accordingly, the status of Joseonjok in Japan has evolved from the position of low-

income migrants to high-income residents in Japan. There is no doubt that this theory furnishes a

good base for explaining Joseonjok labor migration in relation to the economic structure of dual

labor markets in Japan.

2.2.5 Segmented Assimilation Theory

The theory of assimilation was developed in American settings based on European

immigrants’ adaptation to the new society of the United States. It used to be one of the most

influential theories in explaining the migration phenomenon arising in the early part of the 20th

century. Assimilation theory asserts that the immigrants coming to the United States must adopt

the language, values, behaviors, and lifestyle of mainstream White American people (Yoon 2006).

This theory also contends that immigrants should shed old properties of ethnicity to realize upward

24

mobility in their new life.

After the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act15 (Min 2012; Xie 2005), there was a huge

influx of immigrants in the U.S. from non-European regions such as Africa, Asia, Latin America,

and more. These new groups of immigrants who were different from those of European origin have

demonstrated distinctive assimilation processes in American society (Xie 2005). The total

assimilation shown by the early European immigrants did not happen to these new groups of

immigrants.

To explain this new phenomenon of assimilation, the new theory of “Segmented Assimilation

theory” was proposed by Portes and Zhou (1993). This theory has acted as an influential

explanation regarding the new waves of immigrants and particularly their children who arrived in

the U.S. after 1965. It asserts that the United States is a stratified and unequal society, and therefore

different “segments” of society are available into which immigrants may assimilate (Xie 2005).

Moreover, this theory also gives a core explanation of how the second-generation incorporates into

the host society. Zhou (1997) highlights that each generation transfers their cultural baggage and

traditions to the next generation. And yet, the next generation does not fully practice the ethnic

culture taught by their parents. As Zhou further pointed out, “the Segmented Assimilation theory

offers a theoretical framework for understanding the process by which the new second generation-

the children of contemporary immigrants-becomes into the system of stratification in the host

society and different outcomes of this process” (Zhou 1997: 975). Under these segmented

assimilation surroundings, immigrants are supposed to be absorbed into the host culture, but they

still possess and practice the old culture in their households. Thus, their selective assimilation

contributes to preserving cultural values and enhances economic integration in the family (Zhou

1997). In this context, Segmented Assimilation theory provides insightful perspectives in

understanding the immigration phenomena of various ethnic minorities in host societies.

Segmented Assimilation theory partially fits as an explanation for Jseonjok’s selective

assimilation (Yoon 2016) into Japanese society. More than anything else, Joseonjok are selective

in choosing the way to adapt themselves to Japanese society. They keep their original ethnicity as

15 1965 Immigration Act (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965) abolished an earlier quota system of immigration

to the U.S. based on national origin. This Act established a new immigration policy based on reuniting immigrant

families and attracting skilled labor to the United States (Min 2014). As a result of this Act, there has been a great

change of the demographic make-up of the American population. Under this new legislation more people from Asia,

Africa and Latin America as opposed to Europe came in to the U.S.

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Korean-Chinese while absorbing Japanese culture and enjoying the benefits of the Japanese

economy. In this way, they keep their selective lifestyle by partially assimilating to Japanese social

conventions. They know what to choose from the Japanese culture and what to shed from their

ethnic originality to realize a better life in their destination country. In other words, Joseonjok’s

assimilation into Japanese society has partially progressed in that they maintain their ethnic culture

while observing Japan’s norms and pursuing its values. Indeed, most Joseonjok did not come to

Japan to be assimilated into Japanese society. Neither did they intend to live permanently when

they first entered Japan. As a consequence, “permanent residency triumphs over citizenship” (Liu-

Farrer 2015: 134) among Joseonjok residents in Japan. Ironically, permanent resident status does

not mean for Chinese immigrants, including Joseonjok, to live permanently in Japan (Ibid.,). It is

only utilized as a means to stay in Japan without getting assimilated into the host society.

In the short history of three decades of Joseonjok immigrants in Japan, the majority of

second-generation children are too young to show the pattern of segmented assimilation, but soon

they are expected to show the traits of segmented assimilation as is shown by Nikkeijin, old comer

Chinese, and Zainichi Koreans. For the new phenomenon of Joseonjok lifestyle in the future, this

theory of segmented assimilation can be reviewed and developed further to explain the future

aspects of Joseonjok migration in Japan. Moreover, the emergence of a second generation in the

Joseonjok community gives ground for its further application of Segmented Assimilation theory.

The primary purpose of the above literature review on migration theories was to find the

adaptability of these theories to my research on Joseonjok migration in Japan. As was mentioned,

no single theory can utterly cover the diverse issues of the Joseonjok migration (de Haas 2014).

First of all, the phenomenon of the Joseonjok migration in Japan is so distinct that any one theory

cannot fully explain the multiple and distinctive phenomena of their migration. Moreover, the

migration history of Joseonjok in Japan is not long enough to accumulate the resources for the

study of migration theories. Secondly, there has been little research done so far on the topic of

migration theories in Japan (Kodama 2015), South Korea, and China. With all these limitations,

the five reviewed theories here were integrated with my empirical review done during the course

of my research. Unquestionably, they provided a useful theoretical foundation on which I could

develop my research. Some theories worked well when explaining the relevant issues that arose in

Joseonjok migration in Japan while some worked only partially. There is no doubt that the review

of these five theories furnished helpful resources to get the insights to understand the phenomena

26

of Joseonjok migration in Japan within the different frameworks of the migration theories. After

all, much of the difficulty in applying these theories originates from the fact that most of them are

based on European and North American experiences (Ibid.). Needless to say, Japan is not a

traditional immigration country, so migration theories are not expected to emerge within this

tradition. Japan, however, has become the most influential migrant-receiving country in East Asia,

and it will keep relying on the labor force coming from the adjacent countries. It is about time

Japan developed its own migration theories based on its migration experiences to explain the

distinctive migration phenomena occurring in this non-immigration country. As was mentioned

earlier, the fast-changing global economy requires new explanations of international migration and

waits for the advent of the new theories that will explain the fast-changing phenomenon of

contemporary migration.

2.3 Multilingualism

Almost half of the world’s population holds multilingual capacity (Romaine 1995). In this

context, Cenoz indicated, “multilingualism is a common phenomenon” (Cenoz 2013: 3) in today’s

world. The dominance of multilingualism has been accelerated by globalization with the

development of technologies and transnational mobility of the populations (Ibid.).

Multilingualism tends to be highly valued because it allows individuals to communicate in

different languages and becomes a form of marketable human capital. Above all, Language skills

help migrants cope with the challenges confronted in the new life of their settlements. Increased

migration and transnational mobility extensively depend on the utility of multilingualism (Cenoz

2013). As a result, multilingualism gives practical advantages such as better employment

opportunities, the formation of positive identity, and efficient communication (Park and Sakar

2007). In this sense, the language ability of Joseonjok in Japan has acted as a key element in

enhancing their migrant status in Japan. They utilized their trilingual ability in occupying niche in

job markets and business opportunities.

One of the main purposes of this research is to examine how multilingualism affects the life

of Joseonjok migrants in Japan. It further explores the identity issues on multilingualism under the

influence of the transnational context in their life. This research also aims to investigate the issues

in multilingual education for the second-generation children of Joseonjok in Japan. In particular, I

put focus on the subject of maintaining their heritage languages of Korean and Chinese (Ibid.) as

27

Joseojok children are brought up in the monolingual society of Japan. In this chapter, I generally

go over the literature on multilingualism. In chapter 5, I will comprehensively examine the main

issue of Joseonjok multilingualism arising during the course of their migration in Japan.

2.3.1 Definition of Multilingualism and Its Benefits

Multilingualism can be enumerated through terminologies such as bilingualism,

trilingualism, quadrilingualism, quintilingualism, and more. As Cenoz pointed out,

“multilingualism is seen not just as a simple addition(al) of languages but as a phenomenon as its

own characteristics” (Cenoz 2013: 14). There are almost 7,000 languages in the world and about

200 independent countries (Lewis 2009; Cenoz 2013), meaning that there are 35 times as many

languages as there are countries. However, multilingualism used to be disdained as a cause of

social distraction and conflicts. The story of Genesis tells us, “linguistic diversity is the curse of

Babel” (Romaine 1995: 514). According to this biblical description, God punished the people in

Babylon by making them speak different languages. Thus, multilingualism was sometimes

regarded as an obstacle for cooperation and unity among the people in human history (Ibid.,).

Due to globalization, there has been a growing need for communication in different

languages among different people in the world (Cenoz 2013). Furthermore, the development of

technologies and transportation systems makes more and more people move to other countries and

engage in multilingual communication in their everyday life. Consequently, multilingualism has

been regarded as a valuable asset enriching human life in these days (Romaine 1995). Along with

the recognition of the increasing value of multilingualism, the benefits of multilingual education

to children have also gained attention. Multilingualism apparently provides cognitive, academic,

and financial benefits to the users (Paradowski 2010). However, some have argued in the past that

childhood multilingualism may cause the impairment in cognitive development and lead to poorer

results at school (Jessner 2008; Paradowski et al. 2016). Even the renowned theorist Noam

Chomsky 16 showed the prejudice on bilingualism as his language acquisition theories are

16 Without a doubt, Noam Chomsky is one of the best-known linguists of all times. He proposed his famous language

acquisition theories in which he claimed language is an innate faculty-that is to say that we are born with a set of rules

about languages in our minds, which he refers to as ‘universal grammar’. He put emphasis on monolingualism in his

language acquisition theories (Romaine 1995). However, he did not explain the phenomenon of multilingual

communities in today’s world. His theories are all based on monolingual societies. As a result, the theories would not

work in multilingual situations in the migrants’ life.

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exclusively based on his monolingual perspectives. In this context, Romaine indicated that

“Chomsky’s linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely

homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly” (Romaine 1995: 512). Thus,

in the 21st century, Chomsky’s theory of language learning has become quite obsolete.

Beliefs regarding multilingualism have changed over time. More than anything else, it is

proved that multilingualism enhances intellectual flexibility and creativity (Okal 2014). Recent

studies have indicated that children raised in a multilingual environment are more perceptive and

intellectually flexible than those in a monolingual environment. Multilingualism also provides an

insight into the understanding of different cultures on the ground that a multilingual person

becomes multicultural in nature (Barasa 2005; Okal 2014). For this reason, multilinguals tend to

become versatile in accepting other cultures. It is also indicated that multilinguals can learn

additional languages more quickly and efficiently than monolinguals (Paradowski 2010). There is

also an interesting medical report which indicated that multilingualism offers some protection

against the symptoms of Alzheimer’s dementia (Diamond 2010). More importantly,

multilingualism is considered to be a form of human capital (Chriswick and Miller 2007; Okal

2014). It goes without saying that language skills have become a great resource which increases

job opportunities and entrepreneurial activities in today’s global economy. Thus, the human capital

acquired through multilingual capacity plays a vital role in enhancing the social and economic

status of the speakers. Multilingualism is no more a phenomenon in the diasporas of low-educated

immigrants. The value of multilingualism should be cherished, and further studies on

multilingualism will be done in the various fields of linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and

education.

2.3.2 The Multilingual Background of Joseonjok in Japan

In regard to examining the background of Joseonjok’s multilingualism, the educational

experiences of the older generations, as well as the contemporary Joseonjok, are the intrinsic

elements of its explanation. Koreans spoke only Korean in the early stages of migration in China

before the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. After 1932, the Japanese authorities set up Japanese

schools throughout the Joseojok diasporas to implement colonial policies. Under the Japanese

imperial government, Korean settlers in Manchuria were treated as the second-class Japanese

citizens enjoying the rights and privileges issued by Japan (Kim 2009). The descendants of the

Korean settlers were able to receive Japanese education in their schools during this period (Song

29

and Takeshi 2012).

The curricula of the schools were controlled by the Manchukuo colonial government. In this

context, cultural vestiges including the Japanese language, remained in Joseonjok society even

after the end of the Japanese occupation in Northeast China. After Manchuria was returned to

China, Joseonjok harmoniously adapted themselves to the policy of the new Chinese government.

Joseonjok cooperated with the new government and followed its rule as one of China’s 56 ethnic

groups. They absorbed the official language of Chinese while keeping the ethnic language of

Korean in their lives (Song 2007). Consequently, they hold bilingual capacity while learning

Japanese in the secondary education. When Joseonjok moved to Japan, they come to hold trilingual

ability by reinforcing their Japanese language skill (Kim 2018). Most Joseonjok in Japan settle and

work in transnational corporations or engage in transnational entrepreneurship (Kwon 2015) by

making the most of their multilingual capacity.

2.4 Transnationalism

The development of the technologies in communication and transportation has drastically

changed the world into a global village these days. Through affordable travel costs, mobile

communication devices, social media, and online connectivity (Basch et al. 1994; Darvin and

Norton 2014), migrants are now able to keep closer ties between their home countries and host

countries than ever before. This phenomenon of “transnationalism” has emerged as the new trend

of migration since the 1980s. Accordingly, transnationalism has become an essential constituent

of the life among many of migrants in the globalized world today. In this context, Orozco defines

transnational migration patterns by using five main keywords known as 5Ts - “money transfers,

tourisms, transportation, telecommunication, and nostalgic trade” (Orozco 2005: 1).

Vertovec (1999) defined transnationalism as “multiple ties and interactions linking people

or institutions across the borders of nation-states” (447). Through globalization, nation-states are,

one way or another, involved in transnational relationships regarding migration. In this context,

Dunn indicated “transnationalism is often used to describe and categorize certain activities, some

of which are familiar to us as the “normal” activities of migrants” (Dunn 2005: 16). Thus, a great

number of migrants tend to lead transnational lives in their settlement by keeping constant contacts

back in their origin countries. As a consequence, “contemporary migration cannot be understood

without studying the impact of migration on both sides of the borders” (Levitt 2001: 196). After

30

all, the transnational people are apt to live between two cultures, and their lifestyle can be

characterized as “living-in-between” (Clifford 1997; Yamashita 2008).

Transnationalism is one major element of contemporary Joseonjok migrants’ life in Japan.

As mentioned in previous sections, Joseonjok entered Japan as a subgroup of Chinese student

migrants, and they exploited their educational opportunities as a means to settle in Japanese society.

They usually have good careers by engaging in transnational employment niches. Joseonjok, like

many other Chinese student migrants, endeavor to become transnational entrepreneurs after they

acquired their human and social capital through their work experiences. In particular, Joseonjok in

Japan have a better standing than typical Chinese migrants because they can further expand their

transnational ties to South Korea. Above all, transnationalism has played an important role

enhancing Joseonjok’s migrant life in Japan. Through the transnational activities, Joseonjok secure

the social and economic mobility as one of the newcomer migrant groups in Japan (Kwon 2015).

In the field of migration studies, there has been abundant research on transnationalism based

mostly on European and North American migration experiences. However, as I previously

mentioned, the Asia-Pacific region is the world’s newest major international migration system, but

it has been far less studied (Massey et al. 1998; Yamashita 2008). In recent years, however, there

have been an increasing number of migration studies in regard to “the new mobility pattern out of,

into, and within Asia” (Liu-Farrer and Yeoh 2018; 1). While transnationalism in Asia has been

studied by some migration scholars, the case of Joseonjok in Japan has not yet received any

governmental or academic attention. This is an unfortunate situation because there are unexplored

new horizons to be investigated in the transnational mobility of Joseonjok in Japan. More than

anything else, the new horizons cover the territory of three countries of China, Japan, and South

Korea. The transnationality of Joseonjok in Japan incorporates the mixed attributes of the three

countries geopolitically, culturally, economically, and linguistically. Thus, the issue of Joseonjok

transnationalism covers the interests of the three most influential countries of sending and

receiving migrants in East Asia. In this context, investigating how Joseonjok in Japan construct

transnational networks and how transnational practices affect their lifestyle and identity is a very

important goal for this research.

Transnationalism is not a new concept, and it has been embedded in the course of human

migration history. In the 1980s, a new conception of transnationalism was developed by social

scientists as a new field of migration studies. In the age of globalization, nation-states have

31

confronted the challenges of blurring borders. As was expected, global development has affected

migrants to be more transnational than to be fully assimilated to the host societies. Under these

circumstances, more and more international migrants have come to lead transnational lifestyles.

On this phenomenon of transnational migration, Levitt and Jaworsky indicated that “migration has

never been a one-way process of assimilation into a melting pot or a multicultural salad bowl but

one which migrants are simultaneously embedded in the multiple sites and layers of the

transnational social fields” (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 130). In her essay “Transnational Migrants:

When Home Means More than One Country”, Peggy Levitt asserted “the assumption that people

will live their lives in one place, according to one set of national and cultural norms, in countries

with impermeable national borders, no longer holds” (Levitt 2004: 1). In this context, in the

contemporary world, a great number of people are considered to belong to two or more societies

simultaneously. The simultaneous belonging is one of the key concepts of transnationalism in the

migration studies.

Various approaches have attempted to explain the phenomenon of transnationalism. As Glick

Shiller et al. assert, “transnational migration is the process by which immigrants forge and sustain

simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and

settlement” (Glick Shiller et al. 1995: 48). According to their perspective, migrants’ ties between

home places and host societies are the essential elements of the formation of transnationalism. To

this end, immigrants are understood to be transmigrants when they develop and maintain multiple

relations with the familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political backgrounds

of the original countries (Ibid.). It is evident that transnational migration differs from the

conventional one-way assimilative migration, and it has become a global phenomenon (Levitt and

Jaworsky 2007).

There is one indispensable perspective in understanding the concept of transnational

migration. When immigrants engage in transnational activities, they create “social fields” that link

their original country with their new country of residence (Faist 2000). Faist also pointed out

“transnational spaces are the ties, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of

organizations that reach across the borders of multiple states” (Faist 2000: 191). In addition, he

indicated that cultural, political, and economic processes in transnational social spaces involve

various sorts of capital, such as economic capital, human capital, and social capital (Faist 2000).

In particular, he described the difference between globalization and transnationalism for a better

32

understanding of transnational migration. “Whereas global processes are largely decentered from

specific nation-state territories and take place in a world context above and below states,

transnational processes are anchored in and span two or more nation-states, involving actors from

spheres of both state and civil society” (Faist 2000: 192). Overall, Faist gave a distinctive

description to appreciate the concept of transnationalism permeating among contemporary global

migrants. More specifically, he tried to delineate the scope of transnationalism as social space or

transnational social fields which refer to “sustained ties of persons, networks and organizations

across the borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from little to highly institutionalized form”

(Faist 2000: 189).

Aside from the above theorists, there is one more indispensable theorist namely, Vertovec

who distributed a distinctive meaning of transnationalism. He insisted that transnationalism can be

described as a condition where “certain kinds of relationships have been globally intensified and

now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common-however virtual-arena of activity”

(Vertovec 1999: 447). In his book, “Transnatioalism” Vertovec further explains the relationship

between migration and transnational practices. As he indicated “Migration and transnational

practices bring many kinds of diversity to migrant-receiving society; in turn, they carry ‘social

remittances’ and other reverse-cultural flows of ideas, values and tastes, practices and material

culture-back to the migrants’ societies of origin (Vertovec 2009: 162). By reviewing the writings

of the above theorists, I can see the various perspectives on transnationalism which are all put

together to explain the phenomenon of transnational migrants’ life of Joseonjok in Japan. Without

a doubt, transnationalism has become a commonplace ideology embedded in the life of Joseonjok

in Japan. Many of Joseonjok are likely to lead transnational life by forming social spaces spanning

Japan and China as well as South Korea. Indeed, their life is not limited in one place of their

settlement in Japan. In Chapter 6, I will investigate more in detail on the issues and prospects of

transnationalism which pervade in the life of Joseonjok in Japan. To be sure, transnationalism,

along with multilingualism is the main element of this research which leads to findings regarding

identity issues of Joseonjok in Japan.

2.5 Identity

What is identity? Identity has been defined variously in the fields of psychology, social

science, philosophy, and humanities. As a result, the researchers specializing in the topic of identity

often confront difficulties in applying the numerous and varied definitions to their particular

33

research on identity. To begin with, the dictionary definition of identity is “the sameness of a person

or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or the fact that a person or thing is itself

not something else; individuality, personality” (OED 2nd Edition 1989, Fearon 1999: 7). Although

the meaning of identity indicates “the same”, it is noteworthy that the term nevertheless indicates

“both similarity and difference” (Buckingham 2008: 1).

Identity is also defined as “people’s concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are,

and how they relate to others (Hogg and Abrams 1998; Fearon 1999: 4). In addition to the above

definitions of personal identity, identity can also be understood as “a collective phenomenon which

denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among numbers of category” (Brubaker and

Cooper 2000: 7). One other definition of identity proposed by Peter Burke is the concept originated

from “identity control theory” which links identities and social structure. As Burke pointed out,

“identities are the sets of meanings people hold for themselves that define ‘what it means’ to be

who they are as persons, as role occupants, and as group members” (Burke 2004: 4).

2.5.1 Theoretical Review on Identity

According to Burke’s view on identity, there is a link between self and society in the

composition of identity (Burke 2004). To this point, Fearon argues that identity in itself has a

double sense, meaning that “it refers at the same time to social categories and to the sources of an

individual’s self-respect or dignity” (Fearon 1999: 2). With all the different accounts of the above

definitions of identity, it can still be defined in the long run as the matter of what we share with

other people (Buckingham 2008). Buckingham further contends that identity is not a fixed

conception and it is fluid and contingent matter following the external contacts with other people

(Ibid.,). In a similar vein, Tajfel (1974) defined another concept of identity in terms of “social

identity.” Above all, social identity has been one of the most widely used conceptual frameworks

in the study of identities (M.W. Lee 2016). According to Tajfel’s contention, group membership is

the main component in forming an identity. Yet, social identity is a part of an individual’s self-

concept, which originates from the membership in a social group (Tajfel 1974). All in all, as

Oyserman et al. indicated, “Identities are the traits and characteristics, social relations, roles, and

social group memberships that define who one is” (Oyserman et al. 2012: 69).

For the more specific review on identity theories, the perspectives of primordialists and

instrumentalists can be used to explain the intrinsic framework of identity in relation to ethnicity.

34

The theoretical framework of ethnic identity is innately originated from the perspectives of both

primordialists17 and instrumentalists,18 particularly in the study of migration. According to the

primordialist theory, “ethnic identities are shaped on the basis of the combination of fixed elements

and to be inherited through generations” (Shils 1972; Smith 1994; Hong 2013). In contrast, the

theory of instrumentalists explains ethnic identity with their rational terms of “elite perspective”

and “social engineering perspective” (Kataria 2008). Above all, instrumentalists believe identities

are formed by political, social, and economic interests of the related group of people. Thus,

instrumentalists stress circumstantial manipulation of identities, while primordialists point to the

emotional power of primordial symbols (Cohen 1969). In general, Joseonjok in Japan share the

traits of identity shown in these two disparate identity theories. These theories will be dealt more

in detail in Chapter 7 when explaining the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. It is noteworthy to reveal

that one goal of this research is to investigate the identity issues which are based on the primordial

and the instrumental identity of Joseonjok in Japan. After all, it is clear that the identity of

Joseonjok in Japan is “a product of both primordial and instrumental factors” (Kataria 2008: 134).

Having reviewed the above theoretical reviews on identity, this reaearch will further investigate

the issues on “migrant identity” and, most importantly, on “the identity of Joseojok in Japan.”

2.5.2 Migration and Identity

It has been argued that migration and identity are deeply interrelated, and migration affects

“the changes in identity and concept of self” (Bhugra and Becker 2005: 5). Once migrants move

to a new society, they go through the process of formation and transformation of identity. Then

their identity usually develops into being a distinctive migrant identity. To this point, Oppong

argues that “the reconstruction of migrant identity may be influenced by economic, political,

educational, and demographic as well as policy formations and implementation from host countries”

17 In explaining ethnic identity, there are two perspectives of primordialism and instrumentalism. Primordialists regard

ethnicity as naturally, or at least organically, formed through time (Kataria 2018). Primordial perspectives consist of

sociological primordialism and cultural primordialism respectively (Ibid,). To explain Joseonjok ethnic identity I

applied primordial perspectives in this research. 18 Instrumentalism is often viewed in diametric opposition to primordialism. Instrumentalists regard ethnic identities

in principally rational terms. There are two instrumentalist perspectives of particular value: the elite perspectives and

the social engineering perspective (Kataria 2018). Ethnic identities are product of both primordial and instrumental

factors. To explain the identity of Joseonjok in Japan, I applied the two perspectives of primordialism and

instrumentalism. More particularly, to explain the national identity of Joseonjok in Japan, I applied more of

instrmentalism than primordialism in this research.

35

(Oppong 2013: 1). To support his argument, Oppong further cited Robinson’s view on identity

reconstruction,19 as “the process of identity reconstruction essentially involves a subtle balancing

act of deep-rooted ethnic values, cultures, modes of operating etc with often new and in most cases

different norms, cultures, and interests of the host country” (Robinson 2007; Oppong 2013:164).

Cornell and Hartman have also pointed out “that immigrants often did adopt the practices

and ideas of the societies they entered: political and economic development did transform social

relations, daily experiences, and even identities” (Cornell and Hartman 2007: 9). They argue ethnic

migrants’ identities are socially constructed, institutionalized, and maintained throughout their

migrant life in the host societies. On the other hand, Driedger argues “that ethnic identity is

multidimensional which clusters around diverse factors including religion, endogamy, parochial

education, choices of friends, ethnic media, and ethnic organization” (Driedger 1975: 153).

Consequently, ethnic individuals will vary based on the difference of identity components and

migrants as ethnic individuals tend to perceive identity as fluid and multiple. In this sense, identity

can be described as something that individuals “do” rather than something they “have,” as a

process rather than as a property (Jenkins 2008; La Barbera 2015). International migrants hold

their traits of ethnicity, and ethnic identity becomes the basis of migrant identity. Thus, ethnic

identity is a concept that accounts for the process of migrants’ integration into a new host society.

To this end, Chandra indicated a clear-cut description of ethnic identity as follows: “By identity, I

mean any social category in which an individual is eligible to be a member. Ethnic identity

categories, I suppose, are a subject of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is

determined by descent-based attributes” (Chandra 2006: 4). To give examples of constituents of

migrant identity, La Barbera specifically argued that “there are seven interlocked issues related to

identity and migration: cultural diversity, otherness, rights, belonging, membership, differentiation,

and self-representation” (La Barbera 2015: 7). In addition, “identity refers to the outcome of two

main processes: self-presentation and social categorization” (Ibid., 9). In this context, identity

reconstruction is an inevitable procedure ensuing from migration, and the identity of migrants

becomes fluid and flexible.

19 Robinson viewed the process of identity reconstruction is neither straightforward nor essentially successful,

especially in case where ethnic factors came into the calculus of decision making or perhaps threatened directly or

even perceived to have been threatened (Oppong 2013). The degree of identity reconstruction depends on the kind of

migration, the nature of migration (voluntary or involuntary), and the degree of tolerance between co-existing groups

in the host society.

36

2.5.3 Identity Issues of Joseonjok in Japan

It has been over a century and a half since the Korean peasants crossed the border and

arrived in the adjoining areas of China. Ever since their initial settlement in China, Joseonjok have

experienced the changes of political systems in the particular area of Northeast China, namely,

“colonialism, communism, and the capitalist shift” (Kang 2008: 101). For all the transitions of

their migrant life, Joseonjok have maintained their own dual identity of being Chinese citizens

with Korean ethnicity (Choi 2016). After China adopted an “Economic Open-Door Policy” in the

late 1980s, some Joseonjok started to visit South Korea. After a while in 1990s and 2000s, a great

number of Joseonjok moved and were reconnected to South Korea, mainly due to the economic

prosperity and employment opportunities (Song 2007; Kang 2008). However, they mostly engage

in menial work of 3D jobs (dirty, difficult, and dangerous), and they have predominantly been

discriminated against by their compatriot Koreans. As a result, most Joseonjok in South Korea

have developed negative sentiment toward their ethnic homeland. With this in mind, they come to

emphasize their identity as Chinese nationals.

There has been prolific research performed among the South Korean scholars on the topic

of return migration and issues on identity in context to diasporic experiences of Joseonjok in South

Korea (Yoon 2006; Kim 2018). However, Joseonjok issues in Japan have not attracted the interest

of South Korean and Japanese scholars. As a result, there is a difficulty referring to the previous

works on Joseonjok research in Japan. Despite the shortcomings of the resources on Joseonjok

research in Japan, I can still review the prolific references on Chinese migration in Japan to elicit

the common traits of Joseonjok migrants as a subgroup of Chinese mainstream migrants. Through

interviews and participant observation as well as the comparative literature review, I have explored

the multifaceted identity of Joseonjok in Japan. More specifically, I put emphasis on finding how

multilingualism and transnationalism interrelatedly influence the identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

Significantly, I found the fact that the trilingual ability commanding Chinese, Korean, and

Japanese, along with their transnational mobility between the triangular territory of China, Japan,

and South Korea were all molded together to construct a distinctive and multifaceted identity of

Joseonjok in Japan. During their migration process, the identity of Joseojok has been reconstructed

and transformed by the social, economic, cultural, and political shifts throughout their life in Japan.

37

Chapter 3: Research Methods and Fieldwork

3.1 Research Methods

In this research, I have mainly implemented a qualitative method of in-depth interviews and

participant observation through my intermittent fieldwork starting from May 2016. I have

interviewed 55 informants most of whom live in the Tokyo area. I have conducted mostly face-to-

face interviews and occasionally phone interviews with the informants who lived far from Tokyo

such as Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and Sapporo. The interviews were semi-structured and aimed

to get answers to the research questions addressed in the introduction of this thesis. To begin with,

I tried snowballing to find out my informants, and this sampling method was useful for me to

secure my interview subjects. When I first started my fieldwork, I noticed that there were not

enough sources to locate the Joseonjok population. Nevertheless, sooner or later, I was able to get

connections with Joseonjok communities, which furnished various social networks linked among

the focus group of Joseonjok living in Japan.

At the beginning of my fieldwork, one of my acquaintances introduced her Joseonjok

friends to me. This occasion was the starting point to snowball my future subjects. From there on,

these prime informants introduced their friends or acquaintances, and the number of referrals

increased to become the pool of my informants. Occasionally, I conducted group interviews with

two or more informants to diversify my interview contents. I even tried to get hold of an interview

subject by visiting a Korean Community Church in Shinokubo to look for a Joseonjok churchgoer.

However, I mostly found informants by attending Joseonjok gathering events such as an annual

sports event (undōkai), OKTA 20 Business Network Meetings, and Joseonjok academic

conferences held in the Tokyo area. I had chances to interact with numerous people at the nomikai

(飲み会) or uchiage (打ち上げ) drinking parties after the main events. Above all, people at the

drinking parties were open-minded and exposed more of their inside stories. Other than

participating in Joseonjok events, I also joined some meetings of Joseonjok organizations as an

20 OKTA (Overseas Korean Traders Association) is keeping in line with Korean traders all over the world to contribute

the business of overseas Korean traders and their interests. This Association was established in 1981 in 74 countries

with 146 branches. It is known as the overseas Koreans Global Business-Hub and aims to foster overseas Korean ent

repreneurs and build up their communities. There are 5 branches in Japan- Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka, Chiba.

Joseonjok branch belong to the Chiba branch.

38

observer. Getting a membership in one Joseonjok community raised my status as a part of their

community, and it helped me find more connections with other informants. I told my informants

the fact that I volunteered to teach Joseonjok children, and to write monthly reports regarding

Joseonjok’s activities in Japan to a website of the Overseas Korean Foundation. In fact, this

website encourages volunteering Korean language teachers or instructors to upload and share

activities and news with overseas Koreans and ethnic Koreans all over the globe. Moreover,

Joseonjok Korean language teachers or instructors in China also share events held in their schools.

In particular, I talked about my family migration history to Joseonjok in the community so

as they could feel something in common with me. After I told them the fact that my paternal side

of my family came from North Korea, they became friendlier to me. As a matter of fact, quite a

few of Joseonjok I met during my fieldwork told me their ancestors also came from North Korea.

In this sense, they felt a commonality with my family background. What’s more, I purposely did

not emphasize my Korean identity because Joseonjok often show animosity towards South

Koreans due to the widespread discrimination against Joseonjok in South Korean society. Instead,

I told them my personal background that I was born in the U.S. and came back to Korea as a

returnee. There were some common denominators in my personal history with my Joseonjok

informants because of the multifaceted identity constructed by my migration experiences. At least,

by sharing something in common, I was able to secure a solid position as a Joseonjok researcher

and maintain a closer relationship with my informants. Overall, gaining rapport with my

informants was my primary step in developing the foundation of my fieldwork.

To establish the site of my fieldwork, I have been working as a voluntary teacher at the

Weekend Language School since 2016. This school is also known as a chitchat community for

women among Joseonjok parents in the Tokyo area. In practice, I made use of this school as the

center for my fieldwork. In this place, I could participate in language teaching and observe the

activities of the students and the parents as well as the staff members. Overall, the Weekend

Language School serves multiple roles to Joseonjok migrants in Japan regardless of the generations.

For example, other than language teaching to children, it functions as an interpersonal space

(Cummins 2000) and emotional outlet. Furthermore, it works as the center of Joseonjok gatherings

in the Tokyo area (Kwon 2015). I will further explain this Joseonjok community more in detail in

section 3.3.

There is no doubt that social media in ethnic communities have become a significant form

39

of communication among migrants these days (Lee and Lee 2015). Thus, social media

technologies have attracted substantial attention among researchers who pursue qualitative studies

(Snelson 2016). In performing my research, social media have furnished the vast resources in

which I can observe the lifestyle as well as the identity formation of Joseonjok in Japan. More

specifically, to implement my participant observation, I have monitored WeChat21 and Facebook

to utilize them as the sources for understanding Joseonjok communities in Japan or even a

worldwide scale of their communities. By joining their WeChat and Facebook groups, I was able

to interact with Joseonjok and examine their culture and behaviors shown in their life in Japan. I

also used the WeChat free-calling service to interview informants who lived at a long distance

from Tokyo. WeChat is the most widely used messenger application in China. It also plays an

essential role for Joseonjok to stay connected inside Japan.

In this circumstance, Joseonjok invited me to join a few sets of group chats. Most group

chats were related to the Weekend Language School. In the teacher’s group chat, I exchanged ideas

on Korean teaching lessons and discussed available time slots to teach students. In this particular

social media of WeChat, there is one section called “Moments22” where the users usually share

pictures and information. Besides, I signed in their Facebook private groups to follow up on their

events, and I often visited their Facebook group to see the photos sent from their diverse events. I

also had chances to communicate with the parents of my students at weekend school through the

Facebook on the topic of children’s language education. I talked about the Study Korean Program23

to give them information about Korean language education. It is obvious that “cyber-ethnic

communities acting in the interests of immigrant diasporas help promote diasporic cultural

cohesion, political advancement, economic success, and social mobility” (Ding 2008: 630). Under

these circumstances, Joseonjok in Japan have formed their transnational cyberspace and uploaded

21 Joseonjok in Japan also use this Chinese chatting application service. They also made group chats to keep up their

friendship, organize events, and share information on business and children’s education. I was invited to multiple

group chats. For example, I also used this application to discuss teaching Korean to Joseonjok student from the

Weekend Language School.

22 It is one section of WeChat. People post their photos, promotion of their business, and newspaper articles. I observed

my informants’ daily life through moments and read articles regarding Joseonjok’s political views as an ethnic minority.

23 This program was founded by Overseas Koreans Foundation as one branch of the Korean government. The main

purpose of this program is to educate the heritage language, history, and culture targeted to younger generations of

overseas Koreans.

40

information on the topics of cultural values, current issues, politics, economics, and business

networks. Above all, observing their social media gave me a better understanding of Joseonjok

communities in Japan and beyond. It also provided me with the chances to access to the

communication and social interactions with Joseonjok in the communities. I screen-captured

threads in some group chattings to exemplify practices of their multilingualism and

transnationalism. After all, social media of the Joseonjok communities functioned as the staple

resources in developing my research on Joseonjok in Japan.

From September 2016 to December 2018, I worked as a reporter of “Study Korean

Program,” which was sponsored by the Korean government. The founder of the Weekend

Language School recommended this job to me. She intended to make use of my job practically to

enhance the reputation of this school as a unique Korean language school for the Joseonjok

community in Japan. In the meantime, I had my own chances to look into Joseonjok society

through the activities of collecting data for the report materials submitted to the program. On a

monthly basis, I uploaded several reports on the issues of Joseonjok in the Tokyo area by depicting

the events related to their heritage culture and language education. For instance, I featured articles

about Joseonjok events arising in Tokyo area such as International Red-White Singing Contest24

(国際紅白歌合戦), Korean Language and Culture Lessons provided by Kyung Hee University

from Seoul, Overseas Koreans Homecoming Youth/ Teenagers Camp which was held in Korea, a

Korean speech contest at Tokyo Korean School, and an essay contest in Tumen River, China. More

particularly, I wrote some articles about how the second generation of Joseonjok learned Korean

at this Weekend Language School, and they were published in the electronic magazine of South

Korean government agency.

Additionally, there are diverse Joseonjok organizations where I was able to perform my

empirical research by collecting data and meeting my interview subjects. Once, I had a chance to

attend a major business meeting organized by the Overseas Korean Trade Association- Chiba

branch (OKTA Chiba) in 2017. The OKTA was first established in 2007. Every year of summer

around late July, successful Overseas Koreans and Joseonjok entrepreneurs visit Tokyo and give

lectures about their business tips and prospects of global businesses. I attended this event as a

24 There is an annual event to foster a cultural exchange between Japanese and non-Japanese people. NPOs, NGOs,

other ethnic communities in Japan including Shimto collaborate organizing this event. Japanese participants sing in

foreign languages and non-Japanese sing in Japanese in the contest.

41

member of the Joseonjok community and participated in diverse activities. Other than this big

Joseonjok event of the OKTA Chiba meeting, there are also diversified meetings and gatherings

of Joseonjok in Japan, where I can collect data and secure contacts for my research.

3.2 Research Sample

In performing my research, I used snowball sampling by using the social networks of

Joseonjok in Japan. The samples provided me with various data and information which would

bring forth the findings of this research. During the process of my fieldwork, I have conducted in-

depth interviews with 55 Joseonjok migrants mostly in the Tokyo area. The following table shows

the personal data of my 55 informants

Table 3.1: TheDemographic Profiles of the Personal Information of 55 Informants

Place of

Origin

Number Age Number Occupation Number Purpose of Migration Number

Jilin25 39 20s 15 Employee 32 Study Abroad 45

Heilongjiang26 12 30s 20 Entrepreneur 12 Marriage 6

Liaoning27 4 40s 15 Student 8 Employment 4

50s 3 Housewife 2

60s 2 NGO 1

Total 55 Total 55 Total 55 Total 55

Source: From my Interview Data collected from 2016-2020

25 Jilin is one of the three major provinces of Northeast China. The population of Joseonjok of this region is the highest. Joseonok

in this region came mostly from North Korea and they speak in North Korean dialects. Jilin is the center of Joseonjok population.

26 It is one of the China’s northeast provinces and located between the border of Russia and China. It is China’s northernmost

province. Joseonjok in this region mostly came from southern part of the Korean peninsula voluntarily or involuntarily during the

Japanese rule of Korea.

27 Another China’s northeast province and located between the border of North Korea and the Yellow Sea. The population of

Joseonjok are not high in this area. Joseonjok in this province are mostly from South Korea.

42

The empirical research through my fieldwork has acted as the basis of data collection for

the development of this dissertation. While conducting the interviews, I put focus on investigating

the issues of identity as the main theme of this research. Thus, I routinely asked questions of how

they viewed themselves related to their national and ethnic identities. Out of 55 informants, 22 of

them replied that they viewed themselves as Chinese nationals. 12 informants told me they were

closer to Korean ethnic culture than Chinese national culture. In light of their cultural ethnicity,

they wanted to be categorized as Overseas Koreans or Dongpo28. Unlike those above one-sided

informants, 17 informants expressed that their identities were fluid and flexible with their Chinese

nationality and Korean ethnicity. They viewed themselves as ethnic minorities who were born and

raised in China with the background of Korean ancestry. Depending on particular situations, they

put more emphasis on either of their nationality or ethnicity. Above all, their identities are flexible

and not fixed. They thought that they did not demarcate themselves either as Chinese or as Korean.

Lastly, 4 informants expressed themselves as naturalized Japanese citizens. The informants in this

category have generally lived in Japan longer than 15 years. Due to the long separation from their

places of origin, they did not show strong attachments to China not to speak of Korea. After a

while, they get adapted and integrated into Japanese society. In Chapter 7, I will provide various

cases of Joseonjok’s identity issues based on their migrant status in Japan.

In this research, multilingualism and transnationalism are two major components which have

affected the formation of the distinct identity of Joseonjok in Japan. As a consequence, I asked my

informants, in the first place, about the effects of multilingualism on their identity during the course

of their new life in Japan. 27 informants addressed that multilingualism was the positive ingredient

of their identity while 5 of them showed a negative view on their multilingual identity. 18

informants did not take any position on their multilingual identity either positively or negatively.

On the part of transnationalism, I also asked a question of how their transnational lifestyle affected

their identity. 20 informants replied they were actually involved in the transnational

entrepreneurship and transnationalism naturally was embedded in their life. In the meantime, 50

of my informants admitted that they were maintaining transnational connections with their family

28 This term Overseas Korean (Dongpo, 동포) refers to Koreans residing in abroad such as the United States, Canada,

South America, Europe, and Japan. Recently, Overseas Korean Foundation embraces Joseonjok as a part of Overseas

Koreans despite their possession of Chinese nationality. However, Joseonjok are not virtually treated as Dongpo in

South Korean society by their brethren Koreans.

43

members in China or South Korea. Overall, the interview questions were designed to elicit the

information needed to develop this research. The face-to-face interviews allowed me to gather

necessary data retrieved from their diverse ideas, private feelings, and even their subtle emotions.

The interviews usually lasted between one to three hours. The interviews were taken place in

diverse places such as lounges of schools, coffee shops, and restaurants in the Tokyo area. I

sometimes carried out interviews by phone or e-mail. For the most part, my interview subjects

were friendly and showed a cooperative attitude because they appreciated the interview

opportunity as a way to look back at the time of their life story.

3.3 Fieldwork and Participant Observation at Joseonjok Communities in Tokyo

I have conducted my fieldwork since the May of 2016 mostly in the area of Tokyo. In

addition, I once travelled to Seoul to visit Joseonjok communities in the summer of 2018. I also

had a chance to look around the Joseonjok community in Flushing, New York while I was attending

CUNY Graduate Center in 2014. My experiences of meeting Joseonjok in the two cities of Seoul

and New York are just supplementary locations for the comparative analysis of Joseonjok

migration arising under different circumstances. Above all, the main purpose of my fieldwork and

participant observation of the Joseonjok population in the Tokyo area is to collect empirical data

of Joseonjok migration and to substantiate my argument that multilingualism and transnationalism

are the foundations of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. The qualitative data collected during the

course of my fieldwork consist of my fieldnotes, the narratives of my informants, and my personal

journals. On the whole, when I was conducting my fieldwork and participant observation at

Joseonjok communities, I tried to keep the position of an “objective outsider” (Tsuda 1999: 159).

It is noteworthy that Tsuda (1999) introduced this term while he was observing and measuring

Brazilian Nikkeijin’s ethnic discrimination (Tsuda 1999). More than anything else, an objective

outsider “observes the behavior of majority individuals or the practices of institutions” (Tsuda

1999: 159). In this sense, I tried to keep my stance as an objective researcher. Thus, I interpret and

analyze Joseonjok’s behaviors and practices through my observation and participation during the

events or gatherings held by Joseonjok communities in Japan. I also tried not to be too technical

or not to show the attitudes of a researcher.

