International Trade

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Table of Contents1. Problem Formulation ................................................................................................................................3

1.1. Problem Statement............................................................................................................................3

2. Introduction to Regionalism .....................................................................................................................4

2.1. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)...........................................................................................................4

2.2. Custom Union (CU) ............................................................................................................................5

3. Evolution of Regionalism .......................................................................................................................... 6

4. Effects of Regionalism...............................................................................................................................9

4.1. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effect of RTA ............................................................................9

4.2. RTA Effects on Small/Developing Countries ....................................................................................11

4.3. Effects of RTA over Multilateralism .................................................................................................12

5. Conclusion...............................................................................................................................................15

6. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................16

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Abbreviations

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

CU Customs Union

FTAs Free Trade Agreement

WTO World Trade Organization

MTS Multilateral Trading System

RTAs Regional Trading Agreement

BTA Bilateral Trading Agreement

MFN Most Favored Nation

EU European Union

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

EEC European Economic Community




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1. Problem FormulationGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1948. GATT was multilateral agreement regulating international trade. GATT was replaced by World Trade Organization (WTO) as GATT did not have enough power to regulate rules in international organizations. However, WTO followed the idea of GATT with some major improvements. The motive of WTO was the same as GATT that all members of GATT/WTO should be treated equally i.e. ‘multilateralism’. In 1950s, another trade development ‘regionalism’ came into fashion. Regional is a type of trade agreement between similar groups of countries, for e.g. European Union. Regionalism is increasing in current century. Moreover, WTO allowed regionalism within multilateralism.

1.1. Problem StatementShortly discuss the evolution of regionalism and critically discuss the effects of regionalism including Custom Union and Free Trade Agreement.

In this research, the focus will be on discussion of the reasons for the creation of regionalismand its effect that includes the different forms of regionalism. Although, there are several different forms of regionalism, this research will focus mainly on two different types: Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Custom Union (CU).

The coursework will begin with introduction to term ‘regionalism’ gradually leading to its evolution. The following section will cover the discovery of transformation of primary regionalism to ‘New Regionalism’. The coursework will discuss about the effects of regionalism including CU and FTA, focusing on the both sides: positive effect and negative effect. The coursework will use mainly Viner’s theory to demonstrate the effect of regionalism, shortly discussing on trade creation and trade diversion. The coursework will end with a conclusion about the happenings and conclude if regionalism will grow or will the trade development head to new direction.




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2. Introduction to RegionalismRegionalism can be defined as “any policy designed to reduce trade barriers between a subset of countries regardless of whether those countries are actually contiguous or even close to each other” (Winters, 1996). I would define regionalism as a policy to facilitate free movement of goods and services between countries of identical geographic region.

Regionalism can take several different forms among which two of them are explained below:

2.1. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)This is an agreement in which “the member states go a step further and agree to abolishtheir tariffs on all trade between themselves (i.e. to give the partner a 100% tariff preference)” (Grimwade, 2000: p.341). A negotiation on FTAs between European Union (EU) and Korea in 2007 is an example of FTAs (Commission, 2012). In FTA, there are no internal tariffs but the member countries may have different external tariffs. FTAs open up foreign markets for exporter and provides contingency to produce cheaper products for the importers. For example, FTAs was proved to be best ways to open up foreign markets and as a result of 2010, the USA exported 41% of goods and services to its FTAs partners (International Trade Administration, n.d.) as shown in figure below.

Figure 2.1: US Exports to FTA partners. Source: (International Trade Administration, n.d.)




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In one hand, FTAs provides countries to specialize in particular goods in which they enjoy comparative advantage. Specializing in a particular product means gaining economies of scale and hence improving efficiencies of resource allocation. Similarly, increasing freer trade means increasing competition, thus improvement of technology and manufacturing of innovative products. In other hand, the free trade, in the long run, affects the economic welfare because the economies of countries become dependent on global market and the economic downturn in one country directly affects the trading partners. The other disadvantage of FTAs is it increases the rate of unemployment in the long run as the countries manufactures less and depends more on trade (Edge, K., n.d.).

2.2. Custom Union (CU)Custom Union can be defined as union of two more states that have eliminated inter-state tariffs and impose common commercial policy for external states (OECD, 2003). CU is more or less same as FTAs but differs in a sense that the member states adopt Common External Tariff (CET). CU helps to solve a problem that could arise by FTAs, namely, the possibility for the non-member state to export goods through the member states in FTAs at the lowest external tariff.

