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Transcript of Irish Neutrality during World War II – an Unusual Interpretation of a Unilateral International...
IRISH NEUTRALITY DURING WORLD WAR II
Irish Neutrality during World War II
– an Unusual Interpretation of a
Unilateral International Security
Model
Aleksander Dańda
Tischner European University
Krakow
Aleksander Dańda received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Jagiellonian University (the
Faculty of International and Political Studies). During his doctoral studies Mr. Dańda was a
visiting scholar at the University of London (Institute of Commonwealth Studies and Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies). Presently, Dr. Dańda is a member of the faculty at the Tischner
European University in Krakow – lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies. He
is also a project consultant for Peace and Development Studies at the TEU. Since September
2009 Dr. Dańda has been Dean of the Department of Applied Social Sciences at the Tischner
European University. He has authored many publications including a monograph entitled
Dominion – A Form of Political Regime in Anglo-Saxon Countries (TEU Press). He was
Editor of Current Challenges to Peacekeeping Efforts and Development Assistance (TEU
Press). His main research areas include: history of colonialism, political systems of Anglo-
Saxon countries, geopolitics, problems of contemporary international security and conflict
resolution.
2
Abstract
Neutrality is often linked in the field of international relations with negative connotations.
States that engage in the war effort tend to perceive other international actors with a certain
amount of distrust, especially those actors that do not decide to engage in a similar way, but
that actually seem to profit from the war that does not concern them directly. In the history of
World War II there were also cases of neutrality which were assessed negatively. Out of the
group of countries which do not take pride in the fact that they remained neutral during World
War II, there comes a very distinctive actor of international relations – the Irish Free State.
This particular country, although it declared neutrality already in the very first days of the
conflict, does not feel ashamed of the decision taken by the then leaders of Irish society –
Éamon de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party.
In order to understand why the Republic of Ireland still maintains its policy of neutrality,
even in the wider framework of EU cooperation, it is essential to understand how did the Irish
came to accept this position in the first place. This paper provides the answers to the question
why are the Irish so proud of their wartime neutrality? It begins with definitional problems
connected with the notion of “neutrality” – the term which is quite different in meaning for
each century of modern era that it was used in. Then the paper moves on to the examination of
consecutive events from Irish interwar and wartime history. This historical analysis provides
the material which can be used to describe the peculiarities of Irish neutrality. The main
argument in this article is that Irish wartime neutrality wasn’t – as it is often being presented
in the language of Anglo-Saxon politics – an act aimed against the United Kingdom. The
author attempts to prove that only in the reality of this policy of neutrality, neutrality quite
unusually interpreted by the Irish elites (and even more unusually enacted), was it possible to
act with respect to the Irish raison d’etat.
Keywords:
neutrality, Ireland, World War II, Irish Free State, Éamon de Valera, Great Britain, USA, The
Emergency, Éire
3
The etymological meaning of the notion of “neutrality” (from Latin “neuter” meaning
“none of the two”, “indifferent”) points at the possibility of interpreting this term negatively
in the categories of moral evaluation. Indeed, negative connotations have been and still are
being linked with this notion. Indeed, it is true that states engaging all their political,
economic and social systems in the realization of warfare military effort, perceive other actors
of international relations, those that did not decide to engage similarly, with a substantial
amount of suspicion. Even more suspicion and antipathy is being felt towards those states,
which seem to gain substantial political and economic benefits from the war, which does not
concern them in a direct way. It is that very mechanism of negative evaluation of neutrality
that was revealed in the situation of some NATO member states (Poland included) declaring
lack of interest in contemporary Libyan crisis. In turn, the very same antipathy could have
been felt in Poland towards the states which did not support war effort in Iraq in 2003,
however, it did not disturb them in any way to gain profits from the process of the
reconstruction of Iraq (those states being France and Germany). Similar suspicion and relative
antipathy was felt towards the stance of neutrality taken and declared by some states in the
times of World War II.
The states that declared neutrality during the last great armed conflict of global scale
(1939-1945), usually do not express pride of this fact in their respective historiographies. It is
rather futile to search for scientific or journalistic works which would positively assess neutral
stance of Sweden or Switzerland in this respect. Those countries benefited from this course of
their foreign policy as their territories were not damaged directly by the war. It is even more
futile then to search for a positive assessment of neutrality being declared by countries like
Holland or Belgium – countries whose declarations of neutrality were simply not taken into
consideration by their adversary. Historians from those countries do not talk about the
decision of their respective political elites (to accept neutral stance) in superlatives. From this
general landscape of European states, which do not take pride in the fact that they proclaimed
neutrality, one actor of international relations – the Irish Free State – stands apart. This state,
although it declared neutrality already in the very first days of the conflict, does not feel
ashamed of such a decision taken by its leaders – Éamon de Valera and his political party
Fianna Fáil. What’s more, in Irish historical writings one can find, in the whole post-war
period to the present day, clear examples of unequivocal positive assessment which is given
for the neutrality policy by Irish historians, journalists and analysts of various generations and
of various political background (Smyllie, 1946; Duggan, 1975; Dwyer, 2010). Such an
unequivocal positive assessment of Irish neutrality in the years of World War II by the Irish
themselves remains in dire contrast with an equally clearly expressed negative assessment of
the same stance, which is being presented by British – or more widely – Anglo-Saxon
historiography. One of the explanations for that fact may be that in the end, although there
were some inclinations in the Union of South Africa towards neutrality (Gwynn, 1940, 306;
Mazurczak, 1999, 141), all the parts of the British Empire, all the dominions joined the fight
on the side of the United Kingdom. All except Ireland.
Why are the Irish so proud of their neutrality as opposed to the other neutral countries in
the times of World War II? One of the possible answers to this question is the fact that
because of applying neutrality model in its international relations Ireland managed not only to
survive the war without any serious damage done to its independence and economy. Irish state
also managed – by accepting neutrality policy – to gain substantial profits for its independent
political existence. The outcome of this in the post-war period was the transformation of the
Irish Free State (formally still linked by imperial ties with Great Britain) into the Republic of
Ireland – a state totally independent from the United Kingdom, with an elected president
(Uachtarán) as the head of state.
4
It is important to remember that on 11th December 1936 – by taking advantage of the
political crisis in Great Britain connected with the abdication of king Edward VIII – two
amendments for the text of the Constitution of Irish Free State were accepted. The first
amendment removed all the regulations connected with the Monarch and Governor-General
from the constitution. All the former prerogatives of the head of state were transferred either
to the chairman of the lower house of parliament – Dáil Éireann – or to the government. The
second amendment was concerned with regulations of executive power in foreign relations. It
is this amendment that retained some formal links between the Irish Free State and the British
Empire – due to the fact that Ireland was a part of the British Commonwealth of Nations (the
symbol of which was the Monarch), it was still the Monarch who had the power to nominate
diplomatic and consular envoys of Ireland as well as to accept international treaties in the
name of the Irish Free State (after the binding opinion of Irish Executive Council was issued).