I must admit I had not known much about Joseonjok in Japan before I started my research on

Joseonjok issues in Japan for my Ph.D. program. Even so, it was in 2007 when I first happened to

44

meet Joseonjok. I was a freshman at Sophia University in Tokyo, and I needed to open access to

my mobile phone at a store. I was assisted by a store clerk who spoke Korean with an unfamiliar

accent. I thought she was Zainichi Korean, but soon I found out she was Joseonjok from Yanbian,

China. I was surprised because it was my first time interacting with Joseonjok. At that time of my

first encounter with Joseonjok, I thought Joseonjok only lived in China or Korea, not in Japan.

When I was in Korea, I occasionally watched some scenes on TV dramas depicting Joseonjok as

violent and heinous convicts who spoke Korean with unique North Korean dialects. In South

Korean media, as I remember, Joseonjok were described as a low-skilled and marginalized

population causing problems in the Korean society. However, the Joseonjok sales clerk at the

phone store talked about her life in Japan, and I had a great chance to share common feelings as

same Korean descendants. Above all, it was my first encounter with Joseonjok, and the Joseonjok

lady impressed me so much that I could get a better understanding of Joseonjok migrants from that

time on.

One important thing about Joseonjok life in Japan is that Joseonjok have not constructed their

physical enclaves in the host society. For example, their businesses are not clustered in one

particular area but scatterd all over in Shinokubo29 , Ikebukuro, Nippori, Akabane, Ueno, and

Saitama. As a result, there were no such places as Joseonjok’s ethnic enclaves in Tokyo to be called

as Joseonjok town or Joseonjok district. This phenomenon tells the reason why Joseonjok are

regarded as invisible minorities in Japanese society. Yet, I sometimes visited their ethnic

restaurants for my fieldwork. I intentionally tried to observe and feel the atmosphere of the

restaurants as an active researcher of the Joseonjok issue. The menus served in these restaurants

were different from those of the Korean restaurants in Shinokubo, Tokyo. Korean restaurants in

Japan have already been modified and localized based on Japanese customers’ tastes. In contrast,

the Joseonjok restaurants tend to persist in serving the combination of indigenous Korean dishes

and Northeast Chinese cuisines. Interestingly, I tasted flat tofu noodles, spicy beef tendons, lamb

skewers, cold noodle Naengmyun, chapsal soondae (Korean sausage), rice cakes, corn porridge,

29 It is known as a Korea Town in Shinjuku, Tokyo. There are many Korean stores and restaurants attracting Japanese

customers as well as South Korean tourists. Some Joseonjok also run their restaurants and stores in this district by

maintaining symbiotic life.

45

and Kimchi30. In particular, their Kimchi tasted different from the one in South Korea. The spices

and seasonings were more or less pure and natural despite their smell of strong and vulgar

condiments. Furthermore, their eating habits and table manners were somewhat different from

those of South Koreans. My observation in the restaurants at least gave some clues to find out the

distinctive color of Joseonjok identity. In addition to my observation, I often had chances to talk

with the owners and the serving assistants of these restaurants, and I was able to share informative

conversations with them. More importantly, I made a great chance to expand my interview subjects

from their referrals. Thus, the empirical data collected from the conversations with Joseonjok

turned out to be valuable resources for my research findings.

Photograph 3.1: Joseonjok Restaurant in Kita-ku, Tokyo

In June 2017, I had a chance to attend one big event of the Joseonjok Karaoke Contest. I

have never experienced such a unique and yet loud and lively atmosphere of the ethnic gathering.

The participants, as well as the audience, were wearing traditional Korean dresses and showing

enthusiastic and emotional reactions to the performers in unison. It looked like one scene from the

retrospective documentary of Korean society back in the 1960s.

30 As is known, kimchi has become the most famous Korean cuisine (side dish) representing Korean food (K-Food)

throughout the world lately. It is pickled Nappa cabbage with various seasonings. This food symbolizes the Korean

identity. Joseonjok also regard Kimchi as their soul and ethnic food. However, the tastes are different from the ones

eaten by South Koreans due to the different climates, seasonings, and vegetables. Through the taste of kimchi

Joseonjok are identified as Korean descendants.

46

Photograph 3.2: Joseonjok Karaoke Contest Held in Tokyo in June 2017

In some way, Joseonjok have sustained their originality of the Korean ethnicity. At this

event, I happened to meet one Joseonjok, who told me about the purity of Joseonjok as Korean

descendants. According to him, Joseonjok represent the original Koreans before the division of

two Koreas. He also contended Korean people in both South and North had changed drastically

after the division of the Korean peninsula He said, for example, South Koreans were much

affected by Western culture and capitalism, and the influence made them abandon the traditional

cultures of old Korea. On the other hand, North Koreans were affected by communism and

dictatorship. As a result, the civilians in North Korea lost contact with the outside world and

became isolated. To be sure, it was a meaningful event for me to experience the primordial traits

of Korean ethnicity. Without a doubt, the big event of the Joseonjok Karaoke Contest gave insights

for me to look at the particular element of Joseonjok identity in Japan.

There was one more Joseonjok event which attracted my attention. In September 2017, one

Joseonjok community invited Joseonjok announcers (MC’s) from Yanji, Northeast China and held

a Joseonjok Song Festival. Some of the participants sang a series of Arirang31 , the traditional

31 Arirang is the most famous folk song among the Korean people. The tune of this song is the soul of all Koreans and

it represents the sentiments of all Korean descendants wherever they live. There are various versions of Arirang songs

depending on different districts of the Korean peninsula. Both Arirang songs from South Korea and North Korea were

included on the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage list. Joseonjok sing this song at every occasion of parties,

gatherings or family reunions.

47

Korean folk song. When the contestants finished singing the songs, they delivered the messages

during the intermission by saying that they dedicated those songs for their parents in Northeast

China. All of sudden, the audience burst into tears and performed a touching scene. The people at

the contest were so emotional and nostalgic about their hometowns in Northeast China. I realized

Joseonjok had maintained solid and strong ties with their family members in their home places.

During the dance break time, some of the audience came up on the stage and danced the traditional

Korean dances. Without question, the music and dances performed here have already been obsolete

in South Korean society. Through the observation of this event, I noticed the peculiar aspects of

the cultural heritage of Joseonjok, which are quite different from those of South Koreans. It is

evident that Joseonjok have retained their traditional culture inherited from original Korea as well

as mixed traits of Chinese cultural influences. As a consequence, Joseonjok in Japan are endowed

with their multicultural identity. My observation on Joseonjok events gave some insights to see the

true colors of collective Joseonjok identity which had been formed through their diasporic

experiences.

Above all the diverse sites of my fieldwork, the most significant and often-visited place

was the Joseonjok weekend school, where I have volunteered to teach Korean to the children of

Joseonjok in the Tokyo area. This school has acted as the centripetal place for my fieldwork, where

I made the most of my opportunity to meet and get hold of my interview subjects. As was

mentioned earlier, Joseonjok Women’s Association 32 established this school in the cause of

heritage education. The school is one branch of the Joseonjok community in Japan and is

designated as a non-profit organization. In this school, I had taught Korean classes from May 2016

to January 2019. There are several reasons why I chose this school to do my fieldwork. Firstly, I

was inspired by Joseonjok’s multilingual competency because they speak three languages spoken

in Northeast Asia. Secondly, the people in this school were open to me because they needed a

Korean teacher who could teach standard Korean intonation and pronunciation to younger level

students of Joseonjok. After I told them about the background of my double citizenship of South

Korea and the U.S.33, the teachers and the parents who were interested in sending their children to

32 It is one of the most representative Joseonjok ethnic communities in the Tokyo area and was established in 2008. In

the beginning, a small number of Joseonjok female migrants gathered to share difficulties living in Japan and discuss

their children’s identity and education issues in Japan.

33 South Korea allows dual citizenship to some special cases. In my case, I could receive South Korean nationality

because my parents did not give up Korean nationalities while they lived in the U.S. I vowed not to exercise my

48

English speaking countries in the future showed interest in my multiple nationalities. Sometimes,

they asked me how to improve their children’s English. Thirdly, I was interested in the issues of

the second-generation of Joseonjok in Japan for my future research project. More particularly, I

was curious about their identity construction in Japan and their life choices as second-generation

Joseonjok in their future.

I gave Korean lessons every two weeks on Saturday. I taught children of Joseonjok

migrants on how to read and write basic Korean alphabets in the rudimentary level and made my

students read and repeat passages written in Korean. I helped them correct their pronunciations

too. While I was chatting with the teachers and the parents, they asked me to teach their students

or children to speak “beautiful” Korean or the standard Korean following the Korean TV

announcers delivering the news. Indeed, Joseonjok parents want their children to get rid of the

accents of their Yanbian dialect inherited from Northeast China. In this context, I took more care

of correcting their pronunciation during the class. Overall, the learning environment of this school

had limits because of the time span between the bi-weekly classes. Maintaining continuity is

crucial in language learning, but the Weekend Language School cannot fulfill this criterion. What

is worse, the teachers in this school are volunteers. For this reason, they would not permanently

work at this school. Sometimes the schedule of this school clashes because of the teachers’ personal

schedules. Some teachers quit teaching because of the time constraint.

Photograph 3.3: The Scene of my Teaching Korean to Joseonjok Children at Weekend School

American nationality in South Korea. In general, people should register the right for dual citizenship before age 22.

Overseas Koreans who are older than 65 can recover their Korean nationality.

49

Under the difficult situation of this weekend school, I was still able to gather invaluable

data along with my unforgettable experiences of language teaching. The collected data are all

related to multilingual education as well as the identity issues of the particular group of the second

generation Joseonjok in Japan. More importantly, my teaching and association with Joseonjok

parents and teachers are all applied to my research development. Practically, the weekend school

functioned as the center of my fieldwork, where I performed participant observation and shared

various conversations with Joseonjok in Japan. The time I spent in this school will remain to be a

precious memory throughout my academic career in the future.

3.4 Fieldwork in Seoul and New York

To carry out the comparative analysis of Joseonjok migration issues arising in different

locations, I chose two cities of Seoul and New York for the additional fieldwork sites. I intended

to find out the similarities and differences of the Joseonjok migration phenomena in the two cities

in comparison with my main fieldwork site in Tokyo. To begin with, I made a short trip to South

Korea in July 2018. I initiated my fieldwork by making use of my research connection with a

professor of sociology from Seoul. The professor provided me with useful data and literature lists

on Joseonjok research done in South Korean academic circles. He specifically suggested me some

guideline to develop my research based on statistics and theories. I also had a chance to contact

one emeritus professor in Seoul. He helped me arranging to meet with a Joseonjok working as a

director in a Joseonjok NGO. During the period of my fieldwork in Seoul, I was also able to peruse

some useful publications in the public libraries on the theme of Joseonjok research done among

South Korean scholars. I was surprised to find out the enormous amount of research done in South

Korea regarding Joseonjok issues arising in South Korea. After all, I understood the significance

of Joseonjok research in South Korea. Without a doubt, the abundant resources of Joseonjok

research in South Korea would be the essential references for my comparative research on

Joseonjok migration in Japan.

During the short period of my five-day fieldwork in Seoul, I visited the largest Joseonjok

diaspora namely, “Yanbian District34” in Daerim Dong near the metropolis of Seoul. When I got

34 Yanbian District is one of the autonomous prefectures in China. It was established in 1952 and the largest number

of Joseonjok reside in this area (Choi 2006). Yanbian borders to the north by Heilongjang Province and to the south

by North Korea. It was designated as the Korean autonomous prefecture due to the large number of ethnic Koreans

living in the region. There are eight cities in the prefecture and Yanji is the biggest city. 35% of the total population of

50

off the subway at Daerim Station, I could easily notice why Joseonjok had chosen to gather around

this area. As is known, Daerim Donng, along with the adjacent area of Guro Dong, used to be an

industrial zone for manufacturing factories which turned into being commercial and residential

areas for Joseonjok migrants (Choi 2006). More than anything else, it has easy access to public

transportation and inexpensive housing, albeit the crummy facilities and exotic atmosphere. In fact,

Daerim Dong is the largest Joseonjok community in South Korea (Hong 2013). As I had long been

involved in the Joseonjok community in Japan, I felt less strangeness than I expected. However, I

was overwhelmed to see such a large scale of Joseonjok community in Seoul. Actually, I had never

expected to see the swarming array of the Joseonjok stores and the compact Joseonjok residential

area filled with the Joseonjok population in the other cities like Tokyo and New York. Along the

streets of Joseojok town there lined up a variety of stores, restaurants, offices, churches, and

housing facilities of the Joseonjok community. I could hear the familiar sound of Yanbian dialect

which I had often heard at my weekend school in Tokyo. I could even smell the Joseonjok ethnic

food when I passed by the restaurants. I felt a familiarity in this new place because I had often

talked with Joseonjok and tasted their ethnic food at various gatherings in Tokyo.

Photograph 3.4: Joseonjok Town in Seoul

I visited my fieldwork site in Daerim Dong in Seoul, which was known as the largest

Joseonjok diaspora outside China. I was really thrilled to eyewitness the very location of the

Yanbian is Koreans. However, the number has decreased sharply because young Joseonjok have left Yanbian for South

Korea or the big cities in China. As a result, the share of Joseonjok in Yanbian is declining (Lankov 2013).

51

Joseonjok Town. More importantly, I was scheduled to have an interview with a representative

from one of the most influential NGOs acting inside the Joseonjok community. He was the director

of “Joseonjok Hanmaeum Association.35” I was told by the emeritus professor that the director

was working on diverse projects regarding Joseonjok life situations occurring during the course of

their migration ranging from their human rights to social well-being in South Korean society. I

purposely arrived at the appointment place one hour earlier to explore the atmosphere around my

informant’s office. His office was located in the building where native Koreans and Joseonjok

shared the space. The tenants did not seem to interact with each other, and there were no greetings

between the two distinct groups of Joseonjok and Koreans. There were two travel agencies on the

same floor. One was run by Koreans and the other by Joseonjok. I could tell the difference between

the two offices by distinguishing the wording on the signboards. The signs on Joseonjok’s office

used combined characters of Chinese and Korean. Since my informant called in to be late, I had

some extra time to drop by the Joseonjok travel agency and told them I was waiting for the NGO

person next door. They were selling tickets from Chungju local airport to Yanji airport in Jilin in

Northeast China. I observed one middle-aged man purchasing a ticket. I could overhear his excited

voice while talking with the agent. He was planning to visit his family in his home place. He looked

rugged from his hard work in South Korea, but he showed a happy look with his air ticket. At this

sight, I was somehow able to see the transnational lifestyle of Joseonjok with their ties back in

China.

Finally, my informant showed up, and I had a great chance to talk about the issues on

Joseonjok migration both in Korea and Japan as well as the contemporary stream of Joseonjok

migration throughout the world. The informant was a well-educated person, and he had already

published a few journal articles on the theme of Joseonjok. The informant emphasized the fact that

Joseonjok were the same descendants of Koreans although they had been treated as aliens in the

South Korean society. He strongly argued Joseonjok were not like those characters described in

the movies or dramas. He particularly pointed out the crime rate of Joseonjok was by far lower

than ordinary South Korean civilians. Over time, we exchanged opinions more about Joseonjok

issues at large and further talked about the future of Joseonjok as well as the pending issues of the

35 One professor from Hanguk Univeristy introduced me to visit this place while I was performing my fieldwork in

Seoul in 2018. The leader of this NGO explained the history and current situation of Joseonjok in Korea. This NGO

puts efforts on enhancing the reputation of Joseonjok in Korea and helping Joseonjok integrate into Korean society.

52

second generation of Joseonjok in Korea and Japan altogether.

As my interview was not aimed to be structured, both he and I enjoyed bilateral free

conversation by moving out topics here and there. Time went so quickly. Then, he further indicated

that there had been notable changes among the Joseonjok community in South Korea. According

to him, Joseonjok tended to endeavor to be integrated into South Korean society while the Korean

government put noticeable efforts to improve the legal status of Joseonjok by instituting new

policies toward Joseonjok in these days. Lastly, the informant mentioned the Joseonjok migration

interrelated economically and politically between China and South Korea. With all those

informative dialogues, however, my informant did not suggest any clear-cut prediction about the

future aspects of Joseonjok migration in South Korea. One more important thing he pointed out

was more and more Joseonjok tended to identify themselves as Chinese rather than Koreans.

According to him, this phenomenon was the result of ongoing discrimination against Joseonjok

from their Korean compatriots albeit the improvement of Joseonjok legal status in their ancestral

homeland. Time flew so fast, and we were reluctant to leave. I tried to record the interview upon

my informant’s approval. The meeting lasted well over three hours. I donated some amount of

money to his organization following the advice from the professor who referred me to him.

For my New York fieldwork, I tried to bring out my past occasions of meeting Joseonjok

when I was pursuing my master’s degree at CUNY Graduate Center in New York. I used to live in

Flushing, Queens Borough for two years. Flushing is a well-known place as an ethnic enclave for

Korean and Chinese immigrants in New York City. Both Korean and Chinese communities coexist

in this particular district. Originally, this area used to be occupied by a Jewish diaspora before the

rush of Asian immigrants since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Min 2013). As a

matter of fact, Korea Town and China Town keep a good neighborhood in Flushing. In this

situation, Joseonjok as Korean-Chinese have constituted a unique group in this particular area of

Flushing who can handle the intermediary role between the two communities. With their bilingual

and bicultural capacity, they combine the cultural attitudes and customs of the two ethnic groups.

As a consequence, they are highly valued in the labor markets in this district. However, Joseonjok

have led symbiotic life and participated in more activities in Korean communities (Ibid.,).

I often had chances to meet Joseonjok while I was doing grocery shopping at a Korean supermarket.

There usually were Joseonjok laborers who worked mostly in meat and fish corners. After I knew

they were Joseonjok, I intentionally approached and greeted them although they showed brusque

53

attitudes. I once had the experience of using a shipping service from a Joseonjok company when

I sent my belongings to Korea. The owner and the staff were all Joseonjok, and I shared a long

conversation while they were packing my parcels. It was a great chance to know about Joseonjok

life situations in New York. One of them talked about their relationship with the Korean community.

He explained that Joseonjok could not establish an intimate relationship with Korean immigrants

because of their different ethnic backgrounds and particularly their Chinese nationality. He further

mentioned that Joseonjok only maintained business networks and relationship with the Korean

immigrants in the U.S. Inwardly, Joseonjok seemed to feel more connected to China as a nation

although they maintained Korean ethnicity (Min 2012). Despite their loyalty to the Chinese

government, Joseonjok have gathered in the big cities where Korean communities were

constructed, such as Los Angeles and New York City. Their symbiotic life with Koreans seemed

to be inevitable to my viewpoint after the observation of their life in Flushing. After all, my

interviews and observation fulfilled in the Joseonjok community in New York turned out to be

valuable resources for my comparative research on Joseonjok migration in Japan.

Under these circumstances, it is expected that these different groups of Joseonjok will lead

different lifestyles and form different identities respectively in their future. Extensive research is

required to investigate the future aspects of the two different groups of Joseonjok. In this context,

I made it my plan to carry out more collaborative research for the comparative analysis on

Joseonjok migrants in Japan and the U.S. More specifically, I will put emphasis on Joseonjok in

New York to go parallel with Joseonjok research in Tokyo. To sum up, through the supplementary

fieldwork in Seoul and New York I am able to see the migrant life of Joseonjok in a wider spectrum.

After all, Joseonjok in Japan will lead their different migrant life from those Joseonjok in South

Korea and the U.S. Someday there will be all kinds of varying Joseonjok groups such as South

Korean Joseonjok, Japanese Joseonjok, American Joseonjok, and even European Joseonjok and

they will construct respective identities.

In this chapter, I tried to explain the research methods I used during my fieldwork. The basic

methods of in-depth interviews and participant observation supplied the ground for the findings of

this research. However, I have to admit there are shortcomings of this research by not performing

the quantitive method. Above all, there were not enough demographic data or usable statistics

regarding Joseonjok migration in Japan.

54

Chapter 4: Migratory Experiences of Joseonjok in Japan

4.1 The Waves of Joseonjok Migration

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Joseonjok are the descendants of the Koreans who moved from

the Korean peninsula to Northeast China (Manchuria) from the late 1800s to the end of World War

II. The earliest Korean migrants waded across the Tumen River of their own accord in the late 19th

century (Hong 2013). The map below indicates the borderline between China and Korea.

Figure: 4.1 Map of the Borderline between China and Korea

Source: Economist, Aug 23, 2018 “The third Korea China’s ethnic-Korean enclaves have become less Korean.”

The Korean migrants were mostly poverty-stricken farmers living adjacent to the border

between China and Korea. They desperately crossed the border to secure the land for their slash-

and–burn farming. The number of Korean migrants at that time was not significant. Then, in the

early 20th century, after Japan annexed Korea, many Korean peasants and the independent

movement activists relocated to this area of Manchuria looking for a better life or avoiding the

55

persecution by the Japanese imperialists (Seol and Skrentny 2004). After Japan’s occupation of

Manchuria in 1931, many peasants from the southern part of the Korean peninsula were recruited

or forced to move to this area to be exploited as resources for the Japanese military government to

invade mainland China (Song 2014). Also, some Koreans moved voluntarily for their businesses

and employments. Japan urged Koreans in Manchuria to become Japanese citizens under the name

of “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere36 (大東亜共栄圏).” In this regard, Japan claimed that

all Koreans were Japanese subjects during the Japanese occupation in Korea and Manchuria (Seol

and Skrentny 2004). At that time of Japanese rule in Manchuria, many young Koreans received

Japanese education. They pledged allegiance unavoidably for the sake of their protection in this

wild zone of the political arena (Kwon 2015). After Japan retreated from this area at the end of

World War II, China recovered Manchuria as its territory. In 1949 People’s Republic of China

(PRC) was established, and the new Chinese government designated Koreans as its citizens by

calling them Chaoxianzu (朝鮮族) and treated them as one of the ethnic minorities in China (Piao

1990; Hong 2013). After all that complex history of the settlement, Joseonjok have become a

unique and distinguished minority group in China for their economic and educational level.

In China’s 2010 population census, out of the listed 1,830,000 Joseonjok, about one million

were registered as residents of a foreign country, including South Korea (Choi 2016). Besides, half

a million Joseonjok have already moved to China’s coastal cities, where numerous South Korean

enterprises are located. As a consequence, more than seventy percent of Joseonjok have dispersed

to other places through internal and external migration. In a way, globalization effects have caused

the dissolution of Joseonjok diasporas scattered in Northeast China. At long last, the closed society

of the Joseonjok community opened their eyes to look around the outside world, particularly South

Korea, which gave an impact on Joseonjok communities in China (Yoon 2010). More particularly,

Joseonjok in China were amazed to see the economic progress of South Korea. In 1992, China and

South Korea normalized their diplomatic relationship (Kwon 2015). The large influx of Joseonjok

to their ethnic homeland has arisen ever since. “The Korean Wind” (Hong 2013: 31) has been

widespread among Joseonjok from Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin in Northeast China. The

36 Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (大東亜共栄圏・daitōakyōeiken) is an imperial concept promoted from 1930

to 1945 by the Empire of Japan. The colonial empire of Japan implemented and economic unity within the regions in

East Asia.

56

primary motivation of the Joseonjok movement to South Korea stems from the pull factors of the

South Korean economy, which can give an excellent chance for Joseonjok to earn ten to twenty

times more money than they can make in China (Im 1998; Song 2012). The majority of Joseonjok

in South Korea are engaged in 3D industries to fill up the shortage of laborers in the secondary

sector of the labor market in South Korea. They mostly do elbow-greasing jobs in construction,

restaurants, and nursing homes only for the sake of saving money. Otherwise, they would not have

earned that much money back in China. However, they have to confront the discrimination from

their South Korean compatriots. The majority of Joseonjok migrants in South Korea work as low-

skilled laborers, and they have to support their children for their higher education in China or Japan.

One of my Informants, Won (26, Male, MA Student, arrived in Japan in 2013), talked about his

parents working in South Korea.

My parents went to South Korea in the 1990s when I was in elementary school. I lived together with my

grandparents. My parents wanted to make enough money to support me to go to college. They have stayed

in South Korea as laborers working in restaurants and construction job sites. Without their support, I wouldn’t

have finished college in Japan. They always say over the phone that they are discriminated against by South

Koreans. “We do the same work. We work longer and get paid less than South Korean workers.” They seem

to suffer from unfair treatment from South Koreans and the South Korean government. Simply because they

are Joseonjok, they don’t get social benefits from the South Korean government. Indeed, Joseonjok are real

Korean descendants, and we deserve to be treated as such. Anyway, thanks to my parents’ hard work, I can

lead a comfortable life in Japan. I am planning to invite them to Japan to live together in the near future.

In contrast to those Joseonjok in South Korea, many young and educated Joseonjok do not

usually show their interest in moving to South Korea. Instead, they choose to go to Japan for their

better chances of education and career opportunities (Kwon 2015). They tend to believe the

Japanese economy and social system are on a higher level than those of South Korea. They already

know the cold fact that the severe discrimination against Joseonjok has integrated into South

Korean society. In a way, they would rather put up with Japanese people’s prejudice than getting

discrminatory treatment from their Korean brethren. More practically, they believe they will have

better chances of employment in the transnational job markets developed between China and Japan.

They also know their Japanese language learned at schools will eventually furnish them with the

multilingual function that will act as a tool for a successful life in Japan’s transnational economy.

Under these circumstances, the young Joseonjok in China have continuously gone to Japan for the

57

past three decades to accomplish their academic goals and career opportunities. As a subdivision

of Chinese student migrants in Japan, Joseonjok fundamentally take the same trajectory as the

Chinese mainstream (Kwon 2015). At a certain point, Joseonjok show somewhat more diverse

movement and settlement patterns because of their multifaceted aspects of migration background

as an ethnic minority in China. To supplement this research’s resource, I have arranged and

analyzed my interview scripts to explain the migration phenomena of Joseonjok in Japan in the

next section. There are various factors of decision making of Joseonjok migration into Japan.

Based on my informants’ responses, they go to Japan to catch two birds with one stone. They want

to go to Japan both to study and to find a well-paying job. They primarly prioritize their better

living and economical conditions (Kuerkova 2011) in Japan.

4.2 Joseonjok’s Migration and North Korea

My research is mainly focused on the migration issues of Joseonjok in Japan. However,

investigating their ethnic origin and historical background is essential to understand Joseonjok

migrants. Moreover, the relationship between Joseonjok and North Korea is one of the

indispensable portions to highlight Joseonjok’s migration and identities.

As is known, the initial migration of Koreans to Northeast China occurred when the

impoverished farmers in the northern part of Korea crossed the border of the Tumen and Yalu

Rivers in the late 19th century (Seol and Skrentny 2004). Many of Joseonjok came from North

Korea, although some other Joseonjok from South Korea settled in different diasporic areas in

China. Overall, the majority of Joseonjok in Yanbian have their ancestral roots and family ties in

North Korea. In this light, North Korean cultures and tradtions shape Joseonjok’s identities. In

particular, the standard Korean language in major Korean communities is “Pyongyang Korean”

(Choi 2016: 254). Pyongyang is the capital city of North Korea. Moreover, Joseonjok used to

borrow North Korean textbooks to teach their children (Choi 2016).

Historically, there was one important political involvement of Joseonjok in the Korean War.

During the war in the early 1950s, several young Joseonjok were dispatched to the battlefield as

Chinese voluntary soldiers to help North Korea fight against the U.N. military forces (Kang 2008).

This simply tells the fact that Joseonjok’s political connection with North Korea was strong at that

time. During the Cultural Revolution in China from 1966 to 1976, the relationship between China

and North Korea deteriorated (Choi 2001). Many Joseonjok leaders and intellectuals were falsely

58

charged with spying or regional nationalists (Choi 2001; Kang 2008: 109). At this turbulent time,

some Joseonjok in Yanbian crossed the Tumen River and fled to North Korea (Lee 1986; Kang

2008). Under this situation, China criticized North Korea for its economic failure and political

dictatorship. Then, the PRC restored their friendly policies toward Joseonjok and treated them as

an essential ethnic minority member of unified China. Until the 1980s, Joseonjok maintained close

ties only with North Korea under the same Communist bloc (Kang 2008). However, North Korea

has become the poorest and the most secluded country in the world. Joseonjok started to negatively

view North Korea’s political attitude showing dire threats against Northeast Asia’s peacebuilding.

During my fieldwork, I had a chance to meet one Joseonjok informant, Jimin (Female, 43,

Trade, arrived in Japan in 1998), who talked about her vivid experience of encountering North

Koreans.

I visited North Korea in the 1990s when I was an undergraduate student. My university arranged a

field trip to a city near the borderline between China and North Korea. The natural environment

was excellent with fresh air and green mountains. But the facilities in the town were very old and

crummy. When I strolled the street, I happened to see hungry and malnourished kids begging for

food. Judging from my observation, North Korea was extremely poverty-stricken, and its society

was overly exclusive and dogmatic. I know many North Koreans escape North Korea and stay in

Yanbian to go to South Korea. North Korean defectors cause severe problems in China, and they

are routinely deported back to North Korea. I still remember my grandparents sent some food to

their relatives in North Korea when there was the Great Famine in the 1990s. It is tragic to see the

hard life of North Koreans. After all, they are our brethren.

When it comes to discussing Joseonjok’s relationship with North Korea, North Korean

defectors are an integral part of the discussion. Joseonjok feel sympathy for North Korean

defectors and help them because they are the same Korean descendants. However, Joseonjok have

both pities and despise against North Koreans because of the political and economic situations in

North Korea (Choi 2001).

Since the Great Famine in North Korea in the 1990s, there has been a mass exodus of North

Koreans to China, especially to Joseonjok districts in Northeast China (Chang et al. 2008; Kim

YG 2015). However, China has enforced the repatriation policy against North Korean defectors

because China intends to maintain a stable relationship with North Korea as an ally (Kim YG

59

2015). Most of the defectors cross the rivers and seek sanctuaries in Yanbian areas or other adjacent

areas nearby the border. The majority of the North Koreans get aids from Joseonjok communities

(Kim YG 2015). However, the Chinese government does not give refugee status to North Korean

defectors (Chang et al. 2008; Kim 2015). They are only treated as illegal border crossers for their

economic reasons. Under this situation, North Korean defectors are assumed as an illegal entity

and subject to arrest and deportation (Kim 2015).

Because of the large population of Joseonjok in the Yanbian area, North Koreans have good

chances to meet compatriot Joseonjok, who provide them with food and shelter (Charny 2004;

Kim 2015). Typically, North Koreans beg for help from the local Joseonjok, who are willing to

render aid but not long (Chang et al. 2004; Kim 2015). Under this situation, North Korean defectors

are always vulnerable to exploitation by Chinese traffickers or even Joseonjok brokers (Charney

2004). Overall, the relationship between North Korean defectors and Joseonjok is limited to a

small scale only in the initial stage of their stay in China (Kim 2015). Beyond the initial help, the

defectors should find their way to pursue their dream to go to their final destination of South Korea

or to settle in China as residents (Chang et al. 2004; Kim 2015). In short, from their first movement

to China to their present life in China, Joseonjok have maintained some connections with North

Korea. Although the majority of Joseonjok came from the northern part of the Korean peninsula,

most of them prefer to go to South Korea for economical reasons. North Korea is mainly seen as

a sending region of destitute refugees.

4.3 The Immigration Context of Japan and its Effects on Joseonjok Migration in Japan

In this sub-chapter, I highlight how Japan’s immigration context affects Joseonjok migrants’

life in Japan, and further how it has affected their identity construction. It is a prerequisite to review

Japan’s immigration context before discussing Joseonjok migrants’ lives in Japan.

According to an article from “The Japan Times,” 2,829,416 foreigners live in Japan (The Japan

Times, Oct. 26, 2019). The ratio of foreign residents in Japan to Japan’s total population (126.5

million, 2020) is now more than 2 percent. However, compared with other advanced countries in

Europe and North America, the ratio of the foreign residents in Japan is by far on the lower scale.

Be that as it may, the demographic makeup of foreign residents in Japan is quite diverse. Over 80

percent of the foreign residents in Japan are Asians (Liu-Farrer 2020). They mostly came from

China, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, and more. Above all, Korean labor migrants who had

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arrived in Japan during the Colonial era before 1945 have become the first de facto immigrants in

Japan. After World War II, those Koreans (old comers) stayed in Japan and became Zainichi

Koreans. Koreans used to be the largest foreigner group before the massive influx of Chinese

migrants, who eventually surpassed Koreans’ population in Japan (Le Bail 2013). The third-largest

group is Vietnamese, who surpassed Filipinos not long ago. Then, Nikkei South Americans

followed Filipinos to be the 5th largest group, and Nepalese remained the sixth-largest group in

Japan. Taiwanese and U.S. citizens also take a considerable number of foreign migrants in Japan.

The diverse groups of foreign residents in Japan have shown different migration patterns, such as

student migration, labor migration, return migration, marriage migration, family migration,

refugee migration, and clandestine migration. After all, the immigrants in Japan hold diverse

nationalities, and they share varied experiences of foreign residents in Japan.

The increase of foreign residents simply tells the fact that Japan has steadily relaxed the

restrictions toward foreign workers by adopting some new immigration policies. As is known,

“immigration picked up during the go-go 1980s” (Duff et al. 2008: 2). From that time on, Japan

has become an attractive migrant-receiving country to those workers from low-income countries

in Asia. As Liu-Farrer pointed out, “the historical ties and close social and economic connections

have continued to pull in new migrants through business operations, educational programs, and

low-wage labor imports” (Liu-Farrer 2020: 60). Furthermore, Japan expanded its globalization

plan of “the 300,000 International Students Plan by 2020,” which is the extension of “the 100,000

International Students Plan” proposed in 1993. The International Students Plans have virtually

allowed international students to apply for permanent residence status after graduation (Kodama

2015). Undoubtedly, student migration is the byproduct of Japan’s intrinsic pro-immigration policy

to import both low-skilled and highly skilled workers in its labor market. To this immigration

context of Japan, Roberts indicated some delicate stance of Japanese immigration policy as “Japan

up to the present has no official immigration policy, although there are numerous ways by which

people have entered the country, stayed long-term, become permanent residents or naturalized”

(Roberts 2013: 208).

It is generally accepted that Japan is a relatively homogeneous nation. Thus, ethnonationalism

(Liu-Farrer 2020) has been innately pervaded inside the exclusive society of Japan. For this reason,

the unwillingness toward the immigration of foreigners still remains with the attitude of “ethno-

nationalist self-identity” (Liu-Farrer 2020:4) among the Japanese people as well as their

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governments. Nevertheless, “the fear of consequences of the rapidly aging, low birth rate society”

(Roberts 2013: 202) has forced Japan to give a reluctant consent to open its society to immigrants.

Under these circumstances, Japan has but to accept immigrants from other countries, and it has to

get prepared to become a de facto immigration country. During the mid-1980s, Japan gained

international attention mainly because of its economic power, especially the rising value of the

Japanese currency, yen (Kashiwazaki 2013). At that time, Japan also promoted the

‘internationalization’ (kokusaika) campaign. The main goal was to activate the domestic market

and international trade (Kashiwazaki 2013). The strong economy of Japan attracted the foreign

migrants to arrive and settle in Japan from those early days of the 1980s. In this context, “Japanese

immigration policy has begun to transform, albeit slowly, at the intersection of the domestic

demographic change and the advancement of economic globalization” (Tai 2009: 321). However,

Japan has not yet established a firm immigration policy to open its front door like those

immigration countries in Europe and North America. Although immigrants supply the necessary

labor force in Japan, Japan has maintained a hostile stance to accept foreign workers. More

particularly, Japan has shown an unwillingness to accept unskilled labor migrants despite the

massive demand for the unskilled labor force from foreign countries (Le Bail 2013).

Notwithstanding the unwelcoming attitude of Japan, a large number of foreign workers have

arrived in Japan to venture into their new life. However, they usually have to cope with the diverse

problems when settling in the new society. As Kashiwazaki indicated, “Migrants from abroad face

many problems as they settle in Japan, ranging from issues concerning housing, work, social

security and welfare, child-rearing, education of children, and the maintenance of ethnic culture”

(Kashiwazaki 2016: 5).

In the East Asian global market today, Japan is no more a dominating country to monopolize

the global market in the manufacturing industry. Above all, Japan should compete with other

countries (Le Bail 2013) like China, South Korea, and Singapore. Under this situation, the foreign

labor force has become crucial human resource for Japan to compete with other countries. For this

reason, Japan needs external labor supply to revitalize its economy and foster its competitiveness

in the global market today (Le Bail 2013). In this context, the issues on foreign residents and

immigration are worth to be discussed for the social, political, and economic development of

Japanese society. Above all, it is a good sign that the immigration policies of Japan have started to

reflect the “pro-immigration voices” (Roberts 2013). It is about time that Japan admitted foreign

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workers’ role to realize their “Japanese Revitalization Project (JRP),” which was proposed by

Shinzo Abe in 2014. After all, Japan’s immigration policy determines who can come and stay in

Japan, thereby shaping the demographic profiles. Without question, the immigration policy of

Japan has affected the migration stream of Joseonjok in Japan.

4.4 Joseonjok’s Migration into Japan

Japan has long maintained its non-immigration policy to foreigners and has been considered

a closed homogeneous society for a long time. However, due to the aging population and declining

demographic base Japan has called for the foreign labor force, which entails the migration influx

from the adjacent countries. Then, the prime minister Nakasone proclaimed a new plan to invite

international students to Japan in 1983. In the following year of 1984, responding to this policy

initiative, the Japanese government simplified application procedures for student visas,

particularly pre-university language students (Wakabayashi 1990; Liu-Farrer 2011). Nakasone’s

plan, coupled with China’s economic reformation in 1979, enabled many Chinese students to move

into Japan. Moreover, in 1986, the Chinese government relaxed the restrictions on Chinese citizens’

mobility to foreign countries (Liu-Farrer 2011). At last, ordinary Chinese became free to travel to

other countries for their private purposes. The two compatible policies of Japan and China have

provided the foothold for Chinese people, including Joseonjok, to move en masse into Japan.

As was indicated in Chapter 1, Joseonjok arrived in Japan with student visas and exploited

their educational opportunities as their de facto channels (Ibid.) to settle in Japanese society.

Joseonjok migrants followed the same trajectory as Chinese migrants in the course of their

migration into Japan. Kwon indicates that Japan is the most accessible and economic country for

Joseonjok to start a new migrant life compared to those in Europe and North America (Kwon 2015).

Under these favorable conditions of migration, a significant number of young Joseonjok have

moved at a consistent pace to Japan since the 1980s.

The early arrived Joseonjok in the 1980s, the number of which was not large, were mostly

highly educated elites who had been supported either by the Chinese government or Japanese

institutions. Then, in the 1990s, with the simplification of the Japanese ‘guarantor system for

foreign students’ (Kwon 2015), a myriad of Joseonjok, without difficulty, arrived in Japan mostly

as pre-university students. Besides, some Joseonjok entered Japan as IT technicians recruited and

hired directly by Japanese corporate companies as short-term sojourners. Some trainees or interns

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filled up the temporary labor shortage in Japanese job markets (Kwon 2015). With all those diverse

backgrounds of entry in Japan, Joseonjok have constructed their entity as a minority group in

Japanese society. However, there have never been any acknowledgments from the official

institutions in Japan. Consequently, there is only a rough estimate of the Joseonjok population in

Japan, which was informally calculated by Joseonjok media. They checked the number of

Joseonjok by surveying the origin of birthplaces in Northeast China. As a consequence, the survey

cannot suggest a well-founded number either.

When it comes to explaining the reasons for Joseonjok student migration, it is noteworthy to

find out the original intentions of the young Joseonjok who wished to study abroad. As is often the

case, “the priority of studying abroad for Joseonjok students is to go to English speaking countries

in North America or Europe” (Kwon 2015: 140). However, those students usually confront the

challenges of getting visas, not to mention the expensive schoolings and living costs. Furthermore,

their English language deficiency also impairs their will to study in English speaking countries.

Unfortunately, Joseonjok, in most cases, did not have chances to learn English in their secondary

schools because they usually take Japanese as their foreign language subject. As an alternative,

Joseonjok students had but to choose to go to Japan for their higher education and career

opportunities. More than anything else, Japan is the best choice for them to pursue their higher

education because Japan is the most advanced country in technology, education, economy, and

social system in East Asia (Kwon 2012). Besides, the Japanese government welcomes them and

has already simplified a student visa application procedure (Liu-Farrer 2011). More importantly,

Joseonjok students can earn money while attending schools in Japan. There is an additional feature

of Joseonjok students’ coming to Japan. Many of Joseonjok students in China choose to go to

Japan instead of South Korea. They believe they can get better chances of upward mobility after

their education in Japanese society than in South Korean society (Kwon 2015). They usually spend

one or two years at the language schools and then enroll in Japanese universities. Some college

graduates of Joseonjok try to go to graduate schools directly, which is not often the case.

Notwithstanding the proficiency of the Japanese language acquired through their lessons in China

and the language courses in Japan, they still have some difficulties meeting the requirements of

the classes in Japanese universities. Furthermore, they usually have to work long hours to earn

their schooling and living costs. They are obliged to overcome their hardship to achieve a

successful life in Japan for all those difficulties.

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In the initial stages of Chinese student migration in the 1980s, Chinese students, as well as

Joseonjok students, mostly depended upon the social networks of relatives, friends, or alumni who

had already settled in Japan (Liu-Farrer 2011). Thus, the migrant networks were crucial to connect

the link between those at home and with the migrants in the destination countries (Morawska 2007).

The information from these kinds of personal networks helped the students in China secure the

route to enter Japan at that time of the initial stage of student migration to Japan. However, personal

networks were only available to students who had relatives or friends in Japan. As a consequence,

an increasing number of Chinese students who wished to go to Japan could not always obtain

personal networks to get the information needed for the procedure to go to Japan. Compared with

mainstream Chinese students, Joseonjok students had a better position in constructing personal

networks with their co-ethnic predecessors in Japan. Indeed, Joseonjok are more tightly connected

with their ethnic group in Japan than Han Chinese (Kwon 2015). It is noteworthy that solidarity is

one distinctive phenomenon of the ethnic minority (Morawska 2007). To this end, Joseonjok have

a tendency of solidarity when they leave their home places in Dongbei. Their ethnic bond in Japan

was even stronger when there were not many Joseonjok students in Japan. This is why many

Joseonjok, later on, were able to enter Japan with the help of those early arrived predecessors

(Kwon 2015).

Since the early 2000s, recruitment into Japanese universities and language schools has become

much more institutionalized (Liu-Farrer 2011). At this stage of student migration, Chinese students,

as well as Joseonjok students, mostly depended upon recruitment centers in China by paying a fee

to secure entry to Japan. The recruitment agencies helped students prepare the documents for the

visa application. For the time being, the agencies helped students who did not have personal

networks in Japan. Then, along with the advent of the Internet age in China, young Chinese

students could collect the information from the websites (Liu-Farrer 2011). Even after arriving in

Japan, the students still rely on the website to arrange housing and even job postings. In particular,

the portal sites of the Joseonjok community are well developed and serve as useful resources of

information for the newly arrived Joseonjok students. Thus, the ethnic online media of the

Joseonjok community play a critical role for Joseonjok to establish social networks in their new

life in Japan (Lee and Lee 2013).

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4.5 The Motivation and the Entry Process of Joseonjok Migration to Japan

I selected nine interview scripts from my interview data set to illustrate their diverse reasons

to come to Japan. Most of my informants entered Japan to study and move to the highly-skilled

labor market after graduation. Others were interns or technical trainees who usually stay

temporarily in Japan. Even some clandestine Joseonjok came to Japan to make ‘quick cash’ (Liu-

Farrer 2011). They sometimes overstay and become undocumented in Japan. Additionally, among

my informants, there were female marriage migrants who were married to Japanese men in rural

areas. In particular, Joseonjok also come to Japan through family reunion, which gives chances

parents to visit or live together with their children who used to get help from them while studying

in Japan. Among those diverse cases of Jodeonjok migration in Japan, I put focused more on the

cases of the majority group of Joseonjok migrants who came to Japan as university students or

pre-university language school students and later became the residents of Japanese society. During

my fieldwork, I asked the questions of “What was your motivation to come to Japan?” and “How

did you manage to enter Japan?” Then, I selected the scripts to illustrate their diverse motivations

along with their social networks used for their migration to Japan.

