FromtheJawsofVictory

ThepublishergratefullyacknowledgesthegeneroussupportoftheHumanitiesEndowmentFundoftheUniversityofCaliforniaPressFoundation.

FromtheJawsofVictory

THETRIUMPHANDTRAGEDYOFCESARCHAVEZANDTHEFARMWORKERMOVEMENT

MattGarcia

UNIVERSITYOFCALIFORNIAPRESSBERKELEYLOSANGELESLONDON

UniversityofCaliforniaPress,oneofthemostdistinguisheduniversitypressesintheUnitedStates,enricheslivesaroundtheworldbyadvancingscholarshipinthehumanities,socialsciences,andnaturalsciences.ItsactivitiesaresupportedbytheUCPressFoundationandbyphilanthropiccontributionsfromindividualsandinstitutions.Formoreinformation,visitwww.ucpress.edu.

UniversityofCaliforniaPressBerkeleyandLosAngeles,California

UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Ltd.London,England

©2012byTheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData

Garcia,Matt.Fromthejawsofvictory:thetriumphandtragedyofCesarChavezandthefarmworkermovement/MattGarcia.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.

ISBN978-0-520-25930-0(hbk.:alk.paper)1.Chavez,Cesar,1927–1993.2.UnitedFarmWorkers—History.3.Laborleaders—UnitedStates—Biography.4.Migrantagriculturallaborers—Laborunions—UnitedStates—History.I.Title.

HD6509.C48G372012331.88'13092—dc23

2012011880

ManufacturedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica

21201918171615141312

10987654321

Inkeepingwithacommitmenttosupportenvironmentallyresponsibleandsustainableprintingpractices,UCPresshasprintedthisbookonRollandEnviro100,a100%post-consumerfiberpaperthatisFSCcertified,deinked,processedchlorine-free,andmanufacturedwithrenewablebiogasenergy.Itisacid-freeandEcoLogocertified.

InMemoriamTamNgocTranandPeggyPascoe

ForTimotea

CONTENTS

ListofIllustrationsAcknowledgmentsAbbreviations

Introduction

1•BirthofaMovement

2•CapitalisminReverse

3•WorkersoftheWorld,Unite!

4•StuckintheMiddle

5•ABitterHarvest

6•BusyDying

7•RottingfromtheInsideOut

8•SomeWereMoreEqualThanOthers

Epilogue:BeyondtheLegend

NotesSelectedBibliography

Index

ILLUSTRATIONS

MAP

1.CaliforniagrowingareasandlocationsofUFWactivity

FIGURES

1.Achildinanundisclosedfarmlaborcamp,dateunknown

2.MembersoftheCommunityServiceOrganization,ca.1950s

3.GilbertPadilla,1966

4.AFL-CIOandAWOCmembersmarchinsupportoffarmworkersduringtheDelanostrike,1965

5.CesarChavezatanunidentifiedeventwithReverendJimDrake,ca.1970s

6.CesarChavezandMarshallGanzatUnitedFarmWorkersrally,1971

7.JerryBrownonagrapestrikepicketline,Delano,California,ca.1968

8.SupportersofthegrapeboycottdemonstrateinToronto,1968

9.ElaineElinsondistributesflyersontheLondondocks,ca.1969

10.DoloresHuertaandLarryItliong,ca.1970s

11.JerryCohentestifiesbeforetheU.S.SenateSubcommitteeonLabor,dateunknown

12.CesarChavezataUnitedFarmWorkersrally,1971

13.GovernorJerryBrownvisitswithCesarChavezandmembersoftheUnitedFarmWorkersatLaPaz,Keene,California,1976

14.The“Noon14”poster,featuringHarryKubo,1976

15.MembersoftheNationalExecutiveBoard,June10,1976

16.CesarandHelenChavezwiththeirsixchildren,1969

17.PhilipVeraCruz,vicepresidentoftheUnitedFarmWorkers,ataboycottmeeting,ca.1970s

18.ChrisHartmireandCesarChavezpreparetotapeanadvertisementinfavorofProposition14,1976

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Towrite abook, an authormust drawon the support of his friends, family, and colleagues.Fortunately, I have plenty of all three. First, I thank all the veterans of the farm workermovementthatmadetimetobeinterviewed.Withoutthem,Iwouldnothavetriedtowritethisbook.SpecialthanksgototheincrediblestaffattheWalterP.ReutherArchiveofLaborandUrban Affairs at Wayne State University, especially former director Mike Smith, actingdirector Kathy Schmeling, research archivist William LeFevre, and audiovisual archivistsElizabethClemensandMaryWallace.Inspiteofbudgetcutsandvariousotherchallenges,theyhavemaintainedtheUFWCollectionsanddistinguishedtheirsasthebestlaborarchiveinthecountry.PaulHenggeler,aprofessorofhistoryattheUniversityofTexas,Pan-American,whopassed away before completing his biography of Cesar Chavez, unearthed important audiorecordingsatWayneStateandlaidthefoundationsforanonlinearchivethathashelpedmanyscholars.MiriamPawelshareddocumentsandideaswhilepursuingparallel interests.Ialsowish to thankBillSeacrestat theFresnoCountyPublicLibrary,PollyArmstrongatSpecialCollectionsintheStanfordUniversityLibrary,GabriellaGrayandthestaffinUCLA’sSpecialCollections,NeenaSachdevaat theNationalArchives, andPeterBlodgett at theHuntingtonLibrary. Thank you also to the staff at Fresno State University’s Madden Library, SpecialCollections;theBeineckeLibrary,YaleUniversity;AmherstCollege;theMandevilleSpecialCollections, University of California, San Diego; and the U.S. Department of AgricultureLibraryinCollegePark,Maryland.TheindependentwriterandantiwaractivistDavidHarrisdonatedhispersonalarchiveontheUnitedFarmWorkers.MichaelSeslingandPatrickEmondmobilizedtheteamatAudioTranscriptionCentertoaccuratelyandefficientlytranscribeallofmyoralhistories.MyoldfriendKarlJacobyplayedacrucialroleinhelpingmehoneideas,editdownalong

first and second draft, and maneuver through the uncharted waters of publishing a secondmonograph.MynewerfriendDonCritchlowplayedanequally important role inhelpingmemakedifficultcutstothefinaldraft.MadeleineAdamsbroughthereditorialexpertisetobearon the final draft, for which I am grateful. KayMansfield, the manager of the Program inAgrarianStudiesatYaleUniversity,alsohelpedwhittledownthefirstdraft.Iwasfortunatetobe a fellow in the nineteenth cohort of agrarian studies in 2009–10withPoncianodelPinoHuaman,YukaSuzuki,andAnnuJalais,allofwhomgavemecriticalfeedback.Thedirectorsof the program, K. Sivaramakrishnan (“Shivi”) and Jim Scott, have created an intellectualtreasure,andIamgratefulfortheirgenerosityandguidance.Ialsobenefitedfromafellowshipat the Cogut Center for the Humanities and a Solomon Grant at Brown University, and aresearchfellowshipattheHuntingtonLibrary.SeveralBrownUniversitystudentscontributedtomy research, including two formergraduate students andnowassistantprofessors,MarioSifuentez andMireya Loza; Alma Carrillo, a public humanitiesmaster’s graduate; and twosummer undergraduate research groups that included Monica Martínez, Sophie Harris,Armando Garcia, Aracely Pérez, Stella Klemperer, and Liliana Ornelas (2005) and JackieMartínez,AdrianaSandoval,RochelleGarza,AnnetteShreibati,GriselMurillo,andVeronica

Cortez (2006).My researchassistant andgraduateadviseeatArizonaStateUniversity,CaliPitchel McCullough, helped track down incomplete endnotes. Thank you too to my newcolleagues at Arizona StateUniversitywho saw the relevance ofmywork to their goal ofbuildingamoreinclusiveAmericanuniversity.IappreciateNelsonLichtensteinandRalphArmbuster-SandovalatUCSantaBarbara,Dave

GutiérrezandLuisAlvarezatUCSanDiego,AlessandroMonsuttiattheGraduateInstituteinGeneva, Switzerland, Bruce Schulman at Boston University, and Daniel HoSang at theUniversity of Oregon, who hosted me at their campuses while I was still formulating myarguments. I also received helpful feedback from attendees at a colloquium for immigrationstudies at theMassachusettsHistoricalSociety.VickiRuiz has taughtme everything I knowabout thisprofessionandcontinues tobeasourceof inspirationandstrength.Thefollowingfriends, family,andcolleaguescontributedsomethingpositive to thisproject:PeggyPascoe,TamTran,SusanFerber,LollyTran,MarkPadoognpatt,MarilynHalter,ElpidioRocha,JoséAlamillo,AnneMartínez,MikeWillard,MattDelmont,KariannAkemiYokota,BillDeverell,Robert “Roy” Ritchie, Ed Escobar, Gayle Gullett, Carlos Vélez-Ibañez, Elizabeth Cantú,Victor Becerra, Eileen Boris, Dana Frank, Todd Holmes, Melanie DuPuis, Laura Pulido,HowardWinant,StephanieBirdsall,GioviannaRoz,SteveVelasquez,MagdalenaMieri,PeterLiebhold,KristineNavarro-McElhaney,ElizabethFrancis,SarahHellerSteinberg,MarvandLinda Karsten, Mellissa Martínez, my beloved children, Mauricio and Timotea, and myparents,David and JanetGarcia.Twoanonymous readers, latermadeknown tome—CindyHahamovitch and David Montejano—made insightful contributions and helped make myarguments much sharper. A final anonymous reader serving on the University of CaliforniaPress editorial boardmade helpful, last-minute suggestions. I am eternally grateful to them.NeilsHooperattheUniversityofCaliforniaPresssawthepotentialofthisbookearlyon,andencouragedmetobemoreambitiousintheend.Finally,IoffermyloveandappreciationtoDesiréeGarcia,whohelpedmethroughthemost

difficultmomentsofthisprojectandthemostchallengingyearsofmylife.Iamgratefulforherinsightsandaffection,andIlookforwardtohelpingherachievehergoalsasshehashelpedmeachievemine.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFL-CIO AmericanFederationofLaborandCongressofIndustrialOrganizations

ALRA AgriculturalLaborRelationsAct

ALRB AgriculturalLaborRelationsBoard

AWFWA AgriculturalWorkersFreedomtoWorkAssociation

AWOC AgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommittee

CRLA CaliforniaRuralLegalAssistance

CSO CommunityServiceOrganization

IFPAAW InternationalFederationofPlantation,Agricultural,andAlliedWorkers

ILWU InternationalLongshoremenWorkersUnion

ITWF InternationalTransportWorkersFederation

MLK MartinLutherKing,Jr.

NAWU NationalAgriculturalWorkersUnion

NEB NationalExecutiveBoardoftheUnitedFarmWorkers

NEP NewEconomicPolicy,RichardM.Nixonadministration

NFLU NationalFarmLaborUnion

NFWA NationalFarmWorkersAssociation

NLRA NationalLaborRelationsAct

NLRB NationalLaborRelationsBoard

SCFC SouthCentralFarmersCommittee

SDS StudentsforaDemocraticSociety

SNCC StudentNonviolentCoordinatingCommittee

TGWU TransportandGeneralWorkersUnion,GreatBritain

TUC TradeUnionCongress,GreatBritain

UAW UnitedAutoWorkersunion

UFW UnitedFarmWorkersunion

UFWOC UnitedFarmWorkersOrganizingCommittee

USDA U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture

Introduction

[Theroleofthe]organizer[isto]workwiththepeoplewheretheyare,notwhereyouare,orwhereyouthinktheyoughttobe.

FREDROSS“BookOutline(BellTownandCasaBlanca),”fromhisunpublishedautobiography,Fred

RossPapers,StanfordUniversityLibrary

Anorganizerisanoutsiderinmanycases—there’snothingwronginthat.Butthenheassumesasortofspecialpositioninthatprogram.Ifyouorganizeagoodgroup,prettysoonyoufindyourselfhoping,“IwishIhadavoteinthisoutfit.”

CESARCHAVEZ“WhatIsanOrganizer?,”inCesarChavez,AnOrganizer’sTale

Iaimedatthepublic’sheart,andbyaccidentIhititinthestomach.

UPTONSINCLAIRTheJungle

BEFOREPUBLISHINGHISPROVOCATIVENOVEL,TheJungle,onthemeatpackingindustryin1906,UptonSinclairembeddedhimselfintheChicagostockyardsasaworkerandaninvestigativereporter.Dedicatedtotheplightofimmigrantworkers,hesoughttoproducesympathyfortheless fortunateproducersofmeatproducts fromthosewhoconsumed thefruitsof their labor.Like somany issues involving food,hiswas a culturalproblemasmuchas apoliticalone.Howdoyoucommunicatetheexperienceofworking-class,Lithuanianimmigrantlaborersinaway thatmovesmiddle-class,English-speakingconsumers tocare?More important,howdoyou get those consumers to pursue reforms that serve the interest of people other thanthemselves?Tohischagrin,Sinclairsucceededinmeetingonlythefirstchallenge.TheJungleprompted

progressive-era activismand reform—theMeat InspectionAct and thePureFood andDrugAct of 1906—motivated primarily by the public’s horror overwhatwent into the food andconsequently into their bodies. The question of workers’ rights, as Sinclair and othersdiscovered,requiredfurtheractivismupthroughthe1930s.DuringtheDepression,Congresspassed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, but an executive order laterexcluded agricultural workers from the collective bargaining rights that went to industriallaborers.Thetaskofextendingtheserightstofarmworkerswouldfalltoanewgenerationofactivists,mostfamouslyCesarChavezandthemanypeopleresponsibleforbuildingtheUnitedFarmWorkersUnioninthe1960sandearly1970s.CesarChavezcreated themost successful farmworkermovement inUnitedStateshistory.

Bornintoafarmworkerfamily,Chavezfoughthiswayoutfromunderthetyrannyofthefields

to become a community organizer whosemission it was to convince poor people that theycould achieve justice through collective action. Like Sinclair before him,Chavez entered aworldnot completelyhisown.Chavez toohad to findavehicle for explaining theneed forjusticetothepublicinaconvincingmannerthatwouldmovethemtoaction.Althoughheusedmanystrategiestoachievethisgoal—longmarches,fasts,andtheage-oldtoolofthestrike—itwas the boycott that had the greatest impact in reaching across the divide between farmworkersandconsumers.Thisbookexaminesthestrategyandleadershipthatsustainedthefarmworkermovementfor

nearly twodecades, from thebeginningof the1960suntil the endof the1970s.During thatperiod, the United States experienced unprecedented economic change. The country movedfrom being the dominant producer of goods on theworldmarket to a country that importedmorethanitexported.Ratherthanrelinquishtheirattachmenttomilitaryspendingorstakealloftheirhopesonastrugglingautomobileindustry,U.S.lawmakersworkedtoexpandthereachandprofitabilityofU.S.growersbyreducingrestrictionsagainstthetradeofU.S.agriculturalproducts.This shift in economic priorities brought newprestige toCalifornia agriculture; italsorenewedthepublic’sattentiontoruralpoverty.Chavezofferedhissolutiontotheproblembyworking toward an end to the exploitative guestworker program (known as the braceroprogram)andcreatinga union.By using community organizing efforts begun in thewake ofWorldWarII,heandhisearlyalliesforgedabroad,newcoalitionofworkers,students,socialjusticeactivists,andreligiousaffiliates.Throughoutthe1960sandthefirsthalfofthe1970s,theUnitedFarmWorkerswonmostoftheirbattlesbyleveragingthisdiversity.Farmowners,on the other hand, remained committed to ethnic cliques and business models that made itdifficultforthemtocommunicateacommonmessage.Chavezachievedhisearlysuccessthroughacombinationofpoliticalsavvyandattentiveness

toworkers’concerns.AsaformerdirectoroftheCommunityServiceOrganization(CSO),agroup of working-class citizens committed to electoral empowerment, he understood thecapacityoforganizedcitizenstoaccomplishtangiblegoals.Althoughhebecamefrustratedbythe nonpartisan and urban orientation of the CSO, the organization served as an importanttraininggroundthatprovidedopportunitiestocultivatesupportforanewfarmworkersunion.This outreach, as his mentor Fred Ross had taught him, required a tremendous amount ofpatienceandlistening.Ratherthanpushasolutionuponcommunitiesinneed,Rossencouragedmemberstomeet,argue,andeventuallycometocollectivedecisions.Strategicallydeployed,such democratic methods gave participants a sense of ownership over the goals of themovementandinspireddeeperinvestmentsamongitsadherents.Chavezurgedorganizerstobecreativeintheirtactics,whichenabledmanyvolunteerstodiscovernewmethodsforachievingtheirgoals.Thenimbleness and independence thatChavezencouragedamonghisorganizersledtoaunionwithdeeperrootsandmoreeffectivestrategiesthananyofitspredecessorshadachieved.The challenge of building an effective organization also requires decisive leadership.

Chavezexhibitedthisattributeearlyon,offeringaclearpathforthosewhojoinedthecause.ThisbeganinhisyearsasanorganizerfortheCSO,whenhedeterminedthattheorganizationlacked the capacity and appropriate membership to address the particular needs of farm

workers.HisdeparturefromtheCSOin1962tostarttheNationalFarmWorkersAssociation(NFWA)was justonemomentamongmanyover twodecades inwhichChavezassertedhisleadership in away that propelled the dreamof building a farmworkers union forward. Inmakingthesedecisions,Chaveznotonlyassumedgreatriskforhimselfandhisfamilybutalsojeopardizedthesecurityofhisallies.WhentheNFWAevolvedintotheUnitedFarmWorkersunion in 1966,1 his decisions—and the decisions of a small national executive board—threatenedtocompromisethejobsofthousandsofworkersandvolunteerswhosacrificedtheirtimeandtheirbodiesinthepursuitofChavez’svisionofjustice.Thisawesomeresponsibilityweighedheavilyonhim,buthispropensity—in thebeginning—to seekcounsel from trustedadvisorshelpeddistributethisburden.This book shows that the task of striking a balance between cultivating creativity among

organizers and providing strong, timely leadership ultimatelywas a challenge too great forChaveztosustain.AfterachievingthefirstcollectivebargainingagreementsforfarmworkersinCalifornia in1970,Chavezmadea seriesofmissteps that compromised thehealthof theunion.Initially,hisencouragementofdebateamongorganizersproducedinventivesolutionstonewproblemsthatarosethroughoutthefirsthalfofthe1970s.Yetthefailuretochannelthisadhoc democracy into a permanent structure of governance eventually led to personal andsystematic failure. As some of his closest advisors and friends testify, Chavez becameincreasingly invested inhispower todictate the strategiesandprioritiesof theunionas thedecadeworeon.Hisisolationinacommunallivingarrangementattheunion’sheadquarters,LaPaz,augmentedhisinfatuationwithcontrolovertheorganizationandtheindividualswhocomposedit.AccordingtoadvisorsandstaffmemberswhoworkedalongsideChavezduringthis period, the living arrangements separated him from farmworkers andunion staff in thefieldatatimewhenheneededtoincorporatemoreperspectivesintosolvinganincreasinglycomplexsituation.2Chavez’sphysicalandemotionaldistancecontributedtoanalarminglackofaccountabilitytounionmembersandallowedhimtoabandontheprinciplesofdemocracypreached by his mentor and friend, Fred Ross. Ironically, Chavez abused power andmanipulatedthepowerlessliketheemployersandthestatehehadbecomesocriticalof.Sadly,bytheendofthe1970s,hehadalienatedmostofhisearlyalliesandcompromisedmostofthegainsmadeduringthelate1960sandearly1970s.Unlike the overwhelming majority of authors who have written about the United Farm

Workers,Iexplainhowandwhytheunionachievedmostofitsgoalsthrough1970,andhowandwhyitfailedtoliveuptoitstremendouspotentialafterthat.Mosthistorianswritingabouttheunionhavecelebrateditstriumphsonlyand,intheprocess,canonizedChavezasaleaderwhocoulddonowrong.MarioT.García,forexample,recentlydeclaredChavez“oneofthegreatfiguresinthehistoryoftheUnitedStates”for“accomplish[ing]whatnootherU.S.laborleaderhadbeenabletodo:successfullyorganizefarmworkers.”3WhileChavezaccomplishedmuch,Ibelievehislegacyisfarmorecomplicated.Tobeginwith,hissuccessisdebatableifweconsiderthatbytheendofthedecadetheunionlostmostofthecontractsithadgainedin1970.SomeauthorshavedepictedChavezandtheUFWashelplessvictimsoftheTeamstersunion or hostile Republican administrations inWashington and Sacramento to explain theseshortcomings. Although these wealthier and more powerful foes created barriers to UFW

growth,theirinfluencealonecannotexplaintheunion’srapiddeclineduringthelate1970s.What is missing is a consideration of how Chavez employed strategies and management

techniquesthatcompromisedtheunion.Suchself-inflictedwoundswereparticularlydamagingin the late 1970s, when Chavez benefited from the support of a sympathetic Californiagovernor,Edmund“Jerry”Brown,andenjoyedthefruitsof theAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct,astatelawthatgaveCaliforniafarmworkerscollectivebargainingrightsstartingin1975.From themid-1970s through the endof thedecade,Chavez squanderedpolitical advantagesandtheespritdecorpsheandotherleadershadcultivated.Ininterviewswithorganizersandvolunteers, I found that many veterans of the movement hold Chavez accountable for thesefailures.MyoralhistoriesarecorroboratedbyfindingsfromtheFarmWorkerDocumentationProject, including a valuable archive of listserv discussions in 2004–5 among people wholived through these tumultuous years. I also consulted previously uncatalogued archivalmaterial in theUnitedFarmWorkersCollectionsat theWalterReutherLibraryofLaborandUrbanAffairs atWayne StateUniversity that include rarely heard recordings of the union’snational executive board meetings during the mid- and late 1970s. Taken together, thesesources reveal that Chavez had much more to do with the union’s decline than previouslyacknowledged.Chavez’smishandlingof theboycott andhis failure to replace itwithanequallyeffective

strategywasamonghismostimportantstrategicblunders.From1965untilJanuary31,1978,union volunteers extended the reach and power of theUFW through a successful boycott ofgrapes and, to a lesser extent, lettuce and wine. Described by Chavez as “capitalism inreverse,” the boycott emerged as the sine qua non of themovement, expanding the strugglebeyondthefieldsinruralCaliforniatourbanstorefrontsacrosstheUnitedStatesandCanadaanddocksandunionhallsalloverEurope.SuchconsumeractivismfallswithinanAmericanpolitical tradition dating as far back as the Boston Tea Party, although, as most consumerhistorians note, the vastmajority of boycotts have been “putative failures.”4 In some cases,U.S.companies,inafitofeconomicnationalism,encouragedtheboycottofforeignproductsthat served corporate rather thanworker interests.5 TheUnited FarmWorkers, on the otherhand, maintained firm control of their grape boycott campaign, driving growers to thebargainingtablein1970andkeepingtheiradversariesincheckthroughoutthefirsthalfofthedecade.Indoingso, theybuckedthe trendofunionsbefore themwhohadmostly treatedtheboycottasasupplementtostrikesandpicketlinesattheworkplace.6

TheUnitedFarmWorkersdistinguishedtheiruseoftheboycottinthreeprimaryways.First,Chavezexpandedtheuseoftheboycottbyappealingtoconsumerstoparticipateinthepursuitof social justice.7 Prior to the farmworkermovement,most unions had used the boycott tocreateclasssolidaritybyaskingfellowlaborersnottopurchaseaparticularproductlinkedtothe unfair treatment of workers.8 Chavez, however, transformed his campaign into a socialmovement akin to that of the abolitionists who appealed to northern consumers not to buysouthern-madetextilesasaprotestagainstslavery,or thatof theMontgomerybusboycotterswho asked blacks and white allies not to use public transportation until the segregation ofbusesended.TheUFW’sinsistenceonpresentingthecampaigninasocialjusticeframeworkirritated national union sponsors, although Chavez and other UFW leaders understood the

potentialofthecivilrightsmomentanditsinfluenceonthefarmworkers’struggle.Inhopesofcapitalizingonaheightenedcivilrightsconsciousnessinthenation,Chavezusedtheboycotttodraw attention to the injustices of a farm labor system that employed mostlyMexican andFilipino laborers. By matching long marches in rural California with picket lines at urbanmarkets,hedrewaconnectionbetweentheconditionsoffarmlaborersandthebuyinghabitsofurbanconsumers.Tothesurpriseoftraditionalunionleaders,histacticmostlysucceeded.Indoing so, theUnited FarmWorkers articulated the possibilities of uniting protest for socialjustice with labor organizing in a new socialmovement that renewed faith in labor unionsacrossAmerica.9

