INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE

UNIVERSITY OF WROCŁAW

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DORIAN C. ZAPATA RIOJA

INTERNET GOVERNANCE

FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE

Master Thesis

Political Science

Supervisor, Prof. Dr. Hab. Jacek Sroka

WROCŁAW - POLAND

2014

INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA

Index

Chapter I. Introduction 4

I.1. Research questions 6

Chapter II. The Births of the Internet 7

Chapter III. Internet Governance 15

III.1. Paradigms of Global Media and Communication Policy 15

III.2. Definition and evolution of Internet Governance 18

III.3. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN) 25

III.3.1. Some Internet Governance's technical features 25

III.3.2. Structure of ICANN 30

III.3.3. ICANN's Political Struggles: Representation and Legitimacy 34

Chapter IV. The Multistakeholder Model (MSM) 38

IV.1. WSIS and IGF: The rise of the Multi-stakeholder Model 38

IV.2. The MSM and the Third Sector 42

Chapter V. The South and Internet governance 48

V.1. National governments' voices 48

V.2. Brazil and NETmundial 56

Chapter VI. Conclusions: Global South & Internet Governance 73

Chapter VII. Bibliography 85

Annex I. About the Author. Contact details 97

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Internet Governance

From a Global South Perspective

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Chapter I. Introduction

The present research intends to contribute to the academic debate regarding Internet

governance from a Global South perspective. Of particular interest for the research are the

organizational arrangements the Internet governance has on the global level and how the

legitimate oversight of some central Internet resources have contemporaneously posited

challenges to the way governance is imagined and constructed on a transnational scale.

Basic questions in this regard are how and who should rule the Internet? This implies

different conceptions on which agents —national States, civil society, intergovernmental

organizations, technical organizations and so on— have or should have the legitimate

power to regulate the Internet and under which organizational regulatory schemes or

bodies.

In this aim, the research pays attention, in Chapter II, to the origins of the Internet as a

transformative information and communications technology. Later on, the definition and

evolution of Internet Governance are addressed in Chapter III. For this aim, an introductory

approach is set by an overview of the paradigms of Global Media and Communications

Policy (GMPC).

Further, the definition and evolution of the term ‘Internet governance’ is advanced on a

theoretical level; in its technological aspects with an emphasis on the political and

regulatory issues the term brings about; and finally, analyzing the role of Nation-states,

intergovernmental organizations, technical organizations and civil society around the topic.

For the chapter regarding Internet governance, it is crucial to outline a description of

one of the central and most controversial technical regulatory organizations of the Internet,

that is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The

corporation is of special interest due to the political struggles it had brought about in the

past 15 years; mainly regarding its linkages to the US government and its organizational

structure. Being a global Internet regulatory organization, it has been the locus for many

debates around legitimacy and representation.

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ICANN has an organizational structure referred to as a Multi-stakeholder model (MSM).

The understanding of the MSM is fundamental for the contemporary debate about Internet

governance because as an organizational arrangement, it can take different shapes and

forms depending on which actor advances it. Hence, Chapter IV tackles the rise of the

MSM at the inter-governmental level, specifically, at the World Summit on Information

Society (2003-2005) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF); subsequently, the MSM is

addressed in its conceptual framework with its respective problématiques and criticism.

Chapter V depicts three main stances taken by nation-states —and other agents—

regarding the shape and organizational arrangements the Internet Governance should

have. Categorized in 'Cyber-sovereignists', 'Status quo advocates' and 'Moderate

approach advocates', the chapter presents the different proposals of particular states or

group of states since 2011, mainly at intergovernmental fora.

The second section of Chapter V portrays the role of Brazil regarding internet

governance, chiefly by its involvement as a leading organizer and host of NETmundial, a

Global Multistakeholder meeting on the Future of the Internet, held in São Paulo on April

2014. NETmundial had as chief objectives the elaboration of a set of international

principles for the Internet governance and to outline a road-map for the future

developments of the internet governance ecosystem. The outcomes of the meeting are

addressed in its successes but also in its shortcomings. The latter, taking particular

consideration to a comparison between the Brazilian national experience on regulating the

Internet; the outcome document of NETmundial, the São Paulo statement; and the

international context provided by Edward Snowden's leaks.

Finally, in Chapter VI the conclusions depart from a critical perspective regarding the

overall current situation of the Internet governance regulatory arrangements and

proposals. Deriving out of a Global South perspective, understood as a paradigm that can

broad the Internet governance debate regarding which model should be implemented, we

suggest a more comprehensive, inclusive and participatory Multistakeholder Model for the

global Internet Governance.

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I.1. Research questions

Main question

- Is the Global South able to contribute to a new model of Internet Governance for the

21st century?

Complementary questions

- What are the origins of the Internet and its implications for the regulatory

arrangements Internet governance has contemporaneously?

- Who regulates the Internet?

- What are the different stances the actors at the transnational level advance regarding

an organizational model for Internet governance? And, what is the role of ICANN in

these matters?

- What is the Multistakeholder model? And, is there a fixed unique way to understand

the model?

- What is the importance of civil society or the Third sector in Internet governance?

- What is the role of Brazil in the contemporary global Internet governance debate and

future global arrangements?

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Chapter II. The Births of the Internet

It is not essential for the research goals to explain the technical origins of the Internet,

however, a brief recount of the innovations, conditions and institutions that gave birth to

the Network of networks is necessary for contextual purposes. As a term constructed by

the community of users of the Internet, Wikipedia's definition of the Internet understands it

as:

“A global system of interconnected computer networks that use the standard

Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) to link several billion devices worldwide. It is an

international network of networks that consists of millions of private, public, academic,

business, and government packet switched networks, linked by a broad array of

electronic, wireless, and optical networking technologies. The Internet carries an

extensive range of information resources and services, such as the inter-linked

hypertext documents and applications of the World Wide Web (WWW), the

infrastructure to support email, and peer-to-peer networks for file sharing and

telephony.”

In the study field of Internet governance, the term Internet is not enough to grasp all the

angles of the global digital developments. In this sense, much of the studies make

reference to two other concepts: Information society and information and communication

technology (ICT). These two include areas outside the internet domain, for example,

mobile telephone communications. However, the term Internet prevails in the discussion of

governance because of the rapid transition from global communications towards the use of

Internet Protocol (IP) as the main communications technical standard. (Kurbalija, 2010: p.

6)

From a historical perspective, the Internet has its begginings around the 1960s with the

U.S. Defense Department's Agency Research Projects Administration (ARPA), created in

1958 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. ARPA was conceived with the aim of launching

and executing research and development projects to expand the frontiers of technology

and science, and to reach far beyond immediate military requirements.

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Contextually, the origins of the Internet can be traced to the Post Second World War

and the Cold War period, when the United States government intended to create a system

that allowed computer systems to communicate with each other in the face of possible

nuclear warfare. In this sense, the envisioning of a decentralized network of computer

systems is attributed to Paul Baran. (Bing, 2009: p. 9) 1

According to Jon Bing: ‘the development of the atomic bomb ushered in an era of

global tension (...) helped stimulate some of the conceptual work that inspired

development of the Internet.’ The challenge for the US military was ensuring the launch of

atomic bombs from a control facility linked by telecommunications to a Strategic Air

Command. In this sense, Paul Baran's research proposed the distinction between two

types of communication networks: (A) centralized (or star) networks; or (C) distributed (or

grid or mesh) networks; finally addressing an intermediate network, (B) the decentralized

networks as a type along the spectrum from centralized to distributed. (ibid., pp. 8-10) [See

Fig. 1]

Figure 1. Baran's diagrammatic categorization of communications networks: Centralized, decentralized, and distributed networks. Source: Bygrave, 2009: p.9.

In the context of its military uses, ‘(…) a centralized network is highly vulnerable, as the

nodes will not be able to communicate if the centre is taken out. Therefore, these were not

Paul Baran was born in Poland in 1926, and followed his parents to the United States in 1928. He attended Drexel 1

University, Philadelphia, and his first job was with the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation. Taking night classes at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), he earned an engineering Master’s degree in 1959 (Bygrave, 2009: p.9)

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well suited to ensure secure communication between the central command and a launch

control facility. It is possible to calculate network performance as a function of the

probability of destruction for each separate node. Baran concludes that: “It appears that

what would today be regarded as an unreliable link can be used in a distributed network

almost as effectively as perfectly reliable links.”’ (Baran,1964 cited in Bing, 2009: p.11)

However, Baran's vision of a decentralized network did not see the light as such, it

stayed for a time in the form of reports (Bing, 2009: p.12). The deployment and

implementation of a decentralized communication network had its first impulse with

ARPAnet. ‘ARPA grouped together several young, ambitious computer scientists, including

Paul Baran (...). In the process, ARPA gave birth to a network quite different from the

centralized system of the telephone company (i.e., AT&T), which relied on analogue

information: rather, digitization facilitated a decentralized, then distributed network

(...)’ (Warf, 2013: p. 14)

Despite the military research purposes referred as the most commonplace for the birth

of the Internet, it must be acknowledged that the Internet was the creation of different and

disperse individuals who, step by step, solved technical matters in order to create a

communication system that had no center. In fact, the evolution of the Internet was

developed in its early years in conjunction with several United States' university

departments; ‘the entire realm of digital communication was developed through

government-subsidized-and-directed research during the post–World War II decades,

often by the military and leading research universities’ (McChesney, 2013: p.130).

Certainly, ARPAnet connected agencies and projects of the United States Defense

Department's Agency, but the nucleus of what would become ARPAnet also connected

universities such as Stanford, UCLA, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the

University of Utah. The first ARPAnet linkage began in 1969. (Sylvan, 2014: p.29)

ARPAnet, as the Internet predecessor, ‘was designed with no central control so that the

system would be neutral or dumb, leaving the power to develop specific applications to

people on the edges, who could participate as they wished. (Naughton, 2012 cited in

McChesney, 2013: p.130). ‘(...) decentralized control meant all machines on the network

were, more or less, peers. No one computer was in charge.’ (Landau, 2010 cited in

McChesney, 2013: p.130)

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The term Internet was coined in the mid-1970s with the invention of the Transmission

Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), these were authorized as the sole protocol in

ARPAnet in 1983; and with the expansion in the late 1980s of the worldwide TCP/IP

network, the latter took the shape of what we know today as the Internet. (Sylvan, 2014: p.

29; Kurbalija, 2010: p.7)

ARPAnet was not designed for sending messages but for sharing resources under two

main services: Telnet and File Transport Protocol (FTP). Telnet made possible to sit at one

location and work on a computer placed somewhere else. The file transport protocol

allowed files to be moved from one computer to the other. (Bing, 2009: p.28). Nonetheless,

in 1972, Ray Tomlinson adapted computer messages for personal use, inventing the E-2

mail. (Warf, 2013: p.14)

Besides E-mail, other new services emerged, in 1975 network mailing lists;

NewsGroups; Message Services Group, or MsgGroup; and Multiplayer games appeared.

‘Along with this increased use came also informal rules for behaviour and sanctions for

violating them—often referred to as netiquette.’ (Bing, 2009: p.30)

In the view of Robert McChesney, the early Internet was not only non-commercial but

anti-commercial. For most of the users during the 60s and 70s, the internet was

envisioned as a space of ‘egalitarianism and cooperation, not competition and

profits.’ (McChesney, 2013: p.133). Further developments will eventually undermine these

feautres coined by the first community of users.

On 12 August 1981, IBM released its first Personal Computer or PCs. The PC in its first

stage was not connected to the network, instead, it came to replace the traditional

typewriter of the office desk. In this sense, the first PCs were used in commercial

companies for word-processing and spreadsheets. The latter changed when Ethernet

became widespread. Ethernet was a commercial solution by Xerox PARC that consisted of

a Local Area Network (LAN), that means connecting computers together. The expansion in

commercial companies of the use of the Ethernet made possible that ‘two LANs using

Ethernet could interconnect through the ARPANET hub.’ (Bing, 2009: pp.34-5)

Tomlinson became well known for his mail system. Yet his real fame is related to the single sign: ‘@’. (Bygrave,2

2009: p.10)

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Contemporaneously, by the end of the 1970s, there was a preoccupation among the

research community about the access to ARPAnet. ‘The number of academic computer

science departments in the United States exceeded 100, while only 15 of the then more

than 60 ARPANET nodes were located within universities.’ The latter meant that

universities not linked to Defense research projects funded by the U.S. government were

excluded from the network. In this context, the National Science Foundation (NSF), acting

on behalf of the whole scientific community, emerged as a major player interested in the

network. (Bing, 2009: p.31)

By 1985 a US' National network was advanced. The NSF built the backbone for the

network and the National Science Foundation Network (NSFnet) was born. ‘Academic

institutions in a given geographical area were offered to establish a community network;

the NSF would then give this network access to the backbone network. Not only would the

regional networks get access to the backbone but also to each other. The NSF provided

the backbone as a “free good”, but grants to connect campuses to regional networks were

limited to two years; after that time, the universities had to pay for the regional connections

themselves.’ (Bing, 2009: p.32).

Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the National Science Foundation took

control of the network and ARPAnet was incorporated into the NSFnet. Moreover, the

NSFnet explicitly limited the network to noncommercial uses. Veritably, during the 70s and

80s ‘the computer professionals and students who comprised the Internet community

“deliberately cultivated an open, non-hierarchical culture that imposed few restrictions on

how the network could be used.’ (Adler, 2012 cited in McChesney, 2013: p.133) 3

At the dawn of the 1990s, in the midst of the consolidation of the PC and the expansion

of the NSFnet, office programs started to be developed, improved and introduced. The

MS-DOC which is a character-driven interface was replaced by more user-friendly and

less technical office interfaces, for example, Windows was introduced by Apple's

Macintosh. The more easy-to-use interfaces allowed graphics, mouse interaction and click

for navigation. (Bing, 2009: p.44)

Rebecca MacKinnon calls this the digital commons, which would provide the foundation for all subsequent 3

commercial applications. The hacker culture that emerged in that period was typified by its commitment to free and available information, hostility to centralized authority and secrecy, and the joy of learning and knowledge. (McChesney, 2013: p.134)

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Meanwhile, at the European Particle Physics Lab (CERN), Tim Berners-Lee, a British

computer scientist often called the father of the web, created the hypertext and Universal

Resource Locators (URLs). This latter, a system of addresses used on what would

become the World Wide Web (WWW). (Bing, 2009: p.40). The WWW in plain words is a

system of interlinked hypertext documents that are accessed via the Internet. With a web

browser, one can view web pages that may contain text, images, videos, and other

multimedia and navigate between them via hyperlinks.

With the deployment of the World Wide Web and the appearance of user-friendly

internet browsers like Mosaic , Netscape and Internet Explorer, in addition to an interlinked 4

infrastructure already in place, that is LANs hooked up to the Internet through commercial

Internet Service Providers (ISPs), the internet become a place of convergence for an

immense variety of possible activities ranging from education, communication, even

entertainment. (Bing, 2009: pp.44-5)

Further, the first commercial e-mail message was sent on April 1994, however, it was

rejected by a large portion of the net users. The advertiser sender's address email was

clogged by messages 'demanding that the sales pitch be removed and such conduct

never be repeated'. 'This internal policing by Internet users was based on the assumption

that commercialism and an honest, democratic public sphere do not mix.’ According to

McChesney, during the growth and expansion of the Internet, the Internet community of

users was distressed because of the ‘growth of patents and efforts by commercial interests

to make proprietary what had once been open and free.’ (McChesney, 2013: pp.134-6) In

this context, the Open Software Movement has an important role since the 1980s.

Despite the reservations about the commercial uses, on August 1995, Netscape went

public and inaugurated the “dot com” boom. 'In the United States, and to a limited extent

elsewhere, new Internet services providers (AOL, MSN) and later large content and e-

commerce applications (Yahoo, @Home, eBay) aimed to take advantage of the network's

power and scope. A myriad of smaller, more specialized applications also emerged that

Together with Eric Bina, Marc Andreessen developed Mosaic. “It permitted richer formatting with tags like ‘center’, 4

and included an ‘image’ tag that allowed the inclusion of images on web pages. It also had a graphical interface and —like most of the early web browsers (though not the original CERN ‘linemode browser’)— clickable buttons and hyperlinks; rather than using reference numbers which the user had to type in for accessing the linked documents, hyperlinks allowed the user simply to click the link.” (Bing, 2009: p.41)

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built their businesses on powerful, cheaper PCs, broadband networking at the office, and

widespread narrowband networking in the home.’ (Cowhey, 2009: p.23)

Echoing these developments, during the 1990s the Internet control was privatized via a

consortium of telecommunications corporations. The NSFnet turned its backbone to the

private sector and the internet became global through the ‘integration of existing

telephone, fiber-optic, and satellite systems, which was made possible by the

technological innovation of packet switching, TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/

Internet Protocol), and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), in which individual

messages may be decomposed, the constituent parts transmitted by various channels,

and then reassembled, virtually instantaneously, at the destination.’ (…). ‘Soon thereafter

private web browsers sprouted like mushrooms (…) The number of websites grew

exponentially, from roughly 1 million in 1990 to more than 4 billion in 2011.’ (Warf, 2013:

pp.14-5)

Following Marc Raboy, and from a country-based perspective of the development of

the Internet, until the mid-1990s ‘the information society project was driven first separately

by the US and the European Union, and then as a project of the G7 (now G8)’. In this

context, the global information infrastructure was developed under the idea of spreading

the information technology via join efforts of private enterprise and governments with

‘emphasis from the state to the private sector for initiative, innovation and capital

investment to develop the new information infrastructures for global commerce, finance,

communication and social services. In all of these grand designs, people were still

nowhere to be seen.’ (Raboy, 2004: p.227).

