It All Depends: Contemplations on Causality
Transcript of It All Depends: Contemplations on Causality
Tom Weiser
REL 701 Final Paper
I’m writing this at a desk in the Naropa library. The shadow of a pine
branch has fallen on the wall before me. It’s slightly out of focus and
diffuse. I watch as it dances and shimmers. What’s the cause of this
perception? Is it my brain? My mind? My eye? The light bouncing off the
wall? The sun? The wind? The pine branch?
It All Depends: Contemplations on Causality
Introduction: The Smackdown
This paper began with a question that struck me when I first
encountered the “five great Madhyamaka reasonings,” summations of the
fundamental logic of the teachings of the Buddhist Madhyamaka
Philosopher, Nāgārjuna. As I began to become familiar with these
reasonings, it seemed to me that two of them were in conflict with one
another.
The first reasoning is entitled “Analysis of cause: the reasoning
that refutes arising from the four extremes.” It is also given a
nickname, “Tiny Vajra.” “Hmm..” I thought, “Nāgārjuna refutes
causality!”
The second reasoning is entitled “Analysis of Mere Appearances:
the reasoning of dependent origination.” It also has a nickname, “The
King of Reasonings.” “Now wait!” I thought, “How can Nāgārjuna refute
causality and accept dependent origination?” Thus was born the topic
of this paper.
If the two reasonings are in conflict, which one is correct? How
could one determine the winner in the smackdown between Tiny Vajra and
the King? My first impulse was to investigate the definitions and
usage of the two terms. First, I would locate Nāgārjuna in his
historical context. Then I would note his use of specific terms
within his oeuvre and the way in which these terms were used within the
discourse of his day. I would then be able to hypothesize with some
justification the reason Nāgārjuna made a distinction between
causality and dependent origination. Armed with my hypothesis, I
could examine the distinction between causality and dependent
origination as it ramified within the commentarial tradition. I would
then be able to declare one the winner, or to demonstrate that the
apparent conflict was never really a conflict in the first place.
The Fly in the Ointment
I quickly realized that this approach was flawed because: a) I
didn’t have the linguistic skills and b) I was lacking the historical
material. I believe that it will turn out to have been fortunate that
I was not able to pursue this approach, because on further reflection
I realized that even if I had the historical material and the
linguistic skills, the approach itself is questionable. It presupposes
that one can analyze something from a distance, objectively and
independently.
But my analysis could never be distant and independent; my
analysis is the result of my interaction with Nāgārjuna’s works, and
interaction is, by its nature, intimate and subjective. My
reconstruction of Nāgārjuna’s context must be made from my point of
view; therefore my point of view must intrude into that
reconstruction. Even if I try to keep my voice out of the process and
only cite evidence that I have gathered, the evidence that I present
will have been selected in accordance with my ideas of what is
significant and what is not significant.
This doesn’t mean that it is futile to engage with Nāgārjuna’s
writing. Far from it! Why pretend that I must arrive at an accurate
objective reconstruction? Why not admit my subjectivity and engage
Nāgārjuna’s writing in order to illuminate my own experience?
I already have support in undertaking this engagement. The
context of my study and practice includes a lineage that stretches
back to Nāgārjuna’s time. The Buddhist tradition insists that lineage
is extremely important: without a lineage of transmission, a text is a
dead thing. I can use whatever understanding I’ve achieved through
hearing, contemplating, and analytic meditation as my guide in
examining Nāgārjuna’s works. The meaning that I discover will emerge
dependently upon my subjective engagement with the text. I won’t
arrive at an objective understanding of the meaning that the text had
for Nāgārjuna, but even if I were talking to directly to him, I could
never apprehend that intimate, personal meaning.
Aspiration
My aspiration is to understand the Analysis of Cause and the
Analysis of Mere Appearance and to relate them to my own experience. I
also aspire help others around me by communicating what I learn. Since
I aspire to be able to teach these reasonings, I’ll start with what is
commonly accepted, and work my way toward the more difficult logic of
the Analysis of Cause and Analysis of Mere Appearance. I’ll use
everyday, non-academic language and each step of the way I’ll examine
in what way the reasoning is helpful. May it be of benefit!
Causality and the Buddhist Path
Since “causality” is a more familiar term than “dependent
origination”, we’ll start there and proceed until we arrive at
dependent origination. Don’t worry, we’ll get there: I have an
outline.
Causality is central to the path of Buddhism. Indeed, why would
you bother to follow a path if you didn’t think it would lead
somewhere? Buddhism asserts that the principle of causality is very
good news: because there is causality, one’s situation can be
improved. This principle is enshrined in the Four Noble Truths.
But causality isn’t a principle that is specifically Buddhist,
nor one of which we need to be convinced. We believe in causality
because we see the principle demonstrated over and over. Imagine the
alternative: a life in which there was no causality. You would not be
able to control your movements; people and objects would appear and
disappear without any predictability. Life would be disorienting at
best and terrifying at worst.
We trust in causality and use it to navigate our lives, yet we
don’t adhere to our belief rigorously. Sometimes we think that maybe
we can escape the reality of causality. I can verify this from my own
personal experience (okay, you can call them “foibles.”) Sometimes, I
behave as if my actions will not, in fact, bear consequences: as I get
more and more wound up about this paper, I start exercising less,
eating more poorly and consuming more caffeine. And then I’m surprised
that my mind is less clear than usual.
