Counterinsurgency Warfare How Corruptions Undermines the Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency

Operation in Afghanistan

Abdulhaq Azad

Cases in International Relations

4/30/2014

OSCE Academy in Bishkek

Azad2

ABSTRACT

International troops from around 48 countries, as part of their mission have been

engaged in counterinsurgency campaign along with Afghan government to terminate the

Taliban insurgent group. But after passing of more than a decade Taliban seems far from

being defeated. Analysts attribute different shortcomings and setbacks to the failure of

counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, among which is less paid attention on, is

corruption that I in this paper demonstrate how it can affect the effectiveness of COIN

campaign.

INTRODUCTION

As the consequence of September 11 attacks, U.S. invaded Afghanistan and toppled

down the Taliban regimes, which refused to surrender Osama Bin Laden the alleged

orchestrator of these attacks. In 2001 United Nations (UN) passed a resolution that mandated

the deployment of international forces under the name of International Security Assistance

Forces (ISAF) which is mainly composed of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member

countries (NATO) and American forces. The Mission of ISAF was defined to prevent the

resurgence of the Taliban and dismantle Al-Qaeda. The other part of their mission was to

train the Afghan security forces and increase popular support for the newly established

government through implementation of developmental projects in various areas, such as

health, education, agriculture and so on, especially in south and east parts where Taliban has

a strong foothold. Unfortunately, Taliban resurged after the U.S. attention was drifted to Iraq

and by 2006 they appeared very strong. As the Taliban intensified their attacks the U.S.

increased the number of their troops in 2009, so the total number of foreign troop’s presence

reached its peak of more than 130000 in Afghanistan (Goodhand 2012).

The cost of war has been huge for the international community both in term of blood

and money especially for the U.S that is paying for the lion share of this war. So far, as of

Azad3

today1 3438 (iCasualties 2014) soldiers of ISAF have been killed, over 2000 of them

American. Further, the cost of war estimated in 2011 at around US $444 billion for the U.S.

government only (Belasco 2011). The cost of war for Afghan people also has been enormous

as thousands of civilians have been killed or injured. As per 2013 report Afghan national

army has had over 4000 and Afghan national police has had 2300 casualties (BBC Persian

2013). The mentioned figures indicate that the Taliban seems far from being defeated.

Analysts criticize the international community especially the U.S. for not being successful in

eradicating the Taliban insurgent on several grounds but this paper looks at how the

widespread corruption undermines the success of COIN operation in Afghanistan.

The paper proceeds as follow: the first part gives a short description of the research

question, methodology and literature review. The second part elaborates on the concept of

insurgency and theory of counterinsurgency and its correlation with good governance. The

third part presents detailed information on the extent of corruption in Afghanistan and

identifies the ways in which the corruption undermines the effectiveness of COIN campaign.

And the paper concludes from the findings of the paper that corruption negates the success of

COIN campaign and therefore, the COIN strategy should be broad and include fighting

corruption and promotion of good governance as well.

1. RESEARCH QUESTION, METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. Research Question and Methodology

The main research question is ‘how corruption undermines the success of

counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan’. To address this question the paper employs

mixed methods both quantitative and qualitative by utilizing mostly secondary sources.

As for the qualitative method the paper uses the counterinsurgency warfare literature

1 29 April 2014

Azad4

written about the theory and approaches of counterinsurgency doctrine. Further, the paper

demonstrates the opinions of the Afghan people about the corruption from the survey

conducted by the United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2010 and the

recent one. Further in this regard it also uses online newspapers. As for the quantitative

part the paper utilizes some statistical data from United Nations’ reports and other

literature about the level of corruption in state administration. Additionally, it explores

different sources about the amount of income Taliban receives from drug trafficking

which is considered to nourish in corrupt environment.

1.2.Literature Review

There has been quite remarkable number of research papers and reports written about the

counterinsurgency theory, practice and tactics including its success and failure in different

cases. Each analysis usually identifies different aspects of the shortcomings of U.S.’s COIN

doctrine. For instance, Robert Egnel (2010) criticizes the Provincial Reconstruction Team

(PRT) which is a unit created by ISAF to carry out developmental projects in order to win the

hearts and minds of Afghans and boost people’s trust in government. He says that these

programs are carried out by military personnel who lack expertise in this area. Egnel further

criticizes that the US forces' night raids on the Afghan people’s houses and the civilian

casualties caused by NATO military operation offset the little gain they get in winning the

hearts and minds of Afghans by their developmental projects. Because from this issue

Taliban can reap benefit, as every time NATO kills civilians they are providing a foundation

for the Taliban’s propaganda.