I met Minhyuk (Male, 45, Finance, arrived in Japan in 1998) at a Joseonjok community

gathering. I asked a simple question of “Why did you come to Japan?” To this question, he talked

about reasons to come to Japan as follows:

Why did I come to Japan? I simply wanted to have a better life. The town I grew up in China was

underdeveloped compared with other big cities in China or Japan. One day my friend, who had already moved

to Japan called me and persuaded me to come to Japan for my future. He introduced me to one language

school. He explained that I could learn Japanese and work at the same time. I thought that was a good idea.

After that, I convinced my parents that I wanted to go to Japan. Then, they paid my tuition for my language

school. Now, I realize that I made the right decision, thanks to my friend.

Minhyuk first came to Japan as a Japanese language school student. He graduated from a

3-year-college located in his hometown, Yanji37. Then, he worked at a trading company in Yanji,

China. His former company collaborated with Japanese companies. Thus, he had plentiful chances

37 The central or capital city of the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province.

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to interact with Japanese businesspeople. He admired Japan’s high level of economy and its

advancement of technology. He was not satisfied with his living conditions in China. In the late

1990s, there was a new trend among Chinese, including Joseonjok to leave China and go overseas.

Some of his friends already left for Japan and attended Japanese language schools, vocational

schools, or universities. He came to Japan through his social network. He found out the wages in

Japan were incomparably higher than those of China. The income disparity between the two labor

markets in China and Japan was the strongest motivation for him to arrive in Japan.

One other informant Shinyu (Female, 37, Human Resource, arrived in Japan in 2002), also

talked about her background story of her decision to come to Japan in a different way.

In the first place, I wasn’t thinking of going to Japan. My parents were in the medical field, and they forced

me to work at a hospital. I had to follow what they wanted me to do because working at a hospital was a

stable career in China. Getting hired at a big hospital in Yanbian was my top priority after I finished college.

Unfortunately, I couldn’t make it. Instead, I had to work at a small local hospital. I really didn’t want to work

there because it was very boring and hopeless to work in a place where I didn’t like it. First of all, I was

thinking of moving to Shanghai because many Korean companies were recruiting Joseonjok. When I was

seriously considering my future direction, I had a chance to talk with my uncle, who gave me one suggestion.

He mentioned that his son was studying abroad in Osaka and told me, “Why don’t you go to Osaka like my

son?” In the beginning, I told him, “Please give me some time, and I want to discuss this matter with my

parents.” I talked to my parents, and they supported me to start a new life in Osaka. More than anything else,

it would be safer to live where my cousin was living. My cousin found me a place to live and work. I made

this decision in October 2001. It was perfect timing because Japanese language schools usually recruit

students in October and start in April.

Shinyu attended a 3-year college and majored in medicine in the Yanbian district. She was

planning to continue her family tradition by working at a hospital. However, she suffered from the

heavy workload and the competitive atmosphere in the hospital. Nor could she find a job in a big

hospital. Thus, she argued with her parents and showed her reluctance to work in the medical field.

Then, she turned her attention to Korean firms in Shanghai. Song (2009) explained that Joseonjok

used to prefer working at South Korean companies in coastal cities of China for some reasons.

First of all, the South Korean companies highly valued Joseonjok’s labor force due to their cultural

and linguistic proficiency in China and Korea (Yoon 2017). Also, the annual incomes were higher

than Chinese companies. Despite those advantages, Shinyu hesitated to work at a Korean company

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in Shanghai. However, Shinyu was stressed out by the Korean employers’ power harassment and

discrimination against Joseonjok employees. At that time, her cousin already arrived in Japan and

attended a graduate school in Osaka.

On the other hand, Wook (Male, 26, IT Engineer, arrived in Japan in 2010), told me his

reason for choosing to come to Japan with his particular aspiration for his dynamic lifestyle in

Japan.

In fact, I was accepted at one university in Jilin Province, but I decided not to go there. The school had a good

reputation, though. If I had gone there, I would have ended up being a civil servant like my parents. I was

afraid of being like them because their life looked so dull. I prefer a dynamic and active career. I really want

to make a lot of money, expand my social networks, and explore a different part of the world. Many of my

Joseonjok friends decided to study abroad in South Korea. From Joseonjok’s perspective, South Korea is not

a foreign country and doesn’t look attractive to me to start my new life as an adult. Instead, I chose Japan

because it is more developed and wealthier than South Korea. Besides, I could venture to learn more in a

foreign country. Since I learned English as a foreign language in China, I didn’t have a chance to learn Japanese.

So, I wanted to challenge myself in Japan. I spent two years in a Japanese language school and entered a

Japanese university.

Wook was a confident and ambitious person. Unlike most Joseonjok students, he arrived in

Japan with no proficiency in Japanese. For all that, he learned practical things to get used to the

Japanese norms and society while he was working part-time jobs. To explain Wook’s motivation

to come to Japan, it is essential to point out how Joseonjok view South Korea. As might be expected,

South Korea is a more accessible place to migrate and settle due to cultural and linguistic proximity

(Kwon 2015). For this reason, some Joseonjok choose to study in South Korean universities to

experience South Korean society and rediscover their ethnic roots. On the other hand, some

Joseonjok are reluctant to go to South Korea. The primary reason is based on the prejudice of

South Koreans in treating Joseonjok. The other reason is South Korea is not an attractive place to

pursue prospective careers for young Joseonjok. From young Joseonjok’s perspectives, South

Korea is not an exciting country because they have already experienced similar cultural traditions

as Korean descendants in their home place (Kwon 2015). Thus, my informant noted that many

young Joseonjok wanted to explore new countries that were full of foreign and exciting

experiences. Many young Joseonjok students, like those Chinese students wish to go to North

America or Europe as students (Liu-Farrer 2011), but the procedure is not easy for them to meet

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the requirements. Hence, Japan, which welcomes student migrants, become their prioritized

destinations. In addition, Joseonjok in most cases had already learned Japanese at schools before

they moved to Japan.

Jongsuk (Male, 25, IT Engineer, arrived in Japan in 2014), who is working as an engineer in

Japan, talked about his motivation to move his position to the headquarters in his company in

Tokyo.

I used to work at a Japanese IT firm in Shanghai. One day, there was an exclusive interview for sending some

engineers to the headquarters in Japan. I took the interview session and passed. It was a group interview with

a bunch of Han Chinese co-workers. Their Japanese wasn’t good enough. One interviewer asked me to work

in the headquarters. And I said, “Yes.” I knew it would be an excellent opportunity to experience the Japanese

working culture. I was satisfied with the result, and I decided to relocate to the headquarters in Tokyo. I am

learning a lot about the businesses relating to IT, and I wish to stay here longer and pursue my higher

education while working in my firm.

I first met Jongsuk at an OKTA meeting in July 2017. He was outspoken and showed gentle

leadership during the conference meeting. After a while, I conducted an interview at a coffee shop

in the Omotesando area. He learned Japanese as a foreign language from his ethnic schools in

Liaoning province. He graduated from a prestigious university in Shanghai. When he described

his internship experience at a Korean firm, his complexion became darker and showed animosity

against South Koreans. When he did an internship at a Korean company in Shanghai, he

experienced harsh discrimination by the Korean employer. Eventually, he decided not to work at

the Korean firms. Through his experiences, he realized that Korean society reveals strong

characteristics of ethnic homogeneity and acts as a single ethnic nation that forms unified national

identity (Ahn 2016). He further noticed Koreans’ strong homogeneity made them exclude other

ethnic and racial minorities from their closed society. Indeed, Joseonjok are no exception from the

Korean people’s perspectives on foreigners. “Korean society looks over the diversity of migrants,

but only focuses on hierarchy of migrant’s economic status and nationality. This hierarchy is easily

divided between migrants who are laborers or not, Asian or not, and especially marital migrant or

not” (Jung 2016: 71). Due to his negative experience with the Korean firm, he applied to a

Japanese IT firm and got accepted. His highly scored JLPT38 Level 2 test played a critical role in

38 JLPT (日本語能力試験・Nihongo Nōryoku Shiken) is a standardized language test to certify Japanese proficiency

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getting hired at the Japanese IT company. Many of his Han Chinese co-workers envied him and

wanted to work at the main office in Tokyo. Presently, he enjoys working at a new office in the

heart of Tokyo.

Another informant, Gapsoo (Male, 45, Entrepreneur, arrived in Japan in 1999), who owns his

ethnic business in Takashimadaira, told me about his situation of coming to Japan as his secondary

choice.

I used to work at a Korean construction company in Africa. Unfortunately, the company went bankrupt. I had

no option but to come back to China. I pondered how to get a new job. I was thinking of going to Southern

coastal cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou, or Shenzhen. Or I was looking for employment in the U.S. During

this time of my struggle, I knew there were several agencies recruiting applicants for study abroad in Japan.

The agencies were located in the Yanbian district, including Yanji, Helong, and Longjing. Among various

options, I ended up choosing one recruiting company to go to Japan as a language school student. To be

honest, I really wanted to go to Korea Town in LA for the construction job. However, I ended up coming to

Japan as an alternative choice. I was a bit older to start my university education in Japan. After all, I had to

finish language school to get a job in the Japanese labor market.

Before moving to Japan, Gapsoo used to work at a Korean construction company in Libya,

Africa. His former company was known as one of the biggest construction companies in South

Korea, but the IMF Economic Crisis arose in South Korea in the late 1990s. After the bankruptcy,

he returned to China and pondered over where to move and work again. He had several options

regarding his next destination such as coastal cities in China, Korea Town areas in Los Angeles,

and Japan. Among those various options, he had but to choose to go to Japan. He had to leave his

home because the economy of China in the 1990s was not prosperous. Under this situation, he

hesitated to go to the U.S. because of the difficulty of getting a visa and language barrier. He did

not even want to go to South Korea because he knew the severe discrimination against Joseonjok.

In conclusion, Japan was the most attractive and least costly country to start his new life. Gapsoo,

as well as other Joseonjok informants, mentioned that Japan allowed studying at school and

working at the same time. Without the work-and-study system, no Joseonjok student could afford

for foreigners and non-native speakers. The test evaluates test taker’s vocabulary, reading comprehension, and

listening skills. The test is divided into five different levels: N1, N2, N3, N4, N5. N1 is the highest level and N5 is the

lowest one.

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the expensive tuition and living expenses in Japan. Gapsoo went to one nihon ryūgaku (Study

Abroad in Japan) agency in Longjiang, Jilin Province and found out one Japanese language school.

He finally settled in Japan after the language training and now is engaged in transnational

entrepreneurship of small business and acts as a supporter for Joseonjok communities in Tokyo. I

will explain the case of Joseonjok communities in Japan in the later section.

Gayoon (Female, 34, IT Engineer, arrived in Japan in 2016) talked about her particular case

of her decision to stay in Japan and her easy entry into Japanese society.

I graduated from a university in China and worked at a Korean firm for ten years. I was exhausted

working for ten years in China. I decided to take one gap year and went to a Japanese language school.

It was relaxing and fun. I didn’t do any part-time jobs because I brought my savings to spend for a

year. Once a year passed, I didn’t want to go back to China. Actually, I don’t really have a strong

attachment to China. It is not my homeland. I am a kind of a stranger in China. I realized that Japan

was a more comfortable place to live. I searched for a job through a recruitment website. Luckily,

there was one job opening at an IT firm that was looking for somebody who could speak Korean. So,

I applied it right away and got into the firm. I was so lucky. Now, I am considering naturalization. I

love my job. Co-workers are so friendly here. I made many Japanese and Korean friends at my

workplace. Without the one-year Japanese language training, I wouldn’t have thought about living in

Japan.

Gayoon’s case is different from other informants who entered Japanese language schools

for their study and work. She came to Japan to take a gap year by attending a Japanese language

school. She used to work at a Korean IT company in Suzhou, China, for ten years. She had many

chances to interact with Korean customers and went on business trips to Korea several times. She

primarily did not like the working conditions back in China. She took a break from working in

China and decided to explore Japan. She brought her savings, so she did not have to do part-time

jobs. When she was attending the language school, she traveled extensively in Japan during the

holidays. When the end of the term was getting closer, she decided not to leave Japan. She thought

Japan was a better place to live than China. She liked the surroundings of Japan. As Liu-Farrer

asserts, “Japan, like many other destinations, provides a safe haven for some, and an emancipatory

space for others” (2020: 30). After all, she searched job findings through employment websites

and found one international IT firm looking for employees with long working experience and

fluent Korean skills. Gayoon’s past career fit into the requirements of the company. In the end, she

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got the position. Currently, she is working at one international IT firm in Tokyo. The atmosphere

of her company is flexible and international. Her boss is Japanese, who used to live in Canada for

more than ten years. The majority of co-workers are South Koreans who spent many years in Japan.

She gets along with them well.

Another informant, Sooae (Female, 23, Trade, arrived in Japan in 2014), talked about her

particular motivation to come to Japan, which was based on her love toward a man in Japan.

I came to Japan because of my ex-Zainichi Korean boyfriend. He was an exchange student at my university

in Beijing. I followed him and wanted to understand his cultural background. Let’s say the power of love was

the primary reason to be in Japan. Then, I enrolled in an MA program that provided lectures in English. In

fact, I learned English as my second language at Han Chinese schools. I put a lot of effort to learn English in

China. That’s why my English is better than my Japanese. In fact, I didn’t have to enroll in language school

to get in my graduate school. I only learned Japanese when I was in the fourth year at my university. After I

arrived in Japan, I did several part-time jobs. I first worked at an izakaya and drug store. My Japanese got

better because of my everyday conversation with my customers. I also did English tutoring for Japanese

students. In a way, I can speak four languages, so I think I am lucky.

Sooae was an open-minded and very active person. I was impressed by her youthful energy

during the interview. She completed an MA degree at a prestigious university in Kyoto and got a

job offer from a trading company in Tokyo. She straightforwardly explained that she came to Japan

because of her ex-Zainichi Korean boyfriend. After getting to know her ex-boyfriend’s ethnic

background, she got curious about Japanese society. While she was dating, she felt familiar with

her boyfriend because Zainichi Koreans and Joseonjok are the same ethnic Koreans who settled in

two different foreign countries. Before coming to Japan, she took Japanese courses at her

university in Beijing. She applied to a graduate school which provided lectures in English. Due to

her proficient English skill, she tutored English to Japanese and Zainichi Koreans. Indeed, she

seems to be very much satisfied with her life in Japan. Her original motivation to come to Japan

coupled with her academic pursuit brought about her happy life in Japan. Chunza initially came to

Japan for love, but she eventually pursed the economic opportunities that the migration to Japan

afforded her.

As an aged group of Joseonjok Eunok (Female, 62, Retired, arrived in Japan in 1993)

showed some different backgroungd of her coming to Japan from those of the majority Joseonjok

who had to work and study.

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After my husband completed his Ph.D. in China, he got a research position at one university in Tokyo. So,

our family had to move to Tokyo. From the beginning, I was not planning to live here permanently. I used to

be a civil worker in China with a descent salary. I had a good life back in China. At first, I was not motivated

to learn Japanese culture and language. I thought that I would be going back to China, but my husband

decided to work here, and my daughter already got used to Japanese culture. In 1996, a friend of my husband’s

introduced one company to start my new career in Japan. I knew many Joseonjok had a tough time to study

and work at the beginning. I was lucky to gain a connection easily in getting my job.

I first met Eunoak at a spring picnic arranged by the Joseonjok Women Associaiton in late

March 2018. She was retired from one multinational firm and explained it was her first time

participating in an event organized by Joseonjok community. One month later, I arranged her

interview at a coffee shop nearby Ochanomizu station. I first asked her edudcational background

and what made her settle in Japan. She was born and raised in Yanji, Jilin Province and went to

Korean ethnic schools from her elementary to high schools. Then, she majored in economics at

one university in Jilin Province. Before arriving in Japan, she worked for the Chinese government

and gave birth to her daughter. One day, her husband was assigned to work as a researcher at one

university in Tokyo. All of sudden, her family had to move to Tokyo. However, she believed that

she would go back to China when her husband finished his research project. After her husband

completed his project, he got a job offer from another university in Tokyo. Under this situation,

she decided not to return to China. She explained that she struggled to overcome boredom in the

foreign country and complained her situation to her husband. One day, a friend of her husband’s

introduced a new workplace to her. After all, thanks to her husband’s higher education background,

she gained her comfortable life by securing “the patronage and protection” (Esman 1996: 319) as

a migrant in Japan.

The last informant Hyeja (Female, 63, NGO Founder, arrived in Japan in 1998) who have

actively participated in voluntary work for Joseonjok community talked about her experiences of

coming to Japan. She also talked about how she had overcome her difficult life situation in China

by moving into Japan.

I met my Japanese husband in Shanghai. He was researching about China, Korea, and Japan in a research

center. I spent a lot of time with him while I was working at a company. His Korean was fluent, and he knew

a lot of things about Joseonjok. He didn't look down on my ethnicity. Yeah, we magically fell in love. He

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asked me to come and live with him in Japan. While I was working in Shanghai, I had a tough time. My mom

and ex-husband passed away, and I sent my son to Korea. The work was too demanding and stressful. I hated

the Han Chinese's work ethics. At first, I hesitated to go to Japan. I felt like I was escaping from reality. But

my husband suggested to me that I could do something productive and meaningful in Japan. He told me that

I could teach Korean to Japanese people at a community center. Finally, I accepted his idea and decided to

live in Japan.

Hyeja runs one Joseonjok community-based NGO in Tokyo. Before arriving in Japan, she

used to work at a Korean trading company in Shanghai. She told me that she was hired by the

Korean company because she understtod both Korean and Chinese business cultures very well. In

the 1990s, she was having a tough time due to the loss of her ex-husband and the heavy workload

at her company. After her ex-husband’s death, she was burdened to work and take care of her son

at the same time. So, she decided to send her early-teen son to Seoul, Korea where her brother

lived. Then, she became a workaholic to release her deep sorrow from losing her husband. Then,

she met her Japanese husband. They got closer while they were working together. Her husband

noticed that Hyeja was suffering from stress at work, and unhappy family situation. He suggested

her to marry him and work in Japan. On the other hand, she felt guilty that she was running away

from her life problems. Besides, she thought that she was too old to learn a new and foreign culture

and language in Japan. However, her husband kept convincing her to live in Japan so as she could

pursue a more emotionally comfortable life. Her husband also asked her to teach Korean at one

local ward community center. She taught Korean targeting elderly residents nearby her

neighborhood and the students who were interested in Korean culture and food. Sometimes, she

invited her Joseonjok and Zainichi Korean friends to help her hold Kimchi making classes. From

that time on, she became settled and led her steady life in Japan.

Most of the above informants showed common motivation for coming to Japan to lead an

affluent life and enjoy the amenities which were not available back in China. More than anything

else, they were economically motivated to achieve a successful life in Japan. To be sure, the wage

disparities between China and Japan provided the strong motivation to young Joseonjok in China.

To that point, Liu-Farrer argues “people move abroad in order to move up the social ladder and

economic ladder back home. Economic promise is undoubtedly the biggest motivating factor for

immigrants to Japan, especially for people from countries that are economically less developed

than Japan” (Liu-Farrer 2020: 25). However, they were also attracted by higher education

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circumsances and career opportunities in Japan. As a matter of course, there are some other cases

for Joseonjok to decide to come to Japan such as marriage migration and family union. Nonetheless,

the majority of Joseonjok have entered Japan as students. They have mostly gone through the

procedure of language school-university-employment before they settle in Japanese society.

Overall, the motivation and the process of Joseonjok migration to Japan can be explained through

the various migration theories discussed in Chapter 2 of the literature review. However, push-pull

factors and wage disparities between China and Japan acted as fundamental motives for Joseonjok

to get encouraged to move to Japan. Through their social networks they fostered their motivations

to leave their home places in China toward the new settlements in Japan. The above sample scripts

selected from my interview pool cannot fully illustrate the varied motivations of Joseonjok’s

coming to Japan However, the scripts of the discourses at least showed the common factors of the

diverse motivations of Joseonjok looking for better economic opportunities in their new life in

Japan.

4.6 The Life of Joseonjok Students in Japan

Student migration is an essential resource for the Japanese economy as well as the social

structure. Some Japanese private universities suffering from decreases in student enrollment

beckon the international students to fill the empty seats of the classrooms. In the meantime, Japan

also solves the problem of labor shortage through the supply of highly-skilled and low-skilled

student migrants in the primary and secondary sectors of their labor market. In this situation, Japan

has accepted a high number of Chinese students to supplement the labor force needed to vitalize

their economy (Le Bail 2013). Japan has already opened its door to Chinese students as well as

other nationals in East and Southeast Asia. Japan noticed the students eventually turn into good

labor resources after finishing their education in Japan. As Le Bail pointed out, “due to the status

transfer system where student visas are switched for one of 13 visas for skilled workers, many

Chinese people do settle in Japan after their studies” (Le Bail 2013: 25). The settlement of Chinese

student migration in Japan follows the process of status changes from student visa, working visa,

and to permanent visa. To this migration phenomenon, Roberts also indicates that Japan’s student

migration is virtually an alternative way for labor migration and Japan has opened itself to

immigration streams through side doors (Roberts 2013).

Finally, with the hope of successful life, Joseonjok students leave their homes in Dongbei

and arrive in Japan. They usually get help through their personal networks or the arrangement of

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language schools when they start their new life in Japan. More than anything else, they have to

earn their living and tuition costs while going to school. Thus, the majority of Joseonjok students

have to work through their schools (Kwon 2015). They often have to work multiple part-time jobs

violating the legal limit of 28-hour work per week regulation for international students in Japan.

Most of Joseonjok students confront financial difficulties except for those whose parents are in

South Korea working to support their children in Japan (Kwon 2012). However, these Joseonjok

students still have to work to cover the principal portion of their expenses while studying in Japan.

As is known, language schools in Japan were established to give Japanese language courses

to international students who wish to pursue a degree in Japanese universities (Liu-Farrer 2011).

The system of the language schools mentioned here are different from the language courses

provided by the university programs. The language schools are commercially set up to absorb the

demand for Japanese language learning, especially for those students coming from the adjacent

countries in East Asia. Most Joseonjok enroll language schools as the first step to migrate into

Japan. Interestingly, Joseonjok students usually gather together to some specific schools where the

majority of the students are Joseonjok (Kwon 2015). These types of schools usually target

Joseonjok students, establishing networks with Joseonjok agencies back in Northeast China. Most

Joseonjok students arrive in Japan equipped with basic Japanese proficiency acquired in their

ethnic schools in China. At least, they are not at the rudimentary level when they enroll in the

language schools. Evidently, Joseonjok students learn Japanese much faster than Han Chinese

students in language schools because of their learning experience of Japanese language in China

(Ibid.). However, they still have to put a lot of efforts into mastering a high enough level to gain

accesses to Japanese universities. It takes one to two years to finish the language course work. In

particular, the language schools set the timetable in the morning and in the evening to keep up with

the working schedules of the students (Liu-Farrer 2011). To this context, one informant, Hyomi

(Female, 26, BA Student, arrived in Japan in 2010) talked about her experience of working part-

time jobs as a language school student.

I did several part-time jobs. I am still doing one of them now. In the beginning, I was not good at speaking

Japanese, so I worked at a Korean restaurant for several months. When I realized my Japanese improved, I

decided to challenge myself working at a restaurant owned by Japanese. My next workplace was one sushi

chain restaurant. It was a good experience working there because I learned Japanese business cultures and

had a chance to observe Japanese society. Today, I had an interview for my new part-time job. I will start

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working in a guest house next week. The owner wanted to hire someone like me who could speak multiple

languages such as Chinese, Korean, English, and other European languages. I am excited to start my new

part-time job.

I first met Hyomi at one Korean community church in the Shinokubo area. According to

my observation, she got along well with Koreans and spoke Korean without Joseonjok dialect. I

exaplined I was a Ph. D candidate researching Joseonjok migrants in Japan. After she heard my

brief introduction about my project, she responded she would like to help my research, and she

also ased me to help her to get some information on applying for graduate schools. So, I told her I

could share the information of my home institution after the interview. Hyomi used to major in

engineering at a university located in Liaoning province. She quitted her undergraduate studies

after finishing the second year. She was not satisfied with her living in China and wanted to study

abroad. She also explained that she worked at a Korean restaurant when her Japanese level was at

a beginner level. One year later, she left the Korean restaurant and found a new job at one Sushi

chain restaurant owned by Japanese. She told me her Japanese improved in a year and became

confident to interact with more Japanese people. Needless to say, Japanese language skill is an

essential survival tool for migrants to pursue smoother lives within Japanese society (Gottlieb

2012). Hyomi found a new part-time job which encouraged her to use her multilingual skills and

interact with people from diverse countries.

In the initial stage of Joseonjok migration at language schools, Joseonjok students have to

study and work at the same time. As a consequence, they have too much workload in their everyday

life in the new country away from home. They are likely to confront physical and psychological

hardship during the years at language school (Kwon 2015). They usually suffer from financial

difficulties. As international students they have to engage in low-quality jobs with low pay. Thus,

they have to work more hours for their financial security. They mostly work in the secondary sector

in Japanese job markets such as construction, restaurants, convenience stores, and even bars. With

the heavy workload, they still have to burn the midnight oil for their Japanese language study.

Accommodation is one indispensable element of Joseonjok’s early life in language schools.

They usually live in a small dormitory. The dormitories here are not like those in the universities.

They are located in commercial buildings to house the tightly budgeted international students.

They are mostly compact and shabby dwelling facilities. However, these kinds of dormitories are

popular among new arrivals in Japan due to the low cost (Coates 2015). Joseonjok students, in

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general, live in small space, sharing the facilities with other people. They do not have any contact

with landlords, but they just pay the rent to the management companies. The roommates mostly

consist of Joseonjok friends, relatives, or schoolmates. During my fieldwork, I met some Joseonjok

students who were in language schools and universities. They talked about their accommodations

in their student life. Most of my informants told me they lived in dormitories where they had to

rough it with shabby facilities and compact space. Some other Joseonjok students rented a whole

house to share the rent and utilities while enjoying a more spacious room with their friends or

school mates. The last group lived together with their relatives or friends who had arrived in Japan

earlier than them. For the most part, Joseonjok students had to face inconvenience until they

become financially independent. One of my informnats, Soomi (Female, 43, International School

Teacher, arrived in Japan in 1999) described her student life by associating with the

accommodation.

I moved around many places when I first came to Tokyo. I first lived in a dorm of my language school. Next,

I lived with a Korean roommate. I got acquainted with her at one Korean community church. After getting a

job, I lived in a dormitory of my company. Before I married, the conditions were not good. It was a tough

time. The living conditions were terrible until I finally got a nice job and got married

To Joseonjok students to study and work together is a kind of boon for their life because they

can accomplish their goals all by themselves. However, they often suffer from the heavy workload

during their school life. Under these circumstances, getting a job is crucial to lead their life in

Japan. Joseonjok students often get jobs through their personal networks with their relatives,

friends, or Joseonjok communities (Kwon 2015). In general, Joseonjok students maintain strong

ties with other early arrived Joseonjok in Japan. They mostly get help from Joseonjok networks

when they arrive in Japan, particularly in finding jobs and accommodations. More importantly,

they resort to Joseonjok portal sites to get the information needed for their initial life in Japan as

language students. They constantly ask for help through the networks of Joseonjok communities.

In particular, they often find jobs from the ads in the most influential Joseonjok digital newspaper

“Shimto” (Lee and Lee 2015) especially when they fail to get practical help from their personal

networks. The digital site of Shimto has a variety of direct job offers or postings of agencies which

Joseonjok students count on. Other than Joseonjok portal sites Joseonjok students also search the

websites of the South Korean community, which often give job opportunities in businesses or

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enterprises in Japan. Overall, they learned knowledge at school and at the same time they became

streetwise while working in their part-time jobs. They practically have a great chance to learn about

Japanese society in their workplace.

The life experiences of Joseonjok students have become the foundation for their career

prospects. In a way, they build social capital and learn life skills through training at work. Their

sweats from the toil during their school years compensate them with the successful life in the long

run. As Liu-Farrer indicated, “the early student years are all important period for the Chinese

students to accumulate human and social capital for their future career in Japan” (Liu-Farrer 2011:

75). Chinese students, as well as Joseonjok students, learn and practice the Japanese language more

efficiently at work. They also learn the norms and values of Japanese society while working with

Japanese people at work. They often experience frustrating moments at work because of social and

cultural differences. However, those experiences, in the long run, became their means to cope with

the cultural discrepancy between the migrants and natives. Indeed, those school years are the

foundation of their future life in Japan. In other words, they learn knowledge at school and learn

life skills at work. After graduating from the universities, they eventually come to work as

employees in the primary sector of the Japanese labor market. Joseonjok students ordinarily spend

four to seven years (Liu-Farrer 2011) in Japanese educational institutions and jump into the ocean

of the Japanese job world. Finally, Joseonjok students are ready to start their new life after they

secure their stable jobs in Japan.

4.7 The Settlement of Joseonjok Students in Japan

After finishing their schools in Japan, most Joseonjok students do not return to their home

places in China (Kwon 2015). Instead, they stay in Japan for better career opportunities as well as

better living conditions. Although the Chinese economy has improved tremendously, there is still

a profound income disparity between the two countries. More than anything else, the discrepancy

of the earnings is the main factor of decision making to stay in Japan. In many cases of Chinese

students in Japan, the economic factor of income and living conditions are the two most important

reasons to decide to stay in Japan (Liu 2016). More particularly, if Joseonjok students return to

China after graduation, they will have to realize that there is no guarantee of their successful life

because most of them did not major in science or technology. In many cases, Joseonjok students

get degrees in humanities, and they would be better off in Japan than in China with their humanity

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background. With all those arduous efforts at schools, Joseonjok students are equipped with

Japanese language proficiency and the credentials from Japanese universities, and they make entry

into the Japanese job market. It is noteworthy Japanese language skill of international students in

Japan is one important factor to decide to stay in Japan after graduation from Japanese universities.

International students who primarily use English in Japanese universities show the tendency to

leave Japan following their graduation (Liu 2016: 7).

Indeed, English is seldom used in Japan as a practical medium of social life. It is difficult

for those English only speaking students to procure employment since most positions require

proficiency in Japanese (Ibid.). In contrast, the international students who learned Japanese can

easily secure employment and they are likely to stay in Japan for their career opportunities and

permanent residency (Ibid.). For example, students from China and Vietnam who are fluent in

Japanese tend to remain in Japan after all their studies on Japanese campuses. The simple fact is

that Japanese firms prefer to hire foreigners who have graduated from higher educational

institutions in Japan (Yamaguchi and Maeda 2015). Furthermore, Japanese fluency is almost

always required for foreigners working in Japanese job markets. Under this Japanese employment

system, Joseonjok fit for diverse positions and get hired as highly-skilled foreign workers due to

their Japanese proficiency. As a result, many Joseonjok students are likely to stay in Japan after

finishing their education in Japanese universities (Kwon 2015).

When Joseonjok students accomplish their academic goals, they tend to go directly to the real

job world. However, the job searching process usually starts a year before they graduate from

universities. Most Joseonjok students like those of mainstream Japanese students initiate their job

search in the last year of the university following the Japanese employment system39. They often

participate in job fairs or company recruitment events. Sometimes, they directly contact job

openings through internet postings. In some cases, they still make the most of their personal

networks from their professors or senior alumni (senpai) working in the related fields. As is known,

social networks have been one of the most important channels for locating jobs (Liu-Farrer 2011).

Traditionally, the referral system throughout the world used to be the principal source to secure the

jobs. As this system is mostly useful for the secondary job markets for low-wage laborers,

39 Long-term employment and seniority-based wage are generally recognized as major traits of the Japanese

Employment System (Hattori and Maeda 2000). Some of my Joseonjok informants expressed that there is a glass

ceiling in Japanese firms that foreigners cannot enter.

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Joseonjok often used this referral system for their part-time jobs while they were in schools (Kwon

2015). Then, they have to face institutional measures to have broader chances of finding highly-

skilled jobs in the primary sector of the Japanese labor market.

Japan has a very well-organized system of recruitment for college graduates. The last year of

university is thus a crucial period for the students to secure the jobs in Japanese corporate

companies. In Japan, academic reputation acts as a priority in selecting employees in high-quality

job positions in the job market of big companies. It is quite likely that most Chinese students,

including Joseonjok students, are not from prestigious universities in Japan. Thus, the chances of

getting hired by a top-tiered enterprise are slim. Therefore, they mostly have to find positions in

small-and-medium-sized firms (Liu-Farrer 2011). Although Joseonjok students have little chance

of getting jobs in big companies, they still have opportunities of employment in the particular

corporate firms where they can be valued more than native Japanese because of their multilingual

work capacities (Shoji 2008). Besides, Joseonjok students like Chinese students are often highly

evaluated as job applicants in transnational niche job markets (Kwon 2015). Notably, Japanese

corporate companies eager to hire foreign workers based on human capital such as Japanese

language skills and an understanding of Japanese corporate culture (JILPT 2013; Hashimoto 2017).

As was mentioned earlier, Joseonjok employees have already accumulated sufficient human

capital during their school years in language schools and higher education where they had chances

to work part-time jobs and learned Japanese work culture and ethics.

4.8 Joseonjok Community and their Social Life

Joseonjok do not have their own district of ethnic villages or towns to be called as their own

Joseonjok diasporas in Japan (Kwon 2015). In other words, they do not have their own collective

residential areas or some particular quarters of their own ethnic businesses in the cities of Japan

(Kim 2018). As a matter of fact, Joseonjok are scattered all over Japan from the north in Aomori

prefecture to the south in Fukuoka prefecture. However, they have mostly come to Tokyo, Aichi,

Saitama, and Osaka (Kwon 2015), and yet, the majority of them reside in Tokyo area.

The following Figure 4.2 indicates the distribution of overall Joseonjok population in Japan

which is concentrated in the Kanto area. As is known, Tokyo is the center of Kanto.

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Figure 4.2: Joseonjok Population Distribution in Japan

(Retrieved from “Shimto” digital newspaper)

Table 4.1: Regional Distribution of Joseonjok in Japan based on the Shimto Subscribers

Kanto57%Kansai

11%

Others32%

The Regional Distribution of Joseonjok Population in Japan

Users Yamanashi 51 Yamaguchi 25

Hokkaido 112 Toyama 41 Tottori 15

Aomori 36 Nagano 90 Shimane 24

Akita 25 Ishikawa 47 Kagawa 19

Iwate 46 Fukui 24 Tokushima 20

Miyagi 95 Aichi 457 Kochi 19

Yamagata 41 Shizuoka 165 Ehime 31

Fukushima 66 Gifu 54 Fukuoka 163

Niigata 79 Mie 64 Saga 8

Tokyo 2289 Osaka 539 Nagasaki 10

Saitama 847 Kyoto 151 Kumamoto 39

Chiba 766 Hyogo 185 Oita 31

Kanagawa 800 Nara 30 Miyazaki 16

Ibaraki 166 Shiga 69 Kagoshima 29

Tochigi 112 Wakayama 16 Okinawa 28

Gunma 75 Okayama 54 Total 8170

Hiroshima 101

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The online newspaper “Shimto” also introduced the number of digital subscribers of

Joseonjok according to the scattered area throughout the Japanese archipelago.

When Joseonjok settle in the host society of Japan, they realize housing is one of the most

fundamental provisions for their migrant life. They usually spend four to seven years in the

dormitories while they were pursuing their academic goals, and then Joseonjok move to their own

space of residence after they are employed in Japanese corporate companies. Most of the Joseonjok

I met during my fieldwork lived in a public housing complex (danchi, 団地) built by government

authorities. The public housings of danchi are located in the outskirts of Tokyo metropolis. Overall,

Joseonjok either own their apartments or lease them. Joseonjok are likely to gather together in

particular danchies with their friends or relatives although their gatherings are not formed in a

mass. In some cases, they gather together to the danchies which are mostly occupied by Chinese

inhabitants. However, Joseonjok are mostly dispersed following their workplaces nearby urban

areas. Housing is a crucial component in their migrant life in Japan. Furthermore, housing quality

is a key indicator of a successful migrant life. As is often the case, the early arrived Joseonjok who

successfully settled in Japan tend to own single houses in urban residential areas. According to my

survey, a smaller number of Joseonjok in Japan own their houses or apartments, and more of them

still rent the apartments in danchies

Joseonjok in Japan sparsely live together in the outskirts of Tokyo such as Saitama and Chiba

where the rent is comparatively lower than that of metropolitan areas of Tokyo (Kwon 2015).

Although Joseonjok have not formed their central place for their collective living, some of them

gather together and organize various groups of meetings. Joseonjok in Japan have become more

gregarious than they were in home places in Northeast China. Not surprisingly, there are various

Joseonjok organizations in the Tokyo area such as alumni meetings, amateur soccer clubs, business

meetings, and student meetings (Ibid.,). Kwon also introduced one particular organization, namely

“Chonji Club40” which has long existed as a backbone of the Joseonjok community in Japan (Kwon

40 天池協会・천지협회

It is the very first Joseonjok community in Japan established in 2000. This community organized the gatherings known

as dance party, sport event, end of the year party, and new year party.

83

2015: 216). The members of this club hold all kinds of gatherings in Tokyo area such as sports

meetings, dance parties, year-end parties, seminars, job fairs, fundraisings and more (Ibid.,). There

is one indispensable Joseonjok organization “Dongbang Hagwoo Hae41 (東方学友会)” which was

founded as an alumni meeting of Joseonjok university in Yanbian, Northeast China. It is the first

Joseonjok organization in Japan (Ibid.,). They also hold various meetings for their members as

well as other Joseonjok. More importantly, they take up the influential positions in Japanese society

and they usually give help to other Joseonjok organizations by acting as seniors (Senpai 先輩).

There is one more particular organization of Joseonjok, namely “Joseonjok Women’s Association”

which plays an important role among Joseonjok in the Tokyo area. As was introduced in the

previous chapter, this organization was formed initially to foster friendship and exchange

information among Joseonjok women in the Kanto area. Over time, it has evolved into being the

most active organization in Joseonjok society in Japan. It provides practical help to the Joseonjok

community, and it further makes opportunities for Joseonjok women to get socialized and do

volunteer work, and more importantly, exchange information regarding second-generation

education in Japan. Furthermore, the members of the association help newcomer Joseonjok settle

in Japanese society. The most significant accomplishment of this women’s association is the

establishment of Joseonjok weekend language school for Joseonjok children. The school

contributes to the education of the second generation Joseonjok to enhance their multilingual

ability.

In the following, I will illustrate three interview scripts to show how Joseonjok get along

with other ethnic Joseonjok compatriots through the meetings of the organization of their own

communities.

I didn't know there were various types of Joseonjok communities in Japan. My family, including myself,

arrived in Japan earlier than the majority of Joseonjok, and I was busy working and taking care of my daughter.

There was a small circle of Joseonjok researchers, but many of them went back to China. So, the chances of

gathering with Joseonjok became weaker. I mostly hung out with coworkers. In my company, there was a

variety of people from different countries such as Han Chinese, Joseonjok, Koreans, Taiwanese, Americans,

and Japanese. I maintained a good relationship with them. One day, one of my Joseonjok coworkers invited

41 東方学友会・동방학우회

It is a private organization based on alumni of Yanbain University, China. This Joseonjok community was organized

in the early stage of Joseonjok migration in Japan and has contributed to the development of Joseonjok society in

Japan.

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me to some Joseonjok communities through WeChat. I am now retired and have plenty of time. I am planning

to reach out to Joseonjok as often as possible. I want to help them as much as I can. I would like to share

experiences and give some life tips such as career and child-rearing to younger Joseonjok.

(Eunoak, Female, 62, Retired, Arrived in Japan in 1993)

Since 2017, I joined some Joseonjok communities. I discovered many kinds of groups based on their

respective interests. In fact, I am interested in launching my own trade business in a few years. So, joining

the OKTA Chiba business circle was meaningful. I came to know many successful Joseonjok and Overseas

Korean entrepreneurs. Thanks to the meetings of this particular group of businesspeople I could expand my

social network. Before joining this circle, I was afraid of becoming friends with Koreans, but I found friendly

Koreans to reach out and discuss ideas regarding my business plan.

(Hyun, Male, 33, Trade, Arrived in Japan in 2006)

I didn't have fun at Joseonjok communities. I met some Joseonjok who came to Japan earlier. The people

over there always try to emphasize the hackneyed emotion of typical Joseonjok. "Oh, we are all pitiful

Joseonjok. We are the minority of the minorities in Japan, so we should always get together and help each

other." Somehow, I didn't feel comfortable with these phrases. From my point of view, the phrases contained

negative notions that Joseonjok were powerless, incompetent, and marginalized. I do not completely agree

with them. In general, the meetings were unproductive. As I expected, those people at the gathering drank an

excessive amount of alcohol and got tipsy. It was a total waste of time and money. They used to do the exact

same thing back in Yanbian. Joseonjok from Yanbian are well-known for being lousy all the time. I do

understand why Koreans look down on us. I am not going there anymore. I remember talking with a rude

and horrible Joseonjok guy. He said terrible things about Japanese, Koreans, and Han Chinese. I could tell

he was a racist. Basically, I got the impression that people at the Joseonjok meeting were complaining about

their lives in Japan.

(Gayoon, Female, 34, IT Engineer, Arrived in Japan in 2016)

According to the above narratives, Joseonjok communities in Japan emphasize a

collectivity including "real or putative ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural

focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood" (Mackerrass

2003: 11). The Joseonjok communities in Japan also identify themselves from others with "pride

and seek out membership of a minority ethnic group, even if their claim looks suspect to outsider

observers" (Ibid., 11). However, Gayoon felt conflicted against members from the Joseonjok

communities. She was disappointed at their attitudes. Basically, people immigrate to countries with

expectation and optimism (Cebolla-Boado and Soysal 2017). Unfortunately, Gayoon got negative

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impression after attending one Joseonjok gathering. The community seemed to be unproductive

and discouraging to Gayoon’s standpoint. For her better life in Japan, she decided not to participate

in Joseonjok gatherings. Even so, it is noteworthy that Gayoon’s narrative only reflects some

personal impression against Joseonjok gatherings. Overall, there are more of positive things that I

found during my fieldwork in that Joseonjok gatherings function as important parts of their migrant

life in Japan.

When it comes to analyzing Joseonjok in Japan, their media consumption is one

indispensable element which shows the inside stories of their individual migrant life. As Lee and

Lee indicated, “Language and cultural proximity are crucial factors in homeland media use for

entertainment and information” (Lee and Lee 2015: 29). Most of my informants talked about their

media experiences in China when I asked about their media consumption inclination. They used

to watch South Korean satellite TV from their childhood in China. They mostly watched dramas

and music shows, as well as the news programs telecasted from the South Korean broadcast system

(Choi 2006). Even after they moved to Japan, they still watch South Korean TV. They usually

spend more time watching Korean TV than Japanese or Chinese TV programs. It is clear that their

language and ethnicity drive them to watch Korean TV in Japan. More than anything else,

Joseonjok in Japan rely heavily on the ethnic online newspaper “Shimto” which is undeniably the

most influential media for Joseonjok life in Japan (Lee and Lee 2015). The portal site of Shimto

furnishes all kinds of useful information to Joseonjok readers (Kwon 2015). It is not too much to

say that this on-line newspaper Shimto leads the life of Joseonjok in Japan by furnishing and

updating all the necessary information for Joseonjok migrants. On the whole, Shimto contains a

variety of columns from news to job listings as well as on-line markets and advertisements (Ibid.,).

It also provides access to communication and social interactions among readers in the virtual space.

In this online community, Joseonjok even share their stories arising in their everyday life in Japan.

They sometimes talk about some political matters or even their trifling things of everyday life on

the digital site. Evidently, the site of Shimto has become the most popular and influential

community site where ethnic Joseonjok in Japan freely express their diasporic experiences and

share information for their migrant life in Japan (Lee and Lee 2015).

