In-group-out-group differences in social projection

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 28, 422-440 (1992)

In-group-Out-group Differences in Social Projection

BRIAN MULLEN

Syracuse University

JOHN F. DOVIDIO

Colgate University

AND

CRAIG JOHNSON AND CAROLYN COPPER

Syracuse University

Received April 30, 1991

Most studies of Allport’s notion of social projection have addressed in-group social projection (the perceived prevalence of one’s own position within the in- group). The possibility of out-group social projection (the perceived prevalence of one’s own position within the out-group) has been suggested, but the specific patterns of out-group social projection have never been established. This paper reports the results of three studies which directly examine social projection in an intergroup context. These results replicate the previously established false consensus effect for the in-group. However, this effect is reversed in the false uniqueness effect evidenced toward the out-group. The stronger differences between in- group projection and out-group projection in the second and third studies are attributed to their more potent manipulations of the intergroup context. Discussion considers the implications of these results for research on social projection phenomena and for intergroup behavior. o 1992 Academtc press. 1~.

It seemed that along with the public attitude goes a strong feeling of universality of this attitude among other group members, although no particular feeling that it is a charac- teristic attitude of people at large.

Schank (1932, p, 102)

The authors express appreciation to Al Goethals, Chick Judd, Tony Manstead, Jim Sherman, Russell Spears, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Address correspondence to Brian Mullen, Department of Psychology, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210.

422

0022-1031/92 $5.00 Copyright 0 1992 by Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

INTERGROUP SOCIAL PROJECTION 423

Allport (1924) coined the term social projection to refer to the attitude and imagining involved in the reference of self-reactions to others. Ross, Greene, and House (1977) sparked current interest in this type of effect with their studies of false consensus: the tendency for individuals to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate, while viewing alternative responses as relatively uncommon and inappropriate. Operationally, false consensus occurs when persons who make a given choice estimate that choice to be shared by a larger proportion of some reference group than is estimated by people making an alternative choice. For example, Mullen (1983) found that television game show contestants who knew the answer to a question estimated that a greater percentage of the audience would know the answer to that question than did contestants who did not know the answer.

Recent meta-analytic integrations of social projection research (Mullen, Atkins, Champion, Edwards, Hardy, Story, & Vanderklok, 1985; Mullen & Hu, 1988) have revealed three general patterns: (1) Persons in the majority (i.e., those who engage in the most popular behavior) exhibit a significant, moderate tendency to underestimate consensus for their position: The majority underestimated its consensus in 53 out of 67 hypothesis tests examined by Mullen and Hu (1988). (2) Persons in the minority exhibit a significant, strong tendency to overestimate consensus for their position: The minority overestimated its consensus in 65 out of 67 hypothesis tests examined in Mullen and Hu (1988). (3) These two patterns are integrated to produce a significant, moderate tendency for the basic false consensus effect: False consensus was observed in all of the 84 hypothesis tests examined by Mullen and Hu (1988). These patterns have been discussed at length in Mullen et al. (1985), Marks and Miller (1987), Mullen and Hu (1988), and Dawes (1989).’

Practically all previous efforts in this arena have, however, examined only one type of social projection: in-group social projection. In the basic false consensus paradigm, subjects are typically asked to estimate the

’ Although under-/overestimation represents a psychologically different phenomenon than false consensus, operationally the two phenomena are related. As delineated by Goethals (1987), the false consensus effect is algebraically determined by the under-/overestimation of consensus demonstrated by the majority and by the minority. Consider the typical patterns of social projection: The overall false consensus effect is the sum of the majority’s under-/ overestimation and the minority’s under-/overestimation. That is, the majority’s typical underestimation of 10.8 percentage points and the minority’s typical overestimation of 25.5 percentage points sum to equal ({ - 10.8} + { +25.5}) 14.7 (extracted from the meta-analytic database of I34 hypothesis tests analyzed by Mullen & Hu, 1988). This is precisely the difference between the majority’s estimate of the consensus for the majority and the minority’s estimate of the consensus for the majority (59.3 - 44.6 = 14.7), or what is called false consensus. The present paper focuses on the false consensus effect, but information about the extent to which subjects under-/overestimate their actual consensus is also available from the first author upon request.

