Illicit Trade Report - World Customs Organization

Illicit TradeReport

2013PublisherWorld Customs Organization

Rue du Marché 30B-1210 BrusselsBelgium

Tel. : +32 (0)2 209 92 11Fax. : +32 (0)2 209 92 92

[email protected]

Date of publicationJune 2014

Rights and permissions:Copyright © 2014 World Customs OrganizationAll rights reserved. Requests and inquiries concerning translation, reproduction andadaptation rights should be adressed to [email protected]

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Cover photo: © Joly / PHOTONONSTOP

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CONTENTS

Foreword _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3

Introduction ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 4

Section 1. Drugs_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 9

Section 2. Environment______________________________________________________________________________________ 41

Section 3. IPR, Health and Safety _____________________________________________________________ 61

Section 4. Revenue_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 75

Section 5. Security ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 97

Bibliography_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________108

Annex. Abbreviations____________________________________________________________________________________________109

1ILLICIT TRADE REPORT 2013


FOREWORDThe 2013 edition of the WCO Illicit Trade Reportcontinues a new paradigm set last year, wherethe results of the work undertaken by the globalCustoms community to fight cross-border crimeare being released to the general public.

The toxic and corrosive nature of illicit trade andorganized transnational crime harms economicgrowth and job creation, challenges the rule oflaw, robs governments of needed revenue andthreatens human rights and quality of life, andthus requires a strong, internationally coordinatedresponse.

This Report focuses on five major areasaddressed by Customs enforcement on a dailybasis: environmental crime and illegal trade innatural resources; intellectual property infringe-ments and trade in substances that pose a threatto public health and safety; smuggling andcounterfeiting of excisable goods, such astobacco and alcohol, as well as illicit financialflows; trade in illegal drugs; and illegal trade indangerous and prohibited goods.

The Report Sections address these areas using acommon methodology: Customs seizuresrecorded in the WCO Customs EnforcementNetwork are analysed to develop trends andpatterns concerning the aforementioned areas ofenforcement. The Report also contains informationon the results of international enforcementprogrammes, projects and operations conductedin 2013 that were organized and coordinated bythe WCO, its international partners and its Memberadministrations in the five enforcement areascovered in the Report.

We are particularly pleased to note that in 2013more WCO Members reported their seizures tothe CEN than in 2012. While much work still needsto be done, this is an important step towards

shedding more light on the parallel and under-ground economy, and it serves as tangible proofof the commitment of the global enforcementcommunity to address these challenges.

Knowing the importance of high-quality inform-ation for policymakers, the WCO will continueworking with its Members to improve the qualityof seizure data, and increase its input into CEN.More complete information will allow the WCOand the Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices toprovide a better service to the global Customscommunity.

This Report will contribute to the WCO’s growingpool of knowledge that will support analysis of,and actions against illicit trade. Given that the cur-rent year has been designated as the WCO Yearof Communication, we are delighted to be able toshare with you the valuable information containedin this Report.

Kunio Mikuriya, Secretary GeneralWorld Customs Organization

4

General overviewof the Report

This Report, issued on an annual basis, serves as acollective effort to represent the current situationaround five key risk areas for Customs enforcement,namely, drugs enforcement, environment, health andsafety/IPR, security and revenue assurance. The ob-jective of this publication is to raise awareness on thecritical areas of Customs enforcement and to con-tribute to the pool of information for studying the phe-nomenon of illegal trade. Below are the five areasthat are addressed by this Report in the subsequentSections:

• Drug trafficking is the global illicit trade covering thecultivation, manufacturing, distribution and sale ofsubstances which are subject to drug prohibitionlaws.

• Environment risks in the Customs context relate tothe cross-border trafficking of endangered species,hazardous and toxic waste, and ozone-depletingsubstances, and trading in indigenous or protectedtimber, etc. These phenomena threaten sustainabledevelopment and ecological balance.

• IPR and health and safety risks in the Customs con-text relate to interdicting fake or counterfeit phar-maceuticals, other counterfeit and pirated goods,substandard items (such as electrical componentsand vehicle and aircraft spare parts) and taintedfoodstuffs etc.

• Revenue risks include commercial fraud activitiessuch as undervaluation, misuse of origin andpreferential duties, misclassification and drawbackfraud. They also include revenue leakage throughthe smuggling of highly taxed goods such astobacco, alcohol and motor spirits. This Reportfocuses on the analysis of alcohol and tobaccosmuggling, as well as tobacco products, ‘illicit whites’and counterfeit tobacco products and cigarettes.

• Security risks in the Customs context often focus onphenomena such as terrorism, proliferation ofweapons and materials of mass destruction, traf-ficking of small arms and explosives and the diver-sion of dual-use goods. This Report includes data onCustoms seizures in this area.

The analysis contained in this Report is based on thedata from the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN),which is a database of Customs seizures and offencesworldwide. Seizure data contained in CEN and usedin the Report has been entered and validated by theWCO Members and the Regional Intelligence LiaisonOffices (RILOs). Reported seizures include only thosemade by Customs, joint Customs and Police Unitsand other law enforcement agencies that haveCustoms powers.

CEN is a ‘living’ database, as data is constantly beingupdated. Therefore, figures in the current edition of theReport may differ from those taken into account in theprevious reports, and are subject to checking andconstant review. The 2013 Report includes analysis ofdata provided by Member administrations and RILOsfor the period of January to the end of December2013. Where countries have submitted their seizuredata for 2013 later than the end of February 2014, itcould not be taken into account in the current Report.

Since data submission is a voluntary process, thereare certain limitations that need to be taken intoconsideration when performing the analysis:exceptionally large seizures may have a high impacton trends and patterns; some countries provide partialdata or do not report seizures on particularcommodities. As the level of analysis is criticallydependent on the quantity and quality of submitteddata, the figures in this Report cannot suggest acomplete picture on seizures at the global level.Moreover, as enforcement powers often lie within theremit of two or three different governmental agencies,the analysis produced from data reported by theCustoms community may not represent a holistic viewon global efforts to combat illegal trade, but rather its

INTRODUCTION


part. Therefore, while data contained in the Reportserves to assess patterns and flows of illegal trade, itshould not be used as a definitive base to estimatethe overall level of crime.

Recognising these limitations, the WCO is, neverthe-less, continuously working with Members on improvingdata collection, its quality and information sharing. TheWCO developed a special application, nCEN, which iscurrently being implemented in several countries. Thistool is provided to countries that do not have their ownnational seizures database, with the aim of facilitatingdata collection and exchange.

The WCO believes that making this Report available tothe public will raise awareness on the level and scopeof Customs activities in the enforcement area, and willalso encourage Customs authorities to share data ona regular basis in order to have a better understandingof the scope of the problem of illegal trade.

RILO network -a vital resource to supportglobal Customs intelligence

The exchange of intelligence at national, regional andinternational levels is a critical mechanism in order torender enforcement actions by Customs authoritiesmore effective and to secure the optimum use ofavailable resources. At the strategic level the WCOhas incorporated the aim of intelligence exchangeamong all stakeholders, recognising the contributionthis objective has in furthering the protection ofsociety, public health and safety. Therefore, in 1987,the first RILO was established with the intent ofcreating a Global Intelligence Network.

Today the RILO network has grown to 11 officesproviding effective coverage throughout all six WCOregions1. The RILO networks are located in thefollowing territories: Eastern and Central Europe,

Western Europe, Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS), North Africa, Central Africa, West Africa,Eastern and Southern Africa, Middle East, Asia-Pacific, the Caribbean and South America.

Each RILO office covers a number of Member withinthe region concerned and is staffed by personnel fromthose affiliated Member states as well as the hostadministration where the regional office is housed. Thisprinciple of secondment of international staff within theRILO network is essential for the acceptance andoperational continuity of the RILO within each region.These regional offices operate in the interest of theiraffiliated Members, represented by National ContactPoints (NCPs), and as such, there is no hierarchy aseach participating country is equally represented inrelation to the common interests of all affiliatedMembers. In this regard, the independent nature of theRILO network enables accountability to the Head ofRILO, with mutual representation through the WCOSecretariat ensuring appropriate consultation to theWCO Enforcement Committee and Council, to whichthe RILO network reports.

The unique nature of the RILO network offers anadded layer of information exchange to the alreadyexisting intelligence exchange taking place betweenthe Secretariat and Member administrations at the“strategic” or Director-General level. In similar fashionto the WCO Secretariat, the RILO network respondsto the needs of its Members, albeit at the regional ortactical level. At this level, the RILO network also offerssupport to its Members by arranging the nominationsof NCPs within their Members as well as organisingannual regional meetings with all RILO NCPs withintheir jurisdiction.

At the operational level, the RILO network supports itsMember Customs administrations by responding torequests for intelligence or operational support,designing and implementing target-orientatedintelligence analysis projects and regional intelligence-led operations, facilitating mutual administrative

1Further informat ion on WCO regions can be found here: < http: / /www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/wco-members/membership.aspx >

INTRODUCT ION

6

assistance and promoting and maintaining regional co-operation with other law enforcement agencies andorganizations in accordance with any rules orprovisions established by the Enforcement Committeeor the Council.

Today, under this structure, the RILO network remainsan exclusive and unique Customs intelligence ex-change entity, enabling Globally Networked Customscapability, connecting Customs to Customs throughoutmost of the WCO Members and likewise representinga key component of the WCO Global Information andIntelligence Strategy.

Among the tools provided by the WCO to the RILO net-work, as well as the greater WCO Member base, arethe WCO Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) andthe WCO closed user group secure platform, CustomsEnforcement Network Communications (CENComm).The RILO network uses the CEN database to analyseseizures and develop regional intelligence productsand is responsible for verifying the data quality of CENsubmissions from their regional partners or NCPs.

This mechanism is split into three levels which operateinteractively and in a complementary manner, namely:

• At national level, the Member administrations’ NCPsgather information on seizures made from existingsources at national level, electronically input datainto the CEN or transmit the data to RILOs by fax orpost, analyse the information collected at nationallevel to ascertain new trends, produce Alerts andtransmit them to the RILOs for regional circulation,and co-operate nationally with the full gamut of en-forcement agencies or services;

• At the regional level, the RILOs study and evaluateinternational seizures, verify the accuracy of theCEN data supplied by the NCPs, prepare andcirculate Alerts and intelligence profiles, issueperiodicals or ad hoc analysis bulletins, devise,organise and support regional intelligence-basedoperations, facilitate mutual assistance and co-operation with other enforcement services andprovide technical or other assistance to NCPs;

• At the international level, the WCO Secretariat isresponsible for the central management of the CENby using, operating and maintaining the system as a

global information and intelligence tool for the RILOnetwork it periodically conducts global strategic andtactical analyses based on information available in theCEN, circulates a summary of its analyses in itsannual reports, offers training and technicalassistance to the RILOs and their Members, andshares strategic information with other internationalorganisations engaged in combating organised crime.

The RILO network is a premier user of the CENcommplatform. As a multi-regional Intelligence and Informationexchange network, the RILOs are actively involved inseveral ongoing projects and operations organised bythe Secretariat, WCO Members or individual RILOteams. By taking an active role throughout hundreds ofoperations over the years, the RILO network remains asteadfast WCO strategic intelligence capability in theglobal Customs goal of identifying, disrupting and dis-mantling trans-national criminal organizations.

CEN - a unique toolkitto assist Customsin the fight against illegal trade

The WCO dedicated 2013 to the promotion ofinnovation, notably in the development of its tools andinstruments. The CEN includes three standaloneapplications created especially for the Customscommunity, compatible and complimentary in nature,providing the latest technology as well as analyticalabilities to successfully meet the challengesassociated with the fight against illegal trade.

Analysis

andproduction

Processing and exploitation

Diss

emina

tionRequirements

Planning anddirection

Collection

Activecollaboration

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INTRODUCT IONINTRODUCT ION

ILLICIT TRADE REPORT 2013

platform, an operational tool created to enable theexchange and diffusion of information in a secureenvironment, especially in an operational context whentime is of the essence, remains the most popularapplication in the CEN suite. Accessible to Customsofficers as well as other law enforcement agencies, itallows members of a closed user group to exchangeinformation in a standardised manner through the useof templates available in the system. One of thefunctionalities of the system allows for the extractionof pertinent data for analytical purposes and/or for thetransfer of this data to the global CEN database, thusenhancing an active collaboration across the entireborder sector.

As the WCO decides to promote communicationamongst its Members in 2014, the information-sharingattributes of the CEN applications place them at theheart of this new campaign.

nCENCountry A

nCENCountry A

WCO CEN

nCENCountry A

nCENCountry B

Icomm

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/Icom

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m

NN

EN nCEN

WCO CEN

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WCO CEN

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/Icom

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AnalysisMor

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For Customs administrations having to performselective and targeted controls, intelligence is a vitalelement of enforcement. Valuable from the first stepsof the intelligence cycle, the CEN application allowsall WCO Members to access a critical mass ofinformation for analysis of illicit trafficking in thevarious areas of Customs’ competence, which iscrucial in terms of defining strategies, preparing riskindicators and identifying trends on a regional, as wellas global level. This global intelligence can in turn beutilised for further profiling in local databases.

The success of the CEN rests squarely on its ability tofunction as a vital enforcement resource. This is onlypossible if WCO Members regularly provide valuableinformation relating to their seizures and any relevantpictures, as the quality of the final intelligence de-pends solely on the quality of the data provided.Amassing pertinent information which can be utilisedfor producing reliable intelligence will ultimatelystrengthen the network, making it an enviableCustoms resource for all users.

Despite progress with the introduction of modernoperational techniques, analytical use of availableCustoms data in most countries remains low, especiallyin enhancing risk management approaches. SomeCustoms administrations have attributed this to theminimal data-mining capabilities of existing applications.In response, the national Customs EnforcementNetwork (nCEN) application was created to giveCustoms administrations the ability to collect, store,analyse and disseminate law-enforcement dataeffectively at the national level in order to establishrobust intelligence capabilities, and enhance profiling ona strategic, tactical and operational level – including riskmapping of commodities, routes and traders most proneto Customs tax evasion.

Although the primary goal of the nCEN is to function asa centralised database, the application assists ininformation sharing and thus in boosting cooperationbetween Customs administrations at a regional orinternational level. Additionally, the inbuilt InformationCommunication Interface (Icomm) allows for thetransfer of data to the global CEN database, thussupporting the process of global intelligence gathering.

Information sharing is a fundamental part of the activecollaboration to combat illegal trade. The CENcomm

This situation can be explained in part by the late entryof data into the CEN by these countries, and in anyevent after the cut-off date for uploading data to con-duct this analysis, set at 25 March 2013. Any infor-mation received after that date was not taken intoconsideration for this analysis.

As for the working method concerning the units takeninto consideration, the same harmonisation approachfor data analysis as last year was adopted. To that

INTRODUCTION

Compared with reference years of 2011-2012, theyear of 2013 was marked by a slight increase in thenumber of countries that had supplied data to CENdatabase (114 in total).

Some countries which featured in the 2011-2012statistics are no longer included in this analysis and,conversely, new countries have contributed andhave been taken into consideration for the 2012-2013 reference period.

SECTION 1. DRUGSFor the period covering 2012-2013, a total of 120 Members reported seizures in the WCO’s CENdatabase, with the information relating to seizures aimed at combating trafficking in narcotics andpsychotropic substances. This information was largely authenticated by the RILOs as well as bythe WCO Secretariat’s CEN Team as regards information received from Members not yet affiliatedto a RILO. The CEN data received from these 120 Members served as the basis for carrying outthe analysIs contained in this Section.

Cocaine, weapons, ammunition and cash seized by French CustomsPhoto courtesy of French Customs


GLOBAL OVERVIEW

The number of seizures relating to narcotics orpsychotropic substances input into the CEN in 2013involved a total of 51,381 cases and was consequentlysignificantly higher than for 2012, when this total stoodat 43,771 cases (see Table 1). This increase in theregion of 17 per cent is indicative of the clearcommitment by Customs services to combat drugtrafficking more effectively, enhanced by a greaterunderstanding of control techniques. In addition, thevarious projects and operations carried out during2013 substantially boosted this figure due to theexcellent results obtained.

However, this rise in seizures also reflects the reality ofcriminal organizations’ commitment to pursue theproduction and trafficking of narcotics and psychotropicsubstances, for which the diversification of the deliveryroutes and the innovative products coming on themarket are genuine causes for concern and requireconstant vigilance and adaptation by the inspectionservices.

An increase in seizures was particularly noted forcannabis, khat, psychotropic substances and cocaine,in varying proportions. The trend tended to bedownward for opiates. In addition, new forms of drugsflooding the markets pose major problems ofidentification and interception for enforcement agencies,especially as they are primarily traded via the Internetand conveyed by postal or express mail services. Theextremely different legal provisions from one country toanother also make the task of the inspection serviceseven more complicated.

Table 1. Number of seizures by drug category

Category Number of Number ofseizures seizuresin 2012 in 2013

Cannabis 16,902 18,778Khat 11,103 15,253Psychotropic drugs 6,978 8,991Cocaine 6,244 6,296Opiates 2,324 2,016Other 220 47Total 43,771 51,381

10

end, all amounts of tablets were converted into kilo-grams (kg) by using the conversion rate of one gramfor three tablets. The same applies to seizures re-ported in ampoules, capsules, units, etc. which havealso been converted into kg.

With regard to thresholds, all seizures entered into theCEN database were taken into consideration withoutsetting any threshold.

The analyses and trends emerging from this Reportare only as credible as the information from which theyhave been drawn. It is therefore important to stressthat considerable care is needed when reachingconclusions, given that exceptionally large seizuresmight boost the results of the analysis and that someMembers have only provided partial data.

The 2013 Drugs Section is divided into two mainparts. The first part gives an overview of the majordrug types intercepted worldwide and the key trendsnoted by Members. The second part presents specialitems, with particular emphasis on initiatives, projectsand operations initiated or co-ordinated by the WCOSecretariat in its Members’ interest.

Seizure of a large quantity of cocaine by Mexican CustomsPhotos courtesy of Mexican Customs

Table 2. Total number of seizures by region

Region Number of Number ofseizures seizuresin 2012 in 2013

North America 29,712 35,943Western Europe 7,968 9,033Asia-Pacific 2,372 1,864Middle East 1,097 1,625CIS 1,318 1,258South America 546 809Eastern and Central Europe 486 477West Africa 142 200North Africa 87 75Eastern and Southern Africa 20 62Central Africa 11 28Caribbean - 5Total 43,771 51,381

Table 3. Quantity seized by drug category

Category Quantity Quantity(kg) (kg)

in 2012 in 2013Cannabis 1,539,637 1,581,948Psychotropic drugs 435,958 385,368Khat 115,511 168,867Opiates 9,484 93,325Cocaine 119,253 80,996Other 3,086 90Total 2,222,929 2,310,594


DRUGS

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2013). The use of this means of transport is a realcause for concern and merits closer scrutiny by theenforcement services given that it is most often linkedto psychotropic substances, as clearly illustrated bythe statistics based on the years 2012/2013. Indeed,28 per cent of psychotropic substances are conveyedby this means of transport, followed by khat for whichfreight remained the predominant conveyance. Mailwas also one of three conveyances in which allcategories of drugs in circulation featured in 2013. It isworth mentioning that the "Unknown" and "Other"headings constituted very high percentages and limitthe quality of this analysis.

Except for these cases for which there is no informa-tion on the means of transport used, transport by roadvehicle, which follows postal traffic, remained the con-veyance of choice for cannabis delivery.

Transport by air followed the first two conveyancesmentioned, predominantly for cocaine. The use of airtransport is due in part to the geographical location ofthe production zones for this category of drug.

As clearly shown in Table 2, when listing the totalnumber of seizures by region, in comparison with2012, 2013 saw a substantial increase in the numberof interceptions input into the CEN by North America,Western Europe, the Middle East, South America,West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa and CentralAfrica, when compared with 2012. In contrast, therewas a sharp drop in the number of interceptions inputinto the CEN database by Asia-Pacific and Easternand Central Europe.

A review of the data contained in Table 3 shows thatthe upward trend noted in the total number of seizuresmade worldwide was also reflected in the quantitiesintercepted. In fact, there was an increase from2,222,929 kg reported in 2012 to 2,310,594 kg re-ported in 2013. This quantitative rise was slightly no-ticeable for cannabis, much more pronounced for khatand also greatly in evidence as regards opiates forwhich, paradoxically, the number of seizures fell overthe same period. In contrast, there was a substantialdecline in the quantities of cocaine seized, despite asharp rise in terms of the number of seizures made.The results obtained for psychotropic substances mir-rored the trend noted for cocaine.

The order of the means of transport used in 2012 wasreplicated in 2013, with a single difference (see Table4). In this connection, the postal and express mailsector far outstripped all other means of transport (41per cent of total seizures in 2012 and 45 per cent in

Transport by pedestrians was the last conveyance tohave recorded in excess of 2 tonnes of narcotics andrelated more specifically to cannabis and psychotropicsubstances.

Finally, transport by rail and by vessel brought up therear and related more specifically to cannabis (train)and cocaine (boat).

To conclude, bearing in mind certain criteria such asthe relationship between the production and con-sumption zones, drugs are linked to means of trans-port primarily chosen and used in an attempt tocircumvent the watchfulness of enforcement services.Knowledge of the transport sectors must neverthelessbe correlated with other criteria to ensure that drugsare intercepted.

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Table 4. Number of seizures by drug category and by means of transport

2012Cannabis Cocaine Khat Opiates Other Psychotropic drugs Total

Mail 1,523 1,949 10,410 744 210 3,197 18,033Unknown 8,733 257 2 152 - 386 9,530Vehicle 4,811 828 210 500 4 1,456 7,809Air 442 2,800 361 587 5 789 4,984Pedestrian 809 82 - 244 - 919 2,054Rail 335 75 72 62 - 77 621Vessel 124 238 4 25 - 126 517Other 125 15 44 10 1 28 223Total 16,902 6,244 11,103 2,324 220 6,978 43,771

2013Cannabis Cocaine Khat Opiates Other Psychotropic drugs Total

Mail 1,503 2,008 14,144 630 42 5,082 23,409Unknown 9,528 260 16 92 - 328 10,224Vehicle 4,903 813 204 565 3 1,707 8,195Air 1,230 2,764 840 362 - 844 6,040Pedestrian 883 44 9 295 - 806 2,037Rail 418 73 15 50 2 84 642Vessel 108 304 1 15 - 91 519Other 205 30 24 7 - 49 315Total 18,778 6,296 15,253 2,016 47 8,991 51,381

OVERVIEW BY CATEGORY

Opiates

In 2013, approximately 75 Members entered data onopiate seizures into the CEN, i.e. 10 more countriesthan in 2012. Table 5 shows the number of seizuresand quantities of products seized in the opiatescategory over the 2012/2013 period by region.

The year 2013 saw a substantial fall in the number ofseizures involving opiates (14%). From a quantitativeperspective, the huge increase noted in 2013 was en-tirely due to exceptional seizures of poppy straw madein Pakistan. The total amount of poppy straw seizedfrom lorries intercepted within Pakistani territory incities such as Karachi, Sukkur or Faisalabad wasmore than 80 tonnes.

As a result, the total quantity of traditional opiate prod-ucts such as heroin, opium, morphine or codeine wasapproximately ten tonnes, similar to the quantityseized in 2012.

Having taken this fact into consideration, it would ap-pear that in quantitative terms, the Eastern andCentral Europe, the Middle East and the United Statesproduced much higher figures than in 2013. In con-trast, the figures for the Western Europe, theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and theEastern and Southern Africa were substantially lowerfor 2013.

13

DRUGS


Heroin seizuresThe number of heroin seizures fell substantially in2013, going from 1,696 cases reported in 2012 to only1,316 cases reported in 2013.

In contrast, the quantity seized rose from 6,203 kg in2012 to 6,423 kg in 2013, an increase of approxi-mately 4 per cent.

It transpires from Chart 1, listing the top 10 countrieshaving seized more than 100 kg of heroin in 2013, thatthe United States, with 550 interceptions totalling2,730 kg, was well ahead of Turkey with four

Table 5. Number of seizures and quantity ofopiates seized by region

2012 2013Region Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Asia-Pacific 383 1,148 254 84,729North America (USA) 984 3,290 943 4,966Eastern and 81 1046 55 1,831Central EuropeWestern Europe 503 1,562 412 1,238CIS 279 2,075 290 335Middle East 79 78 43 199Eastern and 5 223 13 14Southern AfricaCentral Africa 3 7 3 8North Africa - - 1 3South America 2 8 1 1West Africa 5 48 1 0Total 2,324 9,484 2,016 93,325

Seizure of 10 kg of heroin, concealed in a structure of a car, by Serbian CustomsPhoto courtesy of Serbian Customs

interceptions totalling 1,436 kg, the Netherlands with25 interceptions totalling 302 kg and Sri Lanka whichfeatured for the first time in the listings with aninterception amounting to 261 kg of heroin.

France, Germany and Pakistan were among thecountries having already excelled with seizures in ex-cess of 100 kg in 2012, whereas Italy, Bulgaria andGeorgia featured in 2013 despite not being included inthe 2012 listings.

As for the number of seizures made in 2013, the ma-jority of heroin consignments were transported over-land (33%), followed by air (passengers and airfreight - 24%), and post and express mail (20%).

With regard to the place of consignment and/or origin ofthe heroin seized in 2013, Turkey (32 seizures totalling1,650 kg), followed by Mexico (324 seizures totalling1,638 kg), Pakistan (71 seizures totalling 671 kg), India(184 seizures totalling 185 kg), Iran (30 seizurestotalling 155 kg), the Netherlands (67 seizures totalling151 kg) and Greece (7 seizures totalling 113 kg),appeared in the routings as departure countries.

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Number of seizures by country (Top 10)

2012 2013

Quantity seized (kg) by country (Top 10)

2012 2013

Chart 1. Top 10 reporting countries: number of seizures and quantities of heroin

� United States 652

� Germany 189

� China 156

� Russia 82

� France 72

� Pakistan 56

� Bangladesh 47

� Hong Kong, China 39

� Italy 36

� Saudi Arabia 30

Total (out of 10) 1,359

� United States 550

� Germany 152

� China 70

� Russia 63

� France 63

� Italy 57

� Bangladesh 48

� Pakistan 39

� Azerbaijan 29

� Netherlands 25


� United States 2,042

� Turkey 674

� France 579

� Pakistan 473

� Germany 367

� China 201

� Austria 186

� Australia 140

� United Arab Emirates 124

� Russia 116



� Turkey 1,436

� Netherlands 302

� Sri Lanka 261

� France 219

� Italy 205

� Bulgaria 179

� Georgia 117

� Germany 107

� Pakistan 86


Seizure of 104 kg of heroin in a car, byLatvian Customs

Photos courtesy of Latvian Customs

(19 seizures; 26 kg), China (11 seizures; 43 kg),Turkey (10 seizures; 250 kg), Pakistan (eight seizures;88 kg), the Netherlands (three seizures; 690 kg) andAzerbaijan (two seizures; 80 kg), appeared in theroutings as departure countries for the opiumshipments intercepted.

Cocaine

An analysis of the Table 6 showing worldwide cocaineseizures reveals that the number of seizuresremained relatively stable between 2012 and 2013.

15

DRUGS


Opium seizuresOpium, the second typical component in the opiatescategory, featured 298 times in the CEN database in2013, compared with 277 seizures reported in 2012.

In contrast, the quantities intercepted were downsharply in 2013 (1,726 kg) as against the 4,576 kg ofproducts seized in 2012.

As was already the case over the three precedingyears, approximately 70 per cent of the total quantitiesof opium seized throughout the world were reportedby the United States.

Three other countries made opium seizures amountingto an overall quantity in excess of 80 kg in 2013, thosebeing Germany with 25 seizures totalling 266 kg,Pakistan with seven seizures totalling 84 kg andGeorgia with one seizure totalling 80 kg of opium.

Approximately 70 per cent of seizures (mainly thosemade in the United States), relating to around 40 percent of the quantities intercepted, were made in thepostal and express mail sector.

Some 10 per cent of seizures (mainly those made inEurope), relating to 25 per cent of the quantitiesintercepted, were made in road transport.

In terms of the place of consignment and/or origin ofthe opium seized in 2013, the United Kingdom (61seizures; 142 kg), followed by the Lao People’sDemocratic Republic (58 seizures; 171 kg), Iran (47seizures; 30 kg), Thailand (35 seizures; 105 kg), India

15 kg of opium seized by Tajikistan Customs, from a passenger travelling from AfghanistanPhotos courtesy of the Russian Federation and Tajikistan Customs

Table 6. Number of seizures and quantity ofcocaine seized by region


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Western Europe 3,437 19,441 3,461 34,606North America 2,134 26,739 1,979 24,215South America 410 71,303 578 20,493Asia-Pacific 152 1,170 89 1,014CIS 26 36 21 166West Africa 24 120 34 145Caribbean 5 132Middle East 15 144 35 64Eastern and 6 11 33 61Southern AfricaEastern and 33 264 39 57Central EuropeCentral Africa 6 22 19 33North Africa 1 3 1 1Total 6,244 119,253 6,296 80,996

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However, as regards the quantities of cocaineintercepted, 2013 saw a substantial fall of 30 per centin comparison with 2012.

Although there was relative stability when comparingthe two reference years for North America (24 tonnesagainst 26 tonnes in 2012) and Asia-Pacific(approximately one tonne for each of the two years), avery sharp increase was nevertheless noted in thequantities intercepted by the countries of WesternEurope (34 tonnes in 2013, as against 19 tonnes in2012). An extremely significant fall in the quantitiesseized in South America was also noted (20 tonnes in2013 against more than 71 tonnes in 2012), influencedby some exceptional seizures made by the ContainerControl Programme Joint Port Control Units in 2012.

Besides these four regions which together accountedfor 99 per cent of the total quantity of cocaine seizedworldwide, it is worth stressing there were increases inthe quantities of cocaine intercepted by the CIS, WestAfrica, Eastern and Southern Africa and Central Africa.

It goes without saying that the two main markets forcocaine consumption (final destination of the seizures)were, as has been the case for some years now,Western Europe and North America (approximately 80per cent of the quantities intercepted).

