Migration Policy and Governance in the GCC: A Regional Perspective

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6

Migration Policy and Governance in the

GCC: A Regional Perspective∗

Zahra Babar

n recent years, platforms for contributing to the international dialogue

on migration have multiplied at the regional and inter-regional levels.

These efforts underlie the now common understanding that migration is a

transnational phenomenon which impacts countries of origin, transit, and

destination, and that balancing divergent national interests along with the

needs and rights of migrants themselves is essential for ensuring beneficial

development outcomes for all. Embedded in a common understanding

that migration and development are inexorably linked, and underscoring

the need for the economic, social, and human rights of migrants to be

safeguarded, regional consultative platforms allow for improved dialogue

and cooperation amongst nations that face similar challenges around

migration. In addition to enhancing the exchange of experiences and

improving policy coordination, such efforts also play an important role by

diffusing regional perspectives into the broader, global migration agenda.

This paper is intended to contribute to the ongoing debate on regional

cooperation and policy harmonization on labor migration to the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The first section of this paper

briefly reviews the general trends in migration to the region, highlighting

the fact that the GCC demonstrates the highest density of migrants to

∗ This paper comprises Chapter 6 of Labor Mobility: An Enabler for Sustainable

Development, published by the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and

Research (ECSSR) in 2013. Copyright is retained by ECSSR. For more

information or to purchase the complete work, contact ECSSR on Tel: +9712

4044 445; [email protected]; or via www.ecssr.com.

I

LABOR MOBILITY: AN ENABLER FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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nationals seen anywhere in the world. In the second and third sections the

primary structural features of regional labor migration are discussed, in

particular the impact of kafala arrangements and the transnational labor

brokerage system that brings workers to the Gulf. The fourth section of the

paper examines recent reforms undertaken on migration governance, while

the fifth suggests that national, regional, and international tiers of interest

inform the development of migration policy in the GCC. The final section of

the paper suggests a few areas where further dialogue and cooperation are

needed, and where the research agenda needs to be expanded.

An Overview of Labor Migration to the GCC

The six GCC member states currently comprise the third largest regional

hub of international migration. The discovery of petroleum wealth in the

middle of the last century had a dramatic impact on the social, political,

and economic alignments of the region. Due to the small local population

and low levels of labor force participation, the GCC states had to seek

alternate sources of labor to meet the burgeoning demands of their

ongoing development projects.1 From the 1960s onwards, foreign workers

– initially primarily from neighboring Arab states, but over time

increasingly from South and Southeast Asia – were imported to address

regional labor requirements.2

Recent estimates indicate that across the region about 40 percent of

the population is non-national, and in several of the GCC countries the

majority population is foreign.3 According to the United Nations, all six of

the GCC countries are listed amongst the top twenty nations in the world

in terms of the proportion of migrants to nationals. Foreign labor

comprises a majority of all the GCC nations’ workforces (approximately

70 percent of the regional labor market is composed of non-nationals),

and the foreign population comprises an absolute majority of the

populations of Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.4

These demographic breakdowns are quite astonishing; current

estimates, for example, suggest that over 90 percent of the population of

Qatar is non-national.5 The foreign populations that reside and work in

MIGRATION POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE GCC:

A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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the Gulf come from a variety of countries and continents. In addition to

the presence of large numbers of South Asians, increasingly the region is

drawing labor migrants from Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and other

parts of the Middle East. The bulk of the labor force consists of ‘unskilled’

or ‘low skilled’ workers who occupy low-paid positions in sectors such as

construction. Migrants, however, also populate many other semi-skilled

and professional positions, particularly in the private sector.

Managing the delicate balance between the strain on the population

structure and national development needs continues to be one of the most

challenging policy issues for all the governments in this region. Given the

increasing scrutiny of the issue of migrants’ rights, maintaining their

domestic requirements without drawing international censure requires

dexterity and skill on the part of the regional leadership. Importing non-

national workers to meet domestic labor needs brings with it benefits as

well as costs. Non-nationals can be brought in quickly – and in most cases

cheaply – to meet labor needs as and when required on a project-by-

project basis. They can also be easily released and sent back to their

countries of origin when no longer needed.

There is, however, considerable discussion amongst both state actors and

local citizens about the potential costs of hosting such large numbers of non-

nationals for long periods of time. These costs are not merely economic in

nature, but also potentially social and cultural. The massive influx of

foreigners from all over the world is often seen as a threat to national heritage

and cultural values, and even a latent threat to political stability.

Privatization of Migration Governance: The Kafala

For decades, across the GCC states the migrant labor population has been

governed through the kafala or worker sponsorship system.6 This system

creates a direct relationship between each labor migrant and his or her

sponsor or kafeel; and binds each migrant worker to a particular job for a

specific period of time. Traditionally the kafeel has maintained control

over a worker’s mobility for the duration of his or her stay in the Gulf.