In this light, for the father of the internet Tim Berners-Lee, ‘it would have been

“unthinkable” to patent it or ask for fees. The point of the Internet was “sharing for the

common good.”’ But when the market exploded in the 1990's ‘“patents became the rage”

creating “unnecessary and dangerous monopolies”. By 1999, Berners-Lee wondered “if

the Internet was becoming a “technical dream or a legal nightmare.”’(Berners-Lee, 1999

cited in McChesney, 2013: p.136)

To conclude this section, it can be noted that the history of the Internet showcases that

this communication technology had several birth sources: a) It was a structure conducted

by the US Defense Department through ARPA and ARPAnet, that is, government-funded

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research in the context of the Cold War; b) there was also a central involvement of US'

university research departments and other technical centers located in the developed

world; and c) the work of dispersed and different individuals and the private sector which

contributed with innovations that allowed the consolidation of what we know nowadays as

the Internet.

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Chapter III. Internet Governance

According to Laura DeNardis, Internet governance studies are a subset of the broader

Internet Research and Internet studies. In the same manner, Internet governance, as a

practice, is narrower than the broader area of information and communication technology

(ICTs) policies. (DeNardis, 2014 p.19).

However, because the research pays attention to the institutional arrangements that

apply to policy-making related to the Internet, we have to understand the Internet as part

of a broader category, that is, the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).

For this purpose, in the first section below, we are obliged to introduce the evolution of the

institutional structures that have defined the Global Media and Communication Policy

(GMCP) in the past forty years.

III.1. Paradigms of Global Media and Communication Policy

For Don MacLean there is a difference between the institutional structures that define

Media and Communication Policy (MCP) at the nation-state level and at the global level.

Firstly, he suggests that at the national level there are legal frameworks that provide

institutional structures with policy and regulatory responsibility of carriage and content

aspects of MCP; processes for carrying out these responsibilities; and procedures for

resolving conflicts. This more defined institutionalization at the national level allows

commercial and non-commercial sectors, MCP stakeholders and the general public to

engage in MCP policy-making and regulation. Differently, at the global stage, because of

the absence of global political authority and a comprehensive Global Media and

Communication Policy (GMCP) legal framework, analogous mechanisms found at the

national level cannot be grasped. Furthermore, he remarks that at the level of GMPC

institutions, there is little role for members of the public. (Maclean, 2011: p.47)

Following the latter, MacLean depicts a framework of the major paradigm shifts in

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GMPC over the past 30 to 40 years, hence the changes in the policy agendas of decision-

making procedures in GMCP institutions. He notes that these developments have been

constructed by the interaction of dominant and non-dominant policy paradigms which are

the product of technological, economic, and social forces; power differences of developed

and developing countries and/or between different stakeholder groups in traditional hybrid

or emerging multi-stakeholder organizations. (Maclean, 2011: p.49) [See Fig. 2]

Figure 2. Evolutionary model for GMCP institutions. Source: Maclean, 2011: p.50

The four policy paradigms product of the interplay depicted in the Figure 2 are:

1. The traditional public service paradigm, which discerns the government as the main

agent guiding the media and communication sector by public ownership or regulatory

oversight. Focused mainly on the internal structure of the telecommunications and

broadcasting sectors.

2. The economic paradigm, that identifies the private sector and market forces as the

agents for the development of media and communication technologies and services.

Under this paradigm, the government's role must be reduced for enabling the market to

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work its ways. Moreover, it sees the private sector as an enabler for innovation and

improvement of society. This paradigm displaced the national service paradigm in the

1970s and 1980s.

3. The technological paradigm, as a product of the rise of ICTs in the 1980s and 1990s,

sees media and communication as the fundamental infrastructure for all economic and

social activities in the so-called information society. This paradigm foresees the

transformation of the economy, the social and the governance structures from ‘a top-down,

hierarchical, command-and-control organizational models’ to ‘bottom-up, democratic,

participative arrangements’ due to the developments of ICTs. In this view, the role of

governmental and intergovernmental policy is minor, even though ‘public authorities did

have an important part to play in helping to construct the information society by using ICTs

to transform policy-making processes and public services’. Moreover, under this paradigm,

technical and civil society organizations are recognized as the most important actors of

GMCP.

4. The emerging social paradigm, which began to be developed in the 2000s as a

forerunner of the previous paradigms, sees economic stability, social security, and

environmental sustainability problems, but also opportunities to restore balance in these

areas by linking the possible solutions to the developments of ICTs. In this view, there is a

recognition of the role of the state in promoting rights, freedom, equality and justice;

however, there is the acknowledgment that neither national nor international policy-making

and regulatory models are completely effective in addressing the transnational, highly

distributed and real-time world the ICTs are creating, hence new models of governance

should be erected.

One of the central notions of the last paradigm is the multi-stakeholder model of

governance, to be addressed more profoundly later on in this research; however, it must

be stated herein that the multistakeholder model can be understood as a consequence of

the framework that this paradigm offers. That is, the global issues related to GMCP cannot

be resolved anymore by separated actors, i.e. government, private sector, or civil society.

(Maclean, 2011: pp.51-4)

Finally, and following MacLean, one important caveat must be mentioned. Even though

the latter paradigms have dominated the GMPC, that does not mean they have been

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universally accepted. Every paradigm shift mentioned above has actually emerged in

developed countries, at ‘individual countries, in bilateral relations between nations, in

regional groupings such as the European Union, and in communities of interest such as

the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’; and later on

adopted by GMPC institutions. (Maclean, 2011: p.53) In this sense, during every paradigm

shift launched from the Developed countries, the Developing countries have also created

alternatives and counter-paradigms.

III.2. Definition and evolution of Internet Governance

For DeNardis, the main role of Internet governance comprehends the ‘design and

administration of the technologies necessary to keep the Internet operational and the

enactment of substantive policy around these technologies.’(DeNardis, 2014: p.6)

In our perspective, a more accurate and broad definition is provided by Milton Mueller

who defines Internet governance as the ‘ongoing set of disputes and deliberations over

how the Internet is coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect policies.’ (Mueller, 2010:

p.9)

Mueller posits that the term Internet governance is many times misunderstood in the

sense that it doesn't imply a top-down regulation or control over the Internet. In contrast,

the use of the word governance implies a sense that is weaker than the term government.

With that in mind, governance designates ‘the coordination and regulation of

interdependent actors in the absence of an overarching political authority.’ (Rosenau and

Czempiel, 1992 cited in Mueller, 2010: pp.8-9)

Another broad definition of internet governance is the one provided by the World

Summit on the Information Society (WSIS):

‘Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the

private sector, and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms,

rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and

use of the Internet.’ (WSIS, 2005)

Overall, the concept of Internet governance is still a debated one. Internet Governance

means different things to different actors, and a more comprehensive understanding can

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be extracted from the evolution of the term. For example, because the internet-users of the

early decades considered the network as a ‘regulatory-free zone’, the term Internet

governance was strongly resisted. (Drissel, 2006: p.299).

This negative stance towards governance had its cause in one of the main features of

the internet, its distributed nature. The distributed nature of the internet implies that ‘data

packets can take different paths through the network, avoiding traditional barriers and

control mechanisms.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: p.7). In accordance with this technological principle,

the regulation of the internet in its early stages was developed by the net-users creating

‘virtual transatlantic networks and non-governmental managerial structures’. Organizations

such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) —established in 1986— or the Internet

Society (ISOC), managed the development of the Internet through a cooperative,

consensus-based decision-making process which involved a wide variety of individuals

and non-governmental institutions. Kurbalija indicates, ‘there was no central government,

no central planning, and no grand design.’ (Drissel, 2006: p.301; Kurbalija, 2010: p.7)

Despite all the above, the governance of the Internet —and governance of its previous

shapes i.e. ARPAnet and NSFnet— has existed since its beginnings in the 1960s; even if

that meant governance under the previously mentioned non-governmental managerial

structures. ‘Someone has had to establish the standards for how computing devices

interoperate. Someone has coordinated the distribution of the unique Internet addresses

necessary for devices to exchange information over the Internet. Someone has responded

to Internet security problems.’ Indeed, as posited by DeNardis, the governance of the

technological infrastructure of the internet has always been a locus of competition between

companies and states and largely out of the public view. (DeNardis, 2014: p.18)

What is more, with the increasing massification of access to the World Wide Web, and

the Internet achieving a global scope, a new range of issues arose around Internet

governance. State and business interests became more and more proactive in the future

development of the network. In 1994, consonantly to the process of privatization that

framed the decade of the 90s, the National Science Foundation (NSF), until then in charge

of the key infrastructure of the Internet, subcontracted a private U.S. company 'Network

Solutions Inc. (NSI)' for the management of the Domain Name System. ‘The decision was

not taken well by the Internet community and resulted in what is called the “DNS

war”(1994–1998).’ (Kurbalija, 2010: pp.7-8)

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The "DNS war" was the name coined for the debate between International

Organizations (IOs) and States about who should be in charge of designating Domain

Names. The provisional way out of the impasse has been regarded as a unilateral one. In

1998, a new organization was created, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and

Numbers (ICAAN). The non-profit organization became the locus for much of the struggle

about who should govern the Internet.

Before 1998, the term Internet governance referred to a ‘relatively narrow set of policy

issues related to the global coordination of Internet domain names and addresses.’;

however, after the creation of ICAAN, the meaning of Internet governance expanded. As

seen in the definition of the WSIS, there is a tacit acknowledgment of the importance of

non-state actors (Mueller, 2010: p.9) and the need for principles, norms, rules, decision-

making procedures, and programmes. (WSIS, 2005)

For Mueller, there are two main concerns that stand out in the evolution of Internet

governance. One is the creation of ICAAN, perceived as a ‘unilateral construction of a

global regime by the United States, based on a new, nongovernmental model.’ And

second, the United Nations' World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) —in 2003

and 2005— which under a state-centric logic of intergovernmental organizations,

attempted to ‘address the whole range of relevant issues related to the information

society.’ (Mueller, 2010: p.10)

Consonantly, for other authors, the contemporary debate about Internet governance

revolves around a North-South digital divide. This debate has at its core the opposition of

many Developing countries and emerging powers (BRICS) towards the sensed dominance

of a US-centric hybridized model of Internet governance. In these matters, ICAAN has

been one of the decisive points of the dispute due to its links to the United States

Department of Commerce.

On the other hand, there is a concern in the Net Community about the growing number

of Internet regulations with source in the ‘lowest common denominator’, that is, national-

states legislation regimes over the internet. In the view of Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. and

Adam Thierer, ‘hundreds of cyber-cops patrolling the Net’ would be equally as bad as

inviting one single ‘centralized Super Cyber-Cop’. (Thierer & Wayne, 2003: p.xxv-xxvi)

For Mueller, the question driving the discussion is ‘not whether the Net can be

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governed, but whether there is (or should be) something new and different about the way

we do so.’ He postulates that a globally connected information infrastructure requires —or

perhaps is already producing— new global institutions. (Mueller, 2010: p.1) Having that in

mind, the debate leads necessarily to the relationship between nation-state and Global

governance.

Careful attention must be taken to the understanding of Global governance. For Arne

Hintz, based on Held/Mcgree 2003, Global governance does not just relocate policy-

making from one level (nation-state) to the next (global), but it involves qualitative

changes. ‘An illustration of global governance would encompass self-organizing networks

and webs of policy-making fora in which control is dispersed and capacity for decision-

making and implementation is widely distributed, thus “layers of governance spreading

within and across political boundaries” (Held/McGrew, 2003: p.11) in which new actors and

levels have “transformed sovereignty into the shared exercise of power”’ (Hintz, 2007: p.

1).

A set of specific characteristics of Global governance can be depicted as follows:

a) Participation of new actors, particularly from business and civil society;

b) Re-distribution of spaces and policy layers between local and global;

c) Interaction and cooperation between different actors and layers.

(ibid: p.1)

The notion of Global governance is constitutive to the field of Internet governance. The

Internet had posited challenges to the nation-State because of its global or transnational

reach. From this standpoint, Mueller distinguishes five distinct ways in which the Internet

challenges the nation-state. The Internet…

(1) globalizes the scope of communication. Its distance-insensitive cost structure

and non-territorial addressing and routing architecture make borderless

communication the default; any attempt to impose a jurisdictional overlay on it

requires additional (costly) interventions;

(2) facilitates a quantum jump in the scale of communication. It massively enlarges

our capacity for message generation, duplication, and storage. As a programmable

environment, it industrializes information services, information collection, and

information retrieval. The sheer volume of transactions and content on the Internet

often overwhelms the capacity of traditional governmental processes to respond —

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and can transform governmental processes as well;

(3) distributes control. Combined with liberalization of the telecommunications

sector, the Internet protocols decentralized and distributed participation in and

authority over networking and ensured that the decision-making units over network

operations are no longer closely aligned with political units;

(4) grew new institutions. Decision-making authority over standards and critical

Internet resources rests in the hands of a transnational network of actors that

emerged organically alongside the Internet, outside of the nation-state system.

These relatively young but maturing institutions, such as the Internet Engineering

Task Force (IETF), the Regional Internet Address Registries, and the Internet

Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), provide a new locus of

authority for key decisions about standards and critical resources;

(5) changes the polity. By converging different media forms and facilitating fully

interactive communication, the Internet dramatically alters the cost and capabilities

of group action. As a result, radically new forms of collaboration, discourse, and

organization are emerging. This makes it possible to mobilize new transnational

policy networks and enables new forms of governance as a solution to some of the

problems of Internet governance itself. (Mueller, 2010: p.4)

Despite these challenges, it cannot be said that the role of the Nation-state has been

successfully annulled. For MacLean, ‘in spite of globalization, from a legal, institutional,

and policy-making point of view, we still live in a world in which the primary actors are

sovereign nation-states. This means that the legal authorities, policy-making

responsibilities, and operational capacities of most global media and communication policy

(GMCP) institutions depend largely or exclusively on the decisions of national

governments.’ (Maclean, 2011: p.45)

Conversely, Pierre Mounier depicts an Internet fragmented into small semi-private

spaces in which ‘governance is administered within restricted areas of legitimacy’.

(Brousseau et al., 2012: p.15). Following this description, Eric Brousseau et. al. introduces

the notion of Heterarchic governance. ‘A heterarchy is a system of organization replete

with overlap, multiplicity, mixed ascendancy and/or divergent but coexistent patterns of

relationships.’ (Brousseau et al.: 2012; p.16).

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At the Internet governance field, heterarchy translates into ‘new forms of legitimacies

acquired or regained through the mutual recognition of different actors or norm designers.

Such a process has most notably been undertaken by intergovernmental organizations

(IGOs) and non-governmental organizations’ (Brousseau et al., 2012: p.17). Furthermore,

Brousseau posits that the described heterarchical system stands in need of a meta-

heterarchical level in order to administer the interactions between components of a

complex system. (Jessop, 2003 cited in Brousseau et al., 2012: p.18)

In the same track of mind, DeNardis introduces the image of key gatekeepers in the

field of Internet governance. That is, in the networked heterarchy, there are public

spaces privately regulated by actors that have a central authority, i.e. ICAAN in the

management of the domain name system (DNS) and internet protocol (IP) addresses.

(DeNardis, 2009 cited in Brousseau et al., 2012: p.18). However, admitting the heterarchy

of Internet governance and the privatization of governance does not invalidate the role of

nation-states. ‘Indeed, state control of Internet governance functions via private

intermediaries has equipped states with new forms of sometimes unaccountable and

nontransparent power over information flows.’ (DeNardis, 2014: p.15)

Problematizing more the Internet governance landscape, Mueller points us to the

movement from informal and de facto associations to formal organizations; ‘from loose

consensual or cooperative action to the adoption of binding, agreed procedures.’ In one

word, institutionalization. For Mueller, institutionalization points out parties involved in

regular interactions understanding and accepting certain norms, conventions, and

explicitly formulated rules governing their interaction, moreover, that these rules can be

enforced. In short, a process of shaping the future of Internet governance via the

negotiations of governance problems upon the rise of transnational networked forms of

organizations.

Mueller identifies four possible ways in which the network organizations shaped around

the Internet can lead to institutional change. First, by formalizing and institutionalizing the

network relations themselves; second, by states' attempts to impose hierarchical

regulation upon networked forms; third, by states’ utilization and adoption of networked

forms and: fourth, by changing the polity; namely, by realigning and expanding the

associative clusters around governance institutions. (Mueller, 2010: p.46)

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In the aim to set aside an actors-based notion of Internet governance, more technical

reviews of the field can be advanced, for example, DeNardis proposes that Internet

governance refers to the ‘technologies that are unique to the Internet and deal with

interoperability among devices and the management of networked information flows

between these devices’. However, she also admits that even though Internet governance

is constituted by scientific and technological matters, it also conveys social reflections of

power and authority. Therefore, a central issue in the field of Internet governance is the

balance of power among nation-states and non-territorial and privatized mechanisms.