In one hand, custom union is important because it nourishes in integration of economy in today’s globalised world where everything is advancing. Similarly, CU leads to trade creation as addressed by Jacob Viner (Grimwade, 2000: p.341). The example of most successful CU is European Union Custom Union (EUCU) established in 1958 (Nikolas, n.d.). In other hand, if the CU decides to set higher external tariff than one country offered before to another partner, it would lead to trade diversion and hinder trade creation between the (cheaper) foreign country and CU’s members. For example, let’s assume that it costs 2p for the UK to import a water bottle from Denmark, 1p from USA, and the cost of a water bottle in the UK is 3p. UK imports from USA as it is most efficient exporter. Now let’s assume UK and Denmark form a CU, meaning that the tariffs between them are eliminated. Therefore, at this circumstance, UK will trade with Denmark i.e. trade diversion because the price for USA goes up because of the common external tariffs. The other disadvantage could be that members of CU needs to adapt their border controls as it would be no longer national oriented but have to apply CU regulations.




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3. Evolution of RegionalismGATT progressed conducting different trade negotiating rounds as shown in table 3.1. The Uruguay round concluded about multilateral trade negotiation and the establishment of WTO in 1995 provided institutional support for the evolution of multilateral trading system (MTS) (United Nation, 2005). Bilateral Trading Agreement (BTA) was in effect before MTS, but BTA had several drawbacks which were not seen in multilateral negotiations.Multilateralism was based on fundamental principle of most-favored nation (MFN), in that all the members of WTO should be treated equally regarding tariffs imposed (Grimwade, 2000: p.323). At that particular period of time, MTS was strengthened and was expected that no other trade policy such as regionalism would replace MTS or could act as an alternative trade policy (United Nation, 2005).

Table 3.1: GATT Rounds. Source:(Technical Cooperation Department, n.d.)

But it was opposite of what it was expected. The regionalism went by developing gradually, and even the country engaged in multilateralism enlisted in regional trade agreement (RTA). Consequently, in 2003, 285 RTAs (United Nation, 2005) were notified which were just 123 from 1948 to 1994. The RTAs developed eventually as shown in the graph below. By now, “WTO (as, previously, GATT contracting parties) members are bound to notify the regional trade agreements (RTAs) in which they participate” (World Trade Organization, 2012).




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Figure 3.1: Evolution of RTA in the world, 1948-2011. Source: (World Trade Organization, 2012)

It is clear from the figure; the RTAs have evolved to more than 300 participants by 2011 that are active, and as of 15 January, 2012 there were 511 notifications of RTAs (counting goods and services separately) (World Trade Organisation, 2012). This proves that regionalism has been evolving presently and has become policy option for most countries. The most famous RTAs are European Union (EU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Below is the figure of member countries of COMESA.




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Figure 3.2: Map of Member States. Source: (COMESA, 2012)

Today, the talks are about new regionalism which more open than old regionalism, which was specific on objectives, and content and was narrow focused on trade arrangements. “New regionalism is a comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional process, implying the change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to the number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes.” The new regionalism is a complex form as change takes place at various level of analysis such as global system level, interregional relation etc. (Hettne, n.d.)

In my opinion, the cause for new regionalism to take place is globalization in trade. Naturally, all the countries do not posses all the resources required. Therefore, countries started to trade to each other. While the trading process was on going, countries that were close geographically with a reciprocal demand started forming a unity and thus, formed regional trade agreement. But in the globalised world, trading with geographical partner was not just enough to fulfill demands of the country. There was a need for integration of economy as well as politics, so-called new regionalism. Therefore, trading between different regionsstarted to take place such as EU-Mexico, EU-Iceland and so on (World Trade Organization, 2012).




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It is a good step towards improving welfare of global economy but I think as the pace of RTA is increasing it might affect multilateralism, central principle of WTO, because then RTA goes beyond the fundamental principle of WTO (i.e. non-discrimination). The other effect is on the least developed countries as RTAs are between competitive states rather than complementary.

4. Effects of RegionalismIn this section, this paper discusses the effects of regionalism in three different contexts. The first context discusses about trade creation and trade diversion effects of RTA, second context discusses about effects on small/developing countries and third context discusses about effects of regionalism over multilateralism.

