UNIVERSITY OF WROCŁAW
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
DORIAN C. ZAPATA RIOJA
INTERNET GOVERNANCE
FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE
Master Thesis
Political Science
Supervisor, Prof. Dr. Hab. Jacek Sroka
WROCŁAW - POLAND
2014
INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
Index
Chapter I. Introduction 4
I.1. Research questions 6
Chapter II. The Births of the Internet 7
Chapter III. Internet Governance 15
III.1. Paradigms of Global Media and Communication Policy 15
III.2. Definition and evolution of Internet Governance 18
III.3. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN) 25
III.3.1. Some Internet Governance's technical features 25
III.3.2. Structure of ICANN 30
III.3.3. ICANN's Political Struggles: Representation and Legitimacy 34
Chapter IV. The Multistakeholder Model (MSM) 38
IV.1. WSIS and IGF: The rise of the Multi-stakeholder Model 38
IV.2. The MSM and the Third Sector 42
Chapter V. The South and Internet governance 48
V.1. National governments' voices 48
V.2. Brazil and NETmundial 56
Chapter VI. Conclusions: Global South & Internet Governance 73
Chapter VII. Bibliography 85
Annex I. About the Author. Contact details 97
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Internet Governance
From a Global South Perspective
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Chapter I. Introduction
The present research intends to contribute to the academic debate regarding Internet
governance from a Global South perspective. Of particular interest for the research are the
organizational arrangements the Internet governance has on the global level and how the
legitimate oversight of some central Internet resources have contemporaneously posited
challenges to the way governance is imagined and constructed on a transnational scale.
Basic questions in this regard are how and who should rule the Internet? This implies
different conceptions on which agents —national States, civil society, intergovernmental
organizations, technical organizations and so on— have or should have the legitimate
power to regulate the Internet and under which organizational regulatory schemes or
bodies.
In this aim, the research pays attention, in Chapter II, to the origins of the Internet as a
transformative information and communications technology. Later on, the definition and
evolution of Internet Governance are addressed in Chapter III. For this aim, an introductory
approach is set by an overview of the paradigms of Global Media and Communications
Policy (GMPC).
Further, the definition and evolution of the term ‘Internet governance’ is advanced on a
theoretical level; in its technological aspects with an emphasis on the political and
regulatory issues the term brings about; and finally, analyzing the role of Nation-states,
intergovernmental organizations, technical organizations and civil society around the topic.
For the chapter regarding Internet governance, it is crucial to outline a description of
one of the central and most controversial technical regulatory organizations of the Internet,
that is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The
corporation is of special interest due to the political struggles it had brought about in the
past 15 years; mainly regarding its linkages to the US government and its organizational
structure. Being a global Internet regulatory organization, it has been the locus for many
debates around legitimacy and representation.
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ICANN has an organizational structure referred to as a Multi-stakeholder model (MSM).
The understanding of the MSM is fundamental for the contemporary debate about Internet
governance because as an organizational arrangement, it can take different shapes and
forms depending on which actor advances it. Hence, Chapter IV tackles the rise of the
MSM at the inter-governmental level, specifically, at the World Summit on Information
Society (2003-2005) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF); subsequently, the MSM is
addressed in its conceptual framework with its respective problématiques and criticism.
Chapter V depicts three main stances taken by nation-states —and other agents—
regarding the shape and organizational arrangements the Internet Governance should
have. Categorized in 'Cyber-sovereignists', 'Status quo advocates' and 'Moderate
approach advocates', the chapter presents the different proposals of particular states or
group of states since 2011, mainly at intergovernmental fora.
The second section of Chapter V portrays the role of Brazil regarding internet
governance, chiefly by its involvement as a leading organizer and host of NETmundial, a
Global Multistakeholder meeting on the Future of the Internet, held in São Paulo on April
2014. NETmundial had as chief objectives the elaboration of a set of international
principles for the Internet governance and to outline a road-map for the future
developments of the internet governance ecosystem. The outcomes of the meeting are
addressed in its successes but also in its shortcomings. The latter, taking particular
consideration to a comparison between the Brazilian national experience on regulating the
Internet; the outcome document of NETmundial, the São Paulo statement; and the
international context provided by Edward Snowden's leaks.
Finally, in Chapter VI the conclusions depart from a critical perspective regarding the
overall current situation of the Internet governance regulatory arrangements and
proposals. Deriving out of a Global South perspective, understood as a paradigm that can
broad the Internet governance debate regarding which model should be implemented, we
suggest a more comprehensive, inclusive and participatory Multistakeholder Model for the
global Internet Governance.
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I.1. Research questions
Main question
- Is the Global South able to contribute to a new model of Internet Governance for the
21st century?
Complementary questions
- What are the origins of the Internet and its implications for the regulatory
arrangements Internet governance has contemporaneously?
- Who regulates the Internet?
- What are the different stances the actors at the transnational level advance regarding
an organizational model for Internet governance? And, what is the role of ICANN in
these matters?
- What is the Multistakeholder model? And, is there a fixed unique way to understand
the model?
- What is the importance of civil society or the Third sector in Internet governance?
- What is the role of Brazil in the contemporary global Internet governance debate and
future global arrangements?
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Chapter II. The Births of the Internet
It is not essential for the research goals to explain the technical origins of the Internet,
however, a brief recount of the innovations, conditions and institutions that gave birth to
the Network of networks is necessary for contextual purposes. As a term constructed by
the community of users of the Internet, Wikipedia's definition of the Internet understands it
as:
“A global system of interconnected computer networks that use the standard
Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) to link several billion devices worldwide. It is an
international network of networks that consists of millions of private, public, academic,
business, and government packet switched networks, linked by a broad array of
electronic, wireless, and optical networking technologies. The Internet carries an
extensive range of information resources and services, such as the inter-linked
hypertext documents and applications of the World Wide Web (WWW), the
infrastructure to support email, and peer-to-peer networks for file sharing and
telephony.”
In the study field of Internet governance, the term Internet is not enough to grasp all the
angles of the global digital developments. In this sense, much of the studies make
reference to two other concepts: Information society and information and communication
technology (ICT). These two include areas outside the internet domain, for example,
mobile telephone communications. However, the term Internet prevails in the discussion of
governance because of the rapid transition from global communications towards the use of
Internet Protocol (IP) as the main communications technical standard. (Kurbalija, 2010: p.
6)
From a historical perspective, the Internet has its begginings around the 1960s with the
U.S. Defense Department's Agency Research Projects Administration (ARPA), created in
1958 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. ARPA was conceived with the aim of launching
and executing research and development projects to expand the frontiers of technology
and science, and to reach far beyond immediate military requirements.
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Contextually, the origins of the Internet can be traced to the Post Second World War
and the Cold War period, when the United States government intended to create a system
that allowed computer systems to communicate with each other in the face of possible
nuclear warfare. In this sense, the envisioning of a decentralized network of computer
systems is attributed to Paul Baran. (Bing, 2009: p. 9) 1
According to Jon Bing: ‘the development of the atomic bomb ushered in an era of
global tension (...) helped stimulate some of the conceptual work that inspired
development of the Internet.’ The challenge for the US military was ensuring the launch of
atomic bombs from a control facility linked by telecommunications to a Strategic Air
Command. In this sense, Paul Baran's research proposed the distinction between two
types of communication networks: (A) centralized (or star) networks; or (C) distributed (or
grid or mesh) networks; finally addressing an intermediate network, (B) the decentralized
networks as a type along the spectrum from centralized to distributed. (ibid., pp. 8-10) [See
Fig. 1]
Figure 1. Baran's diagrammatic categorization of communications networks: Centralized, decentralized, and distributed networks. Source: Bygrave, 2009: p.9.
In the context of its military uses, ‘(…) a centralized network is highly vulnerable, as the
nodes will not be able to communicate if the centre is taken out. Therefore, these were not
Paul Baran was born in Poland in 1926, and followed his parents to the United States in 1928. He attended Drexel 1
University, Philadelphia, and his first job was with the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation. Taking night classes at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), he earned an engineering Master’s degree in 1959 (Bygrave, 2009: p.9)
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well suited to ensure secure communication between the central command and a launch
control facility. It is possible to calculate network performance as a function of the
probability of destruction for each separate node. Baran concludes that: “It appears that
what would today be regarded as an unreliable link can be used in a distributed network
almost as effectively as perfectly reliable links.”’ (Baran,1964 cited in Bing, 2009: p.11)
However, Baran's vision of a decentralized network did not see the light as such, it
stayed for a time in the form of reports (Bing, 2009: p.12). The deployment and
implementation of a decentralized communication network had its first impulse with
ARPAnet. ‘ARPA grouped together several young, ambitious computer scientists, including
Paul Baran (...). In the process, ARPA gave birth to a network quite different from the
centralized system of the telephone company (i.e., AT&T), which relied on analogue
information: rather, digitization facilitated a decentralized, then distributed network
(...)’ (Warf, 2013: p. 14)
Despite the military research purposes referred as the most commonplace for the birth
of the Internet, it must be acknowledged that the Internet was the creation of different and
disperse individuals who, step by step, solved technical matters in order to create a
communication system that had no center. In fact, the evolution of the Internet was
developed in its early years in conjunction with several United States' university
departments; ‘the entire realm of digital communication was developed through
government-subsidized-and-directed research during the post–World War II decades,
often by the military and leading research universities’ (McChesney, 2013: p.130).
Certainly, ARPAnet connected agencies and projects of the United States Defense
Department's Agency, but the nucleus of what would become ARPAnet also connected
universities such as Stanford, UCLA, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the
University of Utah. The first ARPAnet linkage began in 1969. (Sylvan, 2014: p.29)
ARPAnet, as the Internet predecessor, ‘was designed with no central control so that the
system would be neutral or dumb, leaving the power to develop specific applications to
people on the edges, who could participate as they wished. (Naughton, 2012 cited in
McChesney, 2013: p.130). ‘(...) decentralized control meant all machines on the network
were, more or less, peers. No one computer was in charge.’ (Landau, 2010 cited in
McChesney, 2013: p.130)
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The term Internet was coined in the mid-1970s with the invention of the Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), these were authorized as the sole protocol in
ARPAnet in 1983; and with the expansion in the late 1980s of the worldwide TCP/IP
network, the latter took the shape of what we know today as the Internet. (Sylvan, 2014: p.
29; Kurbalija, 2010: p.7)
ARPAnet was not designed for sending messages but for sharing resources under two
main services: Telnet and File Transport Protocol (FTP). Telnet made possible to sit at one
location and work on a computer placed somewhere else. The file transport protocol
allowed files to be moved from one computer to the other. (Bing, 2009: p.28). Nonetheless,
in 1972, Ray Tomlinson adapted computer messages for personal use, inventing the E-2
mail. (Warf, 2013: p.14)
Besides E-mail, other new services emerged, in 1975 network mailing lists;
NewsGroups; Message Services Group, or MsgGroup; and Multiplayer games appeared.
‘Along with this increased use came also informal rules for behaviour and sanctions for
violating them—often referred to as netiquette.’ (Bing, 2009: p.30)
In the view of Robert McChesney, the early Internet was not only non-commercial but
anti-commercial. For most of the users during the 60s and 70s, the internet was
envisioned as a space of ‘egalitarianism and cooperation, not competition and
profits.’ (McChesney, 2013: p.133). Further developments will eventually undermine these
feautres coined by the first community of users.
On 12 August 1981, IBM released its first Personal Computer or PCs. The PC in its first
stage was not connected to the network, instead, it came to replace the traditional
typewriter of the office desk. In this sense, the first PCs were used in commercial
companies for word-processing and spreadsheets. The latter changed when Ethernet
became widespread. Ethernet was a commercial solution by Xerox PARC that consisted of
a Local Area Network (LAN), that means connecting computers together. The expansion in
commercial companies of the use of the Ethernet made possible that ‘two LANs using
Ethernet could interconnect through the ARPANET hub.’ (Bing, 2009: pp.34-5)
Tomlinson became well known for his mail system. Yet his real fame is related to the single sign: ‘@’. (Bygrave,2
2009: p.10)
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Contemporaneously, by the end of the 1970s, there was a preoccupation among the
research community about the access to ARPAnet. ‘The number of academic computer
science departments in the United States exceeded 100, while only 15 of the then more
than 60 ARPANET nodes were located within universities.’ The latter meant that
universities not linked to Defense research projects funded by the U.S. government were
excluded from the network. In this context, the National Science Foundation (NSF), acting
on behalf of the whole scientific community, emerged as a major player interested in the
network. (Bing, 2009: p.31)
By 1985 a US' National network was advanced. The NSF built the backbone for the
network and the National Science Foundation Network (NSFnet) was born. ‘Academic
institutions in a given geographical area were offered to establish a community network;
the NSF would then give this network access to the backbone network. Not only would the
regional networks get access to the backbone but also to each other. The NSF provided
the backbone as a “free good”, but grants to connect campuses to regional networks were
limited to two years; after that time, the universities had to pay for the regional connections
themselves.’ (Bing, 2009: p.32).
Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the National Science Foundation took
control of the network and ARPAnet was incorporated into the NSFnet. Moreover, the
NSFnet explicitly limited the network to noncommercial uses. Veritably, during the 70s and
80s ‘the computer professionals and students who comprised the Internet community
“deliberately cultivated an open, non-hierarchical culture that imposed few restrictions on
how the network could be used.’ (Adler, 2012 cited in McChesney, 2013: p.133) 3
At the dawn of the 1990s, in the midst of the consolidation of the PC and the expansion
of the NSFnet, office programs started to be developed, improved and introduced. The
MS-DOC which is a character-driven interface was replaced by more user-friendly and
less technical office interfaces, for example, Windows was introduced by Apple's
Macintosh. The more easy-to-use interfaces allowed graphics, mouse interaction and click
for navigation. (Bing, 2009: p.44)
Rebecca MacKinnon calls this the digital commons, which would provide the foundation for all subsequent 3
commercial applications. The hacker culture that emerged in that period was typified by its commitment to free and available information, hostility to centralized authority and secrecy, and the joy of learning and knowledge. (McChesney, 2013: p.134)
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Meanwhile, at the European Particle Physics Lab (CERN), Tim Berners-Lee, a British
computer scientist often called the father of the web, created the hypertext and Universal
Resource Locators (URLs). This latter, a system of addresses used on what would
become the World Wide Web (WWW). (Bing, 2009: p.40). The WWW in plain words is a
system of interlinked hypertext documents that are accessed via the Internet. With a web
browser, one can view web pages that may contain text, images, videos, and other
multimedia and navigate between them via hyperlinks.
With the deployment of the World Wide Web and the appearance of user-friendly
internet browsers like Mosaic , Netscape and Internet Explorer, in addition to an interlinked 4
infrastructure already in place, that is LANs hooked up to the Internet through commercial
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), the internet become a place of convergence for an
immense variety of possible activities ranging from education, communication, even
entertainment. (Bing, 2009: pp.44-5)
Further, the first commercial e-mail message was sent on April 1994, however, it was
rejected by a large portion of the net users. The advertiser sender's address email was
clogged by messages 'demanding that the sales pitch be removed and such conduct
never be repeated'. 'This internal policing by Internet users was based on the assumption
that commercialism and an honest, democratic public sphere do not mix.’ According to
McChesney, during the growth and expansion of the Internet, the Internet community of
users was distressed because of the ‘growth of patents and efforts by commercial interests
to make proprietary what had once been open and free.’ (McChesney, 2013: pp.134-6) In
this context, the Open Software Movement has an important role since the 1980s.
Despite the reservations about the commercial uses, on August 1995, Netscape went
public and inaugurated the “dot com” boom. 'In the United States, and to a limited extent
elsewhere, new Internet services providers (AOL, MSN) and later large content and e-
commerce applications (Yahoo, @Home, eBay) aimed to take advantage of the network's
power and scope. A myriad of smaller, more specialized applications also emerged that
Together with Eric Bina, Marc Andreessen developed Mosaic. “It permitted richer formatting with tags like ‘center’, 4
and included an ‘image’ tag that allowed the inclusion of images on web pages. It also had a graphical interface and —like most of the early web browsers (though not the original CERN ‘linemode browser’)— clickable buttons and hyperlinks; rather than using reference numbers which the user had to type in for accessing the linked documents, hyperlinks allowed the user simply to click the link.” (Bing, 2009: p.41)
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built their businesses on powerful, cheaper PCs, broadband networking at the office, and
widespread narrowband networking in the home.’ (Cowhey, 2009: p.23)
Echoing these developments, during the 1990s the Internet control was privatized via a
consortium of telecommunications corporations. The NSFnet turned its backbone to the
private sector and the internet became global through the ‘integration of existing
telephone, fiber-optic, and satellite systems, which was made possible by the
technological innovation of packet switching, TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/
Internet Protocol), and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), in which individual
messages may be decomposed, the constituent parts transmitted by various channels,
and then reassembled, virtually instantaneously, at the destination.’ (…). ‘Soon thereafter
private web browsers sprouted like mushrooms (…) The number of websites grew
exponentially, from roughly 1 million in 1990 to more than 4 billion in 2011.’ (Warf, 2013:
pp.14-5)
Following Marc Raboy, and from a country-based perspective of the development of
the Internet, until the mid-1990s ‘the information society project was driven first separately
by the US and the European Union, and then as a project of the G7 (now G8)’. In this
context, the global information infrastructure was developed under the idea of spreading
the information technology via join efforts of private enterprise and governments with
‘emphasis from the state to the private sector for initiative, innovation and capital
investment to develop the new information infrastructures for global commerce, finance,
communication and social services. In all of these grand designs, people were still
nowhere to be seen.’ (Raboy, 2004: p.227).
