X Zjazd Polskiego Towarzystwa Kognitywistycznego

Szczecin, 25-27 września 2014

Interactive Semantics and Self-Awareness

Kasia M. Jaszczolt

University of Cambridge

https://cambridge.academia.edu/KasiaJaszczolt

1

‘I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch.’

Perry (1979: 3)

2

Another scenario:

(1) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.

(2) I am to blame. I completely forgot I was put in charge.

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The problem: Beliefs and expressions de se

referential semantics conflates (1) with (2):

(1) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.

(2) I am to blame. I completely forgot I was put in charge.

x [to-blame(x)] (kasia jaszczolt)

Perry (2001, 2009): referential content as the ‘default’ content

4

Pragmatic aspects

• Conveying the intended de se meaning: grammar or pragmatics?

• De se reports in minimalist and contextualist approaches

• Representing de se reports in Default Semantics

5

? Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28):

The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds.’

6

? Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28):

The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds.’

7

The cognitive access to the self is present in the semantics of English (in some form or other). But is it conveyed through grammar?

8

Indexical/nonindexical: a blurred distinction

‘I am happy.’ (indexical)

‘Kasia is happy.’ (non-indexical)

Japanese and Thai first-person markers have the characteristics of both a pronoun and a noun; pronouns and nouns do not constitute morphologically different categories.

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Neither nouns nor pronouns form a closed class;

Both nouns and pronouns form the plural form by adding a plural morpheme;

Pronouns are not, strictly speaking, indexicals (e.g. honorification – a compulsory social aspect of their meaning).

10

I (body), I (mind), honorifics etc.

Languages of Southeast and East Asia (Thai, Burmese, Javanese, Khmer, Korean, Malay, or Vietnamese)

Words for ‘slave’, ‘servant’, royal slave’, ‘lord’s servant’, ‘Buddha’s servant’ are used there for self-reference, often to indicate self-denigration

Thai: 27 forms for first person (Siewierska 2004: 228);

Japanese: 51 (Tanaka 2012).

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An argument from non-pronominal expressions

x Pace Chierchia, cognitive access to oneself is not so ‘systematically’ excluded from the interpretation of non-pronominal expressions:

‘Sammy wants a biscuit.’

‘Mummy will be with you in a moment.’

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• Spatial deixis can also be employed for self-reference (e.g. Thai phŏm1 nii2, ‘one male this’; Japanese kotira, Korean yeogi, and Vietnamese hây, ‘here’.

• The use of reflexives (Japanese zibun/jibun, Vietnamese mình).

• Acoma (New Mexico) and Wari’ (Brazil): no personal pronouns (Heine and Song 2011).

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Outcome:

• The indexical/non-indexical distinction does not universally apply in the domain of first-person reference.

• This could in principle signal that there is no pure universal concept of the self that can be detached from other meanings.

see Jaszczolt (2013)

Expressing the Self: Cultural Differences and Cognitive Defaults, The Leverhulme Trust Project, University of Cambridge 14

A stronger hypothesis:

• The indexical/non-indexical dichotomy does not stand up to scrutiny in the case of any natural language in that admixtures of other aspects of meaning that take the deictic term beyond the bounds of pure, direct reference can always be attested.

English first-person pronoun ‘I’ can (albeit occasionally) serve purposes other than that of self-referring (Jaszczolt 2013).

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Referring to oneself displays different properties depending on the circumstances:

‘I am in pain.’

immunity to error through misidentification

(IEM, Shoemaker 1968; Prosser and Recanati 2012)

vs.

‘I am wearing a red scarf.’

(no IEM)

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Properties of self-ascription cannot be generalized about.

17

First-person reference is often achieved through the use of non-pronominal expressions,

while

pronominals convey other functions in addition to those specific for indexicals.

18

Devices for signalling a degree of self-reference:

‘One can see the hotel from the window.’

(French on, German man)

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“[g]eneric one is a pronoun that (...) expresses generalizing detached self-reference. It is a first-person oriented generic pronoun, in the sense that it does not stand for the speaker’s actual person, but rather for a range of individuals that the speaker identifies with or simulates.”

Moltmann (2010: 440)

20

The arbitrary (non-controlled) PRO also conveys detached self-reference:

‘It is easy [PRO] to see the hotel from the window.’

21

The semantic category of the first-person indexical does not correspond bi-uniquely to a morphosyntactic category.

? The category of indexical expressions is not well supported on the conceptual level.

22

Character, no content

It’s never too late to say ‘I’m sorry’.

from Huang, p.c.