Jonathan Goodhand (2012) criticizes that the aid money were not channeled through

a single central body and lack of coordination and poor monitoring even have fomented

corruption or in some cases ended up in the pocket of the Taliban. Similarly, Seth G. Jones

(2008) emphasizes the correlation between good governance and COIN and at the same time

Azad5

highlights the need for taking measure against drug trafficking as well. However, this

literature doesn’t pay attention on the relationship of corruption and success of COIN

operation. In 2011 it was estimated that over the last decade around $57 billion (BBC News

2011) aid money poured into Afghanistan. Due to widespread corruption however only 15-20

per cent of this money has been spent for the intended purposes (Robinson 2012). My

assumption is that corruption has far negative effects on the success of COIN operation.

Corruption is defined as behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a public role

because of private (personal, close family, private clique) financial or status gains (Nye

1967) or The abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank).

2. THE CONCEPT OF INSURGENCY AND THE THEORY OF COIN

2.1. The Concept of Insurgency

Insurgency is a tactic or strategy employed by a group of people who cannot achieve their

political objectives through conventional means of gaining power (Metz and Raymond 2004)

such as election and military coup. Because they are too weak to do so, therefore they resort

to violence and psychological warfare. Since they are not strong enough to fight with the state

military in the battle field face to face, they use a complex terrain such as “jungles, mountains

and urban areas.” The insurgents usually seek various goals: they may want to oust the

existence government and seize power themselves or may have more limited goals as such

“separation, autonomy or alteration of a particular policy.” (Metz and Raymond 2004, 15)

The insurgents sustain themselves by maintaining their support and expanding their influence

amongst the populace by political and psychological propaganda. From this it follows that

there is a neutral third side to the conflict which is the populace. Both the insurgents and

counterinsurgents strive to win the support of the populace. It should be noted that either the

insurgents or counterinsurgents may also have external supporter.

Azad6

Speaking in a broader sense, the insurgent groups generally appear in two forms: “National

insurgencies” that fight with the government because of differences in “economic class,

ideology or identity as such race, ethnicity and religion.” (Ibid) The second is the “liberation

insurgencies” these insurgents fight against a ruling groups that is considered as occupiers

(though it may not be occupiers actually). In this case the goal of the insurgents is to liberate

their nation, for example the Taliban/Al-Qaeda insurgency in Afghanistan. It is worth

mentioning that there is not always a clear cut distinction between national and liberation

insurgency. Any insurgency can have the elements of both and “shift emphasizes during its

lifespan” (Metz and Millen 2004).

1.3.Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The core of the COIN theory is to offer approaches and tactics to end insurgency and to

eradicate insurgents who are fighting with a government. According to this theory there are

“soft and hard counterinsurgency approaches” (Mack 1979). The hard approach is based on

the concept of “force, coerce, intimidation and deterrence which include inflicting suffering”

on the insurgents and destroying their infrastructure by bombing and shelling or in the other

worlds to employ terrible pain and violence which are beyond their endurance (Shultz 1979).

In contrast, the soft approach is based on the concept of non-violence; it refers to combating

the insurgents through non-violent means such as political, social and economics (Mack

1979). Mao Tse Tung said that “guerrilla fish can only survive in the hospitable people sea.”

(Mack 1979, 233) Thus, the overriding goal of this approach is to drain the see in which the

insurgents swim. This is done by cutting off the insurgents from their support sources in the

community where insurgents take shelter, recruit people and receive other kind of supports.

This is in turn feasible by persuading the masses to support the government by carrying out

developmental projects, creating jobs and listening to local people’s needs and grievances

(Ibid).

Azad7

U.S has employed a mixed approach of CION in Afghanistan to terminate the Taliban. To

win the hearts and minds of Afghan people, U.S builds schools, hospitals, bridges and roads

and carries other such infrastructural projects through Provincial Reconstruction Team

(PRT). ISAF also are spending resources on promoting good governance because it is

believed that good governance is very important to effective COIN operation as it ensures a

sustained support for the government from the people. In addition the competence of security

forces not only in term of skills but also integrity is directly connected to success of COIN

operation (Jones 2008). ISAF also takes military measures to eliminate the Taliban which in

many cases has been proved counterproductive because of the civilian casualties, and the

night raids which is considered as disrespect to Afghan culture and disturbance to the peace

of people’s house at night. Including the mentioned shortcomings of military action,

unfortunately the strategy of wining the hearts and minds also has had little effect due to

widespread corruption. The amounts of money allotted for developmental project are not

dully spent for intended purpose.

3. THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECT ON COIN

Corruption is pervasive at all level of government from the person who is holding the

lowest civil service position to the police, judge, prosecutor, custom officials, local

authorities and senior officials are corrupt(UNODC 2012). It is difficult to obtain a public

service in Afghanistan without bribing a civil servant. UNODC’s reports conclude that

“Afghanistan is ruled by bribe rather than law.” For instance, if a passenger needs to get to

the airport swiftly without being checked by security officials, no hassle, he can do it by

paying $20 at the checkpoint (Gebauer and Volkery 2010). If you want to get a driver's

license immediately without taking the test, just you need to pay some amount of $180. Every

government agency employs official “commissionkar, the Persian word for intermediary”

(Ibid) he facilitates the speedy process of the application or whatever document it is. Without

Azad8

his help no application would reach its intended destination or may take so long. The

UNODC’s survey suggests that Afghan citizens are often asked by public officials to pay

extra money or give a gift to finalize or accelerate an administrative procedure to obtain a

service or a document. In 2010 over 12 months Afghans paid out $2.5 billion in bribe that is

equivalent to almost one quarter (23%) of Afghanistan’s GDP (UNODC 2010). Poverty and

violence is believed to be the biggest challenges facing Afghans but paradoxically Afghans

see corruption as their biggest concern, based on the interview UNODC did with 7,600

Afghans in 12 provincial capitals and more than1, 600 village around Afghanistan, 59%

considered corruption as the biggest problem which ranks the problem even higher than

security 54% and unemployment52% (UNODC 2010).

Giving bribe is a heavy tax on Afghan citizens because Afghanistan is the poorest

country in the world. UNODC’s survey further reveals that every second person had bribed

public officials in 2009. According to the report, judiciary and other law overseeing agencies

or law enforcement authorities are the most corrupt: Twenty-five percent of those who have

been surveyed said that they had bribed the policeman in 2009. Similarly 18 percent paid

bribery to a judge and 13 percent to public attorney. "The Afghan people are under the

impression that it is cheaper to buy a judge than to hire a lawyer," (Schulman 2010) the report

says. The last survey conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime shows the

total bribe paid to public servants has increased 40% comparing to 2009. The finding

suggests that during the year (2012), Afghan paid for a total of $3.9 billion bribe which is

twice Afghanistan’s domestic revenue (SIGAR 2014). According to Transparency

International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, Afghanistan ranks as one of the three

most corrupt nations on earth after Somalia & North Korea2. Corruption hampers the success

of COIN operation in the following ways: The existence of pervasive corruption in all level

2 Transparency International < http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/>

Azad9

of the state especially in security forces and judiciary erodes the people faith in the

government and it makes the population unhappy and the Taliban exploits this situation in

their favor. It is reported that in remote areas especially in the southern part where Taliban

has stronghold, people go to Taliban’s court to settle their dispute because people are of the

opinion that the Taliban’s court is quick, effective and corruption free (Egnel 2010).

Moreover, corruption “cripples the legal and institutional mechanism necessary to prosecute

insurgents and criminals” (Jones 2008). An NDS (national directorate of security) report

concluded that “The first requirement of countering Taliban at the village level requires good

governance, honest and competent leaders leading the institutions.” (Ibid)

In the same way, corruption undermines both the internal and external legitimacy of

the government, it is said that “corrupt and abusive authorities” at the national level as well as

in the sub national level administrations have limited the support for the government (Shurke

2013). Another indirect negative effect of the corruption on the success of COIN campaign is

that, it impairs the implementation of the development projects which are aimed at winning

the hearts and minds of the people. Because big chunk of the money allocated for the projects

are embezzled. The last and the most important negative impact of corruption is that it

provides an environment conducive to the drug trafficking and other crimes. Analysts believe

that there is a close connection between “narco-trafficking” and the insurgency. It is

identified that drug trade is a major source of finance for the Taliban. There is not enough

evidences that would confirm that to what extent Taliban benefit from drug trafficking,

different sources suggest different figures, for instances UNODC estimates, that 10% of the

value of the opiates transported by traffickers goes to Taliban’s pocket which is around USD

90-160 million per year. Similarly, The New York Times article suggests that the amount of

money Taliban receives from drug trade ranges from USD 70 million to USD 400 million a

Azad10

year. Further, as per the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace3, 100 million dollar per

year would accounts for around 40% of the Taliban’s “alleged war budget.” In addition it is

said that Taliban imposes 10% tax on the opium formers. All in all it is estimated that Taliban

earn around $300 million annually from opium trade (Checchia and Oskarsson 2012). This

sounds valid when we look at the cost of total drug trafficked from Afghanistan via Tajikistan

which is estimated at $200-$250 million annually, while only 25% of Afghanistan’s drug is

trafficked through north which includes Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan but mostly

trafficked to Tajikistan because of long common border and weak and corrupt border police

of Tajikistan (Daniel 2011).

