MSc/Diploma title: Msc in Ethnicity andMulticulturalismCANDIDATE NUMBER: 67829

UNIT NUMBER: SPAIM0023

UNIT TITLE: Religion and Politics in the West

UNIT TUTOR: Tariq Modood

ESSAY NUMBER & TITLE: 6 - Evaluate the contention that the ‘crisis of secularism’ in Western Europe is the result of multiculturalism.WORD COUNT: 3923

0

IntroductionWestern Europe is phasing the outcomes of the development of twodifferent trajectories (Modood, 2012a:138, 2013a). On one side,the immigrant presence from the former colonies, growing sincethe 1960’s, has turned Western Europe into a multicultural(Castles & Miller, 2009:96; Geddes, 2003) and, by extension,multi-faith mosaic (Bramadat, 2009). On the other, the permanentdecline of religious performance (Davie, 2006; Bizeul, 2013;Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Greeley, 2003; Casanova, 2006) hasbrought up a wider consensus concerning the privatization ofreligion as well as its status of invisibility in the publicsphere (Modood, 2012a:138, 2013b:23; Casanova, 2006, 2004:1,7;Berger, 1996). These two trajectories can be perceived asoppositional if one bears in mind the significant numbers of non-white immigrants residing in Western European states and theparamount importance most of them place on religion foridentification, organization and political representation(Berman, Bhargava & Laliberté, 2013:14). Several prominentacademics refer to the emergence of the aforementioned phenomenonas a ‘crisis of secularism’ (Scherer, 2010; Jakelić, 2013:3, asmentioned by Modood, 2012a:132; Roy, 2007; Berman et al.,2013:17).

However, I would like to argue that such clear-cut judgmentspresent several problems. To begin with, ‘secularism’ is acomplex term with multiple meanings (Bouchard & Taylor,2008:134). Western Europe currently sports two forms ofsecularism; the radical model of French laicité and the moderate

1

form followed by the rest of the states. Within the latterframework, several kinds of state-religion connections have beendeveloped throughout the years. Even in the radical French modelsome state-religion connections exist, although they areconcealed under cultural terms. As becomes apparent, if we takeabsolute state-religious separation as a crude definition ofsecularism, it turns out that ‘a crisis’ occurred well before theadvent of multicultural presence.

Indeed, this essay will attempt to clarify that althoughmulticulturalism supports and promotes the recognition ofminority religious identities, the statement that it putssecularism under crisis is a bit exaggerated, if not purposefullymisleading (following Modood, 2012a:146-7). Multiculturalism doesnot opt for a complete disestablishment of secularism. On thecontrary, multiculturalism supports moderate secularism as it isbelieved that the various types of religion-state connectionswithin it can be extended so as to accommodate minorityreligions, as well. All in all, multiculturalism strives for arethinking of secularism (McLennan, 2010), a renegotiation of theterm (Modood, 2013b:183-4), for it to become less restrictive forminorities that feel marginalized because of their religiousidentity.

The defining characteristics of Western Europe’smulticultural reality Western Europe started to receive exceptionally large numbers ofnon-white immigrants after the 1973 oil crisis, in order torebuild its devastated economy (Modood, 2013b:3-4). As itscapitalist economy constantly demands a cheap labor force, peoplecontinue immigrating to Western Europe for the prospect of abetter and safer life. Under these circumstances, Western Europehas reached the diversity previously characteristic oftraditional immigrant receptacles such as the USA (Iibid:4;Modood, 2012a:134). There is, however, a fundamental differencein this comparison; the large amounts of Muslim immigrantsresiding in Western Europe (ibid; Casanova, 2004:6; Modood,

2

2012b:2-3, 2012a:134). Specifically, Muslims form the majority ofnon-white Western European immigrants, with a rough estimateputting them at approximately 6% of the relevant total (PewResearch, 2011). Although Muslims appear to be evenlydistributed, their presence in the larger cities is far morenoticeable and rapidly growing (Lutz, Skirbekk & Testa, 2007).Regardless of this strong Muslim presence, non-white immigrantminorities in Western Europe, especially those coming from SouthAsia, seek to identify themselves, while also being recognized bythe state and their fellow-citizens, on the basis of theirreligious identity (Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims) (Modood, 2014: 122).This strong religious assertiveness, despite having goneunnoticed for a long time as a matter of importance concerninggroup recognition (Bader, 2008:17; Modood, 2012a:135), has becomethe main topic of discussion in Western European multiculturalpolitics over the last few decades (Jansen, 2013:16). The matterof controversy is the position of religious or ethno-religiousimmigrant identities in the public sphere of Western Europeanstates.