Regarding the means of transport used for cocainetrafficking with respect to the number of seizuresnoted, air transport and the postal and express mailsector accounted for 75 per cent of the total interven-tions in both 2012 and 2013, followed by road transportand sea transport which together accounted for 18 percent of the total interventions, with other means oftransport only featuring to a small extent (see Table 7).

The figures were completely different in quantitativeterms, with vessels remaining the most widely usedmeans of transport for cocaine trafficking. Althoughconsignments transported by sea accounted for just5 per cent of the seizures made in 2013, they never-theless constituted in excess of 66 per cent of the totalquantity of products intercepted worldwide. Transportby sea obviously encompasses commercial vessels,fishing boats, yachts and shipping containers. Theconcealment methods used are often sophisticated(specially contrived hiding places on boats, false bot-toms of containers, fruits or vegetables hollowed outand repackaged, etc.), with the value of cocaineseizures in this sector often amounting to tens of mil-lions of euro per shipment.

Road transport also remains a "safe bet" for trans-porting cocaine. Although the number of seizuresmade in this sector remained relatively stable in 2012and 2013, the amounts seized fell in 2013, decreasingfrom 24 tonnes (2012) to a mere 11 tonnes.

Panama Customs seized 200 kg of cocaine in Balboa, concealed in the false bottom of a shipping containerPhotos courtesy of Panama Customs

Table 7. Number of seizures and quantity ofcocaine by means of transport


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Vessel 238 62,268 304 53,587Vehicle 828 24,008 813 11,001Air 2,800 19,264 2,764 6,206Unknown 257 5,121 260 3,790Other 15 2,511 30 3,330Mail 1,949 5,847 2,008 2,978Rail 75 48 73 57Pedestrian 82 185 44 46Total 6,244 119,253 6,296 80,996


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The air passenger sector continues to play an impor-tant role in cocaine trafficking (see the results ofOperations Cocair IV and Westerlies 2 in the secondpart of this Drugs Section). This method is primarilyused in countries involved in the redistribution of co-caine (particularly African and Caribbean countries).Criminals operating in this sector display unbridledimagination when it comes to concealment methods.In addition to targeting and profiling techniques,Customs services often make use of technical aidssuch as X-ray machines or detector dogs to boosttheir performance.

Finally, postal and express mail form extremely sensi-tive trafficking channels which are difficult to managefrom a Customs perspective. With 2,000 interceptionsin 2013 involving a total of approximately three tonnesof products, an average constitutes around 3 kg perinterception which is by no means a small amount.Operation Sky-Net, carried out by the WCO in 2012in co-operation with the Chinese Customs, demon-strated the potential of this means of transport for traf-ficking narcotics and precursor chemicals.

Number of seizures by country (Top 10)

2012 2013

Quantity seized (kg) by country (Top 10)

2012 2013

Chart 2. Top 10 reporting countries: number of seizures and quantities of cocaine


� Netherlands 1,031

� Spain 728

� Germany 571

� France 336

� Italy 270

� Argentina 233

� Venezuela 141

� Switzerland 135

� Portugal 135




� Spain 643

� Germany 559

� France 338

� Argentina 254

� Italy 204

� Brazil 198

� Portugal 142

� France 116


� Venezuela 67,667


� Spain 6,627


� Italy 3,189

� Argentina 2,462

� Portugal 1,781

� France 1,108

� Germany 830

� Hong Kong, China 717



� Spain 14,458


� Ecuador 12,095

� Venezuela 3,469

� Italy 2,427

� Brazil 2,178

� Portugal 1,685

� Uruguay 1,630

� Panama 1,542


Top 10 countries for cocaine seizuresIt is worth noting that the top 10 countries having madethe greatest number of cocaine seizures in 2013include five countries in the two consumption regions(North America and Western Europe) and five countriesfrom the "source region" for this category of drug.

In terms of the number of seizures made in 2012 and2013, same countries featured with a single difference,and the total number of interceptions made by these top10 countries remained relatively stable (see Chart 2).

However, the situation was quite different with respectto the quantities. Firstly, a sharp 30 per cent fall notedin 2013 relative to 2012 can also be seen in the tablelisting the top 10 countries. In addition, Argentina,France, Germany and Hong Kong, China which wereincluded in the top 10 countries in 2012 no longer fea-tured therein in 2013, having been replaced byEcuador, Brazil, Uruguay and Panama.

Turning to the United States, 2013 saw a fall of ap-proximately 10 per cent in the number of seizures re-ported in comparison with 2012 and a fall ofapproximately 20 per cent in the quantities of cocaine

18

intercepted. However, Mexico continued to be themain country of consignment for cocaine interceptedin the United States.

Spain and the Netherlands excelled in 2013 byreporting quantitative results up by over 200 per centand 300 per cent respectively. These extremelypositive results were influenced by a number ofexceptional seizures made in these two countriesduring 2013. On 17 July 2013, Spanish Customsseized 3.3 tonnes of cocaine from a vessel on the highseas, while on 14 October 2013, NetherlandsCustoms officers seized 1,031 kg of cocaine in seafreight at the Port of Amsterdam. The shipment arrivedfrom Colombia.

Despite the substantial fall in the quantities of cocaineintercepted in 2013, the number of exceptionalseizures remained relatively high. As it happens, 24cocaine seizures were in excess of 500 kg and 12 inexcess of one tonne.

60 kg of cocaine were discovered inside a passenger's baggage at Hong Kong International Airport (itinerary: Brazil -China -Hong Kong, China)

Photos courtesy of Hong Kong Customs

US and Colombian authorities seized 1.7 tonnes of cocaineon a "Go-fast" boat

Photo courtesy of the US CBP


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It goes without saying that, in keeping with the resultsachieved in 2011, 2012 and 2013, the United Statesunquestionably remained the most effective countryin terms of herbal cannabis seizures. With a total of1,301 tonnes of products seized in 2013, out of a total

Cannabis

Cannabis is still the most readily available and widelyused drug throughout the world. Its production re-mains global in scale given that the climate in the ma-jority of regions is conducive for its cultivation.

In countries where climate is not favourable to growingcannabis (mainly countries in the Northern hemisphere),indoor and hydroponic cultivation are practiced. Thesealso result in products with far higher than averagelevels of tetra hydro cannabinol (THC).

Around a hundred Members input data relating tocannabis seizures in 2013.

It can be seen from Chart 3 showing the total numberof cannabis seizures broken down into herbalcannabis and cannabis resin, as well as the totalquantity of products intercepted in 2012 and 2013, thatthe breakdown was proportionally very similar both interms of the number of seizures and the quantitiesseized: around 2,000 seizures relating to cannabisresin (per year) amounting to a total of approximately200 tonnes, and around 15,000 seizures relating toherbal cannabis (per year) amounting to a total ofapproximately 1,400 tonnes.

With regard to herbal cannabis, not only the numberof seizures but also the quantities intercepted in-creased substantially in 2013 compared with the pre-vious year.

Table 8 shows the number of herbal cannabis seizuresand the quantities intercepted in 2012 and 2013 (top10 countries).

7.6 tonnes of cannabis resin, transported in an articulated lorry from Spain and concealed behind crates containing foodstuffs,were seized by French Customs

Photos courtesy of French Customs

Chart 3. Number of seizures and quantity of herbalcannabis and resin seized

1,35

9,00

4

1,40

7,46

7

212,

388

14,6

98

16,3

60

2,02

4

1,96

6 181,

234

Herbal cannabis

Num

bero

fsei

zure

s

Qua

ntity

(kg)

Num

bero

fsei

zure

s

Qua

ntity

(kg)

Cannabis resin

2012 2013

20

products having left that country and intended almostexclusively for the United States, following by India (21tonnes), Ghana (20 tonnes) and Albania (nine tonnes).

Three exceptional seizures made in 2013 are worthmentioning. The first was an interception by the UnitedStates on 25 July 2013 at Calexico, at the land borderwith Mexico. United States Customs and BorderProtection (US CBP) officers seized 15,990 kg ofherbal cannabis concealed in an articulated lorry com-ing from Mexico.

The second seizure was made on 23 July 2013 byIndian Customs at Siliguri, within that country’s territory.It involved 4,088 kg of herbal cannabis discoveredamong a lorry’s load.

The third seizure was made on 23 July 2013 byBurkinabe Customs officers at Bobo-Dioulasso, withinthe territory. The interception involved 1,160 kg ofherbal cannabis transported on bicycles which hadcome from Ghana and were bound for Mali.

Turning to cannabis resin, not only the number of in-terceptions but also the quantities seized fell sub-stantially in 2013 in comparison with the previousyear. This fall was in the region of 5 per cent for thenumber of interceptions made, and 15 per cent for thetotal quantity of cannabis seized in 2013.

It goes without saying that, in keeping with the resultsachieved over the past decade, Spain unquestionablyremained the most effective country in terms ofcannabis resin seizures. With a total of 125 tonnes ofproducts seized in 2013 (an increase in excess of 15

of 1,377 tonnes across all countries, the United Statesaccounted for more than 94 per cent of the totalquantities input into the CEN worldwide.

Most of the seizures were made within United Statesterritory and, as was the case in previous years, themajority of the shipments came from Mexico.

The countries which stood out in 2013 by seizing inexcess of 2.5 tonnes of herbal cannabis feature in thetop 10. Spain, India, Malawi and Poland were not in-cluded among the leaders in 2012. Burkina Faso,Bangladesh, Argentina, Italy and Albania demon-strated consistency as regards the results achievedfor this category of drug.

As for the source countries featured in the CEN data-base, Mexico was the clear leader with 202 tonnes of

Table 8. Top 10 reporting countries: number ofseizures and quantity of herbal cannabis

2012 2013Country Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (kg) seizures (kg)United States 12,823 1,266,376 13,057 1,301,414Spain 11 1,179 9 17,486Burkina Faso 45 10,705 56 15,336Bangladesh 213 9,967 267 10,941India 1 3,012 6 10,270Argentina 61 32,766 74 5,919Italy 196 5,215 1,635 4,934Albania 40 7,508 55 4,452Malawi 0 0 2 3,440Poland 36 188 32 2,771Total (out of 10) 13,426 1,336,916 15,193 1,376,963

30 kg of cannabis resin, concealed under the carpet of a car, seized by Serbian CustomsPhotos courtesy of Serbian Customs


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For 2013, three exceptional seizures illustrating theoutstanding work carried out by the WCO Memberstook place. The first was an interception of 16.5tonnes of cannabis resin on 17 December 2013 byMoroccan Customs at the Port of Agadir. The prod-ucts were concealed in a container of tomatoes boundfor the Netherlands.

The second seizure was made on 31 May 2013 bySpanish Customs at sea, on board of a boat boundfor Malaga. The interception involved 16 tonnes ofcannabis resin hidden on board of the vessel.

The third seizure was reported by French Customsand took place on 25 April 2013 at the French-Spanishborder post at Biriatou. It related to 5,5 tonnes ofcannabis resin concealed in an articulated lorrycoming from Spain and bound for the Netherlands.

per cent over 2012), out of a total of 181 tonnesacross all countries, Spain accounted for 70 per centof the overall quantities input into the CEN worldwide.

The countries which stood out in 2013 by seizing morethan 500 kg of cannabis resin feature in the Table 9.Morocco and Germany demonstrated consistency asregards the results achieved in comparison with 2012.Mozambique featured with a single seizure in 2013,but involving a quantity in excess of five tonnes.France excelled through its significant progress (16.5tonnes) in 2013, in comparison with 2012 (10.9 tonnes).All the other countries, namely the Netherlands,Lithuania, Pakistan, Norway and Yemen, witnessed asubstantial reduction in 2013 compared with 2012.

Morocco undoubtedly remained the reference sourcecountry for cannabis in 2013, given that 135 tonnes ofthis product came from that country. Only one tonnecame from Pakistan, another source country forcannabis resin.

Spain also featured in the routes as a country ofconsignment for a total of 31.7 tonnes of product, butactually served more as a redistribution country forcannabis.

Overland transport (lorries, vans, buses, private vehi-cles) clearly remained the preferred delivery method,accounting for 48 per cent of the seizures made, fol-lowed by air transport (passengers and luggage: 44per cent) and, to a lesser degree, sea transport eventhough the quantities intercepted in this last methodof transport were very high.

Table 9. Top 10 reporting countries: number ofseizures and quantity of cannabis resin


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Spain 1,345 105,570 1,197 125,930Morocco 85 24,299 70 25,074France 84 10,971 98 16,574Mozambique - - 1 5,283Netherlands 12 203 7 1,566Lithuania 1 412 3 1,037Pakistan 22 9,754 8 968Norway 26 1,018 29 646Yemen 33 2,279 9 586Germany 44 597 38 577Total (out of 10) 1,652 155,103 1,460 178,241

Seizure of a large quantity of marijuana in a light aircraft by theUS CBP

Photo courtesy of the US CBP

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2013 having relative stability in terms of the countriesfeatured therein, with one exception (Hong Kong,China) which was included in the top 10 in 2012 andreplaced by the Netherlands in 2013. The latter countryrecently changed its legislation and has now includedkhat in the list of substances prohibited on its territory.

It is worth stressing that the number of seizuresinvolving khat grew by over 30 per cent between 2012and 2013 and the quantities intercepted increased byover 40 per cent during the same period, totalling over168 tonnes of products intercepted by Customsthroughout the world.

The countries which witnessed the biggest increaseover the period were: the United States, going from56 tonnes to 80 tonnes of products intercepted,France, going from 2.6 tonnes to over 34 tonnes,Norway, going from 6 tonnes to 12 tonnes, and theNetherlands which featured for the first time in

Khat

Khat is a shrub of the Celastraceae family whichoriginated in Ethiopia and whose cultivation spread toArabia (particularly Yemen) around the 15th century. Itis consumed by the people of those regions, who chewthe leaves slowly for their stimulant and euphoriceffects which are comparable to amphetamine.

The legal status of khat is not uniform throughout thecountries, especially in Europe where it is only illegalin a little over half the European Union Member States.

Khat is legally imported into some countries (chiefly, butnot solely, the United Kingdom), whereas secondarydistribution takes place mainly to Scandinavia and theUnited States.

A review of the Tables 10 and 11 listing the top tencountries having made the most seizures in 2012 and

Fresh khat, transported in a passenger's hand luggage, seized by US CBPPhotos courtesy of the US CBP

Table 10. Top 10 reporting countries: number ofseizures and quantity of khat seized in 2012

Country Number Quantityof seizures (kg)

United States 10,516 56,523Germany 87 27,734Sweden 118 9,500Denmark 32 7,609Norway 122 6,350France 43 2,612Italy 27 1,603Switzerland 22 1,525Hong Kong, China 10 1,095Finland 16 415Total (out of 10) 10,993 114,965

Table 11. Top 10 reporting countries: number ofseizures and quantity of khat seized in 2013

Country Number Quantityof seizures (kg)

United States 13,995 80,158France 60 34,214Germany 55 14,762Norway 191 12,097Netherlands 302 8,944Denmark 65 7,546Sweden 49 5,770Switzerland 44 1,865Italy 31 1,727Finland 24 871Total (out of 10) 14,816 167,955

Table 13. Number of seizures and quantity ofpsychotropic substances seized by region


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Asia-Pacific 1,402 386,885 1,178 343,302North America (USA) 3,024 35,966 5,582 16,465Middle East 608 9,479 713 13,304West Africa 9 47 12 8,389Western Europe 1,214 3,122 919 3,051Eastern and 139 206 116 364Central EuropeNorth Africa 1 0 2 269Central Africa 2 2 5 118CIS 571 232 444 74South America 7 11 19 29Eastern and 1 9 1 2Southern AfricaTotal 6,978 435,958 8,991 385,368


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Psychotropic substances

A review of the Table 13 shows that the quantities ofpsychotropic substances intercepted in 2013 fellconsiderably in comparison with 2012, whereas thenumber of interceptions made increased by over 2,000cases in comparison with the previous year. Despitethis fall in quantities, psychotropic substances remainan evolving threat with respect to new products andespecially their delivery method, as described in thegeneral introduction to this Report. The detailed studyof these products will build on the major current trendsin order to enlighten the border services, which have toestablish innovative strategies to curb this illegal trade.

According to the obtained information (Table 13), themost active regions in the fight against psychotropicsubstances remain, in descending order, Asia-Pacific,North America, Middle East, West Africa, WesternEurope, Eastern and Central Europe, North Africa andCentral Africa which together accounted for quantitiesranging from over 100 kg to five tonnes. The otherregions reported quantities under 100 kg. Despite thegeneralised decline in quantities, it is nevertheless worthnoting the strong growth shown by the West Africaregion which went from 47 kg in 2012 to eight tonnes in2013. This upward trend was also maintained by theMiddle East region which achieved a positive varianceof 40 per cent over the two years, and also by the

statistics with 302 interceptions involving a total of 8.9tonnes of khat.

In terms of the number of seizures made in 2013, inkeeping with the data recorded for 2012 and with tinyvariations, the vast majority of khat consignmentswere sent by postal and express mail (over 92% of theproducts intercepted) followed by air freight (5%) androad transport (2%), other conveyances only playinga minor role (see Table 12).

The main reason for the predominance of postal andexpress mail is the fact that khat is a product that needsto be consumed while fresh. Almost all the khat seizedin the United States used this means of transport.

With respect to the quantities of khat intercepted,nearly all the 2012 trends were repeated in 2013, witha few nuances, i.e. the postal and express mail sectorfor 50 per cent of the products intercepted, followed byroad transport (41%), air transport (passengers andair freight combined: 7%) and rail transport (1.5%).

The significance of road transport (41%) in terms ofthe quantity of products intercepted is essentially dueto the fact that in Europe, the redistribution of khatconsignments to Northern Europe is primarily carriedout by road.

Table 12. Number of seizures of khat seized bymeans of transport

2012 2013Conveyance Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Mail 10,410 51,878 14,144 84,649Vehicle 210 46,762 204 69,008Air 361 10,431 840 12,847Other 44 400 24 1,545Rail 72 2,975 15 544Unknown 2 71 16 247Vessel 4 2,994 1 23Pedestrian - - 9 3Total 11,103 115,511 15,253 168,867

Table 14. Number of seizures and quantity ofpsychotropic substances seized by meansof transport

2012 2013Conveyance Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Pedestrian 919 354,183 806 334,021Vehicle 1,456 44,637 1,707 26,822Other 28 1,118 49 9,712Mail 3,197 6,872 5,082 6,241Vessel 126 1,796 91 3,830Air 789 2,760 844 2,325Unknown 386 24,523 328 2,309Rail 77 69 84 108Total 6,978 435,958 8,991 385,368

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the number of seizures fell substantially between thetwo years. As this conveyance covers larger dis-tances, it makes sense to transport greater quantities.The air sector follows behind the sea transport sectorto round out the quantities intercepted in excess oftwo tonnes, while and the rail sector brought up therear with an increase in quantities and in the numberof seizures made.

However, the headings "Unknown" and "Other"provide no information on a specific means oftransport, even though the combination of the numberof seizures and quantities intercepted under these twoheadings leaves them very well placed. Once again,this raises the problem of the quality of data input intothe CEN which the quality of the analysis depends on.

The psychotropic substances and other prohibitionsrecorded in the CEN by the WCO Members are

Eastern and Central Europe region with a positivevariance in excess of 70 per cent.

Two regions made significant breakthroughs in 2013,whereas the 2012 statistics gave them a score of almostzero. These were the North Africa and Central Africaregions which recorded 269 kg and 118 kg respectively.It is worth underscoring the substantial reductions inquantities seized in North America, Asia-Pacific and theCIS. In total, Africa, with the exception of Eastern andSouthern Africa, achieved exceptional results in 2013as regards seizures of psychotropic substances,alongside the other regions that traditionally supply thegreatest input into the CEN database. This resurgenceby African Customs services highlights both theeffectiveness of the Customs inspection services andthe opening of a consumer market for this type ofproduct in this part of the world. The detailed analysisto follow will help shed light on the issues.

The most frequently used means of transport for psy-chotropic substances indisputably remained postaland express mail services, based on the number ofseizures seizures reported in Table 14, with an in-crease in the number observed in 2013 although thequantities did not keep pace and fell slightly. Largerquantities were nevertheless input into the CEN underthe means of transport entitled "Pedestrian" both in2012 and 2013, with a relatively average and stablenumber of seizures over the two years.

Transport by vehicle followed closely behind in termsof the number of seizures with a slight increase, al-though the quantities intercepted fell by almost halfbetween the two years. Sea transport increasedsharply (almost doubling) from 2012 to 2013, whereas

63 kg of amphetamine, concealed in a consignment of carrots, seized by French CustomsPhotos courtesy of French Customs


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seizures relating to this product. Taking into accountthe data entered into the CEN, the production and cir-culation of this product are confined to India andBangladesh. The number of seizures and quantitiesseized fell between 2012 and 2013. It is neverthelessworth pointing out that the India-Bangladesh routeforms the bulk of this trafficking. The products were pri-marily concealed "on the body" or transported by indi-viduals (99% of cases). This product, in syrup form, isoften used as a narcotic or anti-depressant. Althoughit may be used legally in India, it is prohibited inBangladesh where it is linked to a large number ofcrimes. The disparity in the two countries’ legal frame-works explains the large quantities seized inBangladesh (over 300 tonnes reported over the pasttwo years). Phensidyl manufacturing was also reportedin the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

Approximately 50 countries reported amphetamineseizures. Despite a slight downturn noted in 2013, thenumber of seizures recorded in the CEN database re-mained relatively stable. In contrast, the quantities fellsubstantially in 2013, declining from 28 tonnes to amere 12 tonnes.

This downward trend is reflected in Table 16, listingthe top 10 countries having reported the largestquantities in 2013. This fall was essentially attributableto the United States and Saudi Arabia, given that theyhad supplied most of the data for this product in 2012.

extremely varied to say the least. In order to streamlinethe analysis, the most commonplace products havebeen chosen, taking into account the knowledge andrecognition of these products as well as the quantitiesintercepted. This selection was also made in theinterests of legal balance, listing products for which themajority of Members have clear and precise legislationrestricting their circulation and consumption becauseof their proven of potential risks to citizens. However,the choice will necessarily be restrictive, excludingproducts whose dangers were one of the reasonsbehind Members including them in the CEN.

In light of the foregoing, and for the purposes of thisanalysis, 15 psychotropic substances which were mostfrequently intercepted over the past two years wereselected. These include products which have become"classics", such as amphetamine, methamphetamine,tramadol, captagon, etc., and those which are less wellknown or difficult to identify, especially syntheticcannabinoids. These synthetic drugs take many formsand have various names according to their chemicalcompounds. They are generically listed as newsynthetic drugs (see Table 15).

The product described as Phensidyl is best known inthe Asia-Pacific region which reported almost all the

Seizure of 2 kg of methamphetamine by Thai Customs.Itinerary: China - Hong Kong, China – Bangkok

Photos courtesy of Thai Customs

Table 15. 15 types of the most currentpsychotropic substances seized

2012 2013Category Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Phensidyl 445 379,996 371 339,405Methamphetamine 1,848 9,245 1,870 12,129Amphetamine 631 28,862 622 12,098Captagon 177 3,953 276 11,259Tramadol 151 112 675 1,714Synthetic 269 662 570 1,204cannabinoidMDMA (ecstasy) 309 1,692 436 989GBL 394 1,900 247 944(Gamma Butyrolactone)

Kratom 26 1,071 28 771Diazepam 512 375 241 757Mephedrone 37 113 510 631Sibutramine 20 56 500 464DMT 140 1,692 58 311Ketamine 202 2,545 189 276Alprazolam 226 171 337 263

Table 16. Top 10 reporting countries: number ofseizures and quantity of amphetamine


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Burkina Faso - - 5 8,091United States 220 22,735 311 1,897Saudi Arabia 89 5,245 15 977Germany 122 303 68 336Norway 19 103 38 213Sweden 13 23 50 186France 9 259 12 142Netherlands 1 1 1 58Poland 25 26 21 48China 14 37 - -Total (out of 10) 512 28,733 521 11,948

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Moreover, Mali and Niger were the destinations for theproducts intercepted in Burkina Faso. These productswere being conveyed by vehicles and other means oftransport (bicycles and motorcycles) from Ghana, thecountry of consignment. There are fears of this traf-ficking extending to other countries in the region, giventhat seizures are being reported there in lesser quan-tities but which reflect the scale of this phenomenon.

The road sector predominates for the delivery of theseproducts, based on the information supplied by theUnited States, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Norway,Sweden and France.

During 2013, 53 countries reported information onmethamphetamine seizures, equating to an increaseof 11 countries relative to 2012. This growth in thenumber of countries having reported data was also re-flected in a rise in the number of seizures made whichwent from 1,848 cases in 2012 to 1,870 cases in2013, as well as in the quantities of methampheta-mine intercepted which rose to 12,129 kg in 2013against 9,245 kg in 2012.

Table 17, listing the top 15 countries that reported thelargest quantities of methamphetamine seized,clearly illustrates this upward trend with countriessuch as the United States and Australia which reportedsubstantial increases, and Japan which doubled theamount seized in 2012. Satisfactory increases werealso noted for Hong Kong, China, India, Israel,Indonesia and Sweden. A fall in quantities was mostmarked for Germany, China, Thailand and France.

China, which featured in 2012, did not report anyamphetamine seizures in 2013.

Conversely, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Norwayand Germany reported larger seizures. Burkina Faso,which featured for the first time in 2013 in the amphet-amine seizure statistics, took the lead with an excep-tional quantity of more than eight tonnes of productsintercepted.

This large amount in circulation in this part of the worldsupports a new consumption and marketing trend forthis product in the Sahel zone which is susceptible totensions and wars, especially in Mali and Niger whereterrorist activities have been identified.

6.3 kg of amphetamine and 0.895 kg of ecstasy discovered by Serbian Customs inside the hidden compartments of a vehicletravelling from Hungary

Photos courtesy of Serbian Customs


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83 per cent of the seizures made in the United Statesand 62 per cent of those made in Japan. The second-placed country of departure for methamphetaminebound for Japan was India (13 per cent). India was alsomentioned as a country of departure for 99 per cent ofthe seizures made in Bangladesh, and also forapproximately 50 per cent of the cases in Thailand,Malaysia and Singapore.

Ghana and Benin took second and third placesrespectively for seizures made in Singapore. HongKong, China was mentioned as the country of departurefor 50 per cent of the seizures made in Indonesia andachieved the same score as regards the domesticcirculation of the product within its territory. China, whichachieved the same score for domestic circulation, wasmentioned as the country of departure for 96 per cent ofthe seizures made in Australia. China was alsoconsidered as the country of departure for 60 per centof the seizures recorded in Israel.

With respect to Western Europe, the United ArabEmirates was mentioned as the country of departurefor 60 per cent of the seizures made in Germany,followed by the Czech Republic (30%), with Nigeria inthird place. With regard to France, Cameroon andTurkey were mentioned as the leading countries ofdeparture for methamphetamine seized in thatcountry, each accounting for 29 per cent ofinterceptions.

Captagon seizures increased significantly both in termsof the quantities apprehended and the interceptionsmade. Quantities rose from approximately four tonnesin 2012 to over 11 tonnes in 2013 (see Table 18).

Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Bahrain allreported higher seizures in 2013 for this product whichcirculates almost exclusively in the Middle East region.In contrast, Kuwait recorded a decline, whilst the UnitedArab Emirates and Qatar did not feature in the 2013statistics, even though they submitted data in 2012. Itis worth mentioning that Lebanon, which was not in-cluded in the 2012 tables, made three seizures in 2013totalling approximately two tonnes of products.

Saudi Arabia remained the main consumption zonefor this product (2.5 times the total quantities seized in2012). Similarly, Jordan’s 2012 results increasedalmost fivefold in quantitative terms.

Tajikistan, which featured in 2012, did not report anymethamphetamine seizures in 2013.

Several African countries reported methamphetamineseizures during 2013. Those countries made a signifi-cant contribution to the statistics for that year, essen-tially due to the Westerlies Operations carried out in thisregion. The quantities recorded are not included in thetop 15, yet they do provide information on the origin ofa variety of this product identified through analyses.The final report on Operation Westerlies 2, contained inthe second part of this Section, offers a greater insightinto the issues surrounding this new threat.

The preferred conveyance method for methampheta-mine remained air transport and the postal andexpress mail sector for almost all the Asia-Pacificcountries, in some cases exceeding 65 per cent,whereas for the United States, transport in vehiclesaccounted for 41 per cent, followed by pedestrians (17per cent). Some 40 per cent of the methamphetamineseizures made in Australia were in the sea transportsector.

The countries of departure featuring most frequently formethamphetamine were Mexico, which accounted for

Table 17. Top 15 reporting countries: number ofseizures and quantity of methamphetamines


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)United States 1,124 7,090 1,294 9,464Japan 106 463 112 776Australia 13 144 5 638Bangladesh 105 555 99 521Israel 38 31 55 88Hong Kong, 8 25 25 69ChinaIndonesia 14 26 20 68China 42 122 51 61Singapore 47 46 23 44Germany 72 245 48 37Union of Myanmar 33 120 10 35Thailand 93 77 12 35Sweden 4 22 2 29France 23 51 10 27Tajikistan 1 63 - -Total (out of 15) 1,723 9,079 1,766 11,894

28

fall of approximately 50 per cent in 2013 comparedwith 2012 (see Table 19).

The other products have witnessed upward anddownward variations from one year to another. Itshould be noted that the products classified in thesynthetic cannabinoids category may take on a widevariety of forms and names. They are describeddifferently according to their production method. Theynevertheless pose genuine threats to public health anda major challenge to the inspection units which have tokeep abreast of and adapt to these ever-changingproducts and to frequently amended legislation. It isvital that national intelligence and analysis servicesupdate themselves on a daily basis on the latest trendsconcerning these products. To this end, the RILOshave an important role to play in sharing, at regionallevel, emerging risks relating to these synthetic drugs.

