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HUME’S FOUR DISSERTATIONS: REVISITING THE ESSAY ON TASTE

A number of scholars have raised some issues regarding Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard

of Taste.’ In this paper I aim to answer their objections by examining the essay within the

context of its publication (the Four Dissertations) and the methodology of Early Modern

Experimental Philosophy

1. INTRODUCTION

The first 2011 issue of the Journal of Scottish Philosophy1

was dedicated to Scottish

Aesthetics. Four out of the seven essays in that issue discussed Hume’s essay ‘Of the

Standard of Taste.’2

Clearly, such essay is still regarded a key text for understanding

British Aesthetics in the Eighteenth century. ‘Of the standard of Taste’ (OST) was widely

discussed in the second half of the twentieth century, and the issues first raised in the

1950’s and 1960’s were explored and discussed in the 90’s by highly influential

aestheticians such as George Dickie, Ted Gracyk, Jerrold Levinson, James Shelley, Noel

Carrol, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Peter Kivy.

Recent discussions of Hume’s essay on taste consider a number of issues that are thought

to arise from the argument of the essay. Some authors take Hume to be proposing two

1

Journal of Scottish Philosophy. Volume 9.1 (Spring 2011).

2

David Hume. Four Dissertations & Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul. with

introductions by Jon Immerwhar and John Valdimir Price, and a preface by James FIeser (Indiana: St.

Augustine’s Press, 1995). References to Hume’s essays are taken from this edition, where OST refers to ‘Of

the Standard of Taste,’ OT refers to ‘Of Tragedy,’ and OP refers to ‘Of the Passions.’ The other text of

Hume’s I make reference to is the An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. ed. by Tom L

Beuchamp (Oxford:Oxford Univeristy Press, 1998).

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different standards of taste; some wonder whether his argument is circular; others focus

on the role the critics play in Hume’s theory. I believe that all these issues arise only when

reading the essay outside of its historical context of publication, which leads us to

misrepresent Hume’s purpose in writing it. In this paper I want to propose an

interpretation of the essay on taste that takes into account two key aspects: the unity of the

dissertations that were published along with the essay on taste in 1757, under the title of

Four Dissertations; and Hume’s commitment to the Experimental Philosophy of the early

modern period. I believe that these two features of the context in which the essay on taste

was produced provide a better reading of its aim and purposes and enable us to solve the

problems identified above.

I will begin by giving a summary of the argument of Hume’s essay on taste. In the second

section I give an overview of the main objections several scholars have raised. In section

three I discuss the historical context of the publication of the essay and a basic overview of

Early Modern Experimental Philosophy. Finally, in the last section I show how the

context helps us solve the issues discussed while providing a fair interpretation of the text

and Hume’s purpose.

2. ‘OF THE STANDARD OF TASTE:’ THE ARGUMENT

In this section I present the argument Hume constructs in the essay, remaining as close as

possible to the text in order to avoid any interpretative issues. The reader will then be

able to judge for herself whether the objections scholars have identified actually do stem

from Hume’s writing.

Hume begins his essay by commenting on the obvious variety of taste among individuals,

and describes judgments of taste as a matter of sentiment (not reason) by analogy with

moral judgments. He tells us that this difference of taste is “obvious to the most careless

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enquirer.” (OST, p. 203) It is not necessary to go over the connections Hume makes

between taste and morality for the purposes of this paper. Although the similarities and,

more importantly, the differences between taste and sentiment are important in a woder

context, I will not go into such details since they do not affect the reading I am proposing.

It suffices only to mention here a general consideration, namely, that just like moral

judgments, judgments of taste are a matter of sentiment, and this feature explains the

obvious variety of tastes among individuals. However, the discussion regarding the

standard only happens with matters of taste and not of morality. This difference between

taste and morality is relevant because it explains the practical aim of the essay on taste, as

I will explain in the final section of this paper.