On the other hand, I sometimes hope for a result to arise without
my having undertaken the actions that would be the basis for that
result: I’d like to lose weight, but I hope that won’t have to change
my diet or exercise habits.
The principle of causality says there is actually no way to get
something for nothing, and no way of getting nothing for something.
Buddhism teaches that karma has “strict results” and that it is
“inevitable”.1
How is this helpful?
Trust in the reality of causality is helpful because it leads us
to renunciation. “Renunciation” is not a very popular word in most
circles. It comes across as a sort of holier-than-thou party-pooper:
we have to renounce things that are fun because some stick-in-the-mud
saint or Buddha has told us that we must. But that’s not the spirit
of Buddhist renunciation.
Consider the following example: the stove in the kitchen of my
residence has a large metal hood over it. The other day, I was
talking to the cook, and placed my hand on the hood. When the stove
is in use, the metal hood is HOT; I quickly removed my hand from the
stove hood, and decided not to put it there again again. In Buddhist
terms, that decision not to put my hand on a stove again was
“renunciation.” As Dzigar Kongtrül Rinpoche said “What we renounce is
stupidity.”
1 Gampopa, Jewel Ornament of Liberation, Trans. Guenther, Herbert V. (London: Rider & Co. 1959), 82-83.
Faith in the principle of causality is helpful because it gives
us hope and motivation: if we renounce stupidity, we will suffer less.
This is not a specifically Buddhist principle, as a very old joke
demonstrates:
Patient: Doctor, whenever I drink coffee I feel a stabbing pain in my
eye.
Doctor: Remove the spoon from your cup.
Chain, Chain, Chain: The Twelve Links of Dependent Origination
As we examine causality, we note that the cause that gave rise to
a specific result was itself the result of some previous cause. There
is a chain of causality that stretches back into the past. For
example, if I look at the causal chain that resulted in my wearing a
pair of jeans, I can see that it reaches back to the merchant that
sold me the jeans; the transportation system that brought the jeans to
the store; the manufacturer that assembled the garment; the textile
plant where the material was woven, the farm on which the cotton was
harvested, the seed that was planted, etc.
The Buddhist teachings of the twelve links of dependent
origination, or Nidānas, elucidates the principle of causal chains. The
Nidānas show how states of mind that arise from ignorance form the
basis for actions that propel one forward into future states of mind
that generate more ignorance, and so on. Each link in the chain is the
result of the link that precedes it and becomes a cause for the link
that follows. One cycles endlessly around and around the wheel unless
one achieves enlightenment.
How is this helpful?
When we see that causality is an endless chain of events, we can
see that any given result is not the final link in the chain. This
can give us hope: there’s no situation that’s final, none that is a
dead end. As Yogi Berra said “It ain’t over ‘til it’s over.” (Of
course, Siddhārtha Gautama might reply “It’s endless.”) It can also
sound a note of caution: we should be aware that the law of causality
is not suspended in pleasant situations. Our actions inevitably bear
fruit; renunciation is especially important when everything is going
well.
The teaching of the Nidānas is helpful because it highlights where
renunciation is most needed. We are shown how clinging (attachment to
an object) grows into grasping (strategizing how to get the object)
into becoming (putting that plan into effect). It’s what Pema Chödron
refers to as a chain reaction. Ultimately, we can stop the whole
thing by giving up clinging. But usually we’re way down the line deep
into becoming before we even realize what we’re doing.
Because the causal chain continues, all is not lost even if we’ve
lost our temper, or we’ve offended someone. It’s never too late to
start taking action that will have a beneficial effect Even if we’re
in the middle of ranting at someone, we could realize “Oh, I’m
ranting!” and slow down a little. The teaching of the Nidānas helps us
account for and work with the momentum of our habitual patterns.
The Web Without a Weaver
The Teaching of the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination can be
mistaken for a linear, one-to-one progression. It seems to teach that
a single cause produces a single result. This matches a sort of
simplistic thinking about causality that we often employ. We
desperately want to find the single cause responsible for an entire
situation. We look for heroes and scapegoats. On the break-up of a
relationship we obsess about that one thing that went wrong; we replay
conversations, wondering whether if we just said that one right thing
the whole relationship could have been saved.
This is a highly melodramatic view of the world, full of poignant
“what-ifs?” that’s embodied in a familiar proverb: "For want of a nail
the shoe is lost, for want of a shoe the horse is lost, for want of a
horse the rider is lost, for want of a rider the battle is lost, for
want of a battle the kingdom is lost. All for the loss of a horseshoe
nail." Oh, if only we had not lost the nail!
This melodramatic view is not without basis: small events may
really have inordinate impact on situations. Buddhism recognizes this
in the teaching that says a large result can come from a small
seed.2But the nail by itself does not lose the battle; it only achieves
its famous leverage because it is enmeshed in a web of causal
condition. The nail is significant because of the horseshoe, horse,
rider, battalion, and army.
Multiple previous causes give rise to each phenomenon; myriad
conditions are necessary to sustain that phenomenon. We may think
that “mighty oaks from tiny acorns grow” but the acorn only can grow
to a tree, and the tree can only be sustained if the conditions of
soil, moisture, light, and temperature all stay within the proper
bounds.