More on this can be read in Chubb (1983).
As far as the question of the Irish head of state is concerned, one should also keep in mind
that the office of popularly elected president was introduced in Ireland already in 1937 in the
text of the Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hEireann, Art. 12.2). However, the formal
proclamation of republic took place only after World War II – in November 1948, when the
Irish parliament accepted the Republic of Ireland Act. For more information see Konarski
(2005, 30-31).
So, as opposed to the other states applying neutrality policy during World War II, neither
did Ireland lose economically and materially by such a decision (like Holland and Belgium
did), nor did it earn the name of a state gaining morally dubious profits from the war at the
expense of the war victims (which was the case of Switzerland and – to the lesser extent – of
Sweden). Rather it emerged from the wartime turmoil as a state which, although not taking
part in the actual fighting, was always presenting more or less pro-Allied stance. It is due to
this stance that Ireland was finally able to achieve its basic national goal: complete national
independence. In other words, neutrality policy applied by Ireland in the times of World War
II should not be perceived negatively in the moral assessment of this course of politics.
Furthermore, the acceptance of this model of safeguarding national security in the extremely
unstable international environment made it possible for the Irish to achieve their national
interests, their explicitly formulated, if not always explicitly voiced, raison d’etat.
In order to properly verify the hypothesis stated above, theoretical foundations of the
political neutrality model need to be presented, as this is exactly the model which Ireland
applied in the wartime period and which is still being used by the Republic of Ireland until
today. Then we need to examine the steps which Irish political elites had to take in order to
get to a gradual formulation of neutrality stance through the properly chosen political action
in the interwar period. It is only upon such a prepared research ground that we will be able to
analyze in detail this specific neutrality policy which was enacted by Ireland in the times of
World War II.
Neutrality as a Unilateral Model of International Security
The concept of neutrality is a kind of relic from the earlier times when it was possible to
safeguard national existence and well-being by the implementation of unilateral models of
security. In those times, warfare was not being perceived as a phenomenon encompassing the
whole known world, instead of that it was seen as a separate state of relations between two or
at most a few countries only. In such a reality to remain neutral in a particular war seemed to
be quite an easy task: it needed only to voice, by the means of interstate communication
instruments, that a particular state will not be engaging in the war struggle alongside any of
the parties to the conflict.
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) is being often recognized as the very first conflict on a
5
global scale (taking into consideration that it engaged all the then major political powers and
the fact that most contemporary historians link the European course of the war with the fights
taking place in other continents as well: the so-called Dutch-Portuguese War, 1624-1661, with
the theatre of operations ranging from Africa, South-East Asia to South America). This war,
for the very first time in human history, caused the situation where states not directly involved
in the particular conflict of interest were drawn en masse into the armed conflict nonetheless.
The reality of global-scale conflict – the model of forceful international conflict management
gaining more and more influence since the 17th
c. – it all made the concept of non-
engagement in the armed struggle an outdated and not practical choice of policy. The
maximizing of this stance took place in the times of the First World War and the early
interwar period, when the analysts kept saying that “if civilisation does not stop war by a
common effort, by the use of some form of international police work, where there can be no
such thing as neutrality, war will wipe out civilisation as completely as the city of Knossos”
(Royal Institute of International Affairs [RIIA], 1928, 101-102).
In the Post-Westphalian period the degree of complication of international relations
gradually led to the situation where most of the actors deemed it impossible to safeguard their
own stability and security basing on traditional, unilateral methods. It is in that period that an
era of collective security building measures was begun. Created on the basis of this new
paradigm, multilateral national security models seemed to be the proper response to the needs
of the then international political and military scene. However, through time it turned out that
not every international relations actor accepted such a profound change in the way their own
foreign policy should be managed. Some of the states which have been blessed by nature with
unique, desirable geopolitical attributes (states located far away from the centre of the world
conflicts – meaning Europe), decided to keep in force their traditional attitude towards the
actions which gave them peace and security. Those states decided that the model of not
engaging in the wars which do not affect their national interests in a direct way – the model of
isolationism – is still a valid one. That was the model ruling the actions taken in external
relations by such states as Great Britain (the splendid isolation) and the USA (the Monroe
Doctrine) (Cesarz & Stadtmüller, 1996, 49-50).
The model of neutrality is a slightly different variant of unilateral model of security in
international relations, which also survived Post-Westphalian period and functions until
present day in its various forms. Generally we need to dichotomize this model into the
permanent (legal) neutrality and political (wartime) neutrality, known also as neutralism.
According to contemporary international law interpretations, there are presently two elements
which decide whether a given state can be named as permanently neutral or politically neutral.
The first of those elements defining permanent neutrality is presenting the application of this
neutral stance in external relations in a form of legally binding document. Permanent
neutrality can be outlined either in the internal law document (e.g. an act of parliament,
constitution) or in the text of international treaty. The second element constituting permanent
neutrality are indubitable guarantees voiced by major political powers with respect to the
acceptance of neutrality of a given state (that is how the neutrality of Switzerland began). E
contrario then, a state which did not write down its neutral status in any legally binding
document and/ or a state which did not receive proper international guarantees for its
neutrality, such a state will be acting in its foreign policy according to the model of political
neutrality (neutralism). This concrete model – the relic of an era when the preference for
safeguarding national security was unilateralism – has been accepted as a set of rules guiding
the actions of the Irish Free State which – starting with 1948 – was renamed and reshaped as
the Republic of Ireland.
It needs to be remembered that neutrality is a concept both variable in time and dependent
on a specific international relations actor who elaborates on the subject. What’s more,
6
sometimes even the politicians from the same time and the same state express their views on
neutrality in a completely different way. The best well-known example for such a politically
unstable attitude towards the idea of neutrality are the speeches given by the U.S. President
Dwight D. Eisenhower on June 6th
, 1956 and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on
June 9th
that very same year. Eisenhower, during his press conference, clearly supported the
right of every nation to remain neutral and not to join any military alliances. Dulles on his part
described the concept of neutrality in international relations as “immoral and shortsighted”
(Armstrong, 1956, 57). Such a profound difference in evaluation of one seemingly simple
concept – non-engagement in an armed struggle – is a result of the fact that the very idea of
neutrality is a concept definitely more complex and complicated than it would seem at first
glance. There is no commonly accepted definition of neutrality in the field of international
law. Until today no international treaty was signed that would regulate which aspects of state
activities in international relations are determinants of neutrality and which state activities are
not to be perceived as such. In other words, to define the notion of neutrality and to express a
clear political assessment of this particular stance in international relations is a problematic
task. That is because until presently the concept of neutrality operates mostly based on
customary international law or unilateral declarations defining the obligations and rights of
particular states.