Additionally, the question that comes into the picture is one already proposed by Mueller

and reverberated by DeNardis ‘to what extent problems of Internet governance have

created new global institutions and what are the implications for prevailing political

structures.’ (DeNardis; 2014 pp. 22, 8, 23):

‘The diffuse nature of Internet governance technologies is shifting historic control

over these public interest areas from traditional nation-state bureaucracy to private

ordering and new global institutions. Many of these governance functions are

technically and institutionally complicated and therefore out of public view. Yet how

conflicts over Internet governance are settled will determine some of the most

important public interest issues of our time.’ (DeNardis, 2014: p.1)

Following the above, an additional and pivotal contemporary matter of contention for the

Internet governance field is constituted by the tension between a multistakeholder model

of governance and the possible step in of broader governmental control by the United

Nations' International Telecommunications Union (ITU). (DeNardis, 2014: p.31). In sum,

the debate over Internet governance ‘focuses on what type of regulatory body (if any) is

needed for maintaining an effective, smoothly functioning, Internet.’ (Drissel, 2006: p.300)

Because of these last considerations, at the next section, we pay attention to the

technical matters around one the most controversial institutions that govern Critical

Internet Resources (CIRs), that is, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names

and Numbers (ICANN). The corporation will be addressed not only in its technical Internet

governance features but also, more intensively, in its organizational structure and the

international controversies around the institution itself.

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III.3. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN)

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a non-profit

corporation established in 1998, based in California, United States. Being a non-profit

organization, it acts under Californian State law. Its creation was possible via the

establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the US Department of

Commerce, which delimited its functions. (McLaughlin & Pickard, 2005: p.361; Kurbalija,

2010: p.171)

ICAAN is responsible for the management and oversight of central internet

infrastructure, i.e., the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, domain names, and root

servers. The corporation is referred to as the main actor in Internet governance, however,

it does not govern the whole Internet, it does not have authority over ‘cybersecurity,

content policy, copyright protection, protection of privacy, maintenance of cultural diversity,

or bridging the digital divide.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: p.171) Nevertheless, it has central authority

on matters related to Critical Internet Resources (CIRs).

III.3.1. Some Internet Governance's technical features

A point of start to understand the technological features of Internet governance is the

technical premise that there are some ‘points of centralized control’ at the virtual

infrastructure of the Internet. These are the Critical Internet resources (CIRs), which are

‘Internet-unique logical resources rather than physical infrastructural components’. The

physical infrastructure, i.e., power grid, fiber optic cables, and switches, are part of the

critical Internet infrastructure also, but they are not CIRs. CIRs are global universal unique

identifiers and require some sort of central administration and coordination. The

deployment of the physical infrastructure is independent of the CIRs and does not precise

central coordination. (DeNardis, 2014: pp.34-6)

Two of the CIRs are important in the debate that regards Internet governance, namely

the Domain Name System (DNS) and the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. A brief

explanation of the technical matters of this two, plus its technological management, is

unavoidable for the purposes of this research.

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Domain Name System (DNS). In order for a person read news online, send emails,

access social media or any other task that involves surfing the web, the domain names are

crucial. ‘DNS handles Internet addresses (such as google.com) and converts them to IP

numbers.’(Kurbalija, 2010: p.41) The DNS translates numerical IP addresses —the

language of computers that consists in zeros (0) and ones (1)— into ordinary language

equivalents through a hierarchical naming system (Maclean, 2011: p.44).

‘Domains are administrative entities. The purpose and expected use of domains is to

divide the name management required of a central administration and assign it to sub-

administration.’ (Postel cited in DeNardis, 2014: p.43) In this sense, DNS is subdivided into

three categories, generic Top Level Domains (gTLD), sponsored Top Level Domains

(sTLD) and country code Top Level Domains (ccTLD).

• generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs), include Domains as: <.com>, <.info>,

<.net> and <.org>. In theory, the gTLDs can be obtained by anyone. For example, if

someone wants to have the address on the web <www.pants.com>, there is a

requirement to get permission from some sort of authority to obtain that particular

website address.

• Sponsored Top Level Domains (sTLDs), reserved only for specific industries.

For example <.aero> which is only open to air transport industry or <.edu> reserved

only for the education sector.

• country code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs), as the name of the category

claims, these are limited to a specific country, i.e. <.uk> for the United Kingdom;

<.cn> for China; <.bo> for Bolivia, and so on. (Kurbalija, 2010: p.41)

The gTLDs and the ccTLDs were created in 1984 and each top-level domain space is

divided into sub-domains in an arrangement that presents the form of a hierarchical

t ree. [See F ig . 3 ] For example in a un i form resource locator (URL)

like www.hks.harvard.edu, <.edu> is the Top Level domain, <.harvard> the second-level

domain, and <.hks>, that stands for Harvard Kennedy School, is the third level domain.

(DeNardis, 2014: p.44)

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http://www.hks.harvard.edu/




Figure 3. DNS Hierarchy. Source: DeNardis, 2014: p.52

For every single gTLD, there is a Registry or a name server that maintains the address

list. For example, the <.com> gTLD is managed by VeriSign . Also, to complicate the 5

terminology, different from the Registry, there are also Registrars, which perform a function

of selling the Top Level domains. In some cases, the function of Registry and Registrars

are under the same operator. In sum, every sub-domain is maintained by a Registry

operator which is responsible for maintaining a database of names and associated IP

addresses for every domain name registered within a given TLD. (DeNardis, 2014;

Kurbalija, 2010)

In the hierarchical distribution of domains, there is a technical apex which consists of

Internet's root name servers and a single master file known as the root zone file, known as

the root zone database. ‘The root zone servers, now mirrored (replicated) around the world

for redundancy and efficiency, are the starting point for the resolution of names into IP

addresses. They publish the definitive file mapping top-level domains into IP addresses.

The root zone file is a relatively small list of names and IP addresses of all the authoritative

DNS servers for top-level domains, including country-code TLDs.’ (DeNardis, 2014: p.44)

The number of root servers is quite small, only thirteen (as display in Fig. 4).

Verisign, Inc. is a US company based in Virginia, United States. It operates a diverse array of network infrastructure, 5

including two of the Internet’s thirteen root name-servers, the authoritative registry for the .com, .net, and name generic top-level domains and the .cc and .tv country-code top-level domains, and the back-end systems for the .jobs, .gov, and .edu top-level domains.

!27


Figure 4. Official IANA List of Internet Root Servers. Source: DeNardis, 2014: p.50

The DNS is a CIR which technological design requires consistency, hierarchy,

universality and some degree of centralized coordination. (DeNardis, 2014: p.44) Over the

Root servers, there is a central authority that oversees the DNS and delegates authority

for each top-level domain to the registry operators. (DeNardis, 2014; Mueller, 2010). This

authority is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The origin of centralized

authority in these matters can be found in one person, Jon Postel, and his role when the

Internet was limited to the United States borders. During the period, Postel and some his

colleagues performed the functions of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)

under a contract of the United States Department of Commerce. However, since the year

2000, and with the global expansion of the Internet, the functions of IANA were placed

under ICAAN; centralizing the control of the global IP address allocation and the root zone

management in the Domain Name System (DNS). (Bing, 2009; Drissel, 2006; DeNardis,

2014; Kurbalija, 2010)

ICANN, via IANA, is in charge of the oversight of the top-level domains (TLDs). In the

sphere of managing the DNS, IANA delegates authority for overseeing each generic top-

level domain to registry operators. There is a registry operator for each country code TLD

!28


and all of the generic TLDs. Some of those registry operators are also domain name

registrars, meaning that they assign domain names to individuals and institutions

requesting these names. Nowadays there are also five Regional Internet Registries

(RIRs):

• AfriNIC: African Network Information Centre (Africa)

• APNIC: Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (Asia-Pacific Regions)

• ARIN: American Registry for Internet Numbers (Canada, United States, North

Atlantic Islands)

• LACNIC: Latin America and Caribbean Network Information Centre (Latin

America, Caribbean)

• RIPE NCC: Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (Europe, Middle

East, parts of central Asia).

(DeNardis, 2014; Kurbalija, 2010)

Through IANA, ICAAN distributes blocks of IP numbers to the five RIRs. These latter

distribute IP numbers to local Internet registries (LIRs) and national Internet registries

(NIRs), which in turn distribute IP numbers to smaller Internet Service Providers (ISPs),

companies, and individuals. [See Fig. 5] (Kurbalija, 2010: p.38)

Figure 5. Institutional System of Internet Address Allocation and Assignment. Source: DeNardis, 2014: p.55

Under this technical scheme, ICANN is composed of three main stakeholder groups:

the RIR's or regional registries of IP addresses; the commercial and non-commercial

registries of generic domain names; and registries of country code domain names

(Maclean, 2011: p.44). However, at the formal structure of ICANN we can find a broader

extension of entities and complexity, this will be addressed in the next section.

!29


III.3.2. Structure of ICANN

The Structure of ICANN is set in the Bylaws of the corporation, lastly amended

on February 7, 2014. ICAAN is managed by a 16-member Board of Directors (Art. VI,

section 2) refereed herein as the Board. The Board acts by a majority vote of all members

(Art. II, section 1) and it is composed of:

a) Eight members selected by a nominating committee on which all the

constituencies of ICANN are represented (Art. VI, section 2);

The voting delegates of the Nominating Committee are selected from the

Generic Names Supporting Organizations , established as follows: 6

a. One delegate from the Registries Stakeholder Group;

b. One delegate from the Registrars Stakeholder Group;

c. Two delegates from the Business Constituency, one representing small

business users and one representing large business users;

d. One delegate from the Internet Service Providers Constituency;

e. One delegate from the Intellectual Property Constituency; and

f. One delegate from consumer and civil society groups, selected by the Non-

Commercial Users Constituency. (Art. VII, Section 2)

b) Two voting members selected by the Address Supporting Organization (Art.

VI, section 2)

The Address Supporting Organization (ASO) performs activities related to policy-

making on IP addresses. It was established by a Memorandum of Understanding

of 21 October 2004 between ICANN and the Number Resource Organization

(NRO), an organization of the existing regional Internet registries (RIRs).(Art.

VIII, section 2)

Any group of individuals or entities may petition the Board for recognition as a new or separate Constituency in the 6

Non-Contracted Parties House.

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c) Two voting members selected by the Country-Code Names Supporting

Organization (Art. VI, section 2)

The Country Code Names Supporting Organization(ccNSO) develops policy-

making on country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs). It comprehends (i) ccTLD

managers that have agreed in writing to be members of the ccNSO and (ii) a

ccNSO Council responsible for managing the policy-development process of the

ccNSO. (Art. IX section2). The ccNSO Council have under its tasks: developing

and recommending to the Board global policies relating to country-code top-level

domains; Nurturing consensus across the ccNSO's community, including the

name-related activities of ccTLDs; and; coordinating with other ICANN

Supporting Organizations, committees, and constituencies under ICANN. (Art.

IX, section1)

d) Two voting members selected by the Generic Names Supporting

Organization (Art. VI, section 2)

The Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) performs activities related

to policy-making on generic top-level domains (gTLDs).

e) An At-Large seat filled by an At-Large Organization (Art. VI, section 2)

The At-Large community intends to represent the interests and concerns of

‘individual users’. In this sense, it acts via the At Large Advisory Committee

(ALAC) which comprehends 2 members of each of the Regional At-Large

Organizations (RALOs) and five members selected by the Nominating

Committee. The five latter must include one citizen of a country within each of

the five Geographic Regions (Art. XI, section 4)

The RALOs are non-profit organization certified by ICANN and there is one for

each Geographic Region, their purpose is to act as ‘the main forum and

coordination point for public input to ICANN in its Geographic Region’ (Art. XI,

section 4-g).

The Geographic Regions recognized by ICANN are Europe; Asia/Australia/

Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean Islands; Africa; and North America. They are

created to “ensure broad international representation on the Board’ (Art. XI,

section 5).

f) A President/CEO, appointed by the Board. (Art. VI, section 2).

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Moreover, ICANN can be also divided into two groups. The first is composed of

Supporting Organizations that directly participate in the policymaking, namely, the Generic

Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), the Country Code Names Supporting

Organization(ccNSO), and the Address Supporting Organization (ASO). These are

‘responsible for recommending policies in a specific subject area to be reviewed and then

approved or rejected by the Board. The second group is composed of advisory groups or

committees that ‘give advice to the Board on any issue that concerns ICANN, including the

policy recommendations made by the Supporting Organizations’ (Doria, 2014: p.130), and

they are supposed to represent the interests and needs of stakeholders that are not

directly part of the Supporting Organizations. The integrants of the second group are

stipulated in the Article XI of ICANN By-Laws:

• Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC)

• At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC)

• Root Server System Advisory Committee

• Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC)

• Technical Liaison Group (TLG)

From this organizational structure, we pay attention to the Governmental Advisory

Committee (GAC), which will serve us to make future remarks on issues of Internet

Governance and topics related to the legitimacy of the current systems of Internet

governance.

The GAC was created in 2002 and has representation from 111 national-states (108

UN members, Cook Islands, Niue, and Taiwan), the Holy See, Hong Kong, Bermuda,

Montserrat, the European Commission, and the African Union Commission. (GACweb,

2014) Conjointly it includes in observer positions a range of multinational governmental,

treaty organizations and public authorities (including all the UN agencies with a direct

interest in global Internet governance such as the ITU, UNESCO, and WIPO). (GACweb,

2014)

The GAC has an advisory character to ICANN's board, therefore, it is not a decision-

making body. Its recommendations have to do with ‘issues of public policy, and especially

where there may be an interaction between ICANN's activities or policies and national

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laws or international agreements.’ It usually meets 3 times a year and enters in

discussions with ICANN's Board and other ICANN Supporting Organizations, Advisory

Committees and other groups. (GACweb, 2014)

For Mueller, ICANN has a ‘dual system of policymaking’. In one hand, based on the

non-state actors, that is, ICANN supporting organizations, and on the other hand, the

governments represented at the GAC. This dual system makes the states only to advise

and participate in the determinations of ICANN, while they are ‘liberated from normal lawful

due process and human rights constraints’, leaving ICANN with a lack of ‘sufficient

external accountability’. (Mueller, 2010: p.243)

Moreover, the Board, under the avalanche of different policy proposals from

‘unintegrated processes and bodies’, decides which policy recommendation to adopt.

Additionally, the GAC interventions, most of the times, do not address issues related to

public interests, on the contrary, it has been used to claim special benefits and powers to

the member governments. (Mueller, 2010: p.244):

‘GAC's most important communiqués and policy advice statements have claimed

special powers over the delegation of country code domains; demanded special

reservations for country names or geographic names in new TLDs; and supported

the ccTLD fast track. The European Union used GAC as the platform to lobby for a

new TLD of its own (.eu).’ (Mueller, 2010: p.244)

For Mueller, the debate about CIRs revolves considerably around the role of national

states and its respective governments. In this vein, he identifies three channels where the

problem flows: ‘(1) the attempt by states to assert a special role for themselves in Internet

“public policy”; (2) debates over the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) within

ICANN; and (3) the controversy over the role of the U.S. government in controlling and

supervising ICANN.’ (Mueller, 2010: p.240)

In that regard, the GAC was created in accordance with the aims of the US Department

of Commerce to limit the role of nation-states in the management of the Internet. However,

in the pursuit of broader levels of legitimacy for ICANN, the presence of the governments

was required in its institutional structure. The incorporation of states in the structure made

ICANN the symbolic locus for the struggle about state roles in the internet governance

!33


field; particularly because some of the developing countries managed to carry out some

reforms to ICANN. Furthermore, other groups of developing countries are even pushing to

make the national-states to have the last word regarding Global Internet governance.

(Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.7)

Finally, while the Internet as a whole does not possess a specific and unique entity that

regulates it, the United States government oversees two main and central technical

organizations that keep the Internet running, namely, ICANN and IANA, the latter, the

administrative branch of the first.

In view of this, during 2013 and 2014, ICANN made several efforts to internationalize or

globalize its structure. It opened hub offices in Singapore, Turkey, and the United States;

and engagement offices in China, Belgium, Switzerland, Uruguay, Korea, and the United

States (DC). It still has headquarters in the United States but intends to have a global

presence. In the view of Avri Doria, these improvements cannot be considered as the

endpoint. ICANN has the challenge to ‘outreach to the global multistakeholder community’,

bringing users and non-users of the DNS from different countries and incorporate their

concerns and goals, balancing the ‘profit motive and well being of registrants, users, and

non-users.’ (Doria, 2014b: p.80)

III.3.3. ICANN's Political Struggles: Representation and Legitimacy

Overall, ICANN has 1) policy authority over the Domain Names Space (DNS); 2)

authority to define IP addresses allocation policies; and 3) the management of the root

zone servers. These centralized regulatory functions have a global reach. (Rioux & Pérez,

2014: pp.39-40). As explained at the previous section on the technical matters, ICANN

has the power to choose who is entitled to a specific domain name and to designate the

number of IP addresses available to particular regions and nations. Important to remark is

that the aforementioned are scarce resources and its allocation is in hands of ICANN.

Furthermore, ICANN has authority over the way the disputes about domain names are

settled; this is done through its Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution

Policy (McLaughlin & Pickard, 2005: p.362); its subsidiary organization, the Domain Name

Supporting Organization (DMSO), is the chief entity in charge of resolving these disputes.

