Individualistic tendencies: When group status makes the difference

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations2015, Vol. 18(4) 540 –556

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Individualistic tendencies refer to the individuals’ propensity to emphasize personal distinctiveness and uniqueness, as opposed to the value of the col-lective and intragroup similarity. Research in social psychology has revealed that such individualistic ten-dencies are commonplace in contemporary societies (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). Examples are the purchase of a watch that makes someone feel differ-ent, the customizing of one’s car in order to convey a unique personality, and choosing unconventional forms of dress. Such individualistic tendencies are often considered to derive from a universal human motive to single oneself out (Brewer, 1991; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000), and have been shown to fuel individuals’ self-esteem (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995). Threats to uniqueness are

emotionally painful, and incite people to engage in behaviors, or to assert opinions, aimed at restoring uniqueness (Fromkin, 1972; Imhoff & Erb, 2009; Morrison & Johnson, 2011; Reysen, Landau, & Branscombe, 2012).

But is the pursuit of uniqueness a purely dis-positional phenomenon? There are reasons to think that this is not the case. First, individualistic tendencies are prevalent in western societies

Individualistic tendencies: When group status makes the difference

Vincenzo Iacoviello1 and Fabio Lorenzi-Cioldi1

AbstractIn three studies, the authors investigated whether individualistic tendencies are contingent upon ingroup social status. Ingroup status was created using experimental procedures, and individualistic tendencies were assessed as preference for individualistic over collectivistic advertisement messages or preference for scarce over available products. It was predicted and found that (a) members of high-status groups emphasize individualistic tendencies compared to members of low-status groups, and that (b) this difference increases as a function of ingroup identification. Among highly identified participants, high-status group members held onto their individualistic tendencies, whereas low-status group members resolutely reduced these tendencies. The discussion addresses the role of group status in the emergence of individualistic self-conceptions and worldviews.

Keywordscollective identity, group status, individualistic tendencies, personal identity

Paper received 4 November 2013; revised version accepted 25 August 2014.

1University of Geneva, Switzerland

Corresponding author:Vincenzo Iacoviello, FPSE - Psychologie Sociale, Université de Genève, Uni Mail, Boulevard du Pont d’Arve 40, Genève CH-1205, Switzerland. Email: [email protected]

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Iacoviello and Lorenzi-Cioldi 541

compared to the nonwestern (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). Second, recent lines of research show that tendencies to foster individual uniqueness are contingent upon sociostructural factors.

Sociostructural Moderators of Individualistic Tendencies

Social Class, Ethnicity, and GenderSociologists (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984; Daloz, 2013; Simmel, 1957), and social psychologists (e.g., Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Johnson, Richeson, & Finkel, 2011; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007; see Fiske & Markus, 2012, for a review) have reported social class differences in the propensity to emphasize one’s uniqueness and independence from others in the environment. People from lower social classes exhibit less personal unique-ness than people from higher social classes. Individualistic tendencies are also affected by eth-nicity. Ethnic identity is more salient and mean-ingful for members of minority groups (e.g., Grier & Deshpandé, 2001; Tajfel, 1981), while the pursuit of uniqueness is less prominent among minority than majority groups (Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007). Research on gender highlights similar differences between men and women, in terms of their self-construals. Men’s self-construals emphasize inde-pendence, autonomy, and self-reliance, whereas women’s self-construals stress interdependence and connectedness with others (Cross & Madson, 1997; Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, Crisp, & Redersdorff, 2006; Walsh & Smith, 2007).

Most accounts of social class, ethnic, and gen-der effects on propensities to stress individual distinctiveness are based on socialization histo-ries. There is evidence that people from lower social classes are educated to value interdepend-ence, while people from higher strata are edu-cated to value independence (e.g., Kohn, 1969; Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012; Kusserow, 1999; Stephens, Markus,

& Fryberg, 2012). Likewise, members of ethnic minorities, compared to members of majorities, generally endorse more collectivistic values and are socialized to value interdependence within their group (Gaines et al., 1997; Phinney, 1996). A similar explanation has gained popularity to account for gender differences in self-construals. Men are typically overrepresented in power and decision-making roles, and such roles demand agency. Accordingly, men are expected to express independence and uniqueness, while women are expected to express communion and conformity (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Walsh & Smith, 2007).

The Mere Social Status HypothesisSocial class, ethnicity, and gender characterize major social hierarchies (see Fiske, 2010). In each of these hierarchies, individualistic tendencies are more prominent among the privileged than among the disadvantaged (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990; Pinel, 1999). The consistency of the find-ings across different status cues suggests that individualistic tendencies may be the outcome of a general dynamic related to the rank order of groups on valued social dimensions, reflecting mere status asymmetries. Accordingly, socializa-tion histories may be sufficient but not necessary to account for such differentials between indi-vidualistic tendencies in social hierarchies. Mere status, that is the asymmetry between two groups on a valued dimension, may well account for such individualistic differentials between high-status and low-status groups.

One interpretation of these individualistic dif-ferentials is suggested by research showing that members of a group whose value is challenged or is under threat tend to identify more strongly with their ingroup and conform to its norms (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Simon & Brown, 1987; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Indeed, dismissal of uniqueness for the benefit of ingroup assimilation can buffer against iden-tity threat (e.g., Simon, 1998). As a consequence,



542 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 18(4)

members of disadvantaged groups tend to derive their self-conceptions from features that apply to their group as a whole, while those at the top of the hierarchy emphasize their personal and idio-syncratic characteristics (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2006; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005).

