‘‘Horizontal’’ and ‘‘vertical’’ diffusion: The cumulative influence of Impact and...

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‘‘Horizontal’’ and ‘‘vertical’’ diffusion: The cumulative influenceof Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) on mining policy-productionin New Caledonia

Pierre-Yves Le Meur a,n, Leah S. Horowitz b, Thierry Mennesson c

a Research Institute for Development (IRD), Research Unit Governance, Risk, Environment, Development, New Caledoniab Hawai’i Pacific University, Global Leadership and Sustainable Development Program, USAc Executive director of the semi-public company Mwe Ara, New Caledonia

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 23 May 2012

Received in revised form

27 February 2013

Accepted 28 February 2013Available online 29 March 2013

JEL classification:

D7

D74

F6

M14

P16

Q3

Z1

Keywords:

Decolonization

Indigenous rights

New Caledonia

Resource politics

State-making

Cumulative impacts

a b s t r a c t

The scale, duration and intensity of conflicts over mineral resources vary greatly. However, they always

involve, in varying proportions, the triad stakeholder model—corporation, state, community—each

element of which is internally heterogeneous. Increasingly, new players are entering the scene:

international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), environmental grassroots groups, indigenous

transnational networks, international aid and development agencies. Nevertheless, conflicts and

arrangements around access to and control over mineral resources can take the apparent form of

dyadic relationships between companies and local communities, resulting in negotiated company-

community agreements, often called ‘‘Impact and Benefit Agreements’’ (IBAs). In our analysis, local

agreements on mineral resource governance are seen as building blocks in the production of mining

policy ‘‘from below’’, even though they seem at first sight to exclude the state. This paper argues that

these agreements, and the negotiations surrounding them, inform debates around mining through both

‘‘horizontal diffusion’’ (influence on other localities facing similar situations) and ‘‘vertical diffusion’’

(influence on policy design and implementation at upper political and administrative levels). This

diffusion may occur in a ‘‘positive’’ sense, effecting further change in line with the intent of the original

agreement, or in a ‘‘negative’’ one, actually making substantive change less likely, whether at a

community or policy level. We build this argument through two case studies from New Caledonia, in

the south-west Pacific, where mining has long been a key issue, especially in the current context of

‘‘negotiated decolonization’’ launched by the 1998 Noumea Accord.

& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

The scale, duration and intensity of conflicts over mineralresources vary greatly, from localized and quickly circumscribeddisputes to large-scale human rights violations and civil wars (Filer,1990; Ballard, 2001; Ballard and Banks, 2003; Leith, 2002; Banks,2008). However, these conflicts always involve, in varying propor-tions, the triad stakeholder model—corporation, state, community—

each element of which is internally heterogeneous. Moreover, otherplayers may enter the game, such as international non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), environmental grassroots groups, indigenoustransnational networks, international aid and development agencies,and so on. Against this background, we focus here on conflicts andarrangements around the access and control over mineral resources

that at least putatively take the form of dyadic relationships betweencompanies and local communities, thus downplaying the role of thestate in its different manifestations. In particular, we discuss nego-tiated company–community agreements, often called ‘‘Impact andBenefit Agreements’’ (IBAs). IBAs are a type of contract through whichcommunity representatives provide documented support for a projectin exchange for specified benefits, which may include direct pay-ments, employment opportunities, the protection of particular land-scapes or resources, and/or a greater role in impact monitoring. Whilestill far from universally applied, IBAs have become more and morecommon means of ending company–community conflicts over thepast two decades, in both developed and, increasingly, developingcountries (O’Faircheallaigh, 2008a).

How should one interpret these agreements? Several inter-pretations have been proposed, none necessarily exclusive of theothers. Agreements negotiated between mining companies andlocal community representatives are part of the Corporate SocialResponsibility (CSR) toolbox (O’Faircheallaigh, 2008a) and canthus be seen as a neoliberal strategy aimed at ‘‘green-washing’’

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Resources Policy

0301-4207/$ - see front matter & 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.02.004

n Corresponding author. Tel.: þ687 26 08 03; fax: þ687 26 43 26.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (P.-Y. Le Meur),

[email protected] (L.S. Horowitz), [email protected] (T. Mennesson).

Resources Policy 38 (2013) 648–656


capital, i.e., wrapping the inherently unsustainable nature of miningextraction in the rhetoric of sustainable development. In this respect,CSR is one dimension of the ‘‘new spirit of capitalism’’ identified byBoltanski and Chiapello (1999); in the 1990s, capitalism’s ability tointegrate its own critics took the form of an emphasis on networks,projects and mobility, replacing the 1960s model of the verticallyintegrated firm. As a continuation of this process, CSR addressesenvironmental and social issues such as sustainability, ethics andthe common good (see Kazmi et al., 2008). Within this frame ofinterpretation, one can also see IBAs and more broadly CSR appara-tuses as instruments of self-regulation forged by the globalizedmining sector, or at least its biggest players (Filer et al., 2008), inorder to protect itself from national states’ and international agencies’regulatory intrusions. Both interpretations raise questions about theactual role and regulatory capacities of the state, let alone its veryexistence as a discrete entity (Abrams, 1988; Lund, 2006; Blundo andLe Meur, 2009). A third line of reasoning highlights the relativeautonomy of local arenas and the agency of local actors, whatever theunevenness of the power dynamics organizing mining relationships.In this analysis, local agreements on mineral resource governance canbe seen as building blocks in the production of mining policy ‘‘frombelow’’, even though they seem at first sight to exclude the state.In respect to these three layers of interpretation, risk managementrepresents an often cited driver for negotiating these agreements.It is actually a crosscutting and contested issue as risk is vieweddifferently depending on the stakeholders’ viewpoints. From thecompany’s perspective, IBAs can help to reduce multiple riskssimultaneously: risks from government, such as the imposition ofmore stringent regulations, as well as risks from civil society thatcould result in project delays, costly litigation, and reputationaldamage (Fidler and Hitch, 2007; O’Faircheallaigh, 2011). Commu-nities, meanwhile, hope that the content of the agreements will helpto reduce risks stemming from the ‘‘adverse socio-economic andbiophysical effects of rapid resource development’’ (Fidler and Hitch,2007: 50).

