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Globalization and politics of identity inSouthern Thailand, Betong DistrictChantana Banpasirichote Wungaeoa

a Department of Government, Faculty of Political Science,Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, ThailandPublished online: 29 May 2014.

To cite this article: Chantana Banpasirichote Wungaeo (2014) Globalization and politics of identityin Southern Thailand, Betong District, Philippine Political Science Journal, 35:1, 37-58, DOI:10.1080/01154451.2014.915106

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Globalization and politics of identity in Southern Thailand, BetongDistrict

Chantana Banpasirichote Wungaeo*

Department of Government, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok,Thailand

(Received 1 May 2012; accepted 6 April 2014)

The study explores a changing community at the periphery of Thailand as the countrymoves toward globalization with the focus on local identity. This project examines thecharacteristics of globalization as it manifests in a local community; the changingperception of ethnic identity under the emerging globalization context; and, the responsesof the local government to the challenges of globalization. Data were gathered frominterviews with three different family generations and key informants, and from focusgroup discussions. The clearer driving force of change may be attributed to the expansionof media and telecommunication and the floating idea of internationalization. Theinfluence of transnational social and culturalmovements is from the promotion ofChineselanguage and culture, and the vibrant Islamic revivalist movement. The study finds thatreligion remains a strong factor of identity in comparison to traditions and languages. Thechoice of languages has changed meaning from keeping the mother tongue to gaining amore competitive advantage. As people connecting to cultural and religious roots insideand outside the community, social distances within local ethnic groups becomewidening.Finally, the local government aims to be part of a greater international community topromote economic development by using the cultural capital of Betong. The localgovernment has constructed the Betong identity which serves as a new social cohesionand, at the same time, a mechanism to stand tall in a globalizing world.

Keywords: globalization; identity; cultural politics; southern Thailand; Betong

The study of globalization, particularly in Thailand, has been mostly influenced by the

political-economic analysis of neo-liberalist policy which is predominantly an issue

and an industry base. Also, it is found that most analyses rely on a conflict approach,

i.e., contested positive and negative aspects of globalization. Resistance to globalization has

been amajor assumption of people’s responses to the rapid changes around international trade

competition.

This study raises the following question: do people in the periphery change the way

they think of themselves and relate to others in the globalizing world? The question

concerning people’s sense of belonging in the changing world deserves certain attention

when studying identity and globalization, particularly at the community level. It is

recognized that in the past two decades, the idea of politics has changed from interest,

reform and ideology to group identity-based (Kenny 2004, vii; Bielsa 2009, 3).

The politics of identity is said to have given individual . . . a connection to politicalprojects based on elements that are very basic to their self-conceptions.Members of these groupssee themselves as having in common certain important characteristics that set them apart fromthe larger population – a commonality that is based on difference. (Hoover 2001, 201)

q 2014 Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA)

*Email: cwungaeo@yahoo.com

Philippine Political Science Journal, 2014

Vol. 35, No. 1, 37–58, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2014.915106

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The rise of identity consciousness is believed to be associated with a number of factors

from the spreading of diaspora communities, the sense of loose territory and borders, to the

fear of excessive external cultural influences. Appadurai (2006, 7) explains that “ . . . . where

the lines between us and them may have always, in human history, been blurred at the

boundaries and unclear across larger spaces and big numbers, globalization exacerbates

these uncertainties and produces new incentives for cultural purification as more nations lose

the illusion of national economic sovereignty of well-being.” The feature of globalization,

that is, mobility, might create insecurity and fear in certain sectors of the population.

(Bielsa 2009, 4)

Pieterse (2004, 59–81), in contrast, provides a convincing trajectory of globalization

and culture. Indeed, an increasing mobility, perhaps unconsciously, turns us all into

migrants in one way or another. There is more than one trend of cultural interactions in the

age of globalization, among others, hybridization is going unnoticed.

Along this line, Thai scholars have identified a personality in the age of globalization as

“Thai character, cosmopolitan mind” [ตวไทย ใจสากล], or a paradox when facing globalizationas “big world, narrow mind” [โลกกวาง จตแคบ] (Wungaeo 2002). The paradox has somewhat

been resolved as Thai society should open to possible shared global values while retaining

Thai unique identity. It has not been discussed further what constitutes Thainess in this new

age1; and, the relationship of the highly globalized national center and local community in

reconciling national identity is still not debated. The question of national identity is a

concern here because it overrides the visibility and recognition of other ethnic groups in the

community in an increasingly globalized world. The issue of identity is provoked only when

the national interest is in question. In the age of globalization, local and national interests can

be divergent.

Santasombat (2008, 37–8) reaffirm that the issue of identity, including local, national,

ethnic and diasporas, is very much alive. There is a tendency that the society, particularly

at the borderline, will become more culturally pluralized. At the periphery, the state cannot

exercise authority efficiently so the imposition of national culture by the state is being

challenged or bypassed. Identity in this new age is more dynamic and not necessarily

associated with territory, but is becoming more attached to new rationality, notably the

market, capital and interest.

Studies on northern Thailand advanced by local scholars have raised a fundamental

question on the relationship between the central government and the local communities

regarding responses to the forces of globalization. The introduction of special economic

zones in the border communities intended to invite foreign investment as well as growing

tourism, provide a good ground for the rise of local identity consciousness. The latest

development of political mobilization from a northern province like Chiang Mai was

branded as “the provincial self-management” [จงหวดจดการตนเอง]. In this regard, local

communities in the new age are seeking for their own identity, that is something out of the

central administrative blueprint. They are negotiating for a greater “ownership of local

government (Tan-uyd 2010).”

The impact of globalization on identity cannot be easily gauged. This article will

not attempt to draw a definite causal relation between globalization and politics of

identity. It only describes the presence of globalization in the community, physically and

psychologically, at the same time, assesses the position of the community and individuals

in dealing with increasing cultural homogeneity and diversity. While there are conflicts,

domination and exploitation in the asymmetrical relationship between major globalizing

forces and the community, this study does not rule out a possibility in which the

community is an important agent.

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This study covers two levels of analysis, the community and the individual. At the

community level, investigation includes basically the physical/material appeals of

globalization, ideas of community development, and the management of delicate issues

of identity. At the individual level, inquiries cover the perceptions and behavior around

identity of members in selected local families.

To studymanifestation of globalization in a communitywithout a neo-liberalist project as

an indicator can be complicated. Appadurai’s concept of disjuncture provides a useful

indicator to recognize dimensions of globalization in separate spheres of (1) technoscapes, (2)

mediascapes, (3) ethnoscapes, (4) financescapes, and (5) ideoscapes (Appadurai 2003, 252).

The investigation into the socio-economic and political context of the communities will take

into account changes on those dimensions. As the feature of globalization is about the

shrinking of time and space with the help of telecommunication technology, the study of

Betong assume the presence of new technology as a concrete indicator. The shrinking of time

and space made possible many social, economic and cultural activities to be transnational.

This study traces back to major development events in Betong, with the emphasis on

communication, media, transnational activities, and expression of culture and identity

through time.

Since it is not possible to draw a causal relation between globalization and changes

around identity, this study will only raise important observations of social and cultural

activities since the presence of a certain indicator of globalization. This study looks

particularly from 19922 when the country felt the effect of globalization prevalence

through the incident of “mobile phone mob” in the mass demonstration against the coup

d’etat dictator. When the national TV channels were in control of the government, people

got organized with the help of mobile phones and faxes. As for Betong, it was not until

2002 when the first internet and mobile phone shop was opened (see Table 1). Practically,

the study investigates identity issues and local government responses in the period when

there is a trace of globalization traits.