In this light, for the father of the internet Tim Berners-Lee, ‘it would have been
“unthinkable” to patent it or ask for fees. The point of the Internet was “sharing for the
common good.”’ But when the market exploded in the 1990's ‘“patents became the rage”
creating “unnecessary and dangerous monopolies”. By 1999, Berners-Lee wondered “if
the Internet was becoming a “technical dream or a legal nightmare.”’(Berners-Lee, 1999
cited in McChesney, 2013: p.136)
To conclude this section, it can be noted that the history of the Internet showcases that
this communication technology had several birth sources: a) It was a structure conducted
by the US Defense Department through ARPA and ARPAnet, that is, government-funded
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research in the context of the Cold War; b) there was also a central involvement of US'
university research departments and other technical centers located in the developed
world; and c) the work of dispersed and different individuals and the private sector which
contributed with innovations that allowed the consolidation of what we know nowadays as
the Internet.
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Chapter III. Internet Governance
According to Laura DeNardis, Internet governance studies are a subset of the broader
Internet Research and Internet studies. In the same manner, Internet governance, as a
practice, is narrower than the broader area of information and communication technology
(ICTs) policies. (DeNardis, 2014 p.19).
However, because the research pays attention to the institutional arrangements that
apply to policy-making related to the Internet, we have to understand the Internet as part
of a broader category, that is, the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).
For this purpose, in the first section below, we are obliged to introduce the evolution of the
institutional structures that have defined the Global Media and Communication Policy
(GMCP) in the past forty years.
III.1. Paradigms of Global Media and Communication Policy
For Don MacLean there is a difference between the institutional structures that define
Media and Communication Policy (MCP) at the nation-state level and at the global level.
Firstly, he suggests that at the national level there are legal frameworks that provide
institutional structures with policy and regulatory responsibility of carriage and content
aspects of MCP; processes for carrying out these responsibilities; and procedures for
resolving conflicts. This more defined institutionalization at the national level allows
commercial and non-commercial sectors, MCP stakeholders and the general public to
engage in MCP policy-making and regulation. Differently, at the global stage, because of
the absence of global political authority and a comprehensive Global Media and
Communication Policy (GMCP) legal framework, analogous mechanisms found at the
national level cannot be grasped. Furthermore, he remarks that at the level of GMPC
institutions, there is little role for members of the public. (Maclean, 2011: p.47)
Following the latter, MacLean depicts a framework of the major paradigm shifts in
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GMPC over the past 30 to 40 years, hence the changes in the policy agendas of decision-
making procedures in GMCP institutions. He notes that these developments have been
constructed by the interaction of dominant and non-dominant policy paradigms which are
the product of technological, economic, and social forces; power differences of developed
and developing countries and/or between different stakeholder groups in traditional hybrid
or emerging multi-stakeholder organizations. (Maclean, 2011: p.49) [See Fig. 2]
Figure 2. Evolutionary model for GMCP institutions. Source: Maclean, 2011: p.50
The four policy paradigms product of the interplay depicted in the Figure 2 are:
1. The traditional public service paradigm, which discerns the government as the main
agent guiding the media and communication sector by public ownership or regulatory
oversight. Focused mainly on the internal structure of the telecommunications and
broadcasting sectors.
2. The economic paradigm, that identifies the private sector and market forces as the
agents for the development of media and communication technologies and services.
Under this paradigm, the government's role must be reduced for enabling the market to
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work its ways. Moreover, it sees the private sector as an enabler for innovation and
improvement of society. This paradigm displaced the national service paradigm in the
1970s and 1980s.
3. The technological paradigm, as a product of the rise of ICTs in the 1980s and 1990s,
sees media and communication as the fundamental infrastructure for all economic and
social activities in the so-called information society. This paradigm foresees the
transformation of the economy, the social and the governance structures from ‘a top-down,
hierarchical, command-and-control organizational models’ to ‘bottom-up, democratic,
participative arrangements’ due to the developments of ICTs. In this view, the role of
governmental and intergovernmental policy is minor, even though ‘public authorities did
have an important part to play in helping to construct the information society by using ICTs
to transform policy-making processes and public services’. Moreover, under this paradigm,
technical and civil society organizations are recognized as the most important actors of
GMCP.
4. The emerging social paradigm, which began to be developed in the 2000s as a
forerunner of the previous paradigms, sees economic stability, social security, and
environmental sustainability problems, but also opportunities to restore balance in these
areas by linking the possible solutions to the developments of ICTs. In this view, there is a
recognition of the role of the state in promoting rights, freedom, equality and justice;
however, there is the acknowledgment that neither national nor international policy-making
and regulatory models are completely effective in addressing the transnational, highly
distributed and real-time world the ICTs are creating, hence new models of governance
should be erected.
One of the central notions of the last paradigm is the multi-stakeholder model of
governance, to be addressed more profoundly later on in this research; however, it must
be stated herein that the multistakeholder model can be understood as a consequence of
the framework that this paradigm offers. That is, the global issues related to GMCP cannot
be resolved anymore by separated actors, i.e. government, private sector, or civil society.
(Maclean, 2011: pp.51-4)
Finally, and following MacLean, one important caveat must be mentioned. Even though
the latter paradigms have dominated the GMPC, that does not mean they have been
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universally accepted. Every paradigm shift mentioned above has actually emerged in
developed countries, at ‘individual countries, in bilateral relations between nations, in
regional groupings such as the European Union, and in communities of interest such as
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’; and later on
adopted by GMPC institutions. (Maclean, 2011: p.53) In this sense, during every paradigm
shift launched from the Developed countries, the Developing countries have also created
alternatives and counter-paradigms.
III.2. Definition and evolution of Internet Governance
For DeNardis, the main role of Internet governance comprehends the ‘design and
administration of the technologies necessary to keep the Internet operational and the
enactment of substantive policy around these technologies.’(DeNardis, 2014: p.6)
In our perspective, a more accurate and broad definition is provided by Milton Mueller
who defines Internet governance as the ‘ongoing set of disputes and deliberations over
how the Internet is coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect policies.’ (Mueller, 2010:
p.9)
Mueller posits that the term Internet governance is many times misunderstood in the
sense that it doesn't imply a top-down regulation or control over the Internet. In contrast,
the use of the word governance implies a sense that is weaker than the term government.
With that in mind, governance designates ‘the coordination and regulation of
interdependent actors in the absence of an overarching political authority.’ (Rosenau and
Czempiel, 1992 cited in Mueller, 2010: pp.8-9)
Another broad definition of internet governance is the one provided by the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS):
‘Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the
private sector, and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms,
rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and
use of the Internet.’ (WSIS, 2005)
Overall, the concept of Internet governance is still a debated one. Internet Governance
means different things to different actors, and a more comprehensive understanding can
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be extracted from the evolution of the term. For example, because the internet-users of the
early decades considered the network as a ‘regulatory-free zone’, the term Internet
governance was strongly resisted. (Drissel, 2006: p.299).
This negative stance towards governance had its cause in one of the main features of
the internet, its distributed nature. The distributed nature of the internet implies that ‘data
packets can take different paths through the network, avoiding traditional barriers and
control mechanisms.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: p.7). In accordance with this technological principle,
the regulation of the internet in its early stages was developed by the net-users creating
‘virtual transatlantic networks and non-governmental managerial structures’. Organizations
such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) —established in 1986— or the Internet
Society (ISOC), managed the development of the Internet through a cooperative,
consensus-based decision-making process which involved a wide variety of individuals
and non-governmental institutions. Kurbalija indicates, ‘there was no central government,
no central planning, and no grand design.’ (Drissel, 2006: p.301; Kurbalija, 2010: p.7)
Despite all the above, the governance of the Internet —and governance of its previous
shapes i.e. ARPAnet and NSFnet— has existed since its beginnings in the 1960s; even if
that meant governance under the previously mentioned non-governmental managerial
structures. ‘Someone has had to establish the standards for how computing devices
interoperate. Someone has coordinated the distribution of the unique Internet addresses
necessary for devices to exchange information over the Internet. Someone has responded
to Internet security problems.’ Indeed, as posited by DeNardis, the governance of the
technological infrastructure of the internet has always been a locus of competition between
companies and states and largely out of the public view. (DeNardis, 2014: p.18)
What is more, with the increasing massification of access to the World Wide Web, and
the Internet achieving a global scope, a new range of issues arose around Internet
governance. State and business interests became more and more proactive in the future
development of the network. In 1994, consonantly to the process of privatization that
framed the decade of the 90s, the National Science Foundation (NSF), until then in charge
of the key infrastructure of the Internet, subcontracted a private U.S. company 'Network
Solutions Inc. (NSI)' for the management of the Domain Name System. ‘The decision was
not taken well by the Internet community and resulted in what is called the “DNS
war”(1994–1998).’ (Kurbalija, 2010: pp.7-8)
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The "DNS war" was the name coined for the debate between International
Organizations (IOs) and States about who should be in charge of designating Domain
Names. The provisional way out of the impasse has been regarded as a unilateral one. In
1998, a new organization was created, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICAAN). The non-profit organization became the locus for much of the struggle
about who should govern the Internet.
Before 1998, the term Internet governance referred to a ‘relatively narrow set of policy
issues related to the global coordination of Internet domain names and addresses.’;
however, after the creation of ICAAN, the meaning of Internet governance expanded. As
seen in the definition of the WSIS, there is a tacit acknowledgment of the importance of
non-state actors (Mueller, 2010: p.9) and the need for principles, norms, rules, decision-
making procedures, and programmes. (WSIS, 2005)
For Mueller, there are two main concerns that stand out in the evolution of Internet
governance. One is the creation of ICAAN, perceived as a ‘unilateral construction of a
global regime by the United States, based on a new, nongovernmental model.’ And
second, the United Nations' World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) —in 2003
and 2005— which under a state-centric logic of intergovernmental organizations,
attempted to ‘address the whole range of relevant issues related to the information
society.’ (Mueller, 2010: p.10)
Consonantly, for other authors, the contemporary debate about Internet governance
revolves around a North-South digital divide. This debate has at its core the opposition of
many Developing countries and emerging powers (BRICS) towards the sensed dominance
of a US-centric hybridized model of Internet governance. In these matters, ICAAN has
been one of the decisive points of the dispute due to its links to the United States
Department of Commerce.
On the other hand, there is a concern in the Net Community about the growing number
of Internet regulations with source in the ‘lowest common denominator’, that is, national-
states legislation regimes over the internet. In the view of Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. and
Adam Thierer, ‘hundreds of cyber-cops patrolling the Net’ would be equally as bad as
inviting one single ‘centralized Super Cyber-Cop’. (Thierer & Wayne, 2003: p.xxv-xxvi)
For Mueller, the question driving the discussion is ‘not whether the Net can be
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governed, but whether there is (or should be) something new and different about the way
we do so.’ He postulates that a globally connected information infrastructure requires —or
perhaps is already producing— new global institutions. (Mueller, 2010: p.1) Having that in
mind, the debate leads necessarily to the relationship between nation-state and Global
governance.
Careful attention must be taken to the understanding of Global governance. For Arne
Hintz, based on Held/Mcgree 2003, Global governance does not just relocate policy-
making from one level (nation-state) to the next (global), but it involves qualitative
changes. ‘An illustration of global governance would encompass self-organizing networks
and webs of policy-making fora in which control is dispersed and capacity for decision-
making and implementation is widely distributed, thus “layers of governance spreading
within and across political boundaries” (Held/McGrew, 2003: p.11) in which new actors and
levels have “transformed sovereignty into the shared exercise of power”’ (Hintz, 2007: p.
1).
A set of specific characteristics of Global governance can be depicted as follows:
a) Participation of new actors, particularly from business and civil society;
b) Re-distribution of spaces and policy layers between local and global;
c) Interaction and cooperation between different actors and layers.
(ibid: p.1)
The notion of Global governance is constitutive to the field of Internet governance. The
Internet had posited challenges to the nation-State because of its global or transnational
reach. From this standpoint, Mueller distinguishes five distinct ways in which the Internet
challenges the nation-state. The Internet…
(1) globalizes the scope of communication. Its distance-insensitive cost structure
and non-territorial addressing and routing architecture make borderless
communication the default; any attempt to impose a jurisdictional overlay on it
requires additional (costly) interventions;
(2) facilitates a quantum jump in the scale of communication. It massively enlarges
our capacity for message generation, duplication, and storage. As a programmable
environment, it industrializes information services, information collection, and
information retrieval. The sheer volume of transactions and content on the Internet
often overwhelms the capacity of traditional governmental processes to respond —
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and can transform governmental processes as well;
(3) distributes control. Combined with liberalization of the telecommunications
sector, the Internet protocols decentralized and distributed participation in and
authority over networking and ensured that the decision-making units over network
operations are no longer closely aligned with political units;
(4) grew new institutions. Decision-making authority over standards and critical
Internet resources rests in the hands of a transnational network of actors that
emerged organically alongside the Internet, outside of the nation-state system.
These relatively young but maturing institutions, such as the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), the Regional Internet Address Registries, and the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), provide a new locus of
authority for key decisions about standards and critical resources;
(5) changes the polity. By converging different media forms and facilitating fully
interactive communication, the Internet dramatically alters the cost and capabilities
of group action. As a result, radically new forms of collaboration, discourse, and
organization are emerging. This makes it possible to mobilize new transnational
policy networks and enables new forms of governance as a solution to some of the
problems of Internet governance itself. (Mueller, 2010: p.4)
Despite these challenges, it cannot be said that the role of the Nation-state has been
successfully annulled. For MacLean, ‘in spite of globalization, from a legal, institutional,
and policy-making point of view, we still live in a world in which the primary actors are
sovereign nation-states. This means that the legal authorities, policy-making
responsibilities, and operational capacities of most global media and communication policy
(GMCP) institutions depend largely or exclusively on the decisions of national
governments.’ (Maclean, 2011: p.45)
Conversely, Pierre Mounier depicts an Internet fragmented into small semi-private
spaces in which ‘governance is administered within restricted areas of legitimacy’.
(Brousseau et al., 2012: p.15). Following this description, Eric Brousseau et. al. introduces
the notion of Heterarchic governance. ‘A heterarchy is a system of organization replete
with overlap, multiplicity, mixed ascendancy and/or divergent but coexistent patterns of
relationships.’ (Brousseau et al.: 2012; p.16).
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At the Internet governance field, heterarchy translates into ‘new forms of legitimacies
acquired or regained through the mutual recognition of different actors or norm designers.
Such a process has most notably been undertaken by intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) and non-governmental organizations’ (Brousseau et al., 2012: p.17). Furthermore,
Brousseau posits that the described heterarchical system stands in need of a meta-
heterarchical level in order to administer the interactions between components of a
complex system. (Jessop, 2003 cited in Brousseau et al., 2012: p.18)
In the same track of mind, DeNardis introduces the image of key gatekeepers in the
field of Internet governance. That is, in the networked heterarchy, there are public
spaces privately regulated by actors that have a central authority, i.e. ICAAN in the
management of the domain name system (DNS) and internet protocol (IP) addresses.
(DeNardis, 2009 cited in Brousseau et al., 2012: p.18). However, admitting the heterarchy
of Internet governance and the privatization of governance does not invalidate the role of
nation-states. ‘Indeed, state control of Internet governance functions via private
intermediaries has equipped states with new forms of sometimes unaccountable and
nontransparent power over information flows.’ (DeNardis, 2014: p.15)
Problematizing more the Internet governance landscape, Mueller points us to the
movement from informal and de facto associations to formal organizations; ‘from loose
consensual or cooperative action to the adoption of binding, agreed procedures.’ In one
word, institutionalization. For Mueller, institutionalization points out parties involved in
regular interactions understanding and accepting certain norms, conventions, and
explicitly formulated rules governing their interaction, moreover, that these rules can be
enforced. In short, a process of shaping the future of Internet governance via the
negotiations of governance problems upon the rise of transnational networked forms of
organizations.
Mueller identifies four possible ways in which the network organizations shaped around
the Internet can lead to institutional change. First, by formalizing and institutionalizing the
network relations themselves; second, by states' attempts to impose hierarchical
regulation upon networked forms; third, by states’ utilization and adoption of networked
forms and: fourth, by changing the polity; namely, by realigning and expanding the
associative clusters around governance institutions. (Mueller, 2010: p.46)
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In the aim to set aside an actors-based notion of Internet governance, more technical
reviews of the field can be advanced, for example, DeNardis proposes that Internet
governance refers to the ‘technologies that are unique to the Internet and deal with
interoperability among devices and the management of networked information flows
between these devices’. However, she also admits that even though Internet governance
is constituted by scientific and technological matters, it also conveys social reflections of
power and authority. Therefore, a central issue in the field of Internet governance is the
balance of power among nation-states and non-territorial and privatized mechanisms.