The obvious difference in the particular tastes of individuals leads us to look for a

standard of taste: “It is very natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the

various sentiments of men may be reconciled; or at least, a decision afforded, confirming

one sentiment, and condemning another.” (OST, p. 208) But the task of searching for

such standard is not as easy as it sounds. Hume introduces the paradox of taste that

illustrates the difficulties of our quest: on one hand taste is subjective, so it varies among

individuals; on the other hand it is obvious that some works of art can be judged to be

objectively better than other.

The two horns of the dilemma come from what Hume classifies as ‘species of common

sense.’ Regarding the first horn, common sense tells us that

All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself,

and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it…Beauty is no quality in things

themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind

perceives a different beauty. (OST, pp. 208-209)

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However, there is “a species of common sense which opposes” what is stated in the first

horn of the dilemma. (OST, p. 209) Hume gives two examples and an analogy to

illustrate this second horn of the dilemma. He tells us that whoever claims that the work

of Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, are equally elegant and both product of

genius would be defending something equally absurd to the claim that a molehill is as

high as Tenerife, or the claim that a pond is as big as the ocean. (OST, pp. 209-210) This

example shows that we do tend to agree in matters of taste, counterbalancing the

subjective aspect of taste previously mentioned. The search for a standard of taste does

not seem so absurd now.

The solution to our dispute of tastes seems to be grounded on what Hume calls the ‘rules

of composition’ or ‘rules of art.’ These rules are defined as “general observations,

concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages.”

(OST, p. 210) Like the rules of all the other ‘practical sciences,’ they are not a priori; they

are founded on experience and observations. Beautiful works “must be confined to the

rules of art,” whichever they are. If there are cases where some artists have transgressed

the rules and their work still managed to please, it because the beauties included in their

work (which follow the rules) overpower the faults and give the mind a superior

satisfaction. (OST, p.211) Hume uses Ariosto as an example to illustrate this:

Following the rules:

- Force and clearness of expression

- Readiness and variety of inventions.

- Natural pictures of the passions

Transgressing the rules:

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- Monstruous and improbable fictions

- Bizarre mixture of serious and comic styles

- Want of coherence

(OST, pp.211-212)

Founded on experience and observation, the rules of art can give us an objective

foundation to settle our disputes of taste, but there is a problem when we are faced with

the task of finding these rules. Hume tells us that we just cannot imagine that every time

we are engaged with a work of art we will be able to identify the rules. There are a great

number of circumstances that can affect the relation of our sentiment to the work of art.

We need to be careful when undertaking this task:

When we would make an experiment of this nature, and would try the force of

any beauty or deformity, we must choose with care a proper time and place, and

bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition. A perfect serenity of mind, a

recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances

be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be unable to judge of

the catholic and universal beauty. (OST, p. 213)

Once we find ourselves in such suitable circumstances, we can rely on particular artworks

that can help us identify the rules. Although it is always important to be in the appropriate

state of mind, works of art that “have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion”

(stood the test of time) can make the task a lot easier. (OST, p. 213) A work of art that

has pleased different cultures and different times must possess the true beauties stated in

the rules of art. Hume uses Homer as his example: he pleased thousands of years ago in

Athens, and he still pleases in London and France. (OST, pp. 213-214) Once we rid our

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mind of all prejudices and examine the work in the appropriate light we realize that it

pleases because it follows the rules of art.

This leads Hume to conclude that it seems that there are certain qualities in the work that

“from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to

displease.” (OST, p. 214) These qualities are stated in the rules of art and they are the

foundation of a standard of taste. But, drawing an analogy with gustatory taste, Hume tells

us that the way these qualities affect the mind depend on the sound state of the organs.

The same way a man with a fever and a cold would not trust his perception of flavours

(and we wouldn’t trust his verdict), a ‘sound state’ is necessary for the qualities to cause

the appropriate effect (pleasure/disgust) in the individual. But what does Hume mean by

being in a ‘sound state’? He gives us five aspects that are required.