In fact, the Nidānas are not meant to be understood only as one-
to-one; they can also be understood multidimensionally. 3 As David
Kalupahana points out, Buddhism teaches that things do not arise from
one cause but from a harmony of causes.4 As we examine the causal web
that bears on any phenomenon, we find that we must include more and
more phenomena until, as Bertrand Russell says, “If the inference from
2 Gampopa, Jewel Ornament, 82.3 See Willemen, et al. p 27 for instances of the Nidānas in one
moment, one life, multiple lives.
4 Kalupahana, David, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The Universtity of Hawaii Press, 1975), 54-56.
cause to effect is to be indubitable, it seems that cause can hardly
stop short of the whole universe.” 5
How is this helpful?
The understanding that all phenomena arise on the basis of myriad
causes and are sustained by myriad conditions points out the highly
contingent nature of our situation. If we really take this to heart,
it can help in several ways. First, it can undercut pride and inspire
humility: given all of the casual factors that converged to create a
result, it is not possible that one could be either the sole author of
one’s successes or of one’s failures. And conversely, even if someone
else seems to be the hero or culprit, if one is involved in a
situation, then one must also have a share of blame or credit.
It can reduce resentment (someone else has all the power) and
corrosive regret (I have all the blame). If one understands that one
is enmeshed in a causal web, one can realize that ultimately, one’s
actions must affect all of humanity. No matter how humble one’s
position, one participates in the great tides of history. One need
never scorn a particular type of work: one contributes according to
one’s nature and one’s contribution will infallibly affect the entire
causal web for better or ill.
5 Kalupahana, 203.
It inspires gratitude: myriad conditions were necessary for us
to get where we are. Buddhism teaches that human birth is extremely
rare and precious: it’s more likely that a blind sea-turtle that only
rises every hundred years would manage to stick its head through a
yoke floating on a vast sea than it is that one should take birth as a
human.6
Prediction is Hard, Unless You’re the Weatherman
My sister Katharine told me she would like the weatherman’s job,
because he can be completely wrong about the weather and still not get
fired. The reason that the weatherman enjoys this enviable job
security is that weather is an enormously complex system with many
causal factors. It’s very hard to predict the behavior of such a
system. But as we’ve seen, all effects arise because of myriad causes:
everything is part of an enormously complex system, so it’s impossible
to predict even simple things completely accurately.
Since one’s actions are never the sole casual factor in the
evolution of any situation, one can never predict with certainty what
the specific outcome of one’s actions will be. Even if one is “doing
all the right things” one can still experience bad results: a non-
smoker may contract cancer and a smoker may avoid the disease.
6 Bodhi, Samyutta Nikāya, 871-872 (S v.456-457).
Buddhism recognizes this: it teaches that the reality of karma is
so complex that only a Buddha can understand its workings. Moreover
it stresses that even though karma is inevitable and has a strict
result, we experience a bewildering variety of results because of its
enormous complexity. The Buddha taught that even if one performs good
actions, one will not necessarily attain a good rebirth in the next
life, nor will one necessarily attain a bad birth after a life filled
with bad actions.7 This is the result of the fruition of karma from
many previous lives. This teaching is meant to be cautionary, not
disheartening. The point is that we must trust the reality of the
general principle of causality without insisting on a simplistic model
for outcome: we must learn to stay “in the right direction”.
This approach requires a long view, one that is supported by
Buddhism’s assertion of rebirth. The long time scale is also evident
in the teaching of the Paths and Bhumis: the playing out of karma can
take an enormously long time.
How is this helpful?
When we can accept that it’s impossible to know the exact outcome
that will result from our actions, we can relax our expectations. We
can learn to develop patience, and stay with process rather than
7 Bodhi, Majhima Nikāya, (Mahākammavibhanga Sutta), 1058 – 1065 (M iii.207 – 215).
insist on immediate result. (Happily, staying with process often
leads to better immediate results.) When we feel angry or jealous
because people don’t get “what they deserve” we can expand our view
and realize that since the principle of causality is valid, every
situation must be appropriate: everyone is always getting “what they
deserve.” We can achieve a greater degree of equanimity and
contentment in the face of seeming injustice, and continue quietly
working in the right direction. This does not mean that we should
disengage from the world and accept injustice; it simply means that
outrage, while entertaining, is not helpful.
We can learn what actions inflame situations and learn to avoid
them. The virtues propounded by the foundational path are
renunciative (nonviolence, not lying, not stealing, etc.) As we
choose to undertake the positive actions embodied in the pāramitās, we
can release the expectation of any particular immediate result and
trust in the long-term positive effects.
Multiple Subjects
The casual web is unfathomable, but we experience the phenomena
that appear as results of causality to be quite specific, discrete and
endowed with vivid, inherent characteristics. We may agree that some
of these characteristics are “subjective.” For instance, I think rare
steak is delicious; my vegetarian friends find it repulsive. But we
feel that there are other characteristics that are “objective” and
quantifiable. These seem to be inherent to the object, and not
dependent on the perceiver.
But even such “objective” characteristics can be experienced
differently by different perceivers. When I look at a rose, I see it
as red red. But a honeybee sees the rose in a different spectrum of
colors. If there is a creature that perceives in the spectrum of X-
rays, it might see the rose as a cloudy, translucent object. Is one
of those views of the rose correct? If we took a vote, the insects
would probably win. (Depending on the rules for voter registration.)
Even “objective” characteristics are dependent on the perceiver.
The fact that different objects can be perceived differently is
elucidated in the Buddhist teachings that describe how water is
perceived as different substances by the denizens of the six realms. 8
How is this helpful?
