Interview with a member of Ansar al-Sharia

The emergence of Salafi movements in post-Ben Ali Tunisia

surprised both the international community and many in Tunisia

itself. The astonishment was such that when the first Salafi

demonstrations took place in downtown Tunis, journalists and

observers were talking quite confusingly about the phenomenon.

Some accused men of the former regime of having organized the

demonstrations by these bearded men, others claimed they were

members of the Tahrir Party (a pan-Islamist movement), and others

still labeled them with the generic formula of “Islamists.”

What many did not fully realize is that a new rebellious

generation had matured during the 2000s, keeping their views

hidden. When democracy gave the chance for everybody to “perform”

freely, they showed off and did all through their most meaningful

symbols. Dressed in the Afghan kamis and sporting long beards,

they slowly occupied public spaces, particularly in working class

neighborhoods.

As the phenomenon grew, hysteria began to spread in society,

especially among Tunisian seculars and liberals. In the context of

the Ennahda electoral victory in the 2011 elections of the

constituent assembly, and with the emergence of a larger Islamic

public, Tunisia seemed to have radically changed its face. In

fact, the time had finally come to reveal the “lie” of a secular

country that appeared more similar to France than to any other

Arab country. Post-revolutionary Tunisia was showing off a new

Islamic identity.

Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between different Islamic

representations. There is, on the one hand, a large and better

known Islamic sphere represented by a conservative middle class,

which finds its political reference mainly in the Ennahda party.

On the other hand, there is a new radical Islamism composed mostly

of a younger generation, belonging to the main disenfranchised

social class and integrating into the public scene in the name of

jihad.

While the phenomenon is the heir of international jihadism—most

famously inspired by al-Qaeda—the social dynamics expressed in the

Tunisian scenario are new. Thousands of young people from lower

social classes were appearing in the public scene, employing the

intellectual and political tools of a radical Islam. Adopting the

international slogans of jihad, they started to occupy a new

social space. They do not recognize democracy but instead, they

benefit from the freedom it guarantees, practicing their “jihad”

in a Muslim society with a Muslim inspired government (though very

moderate from their point of view). It is an unpredictable

situation that gives them new chances but new challenges as well.

The chance is the possibility to operate in a context of freedom.

If you live in a Muslim society and the system is letting you

practice and “live” according to your values, there is no reason

to conduct a violent jihad. At the same time, when you preach

freely, society holds you accountable—a society that may question

or be afraid of you. This leads to the transformation of your

jihad into a peaceful process.

The jihadi Tunisian movement is, at this stage of its evolution,

an interesting case study. The interview that I have conducted

below clearly retraces most of the elements that I have

introduced. As witnesses of this process (my colleague Francesco

Cavatorta and I in the framework of a larger research), I

discovered that behind the name Ansar al-Sharia (the denomination

of the jihadi Tunisian organization), there was an incredible

social movement. Just like it is discussed in this interview,

Tunisia is going to be a laboratory both in its transformation

from dictatorship to democracy and in the emergence of a new

jihadi movement.

Ansar al-Sharia drew the attention of the majority of observers,

especially the ones following the evolution of al-Qaeda. It must

be said that in the second decade of 2000, a sub-group of the

terrorist group emerged in the Arabic Peninsula, taking the name

of Ansar al-Sharia. Many thought that the Tunisian group responded

to the same logic. The suspicion was that this denomination was

nothing but the evolution of al-Qaeda in the framework of a new

international strategy.

Though Tunisia’s movement is ideologically and emotionally related

to the duties of international jihadism, it is also something

different and very specific. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia declares

itself as being a new political project, part of the new Tunisian

scene created after the revolution.

This interview was conducted over the course of three different

meetings with a young leader of Ansar al-Sharia between January

and March 2013. We discussed freely but decided together to make

it as a "personal confession," in which he talks about his

personal experience in an immigrant district of Tunis. I met him

in his neighborhood several times and he invited me to participate

to some of Ansar al-Sharia’s actions.

After the American embassy demonstration, which degenerated into a

riot on September 2012, the finger was pointed at Ansar al-Sharia

and a repressive campaign was launched against the organization.

Many young leaders were arrested and two of them died after a

hunger strike carried out in protest against the illegal measures

of detention. Ennahda began a campaign against them that has yet

to cease. The party is under pressure both from the secular

portion of society denouncing them for not fully opposing

jihadism, and the larger Salafi and more conservative public that

accuses them of acting like the Ben Ali regime used to when facing

criticism.

