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INTERNATIONAL AND COMMONWEALTH ASPECTS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1911 - 1922
by ULRIGH HEINZ. STIPKE
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
In the Department of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
We accept this thesis as conforming to the standard required from candidates for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.
Members of the Department of
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, VANCOUVER, CANADA Apr i l , 1953.
ABSTRACT
The present i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i s characterized
by the d i v i s i o n of the World i n two power blocs. The countries
of the Western World have united themselves i n the North
A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization as the f i r s t e f f e c t i v e large scale
example of regional c o l l e c t i v e security i n world history. The
s p i r i t u a l foundation of NATO i s the idea of the ''Atlantic
Anglo-American community based on mutual friendship and co
operation between Great B r i t a i n and the United States.
But i t was by no means certain that these two great powers of
the Anglo-Saxon race should cooperate i n close association with
each other i n world politics. After World War I , the B r i t i s h
Empire found i t s world supremacy - undisputed so f a r - challeng
ed by the p o t e n t i a l and increasing strength of the United States.
Great B r i t a i n had then to make her decision whether she was
to antagonize the United States or to become her cooperative
partner i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .
The test-case was offered by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
The global importance of t h i s A l l i a n c e cannot be over-estimated.
I t was one of the strongest p i l l a r s of B r i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y ,
and contributed, to a substantial degree, to Japan's ascendancy
i n the Far East; i t influenced d e c i s i v e l y United States foreign
p o l i c y immediately a f t e r 1919 - being to a large extent one
of the deeper causes for the i s o l a t i o n i s t withdrawal of the
United States from the system of international cooperation as
established at the Paris Peace Conference -, and presented
Qreat B r i t a i n with the decision to choose definitely-between
Japan as B r i t a i n ' s a l l y i n the P a c i f i c and the r e a l i z a t i o n
of the Anglo-American Community. purpose
I t i s thePS'd.'^-j- of t h i s thesis to point out these
implications of the A l l i a n c e on inte r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y during the c r u c i a l years from 1919 to 1922. An
elucidation of the problem from the B r i t i s h aspect i s a l l
the more important because i t r e f l e c t s the change i n the
con s t i t u t i o n a l development within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth
aft e r World War I. F i n a l l y , B r i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y towards
Japan i n that short period sheds s i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t on the
B r i t i s h attitude towards the p o l i t i c a l development i n the
Far East during the Manchurian C r i s i s i n the beginning of
the 1930's. I t •f.&rnri«'&e£tie key f o r understanding the B r i t i s h
appeasement and f l i r t a t i o n with Japan as i t became evident
by S i r John Simon's p o l i c y i n 1932.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This thesis was written during my exchange-scholarship year 1952/53, sponsored by the International Students Service of the University of British Columbia.
I am indebted to Dean H. F. Angus, Professor G.Davies, Professor Ping-ti Ho and Professor F. H. Soward, who encouraged my work and inspired me with useful suggestions.
Especially I wish to thank Professor G. Davies who supervised the thesis and corrected my English, and Professor F. H. Soward who made accessible to me the "Unpublished Borden Papers" from the Dominion Archives of Canada.
Finally, I should l i k e to express my grateful appreciation to the International Students Service of the University of British Columbia for having made available to me, one year's scholarship-and for the financial assistance granted to my thesis work.
T A B L E OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the P o l i t i c a l Development in the Far East, 1914-18. . . 1
II British and Japanese Diplomacy at the Peace Conference of Paris, 1919. . . . . . 55
III Anglo-Japanese Relations from 1919 to the Imperial Conference of 1921 . . . . 84
IT The Dominions, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the^Imperial Conference" of 1921 . :l 132
V The Washington Conference of 1921-22 and the Solution of the Pacific Problem . . 185
Bibliography 216
CHAPTER I
"THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE FAR EAST,1914-1918"
The ap p l i c a t i o n of the term, •World P o l i t i e s ' i n
i t s s t r i c t modern sense, of expressing the entanglement
and inter-dependence of international a f f a i r s i s only
j u s t i f i e d with the appearance of Japan and the United States
i n world a f f a i r s as powers of dominating influence on both
sides of the P a c i f i c Ocean. The r i s e of the Japanese Empire
as a great power i n the Far East which was primarily due to
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e of 1902, and the expansion of
Japan's po?/er during the F i r s t World War gave r i s e to po l
i t i c a l consequences which were of the highest importance i n
in t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . P rimarily, there were two immediate
r e s u l t s emanating from the ascendance of the Japanese power
during t h i s period. F i r s t l y , there was the decline, i f not
the elimination of Great B r i t a i n as the t r a d i t i o n a l leading
power with her predominant influence in Eastern A s i a ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n China, p o l i t i c a l as well as economical; and
secondly, the steadily growing increase of Japanese power
aroused the antagonism of the United States which, having
become the other world power i n the P a c i f i c , looked upon
Japanese expansion i n China and her pot e n t i a l expansion i n
the P a c i f i c as a serious menace to the basic p r i n c i p l e of
U. S. foreign p o l i c y , - the preservation of the Open-Door
P o l i c y i n China, and as a d i r e c t threat to her own security.
I t i s the scope of t h i s chapter to point out these consequences
of a p o l i t i c a l development which l a t e r on determined de
c i s i v e l y the further course of B r i t i s h and American foreign
p o l i c y i n Eastern Asia. As f a r as Japan was concerned, the
r e s u l t was that at the end of the war, she had reached such
a degree of power, p o l i t l c a L i n f l u e n c e , and diplomatic prestige
.that she was e n t i t l e d to appear at the Paris Peace Conference
of 1919 amongst those great powers which, by their prepond
erant influence, shaped the international post-war world
through the decisions of the "Supreme A l l i e d Council of the
Big Four".
The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , concluded i n 1902, p r o -
videdyone of the strongest p i l l a r s , i f not the foundation
of Great B r i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y i n the following years.
The reasons for the conclusion of the A l l i a n c e , as f a r as
Great B r i t a i n was concerned, were i n the main two-fold.
The advance of Russia i n Manchuria with the aim of absorbing
Korea into the Russian sphere of influence^ i n other 7?ords,
Russia's tremendous increase of power i n the Far East ( con
st i t u t e d a d i r e c t and serious challenge to the B r i t i s h
p o s i t i o n i n the whole of Eastern Asia. The possible danger
- 3 -however, of an alj-gnment of Japan with Russia would have
rendered Great B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n there ^hopeless" 1. Secondly,
Great B r i t a i n a f t e r f a i l i n g to arrive at an agreement with
Russia, Germany and the United States, realized the i n d i s
pensable necessity of overcoming her t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of
•splendid i s o l a t i o n ' the disadvantage of which she may well
have already f e l t i n the Venezuela C r i s i s , the Boer War, and
the Fashoda C r i s i s . The A l l i a n c e from the B r i t i s h view was
anti-Russian. I t was regarded at that time as an instrument
to check a further Russian expansion i n the Extreme East.
The success of Japan i n the Russo-Japanese War i n 1905 had
convinced Great B r i t a i n of the e f f i c i e n c y of Japan fs m i l i t a r y
power and had therefore induced the B r i t i s h Government to
continue the A l l i a n c e , i n a modified form that enhanced i t s
value. The balance of power i n the Extreme East having been
redressed by Russia's defeat, the B r i t i s h Government provided
f o r the extension of the A l l i a n c e to India, whose security
might possibly have been jeopardized i f Russia concentrated
her aspirations on Middle Asia a f t e r having been expelled from
the Far East^>ut r however valuable t h e A l l i a n c e proved as the
keystone of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , Great B r i t a i n had to take
into serious consideration the attitude of another great
power with v i t a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East, - the United States.
'"^Langer, W.L. The Diplomancy of Imperialism, 1890-1902.New York }London, A. A. Knopp , 1935, Vol. II. p. 783.
- 4 -
At f i r s t , the United States contemplated the A l l i a n c e
favourably as a means which was serving the purpose of up
holding the 'Open Door' doctrine and of safe-guarding the i a
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of China as was stipulated by the treaty. Spinks speaks of the United States as a 'secret partner' and:
g •unsigned member' of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e up to 1905 . This f r i e n d l y attitude changed however, when Japan after
1905 embarked oh an aggressive p o l i c y i n China. I t was i n
July of that year that President Theodore R oosevelt stated
that the future h i s t o r y of America would be more determined
by "the United States'position on the P a c i f i c facing China than by her p o s i t i o n on the A t l a n t i c facing Europe." I t
was therefore only natural that U. S. Far Eastern p o l i c y
became more active i n counteracting Japan Ts p o l i c y i n China.
The U. S. Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, addressed an i n d i r e c t
warning to Japan when he stated in October, 1907, at the
American Association of Shanghai: "
The American-Chinese trade i s s u f f i c i e n t l y great to require the government of the United States to take every legitimate means to protect i t against dimin-uation or injury by the p o l i t i c a l preference of any of i t s competitors. . . . I t would have the right to protest against exclusion from Chinese trade by a departure from the p o l i c y of the open door. . . .
c f . I s h i l , V i s c . K . .Diplomatic Commentaries.transit.by W.R.Langdon^ Baltimore /&he John Hopkins Press,1936, p.80. 2Spinks,C.N. ,"the 'Eermination of the Anglo-JapQ^Pse A l l i a n c e " , P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l Review.Vol.VJ. .plEffiS?) p.522 3Th.Roosevelt i n a l e t t e r to B.G.Wheeler,President of the Univ e r s i t y of California,June 17,1905,quoted i n Dennett,T., Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War.New York ,1925 ,p.3. 4 the Statement by secretary of "far,Mr. Taft on Oct.8,1907, i n North China Herald,0ct.11,1907.quoted from Chang.ChF.The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,Baltimore,The John Hopkins Press ,1931, pp.247 f f .
- 5 -
In addition to that, the immigration question between the
United States and Japan assumed serious proportions and con
tributed i n a considerable degree to s t r a i n i n g the r e l a t i o n s
between both countries. In 1906 the famous San Francisco
School Incident occurred because of the Japanese immigration.
One year l a t e r i n 1907, President Roosevelt issued a proclam
ation according to which Japanese immigrants provided with
passports to Mexico, Canada or Hawaii, were denied entry into
the United States. The tension reached i t s climax i n 1907-
08 when President Roosevelt, because of the war scare, ordered
the despatch of the whole of the United States f l e e t into the
P a c i f i c . The B r i t i s h Government was most anxious to see the
strained American-Japanese r e l a t i o n s relaxed^and therefore 7
approached the United States government with suggestions which led f i n a l l y to the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 3rd,
States ^ 1908, by which the Upi "fed/ana Japan re-affirmed t h e i r honest
inte n t i o n to maintain the existing 'status quo* i n the P a c i f i c
and the p r i n c i p l e of the open-door i n China. 8 Since that time,
however, American-Japanese antagonism became a continuous
factor of i n s t a b i l i t y i n the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e which 5-'Chang op. c i t . .Ibid. ppfti^S. Bailey, Th,A., Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American
C r i s i s , Stanford Univ. C a l i f . , Stand.Univ.Press,1934.p.211 f f . 7 cf. Franhke,0. Die Grossmaechte i n Ostasien ,1894.-1914,
Hamburg 1923.pp.300-302
cf. Root-Takahira Agreement of Nov.3,1908, by exchange of notes. Text of. Kawakami,K.K., Japan's P a c i f i c P o l i c y , New York,1922, pp.48-49.
_ 6 -
the B r i t i s h Government had to take into due consideration
i n her r e l a t i o n s with Japan. I t faced Great B r i t a i n with the
serious prospect of being involved i n an American-Japanese
War i n which she had to take the side of Japan against the
United States. Un addition, there was an increasing body of
opinion i n the United States which looked with displeasure
and uneasiness on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , a fac t which 9
was r e a l i z e d i n B r i t a i n as well as i n Japan. The po t e n t i a l
danger of becoming embroiled with the United States because
of the AngloSJapanese A l l i a n c e , constituted a problem of
great concern to the B r i t i s h Dominions of Canada, A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand. As early as 1906, Commander B e l l a i r s raised
the question In the B r i t i s h House of Commons '^whether there
i s any provision i n the Anglo-Jap anese Treaty safeguarding
His Majesty's Dominions from being involved i n a war with
the United States on behalf of Japan." 1 0 At that time S i r
Edward Grey was s t i l l i n the p o s i t i o n to a l l a y such fears,
saying that there was no i n d i c a t i o n that events were l i k e l y
to lead to war. The American-Japanese tension, however, grew
st e a d i l y , reaching a serious c r i s i s i n 1910 over the question
of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of the railway l i n e s i n South Manchuria as
9 cf. I s h i i , op.cit. pp56-59
10 Great Britain,The Parliamentary Debates,House of Commons
4th Series,London,.H.M.St.0. (Hereafter referred to as Gr.Brit.,Pari.DebJ 4th Ser.1906 ,vol.163, p.864,quoted from Chang, op. c i t . pp 149-150.
- 7 -
proposed by the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Knox. The
anxiety of the B r i t i s h Government was obviously r e f l e c t e d In
a despatch of the Foreign Secretary, S i r Edward Grey, i n July
1911. This stated that
Canada was now on such good terms with the United States, and there was such a growing f e e l i n g of f r i e n d l i n e s s between the public opinion i n t h i s country and that of the other side of the A t l a n t i c that i t was clear that we could not undertake any obli g a t i o n which would involve us i n war with the United States 1 1
This was the f i r s t time that Canada who was to play such an
outstanding role i n the h i s t o r y of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e ,
was o f f i c i a l l y mentioned i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r connection.
Accordingly, the B r i t i s h Government was highly pleased when
she was approached i n August and September, 1910, by the U.S.
government with the suggestion of concluding a Treaty of
General A r b i t r a t i o n for the peaceful settlement of d i s p u t e s . 1 2
The B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary immediately communicated with
the Japanese^Government, advancing suggestions which amounted
to an adjustment of the Al l i a n c e to Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s
i n the case of the renewal of the A l l i a n c e . 1 3 The Japanese
government responded p o s i t i v e l y and assented to the B r i t i s h
^ B r i t i s h Documents on the Origin^of the War,1898-1914,ed. Goocn ,ti..F.- Temper l e y ,honaon, ti.M. at. O f f i c e ,1925 f f Yol VIII (Hereafter referred to as Br.Doc.VIII). ' ' Br.Doc.VIII, no.431, p.529. 12
Ibid. Mo.405, p.503, and no.450,p.544, and no.463,p.559. 13 Ibid.and no.406,p.503.
- 8 -
proposal. Japan even took the i n i t i a t i v e for suggesting a
modification of the text of the Treaty i n such a form that
rendered the "casus foederis" of the A l l i a n c e inoperative
against a power with whom B r i t a i n would conclude a treaty 14
of a r b i t r a t i o n . This proposal became a r e a l i t y as A r t i c l e IV
inserted into the renewed; Treaty of A l l i a n c e of 1911. The
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n 1911 was the ex
pression of the changed conditions i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s :
The immediate Russian p e r i l i n the Far East had vanished, the
American-Japanese tension was increasing more and more, and
the view of the B r i t i s h Dominions, who had begun to play a more
Important role and had acquired the right to be consulted i n
matters of foreign p o l i c y i n the Committee of Imperial Defence
established i n 1911, had to be taken into due consideration
by the B r i t i s h government as f a r as her p o l i c y towards Japan
was concerned. Before the A l l i a n c e was renewed the B r i t i s h
Government therefore consulted the Dominion Prime Ministers on t h i s question at the Imperial Conference i n May 1911 and
15 secured t h e i r unanimous approval. The B r i t i s h Dominions were
on t h i s occasion for the f i r s t time introduced i n t o the "arcana
im p e r i i " i n a matter of high p o l i t i c s , whereas the f i r s t two
t r e a t i e s of the A l l i a n c e i n 1902 and 1905 had been concluded
on the exclusive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the London Foreign Office ^ The proposal was advanced by the Japanese Prime Minister Komura,cf.Ishil op.©it Pp.56ff.; cf.also Br.Doc. VIII, no. 407,pp 504-505. ~ 15 of. Statement by the Secretary of State f o r the, Colonies,Mr.
Harcourt, i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons,July 19,1911, Gr
^ - : 2 S ' J . U S . 8 - r " TO1- » ' »" * Br. Doc.
without any cohsultation or cooperation of the Dominions.
In the Australian Parliament, i n the Senate as well as i n
the House of Representatives, the opinion on the treaty-
renewal was expressed by various speakers. Senator M i l l e n
maintained i n September, 1911, that A u s t r a l i a was e n t i t l e d 16
to know how far she was committed. In the Australian House of Representatives, although warning was given that
A u s t r a l i a "must not be l u l l e d i n t o any f a l s e security by
the arrangement between Japan and the mother country", 17
the treaty-renewal was welcomed. I t was r e a l i s t i c a l l y argued that Japan should be the a l l y of the B r i t i s h Empire
18 rather than a "possible assailant". These opinions r e f l e c t e d
not only the A u s t r a l i a n standpoint i n the question of Anglo-
Japanese r e l a t i o n s , but ware also i n d i c a t i v e of the fact that
the Dominions held t h e i r own views which were emanating
from the peculiar and i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t i n t h i s matter.
But they had not yet arrived at that stage i n t h e i r constit
utional evolution which enabled them to i n s i s t vigorously on
t h e i r own r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s or even to exert decisive
influence on the course of foreign p o l i c y as determined ex
c l u s i v e l y by the Downing Street Cabinet.
16 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb., Sess. 1911, vol,
LX, p. 61. 1 7 i b i d . , p. 389. 1 8 l b i d . , p. 203.
- 10 -
Summarizing the matter of the treaty-renewal of 1911
one can say that two factors placed the B r i t i s h government
i n an uneasy p o s i t i o n i n her r e l a t i o n s with Japan; the at
titude of the United States of America and, i n a somewhat
le s s e r extent, in t e r e s t s of the self-governing Dominions.
The United Kingdom Government had good reason to keep the
new Anglo-Japanese agreement secret from the knowledge of
Parliament, thus avoiding a large discussion, which gave
r i s e to c r i t i c i s m i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons.1^
Owing to the combined e f f o r t of the B r i t i s h and
Japanese negotiators, the i n s e r t i o n of the famous* A r t i c l e IV
into, the t r e a t y - a l l i a n c e was achieved. I t read:
Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general a r b i t r a t i o n wLth a t h i r d power, i t i s agreed that nothihg i n t h i s Agreement s h a l l e n t a i l upon such Contracting Party an o b l i g a t i o n to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of a r b i t r a t i o n i s i n force." 20
The purpose of t h i s clause was to eliminate any danger f o r
the B r i t i s h Empire of her being drawn into; a possible armed
c o n f l i c t between Japan and the United States. The B r i t i s h
Government was therefore anxious to communicate with the
U. S. State Department, pointing out the object of the new
l Q Gr. B r i t . , P a r i . Deb. , 5th Sess. , 1911, v o l . 28,
p. 1257. 20
A r t i c l e IJT of the Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, signed at London, July 13,, 1911, quoted i n Br. Doc. VIII, no. 436, pp 532-533.
- 11 -treaty and expressinggthe hope that the U. S. Government would
"appreciate the desire that Great B r i t a i n and Japan have
shown to remove any possible obstacle to progress of a r b i -21
t r a t i o n " . The new provision together with the fact that Japan
was no longer obliged to render armed assistance to Great
B r i t a i n i n the case of complications on the borders of
India meant, without any doubt, a weakening of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e , or generally speaking, a coollng-off of
the diplomatic r e l a t i o n s between the two Empires. Never
theless, on both sides the desire for maintaining the
A l l i a n c e as the keystone of Japanese and B r i t i s h diplomacy
was very strong. Even a formerly declared opponent of the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e l i k e Prince I t o , was convinced i n
1909 of the importance of retaining the Anglo-Japanese 22
A l l i a n c e . He firm l y believed i n the e f f i c i e n c y and stab
i l i t y of the pact. T he Japanese Government r e a l i s t i c a l l y
recognized the urgent necessity f o r Great B r i t a i n to pre
serve amicable relatilons with the United States and so
acquiesced i n the B r i t i s h wishes because they wanted to use
the A l l i a n c e as a further instrument for the consolidation
of Japan's power i n the Far East. The B r i t i s h motive for
the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e derived 21
of.Despatches of the Brit.Foreign Secretary,Sir Edward Grey, to the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Washington,Mr.Bryce,July 12,1911, Br. Doc. ¥111, no. 433 and 434, pp. 530-531.
cf.Interview of the Brit.Ambassador to Tokyo,Mr.MacDonald, with Prince Ito,June 14,1909,in Br.Doc.VIII,no.365,pp 466-468.
- 12: -
pri m a r i l y from two considerations which were closely con
nected with each other. F i r s t , a continued a l l i a n c e with
Japan was regarded as a"guarantee against Japan's i l l - w i l l "
which might have been e a s i l y aroused by the an t i - O r i e n t a l 23
immigration-laws i n the B r i t i s h Dominions. An abrogation
of the treaty a l l i a n c e would have led to considerable
f r i c t i o n s with Japan and might have constituted a permanent
danger f o r the i n t e g r i t y of the B r i t i s h Empire. To avoid
t h i s was the supreme aim of B r i t i s h diplomacy at a time
when Great B r i t a i n had to concentrate a l l her strength on
Europe where the German naval p o l i c y constituted a serious
menace. The prolongation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
was therefore a precautionary measure on the part of the
B r i t i s h Government for the protection of the B r i t i s h Dominions
who were exposed to Japanese pressure. I t was furthermore
based on the assumption that the Japanese government f e e l i n g
under a moral ob l i g a t i o n , would r e f r a i n from embarking on a
large-scale expansion southward by immigration into A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand, as well as to Canada, but would turn to
Korea, Manchuria and the other regions i n the neighborhood
of Japan, as S i r Edward Grey hoped.expressing h i s view to 7
2 3 C f . L e t t e r of the Russian Ambassador to London, July 7,1911 on h i s conversation with the Under-Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , S i r Arthur NIcolson, i n Siebert ,B, •Entente Diplomacy and the World, London,New York,The KnicicerDocicer press, l y a l , p. 32.
- 13 -
the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of Saint James i n
May, 1911.24 This l a s t consideration, serving as i t did the
v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the "White P o l i c y " of A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand and ensuring the security of these Dominions
from a p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y Japanese expansion to the South
apparently became a determining and influencing factor i n
Great B r i t a i n ' s Far Eastern p o l i c y . Since that time i t has
recurred i n British.diplomacy during the Siberian Expedition
i n 1918, 1919 and l a t e r on i n the Manchurian C r i s i s of 1931.
The second reason f o r maintaining the A l l i a n c e was
c l o s e l y linked with, the use of the A l l i a n c e as a means for
safeguarding the P a c i f i c Dominions against a possible attack
by Japan herself. The centre of gravity, as f a r as B r i t i s h
Foreign p o l i c y was concerned, had shifted to Europe since
Germany had embarked upon a long-term naval-building p o l i c y
the speed, extent and i n t e n s i t y of which iipnedlately challeng
ed B r i t i s h naval supremacy which B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y
always sought to maintain as i t s fundamental p r i n c i p l e by
keeping the so-called 'Two-Power Standard'. Tbemeet the
German danger Great B r i t a i n was compelled to concentrate
a l l her naval power i n the North Sea. The Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e enabled Great B r i t a i n to increase the e f f e c t i v e
strength of her navy i n European waters by reducing the
B r i t i s h naval forces i n the Far E a s t . 2 5
2 4Br.Doc.VIII, no. 427,p.525 2 5 c f . L e t t e r of Russian Ambassador to London on a conversat i o n with S i r Arthur Nicolson,July 7,1911,in Siebert,op.cit.p.33
- 14 -
The problem of Empire defence i n the P a c i f i c had
been discussed at the Imperial Defence Conference i n 1909,
when i t was decided to e s t a b l i s h a powerful P a c i f i c f l e e t
consisting of three squadrons stationed in the Indian,
Chinese and Australian waters. The China-station- squadron
was to be composed mainly of New Zealand^units with the
b a t t l e - c r u i s e r !New Zealand' as f l a g s h i p , two cruisers of
the ' B r i s t o l Class', three destroyers, and two submarines.
This decision, however, was not put into e f f e c t by the
B r i t i s h Admiralty. The reason for dropping the plan was
c l e a r l y stated i n October, 1913, i n a telegram from the
B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary to the New Zealand government,
saying that the general s t r a t e g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n of naval
strength, necessary in the interest of the Empire as a whole,
had to be observed, and this "required available B r i s t o l s
elsewhere." I t was evident what was meant by this explana
ti o n . The B r i t i s h Admiralty, p a r t i c u l a r l y Mr. C h u r c h i l l as
F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, gave p r i o r i t y to the B r i t i s h
p o s i t i o n in European waters where he f e l t the decisive b a t t l e
would be fought, and i n 1914 considered the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e as a s u f f i c i e n t instrument for securing the safety 27
of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. 2 6 c f . Report on Naval Defence P o l i c y l a i d before the New Zealand House of Representatives, October 28,1913, New Zea-land,Parl. Deb.,3rd Sess., 1913,vol.166, p. 329. 2 7cf.Statement made by Mr.Churchill i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons,March 17,1914,Gr.Br.,Pari.,Deb., 5th Ser.,1914, vol.59,p.1931 f f .
- 15 -
This p o l i c y , although i t arose from a s i t u a t i o n of emer
gency, was to prove short-sighted i n the long run. I t did
not receive the f u l l assent of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand }as
these Dominions recognized the danger involved i n a lack of
B r i t i s h naval strength i n Far Eastern waters. The New
Zealand Government sent the Minister of Defence, Colonel
A l l e n to London i n the beginning of 1913 to make 'inquiries
concerning t h i s question of naval defence. The Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Mr. Massey, declared i n 1913 In the New
Zealand Parliament:
I t appears quite certain that we are on the eve of great changes i n the P a c i f i c . . . . The government are not thinking of the present, or even of the immediate future but of what may happen i n years to come and the necessity of making preparation therefor. 8
He assiduously urged a close cooperation of Canada , A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand f o r maintaining the absolute naval supremacy
i n the P a c i f i c . There can be no doubt that his almost
prophetical-sounding words alluded to the r i s i n g power of
Japan. T-he p o l i t i c a l development i n Eastern Asia during
the World War was to demonstrate how accurate h i s predictions
were. Similar opposition against the naval p o l i c y of the 29
B r i t i s h Admiralty was voiced i n the Australian Parliament.
• cf. Statement by Mr. Massey on Naval Defence P o l i c y i n the New Zealand House of Representatives, Oct.28,1913, New Zealand,Parl. Deb., 3rd Sess.1913, vol.166, pp.329 and 331. 29Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb. ,Sess.1914, vol.LXXTI ,pp.S? 277.
The Au s t r a l i a n Minister of Defence ? ^ ? < 3 B . l l e n , i n s i s t e d on the proposal
pursuing the defence scheme of 1909 and refused that units
of the Australian navy were to be sent to the North Sea.
However, the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l and strategic conception of
foreign p o l i c y at the eve of the World War which was based
e n t i r e l y on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e demanded concentra
t i o n of a l l strength on Europe, thus leaving the protection
of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East and i n the P a c i f i c to
the Japanese a l l y . The withdrawal of considerable naval
forces from that region proved disastrous for Great B r i t a i n
and made her thoroughly dependent on the A l l i a n c e , that i s
to say,on the goodwill of Japan. Japanese diplomacy d i s
t i n c t l y recognized the unique chance offered to her by the
outbreak of the war i n Europe. I t seized t h i s chance when
the attention of the Western powers was distracted and t h e i r
strength cxampletely absorbed by the.: European c o n f l i c t .
The outbreak of the F i r s t World War i n Europe i n
August, 1914 confronted the B r i t i s h Government with a double
problem: To secure by a l l means Japan's cooperation f o r the
protection of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Eastern Asia and i n the
P a c i f i c , but at the same time to r e s t r i c t possible p o l i t i c a l
and m i l i t a r y action on the part of Japan because of the
Statement made by the Aust r a l i a n Minister of Defence, Senator M i l l e n , i n the Senate,on October 22, 1913, Common-Wealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb., Session.1913, vol, LXXI, p. 2297.
- 17 -
widespread trepidation i n the B r i t i s h Dominions regarding 1 Japan as well as because of the United States who looked
upon every p o l i t i c a l step i n the Far East Ǥr apt to increase
Japan's power with suspicious eyes. The B r i t i s h dilemma i s
r e f l e c t e d by the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey,
i n h i s memoirs:
. . .The prospect of unlimited Japanese action was repugnant to A u s t r a l i a and. New Zealand . . . .It was unthinkable that we should not have the most scrupulous care f o r the i n t e r e s t s and f e e l i n g s of B r i t i s h Dominions that were taking part i n the war ready to make s a c r i f i c e s . .. Equally important, the e f f e c t of Japanese action on public opinion i n the United States might be disastrous; i t might even make American .sentiment d e f i n i t e l y antagonistic to us. . . We had, therefore, to explain to Japan that her help would be welcome but that her action must be l i m i t e d . " 3
The i n t e r e s t s of the Dominions and the United States had to
be taken into due consideration by the U. K. Cabinet.
On the other hand, some suspicion and doubt might have
existed as to the Japanese attitude towards the war. • At the
beginning of the c r i s i s i t was uncertain what this attitude
would be. By 1914 the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was no longer
as e f f i c i e n t and as strong as i t had been i n 1902 or 1905;
a considerable change had taken place In Anglo-Japanese
r e l a t i o n s which was characterized by a cooling-off of the
intimacy between both countries since Japan had turned to
31 ... i Grey, S i r Edwand , Twenjsx^ive Tears , _ 1892-1916. London,
Hodder and Stoughton,Lmtd.iy25, Vol.il,"pp 1U3-104
- 2-8 -
a p o l i c y sofa understanding with Russia over China* and
since B r i t a i n f e l t the f u l l extent of Japanese trade
r i v a l r y i n Eastern Asia. Anti-Japanese statements were
voiced by some sections of the B r i t i s h press. The B r i t
annic Review for instance, termed the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e a 'mesalliance' by means of which Japan had
usurped Korea and Manchuria and was threatening India and
A u s t r a l i a . The paper expressed the fear that Japan i n
pursuing a p o l i c y of 'Asia to the A s i a t i c s * would p r e c i p i -32
tate a general conflagration. In addition to that there
were i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l groups i n Japan advocating the
replacement of the AngloWapanese A l l i a n c e by an agreement.
with Germany which might possibly lead to the formation of
a Eurasian continental power bloc of Germany, Russia and
Japan, p a r t i c u l a r l y after Japan's diplomacy had taken on
a pro-Russian o r i e n t a t i o n through the Russo-Japanese t r e a t i e s
of 1907, 1910 and 1912. Suspicion and anxieties of such kind were expressed as early as 1911 i n the B r i t i s h House of
33 Commons. In 1914 at the outbfeak of the war, i t was
c h i e f l y i n c i r c l e s of the Japanese General Staff that the
idea of an intervention on behalf of Germany was advanced,
so that two d i f f e r e n t groups of influence i n Tokyo contested 32
cf. Japan Post June 13, 1914, no.11, p.384
33 of. Gr. B r i t . , Pari.Deb.5th Sess.1911,Vol.22,p.2529.
- 19 -
against each other. This did c e r t a i n l y not escape the 34
serious attention of the B r i t i s h . The general suspicion
and doubt regarding Japan's attitude immediately before the
World War was increased by a s e m i - o f f i c i a l leading a r t i c l e
of the Japan Times on July 28, 1914, ishich said that Japan
was "on the best possible terms with the three great powers,
Au s t r i a , Germany and Russia," and that i n case of war Tokyo 35
would maintain '.'strict n e u t r a l i t y . " Indeed, the Japanese
Cabinet pursued a 'wait and see p o l i c y ' on the eve of the
World War i n 1914 before i t ultimately decided to take the
side of B r i t a i n and to u t i l i z e the opportunity to embark,
upon a p o l i c y designed to lay the foundations f o r Japan's
undisputed domination over Eastern Asia.
The task imposed upon B r i t i s h diplomacy i n 1914
was, as pointed out, therefore immeasurably d i f f i c u l t .
I t had to ensure the e f f i c a c i o u s aid and the goodwill of
Japan i n a region of the world where B r i t a i n , i n the i n t e r e s t
of wider p o l i t i c a l strategy, had to weaken her own strength;
simultaneously, B r i t a i n had ,with a minimum of available power,
to prevent an excessive Japanese expansion i n the Far East
which jeopardized the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China, i f not
the security of the Dominions. 3 4cf.Steed,W. / ' B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c " The Nineteenth Century and After",vol.CXI (Apr.1932), pp 397-3¥8 3 5cf.Despatch of theAustro-Hungarian diplomatic representative at Tokyo,Freiherr von Mueller,to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister,Count Berchtold ,July 28.1914.Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War(Pjlife^el'll} No. 10,1915) London ,H.M. Stationery u r n c e , n a m son ana sons,print. ersjl915. Cmd?860.('Hereafter referred to as Collect.Diplom. Doc* Cmd. 7860?)Austro-Hungarian Red-book, no.36,p.515
- 20 -
The diplomatic correspondence between the Foreign
O f f i c e and Tokyo preceding the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s r
i n the Far East reveals the desperate B r i t i s h e f f o r t s to
Impose r e s t r i c t i o n s of Japanese war actions. Whilst at
f i r s t the B r i t i s h government took the view that the events 36
i n Europe would not invoke the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i t considered i t advisable on suggestion by S i r William
37 T y r r e l l to i n s t r u c t the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Tokyo, S i r
C. Green, to inform the Japanese government that " i f
h o s t i l i t i e s spread to the Far East, and an attack on Hong -•
Kong or Waihawei were to take place 1 1 — which was the only
case, apart from an uprisin g i n India, i n which the
"casus foederis" for the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could be 38
applied -- B r i t a i n would r e l y on Japanese support.
What Great B r i t a i n wanted was a l o c a l l y limited p a r t i c i p a
t i o n of Japan i n the war such as the capture of German war-
and armed-merchant ships i n Far Eastern waters. Accordingly,
the B r i t i s h government requested Tokyo i n a memorandum of
August 7, 1914, to provide such naval aid. * The Japanese
Br. Doc. 1914, v o l . X I, no. 436, p.256. 3 7 I b i d . , no. 534, p. 292 3 8 B r . Doc. 1914, Vol. XI, no. 549, p. 298 3 9 c f . T a k e u c h i , T. ,War and Diplomacy jn the_Japanese Empire, New York, Doubleday uoran and Comp. ,inc.1935,p.16Q.
- 21 -
government had. declared four days e a r l i e r that Great B r i t a i n
could "count upon Japan at once coming to assistance of her 40
a l l y with a l l her strength, i f c a l l e d to do so." This phraseology used has to be interpreted l i t e r a l l y . I t was
much more than a matter of courtesy. The Japanese Foreign
Minister Kato considered the B r i t i s h proposal as e n t i r e l y
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 4 1 What Japan wanted as an o f f i c i a l reason
to j o i n the war was nothing else but the elimination of
Germany's influence i n the Far East, or i n other words, the
surrender of Kioutchou. On the same day when the B r i t i s h
request for limited action of the Japanese navy was conveyed
to Tokyo, the German naval attache, Captain Knorr, despatched
a telegram to the 'Graf Spee'-squadron, saying that according 42
to r e l i a b l e information Japan intended to take Tsingtao.
The B r i t i s h completely f a i l e d to postpone a Japanese declar
ation of war which implied the extension of m i l i t a r y opera
tions on the Chinese mainland and into the Pacific-{the
matter would have led to a Japanese occupation of the German
Island possessions i n the: South Sea). The B r i t i s h Government
had to comply with the. ambitions of an unyielding Japanese
diplomacy which aimed at a long-term p o l i c y . The only measure 4 0 B r . Doc., 1914, vol XI, no. 571, p.305 4 1 L a Fargue, T.E.,China and the World War, Stanford Univ. Calif..Stanford Univ.Press 1937,p.12 4 S M a r i n e Rundschau, 1921, pp.516-517
- 22 -
the B r i t i s h Government could take when faced with the
' f a i t accompli' of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany was
to issue an o f f i c i a l declaration to the press i n which i t
was stated that the actions being taken by Great B r i t a i n
and Japan were deemed to safeguard the aims of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e , i.e.,the i n t e g r i t y and independence of
China; and i t was announced that the "action of Japan w i l l
not extend to the P a c i f i c Ocean beyond the China Seas. . .
nor to any foreign t e r r i t o r y except i n German occupation on 43
the continent of Eastern Asia." The purpose of t h i s
declaration was evident; i t was designed to dispel anxieties
on the part of the United States and the B r i t i s h Dominions.
The B r i t i s h Government therefore conveyed t h i s declaration
expressly to the U. S. State Department with which" she was 44
i n continuous contact over developments i n the Par East. The reason why B r i t a i n had addressed the request for m i l i t a r y intervention to Japan at a l l , and why she f i n a l l y had to y i e l d to the persistent demands of the Japanese Cabinet lay i n the extreme m i l i t a r y weakness of Great B r i t a i n i n Eastern Asia. The B r i t i s h naval forces of the China squadron consi s t e d of two b a t t l e - c r u i s e r s , the 'Minotaur' and the "Hampshire*, _
Statement of the B r i t i s h Press Bureau,of August 17,1914, published by the 'London Times' on August 18,1914,cited i n MacNair,H.F.' ,Modern Par Eastern International Relations, Toronto ,New York, London 1950, pp 177-178. 4 4Papers Relating_bo_the Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S.Govt. Printing—OTfTce Washington 1924 IT. (diiereai'ter Yet&VT-ed to as U.S.For.Rel.il914,Supplem.p.l27.
- 23 -
fc#K two l i g h t c r u i s e r s , the 'Yarmouth' and the 'Newcastle*,
and the old battleship 'Triumph* which had a slow speed.
The units available from the Australian navy were the modern
ba t t l e - c r u i s e r ' A s t r a l i a * , two new l i g h t c ruisers, -a&a the
'Sidney' and the 'Melbourne', two older c r u i s e r s , the
•Encounter' and 'Pioneer', and one torpedo-boat-destroyer.
In addition to these forces there were three old cruisers
of the New Zealand navy, two old French b a t t l e - c r u i s e r s , the
'Montcalm' and 'Dupleix', and two Russian l i g h t c r u i s e r s , the 45
'Shantung' and 'Askold'. This naval force, even when
combined, was inadequate i n strength, and not i n any p o s i t i o n
to guarantee the protection of the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , poss
essions and sea-communi cations i n the Far East and. i n the
P a c i f i c . Furthermore, they were unable to f u l f i l l the tasks
of B r i t i s h overseas strategy as assigned i n the Committee of
Imperial Defence by Admiral H. Jackson; for instance, the
protection of B r i t i s h commerce and main communication-lines
i n the P a c i f i c , the occupation of various German P a c i f i c
i s l a n d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y for the destruction of the dable stations 46
on Yap, Nauru and Angaur could not be undertaken. The
control of the Chinese waters was l e f t to a so-called 4 5 C h u r c h i l l , W, The 'World C r i s i s , New York, C.Scribner's Sons. 1923. pp 313-314, and Marine Rundscau, 1921, p. 516 4 6 c f . Marine Rundschau , 1921, pp. 522-523
- 24 -
•Yellow Sea P a t r o l ' , consisting of the old 'Triumph',
the l i g h t - c r u i s e r 'Yarmouth', f i v e destroyers, and the
'Dupleix'. These forces were not s u f f i c i e n t to prevent the
German Far Eastern naval squadron of Admiral von Spee from
breaking through the A l l i e d blockade. Not u n t i l Japan»s
entry into the war was the B r i t i s h commander of the China
Station, Admiral Jerram, i n the position to combine h i s
forces i n Singapore for safeguarding the Indian Ocean from
any danger from the East. Thus for the f i r s t time the
dependence of Great B r i t a i n on Japan's m i l i t a r y naval aid
became evident; i n the new circumstances the o f f i c i a l press
statement was i n e f f e c t u a l . This was c l e a r l y shown i n a
telegram from the B r i t i s h Admiralty to the Japanese Admiralty
on November 5, 1914, when an extension of the Japanese naval
operations to the P a c i f i c as f a r as the C a l i f o r n i a n and
Mexican coast was requested. I t was also suggested that a
Japanese squadron should advance to F i j i to secure the safety
of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, whilst another squadron was
to advance southward so f a r as Sumatra and the Dutch East 47
Indies. These tasks were accepted by the Japanese Admir
a l t y . The Japanese f l e e t took over also the protection of
the Canadian P a c i f i c Coast where the naval forces, consist
ing of two sloops, were inadequate for maintaining the 47
Telegram of the B r i t i s h Admiralty to the Japanese Admir a l t y , Nov.5, 1914, i n C h u r c h i l l , op c i t . p.468
- 25 -
security of the coast of B r i t i s h Columbia. The psyhhos&s
of fear from a naval bombardment by the Spee Squadron which
broke out i n Vancouver and V i c t o r i a , was not removed u n t i l 48
Japanese warships anchored i n Vancouver. The predic t i o n
made by the Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r , S i r Wilfred Laurier,
i n 1908 with reference to the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' that
i t would be possible that under the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
Canada "may see the f l e e t of Japan weighing anchor i n the
harbour of Vancouver for the protection of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ,
had proved correct.