The very first attempt at codifying the notion of neutrality is closely connected with the
first attempts at codifying international law as well. Such a correlation shouldn’t surprise us at
all since it was exactly then that the first global-scale armed conflict took place and what
followed was the trend of denying the state the right to remain neutral. In 1625 Hugo Grotius
in his famous work “De Jure Belli ac Pacis” described (in book III, chapter XVII) neutrality
as “the duty to do nothing towards increasing the strength of a party maintaining an unjust
cause, nor to impede the measures of a power engaged in a just and righteous cause”. In case
of any doubt Grotius advises neutral powers “to show themselves impartial to both sides, and
to give no succour to besieged places, but to allow the troops of each to march through the
country, and to purchase forage, and other supplies”. So, Grotius – the father of public
international law – does not insist at all that states which would like to follow the path of
neutrality should remain absolutely impartial. What’s more, Grotius seems to leave neutral
states a certain degree of free will in deciding whether they perceive a given party to the
conflict as fighting a just war (in this situation he acknowledges the right of neutral power to
give any required assistance to the party to the conflict identified as such – with the obvious
exception of directly engaging in an armed struggle) or if they deem that a given party to the
conflict is fighting an unjust war (today we would call such a state an aggressor) and because
of that it is not worthy of getting any kind of assistance from neutral state. Such formulated
first definition of neutrality in the field of public international law is thus positioned definitely
very far from common knowledge on the rights and duties of neutral states.
Subsequent definitions of neutrality originating in consecutive centuries, such as the
definitions of neutrality by Christian Wolff from 1749 or the one by Emmerich de Vattel from
1758 – already focus on a perfectly well-known aspect of neutrality: the obligation to refrain
from giving any assistance towards any of belligerents (de Vattel clearly stresses that a
neutral state must not assist the parties to the conflict in any way, even if such a state would
like to offer its assistance indiscriminately) (de Vattel, book III, chapter VII, §104). So, we
can see that even the classics of legal and political thought from the 17th
and 18th
centuries
were faced with a considerable amount of difficulty in attempting to clearly define what is to
be understood under the notion of neutrality. Those problems with the term “neutrality” are to
be perceived also in later ages. However, until presently the interpretation of rights and duties
for neutral powers more akin to Wolff and de Vattel than to Grotius appears to be the
dominant one. For example, in 1793 the USA declared, in the words of George Washington,
7
that they will remain neutral in armed struggles between post-revolutionary France and other
European powers. In this proclamation of neutrality one could read that the USA clearly
declared to treat all the belligerents in an impartial way.
The text of this proclamation introduced, however, some essential novelty in the matter of
rights and duties of neutral powers as well. It included a clear warning for the U.S. citizens
not to expect any protection from American government if they happen to get caught in the
act of trading forbidden goods with any of the parties to the conflict (RIIA, 1928, 102-103). It
meant that the proclamation of 1793 introduced a substantial rule which from that time
onwards was very often being reproduced in documents regarding neutrality: neutral power
does not answer for the actions undertaken by its citizens, who can trade with one or both
belligerent parties without any detriment to the status of neutrality of the state they are the
citizens of. In later times this rule was also stretched so as to encompass the participation of
individual citizens of neutral state in the armed struggle, as volunteers, at the side of one of
the belligerent powers.
In 1871, due to Great Britain accepting the verdict of arbitration tribunal in the “Alabama”
Claims Case, the set of obligations describing neutrality status was enriched with the
following detailed rules: the prohibition of constructing and equipping ships in the territory of
neutral states if there is a suspicion that those ships will be used against one of belligerent
powers; the prohibition of providing the territory of neutral state for the purposes of
establishing the base of naval operations by any belligerent and the prohibition of recruiting in
the territory of neutral state for the army of one of belligerents (Parry, 1977, 145).
Such a state of affairs with respect to the notion of neutrality was additionally sanctioned
by the confirmation of most of the aforementioned rights and duties of neutral powers in the
text of the Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War
(Hague XIII) from 1907. It needs to be said that in the times before and during the First World
War interpretations of neutrality akin to the classical, however – let us keep this in mind – not
the original, model of Wolff and de Vattel prevailed. More permissive Grotian approach to
the concept of neutrality was not widely known and discussed then. It is in such a state of
public international law that the Irish Free State came to decide on taking the path of
neutrality in its way of conduct in foreign affairs.
Ireland’s Political Activism in International Relations before World War II
After achieving partial independence – as a result of Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 creating
the Irish Free State (IFS), a political entity of British dominion status (Płachecki, 2010, 59) –
Ireland gradually, and not without some internal opposition, started to implement into its
political instrumentation the rule of non-engagement in international disputes which did not
concern this country in a direct way. This rule, being more and more put forward in Irish
foreign policy starting from the moment of Éamon de Valera’s political party – Fianna Fáil –
taking over in Ireland in 1932, had to remain in the 1930s mostly in the sphere of applied but
generally non-verbalized international activity. That was because of the aversion that the then
political elites of Great Britain were expressing towards any dominion activity which was
incoherent with the movements of London in international relations (with Winston Churchill
as one of the main critics of any concessions to dominions in general and to Ireland in
particular).
If the Irish political thought of that time restrained only to this single element – non-
engagement in European or global conflicts – we could risk saying that Dublin simply wanted
to implement a perfectly well known (from the earlier practices of the British Empire) rule of
isolationism. However, the paradigm taking shape then, which would later rule the actions
taken by the Irish diplomacy, included other elements as well. Those resulted in taking a
different model of safeguarding national and international security by the Irish Free State
8
(called by the Irish themselves as Éire, to distinct the 26 counties comprising the dominion
state from the 6 counties comprising Ulster – Northern Ireland). This model, quite similar to
the traditional British model of isolationism, happened to be the model of political neutrality.
Ireland, trying to learn from the experience of Switzerland, wanted to gain some time to
strengthen its political institutions, to develop political, social and economic functions of a
newborn Irish state. This time was to be bought precisely by applying this particular approach
to international relations that worked so well in the case of Switzerland. However, knowing
well that Ireland has had an unfavorable geopolitical position – in the periphery of Europe and
in the close vicinity of its powerful neighbor treated as a past and a possible future invader –
the authorities of the Irish Free State decided to apply a slightly different approach to the
question of neutrality than the one being practiced by Switzerland. The model of permanent
neutrality exercised by Switzerland simply could not have been achieved by Ireland in the
political reality of interwar period. Political elites in London would surely not give their
consent for such a turn of events. It was not without reason that in the text of the Treaty of
1921 Great Britain reserved the right to exclusive use of three naval bases located in the
territory of the Irish Free State (Lough Swilly, Berehaven and Queenstown) and to the free
and undisturbed use of other Irish bases in the times of war. The Lough Swilly naval base was
controlling sea routes located to the north of Ireland (the route between Scotland and the
USA), Berehaven base (today: Castletownbere) – sea routes to the south of Ireland.
Queenstown (today: Cobh) was an extremely important seaport for the Transatlantic transport
(e.g. that was the place where most of the Irish in the 19th
century started their long journey
while migrating to the USA) (Boyd, 1941, 428-429). Therefore Ireland had to undertake its
own, specific path of political neutrality, neutrality which on one hand could be used as a
defense against engaging in international conflicts but on the other hand could also be a factor
attracting attention of post-war major political powers to the plight of this European
periphery.