The changing perceptions of self and group identity in this study are assessed by tracing

back to the characteristics of three generations in one family, namely, grandparents,

parents and children. Ten families were selected for in-depth interviews covering Thai

(Thai-speaking Buddhist or Buddhist Thai), Chinese (ethnic Chinese origin), and Malayu

Muslim (Malay-speaking Muslim)3 in both rural and urban areas. Selected members of

these three generations within a family were interviewed to capture how each generation

makes references to ethnicity. Generations here are defined simply by age hierarchy

within the family. It is assumed that the generation cohorts share more or less common

experiences in Betong’s social and economic history. Most selected households were

concentrated in the Than Namtip community for being convenient. In summary, the

interview covered 5 members of three Thai Families, 12 members of four Malayu Muslim

families, and 9 members of three Chinese ethnic families; and it was conducted during

30 September and 6 October 2008 with additional key informant interviews and focus

group discussions carried out later in April 2009.4 The elements of identity are simple

distinctive characteristics of religion, language, family tradition, and social networks.

Interview guides included origin of family, religion and language, education and

socialization, group affiliation and social networks, ritual and traditional practices, and

perception of other ethnic and religious group.5

Betong District of Yala Province in Southern Thailand was selected as an average

community located in a region where ethnic and religious identity greatly matters in

comparison to other places. By average community measures, it is not marked as directly

driven by dominant globalizing forces like international trade and transactions. Betong is

Philippine Political Science Journal 39

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Table 1. Important landmarks in Betong’s local development history: development and ethnicitycompiled from documents and interviews.

Time/Year Events

1st Generation (Grandparents)1917 Building of Buddhathiwas temple1923 Founding of a private Chinese Elementary School (Intraniwas and

Siriyotai 2009)1924 Biggest mail box in the world1939 Betong district upgraded to municipality1943 Betong Clock Tower (Liangpansakul, pers. comm., April 23, 2009)1949 Jongfa Chinese School (former elementary school) approved by

the Ministry of Education (Intraniwas and Siriyotai 2009)

2nd Generation (Parents)1951 Building of Betong Mosque with Arab name for Al Yamiulmahdi

(Fah-arun 2004)1953 Hakka Association founded in Betong (Sirithanawat, pers. comm.,

April 23, 2009)1962 Setting up office building of Betong Foundation (an umbrella

organization of all Chinese associations)

3rd Generation (Children)1983 Yala designated as a tourist destination, amendment of service

enterprises for closing time extension until 2 AM1987–89 End of Malaya Communist Party, beginning of tourism promotion1992 Dawah movement by the Center of Markas, Betong office

(Piyanonpong, pers. comm., April 22, 2009) -(Dawah arrived in1982 but never set up an office until 1992.)

1992 Building of the largest Buddha statue in Thailand, PhraBudhatammakai-mongkol-payurakesanon-suppitan (BetongMunicipality 2006)

1993 Promotion of new tourist sites, e.g., the former communistinsurgent tunnel, hot spring with the Tourism Authority ofThailand’s support

1995 Foundation of Muslim Thai established (Buena, pers. comm., July12, 2009)

Since 1997 Seven-Eleven convenience stores appeared in Betong, emergingMuslim grocery store, adjustment of old Chinese stores(Ratanasathien, pers. comm., July 10, 2009)

Since 1997 Traditional Pondok Islamic school fading out, being replaced withprivate Islamic school teaching religion in formal education(Buena, pers. comm., July 12, 2009)

2002 Entertainment zoning implemented by the municipality2002 First appearance of internet cafe and mobile phone shop

(Liangpansakul, pers. comm., April 23, 2009)2004 Bilateral Agreement between Betong and Rajabhat Yala

University and Sichuan University for academic cooperation andexchange of both language and culture (Intraniwas and Siriyotai2009)

2005 Cable TV connection from Yala province (Betong Cable TV)(Buena, pers. comm., July 12, 2009)

2006 Opening of Confucius Institute of Betong Municipality (ASEAN-China Center 2010)

2006 † Agreement between Betong Municipality and CommunityCollege on the diploma program for local government andelementary education

(Continued)

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also a place that puzzles a number of people, in that, the community appears to sustain

multi-cultural coexistence (Nararatwong 2009, 171), ultimately, making it a place to

inquire about identity politics in the changing world.

Globalization at the periphery: Betong’s aspiration

The District of Betong covers an area of 1,328 square kilometers. Part of Yala Province,

and bordering Malaysia, it is situated some 140 kilometers away from the provincial seat.

Betong District is sandwiched betweenMalaysia’s Kedah State to the west and Perak State

to its east. Surrounded by mountains and with only 10% of plateau in its entire territory,

Betong is geographically isolated from the rest of three southern border provinces.

Tracing back through its development history, Betong is doing relatively well. It

was predominantly a rubber plantation area. Only after the reconciliation with the

Malayan Communist Party insurgent in 1989, tourism became an important source of

income. For a number of years, the community has attracted people from the nearby

provinces and further away. Unfortunately, tourism developed as a result of

entertainment business catering to Malaysian guests crossing the border to find

comfort in Betong. This has been a controversial issue between the Malayu Muslims

and the municipality’s tourism policy.

Lately, Betong has seen migrants from further afield, such as migrant workers from the

Northeast arriving in Betong to work in the rubber plantations. Betong also experiences

problems of women from Yunnan coming to work in the sex service sector. Labor

migration to Betong has been a long-standing phenomenon due to its frontier location, and

its demand for farm work. Migrant workers tend to form their own communities, such as

Baan Wangmai community in Aiyerweng Sub-District (Buena, pers. comm., April 21,

2009). However, the diaspora community is not so visible and so far has not been very

active in social activities.6

Betong aspires to evolve into an international hub, i.e., international university for

Chinese language (Malay and English as well). Judging from the municipality’s plans,

Betong is becoming more internationalized and modernized with infrastructure

development and regional linkages. Yet, Betong attempts to be distinctive by presenting

Table 1 – continued

Time/Year Events

† Bilateral Agreement with Chonging University in China toestablish Confucius Institute of Chinese cultural studies, andofficial opening of Confucius Institute (Intraniwas andSiriyotai 2009)

2008 † Opening of Betong Museum† Opening of the new bigger mail box (Ratanasathien, pers.

comm., July 10, 2009)2008 † First major direct election according to a local government law

amendment (Mr. Khunnawut Mongkolparjak first elected)(Chantramongkhol, pers. com., September 30, 2008)

2008 † Agreement between Betong Municipality with ThaksinUniversity for a diploma programme in education, and theMaster Degree Programme in Education Management

† Agreement with Burapa University for the Master DegreeProgramme in Public Administration and the set-up of IndochinaStudies (Malaya Studies) (Intraniwas and Siriyotai 2009)

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cultural Betong images, including Chinese shrines, Buddha statues, and international

multilingual universities.

In Betong, people connect to the world through cable TV and their favorite channels

broadcasted from China, Malaysia and Singapore. Needless to say, the prevalence of new

media and telecommunication technologies has a certain psychological effect on how a

community like Betong positions itself in relation to other players in the region.

