Greening the Dam: The case of the San Roque Multi-purpose Project in the Philippines

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Greening the Dam: The case of the San Roque Multi-purpose Projectin the Philippines q

Soyeun KimDepartment of East Asian Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 3 January 2007Received in revised form 31 January 2010

Keywords:GreeningPolitical ecologyPolitical economy of developmentassistanceEnvironmental assessmentJapanThe Philippines

a b s t r a c t

This article aims to illustrate the extent and ways in which a traditional development aid project becamethe focus of a ‘greening’ process in the 1990s (and beyond). The article examines the San Roque Multi-purpose Project in the Philippines – a major Japanese bilateral international cooperation project – froma political ecology perspective. The analysis highlights how a complex story of contemporary aid dynam-ics in the bilateral Japan–Philippines relationship influenced this ‘greening’ process. The article interro-gates critically and empirically the stated greening of a proto-type development aid project. Thisspecific example of the practices of the Japanese aid industry is set within the context of the wider polit-ical economy of both donor and recipient elite interests.

� 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

By the late 1980s, research had already begun to investigate theenvironmental impact of mega-development aid projects; the find-ings of which generally connected aid projects with environmentaldestruction (Adams and Solomon, 1991; Murai et al., 1989; Adams,1990; Forrest, 1991; Sumi, 1992; Wilks and Hildyard, 1994). At thesame time, unprecedented international efforts for ‘greening’ hadstarted to emerge. Our Common Future (WCED, 1987) and the1992 Rio Earth Summit provided a key momentum for placingthe greening agenda firmly in global environmental politics, andled to a proclaimed decade of ‘green development’ in the 1990s(Adams, 2001). This process had a significant impact on Northerndonors and engaged them to pay greater attention to the environ-mental aspects of their aid flows (Wade, 1997; Goldman, 2005). In-deed, as official awareness was promoted, aid agencies accordinglyprovided stricter environmental guidelines and criteria for aid pro-vision in order to change existing policies and practices (even ifonly at the rhetorical level). For example, environmental impactassessments and social impact assessments were held to be criticalto successful aid delivery (JICA, 1990, 2001; OECD, 1992, 1997;World Bank, 1992).

Yet, even the ‘modest’ economic calculation by the Stern Reviewreveals that most global and national environmental problems re-main as challenging as ever (Stern Review Team, 2006). Indeed, agrowing band of environmentalists and NGOs have loudly criti-cized the green commitment of the 1990s as being mere politicalrhetoric, and therefore lacking in any ‘real’ action for sustainabledevelopment (FOE, 2001, 2002; WWF, 2002; Victor, 2006). Thecriticisms by environmentalists and NGOs trigger serious questionsabout the extent and significance of the greening of aid in the post-Rio world – a concern that constitutes the heart of this article. De-spite these criticisms, ‘greening’ is still described in many officialcircles as one of the striking policy trends of the 1990s, and is seen,for example, to have been partially successful in the practices ofmultilateral institutions such as the World Bank (Watts and Peet,2004; Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005). Nevertheless, there has beenrelatively little independent scholarly study of this widely pro-claimed process – particularly of its implications for the qualityof aid via the careful assessment of donor compliance with ‘green’policies in the form of project design and implementation (Fox andBrown, 1998; Horta, 2000). This lacuna is particularly true in thecase of bilateral aid which has benefited from fewer in-depth anal-yses than multilateral aid such as the World Bank (see Goldman,2005). This lacuna is especially critical considering the fact thatbilateral donor agencies constitute nearly 70% percent of total glo-bal Official Development Assistance (ODA) compared to the 30%percent dispersed by the multilateral agencies (Burall et al.,2006). Thus, it is important to examine closely the greening ofbilateral aid, particularly in relation to specific examples of official

0016-7185/$ - see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.02.005

q Interviews used here were conducted during fieldwork in Japan and thePhilippines between November 2003 and May 2004, and in June 2006. The fieldresearch (2003–2004) was funded by the University of London Central ResearchFund.

E-mail address: [email protected]

Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637

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aid industry practices set within the context of the broader politi-cal economy of donor and recipient elite interests.

This article assesses a traditional development ‘aid’ project inorder to appreciate the greening process of the world’s largestbilateral donor in the 1990s, namely Japan. In so doing, it examinesthe San Roque Multi-purpose Project (SRMP) as a case study to pro-vide a ‘snapshot’ of the process through a political ecology ap-proach. Therefore, this article, first, briefly overviews Japan’sinternational cooperation (with a particular focus on its environ-mental and greening aspects) and its relationship with the Philip-pines in order to situate the case study in its wider context. It thenconsiders the political economy of the SRMP through its 30-yearhistory, including the involvement and influence of importantplayers in both Japan and the Philippines. Before concluding, thisarticle analyses the three main steps of the project’s environmentalassessment procedures (i.e. environmental consideration, appraisaland monitoring) so as to examine empirically the stated greeningof a proto-type development aid project.

2. A political ecology perspective

A political ecology perspective suggests that environmentalchanges not only reflect neo-liberal policy imperatives but, inbroader terms, manifest the political economic forces of global cap-italism (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004).Research in this field stresses how a series of highly unequal powerrelationships upon which the present international system wasfounded and continues to operate and influences policy optionsand life chances in the ‘global North’ and ‘South’ (Peet and Watts,2004; Robbins, 2004; Neumann, 2005). Such inequality is reflectedin donor-recipient relationships within the greening of the aid pro-cess, in this case between Japan and the Philippines (see Ofreneo,1993; Tsuda and Yokoyama, 1999).

Political ecology also highlights the role of politics (includingpolicy) in environmental change. Thus, it is asserted that ‘‘the sub-stance of politics – decisions and commands, compliance andenforcement . . .– [are] inescapably implied in almost every ecoso-cial problem” (Deutsch, 1977, p. 359). Since this research considersthe greening of Japanese bilateral cooperation with the Philippinesas a politicized ‘ecosocial problem’, the latter can be studied mostfruitfully by examining the cohesion (or not) between greener aidpolicy – involving ‘decisions and commands’, and aid projects onthe ground, which will assist assessment of the ‘compliance andenforcement’ capacity of the former. As Gasper (1996, p. 160)rightly claims: ‘‘policies cannot be judged primarily by their goodintentions or supposed inherent worthiness regardless of actualperformance” (see also Wade, 1997). In short, policy reform,including the ‘greening’ of aid, is best studied through actual per-formance (Rondinelli, 1993) and the transmission belt betweendecision makers and practice, that is, the policy process.