It is worth stressing that captagon is considered anamphetamine substitute, a prohibited substance in thisregion whose trafficking and consumption carry severepunishments, extending up to capital punishment insome countries. In addition, the precarious situation inSyria has boosted captagon trafficking. This partlyexplains the growth in seizures in neighbouringLebanon, where criminal groups are using theproceeds of its sale to fuel the war effort. Lebanon isalso known as a captagon producer.

The preferred means of transport for this productremains vehicles, especially for Saudi Arabia, Jordanand Yemen, whereas sea transport tends topredominate in Lebanon.

The countries of departure for this product are Jordanfor Saudi Arabia and Lebanon for the United ArabEmirates. Syria was also mentioned as a sourcecountry for seizures made in Saudi Arabia, with transitvia Jordan. In conclusion, Lebanon, Jordan and SaudiArabia make up the main trafficking zone for captagonin the Middle East.

For the purposes of this heading 18 psychotropicsubstances were selected and classified according tothe quantities intercepted, choosing products forwhich the total quantity seized exceeded 50 kg.Overall, an increase in quantities with a top 3 madeup of products close to or exceeding one tonne isnoted. Tramadol was in first place with 1,714 kg in2013, a tripling of the 2012 weight, followed bysynthetic cannabinoids for which the 2013 figuresdouble those of 2012, and ecstasy which witnessed a

Table 18. Captagon: number of seizures andquantity seized


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Saudi Arabia 99 3,221 152 7,902Lebanon - - 3 1,869Jordan 15 316 7 1,225Yemen 5 77 3 138Bahrain 31 12 71 25Kuwait 8 131 4 8United Arab 2 167 1 0EmiratesQatar 11 12 21 0Total 171 3,936 262 11,168

Table 19. Other psychotropic substances:number of seizures and quantity seized

2012 2013Type of product Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Tramadol 151 112 675 1,714Synthetic 269 662 570 1,204cannabinoidMDMA (ecstasy) 309 1,692 436 989GBL 394 1,900 247 944(Gamma Butyrolactone)

Kratom 26 1,071 28 771Diazepam 512 375 241 757Mephedrone 37 113 510 631Sibutramine 20 56 500 464DMT 140 1,692 58 311Ketamine 202 2,545 189 276Alprazolam 226 171 337 263Methaqualone 1 0 4 186(mandrax)Zolpidem 47 20 268 137Clonazepam 101 196 84 230Mirungi 2 114GHB 19 40 24 89(Gamma Hydroxybutyrate)

Benzodazepine 25 22 19 83Mescaline 49 74 22 50


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in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Representatives fromthe 27 African Customs administrations wishing totake part in the Operation participated in this work-shop, sponsored by the Japan Customs Co-operationFund (CCF/Japan). During the workshop, courseswere delivered by a trainer from French Customs, ex-perts from Japan and the WCO Secretariat’sEnforcement Team. The training covered a wide rangeof topics such as passenger risk profiling, cargo, con-trolled delivery, global trend analysis of drug traffickingand practical use of the CENcomm.

One of the main objectives of the workshop was toassist the attending officials to cascade the operationalknowledge acquired down to frontline officers respon-sible for conducting controls on the ground at points ofentry and departure. Due to their co-ordination efforts,the attending officials were able to run a number of na-tional workshops within their respective administrations.

Operation co-ordination

An Operational Co-ordination Unit (OCU) was set upat WCO Headquarters in Brussels for the duration ofthe Operation. It comprised Customs experts from theDemocratic Republic of the Congo, Japan, Nigeriaand Senegal, as well as experts from the WCOSecretariat’s Enforcement Team. The OCU wasrounded out by a representative from the RILO

OPERATION WESTERLIES 2

Operation Westerlies 2 aimed to combat illicit traffick-ing in methamphetamine by air between Africa andAsia, via Europe and the Middle East, through height-ened Customs controls on passengers departingfrom, in transit via and arriving at international airportsknown for being located on routes used by drug smug-glers and members of organized crime syndicates.

It was also intended to co-ordinate the joint efforts ofCustoms administrations at inter-regional level foreffective interception of drug couriers. Over and abovethe seizures and arrests, Westerlies 2 highlighted theimportance of post-seizure investigations into thecriminal groups behind this trafficking, as well asco-operation between Customs, Police and other lawenforcement agencies involved in combating drugtrafficking and organized crime.

The Operation took place during a 10-day period, from6 to 15 December 2013. Approximately 75 Customsadministrations, 10 RILOs and the WCO’s DrugEnforcement Team took part therein.

Training session

The train-the-trainer session was held from 11 to 15November 2013 at the Regional Training Centre (RTC)

Following the “Train-the-Trainer” workshop in Libreville(Gabon), a national training session was organized forofficers from external services

Photo courtesy of Senegal Customs

WCO Secretary General Mr. Kunio Mikuriya (centre) visitingthe OCU (Operational Co-ordination Unit)

Photo courtesy of WCO Secretariat

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Western Europe who performed tasks for the OCU re-motely, out of Cologne. On the first day of theOperation, the WCO Secretary General, KunioMikuriya, met the OCU experts and offered them en-couragement.

The OCU fulfilled its mission in accordance with theOperational Plan, especially with respect to:

• facilitating information exchange at inter-regionallevel via the CENcomm,

• disseminating significant alerts or warningmessages,

• assuming a central co-ordination role betweenCustoms administrations,

• daily monitoring of seizure reports, and issuingan updated operational status report, newslettersand the final report.

After the conclusion of the Operation on 16 December2013, a "virtual" OCU continued to operate for a 10-day period to verify information on ongoing seizures.Participating Customs administrations were able toinput seizure data into the CENcomm up to 26December 2013.

Operation results

The Operation resulted in the seizure of over threetonnes of drugs and precursors across 66 interceptions.The drug seizures covered 2,750 kg of cannabis resinand herbal cannabis, 146 kg of methamphetamine and

Table 20. Number of seizures and quantity(by drug type)

Drug Number of Quantityseizure

Amphetamine 2 20.14 kgAmphetamine - liquid 1 0.6 litresCannabis - herbal 14 2,737.7 kgCannabis - powder 1 1.15 kgCannabis - resin 2 11.43 kgCocaine - crack 2 2 kgCocaine - powder 18 54.04 kgCocaine - solution 2 5.98 kgEphedrine 1 13 kgHeroin - powder 7 20.74 kgKhat 1 85 kgMethamphetamine 1 21 kgMethamphetamine - powder 15 105.35 kgOpium 1 15.46 kgTotal 67 3,092.99 kg

1 0.6 litres

2 kg of methamphetamine, concealed in the false bottom of asuitcase, seized by Nigerian Customs during OperationWesterlies 2

Photo courtesy of Nigerian Customs

Seizure of 1,260,000 US dollars by Congo (Dem. Rep. of)Customs at Kinshasa Airport during Operation Westerlies 2

Photo courtesy of Customs Service of Democratic Republic of the Congo

amphetamine, as well as 62 kg of cocaine, 21 kg ofheroin and 85 kg of khat (see Table 20). In addition todrugs, in excess of 321 kg and 173 specimens of CITESproducts (including ivory, rhinoceros horns, pangolinscales and dried seahorses) were seized.

During this Operation, Customs officers also seizedundeclared currency totalling 1.3 million US dollars,855,970 euro and 195 million Indian rupees, as wellas 16 kg of gold bars and 46 long guns and handguns.


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Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,Senegal, and Togo). Delegates from the JAITFs ofBenin, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali,Nigeria, Senegal and Togo represented their countries.

All experts having completed the training session leftLibreville with the full set of course materials, in orderto relay this training within their respective countries.The courses covered the identification of drugs,knowledge of drug routes, techniques for targetingand selecting passengers posing a risk, recognition ofCITES goods and use of the CENcomm. The courseswere delivered by a French expert (for drug traffick-ing), a Burkinabe expert on behalf of the WCO (forCITES), financed by the GAPIN Project fund, and byWCO officials (use of the CENcomm).

Cascade training took place in 12 countries, enablingthe officials who stayed at the home country to gainand/or consolidate knowledge relating to airport in-spections and enforcement for the purposes of theOperation. These capacity building activities were cru-cial to the responsiveness of officers conducting in-spections in airports.

Operation co-ordination

Co-ordination of the Operation and sharing of informa-tion between participants were facilitated by an OCUset up at the WCO Secretariat in Brussels for the entireoperational phase. It co-ordinated the transmission ofdata between the RILOs and the National Contact

OPERATION COCAIR IV

The fourth Operation Cocair, planned in 2013 was or-ganized following the establishment of Joint AirportInterdiction Task Forces (JAITFs) for Project Aircop.The latter have been consequently involved in everyphase of the process so as to sustainably build theircapacities in the area of joint operations, in accor-dance with their annual programmes.

Consequently, from 26 October to 3 November 2013,Operation Cocair IV, financed by the EuropeanCommission and organized by the WCO in conjunctionwith the UNODC and INTERPOL, pooled all the ProjectAircop JAITFs with the other law enforcement units(Customs, Police and other agencies), established in 30airports across 27 countries in Africa, Latin America andthe Caribbean, primarily to combat trafficking in cocaineand, more generally, in all other prohibited goods.

Some European countries also participated, thus con-tributing to a tighter network for enhanced surveillanceof trafficking from the cocaine production zones to thedestination zones, via the transit countries.

In keeping with previous Cocair Operations and bear-ing in mind the analysis of their results, Cocair IVreprised almost all the same objectives given that theproblem of cocaine trafficking remains current.However, its scope was broadened with the involve-ment of the Project Aircop JAITFs, with a view to de-veloping their reflexes as regards export controls andinformation sharing.

Training session

The train-the-trainer session took place from 30September to 4 October 2013 in Libreville, Gabon.

In addition to the representatives of the WCO, INTER-POL, the UNODC, the RILOs for West and CentralAfrica and France, 56 experts from 27 countries par-ticipating in Operation Cocair IV attended this training(Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côted’Ivoire, Congo (Republic of), Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (DRC), Dominican Republic, Gabon,Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Jamaica,

5.3 kg of cocaine, concealed in engine cylinders, seized byNiger Customs during Operation Cocair IV

Photos courtesy of Niger Customs

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Points (NCPs), sending them a daily newsletter sum-marising the facts and figures for the Operation.

The OCU was composed of the representatives fromRILOs, WCO and INTERPOL experts, an expert fromFrench Customs and several experts from countriestaking part in the Operation. Each participating countrydesignated an NCP tasked with sending and receivinginformation messages and circulating information aboutcontrol points within his/her territory. The NCPs co-ordinated the transmission, to the OCU, of messagesnotifying suspicious consignments.

Operation results

Over 6,000 messages were shared between 109CENcomm users over the nine days of the operationalphase, extended by an additional week to recordpending cases.

This impressive figure adequately demonstrates theintensity of exchanges between the various players.The different NCPs acted as a genuine communica-tion channel between officers at borders and membersof the OCU to inject vitality into this exchange and toplace the control units on a constant state of alert.

The Operation, which concluded on 3 November2013, recorded a total of 98 seizures in theCENcomm. These seizures covered:

• 1.7 tonnes of various drugs, including:• 1,500 kg of herbal cannabis;• 181 kg of cocaine;• 40 kg of methamphetamine;• 2.7 kg of heroin;

• 10 tonnes of medicinal products;• 10 kg of psychotropic substances;• 35 kg of CITES products (including elephant tusks

– rough or worked ivory);• 1,433,000 euro;• 65 kg of gold;• 91 arrests of individuals involved in trafficking.

2.5 kg of methamphetamine, concealed in the false bottomof a suitcase, seized by Nigerian Customs during OperationCocair IV

Photos courtesy of Nigerian Customs


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Operation assessment

It is clear that the positive results generated by theCocair Operations, substantiated by the latestOperation, draw largely on their implementationmethodology which is now considered fundamentalfor actions of this type. The approach is based on atrain-the-trainer activity whose impact is greatly in-creased through cascade training, the opening of aCENcomm test phase to establish improved teachingmethods for information and intelligence exchangeand, finally, coverage of the heightened control periodby a physical OCU.

Looking beyond the performances, which constitute abarometer for assessing an action, Cocair IV wasevaluated against the objectives set, as laid out in theOperational Plan and recalled below.

• Raising airport inspection services’ awareness ofthe risk of smuggling on flights bound for Europeancountries (direct flights or in transit via hubs);

• Gathering information on the status of cocaine traf-ficking in the regions involved; evaluating andanalysing this information in order to generate up-to-date and relevant risk profiles and targeting criteria;

• Promoting information sharing about this phenome-non between law enforcement agencies (Customs,Police and others) as well as co-operation and infor-mation sharing between the RILOs in the regionsconcerned; drawing on the WCO and INTERPOL’sexpertise and logistical resources;

• Strengthening controls within the main internationalairports in South America, the Caribbean and Westand Central Africa on flights bound for Europeancountries or the major North African hubs(Casablanca, Tunis and Algiers), in order to interceptconsignments of cocaine, drugs or chemical precur-sors;

• Identifying the natural and legal persons and organi-zations involved in this trafficking, as far as the legalprovisions offered by each country’s legislation permit(controlled international deliveries and housesearches);

• Providing information on the status of cocaine traf-ficking in the regions involved; evaluating andanalysing this information in order to generate up-to-date and relevant risk profiles and targeting criteria.

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Mikuriya, Secretary General of the WCO. The partici-pants actively exchanged views on various aspects ofthe operation of canine centres and training pro-grammes. They agreed to set up a virtual workinggroup to promote cooperation and to develop com-mon standards for training programmes, as well as toshare perspectives on the establishment of WCORegional Dog Training Centres. To facilitate the ex-change of messages or information related to caninetraining and detection in a completely secure manner,the WCO launched the Canine CENcomm communi-cation platform in 2011.

The delegates agreed that the Forum is a useful plat-form for exchange of professional knowledge in thisarea and it should be an established event.

After the Forum, the participants were invited to attendthe inauguration of the WCO Regional Dog TrainingCentre in Russia. They visited the facility, enjoyed ademonstration by detector dogs and continued theirtechnical discussions on the spot. This is the fifthWCO Regional Dog Training Centre to be openedafter the Centre in Hermanice in Czech Republic, inAlmaty (Kazakhstan), in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and inRuili, Yunnan Province (China).

THE SECOND GLOBALDOG FORUM(28-29 May 2013, Moscow, Russia)

The Strategic Plan in the WCO Customs in the 21st

Century document highlights the promotion of growthand development by facilitating trade and enhancingborder security. To achieve these goals, the use of ef-fective technologies and tools requires human re-source management and training. Holding a workshopwith a focus on multidisciplinary dog and handlerteams is an ideal means of sharing specialized knowl-edge and techniques in this professional area.

To achieve this objective, the first WCO Global DogForum was convened at WCO Headquarters inBrussels in January 2011, which was proved an ex-cellent platform for effectively sharing experiences inthe Customs canine domain.

Riding on the success of the first Forum, the SecondWCO Global Dog Forum was held in Moscow, Russiafrom 28 to 29 May 2013. The Forum was officiallyopened by Mr. Vladimir Malinin, First Deputy Head ofthe Federal Customs Service of Russia and Mr. Kunio

Detection dog demonstration at the Forum in MoscowPhoto courtesy of Russia’s Federal Customs Service

Official inauguration of the WCO Regional Dog TrainingCentre in the Russian Federation by Mr. Vladimir Malinin,Deputy Director General of Russia’s Federal CustomsService and WCO Secretary General Mr. Kunio Mikuriya

Photo courtesy of Russia’s Federal Customs Service

In 2013, the UNODC-WCO CCP expanded to includenine geographical regions in which 33 PCUs are fullyoperational in fifteen countries. In another thirty-fourcountries, the Programme is engaging with relevantauthorities to establish Port Control Units and delivertailor-made training based on the identification ofregional threats and needs.

A pivotal component of CCP continues to be thephased training approach, from basic theoretical andpractical modules, to advanced specialised training.In 2013, 56 training workshops, study tours andmentorships took place. An estimated 553 officialswere trained, of which approximately 12 per cent werewomen. Officials are required to serve their respectivePCUs for a minimum of three years to ensurecontinuity and sustainability.

Throughout the reporting period, the international donorcommunity continued to support the CCP withcontributions now amounting to more than US $40million. Forging partnerships with donors is alsoimportant at a technical level, as it provides CCP withadditional technical know-how. Several donor countrieshave provided law enforcement experts as trainers.

The activity of the Container Control Programme in 2013resulted in seizures of 23,444 kg of cocaine, 6,422 kg ofcannabis, 1,277 kg of heroin, 60,883 kg of tramadol and725 kg of ivory. In addition, large quantities of counterfeitgoods (119 containers), medicines, cigarettes, spirits,stolen cars and e-waste were also seized in 20132.Throughout the years, due to the expansion of the CCPand trainings provided, the quantities of seizedcommodities have been growing steadily.

Seizure of 4,386 kg of cocaine in a shipping container, by Customs officers fromthe Joint PCU at the port of Guayaquil (Ecuador)

Photos courtesy of Ecuador Customs

1 Review of Maritime Transport 2013, UNCTAD, United Nations, 2013, p. xiv. For further information see: <http://unctad.org/en/pu-blicationslibrary/rmt2013_en.pdf>

2 All aforementioned seizures are taken into account in the analysis of the respective Sections of this Report.

CONTAINER CONTROLPROGRAMME

The UNODC – WCO Container ControlProgramme

The WCO-UNODC Container Control Programme(CCP) was established in March 2006 to address theneeds of the global enforcement community tomonitor the movement of containerised cargo in amore effective and efficient way. With more than 600million global container movements reportedannually1, of which only an estimated 2 per cent areinspected, CCP plays an important role in addressingthe risks related to the low inspection rates andfacilitating legitimate trade. The increase in legitimatecontainerised maritime trade is threatened, more thanever, by international organised crime operating alonglegal maritime trade supply chains. Web-basedsecure information exchange systems, developed andcontinuously enhanced by the WCO, have played acrucial role in supporting the global CCP to interceptillicit goods in the trade supply chain and to enhanceglobal cooperation and information exchange.

The Programme launches Port Control Units (PCUs)in selected sea and dry ports by integrating therepresentatives of various enforcement agencies in asingle working body. To be able to identify the high-risk containers, the officers receive training in profilingand targeting using modern risk-based workingmethodologies. They are also trained in the areas ofdrugs and precursor chemicals, counterfeit goods,smuggling of strategic goods, nuclear materials,weapons and CITES-related infringements.

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PROJECT AIRCOP ANDRELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Project Aircop, launched in 2010 with funding from theEuropean Union and co-financing by Canada, isaimed at more effectively combating illicit cocainetrafficking by air from South America, via Africa, boundfor Europe, as well as at fighting airport crime ingeneral. The scope of this Project, which is managedby the UNODC in close co-operation with INTERPOLand the WCO, is primarily West and Central Africawhere the first multidisciplinary units were set up from2011 onwards, during the first phase.

Accordingly, between 2011 and 2013 JAITFs,comprising officials from Customs, Police, theGendarmerie and other law enforcement agencies,were established in the airports of Praia in CapeVerde, Dakar in Senegal, Bamako in Mali, Lomé inTogo, Cotonou in Benin, Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire,Accra in Ghana and Lagos in Nigeria. JAITFs arecontinuing to be established in Central Africa duringthe second phase, especially in Cameroon whereagreements have been signed between theGovernment and the UNODC to set up joint units inthe airports of Douala and Yaoundé.

As part of the same aim of impeding cocainetrafficking for which the air routes are increasinglydiversifying, during the third phase in 2014 ProjectAircop began expanding to the so-called supplycountries in South America and the Caribbean.Accordingly, a JAITF has been operational since early2014 in the Dominican Republic, covering the LasAméricas airport in the capital city and Punta Canaairport. In its wake, Panama is in the process ofsetting up a unit in Panama airport. Other airports willfollow, especially in Argentina, Colombia, Venezuelaand Jamaica.

Airports situated on air routes used for this traffickingare also associated with the Project, with local liaisonsfacilitating the exchange of operational information andbest practices with JAITF officials by means of theCENcomm, the WCO’s secure communication tool.South Africa, Kenya and Morocco, where assessmentmissions have been carried out, have been identified

Photo courtesy of Panalpina

mechanism in real time. Operations Cocair II and IIIwere consequently conducted by the WCO in anumber of African airports, in partnership with theUNODC and INTERPOL. An increase was noted interms of seizures of prohibited goods, thanks to thecontinued control reflexes among the enforcementservices, including the first JAITFs to be set up.

Operation Cocair IV, conducted in 2013, coincidedwith the establishment of the eight Project AircopJAITFs and provided an opportunity to test theiroperational capabilities alongside some 30 airportunits from countries in Africa, Latin America and theCaribbean. The full results of this Operation areavailable in a separate article.

It is, however, noteworthy that the Project AircopJAITFs were particularly successful during thisOperation, making a total of 23 seizures accounting forapproximately 30 per cent of the overall seizures. Theproducts intercepted by the JAITFs included 1,150 kgof cannabis, 21.6 kg of cocaine, 4.2 kg ofmethamphetamine, 2.5 kg of heroin and € 26,870 incurrency within the most important of the ninecategories of products listed. The quantities interceptedby the JAITFs were significant in terms of the seizuresas a whole during the Operation. The diversity ofproducts intercepted bears witness to the JAITFs’desire to discharge the full range of functions assignedto them as regards combating all forms of illicittrafficking in the airport environment.

The highly rewarding experience of Operation CocairIV should culminate by making the JAITFs permanentcomponents of the national machinery for combatingairport crime. Some divides and rivalries with localstructures within this machinery, which had come tolight when the JAITFs were being set up, arebeginning to wane. The JAITFs are working to thisend, by making wise use of the platform available tothem and continuing to conduct anti-traffickingactivities in the airport environment, in concert withother airport stakeholders.

In addition to the management of the airportenvironment, information sharing between airportunits, a practice tested during Operation Cocair IV, iscurrently a core activity of the JAITFs given the latter’s


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as countries "associated" with the Project and arebenefitting from the opening up of the CENcomm forinformation exchange. This same approach is beingapplied to European countries considered as the finaldestination of illicit products. Since 2013, some 12European countries have been connected to theCENcomm, giving the Project a multi-regional quality.

This opening up to Europe is continuing with a clearinterest being shown in the Project by the rest of thecountries. This interest is amply justified not only bytheir membership of the institution which forms theprimary funding agency, but also by the fact that theyare located in the destination zone of the majority ofthe illicit products. A sound understanding of traffickingtrends through the information conveyed by thenetwork developed is consequently enabling them tofurther hone the control strategies implemented attheir air borders.

The WCO CENcomm and INTERPOL’s I-24/7 databaseenable secure information transmission betweenairports and the consultation of air passengers’ criminalrecords, thus facilitating the JAITFs’ risk analysis work.The WCO periodically supplies analytical reportssummarizing the JAITFs’ activities, supplemented byinformation on related criminal activities drawn from itsvarious databases, as well as from the INTERPOLdatabases, in order to target controls more effectively.

It is nevertheless worth mentioning that the pace ofProject Aircop actually increased following the analysisof the results of the first Operation Cocair, carried outby the WCO in West Africa in 2008 in response to theemerging threat posed by the opening up of a newroute for cocaine from South America to Europe,transiting Africa. That analysis made it possible tofocus on the need to build the capacities of airportservices in some African airports affected by cocainetrafficking, particularly in terms of training, facilities,work equipment and drug detection tools, and, mostimportantly, to pool the efforts of the variousenforcement services operating within the same airportenvironment.

The organizational arrangements for the operationsremained the same and were included in the ProjectAircop annual programme, in order to test the

understanding that optimum results will only beobtained through co-operation facilitating theoperational exchange of information and intelligence.

Drawing on the practices during Operation Cocair IV,the JAITFs are keeping up the momentum for co-operation and revitalizing the network by increasinglyusing CENcomm Warning Messages to exchangeoperational information. A tighter information networkis beginning to take shape within Project Aircop andthrough which, thanks to the CENcomm, over 100multidisciplinary staff are sharing extremely variedknowledge relating to all types of enforcement in theairport environment.

A new feature of the Project Aircop version of theCENcomm tool is that it offers not only the possibilityof communicating with the structures, but also oflimited and direct contact with a JAITF unit or aspecific official selected according to certain criteria, inorder to ensure complete confidentiality and sensitivitywith respect to particular issues.

Finally, it is hoped that the multitude of skillsdemonstrated within the JAITFs will form a lastingaspect of the approach to sharing operationalinformation and intelligence on airport crime and thatthese skills will be passed on to the countriesassociated with the Project, especially in Europe, inpursuit of Project Aircop’s objectives.

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INTRODUCTION

By its nature, environmental crime is trans-boundaryand in many cases it involves organised cross-bordercriminal syndicates. Globalisation has indirectly madeit easier to transport harmful commodities acrossnational boundaries: a tiger skin or an ivory tusk

passes through many hands on its way from thepoaching site to the final buyer and an illegally felledtree illegally can travel around the world beforeending up as a piece of luxury furniture. In manycases, endangered species and tropical timber areshipped from less-developed countries to thedeveloped world, whilst hazardous waste is exportedfrom developed to developing countries.


SECTION 2.ENVIRONMENTThe threat posed by an unprecedented spike in the illegal wildlife trade in fauna and flora is immi-nent. It jeopardises the sustainability of populations through irreversible changes in the natural land-scape and the reduction of biodiversity, as well as providing sources of funding to criminal groups andthus constituting a threat to national security. To address the phenomenon, this Section of the WCOIllicit Trade Report is dedicated to environmental issues and divided into the equal priority areas ofwaste, ozone depleting substances, CITES-protected species, timber and minerals.

Seizure of ivory tasks by Kenya Revenue Authority Photo courtesy of Kenya Revenue Authority

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Customs administrations play an essential role atthe border in protecting the environment. Customsis charged with ensuring compliance with the trade-related provisions of multi-lateral environmentalagreements (MEAs) and with national legislation.

The WCO Secretariat continues to work closely withother international and regional organisations involvedin environmental issues. The cooperation has beenformalised through a series of Memoranda ofUnderstanding with partners such as the CITESSecretariat, the Basel Convention Secretariat, theUnited Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), theLusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF) and TRAFFIC,which maximises joint efforts in the fight against envi-ronmental crime. Together with the CITES Secretariat,INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs andCrimes (UNODC) and the World Bank, the WCOforms the International Consortium on CombatingWildlife Crime (ICCWC). By working collaboratively,the five organisations that form ICCWC have a uniquepool of technical and programming expertise, pre-senting the opportunity for a novel approach to themulti-faceted challenge of wildlife crime.

Customs faces many challenges, but is committingsignificant tools and resources towards the fight against

environmental crime at the border. They are using thefull range of inspection, detection and investigationtechniques, including risk profiling, detector dogs, scan-ners, intelligence sharing and controlled deliveries.

The CEN has been widely used for sharing informationon seizures of wildlife and other environmentallysensitive goods. In addition, the WCO Secretariat ismanaging ENVIRONET, which is a secure real-timecommunication tool for information exchange andcooperation in the area of environmental issuesamong Customs administrations, competent nationalagencies, international organisations and their regionalnetworks.

In the following paragraphs, the WCO’s efforts in theEnvironmental Programme in 2013 will be elaboratedwith some key areas of development and operations.While the CEN is designed to be a platform for theglobal reporting of seizures, the available seizurestatistics on environmentally sensitive goods do notallow a comprehensive analysis for a global trend.Hence, the analysis of seizures in this Section will focuson certain key CITES species. This Section aims atgiving the readers an overview of the rampant situationof environmental crime, and calls on the relevantauthorities to continue the combat against this menace.

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Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreements (MEAs)

Many environmentally sensitive goods arecontrolled under MEAs and other treaties.MEAs are agreements between severalparties – that is, States or, in some cases,regional economic integration organisationssuch as the European Union – to pursuespecific measures aimed at protecting theenvironment and conserving natural re-sources. This type of initiative is oftenbrought about by worldwide concerns aboutthe great and sometimes serious impacts ofseemingly harmless human activities on theearth’s fragile environment. When an MEAenters into force, the parties are bound by itsprovisions; indeed, compliance with themeasures is mandatory. The effective moni-

toring and control of the trans-boundarymovement of the environmentally sensitivegoods is a key component of environmen-tal protection and, in many cases, nationalsecurity. The main MEAs with internationaltrade-related provisions are the following:

• Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Was-tes and Their Disposal

• Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety to theConvention on Biological Diversity

• Convention on International Trade inEndangered Species of Wild Fauna andFlora (CITES)

• Montreal Protocol on Substances thatDeplete the Ozone Layer

• Rotterdam Convention on the PriorInformed Consent Procedure for CertainHazardous Chemicals and Pesticides inInternational Trade

• Stockholm Convention on PersistentOrganic Pollutants

Customs officers play a central role in im-plementing international trade-relatedMEAs. They help regulate legal tradeand detect illegal trade. They check thevalidity of trade documents and ensurethat they correspond to the actual goods.They combat fraud and check traders’compliance with prohibition and restric-tion measures and they collect the appli-cable duties and taxes.

ILLEGAL TRADE IN HAZARDOUSAND OTHER WASTES

The Basel Convention regulates the trans-boundarymovement of hazardous wastes and other wastes. Theobligations and procedures of the convention applywhenever hazardous wastes and other wastes coveredby the convention cross from one national jurisdiction toanother, whether or not the wastes are being shippedas part of a commercial transaction or under a tradingrelationship. The Basel Convention was adopted in1989, and it entered into force in 1992. Currently thereare 181 parties to the Basel Convention.

Hazardous waste causes long-term poisoning of soiland water, affecting people’s health and living condi-tions, sometimes irreversibly. Unscrupulous trading inwaste has become an increasingly serious concern.Under the Basel Convention, parties have the right toprohibit the import of hazardous waste, and parties areprohibited from exporting hazardous waste withoutpre-consent from the importing countries. TheConvention establishes a regulatory system that re-quires the prior informed consent of the state of importand the state of transit before wastes can be exported.An obligation of re-importation arises when an exporthas not complied with the Convention.