Second, although initially Chavez and a handful of union leaders started the boycott tooccupyvolunteers’timebetweenharvests,heandunionleaderseventuallycametoregardtheboycottwithatleastasmuchrespectastheydidstrikesandmarches.Here,however,Chavezhad to be convinced. Throughout most of the boycott’s first year, he remained focused onbuilding membership in the fields. Nevertheless, many young, mostly white (and severalJewish)volunteersbelievedinthepoweroftheboycottandcampaignedtomakeitastrongercomponent of la causa. At a timewhen Chavez listened to advice, his acceptance of theiropinionspaidtremendousdividends.From1966to1968,youngcollegestudentsjoinedwithveteran organizers and aggrieved farm workers to build an effective boycott network thatstretched across North America. Key to this networkwere themany boycott houses wherepeoplefromallwalksoflifetookupresidenceandformulatedthebeststrategyforappealingtolocalconsumers.Inthesecities,farfromthefrontlinesoftheruralstruggle,volunteersoftencuttheirteethasorganizers,learninghowtobuildafarmworkerjusticemovementwherenonehadpreviouslyexisted.Manyappliedtacticsborrowedfromavarietyofsources,includingthecounterculturegrouptheYouthInternationalParty,orYippies;fellowcivilrightsorganizationssuch as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Congress of RacialEquality(CORE);andlocalunionswhosupportedtheUFW.Inshort,boycotthousevolunteersadopteda“byanymeansnecessary”approachwithgreatsuccess.Third, theUnitedFarmWorkerspursuedastrategynotavailable tomost laborunions: the

secondaryboycott.In1947theTaft-HartleyLaborActamendedtheNationalLaborRelationsAct torestrict laborunionsfromrunningcampaignsagainstcompanies thatwerenotabusingworkers butwere sellingproducts of companies thatwere. In 1959, theLaborManagementReporting and Disclosure Act strengthened the restriction against this practice, which wasknownasasecondaryboycott.10For farmworkerswhohadbeenexcluded fromtheNLRA,however, the secondary boycott remained a viable tool. The United FarmWorkers availedthemselvesof it thoroughly, settinguppicket lines in frontofmarkets thathadnothing todowiththeproductionofgrapesbuthadbecometargetsbecausetheycarriedtheproduce.Grapesprovedtobeaparticularlygoodproducttoboycottsincemostconsumersregardedthemasanonessential luxury item that they could easily eliminate from their diet.11 Initially, UFWvolunteers persuaded many consumers to forgo shopping at markets that carried nonuniongrapes.WhengrowerswithUFWcontractsbegansharingtheirlabelswithpeersinanactofcorporatesolidarity,theunioncalledaboycottagainstallCaliforniaandArizonagrapes,andconsequently allmarkets that carried the fruit.Rather than sacrifice their entire sales,many

marketownersdroppedgrapesaltogether.The secondary boycott initiated a game of global cat and mouse between the union and

growers that played out over a decade.When the grape boycott began in earnest in 1965,incredulousgrapegrowersdismissedtheactionasaweakpublicitystunt.Theunionproved,however, that it couldaffect the topNorthAmericanmarkets.Growersshifted their sales toothercities,believingthattheycouldoutruntheboycottandoutlastthepoorlyfundedUnitedFarmWorkersinawarofattrition.The union applied an organizer’s logic to the construction of the boycott by aggressively

recruitingvolunteersandconsumersasiftheywerepotentialmembersoftheunionitself.Themore growers expanded into new markets, the wider and stronger the boycott became.Ultimately, theUFWshowed thepowerful growers that grapeswerenot themoveable feastthattheythoughttheywere.12

If the success of the boycott taught the growers the limits of their strategy, it also imbuedChavezwithfalseconfidence.ThestoryoftheUFWafterthehistoricsigningofthefirstgrapecontracts in1970 ismostlyoneof tactical errorscaused inpartbyChavez’s refusal to takecounsel fromhis advisors.Chavez assumed hewas infallible,which led to self-destructivebehavior that short-circuited the movement. Disappointing the many people who dedicatedtheirlivestothefarmworkersstruggle,Chavezultimatelymanagedtosnatchdefeatfromthejaws of victory. Nonetheless, the boycott’s veterans and supporters continued to hold himaccountable to theworkers he purported to serve, even after the boycott network had beendismantled.ThisspiritofresistanceextendedtosomememberswithinChavez’sinnercircle,preventingacompletedissolutionoftheunion.AnexplorationofthesuccessesandfailuresofCesarChavezandtheUnitedFarmWorkers

is valuable now, at a time when a new food justice movement is on the rise. On collegecampuses, a new generation of students have created gardens, demanded new courses, andchallenged their universities to serve “real food” indininghalls.Their ideashave alsohadsignificantinfluencebeyondtheivorytower,compellingconsumerstospurnfastfood,shopatlocalfarmers’markets,andinvestincommunity-supportedagriculture(CSAs).Inmanyways this new consciousness about food and its contents builds upon the longer

American tradition that starts with Sinclair and runs through Chavez and the United FarmWorkers.Mostsimilarare the largenumberofyoungpeopledrawninto themovements thenandnow.Inthe1960sand1970s,manyyoungpeoplededicatedasummer,asemester,orevenyears toworkingfor theUnitedFarmWorkers,participating instrikesor traveling to far-offcities to picket stores carrying nonunion grapes. Such volunteersweremost effective in theboycott, where their cultural affinitywith consumers and their urban upbringingmade themeffective advocates for the movement. At the height of their power, hundreds of boycottvolunteerskilledthegrapemarketinnineofthetenmostimportantNorthAmericancitiesandblocked(or“blacked,”astheycalleditinEngland)grapesfromreachingEuropeanmarkets,contributing to the final push for contracts. In the process, volunteers gained valuableexperiencethatpropelledthemintoalifeofactivismandsocialjustice.Todayadvocatesforfoodjusticehaveasimilarpassionfortheircause.Ifear,however,that

themotivationofmanyparticipantsstemsfromconcernforthemselvesratherthanforthelives

ofworkers.LikeSinclair’saudiencewhoworriedaboutwhatwentintothehotdogsmorethantheconditionsunderwhichlaborersproducedthem,manyoftoday’sactivistsareinclinedtothinkoftheirowndietortheir impactonlivestockanimalsbeforetheythinkoftheworkers.Suchpositionsareaproductofpopularfoodwriterswhooftenprivilegeconsumer-orientedfoodjusticeovertheequallyimportantchallengeofachievingbetterworkingconditionsinthefields.13

The history of theUnited FarmWorkers grape boycott offers a reminder that this has notalwaysbeenthecase.Safeandhumaneworkingconditionsandfairwagesforfarmworkersserved as the primary motivations for boycott volunteers throughout the 1960s and 1970s,compellingsometosacrificetheirownlivesforthecause.Thisisnottosaythatmomentsoftension did not seep into themovement; however, the overwhelmingmajority of thosewhovolunteeredsaw themselvesas servants toan idea thatwentwellbeyondconcerns for theirown health. And although boycott campaigns often involved familiar warnings aboutpesticides, the message focused on workers who endured exposure to potentially harmfulchemicalsinthefields.Atroot,theboycottwasaconsumerstrategyforachievingproducer-orientedgoals.14ThatmostoftheintendedbeneficiariesofthismovementwereMexicanandFilipinoisatestamenttothepoweroftheinterculturalunderstandingthatthrivedintheunionthroughoutthebetterpartoftwodecades.The United Farm Workers, therefore, symbolized the potential of peaceful protest by a

multiracial, intergenerational coalitionofmenandwomenat a timewhen socialmovementshadbegun togrowwearyof such approaches.Students for aDemocraticSociety splinteredinto theWeather Underground, a group that carried out bombing campaigns on unoccupiedgovernment buildings in the early 1970s.15 Similarly, the Student Nonviolent CoordinatingCommittee turned toward a politics of “black power” that privileged black (male) voices,excluded white ones, and questioned the viability of peaceful protest.16 During this sameperiod, the United Farm Workers increasingly became the last, best hope for those stillcommittedtoaworldwithoutviolenceandracialdivision.AsgroupsliketheBlackPanthers,the Brown Berets, and the Young Lords chose a paramilitary character that earned themincreased surveillance from federal and local authorities, the union projected an image ofinclusivityandcooperation thatattractednewrecruitsandwonthesupportof themediaandurbanconsumers.17Although thisapproachmoved thenexusofpowerfarther fromChavez’shandsandintothepublic,italsogavehimmorebargainingpowerthanhiscontemporariesinothermovements.Some readers may wonder why I focus on organizers rather than farmworkers. In some

instances,thedistinctionbetweenthetwoisblurredsincemanyorganizershadexperienceinthe fields, includingChavez himself; however, by themid-1960s,most had left this line ofwork.Theunionreliedheavilyonvolunteerswholivedincitiesandsuburbsrather thantheCaliforniacountryside,afactthatinitiallydidnottroubleChavez.Ashenoted,theorganizerisoftenanoutsidertothepeopleherepresents.AlackofstrikefundsandtheconstantmigrationofagriculturallaborerscreatedwhatChavezcalled“amovementwithoutmembers”thatwaskeptalivebythevolunteerswhohadlittleornoexperienceinthefields.18Itwasnotuntilthemid-1970s that some members of the UFW executive board became concerned about the

authenticityofaunionrunbypeopleotherthanfarmworkers,althoughtheyfailedtoproduceaviablealternative.The experiences of organizers have also been better recorded than those of workers. In

addition tomy oral histories, the FarmWorkerDocumentation Project and theUnited FarmWorker Collections at the Walter Reuther Library provide more insight into the lives oforganizers,reflectingtheoriginsofthesearchives.Asaweb-based,English-languageproject,theFarmWorkerDocumentationProjectattractedcomputer-savvyveteranstouploadmemoirs,documents,andphotosandtoengageindiscussiononline.RegardingthecollectionsatWayneState,mostdocumentsandrecordingsfocusonorganizerswhorantheunionand, toa lesserextent, the farm workers who benefited from their activities. This is not to say that farmworkers’ voices are absent or that worker opinions are not available. Nevertheless, asystematiccollectionoforalhistoriesanddocumentsfromfarmworkersduringtheheydayoftheUFWremainstobedone.19

Theselimitationsnotwithstanding,FromtheJawsofVictoryconveysataleofhope,triumph,anddisappointmentthatwillbeusefultoanyonewhohasharboredthegoalofbringingjusticetothisworld.

ThebookisorganizedintoabalancedfocusontheUnitedFarmWorkersbeforeandafterthehistoricgrapecontractsin1970.Chapter1exploresthemanyactivistswhorevivedaneffortto end rural poverty in California and explains how Cesar Chavez and the United FarmWorkersemergedastheleaderofthisnewmovement.Chapter2examinestheevolutionoftheboycottastheprimarytoolfortheunionandthemanytacticsemployedbyboycottvolunteerstomakeiteffective.Inchapter3,theconditionsthatcontributedtothesigningofthefirstUFWcontracts for grapeworkers, including the efforts of boycott volunteers on both sides of theAtlanticOcean, are explored.Chapter4 considers the changes in theU.S. economy and thepolicies President Richard Nixon employed to expand the “free trade” of California’sagriculturalbounty.ThispolicyincludedencouragingtheTeamsterstoorganizefarmworkersinanattempttodivide(andconquer)thefarmlabormovement.Chapter5examinestheUFW’sdecision to enlist the support of California’s state government in regulating labor relationsthrough the revolutionary Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). Chapter 6 exploresChavez’s failed attempt to shift consumer activism generated by the boycott to support forProposition14,aCalifornia initiative thataimed to resolvefundingand legalambiguities inALRA.Chapter7examinesthefalloutfromthefailureofProposition14,includingChavez’sattempt to rootoutdisloyalstaffwhodared tocriticizehim.Chapter8 explores the strugglebetweenChavezandtheboycottvolunteers,staff,andmembersofthenationalexecutiveboardwhochallengedhisincreasinglyautocraticmanagementoftheunionandresistedhisplanstofocustheunion’senergyonthecreationofanintentionalcommunityatLaPaz.Althoughthesebrave volunteers and organizers failed to bring democracy to the UFW, they succeeded inpreventingChavez from taking theuniondown thepathofnotoriouscultsof that age.Takentogether, these chapters tell a new history of theUnited FarmWorkers, one that honors theservice of volunteers who have been overshadowed by a previous generations’ search forheroesratherthanusableknowledge.

ONE

BirthofaMovement

FARMWORKERADVOCATEShaveoftencontrastedvisionsofruralCaliforniaasthelandofmilkandhoneywith thegritty realityof farmworkers’ lives.This, inpart,was theapproach thatnovelistJohnSteinbeck,photographerDorotheaLange,andotheragrarianpartisansusedinthe1930s toarouse thenation’sappetite for reform.Theirability tounderminegrowers’ idyllicimpressions of the California countryside led to the creation of programs that broughttemporaryrelieftofieldhands.AlthoughtheNewDealultimatelyfellshort,artistsandunionorganizersprovedthattheycouldcounteradvertisementscelebratingthebountyofnatureand,for a time, shift the balance of power in favor ofworkers in the long struggle to end ruralpovertyintheGoldenState.Suchatacticwasattheheartofa1948film,PovertyintheValleyofPlenty.Acoproduction

of theNationalFarmLaborUnionandHollywoodfilmmakers, thefilmdrewattentionto theanti-unionpracticesoftheDiGiorgioFruitCompanylocatedinthelowerSanJoaquinValley.AnItalian immigrant,Giuseppe“Joseph”DiGiorgio,beganmodestly,growingfruiton5,845acresin1919.By1946hehadexpandedproductiononthirty-threesquaremilesworth$18.2million,becomingthelargestgrape,plum,andpeargrowerintheworld.1AccordingtoNFLUorganizers, much of this wealth had been built on the backs of laborers who lived insubstandardhousing.Withthefilmandtheiractivism,theysoughttomaketheDiGiorgioFruitCompanymoreaccountabletoitsemployees.In 1947 union organizers at DiGiorgio petitioned for a 10 cents per hour raise, seniority

rights, and a grievance procedure. The company promptly responded by expelling strikingworkers and replacing themwith several hundredFilipinos, undocumentedworkers, Tejanorecruits, and 130Mexican guest workers, known as braceros. The employment of the lastgroupviolatedtheagreementbetweenMexicoandtheUnitedStatesthatstipulatednoforeignworkers would be used during labor disputes. Members of the Hollywood film unionsregardedDiGiorgio’sreactionassohostilethattheywaivedallwageandpaycontractstogetthefilmmade.2

ThecollaborationbetweentheNFLUandfilmmakersmarkedanewphaseintheevolutionoffarm worker activism. Besides evoking the contrast between growers’ wealth and farmworkers’povertyinthetitle,theyportrayedthestarkdifferencesbetweenthenaturalbeautyofthefieldsandtheramshacklehomesofemployees.Thefirstthirty-sevenoffifty-sevenscenesaccentuatethiscontrast,offeringviewersavisualcontextforthelastportionofthefilm,which

isfocusedontheDiGiorgiostrike.Intermsofactivism,theunionpairedPovertyintheValleyofPlentywith highly public appeals to consumers across the nationnot to buyDiGiorgio’sproducts.Thefirstlarge-scaleconsumerboycottofitskind,thestrategyworked,cuttingdeeplyintothecompany’sprofitsandprovokingangryclashesbetweenloyalemployeesandstrikersonthefarm.3

If theNFLU’s filmandboycott signaledanew levelof sophisticationamong farmworkeractivists,italsodemonstratedtheresolveofDiGiorgiotomaintainthestatusquo.InadditiontohiringaphotographerandfilmmakertoproduceavisualcountertoPovertyintheValleyofPlenty,thecompanyunleashedalegaltorrentontheNFLU,suingthemforlibelandfightingtosuppress any further screenings of the film. Although an independent investigation by CBSNews and Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas revealed the company’s version to befalseandtherepressionofworkerstobereal,DiGiorgiosimplyoverwhelmeditsoppositionwithimagesandlawsuits.Unabletomatchthewealthandpowerofthecompanyinthecourts,theNFLUagreedtodestroyallcopiesofPovertyintheValleyofPlentyandendthestrikeandboycottinexchangeforDiGiorgio’sdroppingchargesagainsttheunionleaders.ThesettlementbroughtanendtotheNFLU,whichceasedtoexistbythesummerof1950.4

DiGiorgioachieveditsintendedgoalofdestroyingtheNFLUandendingthecirculationofthefilm,buttheepisodesignaledacoretruthaboutagriculture:consumeropinionmatters.Theunion’sabilitytoengineeraboycottdemonstratedtobothsidesthattheconflictextendedwellbeyondthefields,andthatsimplyreplacingworkersatthepointofproductioncouldnotsolvetheconflict. Indeed,DiGiorgio’ssuppressionofPoverty in theValleyofPlenty,evenat theexpenseoffreespeech,demonstratedhowseriouslythecompanytookthischallenge.AlthoughDiGiorgiowon this battle, growers remained susceptible to such campaigns as long as theyrefusedtotakeresponsibilityforsolvingtheproblemofruralpoverty.It took time for activists to recover from the collapse of the NFLU. Although Ernesto

Galarza,a labor intellectualandtheformerdirectorofeducationandresearchfor theunion,reconstituted theNFLUas theNationalAgriculturalWorkersUnion (NAWU), thenewunionstruggledasaconsequenceof thebraceroprogram.Throughout the1950s, thesinglegoalofending the program consumed farm worker advocates, delaying the use of tactics brieflyemployed by theNFLU.By the beginning of the 1960s, however, new voices emerged thatrevived someof thehope in the fields,whereconditions remainedasdifficult, ifnotworsethan they had been in the 1940s. Armed with new research and imbued with a sense ofpurpose,thesegrassrootsactivistshitthecountrysideintentonmakingadifference.

RURALCALIFORNIAANDITSDISCONTENTS

Thosewishing to tackle the thorny issue of rural poverty have often begun their fight in theImperial Valley. Its location in the most southern portion of the state made it the firstdestination for desperateMexican immigrants crossing the border to apply their substantialknowledgetothestate’smassiveagriculturaleconomy.ThetumultoftheMexicanRevolutionandtherecruitmentofMexicanworkersbylaborcontractorsduringthefirstthreedecadesof

thetwentiethcenturymadeMexicansthepreferredgroupinaracial-castesystemthatremainedin fluxuntilWorldWar II.5The floodofMexicanworkersgenerateda surplusof labor thatfacilitatedcompetitionamongadiversepopulationsegmentedbyraceandenabledgrowerstopay their employees below subsistencewages.As the first to employ farmworkers for theseason, Imperial growers often established the going rate for many crops in the state. Thedesertclimateaidedthisprocess.AninversionofthetypicalNorthAmericangrowingseasonfrom a spring-to-summer to awinter-to-spring trajectorymeant that Imperial growers coulddeliverwarm-weather,drought-tolerantcropssuchascotton,peas,melons,andlettucetothemarketatatimeoftheyearwhensuchproductswererare.Whencultivationmovednorthward,sodidwagelevelsandworkers.AresearcherstudyingsocialstratificationacrossagriculturalsectionsoftheUnitedStatesin

1959foundthattheImperialValleyhadatwo-classsystem:afewfarmmanagersinthemiddleclassandamassof laborers,mostlyMexican, in the lowerclass.TheseconditionsstronglyresembledthoseintheDeepSouth,wherewhitelandholdingelitesandfarmmanagersprofitedfrom the laborofAfricanAmericans. InTunicaCounty,Mississippi, andWestBatonRougeCounty, Louisiana, for example, “lower class farm personnel,” defined as “all those whoperformonly the labor functionon the farms, plantations, and ranches in theUnitedStates,”constitutedapproximately80percentoftheworkforce.Bycomparison,ImperialValleyfarmsemployed 87 percent of their laborers at this level. Moreover, while all three countiesemployed a smallmiddle- and lower-middle-managerial class, in the ImperialValley thesemanagers constituted a much smaller portion of the total population than inMississippi orLouisiana.Suchnumberssuggest that theruralSouthwestwasaworldasdeeplysouthernastheSouthitself.6

After World War II, many farm worker advocates accused the federal government ofexacerbatingtheproblemwiththeimportationofMexicanguestworkers.Begunin1942,thebilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States known as the bracero programdelivered Mexican nationals to rural California to harvest crops and maintain railroads.Althoughinitiallymeanttobetemporary,theprogramcontinuedwellbeyondWorldWarII.In1951, agricultural lobbyists convinced Congress to pass Public Law 78, formalizing thebracero program, by making spurious claims that the Korean War had compromised theagriculturallaborforceandthreateneddomesticproduction.7

Many scholars have documented the detrimental effect the bracero program had on farmwagesandtheemploymentoflocalworkers.Duringtheinitialyearsoftheprogram,between1943 and 1947,California employed 54 percent of theMexican nationalswho came to theUnitedStates;however,bythelate1950s,mostworkedinTexas.Growersinvestedheavilyinthe program to take advantage of the discrepancies between the wages Mexican nationalswould accept and what local workers needed to survive. Although the bilateral agreementrequiredemployerstopaybracerosatorabovethestandardwageinagivenregion,inrealitytheyearned far less thanwhat their contractspromisedandbetween10and15percent lessthantheirlocalcoworkers.ThedifferenceinthestandardoflivingandwagesbetweenMexicoand the United States compelled Mexican nationals to come north despite receiving illtreatment and false promises from contractors and employers. Many braceros maintained

families inMexicowithwages that far surpassedwhat they could havemade by staying athome.Localswhohadtoraise familiesat thehigherU.S.costof livingfelt thepinchof theprogram’sdownwardforceonagriculturalwages.Byoneaccount,thewillingnessofbracerosto work at starvation levels widened the gap between farm and industrial wages by 60percent.8

Californiagrowers’dependenceonthebraceroprogramvariedfromsouthtonorthandfromcrop to crop. Throughout the twenty-two-year history of the program, reliance onMexicannationalsskewedsouthwardtowardthedesertregionsandthesouthcoastofthestate.Bythelastyearoftheprogram,1964,42percentoftheseasonalemployeesinthedesertcamefromthebracerolaborpool,comparedtojust9percentintheSanJoaquinValley.Onthesouthandcentralcoasts,whereorangeandlemonproductiondominated,bracerosconstituted38and31percent, respectively, reflecting the citrus industry’s historic dependence on the program. Infact,California lemonproducers,who accounted for 90 percent of the lemons grown in theUnited States, drew 74 percent of their labor from the program. In the desert, where asignificant number of braceros worked, melon producers in the Palo Verde and ImperialValleysdrew44percentoftheirlaborfromMexicannationals,whiledategrowerslocatedinCoachellaValleydependedonbracerosfor91percentoftheirlabor.IntheSanJoaquinValley,melonproducerswerethebiggestusersofbraceros,drawing41percentof their laborforcefrom the program. Among grape growers, only those in the south coast region relied onMexican nationals formore than half their labor needs, and in the San JoaquinValley, theyconstituted amere 2 percent ofworkers.Grape growers in the desert region had a slightlyhigher dependence on Mexican nationals, at 11 percent of the total number of employees,althoughCaliforniagrapegrowers ingeneralused theprogrammuch less than theirpeers inothercrops.9

In theSanJoaquinValley, farmworkeradvocatesworriedabout the impactof thebraceroprogramonwages,butotherfactorsshapedpovertythere.InastudyofrurallaborconditionsinFresnoCountyoverasix-monthperiod, fromJanuary toJuly1959,a teamof researchersbased at Fresno State College (which later became Fresno State University) found thatbracerosrarelytotaledmorethan1percentofthelaborforceintheareaandrecentlyhadbeeneliminatedfromthefruitharvestaltogether. Instead,growershadbecomedependentonwhatresearchersreferredtoas“day-haul”laborers:settledworkerswhobroughtinlocalharvestsandreturned to theirhomeseachday. Insome instances,workers traveledas farasSalinas,near thecoast.MostSanJoaquinValleyfarmworkersfoundampleemployment in thecropsimmediatelyaroundFresno,whichenjoyedaharvestcyclethatstartedinAprilandlasteduntilOctober, the longest in the country. According to the researchers, only a small minority ofAnglomelonpickersbasedinthecountyfollowedayear-roundcyclethattookthemfirsttotheharvestsinArizonaandthesouthernCaliforniadeserts,upthroughKernCounty,andbackintoFresno.Knownas“aristocrats,”theseworkersoftenearnedbetween$8,000and$10,000peryear,makingthemthehighestpaidfarmlaborersinthecounty.

MAP1.CaliforniagrowingareasandlocationsofUFWactivity.