The local government’s outward-looking policies can be observed, that is, through

steps to advance internationalization of higher education through regional centers for

Chinese language study. Regional networking is a policy initiative in Betong today.

Establishing social networking is not new. Several examples include, for instance, Chinese

clan associations, provincial groupings, and Islamic education movements (e.g., Tadika

school/Madrassa school club and Dawah movements) – all of which are intrinsic to Betong

and are considered social capital. Extending these existing networks, their geographical

and substantive dimensions are quite recent. The promising link with the outside world is

between local colleges with the Chinese universities coupled with the initiative from the

municipality (see Table 1). The change is built upon the cultural features of Betong.

The community is also looking for a grand project such as new urban zoning, by-pass

highway and road connection with the growth triangle from Songkhla to Penang (IMT-GT

flagship). A few new hotels and building complexes have been built by investors from

Malaysia with local joint ventures. This is developing together with Betong’s grand

symbolic structures like the huge Buddha statue (39 meters tall), the huge Chinese goddess,

and the biggest mail box.

It is interesting to find that changes in Betong are not evolved from cultural

Westernization, as normally seen in globalized tourist destinations at this point in time.

In other words, the consumption pattern has not changed much, except for media and

communication, while changes in major structures of urbanization like roads and building

complexes remain more primary. The only modern trade appears in the spring up of

convenience stores like 7-Eleven.

What has happened in Betong since the presence of globalization in Thailand in the

early 1990s is, in fact, the continuation of a modernization process coupled with

internationalization. Table 1 indicates local perceptions of development which reflect

upon urban-based development with multi-cultural highlights. Betong has been evolving

efforts to develop infrastructure coupled with social capability improvements like

education, networking linkages while promoting cultural diversity. Tourism is considered

an important trigger of economic development linking Betong to the outside world.

However, it is not the only choice; a small community like Betong has boosted its own

development agenda and sought to be more proactive about its future as an international

education hub in the sub-region.

Dynamics of ethnic groups in Betong

Multi-ethnic community

The population of Betong, 31,843 in 2008 (Ministry of Interior 2008) consists of an array

of ethnic groups. The major ethnic group is the Malayu Muslim, which constitutes 51% of

the entire population. The remaining 47% are from Thai of Chinese ancestry and Buddhist

Thais.7 In addition, 2% of the residents are Christians and Hindus (Yala Provincial

Administrative Organization, n.d.). Betong remains firmly a part of the Malayu culture,

which is a distinct feature of the southern border region. At the same time, Betong stands

out because Chinese cultural images outshine the Malayu culture.

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Social and political space within and among the ethnically diverse groups may not

be linear. Settlements are not clearly delineated by ethnicity. However, while there are

mixes of ethnic groups in each community, a concentration of the same group can be found

(Khotae, pers comm. October 2, 2008).

Apart from Thai as the official language, people of Betong speak more than one

language. Practically, people stick to their mother tongue, such as southern Thai dialect,

local Malay and Chinese dialects and Mandarin. However, they mostly go by the local

Malayu dialect, which is slightly different from Malay spoken elsewhere in the three

southern border provinces Central Thai language is used more among Thai, Chinese and

Malayu but with different degree of fluency.

Religious and linguistic heritages lie at the heart of different ethnic groups. In Betong,

one can find private schools teaching Islamic studies for the Muslims, and schools teaching

Chinese language. Chinese schools have undergone some serious transformations, now

that the Chinese language has become more popular and is now attracting more and more

students even among the Malayu Muslims. In any case, new generation ethnic Chinese

now tend to communicate in the central Thai dialect. Betong is setting its sight on

developing international education using English as a medium of teaching and learning.

This development should accelerate dynamic cultural exchanges.

The issue of inter-ethnic conflict in Betong is somewhat murky, even against the

backdrop of increasing tensions that have arisen from the increase of insurgency attacks in

the region since 2003. What is more apparent is mutual cooperation, notably in the local

political arena. Betong has been governed by senior officials who are either MalayuMuslims

or ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Chinese administrators in the past tended to bring Muslims on

board the municipal administrative team. Development directions to date seem to be heavily

influenced by the Chinese culture, to the extent that Betong’s Chineseness stands out (See

Thareelapraksa 2008).

Identity and social networks

Buddhist Thais

The majority of Buddhist Thais in Betong migrated from other provinces mostly in

the upper south. Most of them came in search of employment, while a portion moved

to work in government offices. Thais tend to hang out with fellow migrants from the

same provinces. As settlers from other provinces, Thai Buddhists in Betong cluster

around fellow settlers originating from the same provinces in the form of associations

and clubs. They simply band together to organize group activities to observe local

tradition and cultural practices derived from their place of origin (Wattanachaopisut,

pers. comm., April 20, 2009). There are provincial clubs such as the Nakhon Si

Thammarat Club and the Songkhla Club in which people of different religions

become members as this is simply a get together group (Liangpansakul, pers. comm.,

April 23, 2009).

On the other hand, other groups of Betong residents who are not from the south and

who come to work in Betong are drawn together on the basis of the region where they are

from, such as the Northern Club, the Northeastern Club. Lately, activities originally

organized within these groups have attracted attention of Betong residents, resulting in

some activities being held beyond the groups’ confines, thereby, increasing cultural

exchanges. A case in point is the “Hae Pha Khuen That Festival [แหผาขนธาต],” a Buddhistrite observed by people from Nakhon Si Thammarat, but which has recently become an

event celebrated widely in Betong.

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Malayu Muslims

Like the ethnic Chinese, Malayu Muslims stick together as a family. They practice “family

cooperative,” sharing work and living, particularly in the case of rubber plantation.

An example of an ethnic-based grouping of Malayu Muslims indigenous to Betong is the

Foundation of Muslim Thais in Betong, whose goal is to promote education for Muslim

youth. The Foundation works alongside the Betong municipality, which provides

budgetary support for the Foundation to conduct its activities (Buena, pers. comm., April

21, 2009). Another type of grouping on the basis of shared religion is the Markas Center

whose role is to promote Islam in Betong. The Center is a branch of the Markas Center in

Yala. Headquartered in India, the Center’s key activities are to visit communities to

educate on religious knowledge known as Dawah. The Center stresses networking and

community-based work.8

Ethnic Chinese

The grouping of ethnic Chinese has by far the clearest pattern and structure. This ranges

from grouping among people sharing the same clan names and dialects, all under the

largest umbrella network of the association of all ethnic Chinese residents in Betong.

There are five dialect-based associations of ethnic Chinese Thais in Betong: the Kwong

Xiu, the Hakka, the Hokkian, the Tae-chiu’s Bamrungras, and the Krongsri Samphan

Association. These five associations conduct activities in-line with their respective

cultures, and provide assistance to members in the form of scholarships for their children

(Wattanachaopisut, pers. comm., April 20, 2009). These associations also have links with

other ethnic Chinese associations in Thailand and abroad, especially China and Malaysia,

at the level of jointly organizing certain activities (Sirithanawat, pers. Comm., April 23,

2009). All these point to the fact that ethnic Chinese in Betong associate with the main

objective of preserving the Chinese culture. Membership in these associations is most

often limited to the older generation aged 60 and over. A sizeable group of ethnic Chinese

in Betong still closely follows current affairs in the People’s Republic of China via

Chinese cable TV and by reading Chinese newspapers (Chantramongkhol, pers. comm.,

September 30, 2008).