Workers cannot change their place of employment or exit the country


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without obtaining prior approval from their sponsor. The kafala is bound

by the contractual agreements signed by the foreign workers and their

sponsors. These contracts (particularly for the lower skill categories of

migrants) are drawn up for a two-year period of employment and

residency, but may be renewed or extended. Upon completion of the

contracted period of employment, sponsors are responsible for ensuring

that workers are immediately repatriated to their country of origin.

While for several decades this system has been the means by which

regional governments have regulated the flow of labor migrants into their

countries, it has in essence devolved responsibility for migration

management directly down to employers, leading to a problematic

‘privatization of migration.’

Migrants to the Gulf have almost no agency in terms of obtaining

permanent settlement or citizenship. This is particularly true for those

migrants at the lower end of the income and skill scale. Current Gulf

practices have removed pathways of traditional migration for settlement,

and the kafala system is structured to only grant migrants opportunities

for temporary cycles of employment. Migrants may choose to engage in

repeated cycles of employment within one or more of the GCC states,

interspersed with periods of repatriation.

Scholarship has drawn attention to the decidedly unequal power

relations between worker and sponsor, that are created through the kafala

arrangements. The kafala has also been widely condemned by workers’

rights groups for its inadequate ability to protect migrant workers’ rights.

Several of the Gulf states are currently discussing pathways to dismantle

or substantially alter the sponsorship system.

The Transnational Labor Recruitment System

What many scholars have been drawing greater attention to is the fact

that, as tools of managing migration to the Gulf, the kafala and the

workers’ contracts are but a component of a larger, profit-generating,

international migration system. Recruitment agencies and labor



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brokerages in both labor receiving and sending countries play a critical

role in this system.7 Recruiters in sending countries, along with a host of

sub-agents, serve to link migrants in remote locations of Asia and Africa

with manpower agencies and employers based in the GCC. Recruiters

and labor brokerages at both ends of the system financially benefit from

the costs they extract from potential migrants.

Unskilled and low-skilled migrants typically pay between $1,000 and

$3,000 for the opportunity to work in the GCC states and for obtaining a

two year contract. The cost of migration fluctuates greatly for workers

depending on their country of origin. In most cases, migrants and their

families are only able to cover the cost of migration by incurring debt. Due

to the lack of access to formal credit sources, many incur high interest

loans in their home countries in order to pay for the opportunity to work

in the Gulf.

Analysis of the transnational migration system present in the region

has highlighted its potential for creating abusive and exploitative working

and living conditions for migrants.8 Through the kafala, migrants are tied

to their particular jobs and employers, and are unable to seek alternative

employment if they are unhappy with their working conditions. The most

common complaints from workers relate to the non-payment or delayed

payment of wages; others complain of underpayment in relation to the

contractually promised salary. Another common complaint is that

employers insist on excessive work hours and limited time off. Migrants’

passports are commonly retained by their employers, thereby preventing

them from escaping abusive conditions. Others are summarily deported by

their sponsors without due cause. Housing provided by the sponsor is

frequently crowded, unsanitary, and inadequate, while work environments

can be unsafe.

Migrants are often retained against their will beyond the contractually

delineated two years. Migrants may also arrive in the GCC to find that

their intended occupation or job varies widely from what was promised to

them prior to departing their country of origin. Upon completion of their


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contracts, workers may also find that promised end-of-term benefits

remain unpaid, further reducing the profitability of their time in the Gulf.

In addition, given the unscrupulous practices of recruiters, migrants

arrive in the Gulf uninformed of the living and working conditions they

will face, and unaware of the cost of living in the region. Many come with

high expectations of how much of their salary they will be able to save,

and then find that basic costs such as food and transport eat away at their

meager monthly wages. A survey completed in Qatar in 2011 by Qatar

University’s Social and Economic Survey Research Institute, which

interviewed 854 migrant workers, found that 49 percent of them wished

they had known more about the cost of living in Qatar prior to their

arrival.9 Given that the vast majority of migrant workers arrive via costly

recruitment channels and carrying debt that they must pay off, they are

even less empowered to break their contractual agreements if they face

exploitative conditions.

It is of course true that many labor migrants successfully manage the

challenges of this migration system, and contribute to their personal and

familial development as a result of their overseas employment. Financial

remittances from GCC states contribute critical resources to households,

communities, and the national economies of parts of Asia, Africa, and the

Middle East. In addition, the literature has highlighted the broader

economic and social contributions that returning migrants bring back to

their countries of origin. However, the need to address the weaknesses of

the transnational labor recruitment system is broadly acknowledged as

being critical to ensuring healthy and productive outcomes for migrants

working in the Gulf.

Recent Policy Reforms to Regional Migration Governance

Over the past few years, many of the GCC governments have made public

statements indicating a desire to reform the kafala, and yet conclusive

structural change has remained absent region-wide. Reforms have been

attempted, but none to date have led to a complete dismantling of the



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sponsorship system. They have rather tended to address elements of the

system considered most problematic in terms of rights protection.