In reality the Islamic moderate camp—including Ennahda and the

scriptural Salafis (interested in studying sharia law rather than

doing politics)—acted on a two levels. In addition to repression,

a religious action is taking place, attempting to bring this young

generation to the “right path” of a pious and non-violent Islam. 

At the moment, the situation in Tunisia is even tenser than it was

after the assassination of Chokri Belaid. The two men arrested for

his assassination are close to jihadism and, according to sources

close to the investigation, they have admitted their affiliation

to Ansar al-Sharia. Of course Ansar al-Sharia denies it very

strongly and denounces it as being part of a plot to eliminate the

movement. It is not my role to delve into such a delicate and

complex affair. I only propose that this interview, which was

possible thanks to the mutual trust between the interviewee and

the author, might be useful to highlight how a member of Ansar al-

Sharia articulates his message. He reviewed the interview and

accepted this final version.

Fabio Merone (FM): How did you become engaged under the Ben Ali’s

regime?

Interviewee (I): Since I was a little boy, I used to pray but not

regularly. I was also a great reader and that helped me approach

religious readings. At the age of twelve, I joined the Tablighs. It

was a religious group the regime tolerated because of their belief

that religion and politics should not mix; a sort of laic conception

of a separation between the two. I learned from them how to

practice dawa, both individually and in a group. But at this time,

I remained open to different experiences and continued to deepen

my thoughts through new readings, until I was between seventeen

and eighteen.

In the end, I was not completely satisfied with Tablighi activities.

Their goal was very loosely defined: to Islamize society. Fine,

but “how” do we accomplish this? It seemed to me in the end that,

for the Tablighigroup, dawa was solely for the sake of dawa, and

that is it. In this period of doubt, I ended up bumping into some

youth both from the Ennahda party and Hizb a-Tahrir. I began to meet

them regularly and there was an intense exchange between us. I

liked the ideas of Hizb a-Tahrir. Unlike the Tablighs, they seem to have

an international perspective, as well as a political project: they

have a specific goal and a plan to reach it. Furthermore, as a

result of their analytical approach, I was introduced to more

philosophical readings that I became very fond of. In this way, my

vision of the world expanded beyond a purely religious one. At

this time, I started to read some Marxist authors, as well the

evolutionary theories influenced by Darwinism. But it was religion

that ultimately provided me with the intellectual structures that

formed in my mind, and it was in religious thoughts that I found

fulfillment. However, it was religion that was able to accommodate

politics—that was able to offer a complete and holistic vision of

the world. 

This intellectual evolution led me to eventually join Hizb at-

Tahrir and become a clandestine activist. I remember two books I

read during this time, which influenced my thinking. The first one

was The Awakening of Europe's Sick Man. The author was an orientalist. I

do not remember his name. The other book was Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s

book: The Book of Monotheism. The latter was obviously forbidden in

Tunisia, but a friend of mine at that time used to bring us books

from outside the country. This reading was crucial for my

intellectual development. The author’s main ideas were persuasive,

and based on strong and objective arguments (adalla). In comparison

with the orientalist’s work, I found Abd al-Wahhab’s arguments

more convincing. At that time, I continued as a member in Hizb a-

Tahrir, but my worldview had changed.

FM: It is more or less the path of a young man who finds the

response to his questioning in the Islamic thoughts. Why did you

become specifically jihadi, though?

I: The first real breakthrough in my thinking came on 11 September

2001. I loved Bin Laden very much. I was not alone. There is a

method I follow in developing my worldview. If I feel convinced or

attracted by someone’s ideas, I investigate the opinions and views

that others hold of those ideas. In this case, I looked around and

realized that that the attack in New York and Washington seemed

very popular with people in our neighborhood. Many people seemed

to be happy with these events. I remember a neighbor coming out on

the street and shouting with joy, regardless of religious or

Islamic belief. Bin Laden had given us back our dignity and pride.

America is our political and religious enemy, and Bin Laden

managed to strike at its heart.

I became curious, and wanted to know more about al Qaeda, and

started doing research. I was encouraged, among other things, by

the fact that my enthusiasm was shared by Islamic groups of

different tendencies. It was not easy to get access to sources,

since it was the most dangerous subject to talk about at the time,

and web sites were monitored by the state. So I could not get

direct sources, but I more or less followed what was being said

about these events in the news.