It is those powers, perceived by Dublin as potential allies in slowing down conceivable
expansionist drive of the British Empire, that were the proper audience for diplomatic actions
undertaken by the Irish Free State diplomacy in the interwar period. Those actions included
active engagement in the project of creating the organization which would assure global
security – the League of Nations – as well as initiation of numerous bilateral contacts. Such an
activism in international political relations seems to be incoherent with the model of neutrality
gradually being formulated by the Irish in political practice of the 1920s and 1930s. In truth it
was not incoherent at all. Ireland was meant to be visible in international relations in order for
the world not to forget about the Irish state and thus to make it impossible for Great Britain to
somehow reabsorb Éire into its political framework. On the other hand however, Ireland also
wanted to remain impartial in political, economic and military international relations. This
neutrality was meant to give the Irish institutions sufficient time to get internalized into the
collective consciousness of Irish citizens and to prove to them that, even without the
assistance from London, Irishmen can effectively govern themselves. Another important
factor which made the idea of neutrality start growing in the minds of the Irish was the will to
show that Ireland was a political entity separate from Great Britain. P. Keatinge talks in this
context even of the “psychological necessity” of Ireland accepting the position of neutrality as
a path leading to full independence, which was taken away from the Irish in 1921 (1973, 24).
Taking into consideration the fact that Great Britain in the interwar period was extremely
active in international relations, the gradual implementation of the neutrality model into the
Irish way of reacting at various international situations needs to be recognized as a definitely
good solution.
Accentuating Ireland’s independence in international relations begun already in the very
first years of the Irish Free State existence. The Dublin government took all the necessary
9
steps to register the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the treaty constituting the IFS, with the League of
Nations as a normal international treaty. The aim was achieved even though Great Britain
decisively opposed it (Boyce, 1979, 21). The next move of the sort was to send an Irish
diplomatic representative in the rank of minister to the USA: ipso facto Ireland became the
first of British dominions which established a permanent diplomatic mission in the country
outside of the British Commonwealth (Dwyer, 2010, 2). Soon other Irish permanent
diplomatic missions followed: to the League of Nations, to France and to Germany. Irish
envoys played one of the crucial roles in negotiations during Imperial Conferences which
resulted first in unanimous approval of Balfour Declaration (1926) and then in British
parliament and dominion states’ parliaments accepting the Statute of Westminster (1931).
This document formally declared that all the British dominions are autonomous actors in
international relations, equal in status (more on this in Dańda, 2009, 29-31).
In 1932 political scene in Ireland saw the definite return of Éamon de Valera (after a period
of political absence connected with his negative attitude towards the Anglo-Irish Treaty).
After taking the function of Prime Minister (Taoiseach), one of his first decisions which
became known internationally was the abolition of the pledge of allegiance to the British
Crown by the members of Irish political establishment. The pledge was one of those elements
that originally made de Valera oppose the Treaty in 1921 (Dwyer, 2010, 2).
In the same year of 1932 de Valera assumed the rotational (in three-month cycle) position
of the President of the Council of the League of Nations. While acting as the President, de
Valera distinguished himself by a good sense of timing and an equally good sense of taking
advantage of the mood predominant in the societies of the League of Nations’ states at that
time. In his official speeches of that period he accentuated the necessity of strengthening the
organization which had just had to face its first serious failure – in 1931 Japan disregarded the
Covenant for the League of Nations by attacking Manchuria. In 1934 de Valera took Ireland
to international spotlight again by taking a definite position in the League forum appealing to
this organization to intervene in the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay (Chaco War) – it
was the first time that Ireland took a different stance in international relations than the USA.
A logical consequence of such de Valera’s engagement in the League was his appeal of 1935
to all the member states to stop by any means possible (the collective use of force not
excluded) Italian expansionism in relation to Ethiopia.
Therefore it is clear that Ireland in the interwar period was working primarily on its
national interests which concentrated mostly on stressing the independence of the Irish Free
State from the United Kingdom and on accentuating the presence of Ireland in world politics.
Until the clear division between the states creating the post-war system of international
security took place in the late 1930s, Ireland in practice was not forced to make any choice of
the future political-military alliance. Irish politicians in that period were free to voice their
ideas, both in bilateral and multilateral relations, directed only by ethical-moral indicators
(supporting the causes perceived as politically and legally just – e.g. de Valera’s position on
Ethiopia case stressed by Dwyer: 2010, 4). They didn’t have to face any dilemma on which
side of the future conflict Ireland is going to be placed by those decisions. Until the post-war
structure of the balance of powers existed, Ireland simply did not have to explicitly place its
loyalties. This time of easiness came to a close however, due to a series of events, of which
one of the most important ones turned out to be the aforementioned annexation of Ethiopia by
Italy, with the League of Nations idly standing by.
Let us remind that in 1935 de Valera supported the option of definite counteraction to be
taken by international community, the use of force not excluded. However, on July 2nd
, 1936,
in the forum of the League of Nations the Taoiseach abandoned his previous efforts to
strengthen the system of collective security. In his speech that supported the repeal of
sanctions which the League had previously imposed on Italy, de Valera clearly stated that war
10
is inevitable in the perspective of a few years and that the Irish state will remain neutral in this
upcoming armed struggle (de Valera, 1944, 54-59). Therefore, this is the very first moment
that the concept of neutrality, already growing for some time in the minds of Irish politicians,
has been explicitly verbalized.
This neutral stance, so clearly manifested in 1936 by de Valera, was noticeable to some
extent in Irish foreign policy already for some years. For example, when the civil war in Spain
broke out, and Fianna Fáil with de Valera were being condemned for inaction by the Irish
Catholic hierarchy and political opposition supporting the Church in this matter, the
government of the Irish Free State did not bend under internal pressure and – remaining in
line with the rules of already crystallizing doctrine of political neutrality – decided not to
intervene on the side of general Franco (Dwyer, 2010, 5). In this case the decision was surely
facilitated by the similar attitude that de Valera’s favorite international institution – the
League of Nations – assumed in relation to the Spanish conflict.
From the time of de Valera’s League of Nations speech in 1936 Irish state clearly began
applying in its foreign policy the rule of equal distance being held towards the political-
military alliances forming in Europe. The visible result of that was the unequivocal support
given by the IFS to the policy of appeasement being realized in the period directly prior to
World War II.