Additionally, the question that comes into the picture is one already proposed by Mueller
and reverberated by DeNardis ‘to what extent problems of Internet governance have
created new global institutions and what are the implications for prevailing political
structures.’ (DeNardis; 2014 pp. 22, 8, 23):
‘The diffuse nature of Internet governance technologies is shifting historic control
over these public interest areas from traditional nation-state bureaucracy to private
ordering and new global institutions. Many of these governance functions are
technically and institutionally complicated and therefore out of public view. Yet how
conflicts over Internet governance are settled will determine some of the most
important public interest issues of our time.’ (DeNardis, 2014: p.1)
Following the above, an additional and pivotal contemporary matter of contention for the
Internet governance field is constituted by the tension between a multistakeholder model
of governance and the possible step in of broader governmental control by the United
Nations' International Telecommunications Union (ITU). (DeNardis, 2014: p.31). In sum,
the debate over Internet governance ‘focuses on what type of regulatory body (if any) is
needed for maintaining an effective, smoothly functioning, Internet.’ (Drissel, 2006: p.300)
Because of these last considerations, at the next section, we pay attention to the
technical matters around one the most controversial institutions that govern Critical
Internet Resources (CIRs), that is, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). The corporation will be addressed not only in its technical Internet
governance features but also, more intensively, in its organizational structure and the
international controversies around the institution itself.
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
III.3. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN)
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a non-profit
corporation established in 1998, based in California, United States. Being a non-profit
organization, it acts under Californian State law. Its creation was possible via the
establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the US Department of
Commerce, which delimited its functions. (McLaughlin & Pickard, 2005: p.361; Kurbalija,
2010: p.171)
ICAAN is responsible for the management and oversight of central internet
infrastructure, i.e., the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, domain names, and root
servers. The corporation is referred to as the main actor in Internet governance, however,
it does not govern the whole Internet, it does not have authority over ‘cybersecurity,
content policy, copyright protection, protection of privacy, maintenance of cultural diversity,
or bridging the digital divide.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: p.171) Nevertheless, it has central authority
on matters related to Critical Internet Resources (CIRs).
III.3.1. Some Internet Governance's technical features
A point of start to understand the technological features of Internet governance is the
technical premise that there are some ‘points of centralized control’ at the virtual
infrastructure of the Internet. These are the Critical Internet resources (CIRs), which are
‘Internet-unique logical resources rather than physical infrastructural components’. The
physical infrastructure, i.e., power grid, fiber optic cables, and switches, are part of the
critical Internet infrastructure also, but they are not CIRs. CIRs are global universal unique
identifiers and require some sort of central administration and coordination. The
deployment of the physical infrastructure is independent of the CIRs and does not precise
central coordination. (DeNardis, 2014: pp.34-6)
Two of the CIRs are important in the debate that regards Internet governance, namely
the Domain Name System (DNS) and the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. A brief
explanation of the technical matters of this two, plus its technological management, is
unavoidable for the purposes of this research.
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
Domain Name System (DNS). In order for a person read news online, send emails,
access social media or any other task that involves surfing the web, the domain names are
crucial. ‘DNS handles Internet addresses (such as google.com) and converts them to IP
numbers.’(Kurbalija, 2010: p.41) The DNS translates numerical IP addresses —the
language of computers that consists in zeros (0) and ones (1)— into ordinary language
equivalents through a hierarchical naming system (Maclean, 2011: p.44).
‘Domains are administrative entities. The purpose and expected use of domains is to
divide the name management required of a central administration and assign it to sub-
administration.’ (Postel cited in DeNardis, 2014: p.43) In this sense, DNS is subdivided into
three categories, generic Top Level Domains (gTLD), sponsored Top Level Domains
(sTLD) and country code Top Level Domains (ccTLD).
• generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs), include Domains as: <.com>, <.info>,
<.net> and <.org>. In theory, the gTLDs can be obtained by anyone. For example, if
someone wants to have the address on the web <www.pants.com>, there is a
requirement to get permission from some sort of authority to obtain that particular
website address.
• Sponsored Top Level Domains (sTLDs), reserved only for specific industries.
For example <.aero> which is only open to air transport industry or <.edu> reserved
only for the education sector.
• country code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs), as the name of the category
claims, these are limited to a specific country, i.e. <.uk> for the United Kingdom;
<.cn> for China; <.bo> for Bolivia, and so on. (Kurbalija, 2010: p.41)
The gTLDs and the ccTLDs were created in 1984 and each top-level domain space is
divided into sub-domains in an arrangement that presents the form of a hierarchical
t ree. [See F ig . 3 ] For example in a un i form resource locator (URL)
like www.hks.harvard.edu, <.edu> is the Top Level domain, <.harvard> the second-level
domain, and <.hks>, that stands for Harvard Kennedy School, is the third level domain.
(DeNardis, 2014: p.44)
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Figure 3. DNS Hierarchy. Source: DeNardis, 2014: p.52
For every single gTLD, there is a Registry or a name server that maintains the address
list. For example, the <.com> gTLD is managed by VeriSign . Also, to complicate the 5
terminology, different from the Registry, there are also Registrars, which perform a function
of selling the Top Level domains. In some cases, the function of Registry and Registrars
are under the same operator. In sum, every sub-domain is maintained by a Registry
operator which is responsible for maintaining a database of names and associated IP
addresses for every domain name registered within a given TLD. (DeNardis, 2014;
Kurbalija, 2010)
In the hierarchical distribution of domains, there is a technical apex which consists of
Internet's root name servers and a single master file known as the root zone file, known as
the root zone database. ‘The root zone servers, now mirrored (replicated) around the world
for redundancy and efficiency, are the starting point for the resolution of names into IP
addresses. They publish the definitive file mapping top-level domains into IP addresses.
The root zone file is a relatively small list of names and IP addresses of all the authoritative
DNS servers for top-level domains, including country-code TLDs.’ (DeNardis, 2014: p.44)
The number of root servers is quite small, only thirteen (as display in Fig. 4).
Verisign, Inc. is a US company based in Virginia, United States. It operates a diverse array of network infrastructure, 5
including two of the Internet’s thirteen root name-servers, the authoritative registry for the .com, .net, and name generic top-level domains and the .cc and .tv country-code top-level domains, and the back-end systems for the .jobs, .gov, and .edu top-level domains.
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
Figure 4. Official IANA List of Internet Root Servers. Source: DeNardis, 2014: p.50
The DNS is a CIR which technological design requires consistency, hierarchy,
universality and some degree of centralized coordination. (DeNardis, 2014: p.44) Over the
Root servers, there is a central authority that oversees the DNS and delegates authority
for each top-level domain to the registry operators. (DeNardis, 2014; Mueller, 2010). This
authority is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The origin of centralized
authority in these matters can be found in one person, Jon Postel, and his role when the
Internet was limited to the United States borders. During the period, Postel and some his
colleagues performed the functions of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
under a contract of the United States Department of Commerce. However, since the year
2000, and with the global expansion of the Internet, the functions of IANA were placed
under ICAAN; centralizing the control of the global IP address allocation and the root zone
management in the Domain Name System (DNS). (Bing, 2009; Drissel, 2006; DeNardis,
2014; Kurbalija, 2010)
ICANN, via IANA, is in charge of the oversight of the top-level domains (TLDs). In the
sphere of managing the DNS, IANA delegates authority for overseeing each generic top-
level domain to registry operators. There is a registry operator for each country code TLD
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
and all of the generic TLDs. Some of those registry operators are also domain name
registrars, meaning that they assign domain names to individuals and institutions
requesting these names. Nowadays there are also five Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs):
• AfriNIC: African Network Information Centre (Africa)
• APNIC: Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (Asia-Pacific Regions)
• ARIN: American Registry for Internet Numbers (Canada, United States, North
Atlantic Islands)
• LACNIC: Latin America and Caribbean Network Information Centre (Latin
America, Caribbean)
• RIPE NCC: Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (Europe, Middle
East, parts of central Asia).
(DeNardis, 2014; Kurbalija, 2010)
Through IANA, ICAAN distributes blocks of IP numbers to the five RIRs. These latter
distribute IP numbers to local Internet registries (LIRs) and national Internet registries
(NIRs), which in turn distribute IP numbers to smaller Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
companies, and individuals. [See Fig. 5] (Kurbalija, 2010: p.38)
Figure 5. Institutional System of Internet Address Allocation and Assignment. Source: DeNardis, 2014: p.55
Under this technical scheme, ICANN is composed of three main stakeholder groups:
the RIR's or regional registries of IP addresses; the commercial and non-commercial
registries of generic domain names; and registries of country code domain names
(Maclean, 2011: p.44). However, at the formal structure of ICANN we can find a broader
extension of entities and complexity, this will be addressed in the next section.
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III.3.2. Structure of ICANN
The Structure of ICANN is set in the Bylaws of the corporation, lastly amended
on February 7, 2014. ICAAN is managed by a 16-member Board of Directors (Art. VI,
section 2) refereed herein as the Board. The Board acts by a majority vote of all members
(Art. II, section 1) and it is composed of:
a) Eight members selected by a nominating committee on which all the
constituencies of ICANN are represented (Art. VI, section 2);
The voting delegates of the Nominating Committee are selected from the
Generic Names Supporting Organizations , established as follows: 6
a. One delegate from the Registries Stakeholder Group;
b. One delegate from the Registrars Stakeholder Group;
c. Two delegates from the Business Constituency, one representing small
business users and one representing large business users;
d. One delegate from the Internet Service Providers Constituency;
e. One delegate from the Intellectual Property Constituency; and
f. One delegate from consumer and civil society groups, selected by the Non-
Commercial Users Constituency. (Art. VII, Section 2)
b) Two voting members selected by the Address Supporting Organization (Art.
VI, section 2)
The Address Supporting Organization (ASO) performs activities related to policy-
making on IP addresses. It was established by a Memorandum of Understanding
of 21 October 2004 between ICANN and the Number Resource Organization
(NRO), an organization of the existing regional Internet registries (RIRs).(Art.
VIII, section 2)
Any group of individuals or entities may petition the Board for recognition as a new or separate Constituency in the 6
Non-Contracted Parties House.
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c) Two voting members selected by the Country-Code Names Supporting
Organization (Art. VI, section 2)
The Country Code Names Supporting Organization(ccNSO) develops policy-
making on country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs). It comprehends (i) ccTLD
managers that have agreed in writing to be members of the ccNSO and (ii) a
ccNSO Council responsible for managing the policy-development process of the
ccNSO. (Art. IX section2). The ccNSO Council have under its tasks: developing
and recommending to the Board global policies relating to country-code top-level
domains; Nurturing consensus across the ccNSO's community, including the
name-related activities of ccTLDs; and; coordinating with other ICANN
Supporting Organizations, committees, and constituencies under ICANN. (Art.
IX, section1)
d) Two voting members selected by the Generic Names Supporting
Organization (Art. VI, section 2)
The Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) performs activities related
to policy-making on generic top-level domains (gTLDs).
e) An At-Large seat filled by an At-Large Organization (Art. VI, section 2)
The At-Large community intends to represent the interests and concerns of
‘individual users’. In this sense, it acts via the At Large Advisory Committee
(ALAC) which comprehends 2 members of each of the Regional At-Large
Organizations (RALOs) and five members selected by the Nominating
Committee. The five latter must include one citizen of a country within each of
the five Geographic Regions (Art. XI, section 4)
The RALOs are non-profit organization certified by ICANN and there is one for
each Geographic Region, their purpose is to act as ‘the main forum and
coordination point for public input to ICANN in its Geographic Region’ (Art. XI,
section 4-g).
The Geographic Regions recognized by ICANN are Europe; Asia/Australia/
Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean Islands; Africa; and North America. They are
created to “ensure broad international representation on the Board’ (Art. XI,
section 5).
f) A President/CEO, appointed by the Board. (Art. VI, section 2).
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Moreover, ICANN can be also divided into two groups. The first is composed of
Supporting Organizations that directly participate in the policymaking, namely, the Generic
Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), the Country Code Names Supporting
Organization(ccNSO), and the Address Supporting Organization (ASO). These are
‘responsible for recommending policies in a specific subject area to be reviewed and then
approved or rejected by the Board. The second group is composed of advisory groups or
committees that ‘give advice to the Board on any issue that concerns ICANN, including the
policy recommendations made by the Supporting Organizations’ (Doria, 2014: p.130), and
they are supposed to represent the interests and needs of stakeholders that are not
directly part of the Supporting Organizations. The integrants of the second group are
stipulated in the Article XI of ICANN By-Laws:
• Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC)
• At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC)
• Root Server System Advisory Committee
• Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC)
• Technical Liaison Group (TLG)
From this organizational structure, we pay attention to the Governmental Advisory
Committee (GAC), which will serve us to make future remarks on issues of Internet
Governance and topics related to the legitimacy of the current systems of Internet
governance.
The GAC was created in 2002 and has representation from 111 national-states (108
UN members, Cook Islands, Niue, and Taiwan), the Holy See, Hong Kong, Bermuda,
Montserrat, the European Commission, and the African Union Commission. (GACweb,
2014) Conjointly it includes in observer positions a range of multinational governmental,
treaty organizations and public authorities (including all the UN agencies with a direct
interest in global Internet governance such as the ITU, UNESCO, and WIPO). (GACweb,
2014)
The GAC has an advisory character to ICANN's board, therefore, it is not a decision-
making body. Its recommendations have to do with ‘issues of public policy, and especially
where there may be an interaction between ICANN's activities or policies and national
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laws or international agreements.’ It usually meets 3 times a year and enters in
discussions with ICANN's Board and other ICANN Supporting Organizations, Advisory
Committees and other groups. (GACweb, 2014)
For Mueller, ICANN has a ‘dual system of policymaking’. In one hand, based on the
non-state actors, that is, ICANN supporting organizations, and on the other hand, the
governments represented at the GAC. This dual system makes the states only to advise
and participate in the determinations of ICANN, while they are ‘liberated from normal lawful
due process and human rights constraints’, leaving ICANN with a lack of ‘sufficient
external accountability’. (Mueller, 2010: p.243)
Moreover, the Board, under the avalanche of different policy proposals from
‘unintegrated processes and bodies’, decides which policy recommendation to adopt.
Additionally, the GAC interventions, most of the times, do not address issues related to
public interests, on the contrary, it has been used to claim special benefits and powers to
the member governments. (Mueller, 2010: p.244):
‘GAC's most important communiqués and policy advice statements have claimed
special powers over the delegation of country code domains; demanded special
reservations for country names or geographic names in new TLDs; and supported
the ccTLD fast track. The European Union used GAC as the platform to lobby for a
new TLD of its own (.eu).’ (Mueller, 2010: p.244)
For Mueller, the debate about CIRs revolves considerably around the role of national
states and its respective governments. In this vein, he identifies three channels where the
problem flows: ‘(1) the attempt by states to assert a special role for themselves in Internet
“public policy”; (2) debates over the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) within
ICANN; and (3) the controversy over the role of the U.S. government in controlling and
supervising ICANN.’ (Mueller, 2010: p.240)
In that regard, the GAC was created in accordance with the aims of the US Department
of Commerce to limit the role of nation-states in the management of the Internet. However,
in the pursuit of broader levels of legitimacy for ICANN, the presence of the governments
was required in its institutional structure. The incorporation of states in the structure made
ICANN the symbolic locus for the struggle about state roles in the internet governance
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
field; particularly because some of the developing countries managed to carry out some
reforms to ICANN. Furthermore, other groups of developing countries are even pushing to
make the national-states to have the last word regarding Global Internet governance.
(Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.7)
Finally, while the Internet as a whole does not possess a specific and unique entity that
regulates it, the United States government oversees two main and central technical
organizations that keep the Internet running, namely, ICANN and IANA, the latter, the
administrative branch of the first.
In view of this, during 2013 and 2014, ICANN made several efforts to internationalize or
globalize its structure. It opened hub offices in Singapore, Turkey, and the United States;
and engagement offices in China, Belgium, Switzerland, Uruguay, Korea, and the United
States (DC). It still has headquarters in the United States but intends to have a global
presence. In the view of Avri Doria, these improvements cannot be considered as the
endpoint. ICANN has the challenge to ‘outreach to the global multistakeholder community’,
bringing users and non-users of the DNS from different countries and incorporate their
concerns and goals, balancing the ‘profit motive and well being of registrants, users, and
non-users.’ (Doria, 2014b: p.80)
III.3.3. ICANN's Political Struggles: Representation and Legitimacy
Overall, ICANN has 1) policy authority over the Domain Names Space (DNS); 2)
authority to define IP addresses allocation policies; and 3) the management of the root
zone servers. These centralized regulatory functions have a global reach. (Rioux & Pérez,
2014: pp.39-40). As explained at the previous section on the technical matters, ICANN
has the power to choose who is entitled to a specific domain name and to designate the
number of IP addresses available to particular regions and nations. Important to remark is
that the aforementioned are scarce resources and its allocation is in hands of ICANN.
Furthermore, ICANN has authority over the way the disputes about domain names are
settled; this is done through its Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (McLaughlin & Pickard, 2005: p.362); its subsidiary organization, the Domain Name
Supporting Organization (DMSO), is the chief entity in charge of resolving these disputes.
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(Drissel, 2006: p.303). The contentions arise from the claims of some states and
international actors which perceive that the allocations of domain names are made
arbitrarily and in a disproportional way, benefiting the developed nations over the
developing ones (McLaughlin & Pickard: 2005: p. 362) or favoring powerful business
interests over smaller firms and associations (Drissel, 2006: p.303).