!34


(Drissel, 2006: p.303). The contentions arise from the claims of some states and

international actors which perceive that the allocations of domain names are made

arbitrarily and in a disproportional way, benefiting the developed nations over the

developing ones (McLaughlin & Pickard: 2005: p. 362) or favoring powerful business

interests over smaller firms and associations (Drissel, 2006: p.303).

When revising the literature about ICANN, there is no doubt that the legitimacy of the

institution has been contested since its creation. In the mid-1990s, with the rapid

expansion of the Internet, there was still no legitimate policy-making authority over the

central coordinating functions of the Internet. (Mueller, 2014: p.5) In this context, the so-

called DNS war (1994-1885) breakthrough, bringing different actors into the debate about

who should have control over central governance aspects of the Internet. In view of the

circumstances, the US government envisioned and implemented a solution to the

situation.

The stance of the US government was advanced first in its 1996' Policy statement: A

Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. In the document, the US proposed to solve

the DNS issue through a governance arrangement that recognized the Internet's global

quality without giving power to states or intergovernmental treaties or organizations;

leaving the governance of DNS to a technical community under private contract. (Mueller

& Wagner, 2014: p.5) Moreover, the document was embedded with the worries of the

private business sector, particularly about the negative effects on electronic commerce if

national governments enforced at the global arena of the Internet their different national

laws and regulations. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.5)

By 1998, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an

agency of the United States Department of Commerce, set the policy framework for

ICANN in the White Paper entitled Management of Internet Names and Addresses. The

document invited to recognize the private corporation ICANN as the new administrator of

DNS. The actors involved in the White Paper process attempted to achieve legitimacy for

the new nonprofit corporation by organizing several international meetings, chiefly, through

the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), which didn't succeed in creating

consensus and legitimacy for the newly created corporation and was finally supplanted by

a private deal between Jon Postel, Network Solutions and the U.S. Commerce Department

(Mueller & Wagner, 2014: pp.6-7).

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As far as the beginnings of ICAAN, in the NTIA's White Paper proposal, there was the

acknowledgment for a need to globalize Internet governance. The document stated, ‘(...)

an increasing percentage of Internet users reside outside of the U.S., and those

stakeholders want to participate in Internet coordination.’ In this sense, the proposal of the

US government was to globalize Internet governance by delegating authority to a private-

sector nonprofit corporation, which will deliver policies via private contracts in a

multistakeholder process and not by national governments or intergovernmental treaties.

However, the transition over the past 16 years was never accomplished completely; and

ICANN ‘remained a US government contractor rather than an independent,

multistakeholder governance institution.’ (Mueller & Kuerbis, 2014: p.1)

In that context, diverse sectors of the international community manifested that ICANN

lacked transparency and accountability; and that it had a ‘Western-centric mode of

governance’. (McLaughlin & Pickard, 2005: p.362). What is more, claims about ICANN's

creation with a core ‘dominant coalition’ of stakeholders composed of a small number of

individuals and organizations mainly linked to the United States resulted in criticism

regarding ‘limited participation of a wide range of stakeholders.’ (Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.

6) The most salient controversies around ICANN can be summed up in the next points:

• The relationship between ICANN and the United States Department of Commerce The Memorandum of Understanding has been criticized as illegitimate

supervision of ICANN by the US Department of Commerce, hence the United States government.

• Accountability and transparency. Having a private sector-led governance system in its management of critical resources of the internet, the questions posited are: to

whom is ICANN accountable to? And how could its operations be supervised?

• Legitimacy of the institution, which is linked to matters of participation and democracy. The question posited is who are the stakeholders?; and, in which

organizational branches are these stakeholders represented? For some, the civil society organizations, individual users and developing countries governments are, in

some sense, only represented at peripheral bodies.

• The role of the GAC and the nation-states represented in this body, their scope

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and degree of control and influence in Global Internet policies. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: pp.4-7)

At the beginning of the 2000s, some reforms to ICANN were made in order to palliate

the controversies. In this regard, because of the insistence of European countries, the

opening for national governments was made by the creation of the GAC, additionally,

the community of individual users had their entrance with the creation of the At-Large

Advisory Committee. The latter posed ICANN as a ‘private-public partnership’. Despite

this, the Board remained as the chief decision-making body.

The international context that framed the rest of the decade, namely, the terrorist

attacks in the United States and Europe which triggered discussions about cybersecurity;

the rise of the emerging economies; and the expansion of the use of Internet in these

emerging economies as well as in developing countries, made ICANN a locus of debate

regarding who should be in charge of Global Internet policies; subsequently, this debate

also found its way into international fora. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: pp.7-8) As the overlap

between technical and policy issues became more salient, the debates about governance

of core internet infrastructures emerged on the agendas of different international

organizations. (Global Partners, 2013: pp.17-8)

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Chapter IV. The Multistakeholder Model (MSM)

IV.1. WSIS and IGF: The rise of the Multi-stakeholder Model

In a manner, ICANN's organizational structure was from its beginnings designed to be

a kind of Multistakeholder institution. However, in the early days of ICANN, the notion of

a Multistakeholder model was understood as a ‘private sector-led’ governance. (Mueller &

Wagner, 2014: p.6). It was only until the World Summit on the Information Society

(WSIS) in 2003 that the 'multistakeholder' concept was first used at Internet governance

institutions. (Weinberg, 2011 cited in Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.7)

The WSIS was a United Nations summit with the aim to address exclusively the topic of

information and communication. The themes to be addressed ranged from digital divide,

Internet and education, cultural diversity, security, freedom of expression and financing

mechanisms. The WSIS consisted of two parts, one-first summit in Geneva, on 10-12

December 2003; and the second in Tunis, on 16-18 November 2005. (Hintz, 2007: p.2).

At the WSIS, several civil society organizations made progress regarding their role and

participation in Internet governance, mainly pushing for a multistakeholder modality of

participation and organization of the fora. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.7) Indeed, the multi-

stakeholder approach was the novelty of the WSIS process. (Hintz, 2007: p.3). One of the

innovative challenges of the WSIS was the institutional commitment of the UN to make the

fora a space where civil society organizations will be included as full partners, and not only

as observers or included as members of civil society in national government delegations -

which was the traditional role civil society played at UN summits. (Raboy, 2004: p.228)

The full partnership of civil society organizations appeared to be controversial because

only large NGOs with sufficient funds could cope with the restrictions to participate. Among

these restrictions, Hintz mentions requirements such as being an entity officially

recognized by the UN; detailed personal information and a badge with a Radio Frequency

Identification (RFID) chip which prevented privacy infringements; credentials proving the

formal establishment of the organization with a headquarter; a democratically adopted

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constitution and annual reports; or even expenses of participation, namely, flight tickets to

Geneva and accommodation. (Hintz, 2007: p.3)

Despite the restrictions, the participant civil society organizations posited the need for

broader participation of the sector in Internet governance. As a general assessment of the

WSIS, it can be recognized that civil society organizations had multiple avenues to

participate through open consultation processes and participation in individual events and

workshops. (Global Partners, 2013: p.7)

In its early stage, the principal purpose of the WSIS was to promote the development of

telecommunications infrastructure. However, in the end, the WSIS became a forum that

provided developing and European countries the opportunity to contest the legitimacy of

ICANN. At the WSIS, the US government was isolated diplomatically. There was a

generalized objection among almost all national governments to the United

States' unilateral oversight over ICANN. Some of them emanated proposals of a traditional

sovereignty-based international governance; others accepted ICANN, however, posited

the need for inter-governmental oversight upon the corporation. Despite the latter, a last-

minute change in the stances of the European governments left ICANN without major

change. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.7). Finally and despite all the debates about the

matter, ICANN was not brought under any intergovernmental regulatory regime. (Melody,

2011: p.73)

Eventually, some changes in the Internet governance field were formulated at the

WSIS. The final document of the 2005 Summit, the ‘Tunis Agenda’, managed to assign

different roles to different stakeholder groupings. It defined national governments as

exclusive makers of ‘public policy’ for the Internet. In this vein, it called for ‘the process

towards enhanced cooperation’, that is: ‘enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry

out their roles and responsibilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to the

Internet.’ (WSIS, 2005: Articles 68–71)

The Tunis Agenda also stated that the day-to-day technical and operational matters

with no impact on international public policy issues were meant to be managed by relevant

international organizations with no involvement of governments. (Global Partners, 2013: p.

17) This meant that the technical institutions in charge of Internet governance until that

time were somewhat left untouched despite the novel recognition of states as makers of

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public policy for the Internet. In the view of Radu and Chenou, the Tunis Agenda basically

‘acknowledged the work of existing institutions, while recalling the role of governments and

intergovernmental organizations in Internet governance policy-related issues.’ (Chenou &

Radu, 2014: p.8)

At the WSIS, the traditional manner of addressing international coordination and policy

issues via multilateral agreements was resisted. Instead, led by the private sector and civil

society, a transnational approach was upheld (Melody, 2011: p.73) which we understand

as the rise of the Multistakeholder model in the Internet governance field.

Echoing Raboy, Petros Iosifidis asserts that at the global media and communication

governance level, there is an interaction and interdependence of many actors and policy

bodies; power is not equally distributed among them. ‘National governments and

multinational corporations are clearly more powerful than NGOs and other civil society

associations.’ (Iosifidis, 2011: p.190). Notwithstanding, the WSIS demonstrated in some

way that global media decision-making is not exclusive of nation-states and other

multinational organizations, but also terrain for previously marginalized actors e.g. NGOs.

(ibid.: p.199)

The WSIS left unresolved or in status quo a number of problématiques of Internet

governance, mainly because the ‘outcomes of individual WSIS review events are not

legally binding.’ This situation led to another key innovation at the WSIS, the creation of

the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Intended to be an institutional arrangement that

embodied the multistakeholder model, the IGF was defined by the Tunis Agenda as a

place where all stakeholders can consult with each other on an equal footing with regard

to Internet policy. The IGF was established to be the forum for future discussions and to

provide alternatives to the controversies around Internet governance, one of them, the still

pending issue regarding US oversight over ICANN. (Global Partners, 2013: p.7; Doria,

2014: p.133)

Created by the Tunis Agenda, the IGF was conceived as an annual international

multistakeholder forum for dialogue around Internet policy. Held under auspices of the

United Nations, it also takes place in many countries and regions across the world;

national and regional IGFs discuss local issues and perspectives on global issues to

thereafter feed into the main IGF. It is considered a global, fully open and multistakeholder

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forum where Internet policy and governance are discussed and developed. Nonetheless, it

has no decision-making powers, instead, ‘it functions as a kind of rolling think tank,

highlighting issues, flagging up best practice and acting as a means of exchanging

information.’ (Global Partners, 2013: p.10). What is more, despite IGF's consultative

character, it does have a mandate to direct the attention of relevant authorities to issues

and possible solutions for Internet governance problématiques. (Iosifidis, 2011: p.192)

The structure of the IGF comprehends civil society organizations (33%); governments

(26%), private sector (17%); internet community (10%); media (8%) and inter-

governmental organizations (6%). Its decision-making processes take mainly the shape of

a series of main sessions, with many small workshops that feed the mentioned main

sessions. The participation of civil society organizations is subject to registration on its

website and the necessary funds to attend the meetings or workshops. Civil society

organizations have also the possibility of organizing workshops or contribute through

online and open consultations. (Global Partners, 2013: pp.10-1)

In the view of Kaarle Nordenstreng, while the IGF opened a platform for civil society to

participate in Internet governance, ‘we have to ask how efficient and successful they can

be in countering governmental and corporate interests.’ (Nordenstreng, 2011: p.90)

For Mueller and Wagner, the actual purpose of the IGF consists in binding together the

actors who support the multistakeholder model of Internet governance; legitimizing the

MSM and pre-empting other institutions from governing the Internet; moreover, not really

distributing instrumental power. (Mueller, 2010). Accordingly, ‘the IGF protects the

multistakeholder model by acting as a dam that prevents the discussion from moving into a

more traditional intergovernmental setting.’ (Kummer, 2014: p.16)

The IGF constitutes more a symbolic space rather than a forum oriented to the

production of specific policy outcomes per se. Mueller and Wagner understand the

experiences of the WSIS and the IGF in the past 15 years as attempts of improvised

collective governance arrangements in the field of Internet governance that ‘so far have

failed to fully resolve the issues of legitimacy, adherence and scope on a global

basis.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.8-11)

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IV.2. The MSM and the Third Sector

Following the brief history of the internet depicted in chapter 1 and the description of

chapter 2 about ICANN's structure and governance functions, it can be inferred that non-

state actors have had the main share of the work in the development of the Internet. ‘Civil

society, particularly academia, has been a vital player in the Internet field since its early

days’. This statement can translate into a viewpoint in which ‘governments are relative

newcomers to the Internet governance field.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: p.159). Indeed, this is

partially true.

The truthiness lies in that, differently than other intergovernmental regimes which

opened gradually to non-governmental actors, the issues about Internet governance

became part of international negotiations in a context in which ‘governments had to enter

an existing non-governmental regime, built around the IETF (the Internet Engineering Task

Force), ISOC (the Internet Society) and ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned

Names and Numbers).’ In that respect, there was a need for intersecting the non-

governmental and governmental regime. (Ibid). The first pivotal attempt towards this aim

was the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) during the World Summit on the 7

Information Society (WSIS) process (2003–2005), which produced a first leading notion of

what the multistakeholder model refers to in the field of Internet governance:

‘A working definition of Internet governance is the development and application by

governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared

principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape

the evolution and use of the Internet.’ (WSIS, 2005: Paragraph 34)

The definition foresees a cardinal and basic notion about the MSM. It does not propose

a central Internet authority or a one-stakeholder model, instead, it suggests three

categories of stakeholders, namely, governments, private sector and civil society.

The WGIG was more than an expert advisory group, but less than a decision-making body. It did not produce official 7

UN documents, but it substantially influenced WSIS negotiations on Internet governance. ‘WGIG was a compromise in which pro-ICANN governments let Internet governance issues officially emerge onto the multilateral diplomatic agenda and in which other governments, mainly from developing countries, accepted the participation of non-state actors.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: 160).

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For Eric Brousseau, a multistakeholder model ‘refers to stakeholders – understood as

governments, the business sector and civil society – entering into a bargaining game with

their own stakes and policy priorities.’ (Brousseau et al., 2012: p.12). According to Avri

Doria, there are two basic categories in the definition of the Multistakeholder model in

Internet governance. The first, in an effort to create full democratic participation,

understand multistakeholderism as the ‘belief in a structure with equivalent stakeholders

who participate on equal footing’. The second version, which tends to propose a more

hierarchical model, understands it as the belief that one stakeholder or group of

stakeholders is/are more equal than the other stakeholders, and that ‘the primary

stakeholder discharges their duty by consulting the other stakeholders before making

decisions’. (Doria, 2014: p.116)

Other definitions refer to the multistakeholder model as engaging ‘technologists, the

private sector and civil society in a bottom-up, consensus-driven approach to standards-

setting, Internet development, and management’ (Wentworth, 2013 cited in Hill, 2014: p.

85). Or, that in Internet governance matters, the multi-stakeholder model is a call for

‘participation in an open dialogue that directly reflects the diversity of the interests and

activities that collectively form the Internet itself.’ (Huston, 2013b cited in Hill, 2014: p.85)

Rolf Weber poses that the conjunct involvement of all stakeholders that have

necessary know-how is positive in the sense that strengthens the public confidence in

decision-making processes and that public participation increases transparency and

accountability of governing bodies. (Weber, 2014: p.96)

Indeed, the MSM ‘claims to share decision-making power with non-state actors. As

such, the multistakeholder model could credibly be considered an innovative governance

concept, part of a wider global debate about rethinking governance in a globalized

world.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.8). However, the concept has been recently seriously

studied or evaluated (DeNardis, 2013). Furthermore, no organization has ‘clearly positively

articulated how multistakeholderism should be implemented.’ (Jamart, 2014: p.63)

From a critical perspective, Milton Mueller points out that multistakeholderism ‘does not

provide any guidance on the substantive policy issues of Internet governance’, rather, it

addresses the problem of democracy and participation in the field, concretely, the opening

of existing intergovernmental institutions to non-state actors. Therefore, it evades national

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sovereignty and hierarchical power issues. ‘It offers a simple-minded communitarianism

that implies that all political, economic, and social conflicts can be resolved if everyone

involved just sits down and talks about them together.’ (Mueller, 2010: p.264)

Furthermore, Mueller makes reference to the plasticity and imprecision of

the stakeholder concept because by using broad categories —private sector, government,

and civil society— it does not define for sure who is a stakeholder or what rights adhere to

that status. The latter is of great importance because, at the global level, multistakeholder

institutions lack Rights frameworks which would allow them to provide participating actors

specific civil and political rights, or make the decision-makers formally accountable to

them. (Mueller, 2010: p.265)

Also from a critical perspective, Richard Hill asserts that the discussion is about if

particular Internet governance matters should be decided or not by multistakeholder

organizations such as ICANN, IEFT, or other similar ones. For him, these

multistakeholder organizations obtain political support from the governments of developed

countries whose businesses and citizens are intensely involved in the work of those same

organizations. (Hill, 2014: p.85)

In the view of Michael Gurstein, the multistakeholder model has taken great relevance

in the Internet governance field during the past three years particularly due to the impulse

given by the United States and its allies in the civil society, corporate and technical

organizations. For him, the MSM topic, in the discussions of Internet governance, is

intending to replace other relevant ones, e.g. Internet freedom. Further, it is presented

as the necessary model for Internet-governance' decision-making in broader areas of

public policy that are not necessarily technical.