When we realize that other people experience things differently
than we do, we are less likely to be irritated when they don’t do the
“right thing.” We can learn to communicate with those with whom we are
in conflict and try to understand how they perceive things. Based on
such communication, we may be able to resolve conflict with a solution
8 Mipham, Beacon of Certainty, trans. Petit, John Whitney, 347 (found online)
that meets everyone’s needs. At least we are less likely to make the
situation worse.
Learning to see things from the perspectives of others loosens
our tight boundaries. It cuts down on the self-centered “me plan” and
helps us open to the experience of sympathy and sympathetic joy. I’ve
personally found that when I’m attending a concert and I try to
experience the music from the perspective of the performer, I feel
much more involved in and moved by the music.
Understanding that others may see us differently than we
experience ourselves allows us to develop skillful means. For
instance, I don’t think of myself as large, but to a small child I may
appear huge and frightening. When I squat down to be on the child’s
level, I can make myself less threatening.
In Mahayāna Buddhism, the practice of “exchanging self and other”
or tonglen is a method for developing compassion.
The Way I See it
Still, we might argue, regardless of the multiplicity of possible
perceptions, on the single basis of my experience, things have unique
characteristics. I can’t actually see things as someone else sees
them, I see them…My Way. I can’t decide to see things from another
perspective. My experience of my sense perception is choiceless: if I
look at something that I perceive as red, I have to see it as red; I
can’t decide to see it as blue. If I stick a pin in my forearm, I have
to feel the sharp pinprick, I can’t decide to feel it as a feather.
How is this helpful?
It’s true that although one can imagine another’s perspective,
one cannot actually experience it. It’s also true that sense
perception is largely choiceless. You may choose to shift your focus,
but if your eyes are open, you cannot refuse to see. Since this is the
case, we might examine our experience and see where we have choice and
where we do not. As the popular Serenity Prayer of St. Francis of
Assis advises:“Lord, grant me the serenity to accept the things I
cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom
to know the difference”
In Buddhist terms, we must learn to accept the realm we’re in,
the karma that is currently coming to fruition. If it our experience
is truly choiceless, then resentment will be of no help. We can refer
to the teaching of the Nidānas and realize that feeling is choiceless,
the inexorable fruition of karma. But the next step, craving, is not
inexorable. We have a choice here, and an ability to change our
future karma.
This is an area where I have a good deal of experience: one of
my favorite kleśas is jealousy. I frequently feel that other people
have a better experience of life than I do. And not only is my
experience worse than theirs, it’s choiceless, and that’s not fair! It’s
clear that I should go back a few pages and contemplate causality to
realize that there’s nothing that’s “not fair.” A contemplation on the
likely result of dwelling on resentment would also be helpful. When
you next see me, please remind me of this.
Got Concept?
Let’s review where we’ve gotten to so far: we’ve accepted
causality, and seen that all phenomena arise from and are sustained by
a vast web of causes. As a result, we see that although causality is
inexorable and applies to all phenomena, it’s hard to predict the
outcome of any specific action. We’ve also seen that phenomena can be
perceived in myriad ways and that therefore even seemingly objective,
quantifiable characteristics are dependent on the nature of the
perceiver. This is a sophisticated and cosmopolitan view that
corresponds to the view of the Vaibhāṣika school as it is presented in
the Tibetan classification of the Four Tenet Systems. If we could just
hold this view, we could get a lot of benefit (as we’ve seen above.)
We’ve also seen that any individual’s sense perceptions are
unique and choiceless. But as we examine how those sense perceptions
work, we might notice that whenever we perceive a phenomenon, all
sorts of concepts about that phenomenon also arise to our attention.
We may even notice that our concepts distract us from perceiving the
phenomenon clearly.
We tend to mix up our concepts (labels, stories, opinions) with
the actual sense perception. These concepts tend to remain stable,
while the phenomena to which they refer are impermanent, changing all
the time. We mistake our past (the causal web) for the present (the
current result). There’s a dissonance between concept and direct
perception and this dissonance causes suffering.
The Buddhist Pramana tradition teaches extensively on the
dissonance between concept and perception. The mischief we create for
ourselves via concept is also the chief topic of many popular Buddhist
texts. In fact, concept seems like the chief villain of popular
Buddhism; when he enters the discourse, we all hiss at him.
How is this helpful?
When we become aware that we’re mixing concept and perception, we
can learn to separate the two. Then we can learn which labels are
helpful and which are not.
Realizing that a person is not the same as a label or their past
can help us reconcile. The first fruition of my psychotherapy was a
story that placed blame on my parents. The fruition of my maturation
was that I realized that even if the blame story was correct, there
was no way to reconcile with the people in that story. My parents had
changed and so had I. We have a different relationship now than we
had when I was a child and I can only work with that situation.
Separating my parents from my concepts of them allowed me to improve
my relationship with the people they are today.
Concepts and labels are useful. Without them we could not
communicate, nor could we use the principle of causality to predict
future events. We need concepts to understand the past and predict
the future. But we must realize that labels are provisional, not the
thing itself: we must learn to apply them lightly.
Taking Up a Collection
Sometimes we apply a singular label to a phenomenon that exists
as a collection of parts. Consider “my family.” That label implies
that my family is a single unit. But imagine planning the holiday
party and buying beverages. Does “my family” like beer or not? Turns
out some members of my family do and some members don’t; it’s not
helpful to think of “my family” as a single unit when planning the
bash. In order to work skillfully with “my family” I need to know
about the individuals that make it up.
