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Author(s): Jukka Makinen

Article Title: In defense of a regulated market economy

Article No: RJGE1004464

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In defense of a regulated market economy

Jukka Makinena∗ and Eero Kasanenb,c

aDepartment of Management Studies, Aalto University School of Business, Box 21210, Helsinki 00076,Finland; bDepartment of Finance, Aalto University School of Business, Helsinki, Finland; cESADE

Business School, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona, Spain AQ1¶

(Received 12 December 2014; accepted 2 January 2015)

The dominant understanding of political corporate social responsibility (CSR) suggests new,broader political roles for businesses in the globalized economy, challenging the classicalliberal social order (where business firms’ task is to focus on economic issues and thegovernment’s role is to take care of political responsibilities). In this paper, we show howthe major framing of the political CSR discussion not only challenges the classical liberalsocial order but also goes against the more general political economic perspective of theregulated market economy (where strict and [in most cases] strong boundaries existbetween business and politics). We argue that this latter tendency of the political CSRdiscussion is its main weakness. We introduce a Rawlsian reframing of political CSR thatis in line with the idea of a global-regulated market economy and compatible with some ofthe basic global ethical aims of the political CSR movement.

Keywords: globalization; classical liberalism; corporate social responsibility; politicalcorporate social responsibility; regulated market economy; division of moral labor

1. Introduction

The current political corporate social responsibility (CSR) discussion focuses critically on the

classical liberal social order, which advocates economic responsibilities and apolitical roles

for private firms in a fair society. In this way, political CSR tries to produce a paradigm shift

in CSR studies where the economic conception of CSR is replaced by the political conception

of CSR (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2008, 2011).

When talking about CSR studies, we refer to the academic debate that addresses the exist-

ence and management of firms’ social responsibilities (Scherer and Palazzo 2007; Matten and

Moon 2008). Within CSR studies, political CSR refers to the rapidly growing discussion on

the new political roles of businesses in the global economy (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). In

the political conception of CSR, private firms start to operate as major political actors in the glo-

balized world and take on traditional public sector tasks, such as the regulation of businesses,

and assume major political responsibilities in society as the providers of basic rights and

public goods (Matten and Crane 2005; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten 2009; Scherer and

Palazzo 2011, 3). This suggested change in the political balance between public and private

responsibilities in the context of global governance is arguably one of the major issues of

global ethics. In this paper, we question the functioning of oversized moral responsibility for

companies and instead advocate a more balanced division of moral labor and development of

governmental social responsibility (GSR) globally.

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∗Corresponding author. Email: jukka.makinen@aalto.fi

Journal of Global Ethics, 2015

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2015.1004464

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RJGE1004464 Techset Composition India (P) Ltd., Bangalore and Chennai, India 1/16/2015

In classical liberal social order (represented in CSR discussions by Milton Friedman,

Michael Jensen, and others), the regulatory powers of the state should be separated from the

business interests of private corporations. In this political setting, the task of business firms is

to orient all their activities, including CSR, to value creation for their shareholders within the

background institutions provided by the limited state. The classical liberal state has the

narrow functions of protecting private property, enforcing voluntary contracts, minimizing

externalities, promoting competition, and providing a monetary system. Thus, the central aim

of the state in this setting is the protection of individual freedom and the promotion of the effi-

cient use of resources in society (Friedman 1962; Jensen 2002, 2008). Although the classical

liberal state is minimalist, it is assumed to have efficient mechanisms for taking care of its

basic political tasks.

From the perspective of the dominant understanding of political CSR, the classical liberal

business–society relations are no longer valid in the contemporary global world. It is argued

that, in the global setting, the regulatory powers of the states are seriously weakened, boundaries

between the political and economic spheres of society are vanishing, and businesses gradually

take on traditional governmental tasks, such as the political and social regulation and provision

of public goods. From the perspective of political CSR, CSR studies should forget the classical

liberal political assumptions – that support an apolitical and economic understanding of

businesses’ roles in society – and accept the new political role of corporations in a global

world (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2008, 2011; Scherer,

Palazzo, and Matten 2009).

If the current argumentation put forward by the proponents of the political CSR movement is

not a satisfactory way to challenge the existing business–society relations, what could be an

alternative path? In the following argumentation, we sketch some of the basic elements of an

alternative route. At the same time, we offer a defense of the idea of a regulated market

economy and argue in favor of the reframing of political CSR to be in line with this political idea.