When revising the literature about ICANN, there is no doubt that the legitimacy of the
institution has been contested since its creation. In the mid-1990s, with the rapid
expansion of the Internet, there was still no legitimate policy-making authority over the
central coordinating functions of the Internet. (Mueller, 2014: p.5) In this context, the so-
called DNS war (1994-1885) breakthrough, bringing different actors into the debate about
who should have control over central governance aspects of the Internet. In view of the
circumstances, the US government envisioned and implemented a solution to the
situation.
The stance of the US government was advanced first in its 1996' Policy statement: A
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. In the document, the US proposed to solve
the DNS issue through a governance arrangement that recognized the Internet's global
quality without giving power to states or intergovernmental treaties or organizations;
leaving the governance of DNS to a technical community under private contract. (Mueller
& Wagner, 2014: p.5) Moreover, the document was embedded with the worries of the
private business sector, particularly about the negative effects on electronic commerce if
national governments enforced at the global arena of the Internet their different national
laws and regulations. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.5)
By 1998, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an
agency of the United States Department of Commerce, set the policy framework for
ICANN in the White Paper entitled Management of Internet Names and Addresses. The
document invited to recognize the private corporation ICANN as the new administrator of
DNS. The actors involved in the White Paper process attempted to achieve legitimacy for
the new nonprofit corporation by organizing several international meetings, chiefly, through
the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), which didn't succeed in creating
consensus and legitimacy for the newly created corporation and was finally supplanted by
a private deal between Jon Postel, Network Solutions and the U.S. Commerce Department
(Mueller & Wagner, 2014: pp.6-7).
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As far as the beginnings of ICAAN, in the NTIA's White Paper proposal, there was the
acknowledgment for a need to globalize Internet governance. The document stated, ‘(...)
an increasing percentage of Internet users reside outside of the U.S., and those
stakeholders want to participate in Internet coordination.’ In this sense, the proposal of the
US government was to globalize Internet governance by delegating authority to a private-
sector nonprofit corporation, which will deliver policies via private contracts in a
multistakeholder process and not by national governments or intergovernmental treaties.
However, the transition over the past 16 years was never accomplished completely; and
ICANN ‘remained a US government contractor rather than an independent,
multistakeholder governance institution.’ (Mueller & Kuerbis, 2014: p.1)
In that context, diverse sectors of the international community manifested that ICANN
lacked transparency and accountability; and that it had a ‘Western-centric mode of
governance’. (McLaughlin & Pickard, 2005: p.362). What is more, claims about ICANN's
creation with a core ‘dominant coalition’ of stakeholders composed of a small number of
individuals and organizations mainly linked to the United States resulted in criticism
regarding ‘limited participation of a wide range of stakeholders.’ (Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.
6) The most salient controversies around ICANN can be summed up in the next points:
• The relationship between ICANN and the United States Department of Commerce The Memorandum of Understanding has been criticized as illegitimate
supervision of ICANN by the US Department of Commerce, hence the United States government.
• Accountability and transparency. Having a private sector-led governance system in its management of critical resources of the internet, the questions posited are: to
whom is ICANN accountable to? And how could its operations be supervised?
• Legitimacy of the institution, which is linked to matters of participation and democracy. The question posited is who are the stakeholders?; and, in which
organizational branches are these stakeholders represented? For some, the civil society organizations, individual users and developing countries governments are, in
some sense, only represented at peripheral bodies.
• The role of the GAC and the nation-states represented in this body, their scope
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and degree of control and influence in Global Internet policies. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: pp.4-7)
At the beginning of the 2000s, some reforms to ICANN were made in order to palliate
the controversies. In this regard, because of the insistence of European countries, the
opening for national governments was made by the creation of the GAC, additionally,
the community of individual users had their entrance with the creation of the At-Large
Advisory Committee. The latter posed ICANN as a ‘private-public partnership’. Despite
this, the Board remained as the chief decision-making body.
The international context that framed the rest of the decade, namely, the terrorist
attacks in the United States and Europe which triggered discussions about cybersecurity;
the rise of the emerging economies; and the expansion of the use of Internet in these
emerging economies as well as in developing countries, made ICANN a locus of debate
regarding who should be in charge of Global Internet policies; subsequently, this debate
also found its way into international fora. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: pp.7-8) As the overlap
between technical and policy issues became more salient, the debates about governance
of core internet infrastructures emerged on the agendas of different international
organizations. (Global Partners, 2013: pp.17-8)
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Chapter IV. The Multistakeholder Model (MSM)
IV.1. WSIS and IGF: The rise of the Multi-stakeholder Model
In a manner, ICANN's organizational structure was from its beginnings designed to be
a kind of Multistakeholder institution. However, in the early days of ICANN, the notion of
a Multistakeholder model was understood as a ‘private sector-led’ governance. (Mueller &
Wagner, 2014: p.6). It was only until the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) in 2003 that the 'multistakeholder' concept was first used at Internet governance
institutions. (Weinberg, 2011 cited in Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.7)
The WSIS was a United Nations summit with the aim to address exclusively the topic of
information and communication. The themes to be addressed ranged from digital divide,
Internet and education, cultural diversity, security, freedom of expression and financing
mechanisms. The WSIS consisted of two parts, one-first summit in Geneva, on 10-12
December 2003; and the second in Tunis, on 16-18 November 2005. (Hintz, 2007: p.2).
At the WSIS, several civil society organizations made progress regarding their role and
participation in Internet governance, mainly pushing for a multistakeholder modality of
participation and organization of the fora. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.7) Indeed, the multi-
stakeholder approach was the novelty of the WSIS process. (Hintz, 2007: p.3). One of the
innovative challenges of the WSIS was the institutional commitment of the UN to make the
fora a space where civil society organizations will be included as full partners, and not only
as observers or included as members of civil society in national government delegations -
which was the traditional role civil society played at UN summits. (Raboy, 2004: p.228)
The full partnership of civil society organizations appeared to be controversial because
only large NGOs with sufficient funds could cope with the restrictions to participate. Among
these restrictions, Hintz mentions requirements such as being an entity officially
recognized by the UN; detailed personal information and a badge with a Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) chip which prevented privacy infringements; credentials proving the
formal establishment of the organization with a headquarter; a democratically adopted
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constitution and annual reports; or even expenses of participation, namely, flight tickets to
Geneva and accommodation. (Hintz, 2007: p.3)
Despite the restrictions, the participant civil society organizations posited the need for
broader participation of the sector in Internet governance. As a general assessment of the
WSIS, it can be recognized that civil society organizations had multiple avenues to
participate through open consultation processes and participation in individual events and
workshops. (Global Partners, 2013: p.7)
In its early stage, the principal purpose of the WSIS was to promote the development of
telecommunications infrastructure. However, in the end, the WSIS became a forum that
provided developing and European countries the opportunity to contest the legitimacy of
ICANN. At the WSIS, the US government was isolated diplomatically. There was a
generalized objection among almost all national governments to the United
States' unilateral oversight over ICANN. Some of them emanated proposals of a traditional
sovereignty-based international governance; others accepted ICANN, however, posited
the need for inter-governmental oversight upon the corporation. Despite the latter, a last-
minute change in the stances of the European governments left ICANN without major
change. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.7). Finally and despite all the debates about the
matter, ICANN was not brought under any intergovernmental regulatory regime. (Melody,
2011: p.73)
Eventually, some changes in the Internet governance field were formulated at the
WSIS. The final document of the 2005 Summit, the ‘Tunis Agenda’, managed to assign
different roles to different stakeholder groupings. It defined national governments as
exclusive makers of ‘public policy’ for the Internet. In this vein, it called for ‘the process
towards enhanced cooperation’, that is: ‘enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry
out their roles and responsibilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to the
Internet.’ (WSIS, 2005: Articles 68–71)
The Tunis Agenda also stated that the day-to-day technical and operational matters
with no impact on international public policy issues were meant to be managed by relevant
international organizations with no involvement of governments. (Global Partners, 2013: p.
17) This meant that the technical institutions in charge of Internet governance until that
time were somewhat left untouched despite the novel recognition of states as makers of
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public policy for the Internet. In the view of Radu and Chenou, the Tunis Agenda basically
‘acknowledged the work of existing institutions, while recalling the role of governments and
intergovernmental organizations in Internet governance policy-related issues.’ (Chenou &
Radu, 2014: p.8)
At the WSIS, the traditional manner of addressing international coordination and policy
issues via multilateral agreements was resisted. Instead, led by the private sector and civil
society, a transnational approach was upheld (Melody, 2011: p.73) which we understand
as the rise of the Multistakeholder model in the Internet governance field.
Echoing Raboy, Petros Iosifidis asserts that at the global media and communication
governance level, there is an interaction and interdependence of many actors and policy
bodies; power is not equally distributed among them. ‘National governments and
multinational corporations are clearly more powerful than NGOs and other civil society
associations.’ (Iosifidis, 2011: p.190). Notwithstanding, the WSIS demonstrated in some
way that global media decision-making is not exclusive of nation-states and other
multinational organizations, but also terrain for previously marginalized actors e.g. NGOs.
(ibid.: p.199)
The WSIS left unresolved or in status quo a number of problématiques of Internet
governance, mainly because the ‘outcomes of individual WSIS review events are not
legally binding.’ This situation led to another key innovation at the WSIS, the creation of
the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Intended to be an institutional arrangement that
embodied the multistakeholder model, the IGF was defined by the Tunis Agenda as a
place where all stakeholders can consult with each other on an equal footing with regard
to Internet policy. The IGF was established to be the forum for future discussions and to
provide alternatives to the controversies around Internet governance, one of them, the still
pending issue regarding US oversight over ICANN. (Global Partners, 2013: p.7; Doria,
2014: p.133)
Created by the Tunis Agenda, the IGF was conceived as an annual international
multistakeholder forum for dialogue around Internet policy. Held under auspices of the
United Nations, it also takes place in many countries and regions across the world;
national and regional IGFs discuss local issues and perspectives on global issues to
thereafter feed into the main IGF. It is considered a global, fully open and multistakeholder
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forum where Internet policy and governance are discussed and developed. Nonetheless, it
has no decision-making powers, instead, ‘it functions as a kind of rolling think tank,
highlighting issues, flagging up best practice and acting as a means of exchanging
information.’ (Global Partners, 2013: p.10). What is more, despite IGF's consultative
character, it does have a mandate to direct the attention of relevant authorities to issues
and possible solutions for Internet governance problématiques. (Iosifidis, 2011: p.192)
The structure of the IGF comprehends civil society organizations (33%); governments
(26%), private sector (17%); internet community (10%); media (8%) and inter-
governmental organizations (6%). Its decision-making processes take mainly the shape of
a series of main sessions, with many small workshops that feed the mentioned main
sessions. The participation of civil society organizations is subject to registration on its
website and the necessary funds to attend the meetings or workshops. Civil society
organizations have also the possibility of organizing workshops or contribute through
online and open consultations. (Global Partners, 2013: pp.10-1)
In the view of Kaarle Nordenstreng, while the IGF opened a platform for civil society to
participate in Internet governance, ‘we have to ask how efficient and successful they can
be in countering governmental and corporate interests.’ (Nordenstreng, 2011: p.90)
For Mueller and Wagner, the actual purpose of the IGF consists in binding together the
actors who support the multistakeholder model of Internet governance; legitimizing the
MSM and pre-empting other institutions from governing the Internet; moreover, not really
distributing instrumental power. (Mueller, 2010). Accordingly, ‘the IGF protects the
multistakeholder model by acting as a dam that prevents the discussion from moving into a
more traditional intergovernmental setting.’ (Kummer, 2014: p.16)
The IGF constitutes more a symbolic space rather than a forum oriented to the
production of specific policy outcomes per se. Mueller and Wagner understand the
experiences of the WSIS and the IGF in the past 15 years as attempts of improvised
collective governance arrangements in the field of Internet governance that ‘so far have
failed to fully resolve the issues of legitimacy, adherence and scope on a global
basis.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.8-11)
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IV.2. The MSM and the Third Sector
Following the brief history of the internet depicted in chapter 1 and the description of
chapter 2 about ICANN's structure and governance functions, it can be inferred that non-
state actors have had the main share of the work in the development of the Internet. ‘Civil
society, particularly academia, has been a vital player in the Internet field since its early
days’. This statement can translate into a viewpoint in which ‘governments are relative
newcomers to the Internet governance field.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: p.159). Indeed, this is
partially true.
The truthiness lies in that, differently than other intergovernmental regimes which
opened gradually to non-governmental actors, the issues about Internet governance
became part of international negotiations in a context in which ‘governments had to enter
an existing non-governmental regime, built around the IETF (the Internet Engineering Task
Force), ISOC (the Internet Society) and ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers).’ In that respect, there was a need for intersecting the non-
governmental and governmental regime. (Ibid). The first pivotal attempt towards this aim
was the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) during the World Summit on the 7
Information Society (WSIS) process (2003–2005), which produced a first leading notion of
what the multistakeholder model refers to in the field of Internet governance:
‘A working definition of Internet governance is the development and application by
governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape
the evolution and use of the Internet.’ (WSIS, 2005: Paragraph 34)
The definition foresees a cardinal and basic notion about the MSM. It does not propose
a central Internet authority or a one-stakeholder model, instead, it suggests three
categories of stakeholders, namely, governments, private sector and civil society.
The WGIG was more than an expert advisory group, but less than a decision-making body. It did not produce official 7
UN documents, but it substantially influenced WSIS negotiations on Internet governance. ‘WGIG was a compromise in which pro-ICANN governments let Internet governance issues officially emerge onto the multilateral diplomatic agenda and in which other governments, mainly from developing countries, accepted the participation of non-state actors.’ (Kurbalija, 2010: 160).
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For Eric Brousseau, a multistakeholder model ‘refers to stakeholders – understood as
governments, the business sector and civil society – entering into a bargaining game with
their own stakes and policy priorities.’ (Brousseau et al., 2012: p.12). According to Avri
Doria, there are two basic categories in the definition of the Multistakeholder model in
Internet governance. The first, in an effort to create full democratic participation,
understand multistakeholderism as the ‘belief in a structure with equivalent stakeholders
who participate on equal footing’. The second version, which tends to propose a more
hierarchical model, understands it as the belief that one stakeholder or group of
stakeholders is/are more equal than the other stakeholders, and that ‘the primary
stakeholder discharges their duty by consulting the other stakeholders before making
decisions’. (Doria, 2014: p.116)
Other definitions refer to the multistakeholder model as engaging ‘technologists, the
private sector and civil society in a bottom-up, consensus-driven approach to standards-
setting, Internet development, and management’ (Wentworth, 2013 cited in Hill, 2014: p.
85). Or, that in Internet governance matters, the multi-stakeholder model is a call for
‘participation in an open dialogue that directly reflects the diversity of the interests and
activities that collectively form the Internet itself.’ (Huston, 2013b cited in Hill, 2014: p.85)
Rolf Weber poses that the conjunct involvement of all stakeholders that have
necessary know-how is positive in the sense that strengthens the public confidence in
decision-making processes and that public participation increases transparency and
accountability of governing bodies. (Weber, 2014: p.96)
Indeed, the MSM ‘claims to share decision-making power with non-state actors. As
such, the multistakeholder model could credibly be considered an innovative governance
concept, part of a wider global debate about rethinking governance in a globalized
world.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.8). However, the concept has been recently seriously
studied or evaluated (DeNardis, 2013). Furthermore, no organization has ‘clearly positively
articulated how multistakeholderism should be implemented.’ (Jamart, 2014: p.63)
From a critical perspective, Milton Mueller points out that multistakeholderism ‘does not
provide any guidance on the substantive policy issues of Internet governance’, rather, it
addresses the problem of democracy and participation in the field, concretely, the opening
of existing intergovernmental institutions to non-state actors. Therefore, it evades national
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sovereignty and hierarchical power issues. ‘It offers a simple-minded communitarianism
that implies that all political, economic, and social conflicts can be resolved if everyone
involved just sits down and talks about them together.’ (Mueller, 2010: p.264)
Furthermore, Mueller makes reference to the plasticity and imprecision of
the stakeholder concept because by using broad categories —private sector, government,
and civil society— it does not define for sure who is a stakeholder or what rights adhere to
that status. The latter is of great importance because, at the global level, multistakeholder
institutions lack Rights frameworks which would allow them to provide participating actors
specific civil and political rights, or make the decision-makers formally accountable to
them. (Mueller, 2010: p.265)
Also from a critical perspective, Richard Hill asserts that the discussion is about if
particular Internet governance matters should be decided or not by multistakeholder
organizations such as ICANN, IEFT, or other similar ones. For him, these
multistakeholder organizations obtain political support from the governments of developed
countries whose businesses and citizens are intensely involved in the work of those same
organizations. (Hill, 2014: p.85)
In the view of Michael Gurstein, the multistakeholder model has taken great relevance
in the Internet governance field during the past three years particularly due to the impulse
given by the United States and its allies in the civil society, corporate and technical
organizations. For him, the MSM topic, in the discussions of Internet governance, is
intending to replace other relevant ones, e.g. Internet freedom. Further, it is presented
as the necessary model for Internet-governance' decision-making in broader areas of
public policy that are not necessarily technical.