424 MULLEN ET AL.

consensus for their attitudes and behaviors among “students at this university,” or among “people in this classroom.” Thus, while we have come to understand a great deal about in-group social projection, we know very little at this point about social projection across in-group-out-group boundaries. The primary purpose of our research was to examine intergroup social projection, social projection toward both in-groups and out- groups.

In-group/out-group categorizations play a critical role in theories of cognitive processes in intergroup settings. Indeed, two themes emerge in recent thinking in this domain. First, it seems that the strength or salience of intergroup categorizations can exert substantive effects on the resultant cognitive processes. For example, Mullen (1991) has discussed the effects of salient intergroup categorizations and, in particular, the effects of group sizes and the reality of the group categorizations on the cognitive rep- resentations of ingroups and outgroups. Similarly, Hamilton (1991) has discussed the effects of the “entitativity” (see Campbell, 1958) of groups on the cognitive processes driving impression formation and memory about groups. Second, differences between groups may tend to become exaggerated as a consequence of the in-group/out-group categorization. This is explicitly conveyed in the Social Identity Theory’s (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1985) position of the accentuation of interclass differences that results from the categorization of individuals into two groups. This is also conveyed in the Self-Categorization Theory’s (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) formulation of in-group prototypes in terms of meta-contrast ratios (see, once again, Campbell, 1958) which optimally distinguish the in-group from the out-group. These two themes (the effects of the salience of intergroup categorizations and the exaggeration of in- group-out-group differences as a result of group categorization) have found expression in specific intergroup perception phenomena, such as the relative heterogeneity effect (e.g., Goethals, Allison, & Frost, 1979; Mullen & Hu, 1989) and the in-group bias effect (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). The exaggeration of in-group-out-group differences as a consequence of intergroup categorizations also guides the present research.

Despite the impact of social categorization on other social perceptions, there is surprisingly little evidence regarding false consensus in intergroup contexts. In related work, Schank (1932) first considered the possibility of differing types of projection regarding the in-group and the out-group in his work on pluralistic ignorance. Recently, Granberg (e.g., Granberg & Seidel, 1976) and Miller (e.g., Miller, Gross, & Holtz, 1991) have considered at length social projection in intergroup contexts, but these treatments address an “assumed similarity” conceptualization of social projection rather than the “perceived prevalence” conceptualization rep-


resented by Ross et al. (1977), Mullen et al. (1985), and Mullen and Hu (1988) (see Marks & Miller, 1987 for a discussion of the similarities and differences between these conceptualizations).

Research on the perceived prevalence conceptualization of social projection has barely touched upon issues of intergroup social projection. Judd and Johnson (1981) and Sherman et al. (1984) had subjects estimate consensus among several different out-groups. Judd and Johnson (1981) reported that projection occurred regardless of the target group, whereas Sherman, Chassin, Presson, & Agostinelli (1984) reported stronger projection toward more positive groups. These previous investigations did not, however, involve assessments of estimates or choice behaviors by members of those out-groups. Therefore these previous efforts do not provide direct information about the extent of false consensus in intergroup contexts.

A study by Sherman, Presson, Chassin, Corty, & Olshavsky (1983) did include assessments of both in-group and out-group behaviors, but the results were not conclusive. Sherman et al. (1983) had smoking and non- smoking adolescents and adults estimate the prevalence of smoking among both adolescents and adults. Sherman et al. reported significant interac- tions between subject age and target age, such that stronger false consensus was observed among adolescents when the target group was also adolescents. However, the adult subjects in Sherman et al. (1983) generally did not evidence any false consensus effects, regardless of the target group, suggesting that “smoking behavior” may in some way represent an odd and unrepresentative arena for testing fundamental issues about social projection. Indeed, a more recent study by Suls, Wan, and Sanders (1988) has similarly failed to replicate the otherwise robust false consensus effect on an item involving smoking behavior.