The fact that IBAs are normally bilateral and very oftenconfidential (Fidler and Hitch, 2007: 60; O’Faircheallaigh,2008b), would appear to inhibit their influence on policy produc-tion. However, there is a countervailing tendency: a drive toescape from narrowly bilateral negotiations and to make themas public as possible, as we explore below (compare Filer, 2008 ondevelopment forums in Papua New Guinea).

Thus, this paper will argue that these agreements, and thenegotiations surrounding them, inform debates around miningthrough both what we term ‘‘horizontal diffusion’’ (influence onother localities facing similar situations) and ‘‘vertical diffusion’’(influence on policy design and implementation at upper politicaland administrative levels). This diffusion may occur in a ‘‘positive’’ orproductive sense, effecting further change in line with the intent ofthe original agreement and thus creating new room for manoeuvrefor local actors, or in a ‘‘negative’’ or repressive one, actually makingsubstantive change less likely, whether at a community or policylevel, and thus restraining actors’ action space.

Diffusion, power, and the mining industry

Contemporary reconfigurations of power involve a ‘‘hollowingout’’ of the nation–state (Rhodes, 1994). Increased internationalflows of knowledge, information, and influence have shiftedpower away from states, both ‘‘upward’’ to the international levelof multinational corporations and the transnational activist net-works resisting their activities (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Keckand Sikkink, 1998) and ‘‘downward’’ to local citizens’ groups,through a process labeled ‘‘glocalization’’ (Swyngedouw, 1997).This results in new, cross-scalar, ‘‘networked’’ or ‘‘hybrid’’

governance arrangements (Harrington et al., 2008: 201; Boegeand Franks, 2012). CSR, and specifically IBAs, are enabled by andin turn reinforce this trend by supporting a neoliberal agendathat, at least putatively, excludes formal government structures.However, if local agreements and CSR discursive practices can beseen as part of a global neoliberal agenda, vertical diffusionprocesses toward state authorities potentially pertain to a gov-ernmental project of local anchoring and influence subject-making processes (see Agrawal, 2005; Dean, 2010). In the sameFoucaldian vein, we can identify a strong analogy between the‘‘positive’’ and ‘‘negative’’ forms of diffusion and the ‘‘productive’’(freedom) and ‘‘negative’’ (domination, repression) sides ofpower. In other words, diffusion is not conceived as a merecommunicational process but as power-laden, infused withasymmetrical relations and strategic intentions.

Meanwhile, other factors also work against the regulationof mining activities. The mining sector is organized through thecirculation and transformation of different items: ore, of course;mining revenues (as compensation, royalties, development aid,taxes, etc.); but also policy models (as regulatory and legitimizingtools) and knowledge about mining impacts and policies. Filer(2011) rightly stresses the disconnected or fragmentary nature ofmining knowledge systems, along various lines: temporal (staffturnover), vertical (corporate headquarters versus project site)and horizontal (core mining activities versus social/environmen-tal externalities). Mining policy is similarly ridden with fragmen-tation and disconnection. This fact influences the way mining isexercised as a more or less regulated activity, in terms of both therevenue and the damage that it generates.1

This paper argues that diffusion processes transform the powerdynamics of company–community–state relationships, potentiallyempowering communities, facilitating company–community engage-ments, yet also resulting in a greater regulatory role for formalgovernance structures. We build our argument through two casestudies from New Caledonia, in the south-west Pacific, where mininghas long been a key issue, especially in the current context of‘‘negotiated decolonization’’ launched by the 1998 Noumea Accord(see below). The department in charge of mining and energy for NewCaledonia (DIMENC) elaborated a mining code (Schema d’amenage-

ment minier) in 2009 and a Strategic Industrial Committee (Comite

strategique industriel) was created in 2010. Meanwhile, miningprojects (including both nickel extraction and processing) are boom-ing and with them localized conflicts, negotiations and agreements.These localized processes which affect large-scale multinationalmining projects (SMSP-Xstrata in the north, the Brazilian multi-national Vale in the south, the French company SLN at various sites),will be the focus of this article. We understand them as structuringelements of mining policy production in New Caledonia.

We discuss the two case studies, outlining the sequence ofevents from which these agreements result and describing thearena produced by these interactions in order to show how theyinfluence policy making as well as other company–communityinteractions. The two case studies are situated and enriched bythe brief presentation of similar cases. Before entering into thedetail of the case studies, we outline the New Caledonian contextas regards mining and mining policy and locate the issue of localagreements within the broader frame of Corporate Social Respon-sibility, mining governance, and the policy process.2

1 Furthermore, policy and knowledge disconnections—and the way IBAs

contribute to these processes—relate to the broader issue of the linkage between

public participation, policy making and impact assessment (Fidler and Hitch,

2007; O’Faircheallaigh, 2008b, 2010; Franks et al., 2010).2 The results presented in this article are part of a research programme on

‘‘The politics of nickel between local and corporate governance in New Caledonia’’

funded by CNRT ‘‘Nickel and its environment’’

P.-Y. Le Meur et al. / Resources Policy 38 (2013) 648–656 649


Local agreements, CSR, and the politics of mining in NewCaledonia

It is difficult to locate New Caledonia in the binary landscapeof industrialized versus developing countries. New Caledonia isthe world’s 5th largest producer of nickel ore (around 9% of globalproduction) after Russia, Canada, Australia and Indonesia. Thecountry is estimated to hold between 10 and 30% of the world’snickel reserves (DIMENC, 2008), ranking 2nd after Russia.

New Caledonia’s trajectory of mining cannot be dissociated fromits socio-political history. A South-west Pacific archipelago, NewCaledonia has been administered by Metropolitan France since1853. Nickel was discovered a decade later, and the first mine openedin 1873. Several waves of settlement occurred, with immigrants fromFrance (largely convicts, as it was a penal colony) as well as Asia andthe Pacific, many of whom supplied labor to the mines. NewCaledonia’s population is now approximately 231,000 (ISEE, 2008),but Kanak people have become a minority in their own country, with45% of the population (ITSEE, 2001).