4. CONCLUSION

From the insights given above I conclude that besides carrying out developmental

projects and taking military measures which should take place with no or very limited harm

to civilian, it is imperative for the international actors to exert pressure on Afghan

government to take serious step to curb corruption, because with existence of notorious

corruption all other efforts in eradicating Taliban insurgent will not produce the intended

result. Fighting drugs and corruption should be a part of a broader counterinsurgency policy

in Afghanistan.

BIBILOGRAPHY

BBC News. 2011. “U.S. and NATO ‘far from goals' in Afghanistan.” BBC News, 7 October, <

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15209793> (accessed April 8, 2014).

3 It is a foreign policy think-tank with centers in Washington D.C., Moscow, Beirut, Beijing and Brussels.

(Wikipedia)

Azad11

BBC Persian. 2013. “ Academi Milli Afghanistan be Hemayaty Britania Gushayish Yaft.”

BBC Persian, 11 November,

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2013/11/131111_k02-national-military-

academy.shtml> (accessed 25 November, 2013).

Belasco, Amy. 2011. “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror

Operations since 9/11.” Congressional Research Service, 29 March, <

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ca

d=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCUQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Fsgp%2F

crs%2Fnatsec%2FRL33110.pdf&ei=iZFfU7CpJsfw4QS8roBA&usg=AFQjCNHBvT

3AsuiprB1VbM9h8Wx_67rBCA&bvm=bv.65397613,d.bGE> (accessed 6 April

2014).

Checchia, Mark and Oskarsson, Katerina2012. “Opium, Poppies & Security in Afghanistan."

Civil-Military Fusion Center. 1 July,

<https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Documents/Security/CFC_Afghanistan_Opium-

Poppies-and-Security_July2012.pdf> (accessed 10 April, 2014).

Daniel, De Filippo 2011. “Counter-Narcotics Policies in Tajikistan and Their Impact on State

Building.” Central Asian Survey, 30 (1): 129-145.

Egnell, Robert. 2010. “Winning ‘Heart and Minds?” A Critical Analysis of Counter

Insurgency Operation in Afghanistan.” Civil Wars 12 (3): 282-303.

Gebauer, Matthias and Volker, Carsten. 2010. “Corruption in Afghanistan: UN Report

Claims Bribes Equal to Quarter of GDP.” Spiegel Online, 19 January, <

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/corruption-in-afghanistan-un-report-claims-

bribes-equal-to-quarter-of-gdp-a-672828.html> (accessed 8 April, 2014).

Goodhand, Jonathan. 2012. “Contested Transition: International Drawdown and the Future

State in Afghanistan.” NOREF Report.

ICasualties. 2014. “Coalition Military Fatalities by Year.” iCasualties, 29 April, <

http://icasualties.org/oef/> (accessed 29 April 2014).

Mack, Andrew. 1975. “Counterinsurgency in the Third World: Theory and Practice.” British

Journal of International Studies 1 (3): 226-253.

Metz, Steven and Raymond A. Millen. 2004. Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 21st

century reconceptualizing threat and response. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College. http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS63241\

Robinson, James, and Daron Acemoglu. Why Nations Fail. New York: Crown, 2012.

Azad12

Schulman, Daniel. 2010. “Corruption in Afghanistan: It’s Even Worse than You Think.”

Mother Jones, 21 January, <

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/corruption-afghanistan-its-even-worse-

you-think> (accessed 6 April 2014).

Seth G. Jones. 2008. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. RAND Counterinsurgency Study,

Volume 4. RAND Corporation.

SIGAR. 2014. “Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, but Challenges

Will Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan.”

SIGAR 14-47 Audit Report, 15 April 2014.

Suhrke, Astri. 2013. “State Building in Afghanistan: A Contradictory Engagement.” Central

Asian Survey 32(3): 271-286.

UNODC. 2012. "Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent patterns and trends." United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime, 1 December,

<http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf

> (accessed 8 March, 2014).

UNODC. 2010. "Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims." United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 1 January,

<http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-

corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf> (accessed 8 March, 2014).

Azad13