We introduce a Rawlsian alternative to the dominant understanding of political CSR. In this

alternative version of political CSR, the classical liberal social order is assessed by and competes

with other versions of regulated market economies. In this way, we show that the normative idea

of a regulated market economy is stronger than the classical liberal interpretation of it. The

dominant framing of political CSR is not really able to challenge the need for a moral division

of labor between business and politics, and especially not by only challenging it within the clas-

sical liberal concept of society.

To make our point, we first introduce the basic idea of the regulated market economy and

introduce some of the major versions of it (i.e. ideal types of regulated market economies).

After that, we show the way in which the dominant framing of the political CSR discussion

focuses on one particular variant of regulated market economies (i.e. the classical liberal

variant) when trying to produce a paradigm shift in CSR studies, shifting from the economic con-

ception of CSR to the political conception of CSR.

As a critique of political CSR, we show that classical liberalism is not the only relevant version

of a regulated market economy that is in line with the economic conception of businesses’ role in a

fair society. Indeed, there are other social orders that need to be taken into account in political CSR

discussions. In this setting, we suggest that within the group of the regulated market economies we

can find, e.g. a Rawlsian version of a regulated market economy (property-owning democracy) and

Scandinavian style states (welfare-state capitalism) that could also be in line with some of the basic

global ethical inclinations of the political CSR movement.

Our main point in this paper is to suggest that the political CSR discussion could be redir-

ected to be in line with the idea of a globally regulated market economy and with the economic

understanding of businesses’ role in a fair society. Redirected CSR could then better address

2 J. Makinen and E. Kasanen

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issues of global regulation and assess various models of GSR from a global ethical perspective.

This paper is taking a step forward in the line of the argumentation started earlier on the chal-

lenges of political CSR (Makinen and Kourula 2012; Makinen and Kasanen 2014).

2. The notion of a regulated market economy

According to Jukka Makinen and Eero Kasanen (2014), who draw on the Rawlsian political fra-

mework (Rawls 1996, 2001; Freeman 2007), the notion of a regulated market economy refers to

the social system wherein the political and socio-economic responsibilities are divided between

the public sector of society and economically oriented businesses operating within the public

sector institutions of society. In this type of political economy, there is a relatively clear separ-

ation between the political sphere of society (involving the public institutions taking care of pol-

itical and social issues) and the economic sphere of society (comprising the competitive markets

and economically oriented market actors such as private corporations).

Not all political economies are regulated market economies however. This can be seen in

Figure 1, which illustrates the basic pluralism of political economies. We can have social

orders where there are no separations between the different spheres of society (like in the com-

munist and anarcho-capitalist utopias), going beyond the whole idea of the division of moral

labor. Furthermore, there are also political economies where the boundaries between the differ-

ent spheres of society are highly blurred, like in the extensively privatized libertarian social

scheme and in the highly democratized market socialist social order.

In the following, we will focus on the regulated market economies since these systems are

highly significant when assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the political CSR discussion.

Our political culture involves the competing conceptions of regulated market economies. We

can find versions of market economies where the public sector of society is relatively narrow and

where it is combined with the extensive private sector of society, comprising the competitive

markets and market actors (see classical liberalism in Figure 1). Alternatively, there are versions

of regulated market economies where the market actors are operating within the relatively robust

Figure 1. Political economies.

Journal of Global Ethics 3

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and extensive public sector of society (a property-owning democracy and welfare-state capital-

ism in Figure 1).

Furthermore, the political aims of the public sectors of society may differ significantly in

different versions of regulated market economies. We can have economically oriented regulated

market economies, like that of classical liberalism, where the major aim of the political sphere of

society is to take care of the efficient use of resources in society and the protection of basic capi-

talist rights (like private property and freedom of contracts). Alternatively, we can have regu-

lated market economies, like property-owning democracies and welfare-state capitalism,

where the central aim of the public sector of society is to focus on the issues of political and

socio-economic justice.

Before discussing the different conceptions of GSR in different versions of regulated market

economies, we will briefly introduce the way in which the dominant framing of the political CSR

discussion goes against or challenges one version of the regulated market economy, namely clas-

sical liberal business–society relations.

3. Classical liberalism versus political CSR

The classical liberal variant of the regulated market economy (promoted in CSR discussions by

Friedman and Jensen among others) has been an influential justification for the apolitical and

economic understanding of business firms’ roles in society (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann

2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2008, 2011). According to this traditional idea of proper

business–society relations, the task of businesses is to orient their CSR and other activities to

value creation for shareholders (the search for the business case of CSR) within the frame pro-

vided by the institutions of the limited state.