At the end of the 19th century, the colonial administrationimposed two levels of formally recognized ‘‘chieftaincy’’ (petits/

grands chefs) corresponding respectively to the village and districtadministrative units. This designation resulted in vast changes topre-colonial authority structures as chiefs were selected for theirrelationships to colonial authorities or French language skills, yetcustomary authorities today still command a varying degree ofrespect and legitimacy in the eyes of Kanak community members.Meanwhile, this authority has been complemented, or in somecases challenged, by the rise of other indigenous groups orassociations resulting from the recent rise of the autochthonydiscourse at the global level.

Mining, and especially nickel mining, has been a key politicalissue since the 1870s. In the 1950s and 1960s, a degree ofautonomy was conceded to New Caledonia as far as mining policywas concerned, but the central state retook control over mining in1969, as part of a strategy of regaining colonial control. In theearly 1970s, militant, nationalist, anti-colonialist political partiesformed, and the indigenous people chose to call themselvesKanak. The 1980s witnessed a series of violent uprisings, knownas ‘‘les Evenements’’ (the Events). Mining returned to the fore-ground in the 1990s when pro-independence parties mademining policy the main topic of the re-negotiation of theMatignon Accords, political agreements that had been signed in1988 by representatives of pro- and contra-independence partiesand the French state. This ‘‘prealable minier’’ (mining precondi-tion) resulted in the signing of the Bercy agreement on 1 February1998, as a prerequisite of the Noumea Agreement, signed on5 May 1998, a major milestone in the current process ofnegotiated decolonization. This singular process, which stressesthe need to redress the economic balance between the wealthySouth and the rest of the country (‘‘reequilibrage’’), involves adevolution of powers from New Caledonia to the three provinces(North, South and Loyalty Islands) which were created in 1989.With the Noumea Agreement, more powers were transferredfrom the French state to the newly created government of NewCaledonia.

Amongst these, jurisdiction over mining has been dividedbetween the provinces and the New Caledonian government. Thisis the result of an obligatory process of numerous consultations(including the Consultative Committee on Mines and the MiningCouncil) in which state representatives provided their inputalongside, amongst others, members of the Customary Senate,professional organizations, unions, and environmental non-government organizations.

Another peculiarity lies in the organization of mining capital.In 2003, Ballard and Banks wrote, ‘‘Nationalization is not currently the

threat for mining houses in their dealings with states that it was inthe 1970s’’ (Ballard and Banks 2003: 294). This does not hold true forcontemporary New Caledonia3 where the aforementioned negotia-tions resulted in the so-called ‘‘Northern Refinery’’ (Usine du Nord),a politically-backed project of nickel extraction and processing. It isa joint venture between the province-owned SMSP4 and the Anglo-Swiss multinational company Xstrata,5 SMSP holding 51% of theshares. This project is part of a pro-active, political effort to achievegreater economic balance between provinces (‘‘reequilibrage’’). How-ever, the arrival of another project (carried out by a giant Brazilianmultinational, Vale) changed the playing field. This project is based inthe Southern province, governed by loyalist parties, and follows amore classical path of mining capital organization, striving to build aneconomic enclave disconnected from the local and national context asmuch as possible. In the meantime SMSP signed, in February 2006,an agreement with the Korean steel-making company Posco to builda nickel processing plant in South Korea with SMSP as the majorityshare-holder (51%). The factory unit has been completed and is nowoperational. The oldest nickel company in New Caledonia, SLN(Societe le Nickel), founded in 1880 by Garnier, Hanckar and Higgin-son, and controlled by the Rothschild bank from 1888, underwent arestructuring of its capital in the 1970s and 1980s, with the creationin 1985 of the French industrial group Eramet, of which SLN is abranch. In 2000, following the Noumea Agreement, the newly-createdSTCPI (Societe territoriale caledonienne de participation industrielle),which belongs to the New Caledonian territory and provinces,acquired 30% of SLN’s shares (34% in 2007), thus gaining a blockingminority.

As a final example of the strong role of state authorities inmining policy production in New Caledonia (cf. Filer and Imbun,2009 for the Papua New Guinea case), the department in chargeof mining and energy for New Caledonia (DIMENC) elaborated aplanning paper for mining development (Schema de mise en valeur

des richesses mini�eres), and a mining code based upon it, that wereapproved by the Congress of New Caledonia6 in 2009. Subse-quently, a Strategic Industrial Committee (Comite strategique

industriel) was created in 2010 by the Noumea Agreementfollow-up committee (Comite des signataires de l’accord de

Noumea) under the aegis of the state, which brings together thepolitical parties represented in the Congress of New Caledoniaand Noumea Agreement follow-up committee and the miningcompanies and whose task is to delineate and coordinate astrategy for future extractive and industrial activities in NewCaledonia.

The importance and large number of politically motivatedtexts adopted in support of mining development, to which onemust add special provisions such as fiscal exonerations orpreferential tariffs, contrast sharply with the absence of govern-ment involvement in discussions between local communities andcompanies. The Northern and Southern Provinces have occasion-ally offered support by demanding environmental and socialimpact studies (but see Sourisseau et al., 2008) or by issuingrecommendations suggesting that companies respect sacred sites

3 See (Le Meur and Mennesson, 2011: 11–15) for a detailed account of the

evolutions of mining capital in New Caledonia.4 SMSP (Societe mini�ere du sud Pacifique), owned by the political and economic

entrepreneur Jacques Lafleur, was sold in 1990 to the newly created SOFINOR

(Societe de financement et d’investissement de la province Nord) which was

controlled by the Northern Province, which was in turn governed by pro-

independence parties.5 In 2006, Anglo-Swiss Xstrata absorbed Canadian Falconbridge which was

initially involved in the project, before merging in 2012 with the Swiss giant

trader Glencore, thus becoming the world’s 4th largest mining group after Anglo-

Australian BHP Billiton, Brazilian Vale and Anglo-Australian Rio Tinto.6 The congress is the parliament of New Caledonia, whose members are

elected at the provincial level.