As specified by Gurstein, the MSM is in fact ‘the transformation of the neoliberal
economic model’ into a new way of ‘post-democratic governance’ where the market place
open opportunities for participation of private sector stakeholders, technical stakeholders
and civil society stakeholders in the Internet policy forums, but it does not do so for the
public interest.
From that perspective, in the MSM there is no ‘external regulatory framework’ that
protects the general public interest, which ends up below the interactions of sectoral
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interests, thus, ‘the public interest is a (magical) bi-product/outcome of the confluence (or
consensus) processes of each individual stakeholder pursuing their particular individual
interest (stake).’
The MSM intends to remove governments as protectors of rights and equitable
processes and outcomes of public policy. It produces the privatization of governance in
which the Internet cannot be considered a common good, leaving the ones who cannot be
a stakeholder —the marginalized, the poor, less developed countries and even Internet
users— excluded from decision-making processes that are ultimately made by core
Internet corporations and stakeholders. (Gurstein, 2014: pp.9-11)
For the Internet governance field, the MSM has pressing importance because it
provides a tacit acknowledgment of the relevance of the Third sector.
The third sector or civil society is the sum of organizations that are characterized by a)
being private, however not having profit-oriented goals, and b) having social, public and
collective objectives, while not being part of the State. (Santos, 2006: p.219). However, as
expected, different political and functional contexts at the periphery and center of the
World system produce distinct debate topics advanced by third sector organizations.
Notwithstanding, the expansion of Neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus
provided common ground for the rebirth of the Third sector. (ibid. p226).
This rebirth of the third sector can be interpreted as an opportunity to compare
the community principle with the market and state principles. These last two understood in
their respective historical attempts of hegemonizing social regulation; the market principle
as the phase of the liberal capitalism, and the State principle as the phase of directed
capitalism or fordism. (ibid. p.221)
Santos recognizes four debates around the third sector, due to the aim of our research,
we pay attention only to one of them, particularly, the debate pertaining to the relations
between the third sector and the National state. Even though Santos analysis looks to the
national level, his proposals on how to understand the role of the third sector vis-à-vis the
state are important for making further comparisons and proposals about Global Internet
governance arrangements.
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The problematic conveyed by the debate about the relations between the third sector
and the National state consists in identifying the role and function of the third sector in the
public policies sphere and the overall reform of the State. In this view, Santos depicts two
notions about the State.
The first is the ‘Estado-impresario’ (or ‘State-entrepreneur’) with two basic propositions,
a) privatize all state functions that should not be performed with exclusivity and b) subdue
the public administration to efficiency, efficacy, creativity, competitiveness, and service to
the consumers of the business world. In sum, a conception of the state with the primacy of
the market principle.
In contrast, the second notion about the state understands it as a "new social
movement" (novísimo social movement), a new arrangement of the state principle and the
community principle, with the predominance of the latter. This notion depicts the state
as undergoing transformations in which the traditional Liberal and Marxist theories of the
state are obsolete to explain it. Instead, for a better understanding, Santos proposes as
finer tools the theoretical perspectives used to analyze processes of resistance and
autonomy against the state.
The profound transformations the state is going through are understood as the rise of a
new kind of political organization broader than the state. An organization integrated by a
hybrid aggregate of currents, networks and organizations where state and non-state
elements (national, local and global) combine and interpenetrate, while the state acts like
an articulating node (articulador). This new organization has no center and the
coordination of the state acts like an ‘imagined center’.
In this regard, the social regulation produced by the aforementioned new political
semblance is more ample and unbending than the regulation performed by the State-
entrepreneur; however, it is also more fragmented and heterogeneous, easily confused
with social de-regulation. In fact, a substantial portion of the new social regulation is
produced by political subcontracts with different competitive groups and agents that
represent distinct conceptions on what are public goods and what is the public interest.
(ibid. pp. 230-233)
The explained context transforms the state into a fragmented and fractured political
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relationship which Santos characterizes as the ‘de-centration of the state', as a terrain for
political struggle less formal form an institutional standpoint. The ‘de-centration’ of the state
implies not so much its weakening but a change in the nature of its force.
In other words, the state loses control over the social regulation but earns control over
the ‘meta-regulation’, namely, the selection, coordination, hierarchization, and regulation of
the non-state agents that, under a political subcontract, acquire concessions from the state
power. The political nature, profile and orientation over the control of the meta-regulation
constitutes the main objective of the contemporary political struggle. This struggle takes
place in a public space broader than the state, at a space where the state is only one of its
components. In this sense, the struggles for the democratization of this space are double,
a) democratization of the meta-regulation and b) the internal democratization of non-state
agents. (ibid. p.234)
According to Santos, if in the past there were attempts to democratize the regulatory
monopoly of the state, nowadays there must be a democratization of the disappearance of
its monopoly. In other words, while the modern State assumed as its own, and therefore as
public interest, a certain form or composition of diverse interests, now the state limits itself
to coordinate the different interests that are not only national but also global or
transnational. Consequently, the state is more and more directly committed to the criteria
of redistribution, hence inclusion and exclusion. In this sense, the tension between
democracy and capitalism can only be rebuilt if democracy is conceived as redistributive
democracy.
In a public space where the state coexists with non-state interests and organizations,
the redistributive democracy shouldn't be restricted to the representative democracy.
Instead, under the current conditions, a distributive democracy should be a participative
democracy that affects the coordination of the state as well as the performance of the
private agents (business, NGOs and social movements) which interests and benefits the
state coordinates. (ibid. p.274)
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Chapter V. The South and Internet governance
V.1. National governments' voices
As seen at previous stages of the research, there is an intention of national
governments to be more and more involved in Internet governance. Since 2011, Russia,
China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (RCTU) and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) started
to voice out specific proposals for an intergovernmental control over the Internet. (Jamart,
2014: p.95)
The voices of the national governments have been chiefly channelized at the United
Nations via its pertinent agency, the International Telecommunications (ITU). The World
Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), organized by the ITU and held
in Dubai on December 2012, had the aim to update the 1988' International
Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) — which constitute a treaty that regulates cross-8
border telecommunication.
The conference, which is intergovernmental by nature, had at its core a debate about
the incorporation (or not) of the Internet as part of the ITRs. In the end, the revised ITRs
were signed only by 89 of the 144 members, and much of the language in the treaty was
qualified as dangerous for the Internet. For example, the Resolution 3 of the ITRs
enunciated: `To foster an enabling environment for the greater growth of the
Internet’ (WCIT, 2012), thus not in contradiction to the MSM model, was understood by
some as asserting sovereignty rights for states and an active role of the ITU in Internet
governance. (Polatin-Reuben & Wright, 2014: p.2)
Moreover, the article 5a binds states to ‘endeavor to ensure the security and
robustness of international telecommunication networks’, and article 5b posits: ‘The
Member States should endeavor to take necessary measures to prevent the propagation
of unsolicited bulk electronic communications and minimize its impact on international
The ITRs serve as a global treaty binding signatories to comply with general principles for worldwide interconnection 8
and interoperability, and facilitating the availability of international telecommunication services and networks. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.12)
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
telecommunication services.’ (WCIT, 2012). These articles have been interpreted by the
critics as a top-down state-centric approach that provides control over the broad term of
cyber-security to individual states (5a) and provide a scenario where freedom of
expression and Human Rights can be infringed by governments (5b) (Chenou & Radu,
2014: p.13; Patry, 2014: p.19)
Overall, the process of the WCIT-12 made clear and recognizable a tripartite
categorization based on the position of different states regarding Internet governance,
namely, Status quo Advocates; National Control Advocates and; Moderate approach
advocates (Weber, 2014: pp.98-101).
In the next paragraphs we will describe the stances and features of the three
categories with additional supporting examples of the specific Internet governance
proposals each group of states has advanced.
A) Cyber-sovereignists (or National Control Advocates). A group of countries that
advocate the extension of ITU's prerogatives to include Internet governance matters.
Among these countries, we can find China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others. The
principles of security and public order guide their stances; ‘national control is not only a
political, but also a technical issue.’ For some, this position could lead to the (national)
fragmentation of the Internet. (Weber, 2014: p. 99). Furthermore, the cyber-sovereignists
governments advocate for the application of the same kind of regulation that exists for
telecommunications to the Internet; and by way of the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) where all countries have an equal say through a “one-country, one-vote
system”. (Kummer, 2014: p.12)
We can identify the State actors with a national sovereignty approach to Internet
governance mainly in what is referred to as Developing countries, as well as emerging
economies like China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Roughly most of the countries
under this category can also be recognized as members of the Group of 77 (G77), which
has its roots in the non-aligned movement of the Cold War. In different degrees, these
countries are critics of the United States' “global hegemony” and skeptic (and critics in
some cases) towards the multistakeholder or private sector-led Internet governance
institutions, ‘which they see as creatures of the United States.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.
3)
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
Cyber-sovereignists’ Proposals. On September 12th, 2011, Russia, China,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (RCTU) submitted a letter to the UN General Assembly
outlining a proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security.
(Farnsworth, 2011) The document expressed concern about ‘information security’
understood as the states' right to protect their ‘information space and critical
information infrastructure’, proposing ‘universally recognized norms governing
international relations, which enshrine, inter alia, respect for the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of all states’ (RCTU, 2011).
Furthermore, the RCTU document states that no state should use its ‘resources,
critical infrastructures, core technologies and other advantages, to undermine the
right of the countries, which accepted this Code of Conduct, to independent control
of ICTs, or to threaten other countries' political, economic and social security’. It also
calls for the creation of a ‘multilateral, transparent and democratic international
management of the Internet.’ (RCTU, 2011)
Additionally, at the WCIT-12, Russia presented a controversial provision stating
‘Member States shall have equal rights to manage the Internet, including in regard
to the allotment, assignment and reclamation of Internet numbering, naming,
addressing and identification resources and to support for the operation and
development of the basic Internet infrastructure’ (ITU, 2012).
B) Status Quo Advocates. For this group of countries, only minor modifications
should be made to the existing regulatory bodies of the Internet. Among them, we can find
the United States and most of the OECD member countries. For them, the
multistakeholder is the preferred model to govern the Internet. The latter, bearing in mind
that the majority of the Internet institutions such as ICANN, IETF, and so forth, have their
headquarters in the United States, and there is a fear of losing the existing influence over
them. From a liberal standpoint, the status quo proponents are worried about issues as
freedom of expression and freedom of information guarantees in the internet governance
field. (Weber, 2014: pp.99-100). Additionally, there is the fear of a UN takeover of the
Internet on the basis of regulations taken by the lowest common denominator, i.e.,
national-governments. (Jamart, 2014: p.61)
As allies to this group of states, and also defenders of the MSM model, there are many
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organizations of the civil society and private sector. Among the civil society organizations,
we find those that participate in different Internet governance fora to promote Internet
freedom, privacy and user rights. Within the private sector, we can find representatives of
the Internet technical community, including Internet governance institutions themselves,
namely, ICANN, Regional Internet Registries, the IETF, W3C and the Internet Society, and
on the other hand, multinational Internet and telecommunication businesses such as AT&T,
Verizon, Google, Facebook and Microsoft. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.4)
Status Quo Advocates' proposals. On November 11th, 2011, members of the
European Parliament voted a resolution which stated that some of the ITRs reform
proposals would ‘negatively impact the internet, its architecture, operations, content
and security, business relations, internet governance and the free flow of
information online’. Urging in this way to the EU members States to prevent the
changes. (EU Parliament, 2011)
Likewise, on December 5th, 2012, the United States Congress passed unanimously
a Senate resolution that expressed ‘(...) proposals have been put forward for
consideration at the 2012 World Conference of International Telecommunication
that would fundamentally alter the governance and operation of the Internet’, and
that these proposals ‘(…) attempt to justify increased government control over the
Internet’. Furthermore, the document declares that the role of the United States is
to ‘promote a global Internet free from government control and preserve and
advance the successful Multistakeholder Model that governs the Internet today’.
(US Senate Con. Res. 50, 2012)
At the WCIT-12, the United States representation voiced that the revised ITRs
intended to replace the multistakeholder model of Internet governance and this
meant a threat to an open Internet. The United States, in coalition with non-state
actors, including civil society organizations and large Internet companies,
expressed their concern about the articles 5a and 5b, addressing critically the
legitimacy of ITU on Internet security issues; the limitation to participation in
discussions to non-state actors —which were in quality of observers and advisors
—; and the fact that only states had the right to vote. (Chenou & Radu, 2014: p.13)
As a whole, at the WCIT-12, they voted against the ITRs treaty.
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C) Moderate Approach Advocates. Falling in between the previous stances, the
governments of Brazil, India, South Africa, and others, reject Internet censorship and
closed networks, but at the same time worry about the United States' government,
institutions and large companies role in Internet governance. (Weber, 2014: pp.100-1)
Moderate Approach Advocates’ proposals. The India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA)
Multistakeholder meeting on Global Internet Governance, held on September 1st
and 2nd, 2011 in Rio de Janeiro, produced a set of recommendations based on the
acknowledgment of the Internet as a ‘catalyst for economic and social progress’
while emphasizing the internet's potential to ‘enhance IBSA's profile as a key global
player’. The document also recalled the commitment to the Enhanced Cooperation
principle already outlined at the Tunis Agenda.
‘The IBSA meeting stressed that in order to ensure that Internet Governance is
transparent, democratic, multistakeholder and multilateral (…) the current
institutional gap in managing global Internet processes and developing policies for
Internet at a global level needs to be urgently addressed.’
It called directly on the dangers of ‘fragmentation’ and ‘disjointed policy making’ and
proposed the creation of a body that ‘coordinate and evolve coherent and
integrated global public policies pertaining to the Internet.’ The proposed new body
would have the following features:
‘i. be located within the UN system;
ii. be tasked to develop and establish international public policies with a view
to ensuring coordination and coherence in cross-cutting Internet-related
global issues;
iii. integrate and oversee the bodies responsible for technical and operational
functioning of the Internet, including global standards setting;
iv. address developmental issues related to the internet;
v. undertake arbitration and dispute resolution, where necessary, and
vi. be responsible for crisis management.’
(IBSA, 2011)
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Subsequently, on October 26th, 2011, at the Sixty-Sixth Session of the UN General
Assembly, the IBSA recommendations were rendered through a proposal by the
government of India which called for the creation of a United Nations’ Committee for
Internet-Related Policies (CIRP). The CIRP would comprise 50 member states
chosen on the basis of ‘equitable geographical representation’, meeting annually for
two working weeks in Geneva. (India, 2011)
According to the document, the CIRP's members should be exclusively states,
though other Internet ‘relevant stakeholders’ would be able ‘assist and advise’ via
four Advisory Groups ‘one each for Civil Society, the Private Sector,
Intergovernmental and International Organizations, and the Technical and Academic
Community.’ (India, 2011)
Contrasted with the organizational structure of ICANN, the CIRP inverts the role of
national governments, making them the Internet policymakers because it leaves the
rest of non-state stakeholders to function in Advisory groups; while in contrast, at
the ICANN, it is the national governments which are in advisory position —i.e. at the
GAC— and the civil society, business groups and technical community the ones in
charge of developing policy. (Mueller, 2011)
The proposal of the CIRP envisioned the following tasks for the body:
i. Develop and establish international public policies with a view to ensuring
coordination and coherence in cross-cutting Internet-related global issues;
ii. Coordinate and oversee the bodies responsible for technical and
operational functioning of the Internet, including global standards setting;
iii. Facilitate negotiation of treaties, conventions and agreements on Internet-
related public policies;
iv. Address developmental issues related to the Internet;
v. Promote the promotion and protection of all human rights, namely, civil,
political, social, economic and cultural rights, including the Right to
Development;
vi. Undertake arbitration and dispute resolution, where necessary; and,
vii. Crisis management in relation to the Internet.
(India, 2011)
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
For Mueller, India ‘proposed an entity that combines the functions of the Internet
Governance Forum and some of the revenues of ICANN in a structure that puts
governments on top.’ (Mueller, 2011). This can be grasped in the annexes of the
document which are entitled ‘Links with the IGF’ and ‘Budget’. Firstly, there is a
reference to ‘the deliberations in the lGF along with any inputs, background
information and analysis it may provide, will be taken as inputs for consideration of
the CIRP.’ Secondly, ‘the CIRP should be supported by the regular budget of the
United Nations’ but also by setting up ‘a separate Fund (...) drawing from the
domain registration fees collected by various bodies involved in the technical
functioning of the Internet, especially in terms of names and addresses.’ (India,
2011)
The latter proposal, related to budget, represents a fundamental ambiguity in
Mueller's view, who questions if by these means the CIRP ‘is proposing to add a
new tax on users' name and address registrations (in addition to the fees already
charged by ICANN) or it is proposing to tax or get donations from ICANN. Or,
perhaps, it is proposing to take over ICANN.’ (Mueller, 2011)
Returning to our analysis of the ITU, the WCIT-12 and the 3 stances (Status quo
Advocates, National Control Advocates and Moderate approach advocates), it is
exemplary to point out that over the 150 years of existence of the ITU, all the decisions
were made by consensus of the member states (Kleinwächter; 2014: p.160), in contrast,
the recurrent consensus was not achieved at the WCIT-12. The voting results on the ITRs
had, out of the 144 delegations with voting rights, 89 in favour (including Russia, China,
Arab states, Iran, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and many
African states) and 55 against (including US, UK, Canada, EU states, Australia, Japan,
India, Kenya). [See Fig. 6]
It would appear that the WCIT-12 voting outcome provided a ‘binary global scene’
where most of the developing world sided with the cyber-sovereignty advocates. (Weber,
2014: p.101). Even Brazil and South Africa voted in an apparent contradiction to their
Moderate approach (it is noticeable the exception of India that voted against the
treaty). With governments aligning with one side led by the United States or with the other
headed by Russia, the situation was publicized as a ‘Digital Cold War’ (The Economist,
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2012).