In 2009, the Government of Bahrain omitted one of the more

restrictive practices of the sponsorship system by enacting a ‘mobility law’

that allowed migrants to change employers without approval or consent of

their sponsors.10 This has been an important step forward in improving

migrants’ protections and rights to free mobility. Allowing workers to

change employers may make employers more accountable towards their

sponsored employees, and improve the imbalance in power relations

between workers and their sponsors, as migrants will not risk deportation

through loss of employment. In 2011, Kuwait also announced plans to

restructure the kafala system, and has implemented similar changes as

seen in Bahrain, allowing workers to change employment without losing

their visa status. In 2010, Kuwait also approved amendments to its labor

law, which included the establishment of minimum wages for foreign

workers and domestic workers.

In 2009, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) Ministry of Labor in

conjunction with the UAE’s Central Bank introduced a wage protection

system (WPS), whereby employers are obligated to pay their workers’

salaries through an electronic transfer system.11 The WPS creates a link

between the Ministry of Labor, the Central Bank, and the employer and

allows for the tracking of salary payments. This mechanism is an attempt

to ensure that wages are paid in full and in a timely manner. Given that

the delay or non-payment of wages continues to be one of the most

contentious and certainly the most common complaint raised by workers

across the region, the creation of such mechanisms should facilitate

regular and timely wage payments.

To date, no other GCC state has implemented a similar wage

protection system, although Saudi Arabia has recently announced plans to

follow suit.12 Regarding the feasibility of the adoption of such a system

across the GCC states, questions have been raised around how realistic it

is for banks to be engaged in the process. Of particular concern is the fact


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that many banks in the region impose a minimum monthly wage

threshold of AED 2,500 as a prerequisite for opening a personal bank

account, which would leave a number of migrant workers who earn below

that threshold outside the system.13

Other GCC states have inserted minor modifications to aspects of

their labor laws which address certain problematic areas of the

sponsorship arrangements. In 2003, Oman adopted legislation making it

illegal for sponsors to send their workers to other places of employment.14

Additional areas of migration policy and governance under discussion

across the Gulf include proposals to improve the process of migrant

recruitment, as well as migrants’ working and living conditions, and to

enhance dispute resolution procedures either by enabling the judicial

system to be more responsive or expanding the capacities of Ministries of

Labor.

In 2011, Qatar under the guidance of the Ministry of Labor

established a national committee consisting of multiple public and private

stakeholders dedicated to all aspects of workers’ occupational health,

safety, and rights. This committee is still in its initial phase of operation,

and, in collaboration with the International Labour Organization (ILO),

is devising policies and practices to improve the conditions of migrant

workers in the country, and ensuring that they conform to the highest

standards of international protocols.15 The Qatari Ministry of Labor is

also looking to significantly enhance its capacity in order to ensure

compliance with existing labor laws. As the migrant population in Qatar is

anticipated to grow, a significant increase in inspection capacity and labor

regulations enforcement will be required. Currently, the Ministry of Labor

has a staff capacity of 150 inspectors, but this number will be increased to

300 in the next few years.16

The UAE has also recently undertaken pilot projects to address

challenges posed by the transnational labor recruitment system. One such

scheme launched in 2012 and developed on a bilateral basis with India

will tackle the issue of contract substitution through an electronic contract



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validation and registration system.17 Under this pilot scheme, UAE-based

employers enter details for potential employment offers through an online

application system under the administration of the Ministry of Labor. Full

disclosure of the key terms of employment are required for the processing

of work permits by the Ministry, which then provides the approved Indian

recruitment agencies with access to these electronic records. In turn, these

agencies are required to obtain the potential migrant worker’s signed

consent. The designated Indian government agency is able to review the

terms of employment and grant emigration clearance on that basis. If

successful, this bilateral initiative has broad potential application across

the region. However, currently there is little evidence that other GCC

countries are considering adopting a method of electronic contract

validation and registration.

One of the challenges to adopting this contract validation system is

the implication it has for sending countries. To ensure that unscrupulous

practices of recruiters in sending countries are curtailed, under the pilot

scheme the UAE has requested that an Indian Government employee is

present during the process of obtaining signed consent from a worker.

However, India finds this extremely difficult to ensure, as they do not

have the staff capacity to be present for the signing of every single migrant

workers’ contract.

It must be noted that none of these regional initiatives or reforms to

the kafala have impacted migrants employed in the domestic employment

sector. Any policy dialogue on labor migration to the GCC must also

attempt to address the status and conditions of domestic workers. These

workers are not covered by national labor laws, which in combination with

the sponsorship system places them in a particularly vulnerable position.

The invisible nature of domestic work, taking place behind the closed

doors of people’s homes, means that protecting women in these jobs poses

a great challenge. There are a host of exploitative practices that domestic

workers encounter in the workplace, and which need to be addressed

through some legislative mechanism. While domestic workers are


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excluded from the labor laws in many countries, there have been attempts

to create separate laws specifically focused on protecting their rights.

The GCC states over the past few years have made efforts to develop

and implement legislation to protect the rights of domestic workers across

the region. Such legislation must strive to address the key areas of rights’

violations which are regularly reported, such as: excessive daily and weekly

work hours, no time off or leave days, non-payment or late payment of

wages, no pay for overtime work, no paid sick leave, restrictions on

personal mobility (such as not being allowed to leave the home), and the

withholding of passports.