Spears and Manstead (1990) have recently reviewed the literature on social projection across group categorizations and have proposed a theoretical integration. These authors highlighted two broad possibilities regarding social projection in the intergroup arena. On the one hand, the type of “assimilation” typically observed for ingroup social projection might also occur for out-group social projection. For example, just as people tend to perceive high consensus for their own positions on the part of other in-group members, people might also tend to perceive high consensus for their own positions on the part of out-group members. The other possibility considered by Spears and Manstead (1990) is that a “contrast” form of social projection might occur for out-group social projection. For example, although people tend to perceive high consensus for their own positions on the part of in-group members, people might tend to perceive low consensus for their own positions on the part of out- group members. This latter, “contrast,” form of social projection for the

426 MULLEN ET AL.

out-group would seem to be more consistent with the themes of potency of group categorization and exaggeration of in-group-out-group differences, suggested above.

Spears and Manstead (1990) reported data suggesting that the basic false consensus type of social projection occurred toward both the in- group and the out-group, although it was slightly weaker for the out- group. This result was interpreted as evidence for an overall assimilative type of social projection, with some weak contrast type of social projection mitigating this overall effect toward the out-group. However, two factors limit the contribution of these analyses to an understanding of social projection in intergroup contexts. The effects reported by Spears and Manstead were generally not statistically significant. This may have been because relatively weak in-group-out-group manipulations were used by Spears and Manstead; they simply mentioned males versus females, or arts versus science majors in ways that might not have been perceived as salient or related to the experimental task by subjects. In addition, the unusual composite measure of false consensus effects used in their analyses (e.g., collapsing across items) precludes direct comparisons of their results with the standard social projection paradigm.

Because previous research does not provide a definitive test of the effects of intergroup contexts on social projection, the present effort was directed toward examining this phenomenon. Three experiments inves- tigated patterns of in-group and out-group social projection using different operationalizations of group categorization. Group categorization in each of these studies was based on prior membership in groups that exist outside the laboratory context. Study 1 compared social projection between first- year students and upper-class students at one institution. Study 2 was designed to conceptually replicate Study 1 by examining social projection between students at two rival institutions. Study 3, which used political classifications, examined intergroup social projection in a situation in which the connection between group membership and choice behavior was not obviously linked and in which vested interest was not involved.

STUDY 1

The group categorization employed in the first study was a naturalistic and salient one: Freshmen vs Upperclassmen at a small, private liberal arts university. These two groups are real and consequential to the students at this university. The choice that subjects in each group made in this study had the potential to pit the vested interests (cf., Crano, 1983) of students in the two groups against one another.

Method Subjecrs. Eighty-one undergraduate students at Colgate University (35 Freshmen, 46

Upperclassmen) participated in this study in partial fulfillment of a research participation requirement.


Procedure. Subjects read a brief paragraph describing the endowment of one million dollars to Colgate University by a wealthy publisher who had attended the school in his youth. This money was to be applied to student housing. Two different methods of allocating the funds were described: One allocation would split the money equally between Freshmen and Upperclassmen, yielding $500,000 to Freshmen and $500,000 to Upperclassmen (i.e., Sophomores, Juniors, and Seniors). The other allocation would split the money between the two groups in proportion to the number of students in each group, yielding $250,000 to Freshmen and $750,000 to Upperclassmen. Subjects estimated the consensus for each allocation option in their own “class” (i.e., within their in-group), then indicated which allocation option they themselves supported, and then finally estimated the consensus for each option in the other “class” (i.e., the out-group). After completing this questionnaire, subjects were debriefed and dismissed.

Results

Estimates of consensus for the equal allocation option were subjected to a 2 (choice: equal vs proportionate allocation) x 2 (subject group: freshmen vs upperclassmen) x 2 (target group: freshmen vs upperclassmen) ANOVA with repeated measures on the third factor. Following the ANOVA, we conducted tests of false consensus, which require the cal- culation of an a priori contrast that compares the estimate of consensus for the equal allocation option made by subjects who chose that option to the estimate of consensus for the equal allocation option made by those who chose the proportionate allocation option (see Goethals, 1987; Marks & Miller, 1987; Mullen et al., 1985; Mullen & Hu, 1988).2 These tests were performed separately for each subject group-target group combination. The mean estimates of consensus are presented in Table 1.