Figure 6. Vote of national delegations at the WCIT-12. Source: ITU in Chenou & Radu, 2014: p. 14
Certainly, Brazil aligned with the state top-down approach lobbied by the cyber-
sovereignists at the WCIT-12. The reasons behind Brazil's vote at the WCIT-12 haven
been characterized as 'obscure’. (Patry, 2014: p.20) However, its position can be clarified if
we understand that most of the Latin-American countries who voted in favor of the ITRs
did it so ‘in spite of the Internet and not because of the Internet.’(Aguerre, 2014)
According to Aguirre, for Brazil, as well as for Argentina, Mexico or Uruguay, the ITRs
were looked upon as a means to harvest ‘some of the benefits of the new
telecommunications regulations as a whole.’ The ITRs were perceived in its benefits for
‘maritime communications, communications for the disabled, access for landlocked
countries, disaster communications and lastly, but not less important, international roaming
tariffs.’ Furthermore, for the author, theses countries are ‘not necessarily authoritarian or
anti-democratic’ and have ‘no records of Balkanizing the Internet or creating national
Internet segments’. What is more, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, as well as Colombia
and Chile, are regular participants at ICANN's GAC and other multistakeholder Internet
Governance Forums. (ibid.)
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
In this landscape, Brazil has a special and more complex position. Its government has
not supported Sino-Russian initiatives nor has expressed full support for Internet
governance institutions perceived as being under United States control, namely ICANN.
Alongside China, Russia and India, Brazil is seeking greater recognition in multilateral
forums, and within this group of emerging economies, Brazil may be perceived —with
India— as one of the most democratic countries of the previous group . (Patry, 2014: p.20) 9
V.2. Brazil and NETmundial
Since 2013, Brazil has developed a stronger role in the Internet governance global
debate due to the changes in the political environment, particularly around the mass global
surveillance scandal of the United States National Security Agency (NSA).
In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former US National Security Agency (NSA) clerk,
leaked secret documents that revealed a spying program conducted by the NSA over
Internet infrastructures on citizens in various parts of the world. According to the press
releases, NSA collected telephone records of millions of US customers of Verizon, one of
US' largest telecoms providers. (The Guardian, 2013 June 6,).
In addition, the NSA leaked documents exposed a datamining tool called Boundless
Informant that detailed and even mapped by country the amount of information it collected
and collects from computer and telephone networks around the world. (The Guardian,
2013 June 11)
The NSA international media scandal had its repercussions in Brazil when it was
noticed that the surveillance program was reaching the phone calls and emails of the
Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, in addition to government personnel and Brazilian
companies — among them the oil gas giant Petrobras. (RT, 2013).
The multi-stakeholder governance model was discussed in the meeting of the Sino-European Cyber Dialogue; and the 9
Chinese government’s own policy paper on the European Union expresses the desire to jointly `promote the building of a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace.’ (...) Although China appears to desire a privileged role for state actors in internet governance, its increased engagement in multistakeholder discussions is a promising rest step towards a global governance consensus. (Polatin-Rueben & Wright, 2014: p.5)
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Figure 7. Boundless Informant. The color scheme ranges from green (least subjected to surveillance) through yellow and orange to red
(most surveillance). Note the ‘2007’ date in the image relates to the document from which the interactive map derives its top secret classification, not to the map itself.
Source: The Guardian, June 11, 2013
‘Edward Snowden’s leaks (...) destabilized the foundations of international Internet
governance.’ (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.1) and led ‘Brazil's will to break from US-centric
internet.’ (Patry, 2014: p.21). Against this background, at the 68th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, held on September 24th, 2013, Dilma Rousseff condemned
the NSA' program stating that espionage ‘affects the international community itself and
demands a response from it’; announcing that Brazil would develop proposals for the
establishment of a ‘civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the
internet.’ (Rousseff; 2013)
The technical community of the Internet, moved by the fear that Snowden revelations
will turn the accusation fingers of the international community to the ‘Western-oriented
Internet governance institutions’ and may even produce a ‘break down of the internet into
“walled gardens”’, released the Montevideo statement on October 7th, 2013, just fifteen
days after Rousseff’s now famous speech. (Mueller & Wagner, 2014: p.1),
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
The Montevideo statement, a document by the Directors of the major Internet
organizations —ICANN, the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Architecture
Board, the World Wide Web Consortium, the Internet Society, and all five of the regional
Internet address registries— denounced the NSA activities and called for ‘the globalization
of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including
all governments, participate on an equal footing.’ (ICANN, 2013). Furthermore, the
Montevideo statement gave birth to the 1net as the platform for discussion on Internet
governance topics and that gathered the mentioned Technical community of the Internet:
ICANN, IANA, ISOC, and W3C. (1net.org)
The very next day after Montevideo, on October 8th, ICANN's CEO Fadi Chehadé met
Dilma Rousseff in Brasilia. After the reunion, the government of Brazil and ICANN
announced conjointly that Brazil will host an international summit of government, industry,
civil society and academia, to be held in April 2014. The name summit was later
substituted by conference in order to prevent the conception of the meeting as exclusive
for governments. (Lemos, 2014: p.6)
The Montevideo statement, as well as Rousseff's speech at the United Nations, were in
some traits directed at the same issues. Both pointed out the necessity of a global Internet
regulatory framework that guarantees Human rights, security, and rebuilds trust. However,
Rousseff spoke at the United Nations about ‘multilateralism’ while the Montevideo
statement reasserted the notion of multistakeholderism. In these conditions, one of the key
points of discussion for the announced conference was the equal footing civil society
should have regarding their governmental counterparts. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.118)
The announcement of the conference by Brazil and ICANN could have been perceived
as the ‘loosening up of the sovereignty-multistakeholder polarity’, in the understanding that
Rousseff, by allying with ICANN, was moving away from the cyber-sovereign position
roughly manifested with Brazil vote at the WCIT-12. On the other hand, having ICANN
manifested that governments should participate in equal footing at multistakeholder
institutions, signaled an acceptance of a moderate sovereignist position. (Mueller &
Wagner, 2014: pp.4-5)
Certainly, the political international environment provided by Snowden revelations gave
impulse to the announcement of the conference that was finally named NETmundial:
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Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance. Organized by the
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) in partnership with 1Net, NETmundial
had two chief objectives, a) the elaboration of a set of international principles of internet
governance and b) prepare a road-map for future developments of the internet
governance ecosystem. (NETmundial, 2014 Apr.)
Before we scrutinize the developments and outcomes of NETmundial which took place
in São Paulo, Brazil between 23-24 April 2014, an assessment of the experiences relevant
to Internet governance at the national level in Brazil seems pertinent to understand the
country's position. In this aim, in the following lines, we introduce two key elements of the
Brazilian national Internet governance, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee
(CGI.br) and Marco Civil.
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br). In 1995, the Brazilian Ministry of
Communication and the Ministry of Science and Technology called forth the creation of the
Internet Steering Committee ‘in order to effectively promote the participation of Society in
decisions regarding implementation, management and use of the Internet’. The CGI.br has
a multistakeholder approach in its organizational structure and includes Brazilian members
of the government, corporate sector, the third sector (or civil society) and the academic
community. (CGI.br Official website).
The CGI.br has 21 members, namely, 9 representatives from the Brazilian Federal
Government ; 4 representatives from the corporate sector ; 4 representatives from the 10 11
third sector ; 3 representatives from the scientific and technological community; and 1 12
internet expert. The federal government is broadly represented, however, it does not have
a majority of voting members. (Knight, 2014: pp.102-3)
The mission of the CGI.br consists in: ‘proposing policies and procedures regarding the
regulation of Internet activities, and recommending standards for technical and operational
Namely, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation; Ministry of Communication; Presidential Cabinet; 10
Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade; Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management; National Telecommunication Agency; National Council for Scientific, and Technological Development; National Council of State Secretariats for Science Technology and Information Issues – CONSECTI
Internet access and content providers; Telecommunication infrastructure providers; Hardware, Telecommunication 11
and software industries and; Enterprises that use the Internet.
NGOs and civil society organizations12
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
procedures for the Internet in the country; establishing strategic directives related to the
use and development of the Internet in Brazil; promoting studies and technical standards
for network and service security in the country; coordinating the allocation of Internet
addresses (IPs) and registration in the <.br> domain; and collecting, organizing and
disseminating information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics.’ (ibid.: p.
103)
In 2009, the CGI.br advanced the document ‘Principles for the Governance and Use of
the Internet’ containing 10 principles that included notions of neutrality of the network,
freedom, privacy and human rights; democratic and collaborative governance; universal
access; stability, safety and functionality of the web; among others (CGI.br; 2009). The
CGI.br Principles came to constitute the touchstone for the development of one of the
most innovative experiences in the Brazilian internet-related policies. Concretely, the
Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet, or Marco Civil — short for Marco Civil da
Internet.
Marco Civil. The debate around the draft bill of Marco Civil was led by the CGI.br. The
bill was subsequently passed by the Brazilian House of Representatives (March) and
Senate (April); and sanctioned by the President Dilma Rousseff on April 23, 2014. The
draft bill was an initiative developed by the Ministry of Justice and the Center for
Technology and Society (CTS/FGV) and it is considered an exemplary bill due to its
progressive principles regarding national Internet policy and governance. The latter not
only for its content but also for the process that involved its discussion, creation and
approval.
The process towards Marco Civil has been depicted as broadly inclusive. ‘The draft bill
was written through an open online public consultation process, where internet users were
allowed to comment on the draft, paragraph by paragraph, directly on the website. Over
2,000 contributions from individual users and governmental and non-governmental entities
were received through the online platform. Blog posts, tweets, articles published in
mainstream media, and institutional and individual contributions sent by email (and then
made available to the public online) were also taken into consideration.’ (Varon, 2013: p.9)
Marco Civil exhibited a balanced set of regulations based on the 10 principles of
CGI.br, the open consultations, and the broad debate about net neutrality, privacy, freedom
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
of speech and access to content in the Brazilian context. For some, Marco Civil constitutes
a point of reference for the international discussions about ‘using online tools to foster
democracy’, and at the Brazilian context, it has given the government the basic guidelines
on what kind of policies and principles must be achieved at the Global Internet governance
level. (Ibid.: pp.9-10)
A key feature of Marco Civil in regards to the governance models of the Internet can be
found in its Article 24. It states that the development of the Internet in Brazil should be
addressed through the ‘establishment of mechanisms of governance that are multi-
stakeholder, transparent, cooperative and democratic, with the participation of the
government, the business sector, the civil society and the academia’ (Marco Civil, 2014)
NETmundial. Given that the CGI.br had a multistakeholder internal structure and since
the Brazilian law (Marco Civil) acknowledged the multistakeholder model for the
Internet, NETmundial had the challenge to demonstrate in the practice that the MSM
examples at the national level could be achieved at the international and global scale.
In this regard, NETmundial was organized in a multistakeholder way. As one of the
main arrangers of the conference, the CGI.br, through the ‘Secretariat’, formed committees
composed by different stakeholders. Below you may find Netmundial’s structure and
components.
Figure 8. Hierarchy of NETmundial Committees
Source: NETmundial website: http://NETmundial.br/hlmc/
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A) High-Level Multistakeholder Committee (HLC)
The HLC had the duty of ‘overseeing the overall strategy of the meeting and fostering
the involvement of the international community’. It included:
• Twelve Ministerial-level governmental representatives (Argentina; Brazil; France;
Ghana; Germany; India; Indonesia; South Africa; South Korea; Tunisia; Turkey
and United States of America);
• Twelve non-governmental representatives from the different stakeholder groups
(three from civil society, three from the private sector, three from academia and
three from the technical community);
• Two representatives from International Organizations, appointed by the Secretary
General of the United Nations (Hamadoun Touré, Secretary General from the
International Telecommunication Union; Wu Hongbo, Under-Secretary General
from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and a
representative from the European Commission);
• Chair: Brazilian Ministry of Communications, Paulo Bernardo.
B) The Executive Multistakeholder Committee (EMC)
The EMC was ‘responsible for the meeting agenda, the design of the meeting format
and the invitation of attendees, all equally balanced across the global
multistakeholder community’. It was embodied by:
• Eight Brazilian representatives appointed by CGI. br (two from civil society, two
from the private sector, two from government, from the Ministry of
Communications and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; one from academia and one from
the technical community);
• Eight non-governmental international representatives from the different
stakeholder groups (two from civil society, two from the private sector, two from
academia and two from the technical community);
• One representative from an International Organization, appointed by the
Secretary General of the United Nations: again a representative from the United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs;
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• Co-Chairs: Two representatives from the technical community, one from CGI.br
and another from the international technical community, both were already also
involved in the above groups.
C) The Logistics and Organizational Committee (LOC)
The LOC was ‘responsible for guiding all logistical aspects of the meeting, including
media outreach, international communications, website design and management,
awareness raising, meeting venue, traveler funding strategy, security, and remote
participation’. Its members:
• Two representatives from CGI.br;
• One representative from ICANN;
• One representative from Ministry of Justice;
• One representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
• One representative from the Cabinet of the Presidency;
• One representative from 1Net;
• Co-chairs: One representative from CGI.br and another from ICANN, both were
already composing the groups above.
D) The Council of Governmental Advisors (CGA)
The CGA was composed of all government representatives who participated and
contributed to the meeting.
E) Chair of the Meeting
The meeting was chaired by the Secretary for IT Policy of the Brazilian Ministry of
Science, Technology and Innovation, Professor Virgílio Fernandes Almeida.
Appointed by him to co-chair the meeting, there were also a representative from each
stakeholder group. Fadi Chehadé, CEO and President from ICANN were chosen as
the representatives of the technical community.
(Varon, 2014: pp.17-24)
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The four committees were ‘instrumental in organizing the input from their
constituencies in the process of drafting the final document’. At the NETmundial
conference hall, there were four microphones, the speakers of each of the four committees
could queue to make two-minute statements, while the Chair managed the discussion of
speakers among the four queues. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.119)
In the aim of enhancing participation, the Organizational Committee implemented
virtual participation and real-time interaction during the meeting via local hubs connected
through the Internet, spread over 30 cities in 23 countries. This allowed participants that
couldn't attend the meeting, to participate with audio and video virtual assistance.
Moreover, the meeting was broadcasted online in languages such as English, Spanish,
French, Chinese, Russian, Arabic and Portuguese. (Varon, 2014: p.21)
It is noticeable that the meeting had the attendance of relevant Internet field-related
personas, namely, Wu Hongbo, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations; Fadi
Chehade, President of ICANN; Tim Berners-Lee; Vinton Cerf, co-author of TCP/IP and
vice-president of Google; and Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, who attended the
event via Skype. (Marques, 2014)
Emulating the experience of Marco Civil, NETmundial had an open call for submissions
based on two themes, Principles for Internet governance and the Roadmap. In the first
phase, 190 contributions were gathered from 46 different countries, these were sent by
representatives of civil society (31%), government institutions (15%), the private sector
(23%), academic community (11%) and the global technical community (8%). (Varon,
2014: p.19)
The contributions divided by country had the next distribution, United States, 31
contributions; Brazil, 16; United Kingdom and India, 7 each; Switzerland, France and
Argentina sent 6; Japan and Sudan, 4. Tunisia, Spain, Russia, Nigeria, New Zealand,
Germany sent 3 contributions each, Yemen, South Korea, South Africa, Senegal, Poland,
Mexico, Kenya, Italy, Iran, China, Canada, Belgium and Australia sent 2 each; Zimbabwe,
Uruguay, Ukraine, Trinidad and Tobago, Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Mauritius, Malta,
Malaysia, Kuwait, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Republic of Congo, Colombia, Bulgaria and
Austria were accountable for 1 contribution each. (ibid.)
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It is worth highlighting the participation of Emerging economies. Brazilian stakeholders
submitted 16 contributions; China's government and the Chinses Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) provided two contributions; India’s government, private
sector and non-profit organizations submitted five contributions; Russia delivered three
contributions, one from its government and two from the Russian Center for Policy Studies
(PIR Center); South Africa's government did not submit any contributions —despite the
submissions of other eight African countries— however, the Association for Progressive
Communications (APC), with its executive director’s office in South Africa, presented two
contributions. (Polatin-Reuben & Wright, 2014: p.3)
The submissions were incorporated in a draft or Outcome Document, which at a
second phase were opened for public comment — available for the populace on the
website of the event. The tool for the process was Commentpress, an open-source
Wordpress plugin for social texts. In order to participate, visitors could create an account
providing full name, email address and self-identity with one of the stakeholder groups.