The first aspect is the delicacy of taste. The want of it is the main source of the variety of

taste among individuals. Hume explains this concept by analogy to gustatory taste, this

time referring to a passage from Don Quixote. In the passage, Sancho tells the story of

two relatives of his that were called to give their verdict on a barrel of wine which was

supposed to be very good (old and of a good vintage), since Sancho’s family is known to

have a delicate palate. One of the relatives tasted the wine, and said that it was good, but

that he could perceive a small taste of leather. The second one agreed that it was good,

but mentioned that he could taste a hint of metal. Both verdicts were made fun of, but on

emptying the barrel they found a key with a leather lace (OST, pp. 216-217).

Sancho’s story is supposed to show that his relatives had a higher delicacy of taste (in the

gustatory sense), so they could perceive things others could not. Although this taste is felt,

and is not in the object, it is clear that it is caused by some qualities of the object. The

same is the case with artistic or aesthetic taste: “where the organs are so fine, as to allow

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nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in

the composition: This we call delicacy of taste.” (OST, pp. 217-218)

Hume refers to the rules of art and tells us that they will help us identify those persons

who have delicacy of taste. (OST, pp. 218-219) In order to know if someone has a

developed delicacy of taste, we observe her performance with a work of art that we know

possesses the beauties mentioned in the rules (like a work that has stood the test of time).

If she identifies the rules, then she has a developed delicacy of taste; if she fails then we

should not trust her verdict regarding matters of taste.

Sole possession of delicacy of taste is not enough, since this faculty can be developed and

improved. Practice and comparison must be carried out to keep the delicacy of taste to a

high standard. (OST, pp. 220-224) By constantly experiencing works of a particular art

the observer will find that her awareness is improved as she engages with either the same

work a number of times, or several works to enlarge her experience. This exercise

sharpens the delicacy of taste. Comparing works of art also develops our awareness as

well as our inclinations towards works that produce highest pleasure. If the observer has

only experienced a particular work of art, she has no grounds to know if it produces the

highest pleasure or not. (OST, p. 223) By comparison alone she will notice this and

through experience she will lean towards works that produce the most pleasure.

Two other aspects are required for the ‘sound state’ Hume has in mind: a mind free of

prejudice and a strong sense. He has already briefly mentioned his idea of being free of

prejudice, and here he reminds us what this entails:

We may observe, that every work of art, in order to produce its due effect on the

mind, must be surveyed in a certain point of view, and cannot be fully relished by

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persons, whose situation, real or imaginary, is not conformable to that required by

the performance. (OST, p. 224)

We need to take into account factors like the intended audience, the opinions of the

time, and the context of the artwork in general in order to be affected properly by the

qualities. On the other hand, we must depart from personal considerations (like

friendship with the artist) and “forget, if possible, my peculiar circumstances.” (OST, p.

225)

Finally, having a good sense (good reason) is necessary for the proper functioning of our

faculty of taste. Reason allows us to perceive relations and ends or purposes in the works

of art, which are essential to its composition.

In all the nobler productions of genius, there is a mutual relation and

correspondence of parts; nor can either the beauties or blemishes be perceived by

him, whose thought is not capacious enough to comprehend all those parts, and

compare them to each other, in order to perceive the consistence and uniformity

of the whole. Every work of art has also a certain end or purpose, for which it is

calculated; and is to be deemed more or less perfect, as it is more or less fitted to

attain this end. (OST, p. 226)

Hume concludes his description of the ‘sound state’ by acknowledging a difficulty while

reaffirming what a standard of taste would amount to. He tells us that though an

individual in such state is seldom found, we can’t deny that we would regard her as very

valuable. Hume seems to tell us that wherever such individuals (which he now calls critics)

might be, they can give us the standard of taste: “Strong sense, united to delicate

sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice,

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can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever

they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.” (OST, p. 229)

Hume acknowledges that he cannot tell us where to find these critics, and finding them is

an extremely difficult task. However, this is not a problem:

It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of all

individuals is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, however

difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal

sentiment to have a preference above others. (OST, p. 230)