This b r i e f description of the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n
the Far East at the outbreak of the World War has indicated
that the diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e had passed from the B r i t i s h
Foreign O f f i c e to the Japanese Cabinet. The B r i t i s h press
observed the development with some anxiety. The editor of
the National Review commented i n 1914 on the sit u a t i o n that
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had proved "a great mistake f o r
Great B r i t a i n ' s supremacy i n the Far East.? Great B r i t a i n ,
he complained, had simply surrendered her p o l i c y i n the Far
East to the Foreign O f f i c e i n Tokyo, which he predicted
4 8Lower, A.R.M., Canada and the Far East,1940.,New York, International S e c r e t a r i a t , ?.P.R. 1940. P.9 4 9quoted from Woodsworth, Ch.G.,Canada and the Orient,Toronto The Macmillan. Comp.of Canada Ltd, 1941, pp 163 f f
- 26 -
marked the "beginning of the end of the B r i t i s h — a n d that 50
means the European influenoe--in Eastern Asia." The
B r i t i s h China Press expressed s i m i l a r objections. The
North China Herald stated i n l a t e August, 1914: " I t i s not clear how a Japanese ultimatum to Germany could be j u s t i f i e d . Nothing compels Japan under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese
Treaty to jo i n the war." Neither B r i t i s h trade nor B r i t i s h 51
i n t e r e s t s were seriously endangered, the newspaper said.
The North China Daily News with an uneasy f e e l i n g about
Japan's future steps remarked i n August 1914, that i t would
be very unwise of Japan to ignore the express desires of
Great B r i t a i n , France and Russia. "Although these countries
are preoccupied for the time being elsewhere , they w i l l not 52
remain so permanently." The Japanese government when she
joined the war, made every e f f o r t to avoid any suspicion. .
of her actions i n Eastern Asia. In an o f f i c i a l declaration
she emphasized that the grounds which l e d Japan to the m i l i t a r y
measures, p a r t i c u l a r l y against Kioutchou, were "none other
than to maintain the common in t e r e s t s of Japan and Great
B r i t a i n set out i n the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . " Japan, i t
was argued, harboured no expansionist or s e l f i s h designs
but would"respect with the greatest care in t e r e s t s of t h i r d 53
powers i n Eastern Asia." The real objective of Japan, 5 0 0 s t a s i a t i s c h e r Lloyd.August 28,1914, no. 34, p.194. 5 1 c f . C h i n a Arehiv.Berlin, 1917, p.63 5 2 i b i d . , p. 70 5 3Coll've*Diplom. Dec., Cmd. 7860, p.532
- 8 7 -
however, was by no means that l a i d down i n the A l l i a n c e
with Great B r i t a i n , namely, the preservation of China's
i n t e g r i t y . As early as January, 1913, the Japanese Foreign
M i n i s t e r Kato, then Ambassador to London, had expressed h i s
view to S i r Edward Grey that Japan had a v i t a l p o l i t i c a l
i n t e r e s t i n the Kwantung Peninsula and i n the concessions of
the South-Manchurian Railway. He intimated that Japan de
manded a permanent occupation of the Peninsula and that she 54
would act, i f the 'psychological moment' occurred. There was no doubt i n August, 1914, that t h i s physchological moment
had arrived. The Japanese Government f u l l y understood the
favourable s i t u a t i o n presented by the complete absorption
of the western powers by the European war which permitted
Japan not only to r e a l i z e her designs i n South Manchuria
but to achieve a r a d i c a l solution of the Chinese problem;
she aimed at the diplomatic, ecohomic and m i l i t a r y domination
of China by Japan. The memorandum of the so-called 'Black
Dragon Society' submitted to the Japanese government i n f
r
August, 1914, revealed .the true Japanese aspirations. I t
recognized quite well that preoccupation of the West mention
ed i n the North China Daily News of August 18, 1914, saying,
Takeuchi, op c i t . p. 184
- 88 -
Now the opportunity f o r a solution of the Chinese question has arrived for Japan as i t w i l l never be offered for centuries. . . .After the European war the great powers w i l l d i r e c t t h e i r attention to. . . China again. . . . "
With reference to Great B r i t a i n the memorandum stated:
Her strength w i l l no longer be s u f f i c i e n t to oppose u s . 5 5
The Japanese Government did not intend to f u l f i l the as
surances regarding the surrender of Kioutchou to China.
This can be seen from the announcement of Baron Kato i n
the 35th Diet i n December, 1914, that Japan did not f e e l
committed to a.restoration of Tsingtao or to any l i m i t a t i o n s
on the scope of her m i l i t a r y operations.^ 6 Japan's adherence
to the London Declaration of 1914 was strongly advocated i n
1914 by the then Japanese Ambassador to P a r i s , Viscount
I s h i i , with the view of strengthening Japan's p o s i t i o n at 57
the Peace Conference. This i l l u s t r a t e d that Japan had
more far-reaching designs than acknowledged by herGovernment
i n o f f i c i a l attenuating n o t i f i c a t i o n s . Four days before
Japan's declaration of war to Germany, the Japanese Minister
to Peking, Hioki , was instructed to urge the Chinese P r e s i
dent, Yuan Shi K a i , to enter into an exchange of views coneerniig 5 Pernor and urn of the Black Dragon Society, of. Der_Ne.ue__0_r_ie,nt, Monalsschrift fuer das p o l i t l s c h e ,Wirschaf t l i c h e und gerstige Leben jjimgesamten Osten, B e r l i n , 1919, v o l . I, pp#. 232-235. 5 6 T a k e u c h i , op c i t . p. 181 5 7 I s h i i op c i t . p. 96
- 29 -58
Chinese-Japanese re l a t i o n s : The prelude to the famous
'Twenty-one Demands'had just begun. The events between
January and May, 1915 r e s u l t i n g from the 'Twenty-One
Demands' need not be re c a l l e d here i n d e t a i l . The Demands
not only purported the further consolidation of Japanese
control over South Manchuria and a retention of the former
German t e r r i t o r i a l and economic r i g h t s i n Shantung, but
also amounted i n practice to the establishment of a Japanese
protectorate over China as Group ¥ of the Demands suggested.
Considering the economic r i g h t s to be secured by the demands,
p a r t i c u l a r l y those contained i n Group I I I concerning the
Han-Yeh-Ping Company, one concludes that Japan wanted to
assure he r s e l f the sources of raw material on the A s i a t i c
mainland, p r i m a r i l y coal and i r o n which were indispensable
f o r a large-scale p o l i c y of successful expansion. . In the
l a s t analysis they amounted to the undisputed domination of
Japan over Eastern Asia, or i n other words, the elimination
of the influence of the Western Powers from that region.
The o f f i c i a l attitude of the B r i t i s h Government
towards Japan's diplomatic offensive against China was
s i g n i f i c a n t because i t showed the complete weakness of Great
B r i t a i n i n the Far East and how dependent she was on Japan's
Takeuchi op c i t . p. 184.
- 30 -
goodwill i n that area. After the Japanese demands - except
Group V which was kept s t r i c t l y secret - f i r s t became known,
the B r i t i s h Under-Secretary for Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. Primrose,
announced i n the H ouse of Commons oh March 11, 1914 that
the B r i t i s h Government would raise no objection against any
expansion of Japanese i n t e r e s t s i n China, provided that the 59
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the Yangtse area were not viol a t e d . He was r e f e r r i n g p r imarily to railway concessions; for one
month l a t e r the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Tokyo submitted a l i s t
to the Japanese government enumerating the railway concess-60
ions formerly acquired by Great B r i t a i n i n Southern China.
When they learned of Group V the B r i t i s h Government took a
strong stand i n opposing the demands by intimating i n a note
of May 4, 1915, that the public opinion i n Great B r i t a i n
would consider a disruption of the diplomatic re l a t i o n s between
China and Japan as "disregarding the s p i r i t of the Anglo-Jap-61
anese A l l i a n c e " . An o f f i c i a l memorandum by S i r Edward
Grey to the Japanese Ambassador i n London two days l a t e r
r e i t e r a t e d the B r i t i s h apprehension that the independence and 62
i n t e g r i t y of China were imperilled. O r i g i n a l l y , t h i s had
been one of the main reasons which had brought the A l l i a n c e
into being when China's i n t e g r i t y was threatened by Russia's ^ r B r i t . ,Parl. Deb., 5th ser. , 1915, v o l . 70, p.1722. 6 0 J i b i d . , v o l . 71, p.414 6 1cf.MacNair, op c i t . p. 188 6 2LaFargue, op c i t . p. 74
- 31 -
expansion i n the l a t e 90's. The Japanese actions i n 1915
(in contrast to Tokyo's assurances when Japan entered the
war) reveal c l e a r l y how fundamental the difference of i n t e r
pretation had become as f a r as the scope of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e was concerned, between Great B r i t a i n and
Japan. Japan's p o l i c y i n 1915 towards China constituted a
d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
Nevertheless, the B r i t i s h Government, being always under the
necessity not to alienate her Japanese a l l y because of the
security of the whole B r i t i s h Empire, f e l t i t expedient to
advise the Chinese Government, who had applied to the B r i t i s h
Government for consultation, to accept the Japanese demands 6 3
as contained i n the ultimatum of May 7, 1915. Simultaneously,
she rejected a proposal of the U. S. Secretary of State,Mr.
Bryan, for joint diplomatic action i n Tokyo with the view of 64
exerting a r e s t r a i n i n g influence on the Japanese Cabinet.
Thus, the United States saw themselves l e f t alone i n protest-
ing against the v i o l a t i o n of the"Open-B 7oor"principle by Japan.
This protest was made i n a note sent by Mr. Bryan to Tokyo
on May 11, 1915 which^by saying that the United States could
"not recognize any agreement. . . impairing . . . the open-65
door p o l i c y . . . contained p r a c t i c a l l y the essence of what »»
became famous i n 1932 as the Stimson Doctrine ofnon-n
recognition." 6 5U. S. For. Rel., 1915, pp. 144-145. 6 4 Die Internationalen Beziehungen i n Zeltajte'r des Imperial!sSSff Documente »u.s den Archiven der Zaristishen and Provisionschen RegieKung, B e r l i n , 1934-1936, Vol I I , {[Hereafter referred to as R.D.) 65 U.S. For Rel. 1915, p. 146
- 32 -
Although the Japanese Government was compelled by
the attitude of Great B r i t a i n and the pressure of the U.S.
to drop Group V of her demands i n the Japanese ultimatum
of May 7, i t remains s i g n i f i c a n t that the B r i t i s h Government
yielded i n a matter which seriously affected B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s
i n China. Japan's economic penetration of China including
the B r i t i s h sphere of in t e r e s t i n the Yangtse v a l l e y , spoke
in clear tones. Altogether i t showed that Japan had not
entered the war i n f u l f i l l m e n t of her obligations under the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n order to maintain peace i n the Far
East. P o l i t i c a l l y as well as economically, the i n t e r e s t s of
Great B r i t a i n and Japan c o n f l i c t e d . The attitude of the Foreign
O f f i c e did not remain without c r i t i c i s m of the B r i t i s h press.
Thus for instance, the former representative of the ' B r i t i s h
and Chinese Corporation', Mr. 3?. P. 0. Bland, published an
a r t i c l e i n the Nineteenth Century of November, 1915, i n which
he warned that the history of Korea and Manchuria as well
as Japan's appearance i n the Yangtse v a l l e y showed that any
expansion of Japanese influence "must of necessity e n t a i l
the gradual elimination of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . " What then
were the reasons f o r the B r i t i s h to y i e l d instead of joining
the Americans i n exerting more e f f e c t i v e pressure on Tokyo? One reason was that B r i t a i n was anxious to prevent: any
__ _ . _ _ Bland, 3T.P.0. "Japanese Pjolicy i n China", Nineteenth Century,
Vol. LXXVIII (Nov.1915) P. 1203.
- 33 -
serious American-Japanese tension during the war which
might have been increased i f Great B r i t a i n backed the
American actions against Japan i n 1915. The other reason
was r e f l e c t e d i n a despatch of the Russian Ambassador i n
Tokyo to the Russian Foreign M i n i s t e r , Sasanoff, on February
5, 1915, which read:
According to my opinion, Grey, as f a r as the future r e l a t i o n s with Japan are concerned, never loses sight of the p o s s i b i l i t y that future d i f f i c u l t i e s may a r i s e , not so much because of China but rather because of the B r i t i s h Dominions In the P a c i f i c , A u s t r a l i a and Canada, concerning r a c i a l immigrat i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s . 6 7
This Russian view provides a key to the B r i t i s h
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e : The primary
object was not China but the safety of the B r i t i s h Dominions
i n the P a c i f i c from a possible Japanese invasion, p a r t i c u l a r
l y during a period when a l l strength of the B r i t i s h Empire
had to be concentrated on the war i n Europe. The accent
of the A l l i a n c e , as f a r as the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t was concerned,
had s h i f t e d since 1911 and 1913 more and more i n this d i r e c t i o n .
The security of the Dominions, e s p e c i a l l y of A u s t r a l i a and
New Zealand, was the r e a l motive which impelled the B r i t i s h
Government, and the Dominion governments a f t e r 1919, to
continue the t r e a t y - a l l i a n c e with Japan rather than to
estrange t h i s r i s i n g big power and drive her into the
67 R.D. I I , 7,1. no. 136, p.126
- 34 -
h o s t i l e campp
Only by taking t h i s viewpoint into account can
the B r i t i s h acquiescence i n the measures of Japan's diplomacy
during the World War be understood. I t was a r e a l i s t i c
a ttitude r e s u l t i n g from p o l i t i c a l necessity.
A further example of Japan's increasing prestige
i n the Far East was Japan's intervention i n i n t e r n a l
Chinese a f f a i r s when President Yuan-Shi-Kai attempted to
rees t a b l i s h the monarchy i n China i n la t e 1915. I t was
due to a j o i n t demarche of the Japanese charge d ' a f f a i r e
and of the B r i t i s h and Russian ministers at Peking on
October 38, 1915, that the Chinese government was compelled
to postpone the re-introduction of the monarchical system.
The B r i t i s h Cabinet had instructed i t s representative at
Peking to associate himself with the step taken by the 68
Japanese government. I t was s i g n i f i c a n t that the minor t
Japanese charge d'affaire acted as the leading speaker,
i n spite of the fact that the higher-ranking B r i t i s h and
Russian diplomatic representatives were present - S i r John
Jordan was even the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps i n Peking -
and that i t was he who advised Peking i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n .
This leading diplomatic p o s i t i o n had been t r a d i t i o n a l l y
occupied by the B r i t i s h Minister i n China but had passed
into Japanese hands following the outbreak of the war. 68
cf. Statement by S i r Edward Grey i n answering a question i n the House of Commons, Nov. 9, 1915, Gr. Br.,Pari.Deb., 5th Ser. , 1915, v o l . 75, p.984
- 35 fe
l t was more than a mere question of diplomatic ceremony,
as can be seen from the comment given by the Japanese
Foreign M i n i s t e r , Baron I s h i i , on December 9, 1915, i n
the Japanese Parliament. He remarked
When we gave China t h i s advice Japan did only what was her duty to do i n the i n t e r e s t of the general peace i n the East. . . The only motive for Japan was &*.desire to secure the common int e r e s t s of China and of the Powers . . . ; That meant that the
Japanese diplomatic step was designed to emphasize Japan's
ro l e as mandatory i n the Par East. The c r i t i c i s m of
B r i t i s h newspapers i n China frankly admitted the Japanese
diplomatic victory. The National Review, for instance,
interpreted the subordinate role of the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r
as " f u l l evidence for the complete recognition of the
Japanese d i c t a t o r i a l aspirations on the part of those 70
European powers which have in t e r e s t s i n China." The Peking Daily News commented on the a f f a i r i n January, 1915:
From the viewpoint of those powers who are interested i n maintaining peace i n China the jo i n t demarche of the four powers on October 28, 1915, was a diplomati c mistake of primary importance . . . .The powers would be compelled someday to intervene i n order to restore the order a f t e r revolutionary seditions. •Powers'., however, means i n t h i s case "Japan's" 7!
How thoroughly the s i t u a t i o n i n the Far East had changed
becomes evident i f the y i e l d i n g B r i t i s h attitude i n 1915
D y C h i n a Archiv. 1916, p.73-74 7 0 C h i n a Archiv, 1917, p.73 71 China Archiv, 1916, ppl58
- 36 -
i s compared with the strong protests of Great B r i t a i n
when Japan t r i e d to prevent China's national unity i n 72
1911/12
A s i m i l a r diplomatic defeat for Great B r i t a i n ,
and another manifestation of Japan's predominant influence
i n Eastern Asia a f t e r the war broke out, occurred,when
Great B r i t a i n made e f f o r t s i n l a t e 1915 to induce the
Chinese government to j o i n the war. The underlying idea
was to create a counter balance against the growing influence
of Japan i n China when the Far Eastern problems were to be
discussed at the forthcoming peace conference. China's
resistence against the Japanese p o l i c y of expansion was
to be increased by a l l o t i n g her a voice at the peace con
ference. I t was furthermore recognized that the Japanese
m i l i t a r y occupation of Kiaotchou and of the railway l i n e
Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu had created a serious problem and aroused
China's intense opposition. The problem would have to be 73
solved by a 'modus vivendi'at that conference. The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of China i n the peace negotiations demanded
ed > that China j o i n the war. When, therefore, on November 18,
1915, the B r i t i s h Minister i n Peking ^ c t i n g together with
the French and Russian Ministers approached the Chinese 7 2 c f Chang, op c i t . pp. 165-169 73
of. Japan Weekly Chronicle, Sept.21, 1916.
- 37 -
government with such a suggestion the Japanese government
immediately raised strong objections. Again, the B r i t i s h
government gave way i n s t r u c t i n g the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n
Tokyo on November 30, to communicate with the Japanese
Foreign Minister "that the B r i t i s h government had no
inte n t i o n to enter into any p o l i t i c a l negotiations with 74
China without having consulted Japan."
Japan objected to the B r i t i s h proposal not only
because of her fear of being counteracted and of becoming
i s o l a t e d , but she wanted to give an unmistakable declaration
that she alone was the determining great power i n Eastern
Asia and that no p o l i t i c a l action could be taken i n that
region of the world without the whole-hearted consent of
Japan. This amounted more or l e s s to enunciating an
• A s i a t i c Monroe Doctrine' the guardian of which was Japan
by manifest destiny. The Japanese and Chinese press r e f l e c t e d
t h i s conception quite conspicuously. The immediate comment
of the Japanese controlled newspaper, Jih-Jbh-Hsin-Wen-Pau
i n November, 1915, on the a l l i e d suggestions to China wa_s:
The A s i a t i c Monroe Doctrine must become manifest. Because of t h i s reason we must r e s i s t most energ e t i c a l l y the plan advanced by Britain,France and Russia to draw China into the war . . . because of the Greater A s i a t i c Idea.
'*China Archiv, 1916, pp. SO and 30. 7 5 C h i n a Archiv, 1916, p. 27
- 38 -
The owner of the Osaka Hotchi Shimbun, Utschida, wrote
i n an a r t i c l e i n 1916;
The English have now recogized Japan's superior p o s i t i o n by promising to undertake nothing i n China without consulting Japan. 7 5
In a s i m i l a r way the comment of the Shanghai Chinese paper
Hsinwen-pau of December £, 1915, expressed
What Japan had aimed at during the l a s t ten years, that i s , the supremacy i n the Far East, has now p r a c t i c a l l y and o f f i c i a l l y been recognized by Great B r i t a i n . 7 7
International development i n the la t e years of the
World War was extremely favourable to Japah i n Eastern
Asia; i n consequence Japan was so^on i n the p o s i t i o n to
achieve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y sanctioned implementation of
her claims i n the Far East.
When the United States f e l t compelled to enter the A •
war i n Ap"ri.l'-2r;;.", 1917, she wanted an understanding with Japan on Far Eastern problems, because she needed Japan's
consent to China's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war. Furthermore, States
the Unified A. neeued the goodwill of Japan because the sub
marine warfare necessitated a change i n the naval programme
of 1916. The bui l d i n g of battleships had to be stopped i n
order to allow for replacement by the building of two hundred 78
and f i f t y destroyers. This was the reason f o r the _
Peking Daily News, August 13-14, 1916. 7 7 C h i n a Archiv, 1916, p.31 78
Jensen, G. Seemacht Japan, B e r l i n 1943, pp.188-183
- 39 -
conclusion of the famous Lansing-Ishii Agreement signed
on November 2, 1917, by which the United States conceded to 79
Japan "spe c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n China" based on propinquity*
Whatever the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s agreement by the U. S.
State Department might have been, there can be no doubt
that Japan considered i t as her Monroe Doctrine over Eastern
Asia. Baron I s h i i had already declared during the negotia
tions with the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, i n
November, 1917, that "as the reason of the Monroe Doctrine
exists so does the p o s i t i o n of Japan with respect to China 80
e x i s t . . . .",because Japan's in t e r e s t s " i n the whole of
China'' were greater than those of any other powers. Although
the p r i n c i p l e of the Open-Door and the i n t e g r i t y of China
were again expressly affirmed by Japan i n the agreement,
i t meant nothing but l i p - s e r v i c e after Japan had shown
what she understood by t h i s phrase when she presented the
Twenty-One Demands to China.
The conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was
indeed a matter of far-reaching importance. The Russian
Ambassador to Tokyo observed i n a despatch to St.Petersburg
that the powers were not to be allowed to undertake any
cf. U.S. For.Rel., 1917, pp.266-268
I s h i i , op.cit. p. 117 ,
- 40 -
p o l i t i c a l step i n China without previously exchanging p i
views with Japan. The Agreement was regarded by Japan
as an instrument to eliminate thoroughly the Western
influence from the whole of Asia. In 1916 i t had already
been suggested i n the Japanese press that Japan should
intervene i n India i n the case of a r e b e l l i o n against the
B r i t i s h r u l e . 8 2 The Japanese j o u r n a l i s t Kyosuki Schimatani
i n the newspaper, Hsin Nippon, advocated the creation of an
Indian-Chinese-Japanese league directed against the Anglo-
Saxons for the r e a l i z a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e •The Orient 83
to the Orientals' . The clearest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the agreement came from a top-ranking o f f i c i a l of the Japanese government who had been personally i n i t i a t i n g the Japanese
p o l i c y of expansion i n China, namely the Japanese Minister
to Peking, Hioki. In an a r t i c l e i n the Japanese paper,
Taiyo, he wrote i n August, 1917
To an ever-increasing extent the world concedes to us the role of a leader i n the Far East. . . . Japan must be ready for action i f circumstances demand so. 4
These examples t e s t i f y to the growth of a n a t i o n a l i s t ! c -
expansionist f e e l i n g i n Japan based on i d e e l o g i c a l
cf.Secret telegram of the Russian Ambassador i n Tokyo to St.Petersburg,Oct.22,1917,quoted from Millard,Th.F. C o n f l i c t of P o l i c i e s i n Asia. London, George A l l e n & Unwin Ltd.1924,p.l68 8 2 c f . Peking Daily News, Aug.14, 1916 8 3 J a p a n Advertiser, Aug.10, 1917.
^ Japan Advertiser, Aug. 17, 1917.
- 41 -
considerations. Here we see for the f i r s t time that
Japan looked upon India as a p o t e n t i a l f i e l d of her
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , a f t e r India had become already^ the
f i e l d of Japan's commercial a c t i v i t y .
The B r i t i s h reaction to the Lansing-Ishli Agreement
which had been reported to the B r i t i s h government before 85
being signed, was therefore a l l the more surprising.
Mr. Balfour declared i n the House of Commons that Great
B r i t a i n welcomed the agreement because i t u n i f i e d two
a l l i e s . That means the B r i t i s h government looked upon
the American-Japanese understanding very favourably as a
means safeguarding the s o l i d a r i t y of the a l l i e d war
c o a l i t i o n . Any di s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h i s c o a l i t i o n , no
matter whether caused by an American-Japanese embroilment
or by a serious rupture i n Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s ,
would have entailed a grave danger to the security of the
B r i t i s h Empire.
What, however, was i t that gave r i s e to B r i t i s h
anxiety l e s t Japan might break away from the A l l i e d cause?
I t was an open secret that since 1907 Japan had been
London Times, Nov.7, 1917 86
cf.Statement by Mr. Balfour i n House of Commons, Nov.12, 1917, Gr. B r i t . , P a r i . Deb.,1917,vol.99,pp 1160ff.
- 42 -
pursuing a double p o l i c y . The c o r n e r stone of her ex
ternal p o l i c y remained ( a f t e r h e r v i c t o r y over R u s s i a , the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . At the same time however, Japan
secured several understandings with Russia i n 1907, 1910 and
1912. These agreements on the one side f a c i l i t a t e d Japan's
expansionist p o l i c y i n China, insofar as they stipulated
f o r a d i v i s i o n of spheres of inter e s t between Russia and
Japan i n Manchuria and Mongolia; without these parlJy--
sepret agreements the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 which
guaranteed China's administrative r i g h t s i n those regions 87
would have remained e f f e c t i v e . Beyond that, however,
the Russo- Japanese'rapprochement' served the Japanese
diplomacy as a means of replacing the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e , i f required by circumstances, and of safeguard
ing Japan's i n t e r e s t s against the Anglo-Saxon bloc.
The increasing estrangement, between Great B r i t a i n
and Japan, because of Japan's p o l i c y i n China during 1915,
which devaluated the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e In the eyes of the Japanese government caused her to conclude the
88 Russo-Japanese treaty of July 3,-1916, the additional
8 7 Clyde, P.H. The Far East, New York 2 Prentice-Hall,Inc. 1952, p.334. 88
B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers,1916,vol, CX,London, H.M.St.O. , pp.yi&j —
- 43 -
secret convention of which was of paramount importance.
This secret convention contained the p r o v i s i o n that "China
should not f a l l under the p o l i t i c a l domination of any t h i r d "89
power h o s t i l e to Russia or Japan and provided for mutual
m i l i t a r y assistance for the defence of their- v i t a l i n t e r e s t s
i n the Far East. Although, according to a statement made
by Mr. Balfour i n the Commons i n January, 1918, the Russo-
Japanese treaty had been c o n f i d e n t i a l l y communicated to
the B r i t i s h government, S i r Edward Grey did not know
the treaty terms i n d e t a i l : and although the Japanese
Foreign Minister , Count Motono i n a statement to the press
gave the assurance that the new treaty was not directed
against any s p e c i f i c power but referred to other i n t e r
national agreements deemed as an instrument of securing
the e x i s t i n g 'status quo* i n the Far E a s t , 9 2 there can
be no doubt as to the true scope of the secret a l l i a n c e .
I t amounted to the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e which had become outlived according to the opinion
of larger sections i n the p o l i t i c a l and public l i f e i n
Japan. The t h i r d powers referred to i n the secret con
v e n t i o n which were to be excluded from China^could only 89
Clyde, op.cit. P.413: and Chang op cit.p.181 cf. Gr. B r i t . , Earl.Deb.,5th Sess., 1918,vq1.101,pp.641ff.
91 According to a statement by S i r Edward Grey at the Con
ference of Ministers at Boulogne ,0c1.19,1916, China Archiv, 1917, p.38. 9 2 C h i n a Archiv.1916, p.356
- 44 -
be Great B r i t a i n and the United States. Japan sought the
reassurance of a Russian guarantee for consolidating what
she had already gained and, i n the event of the abrogation
of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , to safeguard h e r s e l f
against a possible united AngIo- wAmerican front. This
i s the only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Count Motono's statement on
the treaty.
The B r i t i s h press reacted to the conclusion of the
Russo-Japanese Treaty i n d i f f e r e n t ways. Whilst newspapers
as the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle, the Dally Telegraph
and the London and China Telegraph eulogized the T r e a t y —
because they did not know of the secret convention— the
Weekly Nation harboured suspicions of a secret clause 9 3
and the London Justice wrote that " B r i t a i n and France are
simply compelled to save face". The paper warned that the
r e s u l t would tee Moscow's and Tokyo's expanding p o l i t i c a l 94
and commercial domination over China. The r e a l danger
threatening the B r i t i s h Empire by Japan's turning away
from the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e cam be measured i n i t s
f u l l extent only i f we s c r u t i n i z e the Japanese tendency
to turn to the h o s t i l e camp, that i s , to Germany. 9 3 G h i n a Archiv. 1916, pp 357' and 432.-433. 94
China Archiv, 1916, p.433.
- 45 -
The h e s i t a t i n g attitude of Tokyo at the outbreak
of the war was due, at least p a r t l y ( t o i n f l u e n t i a l c i r c l e s
amongst the General Staff who favoured a collaboration with
Germany. In the course of the war t h i s tendency increased
more and more. As early as 1915 the Japanese press,
b i t t e r l y resenting the B r i t i s h reluctance to give whole
hearted support to Japan's Twenty-One Demands, began to
agitate for a re-orientation of Japanese foreign p o l i c y
towards Germany. The newspapers (Sekai' and 'Yamato
Shimbun' i n p a r t i c u l a r pleaded for a German-Japanese •95
a l l i a n c e . The 'Sekai' i n c r i t i c i z i n g the B r i t i s h i n t e r
ference i n the Twenty-one Demands said that the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e had l o s t i t s anti-Russian character and
should be put aside unless B r i t a i n were w i l l i n g to acknow-96
ledge Japan's supremacy i n the East. The 'Yamato
Shimbun' served as the mouth-piece of several pro-German
orientated University professors who since 1915 had been
publishing a series of a r t i c l e s under the heading "Japan
to England". E s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t was an a r t i c l e of the
'Yamato Shimbun'of November 7, 1915 ;which said that Tsingtao
and the Sino-Japanese question showed how u n i l a t e r i a l the 95
China Archiv, 1917, p.464
9 6 0 s t a s i a t i s c h e r Lloyd, A p r i l 16, 1915, no.14, p.367.
- 46 -
obligations imposed on Japan by the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e were. I t was argued that i f Japan and Gemany
had combined for a j o i n t large-scale world p o l i c y "the 1
P a c i f i c Ocean, the South Sea, India, P e r s i a , Egypt and
South A f r i c a would have risen under the auspices of the 97
Japanese f l a g . " Not only In the press but also i n
o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s the idea of an a l l i a n c e with
Germany during the war found strong support. There was
a pro-German group i n the Genro 9 8 and, as mentioned,
amongst m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s , demanding i n 1915 that Japan \ ' • • ••
take the side of the" Central Powers. The former Chief of the P o l i t i c a l D i v i s i o n of the Japanese Foreign O f f i c e ,
Hayakawa^stated i n the beginning of 1915 with reference
to the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e : In order to reach her designs i n China Japan has to s t r i v e f o r a * rapprochement 1 towards Russia and Germany instead ofgrnaintaining the waste-paper agreement: . . . .
This was the Japanese conception of a Russo-German-
Japanese combination which would have rested upon the s o l i d
foundation of geographical conditions.
Although Russia was at war with the German Empire
and looked with suspicious eyes upon a possible German-
Japanese understanding a f t e r the European war - such a
fear was expressed by the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo i n
; 9 7 C h i n a Archiv, 1916, p.82 9 8 I s h i i op.olt. p. 112 9 9R. D. I I ; 8,1.no.57, f,59
4 7 -
19,15 - 1 0 0 t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s idea was not too remote
i n view of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r r i v i n g at a separate peace 101
between Germany, Russia and Japan i n March, 1916.
How great the p o s s i b i l i t y of a German-Japanese a l l i a n c e
was to become may be i l l u s t r a t e d by a memorandum from the
Chief of the German General Staff,, von Ludendorff, September
14, 1917, to the German Reichs-Chancellor, i n which von
Ludendorff expressed, h i s opinion on the peace termss, saying The association of Belgium' with Germany w i l l have as a res u l t that Holland, i f she pursues her obvious i n t e r ests willl be attracted to us, e s p e c i a l l y i f her coloni a l possessions" are guaranteed by a Japan which i s a l l i e d to us . . . . 0 2
In any case, the Japanese government must have counted
upon the future formation of such a strong c o a l i t i o n . Only
i n t h i s way i t i s possible to explain the statement of the
Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r , Viscount Motono when he, on
being asked by the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo i n November,
1917, whether the Lansing-Ishii Agreement may not cause misunderstandings between Japan"and the United States
because of an ambiguous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , answered:
i n such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal f o r carrying into e f f e c t her i n t e r p r e t a t i o n rather than that of the United States. . . . 1 0 3
loo ' " " •" <-, - • • ' ! : ~ ~~~ R.D. I I ; 7,2. no. 74.6, pp728
1 0 1Chang ,1.0^. c i t . 186 102 •• ~
Quoted from Lloyd George,D,War Memoirs,London.Nicholson and Watson 1923-36 Vol.IV P.2075 103 •• ' . •
Report of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo>of Nov.1,1917, on a conversation with the Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r Viscount Motono, quoted from M i l l a r d , op cit.p.169
- 48 -
After these considerations the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of
acquiescence towards Japan becomes explicable. The
creation of a p o t e n t i a l 'Eurasian Continental Bloc' which
consisted of two highly i n d u s t r i a l i z e d powers e x p l o i t i n g
the vast riches of raw materials i n the Russian Empire
must have been a nightmare to B r i t i s h diplomacy. The
B r i t i s h diplomatic documents reveal such concern up to ' . 104
and throughout the year 1919. The v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Empire demanded that good Anglo-Japanese
re l a t i o n s based on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , however
obsolete i t might have become with regard to China, be
maintained. InsJas&S of the a n t i - B r i t i s h a g i t a t i o n campaign
of the Japanese press, the B r i t i s h press, notably i n the
Far East, sought therefore to save face and to emphasize
the s o l i d a r i t y of c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s based upon the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e . The London and China Telegraph
referred e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y , I n June, 1916, to a speech
made by the Anglophil Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r , Baron
Kato, i n which ha denied that temporary differences of
opinion could lead to a di s s o l u t i o n of the A l l i a n c e , and
cf. for instance. Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign Policy,1919 -1959 ,ed. E.L..Woodward-R.Butler , F i r s t Senfes 1919 ..London, H.M.,St.O. 194^/Doc.Brit.For.Pol. ,1919).vol III,No.280, no.552, no. 615. ^p/Hereafter referred to as
- 49 -
spoke of a * f r i e n d l y competition" between B r i t a i n and 105
Japan i n China. The Japan Weekly Chronicle complaining
i n October, 1917, of the a g i t a t i o n launched by the Japanese
newspapers, and endeavouring to remove any suspioion of
f r i c t i o n between the two countries, made a sharp difference
between the a n t i - B r i t i s h f e e l i n g of "irresponsible journal-1 n fi
i s t s " and the o f f i c i a l attitude o f : t h e government.
Meanwhile Japan was also enjoying a period of economic
expansion.
The preoccupation of the European powers, primarily
Great B r i t a i n , i n the European war, provided Japan with a
unique chance to replace these powers on the Far Eastern
market, and to increase to a considerable degree her indust
r i a l capacity. According to American consular reports
the number of new f a c t o r i e s established during the war-years
i n Japan amounted to about fourteen thousand with a c a p i t a l
of four hundred-forty m i l l i o n y e n . 1 0 7 The Japanese cotton
industry systematically penetrated the Chinese market
where B r i t i s h trade, as a. consequence of the war, was de
c l i n i n g . Japanese cotton manufacture companies l i k e the Mitsui-Mitsubichi-an& Kfaigi.-Gompand.es established themselves
108 i n Shaaghai and Tsingtao, so that the Japanese s i l k -
and cotton-exp.ort-trade increased from two hundred and The London and China Telegraph, June 12, 1916
1 0 6 J a p a n Weekly Chronicle, Oct. 11,1917. 107
Handelsberichten, Amsterdam, July 3, 1919. 1 0 8Indiaman, London, Feb. 11, 1916.
- 50 -
twenty m i l l i o n yen i n 1916 to three hundred eighty-four 109
m i l l i o n i n 1917.
The second great market conquered by the Japanese
export industry was India. As early as 1912, there was a
s i g n i f i c a n t competition i n the India^coasting trade between
the B r i t i s h - I n d i a Steamship Company and the 'Nippon Yusen Kaishsf
the B r i t i s h and Japanese governmental au t h o r i t i e s expressed
the fear that the competition might prove detrimental to
Anglo-Japanese f r i e n d s h i p . 1 1 0 There were questions i n the
House of Commons i n 1914, which complained about the ex
clusion of B r i t i s h ships from the coasting trade between
Indian ports by Japanese shipping companies which had over^
come a shipping monopoly between Calcutta and Rangoon. 1 1 1
According to o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , the loadings carried by
Japanese shippihg companies between India and other countries
increased between 1912 and 1918 from an annual rate of t h i r t y 132
thousand tons to f i v e hundred twenty-nine thousand tons. The war brought a complete change In the import-trade of
India i n favour of Japan. Whilst the Japanese t o t a l import _
Per Neue Orient, 1919, v o l . I , p.113. 110
Japan Times, Nov.30, 1912. l i : L G r . B r i t . ,Parl.Deb. ,5th Ser. ,1914,vol.63,p.904; 112
Per Neue Orient, 1919, v o l . I I , p. 191.
- 51 -
to'India i n 1913-1914 amounted roughly to only $3,000,000,
the t o t a l amount i n 1918 was ^22,404,000, that i s an increase 113
400 per-cent, or one f i f t h of the whole import of India,
or, expressed i n terms of percentage, the Japanese import
to India rose from 2.5 percent to 19.8 percent, whilst the B r i t i s h import decreased from 62.8 percent to 45.5
114 percent. I t was mainly the Lancashire cotton industry
that suffered from the Japanese competition i n India. Similar increases of Japan's exports took place
on the Australian i*wrket, where the Japanese exports i n 115
1917 amounted to about $11,000,000 more than i n 1912,
and i n Siam and B r a z i l ^ P a r a l l e l 5? the expansion of
Japanese exports overseas there took place a considerable
enlargement of Japan's shipbuilding industry wb. i c h was
subsidized during the war. The t o t a l tonnage of Japan's merchant navy rose from 1,152,575 tons i n 1908 to 2,310,959
116 tons i n 1918. Japan's great shipping l i n e s , such as
the 'Nippon Yusen Kaisha' , the "Tojicyo Kisen Kaisha' and
the 'Osaka Shosan Kaisha' dominated the P a c i f i c Ocean
i n mercantile passenger shipping whilst the B r i t i s h merchant 1 1 SManehester Guardian, July 29, 1919. 114
Per Neue Orient. 1919, v o l . I I , p.231 1 1 5 D e r Neue Orient, 1919, v o l I, p.129 116
Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,New York,Macmillan, 1921/22, p.280.
- 52 -
f l e e t had. been suffering heavy losses from the war.
This s W t summary of Japan's economic expansion,
p a r t i c u l a r l y the growth of her export trade, s u f f i c e s to
i l l u s t r a t e that here a power had grown up during the war
which, because of her expanding i n d u s t r i a l capacity^had
entered into vigorous commercial competition with Great
B r i t a i n , and which had undermined the so f a r undisputed
trade supremacy of Great B r i t a i n ' i n Eastern Asia and i n
the P a c i f i c . In A u s t r a l i a which f e l t the Japanese com
mercial r i v a l r y to i t s f u l l extent, Senator Long warned
the Senate i n 1918 of the r a p i d i t y with which Japan's
mercantile shipping had grown and that i t now occupied a 117
most prominent p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c . Senator what.
MacDougall asked the government ^&fee*f measures i h e j ^
intended to take i n order to compete with the further-
increasing Japanese merchant navy. ^ ®
Thusjit can be seen that whilst the Western Powers
were almost completely absorbed i n the war i n Europe,
Japan u t i l i z e d t h i s opportunity f o r launching a large-
scale p o l i t i c a l , t e r r i t o r i a l and economic expansion i n
the Far East. This expansion together with the tremendous
increase of her i n d u s t r i a l capacity and of her diplomatic
prestige resulted i n the fact that,whilst Japan had entered
117 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb. ,1917-1918,
v o l . LXXXIV, pp3410; 1 1 8 i b i d . , v o l . LXXXV, p.6177
- 53 -
the war as a leading power i n Eastern Asia, she came
out of the war-period as a world power. As such, she
appeared i n 1919 at the Peace Conference i n Pa r i s . The
r i s e of Japan's power was accompanied by the decline of
Great B r i t a i n ' s influence i n the Far East. Although
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had become more and more
obsolete as the common bond of British-Japanese f r i e n d
ship , and a cert a i n antagonism had ar i s e n between Japan
and Great B r i t a i n , Japan was an indispensable a l l y during
the war upon whom Great B r i t a i n was dependent. The B r i t
i s h Government was therefore determined to cooperate
further with the Japanese a l l y and! to maintain the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e . The Japanese statesman Baron I s h i i
commented upon the value of the t h i r d a l l i a n c e f o r
B r i t a i n :
With so many B r i t i s h possessions i n the Orieht--A u s t r a l i a , India, Singapore, Hong Kong— Japan's friendship was absolutely e s s e n t i a l to B r i t a i n .
