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Habermas and post‐national identity: Theoreticalperspectives on the conflict in Northern IrelandGerard Delanty aa Department of Sociology , The University of Liverpool ,Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Gerard Delanty (1996) Habermas and post‐national identity: Theoretical perspectives on the conflict inNorthern Ireland , Irish Political Studies, 11:1, 20-32, DOI: 10.1080/07907189608406555

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HABERMAS AND POST-NATIONAL IDENTITY:THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONFLICT IN

NORTHERN IRELAND*

Gerard DelantyDepartment of Sociology

The University of Liverpool

Abstract: Habermas's theory of post-national identity has mostly been developed in thecontext of debates on German political culture. The basic ideas underlying it haveemerged from his broader theory of society, in particular his notion of discursivedemocracy. His critique of nationalism and his discursive model of democracy can beused to form a theory of post-national identity which can be applied to deeply dividedpolitical cultures. The case of Northern Ireland is an example of such a situation inwhich conflict resolution can be solved only by the discursive transformation of nationalidentities along post-national lines.

INTRODUCTION

In this article I would like to present schematically and largely defendHabermas's concept of post-national identity as well as to apply it to theconcrete case of Northern Ireland. It is helpful to begin with a provisionaldefinition of post-national identity, before looking at Habermas's use of theterm. Frequently referred to in recent theoretical literature there is little clarityon what it is supposed to be (Delanty, 1995d; Laclau, 1994; Matustik, 1993;Cerutti, 1992). Underlying the various accounts is a concern with a non-essentialist identity: national identity is seen as essentialistic while post-nationalidentity is interpreted as an identity that has been radically deconstructed and isopen ended.

I wish to suggest that post-national identity is best defined as an identity thatis based on multiple identities, and can therefore be contrasted to nationalidentity which is based on an exclusive reference to a single identity. A secondcharacteristic is that it is not focused.on the territorial nation-state but on morereflexive reference points. A third characteristic is that post-national identity is

*Originally a paper given at the Political Studies Association annual conference, Glasgow, April

1996. I am grateful to the editors and referees for comments on an earlier version.

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES, 11, 1996, pp. 20-32

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post-historical: unlike national identity it is not defined by reference to the pastor a myth of origins but by the present. A fourth characteristic is that it is notfocused on cultural traditions: rather than presupposing cultural consensus, post-national identity is based on the acceptance of dissent and cultural difference. Afifth characteristic is that if we conceive identity in terms of a continuumranging from positive to negative, post-national identity involves an emphasismore on positive identification than on negative: the 'we' is defined less bynegative reference than by what the 'we' have in common and in broadening the"universe of obligation' (Gamson, 1995; Wendt, 1994).

With this provisional definition of post-national identity in mind, I shall nowpresent and defend some of the key tenets of Habermas's social and politicaltheory. Finally I shall apply it to the case of Northern Ireland in order to seewhether it can help to clarify the normative terms of political debate on thepeace process. Northern Ireland is an interesting example of a situation ofconflict which challenges some of the presuppositions of conventional politicaltheory. Both the communitarian and liberal traditions in political theorypresuppose the existence of a relatively stable political culture which coincideswith the boundaries of the state (Mulhall and Swift, 1996). In the case ofNorthern Ireland this clearly cannot be taken for granted for it is precisely thefact that political culture is deeply divided and the state does not coincide with aunitary political community that is the source of the problem (O'Neill, 1994).

My thesis is that the social and political theory of Habermas offers a usefulcorrective to both communitarian and liberal views on society and the state. Theprincipal advantage of Habermas's approach is that it can be adapted to caseswhere conflict is deeply rooted in political culture. Liberals andcommunitarians, in contrast, tend to assume too easily that political culture isnot fundamentally divisive and an obstacle to conflict resolution. Moreover,Habermas's approach, with its emphasis on post-national identity, challenges thenation-state as a normative reference point for collective identity. SinceNorthern Ireland is, in my view, an example of a society where the nation-statehas utterly failed to provide a means of social and political integration, atheoretical perspective challenging the nation-state seems a matter of crucialimportance.