P.-Y. Le Meur et al. / Resources Policy 38 (2013) 648–656650


during construction activities. However, these comprise tools to assistin decision-making and thus exist prior to any discussions rather thanrepresenting active participation in conflict resolution.

The peculiarities of New Caledonia’s mining policy cannot beunderstood in isolation from the colonial/postcolonial contextand the dual revenue stream it involves. There is a strong inter-play between revenue received from the state, in the form ofdirect transfers, and revenue from mining (see Freyss, 1995).Economically, revenue from the state acts as a cushion in periodsof slow mining activity or low mineral prices. Politically, thisbecomes a complex game of negotiating one revenue streamin exchange for access to the other. This works both ways:the French state gives money to New Caledonia in exchange formaintaining access to revenue from nickel production while pro-independence parties display their competence in managingnickel extraction and processing in order to negotiate additionalfunds from the state as a temporary measure allowing them toconsolidate their own mining development. This brings us back toour initial question about how to situate New Caledonia alongtwo axes: developed/developing and colonial/postcolonial. Whilethe country does not fall neatly into any of these categories, ouranalysis of local agreements (below) will provide some insightsinto this shifting context by highlighting the dynamic role oflocal agreements negotiated by communities and corporations,often with the brokerage or under the aegis of other state andnon-state actors, in reshaping the social, political and economicoutcomes—and indeed the very nature—of mining developmentin New Caledonia.

Case studies

We have selected two case studies that epitomize two eras ofthe nickel industry in New Caledonia: Thio, in the period prior tothe Noumea Accord (involving the long-standing mining corpora-tion SLN, a New Caledonia-based subsidiary of France’s Eramet),and Yate, in the period after the Noumea Accord with theappearance of new actors and discourses on the scene (multi-national corporations, indigenous organizations, environmentalistgroups and environmental policies, sustainable developmentrhetoric, etc.).

Thio, 1996

On 6 August 1996, a memorandum of understanding wassigned between the council of the two customary districts ofThio—the nickel capital of New Caledonia since the 1870s—andSLN. This agreement was based on a register of grievances writtenon 25/04/1996 by this council and the answers offered by SLN.The latter’s concern was to ‘‘avoid penalizing any longer theeconomic activity and social climate of the county and to providethe county residents with a long-term development projectthrough natural resource management.’’ The agreement com-prises nine points: (1) recruiting, over the next four years, sixteenyouths from Thio; (2) mining concessions issued to Kanakcompanies by SLN; (3) subcontracting (basically for enterprisesfrom outside the county); (4) management of SLN housing;(5) cession of SLN land properties; (6) anti-pollution work;(7) resettlement of people located in areas subject to flooding;(8) agricultural insurance; and (9) mediation by a quadripartitecommission (state, county, customary districts, SLN) in case ofdifficulties in interpreting or implementing the agreement. Thelatter was signed by three SLN staff members, eight customaryrepresentatives, the mayor of Thio and the state local representa-tive (subprefect).

The 1996 agreement ended a two-week conflict during whichThio’s two main open pits (Plateau, Camp des sapins) and thewharf (with a Japanese ore carrier) were blocked. The negotia-tions took place at strategically selected sites on the threshold of(and thus outside) the SLN mining concession, and the event wasdiscursively framed (by its participants as well as in the media)as the ‘‘customary authorities’ conflict’’ (conflit des coutumiers).The scope of the agreement is far-reaching; beyond the laborquestion, it embraces environmental and social issues, controlover natural resources and the sharing of mining revenue. Thestate is present, however, as a signatory party, and also throughits technical (central, territorial and provincial) services. Thecounty, governed by pro-independence parties since 1986,remained in the background, acting as an intermediary. Likewise,two Kanak entrepreneurs from Thio played a key role as ‘‘inter-ested’’, non neutral brokers (Banks, 2008: 26) between localpeople and SLN; moreover, one of them holds a strong politicaland customary position.

This conflict is but one in a long history of disputes of varyingscale between SLN and neighboring communities, often sparkedby environmental damage caused by mining activities, and usuallyresolved through compensation directly negotiated between thecompany and the affected people. This constitutes a sort of‘‘historical diffusion’’, memory-building (of conflicts, negotiations,outcomes, etc.) that informs future conflicts and their resolutions.At the same time, the 1996 conflict must be seen in the context ofthe ‘‘Events’’ (violent clashes combining a civil and anti-colonialdimension) of 1984–88 and the Matignon Accords of 1988. Theyears 1995–96 mark a turning point in this respect since FLNKS(the coalition of pro-independence political parties) put themining issue at the forefront of talks with the French governmentthat would eventually result in the aforementioned Bercy andNoumea agreements in 1998. Medium-scale claims, at the level ofXarac �u �u customary area7 for instance, and similar conflicts inother counties (e.g. Houaılou) occurred simultaneously with theThio case. Ceding mining concessions to Kanak groups was arecurrent topic at that time. Horizontal, more or less localizeddiffusion (at least of information and negotiating strategies) wasclearly taking place.

Even though the social actors who led the 1996 conflictemphasized its local specificities, it was inscribed in a broadercontext of the (post-)colonial reclaiming of indigenous lands; anoften-heard cry was, ‘‘This land must be restituted to the land-owners.’’ This register stems from the land reform policylaunched in 1978 and expanded in the 1990s, but it is overlaidby another discourse, a claim for recognition and control overnatural resources, beyond the formal attribution of land per se.The cultural context, in which social status and control over landderives from ancestral claims to a particular locality, led localactors to ‘‘localize’’ the conflict. At stake here for Kanak people isthe regaining of control over resources, territories and, beyondthat, over their own lives (see Horowitz, 2002; Le Meur andMennesson, 2012; cf. Ballard, 1997).