As specified by Gurstein, the MSM is in fact ‘the transformation of the neoliberal

economic model’ into a new way of ‘post-democratic governance’ where the market place

open opportunities for participation of private sector stakeholders, technical stakeholders

and civil society stakeholders in the Internet policy forums, but it does not do so for the

public interest.

From that perspective, in the MSM there is no ‘external regulatory framework’ that

protects the general public interest, which ends up below the interactions of sectoral

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interests, thus, ‘the public interest is a (magical) bi-product/outcome of the confluence (or

consensus) processes of each individual stakeholder pursuing their particular individual

interest (stake).’

The MSM intends to remove governments as protectors of rights and equitable

processes and outcomes of public policy. It produces the privatization of governance in

which the Internet cannot be considered a common good, leaving the ones who cannot be

a stakeholder —the marginalized, the poor, less developed countries and even Internet

users— excluded from decision-making processes that are ultimately made by core

Internet corporations and stakeholders. (Gurstein, 2014: pp.9-11)

For the Internet governance field, the MSM has pressing importance because it

provides a tacit acknowledgment of the relevance of the Third sector.

The third sector or civil society is the sum of organizations that are characterized by a)

being private, however not having profit-oriented goals, and b) having social, public and

collective objectives, while not being part of the State. (Santos, 2006: p.219). However, as

expected, different political and functional contexts at the periphery and center of the

World system produce distinct debate topics advanced by third sector organizations.

Notwithstanding, the expansion of Neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus

provided common ground for the rebirth of the Third sector. (ibid. p226).

This rebirth of the third sector can be interpreted as an opportunity to compare

the community principle with the market and state principles. These last two understood in

their respective historical attempts of hegemonizing social regulation; the market principle

as the phase of the liberal capitalism, and the State principle as the phase of directed

capitalism or fordism. (ibid. p.221)

Santos recognizes four debates around the third sector, due to the aim of our research,

we pay attention only to one of them, particularly, the debate pertaining to the relations

between the third sector and the National state. Even though Santos analysis looks to the

national level, his proposals on how to understand the role of the third sector vis-à-vis the

state are important for making further comparisons and proposals about Global Internet

governance arrangements.

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The problematic conveyed by the debate about the relations between the third sector

and the National state consists in identifying the role and function of the third sector in the

public policies sphere and the overall reform of the State. In this view, Santos depicts two

notions about the State.

The first is the ‘Estado-impresario’ (or ‘State-entrepreneur’) with two basic propositions,

a) privatize all state functions that should not be performed with exclusivity and b) subdue

the public administration to efficiency, efficacy, creativity, competitiveness, and service to

the consumers of the business world. In sum, a conception of the state with the primacy of

the market principle.

In contrast, the second notion about the state understands it as a "new social

movement" (novísimo social movement), a new arrangement of the state principle and the

community principle, with the predominance of the latter. This notion depicts the state

as undergoing transformations in which the traditional Liberal and Marxist theories of the

state are obsolete to explain it. Instead, for a better understanding, Santos proposes as

finer tools the theoretical perspectives used to analyze processes of resistance and

autonomy against the state.

The profound transformations the state is going through are understood as the rise of a

new kind of political organization broader than the state. An organization integrated by a

hybrid aggregate of currents, networks and organizations where state and non-state

elements (national, local and global) combine and interpenetrate, while the state acts like

an articulating node (articulador). This new organization has no center and the

coordination of the state acts like an ‘imagined center’.

In this regard, the social regulation produced by the aforementioned new political

semblance is more ample and unbending than the regulation performed by the State-

entrepreneur; however, it is also more fragmented and heterogeneous, easily confused

with social de-regulation. In fact, a substantial portion of the new social regulation is

produced by political subcontracts with different competitive groups and agents that

represent distinct conceptions on what are public goods and what is the public interest.

(ibid. pp. 230-233)

The explained context transforms the state into a fragmented and fractured political

!46


relationship which Santos characterizes as the ‘de-centration of the state', as a terrain for

political struggle less formal form an institutional standpoint. The ‘de-centration’ of the state

implies not so much its weakening but a change in the nature of its force.

In other words, the state loses control over the social regulation but earns control over

the ‘meta-regulation’, namely, the selection, coordination, hierarchization, and regulation of

the non-state agents that, under a political subcontract, acquire concessions from the state

power. The political nature, profile and orientation over the control of the meta-regulation

constitutes the main objective of the contemporary political struggle. This struggle takes

place in a public space broader than the state, at a space where the state is only one of its

components. In this sense, the struggles for the democratization of this space are double,

a) democratization of the meta-regulation and b) the internal democratization of non-state

agents. (ibid. p.234)

According to Santos, if in the past there were attempts to democratize the regulatory

monopoly of the state, nowadays there must be a democratization of the disappearance of

its monopoly. In other words, while the modern State assumed as its own, and therefore as

public interest, a certain form or composition of diverse interests, now the state limits itself

to coordinate the different interests that are not only national but also global or

transnational. Consequently, the state is more and more directly committed to the criteria

of redistribution, hence inclusion and exclusion. In this sense, the tension between

democracy and capitalism can only be rebuilt if democracy is conceived as redistributive

democracy.

In a public space where the state coexists with non-state interests and organizations,

the redistributive democracy shouldn't be restricted to the representative democracy.

Instead, under the current conditions, a distributive democracy should be a participative

democracy that affects the coordination of the state as well as the performance of the

private agents (business, NGOs and social movements) which interests and benefits the

state coordinates. (ibid. p.274)

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Chapter V. The South and Internet governance

V.1. National governments' voices

As seen at previous stages of the research, there is an intention of national

governments to be more and more involved in Internet governance. Since 2011, Russia,

China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (RCTU) and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) started

to voice out specific proposals for an intergovernmental control over the Internet. (Jamart,

2014: p.95)

The voices of the national governments have been chiefly channelized at the United

Nations via its pertinent agency, the International Telecommunications (ITU). The World

Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), organized by the ITU and held

in Dubai on December 2012, had the aim to update the 1988' International

Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) — which constitute a treaty that regulates cross-8

border telecommunication.

The conference, which is intergovernmental by nature, had at its core a debate about

the incorporation (or not) of the Internet as part of the ITRs. In the end, the revised ITRs

were signed only by 89 of the 144 members, and much of the language in the treaty was

qualified as dangerous for the Internet. For example, the Resolution 3 of the ITRs

enunciated: `To foster an enabling environment for the greater growth of the

Internet’ (WCIT, 2012), thus not in contradiction to the MSM model, was understood by

some as asserting sovereignty rights for states and an active role of the ITU in Internet

governance. (Polatin-Reuben & Wright, 2014: p.2)

Moreover, the article 5a binds states to ‘endeavor to ensure the security and

robustness of international telecommunication networks’, and article 5b posits: ‘The

Member States should endeavor to take necessary measures to prevent the propagation

of unsolicited bulk electronic communications and minimize its impact on international

The ITRs serve as a global treaty binding signatories to comply with general principles for worldwide interconnection 8

and interoperability, and facilitating the availability of international telecommunication services and networks. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.12)

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telecommunication services.’ (WCIT, 2012). These articles have been interpreted by the

critics as a top-down state-centric approach that provides control over the broad term of

cyber-security to individual states (5a) and provide a scenario where freedom of

expression and Human Rights can be infringed by governments (5b) (Chenou & Radu,

2014: p.13; Patry, 2014: p.19)

Overall, the process of the WCIT-12 made clear and recognizable a tripartite

categorization based on the position of different states regarding Internet governance,

namely, Status quo Advocates; National Control Advocates and; Moderate approach

advocates (Weber, 2014: pp.98-101).

In the next paragraphs we will describe the stances and features of the three

categories with additional supporting examples of the specific Internet governance

proposals each group of states has advanced.

A) Cyber-sovereignists (or National Control Advocates). A group of countries that

advocate the extension of ITU's prerogatives to include Internet governance matters.

Among these countries, we can find China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others. The

principles of security and public order guide their stances; ‘national control is not only a

political, but also a technical issue.’ For some, this position could lead to the (national)

fragmentation of the Internet. (Weber, 2014: p. 99). Furthermore, the cyber-sovereignists

governments advocate for the application of the same kind of regulation that exists for

telecommunications to the Internet; and by way of the International Telecommunication

Union (ITU) where all countries have an equal say through a “one-country, one-vote

system”. (Kummer, 2014: p.12)

We can identify the State actors with a national sovereignty approach to Internet

governance mainly in what is referred to as Developing countries, as well as emerging

economies like China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Roughly most of the countries

under this category can also be recognized as members of the Group of 77 (G77), which

has its roots in the non-aligned movement of the Cold War. In different degrees, these

countries are critics of the United States' “global hegemony” and skeptic (and critics in

some cases) towards the multistakeholder or private sector-led Internet governance

institutions, ‘which they see as creatures of the United States.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.

3)

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Cyber-sovereignists’ Proposals. On September 12th, 2011, Russia, China,

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (RCTU) submitted a letter to the UN General Assembly

outlining a proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security.

(Farnsworth, 2011) The document expressed concern about ‘information security’

understood as the states' right to protect their ‘information space and critical

information infrastructure’, proposing ‘universally recognized norms governing

international relations, which enshrine, inter alia, respect for the sovereignty,

territorial integrity and political independence of all states’ (RCTU, 2011).

Furthermore, the RCTU document states that no state should use its ‘resources,

critical infrastructures, core technologies and other advantages, to undermine the

right of the countries, which accepted this Code of Conduct, to independent control

of ICTs, or to threaten other countries' political, economic and social security’. It also

calls for the creation of a ‘multilateral, transparent and democratic international

management of the Internet.’ (RCTU, 2011)

Additionally, at the WCIT-12, Russia presented a controversial provision stating

‘Member States shall have equal rights to manage the Internet, including in regard

to the allotment, assignment and reclamation of Internet numbering, naming,

addressing and identification resources and to support for the operation and

development of the basic Internet infrastructure’ (ITU, 2012).

B) Status Quo Advocates. For this group of countries, only minor modifications

should be made to the existing regulatory bodies of the Internet. Among them, we can find

the United States and most of the OECD member countries. For them, the

multistakeholder is the preferred model to govern the Internet. The latter, bearing in mind

that the majority of the Internet institutions such as ICANN, IETF, and so forth, have their

headquarters in the United States, and there is a fear of losing the existing influence over

them. From a liberal standpoint, the status quo proponents are worried about issues as

freedom of expression and freedom of information guarantees in the internet governance

field. (Weber, 2014: pp.99-100). Additionally, there is the fear of a UN takeover of the

Internet on the basis of regulations taken by the lowest common denominator, i.e.,

national-governments. (Jamart, 2014: p.61)

As allies to this group of states, and also defenders of the MSM model, there are many

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organizations of the civil society and private sector. Among the civil society organizations,

we find those that participate in different Internet governance fora to promote Internet

freedom, privacy and user rights. Within the private sector, we can find representatives of

the Internet technical community, including Internet governance institutions themselves,

namely, ICANN, Regional Internet Registries, the IETF, W3C and the Internet Society, and

on the other hand, multinational Internet and telecommunication businesses such as AT&T,

Verizon, Google, Facebook and Microsoft. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.4)

Status Quo Advocates' proposals. On November 11th, 2011, members of the

European Parliament voted a resolution which stated that some of the ITRs reform

proposals would ‘negatively impact the internet, its architecture, operations, content

and security, business relations, internet governance and the free flow of

information online’. Urging in this way to the EU members States to prevent the

changes. (EU Parliament, 2011)

Likewise, on December 5th, 2012, the United States Congress passed unanimously

a Senate resolution that expressed ‘(...) proposals have been put forward for

consideration at the 2012 World Conference of International Telecommunication

that would fundamentally alter the governance and operation of the Internet’, and

that these proposals ‘(…) attempt to justify increased government control over the

Internet’. Furthermore, the document declares that the role of the United States is

to ‘promote a global Internet free from government control and preserve and

advance the successful Multistakeholder Model that governs the Internet today’.

(US Senate Con. Res. 50, 2012)

At the WCIT-12, the United States representation voiced that the revised ITRs

intended to replace the multistakeholder model of Internet governance and this

meant a threat to an open Internet. The United States, in coalition with non-state

actors, including civil society organizations and large Internet companies,

expressed their concern about the articles 5a and 5b, addressing critically the

legitimacy of ITU on Internet security issues; the limitation to participation in

discussions to non-state actors —which were in quality of observers and advisors

—; and the fact that only states had the right to vote. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.13)

As a whole, at the WCIT-12, they voted against the ITRs treaty.

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C) Moderate Approach Advocates. Falling in between the previous stances, the

governments of Brazil, India, South Africa, and others, reject Internet censorship and

closed networks, but at the same time worry about the United States' government,

institutions and large companies role in Internet governance. (Weber, 2014: pp.100-1)

Moderate Approach Advocates’ proposals. The India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA)

Multistakeholder meeting on Global Internet Governance, held on September 1st

and 2nd, 2011 in Rio de Janeiro, produced a set of recommendations based on the

acknowledgment of the Internet as a ‘catalyst for economic and social progress’

while emphasizing the internet's potential to ‘enhance IBSA's profile as a key global

player’. The document also recalled the commitment to the Enhanced Cooperation

principle already outlined at the Tunis Agenda.

‘The IBSA meeting stressed that in order to ensure that Internet Governance is

transparent, democratic, multistakeholder and multilateral (…) the current

institutional gap in managing global Internet processes and developing policies for

Internet at a global level needs to be urgently addressed.’

It called directly on the dangers of ‘fragmentation’ and ‘disjointed policy making’ and

proposed the creation of a body that ‘coordinate and evolve coherent and

integrated global public policies pertaining to the Internet.’ The proposed new body

would have the following features:

‘i. be located within the UN system;

ii. be tasked to develop and establish international public policies with a view

to ensuring coordination and coherence in cross-cutting Internet-related

global issues;

iii. integrate and oversee the bodies responsible for technical and operational

functioning of the Internet, including global standards setting;

iv. address developmental issues related to the internet;

v. undertake arbitration and dispute resolution, where necessary, and

vi. be responsible for crisis management.’

(IBSA, 2011)

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Subsequently, on October 26th, 2011, at the Sixty-Sixth Session of the UN General

Assembly, the IBSA recommendations were rendered through a proposal by the

government of India which called for the creation of a United Nations’ Committee for

Internet-Related Policies (CIRP). The CIRP would comprise 50 member states

chosen on the basis of ‘equitable geographical representation’, meeting annually for

two working weeks in Geneva. (India, 2011)

According to the document, the CIRP's members should be exclusively states,

though other Internet ‘relevant stakeholders’ would be able ‘assist and advise’ via

four Advisory Groups ‘one each for Civil Society, the Private Sector,

Intergovernmental and International Organizations, and the Technical and Academic

Community.’ (India, 2011)

Contrasted with the organizational structure of ICANN, the CIRP inverts the role of

national governments, making them the Internet policymakers because it leaves the

rest of non-state stakeholders to function in Advisory groups; while in contrast, at

the ICANN, it is the national governments which are in advisory position —i.e. at the

GAC— and the civil society, business groups and technical community the ones in

charge of developing policy. (Mueller, 2011)

The proposal of the CIRP envisioned the following tasks for the body:

i. Develop and establish international public policies with a view to ensuring

coordination and coherence in cross-cutting Internet-related global issues;

ii. Coordinate and oversee the bodies responsible for technical and

operational functioning of the Internet, including global standards setting;

iii. Facilitate negotiation of treaties, conventions and agreements on Internet-

related public policies;

iv. Address developmental issues related to the Internet;

v. Promote the promotion and protection of all human rights, namely, civil,

political, social, economic and cultural rights, including the Right to

Development;

vi. Undertake arbitration and dispute resolution, where necessary; and,

vii. Crisis management in relation to the Internet.

(India, 2011)

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For Mueller, India ‘proposed an entity that combines the functions of the Internet

Governance Forum and some of the revenues of ICANN in a structure that puts

governments on top.’ (Mueller, 2011). This can be grasped in the annexes of the

document which are entitled ‘Links with the IGF’ and ‘Budget’. Firstly, there is a

reference to ‘the deliberations in the lGF along with any inputs, background

information and analysis it may provide, will be taken as inputs for consideration of

the CIRP.’ Secondly, ‘the CIRP should be supported by the regular budget of the

United Nations’ but also by setting up ‘a separate Fund (...) drawing from the

domain registration fees collected by various bodies involved in the technical

functioning of the Internet, especially in terms of names and addresses.’ (India,

2011)

The latter proposal, related to budget, represents a fundamental ambiguity in

Mueller's view, who questions if by these means the CIRP ‘is proposing to add a

new tax on users' name and address registrations (in addition to the fees already

charged by ICANN) or it is proposing to tax or get donations from ICANN. Or,

perhaps, it is proposing to take over ICANN.’ (Mueller, 2011)

Returning to our analysis of the ITU, the WCIT-12 and the 3 stances (Status quo

Advocates, National Control Advocates and Moderate approach advocates), it is

exemplary to point out that over the 150 years of existence of the ITU, all the decisions

were made by consensus of the member states (Kleinwächter; 2014: p.160), in contrast,

the recurrent consensus was not achieved at the WCIT-12. The voting results on the ITRs

had, out of the 144 delegations with voting rights, 89 in favour (including Russia, China,

Arab states, Iran, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and many

African states) and 55 against (including US, UK, Canada, EU states, Australia, Japan,

India, Kenya). [See Fig. 6]

It would appear that the WCIT-12 voting outcome provided a ‘binary global scene’

where most of the developing world sided with the cyber-sovereignty advocates. (Weber,

2014: p.101). Even Brazil and South Africa voted in an apparent contradiction to their

Moderate approach (it is noticeable the exception of India that voted against the

treaty). With governments aligning with one side led by the United States or with the other

headed by Russia, the situation was publicized as a ‘Digital Cold War’ (The Economist,

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2012).