Milton Friedman, who famously thinks that the social responsibility of private firms is to

focus on economic issues and the maximization of their own profits (1970), explains the basic

idea of the classical liberal regulated market economy by saying that:

First the scope of government must be limited. Its major function must be to protect our freedom bothfrom the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens: to preserve law and order, toenforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets. Beyond this major function, governmentmay enable us at times to accomplish jointly what we would find it more difficult or expensive toaccomplish severally. However, any such use of government is fraught with danger. We shouldnot and cannot avoid using government in this way. But there should be a clear and large balanceof advantages before we do. By relying primarily on voluntary co-operation and private enterprise,in both economic and other activities, we can insure that the private sector is a check on the powers ofthe governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought.(Friedman 1962, 2–3)

According to financial economist Jensen (2008), this type of system aims at a state of affairs

where society uses ‘its human and non-human resources most efficiently’. In it, the power of

the government sector of society should be separate from the private interests of firms. In this

setting, the public sector of society has the limited functions of protecting people, enforcing

voluntary contracts, and minimizing externalities. On the other hand, the role of businesses is

to concentrate on the maximization of the long-run total value of the firm (Jensen 2002,

2008; Makinen and Kourula 2012).

Political CSR discussion aiming to challenge the economic understanding of businesses’ role

in society focuses on the classical liberal social order. According to Scherer, Palazzo, and

Baumann (2006, 508):

the position of mainstream neoclassical economics is based on a distinct theory of society and a strictdivision of labor between the private and public domains: business firms should focus on profitseeking, while the state’s role is to take care of issues of public concern.

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However, from the perspective of political CSR ‘the division of labor between business and the

state, as suggested by Friedman (1962) and others, is highly problematic at both national and

international levels’ (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006, 512)

From the perspective of political CSR, the old-fashioned nature of classical liberal social

order and the politicization of corporations are linked with the empirical description of the glo-

balization processes (which makes territorially bounded nation states the impotent regulators of

the business sphere of society and undermines the traditional separations between the political

and economic spheres of society). In this setting, it is stated that:

Under the conditions of globalization, the strict division of labor between private business andnation-state governance does not hold any more. Many business firms have started to assumesocial and political responsibilities that go beyond legal requirements and fill the regulatoryvacuum in global governance. (Scherer and Palazzo 2011, 899)

Unlike national governance with its monopoly on the use of force and capacity to enforce regulationsupon private actors within the national territory, global governance rests on voluntary contributionsand weak or even absent enforcement mechanisms. (Scherer and Palazzo 2011, 900)

In this global setting, the new political role of corporations (where firms enter the regulation pro-

cesses of businesses voluntarily and start to operate as the new providers of basic rights and

public goods in a society) seems suitable to the proponents of political CSR (Scherer,

Palazzo, and Baumann 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten

2009; see also Matten and Crane 2005; Crane, Matten, and Moon 2008).

Makinen and Kasanen (2014) have provided a critique and doubted whether the argumenta-

tion put forward by the proponents of the political CSR movement is quite enough to challenge

the classical liberal conception of the proper business–society relations.

By appealing to the blurred boundaries between business and politics, the extensive role of

private firms in political governance, and the narrow basic structure of society (and the lack of

background justice) in global settings, political CSR is putting forward the basic features of the

libertarian conception of society. However, libertarian political CSR is at odds with the basic

aims of the political CSR movement. This is because the libertarian political setting does not

offer space for the democratic political processes emphasized by the political CSR discussion.

Furthermore, libertarian political CSR does not go beyond the mainstream instrumental under-

standing of CSR since there already is a libertarian theory of political CSR within mainstream

CSR studies (Freeman and Phillips 2002; Makinen and Kourula 2012).

Furthermore, political CSR goes against classical liberal political doctrine based on the

empirical interpretation of globalization processes. This type of argumentation is not enough

to challenge the normative political position put forward by Friedman, Jensen, and others in

the classical liberal camp. What is needed is a relatively robust normative political argument

challenging classical liberal political economy, but this kind of argument is lacking from the

dominant political CSR discussion. In addition, it has been argued that classical liberalism is

not the only relevant version of a regulated market economy that deserves recognition in politi-

cal CSR discussions (Makinen and Kasanen 2014).