Operation Demeter III

Initiated by China Customs and organised by the WorldCustoms Organisation, Operation Demeter III targetedmaritime shipments during a period of five weeks inOctober and November 2013, with a view to identifyingillegal shipments of hazardous and other wastecontrolled by the Basel Convention. The operation wasmounted with the support of the Secretariat of the BaselConvention (SBC), the EU Network for Implementationand Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL), theEuropean Commission’s Directorate General forTaxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD), theInternational Network for Environmental Complianceand Enforcement (INECE), INTERPOL and the UnitedNations Environmental Programme’s Regional Officefor Asia and the Pacific (UNEP ROAP).

The joint efforts of 44 Customs administrations inEurope, Asia and the Pacific and North America,

including participating partners such as the nationalenvironmental agencies and the Police, resulted in 48seizures/detentions of 7,022,724 kg and 3,403 piecesof waste. The seized and detained waste ranged fromtextile waste, plastic waste, household waste, scrapmetal, electrical and electronic equipment (e-waste),to used vehicle parts and tyres.

Most of the seizures/detentions took place inEuropean countries. The largest seizure, namely 5,700tonnes of textile waste, was realised in China. 12Members reported cases: Belgium, Bulgaria, China,France, Germany, Hong Kong (China), Italy, theNetherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal andSweden.

Operation Demeter III involved a series of operationalmechanisms: intensified controls, monitoring, notifi-cations and feedback. Participants relied onCENcomm, the WCO’s secure and encrypted com-munication tool, to exchange crucial information andintelligence and to coordinate their operational activi-ties during the course of this enforcement initiative.

The WCO Regional Intelligence Office for the Asia andthe Pacific – based in Seoul, Korea – hosted theOperation Coordination Unit and played an importantrole during the Operation as a focal point forinformation exchange.

The illegal trade in waste remains a significant globalenvironmental issue and compliance with BaselConvention’s provisions continues to be a challenge.

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Metal scraps intercepted by Swedish Customs during theOperation Demeter III

Photo courtesy of Swedish Customs

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The added-value demonstrated in this Operationstrongly encourages the implementation of similaractions in the future. A coordinated approach involvingall stakeholders is required to tackle the illegal trade inwaste.

China Customs launched OperationGreen Fence to strengthen wastemanagement1

With a view to safeguarding national ecologicalsecurity, protecting human health and deepeningcooperation with domestic and foreign competentauthorities, China Customs carried out OperationGreen Fence domestically from 1 February to 30November 2013, to improve the management ofimported solid waste and fight against smuggling ofthe hazardous waste. During the Operation, ChinaCustoms supervised 45.5 million tonnes of importedsolid waste, investigated 1,176 cases in differentcategories of smuggled waste, arrested 380 suspectsand conducted an audit of over 2,608 enterprises.

On the basis of the analysis of major sources of solidwaste, as well as previous smuggling cases of waste,China Customs examined all the relevant declarationforms carefully, implemented the regulations of thesupervision, transit and repatriation of the imported solid

waste, increased investment in front-line manpower,funding and equipment, optimised the allocation ofhuman resources and made full use of advancedtechnologies such as large-scale inspection equipment.

On the basis of the streamlining of smuggling trendsand previous cases, China Customs, with the purposeof regulating the industry and identifying risks,intensified the collection, analysis and classification ofthe risk information of major enterprises and sensitivegoods, and monitored the repatriation to prevent the re-importation of solid waste, which is prohibited.Meanwhile, external auditing on the enterprisesimporting solid waste was carried out regularly toensure that it was processed by authorised enterprises.

Focusing on key areas and channels of wastesmuggling, as well as its major related goods andenterprises, China Customs established an effectiveand efficient cooperation and coordination mechanismfor information exchange and know-how transfer. Bymeans of strengthening collaboration among regionalCustoms districts and cracking down hard on wastesmuggling via false declaration, fraudulent declarationand concealment, China Customs fought against illegaltraders and syndicates. In addition, China Customs alsostrengthened cooperation with governmental agencies,such as environmental protection authorities, to destroythe smuggling channels and chains in a joint effort.

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Second-handgoods versus waste:challenges for Customs

Countries in Africa and Asia are beingflooded with waste items that have beendeclared as second-hand goods(especially e-waste). Clearly, reusingsecond-hand goods instead of disposing of

them is desirable in terms of a sustainableenvironmental and resources policy.However, if the second-hand goods marketis used to circumvent the regulationsgoverning waste disposal in order to get ridof waste products cheaply in developingcountries, then these actions are illegal. Infact, it often happens that goods declaredusable are already waste when they leavethe country of export2.

There is no clear distinction betweensecond-hand goods and waste. The lack ofinternationally accepted guidelines createsdifficulties for Customs. Some countrieshave developed their own criteria. TheBasel Convention is currently working onguidance for regulating the import andexport of e-waste.

1 Information provided by China Customs.2 Exporting consumer goods – Second-hand articles or waste?, Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN), 2011.

ILLEGAL TRADE INOZONE-DEPLETING SUBSTANCES

The Montreal Protocol is an international agreementthat controls the production and consumption of spe-cific man-made chemicals that destroy the ozonelayer, the earth’s protective shield. The MontrealProtocol was signed in 1987 and came into force in1989. Currently there are 197 Parties to the treaty.

The ozone layer is destroyed by ozone-depleting sub-stances (ODS) when those chemicals are releasedinto the atmosphere and then react with ozone mole-cules. ODS include chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hy-drochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), halons, hydrobro-mofluorocarbons (HBFC), methyl bromide, carbontetrachloride (CTC), methyl chloroform (TCA) and bro-mochloromethane. ODS and products that containODS are used as refrigerants in refrigeration and air-conditioning and heat pump systems, as blowingagents, as cleaning solvents, as propellants, as ster-ilants, as fire extinguishers, as fumigants, and as feed-stock and process agents.

Smuggling ozone-depleting substances

Significant seizures of ODS have been reported byIndia Customs: three consignments with therefrigerant R-22 (used in air conditioners). 1,702cylinders, each weighing 13.6 kg, were concealedamongst the cover load and arrived by vessel fromChina. In another incident 1,305 cylinders containingR22 were detected behind fresh oranges. In this casethe container arrived from Dubai, UAE. Throughinvestigation the Directorate of Revenue Intelligencerecovered 182,901 kg of R-22 kept in storage tanks.The refrigerant was imported misusing the licensingscheme. In recognition of its contribution to enforce thetrade provisions applicable to ODS under the MontrealProtocol the OzonAction Programme of UNEPawarded the ECA Ozone Protection Award for Customs& Enforcement Officers to the Directorate of RevenueIntelligence, Central Board of Excise & Customs, India.

During 2012 several seizures of ODS with false labelsor fake packaging were reported. The trend continuedin 2013. In July Serbia Customs stopped a truck en

route from Bulgaria to Italy with ten cylinders labelled asR134A. The cylinders were hidden amongst apricots.While the sticker covered the number 22 it did not coverthe name of the chemical. Subsequently the substancewas tested and it was found that the containers actuallycontained a mix of R22 and hydrocarbons.

Project Sky-Hole-Patching3

Project Sky-Hole-Patching launched its operation in2006 under the initiative of China Customs. Under theProject, a notification mechanism has been establishedfor the effective exchange of suspicious shipments andseizure information. This regional Project was started intwo phases. Phase I, commencing on 1 September2006, aimed at suppressing the illicit trade of ODS.Phase II was rolled out on 1 March 2007 with theinclusion of hazardous waste in the notification system.With support from participating members, the Projecthas become an ongoing operation coordinated by theRegional Intelligence Liaison Office for Asia and thePacific by the RILO AP since 1 November 2007.Currently, there are 25 Customs administrationsparticipating in the Project: Australia, Bangladesh,Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong(China), India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Macau,Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, NewZealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka,Thailand and Vietnam.

On the 20th anniversary of the Montreal Protocol in 2007,RILO AP was presented with the Stratospheric OzoneProtection Award by the United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency in recognition of its outstanding con-tribution in combating illegal trade in ODS.

In 2013, there were 43 reported seizures in the data-base of Project Sky-Hole-Patching. One of them wasrelated to ODS whereas the remaining cases were re-lated to other kinds of wastes.


Mislabelled cylinder with R22seized by Serbian Customs

Photo courtesy of Serbian Customs

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3 Information provided by RILO Asia-Pacific.

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ILLEGAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE

The Convention on International Trade in EndangeredSpecies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) aims toensure that international trade in specimens of wildanimals and plants does not threaten their survival.CITES has been in force since 1975, and currently has180 parties. The trade in CITES-listed species isdiverse, ranging from live animals and plants to foodproducts, exotic leather goods, wooden musicalinstruments, timber, tourist curios, medicines and otherwildlife products. The Convention accords varyingdegrees of protection to more than 35,000 species ofanimals and plants, whether they are traded as livespecimens or as raw or finished products. AppendicesI, II and III to the Convention are lists of speciesafforded different levels or types of protection fromover-exploitation4.

Cooperation with TRAFFIC

In October 2013 the Secretary General of the WorldCustoms Organisation, Kunio Mikuriya, and StevenBroad, Executive Director of TRAFFIC, signed aMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) between theorganisations at WCO Headquarters.

The MOU formalises the ongoing co-operativerelationship between the WCO and TRAFFIC onsensitising Customs to wildlife conservation issues andbolstering efforts to respond to illegal trade in protectedanimals and plants.

The Parties have agreed to pool their capacity buildingefforts by disseminating existing references andtraining materials, jointly developing new materialsand organising joint training activities for Customsofficers. Both organisations are working together toprovide guidance to frontline Customs officers tacklingillegal practices in the timber trade. They have alsoagreed to enhance information exchange.

TRAFFIC was established in 1976 and has developedinto a global network, research-driven and action-orientated, committed to delivering innovative andpractical conservation solutions based on the latestinformation.

TRAFFIC is governed by the TRAFFIC Committee, asteering group composed of members of TRAFFIC'spartner organisations, the World Wide Fund for Nature(WWF) and the International Union for Conservation ofNature (IUCN). A central aim of TRAFFIC's activitiesis to contribute to the wildlife trade-related priorities ofthese partners5.

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16thmeeting ofthe Conference of theParties to CITES (CoP16)

CoP 16, held in Bangkok, Thailand, inMarch 2013 took decisive action to halt thedecline of tropical timber, sharks, mantarays and a wide range of other plants andanimals. The Parties decided to includefive commercially valuable shark speciesin Appendix II. The oceanic whitetip, scal-loped hammerhead, great hammerheadshark, smooth hammerhead shark and theporbeagle shark are harvested in huge

numbers for their valuable fins and, insome cases, meat. In the future, they willhave to be traded with CITES permits andevidence will have to be provided that theyare harvested sustainably and legally.These listings mark a milestone in the in-volvement of CITES in marine species.Furthermore, the manta ray species wereincluded in Appendix II. Manta gill platesfetch high prices in international marketsand have been traded in significant num-bers in recent years.

International trade in a range of rosewoodsand ebonies from Asia, Central America

and Madagascar will now be regulated bythe Convention as well. Rapidly rising de-mand for these precious tropical hard-woods has led to serious concerns thatunregulated logging is depleting popula-tions of already rare species.

Cross-border movement of wooden musi-cal instruments was also addressed duringthe meeting. CITES also contains specialprocedures for musicians and institutionstravelling with musical instruments con-taining precious woods such as Brazilianrosewood, and other products of specieslisted by the Convention6.

4 “What is CITES?”, available at < http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php>5 “About TRAFFIC”, available at < http://www.traffic.org/overview/>6 “CITES conference takes decisive action to halt decline of tropical timber, sharks, manta rays and a wide range of other plants and

animals”, available at < http://www.cites.org/eng/news/pr/2013/20130314_cop16.php>

Operation Cobra

Customs, Police and wildlife officers from Asia, Africaand the United States mounted a successful cross-border enforcement operation, codenamed Cobra, tocrack down on wildlife crime syndicates. The month-long operation in January and February 2013 targetedspecies under serious threat, such as big cats,elephants, rhinos, pangolins and great apes.

Operation Cobra yielded hundred of arrests andresulted in the seizure of assorted wildlife specimens,such as shahtoosh (1,550 kg – representing the killingof almost 10,000 Tibetan antelope to harvest thewool), red sander wood (42,000 kg), elephant ivory(6,500 kg), live snakes (2,600), hornbill beaks (324),pangolins (102), pangolin scales (800 kg), rhino horns(22), rhino horn carvings (4), tiger trophies (10),leopard trophies (7) and elephant meat (31 kg). Thehaul also included the claws and teeth of protectedfelid animals and plant species, as well as assortedequipment, including firearms and ammunitionrecovered from poachers.

This was a well-received and innovative initiative, thefirst international effort to focus on the sharing of in-formation for investigation in real time among Customsand other law-enforcement agencies of implicatedcountries and partnering institutions in order to curtailrampant wildlife crime. Operation Cobra facilitated co-operation among range, transit and consumer coun-tries. Specialised investigation techniques, such ascontrolled deliveries, were promoted and a number offollow-up investigations into seizures were initiated.

The Operation was organised by China, South Africaand the United States in cooperation with theAssociation of Southeast Asia Nations WildlifeEnforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN), the South AsiaWildlife Enforcement Network (SAWEN) and LusakaAgreement Task Force (LATF), with the assistance ofthe WCO, the CITES Secretariat and INTERPOL. TheWCO’s Regional Intelligence Liaison Office for theAsia and the Pacific took part in the InternationalCoordination Team based in Bangkok.

Illegal trade in great apes

Great apes include gorillas, bonobos, chimpanzeesand orang-utans (the orang-utan is the only great apefound in Asia). All great ape species have experienceda considerable decline in population size and range –deforestation, agricultural expansion and miningoperations are all threats to the range area – over thepast decades.

Great apes and CITESGorillas, bonobos, chimpanzees and orang-utans arelisted on Appendix I of CITES.

The use of great apesGreat apes are hunted for their meat and the demandfor amusement parks, circuses, zoos and private petcollectors are a considerable threat to the survival ofthese species. Sometimes the animals are kept bysailors on board ships.

SmugglingIn 2013 no seizures of great apes were reported toCEN. The smuggling of live animals, and in particulargreat apes, is very different from smuggling wildlifeproducts such as ivory or rhino horn. In the past infantapes have been reported smuggled in luggage by airpassengers. Seeking high profits, organised live apesmugglers aim to minimise the travelling time to en-sure the survival of the animals, which requires agreat deal of planning and logistics. They prefer totransport apes by cargo airplane directly to the desti-nation country using small local air strips7, whichmakes it much more challenging for law enforcementofficers to detect such illegal activities.

Illegal trade in tigers

Less than 100 years ago tigers were found throughoutmuch of Asia, however as few as 3,2008 – poaching isthe most immediate threat to wild tigers – exist in thewild today. Their range has been reduced by 93 percent and wild populations can now only be found in13 countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China,

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7 Stiles D., Redmond I. (eds), Stolen Apes, The Illicit Trade in Chimpanzees, Gorillas, Bonobos and Orangutans.A Rapid Response Assessment, United Nations Environmental Programme, GRID-Arendal, 2013.

8 WWF, “Adopt a tiger”, available at <http://worldwildlife.org/species/tiger>

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India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar,Nepal, Russia, Thailand and Vietnam. At present,tigers exist only in scattered populations in small,isolated and fragmented landscapes9.

Tigers and CITESTigers are listed in Appendix I.

The use of tiger partsEvery part of the tiger, including the bones, is illegallytraded. Their parts are used for traditional medicine(e.g. tiger bone wine), folk remedies and, increasingly,as a status symbol among wealthy individuals.

SmugglingOnly a few seizures of tiger parts and products werereported to CEN in 2013. Customs in the UnitedKingdom and Germany reported several seizures ofsmall quantities of traditional medicines containingtiger parts mainly arriving from China. In the CzechRepublic Customs, in cooperation with wildlifeinspectors, seized two complete tiger skeletons to beexported to Vietnam. The skeletons were hiddeninside loud speakers.

Illegal trade in bears

Bears are found in Asia, Europe, North America andSouth America. All bear populations are threatened bythe illegal trade in bear parts and products.

Bears and CITESBears are generally listed in Appendix II, except theAsian black bear, the brown bear (only the populationsof Bhutan, China, Mexico and Mongolia, all otherpopulations are included in Appendix II), the Sun bearand the Himalayan brown bear, which are listed inAppendix I.

The use of bear partsBears are killed for various reasons. Their paws areconsidered a delicacy while their hides are used ashome decorations. Bear bile, a liquid substance pro-duced by the liver and stored in the gallbladder, hasbeen used in traditional medicine for the last 3,000years. It is sold in various forms including: whole gallbladders, raw bile, pills, powder, flakes and ointmentbut bear bile can also be found in everyday com-modities including wine, tea, and shampoo10. Bearbile medicines are used in China, Japan, Korea,Vietnam and countries across the globe with significantAsian populations11.

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9 Stoner S., Pervushina N., Reduced to Skin and Bones Revisited. A TRAFFIC Report, TRAFFIC International, Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia, 2013.

10 Foley, K-E, Stengel C.J, Shepherd C.R., Pills, Powders, Vials & Flakes: The bear bile trade in Asia. A TRAFFIC Report, TRAFFICSoutheast Asia, 2011.

11 “Operation CHARM: The Illegal Trade in Bears”, Metropolitan Police and Animals Asia Foundation, available at<http://operationcharm.org/documents/illegalBearTrade-En.pdf>

Traditional Asian medicine containing bear bile seized by the United Kingdom Border ForcePhotos courtesy of United Kingdom Border Force

Bear and bear part smugglingIn 2013 Customs reported several seizures of bear bilemedicines mainly for personal consumption. Customsofficers in Mongolia seized 275 bear teeth at the bor-der with China. Several hundred bear paws wereseized by China Customs at the border with Russia.

Illegal trade in elephant ivory

Populations of elephants in Africa continue to be un-der severe threat as the illegal trade in ivory grows –with double the numbers of elephants killed and triplethe amounts of ivory seized, over the last decade.Globally, illegal ivory trade activity has more than dou-bled since 2007, and is now over three times largerthan it was in 1998. Poaching is spreading primarily asa result of weak governance and the rising demand forillegal ivory in the rapidly growing economies of Asia,particularly China, which is the world’s largest desti-nation market12.

Elephants and CITESAfrican elephants are listed in Appendix I, except thepopulations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa andZimbabwe, which are included in Appendix II. TheAsian elephant is listed in Appendix I.

The use of elephant ivoryElephant ivory is carved into jewellery, religious ob-jects, hankos (name seals), pieces of art and decora-tion and other objects. Such carvings have been amuch-revered luxury and status symbol around theglobe for many centuries. While carved ivory is smug-gled from Africa to markets in Asia, North Americaand Europe, raw ivory is mainly smuggled to Chinaand Thailand.

SmugglingElephants in Asia are not immune to poaching. Ivoryfrom Africa is smuggled all over the globe; however,this section focuses on the smuggling of elephantivory from Africa to Asia.

Despite continued efforts by the law-enforcement com-munity, the illegal ivory trade continues on a large

scale. Big quantities of ivory are smuggled in maritimeand air cargo consignments. Smaller quantities, forpersonal use and resale, are transported in luggageand by express courier.

In 2013 Customs in Hong Kong (China), Kenya,Malawi, Singapore, Uganda and Vietnam reportedcases of ivory with over 500 kg seized.

The biggest haul was achieved by officers from theKenya Revenue Authority (KRA) at the Port ofMombasa in October. Upon inspection of two con-tainers, declared to be containing sesame seeds, enroute from Uganda to Malaysia, 1,642 pieces (4,884kg) of raw ivory were detected amongst the coverload. Additional containers with more than 1,000pieces of ivory (more than five tonnes) were inter-cepted throughout the year before leaving the conti-nent. 832 pieces (2,903 kg) of ivory, concealed inbags full of plastic waste, were seized by the UgandaRevenue Authority in Kampala before they could be

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12 UNEP, CITES, IUCN and TRAFFIC, Elephants in the Dust – The African Elephant Crisis. A Rapid Response Assessment,GRID-Arendal, 2013.

Rhino horns and ivory tusks seized by Uganda Revenue AuthorityPhoto courtesy of Uganda Revenue Authority

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shipped out of the country. The Malawi RevenueAuthority seized 781 pieces (2,640 kg) of ivory from atruck which was coming from Tanzania. The contra-band was hidden under bags of cement.

In Asia Customs successfully intercepted several multi-ton shipments of ivory. Hong Kong Customs aloneseized more than 3,200 pieces (6.5 tonnes) of ivoryshipped in containers from Africa. The containers ar-rived from Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria and Togo andthe ivory was hidden under soya, stones and timber.Singapore Customs and the Agri-Food & VeterinaryAuthority worked together to intercept a container with1,099 pieces (1.8 tonnes) of ivory transiting throughSingapore from Africa. Within three weeks in OctoberVietnam Customs seized 4.5 tonnes of ivory at the Portof Hai Phong. The ivory was concealed inside bags ofseashells and shipped in containers from Malaysia.

In April, Hong Kong Customs seized 113 pieces(300 kg) of ivory in an air cargo consignment. Throughrisk assessment, Customs officers selected the con-signment declared to contain “spare parts” transhippingfrom Burundi to Singapore for examination. X-ray ima-ges confirmed their suspicions. Instead of spare partsthe consignment contained ivory. In July, Customs atDubai Airport in the United Arab Emirates intercepted447 kg of ivory sent by air cargo from Zimbabwe. Theivory was stashed under a wooden sculpture.

Mail and express courier shipments with semi-workedivory (cut pieces) and worked ivory (mainly jewellery)were intercepted at European airports and Hong Kong,China. The biggest number of parcels arrived fromNigeria and was bound for China and Hong Kong,China. Quantities ranged from a few grams up to 20 kgof ivory (found in a mail shipment from Portugal toMalaysia). Mainly semi-worked ivory and worked ivorybut also raw ivory was seized from passengers’ lug-gage at departure airports in Africa and transit airportsin Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and destina-tion airports in Asia. Most passengers departed fromsub-Saharan African countries and travelled to Chinaand Hong Kong, China. However, the largest quantity,116 kg of raw ivory, was found in the luggage of a pas-senger departing from Uganda to Nigeria.

Today wildlife smugglers are applying the samemethods and techniques as drug syndicates. If shippedby air cargo, passenger luggage, express courier andmail the contraband is artfully hidden inside objects orin the false bottom of the luggage, wrapped inaluminium foil and placed in metal containers or mixedwith other organic goods such as fruit and coffee toavoid detection by X-ray. Ivory is painted to give it adifferent appearance and mislead law enforcementofficials. Couriers carry parrot eggs and pieces of rhinohorn in their underwear.

Illegal trade in rhinoceros horns

For 16 years, between 1990 and 2005, rhino poachersin South Africa have been killing 14 animals on avera-ge each year. In 2008, this figure rose to 83 and, by2009, the number had reached 122 rhinos. In 2010,poaching escalated dramatically throughout the year,near tripling the toll and reaching 333 rhinos killed. Thenumbers kept rising in 2011 (448 rhinos) and 2012 (668rhinos). In 2013 a sad record of 1,004 rhinos killed wasreported13 in South Africa, while other countries also re-ported cases of poaching of rhinos: India, Kenya, andMozambique (apparently the last known rhinos inMozambique were wiped out by poachers in 2013).

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13 Department of Environmental Affairs, Republic of South Africa, “Update on rhino poaching statistics’’, available at<https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/rhinopoaching_statistics_17jan2014>

Ivory in passenger’s luggage seized by Nigerian CustomsPhoto courtesy of Nigeria Customs

Rhinos and CITESThere are currently five species of rhinos existing inthe wild:

• The black rhinoceros is listed in Appendix I and isfound in sub-Saharan Africa. This animal has twohorns.

• The white rhinoceros is listed in Appendix I and isalso found in sub-Saharan Africa. However, thegeographical populations of a sub-species, in SouthAfrica and Swaziland, are listed in Appendix II (forthe exclusive purpose of allowing international tradein live animals to appropriate and acceptabledestinations and hunting trophies). This animal hastwo horns.

• The great Indian rhinoceros is listed in Appendix Iand is found only in Bhutan, India, Myanmar andNepal. This animal has a single horn.

• The Javan rhinoceros is listed in Appendix I and isfound only in Indonesia and Malaysia. The animalhas a single horn.

• The Sumatran rhinoceros is listed in Appendix I andis found only in Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar andThailand. This animal has two horns.

The use of rhino hornIn the past rhinos were hunted for their horns to becarved and used as the handles of daggers. Yemenwas the main consumer of rhino horn for this purpose.Today rhino poaching is fuelled by the growingdemand of rhino horns in Southeast Asia, in particularVietnam and China. The rhino horn is used as aningredient in traditional medicine. The use began inChina several thousand years ago and later spread toJapan, Korea and Vietnam. Rhino horn is classified asa “heat-clearing” drug with detoxifying properties14.Rhino horn has not been well researched but it isbelieved to cure fevers. Unlike the horns of many otheranimals, rhino horn contains no bone whatsoever.Rhino horn consists of keratin which is the keystructural component of human hair and nails. Morerecently rhino horn has been promoted by some as acancer treatment in Vietnam. It is believed that theconsumption of powdered rhino horn, dissolved inliquids, will halt the progress of cancer. However, themost popular usage appears to be as a cleansingdrink to soothe a hangover resulting from over-consumption of alcohol.

Smuggling of rhino hornAlthough rhino poaching and smuggling also occurs inAsia, this part focuses on the smuggling of rhino horn

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Rhino horns detected by Czech Customs Photos courtesy of Czech Customs

14 “Assessment of Rhino Horn as a Traditional Medicine”, CITES SC62, Doc. 47.2, April 2012.

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from Southern and Eastern Africa to Asia. The vastmajority of rhinos are illegally killed in South Africa, inparticular in the Kruger National Park, borderingMozambique.

Mozambique and South Africa were the top departurecountries for smuggled rhino horn. The main destina-tion was Vietnam, followed by Hong Kong (China)and China.

Air passengers' personal luggage was the most com-mon concealment of smuggling rhino horn. It is com-mon for several horns to be smuggled by one courier.During a luggage inspection of passengers en routefrom Mozambique to Vietnam and China, officers ofthe Mozambique Revenue Authority at Maputo Airportdetected more than 50 kg of rhino horn. In some casesthe rhino horn was cut into smaller pieces in the hopethat this would avoid detection. One passenger con-cealed pieces of rhino horn in his underwear. Customsin Kenya, Thailand and Vietnam seized additionalrhino horn carried in air passenger luggage fromMozambique.

The biggest seizure was made by Hong KongCustoms in August 2013. Acting on intelligence pro-vided by China Customs, Hong Kong Customs moni-tored two suspicious containers shipped from Nigeria.Upon arrival in Hong Kong Customs officers detainedthe two containers, declared as containing timber, forinspection and detected 13 rhino horns (37.2 kg) to-gether with 1,120 ivory tusks (2,229 kg) and five piecesof leopard skin inside 21 sealed wooden crates at therear of one of the containers.

Czech Republic: illegal trade in rhinohorns – abuse of hunting licence15

Customs and Police authorities in cooperation with theEnvironmental Inspectorate conducted investigationsinto extensive cases of illegal trade in rhino horns.During the enquiries, it was established that Czech cit-izens without previous hunting experience and withouta gun licence (“pseudo hunters”) had been recruited bypeople linked to the Vietnamese community, had beenpaid for a hunt and subsequently had given up theirtrophies in favour of the organisers. In the course ofthe investigation, a total of 22 rhino horns worth a hun-dred million Czech crowns (approx. EUR 3.7 million)were seized.

In connection with the so called “pseudo hunting”problem, South Africa has introduced new rules(norms and standards for rhino hunting of April 2012)which entered into force after the misuse of hunting li-cences by people with no hunting experience.

Unfortunately, the most recent cases show a muchwider abuse of the system. Cases in the CzechRepublic indicate that not only the “pseudo hunters”but also the so called “bona fide hunters” (verified inaccordance with the norms and standards – regularmembers of hunting associations with previous expe-rience and gun licences) do not have in their posses-sion the imported rhino horns. This suggests that therhino horns imported by some of the Czech “bonafide” hunters are being traded as well.

One of the latest cases involves a hunter who huntedrhinos in April 2013 in South Africa. The hunter in ques-tion is a regular member of a hunting association andholds a gun licence (he even trades in gamekeepers'guns). The South African authorities checked this per-son according to the norms and standards. The importof a trophy and two rhino horns occurred in August2013 at Frankfurt Airport. In December 2013, theCzech Customs Authorities at Prague Airport detectedillegally exported rhino horns. Two rhino horns wereconcealed inside a shipping container labelled as“wiring accessories” which was intended for exportfrom the Czech Republic to Vietnam. The horns werecarefully covered with a plastic film, resin, asphalt foiland electric wires. In the same container there was

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15 Information provided by the General Directorate of Customs.

also a bear gallbladder which is also used as a “tradi-tional Chinese medicine”. The rhino horns were seizedand the investigation is ongoing.

The above cases and information show that the mereownership of a hunting licence in a hunting associationdoes not guarantee that the hunter will comply with theterms of hunting licences, will retain the trophy as per-sonal property and will not sell it. On the contrary, thecurrent situation clearly suggests that Vietnamesetraders operate directly within the hunting community,where their clients are being recruited.

The available information indicates that other EUMember States might also be affected by an extensiveabuse of hunting licences.

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16 Challender, D.S., Hywood, L., “African pangolins in Asia”, TRAFFIC Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2012.

Illegal trade in pangolins

Pangolins, insect eating mammals (also known asscaly anteaters), are common in Asia and Africa. Theyare slaughtered by the thousands for their meat andscales.

Pangolins and CITESAll eight species of pangolin are listed on Appendix IIof CITES. The Asian species include the ChinesePangolin, Sunda Pangolin, Indian Pangolin andPhilippine Pangolin and the African species include theGiant Pangolin, Ground Pangolin, Tree Pangolin andLong-tailed Pangolin.