Figure 6. Vote of national delegations at the WCIT-12. Source: ITU in Chenou & Radu, 2014: p. 14

Certainly, Brazil aligned with the state top-down approach lobbied by the cyber-

sovereignists at the WCIT-12. The reasons behind Brazil's vote at the WCIT-12 haven

been characterized as 'obscure’. (Patry, 2014: p.20) However, its position can be clarified if

we understand that most of the Latin-American countries who voted in favor of the ITRs

did it so ‘in spite of the Internet and not because of the Internet.’(Aguerre, 2014)

According to Aguirre, for Brazil, as well as for Argentina, Mexico or Uruguay, the ITRs

were looked upon as a means to harvest ‘some of the benefits of the new

telecommunications regulations as a whole.’ The ITRs were perceived in its benefits for

‘maritime communications, communications for the disabled, access for landlocked

countries, disaster communications and lastly, but not less important, international roaming

tariffs.’ Furthermore, for the author, theses countries are ‘not necessarily authoritarian or

anti-democratic’ and have ‘no records of Balkanizing the Internet or creating national

Internet segments’. What is more, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, as well as Colombia

and Chile, are regular participants at ICANN's GAC and other multistakeholder Internet

Governance Forums. (ibid.)

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In this landscape, Brazil has a special and more complex position. Its government has

not supported Sino-Russian initiatives nor has expressed full support for Internet

governance institutions perceived as being under United States control, namely ICANN.

Alongside China, Russia and India, Brazil is seeking greater recognition in multilateral

forums, and within this group of emerging economies, Brazil may be perceived —with

India— as one of the most democratic countries of the previous group . (Patry, 2014: p.20) 9

V.2. Brazil and NETmundial

Since 2013, Brazil has developed a stronger role in the Internet governance global

debate due to the changes in the political environment, particularly around the mass global

surveillance scandal of the United States National Security Agency (NSA).

In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former US National Security Agency (NSA) clerk,

leaked secret documents that revealed a spying program conducted by the NSA over

Internet infrastructures on citizens in various parts of the world. According to the press

releases, NSA collected telephone records of millions of US customers of Verizon, one of

US' largest telecoms providers. (The Guardian, 2013 June 6,).

In addition, the NSA leaked documents exposed a datamining tool called Boundless

Informant that detailed and even mapped by country the amount of information it collected

and collects from computer and telephone networks around the world. (The Guardian,

2013 June 11)

The NSA international media scandal had its repercussions in Brazil when it was

noticed that the surveillance program was reaching the phone calls and emails of the

Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, in addition to government personnel and Brazilian

companies — among them the oil gas giant Petrobras. (RT, 2013).

The multi-stakeholder governance model was discussed in the meeting of the Sino-European Cyber Dialogue; and the 9

Chinese government’s own policy paper on the European Union expresses the desire to jointly `promote the building of a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace.’ (...) Although China appears to desire a privileged role for state actors in internet governance, its increased engagement in multistakeholder discussions is a promising rest step towards a global governance consensus. (Polatin-Rueben & Wright, 2014: p.5)

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Figure 7. Boundless Informant. The color scheme ranges from green (least subjected to surveillance) through yellow and orange to red

(most surveillance). Note the ‘2007’ date in the image relates to the document from which the interactive map derives its top secret classification, not to the map itself.

Source: The Guardian, June 11, 2013

‘Edward Snowden’s leaks (...) destabilized the foundations of international Internet

governance.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.1) and led ‘Brazil's will to break from US-centric

internet.’ (Patry, 2014: p.21). Against this background, at the 68th Session of the United

Nations General Assembly, held on September 24th, 2013, Dilma Rousseff condemned

the NSA' program stating that espionage ‘affects the international community itself and

demands a response from it’; announcing that Brazil would develop proposals for the

establishment of a ‘civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the

internet.’ (Rousseff; 2013)

The technical community of the Internet, moved by the fear that Snowden revelations

will turn the accusation fingers of the international community to the ‘Western-oriented

Internet governance institutions’ and may even produce a ‘break down of the internet into

“walled gardens”’, released the Montevideo statement on October 7th, 2013, just fifteen

days after Rousseff’s now famous speech. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.1),

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The Montevideo statement, a document by the Directors of the major Internet

organizations —ICANN, the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Architecture

Board, the World Wide Web Consortium, the Internet Society, and all five of the regional

Internet address registries— denounced the NSA activities and called for ‘the globalization

of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including

all governments, participate on an equal footing.’ (ICANN, 2013). Furthermore, the

Montevideo statement gave birth to the 1net as the platform for discussion on Internet

governance topics and that gathered the mentioned Technical community of the Internet:

ICANN, IANA, ISOC, and W3C. (1net.org)

The very next day after Montevideo, on October 8th, ICANN's CEO Fadi Chehadé met

Dilma Rousseff in Brasilia. After the reunion, the government of Brazil and ICANN

announced conjointly that Brazil will host an international summit of government, industry,

civil society and academia, to be held in April 2014. The name summit was later

substituted by conference in order to prevent the conception of the meeting as exclusive

for governments. (Lemos, 2014: p.6)

The Montevideo statement, as well as Rousseff's speech at the United Nations, were in

some traits directed at the same issues. Both pointed out the necessity of a global Internet

regulatory framework that guarantees Human rights, security, and rebuilds trust. However,

Rousseff spoke at the United Nations about ‘multilateralism’ while the Montevideo

statement reasserted the notion of multistakeholderism. In these conditions, one of the key

points of discussion for the announced conference was the equal footing civil society

should have regarding their governmental counterparts. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.118)

The announcement of the conference by Brazil and ICANN could have been perceived

as the ‘loosening up of the sovereignty-multistakeholder polarity’, in the understanding that

Rousseff, by allying with ICANN, was moving away from the cyber-sovereign position

roughly manifested with Brazil vote at the WCIT-12. On the other hand, having ICANN

manifested that governments should participate in equal footing at multistakeholder

institutions, signaled an acceptance of a moderate sovereignist position. (Mueller &

Wagner, 2014: pp.4-5)

Certainly, the political international environment provided by Snowden revelations gave

impulse to the announcement of the conference that was finally named NETmundial:

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Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance. Organized by the

Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) in partnership with 1Net, NETmundial

had two chief objectives, a) the elaboration of a set of international principles of internet

governance and b) prepare a road-map for future developments of the internet

governance ecosystem. (NETmundial, 2014 Apr.)

Before we scrutinize the developments and outcomes of NETmundial which took place

in São Paulo, Brazil between 23-24 April 2014, an assessment of the experiences relevant

to Internet governance at the national level in Brazil seems pertinent to understand the

country's position. In this aim, in the following lines, we introduce two key elements of the

Brazilian national Internet governance, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee

(CGI.br) and Marco Civil.

Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br). In 1995, the Brazilian Ministry of

Communication and the Ministry of Science and Technology called forth the creation of the

Internet Steering Committee ‘in order to effectively promote the participation of Society in

decisions regarding implementation, management and use of the Internet’. The CGI.br has

a multistakeholder approach in its organizational structure and includes Brazilian members

of the government, corporate sector, the third sector (or civil society) and the academic

community. (CGI.br Official website).

The CGI.br has 21 members, namely, 9 representatives from the Brazilian Federal

Government ; 4 representatives from the corporate sector ; 4 representatives from the 10 11

third sector ; 3 representatives from the scientific and technological community; and 1 12

internet expert. The federal government is broadly represented, however, it does not have

a majority of voting members. (Knight, 2014: pp.102-3)

The mission of the CGI.br consists in: ‘proposing policies and procedures regarding the

regulation of Internet activities, and recommending standards for technical and operational

Namely, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation; Ministry of Communication; Presidential Cabinet; 10

Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade; Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management; National Telecommunication Agency; National Council for Scientific, and Technological Development; National Council of State Secretariats for Science Technology and Information Issues – CONSECTI

Internet access and content providers; Telecommunication infrastructure providers; Hardware, Telecommunication 11

and software industries and; Enterprises that use the Internet.

NGOs and civil society organizations12

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procedures for the Internet in the country; establishing strategic directives related to the

use and development of the Internet in Brazil; promoting studies and technical standards

for network and service security in the country; coordinating the allocation of Internet

addresses (IPs) and registration in the <.br> domain; and collecting, organizing and

disseminating information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics.’ (ibid.: p.

103)

In 2009, the CGI.br advanced the document ‘Principles for the Governance and Use of

the Internet’ containing 10 principles that included notions of neutrality of the network,

freedom, privacy and human rights; democratic and collaborative governance; universal

access; stability, safety and functionality of the web; among others (CGI.br; 2009). The

CGI.br Principles came to constitute the touchstone for the development of one of the

most innovative experiences in the Brazilian internet-related policies. Concretely, the

Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet, or Marco Civil — short for Marco Civil da

Internet.

Marco Civil. The debate around the draft bill of Marco Civil was led by the CGI.br. The

bill was subsequently passed by the Brazilian House of Representatives (March) and

Senate (April); and sanctioned by the President Dilma Rousseff on April 23, 2014. The

draft bill was an initiative developed by the Ministry of Justice and the Center for

Technology and Society (CTS/FGV) and it is considered an exemplary bill due to its

progressive principles regarding national Internet policy and governance. The latter not

only for its content but also for the process that involved its discussion, creation and

approval.

The process towards Marco Civil has been depicted as broadly inclusive. ‘The draft bill

was written through an open online public consultation process, where internet users were

allowed to comment on the draft, paragraph by paragraph, directly on the website. Over

2,000 contributions from individual users and governmental and non-governmental entities

were received through the online platform. Blog posts, tweets, articles published in

mainstream media, and institutional and individual contributions sent by email (and then

made available to the public online) were also taken into consideration.’ (Varon, 2013: p.9)

Marco Civil exhibited a balanced set of regulations based on the 10 principles of

CGI.br, the open consultations, and the broad debate about net neutrality, privacy, freedom

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of speech and access to content in the Brazilian context. For some, Marco Civil constitutes

a point of reference for the international discussions about ‘using online tools to foster

democracy’, and at the Brazilian context, it has given the government the basic guidelines

on what kind of policies and principles must be achieved at the Global Internet governance

level. (Ibid.: pp.9-10)

A key feature of Marco Civil in regards to the governance models of the Internet can be

found in its Article 24. It states that the development of the Internet in Brazil should be

addressed through the ‘establishment of mechanisms of governance that are multi-

stakeholder, transparent, cooperative and democratic, with the participation of the

government, the business sector, the civil society and the academia’ (Marco Civil, 2014)

NETmundial. Given that the CGI.br had a multistakeholder internal structure and since

the Brazilian law (Marco Civil) acknowledged the multistakeholder model for the

Internet, NETmundial had the challenge to demonstrate in the practice that the MSM

examples at the national level could be achieved at the international and global scale.

In this regard, NETmundial was organized in a multistakeholder way. As one of the

main arrangers of the conference, the CGI.br, through the ‘Secretariat’, formed committees

composed by different stakeholders. Below you may find Netmundial’s structure and

components.

Figure 8. Hierarchy of NETmundial Committees

Source: NETmundial website: http://NETmundial.br/hlmc/

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http://NETmundial.br/hlmc/


A) High-Level Multistakeholder Committee (HLC)

The HLC had the duty of ‘overseeing the overall strategy of the meeting and fostering

the involvement of the international community’. It included:

• Twelve Ministerial-level governmental representatives (Argentina; Brazil; France;

Ghana; Germany; India; Indonesia; South Africa; South Korea; Tunisia; Turkey

and United States of America);

• Twelve non-governmental representatives from the different stakeholder groups

(three from civil society, three from the private sector, three from academia and

three from the technical community);

• Two representatives from International Organizations, appointed by the Secretary

General of the United Nations (Hamadoun Touré, Secretary General from the

International Telecommunication Union; Wu Hongbo, Under-Secretary General

from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and a

representative from the European Commission);

• Chair: Brazilian Ministry of Communications, Paulo Bernardo.

B) The Executive Multistakeholder Committee (EMC)

The EMC was ‘responsible for the meeting agenda, the design of the meeting format

and the invitation of attendees, all equally balanced across the global

multistakeholder community’. It was embodied by:

• Eight Brazilian representatives appointed by CGI. br (two from civil society, two

from the private sector, two from government, from the Ministry of

Communications and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; one from academia and one from

the technical community);

• Eight non-governmental international representatives from the different

stakeholder groups (two from civil society, two from the private sector, two from

academia and two from the technical community);

• One representative from an International Organization, appointed by the

Secretary General of the United Nations: again a representative from the United

Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs;

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• Co-Chairs: Two representatives from the technical community, one from CGI.br

and another from the international technical community, both were already also

involved in the above groups.

C) The Logistics and Organizational Committee (LOC)

The LOC was ‘responsible for guiding all logistical aspects of the meeting, including

media outreach, international communications, website design and management,

awareness raising, meeting venue, traveler funding strategy, security, and remote

participation’. Its members:

• Two representatives from CGI.br;

• One representative from ICANN;

• One representative from Ministry of Justice;

• One representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

• One representative from the Cabinet of the Presidency;

• One representative from 1Net;

• Co-chairs: One representative from CGI.br and another from ICANN, both were

already composing the groups above.

D) The Council of Governmental Advisors (CGA)

The CGA was composed of all government representatives who participated and

contributed to the meeting.

E) Chair of the Meeting

The meeting was chaired by the Secretary for IT Policy of the Brazilian Ministry of

Science, Technology and Innovation, Professor Virgílio Fernandes Almeida.

Appointed by him to co-chair the meeting, there were also a representative from each

stakeholder group. Fadi Chehadé, CEO and President from ICANN were chosen as

the representatives of the technical community.

(Varon, 2014: pp.17-24)

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The four committees were ‘instrumental in organizing the input from their

constituencies in the process of drafting the final document’. At the NETmundial

conference hall, there were four microphones, the speakers of each of the four committees

could queue to make two-minute statements, while the Chair managed the discussion of

speakers among the four queues. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.119)

In the aim of enhancing participation, the Organizational Committee implemented

virtual participation and real-time interaction during the meeting via local hubs connected

through the Internet, spread over 30 cities in 23 countries. This allowed participants that

couldn't attend the meeting, to participate with audio and video virtual assistance.

Moreover, the meeting was broadcasted online in languages such as English, Spanish,

French, Chinese, Russian, Arabic and Portuguese. (Varon, 2014: p.21)

It is noticeable that the meeting had the attendance of relevant Internet field-related

personas, namely, Wu Hongbo, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations; Fadi

Chehade, President of ICANN; Tim Berners-Lee; Vinton Cerf, co-author of TCP/IP and

vice-president of Google; and Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, who attended the

event via Skype. (Marques, 2014)

Emulating the experience of Marco Civil, NETmundial had an open call for submissions

based on two themes, Principles for Internet governance and the Roadmap. In the first

phase, 190 contributions were gathered from 46 different countries, these were sent by

representatives of civil society (31%), government institutions (15%), the private sector

(23%), academic community (11%) and the global technical community (8%). (Varon,

2014: p.19)

The contributions divided by country had the next distribution, United States, 31

contributions; Brazil, 16; United Kingdom and India, 7 each; Switzerland, France and

Argentina sent 6; Japan and Sudan, 4. Tunisia, Spain, Russia, Nigeria, New Zealand,

Germany sent 3 contributions each, Yemen, South Korea, South Africa, Senegal, Poland,

Mexico, Kenya, Italy, Iran, China, Canada, Belgium and Australia sent 2 each; Zimbabwe,

Uruguay, Ukraine, Trinidad and Tobago, Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Mauritius, Malta,

Malaysia, Kuwait, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Republic of Congo, Colombia, Bulgaria and

Austria were accountable for 1 contribution each. (ibid.)

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It is worth highlighting the participation of Emerging economies. Brazilian stakeholders

submitted 16 contributions; China's government and the Chinses Institute of Contemporary

International Relations (CICIR) provided two contributions; India’s government, private

sector and non-profit organizations submitted five contributions; Russia delivered three

contributions, one from its government and two from the Russian Center for Policy Studies

(PIR Center); South Africa's government did not submit any contributions —despite the

submissions of other eight African countries— however, the Association for Progressive

Communications (APC), with its executive director’s office in South Africa, presented two

contributions. (Polatin-Reuben & Wright, 2014: p.3)

The submissions were incorporated in a draft or Outcome Document, which at a

second phase were opened for public comment — available for the populace on the

website of the event. The tool for the process was Commentpress, an open-source

Wordpress plugin for social texts. In order to participate, visitors could create an account

providing full name, email address and self-identity with one of the stakeholder groups.