The B r i t i s h motive which was to determine from
now on Great B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y towards Japan was to use
119 I s h i i , o p c i t . p. 6G
- 5 4 -
the A l l i a n c e as a means for preventing a Japanese
expansion southward to the B r i t i s h Dominions and f o r
exerting a c e r t a i n c o n t r o l l i n g and r e s t r a i n i n g i n
fluence on Japan's expansionist policy. For t h i s pur
pose Great B r i t a i n had to be prepared to make concess
ions to Japan i n China, Manchuria and Mongolia, where
the Japanese expansion could possibly be diverted i n
order to protect the Dominions i n the south and to
preserve the i n t e g r i t y of the B r i t i s h Empire.
Thus^the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e underwent a
remarkable change. Whereas the A l l i a n c e of 1902 had
been directed against Russia, i n 1905 against Russia and
Germany, and a f t e r 1911 pr i m a r i l y against Germany, para
do x i c a l l y , i t served the B r i t i s h government from 1914
u n t i l i t s expiration i n 1922 as a precautionary measure
against Japan herself.
- 55 -
CHAPTER II
BRITISH AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY AT THE PEACE
CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1919
Owing to her considerably enlarged power, influence
and diplomatic prestige, Japan was admitted to the Conference
a^js a P r i n c i p a l Power, ranking equally with Great B r i t a i n ,
France, I t a l y and the United States; she could thus exert
her influence i n the major councils, executives and com
mittees l i k e the Supreme Council of the Big Four and the
Council of Ten. The Japanese delegation, headed by the
former Prime Minister and member of the Genro, Prince
S a i o n j i , was faced with the task of securing j u r i d i c a l l y
by means of diplomacy what had been gained during the war
by means of force. The Japanese government might have re
c a l l e d the demarche of Shimonoseki i n 1895, when, being
i s o l a t e d , 'Japan was deprived of the f r u i t s of her v i c t o r y
over China by the j o i n t intervention of three European
Great Powers. To prevent a r e p e t i t i o n of such events was
the f i r s t aim of Japan's diplomacy i n 1919. Japan had
under a l l circumstances to avoid being placed i n a p o s i t i o n
of diplomatic i s o l a t i o n , and being opposed by a united
anti-Japanese front at the peace negotiations. A r e v i v a l
of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e provided the means of
preventing such i s o l a t i o n . The Japanese government had,
as has been seen, been playing with the idea of replacing
- 56 -
the A l l i a n c e ft^wq#&# with the B r i t i s h Empire by a
formal m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e with Russia ever since the
Russo-Japanese ^rapprochement" had taken place through
a series of public and secret treaties? but the collapse
of the T s a r i s t Empire i n 1918. put an end to these plans
and induced the Japanese government as well as Japanese
Peace Conference-delegation i n 1919, the Tokyo newspaper,
"Nitschi N i t s c h i Shimbun" wrote:
Japan's diplomacy, a f t e r having defended the claims on Shantung, the German P a c i f i c Islands and the supremacy i n Eastern Asia, w i l l be based on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Under these aspects Japan's peace terms w i l l be formulated.^
Furthermore, by the conclusion of the secret agreements of
February, 1917 with Great B r i t a i n , France, Russia and
I t a l y , ( t h e d e t a i l s of which w i l l be mentioned l a t e r i n
t h i s Chapter)Japan had secured an e f f e c t i v e instrument
which provided the l e g a l basis for Japan's demands at
the Peace Conference. Both the a l l i a n c e with Great
B r i t a i n and the secret agreements enabled Viscount Motono,
the Japanese Foreign Minister,to state i n the Japanese
public opinion to think
with Great B r i t a i n .
On the occasion of the departure of the Japanese
Der Neue Orient, 1919, I. p.28
- 57 -
Diet i n June, 1917 that h i s Government had no anxieties
regarding the support of the A l l i e d Powers at the Peace
Conference and had taken adequate measures to secure 2
Japanese rights and in t e r e s t s . Although Viscount Motono
i n h i s statement did not take into account the probable
attitude of the United States, he was p e r f e c t l y r i g h t i n
h i s pre d i c t i o n .
In the session of the Council of Ten on January 27,
1919, the chief Japanese delegate, Baron Makino, presented
h i s demand for the unconditional cession of the former
German r i g h t s i n Shantung and of a l l former German islands 3
i n the P a c i f i c north of the equator. In making the f i r s t
claim Japan was seeking to r e a l i z e the ambition to which
she had aspired i n the Twenty-one Demands i n 1915, and
i n the supplementary agreement i n 1918. I t was designed
to give Japan a dominating p o s i t i o n i n Niprthem China and
to strengthen her economy. The second demand originated
from str a t e g i c considerations. In a memorandum published
i n the London and China Telegraph he emphasized:
2 Takeuchi, T. War and Diplomacy i n the Japanese Empire.New
York,Doubleday Doran & Comp.inc. 1935., p.219 3 Secret protocol of the Council of Ten,January 27,1919 Baker,
R.St. Woodrow Wilson (Memoirs and DocumentsjLelpzig,1925, Vol. II p.174 '
- 58 -
We claim the right to occupy these islands . . . A national sense of dignity i n s p i r e s the -whole people of Japan to the conviction that any other disposal of them would he a r e f l e c t i o n upon us, and the handing over of the supervision of these islands would be a just recognition of the services we rendered In maintaining the commerce of the P a c i f i c a s s i s t i n g our A l l i e s i n the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. We contend, and s h a l l continue to contend that Japan should control the islands north of the equator.. . . 4
The Japanese demand concerning Shantung necess
a r i l y aroused the strongest opposition from the Chinese
delegation at the Conference, who sought to vindicate
by a l l means China's right to have Chinese sovereignty
over Shantung restored d i r e c t l y without negotiation with
Japan. The Chinese opposed Japan because the l a t t e r
i n s i s t e d on carrying out the provisions of the Sino-5
Japanese Treaty of 1915 with regard to Shantung - ac
cording to which China had agreed to assent to any subse
quent settlement disposing of the German righ t s i n
Shantung. This created the f i r s t complication i n the
Eastern A s i a t i c question at P a r i s . The United States, a l -
though she was vff>tkifrly concerned i n t h i s matter, found
her i n t e r e s t ignored; her i r r i t a t i o n over the Shantung
The London and China Telegraph, February 10, 1919 5 cf. Report of the testimony of Professor E.T.Williams,chief
adviser on Far Eastern A f f a i r s to the United States Commission at Paris,before the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations Aug. 22, 1919, i n M i l l a r d , Th.F., C o n f l i c t of P o l i c i e s i n Asia. London,George A l l e n & Unwin,Ltd. 1924.
- 59 -
question had important world repercussions and may ex
p l a i n much of her future foreign p o l i c y . The key,
however, for an understanding of the importance of t h i s
problem l i e s i n the p o l i c y of B r i t a i n at Pa r i s .
B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y toward Japan during the;
World War had been a p o l i c y of acquiescence, the conse
quences of which became evident at P a r i s . B r i t i s h diplomacy
at the Conference was not free i n the choice of the course
to be taken but was bound to a very considerable degree
by the obligations goemLt-yagxl^BB^^ which the
B r i t i s h Government had incurred towards Japan during the
War.
In addition, the B r i t i s h Government i n taking t h e i r
decisions had to take into due consideration the s p e c i f i c
i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Dominions, which were going to
play more and more an independent role i n in t e r n a t i o n a l
p o l i t i c s ^ a n d the attitude of the United States.
The obligations towards her Japanese a l l y imposed
upon Great B r i t a i n were the provisions of the secret agree
ment concluded by exchange of notes between the B r i t i s h
Ambassador to Tokyo, S i r C. Green, and the Japanese Foreign
Mi n i s t e r , Yiscount Motono, on February 16, 1917, which
stipulated that
- 60 -
His Britannic Majesty's Government accede . . . to request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they w i l l support Japan's claims i n regard to the disposal of Germany's ri g h t s i n Shantung and possessions i n the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference . . . .
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out why the B r i t i s h govern
ment had incurred t h i s obligation of far-reaching consequences
i n the Council of the Big Three on A p r i l 22, 1919. According
to the B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , i t was the r e s u l t of the
emergeney-situation i n which Great B r i t a i n found h e r s e l f
i n 1917, when naval units for the anti-submarine warfare
were urgently needed i n the Mediterranean. Therefore,
he stated, Japanese naval aid was indispensable. I t was "7
granted by Japan i n return f o r the agreement. This
argument, however, although i t shows the temporary m i l i t a r y
dependence of Great B r i t a i n i n the Far East on the co-opera
t i o n of Japanese naval power, does not reveal the deeper
reasons for the B r i t i s h concession to Japan. As the United
States Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, staified i n the
hearing before the United States Senate Commission on Foreign
Relations, an understanding, at l e a s t regarding the disposal
^MacMurray,J.V.A.,Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894 - 1919.Washington,1925, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Vol I I , p.1168.
Secret Report of the Council of Four, May 11, 1919, Baker Q.PPcit.Vol.1. p.58.
- 61 -
of the Islands i n the P a c i f i c , was reached between S i r
Edward Grey ahd Baron I s h i i , then Japanese Ambassador to
P a r i s , as early as 1915. I t was1 then arranged that the
equator was to be the demarcation^line between the B r i t i s h 8
and Japanese conquered islands i n the P a c i f i c . On the
Shantung question, there was no formal agreement except
the promise oh the part of Japan to return Kiaotchou to
China a f t e r the war. This revelation made by Mr. Lansing
shows that the B r i t i s h concession i n regard to the P a c i f i c
islands was made at a time when, on the one hand; the Anglo-
Japanese relations had become strained because of the twenty-
one demands of Japan to China, and, on the other hand, the
B r i t i s h Cabinet was negotiating with Tokyo f o r the accession
of Japan to the famous London Declaration of September 4,
1914)under the terms of which the signatory powers pledged
themselves not to conclude a separate peace during the h o s t i l
i t i e s . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that i n 1915 there was a violent
a n t i - B r i t i s h press campaign i n Japan with several suggestions
f o r a re-orientatlon of Japanese foreign p o l i c y towards
a German-Japanese "rapprochement"^ and that, indeed, t h i s
p o s s i b i l i t y was not too remote i n 1914 a f t e r secret and
informal contacts had taken place between German and Jap
anese diplomatic representatives i n Stockholm, which aimed
8 Mr. Lansing referred to an interview with Baron I s h i i
during the American-Japanese negotiations on September 6, 1917. cf,Report of the Hearing on the Treaty of Peace before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 8, 1919,quoted i n M i l l a r d , op.cit. , p.66 f f .
- 62 -
at reaching a separate peace between Germany and the Eastern
Powers, Japan and Russia. The B r i t i s h government had there
fore been extremely anxious to secure Japan's adherence'
to the London Declaration to prevent Japan's breaking away
from the A l l i e d Powers i n general, and from Great B r i t a i n
i n p a r t i c u l a r . That a defection and even a possible a l
lia n c e of Japan with Germany against the A l l i e s was feared
i n Great B r i t a i n was openly expressed by the Tokyo corres
pondent of the "London Times1" to Baron I s h i i . 9 The reluctance
towards Japanese accession to the London Declaration i n
Genro c i r c l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the part of Prince Yamagata 10
and Prince Inouye and the c r i t i c i s m launched In the Japanese
Diet on the accomplished accession of Japan^demonstrated
that the anxieties on the part of the B r i t i s h were not un
j u s t i f i e d . Thus the B r i t i s h concession had to be made at
that time as a price to assure Japan's adherence to the
binding London Declaration.
S i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t was shed on the British-Japanese
secret agreements of February, 1917 by a secret telegram
of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo of February 8, 1917 -
that i s , six days a f t e r the conclusion of the secret agree
ment. This telegram was published i n the leading Moscow
newspaper,I§vestia, on December 14, 1917. Referring to the 9 I s h i i , Viscount K., Diplomatic Commentaries,Baltimore, the John Hopkins Press, 1936. p.103. 1 0Takeuohi, T. Op.cit. , p.196 i ; L I s h i i , op. c i t . , p. 101
- 63 -
expediency of granting Japan the promises requested, the
Russian diplomat expressed the opinion that "the t o t a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p between England and Japan during recent months
e n t i t l e s one to the conclusion that Japanese ambitions w i l l
meet with no objections on the part of the London Cabinet.
The truth of t h i s statement becomes evident i n the l i g h t
of the Japanese answer to the B r i t i s h note of February 6th.
The Japanese reply of February 21, 1917 termed the secret
agreement a "fresh proof of the close t i e s that unite the 13
two A l l i e d powers." That means, the B r i t i s h Government
had concluded the secret agreement of 1917 with Japan
because she was anxious to induce the Japanese Government
to remain i n the war on the side of the A l l i e s .
A further motive was to revive the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e as a possibly e f f e c t i v e instrument f o r B r i t i s h
post-war diplomacy. The secret diplomacy which the B r i t i s h
Government had pursued during the war through a seriea
of agreements necessarily clashed with President Wilson's
ideas of replacing the balance of power-system by a uni
versal system of international co-operation i n which the
old-fashioned secret diplomacy would be replaced by an "open
diplomacy", i . e . , by open discussion i n the League of Nations.
12 Secret.telegram of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo,
Krupensky, No.40, February 8, 1917, pub.by Isvestia,December 14, 1917, quoted from China Archiv.1918, pp.59-60. 13 MacMurray, op c i t . , Vol I I , p. 1167 f f .
- 64 -
Questions i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons i n
March, 1918 r e f l e c t e d some uneasiness about the secret
t r e a t i e s concluded by Great B r i t a i n since the outbreak of
the war, 1 4 and Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd George may have
had si m i l a r feelings? f o r , i n a speech at the London Trade
Union Congress, January 5, 1918,accepting Wilson's p r i n c i p l e s ,
he denied a l l i m p e r i a l i s t i c war aims of the A l l i e s as em
bodied i n the secret agreements. Mr. Lloyd George c a r e f u l l y 15
omitted to mention the secret treaty with Japan.
The U. S. Government did not have f u l l and detailed
information about th i s treaty p r i o r to President Wilson's 16
a r r i v a l at the P a r i s Peace Conference early i n 1919.
President Wilson was, therefore, a l l the more $£jp#^3ce&'when
he learned of the existence of such a treaty i n the Supreme
A l l i e d Council. How b i t t e r the f e e l i n g of President Wilson
was i s revealed by h i s sarcastic remark that he was e n t i t l e d
to ask whether Great B r i t a i n and Japan had any r i g h t to
dispose of the islands i n the P a c i f i c . 1 7 The B r i t i s h Prime
M i n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George, however, took a firm stand with
1 4G*. B r i t . , Pari.Debates, 5th Series, 1918, Yol.103,p.1690 1 5Baker. 0p^ C i t . Vol. I, pp.43-44
Cf.President Wilson's answer to Senator Borah's question, O f f i c i a l Report of the Conference between Pres.Wilson and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the White House, August 19,1919, cited i n M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. , P.65 17
Secret Protocol of the Council of Four,April 22,1919, Baker Op.Cit.Yol I I , p.189.
- 65 -
President Wilson-^saying that the attitude of the B r i t i s h
Government was based on an irrevocable o b l i g a t i o n as contain-18
ed In the Treaty of 1917. He took the same attitude
towards the Chinese demand presented by the Chinese chief
delegate, Dr. Willington Koo, who wanted the German righ t s
i n Shantung d i r e c t l y restored to China. Mr. Lloyd George
argued that the Japanese actions i n the Far East during the
war had also protected China, and that Great B r i t a i n was
morally obliged to Japan^without whose help the German 19
threat i n Eastern Asia could not have been eliminated. The
same view was shared by ^ i i - Arthur Balfour as he pointed out i n a despatch to the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord
20 Curzon. I t was remarkable that the B r i t i s h Prime Minister
never questioned the l e g a l v a l i d i t y of the Sino-Japanese
Treaties of 1915 and 1918, which ,as the Twenty-one Demand s,
were imposed upon China under Japanese diplomatic pressure.
On the. contrary, Mr. Lloyd George doubted whether these
t r e a t i e s constituted a suppression of China, and recommended
to the Chinese delegate not to consider the agreements as a
"scrap of paper". 2 1 Speaking i n terms of Interna 1£ onal Law, l 8 S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Four, A p r i l 22,1919, Baker Op.City Vol IT, p.188 l 9 S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Four,April 22,1919, Baker, Op.Cit.Vol. I I , p. 194.
2 0 D i s p a t e h from S i r Arthur Balfour to Lord Curzon,May 8, 1919, quo ted i n Dugdale, B.E.C. Arthur James Balfour (1906-1930). London,Hut'chtns6h.& Co.Ltd. , 1936, p.332.
Secret Protocol of the Council of Four,Apr.22,1919,Baker Op.Cit.Vol.II, p.193.
- 6 6 -
t h i s meant that the B r i t i s h Government f u l l y recognized, if
not sanctioned, the measures taken by the Japanese Government
during the war i n China. I t was the formal recognition of
the newly created 'status quo' i n the Far East on the part
of the B r i t i s h Government, that i s to say, of Japan's dom
inati n g p o s i t i o n i n Eastern Assia.
When compared with the attitude of the U. S. Govern
ment at that time, which had expressly announced the p o l i c y
of "non-recognition'' i n the case of the ' f a i t accompli'
created by Hiapah, the fundamental difference between B r i t i s h
and U. S. Far Eastern p o l i c y becomes evident. Great B r i t a i n
with her v i t a l commercial i n t e r e s t s i n China, r e a l i s t i c a l l y
adjusted her p o l i c y there to the altered p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n
whenever i t was necessitated by circumstances. This t r a d i t i o n
a l a d a p t i b i l i t y remained a constant feature of B r i t i s h
diplomacy from 1915, through the 1920's, when i t was i l l u s
trated by B r i t i s h willingness to surrender e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l
r i g h t s i n 1926, and by the "recognition of the Nanking Govern
ment i n 1928 down to 1949 when the B r i t i s h Government an
nounced the 'de jure'-recognition of Red China. In contrast,
the U. S. p o l i c y i n the Far East remained p e r s i s t e n t l y
i n f l e x i b l e i n the r e s t r i c t i v e i nterpretation of the open-
door from the time of i t s enunciation i n 1899 , and t r i e d
- 67 -
to meet any serious infringement upon t h i s p r i n c i p l e by
continuously p r a c t i s i n g a p o l i c y of "non-recognition",
as i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the U. S. attitude towards the Twenty-
one Demands i n 1915,towards the Shantung question i n 1919,
and during the Manchurian C o n f l i c t i n 1932.
The basic attitudes of Great B r i t a i n and the United
States thus c o l l i d e d at the P a r i s Peace Conference on the
Shantung question. The B r i t i s h Government was determined to
accept the Japanese dominating influence over cer t a i n
regions i n China as a ' f a i t accompli' and, by doing t h i s ,
to secure Japan's co-operation f o r a p o l i c y based upon the
thesis of "spheres of influence". Accordingly, the U. S.
President faced a j o i n t diplomatic front of Great B r i t a i n
and Japan, when he proposed at the Conference the a b o l i t i o n 22
of a l l spheres of influence i n China. Mr. Lloyd George
impetuously rejected the American proposal, since he was unwilling to allow other nations to share i n the f i n a n c i a l
23 and economic development of the Yangtse Valley.
The B r i t i s h Government, however, took a resolute
and dissenting standpoint when the Japanese delegation put
forward t h e i r demands f o r r a c i a l equality, p a r t i c u l a r l y
when they urged the i n s e r t i o n of a clause i n the Covenant
22 Secret Protocol of the Council of Four,April 21,1919
Baker, Op.Cit. Vol I I . p.186-7.
Baker, QpyCit.Vol.11, ppl97
- 68 -
of the League, which was to guarantee equal and just 24
treatment to a l l members of the League. The B r i t i s h
delegate, Lord C e c i l , declared i n February 1919 that t h i s
question would imply "e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y serious problems
f o r the B r i t i s h Empire" and advocated a postponement of 25
the discussion of t h i s matter. When the Japanese
delegate, Baron Maj0.no, i n A p r i l , 1919 tabled a second
proposal at the Conference, which was an amendment to
the Preamble of the Covenant, Lord C e c i l again expressed
h i s regret not to be i n the p o s i t i o n to vote for the Japanese
amendment, because, as he said, he feared "interference 26
i n the domestic a f f a i r s of states members of the League".
The j^L&^f^aelegate, Mr. M i l l e r , i n commenting on the
Japanese amendment, explained why the B r i t i s h delegation
objected to the proposal of their Japanese A l l y . "The words ..
could only mean that they were a sort of curtain behind which was the question of White A u s t r a l i a and of immigratioh of Eastern Peoples into countries which regarded the poss-
27 i b i l i t y of such immigration as impossible to discuss."
These countries referred to were unquestionably the B r i t i s h
Dominions, whose views i n questions of int e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s
had to be c a r e f u l l y observed by the Imperial Government. 24lbid. Vol.1, p.177-8. 2 5 I b i d . p.178. 26
M i l l e r , D.H. Drafting the Covenant. Vol.11, p.389,quoted by LaFargue, OpoCit. p.209. 27
M i l l e r , Ibid, p.461, quoted by LaFargue, op.cit.p.209.
- 69 -
The standpoint of the B r i t i s h Dominions at the Conference
considerably influenced the decisions of the B r i t i s h Govern
ment, e s p e c i a l l y the Prime Mi n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George,
i n t h e i r p o l i c y toward Japan.
P a r i s , and what i s of f a r more importance, on the further
course of British-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , i t appears necessary
to review s u c c i n c t l y the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the
Dominions up to that time, and the implications thereof
germane to Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . As w i l l be r e c a l l e d ,
the B r i t i s h Dominions acquired i n 1911 the "right" of con
s u l t a t i o n on matters of foreign p o l i c y i n the Imperial
Defence Committee. The Dominion Governments u t i l i z e d t h i s
" r i g h t " f o r the f i r s t time when the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e was at stake i n 1911. The Dominions,
however, were only given a consultative voice. The conduct
of foreign a f f a i r s s t i l l remained the exclusive preserve of
the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e i n London; and although at the
outbreak of the war S i r Edward Grey's attitude towards
Japan's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war was influenced by h i s
fear of repercussion on the Dominions, the l a t t e r played
no major part i n the considerations of the B r i t i s h Cabinet
so f a r as Anglo-Japanese relations during the war period
were concerned. A u s t r a l i a was not even informed by the
B r i t i s h Government about the Japanese actions against China
To understand f u l l y the Dominions' influence at
- 70 -28b
i n 1915. Nor was the Australian Government consulted
p r i o r to the conclusion of the secret British-Japanese
agreement of 1917, although the a l l o c a t i o n of the P a c i f i c
islands ;which was stipulated, was a matter of primary 29
concern to A u s t r a l i a . The Australian Prime Mi n i s t e r ,
Mr. Hughes, was confronted with a ' f a i t accompli' so that
he-according to the B r i t i s h Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Bonar Law - "acquiesced i n that which was
30 already done." This aroused severe c r i t i c i s m i n the Australian Senate and i n the House of Representatives l a t e r
31 i n 1919 when the Peace Treaty was under discussion.
A closer co-operation between the governments of
the United Kingdom and the Dominions began when the Prime
Mini s t e r s of the Dominions had a d i r e c t influence on B r i t i s h
foreign p o l i c y through t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Imperial
War Cabinet i n early 1917; and although t h i s body was
mainly concerned with the conduct of a f f a i r s immediately
connected with the war, the Canadian Prime Minister, S i r
Robert Borden, commented: "With the constitution of that
Cabinet a new era has dawned and a new page of his t o r y has 32
been, written."
Commonwealth of Australia,Parliamentary Debates,Ses.1914-17, Vol.LXXVIII, p.5564. 2 9Ibid.Ses.l919, Vol.LXXXIX, p.12611. 3 0 c f . Statement by Mr. Hughes, Sept.19,1919,Ibid.p.12608. 3 1 I b i d . VolLKXXvTII, p.10203-4. 32
Borden, S i r Robert The War and the Future.London.Hbddqr-.an-g. Stoughton, 1917, p.145.
- 71 -
The decisive change i n the j u r i d i c a l p o s i t i o n of the B r i t i s h
Dominions occurred i n 1917, when by Resolution IJf of the
Imperial War Conference the Dominions were granted an "adequate
voice i n foreign p o l i c y " . However ambiguous t h i s formulation
was from the j u r i d i c a l point of view, i t constituted the
legitimate basis for the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Dominions i n
the P a r i s Peace Conference. I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y due to the
influence of S i r Robert Borden and of General Smuts that the
Dominions obtained the right of separate representation and
separate signature at this conference, thus for the f i r s t time
taking part i n determining post-war p o l i t i c s of the B r i t i s h
Empire. Besides the separate representation, the Dominion
representatives formed part of the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation
which placed them i n a "peculiarly e f f e c t i v e p o s i t i o n " , to
use S i r Robert Borden's phraseology. No action was taken
by the prominent heads of the B r i t i s h Delegation, Mr. Lloyd
George and Mr. Balfour, that had not been submitted to the
Dominion representatives who had "exactly the same voice
i n determining B r i t i s h p o l i c y as any member of the B r i t i s h 33
Cabinet". The concession made by the Imperial Cabinet was due to the fact that the Dominions had rendered valuable
Statement by Mr. Lloyd George i n the B r i t i s h Hous e of Commons, August 18, 1921, Great Brit.Pari.Debates, 5th Series, 1921, Vol. 136, p.1699.
- 72 -
contributions to tbe f i n a l v i c t o r y of the A l l i e s and,
a f t e r having suffered comparatively heavy casualties during 34
the war, had a moral right not only to be consulted but also
to exercise a c e r t a i n active influence on B r i t i s h foreign
p o l i c y . This was a l l the more the case as there were items
on the agenda of the Conference which were of v i t a l import
ance to the Dominions, such as, for instance, the question
of Japanese r a c i a l equality with i t s grave eventual con
sequences on the immigration p o l i c i e s of the Dominions,
and the t e r r i t o r i a l settlement of the question of the former
German P a c i f i c islands which concerned the Governments of
A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand from the st r a t e g i c point of view.
The Australian Prime Minister appeared to be the
dominant figure at P a r i s i n dealing with these questions.
On a l l important problems a f f e c t i n g A u s t r a l i a he was i n
close contact with the Japanese delegates, Baron Makino 35
and Viscount Chinda. The question of o r i e n t a l immigration,
c h i e f l y from Japan and China, had long been a matter of
primary concern for the Australian as well as the New
Zealand Governments. In 1901 the Australian Government
had enacted the "Immigration R e s t r i c t i o n Act" under ythiek
a l l immigrants who were unable to meet the requirements 36
of a language test were refused entry into A u s t r a l i a . 34.
C f . B r i t i s h Empire Army Casualties,1914-19,"Diary and Index of the War" (Times),in King-Hall,S/. ,0ur Own Times, 1913-1938 London,NJefQlson'lind Watson Ltd. ,1938, p.245. 35Cf.Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Debates,Ses.1919,Vol. LXXXIX, p.12609. 3 6Clyde,P.H. Op.Cit.p.474
- 73 -
The same kind of immigration law was introduced i n New
Zealand i n 1908. The purpose of t h i s law was to safeguard
what had already become well-known as the "White fttea l c
P o l i c y " upon which Aust r a l i a ' s foreign p o l i c y was b a s i c a l l y
founded. Any impairment of the sovereign rights of the
Dominions to control the o r i e n t a l immigration was looked
upon by A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand with c r i t i c a l eyes.
Their anxiety i n t h i s respect, l i k e that of Canada, o r i g i n
ated not so much from a f e e l i n g of r a c i a l discrimination
but rather from the governments' e f f o r t s to prevent serious
economic disturbances might have resulted i n lowering the
white men's standard of l i v i n g . 3 7 However, because of the
exis t i n g intimate r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and Japan
as a res u l t of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , the Imperial
Government i n London had the greatest i n t e r e s t i n avoiding
any possible f r i c t i o n with her Japanese a l l y which might
possibly r e s u l t from the anti-Japanese immigration laws of
the Dominions. The London Government assiduously urged the
Dominions to postpone any discriminatory l e g i s l a t i o n against
Japanese immigration on behalf of the greater imperial
i n t e r e s t s .
With the increase of Dominion autonomy expressed i n
Resolution IX, the Australian Government was i n a p o s i t i o n
to take a firmer stand i n securing her int e r e s t s . Prime
'-''Cf.Impsrial Conference 1923, Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings,presented to parliament by Command of His Majesty 1923.Cmd 1988, London H.M.St.0.1923, p.68
- 74 -
Mi n i s t e r Hughes vigorously opposed the Japanese proposals
f o r r a c i a l equality. In a press statement of March 27,
1919 he emphasized:
we cannot agree to the i n s e r t i o n of any words i n the Covenant or i n the Treaty of Peace that would, impair or' even question our sovereign rig h t s In regard to any and every aspect of th i s question. I cannot bytregard ttoe proposed amendment as an e f f o r t to • es t a b l i s h a p r i n c i p l e under which ultimately some nations would f i n d t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y as to immigration and Ra t i o n a l i z a t i o n challenged by the League at the i n s t i g a t i o n of one of i t s members.?8.
Mr. Hughes threatened that A u s t r a l i a "would not sign the 39
Covenant i f i t contained any such amendment." He even
went so f a r as to announce that he would sta r t an a n t i -
Japanese a g i t a t i o n i n A u s t r a l i a i f the Japanese demands
were conceded. This resolute stand on the part of the
Australian Prime Minister caused the B r i t i s h Delegation to
take the same l i n e of opposition against the Japanese, 40
although they did so r e l u c t a n t l y as Lord C e c i l admitted. Mr. Hughes* a t t i t u d e , which rejected even any modification
y 41 i n the wording of the Eapanese amendment, (and which was
not e n t i r e l y approved by S i r Robert Borden, Mr. Massey and 42
General Smuts) may be considered as the f i r s t p r a c t i c a l 3 8Canadian Annual Review,1919, p.254. 3 9The Morning Post,March 29, 1919. 4 0Baker. Op.Cit.Vo.I, p.180. 41 ,
Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Par.Debates,Ses.l919 Vol.LXXXIX p.12175. 4 2 S t e e d , K.W.Through the T h i r t y Years .LondongN.Y.1924, Vol.11, p.323.
- 75 -
application of exercising an "adequate voice i n foreign
p o l i c y " . The Australian-Japanese dispute on the quesCon
of r a c i a l equality was f i n a l l y s e t t l e d by the mediation of
the Canadian Prime Minister, S i r Robert Borden.
In summing up the Australian standpoint at the P a r i s
Conference, as f a r as her r e l a t i o n s with Japan were concern
ed, i t can be stated that Prime Minister Hughes made i t
clear to the Japanese Delegation that he was very anxious
for the maintenance of friendship and a l l i a n c e with Japan,
but only on condition of the undisputed preservation of the
Australian right to decide "who s h a l l enter and who s h a l l
n o t " 4 4 Nevertheless, the Prime Minister of A u s t r a l i a must
have f e l t some uneasiness about the outspoken affront towards
Japan implied i n h i s r e j e c t i o n of the Japanese demands. For
strategic reasons A u s t r a l i a simply could not afford to incur
the enmity of the growing Japanese power. In an interview
with the Japanese press at the Paris Conference, Mr. Hughes
intimated that i t was not A u s t r a l i a who was responsible for 45
the rejection of the Japanese Amendment. The consequence
was that the attacks of the world press were mainly directed
4.^
Borden,H.(ed.) Robert Laird Borden, His Memoirs, Toronto,The Mac-1938, Vol.11, pp 926-28. Millan. Co.of Canada 44
Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Debates,Sess.1917-19,Vol. LXXXTX, p.12176. 4 5 M i l l e r , D.H. My Diary a)ff the Peace Conference of P a r i s , New York, 1924,Vol.1,April 17,1919.,pp.257-8.
- 76 -
against President Wilson, although according to a secret
dispatch to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Morris, the
American Delegation would have possibly accepted the Japan-4-fi
ese Amendment. On the whole, i t cannot be said that the
B r i t i s h r e j e c t i o n of the Japanese proposal f o r r a c i a l
equality affected the comparatively intimate Anglo-Japanese
re l a t i o n s seriously. For the demands were deemed by the
Japanese Delegation to have some value; i f they were re
jected Japan might secure compensation elsewhere. Baron
Makino , when speaking of his Amendment-proposals' on A p r i l 47
28, 1919, declared he would not press i t . In a conversa
t i o n with 'M.r. Arthur Balfour, Baron Makino associated the
r a c i a l question with that of Shantung, intimating that a
grave s i t u a t i o n would be created i f Japan experienced a 48
rebuff on both questions. This in t e n t i o n seems to have been well recognized on the B r i t i s h side. The Tokyo correspondent of the "Morning Post" reported i n March, 1919 from the Japanese c a p i t a l that o f f i c i a l government c i r c l e s wanted
Japan to receive a free hand i n Eastern Asia as compensation
for her renunciation of any demands for unlimited immigra-49
t i o n into the English-speaking countries. As the report
made by Mr. Balfour on h i s ta l k with Baron Makino on A p r i l
28, 1919 In the Council of Four reveals, S i r Arthur Balfour
D.H. My Diary <stf the Peace Conference of P a r i s New York, 1924, Vol.I, A p r i l 17,1919., pp 257-8.
M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. p.74. 4 8 M i l l e r , Op. C i t . Vol.XIX, p.196-7. 49
The Morning Post A p r i l 23,1919.
was f u l l y aware that i f Japan received the rights she
wanted i n Shantung the Japanese delegates would not any 50
longer i n s i s t unduly on their demands fo r r a c i a l equality. .
This was a further reason for B r i t a i n to support Japan
wholeheartedly i n the Shantung question. Here again the
hasic pattern adopted by B r i t i s h diplomacy i n regard to her
p o l i c y towards Japan becomes clear; the B r i t i s h Government
was prepared to make considerable concessions to Japan i n
China f o r the sake of the security of the Dominions, being
urged not a l i t t l e by the Dominions themselves.. This influence
was s t i l l more evident i n another questiion of v i t a l concern
to A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, namely the future status of
the p a c i f i c islands south of the equator.
As early as 1917 the representatives of the B r i t i s h
Dominions pointed out very c l e a r l y i n the sessions of the
Imperial War Cabinet t h e i r intention not to surrender the
conquered former German colonies. I t was agreed then that
t h i s should be the course to be pursued by the B r i t i s h Dele-51
gation at the Peace Conference. This p o l i c y , of course,
5 0 M i l l e r , Op.Cit. Vol.XIX, Pp.196-7.
Lloyd George. War Memoirs.Berlin.1954. Vol.11, p.382.
- 78 -
c o n f l i c t e d with President Wilson's view of the mandatory
system. The U. S. President severely c r i t i c i z e d the idea
of annexation advocated by Hr. Lloyd G eorge on behalf of
the Dominions, saying that on t h i s point the powers were 52
at the parting of the ways. I t was, however, obvious from the very beginning of the discussions that A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand would not accept the American standpoint
as f a r as the P a c i f i c islands were concerned. On January 28, 1919, the same day that Mr. Lloyd George and President
Wilson clashed i n the Council of Ten, the "Sydney Daily
Telegraph" published a statement by the Acting Prime Minister
of A u s t r a l i a , Mr. Watt, which read:
I t i s probable that at the Conference of the A l l i e d Powers an attempt w i l l be made to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e or neutralize these and other countries that formerl y belonged to Germany . . . I am cabling today to the Prime Minister i n P a r i s , strongly s;etH.ng out our objections to any form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l government. b 3
The "Sydney Sun" of February 8, 1919 declared:
The Ladrone, Marshall and Caroline groups involve our strategic and national safety i n the P a c i f i c and are i n e v i t a b l y linked with A u s t r a l i a ' s future greatness and expansion. . . .54
The Australian attitude i n t h i s respect was s u b s t a n t i a l l y
determined by the Japanese expansion into the P a c i f i c during
the war. A u s t r a l i a was the more i n s i s t e n t on her r i g h t s as
0 ^ S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Ten,January 28,1919,in Baker, OppQit. Yol.I . pp219.
°°Cf. Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Debates ,1919 ,Vol.. LXXXVIII, p.12427. 54
Ibid, p.12424.
- 79 -
the Anglo-Japanese intimacy expressed by Mr. Lloyd George's
unqualified support of Japan's demands i n Shantung and the
•Pacific met with some suspicion i n that Dominion. The
"Sydney Daily Telegraph" remarked, f o r instance, that Mr.
Lloyd George was anxious to "appease Japan and accede to
her demands i n the Pacific."55 since the problem was so
important f o r A u s t r a l i a , Mr. Hughes vigorously urged the
annexation of the islands, arguing i n the Council of Ten
that a New Guinea dominated by another strong power meant 56
the domination of the whole of A u s t r a l i a . In an interview
with the P a r i s newspaper "Le Matin" on February 2, 1919 he
stated: The question of these islands means l i f e or death, to A u s t r a l i a . . . i t i s our national roof. We ' want the roof safe as a whole and not open to the fancies of passers-by or agression of marauders..57
A s i m i l a r stand was taken by the New Zealand Prime Minister,
Mr. Massey, i n regard to Samoa, which he pleaded should be 58
controlled exclusively by New Zealand. The Prime Ministers
of both P a c i f i c Dominions were supported by S i r Robert
Borden, who admitted that A u s t r a l i a and. New Zealand were Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.,Ses.1919.Vol.LXXXvTII
p.12423. }
5 6Baker, Op.Cit.Vol.1, p.209-10. 5 7
Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.,Ses.1919,Vol. LXXXVIII, p.12423 58 Mr.Massey i n the Council of Ten,Jan.24,1919,Baker Op.Cit.
Vol.I,p.210
- 80 -
i n a peculiar p o s i t i o n because they had immediately f e l t 59
the r i s e of the new Japanese Empire.
fee B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George, saw
the Dominions acting as a united front on t h i s question. He
was thus placed between the United States and the Dominions.
This was the f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n that the Imperial Cabinet was
no longer free i n i t s decisions concerning B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n
the P a c i f i c . Only with the greatest d i f f i c u l t y did Mr.
Lloyd George succeed i n persuading the Prime Ministers of
Au s t r a l i a and New Zealand, at a special conference of the
B r i t i s h Empire Delegation, to accept the mandate system under
a modified form of a compromise , according to which the re
servation was made that the P a c i f i c islands were to be
administered according to the laws of the mandatory powers 60
being i n t e g r a l parts thereof. I t was due only to thi s compromising p o l i c y of Mr. Lloyd George that President
Wilson's whole idea of the mandate system was salvaged. The
re s u l t was, however, that neither President Wilson nor the
Australian Prime Minister were s a t i s f i e d with this Solutlen.
Mr. Hughes declared b i t t e r l y that the acceptance of t h i s
formula was the 'maximum concession' which the Dominions were 61
w i l l i n g to grant. Nor was the B r i t i s h Government pleasedby
59 Jbi4.--F ra3rl Baker .Op. c i t . Vol. I , p.21St
6 0 S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Ten.Jan.30,1919, i n Baker, Opp C i t . Vol. I , pp S21-2. 6 1 I b i d . P. 223.
- 81 -
Mr. Hughes* Insistence. The ®ffltii-WQ& London "Westminster
Gazette" commented upon h i s attitude at the Conference:
I f i n d i v i d u a l delegates are allowed to do as Mr. Hughes has done , a l l national questions w i l l he made battlegrounds i n the newspapers whenever delegates are d i s s a t i s f i e d with Conference's votes. This i s an impossible state of a f f a i r s ; and Conference i t s e l f w i l l be broken up unless i t maintains some d i s c i p l i n e over i t s members. Nothing i s more deplorable than the bad example of the Australian Prime Minster . . . . 63
This statement, however true the reference to the p o s s i b i l
i t y of a breaking up of the Conference might have been
hardly seems j u s t i f i e d i n the l i g h t of the new stage In
the co n s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the Dominions developing out
of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 and Resolution IX.