Two unavoidable sources of the variety of tastes, and hence obstacles for the search of a

standard are acknowledged in the final section of the essay. The first obstacle is the

different constitution of individuals. As people grow up, their dispositions change, thus

changing their particular choices in taste. He tells us that at twenty, they prefer to read

Ovid, since it suits their warm passions; at forty they prefer something a little bit more

calm, so they choose Horace; and at fifty their favourite is Tacitus. (OST, p. 234)

Individuals prefer to engage with works of art that resemble the way they are. This

extends to Hume’s second obstacle, differences of culture. The same way young

individuals prefer works of art that their elders would not, Italians prefer what the English

do not; the former enjoy ‘reserved humor’ the latter do not.

Finally, Hume concludes the essay with a warning on aspects that should not be taken

into account when judging a work of art: particular manners of the time and religion. We

should not judge a work of art to be faulty based on our disagreement with the manners

of that particular time, nor with any religious orientation portrayed in the work. (OST, pp.

235-240)

3. ‘OF THE STANDARD OF TASTE: THE ISSUES

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As I have already mentioned, the essay on taste has attracted much discussion. Some

authors point out apparent inconsistencies and problems in Hume’s essay. I want to focus

here on three main issues: double standard, circularity, and the role of critics. These

issues are by no means the only ones, but they are indeed the most common.

Jeffrey Wieand and James Shelley3

discuss the double standard issue in their papers. Both

of them believe that Hume is proposing two standards of taste. As we have seen, the first

part of the essay focuses on the rules of art that refer to the qualities naturally structured

to cause pleasure/disgust in the observer. The second part focuses on the description of

the critic. Thus, it seems that Hume is first proposing a standard of taste based on the

rules of art, and then a different standard based on the joint verdict of the true critics.

Wieand acknowledges this problem, but argues that Hume is only proposing one

standard based on the rules of art, and the verdict of the critics is just “a good guide to

what the rules are.”4

He arrives at this conclusion by showing that the verdict of the judges

cannot be the standard of taste. He objects that the critics do not create the rules of art,

they discover them. As Hume clearly states, the rules are found by experiment and

observation, not created by what the critics say. Though critics help in the discovery of

such rules, the judgments of non-critics also matter, so the verdict of critics cannot be the

standard. Wieand also believes that the story regarding Sancho’s relatives shows that

critics can be wrong. Since one of them tastes the iron but not the leather, and the other

the leather but not the iron, they are both wrong. If this is the case, then we need an

3

Jeffrey Wieand, ‘Hume’s two Standards of Taste’, in Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 34, # 135,

(April, 1984):pp. 129-142; and ‘Hume’s True Judges’. In The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.

53 # 3, (Summer 1995): 318-319.; Shelley, James. ‘Hume’s Double Standard of Taste’. In The Journal of

Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 52 # 4, (Fall 1994): 437-445; and ‘Rule and Verdict’. In The Journal of

Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 53 # 3, (Summer 1995): 319-320.

4

Wieand, 'Hume's two standards', 129.

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alternative standard to settle disputes of taste, not based on the critics, so we are left with

the rules of art as the true standard.

Shelley takes a different path, and argues that Hume is in fact giving us a double standard

of taste. He attacks Wieand’s take on the example from Don Quixote, telling us that the

point of the example is not to show that critics can be wrong, but rather that the critics are

not real but ideal: “If Sancho’s fabulous kinsmen do not possess delicacy of taste, nobody

does; if they can sometimes be wrong, everybody can.”5

He then explains that even

though Hume is searching for the one and only standard of taste, he gives two because he

prefers one (the rules of art), but has more confidence in the other(the verdict of the

critics). The rules of art are a strong standard, but since Hume does not specify what these

rules are, he has less confidence in it.6

The verdict of the critics on the other hand, is not

as strong as the rules, but at least we know what qualities to look for in a true critic.