This differential endorsement of self-differen-tiating features according to ingroup status finds expression in a range of intergroup phenomena. A case in point is the amply documented ten-dency to judge ingroup members as more differ-ent one from another than outgroup members (e.g., Voci, 2000). This tendency is partly based on, or at least congruent with, the drive toward boosting feelings of personal distinctiveness (Boldry, Gaertner, & Quinn, 2007; Brewer, 1993). Research on gender and ethnicity shows that this tendency is more pronounced among members of high- than low-status groups (e.g. men and members of the ethnic majority, compared to women and members of ethnic minorities; Cabecinhas, Lorenzi-Cioldi, & Dafflon, 2003; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly, & Stewart, 1995; Voci, Hewstone, Crisp, & Rubin, 2008). Furthermore, in line with the mere status conjecture, the out-group homogeneity effect (a) is moderated by the relative status positions of the ingroup and the outgroup (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2002), and (b) is also present when status hierarchies are created with minimal group procedures (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998, 2008). Apparently, members of high-status groups achieve distinctiveness within the group more straightforwardly than members of low-status groups. It is noteworthy that even research on social class provides some support for mere status effects on individualistic tendencies. For instance, Kraus, Piff, and Keltner (2009) demon-strated a positive relationship between individu-als’ subjective rank in the socioeconomic hierarchy and individualistic perceptions such as personal sense of control. Interestingly, this rela-tionship persisted after controlling for more objective indicators of social class, such as income and education, and political ideology and ethnicity, which are clearly related to individuals’ past histories. Overall, then, it seems reasonable to conjecture that individualistic tendencies are a

function of group status, independent of, or in addition to, socialization histories.

The present research builds on this literature to provide experimental demonstrations of the status moderation of individualistic versus collec-tivistic tendencies. We claim that these tendencies depend on the consensual value ascribed to the group membership in the social structure. When the collective identity’s value is challenged, indi-viduals tend to merge with their ingroup, and, more broadly, to adopt collectivistic worldviews.

The Role of Ingroup IdentificationInsofar as the impact of group status on individu-alistic tendencies is the result of a mere status dynamic, it is likely to be moderated by the inter-group nature of the comparison framework. The social identity perspective suggests that ingroup identification emphasizes an intergroup compari-son framework (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). High levels of ingroup identi-fication promote the depersonalization of self-perception on stereotypical ingroup attributes, and are conducive to enhanced ingroup cohesion and uniformity (Spears et al., 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

We argue that this depersonalization process is likely to be contingent on the status hierarchy. The social hierarchy threatens the identity’s value of highly identified low-status group members, but not of highly identified high-status group members (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Members of high-status groups should thus show pervasive individualistic ten-dencies, whereas members of low-status groups should reduce these tendencies. Accordingly, we predict that with increased ingroup identifica-tion, members of the low-status group will emphasize collectivistic worldviews. In contrast, ingroup identification should not impact on indi-vidualistic tendencies among members of the high-status group. Because of their chronic ten-dency to stress individual differentiation within a positively valued ingroup, they should adopt an individualistic worldview regardless of ingroup identification.




In sum, we expect that with increased ingroup identification, members of the low-status group will experience a decrease in their individualistic tendencies, whereas members of the high-status group will not show any noticeable change. Thus, ingroup identification should accentuate differ-ences in individualistic tendencies between mem-bers of the two status groups.

Current ResearchThis research tested two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicts that members of high-status groups will show more pronounced individualistic ten-dencies than members of low-status groups. Hypothesis 2 predicts an amplification of this effect among highly identified participants. More specifically, members of the low-status group should show less individualistic tendencies with increased ingroup identification, whereas mem-bers of the high-status group should show no differences based on ingroup identification.

We sought to generalize our findings across naturalistic and experimental status cues, and measures of individualistic tendencies. Three studies manipulated group status with experi-mental procedures, in terms of students’ aca-demic advancement (Study 1), and university prestige (Studies 2–3). The main dependent vari-able consisted of individualistic tendencies as measured by participants’ preference for individ-ualistic messages over collectivistic messages tar-geted to the general public (Studies 1–2), and participants’ preference for scarce products (Study 3).

Study 1Study 1 involved bachelor and masters students who were or were not primed with academic sta-tus. Participants in the status condition were informed about the superiority of masters stu-dents over bachelor students on the academic dimension. In the control condition, bachelor and masters students were not told this informa-tion. This design allows for the test of Hypothesis 1, which states that when group status is primed,

preference for individualistic over collectivistic messages should be more prominent among members of the high-status group than among members of the low-status group.

MethodParticipants. Bachelor and masters students from the University of Geneva were contacted by e-mail to participate in an online questionnaire about “various aspects of your life as a student.” Participation was voluntary and without compen-sation. As academic achievement was an inde-pendent variable, we attempted to recruit a balanced sample of bachelor and masters stu-dents. A total of 161 students (113 women and 48 men) filled in the questionnaire. Eighty-one of them were bachelor students (Mage = 20.71, SD = 2.48), and 80 were masters students (Mage = 24.24, SD = 2.88).