HABERMAS'S THEORY OF DISCOURSE

In order to appreciate the significance of Habermas's theory of post-nationalidentity, it is important to begin with a brief overview of the principaltheoretical ideas underlying his writings. I shall concentrate on his recentdiscourse theory, which is of course based on his theory of communicative

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action (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1990) and his earlier work on the public sphere(1989a). Habermas is centrally concerned with the problem of providingnormative justification for identity claims and 'the legitimate ordering ofcoexisting forms of life' (1993a, p. 60). The problem for Habermas is: 'Howcan we appropriate naive, everyday ethical knowledge in a critical fashionwithout at the same time destroying it through theoretical objectification? Howcan ethical knowledge become reflective from the perspective of theparticipants themselves?' (1993a, pp. 22-23). Habermas's aim is to provide anormative grounding for conflicting claims to legitimation by seeking a point ofethical reflection that is both outside the immediacy of the life-world and at thesame time part of it. It is not an attempt to offer an ultimate justification ofethics, which he says is neither possible nor necessary (1993a, p. 84). Indeed, itis precisely the attempt to claim an Archimedian point of ultimate justificationthat is part of the problem, since it is very often the case that such identityclaims are exclusivist in nature.

In the most general terms Habermas's argument is that:

Modern worldviews must accept the conditions of postmetaphysical thought to theextent that they recognize that they are competing with other interpretations of theworld within the same universe of validity claims. This reflective knowledgeconcerning the competition between equally valid warring "gods and demons"creates an awareness of their fallibility and shatters the naivete of dogmatic modes ofbelief founded on absolute truth claims. Recognizing the "burdens of reason" entailsknowing that proponents and opponents in the contest between substantiveworldviews may (for the time being) have equally good grounds for the inability toreach a consensus and for leaving contentious validity claims undecided. Thisfallibilism is grounded in the indeterminism of discursive procedures, in locallimitations on available information and reasons, and, in general, in the provincialityof finite minds regarding the future. Under these conditions there is no guarantee thata motivated consensus could always be attained (1993 a, p. 94).

The theoretical alternative Habermas proposes to metaphysical thinking, aswell as to conventional liberal and communitarian models, is the model of thediscourse ethic. Discourse theory breaks from a purely moral view of the worldas is reflected in national identity and in the taken-for-granted assumptions ofeveryday life. While drawing from the everyday experiences of the life-world,the procedural universalism of the discourse ethic offers a moment of reflectionthat is otherwise not to be found in everyday discourse. It operates at aheightened level of awareness and one which is argumentative in nature.'Polities', Habermas argues forcibly against communitarian theories, 'may notbe assimilated to a hermeneutical process of self-explication of a shared form of

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life or collective identity. Political questions may not be reduced to the type ofethical questions where we, as members of a community, ask ourselves who weare and who we would like to be' (1994a, p. 4). This is a point of greatimportance to recognizing the limits of a national identity. Against the attemptto draw principles of legitimation out of a convergence of settled ethicalconvictions or out of cultural consensus, Habermas insists on the importance ofcommunicative presuppositions that allow better arguments to come into play invarious forms of deliberation, and from procedures that secure fair bargainingprocess (1994a, p. 4).

The model Habermas is proposing is one that is cautious about its empiricalreference points, which cannot be taken to be self-evident. The democraticprocess of the genesis of law cannot be at the mercy of unreflected ethicalpresuppositions. What is required is a deliberative process of political discoursewhich reflects on its own presuppositions. Thus in place of a holistic concept ofsociety, we have a 'de-centred society' (1994a, p. 7). Habermas argues that thisdiscursive 'concept of democracy no longer needs to operate with the notion ofa social whole centred in the state and imagined as a goal-briented subject writlarge' (1994a, p. 8). This is in contrast to the liberal and republican orcommunitarian models of democracy. Both of these presuppose a view ofsociety as centred in the state: the state as the guardian of a market society orthe state as the self-conscious institutionalization of an ethical community(1994a, p. 6). Discourse theory in contrast breaks from these traditions whichpresuppose some kind of macro-subject and addresses itself to the higher levelof the inter-subjectivity that is constitutive in the self-reflective processes ofcommunication. To be rejected, then, is the notion that civic self-determinationrests on a single encompassing macro-subject, a position which is asunacceptable as the liberal argument which invests sovereignty in many isolatedsubjects (1994a, p. 8). This, Habermas argues, is not a denial of popularsovereignty but the recognition that it is not at the disposal of the will of thecitizens in an arbitrary manner. Yet, discursive politics, unlike liberal theory, isstill capable of mediating with concrete life practices. This is because Habermasunderstands discourse to be the means by which communicative action becomesreflective and self-critical. I should now like to discuss Habermas's proposal fora post-national identity.