Yet, the aid policy process has been criticized for the disjuncturebetween the nature and aims of the development process and themethods of project planning and management used by Northernaid practitioners (Escobar, 1995; O’Riordan, 2000). Indeed, thisprocess has generally been divided in practice between policy for-mulation by the donor and its implementation by the recipient.This internationalisation of the formulation and implementationgap is distinctive, and that is possibly why, in part, the aid policyprocess has faced greater problems in achieving policy goals atthe implementation phase than the ‘conventional’ domestic policy(O’Riordan, 2000; Adger et al., 2001).

In order to reduce this disjuncture or gap, project-based pro-grammes were considered to play a central role in effectivelytranslating broad development plans or objectives into more nar-rowly focused design and implementation practices (Rondinelli,

1993; Scholten and Post, 1999). Indeed, projects are still deployedas a key means for effective aid delivery in an era of post-Rio‘greening’ (World Bank, 2003; Acharya et al., 2006) with various‘green’ operational guidelines/manuals to ensure environmentalconsideration (JICA, 1992; OECD, 1992; JBIC, 1999). However, theguidelines are often found inadequately ‘interpreted’ or imple-mented by project officers or field staff (Keen and Sullivan, 2005).

3. ‘Greening’ of aid policy process

In order to achieve the ‘greening’ of aid projects, donors havemade an effort to integrate environmental assessment into allphases of the aid project cycle. In so doing, Environmental ImpactAssessment (EIA) was used as a key decision-making tool, and di-rectly links to three project stages (OECD, 2002; Morrison-Saun-ders and Arts, 2004; Glasson et al., 2005). First is the projectplanning stage where the recipient carries out an actual EIA andproduces a report. Second is the appraisal stage where the donoror the financer reviews the submitted EIA report and makes a fund-ing decision based upon it. Last is the monitoring stage wherebythe donor checks compliance between project implementationand environmental consideration as stated in the EIA report.

These three stages involve different types of decision-making atdifferent stages of a project cycle. As a result, it engages variousdecision-makers as well as other non-state stakeholders in boththe donor and recipient countries, each struggling to reflect theirown interests and motivations during the process (Lee and George,2000). For example, a private corporation is primarily motivated byprofits, and therefore may be only interested in meeting minimumenvironmental requirements (Glasson et al., 2005). In contrast,NGOs often seek to use the EIA process in order to push for stricterenvironmental consideration measures (FOEJ, 2002b; JACSES,2004). Also, when the decision-making authority’s responsibilitylies in such sectors as energy or transportation, its priorities (e.g.building hydropower dams) can often overlook/downplay environ-mental considerations (WCD, 2000; Adams, 2001). Such widerinterests may reduce EIA practices to nothing more than a simplebureaucratic requirement.

It is not just critics that have claimed that the EIA process oftenbecomes a detached and subordinate exercise rather than being anintegral and key part of all phases of the project cycle (Ross, 1994;Smith and van der Wansem, 1995; Sànchez and Hacking, 2002).The reputable World Commission on Dams report specifies that‘‘[t]here are well-documented cases, even in the 1990s, of decisionsto proceed with financing or construction before an effective EIA iscompleted (WCD, 2000, p. 183). This inadequately established linkbetween EIA findings and decision-making (at all stages) often con-tributes to poor environmental consideration (World Bank, 1997;McCully, 2001; Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004).

Although environmental assessment (hereafter EA) is oftenprincipally seen as a rational and scientific/technical processrequiring the professional expertise of the environmental scientist,it is simultaneously a highly political process (Forsyth, 2003; Gold-man, 2005). This is because, as critics argue, the politics ‘‘underliesthe formulation, dissemination, and institutionalisation of scien-tific knowledge and networks” (Forsyth, 2003, p. xiii; see also Ha-jer, 1995; Keely and Scoones, 2003). Thus, an EIA report is morelikely to contain what the EIA client wants decision-makers tosee – highlighting potential benefits (in the case of the SRMP, in-creased power supply, water quality improvement) thereforeobscuring costs (sedimentation, displacement, see below).

Of particular note in this regard are a series of technical reviewreports published by the environmental NGO, the InternationalRivers Network (hereafter IRN, see below). These reports weremade by independent researchers based in the US, and focused

628 S. Kim / Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637


on the most controversial issues surrounding SRMP’s environmen-tal impact assessment. They found that the SRMP’s EIA was ‘unre-liable’ and ‘wrongly assumed’ (Feld, 1999). This conclusion wasbased on several grounds: the estimated sedimentation, waterquality, earthquake-related risks to the dam, the consistency be-tween the original and the updated EIA, technical problems inthe watershed management plan, and flood control provisions(Feld, 1999; Grifoni, 1999; Moran, 1999; Willing, 1999). It is strik-ing how the official EIA report and the IRN’s EIA review reportspresent two very different pictures of the same development initia-tive. Indeed, this discrepancy goes to the heart of the concerns ofthis thesis. Therefore, the environmental consequences can be per-ceived quite differently according to the stakeholders involved (forexample, national power corporations and environmental NGOs inthis paper).

4. Japan’s international cooperation and greening

The history of Japan’s international cooperation has raised con-cerns, not least due to its emphasis on large-scale infrastructuredevelopment and the associated social and environmental impacts(FOEJ, 2002b; JACSES, 2004; Sumi, 2004).1 While successful eco-nomic development in Southeast Asia had, according to some, vindi-cated Japan’s ‘effective’ aid policy (Hanabusa, 1991; Kusano, 1997;Watanabe and Miwura, 2003; see also Nishigaki, 2000), this aid pol-icy has also been criticized by a variety of scholars and activists as anapparatus to further the interests of Japanese and recipient politicaland business elites at the expense of natural environments and poorpeople in ‘the South’ (Forrest, 1991; Dauvergne, 1997; Taylor, 1999;FOEJ, 2002b; Sumi, 2004).