Mostworkersearned far lessdue toa system that facilitatedconstant labor surplusesanddisrupted potential worker solidarity. Researchers found evidence of growers who hadinvested in labor camps for Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans but had recentlyabandonedtheseprojectsinfavorofhiringthroughlocallaborcontractors.Campspromisedamorestablelaborpool,thoughgrowersgrewtoresentthecostofmaintainingsuchsettlements.Most growers found itmore convenient to outsource the hiring process to a third party thatbore theresponsibilityof findingworkersandmakingsure theygot to thefarms.ThecountyFarm Labor Bureau, financed through tax dollars and grower contributions, served as onesource,thoughresearchersfoundthatmostgrowerspreferredthecompletelyindependentlaborbrokerswhooperatedwithoutrestrictionsfromthegovernment.Accordingtotheauthorsofthereport,“ThefarmlaborcontractorsexpressedthefeelingthattheFarmLaborOffice[i.e.,theFresno County Farm Labor Bureau] does not play a role of significant importance in thepresentagriculturalpattern.”Thedisparitiesinthecostofday-haullaborerscomparedtocamplaborersencouragedthis

transition to labor contractors. Fresno State researchers found that growers paid laborcontractorsagoing rateofbetween$1.10and$1.15perworkerperhour.Contractorswereexpected to hireworkers at an average of $.75 per hour, although frequently they increased

their shares by driving down wages at the point of contract. In one instance, a contractorworkingtofilljobsatanearbysugarbeetfarmarrivedatthecornerofTulareandFStreetsinFresno to recruit among a large pool of unemployed men. The contractor offered to payworkersbytherowratherthanbythehour.Oneworkertoldtheresearcher,“Thepayis$1.90arowbuttherowmaystretchfromheretoSacramento.”Hisfriendhadtakenthesamejobthedaybeforeand“nettedonedollar(forabouttenhours’work),”whileanother,moreefficientworkerfinishedtworows,earningatotalof$3.80.10Althoughmanybalkedatthewages,theinformant told the researcher, “Guys will get hungry enough,” and the contractor willeventuallyhavehiscrew.Theauthorsofthereportallegedthatworkerscoulddobetterwithcontracts with the Farm Labor Bureau, earning as much as $6 to $7 per hour, though suchopportunitieswerefewandfarbetween.Infact, thetermsofcontractsvariedsowidelythatresearcherswereunabletoofferanaverageintheirreport.By comparison,workers foundmuch better pay and living conditions on the few ranches

wheregrowersstillmaintainedcamps.AttheWeethRanchwestofFresno,forexample,thirty-fivepermanentemployeeslivedincleanone-andtwo-bedroomunitsmadeofconcreteblockwithfunctioningkitchensandbathrooms.Weethattemptedtopayhisworkers$1.10perhourbutfoundthattheyslowedtheirpaceanddidnotcompletethetaskinaday.Whenheincreasedtheir pay to $2.50 per hour, his work crews finished their tasks in five hours, earningapproximately$15perday.AlthoughWeethexpressedsatisfactionwithhisworkers,hewasdoubtfulthathecouldmaintainthissystem,giventhecostandcompetitionfromlocalgrowerswho used contractors. He preferredmachine labor, although researchers concluded that thecheapnessoflaborunderthecurrentsystemforestalledsuchdevelopments.11

The trend toward hiring through labor contractors had a detrimental effect on the livingconditionsofmostworkers.Underthisnewsystem,growersnolongertookresponsibilityfortheir employees’well-being, includingwhere or how they lived.These concerns fell to thecounty, which now experiencedmany incidents of lawlessness, dependency, and unsanitaryconditions in the numerous “fringe” settlements that completely encircled Fresno in 1959.Labor contractors drew the vast majority of their recruits from these “blighted areas” thatexistedinvariousstagesofdecay.TheauthorsofthereportgavethefollowingdescriptionofThreeRocks,atypicalfringesettlement:“Housingconsistsoftar-papered,verysmallshacks(condemnedhousingfromlaborcamps)withoutdoorprivies,nowaterisavailableintheareawherethehousingis,mustbecarriedfromthegrocerystorewhichisontheroadthatbordersthe property.”12 Six hundred people occupied this particular settlement, a majority of themMexican American. Most settlements, however, consisted of black or ethnic Mexicanresidents, while poor whites made up as much as 10 percent of the total fringe areapopulations.Only 33 percent of the inhabitants owned their ownhome, although75 percentowned a car, reflecting the importance of mobility in getting to and from job sites andrecruitment centers.13 In areas where single men predominated, high levels of alcoholism,prostitution,andviolenceoccurred,creatingconstantchallengesforlawenforcementofficials.Insettlementswherefamiliesresided,countyrestrictionsagainstpublicassistanceforfreeandable-bodiedmendrovemanyunemployedfathersto“habituallyseektobejailed”sothattheirwivesandchildrencouldsecurefoodsubsidiesfromthecounty.“Inmanycases,”researchers

found,“thenoonmealatschool[was]theonlyfullmealmanyofthechildrenreceived.”14

Intheend,theauthorsdepictedaviewofruralpovertythatdifferedinformifnotseverityfromtheonefoundinthesoutherndeserts.TheheavyemploymentoftemporaryMexicanguestworkersandundocumentedimmigrantsintheSouthunderminedlocalwages,precipitatingthemigrationofworkersnorthward. In theSan JoaquinValley, local residents struggledagainstdeclining wages caused by a changing employment system in which growers increasinglyexternalized the cost of labor and placed a heavier burden on contractors and the countygovernment.Fringeareasthatservedasthemajorsourceoflaborswelledinthepostwarerawith the migration of undocumented Mexican immigrants and former braceros who had“skipped” theircontracts.For theauthorsof thestudy,however,migrationconstituteda lessimportant factor in the creation of rural poverty than the maintenance of a large pool ofdesperate workers living on the margins of society, whose conditions led them to acceptwhateverwagescontractorsoffered.“Stepsneedtobetakenimmediately,”theyconcluded,“tobringaboutmoreequitableratesofpay,betterhousing,bettereducationalopportunity,betterpolice and fire protection, increased access to medical care, and all the other advantageswhichmightbeexpectedtoaccruetocitizensinourwealthy,productiveeconomy.”15

FIGURE1.Achildstandsinfrontofaderelicthouseinanundisclosedfarmlaborcamp.ALUA,UFWCollection,7118.

Suchstudiesconfirmedwhatmostonthegroundunderstood:lifeforfarmworkershadgottenworsesinceWorldWarII,despitemassivegovernmentinvestmentsinirrigationprojectsandduring a time when growers expanded their production. U.S. Secretary of Labor James F.Mitchell, speaking to a gathering of farm labor specialists in 1959, confirmed these losses,testifying,“Thereisverylittleevidencethattheunderemployedandunemployedfarmworkeris passing out of society.” The relative rootedness of workers in the San Joaquin Valleynotwithstanding,Mitchell reported that the number ofmigratory farmworkers in theUnitedStateshadnotdecreasedinadecade.Wageshaddeclinedoveraseven-yearperiod,leading

Mitchelltoremark,“Wemustrememberthattheseworkersnotonlydonothavetheprotectionofmostof thesocial legislationwhichplacesa floorunder theeconomicwellbeingofmostAmericans;buttheyarealsodeprivedevenofthe‘automatic’actionofafreelabormarket,inwhich a labor shortage tends to bring its own correction.”16 In spite of his observations,Mitchellpossessedlittlepowertoaltertheconditionsundergirdingthissystem.Inthe1960s,localactivists,communityorganizations,andworkersthemselveswouldbequickertoaddresstheseproblemsthangovernment.Rural labor advocates did not sit idly by as growers’ profits increased and workers’

conditions worsened. In some cases, local activism rose organically from the righteousindignation of people who applied their own analysis to the injustices that they witnessedaround them. Inother cases,workers circulating in andoutof rural areas carriedwith themknowledge of how to leverage the power of unions and initiate reform through labororganizing.Stillothersattemptedtoadaptanurbanmodelofreformtoruralareas.Whatevertheapproach,inthe1960sadvocatesincreasinglytookmattersintotheirownhands.In the southern deserts, advocates for reform prioritized the goal of ending the bracero

program, given the dramatic impact it had on the lives of farm workers in the area. ThepresenceofMexicannationalsupsetsocialrelationsintheseruralcommunities,oftenpittingthe guests against residentswho felt entitled to local jobs.As I have described elsewhere,conflict occurredover employment aswell as courtship, leading toviolence and sometimesmurder.17

In 1960, a coalition of workers in the Imperial Valley tried to increase their wages bystrikingthelettucefields.TwoAFL-CIOrepresentatives,AlGreenandClydeKnowles,hadbegun to organize local workers with an eye toward starting a new union, theAgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommittee(AWOC).GreenandKnowlesbelievedanew,statewideunionmovement could be built among migratoryMexican and Filipino workers who began theirseasons in the southern deserts with the lettuce harvest. Growers’ importation of braceros,however, complicated this dream and led some organizers to take out their frustrations onMexican nationals in the fields. Fights in bars between braceros and strikingworkers alsoeruptedinvicedistrictsontheoutskirtsofmanyruraltowns,leadingtoachaoticsituation.18

Two local activists,Miguel andAlfredo Figueroa, participated in these early attempts atunionization as a consequence of their upbringing. When the Figueroas were children, thefamilymoved fromBlythe,California, tonearbyOatman,Arizona,where their father tookajob in the goldmines and joined the localmineworkers’ union. Althoughmineworkers andfarm workers occasionally overlapped within working-class communities, their rights andexpectationsdifferedconsiderably.The successof theUnitedMineWorkersunionprovidedminerswiththeleveragetoinsistonfairpayandbettersocialservices.Incontrast,thelackofcollectivebargainingrightsforfarmworkersmeantthattheyoftensuffereddiscriminationonand off the job and had relatively little faith in their ability to change their condition.Occasionally, however, families like the Figueroas worked in both mining and agriculture,leadingtoacross-fertilizationofcultures thatbenefitedfarmworkercommunities.Asyoungmen, the Figueroas assisted their father in the mines and the melon harvest in and aroundBlythe.

During the early 1960s,Miguel andAlfredo threw themselves into farmworker activismacross thedesert regionof southernCalifornia.Their trips to the ImperialValleycaught theattentionoflocallawenforcementofficialswhomaintainedcommunicationwiththeirpeersinBlythe.AccordingtoMiguel,thesurveillanceofMexicanAmericansdependedonanetworkof police officers, bankers, and deputized growers who kept tabs on anyone who tried toimprovethelivesoffarmworkerslivingintheTri-Valleyregion.WhenMiguelandAlfredoreturnedhomefromworkingwithAWOCintheImperialValley,townleaderscalledthemtoameeting at the local bank and threatened themwith violence.Miguel recalled their line ofquestioning:“Whatthehell[are]youguysdoingdownthere?Doyouknowthatthosepeoplehaveguns?DoyouknowthatyouFigueroaboysmightgethurt?’”Thetownleaderseventuallylet themgo,butother incidentsofharassment followed. In1963, forexample,Blythepoliceofficers draggedAlfredo from a local bar and publicly beat him, provoking a confrontationbetween his brother Gilbert and the police. Alfredo Figueroa won a case against thedepartment, although a jury inCoachella awarded him a less than satisfactory settlement of$3,500. Investigatorswith theU.S.CommissiononCivilRights laterwrote that the incidentepitomized the kind of intimidation and abuseMexicanAmericans encountered in the ruralSouthwest.19

Such threats and acts of violence did not deter everyone, least of all the Figueroas. Theelection of John F. Kennedy inspired hope that the federal government might intervene toimprove conditions for farm workers in California. The newly formed Mexican AmericanPoliticalAssociation, ledby the labor intellectualBertCorona, organized “VivaKennedy!”campaigns in the West, which sought to rally Mexican American voters and offset theconsiderableadvantagetheRepublicancandidate,RichardNixon,heldinCaliforniain1960.The Figueroas participated in these electoral efforts in the Tri-Valley area, although theybecame disillusioned with Kennedy after he was elected, when he appealed to AFL-CIOleaderstocallofftheAWOClettucestrikeinElCentro.20

ManylocalactivistswerealsoangeredbyKennedy’srefusaltoheedthecallsofthelaborintellectualErnestoGalarzatoendthebraceroprogram.Galarza,aformerpolicyadvisorforthe Pan American Union, became involved with farm worker unions, although his maincontributioncamebywayofhisscholarship.Utilizingpoliticalconnectionsandsocialsciencemethods,hestudiedtheeffectsofthebraceroprogramonthewagesandworkconditionsofallfarmworkersinCalifornia.In1956,hepublishedashortbook,StrangersinOurFields,andspokecriticallyabouttheprograminpublic.HisinterventionsinitiatedaquietreassessmentofthepolicybytheDepartmentofLabor,andby1960theprogrambegantofalloutoffavorwithlawmakers.21 In 1961, Congress passed a two-year extension of Public Law 78 aftertremendous debate, and the following year theKennedy administration finally took a publicpositionagainst theprogram.In1963,Galarzapublisheda longer,morecriticalbookon thebraceroprogram,MerchantsofLabor:TheMexicanBraceroStory,whichhelpedpush thecontract-laboragreementtothebrinkofextinction.AlthoughCongressandthepresidentwouldhonor requests from Mexico to gently wind down the program rather than cut it offimmediately,lawmakers,growers,andactivistsacknowledgedthattheMexicancontract-laborprogramwouldsooncometoaclose.22

StudiessuchasthosebyGalarzaandFresnoStateCollegeprovidedmomentumforchangesinthefarmlaborsystemasactivistspressedtheissueontheground.Manyreformadvocatescombinedcriticismof thebilateral agreementwith a commitment to creating an institutionalpresence in rural California. The slow death of the bracero program allowed advocates tothink about conditions after its demise, specifically how to reform a rural labor systemdominated by disempowered migratory workers and day-haul laborers. In the early 1960s,bothunions andcommunityorganizationsviedwithoneanother to assume leadership as thefighttoendruralpovertymovedintoanewphase.

THEEVOLUTIONOFFARMLABORACTIVISM

Noonedisputedtheneedtoendthebraceroprogram,althoughlittleconsensusexistedonwhattodobeyondthisgoal.InadditiontoassistingAWOCintheImperialValley,MiguelFigueroaworkedwithBenYellen,oneoftwophysiciansinthevalleywhohadservedbracerosandsawfirsthandtheabusesoftheprogram.Yellendistributedaself-publishedpamphletknownasthe“yellow sheet” that criticized the bracero program and exposed local growers for theircircumventionoftheNationalReclamationAct.LikeGalarza,hecampaignedforanendtotheMexicancontract-laboragreement,buthesawitasaby-productofalargerproblemrelatedtotheunequaldistributionofpublicwealthintheformofirrigatedland.Yellenbelievedthattheproblemof ruralpovertycouldbeeliminatedby theenforcementof160-acre limitationandresidencyrequirementsonmegafarmownerswhoreceivedfederallyfundedwater.Hearguedfor thedismantlingof theselandsandtheirredistributiontofarmworkers, therebyachievingthenovel solutionof turning farmworkers into farmers.AlthoughYellen counted amonghissupporters the University of California economist Paul Taylor, his was mostly a one-mancrusadethathadlittlesupportfromlaborunionsandcommunityorganizations.23

Organizing workers was a far more common approach among activists, although not allagreed on themethod. Union organizers likeAl Green and ClydeKnowles believed that aunionshouldbetheultimateobjective,buttheirplansbecamemiredintheconflictsbetweenlocal workers andMexican nationals. Consequently, prior to 1964, AWOC organizers andaffiliatesfoundthemselvesspendingasmuchtimecampaigningagainstthebraceroprogramasthey did organizing workers for collective action. By the time the Mexican contract-laborprogram came to a formal end onDecember 31, 1964,AWOChad established itself as themostlikelylabororganizationtoleadanewuniondriveinruralCalifornia.Membersofanotherorganization, theCommunityServiceOrganization(CSO),believedin

the empowerment of communities to place demands on elected officials to improve livingconditionsandsocial services.During themid-1950s, theCSOused itsmomentumfrom theelectionofEdwardRoybalinurbanEastLosAngelestoexpandintofarmingtownsthroughoutCalifornia.TheorganizationworkedonissuesaffectingMexicanAmericans,butitsexpansionintoruralcommunitiesforcedittocontendwithPublicLaw78andthedisplacementoflocalworkers by braceros. By the late 1950s, a rift had developed between middle-classprofessionalswhowantedtheCSOtoremainpoliticallyagnosticoncontentiousissuessuchas

thebraceroprogramandmemberswhowantedtoalignwithlabororganizations.24

ThepreferencefororganizingfarmworkersfellinlinewiththeeffortsofCSOfounder,FredRoss, and his protégé, Cesar Chavez. Ross had begun his activism in Riverside and SanBernardinocounties,workingwithblackandMexican residentsof citruscolonias to createUnityLeagues,communityorganizationsbuiltonthemodelofSaulAlinsky’sIndustrialAreasFoundationorganizationsinChicago.TheUnityLeaguesservedasatestinggroundforRoss’stheorythatonehadto“organizepeoplewheretheyare,notwhereyouwantthemtobe.”Whenhis efforts produced an organized citizenry and improvements in their communities, such asstreetlights and school buses, Ross felt confident about doing similar work in more urbanneighborhoodsunder thebannerof theCSO. In1952,hemetand recruitedCesarChavez, ayoungveteranoftheU.S.NavyandaformerfarmworkerlivingintheSanJosébarrioofSalSiPuedes.BorninYuma,Arizona,in1927,Chavezunderstoodthedifficultiesofrurallifeinthesoutherndeserts.DuringtheGreatDepression,hehadwatchedhelplesslyasthestatetookpossession of his family’s farm, forcing them into the stream of itinerant farm laborerstraveling throughoutCaliforniaduring the late1930sandearly1940s.Chavez’swife,HelenFavelaChavez,alsoknewruralpoverty;herfamilywasdispersedthroughoutthePaloVerde,Imperial,andSanJoaquinValleys.SuchintimateknowledgeofruralCaliforniamadeChavezsympathetictotheplightoffarmworkersandinspiredhimtomovetheCSOinthedirectionoffarmworkerjustice.As Chavez distinguished himself as a skilled organizer and became an officer within the

CSO,heexplorednewsolutionstotheproblemsconfrontingruralcommunities.Hebeganbyrecruitingmemberswho shared his concerns and experiences, tapping activists in themanysmalltownsfamiliartohim.GilbertPadilla,whohadbeenworkingparttimeasadrycleanerandasagleanerofonionsandothercropsgrownintheCentralValley,wasamonghismostimportantdiscoveries.Chavez foundPadilla throughhis friendPeteGarcía, aCSOaffiliatewhohadinvitedhimtoarecruitmentmeetingathishomeinHanford.WhenPadilladeclinedoutofabeliefthattheCSOwasjustanother“socialclub,”ChavezandGarcíamethimafterwork, and the three men ended up talking late into the evening about their shared goal ofimproving farmworker conditions. Padilla appreciatedChavez’s desire tomake communityorganizations more accountable to the needs of rural communities and agreed to become amember.25 Padilla andChavez’s relationshipwould ultimately serve as the foundation for anewfarmworkermovement.

FIGURE2.MembersoftheCommunityServiceOrganization,ca.1950s.Secondfromright,CesarChavez;frontrowcenter,FredRossSr.;farleft,SaulAlinsky;thirdfromtherightinback,HelenChavez.ALUA,UFWCollection,330.

In1959ChavezexhibitedhisaffinitieswithagriculturalworkersandunionsbyacceptingagrantfromthePackinghouseWorkersofAmericatostudytheeffectsofthebraceroprograminOxnard, California. He succeeded in forcing the Farm Labor Bureau to comply with aprovision in thebilateralagreement that requiredgrowers tohire local farmworkersbeforecontractingMexicannationals.Healsohelpedlocalfarmworkerssecurestateunemploymentinsurance benefits during seasonal downturns. Such actions deviated from the CSO’s morefamiliarvoterregistrationworkandcameclosertotheservicesprovidedbyunions.26WhenChavezbecamethenationaldirectoroftheCSO,heassignedPadillatotheCSOservicecenterinStockton,apredominantlyfarmworkercommunity,andencouragedhimtopursuegrantsliketheoneheheldinOxnard.Tohisdelight,Padillasucceededinsecuringagrantin1961fromtheBishops’CommitteeonMigratoryLaborinChicagotostudyhousingconditionsforlocalfarmworkers.27

FIGURE3.GilbertPadilla,1966.

Padilla joined a growing team of rural recruits, including Julio and Fina Hernandez andRogerTerronezfromCorcoran;TonyandRachelOrendainandGilFloresfromHanford;andaloquaciousandfierysinglemotherfromStockton,DoloresHuerta.28Huertahadneverworkedinthefields,butshemaintainedastrongconnectiontolaborunionsandfarmworkersthroughherfamily.HerfatherhadworkedinthecoalminesinDawson,NewMexico,whereshewasborn, and had belonged to theUnitedMineWorkers.29When Dolores was an infant, laborunrest in themines forced her father to seek alternativework harvesting beets inWyoming,Nebraska, and California. The family eventually settled in Stockton, California, where herfatherworkedintheasparagusfieldsamongapredominantlyFilipinoworkforce.Inthe1940s,heparticipated inastrikeon theZuckermanasparagus farmalongsideHuerta’s future friendandFilipinoactivist,PhilipVeracruz.30

Huerta clashedwith her father over his “chauvinist” behavior and considered hermother,AliciaMargaretSt.JohnChavez,astrongerinfluenceinherlife.DuringtheGreatDepression,AliciadivorcedHuerta’sfatherandraisedDoloresandhersisteron$5perweekfromwagesearnedattheRichmond-Chasecanneriesandalocalrestaurant.In1937,AliciaparticipatedinastrikeofthecanneriesasamemberoftheUnitedCannery,Agricultural,PackingandAlliedWorkersofAmerica,whichforcedhertodependentirelyonherearningsattherestaurant.31In1941sheopenedasuccessfullunchcounterwithhersecondhusband,JamesRichards.Ayear

laterthecouplepurchasedahotelfromJapaneseAmericanownerswhohadtosellwhenthegovernment relocated all Japanese Americans to internment camps. Alicia relied on herchildren to staff the restaurant and clean the hotel, providing Dolores with an invaluableculturalexperiencethatstrengthenedherconfidenceandabilitytoorganizeinanycommunity.She recalled the unique composition of their neighborhood and clientele: “The ethniccommunitywherewelivedwasallmixed.ItwasJapanese,Chinese.TheonlyJewishfamiliesthatlivedinStocktonwerethereinourneighborhood.…TherewastheFilipinopoolhall,theFilipino dance hall. It was [a] very colorful, multi-ethnic scene.”32 When the Richards’relationshipsouredandthecoupledivorced,Alicialosttherestaurantbutheldontothehotel.Dolores continued to help her mother and became friends with many of the Filipino farmworkerswhoweretheirprimarypatrons.LaterhermothermetandmarriedJuan“Fernando”Silva, a former bracero, who conveyed toDolores his deep feelings of bitterness over histreatment at the hands of growers.33 These influences made her sympathetic to Chavez’sappeals to join the local CSO, which she accepted in 1960. In time she too would be asimportanttothenewmovementasPadillaandChavez.TheadditionofruralchaptersintheCSOandthenewmembers’successinbringingattention

to the plight of farm workers compelled Chavez to call for the creation of a farm laborcommittee.AccordingtoPadilla,thedecisionshouldnothavebeencontroversialbecausetheCSO already maintained committees on housing and education, although some membersquestioned whether Chavez’s new plan augured a more aggressive move toward labororganizing.Somememberspreferredtomaintainamorenonpartisanimageandbelievedthatalignment with worker concerns would move the organization strongly to the left. Othersobjected to pursuing work that, they believed, duplicated AWOC’s efforts. Opponents ofChavez’s plan pointed out that AWOC, with funding from the AFL-CIO, had initiated thelettucestrikeinImperialValleyandmadeinroadsinorganizingFilipinoworkersintheCentralValley.Consequently,theCSOnationalcommitteechosetotablethedecisionuntilthenationalconventioninCalexicoinMarch1962,whentheywoulddiscussthematteringreaterdepth.34

In preparation for the conference, Chavez met with Padilla to share his plans. Padillarecalled, “[Cesar] said, ‘I am going to propose to the convention that every chapter shouldhaveafarmlaborcommittee,andthatweshouldstartdoingsomethingforfarmlabor.…Iftheydon’tapprove this, I’mgoing to leave. I’mgoing toquit.’”35Chavezalsocommunicatedhisintentions to a number of members on the CSO board of directors, but no one took himseriously,givenhissuccessful recruitmentofnewmembers,hisability togetoutsidegrants,and,mostimportant,hisdependenceonthedirectorpositionastheonlysourceoffundingforhisfamily.“Ididn’tbelievehim,”Padillarecalled,adding,“becausehe’stheonethatbuiltallthe chapters.” Like Chavez, Padilla also supported an entire family on his CSO salary,partially covered by the grant from the Bishops’ Committee. Although the grant was set toexpire in June, Padilla had hopes of applying for an extension and had already secured apromisefromthelocalchaptertocontinuepayinghim.36

ChavezattendedtheCalexicomeetingflankedbyhisnewstaff,includingPadillaandHuerta,optimistic that a deal could be struckwith his fellow boardmembers.One of the foundingmembersandhisfriend,TonyRios,hadbeenamemberoftheElectricalUnion,andtwoother

board members, Jay Rodriguez and Gil Anaya, had belonged to the Butchers Union andSteelworkers,respectively.Inadditiontothesemen,Chavezbelievedhecouldcountonotherboardmemberswhounderstoodthepowerofaunionandcouldseethevalueofhisproposal.To his chagrin, however, they rebuffed Chavez. Those with union experience argued thatAWOC’s failed strike in the lettuce fields demonstrated the difficulty of organizing farmworkersandrecommendedthattheCSOleavethetasktothem.Padillaalsorecalledthatmanymemberswith professional backgrounds objected to doing farm labor organizing altogether,signalingthedegreetowhichtheCSOhadbecomeamoreconservativeorganizationsinceitsbeginning.“Wehadreallyprofessionalguysupthere,notlikeinthefiftieswhenyouhadthosegrassroots people.” He added, “[The grassroots people] didn’t speak English, [and] wereawkward [when] speaking, but they had lots of balls and guts.” In this case, neither unionsupportersnorprofessionalssupportedChavez.Atsomepoint,Padilla recalled, themeetingturned “very nasty,” with Chavez’s opponents accusing him and his allies of betraying theoriginalmission of theCSO. “Iwas attacked,” Padilla recalled, “but Iwasn’t supposed torespondbecauseIwasstaff.”37Amidtheinsults,Chavezstoodupandfollowedthroughonhisthreattoquit.Chavez’sresignationscaredPadilla,whounderstoodthatChavez’sdecisionrequiredhimto

leavetheorganizationtoo.PadillaconfrontedChavezoutsidetheconventionhall,butChavezshowedlittleremorse.“Iquit!Fuckthem!I’mnotgoingtodoit[any]more,”hetoldPadilla.Chavez’s response revealed his famous obstinacy and a willingness to risk everything toachievehisgoals, twotraits thatwouldbecomethehallmarksofhis leadership.InresigningfromtheCSO,however,Chavezconsidered thestakesquite low,given that theyhadnotyetcommittedsignificantresourcestotheproject.HealsohadgreatfaithinhisrecruitstopursuetheirgoalsindependentoftheCSO.WhenPadillaaskedChavez,“Whataboutme,whataboutus?,” Chavez responded with typical brevity and confidence: “Let’s go organize itourselves.”38Within three days of themeeting, Chavez left his post in LosAngeles for thesmalltownofDelano,wherehisbrother,Richard,andmostofHelen’sfamilylived.Padillamovedback toHanford toworkat thedrycleanerandpreparedmembersof the localCSOchapters in anticipationofChavez’s call to action.OnApril 12, 1962,Chavez tenderedhisformalletterofresignationtotheCSOfromDelanoandbeganmakingpreparationsforanewfarmworkersunion.39