Social networks in different forms based on religion, place of origin and language are

important references of people with similar identity and background. To conclude, what

appears to be a culturally vibrant Betong over the past decade actually is the reinvigoration

of ethnic and religious identity through existing social groupings. Apart from the growing

social capital of social networks of ethnic groups, outside players are also instrumental,

namely the Confucius Institute network and Dawah movement. The leadership of the local

government has also been instrumental in extending social networks beyond the Betong

community. This setting, in a way, explains the cultural dimensions of globalization in a

small community.

Families’ identity references: persistence and changes

It is well understood that ethnic identity is not necessary static, meaning it can change or

the meaning and references of one’s identity might be adapted to the changing context.

At times, there can be different multiple sources to which people can identify themselves

with, called double or multiple identities. This section explores changes of ethnic identity

of the people in Betong by describing perspectives of the three generations in one family

on identity references.

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Buddhist Thai families

Various accounts and Betong’s history indicate that Buddhist Thais are not a part of the

indigenous population. Rather, they settled in Betong from 1957 onwards. The majority of

them arrived in Betong for work and employment reasons – as civil servants, wage earners

in rubber and fruit plantations, and traders (Nualla-ong, pers. comm., October 1, 2008;

Kongka, pers. comm., October 6, 2008). Religiously, of course, almost all consider

themselves Buddhists, though some have converted to Islam after settling in Betong and

marrying Muslim spouses.

When the medium of communication is concerned, it all depends on local dialects of

where they are from, such as the upper South of Thailand, and from other regions. As for

families whose members come from disparate parts of Thailand, they then communicate in

central Thai (Nualla-ong, pers. comm., October 1, 2008). Recently, there is the increasing

inclination for the Buddhist Thai family members to use central Thai, particularly those of

the third generation who are in their 20s and who tend to use central Thai both at home and

outside.

The family case studies identify Thainess as conducting merit-making rituals in

temples, speak Thai, or observing Thai traditions like Wai for greetings (assembling two

hands at the chest). An interesting aspect has to do with how they define Betong identity.

They consider settlers from other localities as not genuinely Betong-ians, because being

Betong natives means being born in Betong (Nualla-ong, pers. comm., October 1, 2008).

On the basis of this criteria and looking at fellow ethnic Thais, people who belong to the

second generation of a family and henceforth are deemed bona fide Betong natives

(Saratsamitra, pers. comm., October 4, 2008).

Ethnic Chinese families

According to evidences and accounts of ethnic Chinese in the locality, the first wave of

Chinese settlers landed in Betong around mid-1857, mostly from Guangxi Province in the

South of China. Their arrival had quite an impact on the consciousness of the indigenous

group. Before the Chinese arrived, the Malayu Muslims, who constituted the main

indigenous ethnic group, hardly ever established any sort of formal land ownership

arrangement (Liangpansakul, pers. comm., April 23, 2009, Wattanachaopisut, pers. comm.,

April 20, 2008).

Ethnic Chinese Thais of the older generation tend to speak Chinese, both the dialect of

where they are from and Mandarin Chinese. The majority of ethnic Chinese follow

Buddhism. There are a few Christians among the Chinese, who would go to church every

Sunday. However, ancestor worship is something all Chinese have in common and a

tradition they equally uphold in earnest. In most Chinese households, one will find

ancestors’ shrines. Rites relating to ancestor worship are rigorously observed. They

believe that, in addition to paying respect to ancestors, such occasion presents

opportunities for family members and relatives to get-together and bond (Bua-niam, pers.

comm., October 5, 2008).

Income-wise, among the ethnic Chinese households, it is found that business provides

the bulk of income for most families – chiefly in the line of commerce and rubber

plantations. Another interesting point is how they manage family assets. The most

common approach is the “family council” whereby legal asset holders are members of the

first generation, and the second generation work around and mange the collective estate

(Trirattanaprakong, pers. comm., October 4, 2008).

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Malayu Muslim families

Malayu Muslim is a double identity for those living in the Malay Peninsula, the territory

that covers most of Malaysia and four southern border provinces of Thailand. The Malay

or Malayu people follow the Islamic faith. Speaking Malay and being Muslim have

emerged as combined features. Calling themselves Malayu signifies distinction from

“si-yae” or people who speak Thai and are Buddhist. Malayu Muslims are therefore

different from Muslims from other parts of Thailand.9

Malayu Muslims represent the very first group of settlers. From the distant past, they

have very close ties to the Malayu Muslims in Malaysia (Serang, pers. comm., April 21,

2008). Although Betong is located within the Malay cultural zone that spans three southern

border provinces, Malayu Muslims in Betong are different from those in the rest of the

three southern border provinces, in terms of their dialect and the degree of their religious

orthodoxy (Serang, pers. comm. April 21, 2008; Kari, pers. comm., April 20, 2009).

However, this changed after the advent of new settlers from the three southern border

provinces to Betong town via marriage or for business reasons (Buena, pers. comm.,

April 21, 2008).

Malayu Muslims in Betong often choose to make their living in agriculture, primarily

rubber plantations that many of them inherited from their ancestors. However, their

livelihood opportunities are typically smaller scale compared to those owned by the

Chinese. The approach of managing family estates among the Malayu Muslims is quite

similar to that of the Chinese’s way through “family cooperative” [kong si system – for

Chinese]. The elder in the family reigns supreme and owns the family estate, while other

members work for the estate and get paid proportionate to their tasks, plus welfare as

needed (Serang, pers. comm., July 29, 2009).

The identity of Malayu Muslims is tightly connected with religion. Malayu Muslims,

like other ethnic groups in Betong, share common experiences through local tradition not

necessarily linked to religion, such as the Kuan Asuroh Tradition10 or through folk culture,

such as Likay Hulu (folk drama).

Asking more people about Malayu, the answers indicate varying degrees of awareness of

an own identity. The first group gives importance to identity in connection to Islam – seeing

Malayu as narrow and this being the cause of isolation. “Malayu must be with Islam, cannot

be with any other religion; and . . . . must pray, those who do not pray cannot be Malayu”

(Serang, pers. comm., October 2, 2008). The first generation is confident in what they mean

by Malayu. The distinction from the Thai is that “to be a Thai is to bare our duty, that is, to

follow official orders if they do not go against our religion” (Maseh, pers. comm., October 2,

2008). The second line of thought sees themselves as Malayu, but unable to assert clearly

what makes-upMalayu identity. Some claim their Malay identity is akin to that in Malaysia.

Others claim their Malayu identity is close to that of the southern border provinces or those

who speak the same language (Khotae, Khodiyoh. pers. comm. October 2, 2008; Baso, pers.

Comm. October 3, 2008; Jehleh, pers. comm., October 3, 2008). More interestingly, people

of a younger age in various case studies interpret Malayu identity as covering the ethnic

Chinese and Thai Buddhists living in the southern border region, and further to Malaysia

(Khotae, Thani, pers. comm., October 2, 2008).

Table 2 provides an overview of perceptions of different generations and ethnic

origins on identity references. The three different generations have experienced

changes brought about by new media, communication technologies and the floating

idea of internationalization to a greater and lesser extent; and their perspectives about

ethnicity, religion and traditions are not necessary the same.

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Table2.