An attempt to drag Ireland away from the path leading it towards a definite neutrality in the
future armed conflict in Europe was made by the British. In January 1938 negotiations with
Irish government were initiated in London. Prime Minister Chamberlain declared the will to
hand over to Ireland the control of three naval bases and all the powers that Great Britain still
retained in the territory of the IFS according to the Treaty of 1921 – all that for the price of
supporting Great Britain in the upcoming war and for terminating the Irish-British customs
war (the economic conflict which began in 1932 because of the differences in interpretation of
the 1921 Treaty) (Gwynn, 1979, 311-312; Boyce, 1940, 22). Finally, although the agreement
was signed in April 1938 in which Chamberlain turned over the control of the three Treaty
naval bases to Ireland (an act of goodwill on the part of Great Britain as it was publicly
pronounced) and which ended the customs war, there was no consent given by Dublin on the
issue of Ireland abandoning its neutrality policy – because of the impossibility of reaching a
consensus with the United Kingdom on Northern Ireland status (Raymond, 1984, 34; Dwyer,
2010, 5-7). Quoting de Valera: “so long as the British kept a foothold on Irish soil (…) Ireland
would not be free, and therefore could not be expected to take an active part in a war on
Britain’s side” (Smyllie, 1946, 318). It was thus yet another case in British-Irish relations that
a well-known sentence of Irish MP Sir Horace Plunkett turned out to be true: “Irish history is
for Englishmen to remember and Irishmen to forget” (Boyd, 1941, 432). This time however,
the sentence uniquely turned out to be true against the interest of Great Britain. Since the
Chamberlain government did not show any inclination to solve the problem of the division of
the island in a way which was interesting for de Valera, Irish decision-making circles were
ultimately reassured in their neutral stance taking shape already for some years. Support to
British cause in the upcoming conflict would surely not bring any benefits to the national
interests of Irish state and thus it would weaken Ireland economically, politically and socially.
So Irish politicians, by engaging their country in the war, could only bring harm to Ireland’s
national interests.
Neutrality of Ireland during World War II
Considering the aforementioned traditional (but not original, Grotian) way of
understanding neutrality, it needs to be said that Ireland was not a model example of neutral
power during World War II. The statement above holds true both for the formal legal sphere
as well as for the field of political practice.
11
The Formal Legal Aspects of Irish Neutrality
Formally Ireland began applying its wartime, political neutrality on September 2nd
, 1939,
when Dáil Eireann (the lower house of Irish parliament) voted in favor of resolution
introducing the state of emergency in the territory of Éire (for more details see The Record of
Parliamentary Debate Prior to the Vote on Imposing the Emergency Measures). It is good to
remember that in Irish historiography the time of World War II is being referred to just like
that – as “The Emergency”. So, contrary to the classical requirements for voicing the will of
applying political neutrality measures, it was not a clearly formulated declaration of non-
engagement in the armed struggle that was to become the basis of Dublin neutrality policy in
the wartime years. Instead of that, the declaration of imposing emergency measures in the
territory of the Irish Free State was to become such a basis for the Irish neutrality policy.
The second formal legal basis for Irish neutrality during World War II, the basis which was
also substantially different from the previous practices of states declaring wartime neutrality,
was the Emergency Powers Act accepted on September 3rd
, 1939 by both houses of the Irish
Free State parliament. The act was empowering the government of Ireland to undertake such
steps as it deemed necessary “for securing the public safety or the preservation of the State, or
for the maintenance of public order, or for the provision and control of supplies and services
essential to the life of the community” (Emergency Powers Act 1939, Art. 2.1). Therefore, the
government of the Irish Free State was entitled by the parliament to take all the necessary
action in the external environment of Éire that would strengthen Ireland as an independent
player and at the same time enable the survival of the Irish Free State in the wartime turmoil.
In the text of the act from the 3rd
of September de Valera together with his ministers also
received the powers to profoundly affect the internal life of Irish state. This influence took the
form of e.g. strict censorship of mass media, governmental control over the key sectors of
economy or the right to intern service members of any belligerent state if they happen to be
found in the territory of the Irish Free State.
As far as the political practices unusual for a neutral state are concerned, it needs to be said
that from the very beginning of “The Emergency” Taoiseach de Valera clearly expressed his
will to assist the British in any way necessary with the exception of taking an action which
would lead Ireland to war. London obviously was not delighted by such a turn of events in the
region which until quite recently had been ruled directly by Great Britain and in the interwar
period was perceived as the unquestionable British sphere of influence. That is why the
British Government of His Majesty George VI with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Anthony Eden initially (September 16th
, 1939)
attempted to prove the Irish wrong in the grounds of constitutionalism. The attempt was made
to prove that Ireland, being the member of the British Commonwealth and a British dominion,
legally had no right to abstain from the war which was declared by Great Britain because it
was a part of the indivisible British Crown. This reasoning was, however, undermined very
quickly, even in the formal legal grounds. For the aforementioned constitutional rule of
Crown indivisibility was undermined by the British themselves already in the period prior to
the dispute between London and Dublin. In 1937, when the Irish Minister was sent as a
diplomatic envoy to the court of the King of Italy recognized as the Emperor of Ethiopia, it all
took place with the consent of the King George VI and his government in London, although at
that time Great Britain still did not formally recognize Italy’s annexation of Ethiopia from
1935. It is in this way that the British Crown had been divided in the grounds of
constitutionalism for the first time in the new era of the British Empire restructured by the
Statute of Westminster (Dwyer, 2010, 19-20).
The legal constitutional arguments were not the only ones which de Valera used in order to
achieve the consent of London government for Ireland declaring neutrality. Political
12
arguments were equally important in this matter: the conviction that any attempt at forcing
Ireland into abandoning its neutral status would surely mean the growth of antipathy in the
spheres of the Irish Americans in the USA. Ipso facto, any attempt to violate the decision of
the Irish Free State in this matter could result in serious worsening of the key relations for
Great Britain: the relations with the Americans, still not engaged in the war effort.
Wartime Neutrality of Ireland in Political Practice
De Valera’s declaration of neutrality, expressing the will of giving assistance to Great
Britain and its allies in any way necessary except the one which would entail engaging Ireland
in the armed conflict, was – similarly as the Dáil resolution and the act of Oirechtas (Irish
parliament), both preceding this declaration – an announcement of quite a peculiar nature, an
act quite unique when compared to the earlier practices which have been applied in such
situations by other neutral states. In the years of World War II Irish neutrality gained even a
more peculiar form, incomparable with anything which had been settled on the matter of
classical neutrality in international legal analyses until that time.
On one hand, there were numerous examples of formal strict application of the rules
defining neutrality model (in the shape of Wolff and de Vattel approach) by the political elites
of the Irish Free State. The confirmation can be the fact of the formal closing the territory of
the Irish Free State for the British Armed Forces (and all other armed forces of any state
taking part in the war). That this Irish declaration has been taken seriously we can learn from
the fact that even after the USA joined the war effort in Europe and the dislocation of
American units in the territory of Ulster was taking place, the U.S. Army – being perceived by
Éire definitely friendlier than the British Armed Forces – never crossed the internal Irish
border (between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State). They stayed on the British side of
the border.