The use of pangolinIn Asia pangolins are mainly poached to meet demandfor their meat and for the use of their scales, made ofkeratin, like rhino horns, in traditional medicines. Thekey consumers are in China and Vietnam. The meatfrom pangolin foetuses is considered a delicacy. InAfrica the animals are hunted for their meat, which areeither consumed or traded as wild meat, and for theirscales, which are used for cultural and ethno-medicalpurposes, including in traditional African medicine16.

Pangolin meat seized by Hong Kong CustomsPhoto courtesy of Hong Kong Customs

Pangolin scales seized by Cameroon CustomsPhoto courtesy of Cameroon Customs

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Case Birdie17

In October 2011, the investigation officers of VaasaCustoms received intelligence information that aperson under investigation had business transactionswith a Finnish man based in Ostrobothnia. Thebusiness between the two men involved some birdeggs collected from the natural environment and theirimport/export between Finland and Sweden.

Vaasa Customs filed a report of an offence in the matterand set up a team for the preliminary investigation ofthe case. In addition to investigation officers from VaasaCustoms, the team included an investigation officerfrom Turku Customs and a biologist from the Centre forEconomic Development, Transport and the Environ-ment for South Ostrobothnia.

A search was conducted in the living quarters and busi-ness facilities of the suspect, resulting in the seizure ofabout nine to ten thousand empty bird eggs along withabout 70 stuffed animals, mostly birds. Furthermore, afreezer containing almost 200 dead animals, most ofwhich were birds, was found in the suspect’s businessfacilities. Customs also seized an egg of the birdAepyornis maximus, which had been acquired from

SmugglingMembers in Asia reported the biggest seizures of livepangolins and pangolin meat. In August 2013 VietnamCustoms discovered more than six tonnes of livepangolins inside a maritime container shipped fromIndonesia. In two separate incidents Hong KongCustoms seized 5,565 kg of pangolin meat at theairport. One shipment with 4,633 kg of pangolin meatarrived from Indonesia, while the other shipment with932 kg of meat and 312 kg of pangolin scales wasshipped from Singapore. Occasionally pangolin meatis seized at European airports from air passengers andair cargo arriving from Central Africa.

During a rescue mission of a Chinese fishing vessel inApril 2013 the Philippines Coast Guard discoveredmore than ten tonnes of frozen pangolins in the cargohold of the vessel. The Chinese crew claimed that thevessel was returning to China from Malaysia.

In order to meet the high demand for pangolin scalesin Asia, to be used in traditional medicines, pangolinsare poached in Africa and the scales are smuggled toAsia. To harvest one kilogram of scales three to fouranimals are killed. The scales are mainly shipped byair cargo, express courier and carried by passengersfrom Central and Western Africa to China and HongKong (China). Customs at major European airports, inparticular at Brussels Airport, Frankfurt Airport andParis Charles de Gaulle Airport reported dozens ofseizures of pangolin scales en route from Africa toAsia. Several hundred kilograms of pangolin scalesdestined for Asia were seized by Customs officers atairports in Cameroon and Mali. In October 2013, theKenya Revenue Authority impounded 534 kg of pan-golin scales discovered in a container from Uganda enroute to Malaysia.

54

17 Information provided by Finnish National Board of Customs.

Stuffed birds seized during an investigation by Finnish CustomsPhoto courtesy of Finnish Customs

Madagascar. The egg in question is of the elephant birdwhich became extinct in Madagascar approximately400 years ago. The export of these eggs fromMadagascar is strictly forbidden by the country’s legis-lation.

The investigation has found that the suspect collectedthe eggs of protected birds from their naturalenvironment for several years when birds werehatching and emptied the eggs whose contents rangedfrom early-stage embryos to more developed chicks.The eggs were collected in Finland, Sweden, Norway,Iceland, Estonia and the United States. The activity ofthe suspect was at its busiest in 2009, and the last timehe collected eggs was in 2011 just before he wascaught. In Finland, the suspect collected bird nests invarious locations including nature reserves.

The investigation has revealed that the suspect tooksome of the eggs to similar collectors in Sweden andimported collections of bird egg clutches and individualegg clutches bought from collectors in Sweden andother countries.

The activity had been sustained for years, which re-quires extensive skills. The suspect did not have a per-mit from any authority to collect, possess, import or ex-port bird eggs. Moreover, he did not have a permit toreceive or possess protected birds or other animals ortheir parts or derivatives.

Some of the concerned bird species are subject toCITES legislation, and some of them are protected bythe Finnish Nature Conservation Act. As the activity ofthe suspect has obviously been illegal, all animalspecies removed from their natural environment aswell as their derivatives will be subscribed indemnityvalues based on the decision by the Finnish Ministryof the Environment. These advisory indemnity valuesare meant to compensate the damage caused to thenatural environment through the criminal offence. Thebird eggs seized from the suspect total a final indem-nity value of around EUR 600,000. The indemnity sys-tem used in Finland is exceptional in the global con-text, and has attracted a great deal of attention in thecountries cooperating in the investigation.

Some of the birds found in the suspect’s freezer weresent to Evira (the Finnish Food Safety Authority) for

55

ENV IRONMENT


examination. According to statements from Evira,some of the birds had been killed by shooting.

The international examination into the legal status ofthe Aepyornis maximus egg is still underway. The eggwas imported in breach of tax regulations, as VATshould have been paid for it as regards its trade priceand freight. In this respect, Finnish Customs is con-sidering the imposition of taxes in the matter.

In September 2012, Customs seized about 700 birdeggs from the possession of a man living in theUusimaa region in connection with the investigation. Inaddition, a few stuffed birds were seized. It becameapparent in the preliminary investigation that the manin question had stuffed and sold a few dozen birds ofprotected species. For this investigation, the indemnityprices set by the Ministry of the Environment amountsto approximately EUR 100,000.

This suspected criminal case is exceptional in Finlandand noteworthy within Europe. The case uncovered inFinland is a part of trans-national crime which can betraced to the United Kingdom and extended to Swedenand Finland.

Consideration of charges in the matter took place in2013. The legal proceedings will be highly interesting inmany respects because there is no precedent of a caseof similar scale in Finland, and because it concernsextensive legislation and the operations of variousauthorities. The diversity of expert statements alonesays a lot about the case, as statements have beenrequested from the Finnish Environment Institute, theFinnish Wildlife Agency, the Centre for EconomicDevelopment, Transport and the Environment for SouthOstrobothnia, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,the Ministry of the Environment, Evira and theUniversity of Helsinki, to name a few parties.

An efficient preliminary investigation is greatly hin-dered by the fact an aggravated type of commission isnot provided for by legislation as regards nature con-servation offences. The criminal case in question hasalso been introduced to the incumbent Minister ofJustice, and it remains to be seen if any necessarychanges will be made to the legislation on environ-mental protection and crime.

55

5656

20 Years of Dedication towards Conservation:Biodiversity, Cultural and National Heritage Protection Branch of Sri Lanka Customs18.

18 Information provided by Sri Lanka Customs.

Biodiversity, Cultural and National Heritage Protection Branch of Sri Lanka CustomsPhoto courtesy of Sri Lanka Customs

The Biodiversity, Cultural and NationalHeritage Protection Branch of Sri LankaCustoms commemorated its 20th anniver-sary on 17 July 2013. It is the world’s firstspecialised office within a Customs admini-stration with the specific task of safeguard-ing the environmental and cultural heritageof a country.

Sri Lanka is recognised as a BiodiversityHotspot. The rich archaeological and cul-tural heritage of Sri Lanka, dating back to2,500 years ago, is now threatened severelyby trafficking. It is a national, as well as aglobal, responsibility of Sri Lanka to takeadequate steps towards conserving its richbiodiversity and cultural heritage.

Against this backdrop, Sri Lanka Customstook the initiative to establish a specialisedunit called the Biodiversity Protection Unit

(BPU) in 1993, which is now recognised asthe Biodiversity, Cultural and NationalHeritage Protection Branch (BCNP), func-tioning under the Enforcement Cluster ofSri Lanka Customs. The legislative power toact on trans-boundary environmental andarchaeological crimes was provided to theBCNP through the provisions of theCustoms Ordinance (Chapter 235) No. 17 of1869, as amended.

While it rendered expert assistance to otherStates' agencies in conducting investiga-tions related to wildlife crime, BCNP wasinvolved in many seizures including sandal-wood, sea horses, endangered plants,CITES-listed species and pangolin scales,etc. In addition, numerous artefacts whichare of archaeological and cultural impor-tance, such as ancient coins, pottery, sta-tues, cloths and manuscripts, were seized

during the attempt to smuggle them out ofthe country. BCNP uses self-developed riskprofiles, databases and identification manu-als as resource materials when conductinginvestigations. It is proposed to set up amini-laboratory to conduct essential analy-sis. BCNP’s achievement towards environ-mental protection has been recognised onmany occasions, including receiving anEnvironment Success Story award. Thefounder of the BPU, Mr. R.S. Gunasekara,who is presently the head of the BCNP, re-ceived the President’s Environmental Award– 2004 for outstanding contribution to theenvironmental sector.

The BCNP organised a forum for gap analy-sis, comprising the Customs, Forest, Wildlife,Quarantine, Fisheries and ArchaeologyAgencies etc. to discuss issues arising at thetime of import and export of biodiverse andarchaeologically important articles. As aresult, important decisions were made tostreamline existing legal gaps to effectivelycombat trans-boundary wildlife and archaeo-logical crimes. In addition, the BCNP con-ducts officer training, research, publicationand raises public awareness to prevent en-vironmental crimes and facilitate legitimatetrading. Furthermore, the BCNP maintainsa substantial repository of artefacts com-prised of wildlife products and archaeolog-ically important articles seized over the past20 years. Some of those specimens arenot even available in the National Museumof Sri Lanka. The unique collection of con-fiscated items will be put on public displayin the Customs Museum which is scheduledto be opened shortly.

ILLEGAL LOGGING ANDILLEGAL TRADE IN TIMBER

It is widely accepted that forests are under severepressure from logging and illegal trade in timber, mostlydriven by strong demand from developed countriesand emerging economies. The illegal timber trade maytake many forms, such as violations of CITES, at-tempted bribery, duty or tax evasion, exports in viola-tion of licensing, and/or the production of fraudulentdocuments both in exporting and importing countries.There have been some reports indicating the involve-ment of trans-national organised criminal groups withsophisticated methods operating on an industrial scale,widespread corruption, as well as semi-legitimate largecompanies involved in unethical activities. The illegallogging and timber trade not only damage the envi-ronment, but also result in reduced profitability for thelegal trade, loss of government revenue and foreign in-come. Illegal logging operations have also, in somecases, involved violence and threats against indige-nous people. Deforestation also threatens many en-dangered species, such as great apes. The majority ofillegal logging takes place in the forests of the Amazonbasin, Central Africa and Southeast Asia. Primary im-porters of illegal logs or wood products are alleged tobe China, Japan, the EU and the USA.

There is no international convention controlling thetrade in timber, although some timber species fall un-der the CITES Convention. However, some countries(e.g. US Lacey Act) and the European Union (i.e. EU

Timber Regulation) have taken a number of unilateralmeasures to reduce illegal logging and exclude illegaltimber products from their markets.

Customs across the globe reported significant seizuresof timber. In Asia mainly red sandalwood (CITESAppendix II) was seized. In June during a trans-national controlled delivery operation involvingCustoms in China, Hong Kong,China and India, twotarget containers loaded with seven tonnes of redsandalwood were seized in Xiamen, China. A further19 tonnes of the logs were recovered in thesubsequent investigation by China Customs. BetweenOctober and November 2013, Singapore Customsworked together with the Agri-Food & VeterinaryAuthority and conducted a series of operationsresulting in the seizure of three containers of 45 tonnesof red sandalwood. The consignments were transitingthrough Singapore from India and were falselydeclared as “hot lime pickles” and “casting wheels”.India Customs managed to intercept four containerswith 132 tonnes of red sandalwood before they couldbe smuggled out of the country in October 2013. Anattempt to smuggle 1,055 kg of red sandalwood,concealed in the false bottom of a truck, from India toChina was foiled by Customs and police in Nepal. Inthe Port of Jebel Ali, UAE, Dubai Customs detectedseveral containers with red sandalwood en route fromIndia to the Far East.

In 2013 Mexico Customs seized 479 tonnes ofprotected rosewood in seaports across the country.The Port Control Unit in the Port of Manzanillo,

57

ENV IRONMENT


Red sandalwood concealed in carpets Photos courtesy of United Kingdom Border Force

57

58

Panama, established under the UNODC-WCOContainer Control Programme stopped five containerswith rosewood before their export to China and HongKong (China). In Iquitios, Peru, Customs officersintercepted several vessels loaded with protected andregulated timber.

Precious wood is not only smuggled in large quantitiesusing trucks, containers and vessels but also in aircargo, express courier and air passenger luggage. InJuly 2013, 725 kg of red sandalwood were seized atthe airport in New Delhi, India, from 29 passengers.The timber was recovered in the form of small cut logsfrom their luggage by Customs. This group of pas-sengers was about to board a flight to China. In thesame month 11 passengers carrying 308 kg of redsandalwood in their luggage were intercepted byCustoms at Mumbai Airport. Hong Kong Customs re-ported several seizures of red sandalwood from pas-sengers arriving on flights from India. Officers from theUnited Kingdom Border Force at London HeathrowAirport identified and intercepted several consign-ments with red sandalwood arriving from India. Theweight of the shipments ranged between 20 kg andnearly two tonnes. In most cases smugglers relied onmisdeclaration of goods. In two cases the logs wereconcealed in the middle of rolled up carpets. The con-signments were destined respectively to Greece, HongKong (China), and Portugal and the United Kingdom.

58

Operation Cullinan

Operation Cullinan, organised by the WCO, targetedmainly rough diamonds subject to the KimberleyProcess (KP) Certification Scheme – the trade in roughdiamonds is permitted between participants of theKimberley Process Certification Scheme only on thebasis of authentic KP certificates – and focused on airpassengers, postal and express courier shipments.

31 Customs administrations in Africa, Asia/Pacific,Europe and North America participated in this globalenforcement initiative. In the pre-operational phase,Portuguese authorities seized 9 kg of industrial dia-monds at Lisbon Airport. No additional cases were re-ported during the operational phase.

Rough diamonds are relatively easy to conceal (lowvolume and weight) and therefore difficult to detectduring Customs controls. The illegal trade in rough di-amond remains a challenge for Customs. A coordi-nated approach involving all stakeholders is requiredto tackle the illegal trade in rough diamonds.

59

ENV IRONMENT


ILLEGAL TRADEIN MINERALS

The illegal trade in minerals (i.e. tungsten, tin and tan-talum), gold and rough diamonds has a severe impacton governance, national security and the economic de-velopment of States.

• An illicit outflow/drainage of capital out of weakeconomies in different African states further limitstheir abilities to fight poverty and spur economicgrowth;

• The illegal profits generated may be used to fuelarmed conflicts, the activities of terrorists and ofrebel movements and the illicit trade in and the pro-liferation of arms with devastating consequences forthe governments and the societies in this regions;

• Illicit funds may be used to finance other criminalactivities such as drug trafficking;

• The investment of ill-gotten gains into legitimatemarkets undermines/weakens existing legitimatebusinesses and economic structures, and also hasthe criminal element of money laundering;

• Revenue losses.

59


As the intellectual property rights and health andsafety programme gathers the most diverse lines ofcommodities, including clothing, accessories, food-stuffs, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, spare parts,construction materials, electronics, etc., reportingcountries have come across a large spectrum of units(containers, cartons, packages, boxes, tablets,blisters, pairs, kilograms, metres, litres, etc.) whichhave all been converted into either pieces (the vastmajority of the cases) or kilograms according to theconversion guidelines set out in Appendix1.

INTRODUCTION

The statistical part contained in this Section outlinesthe main trends on a global scale in intellectualproperty rights (IPR) and health and safety field, onthe basis of seizures reported in CEN by 69 countries,either by direct entry in the CEN database or bysubmission of data files to the Secretariat. The reportalso takes into account the remarkable resultsobtained during Operation Biyela, which weresubsequently entered into the CEN database.

The data has been analysed, as in previous years, byreporting countries, types of commodities, brands,departure and destination countries, type of Customsseizure and seizure location.

SECTION 3.IPR, HEALTH AND SAFETYFor Customs enforcement in counterfeiting and piracy, 2013 became a year when counterfeit pro-ducts reported by Member countries hit the alarming level of 3 billion units, stressing the gravity ofthe situation. This tremendous increase in the number of counterfeit items is partly due to the suc-cess of two large-scale enforcement operations. Being aware that these figures represent only thetip of the iceberg, the Customs community and the WCO are determined to carry on their efforts incombating counterfeiting and piracy.

Machinery to manufacture counterfeit watches intercepted with manuals Photo courtesy of Uruguay Customs

1 For other details on how the data was gathered please refer to the Introduction of the Report.

ANALYSIS OF IPR SEIZURES

Reporting countries

Compared to 2012, a significant increase in the num-ber of countries reporting data (69 as opposed to 58last year), as well as the number of cases, has beenregistered (see Chart 1). Whereas there were 22,543registered cases in 2012, this figure came to 24,092 in2013. These cases account for a total of 3,044,750,738pieces and 1,023,376 kg of goods suspected of in-fringing intellectual property rights or failing to meet na-tional standards.

The United States remains the country reporting thehighest number of cases (7,554), accounting for 33.63percent of all cases, followed by Saudi Arabia (4,153)and Italy (3,145), whereas Germany registered a quite

significant drop compared with last year (1,543 in2013 and 2,602 in 2012). However, when analysingthe countries which reported the highest number of in-tercepted pieces (see Table 1), the situation changesdramatically, with Angola ranking first, and accountingfor almost 50 per cent of the total number of pieces(1,502,418,418), followed by the Democratic Republicof the Congo (1,115,343,026 pieces; 36%) and Togowith a distant third position (148,065,336 pieces;4.86%). This is due mainly to the significant detentionsin illicit medicines2 reported during Operation Biyela3.

Commodities

One of the striking features of 2013 data on counterfeitand piracy is that more than half of the reportedintercepts were illicit pharmaceutical products,followed by counterfeit electronic appliances and illicit

Chart 1. Top 15 countries by number of cases

7,6157,554

2,3774,153

1,7213,145

2,6021,543

1,1471,399

1,0131,009

United States

Saudi Arabia

Italy

Germany

Japan

Denmark

Spain

France

Hungary

Yemen

CzechRepublic

Qatar

Portugal

Morocco

Netherlands

1,300940

276447 289

242

1,080863

300276 224

242 128215 4

211

180224

2012 2013

2 Illicit medicines include, aside from counterfeit products, medicines that lack legal marketing authorisations or they are notcompliant with the national health regulations' provisions.

3 Please note that some of the cases listed in this report (mainly cases involving illicit medicines) will not be found in the excerptfrom the Biyela report as the latter does not take into account a number of cases which were not ultimately seized, but werenevertheless included in the CEN database.

62

foodstuffs – all of which threaten consumer health andsafety (see Table 2). When analysing the data in termsof quantity, pharmaceuticals are by far the mostnumerous commodity reported by WCO members with2,325,247,466 pieces accounting for 76.37 per cent ofall goods. It is a major change compared to last year,when pharmaceuticals accounted for only 10.21 percent. Again, this reflects the outstanding resultsobtained by countries in the West and South Africanregions during operation Biyela, mainly aimed attargeting and intercepting illicit medicines. Medicinesare followed by electronic appliances (470,821,728pieces; 15.46%) which indicates a dramatic increase incommodities endangering the health and safety ofconsumers. Many Customs administrations alsoreported counterfeit and piracy cases in toys, gamesand school supplies drawing much attention becauseof the potential health risk for children caused by sub-standard quality.

A significant number of seizures5 refer to commoditieslabelled as “Other” (ranking third in the top, 95,242,873pieces; 3.13%), covering various goods such asconstruction materials, glassware, furniture and

I PR

4 Countries not listed in the table for the year 2012 have not submitted data for the respective year.5 When analysing commodities, the reference is to ''seizures'' as opposed to ''cases'' as one case can contain multiple seizures,

i.e. multiple lines of commodity.

Table 1. Top 15 countries by quantity (pieces)4

Reporting country 2012 2013Angola - 1,502,418,418Democratic Republic - 1,115,343,026of the CongoTogo - 148,065,336Saudi Arabia 25,538,376 88,221,337Madagascar - 59,350,590Cote d'Ivoire - 26,357,613Kenya - 17,246,130United States 10,423,046 16,501,136Namibia - 10,271,468Benin - 8,869,200Cameroon - 7,454,520Nigeria - 6,240,000Italy 5,371,118 3,628,938Morocco 1,018,482 3,595,401Germany 1,125,386 2,996,214Total (out of 15) 43,476,408 3,016,559,327

Interception of anti-malarial medicines (Medik 55) by TogoCustoms (37,206,080 pieces)

Photo courtesy of Togo Customs

Toys intercepted by Panama CustomsPhoto courtesy of Panama Customs


74.5 kg of Tadalafil (patented ingredient for erectile dysfunc-tion medicine) was intercepted by Mexico Customs

Photo courtesy of Mexico Customs

musical instruments, etc. which were not included inthe standard list of commodities.

The value of the commodities listed in Table 2 must beinterpreted with caution as pricing policies differ fromcountry to country. Moreover, there were a number ofcases where the value was not specified in the data-base as it was either unknown or difficult to estimate.

Brands

IPR detentions in 2013 included the most diversepalette of counterfeit brands, amounting to over 1,000different trademarks. Nike came first in the top 15most counterfeited brands in 2013, as opposed to lastyears’ first place which was represented by Cialis (seeChart 2). Most of the brands in the top 15 this year arealso found in the equivalent ranking produced lastyear, with the exception of three new big playersemerging in 2013: Samsung, Michael Kors andOtterBox.

Whereas the first brand in terms of numbers of piecesis a cigarette one (Supermatch, due to a largeinterception carried out in Togo, during OperationBiyela6, a significant part of the brands rankedfollowing this criteria was represented by medicines(9 out of 15), followed by automotive industry (Honda),

Table 2. Type of commodity by quantity and value

Commodity Quantity (pieces) Value (USD) Quantity (pieces) Value (USD)2012 2012 2013 2013

Pharmaceutical products 4,140,318 14,405,404 2,325,247,466 19,388,693Electronic appliances 3,423,896 170,355,748 470,821,728 74,551,410Other 17,722,180 121,548,149 95,242,873 56,865,587Foodstuff 1,316,034 6,924,247 50,338,796 5,715,238Clothing 12,090,266 111,511,445 32,877,929 115,400,776Transportation and spare parts 4,120,790 27,887,278 17,957,325 13,945,339Cigarettes 47,322 214,095 17,636,183 21,819Accessories 6,712,922 426,677,500 10,079,064 229,781,652Games and toys 3,505,486 22,649,732 5,750,377 28,882,956Toiletries/cosmetics 3,268,255 60,318,717 5,663,822 65,590,057Mobile phones and accessories 1,736,595 21,293,090 3,783,787 24,427,504Footwear 2,352,318 69,881,973 3,139,816 112,530,010Computers and accessories 848,578 11,493,152 2,227,604 22,461,541Textiles other than clothing 4,106,207 8,653,485 1,716,023 7,916,642(towels, bed sheets etc.)Watches 602,911 391,236,132 1,510,171 229,694,582Phonographic products 3,929,684 6,483,568 736,330 6,112,419Soft drinks 0 0 11,580 22,168Alcoholic beverages 24,041 118,340 9,864 179,522Total 69,947,803 1,471,652,055 3,044,750,738 1,013,487,915

Counterfeit purses concealed in a passenger’s suitcasePhoto courtesy of Angolan Customs

6 As it was undertaken during Operation Biyela, this interception is included only in the IPR programme and it will therefore notappear in the Revenue Section.

64

clothing (Seven Towns and Modern) and cosmetics(MAC) (see Table 3). Again, this analysis supports thesignificant results generated by large interceptions ofpharmaceutical products during Operation Biyela.However, despite the alarming number of interceptedmedicines, clothing commodities and brands remainin top 5 of all ranking lists, whether the criteria is madeaccording to the number of cases, pieces or value.

I PR

Counterfeit Adidas T-shirtsPhoto courtesy of Czech Republic

Chart 2. Top counterfeit brands by number of cases

580

1,123826

867207

809103

631491

532530

497

Nike

Apple

Rolex

Samsung

Adidas

Louis Vuitton

Chanel

Cialis

Viagra

Gucci

Michael K

ors

Otterbox

Burberry

Mac Cosmetics

Walt Disney

313

464332

365 58285

1,604425

324307 113

223 319182

247182

240191

2012 2013

Table 3. Top counterfeit brands by reported quantity

Brand Quantity (pieces)Supermatch 40,000,000Medik-55 37,206,080Zmc Hamburg Gmbh Germany 32,232,000Cefalex 20,718,770Dr.Cold 20,718,770Trama Z 20,718,770Enacure 20,718,770Zentral 20,718,770Dexacot 20,656,669Diabetaz 20,656,665Honda 15,033,671MGM 12,519,000Seven Towns 12,484,800Modern 10,270,000MAC cosmetics 9,306,458Duracell 8,636,779Total 322,595,972


Chart 3. Departure country by number of cases

9,735

11,158

5,3035,954

670957 211

504430

50197

501

China

Hong Kong, China

India

Singapore

United Arab Emirates

Pakistan

Turkey

Egypt

Hungary

Morocco

Bangladesh

United States

ThailandIta

ly

546

484 193326

237400 450

284 18230

228217

228205 96

201

2012 2013

Departure countries

In 2013 China emerged again as the main departurecountry for counterfeit goods when analysing data interms of number of cases, accounting for almost half ofthe total number of cases (411,158 cases; 6.31%), fol-lowed by Hong Kong, China (5,954 cases; 24.71%) andIndia (957 cases; 3.97%). This outcome is very similar tothe previous year’s statistics, as Chart 3 demonstrates.

However, India ranks first when it comes to thenumber of pieces of goods (2,203,272,337 pieces;72.57%) as a result of large consignments ofmedicines, intercepted at import by countries in Africaand the Middle East in particular. India is followed byChina (639,203,975 pieces; 21.05%) and the UnitedArab Emirates (68,550,167 pieces; 2.26%). Pleasesee Table 4 for more information.

Destination countries

In 2013, the United States remained the first country ofdestination by number of cases (6,332 cases; 30%).

Table 4. Departure country by quantity ofdetained commodity

Departure country Quantity (pieces) Quantity (pieces)2012 2013

India 2,435,416 2,203,272,337China 41,161,278 639,203,975United Arab Emirates 5,237,593 68,550,167Vietnam 1,583,263 58,490,574Hong Kong, China 3,172,602 10,057,133Hungary 462,752 2,060,126Saudi Arabia 417,926 1,937,442Nigeria 161 1,849,416Indonesia 1,851,248 1,847,550Poland 113,690 1,736,216Turkey 1,265,863 1,585,382Taiwan, 168,349 1,364,091Province of ChinaMalaysia 91,231 1,049,687Bangladesh 219,870 1,017,062Belgium 944,670 944,670Total 59,125,912 2,994,965,827

66

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Chart 5. Number of cases by Customs procedure

19,608

1,688

977

125

21,019

2,087

871

Import

Transit

Internal

Export

115

2012 2013


These figures support the results listed in the analysisof the data on reporting countries as most often thereporting country is the country that intercepted thegoods, i.e. the destination country (there are very fewcases of transit and export detentions reported byCustoms administrations, as shown in the “CustomsProcedure” paragraph further below). As Chart 4 demon-strates, the United States is followed by Saudi Arabia(4,168 cases; 19.75%) and Italy (3,103 cases; 14.71%).

In terms of number of pieces, Angola and DemocraticRepublic of Congo rank first and second as destina-tion countries (1,502,418,418 pieces; 49.97% and1,115,343,366 pieces; 37.10% respectively), reinforc-ing the above mentioned outcome.

Seizures by Customs procedure

As Chart 5 demonstrates, in 2013, the largest part ofseizures of counterfeit goods took place at import(87.27%; 21,019 cases), followed by transit, with adistant second position accounting for 8.66 per cent(2,087 cases).

Chart 4. Destination country by number of cases

7,076

6,332

2,3814,168

1,5453,103

1,1491,399

2,1701,105

1,0071,004

United States

Saudi Arabia

Italy

Japan

Germany

Denmark

Spain

France

Hungary

Venezuela

CzechRepublic

Poland

Yemen

Qatar

Portugal

1,283970

305431

401311

999825

85386 310

311 223242

187233

296279

2012 2013

Location of seizures/detentions

Around 44 per cent (10,605 cases) of all cases wereintercepted in mail centres, followed by airports (5,603cases; 23.2%) and seaports (5,127 cases; 21.28%),very similar figures to the ones registered last year(see Chart 6).

Packaging and concealment methods

Regardless of the type of products, the packaging ofcounterfeit items often features some common traits:items wrapped with transparent vinyl film with no logo,bundled together with a rubber band in batches of 10or 20 items and squashed into cheap cardboardboxes, often beyond their capacity. They also come asconsolidated cargo apparently to reduce the risk of thewhole container being seized. Hiding counterfeit itemsbehind cover loads or deep inside the container is acommon practice as well. These recurrent patterns

were continuously observed in 2013. There were alsoseveral cases where offenders attempted to concealand smuggle fake medicines in a discreet manner.

Domestic assembly

Ironically, the more Customs intercept illicit itemsat the borders, the more effort counterfeiters put in

Chart 6. Detention location by number of cases

10,921

10,605

3,562

5,603

5,0755,127

1,5141,495

8881,000

231131

Mail centre

Airport

Seaport

Inland

Land boundary

Rail

Unknown

Border of Free Trade Zone

Other

River

137

114 382

3013 2

2

2012 2013

An attempt to conceal 5,000 units ofcounterfeit medicines in air-filter ma-chines

Photo courtesy of Hungarian Customs

68

to avoid intervention. Domestic assembly is one of themost popular ways for offenders to try to circumventCustoms. Common practice is that small parts,shaped as a brand name, and blank products(sunglasses, wallets, hair accessories etc.), are im-ported separately, in the hope that at least the blankproducts will be cleared. It is also an often observedpractice for multiple electronic parts, some with logosand some without, to be imported along with apparentmanuals for putting together products such aswatches and flat-screen TVs. These shrewd practices,though in different product categories, turned out tobe popular and widespread across different parts ofthe world.