The description of the conflict as the ‘‘customary authorities’conflict’’ shows on one hand that it is not merely a conflict overlabor relations: it is about redefining the whole set of relation-ships between the locally hegemonic corporation and localresidents. On the other hand, this discursive strategy helps buildunity within the Kanak community, by relegating to the back-ground political, generational and inter-clan cleavages. This uni-fying approach was pursued through the creation of a follow-upcommittee that monitored the agreement implementation up to

7 The main island of New Caledonia comprises five different customary areas

created by the Matignon Accord in 1988. Thio is located in the Xarac �u �u area.



the 2000s, and assisted in recruiting the youths of Thio, solvingland cases and creating a mining company managed by the Kanak.The Thio Mining Company (SOMIKAT), the capital of which comesfrom local contributions (70%) and a public structure financed bythe French Agency for Development (30%), would eventually openin 2008 and started production in 2010.

The 1996 agreement was negotiated by Kanak representativesin order to address local concerns. However, diffusion was atwork here as well. Taking an historical perspective, the 1996conflict and agreement represent the (temporary) endpoint of aseries of events characterized by the deepening, extension, andcoalescence of local disputes (in Thio and the neighboringlocalities; see Le Meur, 2011; Le Meur and Mennesson, 2012).Furthermore, this conflict was influenced by the broader contextwe have outlined above. Moreover, it had significant effectsbeyond the agreement follow-up itself. On 2 August 2007 a newagreement was signed between one village, particularly impactedby mining activities, and SLN. We can understand this as acontinuation of the 1996 agreement, as it also encompasses abroad range of issues (housing, environment, land, employment).However, the case does not only exemplify a process of horizontaldiffusion, influencing this and other communities’ strategies indealing with companies, but also vertical, informing the com-pany’s later interactions with this and other communities. SLNhas historically favored a wait-and-see approach in its dealingswith local populations. In other words, its mode of governanceinvolves letting conflict develop rather than negotiating agree-ments. For instance, the 2007 agreement was preceded by aconflict resulting in a first agreement in 2005 with which SLNfailed to comply, causing unrest to break out again. However,the SLN executive team displayed a capacity to learn from itsinteractions with communities. A legal customary act was signedin 2004 by SLN and customary representatives in Tiebaghi, in theextreme north of New Caledonia, where what was at stake wasthe identification of landowning clans and latecomers and thedistribution of direct jobs and subcontracting. This will to preventand not only solve conflict was unprecedented in SLN’s interac-tions with communities and arguably party reflects the com-pany’s experiences at Thio in 1996.

This learning process has also resulted in a different typeof agreement, tripartite pacts signed by SLN with counties andprovinces (with customary authorities as observers) so as todesign and fund development alternatives to nickel mining.Meanwhile, the company’s contributions to sustainable develop-ment can be seen as a by-product of a new orientation towardboth more negotiated and more public ways of creating corporatepolicy. These agreements exemplify vertical diffusion, as theypotentially inform the creation of new policies through changingpractices.

Diffusion processes are thus at work at different levels in thiscase study of the 1996 conflict and agreement in Thio. The caseitself results from a series of conflicts and negotiations over arange of concerns, not only those related directly to mining. It hadimpacts on SLN’s strategy at the local level and at other sites andit paved the way for two new agreements which, because they aretripartite and not bilateral, do not fit into the IBA category.

Yate, 2008

New Caledonia currently possesses only one fully operationalnickel refinery, located near Noumea, which uses pyrometallur-gical technology, but two more refineries are in progress, knownas the Northern Refinery and the Southern Refinery (see Horo-witz, 2004). The more advanced project, which has attracted farmore controversy, is the Southern Refinery, officially named ValeNouvelle-Caledonie but known until December 2008 (and still

locally referred to) as Goro Nickel. Due to the low mineral contentof the soils, the refinery will use hydrometallurgical technology.This procedure, which has never before been implemented inNew Caledonia, involves the use of acid under pressure to leachnickel and cobalt from the ore. The resulting effluent, containingadditional dissolved metals, will be discharged into the nearbylagoon through a pipeline. The energy required for the refinery’soperations will come from a newly-built, coal-fired power plant.Inco, a multinational mining company based in Canada, pur-chased the mining rights to the Goro site in 1991 and completeda pilot refinery there in 1999. In 2006 Inco was purchased byCVRD, a Brazilian multinational mining company, which in 2007changed its name to Vale. Commercial operations at full capacityare planned for 2013 (Vale, 2010), despite delays caused byseveral accidents including massive spills of sulfuric acid in April2009 and April 2010 (Mainguet, 2010).

In 2002, Rheeb �u N �u �u, which means ‘‘eye of the country’’ inNum�e�e, an indigenous language of the Djubea Kapone customaryarea, was formed specifically to focus on Goro Nickel. The group isled entirely by Kanak. While not entirely opposed to the miningproject, Rheeb �u N �u �u has concerns about its potential environ-mental impacts, particularly on the marine resources upon whichthe local population depends for subsistence and livelihood. Theyare also concerned that Kanak will not benefit adequately fromemployment with the project, as evidenced by the company’sbringing workers from the Philippines for the construction phase.For six years, Rheeb �u N �u �u initiated a series of actions includingthe distribution of pamphlets denouncing Inco’s activities, theholding of public meetings at local villages, open letters sent topolitical leaders, legal action in the courts, the burning ofcompany trucks, and blockades of the construction site whichturned into encounters with 200 armed police during which fourgendarmes were injured, teargas was released, and a protestor’svehicle was fired upon.

Then, on 27 September 2008, 12 Rheeb �u N �u �u leaders, 25customary authorities (including chiefs, representatives of villageand regional councils, and members of the Customary Senate) andtwo Goro Nickel representatives signed a ‘‘Pact for SustainableDevelopment of the Far South [of New Caledonia]’’ (hereafter ‘‘thePact’’). Through this agreement, clearly (although never explicitlyframed as) an IBA, the mining company committed to creatinga corporate foundation to fund local sustainable developmentinitiatives, setting up an Environmental Customary ConsultativeCommittee (Comite consultatif coutumier environnemental, CCCE),recruiting and training local ‘‘environmental technicians’’, andimplementing a reforestation program. In exchange, Rheeb �u N �u �umembers committed to ‘‘assert their point of view not throughviolent or illegal actions, but by dialog’’ (Goro Nickel, 2008: 7).