Procedure. Participants were first presented with a brief report about the findings of an alleged sur-vey carried out among a large sample of students from their own university. This text served to manipulate the status variable. In the control con-dition, the text was entitled “Students’ daily life.” It did not mention any subgroup of students, and provided descriptions of students in general on various characteristics (self-confidence, ability to use information tools, etc.). In the status condi-tion, the text was entitled “Bachelor and masters students’ lives.” It compared bachelor and mas-ters students on the same characteristics used in the other condition, but it emphasized the aca-demic superiority of masters students over bach-elor students.

After reading this text, participants were pre-sented with eight advertisement messages. These messages were selected based on the results of a pilot study assessing their individualistic and col-lectivistic content. Participants in the pilot study (10 women and 10 men) rated the extent to which each of 26 advertisement messages emphasized differences or similarities among people (1 = “Differences,” 7 = “Similarities”). Results showed that four messages loaded substantially toward




the difference pole, M = 2.61, SD = 1.02, α = .78; difference from the scale midpoint, t(19) = 6.10, p < .001, d = 1.36, and four messages loaded sub-stantially toward the similarity pole, M = 4.85, SD = .75, α = .75; difference from the scale mid-point, t(19) = 5.10, p < .001, d = 1.13. Sample individualistic messages are: “Live the differ-ence,” and “Become who you are”; sample col-lectivistic messages are: “The pleasure of sharing,” and “For a happy collaboration.”1

Participants in the main study rated the per-suasiveness of the individualistic and the collec-tivistic messages presented in a random order (1 = “Not at all persuasive,” 6 = “Very persuasive”). They then answered three questions aimed at checking the status manipulation: whether the text emphasized differences or similarities between students (1 = “Differences,” 6 = “Similarities”), and the extent to which the text suggested some students are more competent and are more prestigious than others (for both attributes, 1 = “Not at all,” 6 = “Completely”). On the last page of the questionnaire, and before they decided whether or not they would send their responses to the investigator, participants reported their demographics. Participants were then debriefed about the purpose of the study.

ResultsA 2 (academic achievement) × 2 (status) ANOVA on the three check measures provided evidence that the status manipulation was successful. Participants in the status condition, compared to those in the control condition, rated the text as emphasizing differences rather than similarities among students (M = 2.01, SD = .99, and M = 4.77, SD = 1.09, respectively), and as conveying the feeling that some students are more compe-tent (M = 3.49, SD = 1.76, and M = 2.69, SD = 1.30, respectively) and prestigious (M = 3.46, SD = 1.75, and M = 2.40, SD = 1.24, respectively) than others, Fs(1, 157) = 279.43 (ηp

2 = .64), 10.53 (ηp

2 = .06), and 19.68 (ηp2 = .11), respec-

tively, all ps < .001.In order to test our hypotheses, we performed

a 2 (academic achievement) × 2 (status) × 2 (type

of message) ANOVA on the persuasiveness rat-ings, with repeated measures on the last factor. The analysis revealed that participants rated the individualistic messages as more persuasive than the collectivistic ones (M = 3.55, SD = .99, and M = 3.21, SD = 1.06, respectively), F(1, 157) = 15.38, p < .001, ηp

2 = .09. It also produced an Academic Achievement × Type of Message interaction, F(1, 157) = 5.31, p = .02, ηp

2 = .03. Preference for individualistic messages over col-lectivistic messages was more pronounced among masters (M = 3.62, SD = 1.05, for individualistic, and M = 3.08, SD = 1.11, for collectivistic) than among bachelor students (M = 3.48, SD = .92, for individualistic, and M = 3.34, SD = 1.00, for collectivistic). Furthermore, consistent with Hypothesis 1, this interaction was qualified by the Academic Achievement × Status × Type of Message interaction,2 F(1, 157) = 4.94, p = .03, ηp

2 = .03. The Academic Achievement × Type of Message interaction did not reach significance in the control condition, F(1, 157) < 1 (see Figure 1, left panel). Preference for individualistic mes-sages over collectivistic messages was of similar magnitude among masters (M = 3.53, SD = 1.12, for individualistic, and M = 3.08, SD = 1.11, for collectivistic) and bachelor students (M = 3.70, SD = .89, for individualistic, and M = 3.26, SD = 1.02, for collectivistic). However, as is apparent from Figure 1 (right panel), the status condition produced this interaction, F(1, 157) = 10.18, p < .01, ηp

2 = .06. Preference for individualistic mes-sages over collectivistic messages was more pro-nounced for masters (M = 3.71, SD = .98, for individualistic, and M = 3.09, SD = 1.13, for col-lectivistic) than for bachelor students (M = 3.26, SD = .91, for individualistic, and M = 3.41, SD = .98, for collectivistic). Further inspection of these means revealed that this interaction pattern was mainly due to a significant status effect among bachelor students, F(1, 157) = 7.19, p = .02, ηp

2 = .04. For members of this group, preference for individualistic messages over collectivistic mes-sages was less pronounced in the status condition (p = .33) than in the control condition (p < .01). Masters students did not show this difference, F(1, 157) = .49, p = .49, ηp

2 < .01. They




maintained their preference for individualistic messages in both the control (p = .03) and the status (p < .01) conditions. Moreover, the con-trast analysis showed that, for masters students, there was no difference between the control and the status condition, neither for individualistic messages, F(1, 157) = .69, p = .41, ηp

2 < .01, nor for collectivistic messages, F(1, 157) = .01, p = .97, ηp

2 < .01. For bachelor students, no differ-ences were observed for collectivistic messages according to the status conditions, F(1, 157) = .42, p = .52, ηp

2 < .01. However, they rated indi-vidualistic messages as less persuasive in the sta-tus condition than in the control condition, F(1, 157) = 4.17, p = .04, ηp

2 < .03.