HABERMAS'S CRITIQUE OF NATIONALISM

It should now be possible to see more clearly the direction of Habermas'sdiscourse theory in terms of a notion of post-national identity. Though oftenseen as an abstract theory of society, Habermas in fact offers one of the most

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devastating critiques of nationalism we have. First, let us clarity the theoreticalcritique of nationalism that discourse theory offers. The objections againstnational identity as a basis for democracy are suggested by his critique ofcommunitarianism as outlined above: normative legitimation cannot be derivedfrom unmediated cultural processes. Consensus can only be discursively arrivedat; it cannot be derived from cultural traditions. In jettisoning the philosophy ofconsciousness, Habermas is explicitly rejecting the possibility that there is amacro-subject capable of offering normative foundations. The notion of a 'de-centred' society strikes at the heart of the world-view of nationalism whichpresupposes by definition a national centre and a myth of origins.

On nationalism Habermas in quite unambivalent:

In Germany nationalism took on an excessive, social-darwinistic form andculminated in racial delusions which served as a justification for the massannihilation of the Jews. Consequently nationalism as the basis for a collectiveidentity became drastically devalued in our case. And for this reason the overcomingof fascism constitutes the specific historical perspective in terms of which an identitybased on the universalistic principles of the constitutional state and democracy isunderstood. But since the Second World War all European countries, and not onlythe Federal Republic, have developed in such a way that integration at the level ofthe nation-state has lost significance and relevance (1992a, p. 241).

This is quite a remarkable statement. Habermas unequivocally rejectsnationalism as a world-view that has discredited itself and has been underminedby social, political and economic developments which make it no longersustainable. In this context he mentions European integration, supra-nationalmilitary alliances, processes of globalization, immigration and increased ethnicdiversity in what had once been more homogeneous populations. Thesedevelopments, along with new forms of communication, have heightened oursensitivity to issues relating to human rights and the concerns of minorities aswell as global catastrophes, resulting in a double-edged response. On the oneside, there is the rise of a new wave of defensive ethnic-nationalism in theperiphery and in the core an anxiety-ridden nationalism of prosperity. On theother side, there is the simultaneous development of a consciousness strugglingto articulate universalistic norms. Notwithstanding the contemporary revival ofnationalism, Habermas argues against its ability to provide an enduringnormative standpoint capable of articulating real human aspirations foruniversal norms. Nationalism operates below the level of normative reflectionsince it is based on an essentialist concept of the self. This position ledHabermas (1994b) into criticizing German unification, which in his view was

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based on a 'normative deficit' since it did not involve active democraticlegitimation along deliberative lines.

Universalism, however, does not mean abandoning concrete identities ortranscending history and tradition, but expresses the ability to be able to viewone's determinate identity in a critical light. Habermas is quite clear thatuniversal principles can take root only in determinate identities. In his viewuniversalistic principles must be appropriated out of the particular life contextand be anchored in real cultural contexts: 'a commitment to the principles of theconstitutional state and democracy', he argues, 'can only become a reality in thedifferent states (which are on the way towards becoming post-nationalsocieties), when these principles strike root in the various political cultures indifferent ways' (1992a, p. 241). This includes a post-national identity, whichHabermas insists is also a concrete identity, and, indeed, is much more concretethan the ensemble of basic moral, legal and political principles around which itcrystallizes. What then does universalism mean?: it means that a culture isprepared to relativise its own way of life and does not insist on universalising itsvalues, and that difference is accepted as a positive attribute rather than beingsomething to overcome. It is Habermas's conviction that under modernconditions competing traditions cannot claim general validity. The ideas of theEnlightenment or modernity are "hot just abstract notions, but are deeply rootedin the normative structure of modem societies, including its politicalinstitutions, and are also built into the communicative practices of everyday life:modernity cannot then be avoided by appeal to cultural particularism. Habermasthus insists that modernity - however ambivalent and fragmentary it may be - isnot something we have chosen and cannot therefore be shaken off by a decisionor an act of will (1992c, pp. 226-27).