The analysis of variance revealed a nonsignificant main effect for choice, F(1,77) = 1.17, p = .1414, indicating that a slight overall false consensus effect was obtained when we collapse across subject group and target group: Subjects who chose the equal allocation option estimated that a slightly higher percentage of people would select equal allocation than did subjects who chose the proportionate allocation option (51.80% vs 35.32%). However, a Choice x Target x Subject group interaction, F(1, 77) = 9.09, p = .0035, indicated intergroup differences in social projection. Consistent with the hypothesized differences between in-group and out-group social projection, the analysis of freshmen demonstrated a Choice x Target group interaction, F(1, 77) = 8.55, p = .0046. Spe- cifically, as illustrated in Table 1, a significant false consensus effect was obtained for in-group (freshmen) targets, +29.4%, t(77) = 4.192, p =

’ Note that these analyses focus upon estimates of consensus for only one choice (in this instance, estimates of consensus for the equal allocation option), since the estimates of consensus for the alternative choice are perfectly complementary to the estimates of consensus for the first choice (i.e.. the two estimates are constrained to equal 100%). The a priori comparisons which are used to test the false consensus effect were calculated using the MSerror derived from the choice x subject group x target group interaction.

428 MULLEN ET AL


.000037, but not for out-group (upper-class) targets, +0.42%, t(77) = 0.059, p = .4766. For upper-class students, the Choice x Target interaction was not significant, F(1, 77) = 1.76, p = .1884, but a similar pattern emerged. A significant false consensus effect was obtained for in- group (upper-class) targets, +24.2%, $77) = 3.521, p = .000363, and a weaker, marginally significant false consensus effect was demonstrated of out-group (freshman) targets, +11.33%, t(77) = 1.645, p = .0520 (see Table 1).

Collapsing across subject group, the magnitude of the false consensus effect for the in-group (r = .402) and the false consensus effect for the out-group (I = .096) were highly significantly different, Z = 2.874, p = .00203.3 Thus, consistent with the predictions, the false consensus effects for both freshmen and upperclassmen were stronger for in-group social projection than for out-group social project, where contrast effects were hypothesized to be operating.

Discussion of Study I

In terms of the in-group, these data replicate the basic “assimilation” type of social projection previously observed. Subjects who chose one option (equal or proportionate allocation) perceived more agreement with their position among in-group members than subjects who chose the other option were willing to grant them-the standard false consensus effect. However, similar to the results suggested by Spears and Manstead (1990), a version of the “contrast” type of social projection may be entering into the social projection regarding the out-group. Specifically, subjects making a given choice perceived only slightly more agreement with their position among out-group members than subjects who selected the other option were willing to grant them. In other words, compared to persons who endorsed a different option, subjects perceived substantially more agreement with their position among in-group members but only slightly more agreement with their position among out-group members.

Study 1 also revealed a significant difference between social projection toward the in-group and social projection toward the out-group. This is in contrast to the results of Spears and Manstead which demonstrated only a nonsignificant trend in that direction. It should be recognized that this difference is not due to superior power of the present analyses: While the sample size for Study 1 was N = 81, the sample size for Spears and Manstead was N = 93. However, the use of a stronger intergroup categorization and a more competitive, vested interest issue may have con- tributed to the stronger effects produced in Study 1.

This reasoning suggests that an even stronger difference between in-

’ This 2 represents a focused comparison of the magnitude of these tests of the social projection effects (see Mullen, 1989; Rosenthal, 1991).

430 MULLEN ET AL.

group social projection and out-group social projection could be orches- trated by strengthening the in-group-out-group distinction. Taken to the extreme, a significant false uniqueness4 effect might be produced if the intergroup context were strong enough. As strong and as relevant as the “Freshmen-Upperclassmen” distinction is for the subjects of Study 1, it does have a few subtle anomalies as an in-group-out-group manipulation. For example, the members of one of the groups (Freshmen) do in fact aspire to join the other group (Upperclassmen) and usually do so within a prescribed period of time. Moreover, the decision which benefits the out-group of Upperclassmen at the cost of the Freshmen in-group would eventually benefit the self and the in-group when they progress and mature into membership in the Upper-class. So, while strong and relevant, the in-group-out-group manipulation employed in Study 1 does involve some elements which could mitigate the overall impact of the in- group-out-group distinction.