In conclusion, i t can be seen that B r i t i s h diplomacy
at the P a r i s Peace Conference was affected i n three ways. The
war heritage of the secret Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1917
obliged Great B r i t a i n to render her support to Japanese
diplomacy at the Conference. The United States* p o l i c y at
P a r i s fundamentally c o n f l i c t e d with Japan's i n t e r e s t s i n the
Shantung question. The B r i t i s h P a c i f i c Dominions success
f u l l y i n s i s t e d f o r the f i r s t time on pressing t h e i r special
i n t e r e s t s . Nevertheless, Great B r i t a i n remained to a certain
62 Sydney Daily Telegraph. Jan. 28, 1919, cited i n Commonwealth
of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Debates, Ses. 1919, Vol. LXXXVIII p.12423
Cited Ibid. Vol. LXXXIX, p.12436.
t
- 82 -
degree master of the s i t u a t i o n . As a matter of p o l i t i c a l
prwdence and expediency, the B r i t i s h Government had decided
to make concessions to Japan i n the Far East, and by main
taining intimate friendship with Japan on the basis of the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e to serve the i n t e r e s t s of Imperial
security. The Shantung dispute was i n d i c a t i v e of the grow
ing antagonism between the two world powers i n the P a c i f i c ,
Japan and the United States. Great B r i t a i n , however, decided
at the Paris'Conference i n fewfouj of her So-raw Japanese a l l y .
The P a r i s Conference proved that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
was s t i l l an e f f e c t i v e instrument i n international p o l i t i c s .
I t isVno exaggeration to maintain that i t was t h i s A l l i a n c e
which caused the defeat of U. S. diplomacy i n the Far Eastern
question of 1919, and t h i s led ultimately to the r e j e c t i o n
of the V e r s a i l l e s Peace Treaty by the U. S. Senate. Since
the United States had necessarily to consider Japan's diplo
matic v i c t o r y as a serious menace to the Hay Doctrine of
the Open Door P o l i c y i n China, which was the t r a d i t i o n a l
basis for any American p o l i c y i n the Far East, and as an
undermining of the diplomatic prestige and influence of
the United States Government, the significance of the P a r i s
Conference lay i n the fact that i t turned out as a triumph
of the j o i n t British-Japanese diplomacy over the United States.
- 83 -
The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had thus become i n
American eyes a problem of primary concern. To the United
States Government the settlement of the Far Eastern
question i n 1919 was merely a temporary settlement. I t was
no f i n a l solution. Thus, the o r i g i n of the Washington
Conference ,to which the whole P a c i f i c issue culminating
i n the problem of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e was to be transferred two years l a t e r , l a y i n
Pa r i s .
- 84 -
CHAPTER II I
ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS FROM 1919
TO THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1921],.
I t has been shown how strong was the intimacy of
Anglo-Japanese co-operation at the P a r i s Peace Conference,
which to such a considerable degree influenced the treat
ment of the Far Eastern question at the Conference. In
t h i s chapter i t i s proposed to examine Anglo-Japanese
r e l a t i o n s a f t e r the Peace Conference u n t i l the Imperial
Conference i n June, 192.1. S i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t was shed by
the Siberian Intervention on the Far Eastern p o l i t i c a l
problems Great B r i t a i n had to face i n the years to come.
O r i g i n a l l y , the main reason for s t a r t i n g the so-
c a l l e d Siberian Intervention necessitated by the collapse
of the T s a r i s t Empire i n 1917, had been merely m i l i t a r y -
s t r a t e g i c . I t was the general fear that Germany would
possibly expand her m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l influence i n
the East beyond the Urals to S i b e r i a and to the coast of
the P a c i f i c . 1 This meant not only the seizure of vast
Cf.Lloyd George,D.,¥ar Memoirs,transl.Berlin,1934.Vol.Ill pp. 458 ,468 ,470. Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign Policy,1919-1959, ed.E.L.Woodward-R.Butler ,1st series lyiy.London,H.M.St.U.1949. U&ere-af t e r referred to as Doc.Br.For.Pol. 1919 KVd.Ta. w©.fe > a«Jl W .
- 85 -
natural resources by the German armies, but might have
had also far-reaching p o l i t i c a l repercussions on Japan's
diplomacy. The B r i t i s h Government intended to re-establish 2
a new e f f e c t i v e front i n the East against Germany. She
hoped, furthermore that Japan by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the i n t e r
vention would be committed more deeply i n the struggle
against the Central Powers and thus, perhaps, might be 3
distracted from her ambitions i n China. Therefore, at the end of 1917 and i n the beginning of 1918 London took the i n i t i a t i v e f o r the intervention, proposing i n P a r i s ,
Rome and Washington that Japan should act as a mandatory
of the A l l i e s i n the task of r e s i s t i n g the German advance 4
to the East.. The Japanese Government f o r t h e i r part
watching the s i t u a t i o n i n Eastern S i b e r i a with careful at
tention as a welcome opportunity to extend Japan's influence
i n that region, wgs not d i s i n c l i n e d towards the prospect of
an armed intervention.
At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution the Jap
anese Foreign Minister, Viscount Motono, declared that he could not remain i n d i f f e r e n t i n case of disturbances i n
5 S i b e r i a . I t was, however, clear from the very beginning
2Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919, Vol.Ill,No.223,App.I;No.233 App.I,No.256
3Ibid.No. 613, and V o l . I I , No.59. 4 I b i d . V o l . I I I , No.613 5 I b i d .
- 86 -
to the Japanese Government that they would not extend
Japanese m i l i t a r y operations "as f a r west as possible",
beyond Jrkutsk, as was proposed by the B r i t i s h ; but Japan
was p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n concentrating her actions
on the Eastern Siberian l i t t o r a l , i . e . , the Maritime Pro
vince, with the view of gaining control over that region
and consolidating Japanese influence i n Northern Manchuria
as well as i n Outer Mongolia. Such aims were hinted at
i n various Japanese newspapers. The "Kokusho" demanded in
February 1918 the right for Japan to control the admini
s t r a t i o n of the Siberian Railways, and of the Eastern
Chinese Railway,whilst a high ranking o f f i c i a l i n the Jap
anese Foreign O f f i c e , Dr. Terao, i n the p e r i o d i c a l "Ninon
oy-obi Nihonju" even went so f a r as to suggest the cession
of Amur Province to Japan. Representatives of Japanese
economic c i r c l e s emphasized the necessity of securing
these regions as a convenient market f o r i n d u s t r i a l projects 7
and as a source of raw materials.
The B r i t i s h Government from the very beginning of
the intervention had to overcome the suspicion of the United
States towards Japanese actions i n Eastern S i b e r i a . Only
with the utmost reluctance did President Wilson give h i s
cf. L'Europe Nouvelle 1920, No.27, pp.1074.
Ibid. 1919, No. 17, p.786.
- 87 -g
consent to the B r i t i s h proposals for armed intervention.
The attitude of the American Government,to whom the idea
of further expansion of Japanese power was repugnant,and
the continuous e f f o r t s of the BEitishSSolternment to secure
the e f f e c t i v e co-operation of the United States were i n
dic a t i v e of the changed s i t u a t i o n i n the Far East a f t e r
the F i r s t World War; they r e f l e c t e d the growing American-
Japanese antagonism and revealed the decline of B r i t i s h
power i n the Far East, both f a c t o r s being r e s u l t s of the
World War. The Balfour Memorandum of March 16, 1918 to
the U. S. Government declared with reference to the Siberian
Intervention that no steps could u s e f u l l y be taken to carry out t h i s p o l i c y which had not the active support of the United States. Without that support i t would be useless to approach the Japanese Government. . . :
This meant that Great B r i t a i n i n her p o l i c y i n the Far East
had to take into account the attitude of the United States
more than ever before, whether i t was a question of securing
the U. S. approval for certain actions or of checking Japan
ese expansionist p o l i c y i n Eastern Asia. The need f o r close
Anglo-American co-operation with regard to China and S i b e r i a
was c l e a r l y expressed i n a dispatch of the B r i t i s h diplomatic
representative i n Tokyo, Mr. Alston, to the Foreign Secretary,
8Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919 , V o l . I l l No.613 9 Lloyd George, D.War Memoirs London,Nicholson & Watson,1933-36
Vol. VI, p.3175-77.
- 88 -
Lord Cur.zon, on October 27, 1919:
Should the Japanese harbour designs ascribed to ( t h e m ? ) . retention of U.S. troops i n S i b e r i a would be best to check available (. . ?. .) but nothing can e f f e c t u a l l y control 'peaceful' penetration of China by Japan except a decision by other members of League of Nations, i n which we and U.S.A. would have to take lead, upon a d e f i n i t e p o l i c y of reh a b i l i t a t i o n of. China which (Japan?) would have to accept. . . . 1 0
As a re s u l t of B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e the so-called
" I n t e r - A l l i e d Railway Board" was established i n February,
1919 for supervising the administration of a l l Siberian
railways including the Eastern Chinese Railway. In t h i s
body the United States exerted the predominant influence
and control, and the American director-general, Mr. G. F.
Stevens, was vested with plenipotentiary powers.^ The
purpose was to give the United States a stronger voice as
a check against Japan i n Eastern Siberia. The B r i t i s h need
for American collaboration became apparent when the U. S.
Government, on account of American-Japanese controversies
over the administration of railways, threatened to withdraw
completely from the Intervention.
1 0Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919, V o l . I l l , No.498
i : L I b l d . No. 256.
- 89 -
The B r i t i s h Government repeatedly expressed t h e i r
great concern about t h i s . A memorandum from the Foreign
Office of December 1919 said: >tfe on our side have been
urging the Americans to take no step i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n
which would play d i r e c t l y into the hands of the Japanese by 13
leaving them i n sole control."
To sum up, the Siberian Intervention was an example
of the dual p o s i t i o n i n which B r i t i s h diplomacy found i t s e l f ;
on the one hand, Great B r i t a i n had favoured, i f not induced,
her Japanese a l l y to take action i n Eastern S i b e r i a mainly
f o r strategic reasons, whilst on the other hand the B r i t i s h
Government, f u l l y recognizing that the p o l i c y pursued by
Japan i n S i b e r i a involved the continued occupation of North
Manchuria and Outer Mongolia and %b the control of the
Chin... Eastern Railway, 1 4,as anxious to secure the CO-
operation of the United States as the only power capable
of checking Japan's expansion i n the Far East. For the f i r s t
time since the existence of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
Great B r i t a i n secretly collaborated with the United States
against her a l l y i n the east. A careful examination of
Doc.Brit.For.Pol.1919, Vol.Ill,No.451.Appendix 3;No.466 13
Ibid. No.613 14
Ibid.No.440, Appendix 3; No.613.
- 90 -
B r i t i s h diplomacy during the Siberian Intervention discloses
s t i l l another determining feature of B r i t i s h Far Eastern
p o l i c y at that time. However watchful Great B r i t a i n was
towards the Japanese aspirations i n Eastern S i b e r i a ,
Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and however strongly she
encouraged the United States to counteract Japanese p o l i c y ,
at the same time the B r i t i s h Government was i n c l i n e d to
look not unfavourably upon an involvement of Japan i n
those regions of ftorth-Sastern Asia; at least B r i t a i n
appeared to give her s i l e n t consent to Japan's expansion
there. The reason for thi s apparently inconsistent and
schizoid diplomacy on the part of Great B r i t a i n i s connect
ed with the security of the B r i t i s h Dominions i n the P a c i f i c
and India, as we s h a l l see. To understand this diplomacy
i t i s important to appreciate the trend i n Japanese foreign
p o l i c y immediately aft e r the war had come to an end.
The geographical p o s i t i o n of Japan as an island power
on the coast of Eastern Asia offered Japan the alternative
of either pursuing a continental p o l i c y dl rected towards
the A s i a t i c mainland or of orientating h e r s e l f overseas whioh
meant pursuing an oceanic maritime p o l i c y . During; the second
part of the war the m i l i t a r y Cabinet under General Terauchl,
who was i n o f f i c e from 1916 u n t i l September 1918, had primar
i l y concentrated on a continental p o l i c y . The Russo-
Japanese Treaty of 1916, serving as a measure of reassurance
against an eventual c o n f l i c t with the AngloOSaxon powers
and as the instrument for a common domination over China
- 91 -
by Japan and Russia, was to be the basis of t h i s p o l i c y .
One of the motives which may ha ve induced the Terauohi
Cabinet i n 1917 to take action i n Siberia?" i n addition
to the t e r r i t o r i a l and economic expansion i n North-Eastern
Asia was the f i g h t against spreading Bolshevism. Japan
needed a strong monarchical government i n Russia as a counter
balance against the Anglo-Saxon powers. The Sino-Japanese
Treaties of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e concluded i n March and May,
1918 gave Japan control over the Chinese army and naval
forces and served as a further instrument against Russian
Bolshevism. This turning away from a deliberate oceanic-
economic expansion was r e f l e c t e d i n a new programme of army
expenditures i n the spring of 1918 which was adopted by
the Japanese Diet. The programme inaugurated by General 15
Tanaka, a declared opponent of Bolshevism, provided f o r
the reinforcement of the Japanese Army from twenty-one to
f i f t y d i v i s i o n s at the p r i c e of reductions i n naval expend
i t u r e s . 1 6 The l i b e r a l c i r c l e s of Japanese economy, however,
mainly represented by the Seiyukai Party, were opposed to
the continental p o l i c y as pursued by General Terauchi. This led to the resignation of the Terauchi Cabinet i n September
17 1918 and to i t s replacement by the Seiyukai Party government 1 5 c f . Doc.Brit.For.Pol.1919 , V o l . I l l , No.572. 1 6 J e n s e n , G. Seemacht Japan. B e r l i n , 1943, ppl95 1 7 C l y d e , P.H. The Far East. New York,Prentice-Hall Inc.1952 P. 489
- 92 -
headed by Prime Minister Hara. The new Japanese states
man was determined to resume a p o l i c y of economic expansion
not only on the A s i a t i c mainland but also through an
expansion of Japanese export economy overseas. I t was,
however, evident that such a p o l i c y could not remain
confined to the economic sphere. P o l i t i c a l aims were i n e v i t
ably i n the background. This was a l l the more true i n an
era i n which economic and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , being extremely
interdependent, could hardly be separated from each other.
Thus, the new oceanic p o l i c y of Japan found concrete
p o l i t i c a l expression i n the so-called 8:8 naval b u i l d i n g
programme approved by Parliament i n the winter session of 18
1918-19. According to t h i s programme, which had already
been demanded i n 1910 by the Minister of the Navy, Baron
Saito, two naval squadrons, each consisting of eight b a t t l e
ships, were f i n a l l y to be established. At the outset the
Diet approved the immediate construction of two battleships,
two b a t t l e cruisers, and eight c r u i s e r s , as well as several
destroyers and submarines. A f a r more extensive naval
programme was launched i n the winter of 1919-20, when
Admiral Kato proposed to the Cabinet a naval plan which
provided f o r the construction of four b a t t l e c r u i s e r s , twelve
c r u i s e r s , and twenty-four l i g h t c r u i s e r s , s i x t y - f o u r
Jensen, Op. C i t . p.201
- 93 -19
destroyers, and seventy-four submarines. In a spe c i a l
session i n July 1920 the tremendous naval scheme f o r the
building of four battleships, four b a t t l e c r u i s e r s , twelve
c r u i s e r s , thirty-two destroyers, twenty-eight submarines,
f i v e gunboats, and eighteen special ships, at a cost of
seven hundred m i l l i o n yen, i . e . , 68,000,000, was approved
by the Japanese Parliament. The scale of Japanese naval
armaments can be assessed from the s t a t i s t i c a l figures f o r 20
the annual Japanese Naval expenditures from 1916 to 1921.
Year Amt.in Yen $ of Total Budget
1916- 17 99,900,000 14.8$ 1917- 18 119,880,000 14.8$ 1918- 19 166,500,000 14.8$ 1919- 20 249,547,000 23,6$ 1920- 21 372,627,000 29.5$
In English currency, t h i s was an increase of naval expenditures
from ^15 ,000 ,000 to nearly , 56 ,000 ,000 within f i v e y e a r s . 2 1
What did t h i s mean? The Hara Cabinet being under
the influence of the Japanese Naval c i r c l e s had embarked upon
a large-scale naval p o l i c y which was an in t e g r a l part of
Japan's p o l i c y of oceanic expansion. There can be no other
conclusion but that this huge naval power suited the oceanic
1 9Bywater.H.C.Sea Power i n the Pacific.London,Constable & Co.Ltd.1934, Vol II,p.151 f f . 20
Quoted from Jensen * Op. C i t . p.217
Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1921-22, pp.49650.
- 94 -
conception of the responsible statesmen i n the Japanese
Cabinet. I t was deemed to serve as an e f f e c t i v e i n s t r u
ment for enforcing the new course of p o l i c y i f required.
There could be no doubt as to the d i r e c t i o n of Japan's
oceanic p o l i c y . As early as 1904-05, during the Russo-
Japanese War, the Japanese General Kodama had worked out
a memorandum i n which he alluded to the Japanese conquest 22
of Indo-China. During the years of the World War,
Japanese businessmen had i n t e n s i f i e d their trade r e l a t i o n s
with the P h i l i p p i n e s and the Netherlands East Indies by
increasing their c a p i t a l investments and the number of 23
Japanese f a c t o r i e s and trading estates. The occupation
of the former German P a c i f i c islands north of the equator
i n 1914 can be considered as the prelude to an oceanic
expansion of Japanese power and influence to the South.
In 1916 the Japanese j o u r n a l i s t and former Member of
Parliament, Takekoshi, published an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "The
F i r s t Step of our New Naval P o l i c y " , i n which he remarked: Japan must always aim at expansion. . . as a l l peoples did toward the South, and not toward the North. We must not continue our expansion i n the North beyond Manchuria's boundaries, but must d i r e c t our eyes toward the South . . . we cannot be proud of possession some Islands i n the ?South Seas u n t i l we have Java and Sumatra. . . .
In Japan propaganda started to acquaint the Japanese people
2 2 F r s n e k e , Q.Die Grossmaechte i n Ost.rasien,1894-1914 Ham-burg, 1923, p.293. 2 3Jensen. Op. C i t . p.181
24. China Archiv. B e r l i n . 1916, p.176
with the importance of the economic problems i n Indo
china, the P h i l i p p i n e s , the Netherlands East Indies, and
the S t r a i t s Settlements. The establishment of a Japanese
society for "penetration of the South Seas", presided 2
over by Count Akimosa Yoshikana, was to serve t h i s purpose.
This southward expansion of Japan raised another
problem: the emigration of the Japanese surplus population
into the white B r i t i s h Dominions of A u s t r a l i a and New
Zealand. This was na t u r a l l y a problem of immediate and
v i t a l concern to the Governments of Great B r i t a i n and the
Dominions. I t determined the basic attitudes of these
governments i n t h e i r p o l i c y toward Japan i n general and
the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
i n p a r t i c u l a r . Great B r i t a i n f u l l y appreciated the danger
to the security of the B r i t i s h Empire. As early as August,
1916 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff , S i r William
Robertson submitted an o f f i c i a l memorandum to the B r i t i s h
Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George, i n which he set out the
po t e n t i a l peace terms. In t h i s memorandum SirWilliam
observed:
German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the Salomon Islands. . . are now In the hands of the Australian Government, who have the further enducement to keep what they have got that these islands form a valuable buffer between the mainland and possible Japanese encroachment. . . .26
2 5 D e r Neue Orient. 1919. Vol. I, p.196
26 Cited i n Lloyd George, D. War Memoirs London,Nicholson
and Watson,1933-36. .761.11 p.840
- 96 -
This remarkable statement c a r r i e s a l l the more weight
because i t originated, from competent m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s .
A l l u s i o n s to a southward move of Japanese emigration also
appeared i n the B r i t i s h press. In A p r i l , 1919 the "Morning
Post" said that the masses of Japanese labourers would
prefer to emigrate into the "warmer and r i c h e r t e r r i t o r i e s
of the P a c i f i c Ocean" instead of s e t t l i n g i n China, Korea 27
and S i b e r i a . The "JapanaAdvertiser" i n January, 1920
expressed concern about Japan's "expansion of t e r r i t o r i e s 28
and the hegemony of the A s i a t i c races against the whites". § The r i s e of Japanese sea power i n the Far East
p a r t i c u l a r l y worried the B r i t i s h Government because, as
has already been said, the naval strength of Great B r i t a i n
i n Far Eastern waters was ex t r a o r d i n a r i l y weak during the
war. In August, 1919 the B r i t i s h Admiralty, therefore, sent
Admiral J e l l i c o e to New Zealand to survey the naval s i t u a t i o n
i n the Far East and i n the South Seas. In h i s report,
Admiral J e l l i c o e c l e a r l y pointed out that i t was absolutely
necessary to reinforce the B r i t i s h naval forces i n those
waters : . . .the presence of strong naval forces i n Far Eastern waters i s necessary to ensure the safety of the sea communications from the outset, and to act as a deterrent to other forms of attack, should the condition render them possible as might be the case.. .
2 7Moming Post. A p r i l 23, 1919 28
Japan Advertiser. January 1, 1920
Admiral J e l l i c o e c a l l e d the serious attention of the Admiralty to the "growing naval strength of nations^ outside European waters," which necessitated a "reconsideration of the s t r a t e g i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of B r i t i s h
29
naval forces." Admiral J e l l i c o e was d i r e c t l y r e f e r r i n g
to Japan i n h i s report. The growing Japanese sea power
considered together with the trend of Japanese emigration
towards the South, or as Admiral J e l l i c o e put i t , "other
forms of attack", constituted a dir e c t challenge to the
security of the B r i t i s h Dominions of A u s t r a l i a and New
Zealand, which could not remain unanswered. Accordingly,
Admiral J e l l i c o e recommended the increase of the B r i t i s h
Far Eastern Fleet to two squadrons, each consisting of
eight battleships. He furthermore suggested that Singapore
should be developedlas a strong modern naval base. This
This suggestion was adopted by the B r i t i s h Government two
years l a t e r , a f t e r the Dominions had given t h e i r whole-30
hearted consent. Singapore was deliberately chosen as a 2^cf.Naval Mission to the Dominion of New Zealand.Report of Admiral Viscount Jellicoe,August-October,1919,in:Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand, Wellington,1919. A-4, Vol.I,Chapter I,pp 12-13. 3 0 G r . B r i t . ,Pari. Deb. 5th Ses. ,1923 ,Vol. 165 ,P. 249 ,and Vol.163 pp.1229-13.
- 98 -
naval base and. as the strategic centre of B r i t i s h naval
defence i n the East, rather than Sydney or Melbourne,owing
to the necessity of protecting the access to the Indian
Ocean. This was disclosed i n l a t e r years by the F i r s t Sea
Lord, Mr. Amery. x In view of the Japanese press comments
during the war regarding Japan's Pan-Asiatic aspirations
towards India as well as the penetration of the Indian
market by Japan, the B r i t i s h suspiciona^do not seem
u n j u s t i f i e d .
In the l i g h t of the foregoing B r i t i s h diplomacy
toward Japan, as i t appeared during the Siberian Inter-
vention, becomes clear. Although H i t was not part of
B r i t i s h p o l i c y to r i s k any permanent establishment of
Japan i n S i b e r i a " , as Mr. Lloyd George expressed i t i n 22
h i s Memoirs , the B r i t i s h Government, being f u l l y aware
that Japan, because of her population problem had to expand,
earnestly considered the question of whether or not an
"engagement" of Japan on the A s i a t i c mainland was expedient
i n the i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Dominions of A u s t r a l i a and
of New Zealand. This question was discussed at an Anglo-
French Conference held at number 10 Downing Street on Grt.Brit.Pari.Deb.5th Ses.
B»>d.l924, Yol. 176,p.2304. 32 Lloyd George, D. War Memoirs. London,1933-36.Yol.VI,p.3174.
- 99 -
December 13, 1919. The B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord
Curzon, pointed out that Japan required an outlet "as the
Japanese were debarred from going to America and c e r t a i n
B r i t i s h possessions." In his opinion, S i b e r i a offered an 33
"immense f i e l d for immigration." Mr. Lloyd George 34
associated himself.with t h i s view. The whole problem was set out i n an important o f f i c i a l memorandum from the
Foreign O f f i c e i n December, 1919, which read i n part:
The question i s , are we going to draw a tight c i r c l e around her (^Japan's ) a c t i v i t i e s , or are we going to allow her l a t i t u d e f o r ostensibly legitimate operations outside her appointed sphere? I t may be said that she must expand somewhere. I f so, i s there any great objection to her expansion taking place In the wide undeveloped t e r r i t o r i e s which.lie at her door, Manchuria, Mongolia,Sakhalin, and Eastern Siberia? At any rate, we have at a l l costs to prevent such expansions from being affected i n patent opposition to us. . . 3 5
This basic attitude appeared to become the determinant i n
the future p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h Government as wel.l as of
the Australian and New Zealand Governments towards Japan.
I t was generally f e l t i n Great B r i t a i n that Japan's expansion
on the A s i a t i c mainland was a necessary e v i l to divert
3 3 D o c . B r i t.For.Pol.1919,Vol.II,No.59. 3 4Doc ,Br.For.Pol.1919.Vol.II, No.59 3 5 I b i d . V o l . I l l , No.613
- 100 -
Japanese Immigration and p o l i t i c a l aspirations from the
B r i t i s h Dominions i n the South. For instance, the "Observer"
remarked i n 1921:
I t cannot be denied that just as the security of the economic l i f e of C a l i f o r n i a , Canada or A u s t r a l i a compels them to exclude the competition of A s i a t i c immigrants, even so, the security of the economic l i f e of Japan compels her, either to seek new outl e t s for her surplus population overseas, or to endeavour to secure such a po s i t i o n of economic advantage i n comparatively undeveloped regions of the A s i a t i c mainland,as s h a l l enable her to maintain and increase her industries and thereby feed the people at home . . .
The B r i t i s h Government by no means misinterpreted the two
p o l i t i c a l aims of Japan; nor was she under any delusion 57
regarding Japan's Pan-Asiatic intentions. She looked
upon the Japanese encroachments on China with some uneasiness,
because she f e l t that the B r i t i s h trade p o s i t i o n i n China
would decline more and more owing to the impairment of the
Open Door Doctrine by the Japanese. But for the sake of the
security of the B r i t i s h Dominions - which i n the l a s t analysis
affected the i n t e g r i t y of the whole B r i t i s h Empire - and
because i t was e s s e n t i a l to present o r i e n t a l immigration, the
B r i t i s h Government had to make s a c r i f i c e s i n respect of the
B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n China. The Japanese newspaper,
"The Observer" June 16, 1921. 3 7Doc.Br.For.Pol.l919, V o l . I l l , No.613, and Letter of the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Tokyo, S i r Charles E l i o t , to Mr.Balfour Nov.10, 1921, c i t e d i n Dugdale, Op.Cit. pp.322-5.
- 101 -
"Nippon-oyobi-Nipponjin", alluding to Japan's Pan-Asiatic
programme, had intimated as early as 1916, "the greater the
consideration paid by Japan to India the more should be "38
the B r i t i s h concessions to Japan as regards China.
There was another fear prevalent i n B r i t i s h Government
c i r c l e s which determined to a certa i n extent B r i t i s h Far
Eastern p o l i c y , not only at the time of the Siberian Inter
vention but also thereafter. I t played a r o l e i n the
considerations of the Cabinet as to the expediency of the
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . With reference to
the Japanese aspirations towards the Chinese Eastern Railway,
Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, the B r i t i s h M inister at
Peking, Mr. Jordan, declared i n a dispatch of October 8,1919:
"Japanese influence w i l l always be found on side of whatever
party most l i k e l y to lend i t s e l f the attainment of those ends. 3©
. . Although t h i s statement referred primarily to l o c a l
Russo-Japanese co-operation against China,(that i s , Japanese
assistance to the Russian General Semfinov)it must be i n t e r
preted under the broader aspects of Russo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s .
This i s more c l e a r l y expressed i n the Foreign O f f i c e
Memorandum of December, 1919 which has been previously
mentioned. Warning was given there that the Japanese should
Quoted from Chang.Op.cit. ppl55.
Doc.Brit.For.Pol. 1919, V o l . I l l , No.440,App.3
- 102 -
not be compelled to seek the attainment of their p o l i t i c a l
ambitions "by a combination which would mean the most 40
formidable menace we have yet to face." No doubt t h i s
combination would have been an a l l i a n c e between Japan,
Russia and Germany. The B r i t i s h diplomatic documents of
1919 reveal that the Foreign O f f i c e and several B r i t i s h
diplomatic representatives i n the Far East were deeply
concerned about the exi s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y of such an a l l i a n c e .
In Europe, the B r i t i s h Minister i n Berne, Lord Acton,
reported to London certain rumours about talks going on
between Russian, Japanese and German p o l i t i c i a n s who were discussing the prospects of mutual co-operation. 41 From the Far East the B r i t i s h High Commissioner at Omsk and
the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Tokyo wired that "the idea of 42
Japanese-Russian-German a l l i a n c e no doubt e x i s t s , " and that i n Eastern S i b e r i a i t was "growing stronger amongst
43 pu b l i c . " The same fears were shared by the U. S. State
44 Department. One of the primary motives which had led
President Wilson to y i e l d to the Japanese demands at the
4°Dob.Br.For.Pol.1919, V o l . I l l No.613 41
Ibid. No. 280, App.l 4 2Ibid.No. 280. 4 3Ibid.No. 323. 4 4Ibid.No. 467.
-103-
Pa r i s Peace Conference had been his fear that the with
drawal of Japan might possibly have resulted i n an Eastern 45
a l l i a n c e between Japan, Russia and Germany. The U. S.
au t h o r i t i e s i n S i b e r i a were convinced that the aim of the
jo i n t p o l i c y of the Japanese and General Semenov was the
creation of an independent state comprising S i b e r i a and
Mongolia, which could play an important role i n the forma-46
ti o n of an eventual German-Russo-Japanese c o a l i t i o n .
What conclusions can be drawn from the preceding
considerations? Great B r i t a i n could not pursue a p o l i c y
i n the Par East which was de l i b e r a t e l y directed against
Japan; but she had to attempt to a r r i v e at a diplomatic
understanding with Japan. Furthermore, to prevent an
expansion of Japanese power and influence to the South,
and at the same time to avoid the danger of a pro-German
and a pro-Russian orien t a t i o n of Japan, Great B r i t a i n was
forced to make concessions to Japan on the A s i a t i c mainland.
In practice t h i s p o l i c y of appeasement and understanding
necessitated the maintenance and continuation of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e . An abrogation of the A l l i a n c e would
have meant that Japan, who was i n c l i n e d to a prolongation
of the treaty, would make e f f o r t s to substitute the Eurasian Baker,Op.Cit. Vol.11, pp.195-6, 201-2.
4 6 Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919 , V o l . I l l , No.613
-•104 -continental a l l i a n c e for the a l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n .
In addition to that, Great B r i t a i n had to face the f a c t
that her t r a d i t i o n a l naval supremacy f o r the f i r s t time
i n her his t o r y was disputed hy a threatening preponder
ance of the navy of the U. S. A.
An-additional f a c t o r influencing the B r i t i s h
standpoint i n t h i s question was the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n
India. The security of B r i t i s h rule i n India af t e r the
war could be jeopardized from two sides. Already during
the war period Japan, under the influence of growing pan-
,Asiatic ideas, had directed her attention cto seditious 47
B r i t i s h Indians, and there can be no doubt that the re
volutionary a n t i - B r i t i s h movement i n India which strove
f o r India's independence was affected by the pan-Asiatic
idea. In 1920 the Japanese were i n a p o s i t i o n to give a
warning to the Canadian missionaries i n Korea that i f they
gave "assistance, material or immaterial to either the i n
dependence movement i n Korea or to the anti-Japanese move
ment, the Buddhists i n Japan would be able to f i n d a le g a l
reason for giving a n t i - B r i t i s h assistance to those behind 48
the non-co-operation movement i n India. Furthermore,
the expansion of Japanese exports, primarily of cotton
t e x t i l e s and bazaar goods, to India, which were already high
during the war, increased u n t i l 1922 to the t o t a l of 4 7Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919,Vol.Ill, No.619 48
Japan Advertiser, December 3,1920, cited i n Chang,Op.Cit.p.IS
- 105 -
/49
26.5 m i l l i o n . .-./This economic penetration of India by-Japan provided, of course, a p o s s i b i l i t y of gaining influence
i n that country. The number of Japanese trade agents 50
established a l l over India increased rapidly. In other
words, i t became expedient for the B r i t i s h Government to
assure h e r s e l f the goodwill of Japan and to ensure that
she refrained from any pan-Asiatic propaganda and from
encouraging the revolutionary forces i n India. In the
second place, the i n t e r n a l security of India was threaten
ed to a special degree a f t e r 1918 by subversive a c t i v i t i e s
of Soviet Russian agents, who collaborated with the a n t i -
B r i t i s h elements i n India. According to a "Times" message
of January 2, 1919, the Soviet inspired "League for the
L i b e r a t i o n of the East", established on Moscow's i n i t i a t i v e ,
had declared that Persia and Afghanistan were the channels through which the revolutionary propaganda would penetrate
51 into India. A report of the Moscow newspaper "Isv e s t i a "
of May 6, 1919 said that the leader of the Indian revolution
ary movement and member of the Indian National Congress,
Professor Barakatullah, had expressed India's sympathy with
the Russian struggle against capitalism because the seditious 52
Indians i d e n t i f i e d capitalism with the B r i t i s h Raj. These
examples may i l l u s t r a t e the B r i t i s h concern about the
s i t u a t i o n i n India a f t e r 1918. Undoubtedly English
anxiety to prevent a domestic uprising played an important 4-Q
Cf.Report of the B r i t i s h Trade Commissioner i n India,Mr. Ainscough, on British-Indian Trade 1921/22.The Board of Trade Journal,Nov.9,1922. 5 0 T h e Board of Trade Journal, August 7, 1919. 5 1 D e r Neuye Orient. 1919,Vol.II, pp212 5 2Ibid.Vol.I,p.!81
- 106 -
rol e i n the B r i t i s h considerations about the renewal of
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Although, according to a
statement of the Under-Secretary of State f o r Foreign
A f f a i r s , Mr. C e c i l Harmsworth, the terms of the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty did not provide for Japanese m i l i t a r y aid 53
i n the case of in t e r n a l disturbances i n India. the
Al l i a n c e might serve as a valuable instrument f o r strength
ening the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the eyes of the Indians and
of other A s i a t i c n a t i o n a l i t i e s under B r i t i s h administration.
Statements on the part of the Japanese confirmed t h i s
assumption. For instance, the Japanese Ambassador to
London, Baron Hayashi, declared to the press i n the beginning
of 1921: . . . the basic idea of the A l l i a n c e i s to protect by common action the t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s and special i n t e r e s t s of Japan and Great B r i t a i n i n Eastern Asia and India . . . 54
The same view was supported by the Tokyo newspaper "Nitchi 55
N i t c h i " . This reference to India made by the Japanese
Ambassador i n London was reinforced by another remark of
Baron Hayashi , i n which he declared the A l l i a n c e to be the
only safeguarding bulwark against spreading Bolshevist power. 5 6
53 Gr.Brit.,Pari.Debates,Sess.5, 1921, Vol.146,p.18
54 The Japan Advertiser. Feb.16, 1921
55 The Japan Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1921 56 Ost—Asiatische Rundschau, July 1, 1920
- 107 -
These then were the motives which played an important
r o l e i n determining the course of Great B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y
towards Japan a f t e r 1919 and which affected the development
of Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s a f t e r the Paris Conference. As
fa r as Japan was concerned, she wanted to maintain the
Al l i a n c e a f t e r 1919, for several reasons. The trade competition,
between Japan and Great B r i t a i n , which was the re s u l t of
the enormous r i s e of Japan's economy and industry during
the war, had been continuously increasing since the wary
The Japanese cotton goods and s i l k spinning industry i n
p a r t i c u l a r had entered into competition with the Lancashire
industry by increasing exports of Japanese goods to English
markets. Realizing that the young Japanese economy would
not be able i n the long run to compete successfully with
Great B r i t a i n , Japan made earnest e f f o r t s a f t e r the war
to reach a trade understanding. This induced Japan to
think favourably of the exi s t i n g A l l i a n c e . In July, 1919
the Director of the Japan S i l k Weaving and Spinning Com
pany, Ltd. (Nippon Kimuori Kabushiki Kaisha), Mr. Kanji
Morimura, went to Great B r i t a i n for trade talks. As he
declared, h i s task was to make enquiries about how a new
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could be achieved i n the commercial
f i e l d . 5 7 But of more importance f o r Japan was the p o l i t i c a l
The Journal of Commerce. July 15, 1919.
- 108 -
aspect of the A l l i a n c e , even i f i t could never be
invoked i n the case of serious Japanese-American tension^
or i n a war between those countries. This was expressed
by o f f i c i a l representatives of the Japanese Government.
The former Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r , Count Kato, eulo
g i z i n g the renewal, remarked i n the " J i j i Shimpo" that
even i f the A l l i a n c e were nothing else than a "mutual 58
declaration" t h i s would be better than nothing. The
Japanese press unanimously expressed a strong desire
for a prolongation of the treaty. The Kokumin stressed
i n an a r t i c l e i n 1921 headed "A S p r i t u a l A l l i a n c e " : The object of the A l l i a n c e consists of the s p i r i t u a l a f f i l i a t i o n of the two countries. . . . While the fundamental s p i r i t of Japan and great B r i t a i n continues to be united with each other there can be no h i t c h to the rel a t i o n s of the two countries. 59
Similar favourable utterances were voiced by the Tokyo
N i t c h i N i t c h i and the Asahi Shimbun p r e s s . 6 0 Above a l l ,
Japan needed the A l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n to prevent
the r i s k of diplomatic i s o l a t i o n . A continuation of the
treaty would enhance Japan's international prestige.
58 Le Temps. 2fan.l0,1920
59
The Japan Advertiser. Jan.9, 1921. 6 QIbid.Jan.11, 1921; and the London "Times", June 8, 1920.
- 109 -
Moreover, Japan expected, i f the A l l i a n c e were
continued, that B r i t a i n , although she would never come
to Japan's aid i n case of a m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t with the
United States, would give moral and diplomatic support
to Japanese p o l i c y i n China, or at lea s t acquiesce i n
Japan's measures i n China.
I t has been already seen that a continuation of
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was i n the inte r e s t s of the
B r i t i s h Empire, p a r t i c u l a r l y as f a r as the s e c u r i t y of
Australia-,Mew Zealand and India was concerned. Therefore,
according to a dispatch of the Chinese Minister i n London
and to press reports, the B r i t i s h Government as early as
1920 took steps to negotiate with Tokyo for an eventual 61
renewal of the A l l i a n c e . Both governments recognized, however, that the treaty terms of t h i s A l l i a n c e were not
quite compatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations.
A r t i c l e XX of the Covenant stipulated: The Members of the League severally agree that t h i s Covenant i s adcepted as abrogating a l l obl i g a t i o n s or understandings " i n t e r se" which are inconsistent with the terms thereof and solemnly undertake that they w i l l hereafter not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any member of the League s h a l l before becoming a member of the League have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of t h i s Covenant, i t s h a l l be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure i t s release from such obligations. 62
U.S.For.Rel.1920,Vol.IT,p.679,and the London Journal, Jan.31,1920. 6 2Covenant of the League of Nations,1919,Article XX, quoted i n Duggan,St.P., The League of Nations. Boston, The A t l a n t i c Monthly/1919. App.p.335.
Press,
- 110 -
As to the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i t was notably A r t i c l e
II of the Treaty, providing for immediate mutual m i l i t a r y
assistance, which was inconsistent with A r t i c l e s X, XIII
and XIV of the Covenant as they contained the p r i n c i p l e of
a r b i t r a t i o n and Intermediation by international bodies i n
case of c o n f l i c t s . Consequently, the B r i t i s h Foreign
M i n i s t e r , Lord Curzon, on behalf of Great B r i t a i n , and
the Japanese Ambassador to London, Count Chinda , on behalf
of Japan, addressed a j o i n t declaration from Spa on July
8, 1920 to the Council of the League which read:
The Governments of Great B r i t a i n and Japan have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13, 1911 now existing between the two countries, though i n harmony with s p i r i t of the Covenant of the League of Nations, i s not e n t i r e l y consistent with the l e t t e r of that Covenant, which both governments earnestly desire to respect. They accordingly have the honour, j o i n t l y to Inform the League that they recognize the p r i n c i p l e that i f the said agreement be continued a f t e r July, 1921, i t must be i n a form which i s not inconsistent with that Covenant. 6 3
This j o i n t n o t i f i c a t i o n was to become of j u r i d i c a l and
p o l i t i c a l importance as i t gave r i s e to the question of
whether i t constituted a formal denunciation of the treaty.
The competent law o f f i c e r s of the Crown held the opinion
that a denunciation of the Treaty was unquestionably im
p l i e d and intended. P o l i t i c a l l y i t sheds a s i g n i f i c a n t
l i g h t on the attitude of the B r i t i s h Government that the
Lord Chancellor reversed t h i s interpretation of the
B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers, 1920, Vol.CXIII,p.370.