It should now be apparent that Habermas is not so far from Derrida's (1992)critique of western logocentricism and his plea for a politics of memory(Matustik, 1995). Habermas, too, argues that memory is political for the veryreason that our responsibility also extends to the past. He argues that thecatastrophes of the twentieth century have altered our time consciousnesscompelling us to take up a critical attitude towards the past. In the wake of theholocaust - which was a European as much as a German atrocity - tradition isnot something that can be merely seen as a 'source of the self, to use Taylor'sphrase; or as Gadamer would have it, something which we cannot transcendsince we are too much a part of it, but a burden to be relieved by criticalreflection. Habermas agrees with Gadamer that we 'cannot pick and choose ourown identities but, we can be aware that it is up to us how we continue them'while disagreeing that this does not mean that we can't transcend thesetraditions, for 'every continuation of tradition is selective, and precisely this

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selectivity must pass today through the filter of critique, of a self-consciousappropriation of history' (1992a, p. 243).

The only room for national identity in Habermas's model is a recovery of thecosmopolitan nationalism of the French revolution which must be developed inthe form of multi-culturalism. In particular for Germany - whose historicalnational identity anyway was never exclusively focused on the state - the onlypossible' form of patriotism is what he calls 'constitutional patriotism', whichconsists of taking pride in having succeeded in establishing a constitutional stateanchored in a liberal political culture, however unsatisfactory it may be (see alsoKluxen-Pyta, 1990). In his view the first signs of constitutional patriotism - anidentification with the norms of the constitutional democracy as opposed to theNazi state - were apparent in certain aspects of the mature political culture ofthe Federal Republic (Habermas, 1989b, 1991, 1993b). In the German caseHabermas acknowledges that constitutional patriotism was able to take root byvirtue of the shock of the Holocaust. But as I have argued above, it is alsoevident that this is also a European inheritance and is not confined to Germany.

Constitutional patriotism, as the normative content of post-national identity,refers then to an identification with democratic or constitutional norms and notwith the state, nation or cultural traditions. He speaks of two levels ofintegration, which are underpinned by post-national identity. Since a modernsociety is characterised by both complexity and multiculturalism, there can beno simple form of consensus as a basis for integration, which must instead,therefore, be conceived in terms of the legal system's neutrality vis-a-viscultural communities while at the same time recognizing the diversity of thedifferent forms of life: "The neutrality of the law vis-a-vis internal ethicaldifferentiations stems from the fact that in complex societies the citizenry as awhole can no longer be held together by a substantive consensus on values butonly by a consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws andthe legitimate exercise of power' (1994c, pp. 134-5). This is Habermas's centralinsight. One of its concrete implications is that post-national identity iscompatible with multi-identities, since constitutional patriotism only requiresidentification with normative principles of argumentation. It is in factHabermas's conviction that as a result of the accelerated rate of change inmodern societies, cultures will survive only if they adapt themselves to theprinciples of discursivity and critique (1994c, pp. 130-3).

Habermas's critique of national identity is centrally concerned with rescuingthe notion of citizenship from the model of nationality. He argues that in thebroader vision of history citizenship was not always tied to a concept of nationalidentity. The original concept of popular sovereignty, as developed byRousseau, 'does not refer to some substantive will which could owe its identity