4.9 Closing

According to the United Nations’ Report in 2019, the number of migrants globally reached

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272 million comprising 3.5 percent of the world population. As was indicated in Chapter 1, the

largest population of migrants is moving in and out of the countries in Asia. More particularly,

East Asia has emerged as one of the most dynamic areas for sending and receiving migrants in

recent years. Since the late 1980s China has become an active country sending emigrants

worldwide, and some of them have chosen Japan as an immigration destination (Liu-Farrer 2011).

In the meantime, Japan has accepted a number of the Chinese migrants as de facto means to absorb

them as immigrants (Le Bail 2013). However, there have prevailed the attitudes of unwelcoming

immigration policies toward foreigners in Japan. In this situation, Chinese migrants in general have

settled in Japan not only for their desire for better life and but also for Japan’s dire needs of labor

supply.

In this chapter, I primarily looked over the progression of Joseonjok migration and

settlement in Japan. The qualitative data retrieved from my fieldwork revealed the diverse aspects

of their life experiences occurring during the course of their movement and settlement in the

Japanese society. I witnessed the real state of Joseonjok life by performing interviews and

observation. In particular, the residence and housing of Joseonjok in the specific areas gave well

founded sources to look at their real-life situation as (im)migrants in the host society of Japan. In

addition, I further analyzed some of the Joseonjok media to get the statistics and retrieve the

information related to their concerns in politics, economy, sports, news, and education.

Overall, I tried to review and analyze the migratory progression of Joseonjok from their

earliest movement from the Korean peninsula to the contemporary migration into Japan. I

investigated the diverse motivations of their migration to Japan followed by the procedures of their

arrival, education, employment, and settlement in the host society. As is shown in this chapter, the

life of Joseonjok is full of varieties with the diverse background of their migration history and

distinctive ethnicity. Evidently, Joseonjok in Japan have become a very much unique minority

group in Japan. There are two central elements that made Joseonjok a distinctive and unique

minority. They are their multilingualism and transnationalism which have acted as the major

ingredients consisting of their multifaceted identity. The discussion of the issues of the two

elements of multilingualism and transnationalism will be dealt with in the following two chapters.

As the last part of this chapter, I intend to look into the prospective development of Joseonjok

migration and settlement in Japan. However, I have come to realize the fact that migration

forecasting is notoriously difficult and unreliable (IOM 2016). Thus, I would not venture to predict

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inclusively how Joseonjok migration will turn out in the future. More than anything else, it is not

possible to get the data on the future trajectories of Joseonjok migration without gathering the

pertinent resources of literature and performing fieldwork. In this situation, I can only account for

the plausible prospects of Joseonjok migration occurring in the future.

The economic progress of China and the shifting immigration policies of Japan will certainly

affect the stream of Joseonjok migration into Japan. Presumably, the flow of Joseonjok migration

will continue to take place as long as there still is a considerable income discrepancy between

China and Japan. Based on the theory of Push-Pull factors, Japan is still an attractive place for

Joseonjok to pursue their dreams. Moreover, there are increasing concerns of the immigration

policies in Japanese society and the immigration policies will finally change to an open-door

system (Akashi 2014). Chances are that Joseonjok in China may not choose to leave for Japan en

masse as was done in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Nowadays, Joseonjok in China have

better chances of employment and entrepreneurship because of the rising economy of China (Yoon

2017). Obviously, they have better options to choose from whether to stay in China or to leave for

other countries. Nevertheless, there are still some Joseonjok in China who are tempted to venture

to go to Japan because they somehow feel the limit of their social mobility as a minority in the

Chinese social structure (Kwon 2015). They know they can make the most of their linguistic and

cultural skills in global businesses (Liu-Farrer 2020) which are conducted in Japanese corporate

world. Furthermore, the income disparity between China and Japan still exists to encourage

Joseonjok to move into Japan for their economic mobility. According to IMF statistics, the nominal

GDP per capita of Japan in 2019 was reported as $ 40,846 while that of China was $ 10,098

(International Monetary Fund 2019). The salient income gap between the two countries undeniably

calls for some Joseonjok to make decisions to move into Japan. As Liu-Farrer points out,

“migration is an economic project” (Liu-Farrer 2020: 117). After all, it remains to be seen how

Joseonjok migration phenomena will be developed along with the change of East Asian economy

and the immigration context of Japan.

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Chapter 5: Issues and Prospects of Multilingualism of Joseonjok in Japan

5.1 Introduction

Nowadays, multilingualism is a prevalent phenomenon all over the world (Cenoz 2013). As

Ivanova points out, “migration leads to considerable shifts in social life, economy, politics, and, of

course, language involving contact and use” (Ivanova 2013: 111). Investigating the multilingual

aspects of Joseonjok migration in Japan is the main purpose of this chapter. It is necessary to

review the correlation between multilingualism and migration before investigating the main

features of the multilingualism of Joseonjok in Japan. Migrants usually face a challenge to leave

their country and learn a new language in the receiving country (Walker 2004). They make the

most of their migration chances to learn a new language (Li and Zhu 2013) and try to become

bilinguals or multilinguals in the host society. After all, the multilingual ability of migrants has

predominantly become a tool for a smoother life in their new settlement. The globalization of the

world economy has encouraged many migrants to set their favorable position as multilinguals in

their migrant life (Krumm and Plutzar 2008). Moreover, in the globalized labor market today, the

demand for multilingual skills is high, and migrants can enjoy the benefits of becoming a

multilingual (Paradowski 2010). Migrants can also expand their business territories in the global

markets by utilizing their multilingual skills.

It is generally accepted that migration and multilingualism have an indispensable relationship,

and the phenomenon of multilingualism ensued from migration has been widespread globally.

Ivanova (2013) indicated, “One of the most noticeable macro-effects of migration is the confluence

of linguistic diversities and formation of new multilingualism all around the world” (111). As a

result of diverse migration waves, multilingualism has been omnipresent these days. Many

migrants can speak different languages due to their language contacts with the society of the

receiving country (Krumm and Plutzar 2008). On the other hand, migrants mostly maintain their

old language (heritage language) while absorbing the new language (target language) in the course

of the new life in their settlement (Cenoz 2013). In this migrating society of the world, multilingual

migrants are prevalent, and multilingualism is commonly accepted in the diverse fields of

contemporary human life. We often have chances to meet multilingual individuals with their

multiple backgrounds of language use. The advantages of being a multilingual who has a larger

linguistic repertoire than a monolingual is countless. Thus, the human capital acquired through

multilingual skills plays a vital role in enhancing the social and economic status of migrants

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(Ivanova 2013).

In the following sections of this chapter, I will delineate the result of my research on the

subject of multilingualism in relation to one particular migrant group of Joseonjok in Japan. The

findings on Joseonjok multilingualism are described in detail concerning their migration and

settlement in Japanese society. I focus on how Joseonjok learned the new language of Japanese

while maintaining their bilingual function of Korean and Chinese. Furthermore, I emphasize how

Joseonjok make use of their multilingual language skills to achieve their economic and social

mobility in Japanese society. This chapter examines how Joseonjok in Japan exploit their

multilingual capacity to fulfill their goals of leading a successful life in the host society of Japan.

It also investigates how Joseonjok practice their multilingual function in their transnational

workplaces and their daily living associated with globalization in East Asia. Moreover, it discusses

the multilingual education of the second generation Joseonjok who are situated in unfavorable

multilingual education policies of Japan. This chapter fundamentally covers the multilingual issues

of Joseonjok in Japan, which are related to the social, economic, and linguistic contexts of

Joseonjok migration comprising the three countries of Japan, China, and South Korea.

5.2 Multilingual Background of Joseonjok in Japan

As an ethnic minority in China, Joseonjok speak Korean as their heritage language, use

Chinese as an official language, and learn Japanese as a foreign language. From the 1980s, the

Chinese government encourages the minority groups to preserve their ethnic heritage cultures and

languages while accentuates the learning of the Chinese language for them to be integrated into

Chinese mainstream society at the same time (Mackerras 1995). As a result, bilingualism is

extremely widespread among the Koreans in China” (Mackerras 1995: 142). For one thing,

Joseonjok have preserved their mother tongues all through their 150 years of immigration history

in China. Compared with other Korean descendants such as Zainichi Koreans and Korean-

Americans who lost their heritage language in their third or fourth generation, Joseonjok still use

Korean as their primary language in China (Hong 2013).

Notwithstanding the domination of China’s “Zhonghua Minzu” ideology, which unifies all

of 56 ethnic groups into one Chinese nationality, Joseonjok have maintained their ethnic culture

and language. Although the Chinese government demonstrated an assimilation policy during the

Cultural Revolution between the 1960s and 1970s, Joseonjok were not significantly affected, but

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rather retained their ethnic identity as Korean-Chinese (Song 2014). It was possible because they

have maintained their Korean lifestyle by living inside their own diasporas which were separated

from mainstream Han Chinese society. China’s assimilation policy did not cause Joseonjok to

change their language preference from Korean to Chinese (Hong 2013). Yet, many Joseonjok still

cherish loyalties to the Chinese government because it offered them citizenship and treated them

equally as one of 56 ethnic groups in China (Kwon 2015). Although they are not linguistically

assimilated to the Chinese language by predominantly using Korean in their daily life, they still

keep their Chinese nationality with their Chinese language competency. In this regard, Korean

becomes the dominant language while Chinese functions as their second language after all the long

elapse of their time in the Chinese territory. However, some Joseonjok lost their Korean because

they left Korean communities and lived inside Han Chinese society (Park JB 2018).

As was indicated in Chapter 2, the multilingual makeup of Joseonjok has been created under

the circumstances of their migration history in the particular area of Northeast China. Joseonjok

have been born and brought up to be bilinguals or multilinguals under their unique diasporic

circumstances in Northeast China (Ibid.). Then, some Joseonjok in China have moved to Japan.

They study in language schools and colleges and become complete trilinguals. They successfully

work in the Japanese labor market by making use of their multilingual capacity. Over time, they

come to construct their distinctive identity based on their multilingual practices during their

settlement in Japanese society. For this situation, Joseonjok tend to view their ethnic language as

their cultural capital42 (Bourdieu 1991) in today’s globalized circumstances.

One of my informants, Ajin (Female, 27, IT Engineer, arrived in Japan in 2009), described

her experience when she first did her job Interview. During the interview, she explained her

multilingual background based on her life history back in China.

I still remember one particular question. The interviewer asked me how come I could speak Korean as a

Chinese national. So, I retorted that I used to live in an ethnic Korean district in China where two languages

were spoken. Then, she asked me further about how my home place became a bilingual town. I answered back

that my ancestors came from the Korean peninsula to settle in Northeast China during the time of Japanese

occupation in Korea. Actually, the interviewer didn’t seem to have any knowledge about the modern history

42 Bourdieu’s work was primarily concerned with the dynamics of power in society, and especially the diverse and

subtle ways in which power is transferred and social order maintained within and across generations. In his book

“Language and Symbolic Power”, Bourdieu contends that linguistic exchanges can express relations of power. It is

clear that Joseonjok’s linguistic power is one indispensable element of their positive identity.

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of China and Korea. I know Japanese people aren’t good at understanding the ethnicity of other people. So, I

had a hard time explaining my multilingual background. I had to illustrate further the history of Joseonjok’s

migration from Korea to China, and then I also explained why and how I came to Japan. In this way, I could

at least assure her how I became multilingual in Japan.

In Ajin’s narrative, her multilingual background was revealed within “old and new

sociospatial context” (Ehlert and Moore 2014) arising both in China and Japan. Somehow, she

demonstrated her complex and multiple identities based on her multilingual competency.

Intrinsically, Korean ethnic education in China played a key role for Joseonjok to preserve the

Korean language and culture in the middle of an assimilative Han Chinese (Mackerras 1995; Choi

2016). Korean ethnic schools in China have implemented “Korean as the primary language of

education and communication” (Choi 2016: 250). For instance, Yanbian People’s Press translated

and published the Chinese textbooks in Korean (Mackerras 1995: 142) to promote Korean

language education. However, Joseonjok also learn Chinese as their mandatory official language

to enter job markets and integrate into the mainstream Chinese society. If the ethnic minorities do

not learn the modern standard Chinese, they will face difficulties in entering universities and job

markets in Chinese society (Mackerras 1995). In this situation, an interesting consequence arises

in that “Han (Chinese) need to know only one language, the members of the minorities must know

two if they wish to preserve their own language” (Mackerras 1995: 144). Joseonjok, as one of the

55 minority groups in China, have been able to preserve Korean and command Chinese to become

bilinguals.

As is shown in her interview, Ajin criticized Japanese society for being exclusive toward

other cultures and being ignorant of the modern history of the neighboring countries. Compared

with Chinese multilingual policies, Japan has not yet established firm multilingual policies for

foreigners living in Japan. As Nomoto indicated, “Japan is often thought of as a homogeneous

society by themselves and often by outsiders” (Nomoto 2009: 53).

Shinyu (Female, 37, Human Resource, arrived in Japan in 2002) also told me about her

multilingual background through her experiences of learning Japanese. She also illustrated

Joseojok’s multilingual history with her family situations.

Studying Japanese was not hard for me. It was fun. I know Joseonjok are good at learning different languages.

As I was a Joseonjok minority in China, I became bilingual from my childhood. I was able to speak Korean

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and Chinese at the same time. I mean, perfectly. I also had a good chance to learn Japanese in schools as well

as in my household. I remember my grandparents often blended Japanese vocabulary in daily conversation.

For example, they always used such words as tamanegi (onion), ninjin (carrot), and sara (dish) in the kitchen.

I didn’t know these words were Japanese before I started to learn Japanese in middle school. Often, I practiced

Japanese with my grandparents, who were pretty good at speaking Japanese. I didn’t have any difficulty

learning at a high level in Japanese language school after I arrived in Japan as a language student. I often talk

to my grandparents in Japanese over the phone.

The multilingual background of Joseonjok in Japan is deeply related to their migration history

and education circumstances. Besides, the modern history of the three countries of China, Japan,

and Korea are all interrelated in forming the multilingualism of Joseonjok in Japan (Choi 2016).

In this context, Shinnyu gave an excellent example of a multilingual background of Joseonjok in

Japan. As a matter of fact, Shinnyu’s multilingual ability originated from her grandparents’

education received under the Japanese rule in Manchuria. The older generations of Joseonjok

learned Japanese at schools during the colonial period of Japan in the early 20th century. Thus, the

older generation of Joseonjok who had received Japanese education even spoke Japanese more

fluently than Mandarin (Kim WB 2010). Learning Japanese at school was compulsory to Joseonjok

at the early stage of their settlement. Even under Chinese control, Joseonjok still learned Japanese

at school as a foreign language subject. As a result, the learning of Japanese in China is one of the

backdrops of the intrinsic multilingualism of Joseonjok.

5.3 Multilingual Practices of Joseonjok in Japan

In this section, I will specifically explain the multilingual practices of Joseonjok after they

moved into Japan. Throughout the migration and resettlement process, Joseonjok in Japan take

advantage of their multilingual practices to enhance their social and economic status in their host

society (Kim 2018). In this context, multilingualism is the basis of social and economic capital to

Joseonjok in realizing their dream in their migrant life in Japan. Joseonjok in Japan are a

comparatively new migrant group having only 30 years of migration history in the Japanese host

society (Kwon 2015). They mostly resort to the niche job markets for their employment or engage

in transnational entrepreneurship by exploiting their multilingual skills (Kwon 2012). To this end,

the multilingual ability of Joseojok has become their resource to compete in the host society, and

it also acts as a basis for their affluent (im)migrant life in Japan (Lee and Lee 2015).

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Transnational corporate companies in Japan highly value Joseonjok’s multilingual ability to

expand their business scales in East Asia (Kwon 2012). As a result, quite a few Joseonjok achieve

promotions in their employments or run successful transnational businesses in Japan thanks to

their multilingual ability. They usually cultivate their human and social capitals in their workplaces.

Then, the human and social capitals act as valuable resources to perform transnational businesses

in the global markets. Kwon (2012) addresses that Joseonjok have more advantages than Han

Chinese entrepreneurs due to their trililingual ability, which can connect transnational business

transactions even in South Korean markets. Thus, their multilingual practices give them ample

chances to carry out their successful transnational businesses in this cosmopolitan world in East

Asia.

On the other hand, some of the low-educated Joseonjok have come to Japan since the 1990s,

along with those highly educated mainstream Joseonjok. The Joseonjok in this group mostly

engage in 3K (kitsui, kitanai, and kikken) jobs in Japan (Song and Takeshi 2012). Quite a number

of them come to Japan as technical interns or trainees, although some of them arrive as tourists

and later overstay to become undocumented. They typically find demanding jobs as menial and

unskilled laborers in piecemeal factories or service sectors. Unlike those highly-educated

Joseonjok, they do not have multilingual capacity because of their low educational background to

study and learn other languages. As a consequence, they suffer from a language barrier in their life

in Japan (Ibid.). This particular phenomenon of Joseonjok multilingualism can be shown among

those low-educated Joseonjok as semilingualism 43 , which means they do not have perfect

proficiency in any of the three languages. Thus, the lack of their multilingual ability does not help

them overcome their marginal life, unlike those of highly educated Joseonjok in Japan.

Notwithstanding the negative side of the linguistic ability of some Joseonjok in Japan, there are

numerous benefits of multilingual practices among the majority of Joseonjok in Japan. More than

anything else, they foster the superiority of their multilingualism that they can speak four

languages such as, Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and English (Kwon 2012). Undoubtedly, the

multilingual practices in their transnational life of Joseonjok have become the foundation of their

identity construction.

43 This term was introduced by Swedish researcher Hansegard N.E. in 1975. It is a phenomenon when people speak

several languages at a low level of development, with evident deficiencies in all language (Hinnenkamp 2005; Kim

YG 2018).

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To investigate the phenomenon of the multilingualism of Joseonjok in Japan, the explanation

of transnational activities of Joseonjok is crucial since the two concepts of multilingualism and

transnationalism are interrelated in their life. In this light, the majority of Joseonjok in Japan

usually speak in Korean in their daily life at home while they mostly speak in Japanese at their

workplaces. Furthermore, they speak Chinese when they go on a business trip to China or other

Chinese speaking countries. Due to their diverse language use, they are exposed to multilingual

settings, and they can switch the different codes of languages in their transnational life in Japan.

Naturally, a number of highly educated Joseonjok in Japan have become versatile in language

practices in their workplaces and business contacts (Kwon 2012).

There is one more point to discuss the multilingual practice of Joseonjok in Japan. Media

consumption is one integral part of migrant life (Lee and Lee 2015). Joseonjok in Japan consume

different media such as homeland media of China, ethnic media of South Korea, and the domestic

media of Japan (Ibid.). Yet, most Joseonjok in Japan watch South Korean media, such as dramas,

movies, variety shows, and documentaries. Some of my informants mention that Chinese programs

are less enjoyable due to their lacking contents and qualities (Ibid.). South Korean media attract

worldwide audience aligned with the fashion of Hallyu44. However, Joseonjok in Japan often resort

to Chinese media for their business as well as for their political concern of their homeland. In the

meantime, Joseonjok also watch Japanese TV to keep up with the current events in Japan. They

collect the information needed in their daily life such as news, weather forecast, economic

programs. More particularly, they brush up Japanese language proficiency by watching Japanese

TV programs. One of my informants addresses that watching Japanese variety shows help her

improve Japanese listening and speaking skills and understand the societal trend.

Recently, there has emerged one particular phenomenon of multilingual practice among

second-generation Joseonjok in Japan. The majority of the second-generation Joseonjok are young

school children who have more or less been assimilated to Japanese language use. They are

reluctant to speak Korean after they enter Japanese schools. However, young Joseonjok children

also happen to know the music of K-pop45. As is known, K-pop has become popular all over the

44 Hallyu (한류韓流 Korean Culture Wave or K-Wave) is the increase in global popularity of South Korean culture since

the 1990s. It includes K-pop, K-drama, and K-food. The Korean wave of Hallyu has got worldwide attention in these

days.

45 K-pop is a genre of popular music originated from South Korea. Although K-pop indicates “popular music” within

South Korea, it has been proliferated all over the world lately. The current spread of K-pop as one branch of Hallyu

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world today, and K-pop fans are eager to mimic the lyrics of K-pop songs in the Korean language

(Masserlin and Shin 2017). As a result, learning the Korean language has become a trend among

young K-pop lovers world-widely (Ibid.). The second-generation Joseonjok children in Japan are

no exception, and they are interested in K-pop songs and musiciains. As long as they indulge in

singing K-pop songs in Korean, they will be motivated to learn their heritage language. All in all,

the multilingual practices of Joseonjok in Japan have shown diverse aspects of their developments,

and they are expected to evolve into being distinctive faculty of Joseonjok in Japan. Joseonjok in

Japan will keep using the three most influential languages of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese in the

transnational “social fields” (Faist 2000) consisted of the three leading countries in Northeast Asia.

As far as the multilingual practices of Joseonjok in Japan go, there are two different groups

based on their multilingual capacity. I met many of Joseonjok in Japan who thought of themselves

as “superior multilinguals” (Kim 2018). The multilingual ability of Joseonjok in Japan is “their

resource to compete in the host society” (Lee and Lee 2015: 37). However, some other Joseonjok

expressed they were not “superior multilinguals”. They showed some regrets about having no

chances of learning proper language use in their early life.

To this issue of multilingual practices of Joseonjok in Japan, one of my informants, Joon (Male,

31, Trade, arrived in Japan in 2009), shared his experiences of finding his job relating to

multilingualism.

After finishing my master’s degree, I tried to find a job in Tokyo. I was aiming to get a job in an oote kigyo

(大手企業), a big corporation. Unfortunately, I couldn’t get into the corporation mainly because of my

deficiency in the Japanese language. Even though I had spent some time at a Japanese language school and

finished my master’s course in Japanese, I realized my Japanese proficiency didn’t reach a high enough level

to compete with native speakers. After that, I changed my mind to look for a firm that wants someone like

me to communicate with clients from overseas. In the end, I got an offer from a Chu Sho Kigyo (中小企業),

a small and medium-sized business, which was easy to enter. At my workplace, I mostly translate business

texts from Chinese to Japanese. I also have chances to meet clients from China and sometimes from South

Korea. I am satisfied with my job because my company highly values my language skills. I enjoy working

here. I also hope to do more work in relation to South Korean business contacts. I realize that I should work

hard to improve Japanese and Korean to survive in this competitive nature of the industry. I will watch more

Wave has influenced the music world in Asia, Latin America, North America, and Europe. K-pop also stretched out

to hybrid genre and it makes transnational values in music world. Many youngsters throughout the world are now

crazy about K-pop and they even try to learn Korean language along with other Korean cultures.

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Korean dramas, and variety shows to understand its cultural, ecoconomic, and social trends. I should also try

to have more chances to interact with my Japanese friends to brush up my Japanese.

Despite the favorable aspects of multilingual practices, Joon expressed his deficiency in

commanding Japanese. He said he still had an impediment in commanding high-level Japanese,

although he had studied intensively throughout his schools in Japan. Unlike most Joseonjok in

Japan, he did not have a chance to learn Japanese at Chinese schools where they taught English as

a foreign language. He also mentioned that he had some deficiency in commanding both spoken

and written Korean at a proper level. Besides, he had a strong Joseonjok accent, which was similar

to the North Korean dialect. Thus, he did not feel comfortable when trying to speak in standard

Korean. Naturally, he feels foreign and awkward when it comes to talking to South Korean clients.

However, he said he could fully understand Korean, but had a difficulty expressing his thoughts in

Korean perfectly. His lacking proficiency in Korean originated from his background of spending

his childhood in the Chinese neighborhood and the Chinese schools.

Sometimes, he was frustrated when he encountered other Joseonjok co-workers who spoke

Korean and Japanese better than him. Moreover, he felt pressured from his Japanese boss who had

high expectations regarding his multilingual skills. In spite of his deficiency in Korean and

Japanese, he commands fluent Chinese because he attended Han Chinese schools from elementary

to college in Qingdao, China. Apparently, his Chinese proficiency is the essential tool for

promoting business contacts between China and Japan. In a multilingual context, “one language

will always dominate over others which are considered subordinates” (Okal 2014: 223).

Furthermore, individual levels of multilingual capacities are different based on the personal

background (Edwards 2012). Joon also told me he would have more chances of watching and

reading Korean and Japanese media to improve his multilingual ability.

The other informant, Yoonmi (Female, 31, Translator, arrived in Japan in 2010), also talked

about her multilingual practices at her work. She works in her home office by taking advantage of

her multilingual practices.

My job is closely related to my multilingual skills. I produce programs that collect news from China, Korea, and

Japan. Most of all, I translate the data from Korean and Chinese into Japanese. Sometimes, I got requests to

translate texts into English, too. I have been working in this industry for four years. I used to work at a

broadcasting company. I prefer my self-employed status because I can do my work in my own space and time

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and make more money by doing my own multilingual niche business. I often go on business trips to China and

South Korea to collect news items and conduct interviews with people about the news topics. As I belong to one

documentary producing company, I mostly distribute news items focusing on East Asian politics, economy,

culture, and social issues.

I first met Yoonmi at an OKTA meeting. As I remember, she was looking for a part-time

English-speaking interpreter and proofreader. I told her I wanted to do the part-time job and I also

asked her for a chance to have an interview for my research on Joseonjok. Then, she accepted my

request, and I was able to arrange the interview in Ikebukuro a month later. Yoonmi is a well-

trained translator. Her multilingual practices are done in three languages. She has an excellent

multilingual background accumulated with the diverse experiences of her education. First of all,

she went to Joseonjok ethnic schools in Jilin Province, China. Then, she went to a university in

Seoul, majoring in Japanese literature. Finally, she earned her master’s degree in Tokyo. She wrote

her master’s thesis by comparing the literature of the three countries of China, Japan, and Korea.

While she was pursuing her degree in Japan, she did some translating work as a part-time job,

which turned into her real career after graduation. She is now participating in a documentary

project and going on frequent trips to China and South Korea. She conducts interviews in Chinese

and Korean. Returning to Japan, she translates the interview contents into Japanese. Overall, she

is satisfied with her multilingual career. Within Joseonjok communities in Japan, she is recognized

as a role model of multilingual Joseonjok in Japan. She successfully applied her linguistic skills to

her career. She smoothly bridges and mediates communications among coworkers from different

linguistic and cultural backgrounds. She also recruits highly educated Joseonjok students for part-

time translators and interpreters who can make the most of their multilingual skills.

5.4 Multilingual Education of Joseonjok in Japan

The intercultural contacts of migrants eventually bring about multilingual environments that

necessitate multilingual education. As a result, education in many countries of the world takes

place in a multilingual context (UNESCO Education Paper 2003). In this light, ethnic minority

children’s multilingual education is a crucial issue to discuss their migrant life in the host society

(Skutnabb-Kangas 1988). However, in many countries, multilingual education is not fully accepted

as benefits to both migrants and people in the host society. The receiving countries of migrants still

consider “multilingualism as entirely new challenges to the educational system” (Herzog-

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Punzenberger et al 2017: 9).

There has been a tendency for host societies to compel migrant children not to speak their

heritage language and advise their parents to use school language at home. In this situation, the

migrant children, for fear of discrimination, tend to avoid speaking the heritage language once they

get used to the host language. It has not been long ago that bilingualism in the United States used

to be stigmatized as earning low-income and being uneducated (Ibid.,12). The negative attitude

toward being multilingual has been a trend for some time in the receiving countries of migrants.

However, with all those negative indications on multilingualism, it is asserted that there have been

more positive outlooks on multilingual education in recent years. Numerous researches proved

that well-balanced bilingual students might perform better than monolingual students in thinking

and academic achievements (Cummins 2000). There have been growing interests among parents

worldwide to bring up their children as multilingual elites in the competitive globalized world

today. In particular, the multilingual education of immigrant children has become a significant

concern among the parents as well as the policymakers and educators (Paradowski and

Michalowska 2016).

In the case of multilingual education of Joseonjok in Japan, the teaching and maintaining

their heritage languages of both Korean and Chinese has become a significant concern pervaded

among the young parents who are mostly the third or fourth generation of Joseonjok in China

(Kwon 2015). Most of them arrived in Japan with their multilingual ability and exploited their

language skills in resettling in the host society. As a matter of course, they want to transmit their

multilingual ability to their children. Ahn SG (2016) delivers that “most of the Joseonjok children

in Japan do not have competency in Korean or Chinese, and yet, their parents want to teach their

children their heritage languages” (Ahn SG 2016, Jilin Newspaper, http://www.kr.chinajilin.com).

In this regard, the second-generation Joseojok children in Japan tend to show identity struggle

when they enroll in local schools. Although they seem to be assimilated to Japanese culture, they

sometimes feel they are placed at the crossroads between heritage and host culture. Unlike their

parents, who retain Joseonjok culture and language, the second generation Joseonjok do not

voluntarily practice Joseonjok culture and language (Kwon 2012). They tend to develop their

language function similar to that of the third or fourth generation of Zainichi Koreans, who have

already been assimilated into the mosaic of Japanese society. It seems that the majority of Zainichi

Koreans do not speak the Korean language (Lee Y 1986; Min 1992). They may conceal their ethnic

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identity simply because of “the fear of discrimination” (Mackerras 2003: 11). The same kind of

fear occurs among Joseonjok children in Japanese schools. On some occasions, Joseonjok students

happen to use the Korean language with their Joseonjok friends in class. Teachers usually warn

them not to use Korean because it is not a classroom language (Kwon 2015; Kim 2018). This kind

of incident can happen in reality in the classrooms of Japanese schools. This is why many

Joseonjok children are reluctant to use the Korean language even at home.

As Nomoto indicated, “In Japanese public schools, the children with culturally, linguistically

and ethnically diverse backgrounds have to face great difficulties in entering into Japanese

mainstream” (Nomoto 2009: 56). Furthermore, the homogeneous society of Japan has long

compelled minority children to assimilate into Japanese culture. Above all, the failure of Japanese

multilingual education stems from the fact that “the Japanese only policy” has long acted as an

obstacle in developing multilingual programs in Japan (Ibid.). Japan does not have official

curricula to teach foreign children in their own native languages. The teachers suggest foreign

children speak Japanese all the time in class (Ibid.). More seriously, Japanese authorities are

reluctant to pay attention to other languages, and Japanese people show an indifferent attitude

toward multilingualism (Shoji 2008). Many public schools where students with multicultural and

multiethnic backgrounds are registered at best have some special programs for learning the

Japanese language (Ibid.).

In this unfavorable Japanese society towards immigrants’ languages, Joseonjok as a minor

ethnic group have no choice but to find their way to provide their children with multilingual

education tailored to fit their situations. Unfortunately, Joseonjok communities cannot expect any

practical assistance from the Japanese government (Kwon 2012). The primary concern of

Joseonjok in Japan for their multilingual education is at least to maintain their ethnic language of

Korean and further their national language of Chinese among those of the second-generation who

are likely to be assimilated to the mainstream language of Japanese while losing their heritage

languages. And yet, Joseonjok in Japan realize that merely speaking Korean or Chinese at home is

not enough to make their children reach a high proficiency level. The children need to be exposed

to institutions where they can get formal language lessons to improve their reading and writing

skills.

A weekend school run by Joseonjok private organization, was founded to act as an alternative

institution to give language lessons to the Joseonjok children in the Tokyo area (Kwon 2012). This

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school, namely Sam Mool Hak Kyo (샘물학교), was established in 2008 by Joseonjok Women’s

Association (Ibid.). It mainly provides Korean language lessons and partially Chinese lessons as

well as heritage cultural education to Joseonjok children residing in the Kanto area around Tokyo

metropolis. However, this weekend school has confronted various challenges in establishing,

running, and maintaining its system since its foundation. Above all, weekend schools usually

require a great deal of work and dedication on community members and educational organizations

(Compton 2001; Liu et al. 2011). In addition to this hardship, “community-based heritage language

programs often do not have enough money to own facility to house their schools, since much of

their funding comes from student tuition and private donations” (Liu et al. 2011: 4). The same

financial difficulties arise in Sam Mool Hak Gyo as a community based ethnic school. Nevertheless,

this school at least contributes to the multilingual education for Joseonjok children in their way.

Realistically, however, this school cannot provide full-fledged lessons to Joseonjok second-

generation children. The weekend-based schedule is too short to meet the required amount of time

to reach a certain language proficiency level. The other challenge is the difficulty of the developing

curricula to fit in the diverse backgrounds of language skills of the students (Liu et al. 2011). With

all those hardships, this school still endeavors to do its best to carry out its mission as the first

multilingual education institution for Joseonjok in Japan.

Other than sending their children to weekend language school, Joseonjok parents also try their

own home language teaching approaches in their households. Some parents even try the OPOL46

(one parent one language) method (Paradowski and Michalowska 2016), t to make their children

trilinguals by practicing Korean and Chinese at home and Japanese at school. Based on the OPOL

method, the mother speaks in Korean to her child from birth, and the father speaks Chinese. Then,

the child goes to a Japanese nursery school to learn Japanese. This method seems idealistic, but

the practice can be very challenging for those busy Joseonjok parents in Japan. Thus, numerous

migrant families employ some other strategies to promote using their heritage language among

family members and relatives and participate in community group initiatives that promote heritage

language use. The majority of the Joseonjok population in Japan are in their thirties and forties

with highly educated backgrounds (Kwon 2012). They are well motivated to raise their children

46 During my fieldwork at the Weekend Language School and interviews with Joseonjok informants with children,

they showed interest in their children’s language education. Some parents carry out OPOL practice at home. For

example, Father speaks Chinese to his children and mother talks in Korean to their children.

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as multilingual elites in the globalized world. To this end, they are looking for proper measures to

educate their children to be multilingual. Yet, the task is for Joseonjok themselves, and the task

requires overwhelming effort from Joseonjok parents as well as their children.

Multilingual education of ethnic minority children has become a crucial issue to be discussed

in a society where migration is a salient social phenomenon. In the migration context,

multilingualism has become a form of human capital (Okal 2014). Joseonjok in Japan make it their

hope to make their children multilingual elites in this competitive world today. Accordingly, the

multilingual education of Joseonjok children has become a significant concern among Joseonjok

parents. In the first place, they only worry about their children’s loss of heritage languages. First-

generation Joseonjok parents in Japan notice that their second-generation children already show

the traits of monolingualism by using only Japanese when the children enter Japanese schools.

Somehow, their concern turns out to be real, and they try to find ways to educate their children to

become multilinguals. As is often the case, immigrant parents force their children to learn their

heritage languages and cultures, but it is difficult to fight the influence from the outside world

(Appel 1998). On the other hand, the children of immigrants feel pressure to discard their heritage

cultures and languages to be members of the host society (Zhou and Bankston 2016). Under this

situation, Joseonjok parents endeavor to make their children quadrilinguals who can command

four languages, including English. As Yashiro argues, “Most people are motivated to learn new

language and culture only when these bring them social and economic advantages” (Yashiro 1995:

147). In this context, Joseonjok parents in Japan strongly believe the fact that languages serve as

a social asset (Zhou and Bankston 2016)

One informant, Miyeon (Female, 39, IT Engineer, arrived in Japan in 2004), talked about her

standpoint about multilingual education for Joseonjok children in Japan.

I send my son to a Joseonjok weekend school in Tokyo. This is the only institution that offers Korean and

Chinese lessons to Joseonjok children. I know we should be at least thankful for having this school in our

area. However, the language lessons here are not enough to get multilingual education for a Joseonjok child

like my son. More than anything else, the amount of time is way too short to be enough. Besides, the term

between weekends is too long. My son usually forgets what he learned last time. By the time, he returns to

this school, he should start all over again. The lessons are broken, and there is no continuity. I know the

difficulties of this school. For all that, I want to make him speak my heritage language of Korean as well as

Chinese. But my son is not interested in learning Korean or Chinese. He keeps talking in Japanese, even at

home. I hope he will soon notice the benefits of multilingualism. One thing is he likes K-Pop music very

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much. Eventually, he tries to sing in Korean. Anyway, I’ll keep sending my son to this school. Once he gets

better in this school, I think he would like to use Korean and Chinese. It’s too bad we don’t get any help from

the Japanese government for our children’s multilingual education.

It is difficult for Joseonjok to find any public institutions where their children can learn

Korean and Chinese in Japan. Above all, multilingual education programs have not yet been settled

in Japanese public institutions. Thus, Japanese schools do not provide the opportunites to the

students with different cultural backgrounds to learn their native languages with the framework of

the official curriculum (Nomoto 2009). As a consequence, Joseonjok cannot expect any help from

the Japanese government to fulfill their multilingual education.

It may be surprising to know that there are over 70 Zainichi Korean schools all over Japan

(Ibid.). Pro-North Korean communities mainly run the schools. Most of the subjects are taught in

the Korean language, although the curriculum follows Japanese national standards. These schools

can be ideal places for Joseonjok’s multilingual education purposes. However, the quality of the

education is inferior to those of regular Japanese schools because of the limited support from the

Japanese government. For these reasons, Joseonjok parents do not prefer to send their children to

these schools. Moreover, the identities as well as the ideologies of these two ethnic groups of

Korean descendants are different. They have more options to educate their children in Japan. Many

parents send their children to Japanese local schools. Besides, some parents send their children to

a Chinese school in Yokohama, a (South) Korean school in Shinjuku, and international schools. In

this sense, the weekend schools can function as a minimal means of multilingual education until

they find the measures to accomplish the quality multilingual education for Joseonjok children in

Japan.

Another informant, Naye (37, Female, Restaurant Owner, arrived in Japan in 2002), also

talked about her multilingual education experiences. She particularly introduced her special home

education for her daughter’s multilingual education.

My daughter was born in Yanbian, a Korean district in China. Before moving to Japan, she attended a Korean

ethnic kindergarten in the Korean community. So, she speaks Korean very well. Actually, she doesn’t have

peculiar Joseonjok accents. My husband and I tried to speak in standard Korean to her. The kindergarten in

China used lots of audio-visual material imported from South Korea. In fact, the school used the children’s

program imported from South Korea. I even asked my mom not to use the Yanbian dialect when she visited our

home in Japan. At home, our family tries to speak only in Korean and watch Korean television. I am worried if

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my daughter would lose her Korean language because she is going to a Japanese elementary school next year. I

always tell her to be proud of herself because she can speak one more language than her Japanese classmates. I

am glad she is doing well in her weekend school. She seems to enjoy her language class because she thinks she

is better than her classmates.

Naye deliberately practices OPOL (one parent one language) at home with her husband. Naye

has already talked to her daughter in Korean since her daughter started to speak. After a while, her

daughter began to learn Chinese and communicate in Chinese with her father. Her husband, who

is good at Chinese, gladly shares his part of speaking only Chinese with her daughter at home.

They practically understand the benefits of OPOL (Paradowski and Michalowska 2016). On the

other hand, Naye also wants her daughter to acquire Japanese proficiency from school. In addition,

Naye wants her daughter to become a good speaker of English. She knows English is the index of

the “global standard of international communication” (Gottlieb 2012: 12). It is also true that

“English is an instrument for furthering commercial and national competitiveness” (Hagerman

2009: 56) in this global age. In this light, Naye set up a courageous plan to make her daughter a

multilingual (quadrilingual) who can command four languages of Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and

English. She already made up her mind to send her daughter to an English-speaking country

someday. To attain her goal, she has to put tremendous effort in time and money for her daughter’s

multilingual education.

5.5 Multilingual Identities of Joseonjok in Japan

Language portrays “cultural and identity choices” (Cummins 2000: 164), and is an

indispensable element of migrant life. It is a significant component in maintaining a separate ethnic

identity between natives and migrants (De Vos 1995: 23). Throughout the migration and

resettlement process, the multilingual ability of Joseonjok has become an effective means of social

and economic mobility in Japanese society. Joseonjok in Japan benefit from the three countries by

taking advantage of their trilingual ability. There is no doubt that Japanese language skill is an

essential survival tool for migrants to pursue smoother lives within Japanese society (Gottlieb

2012). To be sure, multilingualism affected the formation of Joseonjok identity in a constructive

way. The growing demand for multilinguals in the global economy has further contributed to a

positive identity formation.

In this context, one informant, Miza (Female, 32, IT Engineer, arrived in Japan in 2009),

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expressed her multilingual identity as follows:

I am so proud of being Joseonjok, who can speak three languages in Japan. We are treated as distinguished

multilinguals in our workplace. Thanks to the education in Joseonjok ethnic schools in China, I became bilingual,

and then I added Japanese to become trilingual. I think I am blessed because I could master Japanese quickly

thanks to the Japanese language classes back in China. You know, Joseonjok play an important role in global

businesses in Japan. After all, we can shape our positive identity as Joseonjok in Japan due to our language skills.

We left our home for a better life in Japan. Without our language skills, we wouldn’t have led our good life here.

Frankly speaking, we identify ourselves as a superior ethnic minority, and our language skills are highly valued

in Japanese society. If I ask one question to my Joseonjok friends, “Who are Joseonjok in Japan?” they will just

answer, “Oh, we are chosen to be a talented ethnic minority who can speak three languages.”

As shown above, Miza identifies herself as Joseonjok in a positive manner because she can

command three languages. It seems that she was born to be bilingual in China. As is often the case,

she also learned Japanese in Joseonjok ethnic schools in China. Now, she works at an IT company

after finishing her master’s degree from a renowned university in Japan. As usual, she didn’t have

any difficulty reaching a high level of Japanese proficiency because of her Japanese lessons

received in China. In particular, she emphasized the linguistic affinity of the languages of Korean

and Japanese. They are cognate languages47. The similar grammatical rules between Korean and

Japanese (Gottlieb 2012) made Miza master Japanese faster than other migrants of ethnic groups

in Japan. Overall, Miza feels superiority as a Joseonjok migrant in Japan, and her language skills

shaped her positive identity as Joseonjok in Japan. She seems to be proud of herself after all the

hardships of leaving home and settling in Japan.

Contrary to Miza’s case, one other informant, Jemin (Male, 26, Trade, arrived in Japan in

2013), showed a different view on multilingual identity.

I think many of Joseonjok in Japan can speak Korean, Chinese, and Japanese. But there are some Joseonjok like

me who can’t speak the three languages fluently. To be honest, we don’t speak Chinese as Han Chinese do. Even

if we studied some Japanese at Joseonjok schools, we don’t speak Japanese as Japanese do. When we talk in

Korean, we use the Joseonjok dialect. South Korean people don’t like our accents. They think we are from North

47 In easier term, cognate language is called as cousin language. Korean and Japanese are cognate languages. In fact,

their semantic and grammatical features are similar. Also, the letters of both languages are influenced by Chinese

characters. Spanish and Italian are also cognate languages in this sense. And yet, English and French are not cognate

languages.

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Korea. Sometimes, I feel confused. I don’t know who I am. I don’t know which language is my native language.

I feel sorry for myself not having proper education in China. I envy those Joseonjok who had a good education

in China and even in Japan. I always feel inferior to them. You know, I can’t find any nice job in Japan because

I don’t speak Japanese well.

There are some traits of semilingualism in Jemin’s comments. Unfortunately, Jemin did not

get a good education in China. He did not have the chance to foster multilingual capacity. Thus,

he keeps a negative feeling regarding his linguistic ability. In a way, he feels inferior as a

semilingual in his migrant life in Japan. He explains that the fundamental dilemma comes from his

low education and his deficiency of language skills. Furthermore, being semilingual means that he

cannot secure any decent jobs in Japan. Instead, he has but to engage in low-quality jobs without

demanding language proficiency. After all, the multilingualism of Joseonjok has two faces of

positive identity and negative identity. Fluency or lack of fluency in a particular language affects

identity construction (De Vos 1995). Jemin addressed how he felt about himself negatively as

Joseonjok without having the faculty of speaking multiple languages. With all those negative sides

of Joseonjok’s multilingualism, the linguistic ability among the majority of Joseonjok in Japan has

acted as a useful tool for their successful migrant life in Japan (Kim 2018 YG). Thus, languages

are “not only useful to distinguish between personal and social identities, but also to differentiate

individual and collective identities” (De Fina 2016: 163).