Another argument, which could be used to support Ireland’s claim to the model
interpretation of neutrality policy, could be the censorship activity, which for the most part of
“The Emergency” period was performed by the Ministry for Coordination of Defensive
Measures led by extremely anti-British, former IRA commander Frank Aiken. It is worth
mentioning that the censorship supervised by Aiken was definitely more aimed at information
which could have supported the Allied cause than at information which had the pro-German
flavor. For example, although the cases of the Irish Free State citizens joining the British
Armed Forces were widely known, in the whole “Emergency” period no piece of information
connected to this fact could have been published in Irish mass media. Therefore, there was no
consent given for the publication of obituaries of the Irishmen who died fighting under the
British banner. When the news reached Ireland that one of the Irish serving onboard the HMS
Prince of Wales in the defense of Singapore did not drown with this famous battleship, the
statement which appeared in Irish media – after having been censored by the Aiken office –
only said that a certain young man survived the boating accident. Another commonly known
topic, which did not found its place in the Irish Free State mass media during the whole World
War II, was the fact that numerous American units were being stationed in the territory of
Northern Ireland. Even the Irish origins of such important Allied Powers commanders as
Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery or Field Marshal Harold Alexander had been
considered by the Irish censorship as the information which – if it were to spread – could have
harmed the neutrality policy being formally implemented by Dublin government (Smyllie,
1946, 323).
Another element corresponding with Ireland acting in accord with the rules of
indiscriminative neutrality policy is the fact of the Irish Free State maintaining in its territory
diplomatic and consular representations of the Allied Powers as well as those of the Axis
states. Those diplomatic ties with the Axis were kept by Ireland even though the most
13
influential of all the allies for Irish cause – the USA – clearly demanded that those ties should
be terminated (to the lesser extent that same demand was voiced by Great Britain as well).
Both American and British objections, directed towards de Valera government in 1944, were
motivated by the fears of the Axis powers discovering the Allies’ plans which were to take its
ultimate form of opening the second front in Europe (meaning Operation Overlord). However,
even such strongly motivated operational need appeared to be insufficient for the Irish
decision-making circles to depart from the rules of diplomatic protocol and to expel from Irish
territory representatives of the Third Reich and the Empire of Japan. Eduard Hempel – the
Nazi German Minister to Ireland (together with his four co-workers) – and Japanese consul
Fetsuya Beppu (with his two assistants) were formally enjoying full diplomatic privileges in
the territory of the Irish Free State. However, in practice their activities were being closely
monitored by the Irish secret service. Also the social life – such an important sphere for
diplomat’s work – was not completely open for the representatives of the Axis states. Only
rarely have they been invited for the meetings with members of de Valera government and the
less formal meetings, which were quite often being organized by Dublin political elites
inviting diplomatic envoys from the USA, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark and Holland, did not see the presence of Hempel or Beppu even
once. The most distinct example of social ostracism, which was in everyday practice being
applied to the diplomatic envoys of the Axis powers in Ireland, was the story of consul
Beppu’s membership in a respectable Irish golf club. He was accepted to join the club only
after the formal intervention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Irish Free State (a few
prominent club members resigned their membership because of this enforced decision).
However, even after such a forced membership in this exclusive circle was granted to Beppu,
nobody wanted to play golf with him (Smyllie, 1946, 325).
Diplomatic relations with the Axis states were the reason for yet another paradox in the
external relations of formally neutral Ireland. According to one of the common rules in
diplomatic relations – the rule of reciprocity – since there was a German diplomatic
representation in the territory of the Irish Free State, Ireland was fully entitled to possess its
own representation in Berlin. This right was being exercised by Ireland for a certain amount
of time during the war, that is until the position of Irish Minister to Germany was vacated. In
such a situation de Valera decided to appoint a new Minister to Germany: the director of
Dublin Broadcasting Station – T.J. Kiernan. It is because of the formal procedure of
acceptance for this candidacy that Ireland’s neutrality was one more time undermined in its
practical, implementing aspect. According to diplomatic protocol German government could
not accept this new Irish diplomatic representative without the proper letter of credence which
had to be signed by the Monarch – the symbol of unity of the British Commonwealth (this
royal prerogative survived the changes done to the Irish constitution in 1936 and 1937). For
obvious reasons His Majesty George VI did not have the slightest possibility (not to mention
the inclination) to – as the head of a state being in war with Germany – contribute to the
implementation of foreign policy of a different state, which was formally not subjected to him
anymore (Smyllie, 1946, 319). Ultimately, the position of Irish Minister to Germany had to
remain vacant until the end of the war and the rank of Irish diplomatic mission in Berlin was
formally lowered, with chargé d’affaires at its steering wheel.
Apart from the elements of the Irish Free State neutrality which corresponded with the
model solution, it needs to be shown that there were also numerous elements which did not fit
into such an idealized frame of neutral state. Formally, the territory of the Irish Free State had
been closed for the armed forces of all the belligerents. In practice however, there were some
situations when the RAF pilots were forced to emergency landing in the Irish territory and –
although there was a formal obligation of detaining them – such an action was never uttered
14
by any of the Irish security forces. Such an event took place already on September 3rd
, 1939 –
on the first day of British Armed Forces at war – when two RAF seaplanes landed in the
waters of Dublin harbor Dun Laoghaire. One of the pilots even went to the shore where, using
the equipment of a local police station, he made a few phone calls. After a couple of hours the
planes took off and flew towards Britain, undisturbed by the Irish Free State security forces
(Dwyer, 2010, 15).
It is also worth to remember that security forces of the Irish Free State in the times of The
Emergency consisted of 40 thousand Regular Army servicemen, 80 thousand members of
Local Defence Force (all of them being volunteers) and an uncertain number of Local
Security Force (mostly elderly people). What is important is that all of those forces
comprising the defense of Éire had been armed almost exclusively by the British. Also, in the
times just after the war there was a documentation revealed testifying to the fact that there
were unusually close relations being kept in the years 1939-1945 between British General
Staff and the highest commanding officers of the Irish Free State armed forces (Smyllie,
1946, 320-321). It is quite obvious then that the practical implementation of a model
neutrality policy attempted by Ireland had to be in such a situation a flawed attempt from the
very beginning.
The untypical, departing from the ideal model shape of Irish neutrality was also being
created by the economic cooperation and trade relations between the Irish Free State and
Great Britain, which for the most part remained unchanged in comparison with the pre-war
situation. Food was still the main Irish export commodity in the trade relations with Great
Britain. It needs to be remembered that although both the value and the amount of food being
sold to the British has been substantially increased during wartime (especially after Hitler
closed the food supplying route from Denmark to Britain), Ireland itself did not benefit a lot
from such trade relations in real terms. The increase in food supplies to the United Kingdom
did not mean that Éire received immediate payment for the sold goods – the effect of all that
was a huge debt (at the end of the war amounting to USD 1.6 bln) – a result of a constant
imbalance in trade relations between London and Dublin (Smyllie, 1946, 322). Therefore, it
can be said that Ireland was supporting British war effort by agreeing to credit the UK’s
consumption needs.