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Pirated computer software discs in simple cardboard boxesPhoto courtesy of Finland Customs

Typical way of packaging counterfeit productsPhoto courtesy of Mexico Customs

Inspector of Chile Customs found approximately 300,000 plasticlogos of a famous optical brand along with sunglasses which didnot carry logos

Photo courtesy of Chile Customs

Combating Counterfeitingand Piracy:WCO Activities and Tools

Determined to protect consumers’ healthand safety, the WCO continues to combatcounterfeiting and piracy through the fol-lowing activities and tools.

1. Large-scale OperationsThe WCO organises simultaneous en-forcement activities with multiple CustomsAdministrations. The Operations intend togauge the scale of global counterfeitingwhilst providing participating Customs offi-cers with hands-on experience. In 2013WCO organised two large-scale operations:Operation Biyela in Africa and OperationTigre 3 in Latin America. The impact of thesubstantial level of intervention in a short

space of time sends a strong messageboth to offenders and the general public.

2. National/regional seminarsThe WCO delivers extensive capacity-building activities mainly in the form oflegislative/operational training seminars.In 2013, the WCO conducted trainingseminars for officers of 75 memberAdministrations.

3. Interface Public Members (IPM)Since its launch in 2010, IPM has sup-ported the operational activities of frontlineCustoms officers in detecting counterfeitproducts. In 2014, the IPM mobile appli-cation will be introduced and is expectedto further assist officers on the ground.

4. Counterfeit and Piracy Group MeetingThe biannual WCO Counterfeiting and

Piracy Group (CAP) meetings provide aplatform for Customs and related law en-forcement agencies to exchange informa-tion, experiences and best practices oncombating counterfeiting and piracy.

5. Right Holders Consultative GroupWCO member Administrations exchangebest practices and opinions with the pri-vate sector twice a year during the RightHolders Consultative Group.

6. E-learning moduleUsing the WCO’s Internet-based E-learningmodule, Customs officers can acquirepractical knowledge on border enforcementrelated to IPR. They can train themselveson IP-related agreements such as theTRIPS agreement and practical risk-based document targeting.


SenegalDakar

GambiaBanjul

GuineaConakry

LiberiaMonrovia

Côte d’IvoireAbidjan

GhanaTema

TogoLomé

BeninCotonou

NigeriaLagos

CameroonDouala

GabonLibreville

Rep. of the CongoPointe Noire

Dem. Rep. of the CongoMatadi

AngolaLuanda

MozambiqueMaputo

KenyaMombasa

TanzaniaDar es Salaam

MoroccoCasablanca

MadagascarAntananarivo

NamibiaWindhoek

South AfricaLe Cap

DjiboutiDjibouti

AlgeriaAlger

OPERATION BIYELA

Operations are key to the WCO's activities in the IPRsector, especially for products raising health andsafety concerns. The objective is to join efforts to com-bat counterfeiting and piracy more effectively throughenhanced enforcement methods and best practices.Operations are also an opportunity to use WCO toolssuch as CENcomm, a secure communication tool forthe exchange of information, and IPM, an online data-base of product information designed to help Customsofficers distinguish between fake and genuine goods,and to potentially detect smuggling trends through theanalysis of results.

Operation Biyela was a joint enforcement Operationled by 23 African countries. Through its focus on fakemedicines and other dangerous counterfeit products,Operation Biyela aims at protecting consumer healthand safety.

‘Encircle’ offenders

The Operation was named Biyela from the Zulu wordmeaning ’encirclement’ to reflect the geographicalcoverage of the operation along the coasts of Africa.The Operation was rolled out in two phases. Phaseone consisted of a pre-Operation 3-day workshop inLomé, Togo. During this time, a selected number ofCustoms officers from all participating countries wereprovided with in-depth training techniques. Phase two,the actual Operation, took place over 10 days in April2013 in the main seaports of participating countries,with the previously trained Customs officers and theirassigned WCO IPR-accredited expert.

Following the 10-day Operation, participating Customsadministrations intercepted 1,135,302,8837 pieces ofillicit products. Pharmaceutical products accounted foraround 49 per cent, and electronic appliances forabout 40 per cent of the total amount of interceptedgoods. These two categories of goods, with a total of

7 Please note that some of the cases listed in the statistical part of this Report (mainly cases involving illicit medicines) will notbe found in this Section as the latter does not take into account a number of cases which were not ultimately seized, but werenevertheless included in the CEN database.

Customs officers in action duringthe Operation

Fraudulent goods were oftenfound at the back of containers

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1,016,366,373 units intercepted, account for about 89per cent of the total amount intercepted, while theremaining 11 per cent are divided into 14 categories ofproducts (see Table 5).

During Operation Biyela countless types of pharma-ceutical products were intercepted (see Table 6). Topof the list includes antibiotics, diet supplements, anti-malaria pills, painkillers and anti-inflammatory treat-ments. Clearly, no medicine is safe from counterfeiting.Whatever the treatment, there is always a risk for themedicines to be counterfeit. Even more frightening isthe fact that the most infringed product categories arethe ones that ordinary people use for general pur-poses in their daily lives.

Faced with the dangers of counterfeit medicines,victims no longer account for a small portion of thepopulation – everyone is at risk.

Modus Operandi

As in other types of Customs violations, offenderstrying to trade counterfeit products use every possibleway to avoid intervention. In Operation Biyela variousmethods were observed. Putting counterfeit goodsdeep in the container or behind legitimate goods is oneof the most classic and easy ways of trying to deceiveCustoms. False import/export declarations is also awidely popular method. Further to these traditionalconcealment schemes, new types of modus operandican be observed. Sending parts of counterfeit itemsand assembling them domestically is one of these newtrends.

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Electric appliances intercepted in DRCPhoto courtesy of the Customs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Sweets intercepted in TogoPhoto courtesy of Togo Customs

Table 5. Types of goods by quantity seized

Type of goods Quantity (pieces)Pharmaceutical products 558,608,805Electronic appliances 457,757,568Cigarettes 50,270,000Foodstuff 31,095,792Transportation & spare parts 16,270,970Other 14,442,327Accessories 2,028,070Toiletries/cosmetics 1,944,601Mobile phones & accessories 1,156,041Textiles 642,262Watches 459,000Phonographic products 267,400Clothing 184,244Games & toys 134,184Footwear 38,789Computers & accessories 2,830Total 1,135,302,883

Table 6. Types of medicines by quantity seized

Drug category Quantity (pieces)Antibiotics 73,472,400Dietary supplements 47,688,330Anti-malaria treatment 37,206,080Painkillers 24,396,090Anti-inflammatory treatment 23,656,669Diabetes treatment 20,904,665Allergy treatment 20,660,645HIV/AIDS treatment 2,100,000Epilepsy treatment 1,000,000Blood pressure/cholesterol/heart 665,700Other/unknown/unspecified 306,858,226Total 558,608,805


INTERFACE PUBLIC MEMBERS(IPM)

Since its launch in 2010, the WCO online anti-counter-feiting tool IPM has become a real communication hubbetween Customs officers on the ground and the privatesector by allowing them to exchange crucial informationin real time in order to intercept counterfeit goods.

During the last year, IPM welcomed some 20 newMember countries thereby confirming its strongerinternational visibility and added value in the fightagainst counterfeiting. Increasingly attracting morecountries, IPM now counts 71 Members and manyothers regularly express their interest in implementingthe system in their countries.

The increase in the number of Members can also beexplained by the launch of the mobile application,scheduled for 2014. Field Customs officers will accessIPM via their mobile devices and retrieve all relevantinformation contained in the database. Several newfeatures have been added to the mobile version suchas the possibility to send or receive alerts regardingthe possible shipment of counterfeit goods and, whenfaced with suspicious merchandise, Customs officerscan contact right holders immediately and uploadphotos of the products in question.

This new version also offers the possibility to usemobile devices to scan industry-standard GS1

barcodes found on millions of products, enablingCustoms officers to search the product database in amore time-efficient manner. The unique productidentifier embedded in the GS1 bar code will facilitateaccess to multiple databases providing trustedsources of product information.

Furthermore, scanning the barcodes will enableautomatic connection to any authentication serviceslinked to the product controlled. This new feature isknown as IPM Connected – a global network ofsecurity features providers (SFP) interfaced with IPM.To date, IPM counts over 10 Connected solutions andthis number is increasing steadily. With this growingnetwork of SFP, the number of right holders to joinIPM is also seeing a boost with over 700 brandscurrently in the system, covering a wide range ofindustry sectors from pharmaceutical, foodstuffs andpesticides, to fast-moving goods and luxury items.

For further information and latest news please visit theIPM website www.wcoipm.org

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APPENDIX. UNIT CONVERSION RULES

In the original data, various units (e.g. piece, unit, pair, kg, litre, drum, carton, box, set, etc.) were used to reportthe quantity of seized/detained goods. For the convenience of analysis, these units have been converted into (1)pieces and (2) kg in accordance with the following rules.

(1) Pieces

• 1 pair, set (of gloves, earrings, footwear, socks, jeans, etc.) = 1 piece

• 1 tablet (of pharmaceutical products) = 1 piece

• 1 blister (of pharmaceutical products (e.g. Viagra)) = 4 tablets = 4 pieces

• Square metres (of textile products) 100 metres = 1 piece

• 1 bottle (of perfume and other toiletries) = 1 piece

• 1 box, carton, container, etc. =a) Take the average price of similar goods in the same country (if not applicable, the regional average and if

not, the global average) in the same year per piece in US dollars (e.g. 10 USD per piece for commodity A).b) Calculate the price of the item in question per unit (e.g. 1,000 USD per box of commodity A).c) Divide the value calculated in b) by a) and obtain the estimated quantity of the item (e.g. 1,000 divided by

10 = 100 pieces).d) If the figure calculated in a) is smaller than the figure in the original unit, then take the original unit as

a piece.

• For the conversion of liquids (litres), the following rules apply:a) If perfume, 100 ml = 1 bottle = 1 piece. 1 litre =10 pieces of perfume.b) If shampoo, 200 ml = 1 bottle = 1 piece. 1 litre = 5 pieces of shampoo.c) If soft drinks, 500 ml = 1 bottle = 1 piece. 1 litre = 2 pieces of soft drinks.d) If spirits or wine, 750 ml = 1 bottle = 1 piece. 1 litre = 1.33 pieces of spirits.e) If ethyl alcohol or motor oil, 1 litre = 1 bottle = 1 piece.f) If refrigerant for a car, 350 ml = 1 bottle = 1 piece.

• 1 packet (of cigarettes) = 20 piecesFor tobacco products, the following rules apply:a) Calculate the value per piece (tobacco is reported in pieces)b) If the value calculated in a) is below 1 USD, it could be one cigarette stickc) If the value a) is between 4-10 USD, 1 piece could be 1 packet (= 20 cigarette sticks)d) If the value a) is around 80 USD, 1 piece would be 1 carton (= 10 packets = 200 cigarette sticks)

(2) Kg:

• 1 metric ton = 1,000 kg

• 1 drum = 200 kg

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finance terrorist or other trans-national criminalactivities.

Customs is therefore required to implement effectiverisk management and control strategies to mitigatethreats that may hinder fair and efficient revenue col-lection and result in increased smuggling. In order toeffectively prevent and detect commercial fraud andother forms of illicit trade, a strategic and multi-facetedapproach, including capacity building and internationalcooperation, needs to be implemented.

INTRODUCTION

Trade liberalisation and the increasing number of free-trade agreements and free-trade zones have addedcomplexity to the international trading system. Everyday more perpetrators of commercial fraud are takingadvantage of vulnerabilities presented in the multi-modal transportation systems and emerging compoundtrade patterns to execute a variety of schemes, causingnot only significant financial damage to thegovernment’s budget, but also inhibiting the economiccompetitiveness of compliant traders. The proceeds ofthese crimes can also serve as a potential source to

SECTION 4. REVENUERevenue risks in the Customs context include leakage through the smuggling of highly taxedgoods such as tobacco, alcohol and motor spirits. They also include commercial fraud activitiessuch as undervaluation, misuse of origin and preferential duties, misclassification and drawbackfraud. The ability to effectively assess and collect legally due revenue remains a high priority forCustoms administrations across the globe.

Photo courtesy of Lithuanian Customs

Under the umbrella of the Revenue Programme,various initiatives have been launched to provideguidance or to support the operational activities ofWCO Member administrations in a broad range ofsectors. These sectors have a direct or indirect impacton fair and efficient revenue collection, as well ascompliance and enforcement efforts in relation tosmuggling and other areas of commercial fraud andmoney laundering. This Section will highlight recentdevelopments in selected areas, with a primary focuson tobacco-related issues.

ILLICIT TRADEIN TOBACCO PRODUCTS

General remarks

Illicit trade in tobacco products is defined in Article 1 ofthe World Health Organization’s (WHO) FrameworkConvention on Tobacco Control as “any practice orconduct prohibited by law and which relates to theproduction, shipment, receipt, possession, distribu-tion, sale or purchase of tobacco including any prac-tice or conduct intended to facilitate such activity”1.

The growth in the illicit trade in tobacco remains aworrying worldwide phenomenon and an enduringsource of funding for other illicit activities thatundermine our societies, good governance and therule of law. A number of studies, including information

supplied by the global Customs community, indicatethat the illicit market may account for as much as onein every ten cigarettes smoked across the globe.

Where goods are highly taxed and easily portable,such as cigarettes, smugglers, rogue traders, crimi-nals and other opportunists will take advantage of anyweaknesses in Customs, revenue or other controls toamass illegal profits. Moreover, their activities hindergovernments’ efforts to fund and protect public health.

This Section of the Report aims at providing a globaloverview of illicit trade in tobacco products particularlyhighlighting current and emerging trends in this do-main, to support future-orientated risk analysis and toassist Members in their anti-smuggling efforts.

Another important focus is to present initiatives un-dertaken by Members, RILOs and other internationalpartners to counter this scourge by exchanging valu-able information.

As in the other Sections of this Report, figures arebased on data available in the WCO CEN databaseon seizures carried out over the last two years. Theproduction of any analytical report depends on thequality and quantity of the data made available.

The information provided to the CEN database doesnot permit the production of in-depth threat assess-ments at a global level. Nonetheless, the data basis issufficient to identify trends and to highlight particular

76

1 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, World Health Organization 2003, updated reprint 2004, 2005, available athttp://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/

Seizure of 240,000 cigarettes hidden in the structure of a lorry Photos courtesy of Brazilian Customs

issues which can provide support for policy anddecision makers, as well as field officers.

It is important to note that the increase with regards tothe statistics for 2012 is namely due to the inclusion ofadditional data for seizures made in 2012 which wereinput into the CEN database after the publication ofthe previous analysis on tobacco included in the 2012edition of the Report.

To complete the picture, short case studies andcountry highlights on the situation concerning illicittrade in tobacco products in several countries wereadded.

Seventy-five Members provided seizure informationinto the CEN database for 2012 and ninety-oneMembers supplied data for 2013. This evidences theincreasing commitment of WCO Members to share theresults of their interventions to facilitate strategic andoperational analysis on illicit trade in tobacco products.

Global overview of illicit trade intobacco products

Cigarettes and cigarsFor the first part of the global overview, cigarettes andcigars and cheroots have been grouped together asthese types of tobacco products are reported in pieces(see Table 1). It is important to point out that one casemay include seizures of different commodities (in thecase of cigarettes this may also include seizures ofdifferent brands of cigarettes that constitute one case).Therefore, the number of seizures, which representsthe number of times a particular commodity wasseized, provides a more accurate picture.

As observed from Table 1, there has been an in-crease in the number of reported seizures for ciga-rettes, from 5,574 seizures in 2012 to 6,564 seizuresin 2013, indicating a growth of nearly 15 per cent.However, the increase in the quantities seized is notproportional to the increase in the number ofseizures. This could evidence a trend of smallerseizures being reported.

In terms of cigars and cheroots, the number of re-ported seizures almost doubled in 2013, nonethelessthe quantity of seized pieces dramatically decreased

from 2,673,971 in 2012 to only 517,396 pieces in2013. In particular this decrease can be explained dueto six large seizures between 200,000 and 460,000pieces reported by Brazil, Spain and Italy in 2012,whereas in 2013 only three seizures between 100,000and 190,000 pieces were reported.

Other tobacco productsA separate categorisation has been made for othertobacco products (other than cigarettes and cigarsand cheroots) which, due to their nature are reportedin terms of quantities seized in kilograms (see Charts1 and 2).

One of the most notable trends is a significantincrease in the seized quantity of chewing tobacco,which in 2012 amounted to 7,997 kg compared to37,844 kg reported in 2013, reflecting an increase ofnearly 5 times. This trend was already observed in the2012 edition of this report where an increase in figuresfrom 2011 to 2012 was noted.

Concerning the reported seizures of cut filler, only 4cases were reported in 2013. A remarkable decreasecan be noted in terms quantities seized from 9,517kg seized in to 2012 to only 56 kg in 2013. This dueto the fact that in 2012 a very large seizure of 9tonnes of cut filler was made in Sydney, Australia.

For hand rolling and pipe tobacco an increase in thenumber of seizures in 2013 can be noted, but a slightdecrease in the quantity seized should also behighlighted. For example, the UK reported that part-processed tobacco imported from the Far East and, toa greater extent, from Eastern Europe is used mainlyfor the production of counterfeit hand rolling tobacco(HRT). In relation to methodology, increasingly morecomplex methods are being adopted by smugglers toavoid detection, from the use of more sophisticatedconcealments to the smuggling of smaller but morefrequent amounts.

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REVENUE


Table 1. Cigarettes, cigars and cheroots

Type of 2012 2013tobacco Number of Quantity Number of Quantityproduct seizures (pieces) seizures (pieces)Cigarettes 5,574 2,568,583,011 6,564 2,703,823,441Cigars, 39 2,673,971 68 517,396cherootsTotal 5,613 2,571,256,982 6,632 2,704,340,837

When turning to figures for raw tobacco, a largeincrease in the number of seizures and quantitiesseized can be evidenced (159 cases with a totalquantity of 2,258,964 kg in 2013). When analysing thedata more in depth, it becomes clear that thisexponential increase is due notably to five very largeseizures made by Poland, Czech Republic, Argentina,the UK and South Africa. Of these five large seizuresthe most significant one was made by the UK, whichamounted to 1,200,000 kg of raw tobacco.

When observing the reported figures of smokingtobacco, there was a significant increase from282,629 kg in 2012 to 1,433,780 kg in 2013, in spiteof the fact that the number of reported seizuresdecreased immensely from 1,628 in 2012 to 780 in2013. When reviewing the reported seizuresindividually, this fact can be attributed to eight verylarge seizures reported in 2013 which accounted for1,141,430 out of the total of 1,433,780 kg, or about 80per cent. Most of these large seizures have beenreported as inland and land boundary seizures.

Finally, for water pipe tobacco a significant increasein the number of seizures can be observed but it is notevident in the total quantities seized; this is due to thefact that many seizures of 1 kg or less have beenreported, which was not the case in 2012.

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Chart 1. Other tobacco products:number of seizures

343

5

505

46 16

3344 159

1,628

780

182

Chewing tobacco

Cut filler

Hand rolling

and pipe tobacco

Raw tobaccoSmoking

tobacco

Water pipe tobacco

Chart 2. Other tobacco products:quantity (kg)

7,99

7

37,8

44

9,51

756

1,32

11,

196

83,8

27 282,

629

68,5

93

75,0

56

2,258,964

Chewing

tobacco

Cut filler

Hand rolling

and pipe tobaccoRaw tobacco

Smoking tobacco

Water pipe tobacco

1,433,780

2012 2013 2012 2013

Seizure of water pipe tobaccoPhoto courtesy of UAE Customs

Different categorisations ofcigarette seizures

In order to provide a more detailed analysis on thesituation of reported seizures of cigarettes severaldistinctions have been made. The first group relatesto seizures of cigarettes which have been reported asregular brand cigarettes (excluding counterfeits). Thisincludes ‘cheap whites’ as well as seizures registeredin the CEN system as ‘unknown’ or in which detailsconcerning the indication of authenticity have beenleft blank.

Another distinction is made for cigarette seizures aboveand equal to 100,000 and below 100,000 pieces. Anoverview will be provided in terms of seizures ofcigarettes which have been reported as counterfeit andfinally a brief section on “cheap whites” will follow.

All reported cigarettes seizuresexcluding counterfeitsChart 3 demonstrates the top 5 reporting countries bythe number of reported seizures. It is important to notethat Italy has doubled its seizure reports whencompared to 2012, having become the top reportingcountry in 2013.

Following Italy, Poland and the Russian Federationare evidenced as the second and third highestreporting countries respectively. For 2013 it is

important to note a significant increase in seizuresreported by Brazil, Latvia, the United Kingdom,Argentina and Belarus when compared to the numberof cases reported in 2012.

It is also noteworthy to highlight that South Africaappears as a high and newly reporting country for 2013.

For the top 10 departure countries for cigarettesseizures (see Chart 4) a more or less consistent in-crease is observed in all featured countries.

The top three identified departure countries in 2013were Tunisia, closely followed by the Ukraine, RussianFederation and Belarus.

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REVENUE

Chart 3. Top 5 reporting countries:number of seizures

1,702

1,411

257

963 974

429332

287 324

Italy

Poland

Russian

Federation

Germany

Lithuania

359

2012 2013


Chart 4. Top 10 departure countries:number of seizures

496

476

399

278

276

206 26

0 305

139

158 22

214

1

162

125

132

73 125

195

122

72

Tunisia

Ukraine

Russian

FederationBelarus

Poland

Moldava

ChinaEgypt

Greece

Algeria

2012 2013

Seizure of 101,020 cigarettes concealed in a carPhoto courtesy of Uruguay Customs

It is interesting to note an increase in incidenceswhere China, Poland, Moldova and Algeria have beenidentified as departure countries. There is still a largequantity of seizures where the departure country wasindicated as unknown.

Table 2 shows seized cigarettes by location both bynumber of seizures and by quantities seized. In 2013,the majority of reported seizures were made at landboundaries, inland and at the airports.

It is worthy to note that there was an increase ofseizures detected at seaports in 2013, with 855reported compared to 698 in 2012. However, thequantity in pieces seized decreased by 363,839,726pieces in 2013. In terms of seizures made at airportsin 2013, they increased threefold when compared with2012, but this did not have a significant impact interms of the quantities seized.

A significant reduction of cases which were reportedas ‘unknown’ or ‘other location’ should be highlightedas well. In total in 2012, 259 seizures were reportedunder these two categories, and in 2013 only 24seizures account for these categories. This reflects animportant improvement in the quality/accuracy of thedata in terms of the reported locations.

Cigarette seizures (excluding counterfeits)above and equal to 100,000 piecesIn order to add more granularity to the data that is beinganalysed, a distinction has been made for cigaretteseizures reported above and equal to 100,000 pieces.

An important feature of this analysis is based on thepremise that there were many reported cases wheremore than 100,000 pieces were seized along withsmaller quantities of other products, meaning that onecase includes different seizures. Therefore, a moresolid proxy would be to focus the analysis not on thequantity of cases, but on the number of seizures.

As is evidenced in the Table 3, the largest quantitiesseized quantities seized were reported by Uganda in2013, followed by Poland and the United Kingdom.

In terms of the concealment methods for seizuresabove and equal to 100,000 pieces (see Table 4), in2013 the highest detection rates and amounts wereobserved in freight and transport. This is consistent

with what was observed during 2012 and is usuallydue to the space required in order to conceal theselarger amounts of cigarettes.

It is important to highlight an increase in cigarettes notbeing concealed, where seizures doubled in 2013. Interms of the quantities seized there was a 46 per centincrease in this category.

An emerging trend that is worth pointing out is theappearance of “mail” as a new concealment methodfor large quantities. In 2012 this method was notobserved while in 2013 it was observed twice.

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Table 3. Top 10 reporting countries for cigarettesabove and equal to 100,000 pieces

Reporting 2012 2013country Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (pieces) seizures (pieces)Uganda 12 5,142,200 22 599,326,000Poland 335 259,425,794 305 243,090,076United 36 192,211,760 107 195,001,060KingdomGreece 24 296,545,475 18 160,664,600Germany 106 124,861,476 88 128,143,405Italy 176 315,841,100 103 125,048,620Brazil 12 22,944,350 134 105,892,180Spain 123 229,302,440 40 102,631,240Panama 0 0 5 96,743,800France 1 108,000 19 71,879,859

Table 2. Cigarettes by location:number of seizures

Location 2012 2013Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (pieces) seizures (pieces)Land boundary 1,201 324,270,823 1,592 989,108,041Seaport 698 1,294,245,668 855 930,405,942Inland 2,771 681,903,006 2,923 616,131,549Rail 102 19,491,515 119 66,536,766Unknown 259 140,494,974 24 41,089,670Mail centre 23 1,659,200 68 24,333,466Airport 337 11,060,864 933 13,704,657Other location 141 83,565,291 17 7,504,650High seas 4 324,200 3 7,242,060River 18 6,708,000 22 6,236,660Border offree-trade zone 20 4,859,470 8 1,529,980Total 5,574 2,568,583,011 4,324 2,703,823,441

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REVENUE


Table 4. Concealment method for cigarettesabove and equal to 100,000 pieces

Concealment 2012 2013method Number of Quantity Number of Quantity

seizures (pieces) seizures (pieces)In freight 333 1,032,814,860 320 1,448,032,753In transport 714 713,300,026 667 745,939,880Not concealed 110 150,387,585 191 220,266,200Unknown 141 382,569,240 105 85,811,680In premises 133 119,042,997 138 81,574,019In baggage 51 17,307,580 38 9,699,986In mail 0 0 2 6,269,560On the person 1 448,600 4 2,050,880Recovered from 9 1,839,800 4 860,000sea/beachOn market 6 6,572,135 4 770,680placesForest cover 0 0 1 118,000Total 1,498 2,424,282,823 1,474 2,601,393,638

Table 6. Concealment method for cigarettesbelow 100,000 pieces


seizures (pieces) seizures (pieces)In transport 1,930 77,591,961 1,768 39,693,447In freight 123 13,815,257 63 28,055,540In baggage 672 8,914,793 1,221 11,174,695In premises 370 8,013,054 764 10,543,146Unknown 511 27,648,806 652 6,544,813Not concealed 339 6,510,935 204 4,483,347In mail 35 517,870 77 877,883On the person 20 475,450 68 551,532On market 72 632,262 270 402,900placesRecovered from 4 179,800 3 102,500sea/beachTotal 4,076 144,300,188 5,090 102,429,803

Cigarette seizures (excluding counterfeits)below 100,000 piecesTable 5 outlines the top 10 reporting countries forseizures below 100,000, and the countries are rankedin terms of quantities. Italy appears to be the highestreporting country both in terms of the number ofseizures, as well in the quantity seized. Their reportedseizures nearly doubled but the increase in the seizedquantities was not very significant.

In terms of the concealment methods for reportedcases below 100,000 pieces, the largest amountswere found in transport during 2013, amounting to atotal of 39,693,447 (see Table 6). This remains con-sistent with what was observed in 2012.

The following two most recurrent methods of con-cealment are in baggage and premises in terms ofthe times that they have been detected, but not interms of quantities. The second most predominantmethod of concealment in terms of quantity is infreight, which shows that, despite the decrease in thenumber of times these amounts have been found, thequantities seized have practically doubled to a totalof 28,055,540 pieces in 2013.

Table 5. Top 10 reporting countries for cigarettesbelow 100,000 pieces


seizures (kg) seizures (kg)Italy 787 29,567,458 1,599 33,943,468Poland 639 13,463,722 1,106 12,302,175Lithuania 251 8,222,260 307 12,180,160Montenegro 3 30,280 4 6,585,120Germany 323 8,515,351 244 5,473,967Hungary 190 5,897,984 169 5,092,112Estonia 51 1,698,640 194 3,914,610Ukraine 195 3,014,595 81 2,183,800Latvia 7 452,820 83 2,094,559Czech Republic 107 1,742,960 104 1,863,400

Seizure of 2,813,000 cigarettes concealed in wood beamsPhoto courtesy of Czech Customs

Counterfeit cigarettesCounterfeit cigarettes are to be considered as thosemanufactured illegally bearing a trademark without theowner’s consent. They can be sold directly in thecountry of production or smuggled into another coun-try. The phenomenon of counterfeit cigarettes hasbeen present for several years and was highlighted inthe 2012 edition of this Report.

Other significant seizures of counterfeit cigaretteshave been detected in the context of the IPR-relatedoperation, Biyela, for which more detail can be foundin the IPR section of this Report.

Table 7 presents all the reporting countries for coun-terfeit cigarettes: these have been outlined byseizures where counterfeit products have been found,due to the fact that in many of the reported casescounterfeit and regular or unknown types of cigaretteswere seized together.

The reported occurrences, as well as the quantities, ofcounterfeit cigarettes dropped dramatically in 2013.This is explained by the fact that the United Stated re-ported 99 out the 133 seizures in 2012, whereas therewere no reported seizures of counterfeit cigarettes bythe United States in 2013. In terms of the quantitiesseized, in 2013 Belgium ranked first with a total of34,604,000, followed by Italy and Spain.

The largest seizure of counterfeit cigarettes in 2013was reported by Belgium with a total of 14,854,000pieces of counterfeit “Marlboro” cigarettes, detected inthe seaport of Antwerp. The second largest seizurewas reported by Italy, amounting to 10,400,000 piecesdetected in the seaport and determined to be infringingthe brand “Palace”.

As was highlighted in the 2012 edition of this Report,“Marlboro” continues to be the most counterfeitedbrand. For 2013 it accounts for the highest number ofseizures and 56 per cent of total reported quantity ofcounterfeit cigarettes (see Chart 5). It is followed by“Palace” with 14 per cent and followed closely by aseizure which accounts for 12 per cent or 10,250,000pieces where the brand was not reported.