5.6 Closing

In this chapter, I explored the issues and prospects of multilingualism pervaded in the life of

Joseonjok in Japan. Indeed, multilingualism let Joseonjok achieve their goal of pursuing better

lives in Japan. The multilingual skill of Joseonjok has played an essential role in their new life in

Japan.

This chapter provides four findings following its structure regarding the issues and prospects

of Joseonjok’s multilingualism arising in Japan. Firstly, the multilingual background of Joseonjok

in Japan is the consequence of the double diasporic migration experiences (Min 2012) of Joseonjok

in Japan. Joseonjok were born to be bilinguals in China and turned into trilinguals after moving to

Japan. Secondly, the multilingual practices allow them to secure career opportunities and

transnational entrepreneurship leading to social and economic mobility. Thirdly, it is also found

that multilingual education has become a consequential task for Joseonjok to carry out for their

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second-generation children. Joseonjok, in this sense, make a great effort to establish their measures

to promote multilingual education in the monolingual society of Japan. Lastly, multilingualism

empowers Joseonjok in Japan to shape their positive identity while making some Joseonjok hold

inferior identity because of their low function of multilingualism. Overall, the findings indicate

that Joseonjok in Japan make the most of their language skills for their new life in Japan.

In the introduction of this chapter, I argue that multilingualism acts as the impetus to incur

Joseonjok migration into Japan, and their multilingual practices support their migrant life to

become an affluent one in their new life. In the long run, their identity based on their multilingual

practices associated with their transnational activities will keep moving toward the changes of

reformation and negotiation while living in this fast-changing world. Above all, Joseonjok keep

“getting attention as important diaspora members in East Asia” (Lee and Lee 2015: 28), and their

language skills keep working as their advantage in their life in Japan. With their multilingual ability,

Joseonjok will “form greater connections among countries in the East Asian market” (Choi 2016:

253). And yet, the multilingualism of Joseonjok in Japan will keep changing according to the

conditions of space, time, and social status in their future migrant life. Linguistic diversity is a

great asset (Maher and Yashiro 1995). In this context, Joseonjok are practicing their multilingual

skills to lead their productive life in Japan. The linguistic superiority of Joseonjok in Japan

functions as a bolster to enhance their life. Moreover, Japan has started its process of moving into

a multilingual and multicultural society. In this way, the prospects of multilingualism look bright

in the life of Joseonjok in Japan.

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Chapter 6: Issues and Prospects of Transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I investigate the particular case of transnationalism in relation to the

Joseonjok migration and their settlement in Japan. Before looking into the specific issues on the

transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan, I will review the meaning of transnationalism relating to

migration for the development of the detailed context of this chapter. According to an IOM Report,

the definitions of transnationalism vary but generally center on exchanges, connections, and

practices across borders transcending the national space as the primary reference point for

activities and identities (IOM Background Paper 2010). Transnationalism creates the connection

between the places of settlement and places of origin and provides migrants with economic and

social mobility in their new life. On the whole, transnational migrants get the benefits of both

societies by maintaining their transnational living (Liu-Farrer 2012). They accumulate human and

cultural capital through transnational activities and use it to enhance their lives. In today’s global

world, a great number of migrants consider themselves as transnational people who belong to more

than two societies simultaneously (Levitt 2009).

The transnational economy between China and Japan (Liu-Farrer 2011) provided many

Chinese migrants in Japan not only the chances to become transnational employees in Japanese

companies but also the chances to become transnational entrepreneurs engaging in the trade

between China and Japan (Ibid.). As a consequence, the transnational mobility coupled with

bilingual ability, enables Chinese migrants in Japan to excel in sales and marketing for the

transactions conducted between the two countries. In the meantime, Joseonjok as a subgroup of

Chinese migrants, show similar traits of transnationalism to that of mainstream Chinese migrants

in Japan. In a way, Joseonjok like those Chinese are, “physically located in Japan but economically

and emotionally located in transnational social space” (Liu-Farrer 2012: 79). However, the

transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan should be understood in a different context from that of

Chinese migrants. Above all, Joseonjok in Japan have formed their distinctive transnationalism

developed under the influence of their Korean ethnicity. In addition, they occupy a broader range

of transnational territory ensued from their connection to Korea. Apparently, they have trilateral

transnational mobility among the three countries of China, Japan, and Korea.

In this chapter, I mainly investigate the transnationalism of Joseonjok regarding their

migration and settlement in Japan. Starting from the review on the historical background of the

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Joseonjok’s transnational movements, I further develop this chapter to examine the complex

aspects of the transnational mobility of this ethnic group of Joseonjok in Japan. In particular, I

focus on finding out the status quo of the transnational employment and the transnational

entrepreneurship of Joseonjok fulfilled in the course of their life in Japanese society. I also treat

familial transnationalism as a critical topic in this chapter. Then, I investigate the transnational

education of the second generation Joseonjok which has become a significant concern of the first

generation Joseonjok in Japan. To supplement the empirical data, I added the detailed interview

scripts to analyze the respective topics covered in the sub-chapters. In sum, this chapter discusses

how transnationalism affects the life of Joseonjok in Japan, and how it affects the formation of

their transnational identity. To this end, I examine the life situations of Joseonjok in Japan based

on their transnationalism lodged in their life.

6.2 Historical Background of the Transnational Mobility of Joseonjok

Koreans’ mobility in the early era of migration to China resulted from the social, political,

and economic factors interrelated among the three countries of Korea, China, and Japan (Yoon

2006). Koreans’ movements to Northeast China intermittently showed some traits of transnational

mobility throughout the different stages of their migration in China. There were three distinct

waves of the transnational migration of Joseonjok to China (Hong 2013).

The first wave arose in the late 19th century when Joseon Dynasty, Korean kingdom before the

Japanese occupation, lost control of its sovereignty, and the movement lasted until Japan annexed

the Korean peninsula in 1910. In this stage, the farmers in the northern part of Korea easily moved

to the adjacent areas without thinking of the borderline demarcation (Yoon 2006). They were

somewhat like pioneers who were looking for arable land for their settlement. The number of those

Korean migrants in the initial stage was not large compared with those of later stages. The farmers

settled in the wilderness and maintained a secluded lifestyle without contacts in their home places

(Kim 2010). At this early stage, the Korean migrants did not show any transnational mobility due

to the limited transportation and communication facilities.

The second wave started to arise when Korea (Joseon) handed over its reign to Japanese

imperialists in 1910. A considerable number of Korean militias and intellectuals involved in

independent movement moved to Manchuria to avoid the persecution. Using China as a base, these

exiled Koreans plotted the overthrow of Japanese rule over the Korean peninsula (Seol and

Skrentny 2009). In this stage, there were conspicuous traits of transnational mobility among these

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Koreans related to independent movement. They had constant contacts and remittances to maintain

their organizations from the home places in Korea. Overall, the development of the railroads and

communication facilities gave them some ease to perform their transnational mobility in a

clandestine way.

The last wave of Korean migration from 1932 to 1945 was made up mostly of the farmers

from the southern part of the peninsula, and the number of the population was the largest ever

(Yoon 2006). In this stage, the geographical scope of Koreans’ mobility stretched to the three

provinces of Heilongjiang and Liaoning and Jilin (Kwon 2015). The economic activities were also

confined to their agricultural zone in the designated regions. (Ibid.). However, there were also

independence activists and entrepreneurs who actively performed transnational mobility between

the colonies of Manchuria and the Korean peninsula.

The wave of Korean migration into China has ceased since World War II. There had been no

more migration from the Korean peninsula since the retreat of the Japanese army from Manchuria

in 1945. However, there were some transnational ties that spanned only with North Korea (Hong

2013). The People’s Republic of China (the PRC) had not allowed Chinese people, including

Joseonjok, to contact the outside world until they initiated the Economic Reformation in 1978. As

a result, Joseonjok had only chances to have contacts with North Korea in this period (Song 2007)

because China and North Korea were in the same communist bloc. During this Cold War period,

China only regarded North Korea as the bonafide state (Song 2009). In the meantime, North Korea

practically helped Joseonjok communities by building schools and hospitals and giving financial

aids for operations (Choi 2001). In contrast, Joseonjok were not allowed to contact or visit South

Korea because of the ideological conflict and the absence of diplomacy between communists and

capitalists (Seol and Skrentny 2004).

Since the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea in 1992, there have been

tremendous transnational activities of Joseonjok between the two places of origin and settlement.

Several Joseonjok have moved to South Korea without being assimilated into South Korean

society (Choi 2009). Joseonjok in South Korea have maintained a transnational lifestyle because

of their ambiguous status in their ancestral homeland (Seol and Skrentny 2004). They have not

been treated as Korean compatriots by the South Korean brethren, and the South Korean

government has not established a firm policy to accept them as Korean citizens (Kwon 2015).

Instead, they retain their emotional connection with China and protect from South Korean

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discrimination by maintaining their transnational identity. Thus, the transnational activities of

Joseonjok in South Korea have been practiced to maximize their benefits of migration and chances

of family survival (Hong 2013).

Unlike Joseonjok in South Korea, Joseonjok migrants in Japan have a better standing in their

economic and social life than those of South Korea. Most of them are highly-educated migrants

engaging in professional jobs in Japan. In many cases, they occupy positions in the overseas

department, and they are often dispatched to the branch offices in China or South Korea (Ibid.) At

the stage of transnational employment, many Joseonjok employees just like other Chinese

employees, learn the business skills and secure business contacts with Chinese business

counterparts and public officials. When the time comes, Joseonjok employees are ready to leave

the Japanese companies and become transnational entrepreneurs (Kwon 2015). In the long run,

quite a few Joseonjok employees accomplish their long-cherished dream of becoming

transnational entrepreneurs who deal with businesses in multiple countries. The enormous

exchanges of business deals and cooperation between the two economic giants, China and Japan,

have provided ample business opportunities to Chinese migrants, including Joseonjok, in the

transnational markets established between the two countries. In this light, Joseonjok transnational

entrepreneurs make the most of their human and social capital achieved during their Japanese

corporate careers. With their trilingual ability, they can build up tripartite business connections

among the three countries (Kim 2018).

6.3 Transnational Life of Joseonjok in Japan

Transnationalism has lodged in the mindset of Joseonjok in Japan, and it plays an integral

role in their migrant life in Japan. Above all, the transnational practices of Joseonjok in Japan have

been used to overcome their marginality as migrants in Japanese society (Kwon 2015; Kim 2018).

Many Joseonjok are employed in transnational corporate companies in Japan, and some are

engaged in transnational businesses between Japan and China as well as South Korea. Most

Joseonjok in Japan have a tendency to maintain ties with their family members in China and South

Korea. In particular, some Joseonjok families are scattered in the three countries and form

triangular family networks (Kim 2018).

The exclusive country of Japan has not set up firm immigration policies yet to integrate

foreigners into their society (Akashi 2014). In this light, Joseonjok in Japan have sustained their

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transnational living without assimilating into Japanese society. More particularly, they have

maintained economic and familial connections with China and South Korea. In many ways,

transnationalism has become a major constituent of Joseonjok life in Japan. The transnational

practices of Joseonjok in Japan are widely demonstrated in their employment, entrepreneurship,

family relationship, and children’s education. According to the survey from my fieldwork, some

of Joseonjok are willing to put up with the hardship of transnational life as long as they can get

benefits from their transnational practices. The transnational economy of the globalized district of

Northeast Asia has given Joseonjok in Japan ample chances to perform transnational practices.

This is the reason why Joseonjok in Japan lead their transnational life.

One informant, Sojoon (Male, 50, Entrepreneur, arrived in Japan in 1995), talked about his

standpoint why he should lead transnational life in Japanese society:

First of all, I am just a foreigner in Japan. I cannot be a true Japanese citizen, even if I have spent long enough

time to live like a Japanese person. You know, I am just treated as a Chinese migrant working in Japan. I

have permanent residency instead of citizenship. I know I would never be treated as Japanese, even if I get

citizenship. I can speak Japanese fluently, and I can act like Japanese, but I am not the same Japanese as those

of mainstream. There is a definite barrier that I cannot pass through in this closed society of Japan. In fact,

Japanese citizenship wouldn’t give any practical benefits to someone like me. I think I am lucky to have

permanent residency because I can get benefits from the two countries. I can get a pension in China, and I

can even get medical care from South Korea when I become 65. This is possible because I am Joseonjok. I

enjoy the benefits of the three countries. As far as my transnational life is concerned, I can never disconnect

my relationship with my family, relatives, friends, and alumni back in China. Every day, I talk to them in

cyberspace and we feel like we are all together. I often go to China for my business and to see my family. I

also go to South Korea to see my relatives. After all the long stay in Japan, I still have my deep sense of

nostalgia for my hometown, and someday I will return to China to spend the rest of my life.

As Sojoon said here, Japanese society is still perceived to be quite exclusive to foreigners

and Joseonjok are reluctant to become Japanese citizens. Instead of citizenship, they prefer to hold

permanent residency because they can enjoy “getting benefits of both society” (Liu-Farrer 2012:

183) by spanning their life between Japan and China. Moreover, Joseonjok in Japan can gain triple

benefits of transnational life by extending their transnational mobility to South Korea.The

economic and familial transnationalism has lodged in the life of Joseonjok in Japan. In this way,

Joseonjok in Japan have maintained their particular lifestyle with their transnational practices in

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the host society.

The other informant, Jisoo (Female, 45, Insurance, arrived in Japan in 2001) also talked about

her transnational life situation occurring between the country of origin and the country of

settlement as follows:

My husband runs his business in Shanghai. He conducts trading business between China and Japan. He

spends most of his time in Shanghai to promote the sales of imported goods from Japan. I sometimes fly to

Shanghai to help my husband’s business. My husband also visits us whenever he has business in Tokyo.

Basically, he imports high-end products from Japan and exports low-end products to Japan. He is always

busy, and I hope his business will thrive. I have a decent job here in Tokyo. I love my job and I don’t have

any intention to quit my job. I can say my home is Tokyo because I work and live here. I think the family

separation is quite bearable because we can see each other quite often. I have a son. My husband and I are

planning to send him to an international school in Shanghai. Then, all my family will be dispersed, and we

will really have to lead transnational life. However, we can enjoy the wealth of our life at the cost of our

separation. So, I am very much satisfied with my transnational life.

Jisoo shows diverse aspects of transnational practices as a Joseonjok migrant in Japan. She

is a life insurance consultant at one American company in Tokyo. She was born and raised in

Heilongjiang and attended Joseonjok ethnic schools. Then, she went to a university as a Japanese

literature major and worked at a Japanese firm in Shanghai. She met her Han Chinese husband

there and became a long-distance couple. To begin with, she revealed her traits of transnational

life through her family situation. She told me her husband ran a trading company in Shanghai. In

a way, her husband provided an excellent example of transnational entrepreneurship performed

among many Chinese in Japan. Her family willingly maintains the split family to benefit from

transnational practices spanning between Japan and China. Besides, the income discrepancy

between China and Japan makes Jisoo work in Japan while her husband maximizes economic gains

by engaging in transnational business. And yet, they try to relieve the tension from their separation

by frequently visiting each other thanks to the affordable cost of air travel.

6.4 Transnational Employment of Joseonjok in Japan

Before investigating the status quo of the employment of Joseonjok in Japan, it is essential

to know what transnational corporations (TNCs) do in this globalized world today. The reason is

quite simple because numerous Joseonjok in Japan have been employed in TNCs, and they have

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done businesses with various TNCs positioned in Japan. As Kordos and Vojtovic asserted,

“transnational corporations are one of the most important subjects of international economics.

They are directly affecting new trends in international business, global competitiveness on

international markets as well as the economics of states, nations” (Kordos and Vojtovic 2016: 150).

In general, transnational corporations (TNCs) produce and sell their products in more than one

country and create added value (Ibid., 151). They usually have their parent companies in their

home countries and affiliate their branch companies in other countries. According to the definition

of a transnational corporation from UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development), TNCs are defined more precisely as “legal entities or entities without legal

personality consisting of parent companies and their foreign affiliates” (UNCTAD 2016).

Today, there are diverse TNCs all over the world, most of which are centered in highly

advanced countries such as the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, the U.K., and France. Japan also has

quite a few TNCs such as Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Sony, NEC, and more. A considerable

number of Joseonjok were employed in small-and-medium-sized transnational companies. In this

context, Liu-Farrer (2012) indicated the position of Japanese TNCs in China as follows:

“Since China has recently become the most important production site and one of the largest consumer

markets for Japanese businesses, not only large conglomerates such as NEC and Mazda that maintain

large production and sales operations in China, but also medium and small Japanese firms are also active,

and to some degree desperate, players in the transnational economy between Japan and China” (179).

Joseonjok in Japan have ample opportunities to get hired in Japanese TNCs, whether they

are large or small. However, there are more chances for Joseonjok to be employed in small-and-

medium-sized TNCs than large ones because small TNCs are less competitive and selective to get

in. Joseonjok employees, just like other Chinese employees, often work as sales representatives in

Japan to deal with businesses with China. They are also dispatched to China to take charge of the

companies in the branch offices in China. Presumably, Joseonjok have better chances of getting

hired in South Korean TNCs in Japan such as Samsung and Lotte, which call for employees with

Korean language ability (Kwon 2015). After Joseonjok employees work in TNCs for a certain

period, quite a few of them take the road to becoming transnational entrepreneurs. As was often

indicated, Joseonjok employees have a strong aspiration to become transnational entrepreneurs

after their hard work in Japanese corporate companies. Those highly-educated Joseonjok in Japan

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finally accomplish “upward mobility of transnational entrepreneurs” (Zhou 2004; Yoon 2017: 393).

In recent years, Japanese global companies have shown a tendency to hire more foreigners

than ever before, especially Chinese students in Japan who can act as intermediaries in the

immense transnational markets between China and Japan (Liu-Farrer 2012). Joseonjok, as Chinese

nationals, enjoy even better positions than other Chinese in the transnational markets because they

can speak one more language, and they can also expand transnational business connections to

South Korea. As was indicated earlier, the majority of Joseonjok students are graduates from the

field of humanities. The employement rate from the humanities field is lower than those of SE

(science and engineering) in Japan. The science and engineering majors have more opportunities

to be recommended by the school (professors) than those of the students in humanities (Liu-Farrer

2015). The employment success rate of Joseonjok students depends on the business lines of

corporate firms. If the firms have positions that deal with multilingual and transnational

transactions, the success rate of Joseonjok students’ employment is naturally high (Kwon 2015).

The fortunate part of Joseonjok student employment is that more and more Japanese multinational

corporate companies have landed in China for production plants in the offshore industrial districts

targeting the enormous Chinese market. Conversely, there have also emerged many corporate

companies importing Chinese products into Japanese markets. As a matter of course, the more

Japanese firms do business with China, the more chances of employment of Joseonjok arise. Under

this situation, Joseonjok employees can predominantly act as intermediaries in the particular area

of the growing industrial area of Northeast China. It is easy for them to build up their networks

and connections because Dongbei (Northeast China) is their origin.

Joseonjok employees often occupy desirable positions by practicing their multilingual

function and transnational mobility. They can play their advantageous roles in the corporate

companies that deal with transnational businesses mostly between China and Japan. Some

multinational corporations in Japan intentionally select Joseonjok students to fill the needs of

multilingual and multinational transactions (Kwon 2015). Sometimes, they recruit Joseonjok

students who can carry out the transactions conducted among the three countries of China, Japan,

and South Korea (Ibid.). These transnational corporations target their marketing in China as well

as South Korea. They usually secure their role in the company by showing their diligence learned

from their bitter experiences during their school life in Japan. They do not forget their resolution

to come to Japan to be successful. However, after some years of hard work in the Japanese

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company, most Joseonjok realize that there is a wall (kabe) (Liu-Farrer 2011) in Japanese

workplaces and even in Japanese society. They also realize they do not expect ultimate career

mobility as foreign employees in Japanese companies (Ibid.). Over time, Joseonjok employees

cannot adapt themselves to the adamant system of the Japanese corporate structure. What’s more,

there is no guarantee for promoting foreigners from a certain point of higher level in Japanese

corporate companies. In the long run, Chinese employees as well as Joseonjok employees in

Japanese corporate companies come to experience “blocked upward career mobility” (Ibid.) in the

tightly structured Japanese corporate ladder.

The globalized economy in Japan has furnished prolific opportunities for Joseonjok to get

employed in the diverse transnational corporations (TNCs) in Japan. Transnational employment

occurs when employers send their employees to perform services in foreign countries (Bales et al.

2017). To this end, many of Joseonjok employees working in Japanese TNCs are often sent to

China to perform the transnational businesses in the local affiliations in China. They usually work

as sales representatives or liaisons to deal with the businesses between Japanese TNCs and Chinese

counterparts. Particularly, Joseonjok employees are often sent to Northeast China (Dongbei),

where they play better roles in their home places.

In this context, one of my informants, Minhyuk (Male, 45, Finance, arrived in Japan in 1998),

talked about his experience of working as an employee at a Japanese Transnational corporate

company as follows:

After graduating from a college in Japan, I got my first regular job in a medium-sized manufacturing

company. Right after the training session, my company asked me to work in Suzhou, where they built a

factory to produce machinery to export to other countries and import back to Japan. After working 4 years

as an expatriate employee in China, I moved back to the head office in Japan and got a promotion in a

managerial position. I often make business trips to China to supervise the local Chinese employees.

Sometimes, I act as an intermediary between Japanese management staff and local Chinese employees. I

also meet the local government officials to deal with legal matters and inspections. When I come back to

my office in Japan, I make reports and present them to the head office. I love my job, and I am pretty much

satisfied with my transnational life. I even enjoy travelling back and forth between Japan and China. I think

I dreamed of this life when I was hard up in my college days in Japan. By now I have accumulated plenty

of social capital and business skills to open up my own business in the near future. I am married to a Korean-

Japanese (Zainichi) wife. Yet, I do not have any intention to naturalize to become a Japanese citizen. I want

to keep my transnational migrant status for my career and business. I hope to run my transnational company

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in China in the district of Dongbei and continue to do business with Japanese companies.

Minhyuk displays a typical pattern of transnational employment of Joseonjok in Japan. As

mentioned earlier, many of Joseonjok employees make the most of their multilingual and

transnational function in the TNCs in Japan. The huge volume of the trade between China and

Japan requires multifunctional employees who can handle the transnational businesses transacted

between these two economic giants. Joseonjok are cut-outs for transnational jobs, and they can

also manage businesses with South Korea. As is shown by Minhyuk’s case, most Joseonjok

transnational employees are sent to China to expand the affiliate companies or factories in the

offshore industrial areas in China. In other words, they can “bridge structural holes between

Japanese employers and Chinese clients as part of the company’s transnational expansion” (Liu-

Farrer 2020: 76). On the whole, they accomplish their career mobility up to a certain level in

Japanese TNCs. However, there is an unseen limit of their mobility in the Japanese employment

system (Le Bail 2005). As a consequence, many of Joseonjok employees cherish their hopes to

become transnational entrepreneurs in the future (Kwon 2013). Minhyuk also talked about his plan

to open his own transnational business in China in the near future. He seems to have already

secured the business contacts both in China and Japan. Armed with his business knacks learned

from his workplace, he was confident to be successful. He also talked about business chances with

South Korean corporates. He may be on the right track of his career mobility in the ocean of the

transnational business world today.

The second case of transnational employment was narrated by Chen (Male, 35, Trade, arrived

in Japan in 2004), whom I interviewed during one Joseonjok sports meeting. He revealed his

transnational work situation in a different way from the case of Minhyuk. He performs his

transnational practice in the opposite direction. He used to work for a Japanese trading company

that mostly imported Chinese food products and distributed them to Japanese markets. He was not

satisfied with the job and found a new job at a Chinese food company. Now he is working for the

company as a sales director at the branch office in the Tokyo area.

I used to work for a Japanese trading company. The company mainly imported Chinese food products for

Japanese consumers. I mainly ordered the merchandise and checked the shipping and handling. Sometimes

I made claims for the damages and defects of the products. I had too much workload, and the pay was not

high. Besides, the scale of business in this company was not large enough to develop my career mobility. I

didn’t see any future. So, I quit my job two years ago. For a while, I was jobless. Then, I saw an ad in

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Joseonjok community newspaper about one food company in China which was looking for a man like me.

Surprisingly, the company was run by my acquaintance. I called the CEO of the company in Qingdao.

Actually, he was my senpai (alumnus) from the same school back in Yanbian. The company built a kimchi

manufacturing facility in Yanbian. My senpai suggested me to work for his company as a sales promoter in

Japan. I accepted his offer and I started to work in the branch office in Tokyo area. I usually meet Japanese

wholesalers in the food industry. The experiences and networks accumulated in my former work give great

help in marketing and sales promotion. My CEO is pleased with my business results, and I get a much

higher salary than before. I often go on business trips to China to attend company meetings and to look

around the production line in the factory. I sometimes go to South Korea to tour around the kimchi factories.

Someday I can do my own business in the food industry and become a successful entrepreneur.

As is indicated by Chen’s narration, a number of Joseonjok are employed in the transnational

companies after finishing their education in Japan. Equipped with language skills and high

motivation, they jump into the Japanese job markets. However, they usually have to go on the

process of “job hopping” (Liu-Farrer 2011) until they settle in the right position in transnational

corporate companies. Joseonjok employees like many other Chinese employees usually work as

sales representatives to develop markets in China or import products made in China. In particular,

Joseonjok in Japan have advantages in dealing with transnational businesses with South Korean

companies. They also have chances of employment to cover the rising industrial areas in Dongbei

(Northeast China) where they have good connections in their home places (Kwon 2015). Chen

found his occupational niche in transnational employment. He seems to enjoy the benefits of his

transnational employment. He has accumulated enough social and human capital to become a

transnational entrepreneur someday soon.

6.5 Transnational Entrepreneurship of Joseonjok in Japan

As a matter of course, Joseonjok employees in Japanese corporate companies try to look for

some solutions to their problems in their careers. Joseonjok, after starting to work in a Japanese

company, accumulate business networks in the transnational markets and eventually get prepared

to set up their own businesses to become virtually transnational entrepreneurs. The business

contacts and social capital acquired during their employment in Japanese companies, in the end,

have become the foundation of their transnational entrepreneurship. Ultimately, becoming a

transnational entrepreneur is a kind of long-cherished aspiration (Liu-Farrer 2011) to Joseonjok

migrants in Japan. On the whole, they set up some intermediary companies bridging between the

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Chinese market and the Japanese market as well as the South Korean market. (Kwon 2012). Some

Joseonjok entrepreneurs build manufacturing companies in China and import products to Japan. I

happened to meet a Joseonjok entrepreneur who built a kimchi factory in Yanbian, Northeast China.

According to him, becoming a transnational businessman was his wish for all those hard work and

training in a Japanese company. He now owns a factory in Yanbian and his office in Tokyo. He

makes frequent trips between China and Japan. He is quite pleased with his transnational life. The

other type of Joseonjok entrepreneurship is exporting goods to China, such as high-quality

electronic goods, cosmetics, baby products, and clothes, which are hot items in the high-end

Chinese markets (Kwon 2015). Those Joseonjok entrepreneurs are shrewd merchants to make wise

judgments of demand and supply in transnational markets between China and Japan. They actually

learned the trade of buying and selling during their employment in Japanese transnational

corporate companies. They acquired the knack of the transnational business (Liu-Farrer 2012)

through their experiences of working as representatives in the Japanese transnational companies.

Other than the transnational entrepreneurship some Joseonjok engage in traditional

entrepreneurship of self-employed businesses in Japanese consumer markets. They open their own

stores specializing in Chinese products for Chinese customers and local Japanese customers.

Without question, Joseonjok are not the major customers in these stores. They also engage in small

businesses such as ethnic food import and distribution and ethnic food restaurants. They even open

dog meat restaurants in Tokyo, attracting Joseonjok, South Koreans, Chinese, and even Japanese

customers (Kwon 2015). Sometimes, Joseonjok open their stores in Korea Town located in

Shinokubo dealing with Chinese low-end products or running Joseonjok ethnic food restaurants.

They also run guesthouses all around the Tokyo area. Language schools and cram schools are

popular business items among Joseonjok. Above all, the most popular businesses among Joseonjok

are ethnic food stores, general supermarkets, restaurants, trading companies, Joseonjok related

employment agencies, travel agencies, IT businesses, and more. All of these traditional migrant

businesses are intrinsically related to transnational activities. The products and services are

transnationally connected with Japan and China. As Solano and Vocca (2013) indicated, “a

business can be transnational in various ways: exporting, importing, or mobilizing resources across

borders of nation-states” (4). In this sense, the self-employed small businesses of Joseonjok in

Japan are mostly involved in transnational practices, and many of Joseonjok engaged in

transnational businesses in Japan are considered to be transnational (im)migrants.

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There are other types of transnational businesses done by Joseonjok in Japan. Some of them

import off-shore products from China and supply them to Japanese markets, while others export

some high-end products to Chinese markets. Particularly, some of them engage in doing business

in the area of Dongbei, where they have good business connections with their home places (Kwon

2015). Some very successful Joseonjok entrepreneurs from Japan build factories in this area and

export the products to Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Some small-scale entrepreneurs

import Joseonjok ethnic products and sell directly to Japanese customers. Conversely, they export

Japanese hot-items to sell directly to Chinese and Joseonjok consumers in the areas of Joseonjok

diasporas. Many Joseonjok entrepreneurs have already actively engaged in transnational

businesses, and they have come to play a prominent role as intermediaries in the transnational

markets in Japan, China, and South Korea. They have developed their own niche domain in the

dynamic economy of Northeast Asia. Joseonjok in Japan are also “exposed to different ways of

doing business through their migration experience, which makes it possible for them to identify

market gaps” (Harima and Baron 2020: 33).

Gapsoo (Male, 45, Entreprenur, arrived in Japan in 1999) whom I met at a Korean business

conference held in Tokyo in 2017 talked about his business background relating to transnational

entrepreneurship.

I am a core member of the “Overseas Korean Trade Association (OKTA), and I represent Joeonjok entrepreneurs

acting in Japan. This year, we have a big meeting in Tokyo, and a number of Korean entrepreneurs all over the

world gathered together. Okay, I am running a trading company in Tokyo. I mainly import products from China

and South Korea. I distribute the goods to retailers all over Japan. The items are diverse from food to toys. The

low-end Chinese products are very much marketable while high-end Korean products have difficulties in

competing with domestic products in Japan. I also import Joseonjok ethnic food products from Yanbian. They

are in good demand among Chinese migrants and local Japanese customers. I often travel to China and South

Korea to find out the new items to import to Japan. I am considering doing more business with those of Joseonjok

entrepreneurs in the U.S. and Europe by sharing information about transnational business items.

Another informant, Jicheol (Male, 42, Entrepreneur, arrived in Japan in 2006) also narrated

his life story of becoming a transnational entrepreneur in Japan:

I used to work at an international IT firm for 9 years. The pay was good enough to lead a comfortable life in

Japan, but I felt a certain limit of my career mobility as a foreigner in the Japanese company. As you know,

there are many talented high-skilled migrant workers in Japanese companies. I wonder if Japanese corporate

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firms would let them move to higher positions. I don’t think so. Even if I worked hard for my company for

many years, I realized there was an invisible glass ceiling covering over foreigners in Japanese corporate

ladder. I also felt the cultural barrier from the Japanese co-workers. So, I decided to leave the company and

launched my own small IT business. I started my venture with a small capital of 10 million yen. Now, my

company makes yearly sales over 20 million dollars. In fact, my company grew to be a multinational

corporate firm hiring diverse employees with their different ethnic backgrounds. They are Joseonjok, Chinese,

Koreans, and Japanese. They all take part in different sectors of transnational businesses based on their

ethnicity. I frequently go on business trips to China and South Korea to meet my clients. I mainly supply IT

products assembled in my company to IT manufacturers in China and South Korea.

Just like other Joseonjok entrepreneurs Jicheol was able to succeed in business because of his

diverse social and cultural capital as well as the business skills learned through his work

experiences in the Japanese company. Based on his transnational business experiences at his

former Japanese transnational corporate company, he performs his job successfully as a

transnational entrepreneur. In particular, he hires emploees from diverse ethnic backgrouds to meet

the needs of global markets consisted in East Asia. His work experiences actually help him

intermediate his employees with diverse cultures. He can overcome the linguistic gaps among his

emploees by commanding Korean, Chinese, and Japanese. The multilingual ability and

transnational mobility are the major resources to accomplish his dream to become a successful

transnational entrepreneur in Japan.

In this sense, Joseonjok are the important players in the transnational markets in globalized

Northeast Asia. Most Joseonjok employees in Japanese job markets aspire to run their own

business after working some time in their companies. Some of them finally say good-bye to their

company and start up their own business by utilizing their human and social capital gained from

their work experiences in Japanese transnational corporate company. The pattern of the

transnational entrepreneurship of Joseonjok in Japan is not quite different from that of Chinese in

Japan. As is known, “China has become the most important production site and one of the largest

consumer markets for Japanese business” (Liu-Farrer 2011: 97). On the other hand, the globalized

economy of Japan has granted prolific chances of the transnational entrepreneurship to Chinese

migrants (Le Bail 2005), including Joseonjok in Japan. As was indicated earlier, Joseonjok

entrepreneurs have a better position to expand their transnational territory to South Korea, the third

largest economic power after China and Japan in East Asia.

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6.6 Familial Transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan

6.6.1 Transnational Family

Huang and Yeoh asserted that “the globalization of migration has spawned multifarious

transnational social practices and networks at every scale including within the realm of family”

(Huang and Yeoh 2005: 379). In this globalized world today, more and more people are moving to

other countries looking for the better life opportunities. Thanks to the development of affordable

transportation and communication technology, migrants can stay in other countries while keeping

their family connections more tightly than ever before. Thus, whole family members of the

migrants can maintain the transnational family relationship in spite of the separation from each

other across the borders. More particularly, when a primary migrant leaves home for the destination

to be employed, the phenomenon of transnational families becomes an inevitable consequence of

this labor migration (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). It is common that in the field of labor migration,

people migrate to other countries while leaving their families in their place of origin. As a result,

family members are dispersed, but they maintain close ties (Cho and Allen 2018).

On the whole, migration has contributed to the economic development of both sending and

receiving countries as well as the migrants and the families concerned. However, migration has

unavoidably brought about issues for transnational families. According to the Coface EU report,

transnational families are defined as “families (where family members) live some or most of the

time separated from each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling

of collective welfare and unity, namely ‘familyhood’, even across national borders” (Bryceson and

Vuorela 2002: 3; Coface EU 2012: 4). Overall, Migration potentially benefits migrants and their

families (Kuerkova 2011). Migrants, especially labor migrants, after moving to other countries

earn money and send remittances back to their families. Family members use the money for their

children’s education and taking care of the elderly members of the families. In this sense, migration

is one’s big event in one’s personal life and the whole family. More particularly, labor migration

impacts the life of migrants and their families through the transnational family relationship

(Massey et al. 1993).

In labor migration, it is commonplace to see one family member moves to another country to

earn money by leaving the family members in the home places. The family ties firmly continue to

exist among those families, but they have to pay for the price of the negative effects of family

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separation. It is psychologically challenging for both sides of the migrants and the left-behind

families to put up with the situations. In other words, labor migrants bring income to their families

and improve their families’ livelihoods, but often face a high cost of separation (Sorenson and

Vammen 2014). Above all, the family separation potentially leads to family disruption (Ibid.,).

Furthermore, it can cause various problems for the children, spouses, and elderly parents who

remain in the home country. In contrast to this negative side of transnational families, there is a

different aspect of transnational families, and it shows rather the positive side of highly educated

migration which does not undergo the difficulty of family disruption in most cases. As is known,

student migration has been used as a side-door labor migration channel to be employed after the

education which furnishes highly-skilled jobs in the primary sector of the labor market (Liu-Farrer

2011). Overall, student migrants usually maintain a stable transnational family relationship while

they study and later get employed. In the end, they settle in good positions of migrants in the labor

market of the host society. Thus, they tend to lead affluent lives as highly-skilled migrants, and

they invite their families to their new homes. Sometimes, they invite their elderly parents to stay

as short-term sojourners or permanent residents.

6.6.2 Transnational Families of Joseonjok in Japan

As indicated before, the transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan goes parallel with those of

Chinese migrants in Japan. However, there are some differences between the two groups in that

Joseonjok have a wider scope of transnational mobility compared to the Chinese mainstream in

Japan. To be sure, Joseonjok have a three-way tract of transnational mobility which is stretched to

South Korea. As a consequence, the transnational families of Joseonjok in Japan sometimes have

triple connections among their family members.

The composition of the Joseonjok population in Japan is based on their different migrant

statuses. Far more than half of the total population of Joseonjok in Japan has come to Japan as

student migrants (Kwon 2015). There are some IT software technicians who entered Japan as

sojourners who do not occupy a noticeable portion of Joseonjok population. There are also some

marriage migrants who do not occupy any significant number to Joseonjok migrants in Japan. The

rest can be counted as clandestine undocumented migrants working in Japan. In consequence, the

majority of Joseonjok are those who initially arrived in Japan as students. To them, family dispersal

and reunification have become their indispensable procedures during the course of their migration

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in Japan. Thus, the familial transnationalism has been commonly practiced throughout their life

before they secured their firm settlement in Japan.

When the young Joseonjok students left China, their parents were working either in their

home places or in South Korea. However, the main issue of transnational families of Joseonjok in

Japan is not the matter in question between those parents and primary migrants in Japan. Rather,

the investigation of transnational families of Joseonjok in Japan is focused on the family dispersion

between the primary migrants and their children and spouses. As Joseonjok migrants in Japan

follow suit of the Chinese migration pattern, they also show similar traits of transnational families

to those of Chinese migrants in Japan. However, the transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan

stretches further to South Korea and forms their far-reaching mobility.

6.6.3 Transnational Families of Joseonjok in Japan Relating to their Children’s Education

There are various types of transnational families among the migrants in the host society. One

particular type of transnational family takes place when the children are sent to other countries for

their overseas education. As Huang and Yeoh point out, “the education of children has become a

major ‘project’ requiring the relocation of one or more members of the family to a different country”

(Huang and Yeoh 2005: 380). In general, educating children abroad accompanies the situation of

family separation between the young students and the rest of the families. Sometimes mothers

accompany their children to alleviate the pressure incurred from the separation. These

accompanying mothers are called as ‘study mothers’ (fei du ma ma) in Singapore (Ibid.). Likewise,

some fathers are called as ‘goose fathers’ (gireogi appa) who work in Korea while wives stay in

English speaking countries for their children’s education (Min 2013). Overall, the phenomenon of

transnational family due to children’s education is a commonplace among those families

particularly in the East Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, South Korea, and more.

Joseonjok in Japan are no exception in constituting transnational families caused by their

children’s education. In fact, most Joseonjok have already gone through the experiences of the

transnational family situation when they first came to Japan. Now, they are settled in Japanese

society, and their children are in school age. They know the value of education particularly as

migrants in the host society. They usually put tremendous efforts to bring up their children to

become global elites. The majority of Joseonjok children are now in the primary or secondary level

at schools. Most of them attend public schools. However, many Joseonjok parents do not count on

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the relaxed education system of public schools in Japan. Some of them prefer to send their children

to private schools in China if economic and familial conditions permit. Above all, some private

schools in China offer a unique stream of the international curriculum which combines the lessons

both in English and Chinese (Liu-Farrer 2011). The dual channels of the programs give perfect

bilingual education. Ideally, Joseonjok children from Japan can command four different languages

after all the education in the private schools in China. Many of Joseonjok parents in Japan are

attracted to the idea of sending their children to better educational environments in China. More

importantly, “Children serve as social, emotional, and economic ‘linchpins’ for households that

span transnational borders” (Soto 1987; Olwig 1999; Orellana et al 2001: 588).

For those young Joseonjok children in Chinese schools, mothers often stay in China as

‘study mothers’ and fathers work in Japan as ‘goose fathers.’ Above all, education has acted as

leverage for Joseonjok to achieve their successful life in Japan. To this end, Joseonjok parents are

well motivated to sacrifice themselves to give better education to their children. While I was

teaching at a Joseonjok weekend school, I often had chances to talk about the future plan of the

children with their parents. They usually asked me about the pros and cons of the study abroad

programs in English speaking countries. Yet, they seemed to worry about the pitfalls of overseas

education at the early age of their children. Many Joseonjok parents I met during my fieldwork

were more or less inclined to send their children to international schools or more preferably to the

private schools in the big cities in China. I met one informant, Bokjoon (Male, 41, IT Engineer,

arrived in Japan in 1999) during my fieldwork in 2017, who talked about his background in

decision making to send his son to an international school in Shanghai. He also talked about the

outcome of his transnational family life.

Two years ago, my son had a chance to attend a Chinese language immersion program offered by some

international school in Shanghai during his summer vacation. I went to the opening ceremony of the

program. I met other parents from all over the world. The majority of the parents were overseas Chinese,

but there were some Westerners from Europe and North America. We shared useful information about

educating children in international schools. I seriously considered sending my son to that school. After

returning to Japan, my wife and I discussed the matter of our son’s education in China. After all, we decided

to send him to China for his better education. Now, my son is studying at this international school and my

wife staying with my son in Shanghai. The school furnishes bilingual classes both in English and Mandarin

through the co-teaching method. My wife and my son live together at our relative’s house near the school.

I live alone in Tokyo and I think I am a ‘goose father’ as you told me about some Korean fathers’ miserable

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life. But I am all right because I often travel to Shanghai for my business and my wife also comes to Tokyo

for her part-time business to buy some hot items for her friends and acquaintances in Shanghai. Actually,

we don’t have any problems financially and emotionally in maintaining our transnational family life. It’s

quite bearable. I think we even maximize our transnational life of a split family. More than anything else,

my son is doing a good job in school. My business is good and my wife even makes good money from her

odd job.

The other informant Hyejin (Female, 45, Tourism, arrived in Japan in 2001) also talked about

her experiences of transnational family life originated from her son’s education. She spent a

somewhat different life from the above informant in that she had to work for her son’s education

in China and she did not frequently fly back to Japan to see her husband. As a ‘study mother’, she

seemed to spend a little tough time in China, but she is happy about the results of her son’s

education.

I had been away from Japan for 7 years before I came back last year. I stayed in China for my son’s education.

My son is now old enough to get along well in the dormitory of his school. Before he left for China, my son

was in 4th grade in Japanese public school. He didn’t seem to study hard maybe because of the pressure-

free education in the Japanese public school. Besides, he didn’t get along with Japanese classmates. My

husband and I were seriously worried about my son’s education. We were really concerned about our son’s

future. Then, I made up my mind to go back to Dalian where I had spent some time for my higher education.

My husband and I agreed to put up with the split family life for a while. My husband had to work hard to

send remittances to pay for the schoolings of my son’s education in a private school in Dalian. I also had to

work to pay for the living expense in China. Above all, all my family had to endure the financial and

emotional burden incurred by our son’s education. When my son first went to a private school in Dalian,

he cried every day because the school system was quite different from that of Japan. His school life in China

was much stricter than his former school. He had to wake up early in the morning, do some exercise at

school, and study late at night. After he finished the elementary school in Dalian, he was transferred to a

boarding school in Yanji where he could brush up Korean language. As is known, Yanji is the center city of

Joseonjok diaspora in the Yanbian district. This summer I sent my son to a Korean language camp in Seoul

which was targeted to overseas Korean students from all over the world. He learned standard Korean as

well as Korean culture there. He enjoyed the camp a lot and he was motivated to go to a college in Korea

after he finishes high school in Yanji. As he can speak Chinese and Japanese, he will be welcomed in Korean

universities. All in all, my husband and I have to work hard to support our son to be successful in his future.

As is shown in the narratives of the above two informants, many Joseonjok in Japan who have

school-age children are likely to consider sending their children to other countries for better

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education opportunities. As mentioned earlier, many Joseonjok in Japan experienced the hardship

of self-financed student life, and they cherish the results of their education in Japan. Thus, they

would take any kind of sacrifice for the sake of their children’s education, and they would even

bear the difficulties of dispersed family. With all the challenges of migrant life in Japan, Joseonjok

do not hesitate to send their young children to other countries for their children’s future. They have

several options for the study abroad programs, and they often consider overseas education in

English speaking countries. However, their priority is China because of its proximity and

affordability. Moreover, China has developed diverse programs for international education which

suit for Joseonjok children in Japan.