In early 2013, the GCC Ministries of Labor announced a draft law to

implement unified employment contracts for domestic workers.18 While

the law has still not been finalized, its stated purpose is to strengthen legal

protections for the domestic sector region-wide. The version of the draft

law that has been released for review includes provisions for an eight-hour

work day, mandatory payment for over-time, mandatory weekly days off,

and penalties for late payment of wages. In addition, domestic workers

will have the right to retain their passports; and employers will be

obligated to ensure appropriate accommodation, food, and clothing, and

cover costs of visas and air tickets to and from the country of origin.

Rights-based organizations have highlighted that the draft law omits any

stipulations of a minimum wage, and does not address the common

practice of tying domestic workers’ wages to their country of nationality.

Questions also remain as to how effective the unified standard contracts

for domestic workers will be in practice, and what mechanism will be

implemented to monitor an employer’s compliance with his or her

contractual obligations.

Drivers of GCC Migration Policy – Three Tiers of Influence

Analysts, scholars, and GCC government authorities have over the years

indicated that the kafala has become outdated, and is no longer an

effective mechanism for managing migration streams to the region. Yet



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despite this widespread recognition, none of the GCC states has

attempted to entirely dismantle the kafala system. Questions must be

asked as to why national and regional enthusiasm for deep structural

reform has remained so tepid. What are the driving factors that restrain

broad-scale revamping of migration policy for the region? The following

section of this paper suggests that in the GCC, policy and practice on

migration is informed by interests that emerge on three different but

intersecting tiers, all of which impinge on the scale of reform that can be

undertaken.

National Context

Migration policy in the GCC states is embedded in a broader state

discourse expressed as an anxiety with the ‘demographic imbalance’ of

national labor markets and population structures. Although the large

foreign workforce has been present for many years, it has increased

markedly over the past decade. Anticipated development needs, combined

with a segmentation of the labor market, which places nationals in public

sector jobs and non-nationals in the private sector, means that for the

foreseeable future the region will continue to rely on imported labor

regardless of the demographic imbalance this creates. Cross-sectoral and

multi-strategic policy and planning documents reflect the awareness that

this demographic trend cannot be radically altered in the short-term, and

that in fact it is to be anticipated and planned for. Despite the region-wide

objective of nationalizing the regional workforce and reducing labor market

reliance on foreigners, a mere glance at the numbers of citizens participating

in the private sector reveals how unrealistic it is to assume that this will

occur seamlessly or quickly.

Regionally, policies reflect the deep anxieties felt by GCC

governments and citizens faced with a significant demographic imbalance

in their own societies.19 In turn, these anxieties of the host state create

pressures for the foreign workforce via the protective kafala system, which

makes foreign workers prone to exploitation at the hands of their

employers. It is the very ‘temporary-ness’ of these visa arrangements that


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plays an integral part in the widespread exploitation of many labor

migrants in the region. Employers can count on the fact that migrant

workers have invested heavily in the opportunity to come to the region for

employment, and are therefore reluctant to leave without some return on

their investment within the allocated time. Sponsors are thus empowered

to exploit the anxieties of those they sponsor.

Broader, strategic development plans for the region are embedded in

the notion of creating a knowledge economy. Efforts towards this end

have driven up the need to bring in a range of skilled and highly skilled

foreign workers to populate jobs in higher education, scientific

institutions, and the technology sector. While much official commentary

suggests that over time the regional labor market will evolve towards a

higher proportion of skilled workers (as it transitions to a knowledge

economy), a number of policy documents acknowledge that in the short-

term there will still be a need for many foreign workers to occupy

positions in the construction and associated infrastructural development

sectors. The longer term goal is to change the qualitative nature of the

foreign work force in the GCC, make it more appealing and attractive to

the highly skilled, and perhaps seek ways of retaining them for longer

periods within the national labor market.20

Despite this, the GCC does not see itself as a destination for

permanent settlement; and a variety of policy documents highlight the

aspiration to build a citizen workforce and reduce the ongoing dependency

on foreign labor. Until that goal can be realized, however, the guiding

principle around migration management is to ensure that the large,

foreign workforce currently dominating the national labor market remains

strictly temporary. Policies such as the kafala exist to control and manage

the large numbers of migrant workers essential to the regional labor

market. Policymaking apparatus is in place to ensure that these flows of

foreign labor remain temporary in nature, and that pathways to permanent

settlement are almost non-existent.

There is certainly no inclination to push the direction of the

conversation towards options for permanent settlement. The absence of



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citizenship rights for temporary migrants is in principle defensible, if this

is accompanied by greater provisions to safeguard their legal status, secure

their human rights, and ensure their greater mobility within the labor

market. While refraining from any discussion of possible pathways to

long-term residency for low skilled migrants, these same policy documents

raise the need to implement changes for recruiting and retaining highly

skilled foreign workers, especially if the country is committed to building a

knowledge-based, diversified economy. Qatar’s Permanent Population

Council released a document in 2011, which states that in order to recruit

and preserve highly skilled foreign workers the government must

implement a program that grants permanent residence to the highly

skilled.21

For any deep, systematic reform of labor migration governance at the

national level, GCC states need to ensure a degree of buy-in from

different social actors. Reluctance on the part of governments to initiate

sweeping reforms indicates a perception that such moves would be met

with wide-spread opposition. A recent study undertaken in Qatar

attempted to determine whether public opinion is indeed entrenched

around the sponsorship system.22 The results indicate that citizens have a

personal and vested interest in maintaining the kafala arrangements, and

are concerned about how its dismantling would impact their own

economic situation.