It is also worth noticing that apart from the lively trading activity, Irishmen during The
Emergency were also quite often deciding to leave their houses and to move into the British
territory looking for better jobs and earnings and – as a side effect – also contributing to the
war effort of the United Kingdom. This possibility was exercised in the wartime years by
approximately 170 thousand Irish workers. De Valera government – besides imposing the ban
on placing advertisements in Irish newspapers which would offer working positions in Great
Britain – did not take any measures in order to stop this outflow of workforce. Some of the
commentators even claim that such a turn of events was perceived by Dublin as definitely
favorable, as it diminished the rate of unemployment in Éire (Smyllie, 1946, 321). The
aforementioned formula of neutrality, announced in the end of the 18th
century by George
Washington, was thus clearly applied in this case: the formula which professed that it is only a
state that, if it wishes to remain neutral, cannot engage in supporting any of the parties to the
conflict; the very same rule however, does not apply to the citizens of such a state.
Another element which can be used to prove that Ireland did not abide by all the rules of
ideal neutrality policy during The Emergency is the fact of 150-180 thousand citizens of the
Irish Free State (with the total population of the state ranging 3 million) decided to cross the
border with Great Britain in order to join the British Armed Forces (usually the easiest road
was being chosen: a largely undefended border with Northern Ireland). This number also
includes approximately 4 thousand deserters from the Irish army (in other words – 10 % of its
total number) (Smyllie, 1946, 320-321). Seven out of those Irish volunteers serving under the
15
Union Jack flag were awarded for their service the highest military decoration of the British
Commonwealth – the Victoria Cross. The very first officer who was distinguished in all the
British Armed Forces during World War II was also an Irishman – RAF Lieutenant Kenneth
Doran, awarded the highest British military decoration for RAF members – the Distinguished
Flying Cross – for leading the raid on the Kiel Canal directly after the hostilities in the
Western front began (Gwynn, 1940, 308).
Such a distinct act of disobedience of a large group of Irishmen against the official line of
politics being implemented by their own state was possible because the Irish Free State
government applied the Washington formula of neutrality also in this regard. According to the
formula neutral state does not hold responsibility for the actions of its citizens if those citizens
opt to support the war effort of one or both of the parties to the armed conflict. Of course,
Dublin could have acted just like any other state declaring neutrality and introduced – in a
form of an act of parliament – the formal prohibition for its own citizens on enlisting into the
military service in the armies of other states. After such an act had been accepted by the
Oirechtas, any Irishman joining the British Armed Forces would have had to face criminal
charges punishable by e.g. the loss of civil rights. De Valera government however, did not
take any steps towards putting such an act to vote in the Irish parliament. The effect of this
governmental inaction was a regular disrespect for general rules of wartime neutrality shown
by the Irish serving on the other side of the British border. This disrespect for the official line
of their own government was such a common case, that when those servicemen received their
short leave from duty, they were usually returning to Ireland in civilian clothing for a quick
visit home.
The only real repercussions that those Irish volunteers fighting in World War II on the
British side had to face were reserved for this particular group of 4 thousand deserters from
the Irish army. However, even those were mostly show trials, all of which ended only with
probation sentences and the prohibition of employing such a sentenced deserter in a position
paid out of the Irish budget. What is interesting, the defender of one of those soldiers
attempted to dismiss the charges of desertion based upon the definitional problems connected
with this term. According to the classical definition desertion means a soldier running away
from the place in danger to some sort of safe haven. The case of the Irish deciding to leave the
ranks of the Irish Free State military and joining the British Armed Forces was completely
different. They were actually abandoning the safe haven for the place where their lives and
health could have been put in a serious danger (Smyllie, 1946, 321).
So, it can be said that in the face of the ambiguous attitude of Dublin political elites, a
relatively big share of Irishmen from the Irish Free State decided that the policy of neutrality
implemented by their own government is unacceptable for them and – even though the anti-
British attitudes in Ireland were still much alive – those Irishmen decided to assist their
attacked neighbors. It is worth recording that a bigger share of the inhabitants of 26 counties
comprising Éire was recruited into the British Armed Forces than the percentage of Irishmen
of Ulster origin (we need to remember that, because of de Valera’s loud protest, Northern
Ireland was not subjected to the conscription for the UK’s army). Possibly they were
following the perennial instructions of the Roman Catholic Church, such as the words of St.
Augustine: “constitutions and written laws do not confer any moral obligation if they are not
the expression of a constitution inscribed in the minds of citizens” (Friss, 2011). Another
equally convincing explanation favored by some of the Irish analysts for this act of mass civil
disobedience is the observation that World War II was the first armed conflict for many ages
that the Irish – a nation of warriors – did not formally take part in (Smyllie, 1946, 319). Yet
another interpretation that also seems to be quite sound in this matter is the fact that tradition
of disobedience against written laws, imposed on the inhabitants of the island for more than
700 years by the British invaders, had to exert a serious influence upon the way that the Irish
16
society en masse treated formal rules and prohibitions issued even by its own government in
the times of The Emergency.
Summary
Wartime Ireland is a perfect example for the observation that accepting the policy of
neutrality does not necessarily mean a negative assessment of a state activity in the field of
international relations. Neutrality does not have to be dull, connected only with inaction in
international relations. Quite the opposite – in order to assure the conditions for survival in the
world overcome by war struggle Ireland had to actively look for its own path in international
relations which would ensure Éire with the status of a non-aligned state (at least in the eyes of
the major international players of that time). In other words, Irish wartime neutrality is not a
neutrality of a fearful hare hiding in its peaceful burrow. Ireland is not an actor which mostly
due to its own and unconstrained will excludes itself from the relations with other actors in
the field of international relations and thus seems to lose its subjectivity in the process of the
game. Political neutrality in the version applied by Ireland in the times of World War II is a
neutrality more akin to a circus acrobat who, while walking on a rope placed very high above
the ground level, has to put special care not to lean too much towards any side in order to
keep balance. The loss of balance would surely end badly for the Irish state – that was the way
the Irish decision-making circles were thinking like starting from 1921. Therefore, as the
primary element of Ireland’s wartime raison d’etat we need to recognize the will to survive as
an independent actor of international relations. This survival was to be achieved precisely by
keeping balance, maintaining equal distance towards every party to the conflict. The side
effect of this concept of neutrality was also the promotion of Ireland as a potential mediator
for the warring parties. Such strengthening of Ireland’s significance in international relations
field (especially in the eyes of the USA) was to guarantee the survival of independent Irish
state in the close vicinity of British imperial neighbor and to create the international situation,
where it would be possible to obtain Great Britain’s decision of ending the political partition
of the island of Ireland.