To explain the phenomenon of Chinese migrants’ educational intentions toward their children,

Liu-Farrer pointed out that “sending school-age children back to China reflects Chinese parents’

distinctively elitist mentality and a strategy to maximize the benefits of international migration”

(Liu-Farrer 2012: 185). The educational phenomenon of the transnational family continues to take

place among Joseonjok migrants in Japan as long as they hold their aspiration to give their children

the opportunities to lead a successful life in the future. I often met Joseonjok parents during my

fieldwork. I usually ask them about their life goals. Many of them answered making enough money

to retire was their secondary goal and making their children global elites was their primary goal.

In this context, Liu-Farrer indicated that “sending children back to China for study was therefore

a strategy parents adopted to prepare children different transnational opportunities” (Liu-Farrer

2020: 164). To put it another way, transnational family ensued from children’s education is not an

impediment in the migrant life of Joseonjok in Japan.

6.7 Closing

In this chapter, I investigate the issues and prospects of the transnationalism of Joseonjok,

which resulted from their migration in Japan. Without a doubt, transnationalism is a critical subject

in migration studies, and it has been defined in numerous ways by scholars from various fields. In

this context, ruminating on some specific definitions of transnationalism in relation to Joseonjok

in Japan is called for to wrap up this chapter. One of the most relevant definitions which support

the situation of Joseonjok transnationalism in Japan was explained in IOM Background Paper in

2010 as follows: “Transnationalism creates a greater degree of connection between individuals,

communities, and societies across borders, bringing about changes in social, cultural, economic,

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and political landscape of societies of origin and destination” (IOM 2010 Background Paper: 1).

There is one more definition which explains specifically the background of Joseonjok

transnationalism in detail. According to Levitt and Jaworsky’s citation, transnationalism is the

outcomes of “practices and relationship that link migrants and their children with the home country,

where such practices have significant meaning and are regularly observed” (Smith R. 2006; Levitt

and Jaworsky 2007: 132). A number of Joseonjok migrants in Japan take advantage of

transnationalism in their employment, business, education, social networks, and family

relationship. Above all, the transnationalized Joseonjok in Japan know how to navigate the

transnational space among the three different cultures, and they also know how to utilize the

economic, social, cultural connections tied among the three globalized countries of China, Japan,

and South Korea. Evidently, transnationalism is a key factor that favorably impacts the life of

Joseonjok in Japan.

This chapter provides various issues of transnationalism embedded in the life of Joseonjok in

Japan. In order to find out the major issues of the transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan, I started

the search from the historical background of the transnationalism of Joseonjok in their early stage

of migration in China. The historical heritage of transnationalism of Joseonjok has been inherited

to the next generations culturally and linguistically. Joseonjok in Japan, in this sense, are destined

to be transnational in the interrelated space of Northeast Asian territory from the first. Then, the

migration of Joseonjok in Japan has entailed the distinctive aspects of transnationalism, which

acted mostly as the positive base of their migrant life in their settlement. It is noteworthy to recall

that one of the ultimate purposes of this research is to find out how transnationalism has affected

the construction of self-identification of Joseonjok in Japan. There is no denying that

transnationalism has dominantly influenced the formation of Joseonjok identity in Japan. Evidently,

Joseonjok in Japan continue to maintain their transnational lifestyle, and there is no denying that

transnationalism constitutes an intrinsic component of their identity.

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Chapter 7: Issues and Prospects of the Identity of Joseonjok in Japan

7.1 Introduction

The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the identity issues of Joseonjok living in

Japan. It aims to find out the common attributes of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan, which are

multifariously related to the diverse aspects of their ethnicity, nationality, and multicultural

competency. The multilingual and transnational features of their migrant life are also examined to

explain the hybridity and fluidity of the Joseonjok identity formed and transformed in the course

of their settlement in Japan.

The meanings of identity were precisely defined in Chapter 2 from the perspectives of diverse

disciplines to give the foundation for further investigation on the issues of Joseonjok identity in

Japan. Moreover, the association between identity and migration was reviewed to explain the fact

that the two concepts are deeply interrelated, and migration eventually affects the change of

identity (Oppong 2013). More specifically, I put a focus on explaining the fact that the identity of

Joseonjok in Japan and their migration have an indispensable relationship. During the course of

their movement and settlement, Joseonjok in Japan experience the change of their identity. As

Foner et al. indicated, “Racial and ethnic identities are socially constructed and amenable to change”

(Foner et al. 2018: 2). Moreover, migrants’ identities are reconstructed and transformed through

the changes ensued from their migration (La Barbera 2015). The similar process of identity change

can be observed among Joseonjok in Japan.

In this chapter, I initially review the general backdrop of Joseonjok identity based on their

migratory history. To this end, I go over the historical framework of their migration occurred in

different stages of time which comprises the changes of their identities from the first movement to

Northeast China to the present-day migration into Japan. Then, I further investigate the

characteristics of the multifaceted identity of Joseonjok in Japan. I specifically examine the

multilingual and transnational attributes of the identity formation of Joseonjok in Japan. To

supplement the findings of the identity issues of Joseonjok in Japan, I perform a comparative

analysis of the identities of Joseonjok in Japan by collating them with those of Joseonjok in the

United States. I also perform a comparative analysis of the identities of Zainichi Koreans living in

Japan as one other distinctive Korean descendant group. In addition, I review the identities of other

groups of Joseonjok in China and South Korea as well as the identity of Chinese migrants in Japan

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to be compared with the identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

For the empirical data collection, I performed the interviews with my subjects on the topic

of Joseonjok identity, and I illustrate the selected scripts which give vivid discourses relating to

their life stories. The scripts are analyzed and installed based on the related topics of the identities

of Joseonjok in Japan. They reflect the issues of identity shift, identity formation and

transformation, and identity negotiation arising in their migrant life. All in all, the multifaceted

identities of Joseonjok in Japan have gone through the process of construction, negotiation, and

accommodation through their new life in Japan. Joseonjok in Japan, over time, have gone through

the identity changes according to the different stages of their living conditions.

7.2 The Identity Formation of Joseonjok in Japan

The identity formation and transformation typically occur when migrants move to the new

place of a receiving country (Oppong 2013). Then, migrants usually experience the change of their

identity in the course of their movement and settlement. To this point, La Barbera explains that

“identity is negotiated in the migration process” (La Barbera 2015: 2). The identity of Joseonjok

has been formed and transformed through their shared experiences of the economic, social, and

political changes of their life in China. More particularly, the identity of Joseonjok has been

influenced by geographical conditions, political changes, Chinese government policies, and

international relationships in the particular district of Northeast China (Choi 2001). Under these

circumstances, Joseonjok have maintained their identity of Korean ethnicity based on their

primordial inheritance. At the same time, they constructed Chinese national identity as one

autonomous minority group of Zhonghua Minzu (the union of all ethnic groups within China)

(Kim 2010).

After settling in Japanese society as Chinese nationals, Joseonjok still possess Korean

ethnicity and lead a unique cultural lifestyle as ethnic Koreans who speak Korean, eat mostly

Korean food, and watch Korean TV (Kim 2018). They have also accumulated Japanese cultural

competence with their Japanese language ability and the learning of Japanese social norms and

values. Consequently, Joseonjok in Japan have constructed their distinctive identity as a foreign

resident group in Japan. Moreover, the identity of Joseonjok in Japan has become multifaceted due

to their multilingual skill and transnational mobility made up in the course of their migrant life in

Japan (Kim 2018).

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I have already indicated in Chapter 2 that most Joseonjok in Japan were born and grew up

in China, and their ancestors came from the Korean peninsula. They are now living in Japan by

holding a sense of belonging and sharing some host soceity’s cultural traits. In this sense, the

identity of Joseonjok in Japan is made up of the triple elements bequeathed from Korea, China,

and Japan. Thus, it is safe to say the identity of Joseonjok in Japan is a mixture of the three

countries (Choi 2016). However, Joseonjok in Japan tend not to consider themselves either as

Chinese or as Korean, to say nothing of Japanese. A significant number of Joseonjok in Japan just

regard them as Joseonjok without solely belonging to any three countries (Ibid.).

The existing studies on Joseonjok identities are mostly focused on identity formation

concerning Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality (Lee and Lee 2015). However, Joseonjok in

Japan have more complex aspects of identity formation beyond those double characteristics. As

was mentioned, the identity of Joseonjok in Japan has been transformed from the dual identity to

the triple identity by adding Japanese cultural integration (Kim 2018). Thus, it is justifiable that

the identity of Joseonjok in Japan has been hybridized with the assorted ingredients of the three

countries. Therefore, it can as well be explained that the identity of Joseonjok in Japan is a

“complex multidimensional and multi-level identity, fluid in time and trajectory” (Pries 2004: 10;

Kim 2018: 69). In the long run, the hybrid identity of Joseonjok in Japan has, once again, been

reinforced to be more multifaceted by their multilingualism and transnationalism, which were

made up as a result of their movement to Japan (Kim 2018).

7.3 The Identity of Joseonjok in China

The review of the identity of Joseonjok in China is a prerequisite in exploring the main issue

of Joseonjok identity in Japan. Somehow, Joseonjok in Japan have brought in their original identity

of Joseonjok in China when they move into the new society of Japan. In this globalized world

today, Joseonjok, in two different locations of sending country of China and receiving country of

Japan have forged and maintained their ties constantly. In this context, investigating the identity

of Joseonjok in China is a fundamental procedure to conduct the primary research of the identity

of Joseonjok in Japan.

The globalization of the world has caused the drastic transition of the life of Joseonjok in

China. A significant number of Joseonjok left their hometowns to the big cities in China and

foreign countries worldwide. It caused the dissolution of Joseonjok diasporas in Northeast China

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(Choi 2016). Since the adoption of reform and the Chinese government’s open-door policy in the

late 1970s, Joseonjok have come to experience a profound social transformation (Kim 2010). As

a result, Joseonjok in China have undergone identity changes through the process of “construction

and transformation” (La Barbera 2015: 1) in their diasporic life in China. Their sense of belonging

as ethnic migrants (Phinney 1990) has been ambiguous because of the changes incurred in their

lives with the influx of globalization. Moreover, the contact with South Koreans has impacted

significantly on their identity (Choi 2016). The globalized economy has affected Joseonjok to

move to other places, mainly for their economic mobility. A great number of Joseonjok seeking

economic prosperity have left their homes to work in the developed countries such as South Korea,

Japan, the U.S., and even EU countries (Ibid.).

The deterioration of Joseonjok diasporas and the decrease in population have shown the

changing phenomenon of Joseonjok life in China (Choi 2016). More and more Joseonjok are

getting assimilated into the Chinese mainstream. In particular, the young Joseonjok keep different

identity from their parents or grandparents (Kim 2010). The Joseonjok grandparents who were

born in China or came to China as young children and were raised in the ethnic villages of

Joseonjok diasporas usually hold strong Korean identity (Ibid.). The parent generation who studied

Chinese and Korean at schools maintain dual identity of Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality

(Seol and Skrentny 2009). They still take pride in their Korean heritage while they appreciate their

Chinese government’s equal treatment. Despite the changes in their lives, they still retain their

primordial lifestyle by persisting their Korean language, culture, food, and even media

consumption (Lee and Lee 2015).

Unlike those two generations of Joseonjok in China, the young generation of Joseonjok

keep quite different identity from those of parents and grandparents (Kim 2010). Most of all, they

have better opportunities for their high education (Choi 2016). In a way, they are a blessed

generation. Their parents work hard and sacrifice themselves to earn money for their children’s

education (Ibid.). This young generation of Joseonjok in China have better social and economic

mobility chances thanks to their high education (Kwon 2015). Consequently, the young

Joseonjok’s ethnic identity has been weakened because of the changes in Joseonjok life in China,

which has been assimilated into Chinese nationalism. Moreover, the dissolution of Korean

diaspora has caused identity changes among Joseonjok in China. The globalization of China, as

well as Joseonjok society, has also affected the the shift in identity among Joseonjok in China

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(Choi 2016). In fact, the young Joseonjok generation have fewer chances of education in their

ethnic Joseonjok schools. As a result, they do not have fluency in the Korean language (Choi 2016).

Most of the young Joseonjok have been educated under the Chinese educational system, and they

work in the Chinese employment system after graduation (Choi 2001). The new generation of

Joseonjok tend to identify themselves as Chinese nationals, and they think of Joseonjok only as

one of the 56 ethnic groups in China. Over time, the political identity of Joseonjok has dominated

over their ethnic identity (Choi 2016). In sum, through the shift of generations, the dual identity of

Joseonjok in China has been changed from an ethnicity-centered identity to a nationality-centered

identity (Kang 2008).

7.4 The Identity of Joseonjok in South Korea

The relationship between Joseonjok and South Korea began in the late 1980s as a result of

China’s open-door policy. Joseonjok initially came to South Korea to visit their relatives. Then,

they came to work while some of them entered through international marriage or studying abroad

programs (Choi 2006). And yet, the majority of Joseonjok came to Korea as low-skilled laborers

only to make money. They have contributed to the development of the South Korean economy by

filling up the labor shortage. However, after their settlement in their ancestral homeland, they soon

realized that their identity was different from that of their South Korean compatriots (Kim 2018).

They also understand their difference leads to discrimination in South Korean society. The

Joseonjok’s experience with discrimination is somewhat paradoxical because they believe they

should be treated exactly like their fellow Koreans (Seol and Skretny 2004). The cold fact is that

a greater percentage of South Koreans tend to oppose the entry of Joseonjok into South Korean

society. As a result of this adverse phenomenon, Joseonjok, in general, show their negative feelings

of being Korean descendants in South Korea. In particular, Joseonjok are often described as

heinous criminals in the movies and dramas, making most of South Koreans have a misconception

of Joseonjok (Kim 2018). Under this situation, Joseonjok in South Korea emphasize their Chinese

national identity to guard themselves against discrimination occurring in South Korea. As Song

pointed out, “the negative experience of Korean Chinese in South Korea was aggravated by other

factors such as difficulties of obtaining entry visas to South Korea, discriminatory treatment by

South Koreans, and the cultural differences between Korean Chinese and South Koreans” (Song

2014: 457).

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Under this particular situation, Joseonjok realized that they should stand on the transnational

position between China and South Korea to protect themselves and take advantage of their dual

identity of being Chinese citizens and being Korean descendants (Choi 2006). Their transnational

identity has already been formed due to their transnational lifestyle spanning two countries of

China and South Korea. The identity embedded with transnationalism makes Joseonjok feel

competent, confident, and comfortable between the two different cultures (Hong 2013). However,

the majority of Joseonjok in South Korea are suffering from identity struggles in their motherland.

They do not know where to settle, and their floating identities are shifting to their migratory

movements. Some of them go back to their home in Northeast China, or some may have to decide

to stay permanently in South Korea by recovering or qualifying their South Korean citizenship

(Choi 2006). By reviewing the identity of Joseonjok in South Korea, I can examine the stream of

the identity changes of Joseonjok in general after they left their home place in Northeast China.

7.5 The Identity of Chinese Migrants in Japan

The trajectory of Joseonjok migration in Japan parallels Chinese migration in Japan (Kim

2018). Joseonjok show similar migration traits to those of the Chinese when they move and settle

in Japanese society (Kwon 2015). It is because Joseonjok are subsumed under the mainstream

Chinese migrants in Japan, and they are treated as Chinese in the statistics of Japanese government

(Kim 2018). In this context, the review of the identity of Chinese migrants in Japan is quite

essential to secure comparable resources for the main research on the identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

However, investigating the identity of Chinese migrants in Japan is too broad a job for me to handle

in this section. Thus, I will simply go over the two basic elements of the national identity and the

transnational identity of Chinese migrants in Japan, which can be compared with those of

Joseonjok identity.

The Chinese migrants in this section refer to those newcomer Chinese who have arrived in

Japan since China’s open-door policy and Japan’s acceptance of international students in the late

1970s. In Japan, two groups of immigrants are divided into “oldcomers” and “newcomers” (Le

Bail 2005). Oldcomers are those foreigners who arrived in Japan before 1945, and newcomers are

those who have arrived in Japan since the late 1970s (Ibid.). These days, Chinese migrants have

become the largest group of foreign residents in Japan by surpassing Korean residents (Le Bail

2013). The newcomer Chinese are generally better educated, more highly skilled, and more

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proficient in Japanese than those of oldcomers (Duff et al. 2008). As a consequence, they can

achieve better integration into Japanese society and enjoy better socioeconomic status than the

oldcomer Chinese in Japan (Le Bail 2005). The Chinese migrants share their common national

identity brought in from China. The national identity of Chinese people is intrinsically based on

Zhonghua Minzu’s thoughts which form a central Chinese identity as a whole (Li 2016).

China has deliberately absorbed the diverse ethnicities under its Zhonghua Minzu identity to

construct one strong nation without division. However, the Chinese national identity is somewhat

centered on Han-Chinese perspectives, and it causes some ethnic tensions among minority groups

(Irgengioro 2018). Under these circumstances, the Chinese migrants in Japan predominantly hold

a strong Chinese national identity (Duff et al. 2008), although some other ethnic groups such as

Joseonjok hold their distinct national identity mixed with their ethnicity (Kwon 2015). The

Chinese migrants in Japan, including all other ethnic minorities, have kept their strong sense of

Chinese national identity. The sense of belonging to Chinese national identity has been derived

from the added value of their being Chinese in their work and business in Japan (Duff et al. 2008).

Chinese migrants in Japan lead their affluent life thanks to their connections with China.

With their bilingual ability and transnational mobility, Chinese migrants in Japan can secure their

own niches in the Japanese economy (Liu-Farrer 2011). Moreover, by maintaining economic and

social ties with China, they can overcome their marginal social positions and gain social mobility

in Japan (Liu-Farrer 2012). The majority of Chinese migrants in Japan do not intend to get

assimilated into the Japanese social system. Rather, they are inclined to keep their transnationality

between China and Japan to take advantage of the benefits from both societies (Ibid.,). In this

context, many Chinese migrants in Japan prefer to hold permanent residency over naturalization

while living in Japanese society (Liu-Farrer 2011). Based on their transnational identity, Chinese

migrants in Japan resort neither to homeland ethnicity nor Japanese cultural assimilation. They

want to maintain their transnational identity to live a life “that can maximize their access to the

resources in both societies (Liu-Farre 2012: 188). Above all, transnationalism is one central

element of the flexible identity of Chinese migrants in Japan.

7.6 Comparative Analysis of the Identity of Joseonjok in Japan with that of Zainichi Koreans

Joseonjok and Zainichi Koreans have the same root of their ancestry as Korean descendants.

They diverged into two different countries of China and Japan from the Korean peninsula. The

identity formations of these disparate Korean descendants have progressed respectively based on

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their historical, geographical, social, political, and economic backrounds of the two different host

countries.

Joseonjok grew up in China with their sense of belonging to their natal homeland of China.

They have been treated equally as bona fide Chinese nationals among the 56 ethnic groups.

Therefore, Joseonjok have maintained their Chinese national identity even after they moved into

Japan. In contrast, Zainichi Koreans have long been marginalized in their host society, and they

have gone through so many difficulties in securing their social standing in the closed nation of

Japan. They have not been regarded as true citizens of Japan up until now. Thus, they have not

constructed a national identity as Japanese nationals. The two different groups of Korean

descendants live together under the Japanese skies. They do not share similar identity traits, and

they lead different lifesytles as foreign nationals in Japan. More particularly, Joseonjok maintain

their Korean ethnicity while Zainichi Koreans mostly lost their sense of belonging to their ancestral

homeland after the elapse of several generations in Japan. Naturally, these two groups do not have

connections to share compatriotism as Korean descendants. They do not have cultural and

economic exchanges in Japanese society.

The purpose of the comparative analysis of the two different migrant groups in Japan who

hold Korean heritage is to compare and contrast the differences and similarities of the diasporic

identities in different migration circumstances. The question “Who are Zainichi Koreans?” is a

prerequisite to investigate the issues of identity of Zainichi Koreans to be compared with that of

Joseonjok in Japan.

The term Zainichi means a foreign citizen staying in Japan as a temporary residence (Cho

2016). The literal meaning of Zainichi seems to be contradictory considering the status of Zaicnihi

Koreans who are staying in Japan permanently. The original meaning of Zainichi has been changed

due to the permanent stay of Korans in Japan after World War II. Now, Zainichi Koreans are the

Korean permanent residents in Japan who arrived before World War II and their descendants in

Japan. In the particular period of Japanese rule over Korea, many Koreans were mobilized between

the Korean colony and the Japanese mainland (Chapman 2004). Moreover, during this colonial

era, Koreans were given citizenship as a second-rated race in Japan as well as other Japanese

colonial territories in East Asia (Choi 2006).

Although Koreans were not treated equally as true citiznes as Japanese nationals, they were

at least granted the citizenship of the Japanese empire during the time of Japanese rule over

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Koreans. The Japanese empire needed to control and exploit Koreans to strengthen the power of

the empire. However, after World War II, however, Zainichi Koreans lost their Japanese nationality

due to the “San Francisco Peace Treaty in 195248” (Kim and Yun 2005; Lee and Tanaka 2017).

Then, in 1991, the Japanese government created “a special permanent residency system49” for

individuals and their families born in former Japanese colonies (Cho 2016). This system released

the humiliating shackles of “fingerprinting requirement50” as aliens in Japan. This discriminatory

requirement had long been a sign of discrimination against foreign residents, including Zainichi

Koreans who had to bear it in their life in Japan. Although Zainichi Koreans benefited from being

special permanent residents, they still do not have the right to vote or apply for the national pension.

Without being naturalized to Japanese citizenships, Zainichi Koreans are not even eligible to apply

for government jobs. Worst of all, they are often targeted for hate speech from the far-right

Japanese groups (Ibid.). The anti-Korean sentiment among some Japanese people still exists in the

shade of Japanese society.

Zainichi Koreans have complexity in their identity because of “the struggle between

assimilation and separation” (Lee 2012: 4). They feel they are just individuals without national

boundaries (Lee and Tanaka 2017). While the identity of first-generation Zainichi Koreans is

solidly tied to the homeland, second to fourth generations of Zainichi Koreans have different

identities relatively free from the relationship with the Korean peninsula. They do not think they

belong to Korea, and they are aware of the fact that they will likely continue to live in Japan (Ryang

1997; Son 2008). In particular, the younger generations of Zainichi Koreans maintain their

existence in Japan as denizens51 with the extension of civil and social rights and at the same time

48 Japan singed a peace treaty in 1951 with 48 countries in San Francisco. The treaty left unresolved problems regarding geopolitical

relationship within other Asian countries (Hara 2006). Japan gave up the colonial control of the Korean peninsula. As a result,

Koreans in Japan became stateless. This was the reason why Koreans in Japan lost their Japanese nationality.

49 Special Permanent Residents (特別永住者/tokubetsueijūsha) are the residents of Japan with heritage related to former colonies

of Korea and Taiwan.

50 Fingerprinting practices were given to alien residents who used to be former colonial subjects. Forced fingerprinting threatened

general human rights and dignity. As a result, Mindan (pro-South Korean Association) protested the fingerprinting in 1983. Also,

Soren (pro-North Korean Association) joined the domestic ethnic movement (Lie 2008: 5).

51 To understand the concept of denizen, we should know the difference between denizen and citizen. A denizen is simply an

inhabitant of a place while a citizen is a person who is legally recognized as a member of a state with associated rights and

obligations. In contrast, a denizen is a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural born subject. A permanent resident with

a green card is not a citizen in the U.S. but a denizen of the U.S. Thus, a denizen in the U.S. is just someone who lives there.

Someone who resides in a country without a citizenship is a denizen. For example, permanent residents, undocumented over-stayers,

or long-term visitors are all under this category of denizen.

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being respected for their ethnicity rather than belonging to either Korea or Japan (Pak Il 2005; Son

2008).

Zainichi Koreans’ identity is complicated due to the effects of the political and ideological

diversity they experienced through their stringent life in Japan’s exclusive society (Cho 2016).

Over time, Zainichi Koreans’ identity has been changed from a collective one to an individual one

(Jang 2019). While the old comers of the first generation Zainichi Koreans held strong traits of

Korean identity, the Japan-born Zainichi Koreans have the assimilated identity with Japanese

cultural acceptance (Lee 2012). The new generations usually use Japanese as their first language,

and their lifestyle and way of thinking have much in common with the Japanese majority.

Moreover, an increasing number of Zainichi Koreans have obtained Japanese citizenship since

1991.

Throughout the shifts of generations, Zainichi Koreans have improved their living conditions.

However, they still have to cope with the discriminative treatment from the Japanese government

and Japanese people (Ibid.). They have endeavored to enhance their status through their persistent

efforts to realize their social and economic mobility in Japanese society for all that hardship. More

importantly, Zainichi Koreans have tried to put in civil rights efforts to achieve “co-living” with

the Japanese majority (Jang 2019). At least, they secured their position in the Japanese social

structure as a member of permanent residents. Zainichi Koreans have played important roles in the

diverse fields of Japanese society. Aa a consequence, their identity has been changed to be a more

positive one after all the improvements in their life in Japan.

This section’s primary purpose is to compare the identity of Zainichi Koreans with that of

Joseonjok in Japan. Joseonjok in Japan and Zainichi Koreans both have Korean heritage.

Nonetheless, they show salient differences due to a century-long separation in two different

locations. After a long lapse of time, the two divergent Korean descendants have evolved into

being different ethnic groups, respectively. Thus, the two Korean descendants have developed the

disparate identities under different diasporic environments (Shim 2017). The two ethnic groups in

Japan who got the same ancestral roots live together in Japan with different identities. The research

in this chapter aims to examine the issues of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. Naturally, the issues

on Zainichi Koreans’ identity act as supplementary resources to pursue the investigation of the

primary issue of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. To this end, I have attempted to find out the

similarities and differences between Joseonjok and Zainichi Koreans in Japan. More than anything

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else, the underlying similarity is in that both of them are ethnically classified as Korean

descendants who are treated as foreign residents in Japan. Yet, both of them do not share much of

a common identity as migrants in Japan.

With all the scarcity of similarities between these two groups, there are notable differences

between Joseonjok in Japan and Zainichi Koreans. Firstly, Joseonjok in Japan maintain their

Korean ethnicity along with their Chinese nationality (Kwon 2015). In contrast, Zainichi Koreans

do not have a strong sense of belonging to Korea because they were born in Japan, educated in

Japanese schools, and are unfamiliar with Korea and its culture (Lee 2012). Secondly,

transnationalism is one core element of Joseonjok identity (Kwon 2015), while Zainichi Koreans

do not forge and maintain strong ties to their ancestral home country to foster transnational identity

(Lee 2012). Lastly, Joseonjok settled in Japan with their multilingual ability, which enhanced their

economic and social mobility (Kwon 2015). Zainichi Koreans predominantly command the

Japanese language after losing their ethnic language competency. By performing this comparative

analysis of the two different groups with the same Korean heritage in Japan, I can see the

similarities and differences of identity issues between these two groups. Overall, the features of

Zainichi Koreans’ identity give the ground to observe the future development of the identity of

Joseonjok in Japan.

7.7 Comparatve Analysis of the Identity of Joseonjok in Japan with that of Joseonjok in the

U.S.

One of the intrinsic differences between the two groups of Joseonjok in Japan and the U.S.

can be attributed to the way how they entered the destination countries. Joseonjok mostly have

come into Japan with a valid student visa or working visa. In contrast, Joseonjok have entered the

U.S. without holding a proper visa to stay and work permanently. Joseonjok, in many cases, hold

temporary visas only for travel or business when they enter the ports in the U.S. Some of them

even smuggle into the U.S. border through Mexico and become illegal alien immigrants.

Other than the different procedures of the entry of these two groups of Joseonjok, it is also

necessary to know that there are significant differences between the U.S. and Japanese societies.

Above all, the differences stemmed from the fact that the U.S. has traditionally been an

immigration country consisting of diverse national origins. In contrast, Japan has long maintained

its homogenous society until recently. In this light, Joseonjok in Japan and the U.S. show different

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aspects of their settlements. The differences have affected the lives of the Joseonjok in two

different societies respectively. As a result, Joseonjok in these two countries have developed

different Joseonjok identities. The bottom line is that Joseonjok largely have come to Japan as

students while Joseonjok have mainly come to the U.S. as laborers working inside Korean

communities. Consequently, the two different groups of Joseonjok have formed different identities

in the different migration environments of Japan and the U.S.

Overall, Joseonjok in the U.S. have gathered together in the metropolitan areas where

Korean communities are established (Lee 2002; Jin 2011; Song 2011a). Joseonjok in the U.S. are

doubly displaced ethnic Koreans that have lived for generations in China and have recently

migrated to the United States (Jun 2012). Since the late 1990s, there has been the presence of

Joseonjok in major cities like New York and Los Angeles. Where there is a Korean community,

there are always Joseonjok maintaining symbiotic life by working for Korean business owners or

doing their own businesses (Min 2012). This phenomenon has been a new trend of Korean

communities in the U.S. since the influx of Joseonjok directly from China or via South Korea. It

seems that Joseonjok have migrated into the U.S. on a large scale since the 2000s in pursuit of

their “American Dream.” The number of Joseonjok can only be roughly estimated as 100,000

without official confirmation because a great number of them stay undocumented after entering

the U.S. with visitor’s visas and counterfeit Korean passports (Jin 2011). Somehow, they chose to

come to the U.S. because they pursued better life chances in the most advanced country in the

world. Most of them entered the U.S. through a B-1 visa52 relying on brokers (Min 2012). The

difficulty of obtaining legitimate U.S. visas have sometimes made Joseonjok resort to the

dangerous option of using illegal brokers to cross the border from Mexico (Song 2011b).

Among those presumed 100,000 Joseojok in the U.S., about 30 percent of them hold

permanent residency (green card), and the rest are counted as temporary stayers and undocumented

overstayers (Lee 2002; Jin 2011; Song 2011b). After Joseonjok stay a certain period in the U.S.,

some try to secure the legal stauts as foreigners. A limited number of them can get green cards of

permanent residency through various channels. Based on eligibility, they often apply for the green

cards through marriage and family invitation. Yet, it is only possible if they have someone to invtie

them as spouses or family members. Otherwise, they use illicit family chain migration or fake

52 It is a temporary/non-immigrant US visa that allows visitors to enter the U.S. for business purposes.

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marriage through the help of illegal brokers in the Joseonjok communities. The other possible way

to get a green card is to utilize the “sixth preference immigration law.” This visa category refers to

the eligibility of a green card given to the applicant who is considered to be “capable of performing

specified skilled or unskilled labor for whoch a shortage of employable persons exists” (U.S.

Immigration Act 1965). Other than those lucky Joseonjok, the rest become illegal alines with their

undocumented status who can still work and make money under the table inside Korean

communities. It is not uncommon that they can survive in the shade of illegal labor markets in the

U.S.

More and more Joseonjok are arriving in the U.S., although the U.S. government enforces

strict control over illegal immigration. As was mentioned earlier, some Joseonjok in South Korea

would make fake Korean passports and try to enter the U. S. illegally as visitors and then overstay

to become undocumented migrants. They manage to stay somewhere around Korea towns and

secure their life (Jin 2011). They work hard and save enough funds to open their businesses. They

also pursue their legal status by achieving permanent residency. After a while, they usually engage

in their businesses such as nail shops and even international trade between China and the U.S.

(Song 2011b). They mostly take over businesses from the first-generation Korean-Americans who

would not inherit their businesses to their children because of their children’s advancement to

professional job market in American society (Min 2012). Above all, Joseonjok have their own

merits in doing businesses in the ethnic enclaves. They can enlarge their business territory to

Chinese markets in the big cities of the U.S. Thus, they often act as intermediaries between Korean

communities and Chinese communities. They can further develop transnational entrepreneurship

between China and the U.S. (Jin 2011).

In this section, I perform the comparative analysis of the identities of the two different

Joseonjok in Japan and the U.S. Thus, analyzing the similarities and differences between the two

groups is called for to find out the comparative aspects of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. There

are intrinsic similarities between these two groups of Joseonjok in Japan and Joseonjok in the U.S.

More than anything else, both of them originated from the same Korean diasporas in China. They

have maintained the same ethnic identity while living in two different countries. The population

that emigrated to these countries is estimated to be about the same number of 100,000, although

both numbers are not officially confirmed. Similarly, these two groups of Joseonjok forge and

maintain strong ties with their families and relatives back in China. They hold a robust

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transnational identity connected to their place of origin (Jun 2012). With all the similarities, there

are noticeable differences between these two groups. With their highly-educated background in

China, one group of Joseonjok in Japan made the most of their education as a springboard to

enhance their status to secure professional jobs or transnational business opportunities in Japan

while the other group did not get the chance of education in their migrant life in the U.S. (Kwon

2015).

More specifically, there are salient differences between these two groups of Joseonjok based

on their settlement processes in their respective host countries of Japan and the U.S. First of all,

Joseonjok in Japan are scattered all over, following their workplaces or businesses. Actually, they

have not constructed diasporic enclaves in Japan (Kim 2018). They have only maintained virtual

communities through diverse social networks (Kwon 2012; Kim 2018). In contrast, Joseonjok in

the U.S. have clustered to Korean diasporas and constituted the sub-group as a part of Korean

communities in the U.S. Secondly, Joseonjok in Japan can command the three languages of Korean,

Chinese, and Japanese (Kim 2018). The majority of them are perfect trilinguals. However,

Joseonjok in the U.S. did not have a chance to learn English in China before they arrived in the

U.S. Moreover, their life after the arrival in the U.S. has mostly been confined to the diasporic

islands of Korean communities. They mostly engage in manual jobs which do not necessarily

require the perfect command of English (Min 2012). Furthermore, they are well motivated to work

hard only to own their own businesses to lead their abundant life in the U.S. or to come back to

China loaded with enough money to lead a comfortable retirement as successful returnees. As is

often the case, Joseonjok in the U.S. keep succeeding to the businesses from Koreans and taking

up a small part of Korean communities by consisting of a sub-group of Korean immigrants in the

U.S. society (Min 2012). As the number of Joseonjok increases in the U.S. Joseonjok gain the

foothold to establish their distinctive ethnic pockets inside Korean communities (Ibid.), and they

stand up as a sub-ethnic minority group in the host society of the U.S. Overall, they maintain their

own Joseonjok identity of Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality inside the Korean ethnic

enclaves.

Despite the differences, these two Joseonjok groups have common traits with food, language,

and customs in general. However, the identities of these two different Joseonjok groups have been

evolving respectively in the different environments of Japan and the U.S. Unlike Joseonjok in

Japan who hold the triple identity of Koreaness, Chineseness, and Japaneseness. Joseonjok in the

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U.S. still hold only the double identity of Koreaness and Chineseness because they are confined

inside Korean communities. In a way, Joseonjok in the U.S. show the similar identity to that of

Joseonjok in South Korea (Jun 2012) because these two groups are exclusively confined in their

own diasporic spaces of Joseonjok towns in Korea and Korea towns in the U.S.

Through the comparative analysis of the identities of the different groups of Joseonjok, I

observe that Joseonjok keep primordially the same identity, but, over time, they keep evolving into

being different groups with different identities. More particularly, the two different groups of

Joseonjok do not share the same traits of identity when their common ethnicity is diluted from

their second-generation, who are likely to be assimilated to their host countries, respectively. In

this context, the comparative analysis of the identities of the respective second-generation

Joseonjok should be conducted to get useful resources for my future research. At the same time,

the analysis of different aspects of multilingualism and transnationalism practiced by the two

different groups of Joseonjok who are placed in different migration settings can also act as the

basis to find out the divergent issues on the respective identity of the two different groups of

Joseonjok. All in all, the identities of the two Joseonjok groups are different in their different host

societies.

7.8 The Identities of Joseonjok in Japan

Examining the identity of Joseonjok in Japan is the main task of this chapter. Indeed, identity

issues frequently emerged during the time of their settlement in the host society of Japan. It is

noteworthy that there are diverse groups of Joseonjok in Japan vested with different identities

based on the time to enter Japan, educational backgrounds, and social status in their life in Japan.

Some are inclined to value their Korean ethnicity, while others emphasize their Chinese nationality.

Moreover, many of Joseonjok in Japan keep their cosmopolitan outlook of multiple identities (Choi

2016).

Joseonjok in Japan hold diverse identities based on their divergent perspectives on their

ethnicity and nationality. According to my survey performed among the various groups of

Joseonjok in Japan, a considerable number of the newcomer Joseonjok who came to Japan in the

late 1990s and the early 2000s tend to hold strong Chinese identity as Chinese nationals although

they simultaneously maintain their cultural ethnicity of Joseonjok (Kwon 2015). In contrast, the

early comers who arrived in Japan in the 1980s and the early 1990s showed their robust identity

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as ethnic Korean descendants in Japan. They maintain the original identity of Joseonjok while

adapting themselves to Japanese cultural and social norms. In addition to these two disparate

groups of Joseonjok, there are quite a few of Joseonjok who do not regard the nationality and

ethnicity as a critical matter of their identity. Other than these two contrasting elements in their

identity, Joseonjok in Japan have added a Japanese cultural component without getting fully

assimilated into the host society. On top of those triple elements of their hybrid identity, Joseonjok

in Japan have come to keep their cosmopolitan perspectives (Choi 2016) in their identity, mainly

due to their multilingual and transnational function embedded in their life in Japan.

Before performing the analysis of the diverse identities of Joseonjok in Japan in the

following sub-chapters, it is necessary to examine how Joseonjok are identified by others in

Japanese society. I often witnessed uncomfortable occasions occurred between Joseonjok and the

South Korean government agencies in Tokyo. The disputes typically arise from the contradictory

perceptions of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. Joseonjok want to be regarded as Korean

compatriots just like those of South Koreans living in Japan. However, Joseonjok are registered as

Chinese nationals in Japan (Kwon 2015), and the South Korean government agencies would not

accept them as overseas Koreans. South Korean officials often showed reluctance to give practical

help to Joseonjok communities, such as leasing the buildings and facilities owned by the South

Korean government. Moreover, the South Korean government even worries about Joseonjok’s

viable connections with North Korea because some Joseonjok in Japan have their relatives living

in North Korea. From the viewpoint of the primordial Joseonjok’s identity, “Joseonjok’s

orientation to the Korean peninsula includes both North and South Korea” (Lee Helene K 2008:

310). It is obvious that the Korean identity of Joseonjok, in general, stemmed from the time before

the division of the two Koreas. Park JB (2018) also argues that Joseonjok have complicated

feelings toward the two Koreas. “They have a mixture of sympathy and shame for North Korea.--

--- They also have a mixture of humiliation and rivalry feelings agsinst South Korea” (13). With

the mixed feelings, Joseonjok are not likely to be identified as true brethren by the South Korean

government. Joseonjok’s entity as Chinese nationals in Japan does not allow them to get South

Korean perqusites given to overseas Koreans. After all, Joseonok’s conflicting positon between

Chinese nationality and Korean ethnicity makes it difficult for Joseonjok to be identified solely as

Chinese or Korean.

It is commonplace that most Japanese people are not aware of the existence of Joseonjok

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in their society. In fact, Joseonjok have not constructed their ethnic enclaves in Japan. Japanese

people who come to know about Joseonjok commonly consider Joseonjok as Chinese migrants in

the first place, but soon they notice Joseonjok are different from the Han Chinese. I happened to

meet some Japanese at a conference who were confused with the name of Chōsenjin (朝鮮人) and

Joseonjok(朝鮮族).This simply tells that Joseonjok are not identified as an independent minority

in Japan. Even after Japanese people notice the entity of Joseonjok, they still have the question on

Joseonjok’s identity if it belongs to North Korea or South Korea. In general, Japanese people ten

d to express anti-North Korean sentiments for political reasons (Shipper 2010). In sum, the identi

ty of Joseonjok in Japan is complex and multifaceted, although it is invisible in Japanese society.

7.8.1 Korean Identity of Joseonjok in Japan

Joseonjok in Japan keep the different backgrounds of their identities. In particular, those

Joseonjok who arrived in Japan in the late 1980s and the early 1990s displayed the traits of Korean

identity more actively than those Joseonjok who came in later years. The early arrived Joseonjok

in Japan were mostly born and raised in the families that had maintained and valued their Korean

ethnicity in their diasporic life situations. Before China adopted the open-door policy, Joseonjok

used to live in the closed society of their diasporas in Northeast China (Choi 2016). They had but

to keep their own distinctive lifestyle as one minority group in China without getting close

associations with the outside world. In a way, they were confined in the ‘cultural island’ of

Joseonjok diasporas (Choi 2001). Armed with a strong sense of Korean identity inherited from

their family, this group of Joseonjok came to Japan to accomplish their successful life as an elite

group of Chinese student migrants (Kwon 2015). This group of the early comer Joseonjok also

carry a Chinese national identity, although it is comparatively weaker than Korean ethnic identity.

In other words, they maintain the dual identity of Joseonjok (Choi 2016), but they put more

emphasis on their Korean ethnicity than Chinese nationality.

Other than early comer Joseonjok, some group of Joseonjok in Japan hold a strong Korean

identity. Many of this Joseonjok group in Japan came from Heilongjiang Province and Liaoning

Province in Northeast China (Kwon 2015). In many cases, Joseonjok from these two provinces

show a strong inclination to Korean identity (Hong 2013) because of their family’s geographical

origins. The older generations of this group mostly came from the Southern States of the Korean

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peninsula (Hong 2013 et al). They have usually maintained their strong attachment to their home

places in South Korea. Since the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea, this

group of Joseonjok in China, whose ancestors came from the Southern States of South Korea, have

started to visit their ancestral home places and established the connections with their family clans

in the pedigree (Hong 2013). Some of them resettled in South Korea as returnees through the South

Korean government policy of recovering nationality (Choi 2016).

Under these influences of their family backgrounds, Joseonjok in Japan who came from the

two provinces of Heilongjiang and Liaoning, are likely to hold Korean identity more strongly than

those from Jilin Province and other areas in China (Kwon 2015). Their family’s geographical

origin has affected this group of Joseonjok to continue to hold a strong Korean identity even after

they settled in Japanese society. However, like those early comers Joseonjok, this group of

Joseonjok in Japan also carry Chinese national identity and maintain their dual identity as

Joseonjok. It is only a matter of the proportion of their inclination between the two identities.

Above all, the above two groups of Joseonjok in Japan, for the most part, have a stronger sense of

Korean identity than that of Chinese identity.

The following two interview scripts were gained to indicate two different types of Korean

identity of Joseonjok in Japan. The two different groups of Joseonjok with strong Korean identity

are distinguished from their age and the place of origin in Korea. Through the interviews, I

examined the various types of identities possessed by Joseonjok in Japan. The first type of Korean

identity was quite prevalent among some of my informants, depending on where they are from in

China and where their families were originally from the Korean peninsula. Also, the age and the

time they entered Japan were also the determinants of the formation of the Korean identity of

Joseonjok in Japan. Through the interviews, I learned most of the early arrived Joseonjok in the

1980s have already become the age of over 50s and 60s who successfully settled in Japan. They

tend to show the attributes of strong Korean identity with their sense of belonging to Korea. In this

sense, my informant Hyeja (Female, 63, NGO Director, arrived in Japan in 1998) talked about her

identity as an immigrant in Japan.

Joseonjok from my generation in Japan may regard themselves as overseas Koreans. You know, I

always tell others I am Korean, not Chinese. The blood of my ancestors from the Korean peninsula is

still flowing in my body. When I used to live in China, I differentiated myself from Han Chinese.

Culturally, Joseonjok and Han Chinese are different. I still remember my Han Chinese neighbors never

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take off their shoes inside my house in Yanbian. They were friendly, but my family didn’t like their

customs. I know they were different from us in some ways. Oh, I never cheered the Chinese team when

Korea and China competed in international sports matches. I also want to tell one more thing about my

Korean identity. Although I am married to my Japanese husband, I can never be a Japanese national.