The negotiations surrounding this IBA and the lead-up tothem, as well as the Pact itself and subsequent discourses aboutit, all exemplify different forms that horizontal and verticaldiffusion can take in debates over mining, and in their putativeresolution.

First, from its inception, Rheeb �u N �u �u’s actions and discourseswere heavily informed by the struggles and successes of commu-nities facing similar mining projects on their lands. To a greatextent, information about these other communities only becameavailable, and exchanges with them possible, through widespreadaccess to the internet. In what is increasingly a ‘‘network society’’(Castells, 1996), such interchange is leading to the creation of‘‘transnational advocacy networks’’ (Keck, 1998). Grassrootsstruggles from which Rheeb �u N �u �u drew inspiration includedAmerindian groups in French Guiana, with whom Kanak leaderscommunicated by email, and environmentalists in France whocirculated information about Rheeb �u N �u �u’s activities throughtheir own networks and generally supported their cause. Clearly,



the shared French language facilitated this communication, whilerestricting exchange with members of neighboring Melanesiannations, many of which experience extensive mining and resis-tance to it (including, notably, Papua New Guinea, SolomonIslands, and Fiji), but all of which are Anglophone. Most pro-foundly, however, and despite this language barrier, Rheeb �u N �u �uleaders were influenced by the struggles of the Innu and Inuitresidents of Canada’s Voisey’s Bay, where Inco had a similarrefinery project that had met steep resistance.

In contrast to this international horizontal diffusion of resis-tance strategies and discourses among grassroots groups, Valeattempted to initiate a different type of international horizontaldiffusion of strategies, one that served to enhance its interna-tional reputation. Representatives were quick to point to the Pactas ‘‘an example of a best practice and benchmark in the relation-ship between resource companies and aboriginal communities’’(Marcuson et al., 2009), attracting an invitation to participate inan international workshop organized by the Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights as a model for ‘‘good companypractices’’ (UN Russia, 2008).

Meanwhile, vertical diffusion between locally negotiatedagreements and mining policy was, in this case, a more complexstory. First, relationships between Rheeb �u N �u �u, its supporters,and formal institutions were multifaceted and ever-changing.At first, the protest group won popular support largely on thegrounds that it was based in customary authority. In the eyes oflocal residents, it thus provided an alternative form of represen-tation of Kanak interests than did political parties, viewed as deafto villagers’ concerns and interested only in maintaining power(Horowitz, 2009). This was somewhat ironic in that its mainleader had long been a politician, including a stint as the secretarygeneral of the local town of Yate from 1984 to 1989 and then asthe mayor from 1990 to 1995, followed by a place in the nationalgovernment in 2001. He had joined the militant pro-indepen-dence party Palika early on and then left it in 1997 to foundthe Federation des comites de coordination independantistes (FCCI),created as part of a coalition with the loyalist RPCR party and thusviewed by many Kanak as a betrayal. In 2002, the FCCI evictedhim from the party when he criticized the RPCR for granting Incoexploration rights, nearly for free, to a peninsula near the Gorosite. That year, Rheeb �u N �u �u was born.

In March 2008, however, some Rheeb �u N �u �u leaders wonthe municipal elections for Yate, taking the mayor’s office andassociated positions. Although the municipal government has nodirect authority over mining activities, and although the protestgroup vehemently denied having become a political party, thisnew positionality was in a sense the ultimate vertical diffusionfrom grassroots to the formal sector—not of discourses or strategiesbut of people themselves! However, the Pact was signed, to thegreat disappointment of many community members, close on theheels of these elections, a fact that was not missed by formersupporters of the protest group who now felt deeply betrayed andwondered whether Rheeb �u N �u �u’s detractors had been right allalong in thinking that its leaders were only interested in (re)gain-ing political power. At the provincial level, meanwhile, verticaldiffusion from the protest activities was both ‘‘positive’’, in thesense of stimulating government action, and ‘‘negative’’, restrict-ing formal policy formulation—or, more accurately, enabling it toremain unformulated. The positive vertical diffusion was precipi-tated by Rheeb �u N �u �u’s demands for increased attention to theproject’s potential environmental impacts. In response to theseconcerns, echoed in the population at large, the Southern Provincecommissioned first a government agency based in MetropolitanFrance, and then a group of scientists based in France and Canadaand approved by Rheeb �u N �u �u, to provide ‘‘independent’’ environ-mental assessments (see Horowitz, 2010). Beyond such ad hoc

reactions, the provincial government also responded to grassrootsenvironmental concerns by implementing new structures toaddress them. It first created, in 2004, a Committee for Informa-tion, Consultation and Environmental Impact Monitoring of theGoro Nickel Refinery, with participating members from themunicipal and provincial governments, customary authorities,Goro Nickel, and Rheeb �u N �u �u. In 2009, it also created OEIL(Observatoire de l’environnement en Nouvelle-Caledonie), an ‘‘obser-vatory’’ composed of local politicians and customary authoritiesas well as representatives of environmental GROs and industry(including, oddly, Vale itself), and charged with monitoring theproject.

Another, this time ‘‘negative’’ form of vertical diffusion con-cerned the negotiation process and resultant outcome. Although,starting in 2006, the provincial government provided an initialforum for Round Table discussions involving Rheeb �u N �u �u andInco (later Vale), it was eventually excluded from these negotia-tions which evolved into two-way talks between Vale and Rheeb �uN �u �u, brokered by each party’s lawyer; nor was any governmentrepresentative invited to sign the Pact itself (Horowitz, 2012).Government officials, however, were not perturbed by thesearrangements, which resulted in the achievement of the govern-ment’s ultimate purpose: allowing the mining operation toproceed unencumbered. In other words, these negotiations, andthe Pact that followed, nourished the provincial government’sneoliberal agenda (despite internal debates about taxation poli-cies and public shareholding), reassuring its representatives thatthey did not need to regulate this mining activity but could allowthe company to essentially self-regulate its socio-environmentalimpacts, achieving its ‘‘social license to operate’’ through aprocess of CSR. This was, then, a type of negative diffusion, nota stimulation of new policy but rather an encouragement of themaintenance of the status quo, a situation in which no formalrequirement existed for the assessment of a project’s potential oractual social impacts. More precisely, this neoliberal agenda wasimplemented through the devolution of regulatory powers tonon-state actors, i.e. corporations and indigenous groups (along-side the growing importance of international NGOs in this field;Sourisseau et al., forthcoming).