Chavez’sambitiontostartanewuniontooktimeandencounteredmorethanafewskeptics.Organizing a union required faith that the bracero program would soon end and that farmworkerscouldattainthesamecollectivebargainingrightsgrantedtoindustrialworkersundertheNationalLaborRelationsAct.Galarza’sactivismcreatedmomentumforachievingthefirstgoal, although the struggle against the program and the failure to sustain a labormovementamongcitizenworkersmadeGalarzadubiousofChavez’schances.Hegavehimcounselandwished him well but had already begun to turn his attention to urban issues. Saul AlinskyremainedsupportiveofChavezduringhistransitionfromtheCSO,buthetooadvisedChavezagainst the venture and encouraged him to organize in cities for his Industrial AreasFoundation.40Chavez’smentor,FredRoss,remainedoptimistic,however,andhelpedchannelIAFmoney to Padilla as he made important inroads in the labor camps.41 Dolores Huerta

moved from Stockton to Los Angeles to become a staff member at the CSO’s nationalheadquarters while she awaited news from Chavez.42 Meanwhile, Chavez’s wife and theoldest of their eight children worked in the fields to support Cesar as he put together theunion.43

ChavezsucceededinconveningthefirstmeetingoftheNationalFarmWorkersAssociation(NFWA), in Fresno in September 1962. At the meeting, composed mainly of former CSOmembers,thedelegatesadoptedtheblackeaglelogoastheirsymbolandred,white,andblackastheofficialcolorsofthenewunion.Theyalsoadoptedaduesstructurethatrequiredeachmember to pay $3.50 per month. The initial death benefit insurance for members mirroredthoseofMexicanmutualistas familiar tomanyof thedelegates.Thedelegatesalsoselectedofficers, including Sanger resident, Jesus Martínez, as president; Hanford resident, TonyOrendain,assecretary-treasurer;CesarChavezasdirectorgeneral;andsixothers, includingGilbertPadilla,asboardmembers.ChavezdedicatedthefirstyeartobuildingtheorganizationCSO-stylebyholdingmeetingsin

the homes ofMexican farmworkers and conducting registration drives and get-out-the-votecampaignsthroughoutthevalley.Padillaparticipatedintheseactivitiesandearnedthetrustofmanylocalresidentsbyorganizingagainstpolicebrutalityandsubstandardpublichousing.Herecalledthat,althoughtheybroughtmanynewmembersintotheNFWA,neitherthestructureofgovernancenortheappointmentsworkedoutaswellasChavezandhehadhoped.Theworkobligations of some officers and lack of shared commitment led to breakdowns in service.Chavezalsofoundhisroletoovagueand,ultimately,unsatisfying.Asaresult,hereshuffledthegoverningstructurein1964,takingoveraspresident,apositionthatgrantedhimthecontrolhesought fromthestart.Orendainremainedsecretary-treasurer,andChavezelevatedPadilla tovicepresident.ChavezalsorecruitedDoloresHuertatoreturntotheCentralValleytobecomeasecondvicepresident.44

The activities of other nonaffiliated activists operating in the San Joaquin Valley gaveChavez confidence that he had allies. Although rural poverty had become a distinguishingfeature of life for most farm workers in California, the high rates of residency and therelativelyweakinfluenceofthebraceroprograminthevalleyprovidedfarmworkeractivistsamorestablelocalpopulationwithwhomtowork.Churchgroupssetupoperationsinmanyofthesefarmworkersettlements,oftenconductingreliefworkratherthanorganizingresidentsforpoliticalprotest.LiketheCSO,however,thesegroupscontainedmemberswhowantedtogobeyond the roleof assisting fieldworkers to form self-help organizations that approximatedunions.Theemergenceofcivilrightsgroups,suchastheCongressofRacialEquality(CORE)and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference during the 1950s, also influenced thethinking of these religion-oriented groups. The audacious challenges by black civil rightsorganizationstoJimCrowlawsanddiscriminationintheAmericanSouthinspiredmanylocalactiviststopursueasimilartransformationintheruralWest.The California Migrant Ministry figured prominently among the religious organizations

committedtoservingruralcommunities.AsaprogramwithintheDivisionofHomeMissionsoftheNationalCouncilofChurchesofChrist,theministryhadgrownaccustomedtoworkingwithimmigrantpopulations.Likeotherorganizationsduringthe1960s,includingtheCSO,the

CaliforniaMigrantMinistryfelttheinfluenceofyouthfulaffiliateswhohadcomeofageafterWorldWarIIandquestionedtheboundariesofwhattraditionalcommunityorganizationscouldandshoulddo.The ministry’s selection of Wayne “Chris” Hartmire as director, a twenty-nine-year-old

father of three and a Presbyterian minister, demonstrated its willingness to embrace theleadershipofanewgeneration.Hartmiresought tobuildon theworkofapreviousdirectorwhohad secured agrant from theSchwartzhauptFoundation to learn fromCSOorganizers’attemptstobuildnewchaptersinruralCalifornia.Uponhisarrival,HartmiremetwithChavez,who recommended that he spend a month in Stockton working with Gilbert Padilla andDoloresHuertatobecomefamiliarwiththeneedsofthecommunity.“IquicklybecameaCSOenthusiast,”Hartmireremembered,attendingalloftheCSOconventions,includingthefatefulCalexicoconventionin1962.“Inretrospect,”heremembered,“I…wonderedwhetherCesarwanteda‘yes’vote.”HartmirebelievedChavezhadalreadyreachedtheconclusionthatmostofhisCSOpeersdidnothavethestomachfororganizingfarmworkersandwantedanexcusetostarthisownorganization.45

Hartmire took the lessons from Stockton and the CSO and immediately applied them tosocialworkin theCentralValley.HerecruitedJimDrake,ayoungNewYorkerfreshoutofUnion Theological Seminary, to anchor the new rural projects for the ministry. Drake hadfinishedhiscourseworkinDecember1961,andhiswife,Susan,hadjustgivenbirthtotheirson, Matthew. As Jim remembers it, he pursued a place on Hartmire’s staff “out ofdesperation” because he needed a job to be able to feed his family. At their firstmeeting,Hartmirequizzedhimaboutwhatheknewoforganizing.Helied toget the job.Immediatelyfollowing their meeting Drake drove to the nearest public library to educate himself. Heremembered,“InthecardfilewasonebookonorganizingpublishedbytheUnitedNations.Istole it.”46 This would not be Drake’s last act of improvisation to propel the movementforward.Inspiteoftheirrelativelackofexperienceandknowledge,thetwoembarkedonorganizing

farmworkersintheSanJoaquinValleyfrom1962to1964.HartmireinstructedDraketomovetoruralCaliforniaandconsultwithCesarChavezonhowtogetstarted.ForChavez,Drake’sarrival provided a set of wheels and theministry’s gasolinemoney to take him around thevalley and make local connections that would contribute to the formation of a new farmworkersunion.Drakebenefitedtoo,learningthelayofthelandandmeetingGilbertPadillainthe process. Padilla was generous with information and gave Drake a history lesson onorganizing.47

PadillarecommendedPorterville,asmalltownthirtymilesfromDelanointheheartofgrapecountry, where a county-owned labor camp known as Woodville housed three hundredfamilies.Drakeandanotherministryrepresentative,DavidHavens,followedPadilla’sadviceand used a small amount of money raised by Hartmire to rent an office behind the localbarbershop for the Farm Workers Organization. Drake got the attention of residents bypurchasingalargetank,fillingitwithgasoline,andinvitingfarmworkerstopaya$2annualfeefor theprivilegeofpurchasingfuelfor$.20pergallon—farbelowthegoingrate.Givenworkers’dependenceonautomobilesfortransportationtolocaljobs,theplanworked,andthe

office flourished.Newsof their organization spread to the neighboring townofFarmervillenear Visalia and attracted residents of another labor camp, Linnell, to participate in theprogram.ThefuelingstationprovidedDrakeandHavensanimportantbaseofoperation,andthetwobegantorunCSO-stylehousemeetingswithlocalfarmworkerstoexploretheirneeds.Meanwhile, Padillaworked on behalf of theNFWA, using the lastmonths of his grant to

conduct a survey of farmworkers’ complaints. He began by recruitingmembers of CentralValleyCSOchapters inCorcoran,Huron, andSelmawhovowed to stay in theorganizationuntil Chavez set up his new union. “I had those guys organized doing the survey,” Padillarecalled.48Whenthemoneyranout,hestayedonasafieldlaborerbutsoonpickedupanothergrantthroughRosstorunawomen’seducationalprojectinHanfordthatincludedattentiontoreproductive rights and child care.49 Drake and Havens shared an interest in makingcontraceptivesavailabletowomenfarmworkers.AccordingtoPadilla,HavensharboredthemisconceptionthatbecausemostwomenfarmworkersbelongedtotheCatholicChurch,theywouldbe resistant to theirmessage. “Theygo [to church] to look for their soul[s],”PadillatoldHavens,“Theydon’tpayattentiontothepriest!”Toprovehispoint,PadillaaccompaniedHavenstotheWoodvillecamp,wheretheyquicklydistributedaboxoffreecontraceptivestofourorfivewomenwhobecametheirprimarydistributorstotherestoftheresidents.Thetripsintothecamprevealedtheextentofthehousingcrisisamongfarmworkers.“The

laborcampwasaverydisgustingsite,”Padillarecalled.Thehousesamountedtowindowless,two-bedroom tin shacks built in 1937 for dust bowl migrants that had been handed downseveral generations to the current residents.During thehot summermonths, residentswouldplaceontheroofwetrugsrecoveredfromthelocaldumpinafutileattempttogetsomerelieffrom the heat. Padilla found that women resented having to share communal toilets andshowers,wheretheyencounteredmanysinglemenwhosatoutsidethefacilitiesinanattempttocatchaglimpseofthemnaked.TheconditionsappalledPadilla,whoencouragedDraketojoinhiminanefforttoclosedownorreformthecamp.Drakeexpressedsometrepidationbutagreed to look into the history of the facility, and Padilla agreed to do outreach among theresidents.Inhisresearch,Drakediscoveredthatthefederalgovernmenthaddesignedthehomestolast

nomorethantenyears.AfterWorldWarII,growershadtakenoverthecampsandcontinuedtouse them for their workers throughout the 1950s, until they began to divest from housingprojectsinfavorofworkingwithlaborcontractorstoacquireday-haullaborers.Bythe1960s,theTulareCountyHousingAuthorityhadtakenoverthecamps,butitdidnothingtoimprovethe conditions. Drake conferred about the tenants’ rights with James Herndon, an AfricanAmerican attorney working on behalf of the poor in San Francisco. Herndon inspected thedilapidatedfacilitiesandinformedDrakethatthecountywasinviolationofa1947lawthatrestricted owners from raising rents on condemned dwellings. He recommended that theypursuelegalaction.50

Evertheorganizer,PadillaencouragedDraketotakethebolderstepofsettingupafundandasking tenants to pay their rent to them instead of the county. In return, Padilla and Drakepromisedtoprotectthetenantsifthecountyattemptedtoevictthemfromthecamp.Althoughnot everyone participated, enough did, and county officials began to send eviction notices.

Theyalsosentthesherifftointimidatetheresidents,althoughPadillareassuredthemthatthecounty had no legal standing to force them to pay. “I said, ‘[The] County doesn’t know…who’s paying … so when they come to you to tell you to pay [your rent], screw ’em.”According to Padilla, several residents followed his directions and lived in the camp formonths, rent-free. They paid whatever they could to the fund set up by Padilla and Drake,whichwasdepositedinthebankincasetheyneededittotakelegalactionagainstthecounty.Padillaalsoraisedawarenessoftheproblemsinthecampbyinvitingthesecretaryoflabortovisit;healsoattractedtheattentionofthelocalpress.51

Thestandoffbetweentheresidentsandthecountyeventuallyeruptedwhenthelocalhousingauthoritychosetoraisetherentstocoveritslosses.Theactionangeredthenewlyempoweredresidents,whotooktodemonstratingagainstthecounty.Drakerecalledthescene:“OnedaytheTulareCountyHousingAuthorityarbitrarilyraisedtherentonthecondemned,tinshacksfrom$19to$22permonth!Idrovedowntothecampnotknowingthis,andtherewasGilunderthewatertank,standingandshoutingontopofacar.Bythetimehegotdown,hehadstartedarentstrike—300 families joined!”52 Padilla, Drake, Havens, and a young college student, DougAdair,counseledtheWoodvillefamiliestojoinwithresidentsofthenearbyLinnellcampinFarmville to create one bigmarch to the Tulare government office building. The protestersoverwhelmed housing authority officials,who took cover in their offices until themarchersmovedontoalocalparkforacelebration.Inthemonthsthatfollowed,DrakeandPadillatookthecountytocourt,wheretheywonasettlementthatrestoredtheoriginalrentandforcedthehousingauthoritytobuildanewfacilityonthesameproperty.53

TheTularerentstrikeinspiredmanyfarmworkersandanumberoflocalorganizerstojointheNFWA.AmongthemwasBrotherGilbert,apriestwhohadlefthispostasprincipaloftheCatholic Garces High School in Bakersfield to help lead the march. “I wore my officialChristianBrothersblacksuit,blacksilkvest,andawhitestarchedcollarsomewhatsimilartothe clerical collar worn by the Catholic clergy.” Brother Gilbert, later known by his birthname,LeRoyChatfield,eventuallyleftthepriesthoodtobecomeacriticalmemberofChavez’steam.Duringtherentstrike,hecarriedaplacardwithaquotebythefamousunionorganizer,JoeHill:“Don’tMourn—Organize!”Chatfieldgot the ideafromaCatholicanarchist friend,AmmonHennacy,whoranaCatholicWorkerhospitalityhouseinSaltLakeCity.“EventhoughIhadneverparticipated ina farmworker ‘rent strike’marchbefore,” recalledChatfield, “IthoughtJoeHill’squotationwasappropriatefortheoccasion.”54Chatfieldwasnotaloneinhislack of experience. Many considered the rent strike an important opening salvo in a newmovementtoimprovethelivesoffarmworkersintheSanJoaquinValley.

ASTRIKEISNOTENOUGH

While the National FarmWorkers Association built its organization, Al Green and AWOCcontinuedtoworkonaparalleltrackinthesoutherndesertsandelsewhereintheSanJoaquinValley.AlthoughdisappointedbythefailuretohalttheuseofMexicannationalsasscablaborintheImperialValley,AWOCkeptthepressureon,believingthatthenationalmoodtowardthe

braceroprogramhadshiftedinitsfavor.AWOC’snationalsponsor,theAFL-CIO,wantedtobe organized and ready in the fieldswhen the bracero program ended. To prepare for thismoment,nationalrepresentativeschanneledfundstoGreenandCliveKnowles,whosearchedforthemostlikelyworkerstoorganize.ThenationalofficealsopursuedlegalactionagainsttheU.S.DepartmentofLabortoenforceceilingsontheemploymentofMexicannationalswhoremainedinthelabormarket.Thismoveguardedagainstthereplacementofdomesticworkerswho,theybelieved,constitutedAWOC’sfuture.55

Green and Knowles reached out to many workers, including those within Chavez’s fold.Padilla recalled thatwhen he left theCSO,Green tried to persuade him to comework forAWOC. “I didn’t like the program,” Padilla said, “because they were organizing laborcontractors.”56 This strategy circumvented organizing in the fields in favor of appealing tomiddlemen who maintained communication with several workers at a time. This wasparticularlytrueamongFilipinolaborcontractorswhostayedincontactwithFilipinomigrantsas they spanned the entireWest Coast, working in canneries, on boats, and on farms fromAlaskatoArizona.AstheFresnoStateCollegestudyshowed,however,thesesamemencouldbeasexploitativeasthegrowersforwhomtheyworked,oftenretainingthegreatestshareofthemoneysetasideforhiringfieldhands.Thedecisiontoorganizecontractorsratherthantherank-and-fileworkersbetrayedtheorganizingphilosophythatChavez,Padilla,andotherCSOveterans had learned from Fred Ross. Chavez articulated the philosophy years later: “Fredusedtosaythat‘youcan’ttakeshortcuts,becauseyou’llpayforitlater.’Hebelievedsocietywouldbetransformedfromwithinbymobilizingindividualsandcommunities.Butyouhavetoconvert one person at a time, time after time.”57 Padilla and Chavez regarded AWOC’sapproachasthekindofshortcutRosshadadvisedthemtoavoid.Chavez stayed true to his training even when workers themselves called on him to take

stronger action. InMarch 1965, for example, a worker on a local rosebush farm, EpifanioCamacho,appealedtoChaveztoorganizeastrikeagainstthegrowerforrepeatedlybreakingpromisesofbetterpay.Chavezresisted,advisingCamachotohavepatience.By1965,NFWAleaders had expanded its membership to approximately 1,200 through such painstakingmethodsthattheybelievedwouldpaydividendslater.58

Incontrast,AWOC’sapproachgarneredsomeimmediatesuccess,especiallyamongFilipinoworkers. Larry Itliong, a veteran of the Pacific migration and a former labor contractor,epitomized the AWOC organizer. Born in San Nicolas, Pangasina, the Philippines, Itliongarrived on theWest Coast in 1929 andworked in various crops throughout California andWashington, including a lettuce farmwhere he lost two fingers in a harvesting accident.Healso canned salmon inAlaska andmetmany labor organizers along theway, some of themaffiliatedwiththeCommunistParty.Bytheearly1950s,hehadrisentothepositionoflaborcontractorinKern-TulareCountywhilemaintainingradicalpoliticalviewsthatmadehimanappealingcandidateformembershipinAWOC.In1956hejoinedthelaborunionorganizingcommittee and began to assist Green, Knowles, and another organizer, Norman Smith, inattractingotherFilipinostotheorganization,includingayoungPeterVelascoandAndyImutan.Alongwith Itliong, two other veterans of the fields, PhilipVeracruz andBenGines, joinedAWOC’sorganizingeffortsandbecamekeyfiguresinAWOC’sattempttoestablishafoothold

intheSanJoaquinValley.59

Inspiteofdifferencesintheirapproach,AWOCandNFWAmembershadmutualrespectandstayedincontact.ItliongwaspresentandorganizingamongFilipinoworkersatthetimeoftheTulare rent strike, whereas Padilla maintained a positive but distant relationship with theFilipinoorganizersheencountered.Althoughexceptionsexisted,NFWAconfinedmuchofitsorganizing effort to Mexican field workers, a decision that mirrored the heavy Mexicaninfluence in theCSO.AWOChadgreater success amongFilipinos, likely a reflectionof itsemphasisonorganizingcontractors,inwhichFilipinosplayedanimportantrole.Inthesummerof1965thetracksofthesetwoupstartunionsconvergedinthegrapeharvest.

AWOCtookonamoreaggressiveposturethatseasoninanticipationoftheendofthebraceroprogram.WhenLyndonJohnsonrenegedonthegovernment’splanandrevivedtheprogramtoallowa limitednumberofMexicannationals toworkin theCoachellaValleygrapeharvest,AWOCpounced. Itpointedout thatdomesticworkers—manyof themFilipino immigrants—earned15cents less than thebracerosand instructedallAWOCpickers tovacate the field.Coachella Valley growers quickly resolved the matter by agreeing to a pay increase in anattempttoavoidacontractandthepossibilityofanextendedbattle.60AWOC’ssuccessonthewage increase, however, encouraged union officials to explore new opportunities as theharvestmovednorthwardintotheSanJoaquinValley,wheretheseasonlastedmuchlongerandworkershadanopportunitytotakeamuchstrongerstand.LarryItliongmovedtoDelanoandbeganorganizingamongthemanymanongs(fellowcountrypeoplefromtheIllocano-speakingregionofthePhilippines)whoparticipatedinthelocalharvest.Throughoutthisperiod,healsomaintained communicationwithDoloresHuerta,whose rapportwith Filipino farmworkersfrom her days working in her mother’s restaurant and hotel made her the ideal liaison forNFWA in its communication with AWOC. Although the organizations maintained friendlyrelations,thequestionofwhichunionwouldtaketheleadinthenewunionmovementamongfieldworkerscreatedabitofa rivalry. Inaddition,AWOChadsupport from theAFL-CIO,whileChavezhadbeencultivatinghisownrelationswithWalterReutherandtheUnitedAutoWorkers(UAW).Thenominalinvestmentintheracetoorganizefarmworkersbytwonationalunionsraisedthestakesenoughforeachorganizationtokeepaneyeontheother.TheNFWA’sorganizingmodelandattentiontoMexicanworkersgaveitastrongerinfluence

intheSanJoaquinValley,whereethnicMexicansdominatedinthelabormarket.Inaddition,therentstrikeservedasanimportanttrainingexperienceforneworganizers.Oneofthecampresidents,PaulEspinosa,wentontoorganizeRadioBilingue,aradioprograminSpanishandEnglish that fed the local populations important information regarding the union. Anotherresident, Ernesto Laredo, continued to organize tenants, along with a sixteen-year-old girl,YolandaBarrera,whoservedasatranslatorandwhoeventuallybecameafederalprosecutor.According to Padilla, Espinosa urged him to branch out into organizing on the local graperanch,J.D.Martin’sRanchoBlanco,wheremanyofthetenantsworked.There,aforemanhadagitated male workers by separating them from their wives. When the women relievedthemselvesinthefields,theforemanwouldfollowtosneakapeekatthem.Espinosabelievedtheycouldorganizetheworkerstogettheforemanfiredortoarrangeforadequatebathroomfacilitiesonthejob.