In the same way, we can notice that almost all of the phenomena
with which we interact are also collections of parts. When we become
familiar with the components we can understand better how the entire
phenomenon works.
How is this helpful?
If we see a person as an individual and not simply as a group
member we can work with that person much more skillfully. We can
avoid “isms”: racism, sexism, agism, etc, because we can distinguish
the implied characteristics that come with any label (white, middle-
aged male) from the actual observable characteristics of the
individual (the person writing this paper).
This applies to inanimate objects as well as sentient beings.
When we see all the component parts of an object, we understand how to
use and maintain that object much more precisely.
The Periodic Chart of the Emotions: Enter the Abhidharma
We’ve seen that it’s important to know about the parts of
something to work with it well. The sciences of chemistry and physics
employ the analysis of components effectively. Through chemistry, we
know that we can break things down into atoms and recombine them into
different substances.
The Dzogchen Pönlop Rinpoche has called Buddhism “a science of
mind.” The abhidharma tradition is analogous to the science of
chemistry; it represents an extensive examination of the components of
experience. The abhidharma tradition identified dozens of mental
factors and created a kind of periodic table of the emotions. Just as
chemists study the combination of atoms to create complex molecules,
the abhidharma examined how simple mental factors could combine into
complex and colorful emotions.
How is this useful?
When we do not see precisely – when we blur the components of
things together – we can remain willfully ignorant about our actions
and mental states. The precision of abhidharma analysis helps us
dispel this ignorance. I had an experience that illustrates this: I
was attending a class in which I had to interact everyday with a
person with whom I was angry. Whenever I entered the classroom, I had
a big chip on my shoulder. I had a really juicy story line worked out
that said that I was totally justified to be carrying that chip (not
looking from other person’s perspective), and there was something
quite satisfying about the intensity of my emotion (not looking at
likely results). One day in the grip of that intense emotion I
recalled my abhidharma studies and realized “This is resentment.
Resentment is nonvirtuous.” I knew that there was no justification for
holding on to resentment. Even a little bit of resentment is toxic,
like a small amount of benzine in your drinking water.
Working with fine discrimination helps us locate what is
beneficial and what is harmful in our relationship with ourselves and
with others. We can work more precisely with situations and therefore
more deftly and with less effort.
When we observe the components of phenomena, we notice that those
components change constantly. We are more likely to notice the
impermanence of phenomena by observing these subtle, constant changes.
And we are more likely to notice that the labels we apply are much
less changeable than the phenomena themselves.
Working with components rather than “solid” entities can help us
overcome laziness and despair. The chain of causality taught us that
all situations change over time: none is a dead end; the analysis of
the components of phenomena teaches us that there are no monolithic
situations: even the worst situation must have some “soft spot” that
is open to communication and change.
Causality and Collections
We’ve seen that there’s a web of causality that provides the
basis for the arising of any phenomenon. When we realize that most
objects have multiple parts, the situation becomes even more
complicated. All the different parts have different causes,
different life histories.
How can we best to examine causality in such a complicated
situation? In any scientific experiment, we try to simplify and
eliminate variables. If we could find a simple object, we might be
able to analyze more easily the workings of causality. Is there any
phenomenon that is simple and not made up of parts? The abhidharma
tradition says that there are such simple elements. It asserts that
partless particles and moments of mind are the simple, fundamental
building blocks of reality.
I said I wouldn’t Do This, But…The Context of Nāgārjuna
And this is where we find Nāgārjuna and his Analysis of Cause.
Nāgārjuna was a Sarvāstivādin monk. He would have been familiar with
the fundamental Buddhist teachings on causality as well as the
abhidharma assertion of truly existing partless particles. And he saw
a conflict between the two.
And here comes a big wrench in the course of this paper. Up until
now, we’ve been proceeding in accordance with a realist view that is
in harmony with the commonsense principles with which we engage our
everyday world. But Nāgārjuna asks whether some of those commonsense
principles are actually in conflict with one another. Up to this point
in the paper, we’ve been looking at how things are; Nāgārjuna asks us
to look at the way things are not.
Causality and Partless Particles
Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakārikas begins with the following famous
verse, which can be understood as the probandum of his Analysis of
Cause:
Neither from itself nor from another
Nor from both,
Nor without a cause,
Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.9
Let’s examine this reasoning using a partless particle as an
example of something that arises. We want to know from whence it
arises; in other words, what is its cause? We can understand
“arising” as a change in state: if the partless particle changes, its
former state ceases and a new state arises.
Perhaps we believe that the particle doesn’t ever change. (This
was the view of some of Nāgārjuna’s contemporaries.) We could theorize
that phenomena change due to shifting combinations of permanent
particles. There’s a problem with this hypothesis: because our
particle has only one part, if it doesn’t change, it must remain
absolutely identical with its previous state. If it always remains
impervious to change, how can anything interact with it? In order to
be perceptible, for instance, the particle must be able to interact
with a sense faculty; in order to be part of an aggregation, it must
adhere to other particles.
If it is neither perceptible nor capable of aggregating with
other particles to create larger phenomena the particle then it may be
permanent but it is permanently ineffectual. Therefore our particle
9 Garfield, Jay L, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 3.
cannot abide without ever changing; we have refuted the case of
“arising from itself”.