DiscussionThe findings from Study 1 revealed that the pref-erence for individualistic messages over collectiv-istic messages is contingent on ingroup status. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this preference was stronger among masters students, the high-status group, than among bachelor students, the low-status group. However, this difference in message preference between the two status groups was moderated by context, being present only when participants were primed with the superiority of masters over bachelor students. Indeed, both

groups expressed similar preference for individu-alistic over collectivistic messages in the control condition, whereas only masters students still showed such preference in the status condition. Study 1 thus provides preliminary evidence of the importance of the comparative context in shifting individualistic tendencies. In a situation of inter-group comparisons, low-status group members become less prone to adopt an individualistic worldview than their higher status counterparts.

Nonetheless, this study has some limitations. We measured search for uniqueness in two differ-ent groups. Even if, in all likelihood, masters and bachelor students did not differ noticeably on any characteristics related to their past histories, they were still likely to differ on several dimensions that are potentially related to social status (e.g., competence, maturity, etc.; see Fiske, 2010). Thus, in Study 2, we conducted a more stringent test of our hypotheses by leading members of a single group to experience either a low or a high status in comparison to a relevant outgroup.

Study 2Study 2 sought to control for group membership while assessing the effect of group status on indi-vidualistic tendencies. To do so we devised an experimental setting that conferred a single group with either high or low status compared to a rele-vant outgroup. The focal group consisted of stu-dents from University of Geneva, who were told that their university had either superior or inferior status relative to a rival, nearby university. Prior to the status manipulation, we measured participants’ identification with their university to serve as mod-erator. Hypotheses were (1) that preference for individualistic messages over collectivistic mes-sages would be more prominent in the high-status condition as compared with the low-status condi-tion, and (2) that this status effect would emerge primarily among highly identified participants.

MethodParticipants. Participants were recruited in the library of the University of Geneva. After having ascertained that the participant was enrolled in

3.0

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Bachelor Master Bachelor Master

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Control Status

Collectivistic messages

Individualistic messages

Figure 1. Means of individualistic and collectivistic messages’ persuasiveness according to participant academic achievement and status manipulation (Study 1).




the University of Geneva, the experimenter invited her/him to complete a questionnaire. The sample comprised 105 participants (71 women, 33 men, and 1 sex-unspecified, mean age = 22.36 years, SD = 3.03).

Procedure. Participants were asked to complete a survey about their daily life as students. Upon agreement, they were handed a questionnaire with instructions and the measures. First, partici-pants indicated their identification with students from the University of Geneva by answering six items adapted from existing identification scales (see Haslam, 2004). Sample items are: “When I introduce myself, I like to mention that I am a student of the University of Geneva,” “When someone praises students from my university, it feels like a personal compliment,” and “I have many things in common with the other students of the University of Geneva” (1 = “Not at all,” 7 = “Completely”).

Participants were then instructed about the ingroup’s status. They were presented with an excerpt of a fictitious newspaper article describ-ing the rank ordering of universities around the world. The article explained that an organization named Ranking of World Universities had sorted universities on the basis of their quality of teach-ing and research. The excerpt focused on the comparison between two competing Swiss uni-versities: Geneva (ingroup) and Lausanne (out-group). Participants in the high-status condition learned that the University of Geneva ranked higher than the rival university. A diagram osten-sibly showed that this advantage had increased over the course of time. Participants in the low-status condition learned that University of Geneva ranked lower than the rival university, and the diagram showed that this unfortunate gap had increased over time. To check their understanding of the status manipulation, par-ticipants reported which university had been ranked in a higher position (“University of Geneva”, “University of Lausanne”, or “Neither university”). To assess the credibility of the status manipulation, they then answered the following question: “To what extent do you think that the Ranking of World Universities is reliable, that is

that it mirrors the real quality of each university?” (1 = “Not at all reliable,” 7 = “Very reliable”). In addition, we measured felt emotion after learning about the ingroup’s status. We reasoned that highly identified participants would experience positive or negative affect after being assigned to the high-status or the low-status condition, respectively. To this end, participants were asked “What emotion did you feel after reading the Ranking of World Universities evaluation? (7-point scale ranging from −3 = “Negative emo-tion,” to 3 = “Positive emotion”). As with Study 1, the main dependent variable was the persua-siveness of the eight advertisement messages (1 = “Not at all persuasive,” 7 = “Very persuasive”). After completion of the demographics, partici-pants were debriefed concerning the purpose of the study.