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to a prior homogeneity of descent or form of life' (Habermas, 1992b, p. 4).Popular sovereignty was intended to show how the social contract could providean abstract model for a mode of political legitimation that was no longer tied tothe authoritarianism of the Ancien Regime. The original revolutionary-Enlightenment notion of nationality was the very opposite to late-nineteenthcentury ideas. The original meaning of the concept 'nation' was not that of aprepolitical entity based on descent, a shared community, a common languageor hereditary authority, but was a constitutive agency within a democraticpolity: "The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some commonethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens whoactively exercise their civil rights' (Habermas, 1992b, p. 3). Habermas believessomething valuable has been lost in the subsequent transformation of therevolutionary notion of the nation into modem nationalism. What has been lostis the concept of democratic sovereignty which has been sacrificed to the ideaof a pre-political historical community, a substantive collective will. For thisreason Habermas is opposed to communitarian ideas of nationality, such asthose of Charles Taylor, since these claim that the universalistic principles ofdemocratic states need anchoring in the historical-political culture of eachcountry before they can be accepted (Habermas, 1992b, p. 7). Habermas citesthe examples of the United States and Switzerland to provide evidence ofsocieties where constitutional principles were institutionalized and have reachedcommon acceptance without being rooted in citizens sharing the same languageor ethnic background. In the context of a future Federal Republic of EuropeanStates the concept of democratic sovereignty would have to be recovered andparticularistic traditions would not have to be given up but be made flexible tosupranational integration. This presupposes an ability to relativize one'shistorical traditions. Habermas does not in fact see that as the insurmountableproblem since there are adequate historical and contemporary examples of self-critical political identities.

It is not my aim to examine in detail Habermas's proposal for an alternativeto the nation-state. I should merely like in conclusion to remark that Habermasargues that Europe needs to create, what to an extent exists in Switzerland, acommon political-cultural identity which would stand out against the culturalorientations of the different nationalities (Habermas, 1992b, p. 12). But unlikeSwitzerland, this will involve creating a liberal immigration policy. In thiscontext, he argues, 'our task is less to reassure ourselves of our common originsin the European Middle Ages than to develop a new political self-confidencecommensurate with the role of Europe in the world of the twenty-first century'(Habermas, 1992b, p. 12). I have argued elsewhere (Delanty, 1995a, 1995c,1995d, 1996a, 1996c, 1996d) that the model of a post-national identity -

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focused less on territory, culture, geography or history than on democraticnorms and citizenship - is the only acceptable means of defining Europeanidentity as a non-essentialistic identity. All other forms of identitfication run therisk of promoting a negative dichotomy of Self and Other. Habermas's theoryallows us to conceive ways in which this could be overcome: its central idea isthat citizenship must be divorced from nationality.

ASSESSING HABERMAS

Against other theoretical positions, Habermas's social theory has a number ofadvantages when it comes to the question of national identity. Againstcommunitarianism and neo-republicanism, he has demonstrated how culturaltraditions including national identity cannot be a normative basis for conflictresolution in advanced societies: consensus can only be discursively achieved.Cultures in western Europe are not so restrictive that they prevent theirmembers from transcending them and rationally deliberating problems that ariseas a result of cultural differences. Moreover, few cultures are homogeneous sowe cannot attach universality to any one tradition: universality is a highlyrestrictive characteristic of constitutional principles which can become areference point for identification. Against liberalism, he has demonstrated thatthe asocial model of the individual is inadequate and that conflict resolution ismore than a matter of mere compromises between competing interests whichtake place on the level of the state, but must penetrate civil society itselfchallenging cultural traditions. So his democratic theory places politics in thesocial and cultural dimensions, but does not concede the communitarian thesisof relativity. Against postmodernism or radical deconstructivist approaches,Habermas's model suggests that there are limits to deconstruction and that post-national identity and the discourse ethic must be rooted in real life-worldcontexts. Habermas's model of discourse, which refers to communication,breaks radically from the postmodernist conception which is based on the modelof the text and the rule of metaphor. In this way Habermas has not precluded theimportant question of how we conceive of solidarity and collective identity(which are dismissed by postmodernism as metaphysical illusions).

The principal shortcoming of Habermas's social theory is the way he linkshis theory of collective identity (post-national identity) to his theory ofdiscourse (his theory of conflict resolution). In his systematic social theory ofcommunicative action, identity is too much reduced to the private realm or thepre-discursive level and does not feature centrally in the idea of discourse: indiscourse people leave their identities behind them and engage in discursivecommunication. As a result dualism pervades his theory, for he is unable to

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show how identity is actually linked into the very process of discursivity. It is, Iwish to argue following Melucci (1989), important to show that identity is itselfgenerated in the actual process through which conflict is resolved and must bemore firmly integrated into the notion of discourse. In this way the discursivedemocracy is itself the social basis of post-national identity. At it stands, thenotion of constitutional patriotism suggests something too formalistic to be abasis of real collective identity.