Multiculturalism, multicultural citizenship andreligious identitiesMulticulturalism is a political ideology which, during the lastfew decades in Western Europe, focuses primarily on the need forrecognition of immigrant minorities (Taylor, 1994; Modood, 2013b;Parekh, 2006). According to Modood (2013b:36) multiculturalism‘refers to the struggle, the political mobilization but also thepolicy and institutional outcomes, to the forms of accommodationin which ‘differences’ are not eliminated, are not washed awaybut to some extent recognized’. Moreover, as he proceeds tomention, multiculturalism ‘is a politics which recognizes post-immigration groups exist in western societies in ways that boththey and the other, formally and informally, negatively andpositively are aware that these group-differentiating dimensionsare central to their social constitution’ (ibid). In summation,multiculturalism avoids group-blind approaches (ibid:46) and

3

‘promotes politics of recognition as a means to securemulticultural equalities between groups’ (Lægaard, 2012: 198).

Members of ethnic minorities with a strong religious character(such as Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus) experience marginalization onthe grounds of their religion (Modood, 2013b:43; Casanova,2004:7; Lægaard, 2012:200). For the members of these minoritygroups, however, religion is a basic element of their self-identity that they are not willing to surrender so as to becomeaccepted. Jacobson (1998:48, 129), O’Beirne (2004:19), Fish(2010) and Gillat-Ray (1998:352) are just a few examples thatillustrate precisely how religion is an aspect that permeates allaspects of Muslim’s life, representing an integral part of theirself as well as a tradition offering a sense of belonging(Bradney, 2009:24). Thus, these groups react with a strongreligious assertion in the public sphere (Yilmaz, 2005:50),demanding the same recognition and respect previously given toother minority groups, originally marginalized in terms of their‘different’ identity (racial, ethnic, sexual) (Modood, 2012a:135).

‘Multicultural citizenship is the project to make citizenship-inclusion or integration possible on terms that respect all andin particular those […] whose subjectivities are marginalized ordismissed […]’ (Modood, 2014a:122-3). Bearing this position inmind, multicultural politics acknowledge ‘the importance ofreligious identities to some non-white ethnic minorities…and…their centrality to some forms of ethnic minority self-assertions, mobilizations and political claims-making’(ibid:122). Thus, from a multiculturalist perspective, in orderfor these ethnic minorities to be equally accommodated, the statemust respect and recognize their religious identities.

Under such circumstances, it becomes clear that state-religionrelations can be seen as a matter of recognition. As religiousidentities (Sikh, Hindu and most notably Muslim) have become oneof the most salient minority status markers, Western Europeanstates, driven by a ‘multicultural sensibility’ (Kivisto & Faist

4

2007: 34-40), realize that state-religion connections must berethought according to the needs presented by the new multi-faithreality. This process of negotiation for the place of religiousminority identities in public is perceived by many as a violationof the secular norms of religious neutrality and church-stateseparation, which are deeply rooted in Western European states.However, to what extent this contention is true is a matter ofgreat controversy.

Secularism in Western Europe Modood (2014b:2) defines political secularism as a condition inwhich ‘political authority does not rest on religious authorityand the latter does not dominate political authority’ (see alsoModood, 2012a:131).