CharacteristicsofthreegenerationsinthefamiliesofBuddhistThai,ethnicChineseandMalayuMuslim

(Databased

fromInterviewsoffivemem

bersof

threeThaiFam

ilies,12mem

bersoffourMalayuMuslim

families,and9mem

bersofthethreeChineseethnicfamilies,during30September–6October

2008,and

20–24April2009,Betong,YalaProvince).

References

Malay-M

uslim

Chinese

Thai

Place

ofbirth

1stgeneration(born

1917–46)

Betong

China,Betong

CityofYala,

ChiangKan

(northeast),

Songkhla

(lower

south)

2ndgeneration(born

1951–73)

Betong

Betong,Pattalung(upper

south)

Betong

3rd

generation(born

1973–94)

Betong

Betong

Betong

Languages

1st

†LocalMalay

only

†LocalMalay

withChinesecom-

municationskills

†Chinese/Chinesedialect

only

†ChinesewithsomeThai

andMalay

communicationskills

†Central

Thai,NortheastThai

(Isan),

SouthernThai

dialect

only,or

†Central

Thai

withsomeunderstand-

ingoflocalMalay

andChinese

2nd

†LocalMalay

only

†LocalMalay

withcentralThaias

the

secondlanguage(notfluent)

†SpeakCentral

Thai

tochildrenand

Chineseto

parents,teachChineseto

childrenforfuture

business,

†Central

Thai,southernThai

dialect

†Central

Thai

withlittle

localMalay

†SpeakCentral

Thai

andlearn

Chinese

3rd

localMalay

withcentral

Thai

asthesecondlanguage(fluentThai

ifattendingform

alschool)

†Central

Thai

†Central

Thai

andChineseonly

toparents

†Central

Thai

†Central

Thai

andchoices

ofMalayu

andChineselesson

Education

1st

Noeducation,orinform

alreligious

lessons

NoThai

education

Form

aleducation

2nd

Pondokreligiousschoolor/andform

aleducation

Form

aleducationin

Thai

andsomein

Chineseschool,University

inBangkok

Form

aleducationat

differentlevels

3rd

Privatereligiousschools*(combined

religiousin

form

aleducation)

Form

aleducation,additional

Chinese

lesson,University

inBangkok

Form

aleducationat

differentlevels

(Continued

)

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Table

2–continued

References

Malay-M

uslim

Chinese

Thai

Marriage

1st

Married

toMuslim

Married

toChinesein/from

China

Married

toChinesedescendents,

Chinese,

andalso

toThai

inBetong

2nd

Married

toMuslim

†Married

toChinesedescendentin

Betong

3casesmarried

toMuslim

s

†Married

toThai

from

other

province

(pattalung)

3rd

Notyet

married

Notyet

married

Notyet

married

ReligiousPractices

1st

Daily

prayer,Ram

adan

FollowingBuddhistThairegularrituals

RegularBuddhistrituals,temple

visits

Alm

soffering

2nd

Daily

prayer,Ram

adan,women

dress

code(hijab)

VegetarianpracticeforGoddess

worship

Tem

ple

visit,Alm

soffering

3rd

Daily

prayer

(lessstrict),Ram

adan,

women

dress

code(hijab)

Notmentioned

Notmentioned

Traditions

1st,2nd,3rd

†HariRayaAidilfriti

†Ancestorworship,

†BuddhistHolidays,

†Islamic

Fam

ilylaw

(landand

inheritance)

†Deity

worship

(????????)Fam

ily

Pooloffamilyproperty

(GongSee),

†The10th

month

meritmaking(boon

duen

sip)

†ChineseNew

Year

†Buddhistfolk

ritual,Chak

Phra

†VegetarianFestival

†Thai

New

Year

PerceptionofSelf-ethnicity

1st

Malay

mustbeMuslim

SpeakChinese,

Chineseancestors

and

traditions

speakThai,livein

Thailand

2nd

†MalayumustbeMuslim

†Muslim

isalso

Thai

†MalayuislikeMalaysia

†Chineselanguageisalso

forbusiness

†Thai

citizen

†Chinesetradition,Thai

citizen

speakThai,livein

ThailandThai

manner

(greetings)

Thai

canbemulti-ethnic

3rd

†Malay

mustbeMuslim

SpeakThai,livein

Thailand,making

merit,choices

ofadditional

languages

†Malay

islikeMalaysia

†Malay

canbemulti-ethnic

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Ethnic

relations

1st

†Close

Muslim

community

†Mem

ber

ofaChineseassociation

†Thai

groupingbytheprovince

of

origin

†ChineseandMalay-M

uslim

contact

inthecommunity,Chinesefriends

dependonthecommunity

†Chinesefriendsandcontact

from

rubber

tree

plantationandtradingin

thecommunity

†Malay-M

uslim

friendsandcontact

from

rubber

tree

plantationand

tradingin

thecommunity

†Thai

contact

from

thetownand

social

activities

2nd

ChineseandThai

friendsandcontacts

from

school

Thai

andMuslim

friendsfrom

school

ChineseandMalay-M

uslim

friends

from

school

3rd

Lessfriendfrom

other

ethnic

groups

dueto

separateschool

LessMuslim

friendsdueto

less

Muslim

innorm

alschool

More

compatible

withChinese,

less

Muslim

friendsdueto

less

Muslim

innorm

alschool

Sources:Interviewsofmem

bersofthreeThaifamilies(Law

anKongka,KingkaewTasi,andSwangNuanla-ong);threeChinesefamilies(K

okhengSaejeng,SermsookLiangpansakul,

andYakyiew

Saelao);andfourMalay-M

uslim

families(M

eenohMaseh,YapaKordeah,Laham

aeBasor,andMudorUooma).

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In the first generation (1917–46), ethnic identity appears to be very distinctive among

Thai, Chinese, and Malay, by their birth, mother tongue, traditional dress and family

rituals. Among Buddhist Thais, place of origin is another referent group when most of

them were not originally from Betong. This generation, at one point in time, lived in an

atmosphere of a strong state nationalism of General Pibool Songkram’s government

(1938–57). The Chinese, in particular, had to hide their Chinese identity and the majority

of them held alien status. However, this has been an important reason why the older

generations of the selected Chinese families insisted on keeping and passing on Chinese

language and respect for the elderly in the Chinese family tradition. This was also

under the influence of the Malayan Communist Party. In an interview, Liangpansakul

(October 4, 2008) explains that during the presence of the Malayan Communist Party,

there was competition to win over the masses, and that Chinese culture was promoted to

draw attention from the Chinese in the area. “The fear of cultural assimilation was real”

and continued to the Sarit Government, said Yingchutrakul (July 28, 2009).

The second generation (1951–73) experienced more diverse groups of population

from in-migration. This brought in new traditions and rituals to Betong. Inter-marriage has

become more common among Thai and Chinese ethnicities, while it remained limited

in the Malayu Muslim community. The end of the cold war and anti-communism led to

economic development for Betong. The state nationalism subsided, resulting in Chinese

language schools becoming more prominent and even more popular today. Yet, people

still use their mother tongue even with better command of Thai as required by formal

education. Traditions brought into Betong by immigrants from other provincial towns

were shared and have become internalized as local traditions.