The stories of the al-Qaeda mujahiddin reminded of the epic of

the sahaba (the first group of Muslims), and I felt, for the first

time, pride in being Muslim. Yes, I was proud, I felt for that the

world respected, and feared us. I had a strong admiration for

sheikh Bin Laden. His life fascinated me. How could it be possible

that a man so rich, that was materially comfortable in life, had

renounced everything to go to live on a mountain. Not to mention,

all the financial resources he provided for the religion. These

are respectful individuals - Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Abi Yahiya

Libi. These are people with respected social positions, both in a

religious and civic sense. They left everything to give themselves

to jihad. 

One more factor confirmed for me the rightness of al-Qaeda’s

project. In our neighborhood, everything they said was reflected

in our daily reality and practices. For example, they talked about

our corrupt Arab governments that repress religion in order to

please Westerners, things I related to in my daily life. At the

age of fifteen, I had my first experience with policemen. I was

arrested because they saw me pray during the morning sobah prayer.

They treated me very harshly in order to teach me a lesson: to

make me understand that a young man like me would be better off

doing something else then going to pray. At the age of eighteen,

they arrested me for the second time, because I was standing with

a group of friends on the street and they thought we were talking

about religion. They detained and abused me for the second time.

It was a great injustice and nobody talked about it. We were

submerged in hypocritical rhetoric, which spoke of terrorism all

the time, just to please the West. Sheikh Bin Laden was the only

one talking the truth. He was sincere and honest, unlike the

majority of our double-talking politicians.

And I liked the sheikh (Bin Laden), even in human terms. I saw him

once feel compassion for a little girl’s death, I saw him burst

into tears. He seemed to me like a man that has devoted his life

for his principles. A strong man, a man that does nt lie, does not

fear anything. He was always worrying about others, expending all

he has for Islam, just like the sahaba. We were all proud of them

(al Qaeda).

It was the first turning point in my life. After that moment,

everything changed. I dreamt about joining al-Qaeda. I tried to

join, but it was too difficult at the time. Many of those that

left for Afghanistan did so through thetabligh, which used to send

people to Pakistan on a regular basis.  Tabligh send people to

Pakistan to gather them each year in an international meeting.

Some of the ones that participated decided to stay once they got

used to life over there. Others went explicitly for that purpose.

They joined the organization with the non-declared aim of joining

the jihad in the region.

The second turning point in my life was the “Sulaiman events” in

the winter of 2006-7. A group of jihadists was discovered on a

mountain fifty kilometers away from Tunis and, as a result,

clashes took place with the security forces. Since then, the

police began standing in front of the mosques of the neighborhood.

Occasionally, they would randomly choose one of the people coming

out from prayer, and detain them for a while. There were many

arbitrary arrests such as these. However, this policy did not

yield the intended results, but rather led to the exact opposite.

Instead, people started to ask about the ones who were arrested.

The more police brutalized these pious men, the more the normal

people felt sympathy towards them.

It is a strange moral that reminded me of the story of the prophet

Mohammed. In particular, when he received the first revelation.

Khadija’s uncle instructed him that just like Jesus and other

prophets, the truth is opposed at the beginning, but at the end

people, would be convinced about you and your message. It is

exactly what happened with the Salafis after the Sulaiman events.

And just like the prophet’s mission, the first ones who joined the

Salafi movements were the youth and poor. 

Socialism, capitalism, they have been tried and they failed.

Besides, they do come from us, they come from another world (e.g.

the West). They are unsuccessful--the policy of birth control, for

example. Why should we take from the West; in those societies

where the age average is very high, and there are very few young

people. At least in our societies we have many young people. Those

are Western ideas they imposed us. I want to have four or five

children. I want a young society.

This is just an example to say that at the end of my human and

intellectual evolution, I came to the conclusion that all the

ideas they imposed on us, since childhood, were ideas that came

from West and brought us nothing but failure. We have the Quran

and the sunna that give us an alternative: with our religion we

can dominate the world, just like we used to in the past.

At that time, I knew a small group of young people (three or four)

that liked jihadi thinking. At that time we did not describe

ourselves as Salafis. Sometimes we would call ourselves “jihadis.”