- I l l -
n o t i f i c a t i o n at the Imperial Conference i n 1921. The
B r i t i s h Government obviously handled the question of the
renewal or abrogation of the A l l i a n c e with the greatest
caution and care, because i t was an extremely delicate
matter i n view of"Great B r i t a i n ' s relationships with Japan,
China and the U.S.A. When asked i n the House of Commons
on what date the treaty would have to be denounced , the
Under-Secretary f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. Harmsworth, denied 64
being i n the p o s i t i o n to answer the question. In the
l i g h t of the problems created for the B r i t i s h Empire by
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e t h i s approach i s understandable.
What were the implications of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e on Anglo-American relations? As w i l l have been
observed, the danger that the B r i t i s h Empire might be
drawn into an American-Japanese war i n which i t had to
support Japan, increased i n proportion to the growing
American-Japanese tension since 1905. This had- already
necessitated a r e v i s i o n of the terms of the treaty i n 1911,
when A r t i c l e IV of the renewed and modified treaty was.:,
inserted, making the "casus foederis" inapplicable i n
case Great B r i t a i n should conclude a general treaty of ar
b i t r a t i o n wL th the United States. The Anglo-American a r b i
t r a t i o n treaty concluded i n 1911 did not receive the approval
of r a t i f i c a t i o n by the two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate
64 Gr,f?Britgin ,P,arls ,D<§&£ e5tbrSeri.es p921 ,Vol. 141 ,p. 21
- .112 -
as required by American c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. Instead of
the a r b i t r a t i o n treaty the B r i t i s h and U. S. Governments
therefore negotiated i n September, 1914 the Bryan-Spring-
Rice Peace Commission Treaty, which, although not techni
c a l l y a treaty of general a r b i t r a t i o n , was considered by
the B r i t i s h Government as such within the meaning of
A r t i c l e IV of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This i n t e r
pretation w a s ' o f f i c i a l l y communicated to the Japanese
Government by Great B r i t a i n ; but the B r i t i s h p u b l i c was 65
not informed about i t u n t i l December 31, 19SO. The
B r i t i s h Government was compelled to make a public announce
ment because of the growing f e e l i n g of uneasiness i n the
U.S.A. about the possible implications of the a l l i a n c e i n
case of an armed c o n f l i c t betv/een America and Japan.
Government and press i n Great B r i t a i n were anxious to remove
a l l fear i n the U.S.A. with regard to the A l l i a n c e . Lord
N o r t h c l i f f e issued a statement i n December, 1920 which said: Some of our American:, friends seem anxious or suspicious about the supposed obligations of Great B r i t a i n to j o i n Japan i n case Japan goes to war against the U.S.A., under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . These suspicions seem to me to be unfounded . . . there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of any combination of England and Japan against the U.S.A. . . .
Lord N o r t h c l i f f e emphasized that the r e a l i t i e s of the B r i t i s h
Empire made i t "impossible to unite B r i t a i n , Canada, Australia
New Zealand and South A f r i c a against America on behalf of 66
the Japanese." The"Times" i n i t s leading a r t i c l e s
65 The London Times, Dec. 1920 The Japan Advertiser, J a n . l , 1921
- 113 -
associated i t s e l f with that opinion. The Japanese Govern
ment on t h e i r part did a l l i t could to appease the U.S.A
by i s s u i n g o f f i c i a l statements through her diplomatic re
presentatives i n London and Washington. I t did so i n f u l l
recognition of the fact that the B r i t i s h Empire could never
be-induced by treaty obligations to f i g h t against the U.S.A.
with whom she was bound by the bonds of common blood, ancestry
and his t o r y . Accordingly, the Japanese Ambassador to
London, Baron Hauashi, declared i n the beginning of 1921:
I t was . . . never i n the mind of the Japanese Government to f i g h t the U.S.A. at a l l , and . . . i n the most improbable eventuality of such a war T r - Japan would not expect England to come to her help . . . I can assure you with a l l the emphasis at my command that the A l l i a n c e w i l l never stand i n the way of the good understanding and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and the U.S.A. . . .68
The same assurance was given by the Japanese Ambassador to
Washington, Baron Shidehara, who, arguing that A r t i c l e IV
of the Treaty had deliberately been inserted to remove any
p o s s i b i l i t y of war between the U.S.A. and Great B r i t a i n ,
denied most emphatically "that ..the A l l i a n c e was ever designed
or remotely intended as an instrument of h o s t i l i t y or even ' 69 of defence against' the U.S.A."
67 The London Times, December 30, 1920. The Japan Advertiser, February 16, 1921 69 The Journal of Commerce, New York, July 5, 1921.
- 114 -
However honest these statements were , they did not s u f f i i c e
to remove the inexorable opposition of the United States
to the A l l i a n c e . I t was f i n a l l y this opposition which
forced Great B r i t a i n to terminate the A l l i a n c e .
The view of the United States (which had emerged
from the war as the other world power i n the P a c i f i c )
had to be taken into consideration by Great B r i t a i n to a
f a r larger extent than before the war because B r i t a i n
de3?e-^efl4^~u^Qja--4^ the United States.
The B r i t i s h Government had to recognize the changed po s i t i o n
of power i n the P a c i f i c which was no longer determined by
Great B r i t a i n alone, but by a • P a c i f i c Triangle* consisting
of Great B r i t a i n , Japan and the United States. For the
B r i t i s h Government the r i s e of the United States as a world
power meant that sooner or l a t e r she had to make her decision
between the United States and her former a l l y , Japan. In
the B r i t i s h House of Commons, Commander B e l l a i r s expressed
the ambivalent p o s i t i o n by c a l l i n g Japan "an a l l y by diplo
matic means and the United States an a l l y by n a t u r e . " ^
Great B r i t a i n found herself i n a dilemma of a l l i a n c e s ; she
was facing the d i f f i c u l t task of bringing into harmony two
Gr.Brit.,Pari.Debates ,5th Series,1980,Vol.126,p.2334.
- 115 -
alignments which were incompatible with each other, the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and Anglo-American co-operation.
This dilemma became apparent as early as 1917, when Mr.
Balfour put forward the proposal f o r a m u l t i - l a t e r a l s i x
power naval agreement between Great B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y , 71
Russia, Japan and the United States. In hi s Memorandum of June 22, 1917 to the Imperial War Cabinet, Mr. Balfour
pointed out that he d e f i n i t e l y would prefer a b i - l a t e r a l
defence a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and the U.S.A.,
but "the objection to i t arises out of our ex i s t i n g treaty 72
with Japan." He feared the implications of an Anglo-
American a l l i a n c e on Anglo-Japanese re l a t i o n s . According
to Mr. Balfour, an Anglo-American defence pact would have
been regarded as "the beginning of the end of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e . " This explains Mr. Balfour's attempt to "associate Japan from the beginning with the new ar-
73 rangement'.' Mr. Balfour was under the misapprehension
that the United States would accept the obligations of a formal a l l i a n c e and would j o i n a combination to which the 74
i & . i f l n n r f i s f l n n w f t T w a s a T>PIT*T. growing Japanese power was a part. Nevertheless h i s
7 1Dugdale, QppCit. p.209 7 2 I b l d . P.210 7 5 I b i d . P.210 7 4 I b i d . P.210.
- 116 -
attitude shows that the B r i t i s h Government did recognize
that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e constituted a real problem
i n the changed s i t u a t i o n i n the P a c i f i c . In the ultimate
analysis the t r a d i t i o n a l Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , which
had rendered valuable service to Great B r i t a i n f o r almost
twenty years and which was s t i l l one of the strongest p i l l a r s
of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , stood against the idea of Anglo-
American co-operation. This idea had grown stronger since
the World War on both sides of the A t l a n t i c . In England
the"London Times"advocated i n 1918 an# Anglo-American
A l l i a n c e , or at least a strengthening of the bonds between
Great B r i t a i n and the U.S.A., upon which friendship the 75
future prosperity of the world would depend. In the
United States President Harding emphasized i n a l e t t e r to
the Chairman of the Sulgrave I n s t i t u t e , Mr. J. A.Stewart,
early i n 1921, the paramount importance of the "unity pf
of English-speaking peoples" i n world a f f a i r s . There
was a widespread f e e l i n g i n the United Kingdom that the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e should not be renewed before the 77
views of the U.S. Government were heard. Questions raised i n the House of Commons by several M.P's expressed serious anxieties as to the effect of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
on Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . _
The London Times ,December 11,1918. 7 6 I b i d . January 19,1921. 77
Gr.Brit. ,Parl.Debates.5th Series,1921,Tol.143,p.1883
- 117 -
Commander B e l l a i r s asked i n June, 1921:
. . . whether i t has been o f f i c i a l l y Intimated to. the U.S.A., by means of a diplomatic note, that i n no circumstances can Japan receive support. . . i n the case of war between Japan and the U.S.A.. .78
He hinted that the B r i t i s h Government should imm§diately
communicate with the U.S. Government regarding the plans 79
for a renewal of the A l l i a n c e . This had not yet been
done, for a press communique issued by the U.S.State
Department denied the alleged reception of o f f i c i a l assur-80
ance and information regarding the possible treaty terms. Lieut.-Col. S i r F. H a l l (M.P. ). as&ed sim i l a r questions about the application of the treaty to a c o n f l i c t between
81 Japan and the U.S.A. The answers given by the Government
representatives i n the Commons were mostly d i l a t o r y and
evasive. The add i t i o n a l Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. Kellaway, r e f e r r i n g to A r t i c l e IV of
the A l l i a n c e , assured the House:
Our relations with Japan are so arranged as not to involve us i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t with the U.S.A. 82
He, as well as the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Chamberlain,
believed i t to be unnecessary to make an o f f i c i a l communi-83
cation to the U.S.A. 7 a G r i B r i t . P a r i . D e b . ,5th Ser. ,1921 ,*Vol.143, p.1791. 7 9 I b i d . P.1983. 80
The London Times,June 23,1921. 8 1Gr.Brit.Pari.Debates.5th Series.Vol.138 ,P.1574. 8 2 L b i d . P.1574 R3
Ibid. P.1574 and P.1791
- 118 -
These answers- revealed two important things. F i r s t l y ,
the B r i t i s h Government believed i t could appease the U.S.
Government by r e f e r r i n g only to the application of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e i n case of war. In so doing they misunder
stood the essential motives behind the U.S. opposition to
the A l l i a n c e . Secondly, being f u l l y aware of the diplomatic
expediency to renew the treaty, but at the same time
r e a l i z i n g the necessity of taking into serious consideration
the attitude of the U.S.A., the B r i t i s h Government proceeded
with extreme caution, wishing to keep the door open for a
compromise solution. Therefore, the Foreign O f f i c e inform
ed the U.S.Ambassador to London i n A p r i l , 1920 that the
question of the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e 84
remained "undecided". There can be no doubt that the
B r i t i s h Government was strongly i n c l i n e d to renew the
Al l i a n c e . Various f a c t s i n British-Japanese r e l a t i o n s
a f t e r 1919 support t h i s assumption.
Anglo-Japanese co-operation i n the League of
Nations^ Assembly was looked upon by U.S.observers with
c r i t i c a l eyes. The B r i t i s h representatives i n Geneva
obviously supported the Japanese standpoint when China,
i n 1920,tried to place her demands for a r e v i s i o n of the
Shantung controversy on the Agenda. The B r i t i s h delegates
intimated to the Chinese that i t was inadvisable to raise
the question, and they i&ade i t unmistakably clear that
84 U.S. For.Rel*1920,Vol.II, p.680.
- 119 -
i f China persisted i n her demands, Great B r i t a i n would
support Japan i n accordance with the obligations incurred
under the terms of the secret Shantung agreement of 1917, 85
and of the V e r s a i l l e s Peace Treaty. American suspicion even went so f a r as to assume that a secret t r i p a r t i t e
agreement between Great B r i t a i n , Japan and France had been
concluded at P a r i s with regard to pursuing a future p o l i c y
of mutual understanding i n the whole of Eastern Asia.
The Japanese Government for th e i r part, being i n a p o s i t i o n
to use the issue of r a c i a l equality to exert pressure on
Great B r i t a i n , offered the B r i t i s h Government the diplomatic
'quid pro quo' by dropping such demands i n the League 87
Assembly.
Another example of the B r i t i s h appeasement p o l i c y
towards Japan which has to be considered i n connection with
the issue of the A l l i a n c e was the attitude of Great B r i t a i n
i n negotiating the 'Consortium Agreement' early i n 1920.
The B r i t i s h Government protested the Japanese demand for
i n s e r t i o n of the express reservation i n the agreement that
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia be exempted
from the scope of the 'Consortium',because Japan claimed
"s p e c i a l r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s " there i n accordance with 88
the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. But the U.3C.Government. i n 8 5 C o n f i d e n t i a l Memorandum ."of Mr. Th. F.Millard .Jan. 1921 .en-1 t i t l e d *The League of NaT ions!*, i n M i l l a r d .,0fc CI t. pp. 155-4. 86
Confidential Memorandum of Mr. M i l l a r d for the Chinese Peace Conference Delegation at Paris,May 8,1919,Millard, Op.Cit. p.100 f f . 87
Confidential Memorandum of Mr. M i l l a r d ,Geneva,Nov.18,1920, i n M i l l a r d Op.Cit. pp.177-8. 8 8Toynbee,A.J.Survey of International Affairs,1920-23 (pp.445 gfcgftClnstit.Qf. Interntl.Affairs,London,H.Milford O.U.P. 192"D~A
- 120 -
i t s note of March 19th, 1920, was prepared "to subscribe
to a written assurance to the eff e c t that the Japanese
Government need have no reason to apprehend that the
Consortium would dire c t any a c t i v i t i e s a f f e c t i n g the
security of the economic l i f e and national defence of 89
Japan." . This formula was ultimately accepted by the Japanese cabinet. I t i s clear from the comment of the
"Observer" upon t h i s agreement:
To expect the Japanese to abandon the po s i t i o n thus created with a l l that i t means to the economic l i f e of the nation, i s to ignore the basic r e a l i t i e s of the situation,90
that the attitude adopted by the B r i t i s h cabinet amounted
i n the f i n a l analysis to an acquiescence i n Japan's p o l i c y
on the A s i a t i c mainland, a p o l i c y based on "spec i a l rights
and i n t e r e s t s " , that i s to say, the Japanese interpreta
tion of the Lansing I s h i i Agreement. The same London
Newspaper went on:
Under these circumstances i t i s reasonable. . .ifchat a f u l l and frank discussion of the renewal of the Al l i a n c e s t a r t i n g with reciprocal recognition of accomplished facts should lead to a clear d e f i n i t i o n of Japan's p o s i t i o n i n Manchuria and Mongolia. . . 9 1
Three days l a t e r the "Observer" again r e f e r r i n g to Great
8 9Note of the B r i t i s h Government of March 19,1920, ci t e d i n Kawakami op.Git. pp 157-58. 9 0The Observer, June 16, 1921
Ibid.
- 121 -
B r i t a i n ' s and Japan's p o s i t i o n i n China remarked:
i t i s today more than ever desirable that Great B r i t a i n and Japan should renew t h e i r a l l i a n c e . 92
These statements of the "Observer" r e f l e c t e d exactly the
view of the B r i t i s h Government who always approached the
s i t u a t i o n i n China with a r e a l i s t i c outlook. Great B r i t a i n
had to accept a sort of Japanese supremacy over certain areas
i n China as a ' f a i t accompli'. She r e a l i z e d that t h i s was
one of the repercussions of the world war on the p o l i t i c a l
•status quo' i n the Far East. To prevent as f a r as possible
d i r e c t Japanese encroachments upon the B r i t i s h commercial
p o s i t i o n i n China she was forced to base her p o l i c y towards
Japan on mutual understanding. This could best be done by a
renewal of the A l l i a n c e .
In the second place the B r i t i s h Government had
always i n mind the Imperial security of the B r i t i s h Dominions.
The B r i t i s h apprehension of a Japan turning to the South
was a motive f o r Great B r i t a i n ' s y i e l d i n g as exemplified
i n the case of the 'Consortium Agreement*.
The power which was immediately affected by the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n the Far East was China. Being
without an e f f e c t i v e and centralized government s i m e the
decline of the Manchu.dynasty, and therefore i n no p o s i t i o n
to r e s i s t European economic penetration and Japan's
aggressive, expansionist p o l i c y , she had been the victim
92 Theo>Jjine 19 , 1921. Observer"
- 122 -
i n the Par Eastern diplomacy of these powers. During the
existence of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e China had suffer
ed considerable impairments to her t e r r i t o r i a l and admin
i s t r a t i v e i n t e g r i t y . The Japanese penetration of South
Manchuria, the occupation of the Liaotung peninsula, the
annexation of Korea, the Twenty-one D emands of 1915 and
the Shantung issue were,the Chinese f e l t , examples which
were the r e s u l t of the AnglogJapanese A l l i a n c e . The
A l l i a n c e , the Treaty terms of which referred d i r e c t l y
to China, was therefore thought by her to be most pre
j u d i c i a l to Chinese i n t e r e s t s . In p a r t i c u l a r a renewal of
the Treaty was interpreted by China as a B r i t i s h endorse
ment of Japan's p o l i c y of encroachments since 1915. As
soon as the intention of Great B r i t a i n and Japan to renew
the A l l i a n c e became apparent, the Chinese Government formally
protested i n 1920 against being mentioned i n the Treaty 93
without being asked previously for her consent. In a
statement to the press on June 6, 1920 the Chinese Foreign
Minister emphasized: Chinese opinion i s not unnaturally d i s t r u s t f u l of any renewal of the agreement . . .a contract regarding her a f f a i r s between other members of the Lea_gue of Nations cannot be entered into without her previous consent...94
93 U.S.For.Rel.l920,Vol.II, p.685.
94 Manchester Guardian,June 6, 1920.
- 123 -
In addition to the o f f i c i a l protests of the Chinese Govern
ment there were protest messages from Chinese public
opinion, p a r t i c u l a r l y from various f i n a n c i a l , commercial,
and banking c i r c l e s . In a memorandum submitted by these
organizations to the B r i t i s h Minister to Peking, S i r . B.
Alston, i n July 1920,reference was made to the secret Anglo-
Japanese agreement of 1917 which was alleged to be one of
the consequences of the A l l i a n c e upon China. Warning was
given that the renewal of that A l l i a n c e would "cause
Great B r i t a i n to share the d i s t r u s t of the Chinese people 95
so widely and deeply entertained towards Japan". The
same view was expressed by the well-known leader of the
democratic movement of China, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, i n an i n t e r -Q &
view with the North "China Herald" . In various messages,
amongst them a telegram from the President of the Shanghai
People's Convention, Mr. Yu Yoh Tesze, the attention of
the B r i t i s h was drawn to the possible e f f e c t s of a renewal 97
of the Treaty on English trade i n China. Similar Chinese
telegrams were dispatched to Melbourne, P a r i s , Rome, Ottawa
and e s p e c i a l l y to Washington where the Chinese asked that 98
strong pressure fe^e brought to bear on Great B r i t a i n . 9 5 t v,Id.Sept. 10,1920.Manchester Guardian , 9 6Chang,op.cit.po 213-14. 9 7The London Times,July 9,1921 and New York Evening Post June 14, 1921. 98
New York Evening Post, June 14,1921
- 124 -
In the o f f i c i a l reply of the Foreign O f f i c e the B r i t i s h Foreign
Secretary, Lord Curzon, gave pleating assurances to the
Chinese that the Imperial Cabinet i n London would take into 99
due account the Chinese standpoint. I t was true that the
Chinese objections against the renewal of the Treaty were
widely shared i n B r i t i s h c i r c l e s . The leading B r i t i s h news
papers i n the Far East, tSe "Japan Chronicle" and the "Peking
T i e n t s i n Times"^reflecting the opinion of B r i t i s h residents
i n these regions, echoed strong d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and were
also opposed to the prospect of a continued a l l i a n c e be
cause of the p r e j u d i c i a l e f f ects on B r i t i s h trade: i n C h i n a . 1 0 0
Numerous questions i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons during
the Spring and summer of 1921 expressed"the same way grave
apprehensions as to the possible reactions of China. Mr.
Kenyon (M.P.) inquired whether the opinions of the B f i t i s h
commercial c i r c l e s i n the Far East had been ascertained by
the Government. S i r W. de Frece (M.P.) intimated the
p o s s i b i l i t y of organized boycott of B r i t i s h imports of the 102
Lancashire cotton trade by the Chinese and Mr. T. Wilson
(M.P.) asked whether the Government would take steps "to
prevent anything that w i l l prejudice our trade r e l a i i ons " 103
with China being embodied i n our treaty with Japan. 9 9 T h e London Times, July 9,1921 1 0 0 M i l l a r d , op.cit. pp.452-469 Appendix 101
Gr.Brit.,Parl.Deb.5th Ser.1921,Vol.143,p.13193 102
I b i d . p. 52 1 0 3 I b i d . p.406
- 125 -
Indeed, the economic penetration of China by Japan, which
ran p a r a l l e l to p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y action had seriously
affected B r i t i s h trade i n China, i f not caused the decline
of B r i t a i n ' s previously supreme commercial p o s i t i o n there.
This was e s p e c i a l l y true as f a r as B r i t i s h export of cotton
goods was concerned. According to information given by
the Secretary f o r the S i n o - B r i t i s h trade association, Mr.
L. E. Haynes, Japanese cotton exports to China i n 1921
t o t a l l e d 70,208 p i c u l s , whilst during the same period the a 104 B r i t i s h cotton yarjr export amounted to 13,371 p i c u l s .
The following figures may i l l u s t r a t e the decline of B r i t i s h 105
export of cotton piece goods to China.
1915 1920 1921
Great B r i t a i n 11,705,426 5,784,026 3,489,093 pieces Japan 5,716,594 7,035,458 5,815,955
*
Roughly speaking these figures show that i n 1913 the B r i t i s h
cotton export to China was about twice as high as that of
Japan whilst i n 1921 the reverse was true. In view of these
economic aspects, the c r i t i c a l voices i n the Commons and i n
the B r i t i s h Far Eastern press seemed to be j u s t i f i e d . Great
B r i t a i n ' s p r i n c i p a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East were predomin
antly economic and commercial i n character. A preservation
or even consolidation of these interests was to a substantial
extent dependent on Great B r i t a i n ' s cooperation with China.
104. Manchester Guardian, Commercial,August 24,1922
1 0 5 Ibid . Sept.7, 1922
- 126 -
The B r i t i s h China expert, Mr. L. Simpson termed th i s co-106
operation as a 'sine qua non*. No less j u s t i f i c a t i o n
was contained i n those questions i n Parliament which ex
pressed apprehension of the p o l i t i c a l repercussions of the.
Anglo-Japanese alignment on B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n China, Mr.
Kenyon, for instance, asked whether the B r i t i s h Government
would be able under the a l l i a n c e " p u b l i c l y to dissociate
i t s e l f from aspects of Japanese action which do not recomm-107
end themselves to opinion i n t h i s country". To sum up the problem of Anglo-Chinese relationship
with p a r t i c u l a r reference to Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , the
B r i t i s h Government had earnestly to consider whether joint
Anglo-Japanese cooperation with regard to B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y
i n China was preferable to securing the good w i l l of China.
The a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and Japan was incompatible
with Anglo-Chinese friendship. A careful examination of the
evasive answers given by the Government i n the Commons
during A p r i l and June 1931 leads to the assumption that the
B r i t i s h Cabinet wanted to leave the f i n a l decision on the 108
renewal of the A l l i a n c e " i n suspenso"
^-Simpsdm, L. op. c i t . p. 110 107
Great Brit.Pari.Deb.5th,ser.1921,Vol.144 p.664 1 0 8 I b i d . Vol.141,pp.370 and 674
Vol.143 pp.52,112-12, 1337,1393
- 127 -
At t h i s stage of developments an event whieh
occurred i n May 1921 must be considered of as great im
portance i n r e l a t i o n to the question of the renewal of
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This was the state v i s i t
of the Japanese Crown Prince, H i r o h i t o , to London. Although
the B r i t i s h as well as the Japanese Press remarked that
no p o l i t i c a l meaning should be attached to the v i s i t , i t
was apparent from various circumstances that p o l i t i c a l
intentions were implied. I t was no accident that the high
v i s i t of a member of the Imperial Family who was accompanied
by such prominent persons as the former Japanese ambassador
to the Court of S t . James, Count Chinda, Admiral Oguri and
Lieutenant-General Nara coincided with the fact that the
renewal of the A l l i a n c e was under consideration. A tour
abroad of the Crown-Prince of Japan was unprecedented and
marked a complete break with the t r a d i t i o n of thousands of
years. This e l i c i t e d the most acrimonious opposition of
the conservative Genro and led to the resignation of Prince 109
Yamagata and Matsukata. I t was the f i r s t time i n Japan's
history that the h e i r to the Imperial throne had l e f t h i s
country. This could only be interpreted as a p o l i t i c a l
mission to be carried out by the personal representative of
the Japanese Emperor. The o f f i c i a l speeches delivered at
the State's Banquet at Buckingham Palace on May 5th,1921
i l l u s t r a t e d the p o l i t i c a l s i gnificance behind t h i s v i s i t .
Koelnische Zeitung, June 25, 1921
- 128 -
King George V, emphasized the importance of " f r i e n d l y co
operation" between Great B r i t a i n and Japan, and the Japanese
Crown-Prince eulogized the "invariable friendship" between
both nations. He hoped that the "happy relations e x i s t i n g
between our two a l l i e d countries" would continue.110
The comments of the B r i t i s h press on t h i s event unanimously
expressed a pro-Japanese f e e l i n g . "The Morning Post"
pointed out that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had proved a
great asset' i n maintaining peace i n the Far East and recomm
ended i t s renewal i n the present y e a r . 1 1 1 The "Dally Telegraph"
emphasized the peaceful character of the A l l i a n c e which
refuted the fears of the U.S.A. The paper p a r t i c u l a r l y
praised the inte r p r e t a t i o n of the A l l i a n c e given by the 112
Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , namely the protection of A u s t r a l i a . The "Daily Chronicle',' also stressing the advantage of the
A l l i a n c e , said that i t had never been directed against the 113
U.S.A. The Japanese newspaper "ASahi Shimbun" c l e a r l y
stated: .'.'the A l l i a n c e , renewed and undergoing changes and
amendments, w i l l continue to be the guiding p r i n c i p l e i n 114
p o l i t i c s and the guarantee of the peace i n the Far East."
I t was remarkable how two days a f t e r the o f f i c i a l receXption
at Buckingham Palace the B r i t i s h Government reacted on 1 1 0London Times,May 10,1921 l i : LMorning Post, May 9 , 1921 112
The Daily Telegraph May 7, 1921 113
The Daily Chronicle, May 9, 1921 114 Quoted i n the London Times, May 12, 1921
- 129 -
questions put forward i n the Commons. The Leader of the
House, Mr. Chamberlain, refused to give precise answers
to a l l questions by remarking: "I can make no further
statement.'' He announced that the problem would be trans
ferred for discussion to the forthcoming Imperial Conference. 1 1
Another example that shows how anxious the B r i t i s h Cabinet
was to avoid having the matter drawn into the public eye, was
the suggestion advanced by Colonel Wedgwood (M.P.) In the
Commons that an opportunity be provided for parliamentary
discussion of the subjects to be tabled on the agenda of the
Imperial Conference. The evasive answer of the B r i t i s h
Prime M i n i s t e r , that he would be w i l l i n g to discuss the
matter " i f there be a general desire i n the House", amounted
to a f l a t r e j e c t i o n of the proposal, p a r t i c u l a r l y the numerous
questions put i n the House wi th regard to China and the
Al l i a n c e had already indicated a general desire for such 116
discussion. Indeed, p r i o r to the Imperial Conference
no general discussion took place i n the B r i t i s h House o f
Commons, a procedure that was e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from that
adopted by the Australian and Canadian Governments. The
Dominion Parliaments were given the opportunity of di scussion
just as the Dominion Prime Minister of A u s t r a l i a and Canada
made statements i n each case expressing the G o v e r n m e n t s " " views.
To sum up , what conclusions can be drawn from the _ Great Brit.,Pari.Deb.5th Ser.1921,Vol.141,pp.1864-65
116 Ibid. Vol.142,pp.567-68
- 130 -
picture of Anglo-Japanese rela t i o n s h i p from 1919 t i l l
June 1921? The motives which influenced the B r i t i s h
Cabinet i n i t s considerations of a renewal or non renewal
of the A l l i a n c e have been discussed and the pros and cons
underlying this question examined. The objections to a
renewal did carry, no doubt, •-; considerable weight; the
complete surrender of B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n China to Japan's
w i l l which made the B r i t i s h Government unable to dissociate
i t s e l f from Japanese actions that were p r e j u d i c i a l to
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ; the probable danger of an estrangement
of China which would have had serious e f f e c t s on B r i t i s h
trade i n China, and l a s t , but not l e a s t , the violent anta
gonism, of the U. S. A. which might r e s u l t i n most serious
repercussions on Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . In spite of
a l l that, the Imperial Government seemed to be strongly '
i n c l i n e d i n the early summer of 1921 to renew the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e , primarily f o r reasons of Imperial security.
She hoped that a continued A l l i a n c e would serve as an
instrument by which a c o n t r o l l i n g and restraining influence
on Japanese foreign p o l i c y could be exercised. Considered
under these aspects the A l l i a n c e had become a kind of
necessary e v i l to Great B r i t a i n .
The approaching date of the expiration of the
A l l i a n c e i n July 1921 required that an immediate decision
- 131 -
be taken by the B r i t i s h Cabinet. This was, however, only
possible a f t e r f u l l consultation with the Prime Ministers •
of the Dominion Governments, because the issue at stake
was a matter that affected, the whole of the B r i t i s h Empire.
This leads to the consideration of the"imperial Conference"
held i n June and July 1921 i n London, and of i t s implications
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
- 132 8
CHAPTER IY
THE DOMINIONS, THE ANGLO-JAPANESE
ALLIANCE AND THE "IMPERIAL CONFERENCE*' OF 1921
As long as the B r i t i s h Government i n London ex
cl u s i v e l y determined the course of the foreign p o l i c y of
the B r i t i s h Empire as one l e g a l e n t i t y , the B r i t i s h Dom
inions had l i t t l e d irect influence on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y
towards Japan. As a r e s u l t , however, of the Dominions*
contribution to the war e f f o r t s , and in consequence of
Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference i n 1917J by
which the Dominions were granted an "adequate voice in foreign
p o l i c y " ) a fundamental change took place i n the inte r n a t i o n a l
structure of the B r i t i s h Empire. This meant that the Im
p e r i a l Cabinet had to take into due consideration the
s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s of the Dominions towards the P a c i f i c
problem as constituted by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This,
problem v i t a l l y affected the Dominions of A u s t r a l i a , New
Zealand and Canada. The"lmperlal Conference"of 1 9 2 1 1 was
convened on the i n i t i a t i v e of the Australian Prime Minister,
"'"Officially c a l l e d : "Conf erence of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions and India."cf. Conference of Prime Minister and Representatives of the United Kingdom,I'ne Dominions and India ( June ,July ,August ,ival)summary of Proceedings and Documents presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.Cmd.1474,London,H.M.St.0.1921,(THereafter referred to as Cmd.1474.)
- 133 -
Mr. Hughes, who urged In October 1920 i n a telegram to
the B r i t i s h Prime Minister, that a joint p o l i c y of Great
B r i t a i n and the Dominions with the regard to the P a c i f i c 2
should be l a i d down at such a conference. The r e s u l t
was that i n December 1920 Mr. Lloyd George informed the
House of Commons that a meeting of the Prime Ministers
of the B r i t i s h Empire was to be^ield i n June 1921. He
announced that action concerning the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e would be taken only a f t e r f u l l consultation 3
with the Dominion Governments. This assurance to the Dominions was reiterated by the Leader of the House, Mr. Chamberlain, i n May and June 1921, when he stated that the
United Kingdom Cabinet would take no decision before having 4
requested the '•advice'' of the Dominions. The attitude
of the United Kingdom Government as expressed by Mr. Chamber
l a i n has to be noted, because i t provided the B r i t i s h "inter
pretation of what an "adequate voice i n foreign p o l i c y " meant.
Although Mr. Lloyd George, declared i n h i s opening speech at
the*Imperial Conference* i n June 1921 that the Dominions had
achieved " f u l l national Status" and stood "beside the United
Kingdom as equal partners" , the B r i t i s h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
an "adequate voice", as conferred upon the Dominions by the
Imperial War Conference i n 1917, was that the Dominion Gov-
ernments were to exert an advlsary influence on the United ^Commonwealth of Australia,Parl.Deb.,1920/21,Vol.XCV,p.7719 Cf. The London Times, Dec.24,1920
4Gr.Brit.,Pari.Deb.,5th Ser.1921,Vol.142,p.844 and p.1681 5 Cmd.1474 p.14
- 134 -
Kingdom Cabinet before i t took the f i n a l decision i n a
matter of foreign p o l i c y . Whilst t h i s was also the i n t e r
pretation by the Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , the Canadian
conception expressed by the attitude of the Canadian Prime
M i n i s t e r , Arthur Meighen, d i f f e r e d greatly from the
B r i t i s h and Australian view. The P a c i f i c problem or more
accurately, the question of the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e , as i t was tabled on the agenda of the
Imperial Conference'*, presented a test-case i n which, f o r
the f i r s t time, the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of Resolution IX
of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 Was to be experienced.
Like a mirror t h i s question of high p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t e d the
degree of autonomy the Dominions had acquired a f t e r the war.
To understand the Australian and New Zealand stand
point i n the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e , i t i s expedient to r e c a l l the determining factors
of A u s t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's foreign p o l i c y . F i r s t l y ,
owing to t h e i r geographical p o s i t i o n i n the vastness of the
P a c i f i c Ocean the security of the Dominions was dependent
upon Empire communications, and, on the protection of the
B r i t i s h Royal Navy. Secondly, the supreme and fundamental
p r i n c i p l e of Aus t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's p o l i c y was the
absolute maintenance of what i s c a l l e d "White '-e^^p-Policy".
I t was the constant determination of these Dominions
situated on the very edge of Asia and immediately exposed
to the o r i e n t a l immigration from China and Japan, to build
- 135 -
up - according to the New Zealand Minister of Education,-
Mr. Parr,-"a great European race i n A u s t r a l i a and New 6
Zealand". The t h i r d factor of decisive influence was that
A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand were d i r e c t l y exposed to the threat
of the r i s i n g Japanese naval power and to the danger of a
Japanese expansion to the South. Pinal l y i t may be mentioned
that A u s t r a l i a had a v i t a l i n t e r e s t i n maintaining good trade
r e l a t i o n s with Japan because Australia's wool export industry 7
was dependent on the Japanese market. This factor was to play
an even more important role i n Australian p o l i c y In the 1930s.
A l l these factors had reactions on the attitude of both Dom
inions towards the possible renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
As w i l l be r e c a l l e d , Japan's foreign p o l i c y a f t e r
1918 In connection with her large scale naval programme and
her expansion into the P a c i f i c Ocean by the occupation of
the former German South Sea Islands indicated the tendency
of a Japanese expansion to the South. This danger was c l e a r l y
recognized i n both chambers of the Australian Parliament.
Senator Needham declared i n the l a t e summer of 1919 that
"because the Marshall and Caroline Islands are to be the
property of Japan, our White A u s t r a l i a P o l i c y i s not safe. . . 6 New Zealand,Pari.Deb.4th Sess.1922,Vol.196,p.497,Cf.also
Mr.Massey's statement at the occasion of the 2nd reading of the New Zealand Immigration R e s t r i c t i o n B i l l 1920,quoted i n Dewey, A.G., The Dominions and Diplomacy, London,Longmans, Green and Comp. 1929, Vol.11, p.65.
Cf.King H a l l St., op.cit. p.667
- 136 -
i n Japan I see a menace to A u s t r a l i a . . . we have to g
watch Japan. . . " The leader of the Federal Country-
Party, Dr. Earle Page, pointing out the r i s e of Japan, her 9
Pan-Asiatic programme and her trend southwards, anxiously
intimated that serious future c o n f l i c t s may r i s e "possibly
from the exclusion of al i e n s from these t e r r i t o r i e s , from t h i s continent or from our treatment of their coloured
lo people. . ." The only e f f e c t i v e means of protection
against the Japanese p e r i l was by a strong Imperial navy
i n the P a c i f i c as had been repeatedly demanded by Aus t r a l i a
and New Zealand statesmen i n the pre-war years. But, as
haw been seen, the B r i t i s h naval p o s i t i o n i n those waters
had decreased i n strength since the World War. The plan
for strong united Imperial f l e e t i n the P a c i f i c had been
e n t i r e l y abandoned. Future naval p o l i c y was, according to a
statement from the B r i t i s h Admiralty, based on "the develop
ment of Dominion Navies" under the command of the i r own
o f f i c e r s , and "each separate Navy being the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
of i t s own Government". At the Imperial Conference of
1921 a resolution was passed that each Dominion Earli-ament Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a Parl.Deb.1919 Vol.LXXXIX pp.12655
& 11337 9 Ibid. 1920/21, Vol. XCI, p.362 10
Ibid. 1921, Vol.XGVII, ppll697 11
Cf.Memorandum Supplemental to the Explanatory Statement of the Navy Estimates, 1921/22, by Lord Lee,March 12 ,1921, cited i n Brassey, op.cit. 1921/22 p.107
- 137 -
alone should decide on methods and expense of naval co-12
operation. This meant that A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand had,
to a considerable extent, to bear the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r t h e i r naval defence, including, the high f i n a n c i a l burden
of naval expenditures. As Great B r i t a i n was deeply indebted
to the U. S . f i n a n c i a l l y the Dominions could not expect
any economic and f i n a n c i a l aid from the United Kingdom
Government •, In a naval race of the great powers i n the
P a c i f i c , the p o s i t i o n of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand would
thus have become disastrous. For these reasons A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand welcomed a strong U. S. Navy as a counter
balance against the rapidly growing Japanese f l e e t . But
the withdrawal of U. S. p o l i c y into i s o l a t i o n a f t e r 1919
and the tendency of the United States to desist from any
entangling a l l i a n c e s eliminated the prospect of a close
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y cooperation between the P a c i f i c
Dominions and the U. S . R.Australia and New Zealand were
therefore under the necessity to safeguard theLr security
by an understanding with Japan h e r s e l f which meant con
tinuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The Australian
Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Hughes, r e a l i s t i c a l l y recognized
Aus t r a l i a ' s s i t u a t i o n by stating i n the Australian House Cmd. 1474, p.6
- 138 -
of Representatives i n A p r i l 1921:
i f we cannot secure a s a t i s f a c t o r y treaty then i t i s obvious that any adequate scheme of naval defence w i l l involve us i n much greater expenditures, and at ahtime when our resources are strained to the utmost. . . 13.
The same r e a l i s t i c argument was advanced by Dr.Earle Page
who advocated a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e as 14
a substitute for the P a c i f i c f l e e t .
A u s t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's security was possibly
menaced by Japan. In the absence of any other means,
however, r e a l security could be only gained by a contin
uation of the A l l i a n c e with Japan, although both Dominions
because of the r a c i a l immigration question were extremely
reluctant to become too dependent on Japan. I t ?ras f u l l y
appreciated i n A u s t r a l i a that the A l l i a n c e had i t s d i s -
advantages and that Japan was by no means a f r i e n d l y
a l l y "by nature", to use Commander B e l l a i r ' s phraseology,
but rather a perilous a l l y "by necessity". A u s t r a l i a and
New Zealand thus v a c i l l a t e d between " S c y l l a and Charybdis" ,
between the fear from a p o t e n t i a l Japanese aggression and
the need f o r Japan's good w i l l . This explains Mr.Hughes'
13Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 Vol.XCIV p.7269. 1 4 I b i d . pp.7398/99 15
Cf. ,for example, Ibid. Vol. XCYI pp.9382/84.
- 139 -
view that the Treaty "means everything to us". He frankly
admitted, i n the House of Representatives on A p r i l 4, 1921:
No man can deny that i s a thing more precious than rubies that we -should have an a l l i a n c e with the greatest power i n the East. . .If we are asked are we i n favour of a renewal of that Treaty. . . we are. 16
Many Australians did not f e e l that the .-maintenance of a
White A u s t r a l i a P o l i c y would necessarily be impaired by a
renewal of the Treaty. On the contrary, even the leader
of the opposition i n the Australian Parliament, Mr. Tudor,
expressed the opinion that a renewal of the a l l i a n c e would 17
serve the preservation of White A u s t r a l i a P o l i c y . Other
members of the House who supported a Treaty renewal did so on condition that the renewal would not impair the p r i n c i p l e
18 of White A u s t r a l i a . The opposition against the renewal
and the r e a l d i f f i c u l t y arose out of the attitude of the
United States. There was unanimity of opinion i n both the
Australian House of Representatives and the Senate that no renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could take place
19 at the p r i c e of antagonizing and estranging the U.S.A.