The third generation (1973–94) of families is more interesting with new variations

from the former generations. The references of ethnic identity now remain distinctive

only in the mother tongue and religion for Malayu Muslims. Chinese descendents do

not necessarily speak Chinese at home, and the true Chinese blood is becoming more

marginalized. This is also true for the younger Malayu Muslims who speak local Malay at

home and central Thai outside home. Younger generations might choose to learn Chinese

orMalay languages because of their increasing popularity in the wider world. The language

issue captured the municipality of Betong’s attention and so different courses in

Malay, English and Chinese were offered for the public on weekends (Chantramongkhol,

pers. comm., September 30, 2008). Tebjit (pers. comm., October 1, 2008), a member of

the third generation for example, shared that the city of Betong promoted Malay lessons

for communication as well, but the majority of students chose Chinese. Other ethnic

appearance such as clothing remains only among the Malayu Muslims who have to follow

their dress code. The change in religious education in Islam is observed resulting in

the Pondok (traditional religious school) gradually disappearing in Betong. Buena

(pers. comm., July 12, 2009) mentioned that Muslims in Betong are closer to theMalaysian

side than Pattani and so their traditional school system follows the Malaysian’s style.

In this generation, Betong’s common identity has become vitalized by the fact that this

generation is from Batong (by birth) regardless of their religion and ethnicity; and the

local government has created the Betong spirit as a common local identity for economic

development purpose such as tourism promotion.

Generational gaps in the Malayu Muslim and the ethnic Chinese families are

noteworthy. For the ethnic Chinese, keeping Chinese tradition is the main concern of the

older generations and that also leads to the support of Chinese language and cultural

preservation. Trirattanaprakong (pers. comm., October 4, 2008), the second generation of

an ethnic Chinese family, expressed his concern that “Chinese tradition was created by

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parents and the younger generation should uphold it, but now all grand children have

abandoned it. There is a saying that “parents built, children uphold, and grand children

abandon.” Trirattanaprakong also thought that the situation was all alike with the Malayu

Muslim and the Buddhist Thai families. Interestingly enough, the younger generation does

not think of taking Chinese language lesson as a cultural preservation; for them, Chinese

language is considered good for labor market and business. They are not taking an active

part in those Chinese associations either. The expectation for the younger generation is to

keep the family tradition especially the respect for the elderly and ancestor worship. This

only indicates a changing rationale behind certain identity references like language and

social networking.

The situation in Malayu families is rather opposite. There is a shared perception

that Muslims today are stricter than before. Headscarf (hijab), separate religious schools,

and separation of girls and boys, for instance, are new developments in the past 10 years.

Kalayani Jehleh (pers. comm., October 3, 2008), the second generation of a Malayu

Muslim family, explained that

Today, Islamic principles and practices are being revived among Muslims. It is partly due tothe fact that there are more knowledgeable people mostly graduated from Islamic Universityin the Middle East. Previously, some could read Quran but could not translate. Now, they canunderstand the meaning of the text. People have gained greater knowledge on Islam . . . .Although this might not totally due to “globalization,” the fact that local people here canwatch Hajj ceremony broadcasted directly from Mecca does matter; not to mention they alsohave access to information from internet.

The revival of Islam seems like a coming trend in the most recent decade. Kalayani

Jehleh (pers. comm., October 3, 2008) talked about her religious life.

Those [Muslims] who are not very strict will take an easy religious life, for example notfollowing 5 times daily prayer. At the early age, I did not follow strictly too, but my parentsmanage to control. My father taught me Quran, and I also studied further in the secondaryschool.

However, Kalayani’s experience of a disciplined religious life might be exceptional.

TN (2008), another member of the Third generation of a Malayu Muslim family, was

sent to Thammavitaya School in Yala province, a school considered strong in religious

education, but he had to return to Betong after the incidence of violence in the southern

border provinces. TN used to experiment with smoking grasses, but was never attracted

to it. He thinks that youth’s life today is not like before. Now, youth carry guns in their

fight. He also finds that holding hand with a girlfriend is natural and does not violate Islam.

Yet, his family does not know about his thinking and behavior.

The transnational religious movement like Dawah was mentioned that it has brought

religious consciousness back to Muslims in the community (Saratsamitra, pers. comm.,

October 4, 2008). However, there are different opinions on the role of Dawah Movement.

Kalayani Jeleh (pers. Comm., Obtober 3, 2008) offered an opinion that Muslims in the

community have gained religious knowledge. Therefore, the Dawah which came to the

villages did not make much difference to people’s lives; the good thing that might have

come from Dawah is the exchange of ideas. Dawah can be more useful in the area where

people have not gained much religious knowledge.

The change in inter-ethnic relations is also observed from the interview. The 52-year-old

Malayu Muslim, Jehleh (pers. comm., October 3, 2008), can still remember that both the

ethnic Chinese and the Malayu people were in the rubber plantation together while the

Buddhist Thais were mostly from other provinces. He describes that he used to “ . . . study

with the Chinese in the same school of which half of the students were Chinese. Children of

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Chinese families could communicate in local Malayu.” From the middle of 1980s, parents in

Malayu families started sending their children to private schools teaching religion in primary

and secondary education.11 Therefore, children of the ethnic Chinese and Buddhist Thais

have not shared school experience with the Malayu. In the second and the third generations,

the three ethnic families have less contact among themselves and often not follow their

classmate tradition like the older generation. Liangpansakul (pers. comm., October 4, 2008),

the third generation in a Thai family, made an observation that “from 2004 on, relations

among different groups are slightly changing such as the separation among groups, less

communication. People in Betong are not as closed as before.”

Normally, people are not so concerned about ethnic and religious differences.

A member of the third generation in a Chinese family shares the perception that Muslim

friends are different but they can get by without having to take part in activities that are

not compatible with Islam. Yet, the in-migration of the Muslims from the three border

provinces creates some concern for the non-Muslim groups that Muslim from outside

Betong might bring radicalization of religion to the community (WH, per. comm., April

21, 2009). In addition, from the Malayu Muslim side, the municipality boosted tourism

with the concomitant effect of sexual services which affects the Muslim’s sentiment.

There has been a practice of tolerance which reflects upon informal negotiation and the

adjustment of local policy to contain such “sinful” activity within a certain location.

An impression on the entertainment zoning policy evaluation was not positive for being

ineffective, but the zoning idea was a good gesture to accommodate the Muslims’ concern.

A better meaningful policy is tourism for the whole family and religious festivals which is

marked as the new feature of Betong.

Globalization and politics of identity

Studying family members’ self-perceptions and Betong’s contemporary development

reveals that the identity tension formerly driven by the nationalist state has been resolved by

the members of the community themselves in accommodating one another and

reinvigorating cultural roots. The tension and accommodation are more true for ethnic

minorities, like the Chinese and Malayu Muslims than the Buddhist Thais. The Chinese’s

fear of losing one’s family traditions and the religion revival of the Malayu Muslims are

sorted out by the influence of social networking beyond physical and virtual Betong’s

borders. Interestingly enough, the uniqueness of Betong in the age of globalization andwith

ethnic identity tensions is in fact that the role of the local government is to handle the future

of the community. The study raises two relevant issues: the role of the state and market in

shaping Betong-ians’ identity, and self-government capacity in politics of accommodation.