ResultsPreliminary analyses. On the check of status meas-ure, nine participants in the high-status condition and eight participants in the low-status condition failed to provide the right answer. Thus, the final sample consisted of 88 participants (41 in the high-status condition, and 47 in the low-status condition).3 In order to assess the credibility of the status manipulation, we performed a linear regression analysis on the reliability of the rank-ing item with participant status as the predictor. Results showed no effect of status, β = −.47, t(86) = 1.58, p = .12, indicating that the ranking of the universities was as believable in the low-status as in the high-status condition.

After computing the ingroup identification score as the mean of the six identification state-ments (α = .84), we carried out a regression analy-sis in which felt emotion was the criterion, and group status (coded −1 for high status, and 1 for low status), ingroup identification (centered con-tinuous variable), and their interaction, were the predictors. This analysis produced a status effect, β = −.78, t(82) = −7.11, p < .001. High status elicited positive emotion (M = 1.04, above the middle scale point, β = 1.04, t(82) = 6.45, p < .001), and low status elicited negative emotion (M = −.52, below the middle scale point, β = −.52,




t(82) = −3.50, p < .01). Importantly, this differ-ence was qualified by the expected Status × Ingroup Identification interaction, β = −.37, t(82) = −3.86, p < .001. Among highly identified par-ticipants, ingroup status influenced felt emotion (Ms = 1.56 for high status and −.88 for low sta-tus), β = −1.22, t(82) = −7.92, p < .001. Felt emo-tion was more positive in the high-status condition, β = 1.56, t(82) = 6.92, p < .001, and more negative in the low-status condition, β = −.88, t(82) = −4.20, p < .001. This status differ-ence was also significant, but of weaker magni-tude, among low-identified participants (Ms = .53 for high status and −.16 for low status), β = −.34, t(82) = −2.12, p = .04. Furthermore, there was a positive effect of ingroup identification in the high-status condition, β = .43, t(82) = 2.88, p <.01, and a negative effect of ingroup identifica-tion in the low-status condition, β = −.30, t(82) = −2.58, p =.01. These findings demonstrate a reli-able relationship between felt emotion, status, and ingroup identification. For highly identified participants, emotion became more positive in the high-status condition, and more negative in the low-status condition. This pattern suggests that participants in the low-status condition were more distressed by the value of their collective identity than their higher status counterparts.

Main analyses. The present study design includes a between-subjects variable (status), a within-sub-jects variable (type of message), and a continuous variable (ingroup identification). Thus, we per-formed a full-factorial ANCOVA. The model includes the main effects (status, identification, and type of messages), and all two- and three-order interactions. This analysis produced the expected Status × Type of Message interaction, F(1, 83) = 9.97, p < .01, ηp

2 = .11. Preference for individualistic messages over collectivistic mes-sages was more pronounced in the high-status condition (M = 4.63 for individualistic, and M = 4.05 for collectivistic) as compared with the low-status condition (M = 3.80 for individualistic, and M = 4.21 for collectivistic). Moreover, this effect was qualified by the expected Status × Ingroup Identification × Type of Message interaction,

F(1, 83) = 6.75, p = .01, ηp2 = .08. The Status ×

Type of Message interaction was not reliable among low-identified participants (−1 SD), F(1, 83) = .93, p = .76 ηp

2 < .01 (see Figure 2, left panel). Preference for individualistic messages over collectivistic messages was of similar magni-tude in the high-status (M = 3.99 for individualis-tic, and M = 3.70 for collectivistic) and the low-status condition (M = 3.78 for individualistic, and M = 3.63 for collectivistic). However, Figure 2 (right panel) makes apparent a Status × Type of Message interaction among highly identified par-ticipants (+1 SD). Preference for individualistic messages over collectivistic messages was more pronounced in the high-status condition (M = 5.26 for individualistic, and M = 4.39 for collec-tivistic) than in the low-status condition (M = 3.82 for individualistic, and M = 4.79 for collec-tivistic), F(1, 83) = 16.60, p < .001, ηp

2 = .17.Similar to Study 1, the interaction pattern was

primarily due to a significant Ingroup Identification × Type of Message interaction in the low-status condition, F(1, 83) = 7.37, p = .08 ηp

2 < .01. Preference for individualistic messages over collectivistic messages was more pro-nounced among low-identified participants than

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Low status High status Low status High status

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Collectivistic messagesIndividualistic messages

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Figure 2. Means of individualistic and collectivistic messages’ persuasiveness according to group status and ingroup identification (Study 2).




among highly identified participants. Highly iden-tified participants even showed a preference for collectivistic messages over individualistic mes-sages, F(1, 83) = 9.26, p < .01 ηp

2 = .10. In the high-status condition, the Ingroup Identification × Type of Message interaction was not signifi-cant, F(1, 83) = 1.30, p = .26 ηp

2 = .02.Furthermore, Figure 2 suggests that messages

were rated as overall more persuasive by high-identified (M = 4.57) than by low-identified par-ticipants (M = 3.78), F(1, 83) = 12.42, p < .01 ηp

2 = .13. In particular, ingroup identification was associated with a significant increase in the ratings of the individualistic messages in the high-status condition, F(1, 83) = 7.79, p < .01 ηp

2 = .09, but not in the low-status condition, F(1, 83) = .01, p = .92 ηp

2 < .01. Moreover, the ratings of collectivis-tic messages increased as a function of ingroup identification in the low-status condition, F(1, 83) = 12.43, p < .01 ηp

2 = .13. This same tendency was only marginally significant in the high-status con-dition, F(1, 83) = 2.94, p = .09 ηp

2 = .03.