4.1. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effect of RTAAccording to (Magee, n.d.), “regional agreements can be welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing, the effects of regionalism depend critically on which country pairs choose to form preferential trade deals.” From the political approach, most countries would adopt trade diverting preferential trade agreements because trade creation displaces a domestic industry. Whereas, trade diversion do not harm domestic industry therefore it is accepted politically. (Krishna, 1998)

RTA is supposed to create freer trade among the members, meaning that RTA is responsible for improving global economic welfare. But according to Jacob Viner it may not be the case necessarily. Viner believes that regional trading arrangement will have a mixture of two kinds of opposite effects. First, when two or more countries form RTAs, they eliminate trade between them resulting in trade creation. Second, the formation of RTAs creates discrimination as non-member state is imposed tariff resulting in trade diversion. So, economic welfare depends on which part is strong: trade creation or trade diversion. If trade creation is greater than trade diversion the CU/FTA will improve global economy, and if trade diversion exceeds trade creation, the opposite will be the result.(Grimwade, 2000: p.341-342). These effects are illustrated through the help of figurebelow:




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Figure 4.1: The effects of CU in home and partner countries. (Grimwade, 2000: p.342)

The above figure explains the effects of CU on the home and partner countries. In the figure, the world price is assumed to OPw. PwTH in home country and PwTP in partner countries are the prices with non-discriminatory tariff on imports before the formation of CU. BC is the imports in home country from rest of the world whereas, the partner country is self-sufficient. After the formation of CU between these countries both establishes a common external tariff equal to PwCET. In one hand, in home country, the price falls, consumption increases from C to G and production falls from B to D meaning that home country requires importing more to fulfill the demands, and thus increases trade. Trade creation is seen as DE plus FG. However, there is also a trade diversion equal to EF. The welfare gains in home country equals to DBE plus CGF and trade diversion generates a welfare loss equal to EFJI. In other hand, in the partner country, the price rises meaning that the consumption decreases to U. This means there is a surplus of products equal to TpCETYW. Therefore, the partner country acts as a net exporter of product. However, there is a loss of TpCETUW leaving UYW as the net gain. ( (Grimwade, 2000: p.342)

In my opinion, this is a win-win situation where both countries gains economic welfare. However, there are some welfare losses in both countries where the home country loses its relation with before trading partner creating trade diversion and the consumers in the partner countries faces higher inflation level due to CU. But in overall, there is net gain in both countries. In addition, although CU/FTA may result in welfare losses, it can be successfully overcome such losses by the process of compensation, in that, the members that gain high welfare from the RTA compensate to the those who lost it.




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One short coming of Vinerian theory of CU is that it does not provide economic rationale for CU. The motive of CU/FTA is to improve economic welfare but still CU/FTA is second best option when the objective of a country is to improve economic welfare. It is because, according to Cooper and Massell (1965), countries can always improve their economic rationale by reducing tariffs on a non-discriminatory basis. In addition, Johnson (1965), proposed an alternative rationale stating that the CU provides developing countries a basis for industrializing. (Grimwade, 2000: p.343-344)

4.2. RTA Effects on Small/Developing CountriesBhagwati and Panagariya (Bhagwati, 1996) argues that small countries lose unambiguously from RTA and gain unambiguously from multilateralism because RTA diverts trade from least-cost suppliers by providing preferential treatment to its member states. The liberalizing country loses from RTA in a sense that it forgoes tariff revenue from the membership in RTA and does not face a lower internal price for the imported products because rest of the world determines market price. Developing countries are mostly trade dependent and have higher tariffs; therefore, they lose from RTA. For example, Mexico losses welfare as high as $3.26 billion from NAFTA according to the calculation of Arvind Panagariya. In this calculation, he assumes that the rest of the world is least cost supplier and the USA has increasing costs. Since Mexico has higher tariffs, its loss of tariff revenue exceeds its gain from preferential access to the US market. (Panagariya, 1997)

Contradictorily, if the union partner is a supplier facing constant cost, it provides an incentive for liberalizing country in price reduction and moreover, the country can gain tariff revenue from non-member states. In this case, there is only trade creation from RTA. But Arvind Panagariya (Panagariya, 1996) argues that, mostly rest of the world faces constant cost and not the union partner; union partner faces increasing cost.