Secularism is a principle deeply embedded in all Western Europeanstates (Casanova, 2004:7) since the signing of the treaty ofWestphalia. In national narratives, secularism has beenreferenced as the modern developmental process that brought aboutthe emergence of sovereign states (Guzzo Falci, 2013:8). It hasbeen defined as the principle that disentangled individuals andstates from their religious beliefs to halt the potentialresurgence of the violent wars of the past (ibid). Thus, the needfor a separate existence of secular and religious spheres hascome to be perceived as the alleged sine qua non for everysociety that wants to be perceived as modern (Casanova,2009:1051).

‘The separation of Church and State, the neutrality of the statein regard to religion, religious freedom and understandings ofsecularisation in terms of the privatisation and decline ofreligion, are all at the heart of discourses about secularism’(Jansen, 2013:40). The practical implementation of secularismdiffers across state borders (Levey, 2009:14). Thus, in broaderterms, Western European secularism can be divided in twodifferent categories; the radical model and the moderate one.

a.Laicité

5

Laicité is the radical model of secularism adopted solely byFrance. In this kind of secularism, religion is essentiallybanished from the public sphere. Religion is perceived as ananachronistic element, which must be completely marginalized inthe name of reason and liberal individual freedom (Modood,2012a:137). Religion is strictly differentiated from the publicdomain, only maintaining a place in individuals’ private life(Guzzo Falci, 2013:10). Accordingly, the state takes a neutralstance on any kind of religion in the name of the liberal valueof equal treatment for all individuals (ibid). Under thesecircumstances, the state supports a model of assimilationist,civic integration. ‘Integration here is understood as anallegiance to a common civic identity and the joint pursuit ofthe common good’ (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008:139). In other words,in order for someone to be fully integrated into French society,the civic element of his/her identity should trump all others inthe public sphere. As Bouchard & Taylor (ibid) aptly put it, sucha position ‘demands the removal or neutralization of the identitymarkers (including religion […]) that differentiate citizens’ and‘[…] assumes that the removal of the difference is a prerequisiteto integration’.

However, this rigid a context is destabilized when the need tointegrate people not previously nurtured with these hardboundaries between private and public religion arises (GuzzoFalci, 2013:15). Such is the case with immigrant minoritiesclaiming a strong religious identity (Jansen, 2013:40).

The French state reacted to this multiculturalist challenge witha top-down approach, which sought to restrict the publicexpression of minority religious identities (Modood, 2013a). Thestate (see the words of former Prime Minister Jean-PierreRaffarin in Sciolino, 2004) as well as the majority of the publicopinion (Bowen, 2007; Scott, 2007) perceived the wearing ofreligious symbols in public as a political project violating thesecular principle concerning the privatization of religion andthe neutrality of the public sphere. Consequently, the wearing ofconspicuous religious symbols – clearly aimed at Muslims’

6

headscarves and Sikhs’ turbans – was banned by law in February2004 (Modood, 2013a). The banning of the full-face veil (niqab)from public spaces followed in April 2011 (ibid).

Both of these legislation initiatives show an inclination tobracket ‘difference’ through the implementation of thehistorically contingent principles of secularism in a sort of‘fetishization of the favored institutional arrangements’(Taylor, 2009:1156). Such movements show the unwillingness of thestate to recognize that religion can be a representative elementof groups or entire cultures (Jansen 2013:43). In other words,the state replies to religious assertiveness with a ‘religious-focused version of different-blindness’ (ibid, following Modood &Meer, 2008; Bader, 2007). The denial of public religiousaccommodation conceals the cultural privileges of Christiantraditions that are deeply entrenched in the notion ofsecularism, thus sustaining the inferiority and alienation ofnon-Christian traditions (ibid). This is to say that a concept of‘neutrality’ is impossible, as the state always reflects specificcultural characteristics (Modood, 2014b:7-8), which in the caseof France are rooted in Christianity.