AlackofagreementonthenextstepandChavez’shealth,however,initiallydelayedfurtherorganizing. The demanding schedule of house meetings and travel landed Chavez in aBakersfieldhospitalwithpneumonia thatAugust.Thissetbackandapreference forbuildingtheuniononememberatatimepreventedhimfrommovingaggressively.Inaddition,NFWAorganizers wanted to respect the wishes of their allies. Unlike AWOC, which had beenorganizedbyunionmenandsupportedbytheAFL-CIO,NFWAhadstartedasacoalitionofcommunity organizers, religious leaders, and college students who did not always have acommon vision forwhat the organizationwould become. Padilla, for example, recalled themomentEspinosa came into thePorterville office to askhim toorganize atRanchoBlanco.“JimDrakehappened towalk inwhen Iwas talking to [Espinosa] andhe [said], ‘Don’tgostrike, you can’t strike.’” According to Padilla, Drake worried about conservative fundersfromtheChurchwhomightwithdrawtheirsupportiftheylearnedthattheywereorganizingaunion.PadillaappeasedDrakebypromisingtoevaluatethesituationontheranchandnotgetinvolvedinlabormatters.61

Padilla’sencountersatRanchoBlancocompelledhimtotakeaction.Hewitnessedseveralinstancesof abuseofworkerson the jobandheard fromanumberof employeeswhowerereadytoprotest.HeknewmanyoftheworkersfromtherentstrikeanddiscoveredthatatleasthalftheworkerslivedinEarlimart,asmalltownnearDelanothathadbeenfertilegroundforrecruitingnewNFWAmembers.“So,oneday,”Padillarecalled,“IgotupandIsaid,‘Ah,I’mgoingtopullthemout.’”WhileChavezlayinthehospital,Padilladirectedthefirstlaborstrikeof thedecadein theSanJoaquinValley.WhenChavezheardof theaction,hecalledPadillafromhishospitalbed, ribbinghimforwaiting tomake themoveuntilhe,Chavez,wassick.UponChavez’sreleasebythedoctor,thetwoimmediatelyhitthefieldswithpicketsignsandcalledallNFWAmemberstoparticipateinthelaboraction.WhenChavezcalledtheownerofthe ranch to reach a settlement, the owner refused to meet. Padilla recalled the grower’sresponse: “Let [Chavez] rot; I don’t care.” The unwillingness of J. D.Martin to settle thedisputesignaledanimportantdifferencebetweengrowersintheSanJoaquinValleyandthosein Coachella. The longer seasons and a thriving day-hauler labormarket gave San JoaquinValleygrowersconfidencethattheycouldweatherthestorm.62

ChavezandPadillaviewedthestrikeasanimpromptuactioninitiatedbytheworkersratherthanthebeginningofanewmovement.Thestrikecametowardtheendoftheseasonandoverissuesnotrelatedtowagesoracontract.Infact,asPadillarecalls,theydidnotevenrefertoNFWA as a union. In this regard, for Chavez the strike symbolized a flexing of NFWA’smusclesandputthegrowersonnoticethattheycouldnolongermistreattheiremployees.ForLarryItliong,however,thestrikerepresentedapotentialthreattousurpaunionmovementthathe and AWOC members had been planning to take over. Padilla recalled his response:“DolorestoldhimthatIwasstrikingandI’mmovingin,sohegotscared.”OnSeptember8,1965, Itliong pulled Filipino workers out of nine vineyards in Delano, initiating the grapestrike.63

TheAWOCactioncaughtChavezbysurpriseandforceduponhimadecisionaboutstrikingthathewasnotpreparedtomake.PadillarecalledhisconcernimmediatelyfollowingthenewsthatFilipinoshadwalkedoffthejob:“Youbettercome;theworld’scomingtoanend!There’s

5,000Filipinosonthestreet,[on]strike.”Whenthetwomet,ChavezaskedPadillatoattendanAWOCmeeting inDelanoat a communitybuildingknown locally asFilipinoHall.HealsoinstructedBillAsher,astaffmemberonthenewspaperElMalcriado,affiliatedwithNFWA,tojoinPadillatodocumentthehistoricmeeting.PadillaandAshersatinthefrontrowinthemostlyFilipinoaudience.ForPadilla,themeetingrevealedadiversityamongFilipinoshehadneverknown.“Ididn’tknowwhatthefuckwasgoingon,”heremembered,becausetheywere“speaking all their different languages.” The meeting required several translators for theFilipinos alone to communicate among themselves, because members spoke at least threelanguages: Tagalog, Illocano, and Pangasinan. In spite of the language barriers, Padillainterpreted the sincerity of AWOC’s commitment and received an appeal from Itliong forNFWA to join them.When Padilla returnedwith the news, Chavez arrangedwith the localpriest to hold ameetingofNFWAmembers at the local church,OurLadyofGuadalupe, inDelano.Hecalledon allies in the civil rightsorganizations,COREandSNCC, touse theirconnectionstodrawinactivistsinterestedinsupportingfarmworkerjusticeandtoldAshertogetthewordouttothecommunityoffarmworkersviaElMalcriado.Meanwhile,Padillatooka sleeping bag down to Filipino Hall to live among AWOC members and discuss mutualinterests.Strategically called on September 16,Mexican IndependenceDay, themeeting of NFWA

drewacapacitycrowdthatoverwhelmedthesmallchurchbuiltwithmoneydonatedbymanyoftheCatholicSlavicgrowersinthevalley.Padillaconductedthemeeting,whichledmanyinattendancetoconfusehimwithChavez.HeinvitedAWOCmemberstoaddressthecrowdtoexplain the reasons for their strike.Chavez,whowaitedpatientlyoff to the side,hadyet todecidewhetherhewouldaskNFWAmemberstojoininthelaborwalkout.“Cesarwasafraidto call a strike,” Padilla remembered. When he finally spoke, however, he discovered areadinessforactionamongthepeople.Heresistedshoutsof“Comeon,sayit!”frompeopleintheaudiencewhowantedhimtoinitiatethestrikethereandthen,largelyoutofrespectforthepriest,whohad askedPadilla andhimnot to call a strike that evening. Instead, he called ameeting for the following week at the American Legion hall. “That’s where we called thestrike,” Padilla remembered. “The following daywewent out and picketed, and the rest ishistory.”64

NumerousscholarsandjournalistshavedocumentedthehistoryoftheDelanograpestrikeandthe beginning of themodern farmworkermovement.Many tell the familiar story of how areluctantCesarChavezwasdrawnintothestrikebythemoreradical,union-orientedAWOCmembers, especially Larry Itliong. This Filipino farmworker vanguard took the first bravestepstowardtheformationofanewmultiethnicunion.AccordingtoPadilla,thecollaborationbetween AWOC and NFWA forced members to deal with cultural differences betweenMexicansandFilipinos,aswellastheverydifferentrelationshipsthesetwoorganizationshadwiththeestablishednationalunions.Early on, differences in resources brought the two closer together. The NFWA had not

accumulated a strike fund or a permanent home,whereasAWOC hadAFL-CIOmoney andFilipinoHall.ThesituationforcedmanyMexicanfamiliestorelyonthegenerosityofFilipino

workerstofeedtheirfamilieswhileoutonstrike.ManyrecalledstrikerseatingmealstogetherinFilipinoHall,oftensharingcuisines.“We[were]introducedtofishheadsandbitterlemonandallthatFilipinofood,”Padillafondlyremembered.65Asthegrowersduginandresistedasettlement, many of the men—both Filipino and Mexican—began to seek work elsewhere,testingthefortitudeofthestrikingfamilies.Atthesemoments,Mexicanwomenpickeduptheslack and led the picketing in the fields. The now famous photo ofUAWpresident,WalterReuther, leading a march, flanked by Cesar Chavez and Larry Itliong, in November 1965conveys the multiethnic solidarity of the moment, although it obscures the significant rolewomenplayedinsustainingthemovement.66

FIGURE4.AFL-CIOandAWOCmembersmarch insupportof farmworkersduring theDelanostrike,1965.Left to right:LarryItliong,AWOC;WalterReuther,UAW;CesarChavez,NFWA.ALUA,UFWCollection,362.

Thephotoalsohidesthesimmeringtensionthatexistedamongthevariouslaborfactionsthatcomposed the movement at the beginning. AWOC struck, in part, because of worries thatNFWA was about to take the lead in the race to establish a farm worker union. Thismisperception was fueled, in part, by Al Green, who had been active throughout ruralCaliforniainsearchoftherightformulaforsuccess.Amercurialfigure,GreenhadbelongedtotheInternationalBrotherhoodofTeamstersbeforetheorganizationwasejectedfromtheAFL-CIOforcorruptioninthenationaloffice.Hemaintainedconnectionstopackinghouseworkersorganizedunder theTeamsters andadvised ItliongandotherAWOCmembers tobeopen towhatever affiliation gave them the best chance for victory.Meanwhile, the presence of theUAW’sWalter Reuther at theNovembermarch and his gift of $10,000 to bothAWOC andNFWA indicatedmore than just ahelpinghand fromabignationalbrother.During themid-1960s,ReutherlockedhornswithAFL-CIOpresident,GeorgeMeany,overarangeofpolicyissues,includingtheroleofthenationalunioninthecivilrightsmovement.ThatReutherhadanespeciallycloserelationshiptoChavezspurredMeanytosendBillKircher,anAFL-CIO

representative, toshoreupthenationalunion’sinfluenceoverthenewmovement.ByAugust19, 1966,Kircher had forged amerger ofAWOC andNFWA under the nameUnited FarmWorkersOrganizingCommittee andbrokered an agreement forChavez rather than Itliong tobecome the president of the union.67 The decision made sense, given that the majority ofworkers were Mexican; however, it also threatened to alienate the significant number ofFilipinoworkerswhostillmaintainedallegiancestootherunions,includingtheTeamsters.By1966,leadershadworkedoutmuchofthelogisticalissuesrelatedtowhowouldguide

theunion,butmanyissuesremainedunresolved,includinghowthismovementwouldsucceedwhereothershadfailed.Althoughmanynobleeffortshadbeenmadeovertheprevioussixtyyears, no organization or leader had figured out the right approach to earning collectivebargainingrightsforfarmworkers.Thetypicalunionstrategy,thestrike,hadthusfarfailed.Bythe end of the harvest that year, growers showed their usual stubbornness in resistingnegotiations and a confidence that they could outlast the poorly funded union. To succeed,Chavezwouldhavetoconsidertheboycott,astrategythathadlapsedsincetheNFLUuseditin1948butthatwouldhavenewpotentialintheeraofthecivilrightsmovement.

TWO

CapitalisminReverse

ASJERRYBROWNHEADEDFORameetingoftheNationalExecutiveBoard(NEB)oftheUnitedFarm Workers Organizing Committee in 1968, he pondered a future without the union.Accompaniedbyhiswife,Juanita,Brown(norelationtothefutureCaliforniagovernorofthesame name) had arrived in Delano in 1966 as a twenty-one-year-old graduate student inanthropology from Cornell University. Within a matter of minutes of their meeting, CesarChavez temporarily derailed Brown’s dream of writing a dissertation on farm workercommunities.BrownrecalledChavez’sfirstwordstohim:“Hesaid,‘Jerry,doyouknowwhowehatemorethansocialworkers?’”StaringintentlyintoBrown’seyes,Chavezansweredhisownquestion:“Socialscientists.”Inthenextminute,ChavezmadeadealwithBrowntoopentheDelanofarmworkercommunitytohimif thecouplevowedtoservethemovementforatleast two weeks. Now, two years later, Brown was heading for Filipino Hall as the co-coordinatoroftheinternationalboycotttopleadhiscasetotheNEBforamajorexpansionofthecampaign.Inhis twoyearsofservice,Brownhadputhis loveofdataanalysis togooduse,studying

USDA consumer andmarketing reports for the top forty-one citieswhereCalifornia grapeswere sold.Brown recalled, “I foundoutvery rapidly that… the tenmajorNorthAmericancities—whichalso includedMontreal,Toronto,andVancouver—received50percentof thegrapeshipments.”1Although the boycott had been a part of the farmworkers’ arsenal since1965,theunionhadneithertheresourcesnorthetimetostudytheeffectivenessofthetactic.Mostoftheunion’sboycotteffortwasintuitive,tryingtostopthegrapesastheywoundtheirway through the market. Anecdotal knowledge of their success came from the front lines,where longshoreman,Teamsters, or restaurant andbarworkers agreednot to conveygrapesand wine to suppliers and customers. Occasionally the media covered an impressivedemonstrationinfrontofasupermarket,butthenotionofhoweffectivesuchcampaignswereinchangingcustomers’buyinghabitswasamystery.NowBrown’sresearchprovidedmaterialevidenceofsuccessand,moreimportant,theprospectofimprovingtheboycott.Accordingtohis statistics, only four of the cities had demonstrated meaningful declines in grape sales.Brownarguedthatbyconcentratingtheunion’smeagerresourcesonbuildingeffectiveboycotthouses in the ten leading cities, the union could affect the majority of the North Americanmarketforgrapesandbringthegrapegrowerstothebargainingtableinawaythatneitherthestrikesnorthemarcheshadbeenabletodothusfar.In spite of Brown’s data, Chavez showed little enthusiasm for his research and privately

upheld the primacy of the strike. “It was important in Cesar’s and in many of the boardmembers’[views],”recalledBrown,“tokeepabigstrikepresencegoingon.”SuchapositionrancountertoBrown’sprescriptionforsuccess:“Istartedrealizingthatwewerenevergoingtowinthestrikeinthefields.Youknow,itwasimportantforthemedia,itwasimportantforthe press, it was important for the farm workers’ morale. Yes, you might get a few more[growers]to[capitulateto]thestrike,buttheycouldalwaysreplacetheworkerswithworkersfromL.A., fromPhoenix, fromMexico—using thepooragainst thepoor.The ideastarted toforminmymindthatunlessweredeployedresourcesandgotstrongboycotts in tenof thesecities,wewerenevergoingtowintheboycott.AndIstartedtoarguethiswithCesarmoreandmorestrongly.”2

RatherthanpleadhiscasefurthertoanobstinateChavez,Brownappealedtotwoveteransofthe movement, LeRoy Chatfield and Chris Hartmire, both of whom had the capacity topersuade Chavez to take the matter to the NEB. “We talked about democracy,” Brownremembered,“butCesarwasverymuchincontroloftheunion,”andsuchamovewasthoughtto be both audacious andpolitically risky.Tohis surprise,Brown received an invitation tospeakatthenextboardmeeting.AsBrownspoke,memberslistenedpatientlyasheexplainedhischartsandgraphs,detailing

changes in grape sales where the boycott had been most consistently implemented. Hisconfidence growingwith every word, Brown boldly challenged his audience: “I endedmypresentationbysayingiftheboarddidnottakeimmediatestepstostrengthentheboycott,thenIcouldn’t really believe that theywere serious aboutwinning. And I—Juanita and I—we’regoingtoleavetheunion.”Heleftthemeetingwiththeimpressionthatthemembershadfinallygrasped the importance of the data, though Chavez showed little sign of agreement and nointentionofansweringBrown’sultimatum.Threedays later, thecouplepackedforMiami tovisitJuanita’sparentsontheirwaytoMexico,whereBrownplannedtoinitiateresearchonanewdissertationtopic.Justbeforedeparting,theyreceivedacallfromLarryItliong.AlthoughChavezwouldneverspeakwithBrownofhisdecision,thelaborleaderandmembersoftheNEBresolvedtoembraceBrown’sideastoredirectunionresourcestowardanexpansionoftheboycott.InsteadofheadingtoMexicotojump-starthisacademiccareer,BrowntraveledtoSantaBarbaraforageneralmeetingoftheunionmembership,wherehehelpedinitiateanewphaseofthemovement.Chavez’s reluctance to embrace the boycott is understandable given the difficulty of

maintaining such a campaign well beyond the primary site of struggle. As a product of anagrariancommunity,Chavezremaineddevotedtothosewhooccupiedsimilarspaces.This,inpart,explainedhiswithdrawalfromtheCommunityServiceOrganizationinSanJoseandLosAngelesinfavoroforganizingfarmworkersonehouseatatimeintheSanJoaquinValley.TheCSOexperience,however,hadopenedhimuptothepossibilitiesofcultivatingsupportforthefarmworkermovementamongurbanconsumers, if fornoother reason than tooccupyunionorganizers’timeduringlullsintheharvest.Acadreofyoung,energetic,andintelligentcollegestudents willing to take a leadership role in this experiment made the effort all the moreworthwhile. Their involvementwould change the complexion and strategy of themovementandforceChaveztocedesomeofhiscontroltoyouthfulprotestersinthemarketplace.Atthe

time,however,Chavezhad limitedoptionsdue to thegrapegrowers’ refusal toyield to thestrike and a lack of resources to keep workers on the picket lines in the fields. Born ofnecessity,theboycottprovedtobeastrokeofgeniusthatgrewoutofaperiodinwhichChavezembracedcreativityandindependentthinkingamongthemovement’smanycontributors.

THENEWFRONT:BOYCOTTGRAPES!

The excitement caused by the impromptu strike by the Agricultural Workers OrganizingCommittee and themerger of AWOC and the National FarmWorkers Association into onegrandunionproducedanarmyoforganizedworkersreadyforbattle.Theseasonalnatureofthegrapeharvestframedtheperiodofconflict,concentratingthefightinthefieldstothelatespringandsummermonths,fromMaythroughAugust.Assummerbecamefall,thestruggletostop the flow of scab workers onto Coachella and San Joaquin Valley grape plantationsbecame less urgent, although the need to keep organized workers committed remainedimportanttothesurvivalofthemovement.GilbertPadillarecalled,“Wetalkedaboutwhatthehellweweregoingtodointhewinter.”Leadersof theunionworriedthata lackofactivityafterthekeysummermonthswoulddepletetheorganizationofbodiesandenergyvital toitsmomentum.Thesechallengesconfrontedunionorganizersasearlyasthefallandwinteraftertheinitial

1965strike.AccordingtoPadilla,theideaforaboycottwasnottheresultofagrandplan,butoriginatedinthecommunityorganizingexperienceofCSOveterans.“WelearnedinCSO,”herecalled,“youdon’torganizepeopleunlessyouhavesomethingforthemtodo;otherwiseyoulosethem.”Inneedofataskfortheoff-season,acoregroupoforganizers,includingPadilla,Chavez,Larry Itliong,DoloresHuerta, and JimDrake, brain-stormed about strategy.Nowaseasoned twenty-eight-year-old, Drake had dropped his inhibitions about working with thenew union and dove headlong into the fray.His commitment to social justice andChavez’sincorporationofCatholicandChristiansymbols into themovement laid the foundation foralong and important relationship that kept Drake at the center of the union for more than adecade.According to Padilla,Drake proposed the idea of a boycott of grapes as away ofoccupyingthenewlyorganizedvolunteersforserviceuntil theprimarytool, thestrike,couldbe employed again during the 1966 season.Years later, amoremodestDrake claimed thatChavezhadagreedtotheboycott“figuringitwasaneasywaytogetthisyoungkidoutofhisway.”3Whetherornotheinitiallybelievedintheefficacyoftheboycott,Chavezembracedthenew strategy, assignedDrake to be coordinator of the national campaign, and asked fellowveterancommunityorganizerstoutilizetheirnetworksintheserviceofcreatingboycottdrivesinkeycities.PadillaandHuertaturnedtotheiroldCSOcontactsinLosAngelestobuildthefirstofmany

“boycotthouses,”asthelocationofoperationsineachcitycametobecalled.Bothhadspenttimebuilding theCSOanddevelopingrelationshipswithnumerous laborunions inEastLosAngelespriortoorganizingfarmworkers.Now,asmembersoftheUFW,thetworeachedoutto thesesameunionleaders tokick-start theboycott.Padillarecalled,“Iwent to theCentral

LaborCouncil, the restaurant and hotel labor union, the autoworkers union—you name theunion,wewenttothem.”Byappealingtofellowunionmemberstoboycottgrapes,theUnitedFarm Workers cultivated a beachhead. Padilla also brought in farm worker families fromDelanoinordertoappealtopotentialallieswhomightcontributetheirtimetothecause.Theappealsworked,asurbanresidentssympathetictothefarmworkerslefttheirjobstoservetheunion.

FIGURE5.CesarChavezatanunidentifiedeventwithReverendJimDrake,ca.1970s.ALUA,UFWCollection,3275.

RudyReyes,aveteranoftheAWOCstrike,joinedPadillaandHuertainLosAngeles,wherethey witnessed the evolution of the boycott from an off-season activity into an integralcomponentofthemovement.Accordingtothetwenty-three-year-oldFilipinofarmworker,theboycottunfoldedintuitively:

When truckloads went to L.A., we followed them, and our L.A. supporters tried toprevent the unloading of the grapes. If they got them unloaded anyway, we tried

stoppinganybigbuyersfrombuyingthem.Ifthegrapesstillgotintostores,wesetuppicketlinestoaskconsumersnottobuythegrapesand,ifpossible,nottobuyinthisstore. Then our dozens or hundreds of supporters took turns calling up those stores,telling the managers that they were long-time consumers, and they wouldn’t buyanythinganymoreuntiltheypromisednottobuyandsellgrapesfromDelanoanymore.After a while, we set up our boycott headquarters in L.A. to coordinate all oursupportersintoacohesivearmy.4

Theboycottslowlygatheredstrengththroughthewinterof1965andspringof1966astheL.A.staffworkedwithlocalunions,followedtheshipments,andappealedtostoremanagersnottocarrygrapes.Initially,theUFWdirecteditsboycottindiscriminately,buttheunioneventuallytargetedtwo

leadersintheindustry:NFLU’snemesis,theDiGiorgioCorporation,andSchenleyIndustries,primarilyaproduceranddistributorofliquor.Bothwereanomaliesamonggrapeproducers,giventheircorporatestructureandsizeofproduction.AlthoughDiGiorgioheldseveralacresin the San Joaquin Valley, the Borrego Valley in the southern desert near Coachella, andcropland in Florida, Robert DiGiorgio, Joseph DiGiorgio’s son, began to diversify thecompany’s interests soonafterhebecamepresidentof thecorporation in1962. In1964, thecompanydropped“fruit”fromitstitleandincreaseditsnonagriculturalbusinessto87percent,on itsway to98percentby1967.TheyoungerDiGiorgioalsodeclared inhis1964annualreport that DiGiorgio Corporation was now “a publicly held, profit oriented processor,distributor and marketer of foods,” moving further away from the production side of thebusiness.SchenleybuiltasimilarempireintheEast.Thecompany’snameoriginatedfromSchenley,

Pennsylvania, where a Jewish businessman, Lewis Rosensteil, produced and distributedmedicinal whiskey during Prohibition. In the 1940s, Schenley expanded on 4,500 acres ofpremium land in theSan JoaquinValley, but continued to drawmost of its $250million inannualincomefromthesaleofsuchbrandsasCuttySarkwhiskey,Seagram’sSevenwhiskey,and Roma wines. In the 1960s DiGiorgio’s main office was in San Francisco; Schenleyoperated out of Chicago, New York, and Delaware. Although both companies benefitedimmensely from the growth of agriculture in rural California after World War II, neitherresembled the family-owned, immigrant-based, grape grower cliques that defined growercultureinCalifornia.The distinctions between corporations and family-owned, immigrant growers became

significantastheboycottworeon.Family-ownedgrowersdefendedtheirturfasthegroundonwhich they, as immigrants, had struggled to create a business and a way of life. Forcorporations, such as Schenley, DiGiorgio, and later InterHarvest—a New York–basedcompanymanagedbyJewishmogulEliBlack—acommitmenttobusinessoverculturemadethe corporations more inclined to settle labor disputes that crimped the flow of capital.Consequently, these corporations maintained an open mind about recognizing unions andsigninglaborcontracts,whereastheoldguardimmigrantgrowersresistedsuchsolutions.Early on, boycotters did not perceive such differences; they pursued large targets such as

SchenleyandDiGiorgiobecause thesecompaniesdependedoneasily identifiednetworksofunionizedworkerstodelivertheirproductstomarket.InthecaseofSchenley,whoseprofitsdepended on the consumption of liquor in urban restaurants and hotels, the “jobbers,” ormiddlemenbetweentheproducersandthebusinessesthatsoldtheproduct,becamethekeystotheexecutionoftheboycott.Onceagain,Padillaturnedtoafriendinthehotelandrestaurantworkersunion,Herman“Blackey”Levitt,whoservedasthepresidentofthejointcouncilforlaborunionsinLosAngeles.Padillarecalled,“ThisguyLevittsaid,‘Letmetellyouhowtodothis.’Andhegotthisbookwithallthejobbers.Sowesentletterstoallthesejobberswewere going to boycott.” Padilla’s appeal to the wholesalers worked. In San Francisco, theunionpicketed thedocksagainst theadviceofAWOCleader,AlGreen,whoworriedaboutembarrassing longshoremen,whom he assumed knew little about the farmworkers. Chavezstood his ground, and, to the surprise of Green and other established labor leaders, thelongshoremen aided the boycott by refusing to unload grapes. By April, Schenley wasexperiencingsteepsalesdeclinesinLosAngelesandSanFrancisco,twokeyurbanmarkets.Thesuccessprovedthattheboycottwasusefultothemovement,makingitapermanentfixtureintheUFWarsenal.5

Theboycottworkedintandemwiththeevolvingsituationonthegroundasruralcommunitiespreparedforthe1966grapeharvest.Throughouttheoff-season,theUFWconductedmarches,challenged local lawenforcement tomanage thestrike fairly,and reachedout toestablishedunions in hopes ofmaintainingmomentum. The tenor of union events rose to the level of areligious revival, as songs, theater, and art developed to promote la causa. The movementinspiredthecreationofthetheatergroupTeatroCampesinobyatwenty-five-year-oldnativeofDelano,LuisValdez,who had graduated fromSan Jose StateUniversity but returned to thevalleytobeapartoftheaction.Inadditiontostagingproductionsthatpresentedgrowers,scabworkers,andlawenforcementofficialsascaricaturesofthemselves,ValdezpennedsomethingofamanifestoinElPlandeDelanothatarticulatedthebroadgoalsandculturalaspectsofthefarmworkermovement.ElPlanannouncedthearrivalofanewsocialmovementanditscloseaffinitywiththeCatholicChurch,whosesymbolsofsacrificeandpietybecameapartoftheiconographyof theUFW.Themanifestoalsoannouncedapilgrimageorperigrinación fromDelano to Sacramento inwhichChavez andUFWofficialswouldmarch 280miles throughfarmworkervillagesnorthwardthroughthevalleyinanticipationofthe1966harvest.Drake andChavez sent a handful of organizers out to unfamiliar cities across the country

withthephonenumberofasympatheticlocalcontact,$100,andthechargeofidentifyingandorganizingvolunteerstodedicateasmanyhoursoftheirdayaspossibletowardinstitutingtheboycottintheirassignedcity.Organizersenduredtimeawayfromhomeorschool,andsomeboycott leadersoccasionallymoved theirentire family toa locationof theunion’schoosing.Unlikeamarchthatcametomanyfarmworkersintheirvillagesanddemandedafiniteamountoftimefromitsparticipants,theboycottfunctionedlikeafull-timejobwithpoorpay,usuallyinanunfamiliarenvironment.Thestrikedemandedasimilarlevelofcommitment,althoughthefact thatsuchbattles tookplacenearworkers’ruralhomesamongacommunitythatsharedacommonlanguageandculturemadeitslightlyeasiertoorganize,comparedtotheboycott.Hijinio Rangel was oneworker whomade tremendous sacrifices for the boycott. Rangel

worked in theGianninipackinghouse inDinuba,California, in theSan JoaquinValleywhenChavez recruitedhim.Althoughpackinghouseworkers receivedpaysuperior to thatofmostagricultural workers and enjoyed collective bargaining rights, Rangel chafed at the abusessufferedbyfieldworkers.Asthemovementmatured,RangelbecameloyaltoUFW,recruitingfieldworkerswhile driving a tractor anddistributingwater to pickers in the vineyards.Healsohostedrecruitmentmeetingsathishome,whereChavezreachedout toasmallgroupofheartyfarmworkerswillingtofightfortheunion.Rangeleventuallyearnedenoughmoneytobuy a tortilleria (tortilla store) in Orosi, California, but maintained his commitment to theUFW, using his store as a base for organizing farmworkers. In 1968, Chavez appealed toRangel to work for the movement full time under the California Migrant Ministry. Rangelremembered,“I[had]toleavemyjobandmybusinessandpersuademywife(whichwasnotsoeasy)tomove.”Thatyear,Rangel,hiswife,andeightchildrencommittedtheirlivestotheunion, going first to Portland, Oregon, and eventually to Detroit, Michigan to oversee theboycott.6

Collegestudentsimbuedwithadesiretomakechangealsosignedupinsignificantnumbers.Forsomeyoungpeople,suchasMarshallGanz,gettinginvolvedinthefarmworkermovementprovedtobeahomecoming.AsaJewishboygrowingupinBakersfield,California,duringthe1950s,GanzhaddevelopedaconsciousnessaboutthefightforcivilrightsintheSouthbuthadnotyetrecognizedtherelevanceofthisbattletohisownbackyard.“Igrewupinthemiddleofthe farmworker world,” recalledGanz, “but of course never saw it.” Although his debatecoachinhighschooltriedtodirecthisattentiontothefarmworkers,ittookatriptotheDeepSouthwhileincollegeforhimtodiscovertheimportanceofcivilrightsactivismbackhome.“Ihad togo toMississippi andget [an] education about race and class andpolitics,”Ganzremembered,“sothatwhenIcameback,Icouldseewithwhatwecall‘Mississippieyes.’”Ganz acquired this newwayof seeingduringFreedomSummer, aMississippiworkshop in1964 runbyacoalitionofnorthernblackyouthsandsouthernblackactivists to trainmostlywhite, northern college students to help in the fight to extend the franchise to AfricanAmericans in the South.7 Ganz made his way to Mississippi that summer from HarvardUniversity, joining such future leaders asMario Savio from theUniversity of California atBerkeley, who went on to lead the free speech movement, and Heather Booth from theUniversity of Chicago, who later founded the Chicago Women’s Liberation Union. TheexperiencechangedGanz’slifeandmadehimmoreawareofthesharedhistoryofsegregationandviolencebetweenAfricanAmericansintheSouthandpeopleofcolorinruralCalifornia:“Imean,itwaslikeseeingthroughadifferentlens,anditwaslike,oh,peopleofcolor,oh,nopolitical rights, just like theSouth…marginalwages, just like theSouth.California’s ownhistoryofsegregation,racialdiscrimination, just liketheSouth.…Andsoitwasmuchmorelikeanextensionofthemovementthanitwaslike,‘Oh,I’mgoingtoworkforaunion,’whichwouldn’thaveoccurredtome[beforeFreedomSummer].”8

FIGURE6.AtaUnitedFarmWorkersrally,CesarChavezlooksoverabinderwithMarshallGanz.Locationunknown,1971.ALUA,UFWCollection,3248.