23

‘Fluid characters’

Processes of utterance interpretation operate on units of different length:

‘or shall I say…’ (‘innymi słowy’)

‘if you like’ (‘powiedzmy’)

24

‘If I remember rightly you had jaundice, didn’t you?’ S1A-028 #051

‘Very short skirt on if you don’t mind me saying.’ S1A-040 #089

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An argument from conceptual shift

Kaplan (1989a: 491): uttering ‘I’ and pointing at someone else is ‘irrelevance or madness or what?’ (fixity thesis)

But:

‘It1+t2 believe I should have prepared the drinks party. In a way It1 also believed that It1+t2 should have done it when It1 walked into the room. The fact is, the person appointed by the Faculty Board should have done it and as It1 later realised It1+t2

was this person.’

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Wiemt1+t2, że to jat1+t2 powinnam byłat1+t2

know1SgPres that Dem INom should1SgFPast

przygotować te drinki. W pewnym sensie,

prepareInf thisAccPl drinkPlMAcc In certainSgMInstr senseSgMInstr

wtedy też wiedziałamt1, ponieważ miała je

then also know1SgFPast because be-toSgFPast theyNMAcc

przygotować osoba wybranaprzez Radę Wydziału,

prepareInf personSgFNom selected by BoardSgFAcc FacultySgMGen

a to jat1+t2 byłam tą osobą.

and Dem INom beSgFPast DemSgFInstr personSgFInstr

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An argument from bound-variable use

Kratzer (2009): pronouns can be ambiguous between a referential and a bound-variable interpretation

‘I’m the only one around here who can take care of mychildren.’

‘Only I admitted what I did wrong.’

‘Only you can eat what you cook.’

28

Restriction: Bound-variable uses are rare, restricted, and differ from language to language.

Tylko ja jeden przyznałem się do błędu.

only 1Sg soleSgMNom admit1SgPastM Refl to mistakeSgMGen

Tylko ja jedna tutaj potrafię zajmować się Only 1Sg soleSgFNom here can1SgPres careInf Refl

swoimi dziećmi.ReflPronPl Instr childPl Instr

29

Kratzer:

(i) bound variable pronouns are underlyingly referential pronouns whose meaning can be accounted for through context-shifting.

or:

(ii) they are unspecified and obtain the meaning through feature transmission from their binders in functional heads.

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Grammatical foundation of self-reference cannot be excluded.

31

Attitude reports

Kasia wie, że jest winna.KasiaNom know3SgPres that be3SgPres guiltySgFN

self-reference

Kasia wie, że to ona jest winna.

Dem she

optional self-reference but strongly entrenched

Kasia przyznała, że jest winna.KasiaNom admit3SgPast that be3SgPres guiltySgFN

optional self-reference

32

PRO + no self-reference

‘Lidia wants to be a scientist.’

no underlying ‘I’-reference: ‘I want to be a scientist.’

33

‘Alice wants what Lidia wants. ‘underlying ‘I’-reference (self-attribution of property)

but:

‘Lidia’s mother wants what Lidia wants and that’s why she is buying her lots of scientific books.’no underlying ‘I’-reference ( propositionalism)

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Interim conclusion:

The cognitive access to oneself is

?‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions’;

?‘systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns’; x ‘systematically and unambiguously associated with the

interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds’;

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lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs

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Part II: Reports de se/de re about oneself

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‘Kasia believes that she is to blame.’

quasi-indexical

38

Against syntactic ambiguity of de se/de re:

Percus and Sauerland (2003): logical form contains

‘variables over concept-generators’

• de re: the complement of ‘believes’ denotes a function from concept-generators to a proposition;

• de se : the complement of ‘believes’ denotes a function from concept-generators to properties, achieved via type-shifting (cf. Chierchia 1989)

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Default De Se

Maier’s (2009) default de se:

(i) syntactic processing results in a de dicto reading;

(ii) presuppositions added (‘equality first’), coreference is established as a default link;

(iii) if recognize (x,x), then no coreference and search continues.

Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010, forthcoming)

40

A disclaimer: non-coreferential readings

Kasiax believes that shex is to blame.

a strong tendency for coreference, van der Sandt’s (1992) (presupposition as anaphora)

grammar delivers contextualist default contents

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Towards a (pragmatic) solution

• self-ascription (of properties, grammar)

• self-reference (pragmatics)

• self-attribution (of mental states, epistemic)

• self-awareness (cognitive)

42

?Grammar conveys self-awareness

Allocation of self-awareness to grammar is a matter of an agreement as to what we want the grammar to do: capture strong tendencies or capture patterns that underdetermine meaning.

minimalist or contextualist account

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Two options for a theory of meaning

(1) to dissociate conversational practices from a theory of meaning and take the latter to pertain only to the language system and to sentences as abstract units

semantic minimalism (minimal role of context)

(2) to capture speakers’ intuitions about meaning in communication, at the same time retaining the commitment to the underlying compositionality of meaning.

contextualism (substantial role of context)

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Contextualists on De Se

(i) free, top-down modulation, unarticulated constituents (e.g. Recanati 2004, 2005b, 2010)

(ii) hidden-indexical theory, additions to the sentence meaning are traceable to the logical form (e.g. Schiffer1977, 1992, 1996; also e.g. Crimmins and Perry 1989)

(iii) all truth-conditional effects of context can be traced to logical form (e.g. Stanley 2002; Stanley & Szabó 2000 )

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Contextualist accounts

John Perry: ‘I am making a mess.’