The strong insistence of French politics on the preservation ofsecularism, as presented through the application of theaforementioned measures, reifies the secular-religious dichotomyas an unsurmountable opposition, diminishing any potential for afruitful mixture between the two sides (following Modood,2013b:120). Based on a secularist argumentation, the statepresents itself as acting ‘in the service of an ‘us’ wanting toassimilate (or exclude) an as yet illiberal (or premodern)‘them’’ (Jansen, 2013:236 following Parekh’s (1994) argumentabout Mill (1863); Chakrabarty 2000; Mezzadra 2006). ‘Suchtotalized dualistic perspectives are not conducive to fosteringdialogue, to respect for difference, to seeking common ground andnegotiated accommodation[…]and above all to multiculturalcitizenship’ (Modood, 2014a:124). If religious identities areexcluded in a way that no other identity (be it racial, ethnic,

7

sexual or whatever else) is, then there is obviously a profoundbias against religious identity which clashes with themulticultural principle of equality between identity groups(Modood, 2014b:7). If one were to use this radical form ofsecularism as a model, then multiculturalism clearly makes it ‘atrisk’.

However, there is another perspective in the French laicité whichis worth mentioning, to illustrate that ethnic minorities’ claimsfor religious accommodation are not all that contradictory to theexisting practices of the Republican state. Rather, they arebased on pre-existing state-religious relationships. Morespecifically, since the establishment of the law of 1905, thestate is committed to contribute financially to the preservationof church buildings, as it acknowledges that they are part ofFrench cultural heritage (Bauberot, 2012). Moreover, since theestablishment of ‘Debré Law’ in 1959, the state, to a greatextent, sponsors Catholic Church Schools (ibid). Clearly, thesecular French state both acknowledges and respects, by law, thatreligion is a part of one’s tradition and culture that needs tobe preserved and moreover that it can contribute to education.

Bearing the aforementioned facts in mind, it seems that even inthe radical laicité model, some manner of state-religionconnections are already active. Consequently, ethnic minorities’struggle, based on the multiculturalist principles, for therecognition of their religious identity by the state is not aninitiative that places secularism under ‘crisis’. What isrequested is not the desecularisation or disestablishment of theprivileges of the Christian tradition within a secular context.Rather, the challenge is ‘how to add the new faiths alongside theolder ones’ in a process of ‘equalising upwards’ (Modood,2014b:10).

A relevant initiative has been launched by president Sarkozi withthe establishment of the French Council for the Muslim Faith in2003, whose function is to act as the primary liaison between theFrench government and Muslims (Modood & Kastoryano, 2006:174-5).

8

Despite the fact that the assembly of the council was a state-construct and that it has, to date, failed to become recognizedas representative by the majority of the French Muslimpopulation, such initiatives are necessary for the equalaccommodation of religious minorities. Even if these initiativesmay seem ‘prima facie contrary to laicité’ (Modood, 2013a), thisis not the case for their relationship to moderate secularism.

b.Moderate secularism

‘The key feature of moderate secularism is that it sees organizedreligion as not just a private benefit but as a potential publicgood or national resource, […]which the state can in somecircumstances assist to realise’ (Modood, 2014b:2). Under thesecircumstances state and church remain autonomous but may stillcollaborate in several domains. Modood (2014b:4) aptly explainswhat can be perceived as such a state-religion connection; it isa ‘kind of relationship with the state such that a religiousorganisation participates in the functions of the state or is apartner in governance, helping the state to discharge some of itsduties and implementation of policies or it is continuouslysupported by public funds or it is part of the symbolism of thestate in a clearly non-neutralist way’. Through the presentationof a series of empirical examples of states that adopt religion-state connections, an attempt will be made to show thatmulticultural recognition politics for immigrants’ religiousidentities do not clash with this manner of arrangements. On thecontrary, the latter may be a platform for multiculturalintegration.