The others attributed the mainstream definition used today to

describe us. Of course, none of us knew about the other’s

ideology. We were too afraid to confess to others our thoughts,

even when you felt that the person you were talking to had the

some opinions. We met at the café in our neighborhood where would

talk about the Islamic creed, or just comment on the news. In a

short time the group had grown.

FM: How did you and your group participate in the uprising in

2010-11? 

I: When the uprising started in Sidi Bouzid, on 17 December, I

worked as a storekeeper in a car dealership. I remember looking

for news about events going on over there on the office computer

trying to avoid censors with a proxy.  I then started posting

videos on Facebook, which were circulated. I would put

commentaries below the videos, making sure not to use religious

language. At that time, people associated religion with terrorism.

I had to hide my identity not only out of fear of the police but

also out of fear of people’s judgment too.

Our neighborhood group met and decided to mobilize and participate

in the ongoing uprising without using religious slogans. In

between the people mobilizing there was Hizb at-tahrir and Ennahda

members, but we were all participating as individuals not as

organizations, and no one showed their affiliation. We decided to

follow the majority.

On the 12, 13, and 14 January, there were clashes with police in

Tunis. During those days, we became acquainted with new people of

all ideological tendencies over the internet. We all came together

to bring down the regime. We asked ourselves what would be the

most effective way to topple Ben Ali. We agreed it was obligatory

to mobilize the capital city. As the south and the center

exploded, Tunis did not move.

We decided to move then, together with the shebab of Ettadhamen and

Bab al-Jedid. Salafis were part of the uprising. In the afternoon

on 12 January, many young people started to come out on the

streets in Ettadhamen and Dawer Hishr. We united and mobilized

together, then headed toward Ettadhamen. Many others joined us as

we marched, including the district’s thieves and criminals. We

have to be honest. Any time we moved, this group of people would

join us in order to take advantage of the situation (in order to

steal). At night, the news spread that the city’s entire urban

belt was mobilized. Tunis finally rose up. The action of

mobilization was working. In the clash, two shebab from Ettadhamen

died. This was the turning point of the uprising. Just like what

happened in the interior region, people of all ages, including

women and men, began to clash with security forces. Police were

surprised to find this reaction from people when they came into

our neighborhoods and onto the streets. It was a battle, house by

house. A zero-sum battle had begun between the regime and us.

The day after, on 13 January, we decided to change our strategy.

We had learned military tactics due to our jihadi formation. Each

one of us is training every day and learning fighting techniques.

We coordinate in small groups. Police were expecting a reaction

after clashes in the neighborhood. We surprised them, and instead

of moving en masse toward a unique target, we decided to organize

quickly in abrupt assaults. By 13 January, the revolution arrived

to all the neighborhoods in the capital. Ben Ali’s speech that

night was proof that we won.

In those two days of the uprising, we fought and they fought.

There was a lot of rage and policemen were afraid. It was clear.

They abandoned the police stations—they seemed to not have orders

anymore. They were no longer receiving any political directions

and the necessary reinforcements were not coming in. 

On 14 January, we felt that the police had all gathered in front

of the Minister of Interior. Our group headed to the Tunisian

General Labor Union (UGTT) headquarters where people were

gathering for a demonstration. At the same time, a spontaneous

discussion was taking place. The trade unionists feared clashes

with police and two scenarios were suggested. Our group was not

satisfied with either of those two options, so suddenly we started

to shout “Ministry of Interior,” and we walked in that direction

pushing the crowd with us. That is the story behind the famous

demonstration of that day, which ended up crossing Bourguiba

Avenue and going to the Ministry of Interior. The Tunisian

revolution was never peaceful; we achieved our goals through

force. My personal conviction is that something that was taken by

force can only be returned through force as well.

FM: How did the jihadi movement come out after the revolution? 

I: After the revolution our group was unveiled. We were Salafis.

All of a sudden, we began shoning off our allegiances. We dressed

in an Afghan manner, and showed clear signs that related us to al-

Qaeda. We did it on purpose; we wanted to show off our identity.