Meanwhile, in step with other Northern donors’ environmentalefforts, the Japanese cabinet adopted an ODA Charter in June 1992,which notably emphasized the importance of sustainable develop-ment and environmental conservation as a global task; a stancethat was reiterated through a set of top-level policy pronounce-ments during the 1990s (see MOFA, 1991, 1992, 1997a, 1997b). Be-fore 1990, no official guidelines existed to check or monitor theenvironmental impact of Japanese aid. However, with a series ofOECD recommendations/guidelines and Japan’s own ‘green’ pro-nouncements, the three key international cooperation agencies be-gan their own ‘greening’ process. Like many other Northernagencies, the greening of Japanese agencies focused on strengthen-ing the EA process performed by both donor and recipient withinaid projects (JACSES, 1996; JICA, 1988, 1990; OECF, 1989, 1995;JEXIM, 1993).

The greening of Japan’s international cooperation during the1990s must be understood in the context of its status as theworld’s largest donor and its efforts to become a global environ-mental leader during the 1990s when greening was prominent

on the international agenda (Taylor, 1999; Dauvergne, 2001).Moreover, it is essential to focus on its consistent emphasis onlarge-scale infrastructure development projects (Arase, 2005) toassess the extent to which ‘greening’ has occurred in the main-stream Japanese aid process. To this end, this article analyses theSan Roque Multi-purpose Project, which purportedly demonstratesa ‘greener’ procedural framework (and practice) via the EA process.In so doing, this article traces three stages of EA to probe the link-ages between policy and implementation, politics and the scientificassessment process in the EIA.

5. Political economy of a Dam

The San Roque Multi-purpose Project (SRMP) is built on thelower Agno River of Pangasinan Province in northern Luzon (SRPC,2006a, see Fig. 1).

The project was designed to generate power for diverse eco-nomic activities as well as to improve water quality by reducingdownstream siltation and flooding (Perez, 2004; SRPC, 2006a). In-deed, due to the huge project cost, SRMP would never have beenpossible without US$ 850 million funding from the Export–ImportBank of Japan (JEXIM) and six associated Japanese banks (see Ta-bles 1 and 2).

Fig. 2 and Table 1 highlight two main aspects of the SRMP’spolitical economy. The first is the shareholder composition of theSan Roque Power Corporation (SRPC). It exemplifies the political

Table 1San Roque Power Corporation. Source: SRPC (2006a).

Corporate shareholders Holding company(Headquarters)

Percentage ofshares

Sithe PhilippinesHoldings Inc.

Sithe Energies Inc. (New York,USA)

50.05

Marubeni Corporation Marubeni Corporation (Tokyo,Japan)

42.45

KPIC Singapore Pvt. Ltd. Kansai Electric Power Co.(Osaka, Japan)

7.5

Fig. 1. Location of San Roque Multi-purpose Project. Source: Adapted from Usui(2003, p. 108).

1 In keeping with Japanese practice, ‘aid’ is used here interchangeably with‘international cooperation’ and ‘official finance’ to denote a broad classification ofofficial assistance encompassing various mixes of grants and loans. Japan’s interna-tional cooperation during the 1990s involved three implementing agencies: JapanInternational Cooperation Agency (or JICA – grants and technical assistance), OverseasEconomic Cooperation Fund (or OECF – concessional ODA loans) and Export-ImportBank of Japan (or JEXIM – export credits, etc.). The ambiguous mixture of ODA andOther Official Finance activities became somewhat more ‘evident’ through theestablishment of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in October 1999,merging OECF and JEXIM. More importantly, the JBIC officials emphasized that themerger enabled them to respond more efficiently to the development needs ofrecipient countries by coordinating two different types of official financing (Interview,2006b). This ‘rationalisation’ became rather irrational as of 1 October 2008, upon theestablishment of the new JICA as a sole ODA agency. JBIC’s function of ODA loans wastransferred to JICA while the export credit agency function was transferred to a newpolicy-based lending agency called the Japan Finance Corporation. However, themajor administrative change will not be discussed here as the main temporal focus ofthe article is on the 1990s.

S. Kim / Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637 629


and economic influence of two former colonial powers: the US andJapan. The second aspect is the project financing arrangement.Some political tactics were clearly employed by both JEXIM andthe associated Japanese banks to arrange this funding portfolioby combining an untied loan to the Philippine state-owned NationalPower Corporation (NPC) with an investment loan and an associ-ated commercial loan from the six banks to the SRPC – a contractorto the NPC (JBIC, 2000, 2003). Therefore, the actual risk associatedwith the project finances was fully covered by the Philippine state,placing a heavy debt burden on Philippine citizens (Motoyamaet al., 1999; IBON, 2003).

5.1. The lessons never learnt: from Marcos’ dream to Ramos’ legacy

Indeed, as JEXIM’s confirmation of the first US$ 700 million dis-bursement was decisive in proceeding with the project, politicizednegotiations on the funding took place from the start in 1993(SRPC, 2006b). These politics did not leave enough room for so-cio-environmental issues (FOEJ, 2002b). Combining huge financialcommitments and perceived risks, the project hence became thesubject of both national and international criticism. The anti-damcampaigning by NGOs drew from the experience of longstandinglocal protests concerning the ‘failed’ dams built upstream in the1950s and 1960s (at Ambuclao and Binga), especially since the late1950s when the social and environmental impacts of these damsbecame apparent (Afable, 1999). These dams were already seri-

ously malfunctioning by the 1980s due to heavy siltation. Sedi-ment flows from the Agno River accumulated in dam reservoirsrather than being emptied into the Lingayen Gulf along thenorth-western coast of Luzon (World Bank, 1994; CPA, 2003). Forthis reason alone, the proposed third dam in the Agno River wascontentious (Interview, 2004a). The two malfunctioning damshad also severely damaged local livelihoods – siltation reachedup to the rice fields of Ambuclao and Binga situated along the val-ley floor, thereby constraining farming (CPA, 2003).

In spite of such obvious lessons and protests from the localcommunity and both local and international NGOs like Friends ofthe Earth Japan and the International Rivers Network, plans forthe San Roque Multi-purpose Project gained impetus in the early1990s and were speedily implemented from 1995 onwards. Itwas a part of the Fidel Ramos government plan to build morepower plants to stop a series of power blackouts that hamperedindustrialisation and damaged his own political reputation (Rim-ban and Samonte-Pesayco, 2002a, 2002b; IBON, 2003).