In addition, developing countries also have domestic distortions which affect the welfare gains from an RTA. Clarete and Whalley (Clarete, 1988), find significant interactions between trade and domestic policies and that the social cost of trade distortions are approximately doubled when distortions are included. They conclude “The lesson would seem to be that these interactions need to be considered more fully in numerical economic policy analysis for developing countries” (p.358). Furthermore, (Anderson, 1997) evaluates the interaction between trade reform under the Uruguay Round and domestic distortions in agriculture in developing countries and introduces anticipated agricultural price increases in a general equilibrium model with domestic distortions in agriculture.




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Other effect is that since the RTAs are evolving, there is a possibility that such proliferation of regional trade blocs may increase trading tensions between countries because when a country enters into a new agreement it undermines the value of preferences offered to other partners. Similarly, regionalism would have adverse effect on smaller countries because regionalism takes place between countries whose competitive levels are identical, this may hinder smaller countries from developing. However, MFN protects smaller countries from big and powerful. (Grimwade, 2000: p.352)

In my opinion, CU or FTA established between small countries under constant cost will result in welfare gaining and trade creating for the trading bloc and for the members of it if members are predominantly least-cost producers. It does not matter even if some members are less efficient. In fact, the less efficient member countries will gain from RTA. However, the most efficient member countries may face welfare losses because of trade diversion and losses of tariff revenue in addition. In other hand, CU/FTA established between small countries under increasing cost will result in welfare losses and trade diversion for the trading bloc and for the members as long as the non-member countries supply imports to member countries. The reason for member countries to import from non-member countries is that although member countries gain welfare from increased exports, they lose tariff revenues from increased imports.

4.3. Effects of RTA over MultilateralismIn this section, the paper discusses about some problems of both multilateralism and regionalism in brief leading the discussion to the question; “Is regionalism building block or stumbling block to multilateralism?”

Nigel Grimwade (Grimwade, 2000: p.350-351) , enlists two problems of multilateral trade negotiations. First problem is so-called ‘free rider’ meaning that member countries will have to offer concessions and not just benefit from concessions which other countries make, as GATT/WTO is based on the principle of unconditional MFN. But countries do hold back from acting reciprocally as they sense that other countries are seeking, in some measure, to ‘free ride’. This leads to another problem so-called ‘convoy problem’ proposed by Wonnacott and Lutz, (Wonnacott, 1989). Regionalism provides a solution to this problem, in that, countries necessarily do not have to reduce tariff barriers to all the trading partners.

The second problem is that multilateral agreement takes long time to negotiate as several countries are involved which has created complexity of agenda. The reason for such time




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consuming process could be GATT rounds getting bigger and more complex; as an example Uruguay Round took seven years to complete.

This is not only the problem with multilateral trade agreement, but regionalism is even more complex it involves tackling non-tariff barriers and other issues such as investment, services, free movement of labor and competition policy. One problem with regionalism is that when country gets involve in new agreement with a second country, it reduces the value of the preferences enjoyed by the first. “For example, if the US and Japan were to negotiate a free trade agreement, it would affect the concessions that the US has granted Canada and Mexico under NAFTA. Canadian and Mexican exporters would now have to share their preferences in the US market with Japanese exporters. Canada and Mexico may, therefore, demand some re-negotiation of their agreement with the US.” (Grimwade, 2000: p.351)

Dealing with regionalism versus multilateralism has always been a mystery to economists. There is no clear conclusion if regionalism acts as building block or stumbling block to multilateralism. As Krugman (Krugman, 1993) concludes “the answer to whether or not regionalism is good or bad must be ambiguous.” However, he also argues that regional negotiations have advantages over multilateral negotiation as a method of trade liberalization.

In contrast, Economist Bhagwati (Bhagwati, 1998), believes regionalism and multilateralism are two distinct and separate ways of achieving global free trade. He adds two processes are separate, and that one does not influence the other. However this statement is proven wrong with the evidence that the formation of preferential trading areas by a small group of countries such as European Economic Community (EEC) in late 1950s goaded other countries to reduce tariffs.

Economist, Richard Baldwin (Baldwin, 2004), suggests that RTAs backpack fear to global trade liberalization. He adds up, regionalism have two key risks. First, it may act as an option to multilateralism since it “dampens nations’ intentness for further multilateral liberalization” and “diverts policy makers’ attention away from WTO negotiations”.