People began to look at us in a weird way. For the first time, we

acted under our new group identity. We lived then, together with

all the people, as the "Committee for the Protection of the

Revolution” --beautiful days lived intensely. We wanted play a

role in the post-revolutionary environment; we wanted to have

adventures. It was during this time we decided on a sort of

“military” role for our group. I remember one of those nights the

army patrols warned us to not cross the point of no return,

because outside it may be dangerous. We did not heed this warning,

and instead did exactly the opposite. Armed with knives and

sticks, we went out to face a superiorly armed enemy. It was done

in the spirit of challenge and adventure.

After the days of the neighborhood committees, our group grew in

solidarity and unity. In reality, we were nothing more then awled al-

houma, a group of kids that grew up together in the same

neighborhood. The only difference now is that we were building up

a new identity. During our recreation time together, often playing

a football game or having a picnic in the mountain, we would speak

about religion. This is how a group of friends from the district

(neighborhood) would find themselves turning into a Salafi group.

Though we did not like to be separated from the others; what

distinguished the Salafi group from others was our specific spirit

of solidarity. For example, in football games, the Salafi part of

the group would form a separate team. Or, when we went out for

picnic, we Salafis would share all the food together. Finally, we

were one group, but inside, there was a specific shared spirit

among the Salafis. A special current flows between us Salafis.

The other guys of the group, the ones that are not Salafis,

noticed this particular feeling that we shared. They were

impressed. I remember one particular friend who used to be a

street urchin, decided to join us. One day he came to see me to

understand what was this special feeling that we shared. We are

more than friends; we are brothers. We share ethics and between

us, there is a special strength and solidarity.

FM: Though many people may feel that you want to impose on them

your vision of religion. 

I: Our conviction as Salafis is that religion should not be

imposed by force. You cannot impose people to follow you. Let us

take the example of the historical Islamic movement in Tunisia,

what today is the Ennahda party. Their actions in the past caused

people to be afraid of them; so the people rejected them. It was

the same for the other side, the ones that wanted to force people

to renounce their religion. The result was the opposite of what

they had hoped for. Yet, the stronger the repression, the stronger

the members’ sense of belonging. 

We do not want to develop a project in conflict with the people.

They are our families, our friends, our neighbors, our brothers,

and sisters. We are a part of them. More than that, we insist on

the fact that we are part of the people, which makes us the

opposite of politicians. We are not, and nor do we want to be a

detached elite. Furthermore, we do not have hierarchies. We have

perfect equality in our movement. The simple person has the same

right to express his opinion as the educated one. A young boy,

even if he does not have the same experience as an elder, can

still have a better idea when it comes to a specific issue. His

age does not make a difference. We are neither classists nor

elitists.

FM: How did the movement begin to grow?

I: The Salafi movement is comprised of small groups of young

people. The youth are joining the movement in big numbers. In our

neighborhood, a big part of the ultras supporters, which I was

also a part of, joined the Salafi movement. In the stadium, we

experienced the first forms of freedom. At that time we were

singing songs of freedom, against the regime and the police.

Our group grew very quickly. Our meetings were informal; they took

place mostly in cafés. The guys loved it, because it made them

feel that we are a part of them. I remember once we organized

a dawa (preach) in one of the neighborhood cafés. On that day, a

football match was going on and the café was crowded. In agreement

with the owner (a friend) we installed loudspeakers. At the end of

the match, we asked the people to stay. It was a big success. We

always do our preaching in the local dialect, far from the

language of politicians. We are simple people and we address

simple people in our sermons. We do not care about showing off a

cultured language as, for example, Hizb at-Tahrir activists do. In

cafés, you find people from all kind of social backgrounds. We all

share our dialect. During our sermons, people also had fun.

Sometimes we would talk in a funny way and make sure to keep our

speeches light. Only at the end would we dedicate a few words to

politics. This is what our work mostly consisted of during this

time. We spontaneously organizeddawa activities or, alternatively,

a distribution of leaflets.

Then we began to build relations outside of the neighborhood. We

got to know people from all over the country. Through our personal

networks, the movement grew to a national level. 

FM: Tell us more about your leaders, the “sheikhs.” How does one

become sheikh?

I: Many new sheikhs emerged from this sort of networking. The term

sheikh is actually quite general. It is a term of respect that the

guys use for someone whose moral authority they recognize. This

authority may be either religious or political. You become sheikh

or leader if you show a special ability in relation to daily

practices. In particular, if you are proactive in finding

solutions and in making decisions. Of course, there is also a more

intellectual side to being a sheikh. In this sense, one joins the

ranks of sheikhs through a personal path of studying and deepening

of religious knowledge. 