State, market and identity

If globalization will affect anything at the local community level, the idea of linkages and

connectivity to the larger world is mostly receptive. The features of Betong’s social

change are the cultural politics in the market economy, turning culture into commodity –

cultural assets for tourism promotion. “Branding Betong,” e.g., Betong chicken, Betong

noodle, Betong multicultural heritage, etc. has been used by the local government to

maneuver development and Betong’s common identity. Having or sharing something in

common that also links to livelihood, justifies why cultural accommodation is possible

among diverse ethnic groups in the community despite a strong religious tradition of Islam

in the southern sub-region of Thailand.

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At the individual Betong resident level, the perceptions of self identity from the

case studies have changed from one generation to the next. In this period, as Thailand

globalizes, language is a choice rather than merely inheritance and can be cultural

asmuch asmarket driven. Religion remains a dividing characteristic among groups. Ability

to access communication technologies and networks creates a new social space particularly

for the new generations that are independent from their families and religious traditions.

The new social spaces and networks seem to be an important determinant to cultural hybrid

for Betong youth; loosening up certain traditional customs and religious practices allows

them to become different from the older generations. This is happening in parallel with the

older generations’ idea of cultural reinvigoration like the Chinese and the Malayu Muslim

families. Both trends link with the increasing connectivity to the larger world.

A certain trait of ethnic identity has changed the meaning, i.e., the language. Over the

past 10–15 years, the greater command of language has gone beyond the meaning of a

mother tongue; it is part of being cosmopolitan. In Betong, there are Chinese-speaking

Malay and Malay now learning Chinese. Chinese language has become popular, while the

local Malay language in the region still has the connotation of a local mother tongue. The

comparative popularity of Chinese and local Malay can be explained by market-driven

factors rather than ethno-nationalism. The future recognition of the local Malay language

may depend on the promotion of the Growth Triangle in the sub-region, which will evolve

the good command of Malay into an asset.

In conclusion, the stories of ethnic families in Betong tell us that people have reacted

and responded to different forces in order to maintain or change what is important to the

meaning of their identities. First, the prominent force in the past dominated by the state

nationalism which imposed assimilation on the minorities. Living in the community at the

periphery, the ethnic Chinese have by-passed the command and kept on cultural activities

quietly. Second, today, the market force plays an important role in changing the rationale of

identity references particularly the language and local community identity. What

comes with globalization, in this case the increasing connectivity with the world, are

threats and opportunities. The study has revealed the fear of the older generation of

neglecting traditions and aspiration of the younger one to make own choices. The anxiety

from external intervention particularly on religious radicalization and the search for

international connection on cultural roots are two different trends under the same

atmosphere of globalization. Third, the force from within the community, i.e., local

government and social networks are a decisive factor as agents of development especially

at the periphery. Although Betong has been presented as a peaceful multi-cultural

community and a tradition of coexistence, a sign of social distances among ethnic and

religious groups is increasing. At this point, it is important to note that while the community

become closer connected with the world, social cohesion within the community can be

affected. What seems relevant is the capacity to manage the contrasting trends coming with

the increasing connectivity. The municipality of Betong has demonstrated as instrumental

to the accommodation of different forces of globalization as well as among different ethnic

identities. The local community finds its stance amidst the disjuncture of different

globalizing forces by its own ability to enhance social capital within itself.

Local self-government and politics of accommodation

The border community of Betong has not been under state patrol as normally assumed.

After the post Cold War era and the settlement of communist insurgents, the community

enjoys relative autonomy to manage its own cultural diversity creatively. Thai nationalism

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is embedded in the culture of public sector bureaucracy and not from a direct policy

imposed on the Betong community. Betong has enjoyed relative freedom of policy

initiatives. It is quite remarkable, in a highly centralized government system, for a local

municipality to sign a memorandum with organizations in another country, like China.

This is a relatively new experience for the Thai local government. What the Betong local

government has advanced, that reflects upon their relative autonomy, is the management

of ethnic differences and the opening up to internationalization of education.

The people of Betong have invented a tradition of political coalition with ethnic

composition in the local administration for the past 15 years. Since 1972, Betong’s

mayors, between 1972 to the present, have stressed the significance of having a mixed

ethnicity in the municipality’s administrative team. As a result, it has become a tradition of

certain ethnic Chinese families, Malayu Muslims and Thais to represent their ethnic

identity in municipal politics. The dominant Chinese political groups might have realized

how indispensable the Malayu Muslim majority is. In a similar vein, the Malayu Muslims,

so far, appreciate the arrangement to have a seat as deputy to the Mayor. This serves for

ethnic political groups as reciprocal relationship. Compared to most communities in the

southern border provinces, except for Yala municipality, Betong has turned policy rhetoric

of cultural diversity into practice. This can only be done if the local government feels more

accountable to the people than the higher authority.12 The politics of accommodation that

the people experimented with has become a political necessity for Betong, passing on the

tradition from the previous to the present generation.

The law allows local government in Thailand to exercise their authority on local

issues. However, more often than not, the legacy of high levels of centralization has

created a psychological stumbling block for the hierarchical relationships between

the provincial and the local governments; a local government does not negotiate with the

higher authority. For instance, urban zoning to restrict entertainment enterprises within a

“red light” area surprisingly has not been done in other Muslim-dominated communities in

the three border provinces. Although this might still need continuous monitoring, the

attempt has prompted the debate into the policy community. Liangpansakul (pers. comm.,

October 4, 2009), a member of a Chinese family, made his analysis,

Betong relies on sex tourism from the early period of urban development. If there were noentertainment enterprises, Betong would have not survived. It might be difficult to change theimage of Betong as a sex tour destination after it has become a trademark already. But, it isimportant for Betong not to be known for sex tourism. There has been an effort to makeBetong an education hub based on its diverse culture. It is also imperative to boost up localculture with a project to trace back the historical roots of Betong people.

Because of Betong’s geographical seclusion, there have been arrangements for Betong to

have special authority in certain functions, such as for transportation and postal offices. For

instance, car registration can be issued in Betongwithout going to the Yala provincial office.

So, the registration plate of a car bought in Betongwill have the Betong name on it instead of

that of Yala province as generally done. This is not a big thing in self-administration, but it

has a tremendous psychological effect on Betong’s identity. People constantly state how

proud they are with the Betong name on their car registration plate.

Solving simple administrative problems with the central government has turned out to

be an important step toward the realization of a greater degree of local self-government.

In the Betong Annual Report, the municipality has a plan to become a “special city” where

greater authority is granted. It says, “In the future when Betong is granted a special city

status, it will yield greater benefit to the local people . . .There will be more staff to serve,

less administrative hierarchy, . . .more budget, . . . generate their own income, and more

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financial support” (2009, 33). The report describes, further, what the new government with

higher authority will look like, for instance with a new advisory board, council of local

government officials, local municipality assembly spreading into five subdivisions, more

local political positions, and so on (2009, 32.).

Of course, the Betong community in the age of globalization is not without a problem.

The study only sheds light on cultural politics of which the community has shown some

initiatives. The challenge is how to maintain co-existence while social distance among

ethnic differences is widening with the effect of cultural and identity reinvigoration

and the policy on social quality like education that separate the Muslims from the rest.

The strategy of building Betong’s common identity is quite positive, using social capital of

the community for economic gain, and should satisfy the livelihood of different groups.

However, Betong’s common image carried on from the recent past as the hub of sex

tourism does undermine the Muslims’ way of life in the area. The municipality is in fact

caught in a development paradox of contrasting image between cultural heritage with

international education hub and sex tourism; and it might lead to a more difficult task of

common identity conflict to be resolved in the near future.