Initially presented to support this argument follows the Germanexample. In Germany, the most important source of funding forreligious communities comes from tax receipts (Korioth & Ausberg,2010: 327). This state financial aid to ‘religious societiesbeing organized as corporations under public law’ is alsoprotected by the law (ibid). Moreover, numerous publicsponsorships are granted to religious communities (ibid). In

9

addition, it must be mentioned that around half of Germany’swelfare provisions are channeled to the public through Church-based organisations (Modood, 2014b:3), within a climate of acivic society, in which church and state can work together forthe accomplishment of common goals (following Bretherton, 2011).The Muslim presence in Germany is considerable and enduring,especially bearing in mind the large Turkish minority. Accordingto Korioth & Ausberg (2010: 320), Muslims make up approximately4% of the German population. Of course, Germany is renowned forits anti-multiculturalist sentiments and the ‘Gastarbeiter’approach in its immigration policy (Rath, 2011). However, aclimate of ‘multiculturalist sensibility’ (Kivisto & Faist 2007:34-40) is present and reflected in ‘corporatist’ forms of Muslimaccommodation (Modood, 2013a). More specifically, chancellorMerkel and her government launched the first German IslamConference in 2006 (Modood, 2013a; Aslan, 2011).This initiativehad aimed ‘to restore mutual trust within the society and itsMuslim communities’ (Aslan, 2011:1) so as ‘to enhance thereligious and social integration of the Muslim population inGermany’ (ibid:5). Since then, the conference has been heldannually in the form of a dialogue between ‘the state andselected representatives of Muslims in Germany’ (ibid). Althoughtop-down, such an attempt can be viewed neither as radicallysecularist nor as assimilationist. Rather, it meets themulticulturalist prerequisites of willingness for mutualnegotiation in order to find effective solutions for theaccommodation of religious difference. The German state remainssecular but understands that Muslims face discrimination on thebasis of their religion and that the state needs to take actionso as to protect this group. This solution is not sought outsideof the secular principles. Rather, the state tries to renegotiatethese principles so that Muslim integration can be achievedwithin them.

England is another relevant paradigm, thoroughly described byModood (2014b:4). Religion and the state are first connected‘symbolically’, as the monarch has also the ultimate authority of

10

the Church of England and can only undertake duties after beingblessed by bishops. Accordingly, 26 bishops are members of theHouse of Lords, the supreme legislative body of the state, havingequal rights with the rest of the members. Apart from that, theChurch of England has a substantial educational contribution, inwhich it is almost exclusively supported by state subsidies.

Of import to the argument at hand is the expansion of stateconnections to incorporate its Muslim immigrant population, aswell. During the New Labor governance, the state recognized theMuslim Council of Britain (MCB) as the representative voice ofBritish Muslim population (1997). Throughout its period ofgovernance, New Labor in collaboration with the MCB initiated aseries of measures that enabled and promoted the smoothintegration of Muslims in the national context. They jointlyfostered public acknowledgment of the importance of theirreligious identity, the introduction of state funded Muslimschools (following their Jewish and Christian counterparts) andconcentrated policies on tackling religious discrimination, whichreached their peak with the establishment of the law againstreligious discrimination (2003). All of these attempts werebacked by the Church in a climate of ‘interfaith respect’(Modood, 2013a) and ‘multi-faith harmony’ (Bretherton, 2011).

Relevant examples of states that have extended their churchconnections to accommodate religious diversity can also be foundin Belgium’s multi-faith Council of Religions (Modood&Kastoryano, 2006) and in Denmark’s model of ‘multipleestablishment’, were Muslim religious communities enjoy aformally recognized and approved status as well as state taxbenefits (Lægaard, 2012:203-4).

None of the aforementioned examples drift from the minimalisticdefinition of secularism presented previously, meaning that amutual autonomy between state and religion is still ensured(Lægaard, 2012: 200). It should by now have become apparent,through the presentation of these empirical examples, that thetype of state-religion connections developed within the framework

11

of moderate secularism makes a clear case that religiousminorities can be recognized and accommodated without braking thebasic secular rule. In other words, multiculturalism andreligious diversity do not necessarily equate eradication ofestablished churches or a ‘crisis’ of secularism (Modood,2010:7).