Senator Barkhap, a declared opponent of the A l l i a n c e stated
i n the Australian Senate i n June 1921: 1Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 Vol.XCIV p.7267-17
i b i d , pp.7389 ,7391,7392 1 8 i b i d . pp.7268,7390,7407 1 9 i b i d . Vol.XCV pp.7646 ,7650 ,7652 ,7657
- 140 -
America i s as much a daughter nation of the United Kingdom as i s A u s t r a l i a ; . . . i t i s a most dangerous thing for us to renew the A l l i a n c e with Japah . . . I r e a l l y believe that i t would be f a t a l before many decades to the continued existence of the B r i t i s h Empire i f we were to renew the Al l i a n c e with Japan or a c t i v e l y operate i t i n defiance of the opinion
. of the people of the U. S. A. . . .20
Numerous statements indicated that sentiment i n favour of
drawing closer the bonds between the great branches of the
Anglo-Saxon race was rather prevalent i n Au s t r a l i a . The
dilemma which was one not only f o r A u s t r a l i a but f o r the
whole of the B r i t i s h Empire was very c l e a r l y recognized by
Mr. Hughes, when he said: "Our i n t e r e s t , our safety l i e s
i n a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e Treaty. Yet 21
that Treaty i s anathema to the Americans." Mr. Hughes,
however, believed i n bringing about an easy solution by
suggesting a modification of the terms of the A l l i a n c e to
make i t acceptable to Great B r i t a i n , the U.S.A., Japan
and A u s t r a l i a . He was of the opinion that A u s t r a l i a should
play the role of an intermediator i n s e t t l i n g the American-
Japanese differences and i n fin d i n g a "modus vivendi" 22
as f a r as the Treaty renewal was concerned. This opinion
was to prove wrong. The severe c r i t i c i s m of the Labour
•SO^ommonweaIth^^ A u s ^ i a .Pari. Deb. 1920/21 ~
21 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 Yol.XCIY
pp.7267/68 22
Ibid, pp.7268
- 141 -
Opposition, notably of the Deputy Leader of the Opposition,
Mr. Ryan, resulted from the fear of antagonizing the U. S.R.
and from a certa i n tendency to accentuate the Dominion's
autonomy i n foreign p o l i c y . The j u d i c i a l dispute between
the Australian Prime Minister and the Deputy Leader of the
Opposition over the extent to which A u s t r a l i a would be
bound by the A l l i a n c e T r e a t y , i f i t were renewed by the
United Kingdom Government without A u s t r a l i a ' s approval of
the r a t i f i c a t i o n , disclosed that the Australian Prime
Minister was not i n c l i n e d to an in t e r p r e t a t i o n of Resolution
IX of 1917 which gave i t more than an advisory character.
Requesting f u l l authority from the Dominion Parliament f o r
his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the forthcoming"imperial Conference
i n London, Mr. Hughes deliberately made a d i s t i n c t i o n
between decisions on the issue of naval expenditures which
were i n any case subject to the approval by the Australian
Parliament.jand the matter of the Treaty renewal. Whereas
i n the f i r s t case Mr. Hughes gave the assurance that A u s t r a l i a
would not be committed at the Conference to any expenditure 23
without Parliamentary approval he evaded ''•faffing the same
assurance with regard to the subject of foreign p o l i c y .
When being asked by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Tudor,
to give a precise statement also with regard to the A l l i a n c e
23 Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1920/21, Vol.XCIV
p.7269 and Vol.XCVII'p.11630
- 142 -
Treaty Mr. Hughes made i t unmistakably clear:
the only thing I asked t h i s Parliament for authority to do, without further reference to Parliament }is to renew the Anglo-Japanese Treaty i n some form acceptable to Great B r i t a i n , to Japan, to A u s t r a l i a , • and i f possible to the U.S.A., provided that no renewal s h a l l impair the p r i n c i p l e of White A u s t r a l i a . I s h a l l not subscribe to anything that might do that. and should bring the Treaty here were i t attempted. 2 4
When th i s statement i s considered i n conjunction with
another one which read:
The question of the renewal of the Treaty . . . i s . . . a matter upon which our voice ought to be heard. . .we have been i n v i t e d to express our opinion 25
Mr. Hughes' conception of Dominion autonomy, and p a r t i c u l a r
l y h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what was meant by an "adequate
voice i n foreign p o l i c y " becomes obvious. He looked upon
the wording of Resolution IX not as f a c i l i t a t i n g a
departure from a united Empire p o l i c y directed by the
Imperial Government i n London, but as conferring upon the
Dominion Governments the right to express t h e i r views on
foreign p o l i c y , which p o l i c y - i n the f i n a l analysis -
remained In the scope of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and function of
the United Kingdom Government. Mr. Hughes believed that
24 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 -Hwrd-. Vol. XCIV, p. 7390
25 I b i d . Vol. XCV, p.7719
- 143 -
the Australian Parliament could only refuse to r a t i f y
the Treaty en-ly i f Australia's "sacred p r i n c i p l e " of w . ...... Policy"
• "Whi t el s'±fca-lliai*«y' "was s a c r i f i c e d , but t h i s was a subject
of domestic and i n t e r n a l rather than of foreign p o l i c y .
When the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ryan,
moved that the Aus t r a l i a n Prime Minister at the forthcoming
Imperial Conference should not be empowered to commit
A u s t r a l i a to any agreement or understanding except on
the condition "that the same s h a l l be subject to the 2fi
approval and r a t i f i c a t i o n of the people of A u s t r a l i a " , and when he urged that^referendum be held on the question
27 of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty } he met with the strongest dissent from the Australian Prime Minister.
Mr. Hughes emphatically denied that the Australian
Government possessed f i n a l treaty-making power which
rested exclusively with the United Kingdom Government.
According to him the AngloSJapanese Treaty was, j u r i d i c a l l y
speaking, one concluded between the United Kingdom Government 28
and the Japanese Government. Refuting the Opposition's
26 Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1921/21 Vol.XCV, p.7635
27 Ibid. p.7631.
28 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a Pari.Deb.1920/21,Vol.XCV,p.7719
- 144 -
view that the Dominion had the f u l l sovereignty to make
the j u r i d i c a l v a l i d i t y of a p o l i t i c a l treaty dependent
on the r a t i f i c a t i o n by the Dominion Parliament, Mr. Hughes
even went so f a r as to say that A u s t r a l i a was e n t i r e l y
subject to the l e g i s l a t i o n enacted by the B r i t i s h House 29
of Parliament. Hereby the Australian Prime Mi n i s t e r r
professed without reservation his b e l i e f that the Dominion
Government was f u l l y bound by the Colonial Laws V a l i d i t y
Act of 1865. Mr. Hughes,rwas undoubtedly right) since the
Colonial Laws V a l i d i t y Act was s t i l l e f f e c t i v e and was not
repealed u n t i l 1931 under the terms of the Statute of West
minster. The Australian Prime Minister smmmarized therefore
h i s standpoint by stating c l e a r l y : I f our people do not approve that w i l l not a l t e r matters by one thousandth part of an inch. . . i f t h i s Parliament. . . rej e c t s the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, then l e t i t do so. . . The Treaty w i l l be i n force. . . i t w i l l make no difference. . . 0
This "fidus Achates" - attitude towards the impe r i a l Cabinet
was shared wholeheartedly by New Zealand. The Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Mr. Massey, advocated i n the New Zealand
Parliament i n March 1921 the establishment of an Imperial
29 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a ,Pari .Deb. 1920/21 Vol.XCV. Ibid. p.7719 and Vol.XCVII, p.11642
30 . • Commonwealth of Au s t r a l i a Pari.Deb.1920/21,Vol.XCV
p.772/22. Consequently Mr. Ryan's Proposal was rejected by a vote of 41;23
- 145 -
Executive headed by. the B r i t i s h Prime Minster, an ex
ecutive which was to be concerned with carrying out a 31
centralized foreign p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h Empire. The
general f e e l i n g i n New Zealand was one of unqualified l o y a l t y
towards Great B r i t a i n and the cause of the Empire; i t was
strongly opposed to any new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Dominion
Status a f t e r 1919 which might claim complete independence
of the Dominions. Just before Mr. Massey l e f t f o r the
"imperial Conference" an "Open Letter from the Wellington
Round Table Group to the Parliament of New Zealand" was
tabled i n the New Zealand Parliament. In t h i s l e t t e r anxiety
was expressed that the unity of the Empire was threatened
by c e n t r i f u g a l tendencies i n Dominion p o l i t i c s . 3 2 In accord
ance wJLth t h i s f e e l i n g Mr. Massey proclaimed at the*Imperial
Conference unreserved l o y a l t y to the Empire.
I t i s evident what stood behind t h i s Australian and
New Zealand attitude. I t was the b e l i e f of both the Australian
31
Cf.The Round Table 1920/21 P.968.
Ibid, pp.974-75 3 3
Cmd. 1474, p.27
- 146 -
and the New Zealand Government that the B r i t i s h Empire was
one i n d i v i s i b l e entity with one united foreign p o l i c y . This
idea culminated i n Mr. Hughes' statement made i n the Australian
House of Representatives on A p r i l 22, 1921 with reference to
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty Alliance:. "-\
... Our l i a b i l i t y i n regard to wars i n which B r i t a i n i s involved arises not out of any t r e a t i e s but out of our r e l a t i o n s to B r i t a i n and to the Empire generally. Whei. B r i t a i n goes to war then, ipso facto, we are at war also . . . .34
P r e c i s e l y the same view was expressed by the Prime Minister
of New Zealand at the Imperial Conference of 1921. The
reason, however, why A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand firm l y adhered
to the p r i n c i p l e of Imperial unity, i f not c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,
originated, as previously pointed out, from t h e i r insular
p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c Ocean on the borders of Eastern Asia.
A u s t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's self-preservation depended
e n t i r e l y upon the .existence of the B r i t i s h Empire. In the
e f f i c i e n c y of t h i s Empire and of Imperial Defence rested
the security of Australia's and New Zealand's independence
as Dominions. This b r i e f review of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue
provides an understanding of the close association of both
Dominion Governments with the B r i t i s h view on the question
of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . I t was i n d i r e c t
34 , Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb. 1920/21 Vol.XCV p.7718
35 Cmd. 1474 p.27
- 147 -
contrast to the Canadian attitude.
At the Imperial Conference i n London which began on
July 20, 1921, the Prime Ministers of A u s t r a l i a and New
Zealand put forward th e i r views on the issues. In h i s open
ing speech Mr. Hughes called the case for the renewal "very
strong. . . i f not. . . overwhelming" 3 6 He emphasized
that to A u s t r a l i a the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had a "special
s i g n i f i c a n c e " . .The Australian main argument f o r favouring
a renewal was the same as that ascribed to; the B r i t i s h Govern
ment i n her p o l i c y towards Japan since 1919, namely that a
continuation of the Al l i a n c e offered the p o s s i b i l i t y to
exercise a greater influence on Japan's p o l i c y and to impose
r e s t r a i n t s on her. But he r e a l i z e d that because of the op
po s i t i o n of the United States of America the Treaty could
not be renewed i n i t s o r i g i n a l form. The Australian Prime
Minister l a i d i t down as a "sine qua non" that any renewed
treaty with Japan had to exclude any p o s s i b i l i t y of war with 37
the United States i n order to be sa t i s f a c t o r y to A u s t r a l i a .
Cmd. 1474, pp.19-20
37 Ibid.
- 148 -
Mr. Hughes saw, therefore, the i d e a l solution i n a
broadening of the b i l a t e r a l Treaty A l l i a n c e into a t r i
p a r t i t e a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n , the United States
and Japan.
On the second day of the Conference he proposed a
special conference of these three powers at which i t should
be discussed how the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could be sup-38
planted by a t r i p a r t i t e treaty. In case, however, that
such an agreement should f a i l he strongly urged the contin
uation of the b i l a t e r a l pact aft e r the views of the United
States of America had been ascertained. Under no circumstances
was the Australian Prime Minister i n c l i n e d to renounce the
a l l i a n c e with Japan. On the same day Mr. Hughes suggested
a disarmament conference of Great B r i t a i n , United States of
America, Japan and France to stop "naval construction and 39
naval expenditure." Both proposals were t y p i c a l of the
Australian standpoint. A u s t r a l i a ' s security required thait
the powers composing the ' P a c i f i c Triangle' , that i s to say,
Japan, the United States of America and the B r i t i s h Empire,
cooperatedwith each other instead of antagonizing each other.
The former Australian Minister of Defence, Senator E. D. 38
Commonwealth of Australia,Parl.Deb.1920/21,Vol.XCVTI pp.11636-37 39 I b i d .
- 149 -
M i l l e n , therefore advocated an understanding between Great
B r i t a i n , Japan and the United States of America as the "Ideal" 40
of A u s t r a l i a . A naval race i n the P a c i f i c which would undoubtedly have resulted from a serious disruption i n the
' P a c i f i c Triangle', whether caused either by the abrogation.
of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e or the deep d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
of the United States of America would have imposed upon
A u s t r a l i a i n t o l e r a b l e expenditures. For the same reasons
as A u s t r a l i a , Mr. Massey supported wholeheartedly the renew-41
a l of the A l l i a n c e . As Mr. Massey had already declared
In May 1921 i n V i c t o r i a , B. C. ". . .we have much to gain
and hothing to lose by a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
Treaty." 42 He supported Mr. Hughes' suggestion for an a l l i a n c e
with the United States of America f u l l y recognizing that 43
future world peace lay i n close Anglo-American relations.
The suggested solution by the Prime Ministers of A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand were based on misinterpretation of United
States p o l i c y . No Dominion was i n a better p o s i t i o n to
understand the United States of America than Canada. Her 40 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21
1*41.Vol.XCVI, P.9390. 4 1Cmd. 1474, pp. 30,31. 42
Canadian Annual Review, 1921 p.97 43
Cmd. 1474, p.30.
- 150 -
attitude towards the A l l i a n c e must therefore now be dis
cussed.
From the very beginning the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
constituted a matter of serious concern p a r t i c u l a r l y for
Canada f o r two main reasons - the immigration problem and
Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . As far as Japanese immigration
into B r i t i s h Columbia was concerned the P r o v i n c i a l Govern
ment and the l o c a l population had been strongly opposed 44
to the o r i e n t a l i n f l u x since the early eighteen-nineties. The P r o v i n c i a l Government as well as the Federal Government
were i n complete accord that the p r i n c i p l e of "White - WPIa-'
p o l i c y " as i t was advocated by A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, 45
should be maintained by Canada. This task however, was
greatly complicated by the existence of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e . Whilst Canada t r i e d to deal with the immigration
question by anti-Japanese immigration acts passed i n the
B. C. Le g i s l a t u r e , the B r i t i s h Government was anxious to
maintain c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s between the Empire and Japan,
and to avoid any f r i c t i o n s with lapan which might res u l t
from Canada's attitude. Such measures might have seriously
affected, i f not jeopardized the foundation of B r i t i s h
foreign p o l i c y , the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Thus, v i t a l
Canadian i n t e r e s t s were i n contradiction to B r i t i s h Empire
•4'4 Woodsworth, Ch.G. Canada and the Orient, Toronto, The
Macmillan Company of Canada Ximited,1941, pp.49 f f . 45
Speech by S i r Robert Borden i n Vancouver,Sept.24,1907 quoted i n Borden, R.L. The Question of Oriental Immigration, Speeches 1907 and 1908, p$3,ff,
- 151 -
po l i c y . Canada's Federal Government i n disallowing a n t i -
immigration acts of the B, C. Legislature under the terms
of the B.N. A. Act.46 was compelled to make s a c r i f i c e s
on behalf of Great B r i t a i n and for the sake of a united
Empire p o l i c y . Consequently, strong opposition was aroused
amonst the population of B r i t i s h Columbia, i n the Canadian 47
Parliament, as well as i n Government c i r c l e s . In 1908, for Instance, when Mr. Lem&ix's Gentlemen's Agreement was
debated in. the'Canadian House of Commons, the French Canadian
N a t i o n a l i s t , Mr. Armand. Lavergne, stated:
I t seems to me that we have been s a c r i f i c i n g Canadian i n t e r e s t s for the Imperial p o l i c y of Great B r i t a i n , for the sake of an a l l y of Great B r i t a i n , which a l l y may appear i n the future as a most dangerous enemy.^8
S i r Robert Borden i n attacking the L a u r i e r ^ ^ ^ o f n o n t h i s
question urged i n a speech(delivered i n Vancouver i n 1907,
that Canada must be accorded perfect and. unimpaired freedom
of action as f a r as the o r i e n t a l immigration problem was 49
concerned. In the House of Commons he emphasized i n 1908:
Canada ought not to enter into any treaty engagement which would prevent the necessary and e f f e c t i v e cont r o l of immigration. Oriental immigration i s a question of v i t a l importance not only to B.C. but to the whole of the Dominion. 0
4 6B.N.A.Act of 1867, sec.132. 47
Woodsworth,0p.cit.passim,particularly pp.55-62,72-87 and Lower,A.R.M. Canada and the Far East-1940.International Secretariat,I.P.R.,New York 1940 pp.68-70 48
quoted from Woodsworth op.cit. p.90 I
50, 4 9Borden, op.cit. pp.3 f f . 'Ibid, p.30
- 152 -
These examples may be s u f f i c i e n t to point out the d i f f i c u l t y
with T/hich the Canadian Government was confronted: v i t a l
domestic i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t e d with Empire p o l i c y as directed
from London. At that time, however, Canada's l e g a l p o s i t i o n
i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and international law had not yet advanced
to the stage which would have enabled the Dominion to i n s i s t
on i t s own r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s . I t had to comply with the
dominating course of foreign p o l i c y as pursued by the B r i t i s h
Foreign O f f i c e . That was Canada's contribution to Empire
po l i c y ; B r i t i s h Columbia had, i n a c e r t a i n sense, to pay
the p r i c e for Imperial security. V i t a l Canadian int e r e s t s
were strongly concerned but not taken into account by the
B r i t i s h Government. I t was obviously & B r i t i s h foreign
P o l i c y rather than >ar s p e c i f i c Canadian foreign p o l i c y executed
i n Ottawa. Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of
1917, however, marked the beginning of a new era i n the con
s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the B r i t i s h Dominions, as pointed
out already. Canada took the lead i n the new evolution.
The issue of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e proved
the occasion when Canada for the f i r s t time practised an
i n d i v i d u a l and s p e c i f i c Canadian foreign p o l i c y . Before
analysing the o f f i c i a l attitude of the Canadian Cabinet and
of Prime Minister Meighen i n p a r t i c u l a r , the general f e e l i n g
- 153 -
of Canadian public opinion has to be elucidated b r i e f l y .
The overwhelming majority of the Canadian press
strongly opposed any renewal of the Treaty with Japan. The
"Toronto Globe" f o r instance drew attention as early as
January, 1920 to the fact that the r i s e of Japanese power
i n the Far East and the Japanese immigration on the P a c i f i c
coast of the North American Continent had led to serious
f r i c t i o n between the United States and Japan, and that
Canada, i n the case of a c o n f l i c t , would stand side by 51
side with the United States instead of aiding Japan.
With reference to o r i e n t a l immigration, the newspaper
declared i n 192:1 that Canada and the United States ?rould
object to any treaty which "would enable Japanese s e t t l e r s
to increase t h e i r already important holdings of f e r t i l e
land i n C a l i f o r n i a , Oregon, Washington and B r i t i s h Columbia.
The: same opposition v/as voiced by such other leading news
papers as the "Winnipeg Free Press", and the "Ottawa Journal
The best comment which summarizes the problem Canada was faced with, came from the "Toronto Star" which stated on _
Cf."Japan Advertiser" Jan.1,1920 52
Quoted from the "London Times" October 28,19 21. 5^
Brebner ,J.B. ,Canada , the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and the Washington Conference.Political Science Quarterly Vol.L, 1935, pp.49-50
- 154 -
May 21:
Canada should oppose the renewal of that Treaty and her supreme i n t e r e s t i n the matter should be recognized and deferred to . . . , ^
Prime Minister Meighen, being f u l l y aware that
Canadian i n t e r e s t and Empire unity were at stake, took the
i n i t i a t i v e i n seeking a sat i s f a c t o r y solution. Conservative
i n h i s p o l i t i c a l outlook he had always professed h i s l o y a l t y
to the B r i t i s h Crown and adhered to the p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h 55
leadership i n -Foreign p o l i c y . As Prime Minister of Canada he f u l l y r e a l i z e d , however, that Canadian p o l i c y , because of
Canada's p o s i t i o n on the North American Continent, was
subject to i t s own r u l e s , that i t faced a dual pos i t i o n ; i t
looked not only towards Great B r i t a i n and the B r i t i s h Empire,
but also towards the great neighbour, the United States ; Allegiance to i t s ' common Sovereign and our membership i n the Empire are fundamental; but geographical s i t u a t i o n , our s o c i a l p o s i t i o n our economic h e r i tage and development r a i s e problems which are not i d e n t i c a l with those which confront the motherland or any other Dominion. 56
Whereas the Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Hughes, interpreted
Resolution IS as meaning that A u s t r a l i a ' s "voice ought to be
heard" the Canadian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was absolutely d i f f e r e n t
Quoted from the Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs,1921 p.102 (hereafter referred to as Canad.An.Rev.)
, A.Meighen .Oversea Addresses June-July 1921 ,Toronto^x: The Musson Book Co.Ltd.1921, pp.21,23,29/31,and Brebner, op.cit . pp49. 56 Meighen,op cit.pp37(statement Sir.Arthur Meighen's at the
Dominion Day Dinner i n London July 1,1921)
- 1 5 5 -
going f a r beyond th i s r e s t r i c t i v e interpretation. The Cana
dian Prime Minister at th££ "Imperial Conference" of .1921
p e r s i s t e n t l y held the opinion that the Canadian voice should
p r e v a i l i n proportion to the i n t e n s i t y with which a problem 5 7 a
ofriforeign p o l i c y affected Canadian int e r e s t s . As one of
the leading statesmen, Mr. Arthur Meighen was the f i r s t to
r e a l i z e the imminent importance of the fact that as a r e s u l t
of World War I the centre of gravity i n world p o l i t i c s > 5 7 b
had s h i f t e d from Europe to the P a c i f i c , where Canada,
sharing with the United States of America the dominating
p o s i t i o n on the Eastern side of the Ocean, had a v i t a l
i n t e r e s t . Thus as early as February 1?21, Mr. Meighen
communicated through the Department of External A f f a i r s with
the B r i t i s h Government. Expressing the view that the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e should not be renewed as a b i l a t e r a l pact,
he suggested that the Canadian Government should approach
the TP. S. Government i n order to ascertain the p o s s i b i l i t y
of a P a c i f i c conference with the B r i t i s h Empire, the United 5 8
States, Japan and China. This proposal appeared to him
to be the best opportunity to'iarrive at a solution s a t i s
factory to a l l the nations whose inte r e s t s were involved.
In other words, i t was to reconcile the diverging interests
of the members within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and par t i c u
l a r l y to s a t i s f y at the same time the United States of America. 5 7 a
Mr. Meighen was considerably influenced by the Legal Adviser to the Canadian Department of External A f f a i r s , Mfl.L.C.Christie, who served on the s e c r e t a r i a l s t a f f of the Conference. Mr. C h r i s t i e had played an eminent role i n drafting Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917^-Brebner. OP. c i t . p . 5 0 .
5 7 bMeighen, OP. c i t . p. 2 5 ,
5 8 XJanad. jgy+Rer, 1921 pp 1 0 2 - 1 0 5 , and B^ebner. op. c i t. pp. 55 f f a. ' • .. _ .
- 156 -
• Prime Mini ster .Meighen, practised a p o l i c y of utmost
caution and reserve. On March 21, he announced i n the
Commons that i n July'a meeting of the Prime Ministers of
the Commonwealth-would he held and that for t h i s purpose
his Government would be prepared to f a c i l i t a t e a preceding
discussion i n the Canadian Parliament. But he refused to •'
make any commitment i n that respect i n advance of the « . »59 Imperial Conference
The Parliamentary Debate, which dealt with the
question of the A l l i a n c e took place on A p r i l 27th. Again
the Canadian Prime Minister reacted rather c a r e f u l l y , saying
that any o f f i c i a l expression of opinion at the present moment
before the*Imperial Conference" had opened would prove de-
trimental to a successful solution. There were, however,
two things which he most emphatically pointed out, one
p o l i t i c a l , the other j u r i d i c a l . The question of the renewal
of the A l l i a n c e was of paramount importance to Canada and
Canadian interest,and arose i n a "very high degree" out of
the i n t e r e s t of the United States i n t h i s question , because
Canada, as a part of the B r i t i s h Empire, stood between
Great B r i t a i n and the United States. Therefore, the question 59
Canada,Parilament,House of Commons.Official Report of Debates Ottawa, King's. Printer,1921 (Hereafter referred to as Canada, Pari.Deb.) Vol. 146,p<.564. 60
I b i d . p.2629. 61 Canada ,Parl.Deb. 1921,Vol. 146,p.2659
- 157 -
concerned Canada more than the other Dominions. There could
be no- o b l i g a t i o n f o r Canada emanating from the A l l i a n c e
Treaty i f renewed, without the approval of the Canadian
Parliament. fM;:» Arthur Meighen was, however, not i n c l i n e d
to accept the proposal of Mr. Lapointe, M.P. for Quebec
East, who-'recommended the i n s e r t i o n of a sp e c i a l clause i n
the treaty I f renewed, which expressly secured t h i s right
f o r the Canadian Parliament. Arthur Meighen agreed
i n p r i n c i p l e but he made the reservation that the question
of Canada's obligations and eommi/tmemts might be quite 62
d i f f e r e n t i n case of war. This showed that the already
i n t r i c a t e and precarious p o l i t i c a l question was further
complicated by the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and j u r i d i c a l aspects.
At the "imperial Conference" i n June 1921 ^ r , Arthur
Meighen presented, Canada's case. Whilst the Australian
and Mew Zealand Prime Ministers i n their opening speeches
eulogized the value of the A l l i a n c e and advocated i t s re
newal , stating that Canada was "not disposed to
give the same attention" t° the B r i t i s h view at any rate,
intimated that he might express more detailed dissenting - 63
opinion i n the further course of discussion. He did so
62 Canada. Pari.Deb.1921 ifri-d. V o l . 148 ,p, 2640
63 Cmd.1474, p.16.
- 158 -
on June 29th a f t e r Lord Curzon had,'announced the B r i t i s h
desire f o r a treaty-renewal. 6 4 ^ f r . A r t h u r Meighen then
launched a massive attack against the intentions of B r i t a i n ,
.Australia and N ew Zealand. He urged that the reason f o r
the continuation of the treaty had disappeared a f t e r Russian
and German influence had been eliminated from the Far East.
He emphasized that the b i l a t e r a l pact with Japan'was i n
compatible with the terms of the League of Nations, and
pointed out that the A l l i a n c e fostered Japanese expansion
i n China and constituted a d i r e c t challenge to the United 65
States. Of a l l these points the l a s t concerning the
United States of America was the strongest and paramount
one. He stressed-the importance of a r r i v i n g at an i n t e r
national cooperation which would include the United States
of America. 6 6 At the same time he exerted a certain amount
of diplomatic pressure on the United Kingdom Government
by c i r c u l a t i n g ^ c o n f i d e n t i a l memorandum i n which he o f f i c i a l l y
declared that i f the A l l i a n c e should be renewed Canada
would not consider h e r s e l f bound by the" treaty without the
formal approval by the Canadian Parliament of the r a t i f i e a t i o n . & 6 4Brebner op.cit p.51 65
Ibid.p.55. 66."Canadian Gazette" July 7,1921 i n Can.Ann.Rev.1921 p.104. 67
Simp son,B.L."An Indiscreet Chronicle from the P a c i f i c by Putnam Weale (pseu.)New York,Dod4Mead & Comp. 1922, p.108, and The Round Table 1920/21. p.112
- 159 -
As the only expedient solution,he re i t e r a t e d the proposal
he had made i n February 1921, i n which he urged the c a l l i n g
of a conference to deal with P a c i f i c . a f f a i r s . 6 8 He wished
to convince B r i t a i n and A u s t r a l i a of the v i t a l necessity to
hold such a conference because i t was the only means of
gaining the cooperation of the United States with the B r i t i s h
Empire i n world p o l i t i c s . This aroused strong opposition
from the Australian Prime Minster who objected to the idea 69
of terminating the a l l i a n c e with Japan.
Canada's attitude was of great importance because
It revealed the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of Canadian foreign
p o l i c y . What were the underlying motives f o r Tdii Arthur
Meighen's v i o l e n t opposition towards the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance?
As pointed out previously the A l l i a n c e hand! capped
the Ottawa Government i n exercising an e f f e c t i v e control
oyer-Japanese immigration into Canada. Indeed, t h i s a n t i -
Japanese f e e l i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia was a factor the
Canadian Government i n Ottawa had to. take into account.
CO Brebner op.ci t . p.49 and Canad.Ann,Rev.1921 p.104
69 Carter,G.Mi The B r i t i s h Commonwealth and International
Security, Toronto , The Ryerson Press 1947, p.44
- 160 -
In a debate In the Canadian House of Commons A p r i l 26,
1921 % v i representative- from Vancouver, Mr. Stevens,
urged the Government to reserve i n any renewed treaty
with Japan the absolute right to control o r i e n t a l im-70
migration. He drew the Government's attention to a
test-case which occurred somewhat e a r l i e r i n B r i t i s h
Columbia, when the Supreme Court and the Privy Council
disallowed a P r o v i n c i a l Law enacted by the B. C. Legis
lature which dealt with employment of o r i e n t a l s . The
Court's decision-was based on the; argument that the act
passed constituted a v i o l a t i o n of the s p i r i t of the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty. During the Imperial Conference i n London
the P r o v i n c i a l Government, of B r i t i s h Columbia despatched
a telegram to Prime Minister Meighen, uB^ng him to oppose
any renewal of the A l l i a n c e unless Canada was given the
r i g h t to r e s t r i c t Japanese immigration. This showed that
there was some pressure on the Government emanating from
the immigration problem i n B r i t i s h Columbia; but i t showed
also that B r i t i s h Columbia did not raise objections to
70 ' Canada Pari.Deb.1921, Vol.148 P.2595
71 Canad.Ann.Rev.1921 p.100
- 161 -
the Treaty-renewal on p r i n c i p l e , i f the r i g h t s of the
P r o v i n c i a l Government were reserved. On the contrary,
newspapers i n B. C. were i n favour of maintaining the
a l l i a n c e 7 2 . Thus i t appears that the o r i e n t a l problem
was a factor i n f l u e n c i n g - ^ ^ Arthur Meighen*s a t t i t u d e ,
but i t was not the dominating one. I t waB^not i l l - w i l l
against Japan or the intention to sever the close r e l a t i o n s
with Japan by which lf£?^Arthur Meighen was led i n h i s
p o l i c y as he emphasized i n a speech held i n Toronto i n
September 1921 .. His objection to the course of B r i t i s h
foreign p o l i c y originated from the f a c t that the contin
uation of, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e jeopardized B r i t i s h -
American as well as Canadian-American r e l a t i o n s .
I t can be stated that a basic axiom of Canadian
foreign p o l i c y i s the maintenance of good and f r i e n d l y
r e l a t i o n s between Canada and the United States of America.
This fundamental p r i n c i p l e i n Canadian external r e l a t i o n s
i s derived not only from a common f e e l i n g between both
nations but also from Canada's geographical propinquity
to the United States. S i r Robert Borden was the f i r s t to
emphasize very emphatically i n 1917 the idea of Anglo-
American cooperation; he regarded united action between the
72 Cf. f o r example, the Vancouver Daily Province,June 22nd, 1921;
and Angus, H.F. "Canada and Naval Rivalry i n the P a c i f i c " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol. VIII (June 1935J,p.l78^ 73 Canad.Ann.Rev.1921 p.101.
- 162 -
' B r i t i s h Empire and the United States of Ameri ca i n world 74
p o l i t i e s as the best guarantee for safeguarding peace.
As early as 1918 S i r Robert Borden made i t clear i n the
Imperial War Cabinet that, i f the B r i t i s h Empire cooperated
with any power against the United States, "that p o l i c y 75
could not reckon on the approval or the support of Canada.
to promote good r e l a t i o n s between the B r i t i s h Commonwealth
and the United States of America, was the underlying idea of those Canadian p o l i t i c i a n s who i n 1920 advocated special
76 diplomatic representation for Canada i n Washington
Such good r e l a t i o n s between Canada and the United States
were seriously imperilled by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
Any continued b i l a t e r a l a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and
Japan^however modified and hedged with clauses which excluded
the p o s s i b i l i t y of war with the United States, was incompatible
with the idea of Anglo-American cooperation. Moreover, i n
the event of war between United States and Japan, China was
supposed to intervene against her r i v a l i n the Far East. Thus
the 'casus foederis' would have presented i t s e l f to Great
B r i t a i n who would have been involved automatically i n a 74
Lloyd George, D. War Memoirs, (Transl.) B e r l i n 1934, Vol.11, p.385. 75
Brebner, |.B. The North A t l a n t i c Triangle, Toronto,The Ryerson Press, 1945, P.281. 7 6Canada.Pari.Deb.1920, Vol.143,p.2444.
- 163 -
c o n f l i c t with the United States of America. This dilemma
had been c l e a r l y pointed out i n May 1921 by Bertram Lenox
Simpson, Chief foreign advisor of the President of the Chinese
Republic, i n a memorandum to the Canadian Prime Minister.
"Sooner or l a t e r " he argued,"the Treaty" would i n e f f e c t
bring B r i t a i n and the United States into c o l l i s i o n with one
another, f i r s t on Chinese, s o i l and then, by natural process, 77
everywhere on the P a c i f i c " . Mr. Simpson considered i t as
self-evident that as a natural consequence of the renewal
of the A l l i a n c e a Sino-American rapprochement would take
place i n form of a j o i n t m i l i t a r y defence scheme under which 78
China offered naval bases on her coast to the United States. The same apprehensions over such an a l l i a n c e and over the possible danger of an armed c o n f l i c t between China and the
United States on the one hand and Japan and B f i t a i n on the
other hand were expressed i n the Australian Senate and the 79
B r i t i s h House of Commons.
Even i f there were no danger of war there remained
Memorandum "China and the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e " May 4,1921, Simpson op.cit.pp 53-58. 78. I b i d . p . 5 7 . 7Q
cf.Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1920/21 Vol.XGVI,p.9383, and Gr.Brit.,Pari.Deb.5th Ser.1921,Vol.144,p.2006.
- 164 -
the strong opposition of the United States Government and
the wide-spread public i l l - w i l l i n the United States against
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
Accordingly, Canadian opposition towards the renewal
of the A l l i a n c e was manifest. In the Canadian House of Commons'
Debate of A p r i l 27th,1921, the leader of the Unionist L i b e r a l
Party, Mr. Rowel1, reflected-the opinion of the overwhelming
majority of the House.- He urged that the Canadian Government
should not ignore the acrimonious f e e l i n g against t h i s treaty
i n the United States. "In the i n t e r e s t of good r e l a t i o n s
between the B r i t i s h Empire and the United States of America,"
he expressed the conviction that the treaty should not be 80
renewed. The mouthpiece of the I s o l a t i o n i s t French-Canadian
opposition, Mr. Deslaurier,(a Member from Montreal) advocated
the conclusion of a defensive a l l i a n c e witli^United States as
foundation of any future Canadian p o l i c y . He went even so
f a r as to think of t h i s proposed a l l i a n c e as a measure of
protection against Japanese aggression which might, turn a
neutral Canada i n t o a new Belgium. This question of pre
serving n e u t r a l i t y i n case of war between Japan and the
United States leads to a consideration of the j u r i d i c a l
aspects. Was Canada j u r i d i c a l l y e n t i t l e d to proclaim neutral
i t y quite apart from the p o l i t i c a l question whether she was
i n the p o s i t i o n to maintain n e u t r a l i t y ?
80 Canada Pari.Deb. 1921, Vol.148,p.2657 81 Ibid, pp 2676-77.
- 165 -The "Toronto Globe" urgently demanding the abrogation
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance commented in January 1921 that in the case of h o s t i l i t i e s between Japan and the United States "the Britannic peoples throughout the world would preserve
82 absolute neutrality" . The newspaper expressed i t s opinion that Canada, treaty or no treaty, would feel under no obligation to render assistance to Japan against the United States. No doubt, these words echoed exactly the feeling of Canadian public opinion and indicated the general trend in Canada towards greater autonomy and against centralized Imperial control; but the opinion as expressed by "The Globe" did not onform with the legal position of the Canadian Dominion at that time. An o f f i c i a l statement of the Canadian Government appeared on February 4, 1920, which alluded to the case of an armed conflict between Canada and a foreign power, saying
Canada owes allegiance to the same sovereign as Great Britain and so long as she continues to do so she would be a party i n the interest and disentitled to vote. If she disclaimed her interest and claimed the right to vote, she would thereby proclaim her independence. 8 3
The same view was shared by Sir Robert Borden when he stated in the Commons Debate of April 27, 1921, that
eaeh Dominion must take i t s reasonable part in the common defence or withdraw and become an independent s t a t e . 8 4
8 2The Round Table 1920-21, p.395 British Year Book of International Law 1922-23.London,H.Milford
O.U.P. 1923, p.38. 84 ^Canada Pari.Deb.1921, Vol.148,p.2629.
- 16* .
This showed the discrepancy between the j u d i c i a l p o s i t i o n
and the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n which Canada found he r s e l f
placed. Suppose war broke out between Japan and the United
States, then Canada's security c a t e g o r i c a l l y demanded at
lea s t maintaining a benevolent n e u t r a l i t y towards the United
States. Diplomatic unity of the Empire, however, required
Canada to associate her actions with those of Great B r i t a i n .
Thus, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e became a symbol of what 85
Putnam Weale c a l l e d "the Break-up of the B r i t i s h Empire"
Should Canada resort to a solution which might pro
duce a new 1776? Several statements made by outstanding
p o l i t i c i a n s , which r e f l e c t e d the strong f e e l i n g f o r nation
alism and the desire f o r absolute independence showed that
the issue of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e might possibly 86
push Canada to the very edge of separation.
Summarizing the main problems which faced the Meighen-
Government i t can be said that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e
constituted a serious threat to Canada's security. I t en
dangered the v i t a l p r i n c i p l e s of Canadian foreign p o l i c y
because i t jeopardized good Anglo-American and Canadian-
American r e l a t i o n s . I t involved the danger of disturbing the
unity of the B r i t i s h Empire. I t was the merit of the
Canadian Prime Minister that he r e a l i z e d very d i s t i n c t l y
8 5Simpson, Op >Cit. p.60
86 cf. Canad.Ann.Rev.1921, p.170
- 167 -
that the hour f o r decision for the B r i t i s h Empire had come,
that the B r i t i s h Empire had to choose between Japan and the
United States as partner f o r future cooperation i n world
p o l i t i c s . S i r Arthur Meighen, i n h i s capacity of Canada's
Prime M i n i s t e r , could n a t u r a l l y pursue no other course of
p o l i c y thaii that which served the special i n t e r e s t s of h i s
country, that i s to say, to prevent under a l l circumstances
a renewal of the A l l i a n c e . Simultaneously, however, by
i n s i s t i n g on the idea of close AngloQ^meriean cooperation
and by acting as intermediator between B r i t a i n and the United
States he served the int e r e s t s of the unity of the whole
Empire. S i r Arthur's p o l i t i c a l conception was embodied i n
h i s message to the London Times of July 4, 1921 i n which he
said that the "peace and welfare of the world i n the future
depended upon the maintenance of a s p i r i t of understanding
and cooperation between the two great English-speaking
Commonwealths." He expressed h i s conviction that Canada
should act as interpreter and intermediary between the members
of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and " t h e i r friends and kinsmen
of the great Republic to the South." 8 7
The question a r i s e s whether Prime Minister Meighen,
i n i n t e r p r e t i n g more or less the American standpoint i n the
whole a f f a i r did anything but execute United States p o l i c y .
Quoted from Canad.Ann.Review, 1921, p.131
- 168 -
There were several statements which appeared, to suggest
t h i s at that time. Mr. Lloyd George was reported to have
accused Mr. Meighen at the Imperial Conference of 1921 of 88
being the mouth-piece of Washington^ the Australian Prime 89
Min i s t e r , Mr. Hughes, made the same charge. In f a c t ,
such a view was even voiced by the United States press.