The second common issue identifies a circular argument in Hume’s search for a

standard. Peter Kivy, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Noel Carroll7

all identify this problem:

To discover whether an artwork is good, ask a good critic; to find a good critic,

search for someone with the five qualities discussed earlier; to decide whether

someone has these qualities, check your candidate’s performance: has he and

does he approve of good artworks? But this is a circle. You must presuppose

5 Shelley, 'Hume's Double Standard', 437. 6

Ibid, 443. 7

Nöel Carroll, ‘Hume’s Standard of Taste’, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.

43, # 2 (December 1984): 181-194; Peter Kivy, ‘Hume’s Standard of Taste: Breaking the Circle’, in British

Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 7, #1 (1967): 57-66; and Carolyn Korsmeyer, ‘Hume and the Foundations of

Taste’, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 35, # 2 (Winter, 1976):210-215.

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knowledge of the good artworks in order to identify the critics who will tell you

which artworks are good ones.8

This group of scholars takes the rules of art to be the standard, but we rely on the critics

to identify the rules, and we rely on the rules to identify the critics, thus completing the

circle. Korsmeyer mentions that the apparent circularity would vanish if Hume tells us

what the qualities or rules are,9

but as we know from Shelley’s reading, Hume never does

this.

Finally, some authors were concerned with the role of critics in aesthetic experience.

Jerrold Levinson and Mary Mothersill, among others, discuss the issue.10

They think that

we need to ask a question regarding the role of critics: Why would non-critics (ordinary

people) care for the judgment of critics? Non-critics have a delicacy of taste less

developed than that of the critics, so chances are they will not enjoy the same artworks as

the critic does. Why should ordinary people care for the judgments of expert critics? This

problem would be solved if Hume would tell us whether ordinary people can develop

their delicacy of taste, and how to do this.

8

Carroll, ‘Hume’s Standard of Taste’,189

9

Korsmeyer, 'Hume and the foundations of Taste', 205-206.

10

Jerrold Levinson, ‘Hume’s Standard of Taste: The Real Problem’, in The Journal of Aesthetics

and Art Criticism, Vol. 60, # 3 (Summer 2002): 227-238 and ‘The Real Problem Sustained: Reply to

Wieand’, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 61, #4 (Autumn 2003): 398-399; Jeffrey

Wieand, ‘Hume’s Real Problem’, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 61, #4 (Autumn

2003): 395-398; Mathew Kieran, ‘Why Ideal Critics are not Ideal: Aesthetic Character, Motivation and

Value’, in British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 48, # 3 (July 2008): 278-294; Stephanie Ross, ‘Humean Critics:

Real or Ideal?’, in British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 48, #1, (January 2008): 20-28; Mary Mothersill, ‘Hume

and the Paradox of Taste’, in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, ed. George Dickie, Richard Sclafani, and

Ronald Roblin, 2nd ed. (St. Martin's Press, 1989), 269-286.

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Before attempting to solve the issues I have presented, I want to highlight that in their

papers all of the authors mentioned believe that Hume is searching for the (perhaps

universal) standard of taste. I believe that this is not an accurate interpretation of the essay,

and by considering the essay within the particular context of its publication we can

construct an interpretation that sheds light on Hume’s purpose in the essay and also

solves the issues identified by modern scholars.

4. THE CONTEXT: FOUR DISSERTATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL

PHILOSOPHY

I want to consider the historical context of the essay on taste by focusing on two aspects:

the publishing history of the volume where the essay was first included, Four

Dissertations, and the methodology that Hume promoted and adopted, that of

experimental philosophy.

None of the articles that deal specifically with Hume’s essay on taste mention that it was

first published as part of the Four Dissertations in 1757; almost all of them refer to the

version included in Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, where the essay of taste

was included along with the other three dissertations a year later. In the Essays the three

items were scattered, breaking the natural connection they had.11

I believe that it is crucial

for our understanding of the essay to take into account the connection it has with the

other texts that were included in Four Dissertations.