Empirical observations on the weak position of governments versus multinational companies

have led political CSR to deem the division of moral labor between business and government

old-fashioned, and to advocate a larger moral role for companies. However, from the same

observations we can derive a drastically different conclusion on the need to strengthen the

moral division of labor between global society and governments versus multinational compa-

nies. Instead of increasing the moral burden of companies to construct legislation, we can

argue in favor of improving GSR, at both global and national levels. We recommend the

latter direction for CSR as it leads to a larger set of realistic political environments, helps to

correct the observed imbalance, and avoids the risk of ending up with a marginal role for

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citizens’ free political deliberations. The fundamental solution to globalization challenges, as we

see it, is not so much strengthening political company-level CSR but developing smart and effi-

cient global GSR. The sources of ethical codes and hard rules should reflect a broader circle of

deliberation than companies alone can provide. Governments and global institutions need help

and better tools in the design of proper rules for businesses.

In the following, we show how political CSR could be reframed to take the idea of a globally

regulated market economy seriously. In other words, we introduce a Rawlsian understanding of

political CSR. This Rawlsian interpretation of political CSR takes the idea of GSR more

seriously than the dominant framing of political CSR (put forward by scholars such as

Scherer and Palazzo). At the same time, the Rawlsian understanding of political CSR offers a

critical analysis of the classical liberal business–society relations suggested by scholars such

as Friedman and Jensen. Proponents of various forms of a regulated market economy challenge

the competing conceptions of government and CSR normatively and politically. A Rawlsian fra-

mework puts political CSR on the same normative level of political argumentation as other the-

ories of political economy.

4. The Rawlsian reframing of political CSR

We start with some of the basic ideas of the Rawlsian approach and continue with its critical

perspectives on the classical liberal version of a regulated market economy. This critique

focuses on the classical liberal conception of GSR. After that, we introduce the main alternative

conceptions of GSR that come from the camp of regulated market economies. In this way, we

show that the political idea of a regulated market economy is larger and stronger than the clas-

sical liberal interpretation of it and that there are strong reasons to reframe political CSR to be

compatible with the political idea of a regulated market economy.

The Rawlsian reframing of political CSR supports the idea of a regulated market economy,

the separation between the business and political spheres of society, and an economic under-

standing of the business firm. In the Rawlsian political setting, the basic idea is to outline a

public political structure to offer just background conditions for economic actors so that these

actors can focus on their ends more effectively within the framework of the basic structure of

society (Rawls 1996, 266–267). Furthermore, the separations between the public and private

spheres of society are needed since, in contemporary political settings, people have different

and opposing ends of life and without this separation there is no real way to respect this

ethical pluralism (Rawls 1996, 2001).

In the Rawlsian political setting, private firms are supposed to be voluntary organizations for

their members. Due to their voluntary nature, businesses are allowed to have their own economic

aims and they can assess and reward their members on the basis of their contributions to the ends

of the firm. These meritocratic practices are not acceptable in the context of the basic political

structure of society since this structure is based on the idea that citizens are free and equal and

should be treated as such (Rawls 1996; Phillips and Margolis 1999).

However, from the Rawlsian perspective, the problem with classical liberalism seems to be

that it is too weak a member of the group of political economies called regulated market econ-

omies. Seen from the Rawlsian position, the conception of GSR endorsed by the classical liberal-

ism is too limited and economically oriented – at least in a highly globalized economy where the

power of economic actors is increasing relative to the political spheres of society (as pointed out

by the proponents of political CSR). On the other hand, the Rawlsian reframing of political CSR

goes beyond the dominant understanding of political CSR by focusing on the different versions

of GSR in a global setting (and not only focusing on classical liberal GSR).

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From the Rawlsian perspective, the main weaknesses of classical liberalism are the fact that,

even though it argues for the boundaries between business and politics, it does not suggest a

robust institutional mechanism or incentives to protect or maintain these boundaries. It can be

argued that political CSR’s description of the globalization scene (with the blurred boundaries

between business and politics, the extensive role of private firms in political governance, and the

lack of background justice) is related to the inability of classical liberal political doctrine (i.e. the

neo-liberal model of global governance) to maintain the boundaries between business and poli-

tics. In contrast with political CSR, the Rawlsian view leads to the conclusion that the division of

moral labor in classical liberalism is too weak and should be strengthened, instead of being seen

as old-fashioned and soon to be phased out.