In contrast, Lawrence (Summers, 1991), has a different viewpoint from Baldwin. He states that there is no clear evidence that multilateralism is undermined by regionalism. Further German Creamer (Creamer, 2003) and Alberto Trejos (Trejos, 2005) adds that RTAs provides an experimental ground for new liberalization ideas. In addition, “RTAs can improve stability and credibility of countries which should have positive effects on multilateral negotiations (Pavia, 2003).




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Another economist, Nuno Limao (Limao, 2006) and (Limao, 2007), provides a study hecarried out analyzing the impact of US RTAs on the evolution of US external multilateral tariffs before and after Uruguay Round negotiations. He finds that non-RTA members are more liberalized by US external multilateral tariffs than RTA members. The principle behind it could be that US is considering concessions from recipients by providing preferences, meaning that US is resisting multilateral trade liberalization. Thus, Limao concludes that RTAs acts as a stumbling block to US multilateral trade liberalization.

Different economists have different perspective. There is no single and right answer to the question this section deals because country varies geographically, politically and economically, though some resemble, therefore, the action taken by different countries depends on the situation of such factors. My opinion supports economists such as Nuna Limao and Richard Baldwin in a sense that, yes, regionalism acts as a substitute to multilateralism because the WTO consists of countries of all categories – Least Developed Countries (LDC), Developing Countries, Developed Countries, and Advanced Countries. Since multilateralism is based on fundamental principle of Most Favored Nation, it becomes difficult for countries of different category to act on non-discrimination basis. For example, trading between EU and Asia would hinder domestic producers of EU because Asia is labor abundant region and therefore can manufacture cheap products. In other hand, EU may have comparative advantage in trading with only Mexico, thus, forming EU-Mexico as outlined in the beginning of this paper. This is one of the problematic areas of multilateralism which regionalism solves. Therefore, I would support that regionalism acts as a building block to multilateralism.




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5. ConclusionThe coursework began with the introducing regionalism and its different forms, gradually leading to its evolution and finally discussing positive and negative impacts of regionalism regarding trade creation and diversion, small/developing countries, and multilateralism.

RTAs have increased its pace towards global liberalization. Starting with few numbers of countries engaging, now almost every country is engage in some kind of RTAs. RTAs have both positive and negative effect and the pace of RTAs is increasing globally. The reasons vary as different theorist sees it differently. However, most economists believes countries involved in RTAs benefits and those members who did not gain welfare are successfully implemented with some compensation which is also a fundamental principle of WTO.

The main discussion area of this paper is effects of regionalism. The first effect of trade creation and trade diversion can be concluded as RTAs may result in both trade creation and trade diversion. Though, this paper focuses more on RTAs as a means of trade creation, there are other economists who argues that RTAs only results in trade diversion. I would say it depends trading partners and the type of trading patterns they choose.

The second effect on small/developing countries also depends on the type of trading pattern chosen and the partner countries. Mostly RTAs takes place between competitive partners rather than complementary partners that may hinder small/developing countries from developing. In addition, as discussed earlier, RTAs among small countries could be trade creating and welfare gaining or trade diverting or welfare losing, it all depends on other member forming RTAs in respect to if they have constant cost or increasing cost.

The third effect or it would better be-called dilemma of regionalism versus multilateralism is still quiet mystery because some economists find it as building block to multilateral trade negotiation with evidence whereas in other hand other economists find it as stumbling block to multilateral trade negotiation. But I would look it as stumbling block as discussed above.




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6. Bibliography

Anderson, J.E. (1997) 'The Uruguay Round and Welfare in Some Distorted Agricultural', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 56, pp. 393-410.

Baldwin, R. (2004) 'Stepping Stones or Building Blocs? Regional and Multilateral Integration'.

Bhagwati, J.a.P.A. (1996) 'Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism:', AEI Press, Washington D.C.

Bhagwati, J. (1998) 'Protectionism', MIT Press.

Clarete, R.L.a.W.J. (1988) 'Interactions between Trade Policies and Domestic Distortions in a Small Open Developing Economy', Journal of International Economics, vol. 24, pp. 345-358.

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Limao, N. (2006) 'Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization', American Economic Review, vol. 96, pp. 896-914.

Limao, N. (2007) 'Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-Trade Objectives a Stumbling Block', The Review of Economics Studies, vol. 74, pp. 821-55.




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Magee, C.S.P. Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, and Endogenous Regionalism, [Online], Available: http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/cmagee/Trade%20Creation,%20Trade%20Diversion%20and%20Endogenous%20Regionalism.pdf.

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