Ganz belonged to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, one of the primaryrecruitmentandtrainingorganizationsforFreedomSummer.ForSNCC,1964wasasoberingexperience,astheirpeacefulbutpersistentprotestswentunheededbythenationalDemocraticParty. At the Democratic National Convention that year, the party stalwarts, including theParty’s nominee, President Lyndon B. Johnson, refused to seat the Mississippi FreedomDemocraticPartyastherepresentativeforthestateevenafternationalmediacoveragebroughtthe violence against civil rights protesters in Mississippi to public light. The murders ofseveralcivilrightsworkers,includingthreevolunteersinvolvedwithMississippiSummer—MichaelSchwerner,AndrewGoodman, and JamesChaney—proved toorganizers thatblackand white activists could be killed with impunity. As a consequence, SNCC leaderscontemplatedamoreconfrontationalpoliticsbutalsoembracedanexpansionofthemovementby placing SNCC representatives with social justice organizations operating outside of theSouth.Ganz’spathtotheunioncamebywayofthekindofdiversityandinter-groupdialoguethat

hadliftedthefarmworkermovementintheearlydaysandmadethesuccessoftheboycottapossibility.Ganz,whohadcomebacktoBakersfieldattheendof1964inpreparationforhisreturntoHarvardinthefallof1965,reconnectedwithanoldfriend,LeRoyChatfield.Bythistime,ChatfieldhadabandonedtheclergytoworkwithChavezontherentstrike.Ganzhadreadabout the strikewhileworking forSNCCandacceptedan invitation fromChatfield tomeet

Chavez.Aswithsomanyyoungpeople,ChavezpersuadedGanztochangehisplansforthefalland instead appeal to SNCC leaders to make him a paid representative for the studentorganizationwithinUFW.SNCCrespondedbyapprovingGanz’sproposalandsenthimandanadditional representative,DickieFlowers—orDickieFlores,as theSpanishspeakers in theunion referred to him—to California. Eventually, Stokely Carmichael, the new leader ofSNCC, came to California to meet Chavez in the fall of 1965 and made Ganz the solerepresentativeofSNCCwithinthefarmworkersunion.SNCCpaidGanz$10perweek,fivemoredollarsperweekthanwhattheunioncouldaffordtopayitsstaff.Ganzrecalled,“Iwassort of a labor aristocrat there.” This arrangement lasted until August 1966, when SNCCembraced the black power movement and chose a more unilateral, blacks-for-blacks-onlyapproach to civil rights.According toGanz, “Imay have been the lastwhite person on theSNCCpayroll(laughter).”9

TheearlysuccessoftheboycottexceededtheexpectationsofChavezandtheleadershipoftheunion.Duringthefirst twoyears,growerswatchedthe“freeonboard”(FOB)priceofalug(box)of theirgrapesplummetfromahighofover$6 in1966toapproximately$5.50 in1968,onitswaydownto$4.89in1969.10InadditiontoDrake,whoservedastheinformationdirector forChavez,LeRoyChatfieldandaBayAreaally,MikeMiller,communicatedwithboycottorganizerslocatedinkeycitiesaroundthecountry.Indicativeofthesupplementalrolethe boycott played in this period, some of the communication came from Delano, whereChatfieldandDrakespentmuchoftheirtime,andsomeofthecommunicationemanatedfromaSanFranciscoofficeconvenienttoMiller’slocation.11TheunionlackedsomuchinthewayofinfrastructurethatChavezhadtorelyonstafflocatedthroughoutthestatetocarryoutmultipletasks.Thoseinvolvedintheboycottcelebratedthemoralvictoryofswayingtheconsumersina given city or at a specificmarket but had little time to devise a system for charting theirsuccess.Tantamounttobuildingaplanewhileflyingit,Chavezandasmallgroupofleadersconstructed the union by stringing together public relations victories that gatheredendorsementsfromadiversesetofsupporters.Securing well-positioned allies had been one of the early keys to Chavez’s success. For

example,whentheAFL-CIOconveneditsannualmeetinginSanFranciscoin1965,thegrapestrikeandboycotthadpiqued the interestof fellowunionists,butnoone inorganized laborformally endorsed the farm workers until UAW president, Walter Reuther, stepped out insupportoftheunion.Inthespringof1967,SenatorRobertF.KennedydrewmediaattentiontothestruggleinaseriesofhearingsbytheSenateSubcommitteeonMigratoryLabor.Althoughthe subcommittee chair, Senator George Murphy (R-California), staunchly supportedagribusiness and hoped to sway public opinion against the farm workers, Kennedy’saggressivequestioningoftheKernCountysheriff,LeRoyGallyen,onchargesoffalsearrestsofpicketersexposedlawenforcementofficials’abuseofactivists’civilrightsandignoranceofthelaw.Afterthelasthearing,KennedypaidanunexpectedvisittoFilipinoHall,wherehedeclared his support for the grape strike. Kennedy later joined a UFW picket line atDiGiorgio’sranchandwasacloseallyofthemovementfortheremainderofhislife.12

The success of the boycott and the political events surrounding theDelano-to-SacramentomarchplacedSchenley andDiGiorgioon thewrong sideof publicopinion.Althoughgrape

growers dug their collective heels in against the union, Schenley’s chief executive officer,LewisRosensteil,recognizedtheUFWcampaignasaliabilitytothemanyproductsmarketedbyhiscompany.BlackeyLevitt’sabilitytodeliversupportfromthebartendersunionandthecooperation of the Teamsters in San Francisco not to load Schenley products worried thecompanybrass, asSchenley’svicepresident JamesWoolsey later testified to theCaliforniaSenateSubcommitteeonAgriculture:“Thesereprisalsandthepublicitypresentedathreatofseriousdamagetoourbusinessonanationwidescale.OursalesdepartmentfeltthatevenmoredamagingthananydeclineinoursaleswastheadversepublicitythataccompaniedtheboycottandtheNFWAorganizingactivities.”13Schenleywasoneofthefourlargestliquordistributorsin the country, and its primary ownership ofCentralValley grape vineyards had to dowithwineproduction,nottablegrapes.Moreover,whereasthetablegrapegrowershadatraditionof not negotiatingwith unions, Schenley settled a strike byGalarza’s National Farm LaborUnionin1952byincreasingwages,establishingagrievanceprocedure,andrehiringworkerswhohadbeenlockedoutduringtheinitialconflict.ForashrewdbusinessmanlikeRosensteil,anythingthatsulliedthenationalreputationofhisproductshadtobeeliminated.14

RosensteilbrokerankswithotherownersandcalledonattorneySidneyKorchaktobrokeradeal with Chavez. A mercurial man with assumed connections to the Chicago mob and areputation for “fixing” labor problems in the liquor and film industry, Korchak summonedChavez, Levitt, Teamster representatives, and AFL-CIO representative, Bill Kircher, to hisBeverlyHillsmansiononApril3,1966.ThemeetingprecededthemergeroftheNFWAandAWOC in August; however, Kircher’s presence provided representation for AWOC.AccordingtoMarshallGanz,everyoneatthemeetinghadanagenda,butKorchakrecognizedthat“itwastheNFWAthatcontrolledtheboycott.”Asaconsequence,KorchakrecognizedtheNFWAas theunion to representSchenleyworkersandagreed toan immediate35centsperhour increase inwages to $1.75, the creation of a union-run hiring hall, and the option forworkers to join theNFWAcreditunionupontheiraffiliation.HealsopromisedfullcontractnegotiationstoreplacethetemporaryagreementinexchangeforanendtotheboycottagainstSchenley.15

News of the breakthrough reached themarchers in Lodi, California, onApril 6, just fourdayspriortoEasterSundayandtheculminationoftheperigrinacióninSacramento.ThenextdayDiGiorgio,theothercorporategiantinthefields,announceditswillingnesstorecognizeaunion, but without fully endorsing the NFWA. Rather, it expressed its support for a secretballotelection,withtheNFWA,AWOC,andacompanyunion,Tulare-KernIndependentFarmWorkers,asoptions.Whenthepressexposedthecompany’stiestoTKIFW,DiGiorgioshiftedtacticsandappealedtotheTeamsterstoorganizefarmworkers.Initially,DiGiorgioattemptedtorunanelectionatitsBorregoSpringsRanchinSanDiegoCountywithoutagreeingtotermswitheithertheNFWAorAWOC.WhentheNFWAappealedtoworkerstoboycotttheelectionand AWOC agreed, nearly half the 732 workers refused to participate, invalidating theresults.16

ToDiGiorgio’ssurprise,itsattempttodividetheNFWAandAWOChadthereverseeffect,drivingthetwounionscloserandmakingitpossibleforKirchertoengineertheirmergerintotheUnitedFarmWorkersOrganizingCommittee.17 FredRoss,who came toDelano to help

with theDiGiorgiocampaign, recalled,“Cesar learnedashewentalong;heknewhehad tohavemoney,andhehadtohavemorestrength.”AccordingtoRoss,“Hehadtodoit,”butthedecisiontomergewithAWOCdidnotsitwellwithmanyoftheorganizerswhohadhopedtomaintain their independence. Chavez sympathized with these concerns, explaining, “I wasworriedthatitwouldcurbourstyle.”Amonghischiefconcerns,AWOC’stacitrecognitionofthegovernment’srestrictionagainst“secondaryboycotts”compelledhimtopushfortermsthatwouldallowforacontinuationofitsuse.“ItoldthemIdidn’tmindjoining,”ChaveztoldthereporterRonTaylor,“aslongaswegotagooddeal,butwehadtohavetherighttoboycott.”18Ultimately,thetwosidesgotwhattheywerelookingfor:AWOCwantedaunionsupportedbytheMexicanworkerswhoconstitutedthemajorityoftheNFWA’srankandfile,andtheNFWAwantedtheapprovalfromtheAFL-CIOthathadbeenbackingAWOC.The formation of the UFW did not please everyone, and some from each organization

defected to the Teamsters or left labor organizing completely. For most, however, Chavezadroitlynavigatedaroundconflictbyhonoringmanyof theFilipinoorganizerswho initiatedthe 1965AWOCgrape strike.Larry Itliong became second in commandofUFW, andAndyImutan and Phillip Vera Cruz were named vice presidents. Veterans of the NFWADoloresHuerta, Gilbert Padilla, and Tony Orendain also became vice presidents, while LeRoyChatfieldcontinuedasanimportantmanagerofthenewunion’saffairsfromitsbaseinDelano.Meanwhile,ChrisHartmireandJimDrakecontinuedtosteerurbansupportanddollarstowardthemovementthroughMigrantMinistry.19

DiGiorgioattemptedtoprotectthereputationofitsnationalproducts,S&WFineFoodsandTreesweetfruit juices, justasSchenleyhad,byseparatingitselffromtheSanJoaquinValleygrowers’ clique and pursuing peace with the union. Another company, Perelli-Minetti, aproducerof qualitywines andvermouth, pursued a similar solutionwhen thenewly formedUFWinitiatedanationwideboycottof itsproducts.LikeDiGiorgio,Perelli-Minetti initiallysought to have the Teamsters represent its workers rather than resist any union. Theeffectiveness of the boycott, however, compelled Perelli-Minetti to back away from theTeamstersandaccepttheUFWasthebargainingagentforitsemployees.OnJuly21,1967,theTeamstersreachedanagreementtoturnoverallitscontractsforfieldworkerstotheUFWinexchangeforChavez’srecognitionoftheTeamsters’righttorepresentallemployeesworkingincanneries,packinghouses,andfreezers.Thenextday,manyofCalifornia’slargewineries,including Gallo Wines and Paul Masson, followed Perelli-Minetti by agreeing to holdelections for their workers.20 The wineries saw the virtue of this strategy because, likeSchenleyandDiGiorgio,theyhadmadetheirmoneybasedonthequalityassociatedwiththeirbrandnames.Thesolutionofunionrecognitionstoodinstarkcontrasttothethinkingoflocaltablegrape

growers,whofoughttomaintainexclusivecontroloverthehiringandlaborprocesses.WhenSchenley caved to the pressure of the march and the boycott, for example, the CaliforniaCouncil of Growers, a nonprofit public relations firm representing themajority of owners,issued the followingstatement:“While theNFWAand its religiouscohortswere righteouslypreaching democratic processes and marching on Sacramento, the leaders were closetedelsewhere,workingoutadealthatdeniesworkersanyvoiceintheproceedings.…Schenley

Industries,whosefarmoperationsareincidentaltotheirbasicwhiskey-makingbusiness,isnotrepresentative of California agriculture, where growers steadfastly refuse to sell out theiremployeesandforcethemintoaunionwhichdoesnotrepresentthem.”21

Unwittingly, themovementexposedtheclasscleavagesamongfarmowners,prompting thelocal table grape growers to articulate differences between them and their corporate peers.The diversity of brands used by Schenley, DiGiorgio, and Perelli-Minetti made themmoresusceptibletotheboycottandmoreinclinedtosettletheconflictquickly.Inaddition,theunionlearned thatby topplinga leader inaparticular industry,othercompaniesquickly followed.ThiswasthelessonofthePerelli-Minettiboycott,inwhichGalloandMassonsuedforpeaceimmediatelyafterPerelli-Minetticapitulated.Table grape growers undermined the assumption that such a strategy worked in all

circumstances.Rather thandividingandconqueringallgrapeproducers, theboycotthad theunintended consequence of moving a diverse group of ethnic and family-based table grapegrowerstowardgreatercooperation.Forgedinthecrucibleofclassconflict,theSouthCentralFarmersCommittee(SCFC)becametheleadingself-helporganizationforgrowers.The SCFC grew out of early affinities among Slavic pioneers, such as Jack Pandol and

MartinZaninovich,butitalsoincludedahandfulofnon-SlavicgrowersfromtheDelanoarea.Bythe1960s,EuropeanethnicgrowershadfullyembracedArmeniansasequals,butJapaneseAmerican small farmers remained conspicuously absent from themembership.According tothe SCFC’s first president,Martin Zaninovich, the organization incorporated onAugust 26,1960, inanticipationofunionorganizing.Whentheuniondidcome, theSCFCbecamemoreorganizedandleasedanofficeindowntownDelanoinearly1966.AccordingtoZaninovich,“Theprimaryfunctionofthecommitteeatthattimewastoserveasthepublicrelationsarmoftheagricultureinthearea.”22Membersalsometroutinelytoplotstrategyandstrengthentheircommonbonds, ifnecessary throughthreats. Inonecase,abeleagueredgrowerconfessed tohavinggrownwearyofconstantlysearchingforworkersandbattlingtheunion.“Thenexttimeyoucome,bringyourpinkslip,”apeerresponded,suggestingthathewouldbuyhimoutratherthanseehisfarmendproductionbecauseoftheunions.“Unionizingoffarmswassimplynotaccepted,”Zaninovichremembered.23

Early on, the SCFC responded to the strike by denying its existence. The arrival of theboycott, however, generated bad publicity at the point of sale, hurting the grape growers’reputationwithcustomersandforcingthemtoabandontheirbunkermentality.InJanuary1966,theSCFCformedaspeakers’bureautocirculategrowerswhowerewillingtomaketheircasetourbanconsumers.Italsoreverseditspositionofrefusingtocommunicatewiththemediaandinitiatedacampaign through theCouncilofCaliforniaGrowers towinback thepublic.TheCouncilchanneledallinquiriesthroughtheSCFCofficeinDelanoandhiredayoungex-navypilot, Bruce Obbink, to serve as the full-time director of education. Obbink had originallycometotheCouncilin1962tohelpfightagainsttheterminationofthebraceroprogram.Withthatbattlelost,ObbinkandtheCouncilfocusedonthenewchallengeofdefeatingtheUnitedFarmWorkers.HereceivedabudgettohireanofficemanagerfortheSCFC,EleanorSchulte,whocoordinatedcommunicationamongtheCouncil,thegrowers,andthepublic.24

Inspiteoftheseefforts,thegrowerscontinuedtolosethepublicrelationswar.Mostofthe

growersattributed their losses tobiased journalistswhocame toDelanowithpreconceivednotions. “A lot of people who come here think they are experts on farm labor,” Schulteobserved. “They come armedwithwhat they consider to be the facts, and this puts us in adefensivepositionrightoffthebat.”25Ratherthanadmittingthewell-documentedproblemsinfarmlaborhousingandwages,theSCFCaggressivelydeniedanydiscontentamongworkers.On behalf of grape growers, SCFC president, Martin Zaninovich, reported to a packedaudienceofjournalistsinSanFrancisco,“Overtheyears,wehavedevelopedandmaintaineda keenpersonal interest in each and every one of our employees.…Manygrowers providesuperiorhousingfreeofcharge.”Thisflewinthefaceofpopularaccountsofthelivesoffarmworkers depicted in programs like Edward R. Murrow’sHarvest of Shame, broadcast in1960,and theattentiondrawnto theproblemby theunion.Althoughsomegrowerssuppliedbetterhousing thanothers, the trend towardday-haulworkers rather than the typeofworkersettlements described byZaninovich undermined his paternalistic stance toward employees.Theworkofphoto-journalistsanddocumentaryfilmmakerstransportedimagesofunrestfromthe fields to urban consumers that served as visual rebuttals to Zaninovich’s constantprotestationthatworkerdeprivationanddiscontentwerea“myth.”26

Unliketheircorporatepeers,thelocalethnicandfamily-orientedgrowersrefusedtoseethestrikeortheboycottasabusinessmattertobedealtwiththroughnegotiations.OfthecorporategrowersGanz observed, “A lot of them had union contracts [in] other places; theyweren’tinvestedintheirstandinginthegrowercommunity;theyweren’tapartofthatlocalscene;theydidn’tgototheSlavclubandtheElksclubandthesamechurch.”27MembersoftheSCFC,ontheotherhand,sawtheunion’scampaignasapersonalaffronttotheirintegritythathadtoberesistedatallcosts.Forthem,thestruggleagainsttheUFWwasmorethanabusinessmatter;itembodied a wider cultural struggle that threatened a way of life. Zaninovich, in particular,harbored deep resentment toward student volunteers, whom he characterized as “far left ofleft”and“veryyoung,probablynaïve,andobviously idealistic,”whodidnot recognize that“theywerebeingmanipulatedbya fewunobtrusivebut effective leaders.”HisdismissalofboththesevolunteersandChavezplacedhimandhisfellowgrowersontheothersideofanewgeneration that now began to question the war, the treatment of racial minorities, and theresponsibilityoftheeducatedclasstosociety.Buoyedbytheirdefeatofthecorporategrowers,in1968ChavezandUFWleadersagreedto

takethefighttotablegrapeproducersratherthanconsolidatetheirgainsinthewineindustry.28As in thebattlewithwinegrapeproducers, union leaders decided to startwith a campaignagainst the biggest producer.GiumarraVineyardsCorporationwas the undisputed leader intablegrapeproduction,with$12milliondollars in annual sales fromproductionon 12,170acresofpremiumfarmland.29Thistime,however,theleadingcompanydidnotconcededefeat,nordiditspeersshowsignsofweakeninginthefaceofpressurefromtheboycott.Unlikethecorporategrowerswhocaredaboutlabels,tablegrapegrowersrarelymarketedtheirproductsbybrandnamesthatwereconspicuoustocustomersinsupermarkets,thusmakingtheboycottdifficulttoenforceatthepointofsale.Tablegrapegrowersfrequentlyusedmultiplebrandstomarketavarietyofgrapesatdifferentpointsintheseason.WhentheunionfinallysucceededindistinguishingGiumarra’sbrandsfromthoseofotherproducers,fellowgrapegrowersloaned

Giumarratheirlabelstofrustrateboycottorganizers.Asaconsequence,ratherthandefeatingthetablegrapegrowersduringthe1968season,theUFWfounditselfinaprotractedwarwiththeindustry,noclosertowinningthestrikesontheirfarmsortheboycottcampaignsinthecity.Theunion respondedbydeclaringan industrywideboycottofall tablegrapes,extending thebantoincludeArizonagrapes,butthegrowersstilldidnotbudgefromtheirposition.30

Tobesuccessful,theUFWhadtodiscovernewcracksinthegrowers’armor.Thefailuretobringethnicandfamily-orientedgrowerstothenegotiationtablethrougheitherthestrikeortheboycott signaled the long battle ahead. The union leadership discovered, however, thatcomparedtothestriketheboycotthadmadegrowersmoreuncomfortableabouttheirposition.“Thewholestrategicpremise,”Ganzremembered,“was…thatyoudidn’thaveenoughpowerinthelocallabormarkettowin.”Thestrikehaddrawnattentiontotheproblemoffarmworkerwagesandlivingconditions,buttheunionhadahardtimemaintainingaconstantpresenceinthe fields without a substantial strike fund to pay workers to walk picket lines or preventgrowers from replacing them with scab labor. When Governor Pat Brown orderedinvestigators from the state department of employment to confirm the existence of a labordispute, they had to rely on testimony from only forty-nine farmworkers who remained inDelanolongenoughtoconfirmtheirparticipation.ThisnumberwasfarbelowthethousandsofworkersChavezassertedhadparticipatedinthestrike.Mostfarmworkersmovedontoseekworkelsewhereinordertofeedtheirfamilies,thinningthepicketlinesinthefields.TheanemicdisplayinthecountrysideforcedChaveztoinvestmoretime,money,andhopein

theboycott.Forallof theirpublicity,unionofficialshaddonelittle tostoptheharvestingofgrapes at the point of production. The secondary boycott, however, showed no signs ofweakness, drawing new recruits in ever increasing numbers as the urban civil rights andantiwarmovementsbecamemoreviolentandfragmentedattheendofthe1960s.AlthoughtheboycottdecenteredthemovementfromitstraditionalbaseofpowerinDelano,whereChavezhadmorecontrol, it also transferred thebattleaway from thestrongholdof thegrowersandintoanarenathatgavetheunionabetterchanceofwinning.AccordingtoGanz,“Byshiftingtheturf[tothecities]…wecouldsuccessfullyfightthem.”31

WORKINGTHEBOYCOTT

By1968,astheunionmovedagainstthecoregroupoftablegrapegrowers,thefarmworkershadthreeprovenstrategiesintheirarsenal:thestrike,themarch,andtheboycott.Amongthethree,theboycottofferedleaderstheleastcontrol,giventheirdependenceonotherunionstoblock shipments and on consumers to avoid purchasing grapes. In addition, the boycottrequiredorganizerstomoveawayfromthecradleofthemovementtoliveinfar-flungcitieswithfewconnectionstoDelano.Theunion’sstandardcompensationof$5perweekdidnotgoas far inmetropolitan areas,where it took organizersmore time to locate allieswho couldoffsettheirexpenseswithdonationsoffood,shelter,andtransportation.Insomecities,suchasNewYork,theunionspentpreciousdollarstorentaboycotthousewherevolunteerssleptandworked.Atthetime,mostinthelabormovementthoughttheseexpenditureswereriskysince

the boycott had longbeen regarded as a tool of last resort.32 The success against Schenley,DiGiorgio, Perelli-Minetti, and Gallo, however, had encouraged union leaders to continueexperimentingwiththetactic.TheUFWbuiltsupportfortheboycottamongurbanconsumerswiththeeffortofasmallbut

committedcadreoforganizedfarmworkersandyouthfuladvocates.DrawinginspirationfromFredRossandtheCSO,JimDrakeappliedthesameapproachtoorganizingvolunteersfortheboycott houses as he had in recruiting farm workers to the union. Drake shared the UFWphilosophy:“Ifyoutrytospreadyourselfamongalltheworkers…thenyouaregoingtodoabout5%oforganizingofmaybe20%oftheworkers.Forgetaboutit,youarejustnevergoingtomakeit.”Instead,theorganizersput100percentoftheirtimeintoorganizingbetween2and5percentofthetotalpopulationoffarmworkers.Fromthisgroupcamethe“reallyorganized[and]committed,”arguedDrake,whowould“stickitoutfor20years”and“seetoitthatyouwin.”ForDrakeandothers,thenumberoffarmworkersinvolvedwaslessimportantthanthequality and commitment of those who carried the message of social justice to the generalpublic.“Wemadeitlooklike[therewere]thousandsofgrapepickersoutonstrike,”recalledDrake, “becausewemoved people around real fast.”Once the boycott came into play, theUFW’scentralorganizersappliedthissametacticonanationalscale.“[Theseworkers]wouldthinknothingofgivingup theirhomesandeverything togo toNewYorkorChicago for theboycott.”33

Astheboycottintensifiedinearly1968,Chavezaskedhislongtimefriendandmentor,FredRoss,torunatutorialonorganizingforfiftyfarmworkersandvolunteersinNewYorkCity,the largest and arguablymost importantmarket for grapes. Organizers ranged from teenagenovices like EliseoMedina to seasoned veterans like Gilbert Padilla and Dolores Huerta.Ross,however,treatedeveryoneequally,employingaphilosophyof“on-the-job”training,asJerryBrowndescribedit:“Rossneverlecturedaboutorganizing.Hebelievedthatonecouldonly learn toorganizebydoingit.Hewouldpointout that therewasnothingromanticaboutorganizing,and that it requiredmainlycommonsense,meticulousplanning,hardworkandagreatdealofselfdiscipline.”34

From this group, Eliseo Medina, an eighteen-year-old native of the Coachella Valley,traveledtoicyChicagointhemidstofwinterwiththeusual$100start-upfunds,ahandfuloflocalcontacts,andabagofunionbuttons.Anotherfarmworker,MarcoMuñoz,establishedaneffectivehouseinBostondespitenotspeakingawordofEnglish.InNewYorkCity,DoloresHuerta was called in to organize the boycott house on Eighty-sixth Street, while LeRoyChatfieldwent toLosAngeles, andGilPadilla startedahouse inPhiladelphia.Meanwhile,Chavezmade theboycott international from thebeginningby assigningGanz toToronto andJessicaGovea,atwenty-one-year-oldfarmworker’sdaughterfromBakersfield,toMontreal.35TheunionalsomaintainedhousesinseveralbigcitiesthroughouttheUnitedStates,includingSanFrancisco,Detroit,Portland,Seattle,andCleveland.TheseweretheboycotthouseswithwhichJerryandJuanitaBrowncommunicatedin1968.