Indeed, SRMP was still being praised as a ‘‘spectacular hydro-power dam . . . worth visiting” by the Philippine Secretary of theDepartment of Energy even in 2004 (Perez, 2004). It is importanttherefore to see how a project with several perceived socio-envi-ronmental deficiencies came to be implemented in the ‘decade ofgreen development’, especially at a time when ‘‘infrastructurewas almost a dirty word in development circles” (White, 2006, p.1; see also Interview, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d).

Table 2The Philippine environmental impact assessment: legal and regulatory framework. Sources: adapted from Smith and van der Wansem (1995), DENR-EMB (1996), and Usui (2003).

Year Law/Regulations Features

1977 Presidential Decree (PD)No. 1151

Philippine Environmental Policy: Requiring sponsors of all government and private projects affecting the quality of theenvironment to prepare an environmental impact assessment (EIA)

1977 PD No. 1152 Environment Code: Reinforcing land use management regulation and systems to consider serious environmental impact1978 PD No. 1586 Establishing an EIS System: centralising the EIS System under the National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC: predecessor

of Department of Environment and Natural Resources or DENR), setting up a screening mechanism for Environmentally CriticalAreas (ECAs) and Environmentally Critical Projects (ECPs) classification

1981 President Proclamation No.2146

Proclaiming certain areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EIS System

1982 Letter of InstructionNo.1179

Authorizing the NEPC to issue Environmental Compliance Certificates

1983 NEPC Office Circular No. 3 Technical definitions of ECAs and ECPs by NEPC1987 Executive Order (EO) No.

192Establishment of DENR: transferring all work from NEPC

1992 DENR AdministrativeOrder (AO) 21

Revision of PD 1586: Decentralising DENR’s EIA operation; necessity of public participation

1996 DENR AO 96-37 Revising DAO 21, Series of 1992, to further strengthen the implementation of the EIS System and Environmental consideration inthe earliest possible stage, using EIS as a planning tools and maximising public participation

The Philippine Government (Loan guarantor)

Power component: total US$450 million towards the construction of power generation facilities and their management

Non-power component: total US$600 million towards the construction of dam and spillway

San Roque Multipurpose Project

Untied loan US$ 400

Overseas Investment Loan:

US$300 million

JEXIM

NPC

The NPC’s operating revenue of US$200 million allocated for socio-environmental issues

SRPC

US$ 150 million

Six Japanese Banking Corporations

Fig. 2. Relations between Key Funders in SRMP. Source: adapted from FOEJ (1999a, 2002a), NPC (1997), SRPC (2006a).

630 S. Kim / Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637


The San Roque Multi-purpose Project was first conceived in theearly 1970s by the Philippine government under President Ferdi-nand Marcos (Asahi-shinbun-shuzaihan, 1985; National Diet,1986c). Under the NPC’s Power Expansion Programme (1981–1990), the project was identified as a key contribution to Philippinedevelopment (Itchon et al., 1986). This project had been originallyproposed to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, then tothe Italian government. Yet in each case, the proposal was turneddown due to the huge project cost and perceived socio-environ-mental risks (National Diet, 1984c, 1984d, 1986c; FOEJ, 2002b).Marcos again requested funding for this project from Japan’s PrimeMinister Yasuhiro Nakasone during the latter’s visit to the Philip-pines in 1983 (National Diet, 1986d).

Given the project’s history of prior refusal, this request was alsoa problem for the Japanese government. The Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs (MOFA) in particular was aware of the risks, via communica-tion from its Manila embassy (National Diet, 1984c). Based uponthe MOFA’s advice, Nakasone suggested an additional feasibilitystudy to the NPC’s 1979 initial feasibility study for the project (Na-tional Diet, 1984e). This is probably the first and (possibly) last ‘giftproject’ that failed to go straight onto the Japanese ODA list.2

However, after the ‘People Power’ Revolution in 1986 thatthrew the corrupt Marcos from power (Thompson, 1995), Japan’sNational Diet organized a committee to investigate the Marcosscandal and its linkage to Japanese aid. The SRMP was investigatedas a likely by-product of ‘crony capitalism’ linking Marcos and hiscronies to Japanese corporations (NHK shuzaihan, 1996; Tsuda andYokoyama, 1999). The project was one of the most heavily dis-cussed cases during the Diet hearings (National Diet, 1984a,1984b, 1986b, 1986c). Two issues in particular were raised at thehearings, the controversy of which eventually put an end to thisODA project. These are worth a closer look in order to better appre-ciate the SRMP and its attendant implications for the stated green-ing of Japanese aid in the 1990s.

First, there was the issue of perceived political favouritism forthe project. Although the SRMP was not on the original official re-quest list to the Japanese government, Marcos ‘personally’ inter-vened to prioritise the SRMP (National Diet, 1986c, p. 31; Tsudaand Deocadiz, 1986). It was also alleged by critics that the fundingdecision may not have been based on ‘rational’ development plan-ning but rather on the narrow interests of the Philippine elites andthe Japanese business sector (FOEJ, 2002b; Interview, 2003c,2003d, 2004e) – considering that the Japanese government wasfully aware of the high project cost as well as the perceived socialand environmental risk.

Second, the Marubeni corporation’s relationship with PresidentMarcos raised troubling questions about the involvement of Japa-nese firms in ‘crony capitalism’ – a relationship also known as‘‘marubeni-kosu”3 (Interview, 2003a). This kind of relationshipemerged through Marcos’s distinctive aid controlling mechanism –shown in Fig. 3 – that was only found with Japanese aid, not withother Northern donors’ (Yokoyama, 1994; Tsuda and Yokoyama,1999).4 Unlike Japan’s own bilateral ODA loan programme to other

developing countries (not to mention other bilateral ODA pro-grammes such as that of USAID), this Japan–Philippine specificmechanism appointed a dedicated Philippine government officialcalled the Japanese ODA Implementing Officer (IO). This positionwas created by Marcos, which gave the IO full control over projectcontracts and all dealings with the Japanese ODA loan implementingagency, OECF. Eventually, it was Marcos who appointed contractorsfor ODA projects thereafter receiving kick-backs. An average of 25–30% of project costs as kick-backs were thought to be channelledto Marcos’s Swiss Bank account through an agent company (Smith,1986; Boyce, 1993). It was also alleged that Marubeni had a ‘‘directhotline” with Marcos (National Diet, 1986c, p. 32) and advised thePhilippine leader that ‘‘the Japanese government had already infor-mally agreed to the San Roque Multi-purpose Project” (National Diet,1986a, p. 31).