ConclusionThis essay aimed to evaluate the contention that the ‘crisis ofsecularism’ in Western Europe is the result of multiculturalism.To this end, several points, facts and empirical examples werepresented. The presence of immigrants in Western Europe hasundeniably brought with it both multiculturalism and religiousdiversity. Moreover, some immigrants brought, and continue tobring, with them religious beliefs totally alien to WesternEuropeans, which can lead to their being discriminated against onthe basis of their religion. Muslims are the most notable exampleof the aforementioned observance, since they form the majority ofnon-Christian immigrants residing in Western European states,with Sikhs and Hindus also sharing similar experiences. It istherefore clear that the minority statuses of the aforementionedimmigrant groups are due to their religious identities.

Multicultural politics support equality for all citizens not onthe basis of providing equal rights to all but rather on that ofrecognition of the existence of group identities. Accordingly,multiculturalism acknowledges the fact that for immigrant groupswith a strong-religious character to be recognized, the stateneeds to recognize religious difference and seek to tackle theproblem of religious discrimination. Some people, and morespecifically adherents of crude secularism, believe that thisbrings the whole notion of ‘secularism’ under crisis. However, asModood aptly puts it, multiculturalism’s focus on recognition ofimmigrant groups’ religious identities ‘is based on recognitionand inclusivity, not the truth of doctrines’ (Modood, 2014b:6)and ‘is not opposed to secular or non-religious identities but isadditional to them and is not meant to suggest any inherent

12

superiority or desirability of religious over non-religiousidentities – or vice versa’ (Modood, 2014a:122).

Multiculturalism interacts with two different kinds of secularismin Western Europe. On the one hand, there is the French laicité,which reacts to the multi-faith challenge with religious-blindpolicies that sustain the inequalities faced by immigrantreligious minority groups. On the grounds of an alleged principleof state neutrality as well as the liberal principle ofindividual freedom, the French state seeks to banish the presenceof minority religions form the public sphere. As it becomesclear, if this is the prototypical model of secularism taken intoconsideration, multiculturalism definitively puts it under greatstrain. However, the challenge is not one of forcing France tolose its Catholic character or abandon the idea of secularism onthe whole. What is requested, is some form of state-religionconnection within the secular framework, which would provide somesort of recognition to the Muslim immigrant community.

Such state-religion connections have been a part of theprevalent, moderate, form of secularism implemented in most ofthe Western European states for some time now. In moderatesecularism, religion is not only understood as a private matterbut also as a potential public good, which the state seeks toassist. Germany, England, Denmark and Belgium are just some ofthe states that have positively and effectively responded to thechallenge of multicultural religious diversity by extending theirstate-religion connections so as to accommodate immigrantreligious minorities.

In summation, multiculturalism may bring religion to theforefront anew but it does not do so in ways necessarily totallyalien to secularism. As it has been shown, several kinds of long-lasting state-religion connections have been developed,especially in moderate forms of secularism, even before theexpression of immigrant demand for some sort of publicrecognition of their religious identities. Seen in this light,multiculturalism cannot be seen as seeking a “crisis of

13

secularism”, but rather as calling for nothing more than anextension of tenets already present in secularism, so that newfaiths can be brought into any given secular state modelalongside their older, preexisting counterparts.

14

BibliographyAslan, A. (2011, February 28). New Approaches to MuslimEngagement: A View from Germany. Policy Brief. Retrieved from:http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Aslan_MuslimIntegration_Feb11.pdf, 14/5/2014.

Bader, V. (2007). Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance ofReligious Diversity. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Bader, V. (2008). Introduction to Secularism or Democracy? –Associational Governance of Religious Diversity. Krisis Journal forContemporary Philosophy, 1, 16-24.

Bauberot, J. (2012). The Evolution of Secularism in France:Between Two Civil Religions. In Linnel, E., Cady, L.E. & Shukman,E. (Eds.). Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age. Basingstoke and NewYork: Palgrave.

Berger, P. L. (1996). Secularism in Retreat. The National Interest, 46,3-12. Retrieved from:http://nationalinterest.org/article/secularism-in-retreat-336,5/5/2014.

Berman, B.J., Bhargava, R. & Laliberté, A. (2013). Introduction –Globalization, Secular States and Religious Diversity. In Berman,B.J., Bhargava, R. & Laliberté, A. (Eds.). Secular States and ReligiousDiversity. Retrieved from:http://www.ubcpress.ca/books/pdf/chapters/2013/SecularStatesAndReligiousDiversity.pdf, 8/5/2014.