In classical liberal social order, the balance between the limited public sector of society and

extensive private spheres of society is relatively fragile. The classical liberal public sector of

society is economically oriented. The classical liberal state is not toothless in protecting the

basic economic and political rights of citizens but its coverage of moral and social issues is

limited by design. Its main aims are the efficient use of resources in society and the protection

of basic capitalist rights (like private property and freedom of contracts). Since these aims are

not very far away from the dominant aims of the private spheres of society, there is, in this

sense, plenty of room for the phenomena of blurred boundaries between business and politics

within the classical liberal scheme. For these reasons, it seems that in this political economy

the needed separation between business and politics is too easy to bypass.

In addition, the classical liberal context lacks robust public sector institutions that are needed

to redistribute economic power over time and safeguard equal political participation for all citi-

zens in society. From the Rawlsian perspective, it can be argued that the limited background

structures suggested by classical liberalism are not enough to level the playing field in the

global economy and that (in the global setting) there is an urgent need for the egalitarian back-

ground structures to stop the concentration of economic power and its transformation into pol-

itical power.

4.1. Alternative conceptions of GSR

The Rawlsian understanding of political CSR focuses on the different conceptions of GSR that

are in line with the economic conception of the business firm (business case of CSR). From this

perspective, the classical liberal idea of the public sector of society emphasizing the issues of the

efficient use of resources in society is only one (and in many ways a too limited) conception of

GSR in a global economy. Somewhat surprisingly we may claim that, in the current global

economy, not even the limited state of classical liberalism is present in all parts of the world.

Free competition, free speech, the economic freedom to set up enterprises, property rights,

the enforcement of contracts, and rule of law are threatened by corruption, organized crime,

incompetence, deficient legislation, and a lack of an independent judiciary.

However, the Rawlsian reframing of political CSR not only focuses on the weaknesses of

classical liberalism. It also tries to offer alternatives to the traditional classical liberal conception

of GSR. These alternatives take into account that, in the global economy, there is a need for the

robust institutional mechanisms to maintain ethically significant boundaries between business

and politics.

One interesting alternative to the classical liberal conception of government responsibility is

offered by liberal equality. The major political aim of this version of a regulated market

economy is to offer equal opportunity for all people in society. This conception of GSR is

worried about the cumulative effects of free economic transactions over time on peoples’

equal chances. To counterbalance the negative consequences of free markets undermining

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peoples’ equal and fair chances, the idea is to set markets within the framework of egalitarian

social background structures. These social structures are ‘designed to even out class barriers’

and to maintain equal opportunities for education and health for all (Rawls 1971, 73;

Freeman 2007; Makinen and Kourula 2012).

The second major alternative to the classical liberal conception of GSR coming from the

regulated market economies camp is welfare-state capitalism. According to this conception of

GSR, the proper aim of the public sector of society is the increasing of the general level of

welfare in society. To achieve this political aim, the egalitarian social structures suggested by

liberal equality are needed. In addition, there is plenty of room for the egalitarian work done

by the socio-economic basic structure institutions (like progressive income taxes and income

transfer programs) redistributing economic resources over time, reducing disparities between

people, and assisting those who lose out in economic competition (Krouse and McPherson

1988; Rawls 2001; Freeman 2007; Makinen and Kourula 2012).

The third major alternative to the classical liberal conception of GSR is offered by property-

owning democracy. This conception of GSR aims at democratic social justice. It sees that the

concentration of economic power over time undermines peoples’ democratic control of their

own social life. This version of GSR takes on board the social and economic basic structure insti-

tutions suggested by liberal equality and welfare-state capitalism (like egalitarian education,

health care, and taxation systems). However, from the perspective of property-owning demo-

cratic GSR, these egalitarian structures are not enough to prevent the control of the economy

and politics by the economic elite, since these systems focus on the symptoms of capitalism

and not enough on the background structures causing the concentration of economic power

over time. To achieve democratic social justice and to limit the concentration of wealth, it

suggests egalitarian inheritance laws and progressive gift taxes, robust public policies to

boost the savings levels of poor people, and public institutions separating business and

politics, such as the public financing of political parties and institutions supporting free public

discussion (Rawls 1971, 2001; Krouse and McPherson 1988; Freeman 2007; Makinen and

Kourula 2012).