Notwithstanding this criticism, which can be accommodated in his broadertheory, Habermas has provided a convincing theoretical defence of thepossibility that ideology and cultural traditions can be transcended and madetransparent. In order to take this further, I shall take the case of NorthernIreland, where a precarious peace process has been in operation for almost twoyears.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Without simplifying the complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland, in lightof Habermas's critique of essentialism it can now be seen that a majordimension to the problem is not merely in finding a point of mediation betweencultural identities but of transforming them in the sense of rendering themreflective or transparent. The concept of peace, for instance, can serve as aregulative idea which can point to an interest in generating discursive norms ofconflict resolution. A post-national identity can then emerge in circumstancesthat have their origin not in existing collective identities but in the very processof over-coming them. Seen from the standpoint of Habermas's theory,nationalism and unionism along with the respective models of Irish and Britishnational identity, cannot in themselves provide normative reference points forconflict resolution. What is required is a higher level of identity than what canbe allowed for by these identities which are not sufficiently reflective to provideself-critical norms. Much more broadly, what is needed is a model of civilsociety in which autonomous public spheres can emerge and provide a forumfor conflict mediation. But at the moment the peace process has not broken fromthe immediacy of socio-cultural identities and the conviction that consensus is amatter of mediating world-views. Yet, the basis is already there for nationalidentity to be transcended. Habermas's idea of the discursive resolution ofconflict and constitutions as discursively mediated is highly pertinent to the caseof Northern Ireland. It is apparent that the simple model of the constitutionalreferendum cannot succeed in resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland whereYes/No forms of decision-making serve only to exacerbate the problem.

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Habermas's discursive democracy suggests that the process of enactingconstitutional charters must be mediated by discursive deliberation.

Habermas's critique of conventional liberal and communitarian views can beapplied to both republican nationalism and unionism which are based onessentialist definitions of identity and view society as being centred in thenation-state. Republican nationalism can be seen as an extreme kind ofcommunitarianism while unionism can be seen as an extreme version ofliberalism (Delanty, 1996b; Delanty and O'Mahony forthcoming). From theperspective of Habermas's theory, then, the concrete conclusion to be drawn isthat national identity, both that of republican nationalism and unionism, must betransformed rather than merely accommodated.

The conflict in Northern Ireland has demonstrated the absence of a point ofconvergence in the extremes of the two traditions and very little in themainstream currents. This is because their collective identities are not onlyprimary identities but are also exclusive of other identities. Moreover, theelement of counterfactualism is particularly pronounced: both nationalism andunionism are very much defined in opposition to each other. Up until now thedominant tendency in the debate about peace has been to seek common groundin the extremes of the two traditions upon which a peaceful and democraticsociety can be built (Delanty, 1995b). While on one level that is indeedcommonsensical, on another level it cannot be the basis for an enduringdemocratic political culture. From a Habermasian point of view nationalism andunionism are themselves incapable of wielding democratic norms upon which apost-national identity could be built. This is because they are based onessentialist identities and the reality is that people have multiple identities, evenif these remain largely repressed or unarticulated. What then could a discourseethic offer?

A discursive model to conflict resolution offers the possibility that in zero-sum situations where there can be no winners or where any gain is at the cost ofan other, a new identity can emerge out of the very process of conflictresolution. It implies that conflict resolution cannot proceed by reference tocultural traditions and that culturally rooted identities cannot find theirexpression in the state. Generalized interests can be articulated only in a contextof equal citizenship and democratic participation. Moreover, it does notguarantee outcomes or privilege one group's identity over the other and requiresthat participants take up a critical attitude to their cultural tradition and toreinterpret certain aspects of their identity. Essential to the task of creating anew collective identity is the need to find less common ground in the extremesof the two traditions than in achieving common-ground between the moderatesides.

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