DiscussionStudy 2 tested the moderating effects of ingroup identification and ingroup status on the preference for individualistic messages over collectivistic mes-sages. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, preference for individualistic over collectivistic messages was more pronounced among participants in the high-status condition compared to participants in the low-status condition. Furthermore, consistent with Hypothesis 2, ingroup identification moder-ated this status difference. The more members of the low-status group identified with their ingroup, the less they were inclined to rate individualistic messages as more persuasive than collectivistic messages. Conversely, ingroup identification did not alter preference for individualistic over collec-tivistic messages in the high-status condition. The findings also revealed that ingroup identification was associated with a general increase in persua-siveness of the messages, although this was an unexpected effect. Presumably, low-identified par-ticipants were less affected by the questionnaire, and thus were more critical of all the messages.

In sum, Studies 1–2 demonstrated a consistent set of findings. However, one limitation of these studies was the use of a single measure of indi-vidualistic tendencies. In order to provide greater generalizability of our findings, the following study introduced a major modification consisting of a new measure of individualistic tendencies.

Study 3In Study 3, we assessed individualistic tendencies by assessing the psychological attractiveness of scarce versus available products. According to previous research, the choice of scarce products increases feelings of individual distinctiveness, because people believe that they possess some-thing that others do not possess (Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). For example, Fromkin (1970) showed that par-ticipants who were told that they shared their opinions with most of their ingroup members restored their feelings of uniqueness by choosing to perform a behavior that would soon become unavailable to them. In a meta-analysis, Lynn (1991) showed that scarce products are perceived to be more valuable, and that this tendency is more pronounced for individuals with a high need for uniqueness.

Hypotheses were the same as Study 2, with individualistic tendencies now measured by pref-erence for scarcity.

MethodParticipants. Students from University of Geneva were recruited by e-mail to participate in an online questionnaire about their “daily life as stu-dents.” A total of 259 students (179 women, 76 men, and 4 sex-unspecified, M age = 24.65, SD = 6.57) filled in the questionnaire.

Procedure. As with Study 2, participants com-pleted the ingroup identification measure, and then were informed of the superior or inferior status of their university compared to the rival university. The status manipulation was checked, as in Study 2, in terms of felt emotion, although




the wording of the Likert scale was slightly modi-fied (1 = “No emotion at all,” 7 = “Strong emo-tion”). The expectation was, in this case, that highly identified participants, regardless of the ingroup status, would acknowledge stronger emotion than low-identified participants.

The uniqueness measure was then introduced. Participants were told that they could choose a computer game among four different games, and that they could play the chosen game after com-pletion of the survey. Each game was portrayed by a picture and a short description sentence, but the only difference between game portrayals con-sisted of their availability. Participants were told that the license for two of the games would not expire until the end of the current year (available games), but that the license for the other two games would expire in 5 hours (scarce games). In order to lend credibility to this availability infor-mation, we included a fifth game which was already unavailable because of its license expira-tion. The order in which the games were shown was randomized across participants. After choos-ing a game, participants reported their demo-graphics, and were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study.

Results and DiscussionOn the check of status measure, two partici-pants in the high-status condition and seven participants in the low-status condition failed to provide the right answer. The final sample con-sisted of 250 participants (132 in the high-status condition, and 118 in the low-status condition). As with Study 2, ingroup identification was assessed as the mean of six items (α = .83). We performed a regression analysis on felt emotion, with group status, ingroup identification, and their interaction as the predictors. This analysis produced only the expected ingroup identifica-tion main effect, β = .72, t(246) = 8.54, p < .001. Highly identified participants expressed more intense emotion (+1 SD: M = 3.86) than low-identified participants (−1 SD: M = 2.16) after learning of the superior or inferior status of their university.

The main dependent variable of the present study consisted of the proportion of scarce games selected. Overall, the choice of scarce (46%) and available (54%) games did not show any difference, χ2 (1, N = 250) = 1.94, p = .16. To test our hypotheses, we performed a logistic regression analysis, with game choice (scarce = 0, available = 1) as the criterion, and group status (−1 for high status, 1 for low status), ingroup identification (centered continuous variable), and their interaction, as the predictors. This analysis did not show any main effect of the status varia-ble (49% and 41% choosing scarce games, in high-status and low-status conditions, respec-tively), β = .16, χ2 (1, N = 250) = 1.59, p = .21, eB = 1.18. However, the expected Status × Ingroup Identification interaction was significant, β = .24, χ2 (1, N = 250) = 4.61, p = .03, eB = 1.27. Figure 3 shows that there were no status differences among weakly identified participants (45 % and 51% choosing scarce games in high-status and low-status conditions, respectively); −1 SD: β = −.12, χ2 (1, N = 250) = .43, p = .51, eB = .89. Conversely, status differences emerged among strongly identified participants. The proportion of participants choosing scarce games was more pronounced in the high-status compared to the low-status condition (53% and 32%, respec-tively); +1 SD: β = .45, χ2 (1, N = 250) = 5.63, p = .02, eB = 1.56. Consistent with the preceding studies, this interaction pattern was mainly due to a significant ingroup identification effect in the low-status condition, β = .34, χ2 (1, N = 250) = 4.24, p = .04, eB = 1.41. For participants in this condition, the likelihood of choosing a scarce game was smaller when ingroup identification was strong (below 50% scarce game choice, two-tailed binomial test, p < .001) than when it was weak (not different from 50% choosing scarce games, two-tailed binomial test, p = .92). The high-status condition did not show this differ-ence based on ingroup identification, β = −.14, χ2 (1, N = 250) = .84, p = .36, eB = .87.