The volume was a very troubled publication.12

Hume first mentions the dissertations in a

letter dated May 1755 to his publisher, Andrew Millar. Hume had with him four

11

John Immerwahr points ou in his introduction to the edition of Four Dissertations cited here that

“there are several unifying themes thatrun throug the essays in their original configuration.” However he

does not comment on this aspect in enough detail. Immerwahr, 'Introduction', in Four Dissertations, xviii. 12

This section is based on Mossner's account in E.C. Mossner. ‘Hume’s Four Dissertations: an

essay in biography and bibliography’ in Modern Philology, 47 (1950), 37-57.; and on Immerwhar's

introduction cited above.

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dissertations he had written a while ago, so he could “polish” them through the years and

were now ready to see the light. The four pieces were: The natural history of religion, Of

the passions, Of tragedy, and “some considerations previous to geometry and natural

philosophy.”13 Mossner speculates that they must have been written sometime between

1749 when he returned from Italy, and before he started working on the History of

England in 1752.14

Hume later realized that there was something wrong with his argument

in the essay on geometry, so he decided not to print it. Millar pointed out that the other

three texts were not enough for a volume, so Hume decided to send two other essays he

had written, and four dissertations now became five dissertations. The two new essays

were Of Suicide, and Of the Immortality of the Soul.

Five dissertations was printed in 1755 and pre-publication copies distributed, but it was

quickly suppressed. It is suggested that Hume might have been facing excommunication

from the church, and the publication of an essay that argued for the utility of suicide and

another one that argued for the mortality of the soul would have been evidence to

prosecute Hume and probably Millar too. Advised by his friends Adam Smith and Allan

Ramsey the painter, Hume decided to remove these two essays and wrote a new one on

the standard of taste. Five dissertations became Four Dissertations again. Hume also

wrote a dedication to John Home, author of Douglas, a tragedy, in January of 1757,

meant to be included in the volume. But Millar had already distributed 800 copies

without the dedication, much to Hume’s frustration. The volume was finally published in

February 1757.

13

Letter 111, June 1755. In The Letters of David Hume, edited by J. Y. T. Greig. Vol 1. (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1932): 222-223.

14

Mossner, 'Hume's Four Dissertations', 37.

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The other contextual aspect that will help us provide a fair interpretation of the text is the

methodology of the experimental philosophy. Since 2009 Peter Anstey has been leading

an interesting research project at the Univeristy of Otago under the title “Experimental

Philosophy and the Origins of Empiricism.” The main claim of the research group is that

the framework we should use for interpreting early modern philosophy is one based on

the methodological distinction between speculative and experimental philosophy, as

opposed to the epistemological distinction between rationalism and empiricism.15

The experimental method was the one adopted by the majority of British philosophers in

the eighteenth century while speculative philosophy was ridiculed and criticized. The

method of experimental philosophy, briefly, consisted in grounding all our inquiries in

facts and observations only, not on hypothesis; there was no use for a priori rules or

maxims; and the practical outcome of our inquiries was extremely important. Unlike

speculative philosophers, who accommodated the phenomena to the fantastical

conjectures they called theories, the experimental philosophers observed the phenomena

and constructed the theory based on the collected facts and observations.

Hume adopted the methodology and, as he tells us in his Treatise, attempted to apply it

to moral subjects. In his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (EPM) he gives us

a clear statement of the adoption of the methodology of experimental philosophy:

As this is a Question of Fact, not of abstract Science, we can only expect Success,

by following this experimental Method, and deducing general Maxims from a

15

The origins of the project can be found in Peter Anstey, ‘Experimental vs. Speculative Natural

Philosophy,’ in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century. P. R. Anstey and J. A. Schuster (eds.).

Netherlands: Springer. 2005. pp. 215-242. Posts regarding claims made by the Otago research group can

be found in their blog: https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/emxphi/ . See also Peter Anstey and Alberto Vanzo, 'The

Origins of the Experimental-Speculative Distinction'. in Intellectual History Review, forthcoming (2012).