Once the Marcos scandal erupted, the SRMP was dropped by theJapanese government as an ODA project. Although its life as anODA project ended abruptly, the SRMP was financed by Japan asan Other Official Finance (OOF) project. Marcos’ dream eventuallywas reshaped as a part of the Philippines’ national power expan-sion programme in the 1990s (Itchon et al., 1986; NEDA, 1991,1992). In the 1980s, the Philippine government was preoccupiedwith development-linked structural adjustment policies that laidthe foundation for neo-liberal privatisation in the late 1980s andearly 1990s (Broad, 1988; Boyce, 1993). This privatisation processcoupled with a serious power crisis during the early 1990s, furtherpushed the power sector reform under the Ramos administrationbetween 1992 and 1998 (Viray, 1998; IBON, 2003).

Accordingly, in 1993, the Republic Act No. 7648 was passed to‘fast track’ the Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects so thatRamos could swiftly enter into contracts with mostly foreign-owned private corporations – as the Philippine private sector hashistorically had insufficient capital to enter into such large-scaleinfrastructure projects (GOP, 1993; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco,2002a; IBON, 2003). He also pushed through Congress the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law, which provided an array of incentivesto the private sector to undertake infrastructure and developmentprojects (GOP, 1994). Despite these generous incentives and theassumptions of mainstream economic theory that increased supplyshould lead to lower consumer prices, the more power generatedby those independent power producer projects in reality resultedin higher electricity rates for Philippine consumers. The majorcause for this phenomenon is the ‘take or pay’ provisions in inde-pendent power producer contracts. These state that the Philippinegovernment has to buy for resale more than 80% of planned IPP-produced electricity (whether domestic demand requires it ornot). What makes matters worse is that IPP contracts are quoted

Fig. 3. Structure of Marcos Rebate. NB. Thicker arrows are the flows of rebatesincluding ‘entertainment costs’. Source: Yokoyama (1994).

2 Requests for Japan’s ODA gift projects are made either during the state visit of aJapanese Prime Minister to a recipient country or vice versa. They are often called‘temiyage-anken’ (gift projects) (Sumi, 1992). The Japanese government usuallyannounces the aid provision to the most wanted project by the recipient governmentduring those state visits (FOEJ, 1997; MOFA, 2002).

3 This term is widely known among Japanese critics, which was generated bycombining ‘Marubeni’ and ‘Marcos’ (Interview, 2003a, 2003b). In spite of its domesticmarket share in Japan (fourth) among other general trading companies, in 1986,Marubeni’s business share in the Philippines was the largest, reaching almost 90% oftotal Japanese business deals in the Philippines (Tsuda and Deocadiz, 1986).

4 This special Yen loan mechanism only existed in the Philippines during theMarcos era, which was revealed by the Presidential Commission on Good Governmentorganised by President Corazon Aquino in the late 1980s (Tsuda and Yokoyama,1999).

S. Kim / Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637 631


in US dollars and their price is fixed (Woodhouse, 2005). Thismeans the Philippine public sector is assuming most of the corpo-rate risk as well as the loan repayment whilst bearing the high costof exchange-rate fluctuation, especially since the Asian financialcrisis (IBON, 2003; see also World Bank, 1994).

The NPC has entered into a total of 48 independent power pro-ducer contracts of which more than half were made during the Ra-mos Presidency – and the SRMP is one of them (Rimban andSamonte-Pesayco, 2002b). The SRMP has been operating since Feb-ruary 2003 in spite of its financial, technical and legal ‘infirmities’as reported by the Philippine government IPP Review Committee(PCIJ, 2002; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco, 2002b).

6. Greening the Dam

The greening of the SRMP mainly concerned the environmentalassessment (EA) process to minimise the adverse environmentalimpact of dam construction. Considering that actual project imple-mentation only took place in 1999, the SRMP has had a long andcomplex history both in terms of environmental considerationand formal confirmation as a project. The environmental consider-ation procedure is in principle conducted by the Philippine coun-terparts via a feasibility study and the EIA requisite under thePhilippine EIS system. Although in principle Japan assists this activ-ity when requested by the Philippine governments (Interview,2004k; see also JICA, 1988), formal responsibility for this activityrests in the hands of the latter and the activity is regulated bythe Philippines’ own national environmental laws, not by thoseof the Japanese. Given that it is integral to Japanese ‘greening’ asa whole – as the project is bound by the recipient’s national envi-ronmental laws – the Philippine EIS system is briefly discussed.

6.1. Philippine Environmental Impact Statement system

The Philippine Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) systemwas established in 1977 (Smith and van der Wansem, 1995). It re-quired that ‘‘all agencies and instrumentalities of the national gov-ernment, including government-owned and controlledcorporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entitiesprepare an EIS for every action, project or undertaking which sig-nificantly affects the quality of the environment” (GOP, 1977).Since 1977, further legal changes have been made (see Table 2).

The chronology of this process is crucial since the San RoqueMulti-purpose Project’s original 1979 EIS report as well as the1997 update have been prepared in light of these changes. In1978, PD 1586 provided a basic screening mechanism with the cat-egories of Environmentally Critical Areas (ECAs) and Environmen-tally Critical Projects (ECPs).5 Since 1982, any project falling ontothe ECP and ECA lists was required to secure an Environmental Com-pliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the NEPC – which later becamepart of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR).

All ECPs including SRMP are required to submit EnvironmentalImpact Statements (EISs) to the DENR in order to obtain ECCs. TheDENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) is formallyresponsible for evaluating EISs. Compliance monitoring is also ameans used by the DENR to ensure compliance with the conditionsof the ECC and other environmental regulations. If a project propo-nent fails to comply, the ECC issued for the project is to be revoked.

This system above was designed to respond to ‘‘an urgent needto formulate an intensive, integrated program of environmental

protection” (GOP, 1977). However, it also has ‘‘special economicsignificance” (Smith and van der Wansem, 1996, p. 39) becausethe EIS system has an effect on the implementation of a projectdeemed to be critical to national development. Further, the issu-ance of an ECC as a procedural item is a prerequisite for projectimplementation. In practice, however, the EIS system has oftenbeen used simply to provide legitimacy for projects. Some ECCswere applied for while a project was under construction or evenafter project completion (Ross, 1994; Interview, 2004j). Despitesuch irregularities, the system is there to satisfy those proponentswho ‘‘wish to comply with the law; that is the EIS system as abureaucratic requirement creates a desire to comply” (Ross,1994, p. 223).