Therefore, the intergroup categorization employed in the second study was an even stronger one: Syracuse University students vs Colgate Uni- versity students. These two private universities, located approximately 30 miles apart in upstate New York, have a tradition of interaction (and a friendly sports rivalry) that extends back to the turn of the century. In addition, preliminary research demonstrated that university identification was a more spontaneously salient intergroup categorization than was academic class. Twenty-one students who were presented with the task of listing roles and identities answering the question “Who am I?” (Gordon, 1968) within 3 min were significantly (p = l.l4E-32) more likely to offer responses related to their college identity than to the more subordinate category of class standing (81% vs 10%). Among the students who listed their college student identification, this response averaged between third and fourth on their list (3.18). Among the students who listed both class standing and college student identification, class standing averaged seventh while college student identification averaged fifth. The choice that subjects at each school made in Study 2 had the potential to pit the vested interests of students at the two schools against one another in the context of a stronger intergroup categorization. In order to once again place the results in the context of previous social projection effects (e.g., Ross et al., 1977; Mullen et al., 1985; Mullen & Hu, 1988), the standard tests for the false consensus effect were examined.

4 Note that several authors (e.g., Suls & Wan, 1987; Goethals, 1987) have inappropriately used the term “false uniqueness” to refer to the (fairly common) phenomenon of underestimation of actual consensus, while using the term “false consensus” to refer to the perception of more consensus than people holding the other position are willing to grant. To date there has been no statistically significant demonstration of a true-false uniqueness effect among any normal population subjects, although there are dozens of instances of underestimation of consensus (see Mullen & Hu, 1988).


STUDY 2

Method Subjects. Ninety-five undergraduate students (42 from Colgate University, 53 from Syr-

acuse University) participated in this study in partial fulfillment of a research participation requirement.

Procedure. Subjects read a brief paragraph describing the endowment of one million dollars to Syracuse University and Colgate University by a wealthy publisher who had attended both schools in his youth. This money was to be applied to student housing, library facilities, and tuition remission at the two schools. Two different methods of allocating the funds to the two schools were described. One allocation (equal allocation) would split the money equally between the two schools, yielding $500,000 to Colgate University and $500,000 to Syracuse University. The other allocation (proportionate allocation) would split the money between the two schools in proportion to the number of students enrolled at each university, yielding $300,000 to Colgate University and $700,000 to Syracuse University. Subjects estimated the consensus for each allocation option at their own school (i.e., within their ingroup), then indicated which allocation option they themselves supported, and then finally estimated the consensus for each option at the other school (i.e., the outgroup). After responding to these questions which gauged social projection in an intergroup context, subjects were debriefed and dismissed.

Results

The data analysis for Study 2 follows the same format used for Study 1. Estimates of consensus for the equal allocation option were subjected to a 2 (choice: equal vs proportionate allocation) x 2 (subject group: Syracuse vs Colgate) x 2 (target group: Syracuse vs Colgate) ANOVA with repeated measures on the third factor. Tests of the false consensus effects were performed separately for each subject group-target group combination. The mean estimates of consensus are presented in Table 2.

The analysis of variance revealed a nonsignificant main effect for choice, F(1, 91) = 2.27, p = .0677, indicating that a marginal overall false consensus effect was obtained when we collapse across subject group and target group: Subjects who chose the equal allocation option estimated that a marginally significantly higher percent of people would select equal allocation than did subjects who chose the proportionate allocation option (54.92% vs 49.32%). However, a Choice x Target x Subject group interaction, F(1, 91) = 20.53, p = .000018, indicated intergroup differences in social projection. Consistent with the hypothesized differences between in-group and out-group social projection, the analysis of Colgate subjects demonstrated a Choice x Target group interaction, F(1, 91) = 8.64, p = .0042. Specifically, as illustrated in Table 2, a significant false consensus effect was obtained for in-group (Colgate) targets, +20.3%, t(91) = 2.953, p = .0020, and a weak false uniqueness effect was obtained for out-group (Syracuse) targets, -8.3%, t(91) = 1.218,~ = .1132. For Syracuse students, the Choice x Target interaction was significant, F(1, 91) = 12.56, p = .00062. As illustrated in Table 2, a significant false consensus effect was obtained for in-group (Syracuse) targets, +25.8%,

432 MULLEN ET AL


t(91) = 4.529, p = .000009, and a weak false uniqueness effect was demonstrated for out-group (Colgate) targets, -2.7%, t(91) = 0.484, p = .3148 (see Table 2).