Chavezexpectedthecoupletoconnectallspokesoftheemergingnetworktothe“pinkhouse,”alittle,three-bedroomcottageontheoutskirtsofDelanothatservedastheheadquartersfortheunion. There, Chavez introduced the Browns to the “boycott room,” where he gave them

minimalinstructions.OnamapofNorthAmericapinnedtothewall,ChavezdrewhisfingerdownthroughChicagoandtheMississippiRiverandsaid,“Jerry,youtaketheEast.Juanita,youtaketheWest.”Eventhen,JerryandJuanitasplittheirtimebywalkingthepicketlinesinthefieldsinthemorningandworkingthephonelinesandwritingletterstoboycottorganizersin the afternoon.Given Juanita’s college-levelSpanish skills,Chavez alsohadher translatedepositionswithimmigrantfarmworkersacquiredbytheheadoftheUFWlegalteam,JerryCohen, tobeused incasesagainst thegrowers.Foranupstartunion representingpoor farmworkers,suchdivisionoflaborwasnecessary,althoughfortheBrowns,italsoindicatedthattheboycottplayedasecondaryroletothemaintenanceofthestrike.36

Outonthefrontlinesoftheboycott,organizershadtoberesourcefuliftheyweretosucceed.Jerry Brown recalled, “Each boycott organizerwas like a brilliant campaign strategist thatfiguredoutwhatthekeytotheirparticularcitywas.…Itwasreally,youknow,on-the-groundorganizations.”37 In New York, Ross’s emphasis on community organizing gave way toestablishingcontactwith laborunions thatcontrolled themovementofproduce inandoutofManhattan. During the spring of 1968, UFW vice president and chief negotiator, DoloresHuerta,appealedtotheCentralLaborCouncil,theAmalgamatedMeatCuttersUnion,andtheSeafarers Union to establish a total blockade of California grapes. The unions agreed tocooperateintimetointerruptthefirstgrapesoftheseasonfrommakingtheirannualtripacrossthe Hudson River by barge. As the grapes rotted in New Jersey, grape growers filed aninjunction against the New York and New Jersey unions for violating federal regulationsagainstsecondaryboycottsanddemanded$25millionincompensationforlostsales.AlthoughtheTaft-HartleyAct didnot apply to farmworkers, it did restrict theSeafarersUnion fromparticipatinginsuchactions.Iteventuallyreleasedthegrapes,butthepauseinshipmentshadreducedtheoverallnumberofcarlotsfor1968toarecordlowof91,downfromtheindustrynormof418.38

Inmid-JulyHuertaand theextremelyefficientNewYorkCityhouseshifted toaconsumerboycott, picketing stores throughout the city. Huerta pursued the same logic in organizingagainstsupermarketsthattheunionhadusedinthecampaignsagainstthecorporateproducers:thelargertheorganization,thegreateritsvulnerability.IntheNewYorkarea,theA&Pchaindominatedthemarket,whichmadeitthefirsttarget.HuertadescribedherstrategyinalettertoDelanoheadquarters:“Ineachofthefiveboroughs,weorganizedneighborhoodcoalitionsofchurch,labor,liberalandstudentgroups.ThenwebeganpicketingA&P,thebiggestchaininthecity.Forseveralmonthswehadpicketlinesonabout25to30storesandturnedthousandsof shoppers away. A lot of the managers had come up through the unions and were verysympathetictous.Inresponsetoconsumerpressure,thestoremanagersbegantocomplaintotheirdivisionheads,andsoontheytookthegrapesoutofalloftheirstores,430ofthem.”39ByknockingoffA&P,therichestmarketchainintheUnitedStates,theboycotterssoftenedupitscompetitors—Bohack, Walbaum’s, Hills, and Finast—for the kill. One by one, the storesbecametheexclusivetargetoftheNewYorkboycotthouseuntilallexceptone—Gristedes,anexpensivedeliveryservicemarketforwealthyclients—stoppedsellinggrapesinthecity.Although Huerta’s tactic became part of a larger strategy used in the boycott, it did not

always work elsewhere. In Los Angeles, for example, LeRoy Chatfield and a former farm

laborcontractor,JoeSerda,ledtheboycottagainstthesecondlargestsupermarketchaininthecountry,Safeway.ChatfieldandSerda’sinitialapproachmirroredthatofHuerta’scampaign:topple the largest chain, and the others will follow. To their chagrin, however, the large,boisterousdemonstrations theystaged in frontofmarkets justupsetaconservativeclientele.Serdacouldnotbelievetheresponse:“Iwasshocked.Mostofthepeoplewouldrolluptheircarwindowsandguntheirmotorsrightbyus.”TheseresponsesdifferedfromthoseinNewYork City, where many working-class consumers belonged to unions and declared theirallegiancetotheUFW.InhisreportfromLosAngeles,SerdatoldBrown,“Evenmanyoftheunion members here are conservative and racist.” In front of some stores, customersoccasionally spit at picketers and yelled at Mexicans on the picket line “to go back toMexico.”40

Safeway’s own business practices contributed to the sentiments of its customers. Thecompany—referred to derisively by some employees as “Slave-way” for its treatment ofworkersandunion-bustingpolitics—foughttheboycottvigorouslyandtookoutfull-pageadsintheLosAngelesTimeschallengingthelegitimacyofboycotterstospeakforworkersinthefields.41 In the summerof1968,during thekeymonthsof the tablegrapeharvest,Chatfield,Serda,andvolunteersattheLosAngelesboycotthousesharedlittleofthemomentumenjoyedbyHuertainNewYork.42

Fartherup thecoast, inPortland,Oregon, theboycott teamusedHuerta’sapproachagainstthe supermarket chain Fred Meyer, but also discovered new strategies. Lead by a formerGiumarra picker and Migrant Ministry member, Nick Jones, a small number of volunteers“introduced the highways [or] human billboard idea.” The idea involved placing severalvolunteers onhighwaybridges adornedwithbody-length signspromoting theboycott. Jonesadmitted to balking at the tactic initially, although he encouraged those who wanted toexperiment to try. “It’s one of those times… that I really blew it. I [said], ‘it’s bullshit.Nobody’sgoingtorespondtothat,it’sjustawasteoftime.’”Withinfiveminutesoftakingtothe freeways,however, Jonesdiscoveredhowwronghewas.“Peoplewere letting looseoftheircarwheelsandlookingupatusandgivingusthefistandthe‘V’andthefinger.Imeanweweregettingarealdefiniteresponseoutofeverybody…tothepointwheretheywerelookingandtheyhadtohittheirbrakestokeepfromhittingthecarinfrontofthem.”Intime,thehumanbillboard strategy traveled across the country, where volunteers in Boston used it to greateffect.43

In Toronto, Marshall Ganz adopted a slightly different approach, a combined strategy ofappealingtounionsforcooperation,picketing,diplomacy,and,whennecessary,actsofcivildisobedience. He began by making overtures to the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union forsupport,but theunioncouldpromiseonly tomake theboycottan issue infuturenegotiationswithCanadianmarkets.UnionorganizersexperiencedfargreatersuccessappealingtoTorontoconsumers, who showed much sympathy for the farm workers’ struggle and respondedfavorablytoTorontomediacoverageoftheboycott.Consumerstendedtoshowgreatersupportfortheboycottinlocationswherechainstoresratherthanindependentsdominatedthegrocerymarket landscape. Toronto was one such place, with more than 85 percent of food salesconcentrated in four stores: A&P, Loblaw’s, Dominion, and Steinberg’s. Unfortunately for

Ganzandtheboycotters,Canadaalsomaintainedlawsagainstpicketinginstoreparkinglots,alesson they learned when police arrested the president of the Canadian Labor Council fortrespassingwhenheattendedapublicrallyfortheUFWinfrontofoneofthechains.ThelawforcedGanztomakeadecision:eitherengageincivildisobedienceinanattempttochangethelaw,ashehaddoneinMississippiseveraltimes,orpursueadifferentapproach.Basedonhisexperienceinthecivilrightsmovement,Ganzunderstoodthattheformeroftentookmanyyearstoachieveresults.Changingthelawwasnottheprimarygoal;applyingeconomicpressureinthe service of the farm workers and achieving victory in the fields of California were.Consequently,Ganzhadtodeviseanapproachthatdidnotsquanderthegoodwillofthepublicwhileavoidingbecomingembroiledinalegalbattleonforeignsoil.Ganzadaptedtolocalconditionsthroughacombinationofdiplomacyandcreativeprotests

thatplayedonpublicsympathies.Ratherthanapproachthemostobstinatestoreownerfirst,hemadeaprivateappealtoSamSteinberg,anownerwhohadareputationforbeingfairwithhisemployeesandhadalreadystatedhissupportforthegrapestrike.GanzremindedSteinbergofupcoming contract negotiationswith theAmalgamatedMeatCuttersUnion,whose presidenthadexpressedhisdispleasureathandling scabgrapes fromCalifornia.Deciding toobservethe boycott, Ganz argued, would give Steinberg an advantage in dealing with the unionrepresentinghisworkersandcompetingwithothermarketsthatshowednosignsofcomplyingwith the boycott. To convinceSteinberg of public opinion in support of theUFW, the localboycottcommitteedirectedOntarioresidents tosendlettersorvisit themarketpersonally toexpresstheirintentionsnottoshopathisstoreaslongashecontinuedtosellgrapes.Unlikehiscompetitors,Steinbergandhis legaladvisor, IrvingLevine, showedrespect for

theunion.Duringthenegotiations,SteinbergturnedtoLevineforguidance.LevinehadrecentlyreturnedfromatriptoCaliforniatoinspectthefieldsforhimselfandreported,“Conditionsarefeudal.”According toBrown, this informationmovedSteinberg: “He [told] us, ‘Wearenotgoingtohandlegrapesanymore.Infact,we’regoingtoputcolorsignsofthefieldsupatouremptygrapebinstoexplaintoourcustomerswhywe’resupportingthegrapeboycott.’”44

Otherstores,however,resistedsuchappeals.Dominion,thelargestoftheCanadianchains,openly flaunted its disdain for the boycott by refusing to meet with Ganz while defendingcustomers’ “freedom to choose”whether to buy grapes. In response, the boycott committeebypassed the parking lots for the interior of the stores. Once inside, boycotters engaged in“creativenonviolence”byfillingtheirbasket,wheelingittothefrontofthestore,thenleavingwithout making a purchase. The stunt upset store managers who had to assign workers toreshelvemerchandise.In another action reminiscentof the theatrical protests by the emergingYouth International

Party, orYippies, boycotters carried helium-filled balloons into the storewith themessage“Don’tEatGrapes”writtenonthem,anddistributedthemtochildrenwhilelettingothersfloatto theceiling.Whenmanagersorderedemployees topoptheballoons,confetticarryingpro-UFW messages rained down upon the store, causing another mess and infuriating storemanagers. In response to the protests, Dominion executives questioned the legality of suchactionsandpubliclylabeledGanzandhismerrygroupofpranksters“uniongoons.”Thepress,which had been called in anticipation of the theatrics, covered the balloon incident in a

sympathetic tone that swayed public opinion toward the union. On one Toronto radiobroadcast,alocaldeejaycomposedanddeliveredthefollowingpoem:

IfallthegoonspoppedtoyballoonsAndsprayeduswithconfettiThencopsandcrookswouldusedirtylooksAndgunsthatshootspaghetti.45

Soonafterthatbroadcast,DominionretracteditsdenunciationoftheboycottersandagreedtosuspendthesaleofCaliforniagrapesindefinitely.Volunteerscelebratedsuchvictoriesbutalsovaluedtheday-to-dayexcitementofbuildinga

movementwithinagivencity.NickJones,forexample,recalledthedifficultyofadaptingtothe cold and rainy Northwest but found it manageable because of the relationships hedevelopedinPortland.“Weconceiveditasonebigcommitteeandwetookprobablyabout25or30,maybeasmanyas50peopleandreallyworkedwiththemformonths,bringingthemintocommitteemeetingsandmovies…workingwith themtoget theboycottworkdone.”Picketline volunteers eschewed intimidation and assumed most consumers possessed a moralresponsibility critical to the success of any consumer activism. This approach earned therespectoftheiradoptedcommunityanddrewinmanynewrecruitstothecampaign.“Wegottogetherregularlyanddidpot lucks,”recalledJones.“Webecameaprettytightcommunity.”Thecrampedquartersofmanyhousesmeantthatpeopleoftensleptonfloorsandclashedwithone another, although the spirit of camaraderie in the early days of the boycott shaped thecultureofmostboycotthouses.Serviceonthefrontlinesoftheboycottbestrepresentedwhatmany in the union called “missionary work,” seemingly impossible tasks that, whenaccomplished,drewpeopleclosertooneanother.46

TheworkofboycottvolunteersincitiesalsopaiddividendsinshoringuppoliticalsupportfortheMigrantMinistryamongProtestantsatatimewhenitdrewfireforsupportingtheUFW.Although Chavez drew on Catholic symbols and rituals to appeal to a mostly Catholicworkforce, it was Hartmire and Drake, Protestant ministers, who were the first religiousleaderstogetbehindthemovement.Whenmembersoftheruraldenominationsdiscoveredthattheir donations had been funding the Migrant Ministry’s activism, many of them passed aresolution demanding that the Ecumenical Ministry of the Protestant Churches terminateHartmire’s budget. The conflict initiated a “two-year war” among Protestant churches inCaliforniaastothefateoftheorganization.“Theruralchurcheswantedusgone,out,ordead,”Hartmire remembered.“Fortunately forus, theurbanchurches’membershipoutnumbered theruralmembership.”TheboycottplayedasignificantroleineducatingurbanProtestantsaboutthestakesof thefarmworkers’struggleandconvincedmanyurbancongregants toencouragetheirministerstofightforthepreservationoftheMigrantMinistry.ThemoraldimensionsofthebattlealsopersuadedmanyurbanProtestantstocontributetimeandmoneytotheboycott.47

As theexamplesofNewYorkCity,LosAngeles,Portland,andToronto illustrate,boycottstrategiesvariedfromcitytocity,butoveralltheboycottseemedtobeworking.Bymid-1968,undertheauspicesofJerryandJuanitaBrown,theUFWbegantocharttheprogressofboycott

housesbythechangesinthequantityofcarlotshipmentstomajorNorthAmericancities.InNewYorkCity,forexample,shippersdelivered801fewercarlotsthantheyhadin1967;inChicago and Boston, the totals were down by 360 and 327, respectively. Although thesenumberssignaledsuccessandoverallshipmentsdeclinedby2,254carlotsinNorthAmerica,theBrownsalsonoticedincreasesinnontraditionalcities:Miamiwasup57carlots;Atlantaup 16;Houston 36;Denver 12,KansasCity 11; FortWorth 7. These numbers revealed thegrowers’strategyofcircumventingtheboycottbymarketingtheirtablegrapestonewmarkets,particularlyintheSouth,West,andMidwest.Inaddition,althoughtheUFWhadestablishedapresenceinCanada,1968marketreportssuggestedthatshippershadredirectedanumberofcarlotsnorthoftheborder:Montrealwasup57carlots,whereasTorontoclimbedby44.48These were the trends that compelled Brown to challenge the union leadership to make adecision: either continue to treat the boycott as a supplement to the strike or place greateremphasisonitbyembracinganapproachthatgavethemagreaterchanceforvictory.

COMMITMENTDAY

Bymidsummerof1968, the strugglehad turnednasty,with threatsagainstChavez’s lifeandpalpableanxietyamongcivilrightsactivistseverywhere.InApril,MartinLutherKingJr.,animportant ally of themovement, had been assassinated inMemphis, precipitating a rash ofviolentreactionsinurbancentersthroughouttheUnitedStates.Growingtensioninthecountrymirroredthatofthecity,aspicketersonthefrontlinesofthegrapestrikeexperiencedphysicalattacks,firstbyTeamsteraffiliatesandthenbylawenforcementofficials,whoemployedroughtactics in dispersing union demonstrations. Chavez, who had observed the effectiveness ofKing’speacefulprotestsandreadGandhi’sphilosophyonnonviolence,suppressedmovementadvocates’appetiteforretaliationbypracticinglongfaststhattookatollonhismindandbody.Thephysicalchallengeofthefastsfurtherweakenedhisachingback,makingtravelofanysortpainful.JerryandJuanitaBrown,whoownedaWestphaliaVolkswagenvanwithafold-downbed,providedChavezwithavehicleidealfortravelingupanddownCalifornia.AccompaniedbyChavez’stwoGermanshepherds,HuelgaandBoycott,he,Jerry,andJuanitamadethetrekup California Highway 1, followed by an entourage of farm workers trained to providesecurity.“There’dbesecuritycarsinfrontofus,andoneinbackofus,”recalledJerryBrown,“allconnectedbywalkie-talkies.”

FIGURE7.JerryBrown(frontright)onagrapestrikepicketline,Delano,California,ca.1968.

AstheyenteredSantaBarbara,ChavezorderedaquickdiversiontotheCaliforniamissionto reflect on the battles ahead and pray for the success of the retreat. From the beginning,ChavezregardedtheCatholicChurchasanimportantinfluenceonthemovementandderivedgreatpersonalinspirationfromtheexampleofChristandHissacrifice.DuringtheGiumarracampaign,theassociationgrewstrongerastheU.S.CouncilofBishopsmovedfromapositionofneutralitytobeinganadvocateforthefarmworkers.AlthoughsomelocalpriestsintheSanJoaquin and Coachella Valleys remained partial to the growers, a number of Catholic andProtestantclergywillinglysacrificed timeandoccasionally theirbodiesfor themovement.49Chavez’shour-longvisit to themission refreshed theembattled leaderandgavehim time tothinkaboutthemessagehewoulddelivertomovementparticipantslaterthatday.JerryBrownchoseamuchmoresecularformofpreparationfortheretreat.Brownbelieved

Chavez’s initialapathyfor thedatahehadcollectedwasaconsequenceofhispoorstyleofpresentation.Brownrecalled,“Iwasveryintense,veryfast-talking,[and]veryimpatient.…Idid the most horrible job one could imagine.” Brown turned to the experienced LeRoyChatfieldforguidance.Chatfieldunderstoodwhatinspiredtherankandfile,andheembodiedthecalmbutdeliberateapproachChavezvalued.Together,thetwomensharedtheirvisionoftheboycott’sfuturewiththeentiremembership,whileChavezwatchedintentlyatthebackoftheroom.BrownandChatfieldargued foramuchmoresystematicapproach to thecampaign, taking

intoconsideration thedatacollectedbyBrownanddrawingon theexperienceof leaders insomeof themost effectiveboycott cities to date.First, the two argued for an approach thatconcentratedonbuildingstrongboycotthouses in tenof the top forty-onecitieswheremorethan 50 percent of California table grapes were sold. Those cities were New York, Los

Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Toronto, Detroit, Montreal, andCleveland.Theyreplacedtheanecdotalreportsfor judgingthesuccessof theboycottwithaclear andmeasurable goal of reducing shipments in every city by 10 percent ormore over1966totals.50Althoughgrowershadbeguntoshowsignsofredirectingshipmentselsewheretosoftentheblowoftheboycott,BrownandChatfieldcalculatedthatsuchashiftcouldnotmakeupforthesubstantiallossesingrowers’traditionalmarkets.Asgrowerssentgrapestootherports,JerryandJuanitawouldrespondbyworkingwithvolunteersinthosecitiestoopenupnewboycotthouses.Second,BrownandChatfieldprovidedananalysisofHuerta’ssuccessfulcampaigninNew

YorkCityandproposedthateveryleaderstrivetoimplementasimilarstrategyinhisorhercity.ThebrillianceofHuerta’sstrategy,Brownconcluded,washerinsistenceonchangingthemarketing habits of the entireA&P chain rather than settling for victory at individualA&Pstores, one at a time. According to Brown, Huerta had built strong boycott committees inneighborhoodswhereunionmembershipwashighandvolunteerswereplentiful,enthusiastic,andcommitted tostopping thesaleofgrapes in theirneighborhood.“Once [these individualA&Pmarkets] started tocapitulate,”Brown told the retreatparticipants, “[Huerta]wouldn’tcall off the picket lines until they agreed to take [grapes] off the entire division [of A&Pmarkets].”Brownexplained the logicofwhathecalled the“tacticof thehostagestores”bywayofhisownresearchonsupermarketchainsacrossNorthAmerica:

[Ihadacquired]oneofthesewonderfuldocumentsthatshowedeverysupermarketinthecountry,everychain;whatitsdivisionswere;whatcities,counties,andareaswereundereachdivision;whothemanagementwasof thatdivision.SoIwasable tosay,youknow,you’vegotthismanystoresinthatdivision.And,youknow,werecognized[that]thewholechaininthewholecountrywasn’tgoingtotakeitoff,butthattheprofitandlossforthatdivision,thatmanager[would].Andasyouknow,foodstores,chainstores,operateonhighvolume,very thinprofitmargins.So ifyoustart turningawaytwo,three,fivepercentoftheircustomers,you’regoingtosendthatstorenegative.51

AccordingtoBrown’sresearch,supermarketsalesinchainstoreswere$22.7billionoutofthetotal$68.3billionspentongroceriesinNorthAmerica,anamountthatconstituted33percentof all grocery sales. In the eight of the top selling cities for table grapes, chain storescontrolledover50percentofgrocerysales.BrownandChatfieldarguedthatbytakingafewkeystoresinthelargestchainsintheUnitedStatesandCanadahostage,theycouldinfluencesales more quickly than if they targeted independents. Given that the boycott had alreadymoved into thepeakharvestmonthsofJuly throughNovember,when71percentofall tablegrapes entered themarket, useof the “hostage stores” tacticbecamecrucial to salvaging aneffectiveeffortfor1968.Huertahadpursuedthisstrategyintuitively;theboycottcoordinatorsnowhadworkeduparationaleforitssuccessandajustificationforitsuseelsewhere.Whentheduofinished,Chavezwalkedtothefrontoftheroom,convincedoftheboycott’s

importance to achieving overall victory. Offering his own interpretation of the strategy, hereferred to the ideaof targetingchainstoresas“capitalism in reverse.”“Wewillpicket thestores,”Chavez announced, “untilwe turn enough customers away tomake themanagement

realizethatitismoreprofitabletostopsellinggrapesthantosellthem.”52Onthequestionofhow to do this, neither Chavez nor Brown nor any of the veterans of the boycott had adefinitive answer, but examples abounded around the room.MarshallGanz,who had flownback from Toronto for the meeting, shared both his diplomatic approach with cooperativeowners aswell as his acts of “creative nonviolence” against thosewho remained stubborn.MarcoMuñoz,backfromBoston,generatedalaughfromtheroomwhenhereportedonhowhis house held a “Boston Grape Party,” in which they dumped cartons of grapes intoMassachusettsBayinorder“toliberatethefarmworkersfromthetyrannyofthegrowers.”53ChatfieldandSerdasharedtheirexperiencesinLosAngelesasawaytolearnfrommistakesmadeincitieswhereamorehostileclimateprevailed.Throughitall,thegroupdevelopedasense of camaraderie, forming a bond thatwould inure them to the difficulties that awaitedthemastheymovedforward,nowwithaclearersenseoftheirmission.Chavez announced a redeployment of boycott workers to the cities, sending his best

organizerstothefrontlinesandacceptingvolunteerstoleadboycotthouses.JerryBrown,whohadremainedinDelanoinhopesofeventuallylaunchinghisPh.D.research,nowsetasidethedissertationindefinitelyforanassignmenttocoordinatetheboycottfromToronto.“Theyhadgivenalottous,”heremembered.“Theywereaccepting[ourchallengeto]reallyputinplaceastrategytowin.”Withinthemonth,JerryandJuanitamovedintoafour-storybrownstoneinTorontowithChavez’scompadre,ManuelRivera,andbeganorchestratingthenew,improvedboycottnetworkfromthere.Beforeadjourningthemeeting,Chavezaskedeveryonetoanswerastraightforward,yetuntil

nowdeceptivelydifficultquestion:“Whatisthekeytotheboycott?”Goingaroundtheroom,participantsofferedavarietyofanswers:effectivepicketlines,raisingmoney,counteringthepropagandaoftheTeamstersandthegrowers,andgettingthechurchesinvolved.“Alloftheseanswershavesometruthinthem,”Chavezresponded,“butthekeytotheboycottispeople.”Inatonethatinstilledconfidenceineveryvolunteersittingintheroom,heelaborated:“You’rebuildinganarmyofsupporters,andyouneedtofindawaytogetthepeopleonyourside.Anorganizerwillfindawaytodotheboycott.Youcantellmetheboycott’sdifficult.Youcantellmethey’respittingonyouinL.A.; that they’re tellingyoutogobacktoMexico, that they’recallingyouaCommunist.Youcantellmeit’scoldinToronto.Iunderstandthat.Butdon’ttellme it can’tbedone. ‘Si sepuede!’Your jobas anorganizer is to find thekey.”54 Chavez’sendorsementoftheboycottsignaledanimportantturnofevents,evenifhehadnotindicatedasmuch prior to the meeting. More than the convincing argument put forth by Brown andChatfield, theresultsof theboycottspokefor themselves,demonstrating that the tacticcouldinstillfear inthegrowersinwaysthat thestrikehadnot.Whetheritcouldactuallybringthemoststubbornofthemtothebargainingtableremainedtobeseen,althoughChavez’ssupportgave volunteers the confidence to try. His encouragement of a free exchange of ideas alsocontributed to their collective knowledge,making the group amore effective team.As theyembarkedontheirnewassignments,eachvolunteercarriedthebeliefthatheorshewasabouttomakehistory.