Regional Policy Framework

While the GCC states have to date not formally harmonized policies for

managing migration, they are more proactive in addressing the issue as a

bloc. This may be in belated recognition of the fact that they all face

similar concerns around migration, and are the target of growing criticism

for their apparent apathy in protecting migrant workers.

During the past few years, the GCC states have initiated regional

cooperative efforts to achieve migration policy reform. These include the

Abu Dhabi Dialogue, a regional consultative process on labor migration

to the Gulf, that brings together labor sending countries from South and


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Southeast Asia with labor receiving countries of the Gulf, to address

mutual concerns.

Within the framework of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, and as part of

their involvement in the Global Forum on Migration and Development,

the GCC states have tried to steer the direction of the conversation

towards ‘enabling sustainable development’ in the countries of origin.

They have posited that the streams of ‘circular’ migration to the Gulf

states link labor mobility to enhanced development outcomes in the

migrants’ home countries. They have highlighted the fact that, by

providing economic opportunities for low income migrants, the GCC

states are contributing to labor mobility-driven development in the poorer

states of Asia and Africa.

Within this framing of the issue, the GCC states have claimed to be

seeking ways to cooperate with sending country governments to enable

the circulation of skills and talent and ensure positive outcomes for the

sending countries, the labor receiving states, and the migrants

themselves. In addition to developing strategies with countries of origin

to address the vulnerabilities migrants are exposed to through the

transnational labor recruitment system, regional governments have

expressed commitments to promote migrants’ human rights and their

access to legal protection.

Within the ambit of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, deliberations on the

migration–development nexus have largely drawn attention to how

migrants have provided economic and social contributions to their

countries of origin. There has been limited discussion of the social, civic,

and economic contributions made by migrants to the GCC states

themselves. This is reflective of the broader literature on the topic, which

consistently emphasizes the impact of migration on the development in

countries of origin while neglecting considerations of how migrants have

contributed to the countries of destination. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue

would benefit from supporting an analytic framework that considers how

migrants to the Gulf have contributed to demography, economic

development, as well as social production.



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International Policy Advances

Currently there is no single international body that governs international

migration, and as stated elsewhere, nation-states still maintain their

sovereign privileges of managing migration governance. International

migration encompasses a host of different categories of migrants, from

low skilled labor migrants to high skilled workers, refugees, asylum

seekers, and trafficked persons.

Policy making at an international level addresses these categories in

different ways. However, despite the lack of a cohesive international

migration regime, a host of international organizations focused on

migration have evolved under the United Nations’ umbrella, including the

ILO and the International Organization for Migration. Such

international efforts have created an atmosphere conducive to the

recognition that migration is a global phenomenon affecting states

everywhere, and accordingly international cooperative mechanisms are

required to deal with migration. In the current context of the GCC, policy

developments occurring at the international and supranational level are

having an impact on migration management at the national level.

While migration policy in the GCC developed in response to specific

national and regional challenges, it is also informed by broader, global

shifts in the discourse on migration. Throughout the world, peoples’

mobility across borders is more and more scrutinized and embedded in

issues of state sovereignty and governance. Borders are being made less

permeable, channels for permanent settlement for new migrants are being

narrowed, pathways to inclusion and participation pared down, and

criteria for citizenship made more stringent.

Beyond the impersonal machinery of the state clamping down on

potential migrants, it is the strong anti-immigration bent to the public

discourse in the developed world that indirectly supports these policies.

Indeed, throughout the developed world, recent trends indicate public

opinion moving sharply against migration. Much of this hinges on the

anxieties of governments and citizenry around the presence of new

migrants who could become eligible for full citizenship and place added


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pressures on the socio-economic and political capacity of the state.

Framing migration as a threat to the development of politically and

economically viable societies is a global phenomenon that is creating a

general climate of migration fear.

Enhancing the Scope for Regional Policy and Research

The Abu Dhabi dialogue has served as a key platform for the development

of regional policies to address both the weaknesses of the kafala and the

vulnerabilities that arise from existing recruitment channels. Within the

scope of this regional consultative process, there are additional areas where

the GCC states can expand their engagement on migration. There is also

a need to support scholarship and research on regionally pertinent issues

which could contribute towards the global dialogue on migration and

development. In this section of the paper, a few suggestions and

recommendations are provided for inclusion in the regional policy

platform as well as for research attention.