The paradigm of conducting foreign policy in The Emergency period in a way consistent
with the basics of neutrality model was not only a creation (as some British historians like to
think) of Irish antipathy towards all that is British. According to the chief editor of “The Irish
Times” – the most important Irish newspaper in the times of World War II – the Irishmen who
would cheer in a case of German victory over Britain were really few in numbers. The actions
of de Valera and other representatives of Irish government in the wartime period remained in
full compliance with the accepted in the first days of World War II rules of political
neutrality. However, Irish neutrality cannot be recognized as the model-type neutrality. This
period in Irish diplomacy and international relations involving the Irish factor was
characterized by activism, untypical and quite absent in the case of other states applying the
model of neutrality back then (e.g. Switzerland or Sweden). Irish neutrality was a concept
forming the way of conduct for political elites in the international field. A concept that was
directly connected with the national interests of Irish state. Those national interests were: 1) to
ensure the survival of a newborn Irish state, 2) to gradually strengthen independence from
Great Britain (both by accentuating differences between Irish and British way of dealing with
international problems and by economic and cultural empowerment of Irish state and society),
3) to pursue such a situation in international relations where the unification of the island of
Ireland would be possible (Dwyer, 2010, 1-20).
From the historical point of view it needs to be said that the strategy of conduct in
international relations which was accepted by Irish elites in the wartime period was a good
choice. Two out of three goals forming the basis of the then Irish raison d’etat were achieved
as a consequence of this strategy being implemented. Independent Ireland survived the times
17
of World War II even though there was the will of a substantial part of decision-making
circles in London to violate its neutrality which could lead in turn to abolition of the Irish Free
State independence (Dwyer, 2010, 19). The internal peace in the years 1939-1945 made it
possible to keep the quality of life on the island on the same level as in the pre-war period (in
the times when the rest of Europe was being ravaged by the cataclysm of war). This in turn
made it possible for the Irish society to strengthen its identification with its own state, a
political entity independent from Great Britain. The result of that was establishing the
atmosphere in Irish society which facilitated the decision of Dublin just after World War II
(1948) to withdraw from political framework of the British Commonwealth and to cut the last
remaining ties between Ireland and Great Britain: the resignation from dominion status and
formal initiation of republicanism.
We can risk saying that Ireland fully engaged in a war effort on the side of the Allies
would not achieve more than it achieved due to its neutrality stance. The question of Ireland’s
unification obviously remains unsolved until the present day, however, again we can risk
saying that even strong and clearly visible military support for the Allied cause, even the price
of blood which had to be paid for such a support would not be enough to bring about the
situation where the Irish pretense towards Ulster gained sufficient support in the USA to
pressure Great Britain in this matter. Of course, one can always question whether the
conceivable Hitler’s victory in Europe would not lead to the situation where Ireland could be
united again. However, it seems that Irish society was not so anti-British in the times prior to
World War II and during the wartime so as to even theoretically give a serious thought to this
option of engaging Ireland in the war effort on the side of the Axis powers (Smyllie, 1946;
Dwyer, 2010). Even more to the point can be the conclusion being widely spread by the Irish
themselves that in 1939 and the following years Ireland was still anti-British, but this anti-
British stance was directed against London political-military-economic establishment and not
against the common people of the United Kingdom who were definitely better perceived by
the Irish already for some time. This situation reminds in some way the ambivalent attitude of
Polish people towards Russia as a state identified with a centuries-long oppressiveness and
towards the Russians as a nation which by its nature comes remarkably close to the Polish
soul.
The Irish Anti-British stance has been additionally weakened by the fact that the USA –
the most substantial ally of Ireland in international relations, the only state whose political
elites Éire was inclined to trust at that time – accepted from the very beginning of the armed
conflict in 1939 position definitely supportive towards the United Kingdom. Also, as it can
be read in numerous memoirs of that time, a typical Irishman would fear an unknown enemy
(meaning fascism and Hitler) as much as the enemy perfectly well known (imperialism and
His Majesty’s Government) (Boyd, 1941, 430-431). It needs to be stressed then, that with
such attitudes predominant in the society of the 26 counties comprising the Irish Free State,
the maxim “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, the maxim which in the case of earlier
global conflicts Irish elites attempted to implement (with no effect: the attempt of getting
Napoleon interested in the Irish cause in the times when he was planning the invasion on the
British Isles happened to be a total failure, the same can be said about Sinn Fein’s strategy
during World War I – trying to get the attention and sympathy of the German Empire), this
time that way was not even an option (Boyd, 1941, 432).
Therefore we must stress that the widespread conviction that the Irish decision to remain
neutral changed the geostrategic situation in Europe in favor of Germany in the first years of
World War II, such a conviction is plainly wrong. This distorted picture of reality is an effect
of the influence which was exerted upon the historiography of World War II by the views of
Winston Churchill (definitely averse towards the Irish cause) and – to the lesser extent –
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt tactically maneuvered by de Valera into supporting Irish
18
demands. Thus a quotation from one of the creators of Sinn Fein – Arthur Griffith: “the
British had built a paper wall around Ireland; on the inside they painted what they wanted the
Irish to know about the rest of the world, on the outside what they wanted the rest of the
world to know about Ireland” – a sentence well-known in Ireland, one more time appeared to
be true (Smyllie, 1946, 317). Keeping in mind the simple fact that history is being written by
the victors (nota bene – the saying attributed to Churchill) and that Great Britain
unquestionably belongs to World War II winners’ circle, we should be definitely more
cautious while evaluating the performance of Ireland during the wartime period. The
widespread negative Anglo-Saxon assessment of Irish neutrality is – in the light of the
aforementioned evidence – definitely unjust. For this neutrality was nothing more but an
instrument of achieving Irish national interests at that time, the instrument which happened to
be extremely effective in securing Irish raison d’etat.
19
References:
Source material:
Treaty Between Great Britain and the United States for the Amicable Setting of all Causes of
Difference Between the Two Countries (The Washington Treaty), Washington,
8th
May 1871, [in:] Parry, C. (ed.) (1977). The Consolidated Treaty Series,
New York, Vol.143, p. 145.
Bunreacht na hEireann (Constitution of Ireland), Dublin 1937.
The Record of Parliamentary Debate Prior to the Vote on Imposing the Emergency Measures
2nd
September 1939, http://historical-
debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0077/D.0077.193909020007.html (accessed on 5.05.2011).
Emergency Powers Act 1939, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1939/en/act/pub/0028/print.html
(accessed on 6.05.2011).
de Valera, E. (1944). Peace and War. Speeches by Mr de Valera on international affairs,
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de Vattel, E. The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, LONANG Library
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Published works:
Armstrong, H.A. (1956). Neutrality: Varying Tunes, Foreign Affairs, vol.35, no.1.
Boyce, G. (1979). From War to Neutrality: Anglo-Irish Relations 1921-1950, British Journal
of International Studies, vol.5, no.1.
Boyd, E. (1941). Ireland between Two Stools, Foreign Affairs, vol.19, no.2.
Cesarz, Z. & Stadtmüller, E. (1996). Problemy polityczne współczesnego świata, Wrocław.
Dańda, A. (2009). Dominium jako forma ustrojowa państw anglosaskich, Kraków.
Duggan, J.P. (1975). Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, Dublin.
Dwyer, T.R. (2010). Behind the Green Curtain. Ireland’s Phoney Neutrality During World
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