If the particle is not permanent, then when it changes, it must
change into something completely other (since it only has one part,
when that part changes, everything changes). When the particle
changes, the new state must have arisen from something completely
other. It can’t be just a little bit other; it’s only got one part.
How could this transformation take place? There couldn’t be a gradual
change from one state to the other because there’s only one part. So
the initial state (cause) must cease before the new state (result)
arises. In which case, there’s no cause present around to act upon
the result. Therefore the result cannot be completely different than
the cause; we have refuted the case of “arising from other.”
What about the possibility of arising both from itself and
another? This is not possible because it only has one part, so either
the previous state is the same as the previous cause (arising from
self) or it’s different (arising from another). These two states are
mutually exclusive: if it arose from itself, it didn’t change, and if
it arose from another, then it did change. Because the particle only
has one part, it can’t both have changed and not changed. The result
can’t be both identical to the cause and also something completely
different than the cause; we’ve refuted the case “arising from both
self and other”
Okay, then it must be neither! This is an interesting position.
It says that the particle is not the same as its previous instant, nor
is it different. Since those are the only two possible state, the
previous moment of the particle must be non-existent! The particle
literally came from nowhere; there is no causality. But as we noted at
the beginning, we see the principle of causality demonstrated over and
over again in our daily life. Our experience will not support that
everything arises randomly and with no relation to a cause. Therefore
a result does not arise causelessly; result is not completely
unrelated to the cause; we’ve refuted the case “arising causelessly.”
We’ve refuted all four cases. To restate our findings:
The result is not the same as the cause; the result is not
different than the cause; the result is not both the same and
different than the cause; the result is not completely unrelated to
the cause.
The Analysis of Cause demonstrates that causality cannot work if
our partless particle has an identity that is the same or different
than the identity of its cause. Since those are the only two
possibilities for such a particle, and since we’ve accepted that
causality does, somehow, work, the Analysis of Cause leads us to the
conclusion that our understanding of identities that are the “same” or
“different” must be faulty. Things are “same” and “different” based
on observable characteristics. The Analysis of Cause suggests that
these characteristics are not inherent, but rather dependent. As a
result, there are no entities that exist independently. The question
that began this paper was founded on an incorrect understanding:
Nāgārjuna does not refute causality. He accepts causality and refutes
the existence of independent entities with inherent characteristics.
How is this helpful?
We’ve already seen that phenomena are not independent (they arise
within a web of causality) they are not permanent (they change due to
conditions) not singular (they have parts). We’ve seen this via a
“top-down”, commonsense approach, a via positiva. This approach
corresponds to the foundational teachings of the five skandhas and the
analysis of the chariot found in The Questions of King Milinda. It is a very
useful approach because it constantly refers to our experiences and
therefore grounds us and helps keep us calm as it undercuts the Self.
But there’s danger: as I work with a “top-down” approach I can keep
defending my beloved Self on narrower and narrower grounds.
Nāgārjuna attacks from below, using a via negativa to remove the
building blocks of the entire structure. If not even the smallest
unit, the partless particle, could be permanent, independent and
singular, then how could any Self be permanent, independent and
singular? For that matter, how could any phenomenon at all be
permanent, independent and singular. It’s like saying, “A soap bubble
is not permanent, but a whole mass of them certainly must be.” As the
Buddha taught, form is as void and insubstantial as a lump of foam.10
Go With the Flow: The E-word and Mutually Dependent Origination
The Analysis of Cause demonstrates that causality cannot take
place in discrete steps, nor can it take place between two or more
independent entities. Therefore, since we accept causality on the
basis of our experience, we must accept that causality describes a
seamless flow of change within a vast interrelated, permeable field in
constant flux.
If things can’t arise as independent entities, we can say that
they are empty of having an inherent identity. If they do not have an
inherent identity, and yet they are not identical with every thing
else, we conclude that their perceptible characteristics must depend
on their context. Therefore emptiness of inherent identity is
synonymous with dependence. This emptiness of self-identity is the
cornerstone of Madhyamaka philosophy and it is identified with
10 Bodhi, Samyutta Nikaya, 951-953 (S iii.140-143)
dependent arising: “Whatever is dependently co-arisen, that is
explained to be emptiness.”11
How is this helpful?
We’ve seen that the building block of phenomena, the partless
particle, is dependent on its context for identity. That context is
constantly in flux, so the building block must have no inherent
stability. This leads us to an understanding of subtle impermanence:
if the building block has no stability, how could any structure built
upon such blocks be stable?
Understanding subtle impermanence removes the insult from the
impermanence that we see all around us. It’s not that things break
because something bad happens to them. It’s the nature of objects to
disaggregate. It’s a wonder that they stay together for so long.
Subtle impermanence explains the basis for change. It’s like
adding oil to the machinery of our understanding.
Not Existent, Not Non-existent: King Milinda Meets the King of
Reasons
The Analysis of Cause has demonstrated that no phenomena have
independent existence. We can easily read this to mean that phenomena
must therefore be non-existent. The second reasoning in our pair, the
Analysis of Mere Appearance (AKA the King of Reasonings) clarifies
11 Garfield, 69. (MMK xxiv.18)
this misunderstanding. Nāgārjuna states it as a question: “How can
those existing by themselves [i.e. truly existent things] be mutually
dependent? How can those which exist not by themselves [i.e. truly
non- existent things] be mutually dependent?”12We’ve accepted dependent
origination, so we can paraphrase the question as a statement: “All
phenomena are not truly existent because the arise dependently. All
phenomena are not truly non-existent because they arise dependently.”