Discussion: policy making and the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’diffusion of local agreements

The two cases discussed here are emblematic of a gradual turntoward locally negotiated agreements between corporations andcommunities. In New Caledonia, local agreements involvingdevelopment operators (not only in the mining sector but alsoin tourism) and local populations, especially Kanak communitiesand their customary and political representatives, have a longerhistory, with a recent flowering in the 1990s and 2000s (Le Meurand Mennesson, 2012). The question raised at the outset of thisarticle relates to the concrete reach of such agreements in termsof mining policy production, as they seem to exclude—though tovarious extents—state instances. More specifically, how do theseagreements diffuse ‘‘horizontally’’ to other localities facing similarsituations and ‘‘vertically’’ to upper political and administrativelevels? And how, and to what extent, do these diffusion processesinduce reconfigurations in power relations and in the modalitiesof state-local anchoring?

Agreements between companies and communities seem, onthe surface, part of a neo-liberal agenda excluding formal govern-ment structures that are often happy to be absolved of theresponsibility of mediating negotiations. As the case studiesexemplify, horizontal diffusion processes, through which com-munities learn from each other’s interactions with companies,



which in turn transfer information and community relationsstrategies within or beyond the individual corporation, bypassthe state entirely. ‘‘Positive,’’ productive horizontal diffusion canempower community-level groups (such as Rheeb �u N �u �u and theThio community) by opening their eyes to the scope of possiblemodes of engagement with companies and avenues for exertingpressure on them. It can also, through peer-to-peer learningaccompanied by peer pressure, encourage companies to employ‘‘best practice’’ in community engagement mechanisms, or toconvince others to follow its example (as Vale attempted to do)even if the ultimate intent is corporate profit rather than com-munity well-being. ‘‘Negative,’’ repressive horizontal diffusion,however, could potentially result in less community engagement,either by convincing communities of the futility or danger ofattempting to influence company behavior, or by warning com-panies of the reduced profits that may result from concessions tocommunities.

Yet vertical diffusion processes bring formal governing struc-tures back into the picture. Local agreements influence not onlycorporate policy (as seen at Thio) but also government policy.Communities’ concerns about a project’s environmental impacts,expressed through pressure on and negotiations with companies,can lead governments to pay greater attention to these potentialharms, as shown in the case of Rheeb �u N �u �u’s demands. However,this diffusion may also be negative. As with Vale’s project,governments may view local agreements as rendering formalregulation or interference unnecessary.

Of course, each agreement is context-specific, with a uniquepolitical, social, institutional and economic setting. Schematicallywe could say that Vale’s Pact is a response to a conflict generatedby a particular project while the agreement negotiated at Thioresults from the cumulative impacts of a long history of disputesand bilateral arrangements, which shows a tendency towarda widening of the arena of actors involved in the negotiation(Le Meur, 2011). The widening of the arenas where conflicts arenegotiated suggests that publicity is part of the strategy ofnegotiation adopted by local populations, which does not neces-sarily contradict the confidentiality of parts of signed IBAs.

Analyzing the policy-making function of these localized (andlocalizing) negotiations and agreements, the following points areto be stressed. First, given the importance of their roles inconflict-solving, rent-sharing, etc., these agreements are buildingblocks of mining policies, at least at the local level where theyoperate, supporting Mosse’s argument that practice producespolicy as much as policy produces practice (Mosse, 2004: 640).Besides the two cases studied, other situations in New Caledoniadisplay similar features. Though it is difficult to fully trace backactual evidence of diffusion processes, there is evidence insupport of this hypothesis. For instance, key staff members andexperts have moved from one firm to another, participating indifferent bargaining processes and bringing their experience withthem. Exploring empirically this dimension would give importantinsights into how a professional culture of negotiation is progres-sively crafted and diffused, knowing that a dose of negotiationprior to project implementation also tends to be part of the CSRtoolkit (O’Faircheallaigh, 2008a). There is also circumstantialevidence of horizontal diffusion in the form of similar negotiationprocesses occurring in different locations, in relatively closetemporal succession. In 2002, for instance, an inquiry carriedout by the government agency in charge of land reform (ADRAF)identified the ‘‘spheres of influence’’ of the clans inhabiting thearea around Vavouto, in the Northern Province where the SMSP-Xstrata nickel refinery was to be built. The results were locallyrecognized and validated by a customary legal act (proc�es verbal

de palabre). The purpose of the agreement was twofold. First,it ratified the ending of a previous conflict which had resulted in a

change of location for the refinery (see Horowitz, 2002). Second, itaimed at forestalling future tensions around mining revenuesharing, especially through agreements to offer subcontractingto local enterprises. In the latter respect, it is very close to anotherlegal customary act signed in 2004 by SLN and customaryrepresentatives in Tiebaghi (see above), suggesting that thismay have been influenced by the 2002 agreement. Other casesin mining localities, especially on the east coast (Houaılou,Kouaoua, Canala; see Demmer, 2012 for the latter case), evidenceboth the singularity of specific settings as well as shareddiscourses—demonstrating horizontal diffusion among Kanakcommunities—around mining rent control and sharing, politicalrecognition and historically-grounded hierarchies between clans.In all these situations, locally-signed agreements express turning-points and embody ‘‘critical junctures’’ in the sense of Mahoney8:they produce new deals and endorse a founding role for the start ofthe project, as at Vavouto, and to a certain extent Yate and Tiebaghi.Moreover, as these agreements concern huge economic projects,their influence necessarily goes beyond these locales, whatever theirintegration or non-integration into a broader policy framework.