The comments could be made paragraph-per-paragraph. This allowed an online
interactive conversation and critique of the text. A total of 1370 comments were
achieved between April 15th and 21st. The Principles had 832 comments, while the
Roadmap 498 comments. (Varon, 2014: pp.19-20)
Furthermore, at the plenary sessions, the event had the attendance of 1229
participants from 97 countries. The stakeholders' distribution was 38.5% government
representatives; 18.1% of the civil society; 14.4% from the private sector; 12.4% technical
community; 9.8% academia, and 6.8% other. The largest delegations by country were
Brazil, 221 participants; the United States, 110 participants; Argentina and France, 30
participants each; Belgium, Germany, Russia, Switzerland, and India, between 15 and 21
participants. When looking at the representation by regions: 378 participants were from
Latin America, 200 from Europe, 166 from North America, 133 from Africa, 128 from Asia
and 33 from Oceania. (ibid.: p.21)
As said before, NETmundial was organized to achieve universal (non-binding)
principles for the Internet, and a proposal of road-map for the future evolution of the
governance ecosystem of the Internet. This meant a discussion over ‘new ethical
guidelines and technical solutions’ (Cyranek, 2014: p.9) Carlos Afonso, member of the
CGI.br and a civil society rep. on the executive committee for NetMundial, pointed out
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some of the core issues to be discussed:
‘(...) the coordination of the logical infrastructure of the net: distribution and
assignment of domain names and IP addresses; definition of protocols and secure
methods in the domain names system; coordination of methods of connection and
routing’, among others. (Burch, 2014: p.8) Basically, this involves ICANN, their
contract with the US Department of Commerce and the control of the root file of
names and numbers.
It must be pointed out that NETmundial represented an acceptance from Brazil, as host
of the meeting, to a transition of IANA functions within the global multistakeholder
community and not by a takeover of an Intergovernmental organization like the
International Telecommunication Union. This could be seen as a ‘step in the direction of
the US, even if the objective is to later propose a “third way.”’ (Lemos, 2014: p.8). It may
also suggest that Brazil moved to a position of ‘arbiter’ between the ‘Western alliance’ and
countries like China and Russia in the Internet governance field. (Polatin-Reuben &
Wright, 2014: p.3). Additionally, it gave many stakeholders an escape from the binary
position of the latter stances and the energy and time-consuming debates within the UN
system. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.117)
Another important affair was that NETmundial intended to be the experiment that
‘demonstrates that an open approach regarding participation is not only desirable but
necessary for internet governance processes.’ (Lemos, 2014: p.8) and set the
Multistakeholder approach as a fundamental constitutional principle of Internet governance
(Bollow, 2014: p.14)
All in all, NETmundial produced by consensus a ‘non-binding outcome of a bottom-up,
open, and participatory process’. (NETmundial, 2014). The final document was adopted by
acclamation by all stakeholders, with the exception of the Russian, Cuban and Indian
governments which expressed reservations (Kleinwächter; 2014: p.119)
The Multistakeholder Statement of April 24th, 2014 tackles sections on Human rights
and shared values. Reminding the decentralized character of the Internet, one of its
principles states the ‘Open and Distributed Architecture’ of the Internet:
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‘The Internet should be preserved as a fertile and innovative environment based on
an open system architecture, with voluntary collaboration, collective stewardship
and participation, and upholds the end-to-end nature of the open Internet, and
seeks for technical experts to resolve technical issues in the appropriate venue in a
manner consistent with this open, collaborative approach.’ (NETmundial, 2014)
At its preamble, the São Paulo statement recognizes the Internet as a ‘global resource
which should be managed in the public interest.’ (NETmundial, 2014). Indeed, when it
comes to Internet governance principles, it endorses the Multistakeholder approach and
has titles that support: Open, participative, consensus-driven governance; Transparency;
Accountability; Inclusion and Equity; among others.
The second section denominated ‘The Roadmap for the Future Evolution of Internet
Governance’ depicts the framework for Internet governance as ‘a distributed and
coordinated ecosystem involving various organizations and fora.’. Point 2 of this section,
‘Issues dealing with institutional improvements’, leaves as an open question if there should
be a new institution for Internet governance, however, it does remarks the importance of
the IGF in the future developments of Internet governance. Accordingly, in section IV, it
states that issues very much controversial during the meeting, like net neutrality, should
‘be addressed at forums such as the next IGF.’ (NETmundial, 2014)
The final document was received with excitement by some and criticized by others. For
Vinton Cerf for example, the document is a ‘strikingly comprehensive statement of
principles and a forward-looking roadmap toward maintaining an open Internet.’ (Cerf,
2014: p.88). For Marilia Maciel, member of the executive committee of NETmundial, one of
the innovations of the text was the acknowledgment, for the first time in Internet
governance, of the Public interest, that is, the document recognizes that Human rights
apply to both offline and online.
In the view of Daniel Oppermann, a researcher from the International Relations Center
for Research of the University of São Paulo (USP), NETmundial would be considered as a
reference in Internet governance history and the challenge for the future is to ‘strengthen
the debates in other fora like the IGF’. (Comciencia, 2014).
Kleinwächter reminds us that even though the São Paulo Document states its
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principles are not binding, also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 is a
legally non-binding document. And that similar to the latter, NETmundial statement is an
important reference source because it had a similar consensus approval. It ‘constitutes a
basis with criteria allowing for measurement and evaluation of internet policies’ and even
though it doesn't provide mechanisms to take ‘wrongdoers’ to an international Internet
court, it allows ‘naming and shaming’ if a government, a corporation or users conflicts with
its principles. (Kleinwächter, 2014: p.120)
For Nnenna Nwakanma, NETmundial recognized and selected many important issues
despite security and surveillance dominated the debates. (Nwakanma, 2014: p.109) These
topics are set under the title IV ‘Points to be further discussed beyond NETmundial’:
• ‘Different roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in Internet governance,
including the meaning and application of equal footing.
• Jurisdiction issues and how they relate to Internet governance.
• Benchmarking systems and related indicators regarding the application of
Internet governance principles.
• Net neutrality’
(NETmundial, 2014)
On the other hand, the São Paulo statement raised criticism from civil society
organizations about its weak approach to massive data espionage, even though it does
mentions ‘Mass and arbitrary surveillance weakens the trust and the confidence in the
Internet and in the ecosystem of internet governance’ and that the wrongdoings ‘should be
subject to international human rights law’. (NETmundial, 2014)
Kleinwächter identifies several sources of discomfort with the outcome of NETmundial
among various sectors. Namely, some civil society organizations did not find their positions
reflected in the statement due to last-minute lobbying of private corporations and
governments or due to the settling of problems via traditional diplomacy behind closed
doors; Russia did not agree on the section related to cybersecurity; and Private sector
organizations were not comfortable with aspects of the document related to privacy.
(Kleinwächter, 2014: p.119)
In regard to the latter, the issue of Privacy is tackled in the document in the following
manner ‘The right to privacy must be protected. This includes not being subject to arbitrary
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or unlawful surveillance, collection, treatment and use of personal data.’ (NETmundial,
2014)
Also, the allusion to net neutrality as one of the ‘Points to be further discussed beyond
NETmundial’ meant for many the postponement of the discussion and a lack of explicit
rules about the issue, moreover it was perceived as a product of the Uniter States private
sector lobby. (Marques, 2014)
In a brief statement of La Quadrature du Net —a non-profit association that defends
the rights and freedom of citizens on the Internet— the outcome document of NETmundial
is described as ‘weak, toothless and disappointing’. La Quadrature points at NETmundial
as a ‘farcical and pointless efforts for a “global multistakeholder Internet Governance”’.
In the statement, La Quadrature du Net called to wake up from the ‘absurd circus of ten
years of Internet Governance Forum (IGF), of sterile discussions that keep citizens busy,
in which corporations and governments have the final word’. It criticized NETmundial as
the latest quintessential example of the “global multistakeholder Internet Governance” in
search of a ‘global consensus’ for the Internet, that instead, should be governed directly by
citizens, independently from ‘these circles’. (La Quadrature du Net, 2014)
Relevant to the purposes of this research, the São Paulo statement, in the section
‘Roadmap for the future evolution of Internet governance’, indicated the situation of ICANN
under the subtitle: ‘Issues dealing with institutional improvements.’:
5. In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government
with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the
discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability
of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an
open process with the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN
community.
The IANA functions are currently performed under policies developed in processes
hosted by several organizations and forums. Any adopted mechanism should
protect the bottom up, open and participatory nature of those policy development
processes and ensure the stability and resilience of the Internet. It is desirable to
discuss the adequate relation between the policy and operational aspects.
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This transition should be conducted thoughtfully with a focus on maintaining the
security and stability of the Internet, empowering the principle of equal participation
among all stakeholder groups and striving towards a completed transition by
September 2015.
6. It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to a
truly international and global organization serving the public interest with clearly
implementable and verifiable accountability and transparency mechanisms that
satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community.
The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure from all
regions is a key issue in the process of a successful globalization.
(NETmundial, 2014)
Interestingly enough, the position of the São Paulo statement regarding the transition
of IANA functions was in line with the earlier announced plans (March 14th) of the United
States government:
’To support and enhance the multistakeholder model of Internet policy-making and
governance, the U.S. Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) announces its intent to transition key Internet
domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community.’ (NTIA, 2014
March).
The NTIA announcement expressed the transition should be made by 2015 through an
ICANN-led convening that should have as an outcome a ‘multistakeholder process to
develop the transition plan’. It also outlined the key principles to guide the transition,
namely, ‘a) Support and enhance the multistakeholder model; b) Maintain the security,
stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS; c) Meet the needs and expectation of the
global customers and partners of the IANA services; and, d) Maintain the openness of the
internet.’ Further and of greater importance, the briefing also stated it ‘will not accept a
proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental
organization solution.’ (NTIA, 2014 March)
Accordingly, on April 2, 2014, while elaborating on the transition principles advanced by
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the NTIA, the US' Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information,
Lawrence Strickling, stated during his testimony to the US Congress that any transition
should ‘present a plan that ensures the uninterrupted, stable functioning of the Internet
and its present openness.’ (Llansó & Shears, 2014: p.71).
For Stéphane Bortzmeyer, an expert on Internet protocols of Mediapart , the strategy 13
of the United States government was to establish its authority over the Internet by giving
the actors two years, until 2015, to present a ‘serious alternative plan’ of Internet
governance, or else, if not achieved, the US could have been in a position to claim that
‘the current system is the only one that works’ (Champeau, 2014)
In the view of Llansó & Shears, the announcement of NTIA raised many questions, one
of them of particular interest for the thesis, that is, what is the “global multistakeholder
community” or “global Internet community”? (Llansó & Shears, 2014: p.71).
The same can be questioned in the São Paulo statement's Roadmap. Even though
there was a reference to a process with ‘participation of all stakeholders extending beyond
the ICANN community’ that leads to a ‘truly international and global organization serving
the public interest.’ (NETmundial, 2014), the definition of who are the stakeholders was
somehow left aside at the section ‘Points to be further discussed beyond NETmundial’;
where it is only addressed tangentially as ‘Different roles and responsibilities of
stakeholders in Internet governance, including the meaning and application of equal
footing.’
The above authors warn us that the challenge beyond the São Paulo statement and
the NTIA announcement consists of a discussion about what is exactly a ‘global
multistakeholder community’ and ‘global internet community.’
In a narrow interpretation, the community can be understood as organizations such as
ICANN, the Internet Society (ISOC), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), the IETF, and
so forth. While a broader interpretation remains to be constructed, thus the challenge is
producing a ‘global multistakeholder community-driven proposal that can garner the
required broad community support.’
From that perspective, the transition of IANA functions can be seen as an opportunity
for ‘identifying diverse stakeholders who can and should contribute to governance
Investigative and opinion online journal from France.13
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processes, conducting effective outreach, and bringing those stakeholders into a
governance discussion typically dominated by technical considerations in a way that
enables them to meaningfully contribute.’ (Llansó & Shears, 2014: pp.76-7)
On top of that, Kleinwächter inquires, ‘did NETmundial create a new multistakeholder
model?’. His answer is twofold, it did not create it because there is no such thing as a
single multistakeholder Internet governance model, and it did because NETmundial came
up with some multistakeholder-approach innovations, that is, it achieved to merge and fill
the gap left by previous institutional arrangements regarding Internet governance, namely:
1) It succeeded ICANN because, even though at the corporation there is an
involvement of all the stakeholders, ICANN relinquishes national states to an advisory
situation in the GAC, and it is mainly a private sector-led organization, differently, at the
NETmundial, governments had equal footing in the decision making.
2) It overcame the problems of the WSIS and the United Nations related to Internet
governance because these two have multistakeholder processes under governmental
leadership which ultimately hold the decision-making power despite the active participation
of other stakeholders. Differently, at NETmundial, there was an emphasis on an equal
footing of all stakeholders.
3) While the IGF erected itself as an open, all-stakeholders-involved forum, it had no
decision-making capacity, differently, NETmundial produced a tangible outcome,
particularly, the São Paulo statement. (Kleinwächter; 2014: p.120)
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Chapter VI. Conclusions: Global South & Internet Governance
The depicted history of the Internet's development exhibits that this information and
communication technology had several births. It was firstly a construction conducted by
the United States' Defense Department through ARPA and ARPAnet. Accordingly,
Government-funded research, in the context of the Cold War, provided the first glimpses of
a communication system that was decentralized in regard to its structure and control.
Moreover, starting from the mid 60s, universities' research departments in the United
States and some other technological centers in the developed world, conjointly with the
work of dispersed and different individuals, made possible the creation of what we call
nowadays the Internet.
The Internet carries non-hierarchical, decentralized and distributed ways of
participation for its users and developers, however, the oversight and regulation of some of
its features have been proved not to have these qualities. Even though the bulk of the
early net-users envisioned the Internet as an egalitarian, free, cooperative and non-
hierarchical space; the subsequent commercial uses of it, the functions performed by
ICANN, and the power struggles of governments at the national level for the control over
the Internet, as well as at the global level, demonstrate that there are points of centralized
control and key gatekeepers in the Internet governance field.
Furthermore, it has been showed that the development of the Internet as a technology
was indeed a US-centered effort, at least in its first stages —and in less extent in Europe
—, hence the institutional regulative framework that arose for the new technology was also
chiefly US-centered. There we can see the examples of NSFnet, Jon Postel, IANA and
ICANN. With the expansion of Internet use to the rest of the world, the fact that the
regulatory institutions were under US oversight, brought about many controversies
depicted in this research.
Against this background, it was also acknowledged that Internet governance can be
included in the broad sphere of the paradigms of Global Media and Communication Policy
(GMPC). In this sense, we understand that the debates around Internet governance can
fall into one of the four paradigms described in Chapter III, depending on which agent-
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actors we refer to and conditioned by a particular historical moment:
The Economic paradigm of the GMPC, as a private-led conception of the
development of Internet governance, was defended by the status quo advocates in their
variant of internet-related business corporations as well as by the United States'
government and its allies; particularly in the decade of the '90s. However, the United
States' government represents different interests in its foreign policy, interests that spring
from its diverse national stakeholders, consequently, there has been a shift in the US
stance from an Economic to a Technological paradigm since the mid-2000s, chiefly guided
by the US-based 1Net organizations.
Following the Technological paradigm, the idea of a bottom-up and democratic
arrangement for Internet governance, under the name of Multistakeholder model, was
fueled by the United States' government and US-based central Internet technical
organizations at the international level. However, this version of an MSM tended to be
apprehensive towards the participation of actors that have no “proper” know-how of the
technological design and administration aspects of the Internet.
On the other side of the spectrum, we have found that the Traditional public service
paradigm of GMPC was advocated by the national governments under the already
depicted cyber-sovereignists category. The stance can be seen at the proposals of states
and group of states that advance the transference of the IANA functions to a United
Nations oversight, particularly, towards the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
control.
Furthermore, the organizational arrangements advanced by these group of
governments —namely, the RCTU's International Code of conduct for Information
Security; India's CIRP; IBSA's meeting 2011; the WCIT-12; and in less degree the ITU's
International Regulation Treaty— ultimately claimed the supremacy of state government's
voices over other actors (NGOs and civil society).
Even though there was a rough acceptance of an MSM for Internet governance in the
proposals and meetings mentioned above, the cyber-sovereignists, under a Traditional
public service paradigm, advanced organizational structures where inter-governmental
schemes for governance leave other non-state actors in an advisory or observer position.
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In sum, the state exclusivity on regulation and decision making over public policies
regarding the Internet was maintained as a principle that guided their stances at most of
the international debates about Internet governance.
Despite the above conflicting paradigms, there must be no doubt that the Emerging
Social paradigm of GMPC has been accumulating more and more legitimacy in the
Internet governance field. There is a tacit acknowledgment at the transnational level that
the nature of the Internet demands governance that cannot be addressed separately, only
by governments, only by the private sector or only by civil society.
In fact, one of the key aspects of this paradigm resides on the importance of the
social, which comprehends the third sector and civil society organizations. According to
this perspective, the future arrangements for Internet governance should be advanced by
moderate approach advocates —governments or organizations— that propose an MSM
with participatory arrangements for the emerging third sector. A third sector understood not
only in its private technical Internet-related organizations, but also inclusive of civil society
organizations from the Global South that are affected by the decision-making processes of
the current Global Internet governance arrangements. 14
A merely superficial outlook to the composition of the parliaments and governments in
Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina or Uruguay would verify that social movements and the
third sector have grown in their influence to determine the public policies of these
countries. The phenomena can be understood as national experiments for more inclusive
and participatory democracies, therefore, we can infer that future innovative global
governance arrangements can have a source of inspiration in these political processes.