In other words, because any phenomenon arises as an aspect of a web of
interrelationships, it is not reasonable to say that it exists as
independent thing with inherent characteristics. And because any
phenomenon arises vividly as an aspect of that web of
interrelationships, it’s not reasonable to say that it is entirely
non-existent.
Logic akin to the King of Reasons (a cousin, perhaps?) appears in
The Questions of King Milinda. When King Milinda asks his name, Nāgasena
replies, “I am known as Nāgasena, [but] this ‘Nāgasena’ is only a
designation, a label, a concept…because there is no person as such to
be found.” 13King Milinda is skilled at debate; he responds to
Nāgasena’s statement by pointing out an absurd consequence (he “hurls
a prāsaṅga”). He searches for Nāgasena in the five skandhas, and when
12 Nagarjuna, Precious Garland, 29.13 Mendis, NKG, trans, The Questions of King Milinda: An Abridgement of the Milindapañha. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1993.
he does not find him there he declares, “There is no Nāgasena.” If
there is no Nāgasena, why should the king give him alms and listen to
him? Nāgasena responds with his own prāsaṅga. He analyzes the king’s
chariot and points out that there is not a chariot present in the
collection of parts, nor a chariot existent apart from the collection
of parts. The king agrees. Nonetheless, Nāgasena points out, King
Milinda did not walk to see him. He rode in a chariot. The chariot
is clearly not inherently existent, because it arises on the basis of
its parts. But it’s not accurate to say that the chariot is non-
existent because it still functions as an entity.
How is this Helpful?
If we misunderstand the Analysis of Cause we might convince
ourselves that everything is non-existent and fall into a deep,
ignorant laziness. If everything is non-existent, why bother doing
anything? Since suffering is non-existent, why should we help
ourselves or anyone else? Mesmerized by the concept of non-existence,
we actually dismiss our own experience. This nihilistic view is very
aggressive in its denial, and results in an inability to help oneself
or anyone else.
Buddhism considers the poison of nihilism more toxic than the
poison of eternalism because it prevents us from pursuing the Path.
Therefore, Nāgārjuna warned that a misunderstanding of emptiness could
be very dangerous, like mishandling a poisonous snake.14The second part
of the King of Reasons (“All phenomena are not non-existent because
they dependently arise”) can help us steer clear of the shoals of
nihilism.
Perceiving Differences
If phenomena have no inherent characteristics, how can they be
perceptible? Let’s return to those inveterate investigators of
experience, the teachers of abhidharma, and steal a leaf from their
book. They tell us that we perceive characteristics via the mental
factor of discrimination, and that there are two types of
discrimination: conceptual and non-conceptual.
I propose that conceptual discrimination is synonymous with
“imputation.” It is fairly easy to understand imputation: I’m “big”
compared to an infant and “small” compared with the Empire State
Building. Clearly, I’m not inherently big or small, it simply depends
on what you compare me to. Big and small are imputations, not
inherent characteristic. It’s easy to conclude that such imputations
are mistaken. (And easy to fall into the pitfall of thinking that
something besides these conceptual imputations is inherent to the
object)
14 Garfield, 68 (MMK XXIV.11)
We make conceptual imputations all the time, and we’ve seen above
that conceptuality can be the basis of much of our suffering. However,
I do not believe that the perception of things as distinct from one
another is necessarily conceptual. We’ve accepted causality based on
experience. Let’s appeal to experience to and examine whether
discrimination can also be non-conceptual.
We noted above that sense perceptions are choiceless: when I open
my eyes, I cannot refuse to see. (The abhidharma recognizes this by
asserting that discrimination is an omnipresent mental factor: it
accompanies all conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses.) I
propose that perception depends upon perceptible distinctions. Let’s
take the example of my visual perception of a red fire extinguisher
silhouetted against a white wall. Clearly, there are many conceptual
imputations mixed with my perception: the labels “red” and “fire
extinguisher,” for example. But all of these imputations are referring
to a non-conceptual experience: the contrasting elements of the raw
sensory perception. The imputations may be mistaken; they’re laid on
top of the perception. But the contrast is not laid on top of the
perception. Rather the sense perception is dependent upon contrast.
And the contrast is only meaningful dependent on the perception. The
two are inseparable: as the Prajñāpāramitā Sutra says “Emptiness is no
other than form, form is no other than emptiness.”
Why is this helpful?
The view of non-conceptual dependence amplifies our understanding
of “not non-existent” It ties ultimate truth of emptiness to the
appearances of relative truth. Although the appearances are said to
be like an illusion, that doesn’t mean they’re a mistake, or that
anyone is being fooled.
The view of non-conceptual dependence is particularly resonant
for me. I remember the first time I experienced it in analytic
meditation. Prior to this, I’d been working diligently at resting in
non-implicative negation. That practice was grimly serious, imbued
with a sense of things being torn away from me. When I experienced the
view of non-conceptual dependence, suddenly phenomena seemed to pop
back up again, vivid and distinct, and also somewhat holographically;
definitely there, but not quite real. The experience was quite warm
and even humorous.
The humor that accompanied the recognition of non-conceptual
dependence seems to me to be one of the great strengths of this view.
The illusion-like nature of appearances seemed really entertaining,
like well-performed sleight-of-hand. Such humor is very valuable; we
need good spirits to continue on the Path.