The Josho (情緒), the culture of emotion between Korea and Japan, is totally different. My husband

never understands typical Korean sentiments. Even if I am naturalized and spent almost 30 years in

Japan, I cannot be the same national as the Japanese. I think I am Korean.

Hyeja belongs to the oldest age group of Joseonjok in Japan. She was brought up in a

traditional Joseonjok family before the time of China’s Open-Door policy. She went to Joseonjok

ethnic schools in the Korean community in Jilin Province. Then, she went through the stage of

“ethnic identity achievement” (Phinney 1990) in her home place in Northeast China. In fact, her

age and her family background are the based on her strong Joseonjok identity, which was focused

on Korean ethnicity. More particularly, Hyeja’s Korean identity was fixed during her adolescent

stage. After all, Hyeja fostered a strong sense of Joseonjok ethnic identity, and she brought it to

her new life in Japan. During the interview session, she displayed her positive identity as a

Joseonjok immigrant who successfully settled in Japanese society. She emphasized her Korean

heritage after all the procedures of her marriage and the naturalization to become a Japanese citizen.

She was also aware of the unhappy situation of the discrimination against Joseonjok arising in

South Korean society. Still, she believed things would be better with the South Korean

government’s new policies and the South Korean people’s improved attitude toward Joseonjok.

She was happy about her life in Japan and showed pride in being Joseonjok with her Korean

identity.

Another informant, Soomi (Female, 43, International School Teacher, arrived in Japan in

1999) also talked about her Korean identity as a Korean descendant based on her family

background related to the South Korean origin.

I am not Chinese. I always believe I am Korean. I was only born in China. Yet, as you know, my

ancestors are all Koreans. Many of my relatives live in South Korea. So, I don’t feel I am attached to

China. I grew up in a place called Joseonjok autonomous village, where most people were Joseonjok.

I can say we lived on a Joseonjok island surrounded by the vast wilderness of Chinese territory. I went

to the Joseonjok ethnic schools in my hometown. My life was closed inside the Korean lifestyle. When

I was a child, I was surrounded by South Korean stuff like toys and stationery. I think my identity was

affected by South Korean things. You know, my grandparents had constant contact with our relatives

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in South Korea. My parents were invited to visit their relatives in our ancestors’ hometown in South

Korea. I think I know much about South Korea. You know, I bought a kimchi refrigerator at a Korean

store in Shin-Okubo, Korea Town. Who would buy this kind of refrigerator except for Koreans in Japan?

I am Korean from my bones.

Soomi showed her strong Korean identity. Compared with other Joseonjok in Japan in her

age group, she emphasized Korean identity more than Chinese identity. Her strong sense of Korean

ethnicity was inherited from her family and her residence in the Joseonjok diaspora back in China.

During this interview, she disclosed that her ancestors moved to China from Kyung Sang Province,

located in the Southeastern part of the Korean peninsula. Her parents secured the pedigree of their

family tree and visited their home places in South Korea. They met their relatives and got help

from them to find jobs. Then, they worked hard for a while in South Korea to save money and

support Soomi to finish college in Japan. Due to her family background and the region of origin

in Northeast China, Soomi has kept her strong Korean identity from her childhood. Even after she

moved to Japan, she still maintains a strong Korean ethnic identity. Yet, it is noteworthy that Soomi

also carries some sense of Chinese national identity as a part of her dual identity of Joseonjok.

After all, the above two informants reflected their sense of Korean identity based on their life

experiences in China as ethnic Koreans. The older age group of Joseonjok in Japan spent their time

in the Joseonjok community when they were young and constructed their strong Korean identity.

With their anscestral origin in South Korea, the other groups also show Korean identity with their

familial connections in South Korea.

7.8.2 Chinese Identity among Joseonjok in Japan

According to the data from my interview survey, the number of Joseonjok in Japan inclined

to Korean identity is relatively lower than that of Joseonjok with their Chinese identity. A

considerable number of Joseonjok are inclined to identify themselves as Chinese nationals (Choi

2016), and their Korean identity remains only in their Joseonjok ethnicity. This does not

necessarily mean they do not hold any Korean identity at all. They usually keep the dual identity

of Joseonjok as Chinese nationals and Korean descendants. The fact is that their Chinese identity

lodge stronger than their Korean identity over the time of their life in China (Hong 2009). It is

noteworthy that Joseonjok, as an ethnic minority in China, enjoy the social and economic

incentives from the government such as the right of giving birth to one more child, tax benefits,

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and the university admissions preference (Mackerras 1994). In this context, numerous Joseonjok

have a tendency to consolidate their Chinese nationality when they move to other countries. In

particular, Joseonjok in South Korea reinforce their Chinese identity because of their negative

experiences of discrimination in South Korean society (Hong 2009). At the same time, most

Joseonjok in Japan tend to believe they are legally Chinese nationals, and thus, they are protected

by the Chinese government (Kwon 2015). Moreover, the political and economic supremacy of

China has affected Joseonjok to lean toward Chinese nationality. A great number of Joseonjok in

Japan identify themselves as Chinese citizens of Korean origin (Choi 2001).

As is known, the majority of Joseonjok have experienced or witnessed the discrimination

against Joseonjok shown by South Korean compatriots in their ancestral homeland of Korea.

Joseonjok in Japan have also realized that discrimination against Joseonjok is prevalent in South

Korean society. The South Korean government would not treat them as true overseas Koreans

compared with those of overseas Koreans in the U.S. (Song 2007). As a consequence, many of

Joseonjok in Japan are likely to hold more of strong Chinese identity for the practical reason of

their legal position as Chinese migrants in Japan. More specifically, two major factors make

Joseonjok in Japan hold Chinese identity more powerfully than Korean identity. One is the

discrimination against Joseonjok pervaded in South Korea, and the other is China’s dominance as

a world superpower (Choi 2016). Above all, China embraces Joseonjok as a member of its unified

nation, while South Korea has not yet accepted Joseonjok as a true member of its nation (Kwon

2015). In this context, Joseonjok, in general, perceive the discriminatory attitudes of South

Koreans (Hong 2013) as well as the unfavorable policies of the South Korean government toward

Joseonjok. Under this situation, Joseonjok are frequently asked the question of “Are you Chinese

or Korean?” To this question, a large number of Joseonjok would answer, “I am Chinese.”

Joseonjok in Japan do not directly experience the discrimination shown by South Koreans,

but they are well aware of the realities of the discrimination against Joseonjok arising in South

Korea. Many Joseonjok in Japan forge and maintain some business contacts and familial

associations with Joseonjok in South Korea (Kwon 2015). They know the negative and unpleasant

circumstances of Joseonjok in South Korea. In a way, they experience discrimination indirectly

from the associations with their acquaintances or family members in South Korea. As a

consequence, they are likely to lose their positive images of their ancestral homeland and

reconsider their Korean identity (Hong 2013). Then, they come to resort to their Chinese identity.

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Yet, the Chinese identity held by Joseonjok in Japan cannot be the same as that of Han-Chinese in

Japan (Ibid.). It is because Joseonjok in Japan do not fully remove their Korean ethnicity traces for

all that inclination toward Chinese identity (Hong 2009). To this group of Joseonjok in Japan,

Chinese nationality is a major part of their identity while Korean ethnicity is a minor part of their

dual identity. Nevertheless, the mixture of the dual identity firmly harbored in the mindset of those

Joseonjok who mostly arrived in Japan in the late 1990s and 2000s. They know they are just treated

as Chinese nationals in Japanese society. Moreover, the entity of Joseonjok as an independent

minority has not been established in Japan, and Joseonjok are counted as Chinese migrants in Japan

(Kwon 2015).

Among my interview samples, quite a few of them identified themselves as Chinese living

in Japan. Their tendency toward Chinese identity seems to be caused by China’s centripetal force

as a superpower nation in recent days (Hong 2013 et al). Without question, China has become one

of the most influential countries in the world, politically and economically. The inclination towards

Chinese identity rather than Korean identity among Joseonjok in Japan has innately resulted from

their sense of belonging to China with their Chinese citizenship (Kwon 2015) in their migrant life

in a foreign country. In this context, one of my informants, Yeon (Female, 25, MA Student, arrived

in Japan in 2015) talked about her source of Chinese identity as follows:

I am Chinese, and I must say China is my home country. China is a powerful country, and it will

protect me wherever I go in this world. Besides, China treats me equally like other Han Chinese.

When I was a child, I was educated just like Han Chinese even though I went to Joseonjok ethnic schools.

The Han Chinese curriculum was translated into Korean, and we learned the same education programs

only in Korean. Later on, I left my home to go to a college in Beijing. At first, I was worried about being

discriminated against by Han Chinese classmates because of my different ethnicity. After all, the worry

was for nothing. All my classmates were generous, and they seemed to know how to embrace the different

ethnic minorities in the great Zhonghua Minzu China. I was impressed by their welcoming attitude and

equal treatment to anybody regardless of his/her ethnicity. It was a great momentum that I decided to

accept the liberal Chinese nationality into my own identity. As I don’t feel any gaps from the mainstream

Chinese, I form my mindset, which has become more tairiku (continental) style as a Chinese citizen in

Japan. In contrast, as you know, Japan and Korea are extraordinarily closed and exclusive countries. They

are not good at understanding other people from different ethnicities. They think other people are inferior.

But China is different from those two countries. In China, people are treated equally no matter what ethnic

background they have. I don’t want to stay permanently where discrimination still exists. As a matter of

fact, I am planning to go back to China after I finish my study and get some careers for a while in Japan.

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You know, China is a big country, and it will be the most powerful country in the world.

The reproduction and reinforcement of national identity (Hall 1990; Lee and Lee 2015) of

Joseonjok are the backlashes against the discrimination they often experience outside China. In

South Korea, Joseonjok tend to actively resort to their Chinese identity because they are not treated

as same as Korean brethren, and they experience negative feelings as Korean descendants in their

ancestral homeland (Choi 2016). As a result, they learn to strengthen their Chinese identity to

protect themselves from South Korean compatriots’ cold shoulders. In the meantime, Joseonjok in

Japan apparently experience far less discrimination than those of South Korean Joseonjok because

of their social and economic status in their migrant life in Japan. Overall, Joseonjok in Japan have

nostalgia for the China’s social system, where people are treated equally (Kwon 2015).

Furthermore, they retain their transnational mobility between China and Japan for their work and

family. There is no denying that a number of Joseonjok in Japan think they are Chinese nationals,

although they hold Korean ethnicity. In this context, one other informant, Sooae (Female, 23, Trade,

arrived in Japan in 2014), also talked about her Chinese identity during my interview session.

I often have chances to be asked, “nanijin desuka?” (What is your nationality?) in Japanese society. I

always answer, “I am Chinese.” Even if I have a Korean root, I still think I am Chinese. I was born and

brought up in China. I was educated in Chinese schools near my Joseonjok village. As a matter of fact,

there are no more Joseonjok ethnic schools in my home place. Joseonjok schools were all closed

because of the decrease in the young Joseonjok population in my hometown area. I know China has a

good policy of equal treatment for all ethnic minorities. You should know minority groups are all under

the Zhonghua category. So, there is no serious problem of discrimination in China. Well, Tibet and

Uyghur are exceptional. It’s a matter of political and human rights issues. I don’t know much about

politics, but I am sure that there is no serious problem of discrimination from mainstream Han Chinese.

You know, my mom went to South Korea when I was little, and she is still working in a restaurant in

Seoul. Thanks to her hard work, I can study in Japan. Sometimes, I visit her in Seoul. But I feel angry

whenever I see her in the workplace. I happened to see some customers were behaving rudely to my

mom. I was even more annoyed when they laughed at my mom’s Yanbian accents. I know many

Joseonjok workers are abused in South Korean workplaces. After I witnessed the discrimination against

Joseonjok in South Korea, I bear in mind some grudges against Korean people. Thus, I do not cherish

Korean heritage in my mind. Maybe I am too emotional, but I must say I am Chinese. I have to rely on

the country which can protect me. I don’t think I can say I am Korean.

Sooae was faced a difficult moment of thinking about her Korean identity. Because of her

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shocking experience of discrimination in South Korea, she discarded her Korean identity. Instead,

she reinforced her Chinese identity after realizing that South Koreans would not treat Joseonjok as

their compatriots. Under this situation, she would rather rely on Chinese nationality for her life in

Japan. Practically, nationality is more important than ethnicity in the migrant life of Joseonjok in

Japan. Sooae also told me one interesting assumption that Joseonjok might confront when traveling

to a foreign country. In case Joseonjok have a problem during their travel to a foreign country, they

will most likely call for help to Chinese consulate offices rather than South Korean offices because

they are Chinese nationals. Soo-Ae used to keep dual identity as Joseonjok in China. Now, she

appeals to the sense of Chinese nationality to consolidate her identity as a Korean-Chinese.

7.8.3 Multiple and Fluid Identity of Joseonjok in Japan

The double diasporic experiences of Joseonjok in Japan (Lee and Lee 2015) have made them

become a distinct ethnic minority with their multifaceted migrant identity. Joseonjok in Japan

have twice-migration (Min 2012) experiences since they originally came from Korea to China and

then move again to Japan. Due to the background of their twice migration, Joseonjok in Japan

naturally come to foster multiple identities in their host society of Japan. As a consequence,

Joseonjok’s identity has been reproduced and reconstructed through the new diasporic experiences

in Japan (Lee and Lee 2015). As is known, Joseonjok in Japan used to hold the dual identity in

China, and they still retain it after moving to Japan. In Japan, they attained their new Japanese

cultural identity in addition to their intrinsic dual identity (Kwon 2015).

The identity of Joseonjok in Japan has naturally turned into a multiple one mixed up with

the three countries’ traits and beyond. At the same time, the identity changes have continuously

arisen among those migrant Joseonjok in Japan during the time of their adjustment to the new

society. As Foner et al. indicated, “people can easily shift from one identity to another in shorter,

more situationally dependent circumstances” (Foner et al. 2018: 5). As newcomer migrants in

Japan, Joseonjok easily absorb Japanese culture and norm during their student life and resettlement

process in Japanese society (Kwon 2015). Overall, they have come to experience identity

transformations since they arrived in Japan. Their multilingual and transnational function has

decisively acted as a bolster to uplift their social and economic position in Japan. As a result,

Joseonjok’s identity has been positively reinforced by their multilingual skill and transnational

mobility.

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To sum up, quite a few of Joseonjok in Japan tend to identify themselves holding ‘hybrid’

and ‘cosmopolitan’ identity, which has been pervaded in their migrant life in Japan. In this context,

Wagner pointed out the merits of hybrid and cosmopolitan identity as “the individuals with hybrid

and cosmopolitan identity can develop creative integration strategies such as flexibility, empathy,

tolerance in ambiguity, as well as the capacity of mediation and negotiation” (Wagner 2016: 249).

In this globalized and transnational market today, Joseonjok in Japan make the most of their

multilingual and transnational functions, and they can hold a hybrid and cosmopolitan identity. In

this sense, I selected two narratives of my informants who talked about their multiple and fluid

identity as hybrid and cosmopolitan Joseonjok in Japan. First, Jimin (Female, 43, Trade, arrived in

Japan in 1998) shared her stories regarding her identity.

Joseonjok from my grandmother’s generation define themselves as Koreans, not Chinese at all. My

father’s generation may say they are both Chinese and Korean. But I don’t know my exact identity.

Since I moved to Japan, I have deeply considered who I really am. To me, being Joseonjok is not being

half Korean and half Chinese. It may be as well to say I am neither Korean nor Chinese. Well, I’m just

Joseonjok in Japan. Although my passport tells me that I am a Chinese national, and my ethnicity tells

me I am a Korean descendant, I don’t really belong to either of the two countries. Han Chinese and

South Koreans can’t feel the sameness with me. You know, I left Yanbian because I didn’t like the life

there. I am now settled in Japan, and I have come to lead a better life than before. Nationality is not

important to me. I don’t think I will ever be either Chinese or Korean. I guess I am just Joseonjok in

Japan. I have to put an effort to make my life successful. I hope my children will become global elites.

I don’t care about their nationality. They can be Korean, Chinese, Japanese, or even American if they

want. In this globalized world, citizenship is not a big thing. Wherever they live, I want them to be

successful.

Another informant, Kihong (Male, 40, IT Engineer, arrived in Japan in 2001) also talked

about his multiple and fluid identity as a Joseonjok migrant living in Japan

I have multiple faces to be described who I am. Sometimes I act as Chinese, and sometimes as Japanese.

Most often, I act as a Korean. But I ultimately act as Joseonjok with multiple identities. For example,

when I conduct business with Chinese or Japanese, I emphasize my Korean identity because they highly

value the Korean products’ qualities. In this sense, I often appeal to Joseonjok ethnicity related to

Korean heritage. By holding Korean ethnicity, I can show off my diversity to my Chinese or Japanese

customers. On the contrary, when I go to South Korea, I often act like Japanese. I speak Japanese, and

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they treat me as Japanese. If I say I am Joseonjok in South Korea, Koreans usually look down on me.

So, I like to use my Japanese name. In China, I don’t really pretend I am Japanese or Korean. I just act

as a Chinese national. As far as my nationality is concerned, I am definitely Chinese. But I am closer

to Korean culture in my everyday life. Everything in myself, including language, food, custom, and

norms, are based on Korean stuff. Yet, I think it is still complex and ambiguous to define exactly who

I am. We live in a globalized world. The borders have been blurred. Do we still have to distinguish

ourselves from others by nationality? As a Joseonjok, I don’t think it is mandatory to choose to be one

of the nationals among Chinese, Korean, or Japanese. People like Joseonjok can never become wholly

Korean or Chinese not to speak of Japanese. I am not Han Chinese from the first, and I don’t want to

be a South Korean citizen. Of course, I can never be a Japanese person in Japan. Perhaps, I am just a

global citizen or a cosmopolitan.

These two informants showed quite similar viewpoints on their identity. Yet, they also shared

some different stance to look at their multiple identities. As Jimin indicated, many Joseonjok, after

moving into Japan, have gone through an identity struggle during their settlement. Then, they

construct their new identity as Joseonjok migrants living in Japan. Jimin demonstrated the

transition of Joseonjok identity through the three generations of her family. As the last generation,

she seems to lose her sense of belonging to either Koreans or Chinese. She only keeps her

cosmopolitan identity after going through the changes in her migrant life in Japan. The other

informant Kihong also talked about his mixed-up identity as a Joseonjok migrant in Japan. Unlike

Jimin, he showed some part of his flexible mind toward his Chinese nationality, Korean ethnicity,

and the new Japanese cultural components. However, he admits that he can never solely belong to

any of the three different constituents of his identity. He seems to realize that he has become a

global citizen. Thus, he keeps his cosmopolitan identity as a migrant in Japan.

The complexity of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan virtually resulted from the mixture of

their ethnic, national, and cultural elements, which were all put together among the three countries

(Li 2014; Choi 2016). As a consequence, the composition of Joseonjok identity is quite fluid and

variable. The identity of Joseonjok in Japan has been molded with diverse elements of the three

countries in Northeast Asia, and its hybridity has merits in the globalized world today. However,

it is noteworthy to know some of my informants hold the view of their identity that their

individualism and cosmopolitan outlooks triumph over their nationality-based identity (Liu-Farrer

2020).

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7.9 The Identity of the Second-Generation Joseonjok in Japan

It has already been more than three decades since Joseonjok started to migrate to Japan.

Following the elapse of the time in Japan, the second-generation have emerged as important

subjects among Joseonjok migrants. At a certain point, Joseonjok parents are likely to notice that

their children encounter some problems regarding their identity when they enroll in Japanese

schools (Kwon 2015). In the preschool stage, Joseonjok children tend not to feel any difference

from their mainstream Japanese friends. By the time they enter regular schools, they begin to have

questions about their identities and disclose their complex thoughts about themselves. Under these

circumstances, Joseonjok children cope with an identity struggle. They realize that they are

different from Japanese students. At this point, Joseonjok parents become aware that their children

have problems identifying themselves, not knowing who they are. Thus, their children are often in

a state of psychological confusion (Phinney 1989) and ask whether they are Koreans, Chinese, or

Japanese. They are likely to confront the occasions of “shocking personal or social event that

temporarily dislodge the person from his old-world view, making the person receptive to a new

interpretation of his identity” (Ibid., 37). However, the second-generation Joseonjok, after a while,

become old enough to accept their multiple identities, particularly their dual identity of Korean

ethnicity and Chinese nationality. Furthermore, their assimilated Japanese cultural identity

dominantly lodge in their life. As a consequence, they appreciate both of their original identity of

Joseonjok and the acquired identity from Japanese social life.

To support the analytical background of the identity issues of the second-generation

Joseonjok in Japan, I examined my empirical data and selected the scripts concerning the second-

generation identity. I secured this data from the various interviews with the parents from the

Weekend Language School and other sources from the snowballing method. Then, I explored the

relevance of the narratives to represent the identities of the second-generation of Joseonjok. Due

to the shortage of the interview pool, I had to use the indirect information from the parents to

investigate the identity issues of the second-generation Joseonjok in Japan. I must clarify that I

could not secure the chance to have interviews directly with the informants in this age group of

the second generation Joseonjok in Japan.

In the following section, I will introduce the different cases of identity issues of Joseonjok

children based on their two different age levels. However, the age group before adolescence will

not be dealt with because the identity of the migrant children under the age of ten is not a matter

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of critical issue in identity study. Thus, I will examine the identity issues of the second-generation

Joseonjok in Japan by dividing them into two groups-adolescent age and the age over 20 years old.

By reviewing the two different age groups of the second-generation Joseonjok in Japan, I can see

the different aspects of identity development in their different growth stages. Apparently, the

adolescent age group is in the stage of “ethnic identity search,” and the group of age over 20 are

in the stage of “ethnic identity achievement” (Phinney 1989).

7.9.1 The Identity of Adolescent Second-Generation Joseonjok in Japan

World Health Organization (WHO) defines an adolescent as any person between the age of 10

and 19. In other words, adolescence is a transitional phase of growth and development between

childhood and adulthood. In this stage, identity development usually takes place, and further

identity crisis (Marcia 1980) arises from an identity search. Before adolescents achieve their firm

identity, they typically stay in foreclosed status (Phinney 1989). To the migrant children, this stage

may “take place as the result of a significant experience that foresees awareness of one’s ethnicity”

(Phinney 1990: 502). In this stage, migrant children explore who they really are, and consequently,

they go through an identity crisis as minority adolescents. Judging from the Phinney’s identity

progression theory, adolescent Joseonjok children usually experience the stage of ‘ethnic identity

search’ (Ibid.) during their migrant life in Japan. As a consequence, Joseonjok children in this stage

of ethnic identity search keep asking who they are in relation to their Joseonjok ethnicity. Then,

they start to explore who Joseonjok are and why they are here in Japan. Through this self-

identification process, Joseonjok children try to label themselves in the host society of Japan.

Although they start to admit themselves as Joseonjok, they are still in confusion, not knowing how

to label themselves exactly before they achieve their firm identity as the second-generation

Joseonjok in Japan. With the clash between their Joseonjok ethnicity and the Japanese cultural

assimilation, Joseonjok children often confront critical moments to judge who they are. It usually

happens at schools when they realize they are different from Japanese classmates. After all, the

identity search of Joseonjok adolescents is complicated because of their hybridity molded among

the three countries (Choi 2016), let alone the inherent problems of teenage migrants. The following

two cases of my samples indicate the complicated process of identity formation of the second-

generation adolescent Joseonjok in Japan. As was mentioned, I did not have the chance to have

direct interviews with Joseonjok children during my fieldwork. The informants in this section are

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the parents of Joseonjok children. The parents contributed the secondhand information to me about

their children’s identities. Jimin (Female, 43, Trade, arrived in Japan in 1998) shared the cases of

her children.

I have two children. The older one is now going through some kind of identity struggle. Maybe, she is simply

having her early puberty syndrome. She is 12 years old, and she is confused about her identity. In fact, she

recognizes that her dad is Japanese, and I am a foreigner. Actually, my husband is a naturalized Japanese

citizen. So, my children are automatically Japanese. My sister is now living in South Korea. My daughter

thinks she is Korean because she lives in Korea. My parents are in China. So, my daughter believes they are

Chinese. Once, she asked me a question. “How come you are not Japanese in Japan?” I didn’t know how to

answer. I really didn’t want to confuse her. She thinks I am Chinese, and my husband is Japanese, and further,

her relatives are Koreans or Chinese. So, she started to think she got so many different elements in her identity.

I don’t want to tell her, “You are this or that,” straightforwardly. What if I say, “Hey, your dad used to be

Joseonjok. Now he is naturalized and legally Japanese. You became Japanese, too.” If I say this complicated

situation to my daughter, she may have a hard time understanding it. I don’t want to confuse her with her

identity. I don’t know if I am doing the right thing educationally, but I don’t want to trouble her. She is too

young to understand this complicated situation. I will wait until she gets matured enough to set up her firm

identity. More than anything else, I wish she could learn something about the right meaning of nationality

and ethnicity in school. I hope she will get a true identity as a Joseonjok descendant in Japan in a positive

way. I know she often complains about her identity because she feels the difference from her Japanese friends

at school. So what? She is not discriminated against in Japan like her aunt’s kids in South Korea. I hope she

will construct a firm identity. The problem is she will soon notice that she is not Japanese, not Korean, and

not Chinese. Then, what? After all, she has to admit she is Joseonjok in Japan and learn to appreciate her

being Joseonjok with multiple functions as migrants in Japan. When the time comes, she will establish her

firm identity as Joseonjok in a positive way.

The second informant, Heesun (Female, 40, Housewife, arrived in Japan in 1999), also

talked about her daughter’s identity struggle as a migrant child in Japan. She explained the course

of identity construction through her daughter’s school life. She tried to awaken her daughter to

understand her Chinese nationality. She also talked about her daughter’s ethnicity as a Korean

descendant.

Some years ago, my daughter went through an identity struggle. Now she is all right. When she was in

the first year at her elementary school, she said, “Mom, I hate China.” I was shocked and asked her

why. She didn’t say such things when she attended kindergarten. After she enrolled the elementary

school, she sometimes had clashes with her Japanese classmates. They often asked her why she had

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only one Chinese character in her last name. In fact, most Japanese people have two kanji characters

in their last names. For a while, she didn’t put her last name on her stationary such as textbooks,

notebooks, and pencils, etc. At that time, she was confused because of her unique identity. Legally

speaking, she is a Chinese national because everyone in my household is registered as a permanent

stayer in Japan. On the one hand, my husband and I speak in Korean and eat kimchi at home. On the

other, my daughter is surrounded by Japanese teachers and friends. One day, she asked me a question,

“nanijin desuka (Who am I?). Then, I told her, “You are Chinese. You aren’t doing anything wrong

here.” I further mentioned, “We all live together in Japan. You were born in Japan. So, it is okay to

follow Japanese norms and culture. Don’t feel guilty when you talk to me in Japanese. But you’d better

know your identity is great because you have many good things from China and Korea.” Now, she is

in junior high school. She will soon grow up to know who she really is. As a matter of fact, she is a big

fan of K-Pop music, and she tries to speak in Korean nowadays. She also knows China is a superpower

in the world. All in all, she should be proud of herself because she has multiple abilities to compete in

this globalized world today. She will soon learn to appreciate her hybrid identity.

The identity of Joseonjok adolescents in Japan has been developed as a result of their

relationship with their family, school friends, the Joseonjok community, and Japanese society at

large. Joseonjok children in Japan inevitably go through the stage of identity struggle during their

adolescence. The identity struggle will continue until they reach the stage of identity achievement

(Phinney 1990) in their adulthood. Overall, the achieved identity is the result of exploring their

identity during the time of their adolescent stage.

The above two narratives of my informants revealed the examples of their school-age

children’s identity struggle in Japan. Their children do not seem to hold any original identity of

Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality as yet. They simply feel the psychological strain between

their family and Japanese school. According to Jimin’s narration, her daughter is now in the stage

of “ethnic identity search/ moratorium” (Phinney 1989). She started to search for her identity as a

second-generation Joseonjok in Japan. She often asks the question of “Who am I here in Japan?”

To answer this question, she is confused by not knowing who she is. Her father says he is Japanese,

while her mother keeps her Chinese nationality. And yet, they speak in Korean at home. When she

is at school, she feels something different from her Japanese friends. Her multicultural and parental

backgrounds make her confused and let her struggle to shape her identity. Heesun also talked about

her daughter’s identity struggle derived from the feeling of difference from the other Japanese

children at school. As De Vos indicates, “Experiences in the family develop as a sense of self, but

peer group experiences in childhood are also important” (De Vos 1995: 36). In fact, her daughter

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experienced a shocking moment when she realized that her name was quite different from the style

of Japanese names. From that moment on, she seems to start to struggle to know about her identity.

However, Heesun believes her daughter will get her positive identity as a Joseonjok when she gets

over her struggling stage of adolescence.

I did not have any direct chances to meet Joseonjok children in the ‘identity search’ stage. I

often performed my participant observation at a weekend school. However, most of the children

were at the preschool level or early grades of elementary school. They were mainly in the stage of

“unexamined ethnic identity” (Phinney 1989). As a consequence, I only had chances to meet the

parents whose children were in the adolescent stage. Through the secondhand information from

the interviews with parents, I can still make the most of their comments to induce the findings of

the identity issues of adolescent children of Joseonjok in Japan. Above all, the identity theory from

Phinney (1989, 1990) was a useful resource to be applied to explain the development of the ethnic

identity of the adolescent Joseonjok children in Japan.

7.9.2 The Identity of the Second-Generation Joseonjok in Japan over age 20

Separating the age groups of the second generation Joseonjok in Japan is essential to analyze

aspects of the different stages of their identity search and identity achievement. After going through

the identity search stage in their adolescent ages, Joseonjok children become adults and experience

identity achievement. The second-generation Joseonjok in Japan in this age group are mostly

college students or young employees who went through the identity struggle (Phinney 1989) in

their adolescent stage. Most of their parents arrived in Japan in the late 1980s or 1990s. The parents

in this group tend to have strong Korean ethnicity, and they have conservative attitudes towards

Korean heritage in their identity. The early arrived Joseonjok have been preserving their distinct

Joseonjok ethnic identity while realizing their economic and social mobility in Japanese society.

They know the value of their ethnic heritage based on their multilingualism and transnationalism

retained in their identity. Naturally, Joseonjok parents of this age group of the second-generation

prevail upon their children to foster a multifunctional ability to compete in the globalized world.

However, the second-generation Joseonjok in Japan have already gone through the process of

assimilation in Japanese society. In this context, Alba and Nee pointed out “assimilation can be

defined as the decline, and as its endpoint the disappearance of an ethnic/racial distinction and

cultural and social differences that express it” (Alba and Nee 1997: 863). More specifically, the

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children of Joseonjok in Japan have accumulated the distinctive traits of ‘segmented assimilation’

by seeking partial adaptation to the host society (Zhou 1992).

Although the parents try to transfer their cultural baggage to the next generation, the children

do not fully practice their ethnic culture taught by their parents (Zhou 1997a). In this situation, the

segmented assimilation theory can give the ground to explain the new phenomenon of the second

generation Joseonjok migrant life in Japan. In fact, “the segmented assimilation theory makes an

important contribution by overcoming the dichotomy of assimilation versus separation and

recognizing an alternative mode of assimilation and pluralism” (Choi 2016: 4).

The following two cases of narratives reveal the identity issues of young Joseonjok adults

in Japan. However, it is noteworthy to know that the interviews were also indirectly performed

through the parents’ statements based on my questions regarding the identity of their adult children.

Inhwa (Female, 50, Journalist, arrived in Japan in 1996) shared the stories of her child.

My son is in his twenties. He was born in China and joined us when he was seven. Now, he is a senior

at a decent university in Tokyo. I am really proud of him, and I believe he will be a global elite in

Japanese society. As far as identity issue goes, my son didn’t really go through a serious identity

struggle when he was young. I know many Joseonjok children in Japanese schools have problems with

their identity. In fact, they are ashamed of their parents’ origin as Joseonjok. But my son’s case was

different. When my son first entered a regular Japanese school, I told my son’s teacher we were Korean-

Chinese. Of course, the teacher didn’t know much about Joseonjok, but I told her my son was Joseonjok.

To explain the identity of Joseonjok to Japanese people was always not easy at all. I always had to

convince them why Joseonjok are different from Chinese or South Koreans. Even if I explain the

background history of Joseonjok, Japanese folks do not get the point of Joseonjok identity in Japan.

Anyway, I did not force my son to keep solely Joseonjok identity. After all, we live in Japan. But I try

to tell my son the value of multiple identities of Joseonjok in Japan.

I always try to tell him to be open-minded. I do not force him to keep Korean ethnicity or Chinese

nationality. I just want him to become a global elite. Contrary to my expectations, from some time on

after going to college, he realized the value of his ethnicity in Japan. Recently, in his job interview, he

stood out and told the interviewers that he was Joseonjok. He described the background of his identity.

He told them he was born in China and raised by his grandparents for a while and came to Japan. He

told them he could speak Chinese, Korean, and Japanese thanks to the multiple elements of his identity.

He further told them a brief history of Joseonjok migration with the historical background of the three

countries in Northeast Asia. He finally got the job, and he is supposed to start work after graduation.

Sometimes, I urge him to get married. I want him to find a nice Joseonjok woman, but he doesn’t seem

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to care about his future wife’s nationality. I am sure he will make a good life in Japan. I want to believe

he is a global elite.

The second case of my informant, Daehui (Male, 50, Entrepreneur, arrived in Japan in

1996), talked about his child’s story in a different perspective from that of the first informant.

My son is not familiar with Korean culture because he spent his childhood in China. When I first came

to Japan, my wife and I decided to send our son to his Han Chinese grandmother’s place. In fact, he

has his hukou (household registration) in China. My family used to live in a Han Chinese village in

Heilongjiang, where not many Joseonjok lived around. After a while, my son came to Japan to live

together with us. He was transferred to a Japanese school and had a little trouble adjusting to the new

school. Let me share one story about my son. When he was still in elementary school, his teacher

contacted me and said my son wasn’t doing well. After talking with the teacher, I scolded my son

harshly. I said, “We are just foreigners in Japan, so we have to work harder than Japanese folks. Your

Japanese classmates have their parents and grandparents who can inherit properties to them in the future.

But I have nothing to give you because I am just a hardworking migrant in Japan. Therefore, you have

to work super hard in Japan.” This lecture made a strong impact on my young son, and he realized that

he was different from the Japanese. I think it was his shocking incident to realize who he was. After he

grew up to be an adult, he still doesn’t seem to hold any sense of belonging to Japanese society. Anyway,

my son is different from those other Joseonjok kids who have already been assimilated into Japanese

life. Recently, my son discussed with his professor about his future plan. He told his professor that he

wanted to go to China to start his career there. I think his mindset still belongs to China. I am Joseonjok

in Japan, but I don’t know how my son feels about his identity. I only hope he will do a good job in

China. I know he will be welcomed in China because he can speak Japanese.

Daehui’s son has already been partially assimilated into Japanese culture because of the time

he spent here in Japan. Besides, he will realize that he has a Korean ethnicity in his mindset. He

will possibly experience the cultural shock in China, although he has his Chinese hukou (family

registration system). In the end, he will admit his multifaceted identity as Korean-Chinese. He also

keeps his fluid identity wherever he may stay.

The above two informants at least disclosed that the second generation Joseonjok in Japan

have “multiple cultural backgrounds inherited from their parents and ongoing process of their own

identity negotiation” (Wagner 2016: 242) in Japanese society. In a way, this age group of the

second generation Joseonjok in Japan has gone through a similar process of assimilation, as was

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shown in the other second-generation migrants such as Korean-Americans and Zainichi Koreans.

However, the migration phenomenon in the 21st century is somewhat different from that of the

late 20th century in that transnational mobility has been tremendously advanced. Thus, the

hybridity of young second-generation Joseonjok has become the source a far more diversified and

fluid identity of their own.

7.10 The Role of Multilingualism and Transnationalism in the Formation of the Identity of

Joseonjok in Japan

Multilingualism, transnationalism, and identity are tied together, and the three concepts are all

interrelated to develop my migration research on Joseonjok in Japan. It is obvious that

multilingualism and transnationalism have substantially affected the formation of the identity of

Joseonjok in Japan since they moved and settled in Japanese society. Lee and Lee argue “the

importance of language depends on their identity and future plan, and language is their resource

to compete in the host society and a tool for ‘self-enhancement’” (Lee and Lee 2015: 37). Without

a doubt, the multilingual ability has influenced their identity construction in a positive way. In this

circumstance, Joseonjok in Japan tend to perceive themselves as “cosmopolitans or worldwide

citizens” (Wagner 2016) because of their multilingual identity in this globalized world today. More

than anything else, Joseonjok in Japan have made the most of their multilingual ability to form

their positive multilingual identity. As a consequence, Joseonjok’s extensive involvement of

multilingual activities in their work has conferred diverse advantages in their migrant life in Japan.

The blessings of multilingual ability have become their human capital and social capital, which

are the essential elements of their positive identity (Lee and Lee 2015).

Other than the positive aspects of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan, there is one more point

to examine how different degrees of multilingualism affect the different identities of Joseonjok in

Japan. Overall, Joseonjok in Japan hold different proficiency levels in commanding Korean,

Chinese, and Japanese according to their family situation and generation (Lee and Lee 2015). The

older generation of Joseonjok in Japan, with their strong Korean identity, tend to have better

proficiency in Korean than Chinese and Japanese. Although they have the trilingual capacity, they

mainly use Korean in their everyday life in their work and family. The predominant use of Korean

naturally affect their maintenance of Korean identity. In contrast, the young Joseonjok, with their

strong Chinese identity, have better chances of using Chinese in their workplaces. Their

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educational background in Chinese schools (Choi 2016) enables them to speak Chinese more

fluently than those of the older generation who received education in their Joseonjok ethnic schools.

The proficiency of Chinese among young Joseonjok makes them foster Chinese identity. The last

group of Joseonjok, with their hybrid and fluid identity, have proficiency in three languages, which

helps them identify themselves as superior multilinguals (Kim 2018). Their multilingual

proficiency and their positive identity are the result from their educational background to learn

Japanese in their schools. The multilingual ability of this group affects the formation of positive

identity with their hybridity and fluidity in language practices.

In the meantime, the transnational identity of Joseonjok in Japan has also been constructed

through the transnational connections spanning between Japan and China as well as Korea. More

than anything else, the transnational mobility of Joseonjok in Japan has functioned as an

underpinning force to lead their affluent life as well as an element of their positive identity. Above

all, the transnational mobility of Joseonjok in Japan has connected the economic, political, and

socio-cultural concerns of the three most powerful countries in East Asia, namely China, Japan,

and South Korea. It is noteworthy that most Joseonjok in Japan do not intend to be assimilated into

Japanese society, but they want to maintain their transnational lifestyle (Kwon 2015). They just

want to obtain partial membership from their host country of Japan (Kim 2018). As a result, they

maintain a flexible lifestyle vested with transnational identity. Be that as it may, the transnational

identity of Joseonjok in Japan would not have been formed had it not been for their multilingual

ability.

Transnationalism is a major component of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan (Kim 2018).

The transnational identity of Joseonjok in Japan has been affected by their transnational practices

in their life in Japan. However, different practices of transnationalism have resulted in their

different transnational identities. Those Joseonjok in Japan with their strong Chinese identity have

their transnational attachment to their home places in China (Kwon 2012). One other group of

Joseonjok in Japan display different identity whose family members reside in South Korea. They

maintain transnational ties with their family in China as well as in South Korea. In a way, they

keep triangular connections among the three countries of Japan, China, and South Korea (Kim

2018). The transnational practices of this group affect their identity construction, which is different

from those who have the only connection with China. Many Joseonjok in Japan engage in

transnational employment or transnational entrpreneurship, which certainly affect the formation of

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the hybrid and fluid identity in their transnational life in Japan.

Both of multilingual skill and transnational mobility of Joseonjok in Japan have functioned as

a driving force to enhance their status in Japan and further become the basis of their positive

identity. After all, Joseonjok in Japan have constructed the combined form of multilingual and

transnational identity (Li 2014; Choi 2016). In other words, the association of multilingualism and

transnationalism has rendered the distinctive identity of Joseonjok in Japan. In the migration

context, multilingualism is fundamentally concerned with transnationalism (Duff 2015). The

transnational trajectories between the two societies of origin and settlement can be made up by

exploiting the multilingual functions of migrants. Thus, multilingual practices and transnational

activities of migrants go together when migrants do their work in their transnational companies

and do their transnational businesses in the global markets (Ibid.). Joseonjok in Japan take part in

transnational activities among the three countries by utilizing their trilingual proficiency. The

identity of Joseonjok in Japan has been reflected by their multilingual function which is utterly

related to their transnational activities. The role of language is crucial in the global market today

(Cenoz 2013). For this reason, Joseonjok in Japan have played an important role as multilinguals

to deal with the transnational businesses transacted in Northeast Asia. There is no denying that

multilingualism and transnationalism have firmly lodged inside the identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

There is one more important point in discussing Joseonjok’s identity in Japan. The

prospects of the second generation’s identity are worth being discussed for further research on

Joseonjok identity in Japan. Joseonjok’s identity in Japan, in some part, has developed into a more

multifaceted one when blended with the issues of the second generation. Joseonjok children in

Japan have already shown some distinctive attributes of their own make-up of their identity, which

are different from their parents. Unlike the first-generation Joseonjok in Japan, the second-

generation Joseonjok children do not foster multilingual and transnational fuctions in their migrant

life in Japan. Instead, they show similar traits of assimilation like those other children in

immigration countries. More particularly, they get assimilated into Japan’s host culture to follow

suit of those Zainichi Koreans who went through the assimilation process several decades ago.

According to my empirical data from the fieldwork, Joseonjok children tend to refuse to

speak Korean at home and even refuse to learn Korean or Chinese when they become old enough

to attend regular Japnaese schools and get along with Japanese peers. In the meantime, their parents

push them to learn Korean and Chinese for multilingual ability. With all those parents’ effort to

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provide their children multilingual and transnational functions, the second generation Joseonjok

in Japan tend not to embrace their parents’ offers. They tend to bear the feelings that their home is

Japan. They have become incorporated into the Japanese mainstream since they enrolled in

Japanese regular schools (Kwon 2015). Under this context, the second generation Joseonjok have

not constructed any ground to hold their multilingual and transnational identity. Unlike their

parents who have “distinct point of reference in the country of origin” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001),

they do not hold any ethnic identity as Joseonjok. They have already been assimilated into the host

culture.

The future generations of Joseonjok in Japan would likely experience different lives and

their different identities compared with those of their parents. However, some Joseonjok children

went through the “ethnic identity achievement stage” (Phinney 1990) at a certain age level.

According to my interview data, not many but some Joseonjok children aged over 20 showed the

multilingual and transnational traits of their identity inherited from their parents. They seem to

highly value their multilingual and transnational function in the globalized market in East Asia.

More particularly, they realize the value of multilingualism and transnationalism in their job

searches and business opportunities. Under this complicated situation, it is not easy to predict the

outcome of multilingualism and transnationalism which will affect the formation of the new

identities among the succeeding generations of Joseonjok in Japan.