Collapsing across subject group, the magnitude of the false consensus effect for the in-group (r = .364) and the false uniqueness effect for the out-group (r = - .089) were highly significantly different, 2 = 4.465, p = .0000041. Th us, consistent with the predictions, a false consensus effect was observed for in-group social projection, for both Colgate students and Syracuse students, whereas a false uniqueness effect was observed for out-group social projection once again for both subject groups.

Discussion of Study 2

These results replicate and extend those of Study 1: The basic “assimilation” type of social projection occurs with reference to the in-group, while a “contrast” type of social projection occurs with reference to the out-group. The difference between the out-group social projection results of our studies and those of Spears and Manstead can be attributed to two plausible factors: (1) the use of a stronger intergroup categorization and (2) a more competitive, vested interest issue. That is, our studies involved a zero-sum allocation of funds: More money for the out-group was linked to less money for the in-group.

Study 2 was designed to examine the effect of strength of intergroup categorization independent of vested interest. Specifically, Study 2 was able to exaggerate these social projection effects by strengthening the in- group-out-group distinction relative to Study 1 while maintaining the vested interest. Meta-analytic comparisons of the magnitude of the social projection effects obtained in Study 1 and Study 2 revealed a significant difference in out-group social projection between the two studies, Z = 1.685, p = .0460: The false uniqueness effect in Study 2, collapsing across subject group (r = - .089), was significantly different from the weak false consensus effect for Study 1 (r = .096). Strengthening the group categorization from Study 1 to Study 2 did not affect the magnitude of the in-group false consensus effect: Study 1, r = .402 vs Study 2, r = .364, Z = 0.404, p = .3430. Thus, our findings are consistent with the themes identified in the introduction regarding the salience of group categories and the exaggeration of differences in responses to in-group and out- group members (Brewer, 1979; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Mullen, 1991; Turner et al., 1987; Wilder, 1986). Whereas previous research has generally emphasized evaluative reactions to in-group and out-group members, our research involves a different phenomenon: the perceived prevalence of one’s own choices within the in-group and the out-group.

While vested interest is a commonplace attribute of various intergroup contexts, it is important to determine whether the intergroup social pro-

434 MULLEN ET AL.

jection effects we obtained in Study 1 and Study 2 require the vested interest manipulation inherent in these studies (cf., Crano, 1983). There- fore, Study 3 was conducted in an attempt to replicate the patterns observed in the first two studies in a paradigm in which subjects’ choices did not directly engage vested interest between the in-group and the out- group.

Method

STUDY 3

Subjects. Eighty-four undergraduate students from Syracuse University participated in this study in partial fulfillment of a research participation requirement.

Procedure. To make subjects’ political ideology membership salient and to provide a means of categorizing subjects into distinct political ideology groups, subjects indicated their own political ideology on a scale from 1 to 11 (where 1 = liberal and 11 = conservative). Subjects who responded below the midpoint of 6 were identified as “liberal,” and subjects responding above the midpoint were identified as “conservative” (an additional 12 subjects who responded at the midpoint of the scale were identified as neither “liberal” nor “conservative” and were not included in these analyses). Subjects then read a brief passage describing the history of the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by the Soviet Union in the 1940s and the dilemma that was presented in the news media at that time: Should the United States press the Soviet Union for the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, at the risk of losing further democratic reforms outside the Soviet Union (e.g., in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary)? This choice will be referred to below as “Press.” Or, should the United States not press the Soviet Union for the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, in the hopes of fostering further democratic reforms outside the Soviet Union? This choice will be referred to below as “Not Press.“5 Subjects then indicated which choice they personally supported and, similar to Studies 1 and 2 above, estimated the consensus for each choice among liberals and again among conservatives. However, different from Studies 1 and 2 above, there is no direct benefit accrued to liberals over conservatives (or vice versa) for choosing either “Press” or “Not Press.” In fact, there is no single, simple reason why liberals (or conservatives) would choose one alternative over the other. In this manner, the paradigm used in Study 3 did not directly engage vested interest of the in-group and the out-group.