Study 3, unlike the preceding studies, did not obtain a main effect of the status variable. However, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the find-ings revealed an interaction between the status




variable and participant identification with the ingroup. In the low-status condition, the more participants identified with their group, the less inclined they were to choose a scarce game, whereas in the high-status condition, ingroup identification did not influence participants’ like-lihood of choosing a scarce game.

General DiscussionThe purpose of the present research was two-fold: to establish a relationship between group status and group members’ individualistic ten-dencies, and to ascertain whether ingroup identi-fication moderated this relationship. Studies 1 and 2 considered the persuasiveness of individu-alistic over collectivistic advertisement messages, while Study 3 considered the appeal of scarce over available products. The predictions were that members of the high-status group would show a stronger preference for individualistic tendencies compared to members of the low-status group, and that this status difference would be more pronounced among highly identified group members.

Studies 1 and 2 showed a direct impact of social status on group members’ preference for individualistic over collectivistic messages. This preference was more conspicuous among mem-bers of the high-status group than among those of the low-status group. Although Study 3 did

not produce the corresponding main effect, all of the studies that considered ingroup identification (Studies 2 and 3) yielded results that accord with the prediction that individualistic tendencies are moderated by ingroup identification. Among high identifiers, members of the low-status group showed less inclination toward distinctiveness and uniqueness than members of the high-status group, whereas among low identifiers, members of both status groups showed similar inclinations to distinguish themselves by choosing a scarce product.

The Mere Status EffectThe present findings provide new insight into the role of group status on the emergence of indi-vidualistic self-conceptions and worldviews. Most of the existing research and theoretical specula-tion proposes that people’s tendencies to value personalized versus collective self-conceptions are anchored into their socialization histories (e.g., Brauer & Bourhis, 2006; Kraus et al., 2012). Study 1 considered a socially homogeneous sam-ple of university students, and divided them by seniority in the educational career. Studies 2–3 manipulated the status of a single target group by favorably or unfavorably comparing it to a rival outgroup. Thus, the designs of our studies mini-mized the utility of prior socialization explana-tions. Indeed, despite group differences in socialization being minimal (in Study 1 status was primed as students’ educational achievement) and even further reduced in Studies 2 and 3 (where status was temporarily primed in a single group), similar findings emerged across studies, with our status and identification-moderation effects vir-tually unchanged. This is not to say that socializa-tion histories do not matter. Rather, we can assert that the observed status effects can be reliably attributed to transient manipulations rather than enduring, socially acquired dispositions. These findings therefore allow for the confident conclu-sion that status per se was a crucial determinant of these differences.

The present findings build on a growing body of research that highlights the role of group

0

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Low identification (-1 SD) High identification (+1 SD)

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Figure 3. Scarce game choice according to group status and ingroup identification (Study 3).




status on cognitive, affective, and physiological outcomes (e.g., Mendelson, Thurston, & Kubzansky, 2008; Platow, Byrne, & Ryan, 2005). Socialization differences are undoubtedly of great consequence, but they are not necessary antecedents of status effects. When the status hierarchy is meaningful in a given context, sociali-zation histories of high- and low-status groups are no longer necessary to produce differences in such tendencies. Combined with previous research (e.g., Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998, 2008), the consistency of the current findings suggests that mere status differentials between two groups are sufficient to elicit distinct propensities for indi-vidual differentiation. Even in the absence of socialization differences, competitive advantage or disadvantage in a social hierarchy is partly responsible for contrasting ways of perceiving the human environment and the self within it. Thus, the role of group status on individualistic tendencies should be interpreted in terms of the mere status dynamic as well as in terms of sociali-zation practices and histories. The knowledge of belonging to a socially advantaged group favors individualistic self-conceptions and worldviews, while the knowledge of belonging to a socially disadvantaged group favors more collective and interdependent conceptions of the self.

Potential Explanations and LimitationsThe findings from the present research show that it is the low-status group that is responsible of dif-ferences between individualistic tendencies in sta-tus hierarchies. When group status differences are explicitly mentioned (Study 1), or when partici-pants are strongly identified with their status group (Studies 2 and 3), members of the low-sta-tus group resolutely reduced their individualistic tendencies. In line with the social identity perspec-tive (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), the intergroup comparison framework elic-ited by these conditions attenuated the low-status group members’ individualistic tendencies. That is, when expressing preferences in a status-rele-vant context, members of the low-status group downplayed individual-based distinctive features,

and were less likely to express distinctiveness via the choice of a scarce, relatively unavailable prod-uct. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), members of disadvantaged groups face the threat of a consensually acknowledged lesser value of their group (Branscombe et al., 1999). Hence, they might become motivated to “close the ranks” in an attempt to cope with the threat to their ingroup’s value (Karasawa, Karasawa, & Hirose, 2004; van Zomeren, 2013). In our studies, such a coping tendency was not measured by accentuation of intragroup similarity, but rather by the preference for collectivistic mes-sages over individualistic messages and by a decrease in the search for personal uniqueness.