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Comparison of particular Instances. The other scientifical Method; where a

general abstract Principle is first establish’d, and is afterwards branch’d out into a

Variety of Inferences and Conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but it suits

less the Imperfection of human Nature, and is a common Source of Ilussion and

Mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of Hypotheses and

Systems in natural Philosophy, and will hearken to no Arguments but those

derived from Experience. ´Tis full time they should begin a like Reformation in

all moral Disquisitions; and reject every System of Ethics, however subtile or

ingenious, that is not founded on Fact and Observation. (EPM, 8-9)

These two contextual aspects will help us understand Hume’s purpose in the essay.

5. REVISITING THE ESSAY

I follow John Immerwhar’s16

lead and argue that there is a unity among the four essays

included in Four Dissertations, unity that was lost when they were separated and included

in the 1758 volume of the Essays.

The central essay in the volume is the dissertation Of the passions. It is an abridged

version of book II of the Treatise, and the theory put forward there is applied in the first

dissertation of the volume, The natural history of religion, as well as in the essays on taste

and on tragedy. The way the theory is applied in the first essay is not of our present

concern, so I will focus on its application in the two ‘aesthetic’ essays.17

In the dissertations

on the passions Hume tells us about his theory of the predominant passions. When two

contrary passions are experienced at the same time, the stronger passion absorbs the

16

Immerwhar, introduction to Four Dissertations, xviii-xxvii.

17

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weaker one and makes itself stronger. Hume illustrates this with the example of someone

in love:

When a person is once heartily in love, the little faults and caprices of his mistress,

the jealousies and quarrels, to which that commerce is so subject; however

unpleasant they may be, and rather connected with anger and hatred; are yet

found, in many instances, to give additional force to the prevailing passion.

(Passions, p. 174)

This is exactly what happens when we enjoy tragedies, as Hume tells us in the essay on

that topic. Of Tragedy deals with the apparent paradox where we seem to derive pleasure

from “sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, which are in themselves disagreeable

and uneasy.” (Tragedy, p. 185) This is explained by the theory of the predominant

passions: When a tragedy is beautifully written, the pleasure derived from the beauties is

stronger than the uneasiness from the unpleasant emotions, so the pleasure absorbs the

uneasiness and makes itself stronger. The theory is also applied in the essay on taste,

where Hume tells us that Ariosto pleases despite transgressing the rules. His poems might

be a mixture of serious and comic styles, incoherent, and depict improbable fictions; but

the unpleasantness of these faults is absorbed by the dominant pleasure that results from

the clearness of expression, his natural pictures of the passions and all the other god

qualities of the artwork.

The essay on tragedy is also connected to the essay on taste. In fact, Of tragedy is the

search for the rules of art proposed in the essay on taste put into practice. Hume gives an

account of features that make a tragedy more pleasant. The whole essay on tragedy might

be considered to be a standard of taste for that particular type of art. As I will mention in

18

what follows, this link between the essays will also help us resolve the issues previously

discussed.

Besides these specific connections between the texts, there is a theme that helps us look at

the volume as a whole: the experimental method. I have already mentioned that the

theory of the predominant passion is shown at work in the essay on tragedy and in the

essay on taste, and that the search for a standard of taste does the work in the essay on

tragedy. This clearly shows the commitment of Hume to the experimental method. His

interest in the volume was not just to create a theory of aesthetics, but rather give an

explanation for our experiences with art, and with tragedy in particular. Hume achieves

this by basing and confirming his theory on facts and observations. The theories

explained in Of the Passions and Of the Standard of Taste are confirmed by observation

in his essay on tragedy. The search for the rules of art, which Hume explicitly mentions

that are not a priori rules on his essay on taste, is carried out in his essay on tragedy where

he gives us a list of ‘good’ qualities of tragedies.

The same goes for the theory explained in Of the passions. The idea of a predominant

passion absorbing an opposite, weaker one is not a mere conjecture but actually

confirmed in the essay on tragedy. The fact that we can derive pleasure from sad

situations is the evidence Hume uses to confirm and apply his theory. This is exactly what

a philosopher committed to experimental philosophy would do. It is not enough to posit

a plausible theory without any grounding on facts and observation. If the theory is to be of

any worth, it must be both based on and confirmed by the phenomena. If we separate the

three essays we lose this aspect and are mislead to indentify some problems in Hume’s

essay on taste, as the authors I have discussed do.