After responding to these questions which gauged social projection in an intergroup context, subjects were debriefed and dismissed.

Results

Parallelling the analyses of the first two studies, estimates of consensus for the “Press” option were subjected to a 2 (choice: “Press” vs “Not Press”) x 2 (subject group: liberal vs conservative) x 2 (target group: liberal vs conservative) ANOVA with repeated measures on the third factor, and then tests for false consensus effects were performed separately for each subject group-target group combination. The mean estimates of consensus are presented in Table 3.

The analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for choice,

’ This procedure was conducted in the early spring of 1990, when the beginnings of perestroikn were being widely publicized.

TABL

E 3

ESTI

MAT

ES

OF

CONS

ENSU

S AS

A

FUNC

TION

O

F CH

OICE

, SU

BJEC

T GR

OUP,

AN

D TA

RGET

GR

OUP:

ST

UDY

3

Libe

ral

targ

et

Con

serv

ativ

e ta

rget

%

Estim

ated

Es

timat

ed

s

perc

enta

ge

of

perc

enta

ge

of

“Pre

ss”

“Not

Pr

ess”

2 z

Subj

ect

grou

p

Libe

ral

Cho

ice

(N)

“Pre

ss”

(12)

“N

ot

Pres

s”

(16)

Estim

ated

pe

rcen

tage

of

“P

ress

” __

___

72.1

49.6

Estim

ated

pe

rcen

tage

of

“N

ot

Pres

s”

27.9

50.4

55

.7

62.9

Q

9 P 44

.3

g C

onse

rvat

ive

“Pre

ss”

55.7

44

.3

60.7

39

.3

5

(24)

?

“Not

Pr

ess”

66

.3

33.7

33

.2

66.8

(4

2)

___-

__

__.-~

-___

___

____

_ __

_~

436 MULLEN ET AL.

F(1, 80) = 7.21, p = .0044, indicating that an overall false consensus effect was obtained when we collapse across subject group and target group: Subjects who chose the “Press” option did estimate that a significantly higher percentage of people would select “Press” than did subjects who chose the “Not Press” option (57.00% vs 50.55%). However, a Choice x Target x Subject group interaction, F(1, 80) = 20.78, p = .000018, indicated intergroup differences in social projection. Consistent with the hypothesized differences between in-group and out-group social projection, the analysis of Liberal subjects demonstrated a Choice x Target group interaction, F(1, 80) = 9.24, p = .0032. Specifically, as illustrated in Table 3, a significant false consensus effect was obtained for in-group (Liberal) targets, +22.5%, t(80) = 2.348, p = .0107, and a significant false uniqueness effect was obtained for out-group (Conserv- ative) targets, -18.6%, t(80) = 1.947, p = .0275. For Conservative subjects, the Choice x Target interaction was significant, F(1, 80) = 17.69, p = .000068. As illustrated in Table 3, a significant false consensus effect was obtained for in-group (Conservative) targets, +27.5%, t(80) = 3.565, p = .00031, and a marginally significant false uniqueness effect was demonstrated for out-group (Liberal) targets, - 10.3%, t(80) = 1.375, p = .0865 (see Table 3).

Collapsing across subject group, the magnitude of the false consensus effect for the in-group (r = .313) and the false uniqueness effect for the out-group (r = - .182) were highly significantly different, 2 = 4.522, p = .OOOOO31. Thus, consistent with the predictions, a false consensus effect was observed for in-group social projection, for both Liberal subjects and Conservative subjects, whereas a false uniqueness effect was observed for out-group social projection once again for both subject groups.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results of these three studies replicate people’s significant tendency toward an assimilation type of in-group social projection and demonstrate a different, contrast type of out-group social projection. With respect to in-group social projection, all three experiments demonstrate an overall false consensus effect. The magnitude of this effect was r = .402 for Study 1, r = .364 for Study 2, and r = .313 for Study 3. Thus, these results are consistent with a large body of previous research and (important when we consider out-group social projection) indicate the comparability of our paradigm to previous research demonstrating false consensus.