In this research, we have taken Brazil's Internet governance experience as an example
of one of these possible sources of inspiration, therefore, we understand Brazil as a
prospective key international player in the advancement of new arrangements for Global
Internet governance; from an Emerging social paradigm of GMPC stance and as a
representative of the moderate approach advocates group of states.
What is more, given that the Global south exhibits the fastest rates of growth in Internet use, there is an inherent 14
awareness in these countries about Internet governance and the participation at global policy processes regarding the Internet. (Nwakanma, 2014: p.110).
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In the aim of encountering sources of theoretical insight for alternative Internet
governance models, we find that the notion of ‘Global South’ has to call the attention of the
Internet governance field and its study. The term Global South has been utilized more and
more in academic texts and the press. Many times the term refers only to the governments
or states of developing countries or even emerging economies, however, a broader
understanding of the concept can be extracted from Boaventura De Sousa Santos
proposal:
‘The global South is (...) not a geographical concept, even though the great majority
of these populations live in countries of the Southern hemisphere. The South is here
rather a metaphor of the human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism at
the global level, and a metaphor as well of the resistance to overcome or minimize
such suffering. It is, therefore, an anticapitalist, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist
South. It is a South that also exists in the global North, in the form of excluded,
silenced and marginalized populations, such as undocumented immigrants, the
unemployed, ethnic or religious minorities, and victims of sexism, homophobia and
racism.’ (De Sousa Santos, 2012b: p.51)
Despite the conceptual richness of the metaphor advanced by De Sousa Santos, for
the purposes of our research, we are obliged to constrain the notion of Global South to
one variant. Therefore, we propose understanding the term as encompassing
those governments located in the South that are attempting to open new participation and
policy-making channels for the civil society, social movements and the third sector. In the
pursuit of an epistemology of the South, De Sousa Santos points out three premises which
serve us to contrast with the developments of global Internet governance:
First, ‘the world is much broader than the Western understanding of the world’ (De
Sousa Santos, 2012a: p.51). This premise leads him to indicate that the transformations to
occur may have not been foreseen by the ‘Western thinking’, including critical or Marxist
Western notions.
Second, the diversity in the world is infinite. There are diverse ways of thinking, feeling,
and acting, hence, different ways in which relations are established among human beings,
and between humans and non-humans. For example, in the economic field, there are
different ways to organize the collective life and the provision of goods and resources.
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From the epistemologies of the South perspective, this diversity is somewhat wasted
because, despite the existence of popular, solidarity-based or social economies
implemented in many parts of the world, the hegemonic knowledge tends to make them
invisible.
Third, the grand diversity of the world can be and must be activated and transformed
theoretically and in praxis through various and plural ways, and cannot be monopolized by
one general theory. (De Sousa Santos, 2011: pp.17-8)
Through the view of a diversity of knowledges, the world is not as globalized as it
seems. ‘Globalization conveys very often the false idea of homogeneity, as if the internet
and, more generally, information and communication technologies have translated all the
relevant existence of the world into one single language and have universalized its cultural
premises.’ Instead, there are many different used languages and there is a vast majority of
people in the world that does not live according to Western cultural premises. (De Sousa
Santos, 2012b: p.240)
In the view of De Sousa Santos, the common understanding of globalization tends to
one-sided, dismissing the possibility of one hegemonic globalization and another counter-
hegemonic globalization, or even various other globalizations. This as a result of the
assumption that the resistance(s) to the hegemonic globalization can only take the shape
of localization. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.164)
In other words, globalization implies multiple arrays of social relations that change,
hence producing transformations in the globalization. In this vein, De Sousa
Santos depicts a diversity of globalizations where there are winners and losers. In fact, the
hegemonic discourse about globalization attempts to obscure the other globalizations by
qualifying them as localizations. Yet, even the hegemonic shape of globalization has been
deployed from a local instance and condition, and while extending its influence radio
across the globe, it has developed the ability to nominate as ‘local’ the other instances and
conditions which it competes with. In sum, what we call globalization is the successful
globalization or global deployment of one particular localism. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.
165)
These last remarks lead us to see with different eyes the MSM for global Internet
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governance. In the version of the Status quo advocates, the MSM could be understood as
the only way to govern the Internet, one globalization. The Status quo advocates have
a vision of a restricted MSM that involves only large/historical/technical stakeholders,
namely, the Western governments, the Internet technical organizations —linked in their
bulk to the US government and developed countries—, and Internet-related business
corporations; leaving the developing countries and other sectors in a marginal position
when talking about real and effective participation in global processes of Internet
governance policy-making.
The phenomenon of a one-sided globalization in the internet governance field is also
seen on the insistence of leaving Internet governance to the technical organizations based
in developed countries, yet, as we have seen in the research, the technical policy
decision-making processes for the Internet has as well implications for the public and
private life of citizens outside these geographies.
With Snowden' leaks and the US' mass surveillance program revealed, the status quo
advocates were compelled to shift their position in order to restore trust and legitimacy
towards the current organizational arrangements of Internet governance; acknowledging a
need for change, the status quo advocates proposed the globalization of ICANN. However,
the NTIA announcement about the transition of the key Internet domain name functions
(ICANN/IANA) to the “global multistakeholder community” seems far from an ultimate
solution. In fact, delimiting who are the members of the global multistakeholder community
is the challenge for the years to come.
In our perspective, there is a necessity for an Internet governance global arrangement
that gives a voice to central and non-central agents in the decision-making over Internet
policies. The latter in the understanding that these policies affect not only the central
actors but also citizens/internet users across the globe, including those in developing
countries.
The hegemonic globalization depicted by De Sousa Santos has encountered a different
array of resistance(s), namely, regional initiatives, local organizations, popular movements,
social movements and transnational networks, that oppose social exclusion by promoting
and creating new spaces for democratic participation. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.166)
Moreover, the resistance nodes have called for ‘alternatives to the neoliberal globalization
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on the basis of transnational networks of social movements’. (De Sousa Santos, 2012a: 15
p. 61)
De Sousa Santos points out that the counter-hegemonic possibilities of the XXI
Century can be found in Latin America. He posits the need to create, not newly ‘vanguard
theories’ but instead ‘rearguard theories’. The latter implies a task of accompanying the
work social movements have been realizing in order to translate them into a theory that
does not instigate practice, but instead, learns from the practices and makes comparisons
of the experiences, struggles, and emancipations. (De Sousa Santos, 2011: p.21). This
work of translation entails clarifying ‘what unites and separates the different movements
and practices’ within the counter-hegemonic globalization movement, while at the same
time, attempts to identify ‘which constellations of subaltern practices carry more counter-
hegemonic potential.’ (De Sousa Santos, 2012a: p.61)
Employing the notion of rearguard theories in the analysis of the Internet governance
field, we could look at the Brazilian inclusive and participatory construction of Marco Civil
as an example of a practice that involves the bulk of the civil society in decision-
making processes related to the Internet at the national level; while identifying what unites
and separates the different movements and practices in its interior, to further radiate the
successful arrangements to a global level.
Indeed, because of the limited amount of organizations, common political culture, and
the primacy of the national government as articulator at the national level, is facile to clarify
what unites and separates the movements and practices. As the result, a consensual
legitimate process was achieved with Marco Civil through an open MSM based on the
CGI.br structure, and accessible ways for the public to participate in open public
consultations via the Internet, and through comments and criticisms, paragraph by
paragraph, of the draft of Marco civil.
However, attempts to replicate the successful national experience of Marco Civil at the
Global or transnational level carries its challenges. At the global level, the task is more
complicated. ‘On the one hand, there are local movements and organizations not only very
different in their practices and objectives but also embedded in different cultures. On the
Two chief examples of this, not related to Internet governance, were the Seattle movement of November 1999 and 15
the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2001.
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other, transnational organizations, some from the South, some from the North, that also
differs widely among themselves.’ (De Sousa Santos, 2012a: p.61)
NETmundial has been our selected case study to review the attempt to translate Marco
Civil's successful processes into the transnational arena. Despite NETmundial's
innovations in participation schemes, namely, a broader and inclusive MSM, the
conference and its proposals did not alleviate the power disparities concerning the
struggles to govern the Internet at the global level.
Indeed, the São Paulo statement revealed its shortcomings because the core of the
document was much influenced by the holders of central Internet governance
apparatuses, that is, the United States' government through NTIA, ICANN and the 1NET
institutions. Brazil's government, with very much good intentions, was at the end
conditioned by the United States' position and the ‘Points to be further discussed beyond
NETmundial’ demonstrate how decisive are the interests and lobby practices of Western
states and major business corporations.
Accordingly, the proposal of globalizing ICANN acknowledged in the São Paulo
statement fits well the situation described above. In our view, NETmundial should have laid
out the modality of transition or globalization of ICANN from a United States' oversight to a
new broad global MSM oversight; instead, the document reverberates the contents of
NTIA's March 14th announcement.
However, not everything was lost, an important aspect of the ICANN-related section in
the São Paulo statement posits that the transition should lead to an ‘international and
global organization’ that will serve ‘the public interest’. Not yet detailedly defined, the
introduction of the notion of ‘public interest’ is new in the global Internet governance field;
and, it contrasts with the conception of a narrow and restricted MSM that sees the Internet
governance decision-making processes as by-products of individual central stakeholders
pursuing their particular individual/technological interests.
Within the context provided by Snowden leaks and the outrage of the international
community about the mass-surveillance of the NSA; the NETmundial and the São Paulo
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statement could have become the locus of a New Manifesto for Internet governance. A 16
new Manifesto that looked upon Internet governance under an open, participatory across-
the-globe model. Indeed, this was partly achieved because the procedures of the meeting
intended and were broadly inclusive and participatory. However, at the same time, the São
Paulo statement prevented the leap due to its weakness in specific proposals about which
institutional Global arrangements will provide a truly broad MSM for Internet governance.
The evidence of the aforementioned can be found in the Road map section where there is
no outline for a new institution for global Internet governance and just a remark of the
importance of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
Alongside the hegemonic model of democracy, that is, in its liberal and representative
shapes, subaltern models of democracy have coexisted in the world. The crisis of the
liberal and representative democracy in our times, manifested in the deficits of credibility
and legitimacy, has given space to diverse democratic experiments and initiatives where
the tensions between democracy and capitalism, and between distribution and recognition,
have generated new social contracts that intend to be more comprehensive, inclusive and
just. In some Latin American, African and Asian countries, the traditional shapes of
authority and self-government have been revised with the objective of promoting novel
internal transformations and arrangements with other forms of democratic governments.
(De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.195)
One of these democratic experiments in the Global South, and within the Internet
governance field, was the process of Brazil's Marco Civil for the Internet. At this
experience, the third sector provided legitimacy to the law creation' process, and the
Brazilian government, along with a CGI.br that is structured under a broad MSM, allowed
open online participation from the public. Hence, the question that comes in mind remains:
What can we take from this particular Global South’ experience and translate to
the Internet governance at the global level?
The 21st Century panorama of complexity, diversity, and inequalities leads De Sousa Santos to propose the necessity 16
of erecting New Manifestos that will open the way to counter-hegemonic alternatives and carry the potential to erect counter-hegemonic globalizations. One of his central suggestions is that of a Participative Democracy, a model that in his view, has a large historical track when looking to the Latin American context. (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.195). In this regard, one fundamental difference between the transnational political struggles of our times and the traditional Western modern paradigms of social transformation —that is revolution, socialism, and social democracy— is that the former are submerged in the logic of politics of equality (redistribution) and politics of difference (recognition). (De Sousa Santos, 2006: p.167)
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To answer, we summarize the overall context observed throughout our research. We
have come to understand that the fundamental contemporary tendency within the Internet
governance field is the change of the global polity, a phenomenon caused by the following
developments:
a) The consolidation of restricted areas of private regulatory legitimacies or private
norm-designers that are inherent to the technical features of the Internet;
b) The rise of the third sector or civil society, accompanied by some states in the
Global south that enhance the importance of the former;
c) The advantages of the Internet as a transnational communication tool decreases
the cost of action and increases the capabilities of the third sector and private
entities, providing an ambient of new legitimacies and new ways of transnational
contact, action and possible cooperation; therefore, the need of novel global
governance institutions;
d) The transformation of the nation-state's role in its capacity to regulate an area of
the public life that cannot be reduced to the national borders, similarly to global
environmental issues, Internet governance tends to a transnational approach by
default.
These developments are not set in stone, they evolve with grand problématiques. The
national-state is still a major player (if not the main) at the international level, and in some
cases, even newly global private norm designers for the Internet (e.g. ICANN)
are acting as intermediaries or representatives of particular state interests. Given that
power is not equally distributed among states, the new global Internet regulatory
arrangements should attempt the construction of organizational schemes that incorporate
principles of global transparency and legitimacy of the private global norm-designers.
Due to its large number of stakeholders and technical complexities, the Internet's
governance debates have been significantly out of the public view, degenerating in a
sensed lack of accountability and transparency. Since the third sector and civil society
organizations posit themselves as representatives of the public interest, a partial solution
to the accountability and transparency issues would imply the incorporation of the former
as co-decision-makers and participants of the Internet's policy-making processes.
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
Consequently, the identification of the third sector's organizations should be thorough.
A stakeholders mapping that encompasses not only specific Internet-related technical
organizations but also other spheres containing third sector's organizations on the
transnational and local level which are collaterally affected by and/or have certain interests
in the outcomes of Internet's regulatory decisions. At these spheres, we might encounter
organizations that address education, collective rights, communication, access to
information, cultural rights and so forth. Their incorporation into a broad MSM would
provide the realignment and expansion of the clusters around global internet governance
institutions.
Furthermore, one of the main characteristics of the Internet as an Information and
communication technology is that of Paul Baran's vision, that of a communication system
that is decentralized. This feature still constitutes one of the chief technological principles
in the functioning of the Internet, hence, it seems advisable that the governance
arrangements strive to emulate the decentralized nature of the technology in its
organizational structures. In this sense, the conception of a heterarchical governance
model for the Internet seems appropriate.
As seen before, heterarchical governance implies overlap, multiplicity, mixed
ascendancy and/or divergent but coexistent patterns of relationships. At the internet
governance field, the heterarchical governance reveals itself in the coexistence
of intergovernmental organizations and technical non-state organizations each with a
certain degree of legitimacy to norm specific aspects of the Internet. In the absence of an
overreaching global political authority, struggles for hegemonizing the regulation of the
Internet have surged between the two mentioned actors, namely, IOs and Technical
organizations, with the addition of national governments and civil society organizations.
This situation posits the need for a double-democratization process, one within the
intergovernmental organizations where Global public policies related to Internet are
decided (i.e. Transnational MSM governance fora like the IGF and NETmundial) and the
other within the organizations in charge of the points of centralized control of the Internet
(e.g. ICANN). With this objective, the findings of our research guide us to
propose the Meta-heterarchical as the level in which these interactions and struggles
should be administrated.
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INTERNET GOVERNANCE FROM A GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVE DORIAN ZAPATA
In our view, the Meta-heterarchical level must be (re)created as Imagined center(s).
Following De Sousa Santos' notion of the state as an articulating node —meaning a new
kind of organization integrated by a hybrid aggregate of currents, networks and
organizations where state and non-state elements (national, local and global) combine and
interpenetrate—, the proposal of this research is to apply the same conception to
organizations like ICANN or to the potential novel future transnational multistakeholder
regulatory bodies of the Internet.
What is more, at the Meta-heterarchical level, a legitimate and transparent MSM
arrangement for Internet global governance would not be fully achieved if it only includes
national governments and/or only technical organizations; instead, it would require the
participation and incorporation of the third sector and the social in novel organizational
schemes. The social, herein, understood as the interests of the citizens of the globe, as
Public interest.
Finally and to conclude, we have retrieved from the Brazilian government's experience
a proposal that in our view could be advanced at the global level. Specifically, that
experience of Brazil's government acting as an articulating node, giving equal footing to a
broad set of stakeholders in the internet policy decision-making process of Marco Civil.
The final proposal is that of a meta-heterarchical model, understood as the advancement
of an imagined center attempting to take the lead of the meta-regulation. Consequently, we
propose that the new arrangements for Global Internet governance could take into account
the meta-heterarchical model, particularly in the eventual globalization of ICANN in 2015
or the future construction and transformation of multistakeholder global Internet regulatory
bodies.
Indeed, Brazil's experience has served herein as a precedent, as a source of
knowledge, about the possibi l i t ies of f inding novel Internet governance
models within and from the Global South. The data and notions collected in this research
lead us to conclude that a Heterarchical Broad-Multistakeholder Transnational model for
Internet governance, with bodies that act like imagined centers, could constitute one of the
most fundamental innovations the Global South can bring about to the Global Internet
Governance of the 21st Century.
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Annex I. About the Author. Contact details
Dorian C. Zapata Rioja
Date of birth: 12/06/1986
Nationality: Bolivian
Address: Wrocław, Poland
Email: [email protected]
Li: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dorianzapata/
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