Conclusion: Rapprochement of Tiny Vajra and the King
Now we can return to our initial question and ask, “Are Tiny
Vajra and the King in conflict?” Certainly not! They’re the best of
friends! Tiny Vajra eliminates our clinging to truly existent
phenomena. She says, “Because we accept causality, phenomena can not
be independent entities with inherent characteristics. Causality only
works when things are interdependent and without fixed boundary. Go
with the flow!” The King confirms this and amplifies it: “Because
phenomena arise dependently they are neither truly existent, nor truly
non-existent. If they were truly existent they would be independent
and with fixed boundaries, and therefore could not arise dependently.
If they were truly non-existent, they wouldn’t appear at all! An
illusion is not just a mistake! Emptiness is not just a big old
nothing!”15
Implications for the Path
Since no individual has firm boundaries, since we are all in a
web of interdependence, then it is literally true that I am not
separate from any other sentient being. Compassion is truly self-
interest. When I help someone, I am also helped, just as my hand
feeds my mouth and receives the nourishment as well.
15 I stole that last line from Ari Goldfield, translating for Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche.
When a permanent, singular independent Self is refuted (from top
down and from bottom up!) there is no longer any territory to defend,
no basis for the arising of the three poisons of passion, aggression
and delusion.
“Three-fold purity” becomes understandable. For instance, there
truly is no giver, no receiver, no gift, and yet all three manifest in
dependence on one another. It’s not the case that nothing is
happening. It is the case that no solid “thing” is happening.
The understanding that emptiness is synonymous with dependent
origination is the gateway to the Mahayāna.
“Here Come the Excuses” or “Why This Paper Failed”.
Although I started with a good aspiration, I believe that this
paper failed in several significant ways:
First, and probably most significantly, in trying to restate the
ascending levels of analysis argument in everyday language, I began to
rely more and more on my own thinking. Although I began this paper
with an appeal to the lineage, in the end, I feel that I didn’t ground
my argument in the lineage sufficiently. I made the argument that all
phenomena must be interdependent, and then, ironically, tried to write
the paper from an independent point of view
I also failed to take into account the vastness of the material.
My reach far exceeded my grasp. I could have written a much better
paper by limiting the scope. I’m afraid that by addressing so many
subjects I created a paper that is wide and shallow. As a result, it
tended to evaporate as I wrote.
I also realized that I had made a false assumption in planning
the paper: I thought that I could take the “realist” approach all the
way through Nāgārjuna’s refutation. In the course of writing the
paper, I realized that realism only gets us as far as the stage of
abhidharma analysis. I spent a long time trying to figure out how to
make a “pivot” from investigating how things exist to how they do not
exist.
How I Succeeded (In Spite of My Failure)/(Because of My Failure)
As I wrestled with the transition from explaining how things are
to explaining how they are not, I got a clearer understanding of the
distinction between relative and ultimate teachings. I also
understood better the uses of via negativa and via positiva. I had an
insight into why so many popular Buddhist books stick primarily to
relative teachings: the relative teachings are easy to explain in
commonsense terms, and easy to digest. The via negativa is irritating,
hard to digest, and very hard to write about.
I got a view of the vastness of the material and also its
interrelatedness. I understood more clearly the place of Western
scholarship, and began to become familiar with the analyses of Western
philosophers (I mostly rejected that material.) I became interested
in understanding the roots of Madhyamaka in the Nikāya material, and
in understanding better how the abhidharma might work as a guide to a
path of meditation.
I lost my mind. Really. There were several times when I felt my
mental gears slip as the Madhyamaka jarred me out of my intellectual
cocoon and delivered me to a groundless state. I developed more
tolerance for that groundless state and considerably less anxiety
abiding there.
Writing the paper provided a great review of the material and a
welcome opportunity to contemplate it. The “How Is It Helpful?”
contemplations that I wrote for each stage of analysis were, actually,
quite helpful. Several times in the course of writing the paper I had
recourse to the contemplations and found relief. I found it difficult
to write “How Is It Helpful” for the Madhyamaka analysis, though, and
that emphasizes the difference between relative and ultimate
teachings.
As I developed the material, I realized that it was not going to
take the form of a standard academic paper. In particular, I realized
that I would not have very many citations. I panicked briefly: “What
if I fail?” But then I thought: “Exactly how does one fail at the
Dharma? If I had the choice between receiving an A on this paper or
gaining better understanding of the Dharma, which would I take?” I
must admit, sheepishly, that it was something of a toss-up. In the
end, I decided that my initial aspiration was worthy. The paper was
not turning out as neatly as I hoped, but I wanted to learn how to
relate the Madhyamaka logic to my own experience and how to explain it
to others in non-academic language. I decided to keep following that
aspiration, even if it meant that my paper might be something of a
mess.
Ultimately, I think that my willingness to allow the paper to
“fail” was my greatest success. In doing that, I broke with old
habitual patterns of academic self-confirmation and allied myself
instead with the aspiration to cultivate bodhicitta. By accepting the
possibility of short-term failure, I strengthened my aspiration to
gain fluency in the logic of Madhyamaka for the long-term benefit of
all beings. May it be so!
I’m writing this at a desk in the Naropa library. The shadow of a pine
branch has fallen on the wall before me. It’s slightly out of focus and
diffuse. I watch as it dances and shimmers. What’s the cause of this
perception? Is it my brain? My mind? My eye? The light bouncing off the
wall? The sun? The wind? The pine branch?
Yes.
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