They were the main actors in the organization of the movement.

They became known among the youth through videos distributed on

Facebook. Soon, all the young activists of the movement became

familiar with these sheikhs and would rush to see them whenever a

popular sheikh would come to a nearby mosque during a speaking

tour. These sheikhs had an important impact on the evolution of  

the movement, and the sense of belonging it engendered amongst its

followers.

FM: Ansar al-Sharia was the idea that shaped the movement?

I: Ansar al-Sharia developed within the framework of this network

that emerged after the revolution. In fact, the idea of creating a

Tunisian Salafi project was already in the mind of those that had

participated in the international jihad, and above all, in the

mind of Abu Iyadh. The Tunisian jihadi project is really the

brainchild of Abu Iyadh. Other leaders emerged in the process I

have described. They became representatives of different local

groups. Little by little the exigency of having a fixed structure

was raised. Meetings were taking place at a regional level, and

did differentiate geographically between the structures. You

should not think though that it is a top-down organization that

emerged. On the contrary, it is a lightweight and decentralized

movement, with an extended autonomy for the local groups, which

are the real core of the movement.

FM: What are Ansar al-Sharia’s ideology and objectives?

I: The main aim of the movement is the creation of an Islamic

state, implemented through dawa. So we have tried to put in place

the instruments to achieve this. Our aim is to propose a concrete

Islamic alternative, capable of facing today’s reality. The duty

of Ansar al-Sharia is to produce a program and the competences to

run it. 

FM: Did you write a program?

I: With that in mind we created specific departments for each

sector of activity. Of course we discussed the fact that we needed

to evolve intellectually and therefore, find experts between us

for each subject.

We elaborated a program in health, tourism, and education. We

presented our program in Kairouan (the second national Ansar al-

Sharia’s rally on May 2012). We decided that we should have our

own range of associations, including a sports association. Since

its establishment, we had a clear idea of what Ansar al-Sharia’s

mission was, with a formal organization and a program that

reflected this.

FM: What about the structure? Was it influenced from the evolution

of the organization? 

I: As I said, the principle of local autonomy is very important to

the group. The lowest level in the organization’s pyramid

structure is its most important. It can be a local group,

organized on a neighborhood level, or even lower than that, such

as a group that can be divided further on a micro level, as with

the groups in individual mosques.

Small groups comprised of around twenty people were formed, and

they played a central role in the coordination of such activities.

For organizational purposes, the country was divided into three:

north, center, and south.

FM: When did you officially begin your activities?

I: In April 2011, we announced the birth of the movement. It was

an official ceremony and we invited politicians to participate.

The meeting was in Soukra (Tunis suburb), in a hall in which 2000

people attended. Ansar al-Sharia was officially born.

The group’s first official activity was a humanitarian action in

Choucha refugee camp, where refugees coming from Libya were being

accommodated (during the Libyan uprising). We created our own

structure in a separate space inside the camp. Our small camp was

well organized and self-sufficient, which is why many at that time

(the local media) started to talk about an Islamic Emirate in Ben

Guardene. 

FM: Tell us a little more about the internal debate. How did you

discuss the evolution of Ansar al-Sharia’s project? 

I: The principal idea behind Ansar al-Sharia’s project was the

notion that Tunisia is a specific country and this specificity

should be respected. We recognized that this is the world we live

in, and with which we want to deal. We have the Quran and the

sunna, sure, which are universal. But we also have our own

specific context. We are neither Afghanistan, nor Iraq.

Furthermore, the name that we chose for our salafi-jihadi project

does not necessarily mean that we are referring to the Yemeni

experience. When we chose this name, some of us in fact raised our

concerns that we would be associated with the international

jihadist-terrorist project as a result. Different names were

proposed, but in the end we really thought that it was the best

name to describe our activities so we stayed with it. 

FM: But still you are part of a larger international jihadi

movement? 

I: We do share our theoretical references with the international

jihadi movement.

FM: Who are the authors that you consider your theoretical

references?

I: From the perspective of the development of our group’s

theoretical framework/worldview, some of the most influential

Salafi activists include: Abu Quttada al-Falestini, Abu Mohammed

al-Maqdassi, Abu Basir Tartusi, Hani Sabahi, and al-Aulaki. Abu

Kottada al-Falestini is probably the most influential among them--

our brothers that were in Europe over the past years all flocked

to listen to his lessons. It is not strange then that Abu Yadh

himself or Abdallah a-Tunsi went to him as well. Sheikh Hani

Sabahi is also respected in our movement. We have a steady contact

with him and he is very sympathetic to our experience. 