6.2. Environmental consideration

Two phases of the life of the SRMP (the Marcos and Ramos eras)are examined here in order to highlight the supposedly ‘greener’policy and practice in the second phase as it was caught on thecusp of the 1990s international greening. The first feasibility studyfor the SRMP was carried out between May 1977 and March 1979(ELC and EDCOP, 1979). This work reported favourably on theSRMP as both the Philippine government and the NPC sought to at-tract foreign funding – highlighting its prospective positive role asa huge mine tailing dam which, by trapping and diluting water inits reservoir, would improve water quality in the Agno River (Abra-cosa and Ortolano, 1989).6 Accordingly, the study concluded thatthe SRMP was technically sound and economically feasible despitea huge estimated cost of US$ 1.2 billion.

The NPC belatedly began an EIA (as required in EIS) after thefinancial arrangements were confirmed in May 1983 to acquirean ECC for executing project implementation (Test Consultants,1984). However, preparatory works including site developmentand access road/bridge construction began before the commence-ment of an EIA study – meaning that project implementationstarted without issuance of an ECC (Abracosa and Ortolano,1989). As such, there was no room for an EIA report to influenceproject decision-making process. Therefore it can be concludedthat the initial 1984 EIA was merely conducted to gain legitimacyrather than to be a decision-making tool designed to minimizeenvironmental damage.

Due to the poor record of the initial EA, the Japanese govern-ment proposed further review studies during Prime Minister Naka-sone’s meeting with Marcos in May 1983. Accordingly, a JapanInternational Cooperation Agency (JICA) team performed threestudies additional to the original EIA, including a review of theNPC hydrological analysis and an assessment of both the reservoirand irrigation water quality (Abracosa and Ortolano, 1989; JICA,1985a, 1985b). Yet, the JICA study failed not only to show muchsign of rigour, but also to coordinate with and complement the ini-tial EIA by the Philippine side. Moreover, no environmental guide-lines were established in 1983 for JICA to work with.7 Notsurprisingly, the JICA produced a report that covered only a few pos-sible negative socio-environmental impacts, mostly confirmed theoriginal study. Hence it concluded that the project was ‘‘feasible”(National Diet, 1986c, p. 32).

Because the recipient’s environmental consideration process ina mega-development project was often liable to be superficial (seeFOEJ, 2002b; Sumi, 2004), Japanese officials sought to ensure thatthey had done (or were at least seen to have done) a ‘rigorous’ vet-

5 ECPs have three major undertakings such as heavy industries, resource extractiveindustries and infrastructural projects with ‘‘high risk or negative environmentalimpact”, and ECAs are classified with 12 categories of ‘‘ecologically, socially, orgeologically sensitive” areas (GOP, 1981).

6 The Agno River runs through the Benguet province where three major miningcompanies (Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc., Benguet Corporation Inc. and Philex Mining,Inc.) are operating (Usui, 2003).

7 The first JICA environmental guidelines for dam construction appeared in 1990(JICA, 1990).

632 S. Kim / Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637


ting procedure in order to avoid future criticism. Indeed, this JICAactivity was performed to satisfy a procedural requirement; how-ever it is important to note that the activity was an exclusivelyenvironmental survey, which in the end emphasized the dam’spossible contribution to water quality improvement. Such ‘green’signals, however limited, suggested at least some procedural con-cern over the likely environmental impacts of the proposed dam.

The timing of the SRMP resurrection is all the more interesting.The project was mired in both the greening agenda of the 1990sand huge criticism against Japan’s involvement with the controver-sial Narmada Dam in India that caused serious social and environ-mental problems (National Diet, 1990, 2003). Notwithstanding theexperience with the Narmada Dam, the environmental consider-ation for the second round was still patchy – the original ECC is-sued in 1985 was still in force despite notable changes to thePhilippine environmental regulation system in the interveningdecade (SRPC, 2006b). The effort to avoid the painstaking EA proce-dures of the 1990s by having the 1980s work ‘retro-validated’ en-tailed complex political and bureaucratic negotiations as well asthe generation of much controversy, which were clearly demon-strated in an ‘illegal’ quarry case linked to the dam constructionwork.

The local municipal government of San Manuel raised concernson San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC)’s quarrying taking place inan area without ECC permit – as clay and gravel quarrying wouldhave a significant environmental impact on the existing river chan-nel and the neighbouring agricultural lands (DENR-MGB, 1999). Itwas an illegal quarry because neither a specific quarry plan nor anecessary mining permit was made for this activity (DENR-MGBRegional Office I, 1999). Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd. (REOL) –the construction work subcontractor – had been found extractingsand and gravel materials within a ‘banned area’ requiring a specialmining permit (Ministry of Natural Resources, 1983). The Region Ioffice8 of the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Re-sources Mines and Geosciences Bureau (DENR-MGB) accordinglyconducted an investigation based on the San Manuel municipality’sappeal, and produced a memorandum. The memorandum concludedthat this sensitive area should remain classified as a ‘banned area’since the environmental impact of the quarrying (i.e. intensifyingexisting erosion and sedimentation problems) had not been properlyaddressed by the NPC and SRPC (DENR-MGB, 1999). However, theSRMP Project Director (1999), wrote directly to the Under-Secretaryof the DENR in Manila (not to the Region I office) – arguing that thememorandum used ‘‘biased” data and was therefore a ‘‘superficialdocument” containing allegations rather than facts. The letter fur-ther highlighted the DENR’s inability and negligence in its EIA reviewthat failed to identify the absence of a clear and detailed quarryingplan and environmental programmes in both the 1985 and 1997EIAs. Accordingly, the Project Director (1999, p. 2) strongly urgedthe Under-Secretary ‘‘not [to] wait for the NPC and the SRPC to pre-pare a detailed technical response to the DENR-MGB report allegingenvironmental impacts and any debates or reconciliation of the find-ings” – because, instead, the NPC was proposing a ‘‘Presidential Or-der creating the Special Government Permit [being issued] withoutfurther delay.” In spite of this SRPC intervention, the DENR RegionI office (1999) ordered a suspension of quarry activity through aCease and Desist Order (CDO) based on its memorandum.