John Perry believes that he is making a mess.

>> John Perry believes of himself that he is making a mess.

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In defence of default grammar-based de se

It is methodologically more judicious to assume that grammar produces standard readings.

(from: the conceptual universal of self-reference; the omission of the

pronoun in pro-drop languages without introducing ambiguity)

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Interim summary

• Self-awareness persists as a strong tendency across self-attribution and third-person attribution.

• Contextualist orientation to truth-conditional content does not preclude deriving some of the optional aspects of meaning, such as de se reading of third-person pronouns in belief reports, from the grammar.

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Minimalism on de se

Minimalists fulfil their raison d’être with respect to the semantics in a language system but at the expense of misrepresenting the power of grammar. The grammar/pragmatics interface does not allow for a theoretical divide in that when we attribute strong tendencies to grammar (partially supported), there has to be an option for them not to be realised in a particular situation of discourse.

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Proposal: We should not ‘split’ the power of grammar into that pertaining to the system and that pertaining to how grammar functions in utterance processing.

De se belief ascription provides strong support for a contextualist, grammar-triggered construal

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De Se in Interactive Semantics

Jaszczolt 2005, 2007, 2010, forthcoming

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Default Semantics

K. M. Jaszczolt, 2005. Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press

K. M. Jaszczolt, 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 215-246.

world knowledge (WK)

word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

situation of discourse (SD)

stereotypes and presumptions properties of human inferential system (IS)

about society and culture (SC)

Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ

merger representation Σ

Primary meaning:

combination of word meaning

and sentence structure (WS)

conscious pragmatic inferencepm

(from situation of discourse, social and

social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD) cultural assumptions, and world

world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm) knowledge) (CPIpm)

Secondary meanings:

Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm)

conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)

Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised

version of Default Semantics

merger representation Σ

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sources of information types of processes

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Mapping between sources and processes

WK SCWD or CPI

SC SCWD or CPI

WS WS (logical form)

SD CPI

IS CD

DS/IS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of ∑ with a subscript standing for the type of processing

Pragmatic compositionality

• methodological assumption: a shift of compositionality requirement to the level of interaction of semantic and pragmatic properties (Recanati 2004, 2010; Jaszczolt 2005a, 2010)

• a supervenience relation between linguistic expressions and a metaphysical (compositional) foundation (Szabó 2000; Schiffer, e.g. 1992, 1996, 2003)

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Bel (x,’)

the individual x has the cognitive state represented as an embedded representation ’

58

(i) CD default status of de re

(ii) coreference x=y

(iii) de se (= from CD, WS)

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60

‘I believe I am making a mess.’

x y ’

[John Perry]CD (x)

[John Perry]CD (y)

[y=x]WS

[[x]CD [believes]CD,WS’]WS

’: [[y]CD is making a mess]WS

It1 believed It1+t2 was making a mess.

?/In a sense, It1 believed It1+t2 was making a mess. It1 just didn’t know that the person It1 referred to was It1+t2.

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Merger representation:

• coreference: condition [y=x]WS

• the lack of self-awareness: differentiation of indexing on x and y (CD vs CPI) and the non-default use of the belief operator (CPI)

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‘I believed, in a sense, I was making a mess.’ (marked reading)

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x y ’

[John Perry]CD (x)

[John Perry]CPI (y)

[y=x]WS

[[x]CD [believe]CPI’]WS

’: [[y]CPI is making a mess]WS

‘John Perry believes that he is making a mess.’ (default reading)

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x y ’

[John Perry]CD (x)

[John Perry]CD (y)

[y=x]WS,CD

[[x]CD [believes]CD,WS’]WS

’: [[y]CD is making a mess]WS

‘John Perry believes that he is making a mess.’ (non-default coreferential reading)

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x y ’

[John Perry]CD (x)

[John Perry]CPI (y)

[y=x]WS

[[x]CD [believes]CPI ’]WS

’: [[y]CPI is making a mess]WS

Summary and Conclusion

• There is substantial cross-linguistic evidence that there is no reliable representation of self-awareness in the grammar or the lexicon. Instead, there is a lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-off, allowing for various degrees of salience of communicating cognitive access to oneself.

• When compositionality is shifted to the level of the merger of information (), as in DS, the differences between syntactic and pragmatic solutions to de se are rendered unimportant.

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• In DS, rather than make a case for conscious self-reference as derived from the grammar or from pragmatic enrichment, we acknowledge its default status triggered by the grammar and aided by the CD process that produces an interpretation pertaining to the strongest intentionality of the speaker’s mental state and the strongest referential intention.

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‘The indexical fact may have to be taken as primitive.’

Chalmers (1996: 85)

the indexical fact the indexical expression

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