Bizeul, Y. (2013). Secularism in Europe. Retrieved from:file:///C:/Users/Peny/Downloads/E_ELF_Saekularismus%20(1).pdf,14/2/2014.

Bouchard, G. & Taylor, C. (2008). Building the Future: a time forReconciliation. Retrieved from: http://www.accommodements-quebec.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf,10/5/2014.

15

Bowen, J.R. (2007). Why the French don’t like Headscarves: Islam,the State and Public Space. European Review, 15 (3), 397-400.

Bradney, A. (2009). Law and Faith in a Sceptical Age. Oxon and New York:Routledge-Cavendish.

Bramadat, P. (2009). Religious Diversity and InternationalMigration: National and Global Dimensions. In Bramadat, P. &Koenig, M. (Eds.). International Migration and the Governance of ReligiousDiversity. Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's UniversityPress.

Bretherton, L. (2011). A Postsecular Politics? Inter-faithRelations as a Civic Practice. Journal of the American Academy of Religion,79 (2), 346-377.

Casanova, J. (2004, July 29). Religion, European secularidentities, and European integration. Eurozine. Retrieved from:http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html,4/5/2014.

Casanova, J. (2006). Rethinking Secularization: A GlobalComparative Perspective. Hedgehog Review, 8 (1/2), 7–22. Retrievedfrom:http://iascculture.org/THR/archives/AfterSecularization/8.12CCasanova.pdf, 4/5/2014.

Casanova, J. (2009). The Secular and Secularisms. Social Research: AnInternational Quarterly, 76 (4), 1049-1066.

Castles, S. & Miller, M.J. (2009). The Age of Migration. InternationalPopulation Movements in the Modern World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought andHistorical Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Davie, G. (2005). Europe: the Exception that proves the Rule?. InBerger, P.L. (Eds.). The Desecularization of the World – Resurgent Religion andWorld Politics. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans PublishingCompany.

16

Davie, G. (2006). Religion in Europe in the 21st Century: TheFactors to Take into Account. European Journal of Sociology, 47 (2),271-296.

Fish, S. (2010, October 25). Serving Two Masters: Shariah Law andthe Secular State. The New York Times. Retrieved from:http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/serving-two-masters-shariah-law-and-the-secular-state/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, 5/5/2014.

Geddes, A. (2003). The politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe.London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.

Gillat-Ray, S. (1998). Multiculturalism and Identity: Theirrelationship for British Muslims. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18(2), 347-355.

Greeley, A. (2003). Religion in Modern Europe at the End of the SecondMillennium. London: Transaction.

Guzzo-Falci, P. (2013). (Il)liberal Secularism: A CriticalApproach to the Governance of Immigrant Religions in WesternEurope. PhD Dissertation Proposal. Trento, Italy: University of Trento.

Jacobson, J. (1998). Islam in Transition: Religion and Identity among BritishPakistani Youth. London: Routledge.

Jakelić, S. (2010). Secularism: A Bibliographic Essay. TheHedgehog Review. Retrieved from:http://www.iasc-culture.org/publications_article_2010_Fall_Jakelic.php, 11/10/2011.

Jansen, Y. (2013). Secularism, Assimilation and the Crisis of Multiculturalism.Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Kivisto, P. & Faist, T. (2007). Citizenship: Discourse, Theory andTransnational Prospects. Malden: Blackwell.

Korioth, S. & Ausberg, I. (2010). Religion and the Secular Statein Germany. In Martínez-Torrón, J. & Durham Jr, W.C. (Eds.).Religion and the Secular State – Interim Reports. Utah: The International

17

Center for Law and Religion Studies. Retrieved from:http://www.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Germany.pdf, 14/5/2014.

Lægaard, S. (2012). Unequal recognition, misrecognition andinjustice: The case of religious minorities in Denmark. Ethnicities,12 (2), 197-214.