The comments could be made paragraph-per-paragraph. This allowed an online

interactive conversation and critique of the text. A total of 1370 comments were

achieved between April 15th and 21st. The Principles had 832 comments, while the

Roadmap 498 comments. (Varon, 2014: pp.19-20)

Furthermore, at the plenary sessions, the event had the attendance of 1229

participants from 97 countries. The stakeholders' distribution was 38.5% government

representatives; 18.1% of the civil society; 14.4% from the private sector; 12.4% technical

community; 9.8% academia, and 6.8% other. The largest delegations by country were

Brazil, 221 participants; the United States, 110 participants; Argentina and France, 30

participants each; Belgium, Germany, Russia, Switzerland, and India, between 15 and 21

participants. When looking at the representation by regions: 378 participants were from

Latin America, 200 from Europe, 166 from North America, 133 from Africa, 128 from Asia

and 33 from Oceania. (ibid.: p.21)

As said before, NETmundial was organized to achieve universal (non-binding)

principles for the Internet, and a proposal of road-map for the future evolution of the

governance ecosystem of the Internet. This meant a discussion over ‘new ethical

guidelines and technical solutions’ (Cyranek, 2014: p.9) Carlos Afonso, member of the

CGI.br and a civil society rep. on the executive committee for NetMundial, pointed out

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some of the core issues to be discussed:

‘(...) the coordination of the logical infrastructure of the net: distribution and

assignment of domain names and IP addresses; definition of protocols and secure

methods in the domain names system; coordination of methods of connection and

routing’, among others. (Burch, 2014: p.8) Basically, this involves ICANN, their

contract with the US Department of Commerce and the control of the root file of

names and numbers.

It must be pointed out that NETmundial represented an acceptance from Brazil, as host

of the meeting, to a transition of IANA functions within the global multistakeholder

community and not by a takeover of an Intergovernmental organization like the

International Telecommunication Union. This could be seen as a ‘step in the direction of

the US, even if the objective is to later propose a “third way.”’ (Lemos, 2014: p.8). It may

also suggest that Brazil moved to a position of ‘arbiter’ between the ‘Western alliance’ and

countries like China and Russia in the Internet governance field. (Polatin-Reuben &

Wright, 2014: p.3). Additionally, it gave many stakeholders an escape from the binary

position of the latter stances and the energy and time-consuming debates within the UN

system. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.117)

Another important affair was that NETmundial intended to be the experiment that

‘demonstrates that an open approach regarding participation is not only desirable but

necessary for internet governance processes.’ (Lemos, 2014: p.8) and set the

Multistakeholder approach as a fundamental constitutional principle of Internet governance

(Bollow, 2014: p.14)

All in all, NETmundial produced by consensus a ‘non-binding outcome of a bottom-up,

open, and participatory process’. (NETmundial, 2014). The final document was adopted by

acclamation by all stakeholders, with the exception of the Russian, Cuban and Indian

governments which expressed reservations (Kleinwächter; 2014: p.119)

The Multistakeholder Statement of April 24th, 2014 tackles sections on Human rights

and shared values. Reminding the decentralized character of the Internet, one of its

principles states the ‘Open and Distributed Architecture’ of the Internet:

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‘The Internet should be preserved as a fertile and innovative environment based on

an open system architecture, with voluntary collaboration, collective stewardship

and participation, and upholds the end-to-end nature of the open Internet, and

seeks for technical experts to resolve technical issues in the appropriate venue in a

manner consistent with this open, collaborative approach.’ (NETmundial, 2014)

At its preamble, the São Paulo statement recognizes the Internet as a ‘global resource

which should be managed in the public interest.’ (NETmundial, 2014). Indeed, when it

comes to Internet governance principles, it endorses the Multistakeholder approach and

has titles that support: Open, participative, consensus-driven governance; Transparency;

Accountability; Inclusion and Equity; among others.

The second section denominated ‘The Roadmap for the Future Evolution of Internet

Governance’ depicts the framework for Internet governance as ‘a distributed and

coordinated ecosystem involving various organizations and fora.’. Point 2 of this section,

‘Issues dealing with institutional improvements’, leaves as an open question if there should

be a new institution for Internet governance, however, it does remarks the importance of

the IGF in the future developments of Internet governance. Accordingly, in section IV, it

states that issues very much controversial during the meeting, like net neutrality, should

‘be addressed at forums such as the next IGF.’ (NETmundial, 2014)

The final document was received with excitement by some and criticized by others. For

Vinton Cerf for example, the document is a ‘strikingly comprehensive statement of

principles and a forward-looking roadmap toward maintaining an open Internet.’ (Cerf,

2014: p.88). For Marilia Maciel, member of the executive committee of NETmundial, one of

the innovations of the text was the acknowledgment, for the first time in Internet

governance, of the Public interest, that is, the document recognizes that Human rights

apply to both offline and online.

In the view of Daniel Oppermann, a researcher from the International Relations Center

for Research of the University of São Paulo (USP), NETmundial would be considered as a

reference in Internet governance history and the challenge for the future is to ‘strengthen

the debates in other fora like the IGF’. (Comciencia, 2014).

Kleinwächter reminds us that even though the São Paulo Document states its

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principles are not binding, also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 is a

legally non-binding document. And that similar to the latter, NETmundial statement is an

important reference source because it had a similar consensus approval. It ‘constitutes a

basis with criteria allowing for measurement and evaluation of internet policies’ and even

though it doesn't provide mechanisms to take ‘wrongdoers’ to an international Internet

court, it allows ‘naming and shaming’ if a government, a corporation or users conflicts with

its principles. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.120)

For Nnenna Nwakanma, NETmundial recognized and selected many important issues

despite security and surveillance dominated the debates. (Nwakanma, 2014: p.109) These

topics are set under the title IV ‘Points to be further discussed beyond NETmundial’:

• ‘Different roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in Internet governance,

including the meaning and application of equal footing.

• Jurisdiction issues and how they relate to Internet governance.

• Benchmarking systems and related indicators regarding the application of

Internet governance principles.

• Net neutrality’

(NETmundial, 2014)

On the other hand, the São Paulo statement raised criticism from civil society

organizations about its weak approach to massive data espionage, even though it does

mentions ‘Mass and arbitrary surveillance weakens the trust and the confidence in the

Internet and in the ecosystem of internet governance’ and that the wrongdoings ‘should be

subject to international human rights law’. (NETmundial, 2014)

Kleinwächter identifies several sources of discomfort with the outcome of NETmundial

among various sectors. Namely, some civil society organizations did not find their positions

reflected in the statement due to last-minute lobbying of private corporations and

governments or due to the settling of problems via traditional diplomacy behind closed

doors; Russia did not agree on the section related to cybersecurity; and Private sector

organizations were not comfortable with aspects of the document related to privacy.

(Kleinwächter, 2014: p.119)

In regard to the latter, the issue of Privacy is tackled in the document in the following

manner ‘The right to privacy must be protected. This includes not being subject to arbitrary

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or unlawful surveillance, collection, treatment and use of personal data.’ (NETmundial,

2014)

Also, the allusion to net neutrality as one of the ‘Points to be further discussed beyond

NETmundial’ meant for many the postponement of the discussion and a lack of explicit

rules about the issue, moreover it was perceived as a product of the Uniter States private

sector lobby. (Marques, 2014)

In a brief statement of La Quadrature du Net —a non-profit association that defends

the rights and freedom of citizens on the Internet— the outcome document of NETmundial

is described as ‘weak, toothless and disappointing’. La Quadrature points at NETmundial

as a ‘farcical and pointless efforts for a “global multistakeholder Internet Governance”’.

In the statement, La Quadrature du Net called to wake up from the ‘absurd circus of ten

years of Internet Governance Forum (IGF), of sterile discussions that keep citizens busy,

in which corporations and governments have the final word’. It criticized NETmundial as

the latest quintessential example of the “global multistakeholder Internet Governance” in

search of a ‘global consensus’ for the Internet, that instead, should be governed directly by

citizens, independently from ‘these circles’. (La Quadrature du Net, 2014)

Relevant to the purposes of this research, the São Paulo statement, in the section

‘Roadmap for the future evolution of Internet governance’, indicated the situation of ICANN

under the subtitle: ‘Issues dealing with institutional improvements.’:

5. In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government

with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the

discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability

of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an

open process with the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN

community.

The IANA functions are currently performed under policies developed in processes

hosted by several organizations and forums. Any adopted mechanism should

protect the bottom up, open and participatory nature of those policy development

processes and ensure the stability and resilience of the Internet. It is desirable to

discuss the adequate relation between the policy and operational aspects.

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This transition should be conducted thoughtfully with a focus on maintaining the

security and stability of the Internet, empowering the principle of equal participation

among all stakeholder groups and striving towards a completed transition by

September 2015.

6. It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to a

truly international and global organization serving the public interest with clearly

implementable and verifiable accountability and transparency mechanisms that

satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community.

The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure from all

regions is a key issue in the process of a successful globalization.

(NETmundial, 2014)

Interestingly enough, the position of the São Paulo statement regarding the transition

of IANA functions was in line with the earlier announced plans (March 14th) of the United

States government:

’To support and enhance the multistakeholder model of Internet policy-making and

governance, the U.S. Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and

Information Administration (NTIA) announces its intent to transition key Internet

domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community.’ (NTIA, 2014

March).

The NTIA announcement expressed the transition should be made by 2015 through an

ICANN-led convening that should have as an outcome a ‘multistakeholder process to

develop the transition plan’. It also outlined the key principles to guide the transition,

namely, ‘a) Support and enhance the multistakeholder model; b) Maintain the security,

stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS; c) Meet the needs and expectation of the

global customers and partners of the IANA services; and, d) Maintain the openness of the

internet.’ Further and of greater importance, the briefing also stated it ‘will not accept a

proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental

organization solution.’ (NTIA, 2014 March)

Accordingly, on April 2, 2014, while elaborating on the transition principles advanced by

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the NTIA, the US' Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information,

Lawrence Strickling, stated during his testimony to the US Congress that any transition

should ‘present a plan that ensures the uninterrupted, stable functioning of the Internet

and its present openness.’ (Llansó & Shears, 2014: p.71).

For Stéphane Bortzmeyer, an expert on Internet protocols of Mediapart , the strategy 13

of the United States government was to establish its authority over the Internet by giving

the actors two years, until 2015, to present a ‘serious alternative plan’ of Internet

governance, or else, if not achieved, the US could have been in a position to claim that

‘the current system is the only one that works’ (Champeau, 2014)

In the view of Llansó & Shears, the announcement of NTIA raised many questions, one

of them of particular interest for the thesis, that is, what is the “global multistakeholder

community” or “global Internet community”? (Llansó & Shears, 2014: p.71).

The same can be questioned in the São Paulo statement's Roadmap. Even though

there was a reference to a process with ‘participation of all stakeholders extending beyond

the ICANN community’ that leads to a ‘truly international and global organization serving

the public interest.’ (NETmundial, 2014), the definition of who are the stakeholders was

somehow left aside at the section ‘Points to be further discussed beyond NETmundial’;

where it is only addressed tangentially as ‘Different roles and responsibilities of

stakeholders in Internet governance, including the meaning and application of equal

footing.’

The above authors warn us that the challenge beyond the São Paulo statement and

the NTIA announcement consists of a discussion about what is exactly a ‘global

multistakeholder community’ and ‘global internet community.’

In a narrow interpretation, the community can be understood as organizations such as

ICANN, the Internet Society (ISOC), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), the IETF, and

so forth. While a broader interpretation remains to be constructed, thus the challenge is

producing a ‘global multistakeholder community-driven proposal that can garner the

required broad community support.’

From that perspective, the transition of IANA functions can be seen as an opportunity

for ‘identifying diverse stakeholders who can and should contribute to governance

Investigative and opinion online journal from France.13

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processes, conducting effective outreach, and bringing those stakeholders into a

governance discussion typically dominated by technical considerations in a way that

enables them to meaningfully contribute.’ (Llansó & Shears, 2014: pp.76-7)

On top of that, Kleinwächter inquires, ‘did NETmundial create a new multistakeholder

model?’. His answer is twofold, it did not create it because there is no such thing as a

single multistakeholder Internet governance model, and it did because NETmundial came

up with some multistakeholder-approach innovations, that is, it achieved to merge and fill

the gap left by previous institutional arrangements regarding Internet governance, namely:

1) It succeeded ICANN because, even though at the corporation there is an

involvement of all the stakeholders, ICANN relinquishes national states to an advisory

situation in the GAC, and it is mainly a private sector-led organization, differently, at the

NETmundial, governments had equal footing in the decision making.

2) It overcame the problems of the WSIS and the United Nations related to Internet

governance because these two have multistakeholder processes under governmental

leadership which ultimately hold the decision-making power despite the active participation

of other stakeholders. Differently, at NETmundial, there was an emphasis on an equal

footing of all stakeholders.

3) While the IGF erected itself as an open, all-stakeholders-involved forum, it had no

decision-making capacity, differently, NETmundial produced a tangible outcome,

particularly, the São Paulo statement. (Kleinwächter; 2014: p.120)

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Chapter VI. Conclusions: Global South & Internet Governance

The depicted history of the Internet's development exhibits that this information and

communication technology had several births. It was firstly a construction conducted by

the United States' Defense Department through ARPA and ARPAnet. Accordingly,

Government-funded research, in the context of the Cold War, provided the first glimpses of

a communication system that was decentralized in regard to its structure and control.

Moreover, starting from the mid 60s, universities' research departments in the United

States and some other technological centers in the developed world, conjointly with the

work of dispersed and different individuals, made possible the creation of what we call

nowadays the Internet.

The Internet carries non-hierarchical, decentralized and distributed ways of

participation for its users and developers, however, the oversight and regulation of some of

its features have been proved not to have these qualities. Even though the bulk of the

early net-users envisioned the Internet as an egalitarian, free, cooperative and non-

hierarchical space; the subsequent commercial uses of it, the functions performed by

ICANN, and the power struggles of governments at the national level for the control over

the Internet, as well as at the global level, demonstrate that there are points of centralized

control and key gatekeepers in the Internet governance field.

Furthermore, it has been showed that the development of the Internet as a technology

was indeed a US-centered effort, at least in its first stages —and in less extent in Europe

—, hence the institutional regulative framework that arose for the new technology was also

chiefly US-centered. There we can see the examples of NSFnet, Jon Postel, IANA and

ICANN. With the expansion of Internet use to the rest of the world, the fact that the

regulatory institutions were under US oversight, brought about many controversies

depicted in this research.

Against this background, it was also acknowledged that Internet governance can be

included in the broad sphere of the paradigms of Global Media and Communication Policy

(GMPC). In this sense, we understand that the debates around Internet governance can

fall into one of the four paradigms described in Chapter III, depending on which agent-

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actors we refer to and conditioned by a particular historical moment:

The Economic paradigm of the GMPC, as a private-led conception of the

development of Internet governance, was defended by the status quo advocates in their

variant of internet-related business corporations as well as by the United States'

government and its allies; particularly in the decade of the '90s. However, the United

States' government represents different interests in its foreign policy, interests that spring

from its diverse national stakeholders, consequently, there has been a shift in the US

stance from an Economic to a Technological paradigm since the mid-2000s, chiefly guided

by the US-based 1Net organizations.

Following the Technological paradigm, the idea of a bottom-up and democratic

arrangement for Internet governance, under the name of Multistakeholder model, was

fueled by the United States' government and US-based central Internet technical

organizations at the international level. However, this version of an MSM tended to be

apprehensive towards the participation of actors that have no “proper” know-how of the

technological design and administration aspects of the Internet.

On the other side of the spectrum, we have found that the Traditional public service

paradigm of GMPC was advocated by the national governments under the already

depicted cyber-sovereignists category. The stance can be seen at the proposals of states

and group of states that advance the transference of the IANA functions to a United

Nations oversight, particularly, towards the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)

control.

Furthermore, the organizational arrangements advanced by these group of

governments —namely, the RCTU's International Code of conduct for Information

Security; India's CIRP; IBSA's meeting 2011; the WCIT-12; and in less degree the ITU's

International Regulation Treaty— ultimately claimed the supremacy of state government's

voices over other actors (NGOs and civil society).

Even though there was a rough acceptance of an MSM for Internet governance in the

proposals and meetings mentioned above, the cyber-sovereignists, under a Traditional

public service paradigm, advanced organizational structures where inter-governmental

schemes for governance leave other non-state actors in an advisory or observer position.

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In sum, the state exclusivity on regulation and decision making over public policies

regarding the Internet was maintained as a principle that guided their stances at most of

the international debates about Internet governance.

Despite the above conflicting paradigms, there must be no doubt that the Emerging

Social paradigm of GMPC has been accumulating more and more legitimacy in the

Internet governance field. There is a tacit acknowledgment at the transnational level that

the nature of the Internet demands governance that cannot be addressed separately, only

by governments, only by the private sector or only by civil society.