Taking into consideration the previous explanationconcerning the general decrease in terms of seizuresand quantities of seized counterfeit cigarettes in 2013,

the most frequent locations where they were foundwere at seaports and inland (see Charts 6 and 7). Incomparison with 2012, the data on locations was moreaccurate and no unknown locations were reported.

For the seizures reported in 2013 the majority ofseized counterfeit cigarettes, both in terms of numberof seizures and quantity, were detected in freight – atrend that is consistent with the figures for 2012 (seeTable 8). The next two large categories are detectionsof counterfeit cigarettes concealed in transport, as wellas in premises.

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Table 7. Reporting countries for counterfeitcigarettes


seizures (pieces) seizures (pieces)Belgium 2 25,440,000 3 34,604,000Italy 6 15,637,000 4 14,155,800Spain 6 28,205,600 2 11,948,800Netherlands 2 1,732,000 4 8,724,000Austria 1 5,617,940 2 8,507,600Malta 1 7,590,000 1 4,470,000France 4 115,801 1 2,199,200Slovakia 1 5,542,300 1 2,140,000Poland 1 600,000 1 483,200Germany 1 9,000,000 2 20,738Burkina Faso 1 12,000 0 0United States 99 40,423,739 0 0Lebanon 1 8,940,000 0 0Czech Republic 3 2,804,444 0 0Estonia 4 8,589,080 0 0Total 133 160,249,904 21 87,253,338

Chart 5. Top 6 reported counterfeit brands in 2013

Palace 14%

Marlboro Light 3%

LD 4%Marlboro 56%

Not reported 12%

Richman 11%

Cheap or illicit whitesThe “cheap whites” phenomenon has been describedin previous editions of this Report, and theirappearance in markets has been identified to dateback to more than a decade ago. When referring tothis type of cigarettes, they are to be understood asbranded cigarettes, legally produced by independentproducers established in various regions of the world.These products are legally produced in themanufacturing country and are legally exported, butrepresent a challenge when imported into someintended destination countries.

During the OLAF’s 18th Task Group CigarettesConference, held from 11th-14th November 2013 inBucharest, Romania, the delegates tried to identify acommon definition for cheap whites. The text agreed bythe Working Group was: “Cheap whites are cigarettesmanufactured legitimately in one country where theymay have a domestic market or may not have a marketat all in the EU, but are smuggled into or sold illegally inanother country/market, where they do not have the li-cence to be sold legally.” This definition is not an officialEU position, and is not intended to have a legal value,but to bring a common understanding of the issue.

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Chart 6. Counterfeit cigarettes by location:number of seizures

22

11

811

9

11

16

3

72

00

SeaportInland

Land boundary

Airport

Unknown

Mail centre

2012 2013

Chart 7. Counterfeit cigarettes by location:quantity (pieces)

30,105,938

25,024,505

326,

476

2,19

9,20

0

20,4

00

54,927,800

5,547,868

476,047

25,335,162

00

103,539,846

Seaport

Inland

Land boundary

Airport

Unknown

Mail centre

2012 2013

Table 8. Concealment method for counterfeitcigarettes


seizures (pieces) seizures (pieces)In freight 19 94,330,196 8 53,076,800In premises 6 14,404,684 6 17,800,800In transport 12 11,288,480 4 16,354,200In baggage 1 10,000 3 21,538Not concealed 9 187,986 0 0Unknown 15 39,582,911 0 0In mail 71 445,647 0 0Total 133 160,249,904 21 87,253,338

Illegal production of cigarettesPhoto courtesy of Spanish Customs

It has been pointed out that in some cases it is noteven possible to buy cheap whites legally on the do-mestic market of the manufacturing country. They aretherefore smuggled via similar routes and patternsused by smugglers of traditional branded cigarettes.

The most common brand of cheap whites is “Jin Ling”.It is produced in Russia (Baltic Tobacco Factory,Kaliningrad), Ukraine and Moldova. In 2013 therewere 241 seizures of “Jin Ling”. Another popularcheap whites brand is “Raquel” (whose manufactureris based in Cyprus, while there seem to be additionalproduction sites in several other countries).

Case studies and country highlights

Extra-inspective smuggling1The extra-inspective smuggling of tobacco productsconsists of introducing cigarettes onto Italian territoryby avoiding border-crossings controlled by Customs,and essentially introducing them by sea aboardspeedboats coming directly from the Adriatic coast ofthe states of the former Yugoslavia.

This phenomenon seemed to have ended in the year2000, when the level of danger and aggression ofsmuggling organisations generated a strong militaryresponse which was able to shut it down completely.However, in 2013 the Italian Guardia di Finanzacarried out specific and complex investigations whichevidenced a possible resurfacing of this phenomenon.

The investigations highlighted the existence of a cri-minal association comprised of Montenegrin andItalian citizens engaged in international cigarettesmuggling using powerful boats leaving from theMontenegrin island of Sveti Nikola to land on theAdriatic coast.

In particular, eight responsible individuals werearrested on the spot and 1.3 tons of cigarettes as well

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as four powerful boats were seized. Evaded dutieswere assessed at EUR 230,000. The subsequentinvestigations and actions coordinated by the localAnti-mafia District Directorate included 40 orders ofpreventative detention for criminal association inexecuting a cigarette smuggling scheme.

Smuggling of contraband cigarettes usingluxury cars2In 2013, 15 offenders were caught attempting to smug-gle contraband cigarettes into Singapore using luxurycars. The offenders concealed the contraband ciga-rettes in modified compartments of their luxury cars as-suming that luxury vehicles would less likely bechecked by enforcement officers at the checkpoints. Inone of these cases, a Singaporean man was caught at-tempting to smuggle 318 cartons of contraband ciga-rettes in a Singapore-registered Mercedes Benz atWoodlands checkpoint. The cigarettes were concealedin a modified compartment of the car. The duty andGST3 evaded amounted to more than US $24,000.

“Ants-moving-home”4The illicit trade in cigarettes became increasingly so-phisticated with infiltration of the supply chain net-works. Instead of keeping large local warehouses tostock up illicit cigarettes, syndicates applied the “just-in-time” concept for fast delivery of smuggled ciga-rettes to different parts across Hong Kong. In effect,illicit cigarettes of different brands were first pre-sortedaccording to advance orders. Upon being smuggledinto Hong Kong, they were immediately disseminatedby local vehicle fleets to distributors in different re-gions of Hong Kong for sale on the black market.

To evade detection by Customs, syndicates usuallymix-loaded illicit cigarettes among general cargoes,or used false compartment in containers for conceal-ment. For passenger couriers, they mainly adoptedthe “ants-moving-home” tactic to bring in illicit ciga-rettes by mix-loading with personal belongings orbody-packing.

1 Information provided by Guardia di Finanza, Italy.2 Information provided by Singapore Customs.3 GST is a broad-based consumption tax levied on the import of goods (collected by Singapore Customs). GST is the equivalent

of Value Added Tax (VAT).4 Information provided by Customs and Excise Department, Hong Kong, China.

Operation Romoluk5Operation Romoluk is a joint international Customsoperation which took place from April to May 2013,with the participation of the Moldovan, Romanianand Ukrainian Customs authorities, OLAF, Frontex,EUROPOL and EU Border Assistance Mission toMoldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), as well as theRomanian Border Guard Service.

In the context of this Operation, aimed at thecounteraction of illegal movements of tobacco andalcohol products, the Ukrainian Customs made aseizure of 12,730,000 pieces (1,273 boxes) ofcigarettes (Brendal and Camri brands) that weremoving from Poland and Slovakia to Moldova by transitvia Belarus and Ukraine. The aforementioned tobaccogoods were imported in Belarus from Poland on 2 April2013 and left for temporary storage at the Customscontrol zone. On 11 April 2013 these goods wereimported in Ukraine, however as the accompanyingdocuments regarding the addressee of the goods werefalsified, the cigarettes were seized.

Tobacco smuggling trends6Latvian Customs has reported that the most frequentlyused carriage for smuggling tobacco products is inlorries, usually equipped with special compartmentsfor concealing the goods (double/fake walls and floor)or using cover loads such as timber cargos, as wellas in sea containers (providing false informationregarding the cargo contents). The trend observedover the last three years is that smuggled cigarettes ofBelorussian origin tend to be carried by rail, e.g. byhiding them in coal cargos (about 20 cases weredetected in 2013).

Cigarettes arriving by sea from countries such asChina, are usually smuggled and predominantlycounterfeit. It is also important to highlight that thenumber of seizures, as well as the number ofconfiscated excise goods units, in the Riga Free Porthas increased.

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5 Information provided by the State Customs Service of Ukraine.6 Information provided by the Latvian National Customs Board.

A seized speedboat used to smuggle cigarettesPhoto courtesy of Italian Guardia di Finanza

Concealment of contraband cigarettes using modified fueltank of the Mercedes Benz car

Photo courtesy of Singapore Customs

PROJECTS AND OPERATIONS

Operation Gryphon

Operation Gryphon, the first global Customs-centricoperation tackling illicit trade in tobacco, was launchedby the WCO on 1 October 2013 as a six-monthsmonitoring project aimed at addressing the globalthreat posed by illicit trafficking in tobacco and tobaccoproducts.

Ninety-three Member administrations participated inthis global effort in monitoring trans-boundaryshipments of tobacco products; they providednotifications on exported shipments which pose a highrisk of being illegal or being diverted, provided feedbackagainst information received from other parties andreported all seizures of tobacco products. The WCOnetwork of 11 RILOs supported the operation in theirroles as regional Operational Coordination Units,effectively covering all six WCO regions.

In addition to its general objectives, the Operation hasbeen divided into three specific focus areas or phases(each for a period of two months) to target specific

risks. The first phase aimed at the identification ofdiverted equipment, chemicals, papers and othermaterials involved with the illicit production of tobaccoproducts; the second phase focused on monitoringabuses of Duty Free licences and reporting controls;controls in ships stores (e.g. ships/aircraft/lorries/privatevessels) and in free zones; and the final phase focusedon identifying the smuggling of tobacco products via theInternet, mail and express consignments.

Operation Gryphon serves as a prime example of in-ternational Customs cooperation which has resultedin significant seizures and the identification of poten-tial vulnerabilities and best practices when engagingin such large scale efforts.

The crucial role of the global RILO network has alsobeen evidenced. During the operational phase,important information generated at national level wasswiftly shared/handed over via CENcomm by the RILOsin the relevant regions. RILOAP, capitalising on their vastexperience with similar long-term regional tobaccoinitiatives has taken a principal role in the implementationof Operation Gryphon, displaying extraordinary diligencein sharing information and intelligence.

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Map 1. Countries participating at the Operation Gryphon

Participating country

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Data collected throughout Operation Gryphon will beanalysed in detail in order to provide a global overviewof the scourge of illicit trade in tobacco and tobaccoproducts. Nonetheless, it is important to mention thatseizures reported during the first trimester of this

Operation have been taken into consideration for theglobal figures contained in this edition. Trends andpatterns identified during this initiative will be reportedin the 2014.

Seizure highlights

Chile:Seized: 10,062,000 cigarettesCover load: glasswareConveyance: vessel (commercial-container ship)

Belgium:(not part of the operation)Seized: 30,298,000 cigarettes(counterfeited-brands: Marlboro, Palace and L&M)Cover load: noneConveyance: container (commercial-container ship)The seizure by Belgian Customs was made based on riskprofiling and intelligence sharing by RILO AP.

Zimbabwe:Seized: 15,930,000 cigarettes (4 full train wagons)Cover load: timber, eucalyptus gum poles conveyance: rail train

Spain:Seized: 9,180,000 cigarettesThe container number wasduplicated (using stickers).One container was filled withstones; the other containerwas packed with cigarettes.Conveyance: vessel(commercial-container ship)

1 2

3

4

Operation GryphonPhotos courtesy of Zimbabwe Customs

Operation GryphonPhotos courtesy of Spanish Customs

Project Crocodile

Project Crocodile aims to trace suspicious cigaretteshipments through a mechanism of export and arrivalnotifications. In 2004, RILO AP coordinated theinception of Project Crocodile and serves as theregional intelligence hub for the initiative. Currently, thisProject has a membership of 22 Memberadministrations including Australia, Bangladesh,Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Fiji, Hong Kong(China), Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Macau (China),Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Pakistan, PapuaNew Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka,Thailand and Vietnam. In 2013, RILO AP managed 599export notifications and 259 arrival notificationsconcerning suspicious cigarette shipments. Whenshipments involved other non-AP countries, RILO APalerted the relevant RILO region, capitalising on theRILO networks Customs-to-Customs coordinationcapabilities. Through this project, Customs admini-strations effectively monitored cigarette shipments andsuccessfully countered cigarette smuggling in the APregion. In 2013, members reported seizures of 56.5million cigarettes and 9,700 kg of tobacco leaves.Through an intelligence exchange with RILO WesternEurope regarding suspicious shipments, Belgiumseized 30 million cigarettes from Singapore and Chinain November 2013.

Member Testimony to Project Crocodile -Hong Kong CustomsThe Project is a platform for multi-lateral cooperationamong Customs administrations in the Asia-Pacificregion to fight against transnational illicit cigarette andtobacco products smuggling. In 2013, the successfuldetection of a cigarette smuggling case valued atover USD 0.4 million in Manila, the Philippines was aprime example which illustrated how ProjectCrocodile, an effective common cooperation platformcoordinated by the RILO AP, facilitated differentCustoms administrations to fight the battle againsttrans-national smugglers.

Acting on intelligence provided by the UK’s HerMajesty’s Revenue & Customs, a suspicious cigaretteshipment was being targeted and monitored by threeWCO AP members, namely, China Customs, HongKong Customs and the Philippines Customs, and onenon-WCO member, Taiwan, under Project Crocodile.The shipment was first exported from North Korea and

after calling on two ports in China, it transited throughTaiwan where it was examined. Taiwan Customs foundfake cigarettes inside the containers, but did not seizethem because “counterfeits-in-transit” was not liable toforfeiture under local laws. Hong Kong Customs wasmade aware of the situation and closely monitored theshipment while it continued its voyage from Taiwantransiting through Hong Kong and subsequentlyreaching the Philippines. Hong Kong Customs quicklyalerted their Customs counterparts, includingPhilippines Customs and the RILO AP, providing themwith the details of the shipment through the intelligenceplatform of Project Crocodile. The coordination,cooperation and communication demonstrated byRILO AP and their Customs counterparts led to theidentification and disruption of this cigarette smugglingcase in Manila, Philippines.

The commendable outcome reflected the enthusiasmof the WCO Member administrations and wasattributed to their concerted efforts, mutual cooperationand timely exchange of information, which is the basisfor the international community when working togetherto crack down on trans-national cigarette smugglingactivities.

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Seizure of cigarettes concealed in water heatersPhoto courtesy of Hong Kong Customs

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INITIATIVES

The WHO Protocol to Eliminate IllicitTrade in Tobacco Products

The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in TobaccoProducts was adopted on 12 November 2012, duringthe Fifth Session of the Conference of the Parties ofthe Framework Convention on Tobacco Control(FCTC) of the WHO held in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

The Protocol was developed in response to the growinginternational movement of illicit trade in tobaccoproducts and aims to combat the illegal trade intobacco products through control of the supply chainand enhanced international cooperation, therebyprotecting people around the world from the health risksof tobacco, ensuring that all Customs, excise and othertax revenues due are collected and accounted for, andreducing the burden on national health systems.

In its preamble, the Protocol stresses that Parties shalltake "into account that effective action to prevent andcombat illicit trade in tobacco products requires acomprehensive international approach to, and closecooperation on, all aspects of illicit trade..."7. It makesspecific reference to enhanced cooperation betweenthe Convention Secretariat, UNODC, WCO and otherbodies, as appropriate.

Several areas within the mandate and expertise of theWCO, including the development of effective enforce-ment strategies for the control of cross-border move-ments of goods, people and conveyances, its leadingrole in securing the international supply chains, andthe provision of technical assistance to its Members,are of high significance for raising awareness of theProtocol and its implementation upon entry into force.

Initial cooperation between the Convention Secretariatand the WCO has occurred, particularly during thenegotiations of the Protocol and following its adoption,and demonstrated the potential benefits of suchcollaboration in the interest of the Parties to the WHOFCTC and to the Protocol. The WCO and the FCTCSecretariat will continue to explore ways of enhancing

such cooperation in raising awareness of the Protocoland its relevant provisions among national Customsauthorities, and promoting multi-sectorial dialogue andcoordination between health, Customs and otherrelevant sectors, in view of assisting countries in theprocess of ratification and entry into force of theProtocol.

By the end of April 2014, the Protocol had fifty-foursignatories and one ratification.

The Protocol will enter into force on the 90th dayfollowing the date of deposit of the 40th instrument ofratification.

WCO Assessment Questionnaireon the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Tradein Tobacco Products

Considering the relevance of the WHO Protocol forCustoms administrations and their activities to fight il-licit trade in tobacco, the WCO Secretariat wished toobtain a clearer picture on the level of awareness ofthis instrument and its potential implications amongstits Members, and therefore prepared and circulated aquestionnaire in July 2013.

The questionnaire intended to touch upon key aspectsof the Protocol, particularly provisions related to sup-ply chain control, offences and international coopera-tion. This was done with the aim of assessing theMembers’ current situations and identifying potentialgaps. The final part of the survey was aimed at ob-taining information on the capability of our Members toestimate the scale of illicit trade in tobacco products.

Feedback was received from 87 Members across the6 WCO regions. The highest percentage of repliescame from Europe, followed by East and SouthernAfrica, South America, North America, CentralAmerica and the Caribbean, and the Far East, Southand South East Asia, Australasia and the PacificIslands. A lower percentage of replies were receivedfrom North Africa, the Near and Middle East and Westand Central Africa (see Table 9) .

7 Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, World Health Organisation 2013,http://www.who.int/fctc/protocol/about/en/

The survey results evidenced a general interest fromMembers in ratifying the Protocol. In the run up to theratification, respondents indicated that the mostprominent leading authority was the Ministry of Health.Nevertheless, Customs would potentially be moreinvolved in the process of implementing the Protocolafter it enters into force.

The majority of Members declared that they hadaccess to statistics regarding the domestic productionand consumption of tobacco and that they were ableto track and trace the supply chain of tobaccoproducts, mostly by using their Customs declarationsystems.

On the one hand, a high number of Customsadministrations indicated that they had a possibility tomaintain records of imports and exports of tobaccoproducts and tobacco manufacturing equipment. Onthe other hand, the majority of respondents pointed outthat they did not have information concerning thedomestic production of tobacco manufacturingequipment. With regards to retail sales of tobaccoproducts via the Internet, the survey showed that theywere allowed in a large number of jurisdictions.

Concerning the questions related to control provisionson the manufacturing and transactions of tobaccoproducts in free zones, 33 countries indicated theexistence of a system of control, while 22 countriesconfirmed that that a system was in place, but was notnecessarily effective.

The majority of administrations replied positively to thequestion concerning the existence of a control systemfor recording duty free sales of tobacco products andfor the supply of tobacco products in ship stores.

Results also evidenced that the illicit trafficking oftobacco products is subject to both criminal and

administrative laws in a great number of countries,but only half of the respondents indicated to havethe authority/procedure in place to conduct “con-trolled deliveries”.

The vast majority of Customs administrations repliedthat they had the legal authority to share informationrelated to the supply chain of tobacco products withother administrations.

Most countries responded that they considered thecounterfeiting and smuggling of cigarettes as a highpriority. As to the capability to evaluate the size andthe scale of the revenue losses associated with thiscriminal phenomenon, only half of the participantsreplied positively.

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Table 9. Survey response results

North of Africa, West and East and South America, Europe Far East, SouthNear and Central Southern North America, and South East AsiaMiddle East Africa Africa Central America Australasia and

and the Caribbean the Pacific IslandsTotal number 17 23 24 31 51 33of countriesNumber of 2 4 9 12 41 12responses

Seizure of 3,000,000 cigarettes declared with a false HS codePhoto courtesy of Uganda Customs

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ILLICIT TRADEIN ALCOHOL PRODUCTS

As previously discussed, illicit trade in highly excis-able products represents an ongoing challenge forCustoms administrations across the globe. In mostcountries alcohol and alcohol-related products havebeen traditionally subject to Customs duties and/orexcise duties.

Excise duties applicable to such products tend to varyfrom country to country and product to product. Inmany cases the type of product, for example, beer,wine or distilled spirits, as well as the percentage of al-cohol they contain, are the criteria for the variationson the rates applied. In other jurisdictions, alcohol andalcohol products are generally banned from importa-tion due to national prohibitions and restrictions.

The illicit trade in alcohol products is also conductedin various ways, ranging from “classic” methods suchas false Customs declarations and/or accompanyingdocuments, concealments in vehicles and containers,and the misuse of excise suspension regimes in thesingle markets.

For example, in the United Kingdom alcoholic bever-ages such as beer, wine and spirits are smuggled pre-dominately via Roll-on–Roll-off (RoRo) ferry trafficarriving at South East ports from the near continent.Inward diversion fraud is primarily used to facilitate al-cohol smuggling in addition to abuse of the ElectronicManagement Control System (EMCS). Whilst RoRotraffic is the predominant mode of transportation, al-cohol is also moved via container traffic and this modeis likely to pose a greater risk for smuggling thanseizures alone would suggest.

In 2013 there were approximately 900 seizures ofbeverages (beer, wine, alcoholic products) recordedin the CEN database, reflecting a slight increase in thereported seizures compared to 2012. This data wasreported from only 24 countries, which makes it diffi-cult to provide a true reflection of the magnitude andscope of this phenomenon.

Due to its impact in accurate revenue collection, thisis an area of high relevance for Customs. An im-provement in the availability of seizure information

through input into the CEN database is crucial in aneffort to more effectively identify trends and highlightparticular issues for the benefit of the internationalCustoms community.

Comparing the data between 2012 and 2013, therewas a high increase in the quantity of seized beermade from malt: from 16,339 litres reported in 2012 to673,509 in 2013 (see Table 10). This is notably due toa large seizure made by Poland in March 2013,accounting for 630,000 litres.

As in 2012, whisky products continue to dominate the

Table 10. Seizures of alcohol and alcoholicbeverages

Alcohol and 2012 2013alcoholic Number of Quantity Number of Quantitybeverages seizures (litres) seizures (litres)Beer made 139 16,339 202 673,509from maltGin and Geneva 2 8 2 192Liqueur 9 21,800 22 25,711Others 18 5,040 6 49,351Rum and Tafia 6 17,761 12 362Spirits obtained 14 3,690 11 3,767by distillinggrape wine e.g.cognac, grappa,brandy etc.Undenatured 35 1,330,579 26 57,123ethyl alcohol ofan alc. strengthby vol. of 80%vol. or higherUndenatured 2 4,332 7 18,752ethyl alcohol ofan alc. strengthby vol. of lessthan 80% vol.Vermouth and 8 179 2 404other winefrom fresh grapesflavoured withplants or aromaticsubstancesVodka 59 26,201 100 5,547Whisky 429 229,198 452 205,280Wine from fresh 24 4,448 46 72,759grapes includingfortified winesTotal 745 1,659,575 894 1,114,155

number of seizures with a total of 452 reported in2013. This category also remains at the second posi-tion in terms of seized quantities (approximately205,280 litres).

Another interesting fact is the significant drop inseizures of undenatured ethyl alcohol consisting of al-cohol strength by vol. of 80 per cent or higher com-pared with 2012. Specifically, in 2012 a total of1,330,579 litres were reported and in 2013 the figuredropped to only 57,123 litres.

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In March 2013, the Customs officers atRiga Free Port made a large seizure ofalcohol, recognised as counterfeit.

The seizure included:> 3,600 bottles of Jack Daniel's> 1,344 bottles of Hennessy> 774 bottles of Glenmorangie

When comparing the data, an interesting findingrelates to seizures of vodka. While the amount ofreported seizures was roughly the same year to year,the quantity in litres decreased from 26,201 litres in2012 to 5,547 in 2013.

Another important aspect of illicit trade in alcohol isthe phenomenon of counterfeit alcohol. More infor-mation concerning reported seizures of counterfeitalcohol products can be found in the IPR Section ofthis report.

Photos courtesy of Latvian Customs

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MONEY LAUNDERING

Customs Initiatives to CombatMoney Laundering

Trade Based Money Laundering – TradeTransparency Unit solutionThe objective of most Trans-national CriminalOrganizations (TCOs) is to generate profit. With theinternational community enacting stricter financialregulations and new cash control systems, trade-basedmoney laundering (TBML) schemes are becomingincreasingly popular with TCOs.

TBML refers to the process of disguising criminalproceeds through trade with the intent of legitimisingtheir illicit origins. Rather than being a single activity,TBML refers to a variety of schemes used to disguisecriminal proceeds. The process can involve moving illicitgoods, falsifying trade documents, and misrepresentingtrade-related financial transactions with the purpose ofintegrating criminal proceeds. Value is also movedthrough processes such as false-invoicing, over-invoicing and under-invoicing commodities that areimported or exported around the world. The BlackMarket Peso Exchange (BMPE), a complex form ofTBML, has become one of the preferred methods forTCO financiers to move money for the purpose ofdisguising its origins and integrating it into the legitimateeconomy. As the anti-money laundering (AML)standards become increasingly effective against othermoney laundering methods and with the increase inglobal trade, abuse of the international trade systems isexpected to become even more attractive for TCOs.

International trade systems are clearly subject to awide range of risks and vulnerabilities that can be ex-ploited by TCOs. In part, these arise from the enor-mous volume of trade transactions, which obscuresindividual transactions; complexities associated withthe use of multiple foreign exchange transactions anddiverse trade financing arrangements; the commin-gling of legitimate and illicit funds; and the limited re-sources that most Customs agencies have availableto detect suspicious trade transactions.

Adding to the complex nature of international tradesystems, law enforcement agencies are only ableto see one side of the trade transactions. Criminal

investigators might have the expertise and experiencein investigating either financial or Customs fraudcrimes, but they do not have the full financial andtrade data that would give them a complete picture ofthe scheme. This lack of transparency often catalyzesthe use of TBML by TCOs.

Recognising that bilateral law enforcement relationshipsare essential due to the international aspects of TBML,in 2004, the US Department of Homeland Security,Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) created theTrade Transparency Unit (TTU) in Washington D.C.TTUs are cooperative investigative units designed toeliminate criminal organizations seeking to exploit theinternational trade system to launder their illicitproceeds. These units are hosted by partnering foreigngovernments and help to identify vulnerabilities withinthe global trade and financial systems.

HSI has developed TTU partnerships with Argentina,Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic,Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay andPhilippines. The TTUs exchange trade data throughexisting Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements(CMAAs) and other international sharing agreements.CMAAs give TTUs the ability to work directly with eachother, which is one of the keys to the success of theTTU mission.

To facilitate sharing and analysis of the trade databetween TTU partners, the HSI TTU has developed theFALCON Data and Analysis for Trade TransparencySystem (DARTTS). FALCON DARTTS allows users togenerate leads and to otherwise support investigationsrelated to TBML, smuggling, commercial fraud, andother crimes within the jurisdiction of HSI and foreigncustoms organizations. FALCON DARTTS analysesdata to identify statistically anomalous transactions thatmay warrant investigation for money laundering orother import-export crimes.

HSI’s TTU is used to provide investigative, analyticaland intelligence case support to law enforcementagents and to support TBML investigations involvingTCOs. The TTU methodology has been recognised asa best practice to combat and prevent the TBML threat.

The United States and other countries derive manybenefits from participation in this initiative. TTUsenhance the quality and depth of money laundering

investigations, as well as improve foreign and do-mestic border security and cooperation. From HSI’sperspective, the creation of additional TTU partner-ships will enable HSI to more effectively investigateand prosecute criminal organisations within specificgeographic areas, with the ultimate goal of eliminat-ing systemic vulnerabilities within global trade and fi-nancial systems.

Partnership success storyA major threat to the Paraguayan economy are thehigh risk factors posed by the multi-billion dollar con-traband trade that is occurring in the border regionshared with Argentina and Brazil (the Tri-Border Area).The contraband trade facilitates much of the moneylaundering in Paraguay. Laundering channels includethe use of banks, real estate investment, financialasset markets, luxury goods, remittance networks, in-formal financial networks and trade-based moneylaundering. Large sums of dollars generated from nor-mal commercial activity and suspected illicit commer-cial activity are also transported physically fromParaguay through Uruguay and Brazil to banking cen-tres in the United States.

In March 2007, the HSI TTU initiated a TTU partnershipwith Paraguay Customs to aggressively analyse,identify and investigate companies and individualsinvolved in trade-based money laundering activitiesbetween Paraguay and the United States.

The Paraguay TTU is one of the most diverse TTUs,members include personnel from Paraguay Customs,the Under Secretary for State Taxation (Subsecretaríadel Estado de Tributación, or SET), the SpecialisedTechnical Unit for IPR Enforcement (Unidad TécnicaEspecializada, or UTE), and the Financial IntelligenceUnits (Secretaría de Prevención de Lavado de Dineroo Bienes SEPRELAD).

As a result of the TTU partnership, Paraguay hasidentified millions of dollars of lost revenue; the U.S.and Paraguay have made numerous seizures of con-traband worth multiple millions of dollars; andParaguay and the U.S. have worked together in tar-geting a criminal organization accused of supporting aterrorist entity.

Sezam – a global analytical project oncurrency smuggling

Background of the projectIn 2006, a strong increase in currency seizures in theEastern and Central Europe region was noted. TheNational Contact Points of the RILO Eastern andCentral Europe (ECE) therefore discussed thepossibility of initiating a global analytical project oncurrency smuggling.

The delegates of the 2007 WCO Global RILOMeeting decided to launch this analytical project, leadby RILO ECE, in cooperation with other RILOs underthe codename Sezam. It was also agreed that RILOECE would produce regular annual analysis reportson this issue.

The first two reports, covering the period 2005-2008,provided only a general overview of the phenomenonof cash smuggling. Supported by a more robust database, the 2009 analysis report contained, apart froma general analysis, regional overviews on currencysmuggling throughout the six geographical regions8 ofthe WCO.

The fourth stage of the project contained an analysisof currency seizures, comparing the years 2009 and2010. The report was complemented by an analysis ofseizures of precious metals and precious stones.