Compared with the classical liberal scheme, in all of these alternative versions of a regulated

market economy there is clearer separation between the conceptions of GSR and CSR. In this

sense, there is more effort required to maintain the ethically significant boundaries between

business and politics than in classical liberalism. In addition, these alternatives suggest insti-

tutional structures that work against the concentration of economic power over time. Thus,

these alternative conceptions of GSR work against the dominance of the economic sphere of

society over the political sphere. Trying to achieve this type of balance between business and

politics is urgently needed in the global setting where the economic sphere too easily dominates

the political sphere.

The practical examples of global moral codes and hard enforceable rules for the business

sector can be found in private and public institutions. Although not perfect, code and rule

setting global institutions – like the IASB (accounting), BCBS (The Basel Committee on

Banking Supervision), the WTO (trade), the IMF (financing), the ILO (labor), the UN Global

Compact (business practices), climate agreements, and maritime law – provide global regulation

and arbitration for businesses. In a balanced global moral division of labor, we need both rule

setters and market actors. Redirected CSR could take the development of global governance

and GSR as their next goals.

Another practical observation is that more regulation does not equal better government.

Arguably, in Europe and the USA there is overregulation and red tape, stifling growth and

employment. Similarly, in developing countries like India and China there are perhaps too

many bureaucratic rules and procedures, which lead rather to corruption than to background

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justice. Solid rules and referees are needed, who create a good playing ground for companies, not

unlike in popular global sports like soccer.

5. Conclusion

Political CSR is addressing a serious issue in the global economy. It seems that national govern-

ments are in a weak position versus multinational companies. To solve this imbalance, political

CSR has proposed a larger moral and social role for companies in building the ethical codes of

conduct and legislation for global businesses. On a conceptual level, political CSR has chal-

lenged classical liberalism in general and its division of moral labor between business and pol-

itical responsibilities in particular.

We argue that political CSR should be redirected to take GSR and different models of a regu-

lated market economy seriously. The Rawlsian view opens up a new perspective to the globa-

lization challenge. An ethically sustainable solution is to create a proper division of moral

labor and enough background justice mechanisms to provide a more competent and public

sector, free of corruption. Redirected CSR could concentrate on issues like how to support

the development of responsible governments and smart global regulation. The promotion of

good business practices and punishment of the worst offenders are also in the interests of socially

responsible companies. Conceptually we argue that, instead of drifting towards libertarian

models where companies have oversized moral responsibility, it is more fruitful to debate

what moral and social boundary conditions are needed so that companies can concentrate on

economic value creation.

The political aims of the alternatives to the classical liberal limited conception of GSR

are very similar to the democratic and ethical aims of the political CSR movement

(Scherer and Palazzo 2007). All these alternative versions of regulated market economies

present some of the major institutions that could be used to preserve the background

justice needed for democratic deliberation (Richardson 2002, 88; Crocker 2006). Further-

more, Scherer and Palazzo (who appeal to the republican notion of society when arguing

against the classical liberal version of a regulated market economy) may welcome the fact

that the contemporary republican political philosophy seems to support the version of a regu-

lated market economy that is called a property-owning democracy (Dagger, 2006; Thomas

2012; White 2012).

Our argument – defending the idea of a regulated market economy and suggesting the

reframing of political CSR to be compatible with this idea – tries to be in line with John

Rawls’s understanding of the practical role of political philosophy as part of society’s public pol-

itical culture. According to Rawls (2001, 2), ‘one task of political philosophy – its practical role,

let’s say – is to focus on deeply disputed questions and see whether, despite appearances, some

underlying basis of philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered’.

Acknowledgements

The authors are indebted to Guest Editor Professor Matti Hayry for his insightful comments.

Funding

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Liikesivistysrahasto – The Foundation forEconomic Education, Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, The Finnish Cultural Foundation, and HelsinkiSchool of Economics Foundation.

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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Jukka Makinen, Ph.D., is Adjunct Professor (Docent) of Business Ethics at the Department of ManagementStudies, Aalto University School of Business. He approaches the political and socio-economic roles ofbusinesses in a society from the perspective of the contemporary theories of social justice. His researchhas appeared in journals such as Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, and Utilitas.

Eero Kasanen is a Professor of Finance at Aalto University and a Visiting Professor at ESADE. His currentresearch interests include banking crises, financial ethics, and university management. His research hasbeen published in Journal of Business Ethics, Accounting, Organizations and Society, and Journal ofAccounting and Economics. He has served as Rector of Helsinki School of Economics and on severalcompany boards.

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