Beyond replicating the in-group social projection effects, our studies demonstrate a different type of social projection toward out-groups. In Studies 2 and 3, in particular, false uniqueness effects were obtained for out-group social projection (with magnitudes of r = - .089 for Study 2, and r = - .182 for Study 3; r = .096 for Study 1). Thus, our results are


generally supportive of Spears and Manstead (1990), who suggested the possibility of two types of social projection: assimilation and contrast. Nevertheless, the specific patterns we obtained were not entirely consistent with the results of the study reported by Spears and Manstead (1990) or with the findings of Sherman et al. (1983), who also examined social projection toward and assessments of in-groups and out-groups. One key element of the present research, which may help to reconcile these ap- parently inconsistent findings, is the identification of factors that may mediate the relative strengths of assimilation and contrast processes in intergroup social projection.

Within the present research, one factor that seems to influence the differentiation between in-group social projection and out-group social projection is intergroup categorization strength. The contrast type of social projection for the out-group was exaggerated from Study 1 to Study 2 when the group categorization was made more powerful. Furthermore, salience of categorization may account for disparities between our results and those of Spears and Manstead (1990). Whereas Study 1, which involved weak intergroup categorization, produced results similar to the findings of Spears and Manstead (1990), Study 2, which involved stronger intergroup categorization, produced greater in-group/out-group differentiation in social projection. The categorization manipulation used by Spears and Manstead (i.e., simply mentioning males vs females, or arts majors vs science majors) appeared relatively weak. This interpretation suggests that using long-standing groups that involve greater emotional identification (such as race or religion) would produce even greater differences in in-group/out-group social projection than those obtained in the present research. Future research might be directed toward more controlled efforts to examine the effects of the salience of intergroup categorization. For example, experimental manipulations of the salience of one or both groups could be accomplished through verbal instructions to pay particular attention to one or both groups (e.g., Sanbonmatsu, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1987).

With respect to discrepancies between the present research and the work of Sherman et al. (1983), the fact that adults in the Sherman et al. (1983) study did not show any false consensus bias suggests that the behavioral choice, smoking, may be atypical in the area of social projection (see also Suls et al., 1988). In contrast, the replication of the standard in-group false consensus effect in our research supports the comparability of our paradigms to previous research in this area.

Within the present research, one factor that does not seem likely to account for the differentiation between in-group social projection and out- group social projection is vested interest. Significant differences between in-group and out-group social projection were demonstrated in Study 3, which involved a choice about a historical, political event that was largely

438 MULLEN ET AL.

devoid of any direct in-group-out-group vested interest. Therefore, it seems unlikely that vested interest is necessary for the demonstration of differences in in-group-out-group social projection.

In closing, it is interesting to consider the possible consequences of these patterns of social projection for intergroup behavior. It is possible that the patterns of in-group false consensus and out-group false uniqueness revealed in these analyses could serve to maintain or exacerbate intergroup conflict. Thus, individuals seem prone to minimize the apparent consensus for their own position within the out-group. This contrast pro- cess conveys the sense of a united, and opposing, out-group. In this way, the fundamental perceptual tendencies of social projection may set the stage for the development, and escalation, of intergroup conflict.

The results of the present research also suggest a mechanism whereby social projection might impact upon the relative heterogeneity effect (Mul- len & Hu, 1989). That is, false uniqueness effects in the perceptions of out-group may set the stage for perceiving the out-group as relatively homogeneous. An inverse relation may obtain between perceptions of an out-group’s variability and perceptions of the prevalence of one’s choices in that out-group. In other words: To the extent that everyone in the out- group disagrees with me, they are more likely to be seen as similar to one another. It remains to be seen whether the paradoxical complement of this pattern would also occur: To the extent that everyone in the in- group agrees with me, they are more likely to be seen as dissimilar to one another. The link between social projection (Mullen & Hu, 1988) and relative heterogeneity (Mullen & Hu, 1989) is particularly plausible, especially insofar as both phenomena are predicted by some of the same variables (e.g., proportionate group sizes; see Mullen, 1991). Only a few studies have examined the possible connections between social projection and relative heterogeneity, and these have been restricted to the context of in-group perceptions (Goethals et al., 1979; Manstead, 1982). However, social projection and relative heterogeneity may be even more directly linked in the intergroup context, and future research might be directed toward examining this possibility.

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In-group-out-group differences in social projection

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