For instance, the "Philadelphia Ledger" said that Mr. Meighen
represented the United States'*viewpoint rather than that
of Canada. 9 0 This s u p e r f i c i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , however,
which tends to depreciate the Canadian Government to a mere
executive agency of the United S t ates Government hardly
seems j u s t i f i e d . The attitude of the Canadian press and of
the Ontario Legislature which opposed the a n t i - B r i t i s h
a g i t a t i o n campaign i n the American Hearst newspapers, de
monstrated that Canadian public opinion was not exclusively
pro-American but had i t s own views. 9 1Moreover, at that time
no dire c t diplomatic channels existed between Y/ashington
and Ottawa, through which the U. S. State Department could
have o f f i c i a l l y conveyed i t s opinion to the Canadian Government.
In t h e i r deliberations on p o l i c y to be pursued, the Canadian
Government were le d primarily by Canada's own v i t a l i n t e r e s t s op
Simpson, Op.Cit.p.110 8 9Brebner, J. B.Canada., the Anglo^Jap.Alliance and theWashington ton Conference, P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly Vol.L ,1935,pp56
Cf.Statement of the U.S.Correspondent of Philadelpha Ledger, Mr.C.lvAckerman:a i n the Can.Ann.Rev. 1921,p. 101. 91
Can.Ann,Rev. 1921, p.130
- 169 -
as necessitated by Canada's geographical p o s i t i o n on the
North American Continent and by her dual p o s i t i o n between
two world powers;Canada*s security, which was dependent
upon the protection of the B r i t i s h Navy i n the A t l a n t i c
and the United States naval power i n the P a c i f i c , demanded
that B r i t i s h and American foreign p o l i c y be i n complete
agreement with each other, or,, as Lord Baldwin termed i t ,
that the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e "secures the acquiescence" 92 * of the State Department. The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e ,
i f continued, imperilled the harmony between the Empire and
the United States. In addition, Canada had to take into
consideration that i n case of war between Japan and the
United States, which was l i k e l y to be pr e c i p i t a t e d by
the A l l i a n c e , Canadian t e r r i t o r y would be involved. Thus i t
was quite natural that - ^ r . Arthur Meighen's foreign p o l i c y w»'sV\ -to avoid
l i k e any other Canadian external p o l i c y , ttfould •®jja#©£yan-
tagonizf^United States p o l i c y or even American public opinion.
This, however, did not imply that Mr. Meighen merely executed
the p o l i c y of the State Department i n Washington. His p o l i c y
served the r e a l i n t e r e s t s of Canada. I t was the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a s p e c i f i c Canadian p o l i c y : "Canadianism rooted i n North
93 Americanism" as Brebner termed i t .
Strange.W.Canada, the P a c i f i c and War. Toronto: Thos.Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1937, p.35. 9 3
Brebner, QppCit.p.56
- 170 -
This was the f i r s t time i n the hist o r y of the
.British Empire that a Dominion l i k e Canada had practised
a s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l foreign p o l i c y of her own, as d i s t i n c t
from a united Empire po l i c y directed by the B r i t i s h Foreign
Off i c e . Uls,Arthur Meighen*s p o l i c y f i n a l l y convinced the
B r i t i s h Government that B r i t i s h Empire p o l i c y toward Japan,
(that i s i n the P a c i f i c and i n the Far East) must coincide
with U. S. p o l i c y . This basic p r i n c i p l e of Canadian ex
ternal p o l i c y was vigorously maintained unchanged during
the following period. When rumours a l l u d i n g to the r e v i v a l
of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e occurred i n 1934, the
"Winnipeg Free Press", emphasized that Canada's attitude of
1921 was a f i n a l one, and stated that
any prospect of an agreement which would draw Great B r i t a i n into Japan's o r b i t at the expense of the U.SJR., with the consequent e f f e c t on British-American r e l a t i o n s , would be repugnant to Canada and f i n d nothing but opposition i n the Dominion. 9 4
The success of Mr. Meighen's p o l i c y can therefore be de
scribed as a diplomatic victory which contributed l a r g e l y
to increasing Canada's p o l i t i c a l prestige and influence
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , and was a prelude to a further
consolidation of Canada's le g a l p o s i t i o n . The co n s t i t u t i o n a l
issue raised by the Japanese A l l i a n c e , - the c o n f l i c t between
ce n t r a l i z a t i o n and autonomy - was solved by Mr. Meighen's
The Winnipeg Free Press, December 3, 1934, quoted by A.R.M.Lower '@pyCit. p.35
- 171 -
compromising p o l i c y of securing the unity of the Empire 95
plus the autonomy of Canada.
Meanwhile, the B r i t i s h Cabinet was under urgent
pressure of time because the treaty was due; to expire on
July 13, 1921, i n two weeks' time from the beginning of
the Imperial Conference. The B r i t i s h Government therefore
o f f i c i a l l y addressed a request to the Japanese Government
for an extension of the treaty f o r three months i n order
to gain time to consider the matter. An immediate decision
had to be taken. The B r i t i s h Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd
George, presented h i s views at the beginning of the Conference.
He pointed out that the A l l i a n c e had proved a most valuable
f a c t o r i n B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , and rei t e r a t e d that Japan 97
had "sp e c i a l i n t e r e s t s " i n the Far East. With regard
to the United States he l e f t no doubt that the "cardinal
p r i n c i p l e " of B r i t i s h Foreign p o l i c y was close and f r i e n d l y
cooperation with the United States. But Mr. Lloyd George
put forward one argument i n strong support of returning
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . In view of the increasing
tension between Japan and the United States, which involved Cf.Mr.Meighen's speech in June 1921, as guest of the Benchers
of Gray's Inn:"We have a sense of independence and a sence of unity, and these do not clash; they are i n harmony." quoted from Can.Ann.Rev.1921, pp220. 9Commonwealth of Au s t r a l i a Pari.Debates. 1921, Vol.XCvTI ,p. 11635. 97 Cmd.1474 p.13.
- 178 -
the r e a l danger of war - a r a c i a l war because of the im
migration question - ;an abrogation of the A l l i a n c e would not
only have increased the tension and a c c e l e r a t e d the outbreak
of an armed c o n f l i c t , but would also have resulted i n
serious repercussions on the B r i t i s h Empire. A cancellation
of the treaty would be considered by Japan, and furthermore
by India and the other A s i a t i c dependencies of the Empire,
as a sign that Great B r i t a i n endorsed a r a c i a l d i v i s i o n of
the P a c i f i c Area. Mr. Lloyd George expressed himself thus:
No greater calamity could overtake the world'than any further accentuation of the world's d i v i s i o n upon the l i n e s of race. Our foreign p o l i c y can never arrange i t s e l f . . •. upon the differences of race and c i v i l i z a t i o n between East and l e s t . I t would be f a t a l to the Empire. . . I t would o g
divide the B r i t i s h Empire against i t s e l f . . . /
Owing to the structure of the B r i t i s h Empire, the Imperial
Government had to play the role of r'jfceimediator between
East and West. The expression of t h i s p o l i c y was i n terms
of friendship with Japan. Speaking i n terms of power p o l i t i c s ,
i t meant that the supreme aim of B r i t i s h P a c i f i c p o l i c y had
to ge the prevention of a war between Japan and the United
States, and the preservation of a. certain balance of power
i n the P a c i f i c . Accordingly, the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary,
Lord Curzon, presented a detailed analysis of Br i t i s h foreign
p o l i c y to the Conference i n which he favoured strongly a re-99
newal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
98 Cmd.l474.P.13 99 Brebner, OppCit. p.51
- 173 -
I t was at t h i s stage of the Conference that the
Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r , .ri:Jfr.Arthur Meighen, started his
attack on the intention of the B r i t i s h , Australian and
New Zealand Governments. The dilemma for Great B r i t a i n
was evident; the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e offered to her
the pernicious prospect of disunity i f not dismemberment
of the Empire, and antagonism or open h o s t i l i t y of the
United States. A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l authority such as Prof.
A. B. Keith suggested i n a l e t t e r to "The Times" that the
d i f f i c u l t y with regard to the Dominions might be overcome
by i n s e r t i n g a clause i n the treaty s t i p u l a t i n g that the
terms of the new treaty should not be applicable to the
Dominions without the acceptance of the Dominion P a r l i a m e n t s . 1 0 0
Prof. Keith thus followed the precedent of the Treaty of
Mutual Guarantee with France of June 28, 1919, and a n t i c i
pated A r t i c l e IX of the Treaty of Locarno. I t w i l l be
understood, however, from the foregoing that t h i s suggestion
offered no r e a l solution. Prime Minister Lloyd George chose
another way. On July 1, 1921 he surprised the Imperial
Conference with the announcement that he accepted the Canadian
proposal for the P a c i f i c Conference. 1 0 1 The aim was to ar
r i v e at a reasonable understanding by j o i n t discussions with
the United States, Japan and China. Consequently, the
B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, communicated with
the Japanese and United States Ambassadors and with the
Chinese M i n i s t e r , approaching them with the idea of a
100 cf.The London Times, July 6, 1921.
101 Woodsworth, Op.Cit.P.176
- 174 -102
conference on the Problems of the P a c i f i c and the Far East.
This by no means implied a cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e by Great B r i t a i n . The Imperial Cabinet was determined
rather, to keep the door open for a spe c i a l solution. Whereas,
p r i o r to the Imperial conference^the B r i t i s h n o t i f i c a t i o n of
July 1920 to the Leaguejregarding the treaty with Japan had
been generally considered as constituting a denunciation
of the A l l i a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y by the Law O f f i c e r s of the
Crown, as the request for a three months* extension demon-'
stated, the Lord Chancellor;,' Lord Birkenhead, expressed the
reverse l e g a l view at the Conference. He argued that a de
c i s i o n was not immediately urgent since the t r e a t y A l l i a n c e ,
not having been formally denounced, would automatically 103
continue i n force. By adopting t h i s d i l a t o r y j u r i d i c a l
procedure, the B r i t i s h Government gained time f o r the re
adjustment of i t s p o l i c y . Almost simultaneously, the B r i t i s h
and Japanese,Governments n o t i f i e d the League of Nations
that i n case of a s i t u a t i o n which rendered the A l l i a n c e i n
consistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant,
the l a t t e r was to p r e v a i l . 1 0 4 The purpose of t h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n
was obvious. I t was to confirm the B r i t i s h intention to
keep the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n force, but i n a form
compatible with the League Covenant. 1 0 2 c f . G r . B r i t . , P a r l . D e b . 5 t h Ser.1921,Vol.144,p.917. 1 0 3 I b i d r . p . 9 1 6 104
cf.Monthly Summary of the League of Nations,Aug.21,1921, p.64, quoted i n Chang op.cit.p.193
- 175 -
In the meantime,, the B r i t i s h Prime Mi n i s t e r was
pressed i n the House of Commons by questions about the renew
a l of the A l l i a n c e . Mr. Lloyd George then answered that he
would issue a statement which would depend upon ''whether
r e p l i e s are received from the United States, Japan and 1G5
China." But he was cautious enough to avoid a d e f i n i t e
answer to Lt.-Com. Kenworthy's question whether the House
would be given the opportunity of discussing the i s s u e . 1 0 6
The reply expected by the Cabinet from the United States 107
Government arrived at London on July 10, 1921. This reply took the form of an i n v i t a t i o n from the United States
President, Mr. Harding, f o r a conference on l i m i t a t i o n o f
armamentsand on the problems of the P a c i f i c and the Far East to be held i n Washington. The United States step was
108 unanimously praised by Great B r i t a i n and the Dominions. The Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , i n a message to the "London
Times", u t i l i z e d t h i s occasion f o r restating:
The i d e a l at which the Conference should aim as the f i r s t step to peace was the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty i n such a form as would be acceptable to Great B r i t a i n , America, Japan and o u r s e l v e s . 1 0 9
1 0 5Gr.£rit. ,Pari.Deb.5th Ser. 1921,Vol. 144,p.621. 106
Ibid . P.622 1 0 Y I b i d . P.914
3
109
108 Ibid. P.917,and the London Times, July 9,1921 The London Times July 12, 1921
- 176 -
In h i s o f f i c i a l statement of July 11, 1921 i n the House
of Commons Prime Minister, Lloyd George, enunciated the
course of foreign p o l i c y which was to be pursued by the
Imperial Government:
In the U.S.A. we see today, as we have always seen the people closest to our own aims and i d e a l s with whom i t i s for us, not merely a desire and an i n t e r e s t , but a deeply rooted i n s t i n c t to consult and to cooperate. . . The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of our p o l i c y i s " f r i e n d l y cooperation with the U.S.A." . .
Simultaneously Mr. Lloyd George declared "we also desire. . .
to maintain our close friendship and cooperation with 110
Japan. . ,
These statements reveal the attempt of the B r i t i s h Govern
ment to reconcile by an ambivalent p o l i c y both the
Japanese A l l i a n c e and the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h
p o l i c y , Anglo-American cooperation. The B r i t i s h Government
recognized that i t had to meet the desires of the United
States by j o i n t and d i r e c t discussions, but Mr. Lloyd
George believed that he could f i n d the solution i n a
merging of the A l l i a n c e into a t r i p a r t i t e treaty between
Great B r i t a i n , Japan and the United S t a t e s . 1 1 1 . In t h i s
the B r i t i s h and the Australian views completely coincided.
Great B r i t a i n wanted, l i k e A u s t r a l i a , an a l l i e d or, at
l e a s t , cooperating P a c i f i c t r i a n g l e . 1 1 0 G r t . B r i t . P a r i . D e b . 5 t h Ser.1921 ,Vol.144,pp.915-16. l i : L I b i d . Vol.146,pp. 704-6
- 177 -
During the whole period following the Imperial
Conference up to the opening of the Washington Conference
i n November 1921 the B r i t i s h Government showed utmost
reluctance towards a formal and complete abrogation of
the A l l i a n c e . On August 18, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George stated
c l e a r l y i n the Commons:
The A l l i a n c e i s an ex i s t i n g a l l i a n c e . . , I do not believe there i s any country i n the world whether i t l i k e s the Japanese a l l i a n c e or does not l i k e i t , that would think any better of the B r i t i s h Empire i f we broke o f f the A l l i a n c e -n6t one. 1 2
There were also Voices i n the House which emphatically pro
tested against a disruption with the Japanese a l l y . 1 1 3
Mr. Lloyd George eagerly sought to avoid an open parliamentary
Rebate as h i s answers to questions i n the Commons showed.
He argued a debate "would be inopportune i n the present stage 114
of negotiations" The Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Chamberlain, r e p l i e d to an enquiry from E a r l Winterton, whether the
issue of the A l l i a n c e would be touched i n the next debate
on the forthcoming Washington Conference, that he would
"deprecate as contrary to the public i n t e r e s t " any discussion 115
of that subject." Indeed, t h i s subject was not mentioned i n the Commons' debate referred to, except i n a statement
by Colonel Burn that, i f an a l l i a n c e between England, America _ _
Gr.Brit.Parl.Deb.5th Ser.1921 Vol.146,pp.1704-6 1 1 3Ibid.Vol.l46,pp.1725-26 and Vol.147,p.2140 114
Ib i d . Vol.144 pp.1459-60. l i e ;
The London Times Nov. 3, 1921
- 178 -
and Japan would be concluded, the P a c i f i c problem would 116
disappear. How fir m l y the B r i t i s h Government s t i l l
supported Japan i n the Far East can be seen from Mr. Cham
berlain's statement i n October 1921 on the question whelher
Great B r i t a i n was s t i l l - i n spite of the changed circum
stances - bound by the secret Anglo-Japanese agreement
regarding Shantung. His answer was that His Majesty's
Government considered the Shantung question as s e t t l e d 117
by the decisions of the Peace-treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . p r i o r
v•• i s i ^ ^ l m m e d i a t 6 1 ^ % ^ the. Conference, the B r i t i s h
Cabinet was then divided about the attitude to be adopted
at Washington towards Japan and the United States. Great
B r i t a i n was facing the al t e r n a t i v e whether she should
y i e l d completely to the United States demand for the abro
gation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e or whether she should
try to keep the balance of power between Japan and the United
States i n the P a c i f i c by pursuing a middle road course of
n e u t r a l i t y . The l a s t p o s s i b i l i t y implied the reiition of
the A l l i a n c e . Mr. Lloyd George and the Foreign Secretary,
Lord Curzon, were very strongly i n c l i n e d to the second poss
i b i l i t y which seemed to o f f e r the greater degree of Empire 1 1 ft
security i n the P a c i f i c . Mr,
I t was no accident that $fcJ*"Arthur Balfour was
IT6 Great Brit.Pari.Deb.5th Ser.1921, Vol.147,p.2120
117 Ibid . Vol.147, pp.641 f f .
118 cf.Steed W, B r i t i s h P o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c , The 19th Century
Vol.CH ( A p r i l 1932) p.399
- 179 -
appointed chief of the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation to
Washington. He had been the moving s p i r i t b«Vuw<lthe
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n 1902. Nobody recognized the
importance of that B l l i a n c e better than he. The SLliance had
been the pivot of B r i t i s h Foreign p o l i c y i n Asia for almost
twenty years. In spite of the changes i n the international
s i t u a t i o n Arthur Balfour s t i l l f i r m l y believed i n the
value of the a l l i a n c e for the B r i t i s h E mpire. 1 1 9 He there
fore showed the utmost d i s i n c l i n a t i o n , to abrogate the treaty.
The Japanese Government on t h e i r part was also strongly i n
favour of the continuation of the B l l i a n c e , i f necessary
as a t r i p a r t i t e agreement including the United States, although 120
Japan preferred that the b i l a t e r a l treaty continue. The proposal of His Majesty's Ambassador to Tokyo to the
Japanese Government for j o i n t British-Japanese preliminary
discussions on the presumable agenda of the Washington 121
Conference gave further evidence that Great B r i t a i n on the
eve of the Washington Conference s t i l l maintained the view
that notwithstanding the unimpaired p r i n c i p l e of Anglo-
American friendship the equilibrium i n the P a c i f i c could
be preserved only by Anglo-Japanese cooperation.
119 Dugdale op.cit. p.319
1 2 0 c f . L e t t e r of the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Tokyo,Sir Charles
E l i o t , of Nov.10,1921 to Sir.A.Balfour quoted i n Dugdale op.cit. p.328. 121
I b i d .
- 180 -
I t should, be b r i e f l y noted here that the p o s i t i o n
taken by the B r i t i s h Government was not shared by the "London
Times". The p o l i c y of the vTimes"as determined by Lord
N o r t h c l i f f e and Mr. Wickham Steed, exerted.a cert a i n influence
oh the course of events i n t h i s matter/which should not be
underestimated. I t was undoubtedly true that i n July 1921
the MTimes- Mr. Steed being i n personal contact with Mr.
Lloyd George and the U. S. Ambassador to the Court of St.
James, Mr. Harvey,considerably f a c i l i t a t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y 122
of convening a conference on P a c i f i c questions. In a
leading a r t i c l e of July 9, 1921, the"Times"declared that
any continued a l l i a n c e with Japan, however modified, would
form an "insuperable obstacle" to Anglo-American cooperation .
Furthermore, the a r t i c l e c a l l e d attention to the f a c t that
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e would prevent an agreement f o r
the l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments. As a solution the "Times"
also advanced the proposal of a larger agreement by a
triangular exchange of notes to which the United States 124
should be a party. With regard to China the "Times" advo
cated close cooperation between Great B r i t a i n and the United
States who had " i d e n t i c a l i n t e r e s t s ^ there against any 125
Japanese attempt of domination and exploitation. During
the summer of 1921 Lord N o r t h c l i f f e and Mr. Steed undertook
an extensive journey to the United States and Canada.They cf .Steed ,H.W. .Through 11,3 Th i r t y Years, London ,William
Heinemann Ltd. 1925, Vol.11, p.362. 123
The London Times July 9, 1921 1 2 4 i b i d . 12§ The Times, Oct.18,1921
- 181 -
toured i n p a r t i c u l a r the P a c i f i c coastal area of North
America^including v i s i t s to Vancouver, V i c t o r i a , Seattle
and San Francisco. Their object was to study the s i t u a t i o n
on the spot, e s p e c i a l l y i n B r i t i s h Columbia, and to deter
mine the press p o l i c y to be pursued by the "Times" at the
forthcoming Washington Conference. On t h i s journey Mr.
Steed had several contacts with Canadian p u b l i c i s t s ^
American naval o f f i c e r s , with the Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r ,
the Governor General, Lord Byng, and the Japanese Ambassador 126
to Washington, Mr. Shidehara. The p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t of
these contacts was a memorandum summarizing the p o l i t i c a l
problems created by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This memor
andum wa.s submitted to the members of the B r i t i s h Empire
delegation and to B r i t i s h naval o f f i c e r s and may have exer
cised influence on the B r i t i s h Delegation.
After the Washington Conference had opened, the
"Times", arguing that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e prevented
the r e a l i z a t i o n of Anglo-American cooperation, p e r s i s t e n t l y
advocated the abrogation of the Treaty. The "Times"' leading
a r t i c l e of November 23, 1921, pointed out that the decision
taken by the statesmen of the B r i t i s h Empire at the Imperial
Conference could not be put into e f f e c t u n t i l the A l l i a n c e
was denounced."The Anglo-Japanese Treaty stands i n the way. I t must be cleared out of the way, and the sooner. . .the _ _
Steed, W. op.cit. pp 369-70
- 182 -127 better f o r Anglo-American understanding."
Thus i t can be seen that at the Imperial Confer
ence i n 1921 the disunity of opinion amongst the members
of the B r i t i s h Empire with regard to the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e had become obvious. Whilst the standpoint of
A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand was derived from their i n s u l a r
geographical p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c - because these
Dominions, according to the words of the New Zealand
Minister of the I n t e r i o r , Mr. Downie Stewart, f e l t "the
f u l l danger'of foreign aggression and t h e i r entire de-1 p Q
pendence on Imperial defence" . - Canada's attitude
resulted from her continental p o s i t i o n on the North American
continent. The p o l i t i c a l implication was that Canadian se
c u r i t y could r e l y on the Monroe Doctrine,but was basic££ly
dependent upon good r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and the
United States. I'hese fundamental differences of geographical
conditions account for the diverging opinions of the Australian
and the Canadian Prime Minister with regard to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance.Mr/Hughes' utterances:"I do not mistake
the voice of a noisy, a n t i - B r i t i s h f a c t i o n i n America f o r the 129
sentiment of that great Republic" and "I lay i t down as an 130
axiom that, we must not be embroiled i n war with America" The London Times,Nov.23,1921
1 2 8New Zealand, Parl.Deb.4th Sess.1922, Vol.196 ,p.503 129
Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1920-21 Vol.XCVIT 1 3 0 I b i d . Vol.XCV, p.7718
- 183 -
reveal that he misinterpreted the i n t r i n s i c and fundamental
aims of United States foreign p o l i c y . I t was not a question
of war against the United States which perturbed the U. S.
Government, but i t was simply the basic demand of the United
States that Great B r i t a i n ' s Far Eastern and P a c i f i c P o l i c y
had to coincide e n t i r e l y with that of the United States. I n
the f i n a l analysis t h i s amounted to Great B r i t a i n ' s former
predominating p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c being supplanted by
the United States. The Canadian Government, on the other
hand, did r e a l i z e the problem which jeopardized Anglo-Aijeer-
ican r e l a t i o n s . The importance of fM.r. Arthur Meighen's p o l i c y
at the Imperial Conference lay i n the fact that he, by
vigorously i n s i s t i n g on Canada's r i g h t s , took the i n i t i a t i v e
f o r the c a l l i n g of the Washington Conference which was to
become the turning-point i n B r i t i s h Far Eastern poli c y . The
Canadian Government thus contributed to paving the way for
the achievement of the unique phenomenon of the Anglo-American
community. The Canadian p o l i c y at the Conference was indeed
nothing else than the implementation of the s p e c i a l role
that Canada i s destined to play i n world p o l i t i c s , because
of her geographical p o s i t i o n , of her ancestry and history.
Canada acted as the intermediator and interpreter of the
Ijrreat branches of the English speaking race; she was the
bridge over the A t l a n t i c between Great B r i t a i n and the United
States. However, there i s good reason to believe that the
- 184 -II "
role of the Canadian Prime Minister at the Imperial Conference
should not he overestimated and overemphasized. Mfi'r
Me\±%hah did not dominate the Imperial Conference because
the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n there was very strong. I t would be
inaccurate to say that he f o r c i b l y deflected B r i t i s h foreign
p o l i c y completely, but rather that he induced the B r i t i s h
Cabinet to abandon the idea of a b i l a t e r a l treaty with
Japan and to enter into d i r e c t discussions with the U. S.
Government. By achieving t h i s he accelerated a h i s t o r i c a l
development culminating i n the integration of Anglo-American
partnership. The B r i t i s h Government fo r their part were
convinced that the A l l i a n c e had to be transformed. I t
r e a l i z e d that Anglo-American friendship and cooperation
had to be the axiom of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y . Great
B r i t a i n acknowledged furthermore that i t was merely a
question of time before she had to drop her p o l i c y of playing
her both ways, and to associate her P a c i f i c p o l i c y with
that of the United States of America.
- 185 -
CHAPTER V.
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921-22
AND THE SOLUTION Off THE PACIFIC PROBLEM
- \« V\e ao+Vio-ri-opinion —
The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 ended with a
&#s#ee diplomatic defeat of United States feee4gn p o l i c y .
Ultimately the deep, American d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over the
Shantung problem was one of the p r i n c i p a l reasons for the
r e j e c t i o n of the V e r s a i l l e s Peace Treaty by the United
States Senate. On the very day that the unfortunate decision
concerning Shantung was made at P a r i s , the chief Far East-
expert of the United States delegation to the Conference
commented upon i t : ..'.'It may bring war i n A s i a . " 1 The United
States had already been appalled by the secret diplomacy
of Great B r i t a i n i n European questions, as f o r instance
i n the case of Trieste^ but she would not long tolerate the
enforced settlement ov er Shantung which immediately concerned
the United States. For i n the case of China the United States
Government had assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . China had entered
the war i n 1917 a f t e r having been induced to do so by the
United States. The United States had at least a moral re
s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the preservation of China's t e r r i t o r i a l
and administrative i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l autonomy. Moreover,
the Treaty of 1858 with China imposed the o b l i g a t i o n upon
Cf . M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. p.84
- 186 -
the United States to use her good o f f i c e s i n case China
should receive unjust treatment. This alone s u f f i c e d to
i l l u s t r a t e that the i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d upon China by the
Shantung decision d i s c r e d i t e d United States p o l i c y and d i
plomatic prestige. The conclusion which the United States
Government had to draw from the r e s u l t s of the P a r i s Con
ference , where she had been thwarted by the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e , was that Japan's diplomatic p o s i t i o n i n the Far
East was strengthened by the A l l i a n c e . The United States
feared that Great B r i t a i n would give moral and possible
material support to Japan i n case of an American-Japanese
war, and that the United States would remain i s o l a t e d i n
Eastern Asia. On the whole Great B r i t a i n was compelled
by the A l l i a n c e to endorse t a c i t l y Japan's p o l i t i c a l and
m i l i t a r y actions which were p r e j u d i c i a l to v i t a l American
i n t e r e s t s and constituted a d i r e c t challenge to the basic
p r i n c i p l e of United States p o l i c y i n A s i a , the Open-Door
Doctrine. Thus, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was d i r e c t l y
responsible f o r the fundamental schism between the two
Anglo-Saxon world powers i n global p o l i c y .
The supreme aim of United States foreign p o l i c y
a f t e r the disastrous blow at P a r i s had therefore to be to
prevent by a l l means a r e s u s c i t a t i o n or renewal of the
- 187 -
Al l i a n c e a f t e r i t s expiration i n July, 1921. In a confid
e n t i a l memorandum "Aspects of the Problem of the P a c i f i c
and the Eastern Question as they Relate to the U.S.A." u n o f f i c i a l 1
issued i n July, 1920 by the J&ttffflTfc adviser of the omki&BQ
•^v^rhmewtP-•j ^I^I^xMh^is&^mk, Mr. M i l l a r d , i t was
c l e a r l y pointed out that a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e would "require the American Government ei t h e r to
abandon i t s Far Eastern p o l i c y , to submit i t to the d i c t a t i o n
of Japan and Great B r i t a i n , or to develop i t s naval and m i l i t a r y
programme on a basis of equalling the combined powers of
Great B r i t a i n and Japan." Mr. M i l l a r d suggested i n h i s
remarkable memorandum that "Great B r i t a i n should be made to
choose d e f i n i t e l y between Japan and America and the Far East."3
These intimations reflect*, the attitude of the American Govern
ment toward the' P a c i f i c problem. Only i n t h i s context i s
i t possible to understand f u l l y the exasperated and tenacious
opposition of the United States to the Anglo-Japanese A l
l i a n c e , and the importance of the Washington Conference which
was the United States 5counter attack against the re s u l t s of
the jo i n t British-Japanese diplomacy at Pa r i s .
As early as October, 1919 the U. S. State Department
became concerned because of various rumours that the B r i t i s h
Government had entered into negotiations with Japan concerning
i M i l l a r d , 'Op.Cit. p.196 3 M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. p.198
- 188 -
a renewal of the A l l i a n c e . A dispatch from the Acting U.S.
Secretary of State, Mr. P h i l i p p s , to the U. S. Ambassador
to the Court of St.James, Mr. Davis, instructed the Ambassador
to inquire whether the B r i t i s h Government intended "to
broaden or to r e s t r i c t the recognition of Japan's special
i n t e r e s t s i n Eastern Asia . . ." 4 This i n s t r u c t i o n revealed
the decisive motive f o r the American opposition to the
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The prospect of
an American-Japanese war and the uncertain p o s i t i o n of
Great B r i t a i n i n such an eventuality perturbed the American
Government since the Anglo-American Treaty of General Ar
b i t r a t i o n of 1911, which, combined with A r t i c l e IV of the
A l l i a n c e , was to eliminate any p o s s i b i l i t y of an armed
c o n f l i c t between Great Brit a i n and the United States, had 5
never been r a t i f i e d by the American Senate. The Bryants
Spring-Rice Peace Commission Treaty of September 1914
was no adequate substitute. Although S i r Edward Grey on
hi s own i n i t i a t i v e informed the Japanese Ambassador, Baron
Inouye, that His Majesty's Government did consider the
Treaty as equivalent to a general a r b i t r a t i o n treaty,
o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h n o t i f i c a t i o n to t h i s e f f e c t was not given 7
to the U. S. Government. I t was, however, not the question
of war which caused uneasiness i n the American Government
so much as the fact that Great B r i t a i n was bound by the 4U.S.F6r.Rel.1920,Vol,II, p.679 5Br.Doc.VIII,No.514,p.604. 6 I b i d . p.631 and 648, and U.S.For.Re1.1914,pp.304-7. 7cf.Statement of the Additional Undersecretary of State f o r Foreign Affairs,Mr.Kellaway,in. the Commons ,Gr.Brit.Pari.Debet.5th Ser
& ' 1921,vol.138,p.1574
- 189 -
A l l i a n c e to support the Japanese inte r p r e t a t i o n of the
Lansing-Ishii Agreement regarding the recognition of Japan's
"spec i a l i n t e r e s t s " i n Eastern Asia. The r e s u l t would have
been that on the one hand the Japanese m i l i t a r y party might
be encouraged i n th e i r further aspirations. On the other
hand Great B r i t a i n was handicapped i n supporting American
diplomacy wholeheartedly i n the Far East by taking j o i n t
diplomatic action designed to prevent Japanese encroachment
i n China, so*h£n such circumstances the United States Govern-
menf'might f i n d i t s e l f v i r t u a l l y alone as had been the case
i n 1915, and i n the Yap dispute.
The Japanese occupation of the former German Islands
i n the North P a c i f i c was regarded by the American Government
with the utmost uneasiness. President Wilson's insistence
on administering the former German P a c i f i c islands under
the mandatory system, i f they could not be neutralized, arose
from strategic rather than i d e a l i s t i c considerations; i t was
part of the American fear that these i s l a n d s , i f f o r t i f i e d
as naval bases, would form a menace to the American l i n e s 9
of communication from Hawaii to the P h i l i p p i n e s . The
dispute over the important cable station of Yap, i n which
the United States claimed the cable from Yap to Guam, showed
how strongly the B r i t i s h were t i e d to t h e i r Japanese a l l y .
8U.S.For.Rel.l921,Vol.II, pp.314-5. Q Cf.Pres.Wilson's conversation with Mr. D.H.Miller immediately
a f t e r the session of the Council of Ten ,Jan.30,1919,in M i l l e r Op.Cit. Vol.1, p.100
- 190 -
In answering American protests to a u n i l a t e r a l disposal of
Yap and r e f e r r i n g to United States intimations that an
unsatisfactory settlement would have serious e f f e c t s upon
American public opinion, the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Washington
stated i n A p r i l , 1921 that His Majesty's Government "had
no a l t e r n a t i v e , and that no matter what the consequence,
they must abide with the agreement with Japan. . . "}°
Incidents such as these convinced the United States that i n
spite of a l l assurances to the contrary, the A l l i a n c e must
be considered "as an a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and
Japan against the United States". 1 1
Accordingly, American public opinion as r e f l e c t e d by
the press c a t e g o r i c a l l y demanded the complete abrogation of 12
the Treaty B l l i a n c e . The Hearst press p a r t i c u l a r l y voiced
strong a n t i - B r i t i s h f e e l i n g s . The A n t i - B r i t i s h Senator Reed
of Missouri even charged Great B r i t a i n with having inserted 13
a "secret clause directed against the United States" 14
and with " p l o t t i n g i n the dark for her own aggrandizement".
1 0U.S.For.Rel.1921, Vol.11, p.286. 1 1Borden, Sir.Robt., Diary of the Washington Disarmament Confer ence p.6. The Unpublished Borden Papers. F i l e 00611,Wash. Conference 1921-22. Microfilmed i n 1952 by the Public Archives of Canada. 1 2 C f . f o r instance, The New York Times,June 24,1921 and July 5,1921 13
Cf.The London Times,January 4, 1921. 1 4 I b i d . January 3,1921
- 191 -
In several confidential.memoranda the United States
encouraged Chinese representatives at the League of Nations
i n Geneva to object openly and f o r c i b l y to the ex i s t i n g
A l l i a n c e , c a l l i n g the attention of the Chinese delegates to
the p r e j u d i c i a l character of that A l l i a n c e i n i t s application 15
to China. I t was even suggested i n July 1920 that plans
should be worked out by the State, War and Navy Departments
f o r a p o t e n t i a l j o i n t m i l i t a r y cooperation of America with
China, Korea and Eastern S i b e r i a i n case of an armed c o n f l i c t 16
i n the Far East.
As a further means of influencing British-Japan ese
re l a t i o n s i n d i r e c t l y , the United States attempted to exert
diplomatic pressure on Great B r i t a i n i n the I r i s h question,
which was acute at that time. The American Secretary of
State frankly intimated to the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Wash
ington that a B r i t i s h i n d i c a t i o n of good w i l l to support
United States' Far Eastern p o l i c y would prevent Congress
from adopting a n t i - B r i t i s h resolutions i n favour of the 1 7
I r i s h Republic. I t was also recommended to the American
Government that i n view of Canada's s t r a t e g i c a l p o s i t i o n
and of Canadian sentiment the latent danger of Canadian
separation from the Empire i n case of war between the United Cf. Confidential Memorandum of Mr.Millard of Aug.1920 "China
and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance",Mlllard,0p.Cit.pp.185 f f , and Confidential Memorandum of October 1920 "China and the League of Nations Meeting??, Ibid, p.144
Memorandum of Mr. M i l l a r d , J u l y 1920 "Aspects of the Problem of the P a c i f i c and the Eastern Question as they Relate to the U.S.A. " ,0p.Cit.p.l98 1 7U.S.For.Rel.1921,Vol.II, pp 315-16.
- 192 -
States on the one hand and Japan and Great B r i t a i n on the
other hand, should be u t i l i z e d as a factor of United States
diplomacy. The suggestion was advanced, therefore, that
American assent to the establishment of a separate Canadian
diplomatic representation at Washington should be withheld,
the implication being that the B r i t i s h Government should
not be relieved of the danger of losing Canada as an i n t e g r a l
part of the B r i t i s h Empire. The establishment of a Canadian
Legation at Washington could possibly have been construed
as an a l t e r a t i o n of the international status of Canada which
might have exempted the Dominion from the scope of the Anglo-18
American dispute at that time.
To exert direct pressure on the B r i t i s h Government
the U. S. Government c a p i t a l i s e d on two factors of paramount
importance. The f i r s t of these was the general f e e l i n g i n
the two Anglo-Saxon countries of America and Great B r i t a i n ,
towards the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e on the one hand and the
idea of Anglo-American friendship on the other. Accordingly,
the American Ambassador to the Court of St.James was instructed
i n 1919 to ascertain the general f e e l i n g of the B r i t i s h people 19
on t h i s subject. In o f f i c i a l representations to the B r i t i s h
Foreign O f f i c e , expressing opposition to the renewal of the 18
Cf .Memorandum by Mr. M i l l a r d , J u l y 1920 "Aspects of the Problem of the P a c i f i c . . . " M i l l a r d , Op.Cit.p.200 19
U.S.For.Rel.1920 Vol.11, p.679
- 193 -
A l l i a n c e , the U. S. State Department always emphatically
drew B r i t i s h attention to the disastrous e f f e c t s upon American 20
public opinion. The aim of t h i s t a c t i c , which was a 'novum'
i n the his t o r y of modern diplomacy, was to demonstrate to
Great B r i t a i n that the ideal of Anglo-American cooperation was
simply impossible as long as B r i t a i n maintained the A l l i a n c e
with Japan. I t was an appeal to the sentiment of the English
people, to the deep-rooted conscience of common descent and
ancestry. Here no t e r r i t o r i a l issues were at stake,, no
boundary disputes, no f i s h i n g r i g h t s , no spheres of influence,
problems which had characterized so f a r disputes In B r i t i s h -
American relations - but imponderables which carried f a r
heavier weight: the fundamental idea of the Anglo-Saxon
community, the physical centre of which l i e s i n the A t l a n t i c ,
but the s o l i d i t y of which was tested i n the P a c i f i c .
The second fac t o r applied by the American Government
was American naval p o l i c y . The emergence of the United States
as a world power found concrete expression i n the tremendous
naval building programme which had been inaugurated and ap
proved by Congress i n August, 1916 as the " f i r s t far-reaching 21
constructive programme i n the h i s t o r y of the Republic." According to t h i s plan a powerful navy was to be completed
within seven years, consisting of ten battleships, six battle
20 ' ' Cf. U.S.For.Rel.1921 Vol.11, p.286; and Ibid.pp.314^15.
21 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1920-21,p.42.
- 194 -
c r u i s e r s , ten c r u i s e r s , f i f t y destroyers, and sixty-eight
submarines; and i t was planned to increase the t o t a l amount 22
of c a p i t a l ships to f i f t y ships u n t i l 1925. In h i s speech
on February 3, 1916, President Wilson had announced that the
United States was determined to construct a navy which was to be superior to the capacity of a l l the navies of the
world. The diplomatic doreat of America at the Paris Con-
ference^and her i s o l a t i o n i s t withdrawal from European a f f a i r s
only served' to encourage the United States Government to
implement th i s naval programme. The existence of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e and the B r i t i s h intention to continue t h i s
treaty convinced the United States Navy Department that i t
had to face the naval preponderance of the combined B r i t i s h
and Japanese f l e e t s which could be balanced only by the
creation of an adequate American naval force. At the t h i r d
anniversary of the naval armaments programme on August 31,
1919, the Secretary -of the U.S.Navy, Mr. Joseph Daniel,
announced at a speech at Charleston (West V i r g i n i a ) :
We are not only completing t h i s great plan, but are building enormous stocks and other needed shore f a c i l i t i e s elsewhere, and are constructing eighteen dreadnoughts. . . which, i n e f f e c t i v e f i g h t i n g power w i l l give our navy world primacy. . .The navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to that of the most powerful maintained by any other nation i n the world. . . . 2 4
__ Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1920-21,
and Jensen, Op.Cit.p.182
23 Cf.Baker,Op.Cit.Vol.I. , ppSO.7-8
24 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1920-21 pp43.