Our theoretical argument assumes that the ingroup status effect is governed by the threat to the ingroup’s value. Future research should inves-tigate this inferred mechanism. The present research leaves open alternative interpretations of the status effect and its moderation by ingroup identification. One such interpretation is based on status differences in context sensitivity. Past research has demonstrated that group identifica-tion is more meaningful, compelling, and influen-tial for minorities and low-status groups than for majorities and high-status groups (see Frable et al., 1990; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Larkey & Hecht, 1995; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Tajfel, 1981; Ting-Toomey, Yee-Jung, Shapiro, Garcia, & Wright, 2007). Hence, ingroup identification as measured in Studies 2 and 3 may have been an effective indicator of status relevance only for members of the low-status group. In line with this conjec-ture, oppression or subordination theories pre-dict that context sensitivity should be more prominent among members of low- than high-status groups (see Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2006). Empirical evidence indeed shows that people from low social class backgrounds are more attuned to others’ needs than are people from high social class backgrounds (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010), that immigrants are more mindful than the natives about stereotypes attributed to their group (Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis, & Otten, 2009), and that women use the outgroup as a standard of comparison more




than men do (Hurtig & Pichevin, 1990; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991, 1993). Sensitivity to the intergroup context may thus have been responsible for the highly identified low-status group members’ ten-dencies to emphasize individual similarity and choice of available products. Conversely, the lower concern of members of the high-status group for the intergroup context could have been responsible for their lack of behavior difference as a function of ingroup identification.

Although chronic context sensitivity is a plau-sible candidate to account for our findings, the present research provides clues that downplay the viability of this explanation. Indeed, Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that members of the high-status group felt as much emotion as members of the low-status group in response to their status com-parison condition. More importantly, felt emotion was even stronger for both groups among high identifiers. Hence, our felt emotion measures sug-gest that participants assigned to the high-status group may have been as sensitive to the inter-group context as their lower status counterparts. However, the lack of more sophisticated meas-ures of context sensitivity is a limitation in our studies that should be addressed in future research.

Finally, it is possible that the dependent varia-ble in Studies 1 and 2, that is the preference for individualistic over collectivistic messages, was contaminated by the items’ content. Indeed, indi-vidualistic messages might have primed contents related to personal achievements, while collectiv-istic messages might have emphasized the enjoy-ment of social connection. Achievement might be perceived as a core dimension accounting for a university’s ranking. In their attempt to restore a positive self-image, members of the low-status group might have engaged in a social creativity strategy consisting of focusing their interest on a status-irrelevant dimension of comparison with the outgroup. With our experimental procedures, such alternative dimension of comparison may have been provided by the collectivistic advertis-ing messages emphasizing social connectedness. By focusing on this communal content, partici-pants would mitigate the importance of the sta-tus-relevant achievement dimension (see Tajfel &

Turner, 1979). However, the plausibility of such an explanation is seriously challenged by the find-ings from Study 3, which assessed individualistic tendencies by means of preference for scarce over available products.

ConclusionThis research points to the importance of con-sidering group status in social identity dynamics. From the writings on crowds by Le Bon (1895/1960) to current identity theories (e.g., Turner & Reynolds, 2001), the assumption of the fading away of individuality into the collective is generally accepted. Our research revises this assumption by showing that members of high-status groups indulge in their individualistic ten-dencies even in meaningful intergroup contexts.

The present findings have interesting implica-tions regarding stability and change of social hierarchies. Social stratifications fuel intergroup competition to achieve positive identity (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Legitimizing beliefs about current social arrangements typically emphasize individual responsibility, meritocracy, and fluidity of the group boundaries—a set of ideals and beliefs that resonate with individualistic ideologies. Though these beliefs are widely accepted (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), members of disadvantaged groups strive for a favorable identity by challenging the superiority of the higher status outgroup. To this end, the most effective way forward is to promote solidarity and collective organization among ingroup members (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984; van Zomeren, 2013). Our findings suggest that the mere consciousness of the relative ingroup status engenders predisposi-tions toward individualistic beliefs among mem-bers of high-status groups, and toward collectivistic beliefs among members of low-sta-tus groups. Thus, even in the absence of feelings of injustice and relative deprivation (caused nota-bly by unequal distribution of power and resources), members of low-status groups de-emphasize the individual self in favor of the col-lective self.




AcknowledgementsWe would like to thank Nyla R. Branscombe, Clara Kulich and two anonymous reviewers for their valua-ble comments on a previous draft of this article.

FundingThis research received no specific grant from any fund-ing agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes1. Interested researchers can write to the authors

for a copy of the advertisement messages and the experimental instructions.

2. Both effects persisted after controlling for partici-pant age.

3. Given the substantial proportion of participants that failed the status check (16.19%), we also per-formed the analyses including these participants. The effects remained unchanged.

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Individualistic tendencies: When group status makes the difference

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