Development Impacts of Migration on Destination Countries

Migrants’ lives are clearly transnational, as they belong not only to their

countries of origin but, even if temporarily, also to the countries receiving

them. While migrants’ contributions to their countries of origin have long

been recognized – and there is an exhaustive body of empirical data on

this – there is a growing awareness of the need to better understand how

migrants contribute to the development of the countries of destination.

Systematic and empirically-based research on the development impact of

migration that moves the discussion beyond a review of regional labor

markets and demographic trends in the GCC is almost entirely absent.

Scholars across the social sciences have provided ever more

information on the experiences of migrants in the Gulf, and drawn critical

attention to their living conditions and work experiences. Research has

also been devoted to unpicking the structural alignments of regional

migration governance, such as the kafala, the regulatory environment, and



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the role of recruiters. However, there has been scant attention to how the

Gulf states have been affected by more than forty years of hosting large

migrant populations. Evidence-based assessments of the economic, social,

cultural, political and environmental impact of migration to the region are

critical. Such studies are essential for providing a conceptual framework to

guide regional policy makers, and for the formulation of broader,

coherent, and sustainable national development strategies for the GCC

states. Given the degree of resistance to the presence of foreigners by Gulf

nationals, academic exploration that addresses concerns over cultural

dislocation and social anomie would be very welcome.

Family Reunification

International conventions on the protection of migrants clearly recognize

that the reunification of migrant workers with their spouses and

dependent children should be considered an essential human right, but

policy discussion on this subject is often neglected in the GCC. Currently

across the region, there are no safeguards of migrants’ rights to family

unity. Rather, for decades certain categories of migrants have been given

more rights than others in terms of family unification. Family sponsorship

visas in the GCC states are for the most part tied to salary levels, with

only those migrants earning at certain prescribed levels being permitted to

sponsor their spouses and children to reside in the GCC with them. Low

income migrant workers are thus automatically excluded from the eligible

pool. Such selective policies work to guard the interests of states, which

have not had to face the social and economic costs of hosting a large,

uneducated, low-skilled foreign population. Given that family life is

considered such a fundamental human right, it is important that regional

policies on migration management seek to balance the states’ interests

with those of migrants.

Scholarship on other regions has demonstrated that solitary existence

has a potentially detrimental impact on migrants’ well-being, may affect

their occupational productivity, and may even have unintended


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consequences for the receiving state. Research is needed to assess the

impact of separation from family on migrants in the Gulf, and also what

effect hosting single migrants has on the society and culture of receiving

states. Many of the GCC states exhibit startling levels of gender

imbalance, with men vastly outnumbering women. In Qatar for example,

there are 308 men for every 100 women.23 This gender imbalance is a

direct result of hosting large numbers of single male migrants, who occupy

the lower echelons of the labor market.

While the state has implemented policies limiting family unification

in order to reduce the economic and social burden on the state and avoid a

longer-term diasporic presence, little work has been done on how effective

such policies are. Keeping migrants from their families may well translate

into potentially negative impacts on the social and cultural fabric of the

region, and research on this topic has broad implications for regional

policymaking.

Gender-specific Vulnerabilities

While over the past few decades the majority of migrants to the Gulf

region have been men, an increasing number of women are now also

migrating for work reasons.24 As with men, migration offers women new

opportunities to improve their financial situation, enhance their skills and

capacities, and contribute to the resources and development of their

homes and communities. However, studies of female migration have

clearly demonstrated the heightened vulnerability of women to

discrimination, exploitation, and abuse.25

The range of risks and vulnerabilities that women are exposed to

during the migration process are transnational in nature, occurring both in

the sending and receiving states. While making a decision to migrate from

their country of origin, women are less likely to have full and accurate

access to information and knowledge of overseas job opportunities

available to them, and are less well-equipped to navigate appropriate



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recruitment channels.26 Women may also have fewer financial resources to

cover the costs of migration when compared to their male counterparts,

and as a result are more prone to irregular or informal migration. Female

migrants are also more likely to end up in jobs not adequately covered by

labor laws, and often lack information on the rights and protections

accorded to them in the countries of destination.

Despite growing recognition that migration impacts men and women

in different ways, migration policy-making in the GCC has largely

remained gender-blind. Introducing a gender perspective to

understanding regional migration is essential, so that the particular

vulnerabilities and risks that female migrants are exposed to are better

addressed.

There is limited academic analysis of the conditions of women

migrating to the Gulf, and the literature that does exist largely focuses on

female domestic workers. Women migrants are present in the region not

just in domestic work, but across a range of skilled and unskilled sectors.

We must broaden our understanding of the economic opportunities

undertaken, work experiences, strategies, and life plans of female migrants

to the Gulf. The research on skilled Gulf migration focuses primarily on

the experiences of male migrants. Women migrate to the GCC both as

workers and as wives accompanying their husbands. Regional scholarship

on migration has paid scant attention to what the migration experience

entails for those women who come to the GCC with high degrees of

human capital development and education, and how they are integrated

into labor markets. This group of women often escapes the attention of

policy makers, as many do not change their sponsorship from dependent

wives even once they take up an occupation of their own.