- 195 -
The same view was expressed by the United States President,
Mr. Harding, i n December, 1921 at Norfolk ( V i r g i n i a ) :
. . . I believe i n p a r t i a l but not permanent d i s armament and I foresee the time when t h i s w i l l be r e a l i z e d , but u n t i l that time a r r i v e s , I want a Navy f o r America's defense that i s equal to the aspirations of this country.. . 25
There can be no doubt that the United States was determined to
counteract the menace constituted to her by the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e by a deliberate large scale naval compe
t i t i o n with Great B r i t a i n and Japan. President Harding's
statement can be interpreted only as meaning that the United
States would not consent to a naval disarmament or to a
suspension of naval construction u n t i l the supreme aim of
American post-war foreign p o l i c y was reached, namely the
abrogation of the...Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
The reactions on Great B r i t a i n produced by the
United States naval p o l i c y were s i g n i f i c a n t . World War I
which resulted i n the a n n i h i l a t i o n of Germany's sea power
had l e f t Great B r i t a i n i n the p o s i t i o n of undisputed naval
supremacy. ?fhereas immediately a f t e r the war L i b e r a l
c i r c l e s concentrating around the "Manchester Guardian"
and including General Smuts and Lord Robert C e c i l , advocated
Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1921-22, p.31
- 196 -
a l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments, Gonservative groups, repre
sented by the B r i t i s h Admiralty, the "Morning Post" and
prominent persons l i k e Lord Curzon and Winston C h u r c h i l l ,
tenaciously upheld the supreme and t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e o f f 26
naval superiority. The competent naval experts of the B r i t i s h Admiralty unanimously agreed that no challenge to
B r i t i s h naval supremacy could tie tolerated. S t i l l , i n 1921
Rear*? Admiral S i r Roger Keyes pointed out most emphatically
at a speech at S h e f f i e l d that Great B r i t a i n was not disposed
to surrender her sea power supremacy "not even to a kinsman 27
who i s a good and t r i e d f r i e n d . " I t was, however, obvious
that owing to the d i s l o c a t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s post-war economy
i n the long run she was either going, to-be -outbuilt by
American competition or go bankrupt. This was "frankly ad-28
mitted by Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy as early as 1921.
F u l l y appreciating economic n e c e s s i t i e s , the B r i t i s h
Admiralty i n March 1921 r e a l i s t i c a l l y arrived at the
h i s t o r i c decision to abandon the t r a d i t i o n a l "Two Power
Standard" of the B r i t i s h Navy, for the maintenance of which
Great B r i t a i n had l a s t l y fought the war against Germany.
The basis of the new naval p o l i c y was the preservation of
the "One Power Standard". This meant that the B r i t i s h 26
Baker, Op.Cit. Vol.1, p.306. 27
Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1921-22 p.3. 28 Grt.Brit.Pari.Deb. 5th Ser.1920,Vol.126,p.2346.
- 197- -
Royal Navy should not be i n f e r i o r i n strength to that o f
any other power. The Navy Estimates of 1921-22 as i n t r o
duced by the F i r s t Sea Lord, Lord Lee of FarBham, amounted
tol.91, 186,369, whereas the t o t a l for naval expenditures
i n the prededing year was £ 105,283,281 - a dra s t i c reduction 29
of aboutj 000,000. In March, 1921 the F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty declared i n the Commons that he strongly
desired an agreement with America on the naval question 30
of the basis of p a r i t y i n naval strength. On July 5,
1921 the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, o f f i c i a l l y
proposed to the U. S. Ambassador to London that a conference
should be held
to consider a l l e s s e n t i a l matters bearing on Far East and P a c i f i c Ocean with a view to a r r i v i n g at a common understanding designed to assure settlement by peaceful means, the elimination of naval warfare. . . etc., f ^ e . 31
Considering the fac t that i t was for the f i r s t time i n the
history of the B r i t i s h Empire that Great B r i t a i n contented
herself with naval p a r i t y with another sea power and s a c r i
f i c e d a fundamental p r i n c i p l e upon which her world p o l i c y
had been based, the conclusion which has to be drawn from
t h i s decision can only be that B r i t a i n had determined to
y i e l d to the United States rather than to struggle i n r i v a l r y
with her i n world p o l i t i c s .
Lord Curzon's message showed that the leading
B r i t i s h statesmen c l e a r l y recognized that the question of CO
Brassey's Naval & Shipping Annual,1921-22 p.405 30
Cf .Dugd'ale ,Op. C i t . p. 315. 3 1U.S.For.Rel.1921 Vol.1, p.19.
- 198 -
Anglo-American naval competition and that of the renewal
of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e were intimately related.
The o f f i c i a l text of the U. S. i n v i t a t i o n issued by Presid
ent Harding for convening such a conference also l e f t no
doubt about the fact that the issue of the l i m i t a t i o n of
naval armaments had ''close r e l a t i o n to P a c i f i c and Far « 3 2
Eastern problems. As pointed out, however, the Imperial
Government was s t i l l hoping to maintain the Al l i a n c e with
Japan i n a modified form. B r i t a i n , therefore, made the
attempt to separate the issues of naval disarmament and
of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n order to avoid a conference
at which the discontinuation of the A l l i a n c e would be made
"sine qua non" on the part of the Americans for an Aiigo-
American naval agreement. Consequently, the B r i t i s h
Government proposed to the American Government that a pre
liminary conference was to be held i n London which was to .
deal with the P a c i f i c and Far Eastern problem before the 33
conference on naval disarmament started at Washington.
This suggestion had been one of the decisions reached at
the Imperial Conference. I t was i n d i c a t i v e of the attitude
of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, who favoured a renewal of the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , that the Au s t r a l i a n Prime Minister
vigorously i n s i s t e d on holding the P a c i f i c conference f i r s t , _____ __________________________________
U.S.For.Eel.1921 Vol.1, P.24 33
Cmd.1974, P.5
- 199 -
at which A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand should be represented.34
When answering President Harding's i n v i t a t i o n , the Japanese
Government agreed i n p r i n c i p l e to the idea of a conference
but made the reservation that questions of "sole concern
to certain p a r t i c u l a r powers . > j.. should be scrupulously 35
avoided". Furthermore, theyzresponded p o s i t i v e l y to the 36
B r i t i s h suggestions of a preliminary conference i n London.
I t was clear from that that B r i t a i n wanted to u t i l i z e the
proposed London discussions to ar r i v e at an agreement with
Japan i n advance of the naval disarmament conference at
Washington.
The U. S. State Department recognized the diplomatic
move on the part of the United Kingdom Government, and
therefore rejected t h e i r proposal by arguing that a confer
ence i n London would not be regarded favourably i n America,
" i n the l i g h t of rel a t i o n s between Japan and Great Britain."°
The American diplomatic standpoint i s perhaps i l l u s t r a t e d
most c l e a r l y by two newspaper messages, the correspondents of both papers being i n close contact with the "New York __
Cf.Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb. ,Ses.1921,Vol.XCVII,p.11639. 3 5Chang, Op.Cit. p.196 3 6Cmd. 1474, p.5. 37
U.S.For.Rel.1921, Vol.1, pp 28-9.
- 200 -
Herald". The I t a l i a n newspaper, "Gorriere d e l l a Sera" wrote
on October 28, 1921:
La p i u importante d e l l e condizione,chi g l i S t a t i U n i t i imperanno come preliminare necessario per l a l imitazione dei propri armament!. . . sara^l'abrogazione d e l l ' a l l i a n z a anglo-giapponese che U. considerata come indirettamente r i v o l t a contro 1'America e che s i r i t i e n e abbia e f f e t t o perturbatore n e l l ' Estremo Orients. 38
In the same vein the French paper, "Le Temps'1 stated on
November 9, 1921:
Les Etats-Unis s'opposeront a touts tentative qui aurait pour objet l'examen de l a l i m i t a t i o n dey armaments avant qu'ait ete reglees l e s questions extremes orientales. . . 3 9
Indeed, t h i s has to be pointed out most emphatically; the
abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was the p r i c e
demanded by the U. S. Government fo r stopping the expensive
naval construction programme of 1916 which, i f ca r r i e d out,
would have proved i n the long run disastrous for Great
B r i t a i n ' s economy, naval strength and p o s i t i o n as a world
power. The U. S..Government would never have agreed to a
l i m i t a t i o n of naval armament such as was embodied i n the
proposals of the U. S. Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes,
i f the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e confronted
the United States with the prospect of dealing with the 40
combined f l e e t s of two strong naval powers. Gorriere d e l l a Sera, October 28, 1921
39 Le Temps, November 9, 1921.
40 cf.Statement of Senator Lodge i n the 67th U.S.Congress,in
Ic h i h a s h i , The Washington Conference and A f t e r , Stanford C a l i f . , Stanford University Press, 1928, p.127.
- 201 -
The B r i t i s h Government was facing tremendous
problems. On the one hand, Great B r i t a i n saw her po s i t i o n
i n the Far East impe r i l l e d by the r i s e of Japan. For the
sake of her commercial i n t e r e s t s i n China and the security
of her Empire i t was expedient to keep on good terms with
Japan by means of the A l l i a n c e . On the other hand, she ran
the r i s k of incurring the permanent antagonism of the United
States which would have resulted i n an exasperated naval
r i v a l r y between the two Anglo-Saxon powers, and, i n the
ultimate a n a l y s i s , i n the f a i l u r e of the idea of the Anglo-
American community. P a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the l a t t e r
aspect, there could be no doubt where B r i t i s h public opinion
stood. During the summer of 1921 the general f e e l i n g of the 41
English people grew stronger against the A l l i a n c e , The
"London Times'; conveying the American f e e l i n g towards the
Al l i a n c e to the people of England commented i n July, 1921: Any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , even i f the United States were expressly excluded from the scope of i t s operation, might render impossible that close cooperation between the nations of the English-speaking world which President. Harding and h i s administration are eager to promote. 42
I t was clear that the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation, headed by
$£r. A. J. Balfour, had to take Into account the strong s e n t i
ment of the Anglo-Saxon people ofi both sides of the Atlantic,
when they went to Washington to seek the solution.
4 1U.S.For.Rel.1921, Vol.1, p.20. 4 2 T h e London Times, July 11, 1921
- 302 -
I t i s not the scope of th i s thesis to give a detailed
analysis of the events of the Washington Conference of 1921-43
22. This has already been done i n other works. But due
consideration should be given to the fairness with which the
B r i t i s h Empire Delegation handled the dual Anglo-Japanese
and Anglo-American problem at i t s f i n a l stage, as well as
to the eminent influence and share of Canada ,through her
delegate S i r Robert Borden, i n bringing about a solution.
The l e t t e r ' s contribution i s revealed by the Unpublished
Borden Papers. Even p r i o r to the Washington Conference
the Canadian delegate, anxious to prevent a renewal of the
Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , contacted,and had several con-
versatlonswith.important persons concerned with the Con
ference such as, f o r instance, the U. S. Delegates Mr.
Root and Senator Lodge, the U. S. Secretaries of State,
War and Navy Departments,First Lord of the Admiralty,
Lord Lee of Fareham, and the A u s t r a l i a n and New Zealand
Delegates, Senator Pearce and S i r John Salmond, and the 44
editor of the London Times, Mr. Steed. In doing t h i s
S i r Robert Borden, as the representative of Canada, assumed
the task of an intermediator not only between Great B r i t a i n
and the United States, but also between the members of the
B r i t i s h Commonwealth themselves. Thus he impressed upon 43
Cf.for instance.Iohihashi,0p.Cit. ,and Buell.R.L..The Washington Conference, New York: D.Appleton & Co. 1922. 44 Diary of S i r Robert Borden, pp.2,4,6.
- 203 -
the American Delegate, Mr. Root, that a s a t i s f a c t o r y solution
must be found which would help to placate the apprehensions 4 5
of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand . The idea of S i r Robert Borden, which was f u l l y shared by the Canadian Government,
was to achieve under a l l circumstances an understanding between
the B r i t i s h Empire and the United States which would secure
close cooperation between the two Anglo-Saxon powers. S i r
Robert r e a l i z e d that a formal a l l i a n c e with America was not 46
obtainable from the U. S. Government. In a l e t t e r to the
head of the Empire Delegation rUr»Arthur Balfour, he expressed
h i s view, saying: The scope of any treaty or agreement. . . must be l i m i t e d f o r the present; . . . i f we cannot have the United States enter the League of Nations, we should spare no e f f o r t to bring i t into cooperat i o n with us. 47
Such cooperation applied to the P a c i f i c was to give A u s t r a l i a
and New Zealand a certain guarantee a f t e r the A l l i a n c e with
Japan was abandoned. The Canadian p o l i c y at the Conference
de l i b e r a t e l y aimed at a replacement of the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e by close Anglo-American cooperation! After having
secured the-approval of h i s suggestion by Mr. Root, who
believed that "an arrangement as to the security i n the
P a c i f i c could be established which would be much more valuable
to A u s t r a l i a than any safeguard afforded by the Japanese Treaty^" 48
45 1 "~~ Diary of S i r Robert Borden, Nov. 9, 1921, p.6
46 Ibid.
47 cf.Letter of S i r Robert Borden to S i r A.Balfour,Nov.26,1921,
from the Unpublished Borden Papers,Washington Conference. 48e' S i r Robert Borden Diary, November 9, 1921 p.6
- 804 -
S i r Robert Borden was i n a p o s i t i o n to influence the Austral
ian and New Zealand delegates by conveying t h i s assurance
to them. Thus, by removing Aus t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's
fears, Canada through th i s intermediary p o l i c y contributed
considerably to the achievment of the f i n a l solution of
the P a c i f i c problem. In the same way as the Canadian delegate
influenced the representatives of the Australian and New
Zealand Governments, he urged the B r i t i s h and American
Governments, represented by I f f f r . A . Balfour and Secretary
of State Mr. C^. E. Hughes, to reach a general agreement
of close cooperation. On the assumption that the best
possible way f o r securing the association of the United States
would be a m u l t i - l a t e r a l agreement(to which the United
States adhered) f o r the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, S i r Robert ^rojBsed the conclusion of a treaty by
which the signatories would oblige themselves "to i n v e s t i
gation and report by a permanent International Tribunal" /, 49
before the powers concerned "would commence h o s t i l i t i e s . . .
The idea involved i n the Canadian proposal was, i n a
nu t s h e l l , the continuation or rather resumption of the
t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of s e t t l i n g disputes by general ar
b i t r a t i o n which has bash c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n Anglo-American 49
Cf.Letter of S i r Robert Borden to the Acting Prime Minister of Canada, Nov.14,1921, from the Unpublished Borden Papers, and Secret Letter of S i r Robert to f i r . Arthur Balfour,Nov.2 6 , 1921, Ibid.
- 2G5 -
rel a t i o n s h i p . Furthermore, since the Covenant of the
League and the Permanent Court of International Justice
were not recognized by the United States, Canada attempted
to induce America to associate herself as f a r as possible 50
by cooperating with the League of Nations. In h i s de
termination to secure United States cooperation i n i n t e r
n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s under a l l circumstances and at any p r i c e ,
S i r Robert Borden even went so f a r as to ignore o¥l?»Arthur
Balfour's lukewarmness towards the Canadian proposal, which,
as the Chief B r i t i s h Delegate r e a l i z e d , would duplicate the 51
e x i s t i n g machinery of the League, S i r Robert's argument
being that they should not "even shrink from duplication
of machinery, i f such duplication would be of e f f e c t i v e aid
i n that great purpose." 5 2
S i r Robert's proposal was f i n a l l y r e a l i z e d to a
large extent i n the Quadruple^Pacific Pact which terminated
and replaced the b i - l a t e r a l Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . At
the Conference $L.r» Arthur Balfour made a l a s t attempt to
salvage the essentials of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e by
suggesting a t r i p a r t i t e a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n , 5 0 C f . S i r Robert Borden Diary,Nov.17,1921,p.91 5 1 c f . Private and Secret L e t t e r of iflr. Arthur Balfour to to S i r Robert Borden Nov.29,1921,from the Unpublished Borden Papers. 5 2 C f . L e t t e r of S i r Robert Borden to $ltr, A.Balfour , Dec. 3, 1921, Ibid.
- 206 -53
Japan and the United States. Among the B r i t i s h j o u r n a l i s t s attending-the Conference, the representative of the "Morning
' 54 Post" pleaded strongly f o r the preservation of the A l l i a n c e .
55 But i n view of the strong opposition of the U. S. Government and of the. American press(86)to such a solution as i t suited
Sxeluslvely B r i t i s h , A u s t r a l i a n and Japanese i n t e r e s t s ,
5jf r. Arthur Balfour, without making further attempts, acquies
ced i n the. proposal advanced by the U. S. Secretary of State,
Mr. Hughes.
The Four POwer Treaty between the United States, the
B r i t i s h Empire, France and Japan of December 13, 1921, by
whioh the signatory powers pledged themselves to respect
mutually t h e i r " i n s u l a r possessions and i n s u l a r dominions
i n the P a c i f i c Ocean," to r e f e r any international dispute
" a r i s i n g out of any P a c i f i c question and involving t h e i r
said r i g h t s which i s not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y s e t t l e d by diplomacy"
to a j o i n t conference " f o r consideration and adjustment",
and i n case that the rig h t s of the contracting p a r t i e s "are
threatened by the aggressive action of any other power",
to consult each other f o r e f f e c t i v e measures "to be taken 57
j o i n t l y or separately," was indeed, according to a state
ment of the U. S. Foreign Relations Committee, no formal 58
a l l i a n c e , and contained "no committments to armed force." 53 cf.Letter of $&r.A.Balfour to His Majesty's Ambass.to Tokyo,Sir Chas.Eliot,in Dugdale t0p.Cit.pp.328-9 54 c f . S i r Robt.Borden Diary,Nov.9,1921,p.7 55 cf. U.S.For.Rel.l921,vol.II ,p.315 ,and Ibid.1922,Vol.I ,pp.7ff Ichihashi,Op.Cit.p.120 5 6The "New York Sun" and "Evening Post" had rejected such proposals already i n Aug.1921,cf.the London Times,Aug.20,1921. 5 7Cf.Cmd.2037. 5 8The London Times,March 25,1922
- 207 -
But i t can be considered as the f i r s t treaty i n the history
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s which embodies the p r i n c i p l e
of non-universal, regional " c o l l e c t i v e security". In the
f i n a l analysis the Canadian alternative for the Anglo-Japanese
A l l i a n c e was thus carried through. In a l e t t e r to the newly
elected Canadian Prime Minister,Mr. MacKenzie King, S i r
Robert Borden declared that the Four Power P a c i f i c Treaty
was " e n t i r e l y i n l i n e " with S i r Arthur Meighen's suggestions
at the preceding*Imperial Conference" There i s , indeed,
good reason to believe that M ^ j ^ l ^ f F had proposed at the
Imperial Conference that i n a P a c i f i c treaty countries with
important P a c i f i c i n t e r e s t s should be included, es p e c i a l l y
the United States. Morever., S i r Robert Borden's ideas of
bringing the United States into international co-operation
by an agreement for peaceful settlement of disputes found
expression i n that Treaty. Consequently, S i r Robert's
comment on the P a c i f i c Treaty as re f l e c t e d i n a l e t t e r to-foe
Canadian Prime Minister Meighen read:
The v i t a l feature i s that, i t provides a d e f i n i t e method whereby, i f r e l a t i o n s become strained, the issues involved may be adjusted through a joint conference between a l l the parties to the' agreement. That i s to sayl; i t substitutes the conference method for other methods of resolving i n t e r national disputes. . . b 0
Secret l e t t e r of S i r Robert Borden to Prime Minister MacKenzie King, January 31, 1922, from the Unpublished • Bord'en Papers. . fin Most Secret Letter of S i r Robert Borden to Prime Minister
Arthur Meighen December 8, 1921, Ibid.
- 308 -
Being thoroughly convinced that the Conference would not
only decide on the future of Anglo-American re l a t i o n s i n
the P a c i f i c and i n the Far East, but that i t also presented
a test case for the re l a t i o n s h i p between Great B r i t a i n and
America ' i n toto' , S i r Robert Borden made constant e f f o r t s
to bring about a harmonious British-American understanding
over naval disarmament^which should eliminate any apprehension
or cause of f r i c t i o n on either side of the A t l a n t i c . One
could go so f a r as to say that whereas a pro-American solution
of the problem of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was designed to
appease the United States i n the P a c i f i c , the acquiescence
i n the American proposals for the l i m i t a t i o n of naval arma
ments on the part of Great B r i t a i n was to s a t i s f y America i n
the A t l a n t i c . After the announcement of the famous proposals
for a ten years' naval holiday had been put forward by the
U. S. Secretary of State, S i r Robert Borden urged the leader
of the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation most emphatically to "accept 61
the proposal.in s p i r i t and p r i n c i p l e " without making any reservation. How strongly S i r Robert impressed j ^ r Arthur
Balfour can be seen from the fact that the l a t t e r used
almost p r e c i s e l y the same wording i n h i s cable to the B r i t i s h Prime Minister .recommending the acceptance of the American
7 6£ proposal as f a r as c a p i t a l ships were concerned. An agreement
on the naval question, however, was jeopardized by the constant
61 S i r Robert Borden,Diary, November 14, 1921 p.16 62 Cf. Dugdale. Op.Cit.p.521
- 209 -
objections of the naval experts amongst'the B r i t i s h Dele
gation. They tenaciously held the view that the American
suggestion for a naval holiday should be rejected or at 63
le a s t paralyzed as far as possible. Admiral Chatfield
even intimated h i s readiness to f i g h t against the U. S. 64
navy. In a draft telegram to Mr.Lloyd George, the naval
experts led by Lord Lee urged the B r i t i s h Government to
"oppose the construction by the United States and Japan.
of any cruisers or destroyers during the ten years' period.
Mr. Lloyd George generally shared S i r Robert Borden's view 66
as f a r as the naval holiday was concerned, but the Borden
Papers reveal that at the same time the B r i t i s h Government imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s on fey Arthur Balfour which haniicapped
67 h i s freedom of action at the Conference. ThuSjSir Robert
faced at times the d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n that a l l the members
of the Empire Delegation were i n c l i n e d to adhere to the 68
opinion of the naval experts. An agreement was f i n a l l y reachgd
on t h i s que°stionj however, due to the incessant e f f o r t s of 63
S i r Robert Borden Diary,December 9, 1921, pp.73-5 6 4I_bid
S i r Robert Borden Diary,P.20 6 6 c f . L e t t e r of S i r Robert to the Acting Can.Prime M i n i s t e r , S i r James Longhead, Nov.16,1921 from the Unpublished Borden Papers. 6 7 S i r Robert Borden Diary,Nov.25,1921,p.42. 68
Ibid.Dec.9 ,1921, p.73
- 210 -
the Canadian Delegate to avert the r e j e c t i o n of the American
naval o f f e r , S i r Robert r e a l i s t i c a l l y argued that the finan
c i a l and material resources of America capacitated her "to
outstrip the B r i t i s h Empire i n any competition i n naval armaments.69
In the discussions of the l i m i t a t i o n s of naval armaments
the r e a l i t y - o f Anglo-Am-erican cooperation became obvious i n
that Great B r i t a i n took a firm stand for the f i r s t time against
her former Japanese a l l y , when the Japanese Delegate, Admiral
Kato, demanded an increase of the Japanese r a t i o of c a p i t a l
ships from 60% to 70%. The London Times, i n speaking of the
"unanimous view of Great B r i t a i n and the United States", gave
the best expression of the changed p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n by stating:
I f the Japanese by t h e i r proposal wished to test the strength of t h i s view, they w i l l c e r t a i n l y be confronted by an impressive ;demonstration of i t s weight and power. 71
Owing to the Jfleto0^e4ia-M_tg Canadian influence and to
the B r i t i s h willingness to gain the friendship instead of the
enmity of the United States, full.agreement was thus reached
on the P a c i f i c and Far Eastern problems and on the Issue of
l i m i t a t i o n of naval armament. The immediate res u l t was the
Four Power P a c i f i c Pact, which supplanted the former Anglo-Japanese
^ 9Secret l e t t e r of S i r Robert Borden to S i r Arthur Balfour, Nov.26,1921, from the Unpublished Borden Papers. 70
Cf.Admiral Kato's statement to the press, Nov.17 ,1921,in the London Times, Nov.21, 1921. 71
cf.Leading a r t i c l e of the London Times, Dec.2, 1921.
- 211 -
A l l i a n c e , and the Naval Treaty for the l i m i t a t i o n of naval
armament which sanctioned the p r i n c i p l e of naval equality between
Great B r i t a i n and the United States and granted Japan the third-
place as sea power. In both cases Japan could do nothing but
comply with p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . she did so without resentment.
In t h i s thesis the development of Anglo-Japanese re
l a t i o n s since 1911 up to the Washington Conference has been
portrayed i n the special l i g h t of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
This A l l i a n c e had formed the strongest p i l l a r of the structure
of B r i t i s h world p o l i c y since 1902, despite the changes which
the Treaty underwent i n i t s p o l i t i c a l scope and character. These
changes, r e f l e c t i n g the dynamic character of international
p o l i t i c s , were due to three factors; the tremendous r i s e of
Japan as an expanding world power i n the Far East, the p a r a l l e l
ascendency of the United States on the eastern coast of the
P a c i f i c Ocean, and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the Dominions
within the B r i t i s h commonwealth i n which Canada took the lead.
The expanding power and influence of Japan i n Eastern Asia
appeared to make a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e a
matter of expediency. From the B r i t i s h view the A l l i a n c e was
i n the f i r s t place designed to safeguard B r i t i s h commercial
i n t e r e s t s i n China and to serve the interests of the Dominions
of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. Both aims could best be achieved
by securing the goodwill of Japan and by exerting a r e s t r a i n i n g
and c o n t r o l l i n g influence oft Japanese p o l i c y rather than by
estranging Japan and making her an anemy. In the second place
- 212 -
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , B r i t a i n f e l t , might serve as
an instrument for maintaining the balance of power i n the
P a c i f i c which was seriously disturbed by the steadily increasing
tension between Japan and the United States. The i d e a l solution
for the security of B r i t i s h , Australian and New Zealand's
i n t e r e s t s would have been a t r i p a r t i t e a l l i a n c e between Great
B r i t a i n , Japan and the United States, that i s , the establishment
of a P a c i f i c Triangle i n which the three powers cooperated with
each other. Such a solution, however, would have meant United
States acquiescence and recognition of Japan's "special i n t e r e s t s "
i n the Far East, or i n other words, the s a c r i f i c e of the
essentials of the"Open-Door Doctrine" upon which United States
Far Eastern p o l i c y was based.
Any continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was
d i r e c t l y detrimental to one of the foundations of U. S. foreign
p o l i c y and to the s e l f i n t e r e s t of America J i B r s e l f . This explains
the acrimonious apposition of the United States to the renewal
of the A l l i a n c e . Great B r i t a i n had to. make her f i n a l decision -
a decision which was to become of f a r reaching importance i n
the development of international r e l a t i o n s . E i t h e r Japan or the
United States had to be chosen as the future partner^in world
p o l i t i c s . The U. S. Ambassador i n London, Mr. Harvey, empha-
dized the h i s t o r i c a l nature of the decision i n a speech i n
London,on October 31 1921,when he said:
- 313 - • '*
The bonds of friendship and forbearance which now hold us clos e l y together . . . are hound to he strengthened or relaxed by what happens to Washington. I f we cannot act i n unison now there i s s l i g h t reason to assume that we ever can. . . 72
At the Washington-Conference Great B r i t a i n made
her decision i n favour of the United' States, her ''ally
by nature" i n preference to her former " a l l y by diplomacy".
The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was formally superseded by
the Four Power P a c i f i c Treaty which p r a c t i c a l l y meant the
abandonment of Japan as Great B r i t a i n ' s a l l y .
The analysis of B r i t i s h Far Eastern p o l i c y and of
the American motives behind t h e i r i n f l e x i b l e resistance to a
renewal of the A l l i a n c e make i t abundantly clear why the
United States appealed to Great B r i t a i n to ensure that
her p o l i c y i n the Far East coincided with that of the United
States. This,indeed, was the resu l t emanating from the
Washington Conference, or more accurately, from the abrogation
of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . In the years to follow Great
B r i t a i n pursued the l i n e of action taken by the U. S. Govern
ment i n the Far East, i n the case of the Mahchurian C o n f l i c t
of 1931-32 h e s i t a t i n g l y , but from the China Incident of 1937
t i l l the outbreak of World War I I i n Eastern As i a , i n complete 73 ~
accord w>ith the United States. Mr. C h a r c h i l l declared i n
72 Q&dted from the London Times, November 1, 1921
73 cf. Hubbard, G.E. B r i t i s h Far Eastern Pol i c y . I.P.R.Inquiry
Series, I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 1943.pp.41,45 ,46
- 214 -
h i s Mansion House speech,on November 10, 1941:
. . .The United States are doing th e i r utmost to f i n d ways of preserving peace i n the P a c i f i c . . . i t i s my duty to say, that, should the United States beoome involved i n war with Japan, the B r i t i s h declaration w i l l follow within the hour.. .74
Moreover, Great B r i t a i n ' s renunciation of a Far Eastern
p o l i c y deviating from the American l i n e had decisive bearing
on the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the whole of the P a c i f i c . The
former B r i t i s h supremacy i n the P a c i f i c was supplanted by
the dominant p o s i t i o n of the United States after the l a s t
B r i t i s h attempt to preserve *a balance of power by the es
tablishment' of a P a c i f i c Triangle had f a i l e d . One year a f t e r
Washington the F i r s t Sea Lord of the B r i t i s h Admiralty, "jj r...
Amery, declared i n the Commons with reference to the B r i t i s h
p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c : ". . .we are helpless and r e l i a n t
on the goodwill of a f r i e n d l y and l a t e l y a l l i e d power. . .75
But whilst Great B r i t a i n l o s t on the one hand the " P a c i f i c
Triangle ,she gained on the other hand what was to become
the "North^Atlantic Triangle". Herein l i e s the p o l i t i c a l
quintessence of the problem of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .
The Washington Conference was something more than B r i t i s h
and American diplomatic cooperation ; the decision brought
nearer the r e a l i z a t i o n of the idea of the community of
74 Hubbard, op.oit.page 66.
75 Gr.Brit.Pari.Deb.5th Se*.1923,Vol.163,pp.1267-8.
- 215 -
English-speaking nations based upon common t r a d i t i o n and
heritage. Thus i t marked the beginning of a new epoch
i n Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s .
In conclusion,the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , with
Great B r i t a i n ' s supremacy i n the P a c i f i c had to be sacrificed
on the a l t a r of the idea of the Trans-Atlantic Anglo-Saxon
community. Although the ph y s i c a l centre of gravity of
the Anglo-American community was, i s , and w i l l remain the
North A t l a n t i c , nevertheless the intimate association of t h i s
community originated i n the P a c i f i c .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e , however, of the problem of the Anglo-
Japahese A l l i a n c e as dealt with i n t h i s thesis l i e s i n the fact
that i t i s immediately associated with present world history.
Great h i s t o r i c a l events never happen spontaneously or Incident-
ally; tout according to the law of h i s t o r i c a l continuity they
are the product and the r e s u l t of the long-lasting process of
a development which passes beneath the surface of events.Thus,
the h i s t o r i c decision of the B r i t i s h Government at the Washing
ton Conference, brought about by Canada,laying, as i t d i d , the
foundation f o r Anglo-American partnership must be considered
as an important milestone i n a development which led ultimately
to the formation of the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization of
1949, which i s the p o l i t i c a l implementation and the s p i r i t u a l
incarnation of the idea of Anglo-American cooperation.
- 816 -
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
A. PRIMARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION I. O f f i c i a l and Government Publications
1. British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914. ed. G.P.Gooeh-H.W.Temperley, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1926 f f . Vol. VIII and XI.
8. British and Foreign State Papers, London, H.M.St.Office, 1920 f f . Vol. CX (1916) and Vol.XCIII (1920).
3. Canada.Parliament.House of Commons.Official Report of Debates. Ottawa King's Printer. 1920,Vol.143; 1921, Vol. 146 and 148; 1922, Vol.151.
4. Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War,(Mlscell No. 10) 1915, London, ~~ H.M.St.Office, Harrison and Sons printers, 1915,Cmd.7860.
5. Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates. Sess.1911, VolJX; Sess. 1913, Vol.LXX1; Sess,1914/17 Vol.LXXIII and LXXVIII; Sess.1917/18,Vol.LXXXIV and LXXXV,Sess.1919, Vol.LXXXVIII and LXXXIX,Sess.1920/21, Vol.XCI, XCIV, XCV, XCVI, XCVII.
6. Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and India.(June,July, August,1921) Summary of Proceedings and Documents Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty,Cmd.1474. London, H.M.St.Office,1921. -
7. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. ed.E.L.Woodward - R.Butler, 1st Series, 1919. London, H.M.St.Office, 1949, Vol.11 and III.
8. Great Britain, The Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons London, H.M.St.Office.5th Ser.1911,Vol.22 and 28,1914, Vol.59 and 63; 1915, Vol.70,71 and 75; 1917, Vol.99;1918, Vol.101 and 103; 1920, Vol.126; 1921,Vol.136, 138,141,142,143,144,146 and 147; 1923,Vol.163 and 165; 1924, Vol.176.
9. Imperial Conference 1923.Appendix to the Summary of Proceedings. Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. 1923. Cmd.1988. London,H.M.St.Office 1923.
10. Die Internatlonalen Bezlehungen im Zeitalter des Imperial!smus Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zaristischen und Provisori-schen Regierung. Berlin, 1934-36, Vol.11.
11. Naval Mission to the Dominion of New Zealand. Report of Admiral Viscount J e l l i c o e . August-October 1919. Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives of New Zealand. 1919. Wellington 1919. A-4 Vol.1.
12;. New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Sess.1913, Vol.166; 4th Sess.1922, Vol.196.
13. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the. United States. U.S.Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , Washington 1924 f f . 1914, Supplem; 1915; 1917;1920, Vol.11; 1921, Vol.1 and I I ; 1922, Vol.1.
14. Treaty Series No. 6 (1924) Treaty between the B r i t i s h Empire, France, Japan and the ': United States,,Relating to t h e i r Insular possessions and Insular Dominions i n the P a c i f i c Ocean, and Accompanying Declaration. Washington, December 13th,1921. Presented by the Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. Cmd.2037, London, H.ffl. St.0.1924. •
I I . Memoirs, D i a r i e s . Speeches, etc.
1. Borden, S i r Robert, Diary of the Washington Disarmament Conference. The Unpublished Borden Papers. F i l e OC 611. Washington Conference 1921/22. Microfilmed i n 1952 by.the Public Archives of Canada.
2. Borden, S i r Robert, Robert L a i r d Borden, His Memoirs, ed.by ":r Henry Borden, Toronto. The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd.
1938, Vol.11.
3. Borden, S i r Robert, The Question of Ori e n t a l Immigration. Speeches i n part delivered i n 1907 and 1908.
4. The B r i t i s h Year Book of International Law. 1922/85.London H.Milford.Oxford University Press 1923.
5. Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual 1920/21 and 1921/22, New York, Maomillan. 1921 f f .
6. C h u r c h i l l , W. The World C r i s i s . New York, C. Scribnerls Sons. 1923. •
7. Dugdale, B.E.C., Arthur James Balfour. 1906/1930. London, Hutchinson and Co.Ltd. 1936.
8. Grey, S i r Edward, Twenty-five Years 1892-1916 London, Hodder and Stoughten, Ltd.1925, Vol.II.
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by W. R. Langdon), Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1936.
10. Lloyd George, D. t i War Memoirs, London, Nicholson and Watson, 1933-36, Vol.11, IV, and VI. 11. Lloyd, George, D. , War Memoirs, (transl.), Berlin,1934. 12. MacMurray, I. V. A., Treaties and Agreements with and
Concerning China, 1894-1919. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1929, Vol.11.
13. Meighen, Arthur, Oversea Addresses. ( June -July 1921). Toronto^ The Musson Book Company, Ltd. 1921.
14. Millard, Th. F. , Conflict of Policies in Asia. London, George Allen and Unwill, Ltd. 1924.
15. M i l l e r , D. H., My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris. New York 1924. Vol. I and XIX.
16. Siebert, B. V., Entente Diplomacy and the World. ed. Schreiner, A. B., New York, London. The Knicker-bocker Press, 1921.
III. Newspapers 1. The Board of Trade Journal 1919, 1922. 2. Corriere della Sera, 1921. 3. The Daily Chroniclei 1921. 4. The Vancouver Daily Province 1921 5. The Daily Telegraph 1921. 6. Handelsberichten, Amersterdam, 1919. 7. Indiaman, London, 1916. 8. Japan Advertiser 1917, 1920, 1921. 9. Japan Post 1914. 10. Japan Times 1912. 11. Japan Weekly Chronicle 1916, 1917.
- 219 -
The Journal of Commerce, New York, 1919, 1921. Koelnische Zeitung 1921. The London and China Telegraph 1916, 1919. The London Journal 1929. The London Times 1917, 1918, 1920, 1921, 1922. The Manchester Guardian 1919, 1920. The Manchester Guardian Commercial 1922. The Morning Post 1919, 1921. The New York Evening Post 1921. The New York Times 1921. The Observer 1921. The Peking Daily News 1916. Le Temps 1920, 1921.
B. SECONDARY SOURCES OP INFORMATION
I. Books 1. Bailey, Th. A. , Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-
American C r i s i s , Stanford, California,, Stanford University Press 1934.
2. Borden, Sir Robert, The War and the Future, London, Hodder and Stoughten, 1917.
3. Brebner, J . B., The North Atlantic Triangle, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1945.
4. Buell, R. L., The Washington Conference, New York, D. Appleton and Comp. 1922.
12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
1 7 •
18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
- 220 - •
5. Bywater, H. C. , Sea Power i n t h e P a c i f i c , London, Constable and Comp., Ltd. 1934.
6. Carter, G. , The B r i t i s h Commonwealth,and International Security, Toronto, TheRyerson Press, 1947.
7. Chang, Ch. F., The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1931.
8. Clyde, P.H. , The Far East, New York , Prentice , H a l l , Inc. 1952.
9. Dennet, T., Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York 1925.
10. Dewey, A. G., The Dominions and Diplomacy London,New York,Toronto,Longmans,Green and Comp.1929.Vol.11
11. Duggan, St.P., The League of Nations Boston, The A t l a n t i c Monthly Press, 1919.
12. Francke, 0., Die Grossmaechte i n Ostasien,1894-1914.Hamburg 192£
13. Hubbard,.G. E. , B r i t i s h Far Eastern P o l i c y New York, International Secretariat,I.P.R.,1943.
14. Ichihashi, Y. , The Washington Conference and After Stanford, C a l i f . , Stanford University Press, 1928.
15. Jensen, G., Seemacht Japan, B e r l i n , 1943.
16. Kawakami, K.K., Japan's P a c i f i c P o l i c y New York 1922.
17. King-Hall, S*., Our Own Times, 1913-1938. London, Nicholson and Watson Ltd. 1938.
18. La Fargue, T. E., China and the World War Stanford, C a l i f . , Stanford Univ. Press, 1937.
19. Langer, W.L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902., New York, London, A.A.KnojJf, 1935. Vol.11.
20. Lower, A.R.M., Canada and the Far East - 1940 New York, International Secretariat, I.P.R.1940.
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21. MacNair, H. F., Modern Far Eastern Internation Relations Toronto, New York, London, 1950.
22. Simpson, B.L., An Indiscreet Chronicle from the P a c i f i c by Putnam Weale (pseu.) New York, Dodd, Mead and Comp.1922.
23. Steed, H. W. , Through i.. , . ^ T h i r t y Years, London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1925, Vol.II.
24. Strange, W. , Canada,. The P a c i f i c and War. Toronto, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1937.
25. Takeuchi, T., War and Diplomacy i n the Japanese Empire, New York, Doubleday, Doran and Comp.Inc. 1935.
26. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey of International Affairs,1920/23 B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , London, H. M i l f o r d , Oxford, Unversity Press 1925.
27. Woodsworth, Ch. G., Canada and the Orient, Toronto, The Macmillan Comp. of Canada Ltd. 1941.
I I . P e r i o d i c a l s , Special A r t i c l e s , etc.
a) Special A r t i c l e s
1. Angus, H. F. , Canada and Naval Rivalry i n the P a c i f i c , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s . V o l . VIII (June 1935) pp 176-184.
2. < Bland, I.P.O., Japanese P o l i c y i n China, the Nineteenth Century and After,Vol. LXZVTII (November 1915) pp 1198-1212.
3. Brebner, J.B., Canada, The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and the Washington Conference, P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, Vol. L (March 1935.) pp. 45/56L -
4. Spinks, C.N. , The Termination of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l Review, Vol. VI, (1_37) pp.321-340.
5. Steed, W., B r i t i s h P o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c ; The Nineteenth Century and A f t e r , Vol.CXI, ( A p r i l 1932) pp 369-409.
- £22 -
b) P e r i o d i c a l s
1. The Canadian Annual Review of Public A f f a i r s 1919. 1921.
2. China Archiv. B e r l i n 1916, 1917, 1918.
3. E.',iEurop.a£Nbuye.leIl_19, 1920
4. Marine Rundschau 1921.
5. Der Neue Orient, B e r l i n 1919
6. Ostasiatische Rundschau 1920
7. Ostasiatischer Lloyd 1914, 1915
8. The Round Table 1920/21.