FM: How is your experience is different from the others?

I: It is clear to each of our activists that our experience is

unique, in the same way that our revolution was also original and

unique.

FM: After you created Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, many other

groups came out with the same name. Some observers thought that it

is part of the same international jihadi project.

I: As we were the first of the “Arab Spring” to build a jihadi

movement, it is obvious that others have watched and considered us

a model to imitate. That is why it has not come as a surprise to

see other groups come out in different countries with the same

name. But it should not make people think that we are one and the

same. I insist on this point, our experience reflects the

particularity of the context we live in. Of course, the success or

the failure of our experience will have an impact on the

experiences of other countries. This is true as well for the

general post-revolutionary process in our country. Today, Tunisia

has become a political laboratory. 

FM: Let us go back to the original debate. 

I: Our project was based on two points: the specificity of the

Tunisian experience and the specific competences and instruments

available for us to realize an Islamic state as an alternative to

the existing scenario.

This was the gist of our discussions at the time. We knew, of

course, that this was an ambitious project. We realized very

quickly that the first thing to do is to work on influencing

people’s way of thinking. To destroy is simple, but to build up

demands time. For fifty years, the Tunisian people have lived

under a regime that has westernized every aspect of their social

lives. Tunisians are Muslim, and they are thirsty for religion.

Once we manage to overcome the prejudices towards us, the Tunisian

people will be keen to pay attention.

FM: Are you saying that the international jihadi movement has

changed?

I: The jihadi movement has not changed in the way that many

analysts assume. What it has changed is the reality in which we

operate. Today, we are in a regime of unprecedented freedom. Why

should we embark upon a jihad? This does not mean we have

eliminated the idea of jihad from our philosophy. When it comes to

our religion, we embrace it all. Obviously, jihad is a part of

that. It is a duty for each and every Muslim. For example, if one

day France invades Tunisia and occupies it, jihad would be a duty

for all of us. In the context of today’s Tunisia, though, it is

clear to us that jihad should be based on dawa. The goal is to

reach Tunisian society, the society we live in. I want to change

it. I am not interested in taking over power. This is the big

difference between the others in the political scene and us. Our

target is the people, not the state.

FM: You do not recognize the state?

I: We do not recognize the State, nor democracy, for the simple

reason that we are guided by the sunna and the Quran. The only law

with worth for us is God’s law, and not secular law. Of course, as

we said, we deal with reality, but without forgetting

that sharia remains our reference. Sharia is a law that we apply in

our daily attitudes. For example, when we are in a group with

friends, and take a walk, we are applying sharia among us.

FM: To what extent does Ansar al-Sharia represent the Tunisian

jihadi movement? 

I: Ansar al-Sharia does not represent the entire jihadi movement,

although it has been a key part of this movement since the period

immediately following the revolution. However, the salafi-jihadi

project is bigger than Ansar al-Sharia. Our proposal is to work

with the others. We share the same goals with other brothers.

Differences exist only in the means we have chosen to achieve

these goals.

Ansar al-Sharia’s goal is not to achieve power. That is why we do

not stress on having the largest number of members, but rather

getting people involved in the general salafi-jihadi project. Our

main objective is to reach people’s hearts. We are keen to make

people understand that we are a protection for society and not a

threat. It is true that we have a lot of work to do in order to

convince all of our members of the validity of our aims and means.

I agree that we still need to teach our young members that

religion is not something to impose by force. I confess that this

is a big part of our work today. Our organization grew very

quickly. Everyday new members are joining. The greatest task for

us now is to incorporate new members into our framework and

vision.

FM: As far as I know, not everyone within the Tunisian jihadi

movement agree on Ansar al-Sharia’s project.

I: The creation and the success of Ansar al-Sharia initiated an

important discussion within the salafi-jihadi movement. At the

beginning, the debate was focused on the name. As I said, many

feared this name would hinder our efforts to reach people as they

may link it to the movement in Yemen and terrorism. Later, another

point of discussion emerged around the question of whether this

organization would, sooner or later, become just another political

party. Would Ansar al-Sharia eventually be integrated into the

democratic process? Was there an underlying ambition for political

power?