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The experimental method not only helps to show the unity of the essays, but it can also

help us understand Hume’s purpose in the essay of taste, which will in turn help us solve

the issues identified by the modern scholars. Rather than trying to establish the one and

only standard of taste, Hume’s essay should be regarded as practical guide for the

enjoyment of aesthetic experience. As I mentioned in the previous section, one of the

concerns of the method of experimental philosophy was the practical outcome of their

enquiries. Through the experimental method the search for knowledge had the ultimate

goal of improving our lives. The essay on taste is a guide to improve our aesthetic

experience. This is supported by a passage where Hume clarifies the purpose of his essay:

It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of all

individuals is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, however

difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal

sentiment to have a preference above others. (Taste, p. 230)

Hume not only tells us this, but that in fact there is something we can do to develop our

taste. Delicacy of taste is a faculty that needs to be developed through practice and

comparison, and this is something that is not exclusive to the critics. All of us ordinary

people can and should develop our faculty of taste if we want to derive greater pleasure

from our aesthetic experiences. Only through the context of experimental philosophy,

where theories are meant to be grounded and confirmed on facts an observations, we can

read the essay on taste as a guide to develop aesthetic enjoyment.

If we accept this reading of Hume’s essay, we can easily solve the issues previously

discussed. Since the standard is meant to be a practical guide, Hume was not trying to

find the standard of taste, as the passage above shows. This being the case, there is no

room for considering that Hume is giving us the one and only universal standard based

20

on the rules of art or the verdict of the critics. If the purpose of the essay was to show that

some people have a more developed delicacy of taste (and consequently a ‘better’

aesthetic experience), Hume could not have intended to have defined a standard of taste.

Furthermore, this reading also helps answer Korsmeyer’s complain that Hume never tell

us what the so called qualities are.

Hume doesn’t give us a full list of the qualities on which the rules of art are based and

there is a good reason for this. Since he was not trying to give us a definition of the

standard of taste but rather construct a guide for aesthetic experience he could not

possibly list all the qualities that cause pleasure. He does mention some of them both in

the essay on taste and in the essay on tragedy, but, as he clearly states, the qualities are

something we can only find through experience and observation, and he only mentions

the qualities he has been able to experience, both in the examples given in the essay on

taste and in Of Tragedy. As Korsmeyer mentioned, the circularity issue can be solved if

Hume tells us what the qualities are; he actually does this. His description of Ariosto gives

us some of the desirable qualities (force of expression, natural pictures of the passions,

variety of inventions) and the faults (improbable fictions, lack of coherence, mixture of

styles) that might be identified in a work of poetry. In the essay of tragedy, he mentions

rules for such works as well:

The force of imagination, the energy of expression, the power of numbers, the

charms of imitation; all these are naturally, of themselves, delightful to the mind;

and when the object presented lays also hold of some affection, the pleasure still

rises upon us, by the conversion f the subordinate movement, into that which is

predominant. (Tragedy, p. 196)

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Finally, since the essay is not supposed to be restricted only to the true critics, but

ordinary people should also experiment and develop their delicacy of taste, we should

care about what critics say. Not in order for ordinary people to end up liking the works of

art the critics like, but so the former can improve their own delicacy and use their

judgment as a guide to works of art that will enhance the pleasure of our aesthetic

experience. It is important to mention here that there is a difference between liking a

work of art and judging it to be beautiful.18

The critic is supposed to identify the qualities

that make a work of art beautiful, not to discuss his personal preferences. This is precisely

why Hume’s standard of taste is a guide for aesthetic experience. He acknowledges that

personal preferences (whether influenced by culture, age and country or not) are an

unavoidable source of the variety of taste, but this doesn’t entail that we cannot agree on

what makes a work of art beautiful.

18

Nöel Carrol covers this distinction in the paper cited here. (pp. 187-188)