Further empirical work is needed to determine the conditions of

skilled female migrants who are present in the GCC, particularly those

who initially migrate as dependents of highly skilled males but end up

contributing to the labor market.


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Second and Third Generation Migrants

There is demonstrated evidence that many migrants, particularly those in

the mid- to high-skill categories, stay in the Gulf far longer than can be

termed ‘temporary.’ Despite regional governments’ policies of limiting

workers’ periods of residence, the existence of second and third generation

migrants in the six states makes it obvious that policy-making cannot

always control the changing demographics of a region.

The presence of second and third generation migrants indicates that

employers, and in fact the states themselves, have a vested interest in

retaining workers for longer periods than the stipulated two years. It

would also appear that despite the lack of access to citizenship rights,

certain categories of migrants are satisfied with their lives and jobs in the

region and look to extend their periods of stay. While media scrutiny and

international advocacy platforms give the impression that the conditions

for all migrants to the Gulf are abysmal, there are in fact vast differences

between how low skilled workers and the mid- to high-skilled workers

navigate the migration experience.

There is limited scholarship and analysis on the second and third

generations of migrants present in the Gulf. Data on their educational

qualifications and skill levels, their socioeconomic status and labor force

participation, their values, identity, and affiliations are sorely needed to

broaden scholarly understanding of this sub-category of Gulf migrants.

Diaspora communities also differ in how they interact with their countries

of origin; and exploration of the migration–development linkages between

long term residents of the Gulf and their home countries would contribute

both conceptually and theoretically to the literature on diaspora–home

state relations. Detailed analysis of the social, economic, and political

contributions that second and third generation migrants bring to their

countries of origin is much needed.

Temporary migration is seldom temporary across the GCC, and there

should be regional consideration of the needs of longer term migrant

communities or diasporas. Despite policies and practices aimed at



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reducing the longer term presence of foreign workers and their families,

the percentage of non-nationals has consistently remained high over the

past two decades, and second and third generation migrants are part of the

factual reality of the region. As the number of citizens is far outstripped by

the needs of the marketplace, it makes sense to adjust policies and

strategies to the existence of long-term migrants and to the enduring

employment needs of the state. The second and third generation of

migrants can potentially make substantial contributions to the growth and

development of the GCC states, if policies and practices ensure that their

education and employment credentials are in line with national labor force

needs.

Attracting and Retaining the Highly Skilled

The GCC states are amongst the most significant non-OECD

destinations for high-skilled migrants.27 In the broader literature on

migration, it is assumed that when considering migration for employment,

people choose a destination based on a variety of personal and familial

assessments of the ‘push–pull’ factors. There is a lack of in-depth

understanding of the drivers and dynamics of the phenomenon of high-

skilled migration to the Gulf region. Increasingly, at the global level,

migration is being affected by the mobility of the highly skilled, and other

niche areas such as student migration. In the Gulf region today, there is a

need to expand the lens to take into account these specialized forms of

migration, and their development impact both on source countries as well

as countries of destination.

Conclusion

Developing a successful and effective multi-stakeholder dialogue on

regional migrant labor governance is a challenging process, but through

the Abu Dhabi Dialogue the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council

have already made significant strides. Since the purpose of such an

engagement has been to build a shared understanding of the issues, and


[142]

create a common platform for joint action, the direct participation of

multiple actors, government and non-government, regional and

international, has already demonstrated an inclination for open and

transparent cooperation and dialogue.

The issue of managing migrant labor for both labor receiving and

labor sending countries continues to be a highly sensitive one, and while

the management of regional migration is not going to change dramatically

overnight, recent policy-making reforms indicate a willingness of all

parties to address some of the outstanding issues and develop modalities

for greater protection of workers. Building on this cooperation, it would

be fruitful to expand the areas of policy engagement and research focus,

and strengthen cooperation between regional academics and policy

makers, so that a diverse agenda of issues can be debated and addressed.


[230]

David McKenzie, “Learning about Migration through Experiments,”

CReAM Discussion Paper 07/12, Centre for Research and Analysis of

Migration, University College London 2012 (http://www.cream-

migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_07_12.pdf); and Khalid Koser,

“Assessing the Impact of Migration Policies on Economic and Social

Development,” in Irena Omelaniuk (ed.), Global Perspectives on

Migration and Development (New York, NY: Springer, 2012), pp. 173–

184.

39. Gardner, op. cit.

40. See for example: David McKenzie, Caroline Theoharides, and Dean

Yang, “Distortions in the International Migrant Labor Market:

Evidence from Filipino Migration and Wage Responses to

Destination Country Economic Shocks,” Working Paper, University

of Michigan Dept. of Economics, 2012 (http://www-personal

.umich.edu/~deanyang/papers/mckenzie%20theoharides%20yang%

20-%20distortions.pdf).

41. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “The GCC in 2020: The Gulf and

its People,” report sponsored by the Qatar Financial Centre Authority.

Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009 (http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/

eb/Gulf2020part2.pdf), p. 17.

42. Gardner, op. cit.

Chapter 6

1. Ugo Fasano-Filho and Rishi Goyal, “Emerging Strains in GCC

Labor Markets,” in Emerging Strains in GCC Labor Markets, IMF

eLibrary, 2004, p. 6.