In fact, one of the key aspects of this paradigm resides on the importance of the

social, which comprehends the third sector and civil society organizations. According to

this perspective, the future arrangements for Internet governance should be advanced by

moderate approach advocates —governments or organizations— that propose an MSM

with participatory arrangements for the emerging third sector. A third sector understood not

only in its private technical Internet-related organizations, but also inclusive of civil society

organizations from the Global South that are affected by the decision-making processes of

the current Global Internet governance arrangements. 14

A merely superficial outlook to the composition of the parliaments and governments in

Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina or Uruguay would verify that social movements and the

third sector have grown in their influence to determine the public policies of these

countries. The phenomena can be understood as national experiments for more inclusive

and participatory democracies, therefore, we can infer that future innovative global

governance arrangements can have a source of inspiration in these political processes.

In this research, we have taken Brazil's Internet governance experience as an example

of one of these possible sources of inspiration, therefore, we understand Brazil as a

prospective key international player in the advancement of new arrangements for Global

Internet governance; from an Emerging social paradigm of GMPC stance and as a

representative of the moderate approach advocates group of states.

What is more, given that the Global south exhibits the fastest rates of growth in Internet use, there is an inherent 14

awareness in these countries about Internet governance and the participation at global policy processes regarding the Internet. (Nwakanma, 2014: p.110).

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In the aim of encountering sources of theoretical insight for alternative Internet

governance models, we find that the notion of ‘Global South’ has to call the attention of the

Internet governance field and its study. The term Global South has been utilized more and

more in academic texts and the press. Many times the term refers only to the governments

or states of developing countries or even emerging economies, however, a broader

understanding of the concept can be extracted from Boaventura De Sousa Santos

proposal:

‘The global South is (...) not a geographical concept, even though the great majority

of these populations live in countries of the Southern hemisphere. The South is here

rather a metaphor of the human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism at

the global level, and a metaphor as well of the resistance to overcome or minimize

such suffering. It is, therefore, an anticapitalist, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist

South. It is a South that also exists in the global North, in the form of excluded,

silenced and marginalized populations, such as undocumented immigrants, the

unemployed, ethnic or religious minorities, and victims of sexism, homophobia and

racism.’ (De Sousa Santos, 2012b: p.51)

Despite the conceptual richness of the metaphor advanced by De Sousa Santos, for

the purposes of our research, we are obliged to constrain the notion of Global South to

one variant. Therefore, we propose understanding the term as encompassing

those governments located in the South that are attempting to open new participation and

policy-making channels for the civil society, social movements and the third sector. In the

pursuit of an epistemology of the South, De Sousa Santos points out three premises which

serve us to contrast with the developments of global Internet governance:

First, ‘the world is much broader than the Western understanding of the world’ (De

Sousa Santos, 2012a: p.51). This premise leads him to indicate that the transformations to

occur may have not been foreseen by the ‘Western thinking’, including critical or Marxist

Western notions.

Second, the diversity in the world is infinite. There are diverse ways of thinking, feeling,

and acting, hence, different ways in which relations are established among human beings,

and between humans and non-humans. For example, in the economic field, there are

different ways to organize the collective life and the provision of goods and resources.

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From the epistemologies of the South perspective, this diversity is somewhat wasted

because, despite the existence of popular, solidarity-based or social economies

implemented in many parts of the world, the hegemonic knowledge tends to make them

invisible.

Third, the grand diversity of the world can be and must be activated and transformed

theoretically and in praxis through various and plural ways, and cannot be monopolized by

one general theory. (De Sousa Santos, 2011: pp.17-8)

Through the view of a diversity of knowledges, the world is not as globalized as it

seems. ‘Globalization conveys very often the false idea of homogeneity, as if the internet

and, more generally, information and communication technologies have translated all the

relevant existence of the world into one single language and have universalized its cultural

premises.’ Instead, there are many different used languages and there is a vast majority of

people in the world that does not live according to Western cultural premises. (De Sousa

Santos, 2012b: p.240)

In the view of De Sousa Santos, the common understanding of globalization tends to

one-sided, dismissing the possibility of one hegemonic globalization and another counter-

hegemonic globalization, or even various other globalizations. This as a result of the

assumption that the resistance(s) to the hegemonic globalization can only take the shape

of localization. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.164)

In other words, globalization implies multiple arrays of social relations that change,

hence producing transformations in the globalization. In this vein, De Sousa

Santos depicts a diversity of globalizations where there are winners and losers. In fact, the

hegemonic discourse about globalization attempts to obscure the other globalizations by

qualifying them as localizations. Yet, even the hegemonic shape of globalization has been

deployed from a local instance and condition, and while extending its influence radio

across the globe, it has developed the ability to nominate as ‘local’ the other instances and

conditions which it competes with. In sum, what we call globalization is the successful

globalization or global deployment of one particular localism. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.

165)

These last remarks lead us to see with different eyes the MSM for global Internet

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governance. In the version of the Status quo advocates, the MSM could be understood as

the only way to govern the Internet, one globalization. The Status quo advocates have

a vision of a restricted MSM that involves only large/historical/technical stakeholders,

namely, the Western governments, the Internet technical organizations —linked in their

bulk to the US government and developed countries—, and Internet-related business

corporations; leaving the developing countries and other sectors in a marginal position

when talking about real and effective participation in global processes of Internet

governance policy-making.

The phenomenon of a one-sided globalization in the internet governance field is also

seen on the insistence of leaving Internet governance to the technical organizations based

in developed countries, yet, as we have seen in the research, the technical policy

decision-making processes for the Internet has as well implications for the public and

private life of citizens outside these geographies.

With Snowden' leaks and the US' mass surveillance program revealed, the status quo

advocates were compelled to shift their position in order to restore trust and legitimacy

towards the current organizational arrangements of Internet governance; acknowledging a

need for change, the status quo advocates proposed the globalization of ICANN. However,

the NTIA announcement about the transition of the key Internet domain name functions

(ICANN/IANA) to the “global multistakeholder community” seems far from an ultimate

solution. In fact, delimiting who are the members of the global multistakeholder community

is the challenge for the years to come.

In our perspective, there is a necessity for an Internet governance global arrangement

that gives a voice to central and non-central agents in the decision-making over Internet

policies. The latter in the understanding that these policies affect not only the central

actors but also citizens/internet users across the globe, including those in developing

countries.

The hegemonic globalization depicted by De Sousa Santos has encountered a different

array of resistance(s), namely, regional initiatives, local organizations, popular movements,

social movements and transnational networks, that oppose social exclusion by promoting

and creating new spaces for democratic participation. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.166)

Moreover, the resistance nodes have called for ‘alternatives to the neoliberal globalization

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on the basis of transnational networks of social movements’. (De Sousa Santos, 2012a: 15

p. 61)

De Sousa Santos points out that the counter-hegemonic possibilities of the XXI

Century can be found in Latin America. He posits the need to create, not newly ‘vanguard

theories’ but instead ‘rearguard theories’. The latter implies a task of accompanying the

work social movements have been realizing in order to translate them into a theory that

does not instigate practice, but instead, learns from the practices and makes comparisons

of the experiences, struggles, and emancipations. (De Sousa Santos, 2011: p.21). This

work of translation entails clarifying ‘what unites and separates the different movements

and practices’ within the counter-hegemonic globalization movement, while at the same

time, attempts to identify ‘which constellations of subaltern practices carry more counter-

hegemonic potential.’ (De Sousa Santos, 2012a: p.61)

Employing the notion of rearguard theories in the analysis of the Internet governance

field, we could look at the Brazilian inclusive and participatory construction of Marco Civil

as an example of a practice that involves the bulk of the civil society in decision-

making processes related to the Internet at the national level; while identifying what unites

and separates the different movements and practices in its interior, to further radiate the

successful arrangements to a global level.

Indeed, because of the limited amount of organizations, common political culture, and

the primacy of the national government as articulator at the national level, is facile to clarify

what unites and separates the movements and practices. As the result, a consensual

legitimate process was achieved with Marco Civil through an open MSM based on the

CGI.br structure, and accessible ways for the public to participate in open public

consultations via the Internet, and through comments and criticisms, paragraph by

paragraph, of the draft of Marco civil.

However, attempts to replicate the successful national experience of Marco Civil at the

Global or transnational level carries its challenges. At the global level, the task is more

complicated. ‘On the one hand, there are local movements and organizations not only very

different in their practices and objectives but also embedded in different cultures. On the

Two chief examples of this, not related to Internet governance, were the Seattle movement of November 1999 and 15

the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2001.

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other, transnational organizations, some from the South, some from the North, that also

differs widely among themselves.’ (De Sousa Santos, 2012a: p.61)

NETmundial has been our selected case study to review the attempt to translate Marco

Civil's successful processes into the transnational arena. Despite NETmundial's

innovations in participation schemes, namely, a broader and inclusive MSM, the

conference and its proposals did not alleviate the power disparities concerning the

struggles to govern the Internet at the global level.

Indeed, the São Paulo statement revealed its shortcomings because the core of the

document was much influenced by the holders of central Internet governance

apparatuses, that is, the United States' government through NTIA, ICANN and the 1NET

institutions. Brazil's government, with very much good intentions, was at the end

conditioned by the United States' position and the ‘Points to be further discussed beyond

NETmundial’ demonstrate how decisive are the interests and lobby practices of Western

states and major business corporations.

Accordingly, the proposal of globalizing ICANN acknowledged in the São Paulo

statement fits well the situation described above. In our view, NETmundial should have laid

out the modality of transition or globalization of ICANN from a United States' oversight to a

new broad global MSM oversight; instead, the document reverberates the contents of

NTIA's March 14th announcement.

However, not everything was lost, an important aspect of the ICANN-related section in

the São Paulo statement posits that the transition should lead to an ‘international and

global organization’ that will serve ‘the public interest’. Not yet detailedly defined, the

introduction of the notion of ‘public interest’ is new in the global Internet governance field;

and, it contrasts with the conception of a narrow and restricted MSM that sees the Internet

governance decision-making processes as by-products of individual central stakeholders

pursuing their particular individual/technological interests.

Within the context provided by Snowden leaks and the outrage of the international

community about the mass-surveillance of the NSA; the NETmundial and the São Paulo

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statement could have become the locus of a New Manifesto for Internet governance. A 16

new Manifesto that looked upon Internet governance under an open, participatory across-

the-globe model. Indeed, this was partly achieved because the procedures of the meeting

intended and were broadly inclusive and participatory. However, at the same time, the São

Paulo statement prevented the leap due to its weakness in specific proposals about which

institutional Global arrangements will provide a truly broad MSM for Internet governance.

The evidence of the aforementioned can be found in the Road map section where there is

no outline for a new institution for global Internet governance and just a remark of the

importance of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).

Alongside the hegemonic model of democracy, that is, in its liberal and representative

shapes, subaltern models of democracy have coexisted in the world. The crisis of the

liberal and representative democracy in our times, manifested in the deficits of credibility

and legitimacy, has given space to diverse democratic experiments and initiatives where

the tensions between democracy and capitalism, and between distribution and recognition,

have generated new social contracts that intend to be more comprehensive, inclusive and

just. In some Latin American, African and Asian countries, the traditional shapes of

authority and self-government have been revised with the objective of promoting novel

internal transformations and arrangements with other forms of democratic governments.

(De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.195)

One of these democratic experiments in the Global South, and within the Internet

governance field, was the process of Brazil's Marco Civil for the Internet. At this

experience, the third sector provided legitimacy to the law creation' process, and the

Brazilian government, along with a CGI.br that is structured under a broad MSM, allowed

open online participation from the public. Hence, the question that comes in mind remains:

What can we take from this particular Global South’ experience and translate to

the Internet governance at the global level?

The 21st Century panorama of complexity, diversity, and inequalities leads De Sousa Santos to propose the necessity 16

of erecting New Manifestos that will open the way to counter-hegemonic alternatives and carry the potential to erect counter-hegemonic globalizations. One of his central suggestions is that of a Participative Democracy, a model that in his view, has a large historical track when looking to the Latin American context. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.195). In this regard, one fundamental difference between the transnational political struggles of our times and the traditional Western modern paradigms of social transformation —that is revolution, socialism, and social democracy— is that the former are submerged in the logic of politics of equality (redistribution) and politics of difference (recognition). (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.167)

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To answer, we summarize the overall context observed throughout our research. We

have come to understand that the fundamental contemporary tendency within the Internet

governance field is the change of the global polity, a phenomenon caused by the following

developments:

a) The consolidation of restricted areas of private regulatory legitimacies or private

norm-designers that are inherent to the technical features of the Internet;

b) The rise of the third sector or civil society, accompanied by some states in the

Global south that enhance the importance of the former;

c) The advantages of the Internet as a transnational communication tool decreases

the cost of action and increases the capabilities of the third sector and private

entities, providing an ambient of new legitimacies and new ways of transnational

contact, action and possible cooperation; therefore, the need of novel global

governance institutions;

d) The transformation of the nation-state's role in its capacity to regulate an area of

the public life that cannot be reduced to the national borders, similarly to global

environmental issues, Internet governance tends to a transnational approach by

default.

These developments are not set in stone, they evolve with grand problématiques. The

national-state is still a major player (if not the main) at the international level, and in some

cases, even newly global private norm designers for the Internet (e.g. ICANN)

are acting as intermediaries or representatives of particular state interests. Given that

power is not equally distributed among states, the new global Internet regulatory

arrangements should attempt the construction of organizational schemes that incorporate

principles of global transparency and legitimacy of the private global norm-designers.

Due to its large number of stakeholders and technical complexities, the Internet's

governance debates have been significantly out of the public view, degenerating in a

sensed lack of accountability and transparency. Since the third sector and civil society

organizations posit themselves as representatives of the public interest, a partial solution

to the accountability and transparency issues would imply the incorporation of the former

as co-decision-makers and participants of the Internet's policy-making processes.

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Consequently, the identification of the third sector's organizations should be thorough.

A stakeholders mapping that encompasses not only specific Internet-related technical

organizations but also other spheres containing third sector's organizations on the

transnational and local level which are collaterally affected by and/or have certain interests

in the outcomes of Internet's regulatory decisions. At these spheres, we might encounter

organizations that address education, collective rights, communication, access to

information, cultural rights and so forth. Their incorporation into a broad MSM would

provide the realignment and expansion of the clusters around global internet governance

institutions.

Furthermore, one of the main characteristics of the Internet as an Information and

communication technology is that of Paul Baran's vision, that of a communication system

that is decentralized. This feature still constitutes one of the chief technological principles

in the functioning of the Internet, hence, it seems advisable that the governance

arrangements strive to emulate the decentralized nature of the technology in its

organizational structures. In this sense, the conception of a heterarchical governance

model for the Internet seems appropriate.

As seen before, heterarchical governance implies overlap, multiplicity, mixed

ascendancy and/or divergent but coexistent patterns of relationships. At the internet

governance field, the heterarchical governance reveals itself in the coexistence

of intergovernmental organizations and technical non-state organizations each with a

certain degree of legitimacy to norm specific aspects of the Internet. In the absence of an

overreaching global political authority, struggles for hegemonizing the regulation of the

Internet have surged between the two mentioned actors, namely, IOs and Technical

organizations, with the addition of national governments and civil society organizations.

This situation posits the need for a double-democratization process, one within the

intergovernmental organizations where Global public policies related to Internet are

decided (i.e. Transnational MSM governance fora like the IGF and NETmundial) and the

other within the organizations in charge of the points of centralized control of the Internet

(e.g. ICANN). With this objective, the findings of our research guide us to

propose the Meta-heterarchical as the level in which these interactions and struggles

should be administrated.

!83






In our view, the Meta-heterarchical level must be (re)created as Imagined center(s).

Following De Sousa Santos' notion of the state as an articulating node —meaning a new

kind of organization integrated by a hybrid aggregate of currents, networks and

organizations where state and non-state elements (national, local and global) combine and

interpenetrate—, the proposal of this research is to apply the same conception to

organizations like ICANN or to the potential novel future transnational multistakeholder

regulatory bodies of the Internet.

What is more, at the Meta-heterarchical level, a legitimate and transparent MSM

arrangement for Internet global governance would not be fully achieved if it only includes

national governments and/or only technical organizations; instead, it would require the

participation and incorporation of the third sector and the social in novel organizational

schemes. The social, herein, understood as the interests of the citizens of the globe, as

Public interest.

Finally and to conclude, we have retrieved from the Brazilian government's experience

a proposal that in our view could be advanced at the global level. Specifically, that

experience of Brazil's government acting as an articulating node, giving equal footing to a

broad set of stakeholders in the internet policy decision-making process of Marco Civil.

The final proposal is that of a meta-heterarchical model, understood as the advancement

of an imagined center attempting to take the lead of the meta-regulation. Consequently, we

propose that the new arrangements for Global Internet governance could take into account

the meta-heterarchical model, particularly in the eventual globalization of ICANN in 2015

or the future construction and transformation of multistakeholder global Internet regulatory

bodies.

Indeed, Brazil's experience has served herein as a precedent, as a source of

knowledge, about the possibi l i t ies of f inding novel Internet governance

models within and from the Global South. The data and notions collected in this research

lead us to conclude that a Heterarchical Broad-Multistakeholder Transnational model for

Internet governance, with bodies that act like imagined centers, could constitute one of the

most fundamental innovations the Global South can bring about to the Global Internet

Governance of the 21st Century.

!84


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Annex I. About the Author. Contact details

Dorian C. Zapata Rioja

Date of birth: 12/06/1986

Nationality: Bolivian

Address: Wrocław, Poland

Email: [email protected]

Li: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dorianzapata/

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mailto:[email protected]

INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE

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