FM: You fear being associated to democracy?

I: It would be interesting to point out here that we are not

absolutely in opposition to pluralism and elections. Our project

is an entirely new initiative. At its heart is the idea of

adapting a pure Islam to modern times, that is why we are not

against pluralism and elections in principle. The main point is

that we could conceive of such a development, but only in the

context of an Islamic state. The state that we imagine is based on

God’s laws. This is the not up for discussion. We are Muslims and

we want to act according the Quran and sunna. Within this

framework, the existence of parties and elections would not be

forbidden. However, the current stage prevents us from working on

the societal model that we would like to develop. We are currently

at a different stage, which requires that we still work on the

minds and the hearts of people, both inside the movement and

outside it. 

FM: There was also a more doctrinal aspect of discussion.

I: There is, of course, another issue that has emerged, which is

more doctrinal. Some accused us of making ajamaa (in the sense of

claiming of being a group of exclusive Muslims). Our response was

that Ansar al-Sharia is an organization, and not a group of people

excluding others. This discourse is based on the Quranicdefinition

of jamaa. In the prophetical mission, the jamaa was comprised of

the first Muslims that joined the prophet. So jamaa in this sense

is the equivalent of Muslims. In our defense, we say that Ansar

al-Sharia is not the jamaa, but rather it is an organizational

tool.

FM: What was, in this discussion, Khatib Idrissi’s position? 

I: At the beginning, Khatib Idrissi’s (the most respected salafi-

jihadi cleric outside Ansar al-Sharia) criticism of the

organization focused on its name, later on, he criticized the idea

of having an organization. My personal feeling is that his views

changed. The turning point was certainly the meeting at the

Presidential Palace that took place October 2012, after the

American Embassy incidents when the President invited a group of

clerics as representative of the movement.

FM: What were your views on the meeting? 

I: The youth of the movement were against this meeting. It was a

mistake, and we are not ashamed to admit this before our sheikhs.

If the state wants to open a dialogue, it has to come to us and

not the opposite. There is a saying from the classical era: “If

one that goes to princes, it is because something is not clear.”

This was the first point we disagreed on. There is a second one

and it regards Khamis Majri’s attitude vis-a-vis Moncef Marzouki.

When Majri met with Marzouki, he referred to him as “Honorable

President of the Republic.” Why did he not just call him

“president?” Why did he need to say “honorable?” This was the

second point we disagreed on. 

The feeling of bitterness increased after some sheikhs approached

us. In the middle of clashes with police in Dawar Hisher, they

contacted us and insinuated that we should go back home. They said

this as we were under siege in the middle of a battle (in

reference to the clashes between a group of Salafis and police in

the aftermath of a gang quarrel in the neighborhood. Four young

Salafis died and a policeman was wounded). We were still trying to

recover the body of our slain brother from the police station. In

this context, all they had to say was “go back home,” without

discussing or trying to understand our reasons.

They acted just like the others (the politicians), in an elitist

manner. Abu Iadh is not like that. He always takes time to discuss

issues with us, and decisions are taken together. He respects us

and treats us as equals. This is exactly the opposite of the

attitude of our sheikhs. What did they do in this palace? Who has

delegated them with the power to negotiate with the state? Who

gave them the right to speak in the name of the entire movement? 

Later on, they (the sheikhs) wanted to organize a meeting in

Ennour Mosque, the mosque where the clashes with police happened.

The guy from the mosque's committee refused, they ended up holding

their meeting in a mosque in Ettadhamen.

FM: What is the situation now? Where are you today?

I: At this stage, things have changed and we are back under

pressure. The period of freedom is over. We knew that it would not

last. We were expecting that. Our activities are now completely

suspended. We are not even able to organize our third congress as

it was scheduled.

FM: What is your reaction to this?

I: In response to this campaign, we came up with a new campaign

that we called “The International Campaign to Join Ansar al-

Sharia." We call on all Salafis, the young and the sheikhs to join

us. We called it an "nternational campaign" because we insist that

Tunisia is a model that can be exported. We want to realize our

project peacefully; we want to realize the jihad through dawa. And

we think that everybody that shares the same objectives can

identify himself under “Ansar al-Sharia,” which means nothing but

“partisan of Sharia.”