In response, the NPC, SRPC and REOL sent a letter to the DENR-MGB Region I Director requesting the CDO on the largest PhilippinePresidential Flagship project be reconsidered. They argued it was‘‘inconsistent with numerous legislative and executive issuances”(NPC-SRPC-REOL, 1999, p. 1), and would jeopardise ‘‘social bene-

fits” of the project for the affected local communities as well asthe ability of the Philippines to ‘‘secure international financingfor other infrastructure projects” (NPC-SRPC-REOL, 1999, p. 3). Atthis point, the NPC had already applied to the Office of the Presi-dent for a special (‘waiver’) permit rather than an additional ECCapplication for the contested quarry. The project proponents wereclearly seeking a political solution to a contentious and time-con-suming issue – stating that they ‘‘will not withdraw these applica-tions until and unless [they] can obtain the special governmentquarry permit discussed herein” (NPC-SRPC-REOL, 1999, p. 3).Clearly the companies were confident of their ability to acquirethe special permit as they had already gone straight to the DENRManila office (by-passing the regional office) and even to the Pres-ident who did not hesitate to organize several committees to assistthe project’s completion (NPC-SRPC-REOL, 1999).

Soon after the CDO issuance, President Joseph Estrada9 issuedExecutive Order 200 that provided the legal cover for SRMP quarry-ing in the contested area (GOP, 2000). EO 200 stated that: ‘‘. . . quar-ry, sand, gravel, clay and related materials from onshore areas arehighly suitable raw materials for government infrastructure projects,especially flagship projects, . . . it is in the national interest to prior-itise government projects in the utilization of these materials to en-hance the delivery of services vital to the Government’s economicand social development programs”. Both an interim and a ‘perma-nent’ special permit were granted for SRPC to quarry 2606 hectaresin the contested area (NRDC, 2000a, 2000b).

6.3. Environmental appraisal

This was the stage where JEXIM played the central role inchecking the efficacy of the recipient’s environmental consider-ation. JEXIM reviewed the EA reports by the NPC according to itsenvironmental checklists (JEXIM, 1993). Therefore, JEXIM’s rolehere was that of a passive auditor rather than an active ‘watchdog’for effective environmental consideration. And yet, it needs to beemphasized at this stage that JEXIM directly controlled projectfunding decisions. By addressing environmental issues raised dur-ing the appraisal, it had the power to effect material improvementsto the environmental aspect of a proposed project (for example,through new conditions added to the loan agreements) and there-fore, if necessary, to suspend (or even terminate) a loan when non-compliance with social and environmental standards occurred(JEXIM, 1993; see National Diet, 2000).

By February 1999, JEXIM had already completed an environ-mental appraisal for the hydropower plant construction and wasin the midst of completing an additional environmental appraisalfor the multipurpose dam construction (JEXIM, 1999). However,because an additional investigation only occurs ‘‘when there isan issue that needs further attention” (according to the JEXIM’sofficial checklist), some disturbing issues must have been flaggedduring the initial environmental appraisal (JEXIM, 1993, p. 1). JEX-IM had solely focused on a supplementary enquiry on socio-envi-ronmental issues for the additional investigation (JEXIM, 1999;Interview, 2004i). Nevertheless, in practice, instead of reinforcingenvironmental standards via the loan agreement, JEXIM simply af-firmed the SRMP’s compliance with Philippine environmental lawsin a basic manner (JBIC, 2004a). Yet, in order to account for someapparent reservations that had cropped up during the appraisal,it allocated a lengthier 15-year period of time to the monitoringphase (JEXIM, 1999). Hence the project went ahead more or less in-tact despite concerns and opposition by local governments, localcommunities and NGOs (FOEJ, 1999b; CPA, 2000).

8 Region I (Illocos) is where SRMP-affected Pangasinan and Benguet Provinces arelocated.

9 Joseph Estrada was impeached by the House of Representatives in November2000 for alleged corruption.

S. Kim / Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637 633


6.4. Monitoring

The monitoring process is the final stage of EA at which Japa-nese officials can encourage ‘greening’ by insisting on the full com-pletion of all prior environmental undertakings. Even by June 2006the monitoring period was still left open and was said to continueuntil a clear sign of project sustainability was established (Inter-view, 2006a). Two main issues have been monitored: environmen-tal (flooding, sedimentation) and social (resettlement, livelihood)problems that have been raised by the local community and NGOssince the start of the project. Japanese officials admitted that theproject’s appraisal was inappropriately conducted due to the poorsocio-environmental standard of JEXIM 1993 environmentalchecklists (Interview, 2006a).

The key agency at the monitoring stage for this project, how-ever, was the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (hereafterJBIC which JEXIM merged with in October 1999). Such monitoringwas based on JBIC’s guidelines with the specific purpose of ensur-ing compliance with the SRMP’s prior socio-environmental com-mitments (FOEJ, 2004c). The SRMP monitoring system wasestablished in accordance with the delegated monitoring plan setby JEXIM in light of its own environmental appraisal noted above(FOEJ, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e). JBIC was thus to be regularly updatedby reports from the NPC and the SRPC, and simultaneously conductits own field investigations by dispatching an environmental mis-sion team to the area biannually. Thus, monitoring is mostlyundertaken remotely from Tokyo via reports and information pro-vided by the project proponent, while the field investigation was tobe carried out regularly at times ‘‘when [it was] perceived [as]opportune” (MOF in FOEJ, 2004e, p. 2). However, monitoring re-ports submitted by the NPC are not available to the public as thereis no bilateral agreement to disclose them (MOF in FOEJ, 2004e).10

In practice, JBIC has regularly dispatched a field investigationteam to the project site and neighbouring areas. The team consistsof members from the Environmental Analysis Department, the pro-ject office (International Finance Department I), and one external‘independent’ environmental consultant hired by JBIC ‘‘if neces-sary” (MOF in FOEJ, 2004e, p. 2, FOEJ, 2004b, 2005c; Interview,2006b). The duration of investigation is generally about a week,but ‘‘mainly depends on the situation at the time of dispatch”(Interview, 2006b). Indeed, the field investigation was a costly af-fair for JBIC as it involved extra expenditure such as hiring an ‘inde-pendent’ third party consultant and helicopter ride to and aroundthe project site (FOEJ, 2004c, 2004e).11

Despite the additional efforts and expenses, the team’s activitiesat the SRMP site were still described as ‘‘covering up the dirt” byone senior Japanese aid official ‘‘rather than ultimately solvingthe actual problems” (Interview, 2006a). Such a perfunctory atti-tude is partly due to the strong tendency within the Japanese aidbureaucracy to deny failure in their aid delivery (Interview,2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004i). For the 2004 field investigations,the mission team only spent 2 days at the project site (out of a totalof 4 days), with the rest of the time spent in Manila (FOEJ, 2004a,2004b, 2004c). In such a short stay, it is unlikely that five investi-gators can appreciate the complex socio-environmental conditionsof the affected area and four resettlement areas across threemunicipalities.