What has happened in Betong somehow leads to an understanding that when it comes

to culture and identity, globalization leaves it to different imaginations. While Betong

attempts to be more imaginative, it also calls for more authority. Betong’s initiatives are

certainly different from many other communities in the southern region, which to a large

extent is attributed to their ability to exercise authority with the leadership of political

accommodation among different ethnic groups.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Chalit Tavornukitkul for his assistance in the fieldwork; the Municipality ofBetong and the administration team for information and hospitality; Ngamsuk Ratanasatian and allkey informants for sharing their perspectives; Supapohn Kanveerayothin and Marine K. Miller forEnglish translation and correction, respectively; reviewers of the research project and for this article;Eduardo Tadem, Vira Somboon andWillemWolters for their constructive reviews and comments onearly drafts; two anonymous reviewers; and Maria Ela L. Atienza for her advice on the preparation ofthe manuscript. The author assumes full responsibility for the final paper.

FundingThis is one of the case studies in the project “Examining the Impact of and Responses toGlobalization of Selected Local Communities in the Philippines and Thailand,” funded by theSoutheast Asian Studies Research and Exchange Programme (SEASREP) Foundation

Notes

1. The most recent work can be found, for example, จนตนาการ ความเปนไทย [Imagining Thainess]edited by Krtitaya Achavanichkul (2008) published by the Institute for Population and SocialStudies and the Center for the Promotion of Peace, Mahidol University.

2. Ericsson was the first telecommunication company in Thailand in the mid 1980s, but themarket was still limited. It did not take long for the market to grow afterward. http://www.scottmurray.com/ericsson.htm accessed February 27, 2014.

3. Malayu is the term used in Betong and the three border provinces. Some local Muslims mightalso use Nayu.

4. Interviewees were supposed to be from the same nuclear family. However, tracing all membersof three generations from 10 households at the same time was not always possible. In that case,any member of the same extended family was sought to replace the missing respondent of thatgeneration.

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5. This study cannot claim that it is a full ethnographic study; the qualitative methods usedare in-depth interview, focus group discussion, and observations. Data was collected fromOctober 2008 to April 2009 with several visits.

6. The situation of diasporas in Betong is not the same as in Ranong and Mae Sod located on theborder with Myanmar, where more than several hundred thousands of Burmese workers havedominated the town. Diasporas are best studied in these places rather than in Betong.In addition, my initial survey of Betong did not convince me of a high level of interactionbetween diasporas and the local ethnicity issues.

7. The three groups are called, in the Thai language, Thai Put (Buddhist Thai), Kon Jean (Chinesedescendants/origin) and Thai Muslim (Malayu Muslim). Malayu and Muslim in the southernborder provinces is used interchangeably or combined.

8. Thailand’s headquarter of theMarkasCenter is inNongjok, Bangkok. The center, while educatingthe community about Islam, does not identify good and bad, leaving it to an individual’s judgment.Their approach is, therefore, compatible with local Muslim communities so they have notpresented a major problem with their interventions. The center is strictly non-political andoperateswith donations frommembers and networks (Piyanonpong, pers. comm.,April 22, 2009).

9. Studies on Muslim identity in the three border provinces can be found, for instance, inการปฏสมพนธระหวางศาสนกทปรากฏในจงหวดปตตาน ยะลา และนราธวาส [Interaction among religiousbelievers in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwas ] by Salae (2001, 13); สงคมและวฒนธรรมมลาย [Malaysociety and culture] by Prachuabmoh (2007, 56–83) in มลายศกษา ความรพนฐานเกยวกบมลายมสลมในภาคใต [Malayu Study: Background of Malayu Muslim in southern Thailand] edited byNithi Eaosiwong; and “National Identity, the ‘Sam-Sams’ of Satun, and the Thai MalayMuslims” by Suwannathat-Pian (2008, 155–72) in Thai South and Malay North: EthnicInteractions on a Plural Peninsular edited by Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory.

10. Asuroh is a kind of pudding; literally in Arabic, it means to mix or to put together. It is carriedout annually in November or on the 10th of the month of Muharram, the first month of Hijra erain Islam. The ceremony calls for the participation and cooperation of Muslim communities(Trinnara 2007).

11. Private religious schools were provided by Private School Act 1989 because the normalschools (formal education) have not provided enough Islamic education. Since then, more andmore Muslim parents send their children to these private religious schools instead of normalschool. There was an understanding that the new generation of Islamic teachers advocated aseparate school for Muslims, while the older generation did not (Nualla-ong, pers. comm.,October 1, 2008).

12. The author’s other study on multi-ethnic democracy and local government models for thesouthern border provinces found that there have been prejudices within the bureaucracy againstMalayu Muslim as not being trustworthy. Policy to advocate cultural diversity often becomesrhetorical, unless the local government is relatively independent and able to break through theprejudice.

Notes on contributor

Chantana Banpasirichote Wungaeo is associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science,Chulalongkorn University. Thailand. She teaches politics of development, peace and conflictresolutions. Recent research interests cover current political crises, nonviolent conflicts, state-civilsociety relations in Thailand and developing countries.

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Interviews and Personal Communications

Baso, Lahamae. 2008. Interview by author, October 3, Betong, Yala.Bua-niam, Pimpis. 2008. Interview by author, October 5. Betong, Yala.Buena, Wanghama. 2009. Interview by author, July 12. Betong, Yala.Buena, Wanghama. 2009. Interview by author, April 21. Betong, Yala.

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Chantramongkhol, Nuchanart. 2008. Interview by author, September 30. Betong, Yala.Jehleh, Kalayani. 2008. Interview by author, October 3. Betong, Yala.Jehleh, Wahamah. 2008. Interview by author, October 3. Betong, Yala.Kari, Azan. 2009. Interview by author, April 20. Betong, Yala.Kongka, Lawan. 2008. Interview by author, October 6. Betong, Yala.Khotae, Khodiyoh. 2008. Interview by author, October 2, 2008. Betong, Yala.Khotae, Thani. 2008. Interview by author, October 2. Betong, Yala.Liangpansakul, Klaahaan. 2008. Interview by author, October 4. Betong, Yala.Maseh, Minoh. 2008. Interview by author, October 2. Betong, Yala.Nualla-ong, Sawang. 2008. Interview by author, October 1. Betong, Yala.Piyanonpong, Suden. 2009. Interview by author, April 22. Betong, Yala.Ratanasathien, Ngamsuk. 2009. Interview by author, July 10. Betong, Yala.Saratsamitra, Pornpimol. 2008. Interview by author, October 4. Betong, Yala.Serang, Abdullah. 2008. Interview by author, October 2. Betong, Yala.Serang, Abdullah. 2008. Interview by author, April 21. Betong, Yala.Serang, Abdullah. 2009. Interview by author, July 29. Betong, Yala.Sirithanawat, Kaj. 2009. Interview by author, April 23. Betong, Yala.Tebjit, Manlika. 2008. Interview by author, October 1. Betong, Yala.TN [pseudo]. 2008. Interview by author, October 2. Betong, Yala.Trirattanaprakong, Lersak. 2008. Interview by author, October 4. Betong, Yala.Wattanachaopisut, Chaolert. 2009. Interview by author, April 20. Betong, Yala.WH [pseudo]. 2009. Interview by author, April 21. Betong, Yala.

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