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8 North of Africa, Near and Middle East, West and Central Africa, East and Southern Africa, South America, North America,Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, Far East, South and South East Asia, Australasia and the Pacific Islands.

Trade Transparency Unit in ParaguayPhoto courtesy of the US ICE

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REVENUE


The last issue of the report contained comprehensiveanalysis and included advice and tips aimed to raiseawareness of the users of the WCO CEN globalseizure database concerning currency seizures.

Project objectivesProject Sezam was intended to train WCO MemberCustoms administrations on current currency smug-gling methods as an integral element of internationalmoney laundering and terrorist financing activities.Moreover, the project has a specific focus on the de-velopment of strategic intelligence on key trans-ship-ping and courier routes. In addition, it seeks to identifyadditional risk indicators which can be used to im-prove Customs’ risk profiling capabilities on illicitcross-border movements of cash and BearerNegotiable Instruments (BNI).

The project is also expected to improve the quantityand quality of seizure data input in the WCO CENGlobal Seizure database.

Working methodsThroughout the project period, all RILOs – supportedby their National Contact Points – were encouraged toinput data on cash seizures and photos in the CENdatabase. RILOs were also asked to notify RILO ECEof specific developments, emerging routes for currencysmuggling and to provide any other important infor-mation which could be of relevance for the project.

Analysis methodologyAnalysis was based on all currency seizure reportsentered into the WCO CEN Global Seizure database.Each case of currency smuggling is registered as onecase; seizures of different currencies are also listedas one case. It is therefore important to distinguishbetween the number of cases and the number ofseizures, as one case of currency smuggling caninclude seizures of numerous different currencies.

The following aspects of cash smuggling wereexamined in the framework of Project Sezam:• Number of currency smuggling cases and quanti-

ties seized• Number of seizures and quantities seized per cur-

rency• Place of seizure and geographical location• Means of transport• Method of concealment• Country of departure and country of destination• Reason for seizure• Detection method and technical aids used• Overview of forged bank-notes.

Summary of the Project SezamimplementationThroughout the different stages of Project Sezam, itcan be concluded that the project currently meets itsobjectives. The initial development of Project Sezamconsisted of participation from 8 out of the 11 RILOs.

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49,350 USD hidden inside aluminium tubes for cigars Photos courtesy of Cuban Customs

Today data is provided by all 11 RILOs within thenetwork as well as the United States which is notcurrently affiliated with a RILO. The analysis from thesecontributors clearly supports the premise that thephysical cross-border movement of currency is one ofthe integral parts of international money laundering andterrorism financing schemes. The properimplementation of Financial Action Task Force (FATF)Recommendation 32 on cash couriers is posingspecific challenges to law enforcement agenciesworldwide, particularly Customs administrations whichare the main competency in border control matters.Due to its international implications and the leading roleCustoms plays in cross-border crimes cooperation atevery level is paramount in successfully combating thisissue. Collaboration among Customs administrationsworldwide as well as information and intelligenceexchange with the network of Financial IntelligenceUnits (FIU) is essential. Therefore, through Members’

support, the global network of the RILOs has prioritisedcurrency smuggling as a key topic for RILO activities.

Input of case data into the CEN global seizure data-base increased significantly since the beginning of theProject. While 1,799 cases of cash smuggling were re-ported in the first report (covering the years 2005-2007), a marked increase of 6,006 cases wereanalysed in 2010. In addition to the increase in re-ported cases, the quality of data also improved notably.

All Project Sezam reports issued to date provide aclear picture on the cash smuggling phenomenonworldwide by providing specific information through-out the separate geographical regions. New modusoperandi, such as transport routes and methods ofconcealment were identified and supported by abun-dant photo material. The next phase of ProjectSezam, covering the period 2012-2013, will focus onbitcoins and virtual currencies.

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80,000 Canadian dollars concealed in the suitcase wheels Photo courtesy of Cuban Customs


In 2013 a total of 4,939 cases were reported throughthe CEN system, out of which 37 cases refer toexplosives. Therefore, the analysis below is focusedon the 4,902 cases that exclude explosives and theirparts. Apart from universally recognised weapons andexplosives, there are some categories of goods thatcould be considered to be weapons or explosives onlyby some countries. For example, many types of coldweapons are in free circulation in Asia-Pacific, but fallunder restrictions in the European countries and in

INTRODUCTION

The seizure data contained within this Section hasbeen obtained through the CEN system. Comparedwith the previous year’s Report, this year, the SecuritySection contains information on more commoditiesand provides a more strategic overview of the currentsituation. Since the methodology and the scope ofanalysis were changed, no comparison with seizuredata in 2012 can be provided.

SECTION 5. SECURITYOver the years, the role of Customs has evolved and diversified, and the number of functionsCustoms officers are required to exercise continues to grow. In recent times, Customs has becomecentral in security-related functions. The role of Customs in security can be defined as the preventionof smuggling of dangerous or prohibited goods, or trade in or transport of these goods withoutappropriate licences. This Section provides a general analysis based on Customs seizures ofammunition, firearms, cold weapons, gas weapons, war weapons, industrial explosives andprecursor chemicals in 2013.

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Photo courtesy of French Customs

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Russia. In many countries fireworks are consideredexplosives if they do not have an appropriate nationallicence. In order to facilitate a global analysis andtaking into account these differences in the existinglegal frameworks, the analysis is made on thepresumption that goods entered in the CEN systemare classified as weapons or explosives by thereporting country in accordance with its nationallegislation, and therefore will be deemed as such inthe respective categories.

The Section is divided into two parts. The first partcovers major types of weapons and ammunition; thesecond part is dedicated to industrial explosives andtheir parts, including precursor chemicals, identifiedby the WCO Global Shield Programme.

WEAPONS ANDAMMUNITION

Categorisation by type of weapons

Weapons include firearms and items considered to beoffensive, restricted, prohibited, chemical, explosiveand radioactive. An important feature of this analysis isbased on the premise that many reported cases com-prise different types of goods. Therefore, it is impossi-ble to calculate how many cases of a particular type ofweapon were reported in 2013. A more solid proxywould be to focus the analysis not on the quantity ofcases, but on the number of seizures a particular kindof goods was seized either within a unique or a com-pound case. All types of goods, with the exception ofsome explosives, are measured in pieces (see Table 1).

Ammunition is by far the leading category of goodsboth by number of seizure occurrences and by quan-tity. Ammunition includes bullets of different calibres,buckshot, cartridges, primers and shells. This findingis not surprising for two reasons:

1. There are reports on many seizures where ammu-nition was seized along with weapons and

2. Ammunition includes different types, measured inpieces. Therefore, the quantities seized are veryhigh.

The two largest seizures were reported by Yemen andGuinea with 300,000 and 256,250 pieces of ammunitionrespectively. In the case of Yemen, the seizure wasmade at the seaport when goods were being importedfrom China. The ammunition was found in a containerhidden among other accessories. The seizure reportedby Guinea took place at the land border: the bus withammunition arrived from the neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. Out of the 36 countries that reported seizuresof ammunition, the top six reporting countries with the

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Table 1. Categorisation by type of weapon

Type of weapon Number Quantityof seizures (pieces)

Ammunition 2,357 1,265,807Handguns - Pistols 1,081 109,921Parts of weapons - Scopes 496 16,169Parts of weapons - Magazines 512 14,445Cold weapons 693 12,128Parts of weapons - Other 141 11,485Blank guns 6 3,321Pneumatic (air/gas) weapons 288 1,418Handguns - Rifles 458 1,346Parts of weapons - Bolts 17 1,010Hunting firearms (incl. shotguns) 263 604Electroshock weapons and parts 78 313Parts of weapons - Barrels 30 288Parts of weapons - Silencers 30 279Handguns - Revolvers 196 276War weapons 27 234Gas weapons and parts 25 173Other items 32 81Machine guns 45 61Total 6,775 1,439,35

EKOL Special 99 9 mm gas pistol with 200 gas alert cartridgesPhoto courtesy of Georgian Customs

largest seizures were Yemen (308,035 pieces; 25%),USA (301,597 pieces; 24%), Guinea (256,254 pieces;20%), Turkey (114,250 pieces; 9%), Germany(103,790 pieces; 8%) and Croatia (53,836 pieces;4%). 10 per cent of pieces seized were reported by31 countries. Yemen and Guinea in particular are inthe top six due to the large seizures mentioned above.In terms of the Customs procedure, in the USA 57 percent of ammunition was seized at export, 23 per centof pieces were seized internally and 20 per cent atimport. Turkey emerged as the exporting country forammunition based on reported seizures, while 59 percent of ammunition reported by Germany was seizedduring transit and 34 per cent of ammunition wasseized internally. This finding confirms the role ofGermany as a major transit country for ammunition.Croatia became the sixth largest reporting country inthis category due to a large seizure of 50,000 units ofammunition for air rifles. The Croatian Customsseized the goods on a land border in a vehicle thatwas going from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria.

Pistols are the second largest category of weaponsseized (109,800 pieces). The three largest seizures ofpistols were reported by Yemen and Oman. Yemenreported the largest seizure, 47,720 pistols, whichamounts to 44 per cent of the total quantity of pistolsseized. This particular seizure took place while thegoods were in transit with final destination to Oman. Inall three instances the departure country was Turkeyand the destination country was Oman. Omanreported two large seizures at import with 30,393 and28,200 pistols respectively. Overall, Oman seized 53per cent (58,593 pieces) from the total quantity ofpistols, followed by Yemen (47,793 pieces, 43%),

Germany (1,671 pieces; 2%) and the USA (1,147pieces; 1%). The rest of pistol seizures (771 pieces;1%) were reported by the remaining 27 countries.

Parts of weapons, such as scopes and magazines arethe third and fourth largest categories of seized goods.Out of 16,169 scopes, 13,726 scopes were seized bythe USA, whereas more than 12,000 pieces wereseized at export with China indicated as the final des-tination. Germany reported one seizure of 2,000pieces in transit, and several small seizures of 1-2pieces. There is a similar dynamic observed in the re-porting of seizures of magazines, where the USA re-ported the vast majority of all seized items (13,433 outof 14,445 magazines). However, while scopes weremostly seized at export, the magazines were seized atimport. The major countries of departure for maga-zines imported in the USA were Turkey and Italy (8,011and 2,400 pieces accordingly) which accounts for ap-proximately 75 per cent of the total quantity reportedas seized by the USA.

Other parts of weapons mainly include gun cases andparts, such as compressed air cylinders etc. Morethan half of the items in this category were reported byby Venezuela due to one large case of 6,000 pieces ofcompressed air cylinders which were seized on a ves-sel that had arrived from the USA. The three largestseizures of bolts (parts of weapons) were reported bySaudi Arabia (between 200 and 330 pieces) and wereseized on the land border.

Cold weapons is the next vast category that includesvarious types of weapons, such as brass knuckles,batons, different kinds of knives and swords, precision

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A large seizure of 128 assault rifles AK-147, 361 magazines and 320 other weapons made by Czech CustomsPhotos courtesy of Czech Customs

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catapults, stun guns and nunchaku, etc. The fivelargest seizures were made en route from China to theCzech Republic by sea, and included knuckle dusters,nunchaku, stun guns and precision catapults, whichaccounts for 86 per cent (10,488 pieces) of all coldweapons seized. These seizures were reported bySlovenia and Germany. The remaining 14 per cent(1,640 pieces) of cases where cold weapons weredetected were either single cases of one and more coldweapons or compound cases with different types ofweapons. In some countries, in particular, the Asia-Pacific region, certain types of cold weapons are in freecirculation and can be purchased by individuals forpersonal use. Therefore, in many instances they areseized in single quantities at airports or land borders.

The quantities of pneumatic weapons and rifles arerather similar. The predominant feature of seizuresrelated to these two kinds of weapons is that the ma-jority of them only contained one unit of weapon. Thelargest seizure was of 320 pieces. The same dynamicis observed in relation to hunting firearms (includingshotguns), revolvers and machine guns.

Electroshock weapons and parts include electric guns,electric zappers and their parts. No large quantitieswere seized in this category.

War weapons include grenades, rockets (includingsignal rockets) and other items. Out of eight countriesthat reported results in this category, France reportedseizures that accounted for 72 per cent (170 pieces) ofthe total and they mostly took place inland, followed

by Germany with 14 per cent (33 pieces) and FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia – 9 per cent (20pieces). Another five countries reported 4 per cent ofgoods seized.

Gas weapons and parts include different kinds of gasweapons, tear gas and pepper spray. Out of 173weapons in this category, Denmark made a largeseizure equal to 59 per cent (102 pieces) of thetotal quantity. The seizure contained pepper spraydiscovered on the land border in a vehicle coming fromGermany. Apart from this seizure, the majority ofinstances of smuggling of gas weapons and their partswere reported by Denmark as well. Other items mainlyincluded bullet-proof vests.

Reporting countries

In total 41 countries reported seizures of weaponsand ammunition in 2013. In the majority of cases thereporting country is the country that made theseizure. Since there is no specification on type ofgoods seized by country, the total quantity of casesreported per country was taken as a proxy. Chart 1includes top ten reporting countries and the numberof reported seizures.

The reason for a big difference between the numberof reports by the USA and other countries is partiallydue to the fact that USA reports all cases, whereasout of 2,957 cases, 1,201 (or 41%) are internal ones(i.e. goods were seized inland with the USA indicated

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Bow with arrowsPhoto courtesy of Cuban Customs

Pneumatic weapons: 1 AR-15 style; 1 MP-5 style; 1 Carl GustavM45 style

Photo courtesy of Swiss Customs

both as a departure and destination country). Thesame tendency was observed in Yemen, where out of288 reported cases, 92 (or 32%) were made inland.Nevertheless, the quantity of internal cases does nothave a direct impact on the placing of countries in thisChart 1, as the order would still be the same.

Departure and destination countries

Departure and destination countries are a useful indi-cator on the movement of goods. However, the depar-ture country does not necessarily mean the country oforigin (production), and the destination country doesnot necessarily mean the final destination of the goods.

Such is the case with the reporting countries, the rea-son why the USA dominates the list of the top 20 de-parture and destination countries is due to the highpercentage of inland seizures, where they were iden-tified as a departure and destination country in 1,183cases. Therefore, the number of international caseswhere the USA was identified as a departure countryequals to 1,349 cases, and as a destination country in482 cases. Even with this clarification on the figures, itstill remains the top departure and destination country.It is important to take into account that there is still quitea large quantity of reported cases where either depar-ture or destination country was unknown (122 and 184cases respectively). Therefore, analysis based on de-parture and destination countries cannot serve as a ro-bust indication of the real situation (see Table 2).

Seizures by Customs procedure

Out of the 4,902 reported cases, in 1,776 casesseizures were made at import and in 1,575 cases theywere made at export. These are the two leadingcategories with 36 and 32 per cent respectively,followed by 1,323 reported cases of internal seizuresthat equal 27 per cent of cases and 228 cases whereseizures were made in transit representing theremaining 5 per cent (see Chart 2). This result is notsurprising and is consistent with the trends andpatterns observed during the previous years.

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Chart 1. Top 10 reporting countries by numberof cases

2,957

347330

288166

129 115 109 96 96

USA

Saudi Arabia

Germany

Yemen

Russia

Switzerla

nd

Ukraine

UAE

Estonia

Denmark

Table 2. Top 20 departure and destinationcountries

Departure Number Destination Numbercountry of cases country of casesUSA 2,532 USA 1,665Yemen 282 Saudi Arabia 374Canada 221 Russia 271Turkey 196 Germany 271Unknown 122 Unknown 184Mexico 111 Mexico 183Germany 105 Canada 183China 90 Paraguay 150UAE 87 Yemen 136Kuwait 84 Switzerland 128Russia 66 UAE 119Oman 58 Ukraine 111Switzerland 57 Honduras 98Poland 55 Denmark 83Estonia 50 Philippines 78Ukraine 45 Argentina 48Singapore 44 Estonia 46France 44 France 45Austria 39 Brazil 45Czech Republic 35 Sweden 44

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Method of concealment

In terms of the method of concealment, there is still avery large portion of cases where the method ofconcealment is not identified (1,218 cases; 72,289pieces). Therefore, the analysis on the method ofconcealment can only be done effectively based onthe 3,684 cases where the reporting country providedinformation in this category (see Table 3).

Since cases vary by size, its number by method ofconcealment does not provide enough information ofthe most frequent methods of concealment used forparticular types of weapons. Therefore, an additionalanalysis is needed based on the type of goods,method of concealment and quantity of goods seized.

Out of the 4,902 reported cases, ammunition was mainlyfound in freight, baggage, transport and mail. Coldweapons, pistols, rifles, pneumatic weapons and scopeswere primarily found in freight. The largest cases ofseizures of magazines (by quantity of pieces) were easyto detect as they were not concealed and transported byair. Almost all electroshock weapons and parts, as wellas gas weapons and parts were found concealed intransport. Blank guns were mainly transported by air andwere not concealed. There was one seizure of a largequantity of blank guns at the seaport at import, andthese guns were not concealed either.

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Chart 2. Seizures by Customs procedure

Export 32 %

Transit 5 %

Import 36 %Internal 27 %

Table 3. Classification by concealment method

Concealment Number Quantitymethod of cases (pieces)In freight 595 600,773In baggage 940 398,412In transport 983 196,201Not concealed 340 75,211Unknown 1,218 72,289In premises 79 48,348On the person 142 28,283In mail 603 19,828On market places 2 14Total 4,902 1,439,359

Concealed MK2 style hand grenadesPhoto courtesy of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Customs

Gun Beretta 92 FS, 9 mm with 15 bullets concealed in a carPhoto courtesy of Georgian Customs

Table 4. Classification by seizure location

Seizure Number Quantitylocation of cases (pieces)Land boundary 1,317 655,858Seaport 352 481,297Inland 1,362 160,018Airport 1,154 127,287Mail centre 688 10,629Rail 22 4,238River 5 29Unknown 2 3Total 4,902 1,439,359

Seizure location

In terms of seizure location, apart from inland seizures,executed mainly by the USA and Yemen, otherseizures were mainly made at land border crossings(1,317 cases; 27%) and airports (1,154 cases; 23%),followed by mail centres (688 cases; 14%) and sea-ports (352 cases; 7%). In the remaining 27 cases,which constitute approximately 1 per cent, seizureswere made in railways, river ports and other unidenti-fied locations (see Chart 3).

However, in order not to be misguided, it is necessaryto include the correlation of the quantity of piecesseized and number of cases recorded (see Table 4).Therefore, the highest amounts of weapons, theirparts and ammunition were seized at land borders andseaports, even though the number of the reportedcases at the seaports is much lower than the numberof cases at the land borders.

Besides the large quantity of weapons and ammunitionseized in and reported by the United States, theinformation retrieved from the CEN databasedemonstrates that large seizures were made in socalled ‘crisis areas’, countries with internal conflicts orcountries adjacent to those or in known transitcountries (e.g. Germany or Turkey). This has been acontinuous trend for a number of years which issupported by findings from other open sources.

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Chart 3. Classification by seizure location

Land boundary 27%Airport 23%

Other 1%

Seaport 7% Inland 28%

Mail centre 14%

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NB: for graphic purposes the categories of 'Rail', 'River' and'Unknown' were united into the category 'Other', as they constituteless than 1 per cent when analysed separately.

Concealed caliber 16 gauge shot shellsPhoto courtesy of Georgian Customs

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INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIVES,THEIR PARTS ANDPRECURSOR CHEMICALS

Industrial explosives and their parts

In 2013 seizures of explosives and their parts1 werereported through the CEN system 57 times amountingto 26,866 pieces and 916 kg of seized materials. Apartfrom mortar shells and propellants, the category ofexplosives includes fireworks due to the fact that theywere seized for not being accompanied by a validlicence, and are therefore classified as explosives bythe reporting country. In particular, a large seizure of13,640 pieces of fireworks was reported by Kuwait.The seizure took place at the seaport and the goodswere arriving from China to Kuwait as a finaldestination. This seizure alone amounts to half ofitems seized under this category. Out of 916 kg ofseized materials, three large seizures of 500 kg ofurea, 230 kg of fireworks and 180 kg of otherexplosives constitute almost all seizures by kg. Inparticular, the seizure of urea, reported by Colombia,was made together with 1,000 pieces of electricdetonators. Both kinds of materials were transportedby truck from Bolivia. The seizure of 230 kg offireworks2 took place at a US land border at themoment of export to an unknown destination.Burkina Faso reported the seizure of 180 kg ofexplosives that were imported from Ghana by truck.

Unfortunately, the quality of data in this category doesnot allow for further analysis.

Precursor chemicals

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) manufacturedfrom readily available precursor chemicals are themost prevalent form of explosive employed inbombings around the world. Programme Global Shield(PGS), in close collaboration with INTERPOL andUNODC, aims at countering the illicit diversion andtrafficking of precursor explosive chemicals that maybe used to manufacture explosive devices.

Fourteen chemicals have been identified as the mostwidespread precursors in manufacturing IEDs (seeTable 5).

One of the challenges specific to this Programme isthat the explosive chemical precursors are dual-usegoods, and as such part of considerable legitimatetrade flows. Using profiling of total shipments, Customsadministrations have the task of identifying the high-riskshipments and warning each other regarding thepotential need for additional, in-depth controls. Due tothe fact that only a very small fraction of globalshipments of explosive chemical precursors are indeeda matter of illicit diversion, the number of seizures inProgramme Global Shield is lower than for othercommodities.

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1 Since in numerous cases explosives and their parts were seized with other commodities, the analysis is based on the numberof times explosives and their parts were reported rather than on the number of cases.

2 Only in this case fireworks were reported in kg; in other cases fireworks were reported by pieces.

New Zealand CustomsCounter-ImprovisedExplosive Devices (C-IED)project

Since March 2013 New Zealand Customshas implemented the Counter-ImprovisedExplosive Devices (C-IED) project for tradesector imports. Goods exported from NewZealand fall under the World CustomsOrganization Programme Global Shield

reporting process and are not specificallypart of the C-IED project. The C-IED projectfocuses on commodities requiring formalCustoms entry rather than the less regulatedcourier/mail system (although additional riskmitigation strategies are in place in thatstream).

Seventy consignments of dual-use IEDprecursor commodities were checked during2013 to establish the legitimate use of thegoods before their release. It was found that

all the goods were imported by legitimateend users. In addition, the WCO ProgrammeGlobal Shield 2013 results noted 690 importand 105 export consignments, all of whichwere considered to be entered for legitimatepurposes. This year, New Zealand has alsocommenced reporting its monthly importsand exports of goods covered by GlobalShield on the WCO Global Shield website.

Table 5. List of 14 PGS explosive precursor chemicals

Name of Chemical Other Names Common UseAmmonium nitrate High nitrogen Instant cold packs, high-nitrogen fertiliser in agricultureAcetic anhydride Ethanoic anhydride Photographic film and other coated materials, production of

aspirin, wood preservative, production of modified starches,synthesis of heroin

Acetone Dimethylformaldehyde, Cleaning solvent, component of some paintsDimethyl Ketone, β-Ketopropane, Cleaning solvent, component of some paints and varnishes,2-Propanone nail polish remover, superglue remover

Urea Carbamide, carbonyl diamide, Nitrogen-release fertiliser, raw material for the chemicalcarbonyldiamine, diaminomethanal, industrydiaminomethanone

Aluminium powdersand flakesHydrogen peroxide Dioxidane Bleach, disinfectant, antiseptic, oxidiserNitric acid Aqua fortis, Salpetre acid, Fertilisers, purification and extraction of gold,

Spirit of nitre chemical synthesisNitromethane Nitrocarbol Industrial solvent, cleaning solvent, pharmaceuticals,

pesticides, explosives, fibres, coatings and racing fuel,dry cleaning, degreaser, solvent for superglue

Potassium chlorate Potcrate Disinfectant, safety matches, explosives and fireworks,oxidising agent, pesticide

Potassium nitrate Saltpetre, Nitrate of potash, Fertilisers, rocket propellants, fireworks, food additives,Vesta powder pre-rolled cigarettes, tree-stump remover

Potassium perchlorate Potassium chlorate, Perchloric acid, Fireworks, ammunition percussion caps, explosive primers,Potassium salt peroidin propellants, flash compositions, stars, sparklers

Sodium chlorate Herbicide, defoliant and desiccantSodium nitrate Caliche, Chile Saltpetre Colour fixative and preservative in meats and fish, dyeing

and printing textile fabrics and bleaching fibres, manufactureof rubber chemicals, corrosion inhibitor

Calcium ammonium Fertilisernitrate


In 2013, Customs and Police administrations seizedmore than 114 metric tons of solid chemicals and nearly13,000 litres of liquid precursors within the frameworkof the Programme Global Shield (see Table 6).

Ammonium nitrate and potassium chlorate accountedfor the bulk of the seizures during 2013, representing92 per cent of all precursors seized. Eighty per cent ofseizures in 2013 were reported by Afghanistan, and theremaining 20 per cent by Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Montenegroand Thailand.

In addition to the seized precursor chemicals used inthe manufacturing of the IEDs, 20 already-made IEDswere seized in 2013 and 28 arrests were made inrelation to the seizures.

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Table 6. Classification of quantities seized byprecursor chemical in 2013

Precursor Quantity Quantityseized (kg) seized (l)

Acetic anhydride - 12,770Ammonium nitrate 77,500 -Hydrochloric acid - 100Potassium chlorate 28,875 -Sodium chlorate 72 -Urea 5,000 -Other 3,369 16Total 114,816 12,886

During the year, 120 warning and feedback messageswere exchanged on suspicious shipments through thededicated online Global Shield Application that is usedfor secure information exchange among the 94 Customsadministrations participating in the Programme.

Chart 4. Seized precursor chemicals in 2012-2013

66,699

114,816

12,34012,886

Solid precursors (kg) Liquid precursors (litres)

2012 2013

In a special action, the WCO teamed up withProgramme partner INTERPOL to engage in a jointtraining and subsequent operation in Thailand. Thetraining session included 26 officials from the ThaiCustoms Department, the Royal Thai Police, theBorder Patrol Police and the Immigration Department.As a part of the training session, participants learnedhow to use Programme Global Shield chemicalidentification field test kits that were later successfullydeployed during the operation. Thai Customssuccessfully seized 72 kg of sodium chlorate duringthe operation.

Overall, in 2013 the Programme registered a 72 percent increase in reported precursor chemicals compa-red with seizures reported for 2012 (see Chart 4). Thereason for the increase is the intensified focus andawareness that the Programme has achieved throughtraining, communication and operational activities inthe areas of the world most concerned by the threat ofIEDs: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Central Asiancountries. Due to these activities, the reporting ofseizures increased as well: 50 seizures were reportedin 2013, compared to 21 in 2012.

In cooperation with the military, Thai Customs seized approximately72 kg of sodium chlorate including 188 bottles of rubber stimulantproducts concealed in offender's pick-up truck

Photo courtesy of Thai Customs

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Challender, D.S., Hywood, L., “African pangolins in Asia”, TRAFFIC Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2012.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSASEAN-WEN

BCNP

BNI

BPU

CAP

CBP

CCF

CCP

CEN

CENcomm

CIS

CITES

CTS

DARTTS

DG TAXUD

EMCS

ECE

EU

EUBAM

FATF

FCTC

FIU

GBL

HRT

HSI

ICCWC

ICE

Icomm

IED

IMPEL

INTERPOL

IPM

IPR

IUCN

Association of Southeast Asia Nations Wildlife Enforcement Network

Biodiversity, Cultural and National Heritage Protection Branch

Bearer Negotiable Instruments

Biodiversity Protection Unit

Counterfeiting and Piracy

Customs and Border Protection

Customs Co-operation Fund

Container Control Programme

Customs Enforcement Network

Customs Enforcement Network communication

Commonwealth of Independent States

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species

Cargo Targeting System

Data and Analysis for Trade Transparency System

Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union

Electronic Management Control System

Eastern and Central Europe

European Union

EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

Financial Action Task Force

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Financial Intelligence Unit

Gamma-Butyrolactone

Hand-rolling tobacco

Homeland Security Investigations

International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime

Investigation and Customs Enforcement

Information Communication Interface

Improvised Explosive Device

EU network for Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law

International Criminal Police Organization

Interface Public Members

Intellectual Property Rights

International Union for Conservation of Nature


JAITF

KP

KRA

LATF

MDMA

MEA

MOU

nCEN

NCP

OCU

ODS

OLAF

PCA

PCU

PGS

RILO

RILO AP

ROAP

ROCB

RoRo

RTC

SAWEN

SBC

SFP

TBML

TCO

THC

TTU

UNEP

UNODC

WCO

WHO

WWF

Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force

Kimberley Process

Kenye Revenue Authority

Lusaka Agreement Task Force

3,4 metylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine (ecstasy)

Multilateral Environmental Agreement

Memorandum of Understanding

National Customs Enforcement Network

National Contact Point

Operational Co-ordination Unit

Ozone-depleting substance

European Anti-Fraud Office

Post-Control Audit

Port Control Unit

Programme Global Shield

Regional Intelligence Liaison Office

Asia-Pacific Regional Intelligence Liaison Office

Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific

Regional Office for Capacity Building

Roll-on-Roll-off

Regional Training Centre

South Asia Wildlife Enforcement Network

Secretariat of the Basel Convention

Security Features Providers

Trade-based money laundering

Transnational criminal organization

Tetra hydro cannabinol

Trade Transparency Unit

United Nations Environment Programme

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

World Customs Organization

World Health Organization

World Wide Fund for Nature

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NOTES

Illicit TradeReport

2013PublisherWorld Customs Organization

Rue du Marché 30B-1210 BrusselsBelgium

Tel. : +32 (0)2 209 92 11Fax. : +32 (0)2 209 92 92

[email protected]

Date of publicationJune 2014

Rights and permissions:Copyright © 2014 World Customs OrganizationAll rights reserved. Requests and inquiries concerning translation, reproduction andadaptation rights should be adressed to [email protected]

D/2014/0448/12

Cover photo: © Joly / PHOTONONSTOP

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Illicit Trade Report - World Customs Organization

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