Levey, G. B. (2009). Secularism and religion in a multiculturalage. In Levey, G.B. & Modood, T. (Eds). Secularism, Religion andMulticultural Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lutz, W., Skirkbekk, V. & Testa, M. (2007). The Low-fertilityTrap Hypothesis: Forces that may lead to further Postponement andfewer British in Europe. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2006.Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography.

McLennan, G. (2010). The Postsecular Turn. Theory, Culture & Society, 27(4), 3-20.

Mezzadra, S. (2006). Citizen and subject: A postcolonialconstitution for the European Union?, Situations, 1 (2), 31-42.

Mill, J. S. (1912) [1863]. Utilitarianism, Liberty and RepresentativeGovernment. London: Dent.

Modood, T. & Kastoryano, R. (2006). Secularism and theAccommodation of Muslims in Europe. In Modood, T.,Triantafyllidou, A. & Zapata-Barrero, R. (Eds.). Multiculturalism,Muslims, and Citizenship: A European Approach. London: Routledge.

Modood, T. & Meer, N. (2008). The multicultural state we’re in:Muslims, “multiculture” and the civic re-balancing of Britishmulticulturalism. Political Studies, 57 (3), 473-497.

Modood, T. (2010). Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity andRespect for Religion. The Political Quarterly, 81 (1), 4–14.

Modood, T. (2012a). Is there a Crisis of Secularism in WesternEurope?. Sociology of Religion, 73 (2), 130-149.

Modood, T. (2012b, July). The Voice of Faith and the Challenge of DemocraticMulticulturalism. Lecture given at the Wheeler Center, Melbourne,

18

Australia. Retrieved from:http://download.wheelercentre.com/programs/faithandculture/2012_FaithAndCulture_Modood.pdf, 3/5/2014.

Modood, T. (2013a, May 9). Multiculturalism and Muslims inBritain and France. Public Spirit. Retrieved from:http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/about-public-spirit/, 29/3/2014.

Modood, T. (2013b). Multiculturalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Modood, T. (2014a). Part one Accommodating religions:Multiculturalism’s new fault line. Critical Social Policy, 34 (1), 121-127.

Modood, T. (2014b). State-Religion Connexions and Multicultural Citizenship.Retrieved from: https://www.academia.edu/5735585/State-Religion_Connexions_and_Multicultural_Citizenship, 24/4/2014.

Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and Secular – Religion andPolitics worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O’Beirne, M. (2004). Religion in England and Wales: Findings from the 2001Home Office Citizenship Survey. London: Home Office Research &Development and Statistics Directorate. Retrieved from:http://re-handbook.org.uk/media/display/hors274.pdf, 11/5/2014.

Parekh, B. (1994). Decolonizing liberalism. In Shtromas, A.(Eds.). The End of ‘Isms’?. London: Blackwell.

Parekh, B. (2006). Rethinking Multiculturalism. 2nd edition.Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pew Research (2011, January 27). The Future of the Global MuslimPopulation – Region: Europe. Retrieved from:http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe/, 12/5/2014.

Rath, J. (2011, January 6). Debating Multiculturalism. HarvardInternational Review. Retrieved from: http://hir.harvard.edu/debating-multiculturalism, 15/5/2014.

19

Roy, O. (2007). Secularism Confronts Islam. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Scherer, M. (2010, November 10). Landmarks in the Critical Studyof Secularism. The Immanent Frame. Retrieved from:http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/11/12/landmarks-secularism/,12/5/2014.

Sciolino, E. (2004, February 4). Debate Begins In France OnReligion In the Schools. The New York Times. Retrieved from:http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/04/world/debate-begins-in-france-on-religion-in-the-schools.html, 13/5/2014.

Scott, J.W. (2007). The Politics of the Veil. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.

Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In Gutmann, A.(Eds.). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Taylor, C. (2009). The Polysemy of the Secular. Social Research: AnInternational Quarterly, 76 (4), 1143-1166.

Yilmaz, I. (2005). Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States:Dynamic Legal Pluralisms in England, Turkey and Pakistan. Aldershot: Ashgate.

20