Second, a detailed examination of ‘‘vertical’’ and ‘‘horizontal’’influence shows that what is diffused is not the whole ‘‘pack-age’’—the document and procedures resulting from the negotia-tions— but either elements of it, or, on the contrary, more thanthe sole IBA package. From a vertical vantage point, we caninterpret the formal requirement of Environmental ImpactAssessments (DIMENC, 2009) as an effort to avoid the type ofviolent protests that targeted the Vale project in 2006, and thus asthe result of an upward diffusion of an element of IBAs (throughlobbying and/or learning processes). Horizontally, communitiestend to focus negotiations on broader issues than mining andlabor relations. Though it is difficult to identify actual diffusionprocesses (and these may be restricted through confidentialityclauses), there clearly is a convergence in the way communitiesaround New Caledonia deal with corporations.9 This is the case asregards the reconfiguring of both land issues and customaryauthority. There has been a widespread shift from claimingattribution of legally customary land (according to the underlyinglogic of the land reform) toward a claim for recognition rootedin autochthony as a principle of anteriority (Le Meur, 2010). Thisclaim constitutes the basis for negotiating development agree-ments with external investors, as seen above. At the same time,the customary institutional apparatus becomes more complexand strongly regulated by law, while lying at the core of economicarrangements within the mining sector and beyond. Thus, themodels of negotiation and agreement that circulate are more thanIBAs (as they are usually seen: an element of the CSR toolkit), asthe issue is not only about equity in benefit sharing but morefundamentally about regaining control over resources and terri-tories: about politics and not only management. This denotesat least horizontal convergence among communities, if notevidenced diffusion processes.

Third, another mode of vertical diffusion is actually closer to areaction against features of these agreements, even though theform of an agreement is retained: the development of tripartiteagreements involving formal political and administrative institutions

8 ‘‘Critical junctures are characterized by the adoption of a particular institu-

tional arrangement from among two or more alternatives. These junctures are

‘critical’ because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively

more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still

available’’ (Mahoney, 2000: 513).9 Differences occur nevertheless in the content of what is negotiated and

included in the agreement, especially as regards subcontracting (see Le Meur et al.,

2012). It is noteworthy that in Yate, the subcontracting interface between Vale and

local entrepreneurs was negotiated in 2003, prior to and separately from the Pact,

and it has become a contentious issue among Kanak entrepreneurs.



(municipality, province), thus bringing state authorities back in.While this represents a move away from the bipartite model ofIBAs, expressing the local (especially provincial) government’scapacity to exert regulatory power over mining development, thisdevelopment also clearly results from the success of IBAs inresolving conflicts.

Finally, though this goes beyond the narrower definition ofdiffusion we have focused on in this text, we have seen with theYate case study that vertical and horizontal forms of diffusionoccur at different scales, beyond the New Caledonian context:borrowing exogenous discourses (of indigeneity, sustainabledevelopment, CSR, etc.), exchanging experiences with other com-munities involved in similar situations, all this exemplifying theglobalizing/localizing dialectic at work in the mining sector. Thismulti-scalar/multi-directional dimension of the diffusion, mobi-lization and circulation of discourses, institutions and actors,exerts a major influence at the local level. The trends mentionedabove about land and autochthony apparently depart from theidea of a global hegemony of neoliberal governmentality. It can beinterpreted the other way round, as pertaining to, and expressinga localized pattern of this evolution, as scholars have shown it inother Pacific contexts (see Rata, 2000, for the Maori case). In thisrespect, what makes the difference in New Caledonia is theimportant role formal governing structures play in the miningsector.

Conclusion

Agreements negotiated between mining companies and localcommunity representatives, known as IBAs, are part of the CSRtoolbox. They can be analyzed as pertaining to a neoliberalstrategy of capital ‘‘green-washing’’ supported by governments,as instruments of self-regulation crafted by the globalized miningsector, or as building-blocks in the production of mining policy‘‘from below’’. These interpretations are not mutually exclusive.On the contrary, we should see the negotiation process surround-ing and producing these agreements as an arena of contest aboutrent-sharing, control over natural resources, and social andenvironmental externalities generated by the mining activity.

In that respect, we argue that the way negotiation processesare organized, including who negotiates (and thus who isexcluded), and how (whether they are public, what sources ofpower each group mobilizes, etc.), and how the results areformalized, constitute key aspects of these processes, whateverthe content of the agreement. Through relations of force anddiffusion and learning processes, these agreements constitute aninnovation compared to what has long been a widespread ‘‘modeof governance’’, namely conflict: letting conflict develop accordingto a wait-and-see and case-by-case approach. Now, in contrast,learning processes are at work, as we have shown above, andthough we must not idealize this turn, negotiated agreementsconstitute a new resource or possibility mobilized in the craftingof community/corporation relationships alongside the other modesstill in use (blockade, strike, etc.).

The processes we have described can be understood asadaptations of IBA ideologies to the New Caledonian contextwhere state authorities, despite their multilayered and postcolo-nial/colonial hybrid nature, are strongly involved in policy-making processes through a broad set of measures, ranging fromthe initiation of public shareholding to the drafting of a miningcode. In this respect, the bilateral and confidential approachesthat are usually an important part of the IBA process do notcompletely fit in this policy context, although confidential clausesin New Caledonian IBAs are of course not absent. As discussedin the introduction, mining activity as well as mining policy are

ridden with fragmentation and disconnection, in terms of flowsof ideas, models and knowledge. Nonetheless, as this paper hasdemonstrated, an often-overlooked but increasingly commonelement of the mining arena works against this fragmentationand is gradually beginning to regularize poorly coordinatedmining policies and diverse community engagements withmining companies. This element, or rather these processes, whichwe have labeled ‘‘vertical’’ and ‘‘horizontal diffusion’’, encompassthe various ways that bilateral negotiations between companiesand communities, although intended to resolve solely the disputeat hand, can—often despite the companies’ vigorous efforts tokeep them localized and confidential—filter ‘‘up’’ to the policylevel, whether government or corporate, or ‘‘across’’ to othercommunities facing similar situations. Time, and further research,will tell whether this will eventually create a more coherent, evenharmonized, field of action.

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‘‘Horizontal’’ and ‘‘vertical’’ diffusion: The cumulative influence of Impact and...

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