Further, as the JBIC team was mainly guided by NPC and SRPCstaff during the field investigation, the nature of the consultationwith the local community and the associated data collection wereinevitably biased (FOEJ, 2004e, p. 3).12 As a lender JBIC is (ulti-mately) not responsible for the environmental consideration – butrather relies upon NPC-SRPC involvement as the key local playersin that process. Yet again, such dependency raises questions aboutthe utility of monitoring as an independent and thorough mecha-nism by which to ensure compliance.

Considering the socio-environmental commitments examinedso far, not much can be expected at this final stage for unfulfilledenvironmental commitments. In sharp contrast to both JEXIM’s re-port (JEXIM, 1999) and JBIC’s pronouncements on its commitmentto environmental monitoring (FOEJ, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2005b),local people have seen not much of the team in action. For exam-ple, one indigenous community leader described the missionteam’s visits dismissively: ‘‘when they came and asked the samequestions over and over. That is all. But nothing has changed.”(Interview, 2004f, also see Interview, 2004g, 2004h.

After almost three decades of ‘involvement’ with the troubledSRMP, Japan has finally withdrawn from its original plan to financethe SRMP’s irrigation component in 2008 despite the 5-year con-sultation with the Philippine government. No clear reason was pro-vided. But the political killing of a local peasant leader and theproject’s potential socio-environmental impact were mainly per-ceived as the reason for withdrawing. With the ‘greener’ policyand procedure in place, Japan was not able to continue financingthe SRMP which was no longer seen to be socially and environmen-tally feasible (FOEJ, 2008; Tokyo Shimbun, 2009). In the absence ofJBIC’s funding, China has decided to finance the irrigation compo-nent, for which the Philippine government has been negotiating aloan of over US$ 213 million (PIA, 2009). An anonymous Philippinegovernment official commented that the Philippines replaced the‘‘demanding” donor Japan with China who did ‘‘not ask about so-cial and environmental issues but only talks about money” (TokyoShimbun, 2009). But the official equally emphasized the impor-tance of social and environmental consideration in infrastructureprojects like the SRMP.

7. Conclusion

This article assessed the extent and ways in which a traditionaldevelopment ‘aid’ project has been the subject of the ‘greening’process in the 1990s (and beyond). The history of SRMP demon-strated how successive Philippine leaders (and their internationalpartners) managed to finance the project despite significant socialand environmental implications. Through a political ecology ap-proach, the article highlighted the vital role of the EA procedurein greening of the aid project. In doing so, the case study revealedhow the procedure was in reality riddled with the political-eco-nomic strategies of state managers and vested interests of com-mercial elites in Japan and the Philippines.

As the evidence suggests, the ‘greening’ of SRMP was signifi-cantly disrupted by the implementation ‘gap’ – which mainly re-lates to the degree of procedural commitment/compliance withthe EA process. In order to ‘mind’ this particular gap, Japan as a do-nor could have reinforced two procedural commitments clearlystated in its policy documents. The first was to build ‘green’ condi-tions into its loan agreement with the Philippine recipient. In spiteof its diplomatic ‘sensitivity’, it would have given Japan the powerto suspend the loan in the event of socio-environmental non-com-pliance. The second was to ensure the EA procedure is thoroughly

10 This was corroborated by similar incidents involving Japanese aid. For example,when challenged to disclose loan agreement related documents, a JBIC lawyer duringthe Kotopanjang Dam hearing at Tokyo district court told the court that they wereunable to do so due to ‘respect for the recipient’s sovereignty’ and ‘secrecy for thesake of diplomacy’ (Direct observation 13 November 2003). Similar comments(including respect for inter-state confidentiality) were made during Marcos scandalinvestigation (National Diet, 1986d; Tsuda and Deocadiz, 1986).

11 It is indeed difficult to travel to the SRMP site area due to extremely poor publictransport (Direct Observation 24–29 March 2004).

12 Community meetings (including interpreters) were arranged through the SRPCand NPC (FOEJ 2005a).

634 S. Kim / Geoforum 41 (2010) 627–637


followed. With the knowledge of SRMP’s socio-environmentalimplication from the past, further efforts could have been madeto ensure the procedural commitment. The latter in particular iscentral to the ‘successful’ implementation of greening of aid. Thus,in concluding, the article addresses major constraints to the proce-dural commitment/compliance with the EA process.

The first constraining factor is, as highlighted in the politicalecology literature, that the procedure has become a highly politicalprocess. Without being able to serve its prescribed role as a ‘scien-tific and technical’ undertaking to inform decision makers, the pro-cedure was compromised by the different political decisions andviews by various stakeholders. Consequently the second constraintconcerns the procedure being a detached bureaucratic exercise togain legitimacy. For effective greening, the procedure needs to befully integrated (or ‘embedded’) particularly in the decision-mak-ing stage. However, the findings illustrated that the complex polit-ical and bureaucratic negotiations surpassed extensive proceduralundertakings. The third constraint is weak institutional capacityand commitment to the procedure. The recent development ofSRMP since the JBIC’s withdrawal in particular highlights not onlythe importance of the recipient’s role in fulfilling the greening butalso the possibility of the recipient opting out of the ‘demanding’donor.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the referees and the editor for their valu-able time and constructive comments/suggestions. Also, I amgrateful to Liam Campling, Kathy Baker, Linda Etchart, Kevin Grayand Mike Parnwell for their feedback. All errors remain theauthor’s own.

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