2. Helene Thiollet, “Migration as Diplomacy: Labor Migrants,

Refugees, and Arab Regional Politics in the Oil-Rich Countries,”

International Labor and Working-Class History, vol. 79, no. 1, 2011,

pp. 105–107.

NOTES

[231]

3. Ingo Forstenlechner and Emilie Jane Rutledge, “The GCC's

‘Demographic Imbalance’: Perceptions, Realities and Policy

Options,” Middle East Policy, vol. 18, no. 4, 2011, p. 27.

4. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Labor Immigration and Labor Markets

in the GCC Countries: National Patterns and Trends,” Kuwait

Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the

Gulf States, 2011, pp. 9, 11.

5. Ibid., p. 8.

6. Anh Nga Longva, “Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala

System in the Gulf,” Middle East Report no. 211, 1999, pp. 20–21.

7. Gwenann S. Manseau, “Contractual Solutions for Migrant

Labourers: The Case of Domestic Workers in the Middle East,”

Human Rights Law Commentary no. 3, 2007, pp. 25, 30.

8. Muhammad A. Auwal, “Ending the Exploitation of Migrant

Workers in the Gulf,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 34,

no. 2, 2010, pp. 93, 100.

9. Social and Economic Survey Research Institute, Annual Omnibus

Survey: A Survey of Life in Qatar 2011.

10. Hamida Ghafour, “Bahrain Introduces Job Switch Visa Rules,” The

National, August 1, 2009.

11. For further details see : UAE Ministry of Labor, “ Wages Protection

System Guideline” (http://www.mol.gov.ae/english/wpsGuideline

Eng.aspx#1).

12. “Saudi to Introduce Bank Wage System for Expats: Employers to

Transfer Salaries of Workers to Banks to Protect their Rights,”

Emirates 24/7, January 24, 2012.

13. “The UAE Wages Protection System, its Processes and Players,”

CPI Financial, Issue 111, October 2009, p. 3.


[232]

14. Oman Ministry of Manpower, Article 18 B, Labor Law, Sultanate of

Oman, 2012.

15. Interview between author and Qatar MOL officials, June 2013.

16. Ibid.

17. Government of India, “UAE and India to Activate an Electronic

Contract Registration and Validation System to Stream-line the

Employment of Indian Contract Workers,” Press Information

Bureau, April 4, 2012.

18. “GCC Draft Law on Domestic Workers Ready,” The Peninsula,

March 25, 2013.

19. In 2012 Qatar’s Permanent Population Committee carried out a

survey amongst Qatari nationals on Citizens’ Knowledge and Trends

Towards Population Issues. According to the survey, 82 percent of

the respondents stated that Qatar suffers from a demographic

imbalance. The two main areas of concern expressed were around the

negative social and cultural impacts on Qatari identity, and on the

competition for employment as foreigners dominate the labor

market.

20. “Integrating Foreign Workers Issues into Qatar Strategies and

Policies,” the Permanent Population Committee, Qatar, 2011, pp.

33–35.

21. Ibid. p. 35.

22. Abduoulaye Diop, Mark Tessler, Kien Trung Le, Darwish Al-

Emadi, and David Howell, “Attitudes Towards Migrant Workers in

The GCC: Evidence from Qatar,” Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia,

the Gulf, and the Red Sea, vol. 2, issue 2, 2012.

23. “Qatar Population Status 2012,” Permanent Population Council,

Qatar, 2012, p. 20.

24. Manseau, op. cit., pp. 27–28.

NOTES

[233]

25. Ibid., pp. 33–35.

26. Pamela Philipose, “Global Gulf Journeys: Securing the Lives of

South Asia's Women Migrants,” Women's Feature Service, June 11,

2012; and Nicola Piper, “Feminization of Labor Migration as

Violence Against Women International, Regional, and Local

Nongovernmental Organization Responses in Asia,” Violence Against

Women, vol. 9, no. 6, 2003, p. 727.

27. Frédéric Docquier, Çaaglar Özden, Christopher Parsons, and Erhan

Artuc, “A Global Assessment of Human Capital Mobility: the Role

of non-OECD Destinations,” No. 2012022. Université Catholique

de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES),

2012, p. 3.

Chapter 7

1. Larry Elliott, “New-wave Economies Going for Growth,” The

Guardian, December 18, 2012 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/

2012/dec/18/booming-economies-beyond-brics).

2. Ibid.

3. World Bank, “Prospects: Migration & Remittances Data,” 2012

(http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EX

TDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:6416540

1~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html#Remittances).

4. “Asia 2050 and Bangladesh,” The Daily Star, June 15, 2011

(http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-

details.php?nid=189963).

5. “Bangladesh Ahead of India in Gender Equality: Amartya Sen,” The

Hindu, January 5, 2013 (http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/

bangladesh-ahead-of-india-in-gender-equality-amartya-sen/article

4277151.ece); and Roy, op. cit.

Migration Policy and Governance in the GCC: A Regional Perspective

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