As Duff points out, “multilingualism and transnationalism are intimately tied to go

globalization” (Duff 2015: 61). Joseonjok in Japan have mostly led their globalized lifestyle by

performing the multilingual function and the transnational mobility in the globalized environment

of their life in Japan. In other words, Joseonjok in Japan lead their globalized life with their

multilingual and transnational identity in the host society of Japan. The three concepts of

multilingualism, transnationalism, and identity are connected to explain the distinctive

phenomenon of Joseonjok migration in Japan. More than anything else, multilingualsm and

transnationalism have firmly lodged inside the identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

7.11 Closing

To conclude this chapter, I need to retrospect the contents which I have already dealt with in

the previous chapters. As mentioned earlier, a significant number of Joseonjok have moved into

Japan in search of their better life chances since the late 1980s. Most of them are highly educated

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Joseonjok, who were motivated to pursue their education and career development in Japan. They

have constituted a unique minority group in Japan, although they have not been officially admitted

as an independent minority group in Japanese society (Lee and Lee 2015). Their existence has

been concealed inside the mainstream Chinese migrants in Japan. Yet, Joseonjok in Japan have

preserved their ethnic identity as Korean descendants in the host society. During their new life in

Japan, they have absorbed Japanese cultural elements in their identity. As a result, they have

formed their multiple identities blended with the different ingredients from the three countries (Li

2014; Choi 2016). Then, how do they identify themselves, and how are they identified by others

in Japanese society? More than anything else, Joseonjok in Japan have a double diasporic identity

because they “moved not from their home country, but from a place of having been moved” (Lee

and Lee 2015: 30). The extensive experiences of Joseonjok movements that occurred from Korea

to China, and then to Japan have resulted in forming the triple identity of Joseonjok in their new

settlement in Japan. The new Japanese host culture supposedly added one more element to their

hyphened identity of Joseonjok in Japan. Thus, their identities are mixed up, hybrid, and

multifaceted with the triple traits of Koreaness, Chineseness, and Japaneseness (Kwon 2015; Kim

2018). To this point, Song indicated, “hybridized identities suggest a positive outcome of mixing,

which may increase people’s repertoire of identity choices, rather than diluting cultural content”

(Song 2003: 114).

One of my informats, Heesun (Female, 40, Housewife, arrived in Japan in 1999), talked about

her mixed identity of the three countries as follows:

Simply speaking, Korea is the country of my ancestors. China is the country where my life began. Japan is

the country where my second life started as a young student. I think I will stay here for good. My life

belongs to Japan. I have many precious things in my life in Japan. After all, Japan is my home place.

However, I cherish my Korean heritage and Chinese nationality.

The identity of Joseonjok in Japan will keep evolving into being a unique and multifaceted

one “through the process of negotiation and reconstruction” (La Barbera 2015). Moreover, the

traits of Koreaness, Chineseness, and Japaeseness along with the cosmopolitan attributes, will

remain as the main constituents of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan (Lee and Lee 2015). The

multifaceted identity of Joseonjok in Japan reveals the complicated aspects accumulated in their

migrant life, either positively or negatively. However, most Joseonjok have come to retain their

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own positive identity, which acts as a driving force to gain upward mobility in their new life in

Japan (Kwon 2015). More particularly, the intrinsic elements of Joseonjok identity have been

restructured by multilingual and transnational experiences since they moved into Japan (Kim

2018). To sum up, multilingualism and transnationalism are two primary sources of the distinctive

identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion

Many Joseonjok have voluntarily come to Japan with all the expectations of better life for

more than 30 years in the past. It was often indicated in the previous chapters that the majority of

Joseonjok entered Japan as students, and they turned into highly-educated and highly-skilled

migrants. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, most of my informants chose to come to Japan because

of its close location and the cultural affinity (Kwon 2015). They regarded Japan as the most

accessible country where they could start their new life. Through the data from the interviews, it

became clear that Joseonjok, in most cases, entered Japan with their student visas and willingly

stayed for their education as well as career opportunities (Ibid.). They usually spent the harsh years

at language schools and universities before entering the Japanese job market as labor migrants

(Lee and Lee 2015). They ended up getting jobs in the primary sector of the Japanese labor market

by making the most of their multilingual and transnational capacity.

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the identity formation of Joseonjok

migrants in Japan. In particular, this research focuses on the influence of multilingualism and

transnationalism on the formation and transformation of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. As is

known, during the course of their migration Joseonjok in Japan have constructed their distinctive

identities under the complex environments of moving and adaptation in Japanese society. The

ongoing negotiations and compromises over the transition from student’ status to employees or

entrepreneurs have affected their identity to be more complicated. Undoubtedly, multilingualism

has acted as a bolster to support their positive identity, and transnationalism added impetus for

Joseonjok to construct their firm identity as successful mediators in East Asian transnational

markets (Kim 2018). In this light, the multilingual and transnational identity of Joseonjok in Japan

is the consequence of their survival efforts to fit their life in the place of destination. To explain

the findings, I made use of my empirical data garnered from the interviews and the observation

performed through my fieldwork. At the same time, the extensive review of the related literature

regarding Joseonjok migration at large constituted the foundation of this research.

Other than explaining the primary purpose of this research, I also have to reveal my

motivation for conducting this research. Overall, my motivation to undertake this research

stemmed from my empathy toward my Korean compartriots of Joseonjok in Japan. I have a feeling

that my life story is mirrored somehere in their lives of my research subjects. There are so many

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things in common between my life and those of Joseonjok in Japan. Under this situation, my

academic background in sociology and anthropology encouraged me to challenge the research on

the particular case of Joseonjok’s migration to Japan. I realized the research would be a unique

and intriguing theme that could be performed by a social scientist like me. In particular, the topic

seemed to belong to a less explored or even unexplored area of the migration studies in Japan. I

was so motivated to do the research, and I was even confident to proceed with the project because

I had already specialized in migration studies during my master’s course. Furthermore, I myself

had gone through the diverse experiences of migration in different countries, which would be

applicable to the case study of Joseonjok’s migration.

More than anything else, my emotional attachment to Joseonjok was the primary impetus

to pursue this research persistently. Through my research, I tried to engage in active interactions

with my informants and review extensive literature to get the result of this research. I was so

committed to doing this research and I devoted myself to the investigation of Joseonjok’s identity

in Japan. By doing so, I can finally get the answers to my research questions suggested in the

introduction of this dissertation.

8.1 Synopsis of the Chapters

As was done in the Introduction chapter, I should initiate the chapter analysis of the thesis

from Chapter 2 in this section. In Chapter 2 of the literature review, I tried to link the previous

studies on the cases of Joseonjok in general as well as the particular cases of Joseonjok in Japan.

In the first part of this chapter, I introduced Joseonjok migration history, mostly from the Japanese

colonial era to the present day Joseonjok migration in Japan. Then, I highlighted the migration

theories (i.e., New Economics of Labor Migration, Dual Labor Market Theory, Segmented

Assimilation) to substantiate the reasons and consequences of Joseonjok migration in Japan. I also

explained how I connected the concepts of multilingualism and transnationalism to Joseonjok

migration issues in Japan. Furthermore, I indicated the theoretical framework of identity

concerning Joseonjok migration from a sociological angle.

In Chapter 3 of Methodology, I explained how I implemented my participant observation,

the social media analysis, and the qualitative interviews with my informants at Joseonjok

communities in the Tokyo area. Overall, the empirical data obtained from 55 interview subjects

were the most crucial to this research. In Chapter 4, I summarized the historical background of

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Joseonjok’s migration into Japan. To do so, I traced the comprehensive history of Joseonjok

migration processes for the past one and a half centuries in East Asia. Furthermore, I put a focus

on the phenomenon of Joseonjok’s arrival and settlement in Japan. As a detailed explanation, I

narrated my informants’ stories, starting from the reasons why they chose to come to Japan and

further how they settled in the host society. More specifically, I tried to describe and analyze the

different stages of life situations of Joseonjok at schools, workplaces, and their ethnic and

transnational settlements in Japan.

In Chapter 5, I highlighted how Joseonjok practiced their multilingual skills and how

multilingualism affected their migrant life in Japan. I also showed how multilingualism motivated

Joseonjok to move to Japan and how it exerted influence on shaping their identity in their migrant

life. Thus, I proposed to treat multilingualism as a cornerstone of the construction of the positive

identity of Joseonjok in Japan. Additionally, I dealt with the issues of multilingual education of the

second generation Joseonjok. In Chapter 6, I presented an outlook of how Joseonjok practiced their

transnational mobility in the course of their new life in Japan. Then, I analyzed the Joseonjok

identity constructed under the influence of their transnational lifestyle. The narratives of

transnational Joseonjok furnished the ground to explain the distinctive identity of Joseonjok in

Japan. I also presented the theoretical explanations of how transnationalism affected the formation

of Joseonjok identity in Japan. Furthermore, I illustrated my informants’ narratives to back up the

foundation of Joseonjok’s transnationalism in Japan. In Chapter 7, I finalized the issues of

Joseonjok identity along with the historical and theoretical explanations of the Joseonjok migration

phenomenon in Japan. In the end, I was able to reveal the fact that the significant element of

Joseonjok identity was integrated with multilingualism and transnationalism in their life in Japan.

In an effort to explicate the central issue of Joseonjok identity, I categorized the identity types of

Joseonjok in Japan based on their backgrounds, and divided them into three labels as Korean

descendants, Chinese nationals, and hybridized Joseonjok.

Overall, in this last chapter, I intend to draw on the result of this research and wrap up the

issues of multilingualism and transnationalism, which are merged into the dominant theme of the

identity of Joseonjok in Japan. The findings on the identity of Joseonjok in Japan are the main

accomplishment of this research. The results of this research were yielded by my empirical

fieldwork and the assorted literature review on migration, multilingualism, and transnationalism,

and the main theme of identity. The historical and theoretical investigation of the background

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studies on the related issues is also integrated into the findings.

8.2 Findings of this Research

Investigating how Joseonjok in Japan construct their identity while they were going through

the process of migration and resettlement in the host society of Japan has acted as the principal

task to be carried out for this research. On the whole, the findings of this research have mainly

been attained by my empirical analysis of the identity issues of Joseonjok in Japan. More

importantly, the impact of multilingualism and transnationalism on the formation and

transformation of the identities of this particular group of Joseonjok in Japan has been the prime

source to yield the findings of this research (Kim 2018).

In the first place, I come to realize that Joseonjok possess the ethnic traits of Korean

descendants and the national characteristics of Chinese citizens, as well as some Japanese cultural

attributes. In addition to these intricate aspects of Joseonjok identity, I also found out the the

hybridization of the identities mixed with the historical, social, political, economic, and linguistic

background of Joseonjok migration involved in the three countries. The movement of Joseonjok

from the Korean peninsula to Northeast China and then to Japan has made up the multiple and

distinctive identities of Joseonjok. In other words, the dual identity of Joseonjok was initially

inherited from the “natal homeland China and ethnic homeland Korea” (Song 2014: 445; Kim

2018: 63). The dual identity then turns into the triple identity when Joseonjok are blended into the

Japanese society (Kim 2018). As a consequence, Joseonjok have constructed their good standing

in Japanese society with their multilingual and transnational identity. Indeed, the two functions of

multilingualism and transnationalism of Joseonjok in Japan have vitalized their identity while

sustaining their migrant life in Japan. Under these circumstances, the identity of Joseonjok in Japan

has continued to change “over time and space” (La Barbera 2015: 3).

The relationship between identity and multilingualism is a consequential phenomenon of

migration (Kim 2018). In this context, the migration of Joseonjok into Japan has inevitably brought

about identity issues concerning their multilingualism. More specifically, there are two aspects of

the multilingualism of Joseonjok in Japan. While the highly educated Joseonjok who take up the

lager portion of the Joseonjok population in Japan enjoy the benefits of trilingual ability, those

low-educated and low-skilled Joseonjok suffer from the linguistic incompetency in commanding

the languages of appropriate Chinese and Korean, not to mention the target language of Japanese

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(Kim 2018). More seriously, I come to find the fact that there is a tendency that the second-

generation Joseonjok in Japan are likely to confront the confusion of language use in their bilingual

circumstances between family and school (Kwon 2015, Kim 2018). They tend to hesitate using

their heritage language and lose the competency of Korean or Chinese. Be that as it may, it is

obvious that the majority of Joseonjok in Japan regard them as multilinguals and their multilingual

ability is one seminal element of their positive identity (Ibid.).

It is also noteworthy to know that the identities of transnational migrants are complex and

diverse. Joseonjok in Japan, in particular, possess a triple identity due to their double diasporic

experiences (Lee and Lee 2015) accumulated both in China and Japan. Transnationalism has acted

as one principal constituent, making the migrant life of Joseonjok in Japan more affluent (Kwon

2015). More particularly, the fast-developing transnational economy in Northeast Asia has

provided ample opportunities for Joseonjok in Japan to take part in transnational businesses. Based

on the data from my fieldwork, I found out that there are two different groups among my

informants regarding their transnational identity. One group showed more connection to China due

to their transnational attachment to their home places in China. Naturally, they have strong ties

back in China. The other group also displayed transnational ties back in China, but they also well

maintain ties in South Korea. Eventually, they maintain the triple connections among the three

countries (Kim 2018). In this context, Joseonjok in Japan can perform more diverse transnational

mobility than any other ethnic groups in Northeast Asia.

Overall, Joseonjok in Japan have employed their multilingual and transnational function to

strengthen their social and economic position in the host society of Japan (Ibid.). They have

resorted to the transnational niche market for their employment and entrepreneurship by exploiting

their multilingual capacity (Kwon 2012). There are two major elements of the identity of Joseonjok

in Japan, which have been formed and transformed since they arrived in Japan. Without a doubt,

the two aspects are multilingualism and transnationalism, which are embedded in the mindset of

Joseonjok in Japan. With all those complex aspects of their identity, Joseonjok in Japan persistently

strive to enhance their life by making the most of their multilingual capacity and transnational

function in this exclusive society of Japan. Joseonjok identity has been hybridized with their

multiple ingredients of dynamic activities as migrants in Japan. As Song indicated, “Hybridized

identity suggests the positive outcome of mixing, which may increase people’s repertoire of

identity choices, rather than diluting cultural content” (Song 2003: 141). After all, I found out that

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multilingualism and transnationalism are the firm foundation on which Joseonjok in Japan have

constructed their positive identity.

8.3 Limitation of this Research

As was expected, I often faced limitations while working on my research. First of all, the

main restriction was revealed with an absence of literature relating to my research topic published

in the academic fields in Japan. The studies on Joseonjok have scarcely been done in Japanese

academia, and the resources for the specific themes on Joseonjok migration, as a consequence, are

not readily available. In this situation, I had but to rely on a few journal articles written by

Joseonjok scholars acting in Japan. However, their works were mostly focused on the overall

history of Joseonjok migration and their diasporas in China. Their research was not diverse and

prolific enough to supply the relevant resources for my study. As an alternative material for my

literature review, I referred to the previous studies done by South Korean scholars who had

specified in Joseonjok research focused on the phenomena of return migration arising in South

Korea.

It is noteworthy that Joseonjok studies have not been done actively in Japanese academia

because Joseonjok are simply included as Chinese nationals in the demographic statistics and

treated as such in Japanese society. As a consequence, the official statistics of Joseonjok

demography was not available from the Japanese government institutions. Moreover, Japanese

academia in the field of migration studies has not paid any attention to this invisible minority group

of Joseonjok up until now. Even so, I am pleased with my challenge as I have come to secure my

own niche in the field of migration studies in Japan. Under these circumstances, I was even in

better position to perform this research through the comparative analysis of Joseonjok in Japan

with those of other Joseonjok in China, South Korea, and even in New York City. In the meantime,

I also performed empirical fieldwork in Seoul to elicit the supplementary findings of the research.

Overall, I tried to overcome the limitations by reviewing the various cases of Joseonjok studies

done in South Korea. I also referred to case studies of Chinese migrants in Japan. I reviewed the

references of Chinese migration in Japan to apply the Chinese migration phenomenon to my

specific study of Joseonjok migration in Japan.

There were also limitations in securing the relevant interview pool through the course of my

fieldwork. More than anything else, the interview subjects were not diverse enough to represent

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Joseonjok from all walks of life based on their different statuses in Japanese society. The interview

pool was mostly expanded through the snowballing method, and my informants kept introducing

their acquaintances who carried similar characteristics of their ages, occupations, places of origin,

educational backgrounds, and familial relationships back in China and South Korea. Under this

situation, I did not have enough opportunities to meet some people of their low-skilled, low-

education, and undocumented status. Furthermore, the geographical scope of my fieldwork was

mostly confined to the Tokyo area. Joseonjok have scattered all over Japan from Aomori to

Fukuoka. In particular, there has been a considerable increase in Joseonjok population in Osaka.

Given the limited sphere of my fieldwork territory in Tokyo, I expanded my fieldwork to Seoul to

supplement the scope of my survey. I also used my past experiences of encountering Joseonjok in

New York City as an extended area of my fieldwork. Unfortunately, however, I failed to seize the

opportunity to visit the districts of Joseonjok diasporas in Northeast China. I will include this task

of visiting Joseonjok communities in China for my future fieldwork.

Another limitation of this research is the lack of resources on the second generation Joseonjok

in Japan. As is known, it has been over 30 years since Joseonjok started to move to Japan. The first

generation Joseonjok in Japan have settled in Japanese society and now they have children in their

school ages. The second-generation Joseonjok in Japan have already shown the traits of

assimilation, and their parents often struggle to instill in their children some Joseonjok identity.

Thus, the identity struggle of the second generation has been exposed as one critical issue among

Joseonjok in Japan. Unfortunately, little work has been done in relation to the identity of Joseonjok

children in the Joseonjok community. To a limited extent, I could still utilize my teaching

experiences at a weekend school to elicit the identity issues of Joseonjok children. However, the

data collected from my teaching at the Weekend Language School was not informative to cover

the identity issues of the second generation Joseonjok because most students were not old enough

to talk about their identity. To this end, I will have but to leave this task of investigating the identity

of the second generation Joseonjok for my future research.

Lastly, I can indicate one more limitation of this research about the lack of my quantitative

analysis. Above all, I could not obtain the quantitative data from the related official resources, nor

from the literature review on Joseonjok in Japan. Moreover, the official statistics for Joseonjok

research in Japan were not available from the Japanese government agencies or any other academic

institutions. Even the references from South Korean research institutions did not cover any official

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quantitative data in their research reports on the specific topic of Joseonjok in Japan. Indeed,

Joseonjok in Japan have not attracted any attention from South Korean academia in the field of

migration studies, social sciences, or international relation studies. However, the limitations of

this research can conversely provide room for more studies to be done in the future. In my future

studies on Joseonjok, I will emphasize the issues derived from the limitations indicated in this

research. Last but not least, I have to mention one more limitation of my research. Overall, my

viewpoints on Joseonjok research are more likely to be inclined to the South Korean perspectives.

Thus, I should reinforce my standpoint to look at the issues of Joseonjok in a somewhat more

objective manner. To do that, I should also observe the issues of Joseonjok from the perspectives

of China and Japan. Joseonjok in Japan keep a tripartite identity bequeathed from the three

countries. For this reason, the issues of Joseonjok in Japan should be investigated and examined

as a common research task among China, Japan, and Korea in unison.

8.4 Contributions and Suggestions

This research is an unprecedented attempt to explore the migration issues of one particular

ethnic group of Joseonjok in Japan. The unique outcomes of Joseonjok migration have provided

me with sufficient incentives to examine the distinctive phenomenon of Joseonjok’s movement

and settlement in Japanese society. As was mentioned in Chapter 7, the multiple identities of

Joseonjok in Japan have shown the traits of their ethnicity and nationality, which were mixed with

the new Japanese cultural assimilation. The complex constitution of Joseonjok identity has

furnished me with the motivation to initiate this research and further fill up the lacuna of the

migration studies progressed in East Asia. In this context, this research can make a small but

significant contribution to the migration studies in East Asia. The migration studies in this region

of East Asia, albeit the large scale, have been done less compared with those in North America and

Europe (Yamashita 2008). The perspectives on migration theories developed from those Western

predecessors do not always fit East Asian migration cases. At least, this research gives some

suggestions for the development of the pertinent theories that can explain the distinctive aspects

of the migration phenomenon arising in East Asia.

There are various fields of studies to which my research can make contributions. Above all,

the findings of this research can give a fresh impact on East Asian studies, applied linguistics,

migration studies, and more. More importantly, this research can be applied to the specific study

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topics of multilingualism, transnationalism, and identity, which are all related to migration studies.

Therefore, my research can, most importantly, advance the study of migration by integrating the

themes of identity with the multilingual and transnational issues raised in this particular area in

East Asia. My research implies the outcome of the social, economic, political, educational, and

linguistic consequences of Joseonjok migration in Japan. Above all, the case study of Joseonjok in

Japan can be a unique model of migration studies that combine the interrelationship of

multilingualism, transnationalism, and identity.

By carrying out this research, I believe I can at least contribute something to the

advancement of migration studies in the particular region of East Asia, not to mention the ongoing

migration studies in Japan. In the long run, the studies of Joseonjok in Japan will continue to be

developed to take up a solid field of ethnic minority studies in Japan. In this way, my research

suggests a new field of migration study that can investigate one of the contemporary migration

phenomena occurring in Northeast Asia. More specifically, this study contributes to the scholarly

discussions on the identity formation of migrants on the basis of their multilingualism and

transnationalism.

Notwithstanding the prolific results of this research, there is still some insufficiency

because it did not cover the issues of the unexposed Joseonjok groups in Japan. These classes of

Joseonjok are low-skilled laborers and marriage migrants living in Japan. Investigating the issues

of low-skilled Joseonjok in Japan is essential for further research on Joseonjok migration in Japan.

Japan is constantly in need of low-skilled foreign workforces in the secondary sector of job markets,

and the flow of low-skilled Joseonjok in this category is likely to continue, although the volume is

not expected to be high (Kwon 2015). What’s more, Japan is taking a more positive stance toward

the acceptance of foreign workers (Kodama 2015). Admitting the fact that low-skilled Joseonjok

account for just a small number, the issues raised from this group are worth to be reviewed as an

important subject for further research on Joseonjok migration in Japan. As was indicated in Chapter

5 and Chapter 6, the low-skilled Joseonjok in Japan do not have the multilingual capacity and

transnational function because of their low-educational background (Kwon 2015). As a

consequence, they demonstrate quite different aspects of the lifestyle from those of the main group

of highly skilled Joseonjok in Japan. After all, the unexplored aspects of the life situations of the

low-skilled Joseonjok in Japan are the substantial resources to diversify this research.

At the same time, investigating the issues on marriage migration of Joseonjok women in Japan

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can also provide one more important subject in Joseonjok migration studies. Apparently, there are

some Joseonjok women who marry Japanese men and settle in Japanese society (Kwon 2012).

They usually follow suit of the trajectory of the Chinese marriage migrants in Japan. Interestingly,

a great number of Chinese marriage migrants came from Dongbei (Northeast China), where most

of Joseonjok reside in their diasporas. Under this situation, some Joseonjok women came to Japan

to fill the demand of unmarried Japanese men. However, it is noteworthy that there are still a great

number of unmarried men in China. The sex ratio between men and women in the age group of 24

to 54 years old is high, which tells that there is a shortage of women population for marriage in

China. Notwithstanding the imbalance of sex ratio, quite a few Chinese women have come to Japan

to marry Japanese men. This phenomenon is mostly due to the intention of those Chinese women

for their economic mobility.

Under this situation, Joseonjok women also enter Japan through matchmaking and take

advantage of their marriage as “a means to escape a dire situation and seek emotional healings”

(Liu-Farrer 2020: 31). However, the Japanese bridgerooms for the arranged marriages are likely

to be old farmers or low-paid workers (Le Bail 2005). Naturally, not all but many of Joseonjok

women suffer from the drop in social status. The Joseonjok marriage migrants’ complicated

situations can also supply me with additional resources for my further research on Joseonjok

migration. Overall, the research on Joseonjok migration is unlimited and wide-ranging, and it gives

me high motives to explore further into undiscovered topics for my future research on Joseonjok.

For the development of my next research project, I have made an actual plan to do my

research in the United States. To initiate my next research, I have particularly set up of my

fieldwork in New York City. In Chapter 7, I have already performed a comparative analysis of the

identity issues of Joseonjok in Japan with those of Joseonjok in New York City. According to the

survey done in this chapter, I found out that Joseonjok have constituted their own diasporic entity

inside Korean communities in Metro New York. In general, Joseonjok in the United States have

maintained their symbiotic life with their compatriot Korean-American immigrants (Min 2013).

As was indicated in Chapter 7, Joseonjok in the United States have a different identity from that

of Joseonjok in Japan. The identity (re)construction of these two groups has taken disparate

procedure, and the two different groups of Joseonjok have evolved into being separate entities as

ethnic minorities residing in two different places. More than anything else, the comparative

analysis of the two different groups of Joseonjok in New York and Tokyo will give an insight to

177

enlarge my research scope. More specifically, I will investigate the issues of the multilingual

education of the second generation in both ethnic communities of Joseonjok in Japan and the U.S.

to initiate a specified subject of multilingual education of Joseonjok for my future study.

8.5 Closing53

Multilingualism, transnationalism, and identity are tied together, and the three concepts are

all interrelated to develop my migration research on Joseonjok in Japan. How do Joseojok integrate

their multilingualism and transnationalism in establishing their identity as a minority group in

Japanese society? The question has consistently provided me with the stimulation to investigate

Joseonjok migration issues, and their identity formation ensued in their life in Japan. Most

importantly, the research question of “How do multilingualism and transnationalism influence the

self-identification of Joseonjok in Japan?” (Kim 2018: 68) primarily composed the main subject

to be discussed in this research. In the previous chapter, I explained the role of multilingualism

and transnationalism in forming the new identity of Joseonjok after they arrived in Japan. To

conclude the subject matter of this research, the issues of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan relating

to the two functions of multilingualism and transnationalism are required to be summed up. There

is no doubt that both multilingual skill and transnational mobility of Joseonjok have served as a

driving force to enhance their status in Japanese society and further become the foundation of their

positive identity. More significantly, Joseonjok in Japan have constructed the combined form of

multilingual and transnational identity (Li 2014; Choi 2016). In this context, the association of

multilingualism and transnationalism has rendered the positive identity of Joseonjok in Japan.

However, it is also necessary to look at some of their real-life situations in which they

struggled and overcame the difficulties. The difficult conditions of their migrant life also affected

the formation of the identity of Joseonjok in Japan. As was indicated in Chapter 4, most Joseonjok

have gone through the arduous life stages when they arrived in Japan and started their new life as

student migrants. Over time, they endeavored and attained their social and economic mobility

through their study and hard work. With all the positive features of their life in Japan, Joseronjok

still have to confront some hardship as foreign residents in the closed society of Japan. They do

53 In this section of conclusion, I once again extracted some portion of my journal article which was published by

“Journal of GSAPS, Waseda University No.36 (2018.9).” In fact, the contents of the conclusion of this article coincide

with my thesis. And yet, I modified and modified the contents based on the mega research in this thesis.

178

not usually experience any severe discrimination from Japanese people, but they often feel some

subtle differences in the social institutions of Japanese society. Japan still keeps unwillingness

toward immigration because of their long-cherished ethnocentric national disposition. Under this

circumstance, Joseonjok are not inclined to assimilate into Japanese society, although the

immigration policies of Japan have started to change to meet the needs of a Japanese labor shortage.

More often than not, Joseonjok, as well as Chinese migrants, still feel there is a wall (kabe)

standing between immigrants and the mainstream Japanese society (Liu-Farrer 2011).

One other difficult situation occurs when the time comes for Joseonjok to decide either to

stay in Japan or to return to China. After staying in Japan for a certain period of time, Joseonjok,

just like Chinese migrants, tend to ponder over returning to China (Kwon 2015). There are various

reasons for returning, but it is not an easy job to make decisions. They usually consider returning

if they can secure better chances of employment or business opportunities in China. As was

indicated in Chapter 6, most Joseonjok initially do not intend to stay in Japan permanently. Rather,

they try to maintain transnational ties back in China weighing the better life chances between the

two countries. However, returning to China can either be a success or a failure. This phenomenon

of their dual mindset may simply indicate the fact that “the grass looks greener on the other side

of the fence.” After all, some Joseonjok who returned to China already showed their regrets of

leaving all the comforts and amenities of the life in Japan (Ibid.). Yet, some returned Joseonjok

showed the satisfaction of their life with better chances of careers or businesses.

As Duff et al. pointed out “Japan is shrinking. If trends continue, the working-age population

will by 2050 drop from 81 million to 49 million” (Duff et al. 2008: 1; Kim 2018: 68). Under this

situation of the ageing population and decreasing birth rate, Japan demands the need for

immigrants as a labor force. This demand entails the constant wave of foreign laborers in this non-

immigrant country (Roberts 2013). Without any choice, Japan has but to establish a legitimate

policy to accept foreign laborers into their society. In this context, I can simply hypothesize that

the young Joseonjok still choose to come to Japan instead of South Korea for better career chances.

Thus, the Joseonjok migration stream into Japan will continue (Kim 2018) in the future. However,

the rapid decrease of the Joseonjok population in China (Choi 2016) will likely affect the new

stream of Joseonjok migration into Japan in the future.

The limited scope of my research cannot fully cover the diverse issues of Joseonjok migration

arising in Japan. Even so, this research undoubtedly laid the groundwork for further investigation

179

on the various aspects of the Joseonjok migration in Japan. Joseonjok are identified differently in

different migration perspectives. In Japan, they are simply treated as Chinese migrants. They are

just subsumed under the Chinese national category in Japanese demographic statistics. For all that,

they display their unique characteristic as a distinctive minority group in Japan. The diverse aspects

of Joseonjok migration in Japan furnish appealing topics of migration studies. More importantly,

the research on Joseonjok in Japan provides insights to develop some particular migration theories

that fit East Asian migration cases.

Retrospecting at the time of my fieldwork, I was a good listener to share the memories

of my Joseonjok research subjects. During the interview sessions, my informants often showed

their mixed feelings of joy, anger, confidence, and frustration as migrants living in the host society.

The oral statements of their life stories gave me great insights to develop this research. As Liu-

Farrer points out, “migration is a journey and a project” (Liu-Farrer 2020: 204). During the course

of their new life in Japan, Joseonjok, in many cases, study and work hard to fulfill their dream.

Hence, the future of Joseonjok in Japan looks bright. I hope my research will provide an impetus

to broaden the horizon of migration studies progressing in this particular area of Northeast Asia.

All in all, continuous observation on the life of Joseonjok in Japan is needed for further

development of my Joseonjok research.

180

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225

Appendix 1 Demographic Information of the Informants

Name Gender Age Occupation/

Industry

Hometown Marital

Status

Visa Status Entry in

Japan

1 Joon Male 30+ Trade Jilin

Province

Married Working

Visa

2010

2 Hyomi Female 25+ Student Liaoning

Province

Single Student

Visa

2010

3 Seon Female 45+ Trade Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2000

4 Hyeja Female 60+ NGO

Director

Jilin

Province

Married Naturalized 1998

5 Soomi Female 40+ Teacher Jilin

Province

Married Naturalized 1999

6 Heesun Female 40+ Housewife Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1999

7 Won Male 25+ Student Liaoning

Province

Single Student

Visa

2013

8 Dojin Male 30+ Student Jilin

Province

Single Student

Visa

2009

9 Sooae Female 20+ Trade Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2014

10 Yeon Female 25+ Student Jilin

Province

Single Student

Visa

2015

11 Ryujoo Female 25+ Education

Industry

Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2011

12 Jisub Male 25+ Student Liaoning

Province

Single Student

Visa

2011

13 Eunhwa Female 25+ Trade Jilin

Province

Married Working

Visa

2011

14 Shinyu Female 35+ Human

Resources

Jilin

Province

Single Permanent

Residence

2002

15 Jimin Female 40+ Entrepreneur Heilongjiang

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1998

16 Eunjoo Female 35+ Housewife Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2003

17 Chen Male 35+ Trade Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2004

18 Taesoo Male 45+ Trade Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2003

19 Miyeon Female 35+ Trade Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2004

20 Shinja Female 30+ IT Engineer Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2008

226

21 Daehui Male 50+ Entrepreneur Heilongjiang

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1996

22 Shim Male 35+ Entrepreneur Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2004

23 Jihyo Female 30+ Student Heilongjiang

Province

Single Student

Visa

2008

24 Wook Male 25+ IT Engineer Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2010

25 Soyeon Female 30+ Student Jilin

Province

Single Student

Visa

2013

26 Kihong Male 40+ IT Engineer Heilongjiang

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2001

27 Inwha Female 50+ Journalist Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1996

28 Jicheol Male 40+ Entrepreneur Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2006

29 Minsoo Male 30+ Tourism Heilongjiang

Province

Single Working

Visa

2007

30 Seolmae Female 40+ Lecturer Heilongjiang

Province

Single Permanent

Residence

2001

31 Heyjin Female 45+ Tourism Jilin

Province

Married Working

Visa

2001

32 Dongsoo Male 25+ Finance Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2010

33 Goo Male 45+ Entrepreneur Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2001

34 Sojoon Male 50+ Entrepreneur Liaoning

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1995

35 Bokjoon Male 40+ IT Engineer Heilongjiang

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1999

36 Gapsoo Male 45+ Entrepreneur Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1999

37 Naye Female 35+ Entrepreneur Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2002

38 Jongsuk Male 25+ IT Engineer Heilongjiang

Province

Single Working

Visa

2014

39 Cherim Female 25+ Tourism Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2009

40 Ajin Female 25+ IT Engineer Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2009

41 Joonho Male 35+ Human

Resources

Heilongjiang

Province

Single Working

Visa

2002

42 Minhyuk Male 45+ Finance Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1998

43 Jisoo Female 45+ Insurance Heilongjiang

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

1999

227

44 Jemin Male 25+ Trade Heilongjiang

Province

Single Working

Visa

2013

45 Hyun Male 30+ Trade Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2006

46 Miza Female 30+ IT Engineer Heilongjiang

Province

Single Working

Visa

2009

47 Miran Female 30+ Tourism Jilin

Province

Married Working

Visa

2008

48 Yoonmi Female 30+ Entrepreneur Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2010

49 Gayoon Female 30+ IT Engineer Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2016

50 Yeol Male 45+ IT Engineer Jilin

Province

Married Permanent

Residence

2005

51 Nanhee Female 25+ Student Jilin

Province

Single Student

Visa

2016

52 Hongmae Female 25+ Trade Jilin

Province

Single Working

Visa

2015

53 Ilsoon Female 60+ Human

Resources

Jilin

Province

Married Naturalized 1992

54 Mijung Female 40+ Entrepreneur Heilongjiang

Province

Married Naturalized 1999

55 Woopil Male 30+ Student Jilin

Province

Single Student

Visa

2014

228

Appendix 2

English Interview

[Personal Information]

1. How old are you? Which year were you born?

2. Where were you born? Where is your hometown in China?

3. Have you ever heard of the origin of your ancestor? Do you specifically know where your ancestor’s

hometown is?

4. Which generation of Joseonjok are you?

5. How many family members do you have?

6. What do/did your parents do?

7. Where are your parents now?

8. What do your siblings do?

9. Where are your siblings now?

10. Where did your spouse come from?

11. When did you first meet your spouse?

12. Did you come to Japan together or separately?

13. Do you have children?

14. How old are your children?

[Educational Background]

15. Which type of educational institution did you attend in China?

If you attended Joseonjok schools, were the lectures mostly conducted in the Korean language?

16. Where did you receive your undergraduate education? What was your major?

17. What did you write about your MA thesis?

[Migratory Experience in Japan]

18. When did you first learn the Japanese language?

19. How was your experience studying Japanese?

20. When did you come to Japan?

229

21. What brought you to Japan? Did you have specific goals?

22. What did you expect before coming to Japan?

23. What were the most difficult and challenging parts of living in Japan? How did you deal with the

difficulties or distress?

24. Did you feel cultural differences between China and Japan?

25. By comparing with your hometown, what were the pros and cons of living in Japan?

[Student or Working Experiences in Japan]

26. What is your job?

27. How long have you worked in this industry/ company in Japan?

28. Did you work in a different industry before this career?

29. Have you ever worked in different countries other than China or Japan?

30. What is the most challenging part of working in Japan?

31. Where do your clients come from?

32. Are you thinking of changing your career and moving to another country?

33. What are your general thoughts about your job? Could you please tell me your impression of Japanese

society?

34. What are your life goals?

[Lifestyle in Japan]

35. Which visa are you receiving now?

36. Are you planning to apply for permanent residence or naturalization?

37. Are you permanently stay in Japan? If not, how do you want to stay in Japan?

38. Do you think you are accustomed to Japanese norms and values?

39. Whom do you mingle with during free time? Where did your friends come from?

40. Do you have friends or cousins living overseas except for China, Korea, and Japan?

[Joseonjok Communities in Japan]

41. Are you attending any kinds of Joseonjok community meetings?

42. When did you first hear about the community?

230

43. How did you know the community?

44. How is the atmosphere of the community?

45. How often do you attend the gatherings?

46. How does it help your life in Japan?

47. Have you ever visited Korean or Joseonjok ethnic community churches in China and Japan?

[Identity]

48. Among the Korean peninsula, China, and Japan, which culture do you feel the closest to?

49. How do you identify yourself?

50. How do you describe yourself when you have to introduce yourself?

51. Have you ever had a hard time with your identity as Joseonjok?

52. How are Joseonjok different from Han Chinese, South Korean nationals, Japanese, and other overseas

or ethnic Koreans worldwide?

53. What do the Korean peninsula, China, and Japan mean to you?

54. How do you describe the traits of Joseonjok?

55. Have you ever visited South Korea? What was your first impression?

56. How often do you visit South Korea and China?

57. How often do you watch Korean variety shows and dramas?

58. How are Korean, Japanese, and Chinese pop cultures different?

59. Which ethnic group do your children want to marry in the future?

60. Do you care about the nationality and ethnicity of your future spouse?

[Language, Multilingualism]

61. Which language do you feel most comfortable speaking?

62. Do you feel the difference when you switch your languages?

63. Can you hang out with Joseonjok, who do not speak the Korean language?

64. Which language do you talk with your family members?

65. How much do your children speak and understand Korean and Chinese?

66. How do you educate your children?

231

67. Are you planning to send your children abroad in the future?

68. Are you interested in East Asian politics? As Joseonjok, what do you think of Korea, China, and Japan’s

interrelated historical and geopolitical issues such as the Korean Peninsula division, Terminal High Altitude

Area Defense (THAAD), comfort women issues?

232

인터뷰 한국어 버전

[개인 정보]

1. 나이가 어떻게 되세요? 몇 년생 이세요?

2. 태어나신 곳은 어디인가요? 고향은 어디에요?

3. 조상의 한국 고향은 알고 계신가요?

4. 조선족 몇 세 인가요?

5. 가족관계는 어떻게 되나요?

6. 부모님께서 무슨 일을 하셨나요?

7. 부모님은 현재 어디에 계신가요?

8. 형제는 지금 어떤 일을 하고 있나요?

9. 형제는 지금 어디에 있나요?

10. 배우자는 어디 출신인가요?

11. 배우자는 언제 어디서 만났나요?

12. 일본에는 함께 들어왔나요? 아니면 따로따로 들어왔나요?

13. 자녀는 있으신가요? 몇 명인가요?

14. 자녀는 몇 살이에요?

[교육 환경]

15. 초,중,고는 조선족 학교 였나요? 한족 학교 였나요? 모두 조선어로 수업을 진행했나요?

16. 대학은 어디에서 다니셨으며, 어떤 전공을 하셨나요?

17. 대학원 때 어떤 연구 테마로 논문을 쓰셨나요?

233

[일본 이주 경험]

18. 일본어는 언제 어디서 배우셨나요?

19. 일본어 공부 어땠어요? 어려웠어요? 쉬웠어요?

20. 일본에는 언제 오셨나요?

21. 일본은 어떻게 오셨어요? (오시게 된 계기, 이유)

22. 일본 오시기 전에 일본생활에 기대한 점은 어떻게 되나요?

23. 일본 생활 하면서 실망스럽거나 마음에 안 든 부분도 있나요?

24. 고향 생활과 비교했을 때, 일본 생활하면서 문화차이를 크게 느꼈나요? 예) 인간관계

25. 고향과 비교했을 때 일본 생활의 장점/ 만족스러운 점은 어떻게 되나요?

[일본 직장 생활]

26. 지금 하시는 일은 어떻게 되나요?

27. 일 하신 지는 얼마나 되셨어요?

28. 그 전에 다른 일을 하신 적이 있으신가요?

29. 중국이나 다른 나라에서 일하신 경험이 있으신가요?

30. 일본에서 직장생활 하며 힘든 점이 있으신가요?

31. 어느 나라 고객과 주로 일을 같이 하신가요?

32. 직장을 옮기거나 다른 나라에서 일을 하고 싶으신가요?

33. 일 하시며 느낀점? 간단한 소감? 일본 사회에 대한 부분?

34. 앞으로의 사업 목표는 어떻게 되시나요?

234

[일본 라이프스타일]

35.지금 어떤 비자를 받고 있나요?

36.미래에 영주권 신청이나 귀화 하실 계획이 있으신가요?

37. 계속 일본에 자리 잡고 머무르실 생각이신가요? 아니면 다른 나라로 이주할 계획이 있으신가

요?

38. 일본 문화에 잘 적응 되었다고 생각하신가요?

39. 주로 어느 나라 사람들과 어울리나요?

40.한중일 제외하고, 외국에 친척이 친구들이 있나요?

[조선족 커뮤니티]

41. 지금 나가는 조선족 모임이 있나요?

42. 조선족 모임은 언제부터 나갔어요?

43. 도쿄내 조선족 모임은 어떻게 해서 알게 되셨나요?

44. 조선족 모임의 분위기는 어떤가요?

45. 조선족 행사에는 자주 참여하신가요?

46. 조선족 모임 나가면서 도움되는 부분이 있나요?

[조선족 아이덴티티]

47. 본인은 한국, 중국, 일본 중 어느 나라 문화에 가장 익숙하고 가깝다고 생각하시나요?

48. 본인은 어느 나라 사람이라고 생각하시나요?

49. 자기 소개 하실 때 자신에 대해 어떻게 설명하시나요?

50. 자신의 민족 아이덴티티에 대해 고민 되거나 어려운 적은 있었나요?

51. 자신의 민족과 다른 민족 (한족, 일본인, 한국인, 재일동포, 재미동포)와 비교해 본 적은 있었나

235

요?

52. 비교를 했다면 어떤 부분이 많이 다르다고 생각하세요?

53. 본인에게 한중일은 어떤 의미를 가진 나라라고 생각하신가요?

54. 개인적으로 조선족은 어떤 민족이라 생각되시나요? 대표적인 특징을 말씀해주세요. (자부심)

[한국 관련 질문]

55. 한국에 친척이나 친구들이 살고 있나요?

56. 한국을 방문 하신 적이 있으셨나요? 한국 방문 하셨을 때 느낌은 어떠셨나요?

57. 한국이나 중국은 일 년에 몇 차례 방문하나요?

58. 평소에 한국 방송을 보시나요? (음악, 예능, 드라마, 영화)

59. 보신다면, 일본과 중국 방송과 어떤 점이 크게 다르다고 생각하시나요?

[자녀 결혼관, 싱글 결혼관]

60. 자녀가 나중에 어느 나라 사람이나 민족과 결혼하길 바라신가요? (조선족, 한국인, 일본인, 중

국 한족 기타 등등)

61. 결혼 상대자로 민족이나 국적 신경 쓰는 편인가요?

[언어]

62. 조선어와 중국어 중 어떤 언어가 모국어이자, 가장 편한 언어라고 생각하신가요?

조선어, 중국어, 일본어 중에 어느 언어가 가장 편하신가요?

63. 조선어, 중국어, 일본어 쓸 때마다 차이가 있나요? code switching

64. 조선어를 모르는 조선족과도 친하게 잘 지내실 수 있으신가요? 아무래도 조선어를 해야 더 친

밀감을 느끼신가요?

65. 가족이나 친구들끼리 주로 어떤 나라 언어로 소통하시나요?

236

66. 자녀는 한국어와 중국어를 어느 정도 하나요?

67. 교육은 어떻게 시키고 있어요? 학원을 보내거나, 영어교육?

68. 자녀는 일본에서 교육 시키실건가요?

69. 중국이나 일본에서 한국교회나 조선족 교회에 나간 적이 있나요?

70. 정치에 관심이 있으신가요? 조선족으로서 한중일 역사 문제와 정치 문제에 대해 자유로운 견

해를 들려드리면 감사하겠습니다.(남북분단 (북한), 중국의 정치문제 사드, 한국의 대통령 탄핵, 세

월호 사건, 위안부)