THREE

WorkersoftheWorld,Unite!

ELAINEELINSONHADNEVERVISITEDtheheadquartersoftheUnitedFarmWorkersunion,norhadshe evermet the president of the organization, Cesar Chavez, despite having served in themovementformorethanayear.Yetin1969,assoonasshesteppedontothestageatFilipinoHall inDelano,California, themostlyMexicanandFilipinoaudiencegreetedherasa long-lost sister. Farm workers and activists alike honored her with the traditional farm worker“clap” that started slowly andbuilt rapidly to a crescendo and cheers of “Viva laHuelga.”Elinson,likemanyboycottworkers,hadskippedaprocessofinitiationinthetrenchesofthegrapestrikeinfavorofservingwhereshewasneededmost:onthefrontlinesoftheconsumerboycott in urban centers around the world. For her, the notion of an international boycottbecamearealityonthedocksandintheunionhallsofLondon,Copenhagen,andStockholm,whereshecombinedaskingconsumersnot tobuygrapeswith themore traditionalappeal tofellowunionizeddockworkersnottounloadthem.SherecountedherexperiencethateveninginDelanoafterthelongbattleabroad:

And as I stood there before this huge, curious, andopen-hearted crowd, I realized Iwas one of the luckiest people in the world. I had been the link between thecourageous, tenacious, spirited farm workers of the UFW and the committed,internationally minded transport workers of Britain and Scandinavia. Though theydidn’tknoweachother,theywerereadytofighttogetherforLaCausa.Together,theyhadpulledoffanamazingfeatofsolidarity.ThecheersthatIheardintheFilipinoHallmixedwith thecheers Ihadheardon thedocksatTilbury,Malmo,Birmingham,andLiverpool.Sothisiswhattheymeanby“WorkersoftheWorld,Unite!”1

RelyingonaLondonpayphoneandtheadviceoftheboycottcoordinatorJerryBrown,ElinsonhadstoppedgrapesfromreachingtheEuropeanmarket.ForthoseonthegroundinDelano,thisachievementearnedheradegreeofrespectequaltoworkersandpicketersinthefieldsandinfrontofmarketsintheUnitedStates.Hersuccessprovedtothefaithful inthemovementthatconsumersandworkersaround theworldhad thecapacity tocare for farmworkers in ruralCalifornia.Events in Europe also provided evidence that the union’s investment in the boycott at

midharvest 1968 had been awise one. Growers disputed the effectiveness, but the shift insalesoftablegrapesawayfromtraditionalmarketstosmallercities,ruralareas,andoverseas

signaledanindustryincrisis.Tablegrapegrowersrepeatedlypointedtotheincreasesintheirproduction—up19percentin1969from1966totals—whileignoringthefactthatuseofthesegrapes for table consumption had declined by 12 percent. Increasingly, growers designatedgrapes for crushing to salvageanyvalue from their crops.2TheGrape&TreeFruitLeagueattemptedtodisguiselossesinsalesofthepopularThompsonseedlessgrapesbyannouncingtherecordsalesofothervarieties,whileignoringthatgrowersearnedbetween50centsandadollar lessperbox than in1968.Suchmediaefforts failedasdesperateCoachellagrowers,dependenton thesubstantialprofitmarginscreatedbybeing thefirston themarket,publiclydisputed therosypicturepaintedby the league.Amongthem,LionelSteinberg,ownerof theDavidFreedmanRanch,worriedaloudaboutfallinggrapeprices,risingproductioncosts,andthedeclinesinThompsonsalesthatthreatenedtoputhimoutofbusiness.“WearenotsellinginnormalquantitiesinmajormarketssuchasChicagoandNewYork,”Steinbergcomplained,“and prices forThompson seedless grapes have already broken and are down to $5 a box,compared to about $6.50 last year.” Predicting, “Many of us will show red ink this year,”Steinberg’s admissions disclosed two uncomfortable truths: theUFWwaswinning, and thegrowerslackedthepowertostopit.3

Thesubstantivedataflowingfromthenervecenteroftheboycottconfirmedthemomentumexperienced in the field.Whereas Brown and LeRoy Chatfield had established the goal ofhavingeffectiveboycotthousesintenoftheforty-oneleadingcities,byearly1969theunionhadestablishedboycotthousesinthirty-onecitiesandwasabouttoopennewonesintheSouthandMountainWest,placesformerlythoughttobeimpervioustofarmworkerappeals.Inthetraditional markets, organizers stepped up their efforts to overcome impediments to theboycott,whilenewsoftheirsuccessencouragedvolunteerselsewheretoimplementboycottsof table grapes in their cities. Through it all the UFWmaintained no budget for publicity,relyingexclusivelyoncoveragefromeagerjournalists.Yet despite this success, the union struggled to make ends meet. Beleaguered growers

maintained the economic advantage by hiring a San Francisco–based public relations firm,Whitaker and Baxter, to counter union claims of worker exploitation and pesticide use.4Members of the South Central Growers Association also began to see beyond their ethnicdivisions to organize twenty-six growers into a new coalition. The growers’ group secretlyfinancedtheAgriculturalWorkersFreedomtoWorkAssociation,aparallellabororganizationthat failed to attract meaningful support among workers. The UFW quickened AWFWA’sdemise by exposing the organization’s general secretary, Jose Mendoza, as an anti-Chavezlabor contractor on the growers’ payroll.5 Still, countering the growers’ moves depletedresourcesastheunionstretcheditsbudgettomeetthecommitmentsmadetotheboycottduringthe July 1968 retreat. Chavez, who privately worried about “the tremendous drain on the[union’s] treasury,” saw1969asacriticalyear to theoverall successof themovement.“Atthis point,” he told Ganz as the union prepared for its fourth andmost serious year of theboycott,“it’seitherthemorus.”6

SUCCESSINNORTHAMERICA

ThegameplanpreparedbyJerryBrownandLeRoyChatfieldproducedresultsasboycottersreturned to houses across the country for the remainder of the 1968 season and through the1969 harvest. Chatfield, for example, adapted to the conservative environment of SouthernCalifornia.InOctober1968,seventeenLosAngelesstores,ledbySafeway,successfullysuedtolimittofourthenumberofpicketersoutsidetheentranceoftheirmarkets.Ratherthanresistthenewlawswithcivildisobedienceandboisterousprotests,Chatfieldchoseamorelabor-intensiveapproachthatinvolvedwell-dressedunionrepresentativesworkingtenhoursaday,six days a week. Each representative adopted a calm, business-like demeanor and madeappealstoshoppersonanindividualbasis.Chatfieldrecruitedsixtynew,full-timevolunteersandconcentratedtheireffortsonthirtystoresintheArden-Mayfairchain,amajorcompetitorofSafeway.“Itwasgruelingwork,butitdidthetrick,”ChatfieldreportedtoBrown.“Atfirst,peopledidn’tpaymuchattentiontous.Butaftertheysawusseveraltimes,they’dstoptotalk.Eventually,manyofthemagreedtoshopelsewhere.Theoneswhodidreallyunderstoodtheissue andwould often talk to themanager and tell himwhy theywere switching to anotherstore.”7Bytheendofthe1969harvest,Chatfield’stacticshadsucceededinconvincingArden-Mayfair to remove table grapes from their stores. Although LosAngeles continued to be achallenge,theboycottreducedoverallshipmentstothesecondlargestmarketfortablegrapesintheUnitedStatesbyarespectable16percent.8

The boycott swept over the continent, garnering support from consumers and politiciansalike. InToronto, themayordeclaredNovember23, 1968, “GrapeDay” and announced thecitygovernment’sdecisionnot tobuygrapes in recognitionof thefarmworkers’struggle. InChicago,EliseoMedinaorganizedaboycottcampaignthatpersuadedtheleadingsupermarketchain,Jewel,tostopcarryingtablegrapesateveryoneofits254storelocations.Forthisfeat,MayorRichardDaley, a pro-laborDemocrat, recognizedMedina as “Manof theYear” andendorsed the boycott. Similarly, in Cleveland,Mayor Carl Burton Stokes, the first AfricanAmericantobeelectedmayorofamajorU.S.city,orderedallgovernmentfacilitiestoceaseservingtablegrapes.MackLyons,theonlyAfricanAmericanontheNationalExecutiveBoardoftheUFW,madetheappealtoStokesandorganizedoneofthestrongestboycotthousesinthenetwork. In San Francisco, five major agribusiness organizations canceled their annualmeetingsinthecityinresponsetotheSanFranciscoBoardofSupervisors’endorsementoftheboycott.AttheannualmeetingoftheNationalLeagueofCities,themayorofDelano,CliffordLoader, tried to stem the tide of city governments’ support for the boycott by introducing aresolution requestingmayorsnot to take sides in thegrapedispute.ToLoader’sdismay,hispeerssoundlydefeatedhisproposal.9

Supportfromreligiousleadersextendedtheappealoftheboycotttopatronsordinarilymorereluctant to weigh in on labor matters. From the beginning individuals from a range oforganizedreligionssupportedthemovement,volunteeringtheirtimetotheunion,occasionallyindefianceof their church’s orders.By1968, however, organized religionbegan to see themoral dimensions behind the farmworkers’modest demand for collective bargaining. Thatgrowersresistedthisbasicrightsharedbymanyworking-classchurchgoerspermittedmenoftheclothtotakeapositioninfavoroftheunion.Newreportsoffarmworkerssufferingfromexposuretopesticidesalsomovedreligiousand

secularconsumersalike. JessicaGovea,working in thenewunionServiceCenter, receivedcomplaintsfrommanywomenwhoexperienceddizziness,nausea,andsweatsafterworkinginthefields.Asa formerfieldworker inBakersfield, sheknew the symptomsassociatedwithexposure topesticidesand immediatelyappealed to JerryCohen to seewhat couldbedoneabout theproblem.WhenCohenasked theagricultural commissioner,C.SeldonMorely, forreportsofpesticidesuseongrapes,thegrowerswenttothecourtstoblockaccess.WhenthematterfinallymadeittoaKernCountycourt,thejudgeblockedaccesstotherecordsonthegrounds that the unionwould use it in the boycott. Eventually,Cohen succeeded inwinningaccesstoseveral“littlegreenbooklets”listingthedaysinwhichgrowerssprayed,butlimitedinformationonwhatexactlyhadbeenused.Thelackofclarityonthesubjectinspiredtheunionand SenatorWalterMondale, a Democrat, to aggressively pursue a farm worker’s right toknowthecontentsofthepesticides,andprovidedboycottvolunteersanothertalkingpointonthepicketlines.10

Themomentumof theboycott carried itnorth,where shipmentsofCalifornia tablegrapesarrivedatafruit terminal inDetroitbeforebeingdistributedthroughoutMichigan,Ohio,andCanada.TheUFWinitiallytriedtoshutoffthecorridorbytargetingthefruitterminalsrunbyadirectorknownonlyas“Mr.Andrews.”Duringthe1968campaign,theDetroitboycotthouse,managedbyaCatholicnun,SisterLupéAnguiano,andanL.A.boycottveteran, JoséSerda,appealed toAndrews to cooperatewith the boycott, but the terminal director showed littleregard for the union.Appearing to have reached a dead end inDetroit,Chavez shuffled theleadershipbybringinginHijinioRangeltorunthehouse.RangelmovedhisentirefamilytotheMotorCityfromPortland,Oregon,inDecember1968.

Withinafewweeks,theRangelsmobilizedagroupof5,000volunteerscomposedofstudents,religiousleaders,andfellowunioniststomarchfromAnnArbortoDetroit.TheformerDelanolabor contractor and tortilleria owner followed this showof forcewithquiet butpersistentappealstoAndrewstorethinkhisoppositiontotheboycott.AsRangelrecalledinhismemoir,Andrews respondedwith disdain, boasting, “I sent José Serda and LupéAnguiano back toCalifornia,andthesameisgoingtohappentoyou.Youwillgobackonyourknees.”11

Rangelacceptedtheinsultasachallengetodeviseasuccessfulstrategy.Ratherthancontinuehis appeals toAndrews, he took his case toDetroit’s leading supermarket chain,Kroger’s.Flankedbynunsononesideandapriestontheother,RangelaskedstoremanagersnottocarryCaliforniatablegrapes.Whentheseeffortsfailed,hedirectedvolunteerstoenterthemarketswiththeirprotest,provokingmanagerstocallthepolicetoarrestthem.Asprotestersfilledthecityjailtocapacity,courtofficialsquicklyarrangedarraignmenthearingsonaSaturdaytodealwiththedelugeofcases.Rangelrecalled,“[The]judgearrivedstill inhisshortsbecausehehadbeencuttinghis lawn.” Inadvance,Rangelmadecontactwith local leaders in theAFL-CIO,UAW,andsteelworkers,carpenters,andelectricalworkersunions,wholent their legalcounsel to theboycotters in theirmomentofneed.As thecourtroomfilledwithmore thanathousandarrestedprotesters,thejudgedismissedthechargesandsentUFWvolunteersflowingtriumphantly into the streets of Detroit. On Monday morning, Kroger’s acquiesced andannounced itsdecision to stopsellinggrapesat allof its twenty-fiveDetroit-area locations.Rangelcomplementedtheseactionsbyengaginginaneleven-daypublicfasttodrawattention

totwoothermarkets,AM-PMandFarmerJohn’s,bothofwhicheventuallyfellintolinewiththeboycott.ThecampaignagainstDetroit-areamarketsdidnot immediatelybreakAndrews,given that

thefruitterminalservedasatransferpointfortablegrapesgoingtomarketsbeyondthecity.Rangelordered150volunteerstopickettheterminalaroundtheclockandsentanother500topicketindependentstoresstillreceivingtablegrapes.PicketersmetAndrewseverymorningatseven,firstinfrontoftheterminalashecameinforwork,thenquicklymovingtohisofficetocreatetheillusionthattheunionhad300boycottersworkingthepicketlines.Ontheninthday,Andrews agreed to negotiate, offering to discontinue the sale of California grapes after thearrivalofthelasttrainload.Rangelrecalledtheconversation:“Isaid,‘Thisisnotacceptable,Mr.Andrews.Senda telegramtoMr.Giumarrarequestinghe take thegrapesback.Iwantacopyofthetelegram.AlsoIwantpermissiontoinspectyourterminaleverydayuntilfurtherorders.’”AbeleagueredAndrewsconcededtoRangel’sdemandsandstoppedsellinggrapesimmediately. A few days later, when Rangel sent his son,Manuel, to inspect the terminal,Andrewsaskedtheyoungmantoconveyamessage:“TellyourfatherthatIhavemuchrespectforhim.”12

The success of the boycott significantly disrupted the grower community as differencesamongthembecamemorepronouncedthelongertheboycottworeon.Coachellagrowers,whohada reducedcapacity towithstand thepressuresof theboycottgiven theshortnessof theirgrowing season, felt thepinchearlier andmoreacutely than theirSan JoaquinValleypeers.They increasingly resented themessages from theGrape& Tree Fruit League that growerswere impervious to theboycott.LionelSteinberg, theunofficial spokesperson forCoachellagrowers,brokewiththeleague’spracticeoffocusingonproductiontotalsfromoneyeartothenextbymakingbroaderandlongerrangecomparisonsthattookintoaccountproductioncostsand consumer spending on groceries. For Steinberg, the differences between 1952, whenconsumers spent 30 percent of their income on food, and 1969, when they spent only 17percent,providedamoreaccurateportraitofthechangesinthemarket.Thedoublingofwagesfrom$1 to$2, increases in thecostofcontainers from25cents to70cents,and thecostoftractors up from $1,800 to $6,000 over this same period gave them reason to worry. Theprospectoflosing20percentoftheirmarkettotheboycottweighedheavilyonSteinbergandotherCoachellagrowerswhohadhadenoughby1969.“Farmworkersandgrowersbothhaveproblems,”heopined,“anditdoesnotdoanygoodtotrytofoolanyoneabouttheadditionalproblemspresentedtogrowersbytheboycott.”13

Steinberg responded to theseconditionsby resigning from theGrape&TreeFruitLeagueandorganizingtenofhisfellowCoachellagrowerstosueforpeacewiththeunion.Inhisletterof resignation, Steinberg accused E. AllenMills, the league’s executive vice president, ofsweepingtheproblemoftheboycottundertherug.“Whenyoukeepinsistingeverythingisrosyandweshouldkeepourchinsup,”Steinbergangrilywrote,“Isincerelyfeelyouaredoingadisservicetothegrowers.”Steinbergnowlaidbaretothepublicariftwithintheindustry.SanJoaquinValleygrowersviewedCoachellaasarelativenewcomertothebusiness,constitutingonly10percentofthetotalmarketforgrapes.Steinberg,anentrepreneurwhohadinvestedinfarmland after the arrival of federalwater in 1948, stoodoutside awell-developedgrower

cultureintheSanJoaquinValley.AlthoughMarshallGanzthoughtitmorethanacoincidencethat Jewish owners of farms were often the first to settle disputes with the union, thebreakdowninthegrowercoalitionduringthe1969harvestappearedtohavemoretodowithmarketshareandregionaldifferencesamongCaliforniagrowersthanwithanti-Semitism.14

Trying to work out a settlement with the union proved to be as difficult for CoachellagrowersasgettingtheirSanJoaquinpeerstocareaboutthem.Caughtupinthemomentumoftheboycott,unionofficialspushedhardoncetheyarrivedatthenegotiationtable.Theunion’sdelegation, which many growers deemed “the circus,” offended the majority of Coachellagrowers,who abandonedSteinberg and vowed to fight on.A year later,MonsignorGeorgeHiggins of the National Catholic Conference reported the sentiments of the growers in theaftermath of the failed negotiations: “They said the unionhad20or 30 people in the room,workers andwhatnot.They said theuniondidn’t negotiate; itmadedemands.”Whether theUFWoverplayeditshandmatteredlessthanthattheunionhadopenedupyetanotherschismamongthegrowers.The absence of a settlement with Coachella growers did little to dampen Chavez’s

excitementfortheboycott.Bytheendofthe1969season,theunionhadachievedmostofthegoalssetduringthesummerretreatayearbefore,namelytheorganizationofeffectiveboycotthousesandthereductionoftablegrapesalesinnineofthetenmostimportantcitiesinNorthAmerica.Theunionreliedontwosourcesofinformationthatindicatedprogress:thereportsflowingfromtheboycotthousestoJerryandJuanitaBrownandthehardevidencepresentinUSDA reports regarding the changes in grape sales from year to year. The poor growingconditions in1967 that led tounusually lowcropyields caused theunion,growers, and thegovernmentofficialstorelyon1966asthemoreappropriatebenchmarkforthe1969season.USDAreportsconfirmedSteinberg’scomplaintsandtheunions’claimsofprogress.Shippersposted a decline of 24 percent in grape shipments to the ten leading cities and providedevidence of extremely effective boycott operations inChicago (down 42.8 percent),Boston(down41.8percent),Detroit(29.6percent),andNewYorkCity(27.6percent).Infact,onlyonecityamongthetopten,Montreal,postedanincreaseincarlotsofCaliforniaandArizonatablegrapesfrom1966to1969,whereastheotherninemajorboycotthouseshittheirtargetofreducingshipmentsby10percentormore.Growers attempted to circumvent the boycott by redirecting table grapes to other major

NorthAmericancities,especiallythoseintheSouth,includingAtlanta,Memphis,Miami,andNew Orleans. The UFW built new boycott houses in thirty-one of these cities to meet thechallenge,includingtwenty-onesupportedbyapaidorganizerandtheothertenstaffedentirelybyvolunteers.Amongthesehouses,thetwenty-onewithpaidorganizersreducedshipmentsby13 percent, whereas the ten with no organizers still managed to reduce shipments by 12.6percent.Growersalsoexperiencedadramaticdeclineinprofitsastheglutofunsoldgrapesonthemarket forcedbrokers to lower theprices tooffload their inventory.ThesedeclineshurtCoachella growers the most because their profits depended on the bump in prices thataccompanied being the first on the market. By placing their grapes in cold storage inanticipation of finding newmarkets, Coachella growers experienced more competition andlowerpricesastheseasonworeonandSanJoaquinValleytablegrapesbecameavailable.In

amarketmadeuncertainbytheboycott,grapegrowerscouldanticipateapoorerreturnontheirinvestments.

TABLE1.CarLotUnloadsofAllCaliforniaandArizonaTableGrapesinTenMajorNorthAmericanMarkets,1966and1969SeasonsCompared*

SOURCE:Compiled fromU.S.Department ofAgriculture, Consumer andMarketing Services,Fresh Fruit and VegetableUnloadsinEastern,Southern,MidwesternandWesternCitiesbyCommodities,StatesandMonths,1966,1967,1969,1970,passim.InJeraldBarryBrown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,1965-1970:AnEvaluationoftheCultureofPovertyTheory,”(Ph.D.dissertation,Anthropology,CornellUniversity,1972)212.*MaythroughJanuaryshipments

The enthusiasm of volunteers to staff more effective boycott houses and the mostlysympatheticpresscoveragetheunionreceivedconvincedCesarChavezofthecentralityoftheboycott to the movement. Over a four-year period, the boycott moved from an activityundertakenby theunion tokeepfarmworkersandvolunteers inspiredbetweenharvests toayear-round tactic. According to Jerry Brown, when farm workers from other crops andworkers from Oregon, Texas, Florida, and Ohio appealed to the UFW to send organizers,Chavezdeclinedsuchinvitationsnotonlybecausetheunionhadbeenstretchedtoitslimits,butalsobecausehenowbelieveditwouldbe“foolish”toinitiateastrikewithoutthebackingofaboycott.15

Growersrefused toconcededefeat,however,believing that their tacticofshiftingsales tounderdevelopedmarketshadnotbeen fullyexplored.AsbadasUSDAshipment reports fortraditionalmarketsappeared,growers succeeded in reroutingone-thirdof their shipments toruralareasandsmallercitieswheretheUFWhadnorepresentatives.Thedivertedshipmentsamountedtoa20percentincreaseintheseareas,whichleftgrowers’totalshipmentsfortheentireNorthAmericanmarketdownby9.2percentfortheyear.Giventheirabilitytoadjusttothe adversities caused by the boycott, most growers held on to the idea that an organizedreroutingandstrategicmarketingofgrapescouldweardowntheunion.Moreover,thefailureoftheUFWtocreateaviableboycottinMontrealsuggestedthepossibilityofbeatingtheunionintheinternationalmarketplace,whereculturaldistinctionsanddifferent laborandpicketinglawsmade it more difficult for the union to establish effective boycott houses. Bymovinggrapesacrossbordersandoff-shoregrowershopedtofinallyexpandbeyondthereachoftheUFWandbreakfreeofthepoweroftheboycott.

THEINTERNATIONALARENA

AcrosstheDetroitRiverinCanada,MarshallGanzandJessicaGoveaworkedtoconsolidatethegainsmade in theUnitedStatesbyenforcing theboycott in theprovincesofOntarioandQuebec.Although laws restricted the union from staging storefront protests,Ganz’s uses ofcreative nonviolence played on the sympathies of customers. The enthusiasm of localvolunteersaffirmedthebeliefsoftheTorontoboycottstaff,asdidthesupportfromCanadianunionsandthedecidedlyfavorablecoveragebyTorontomedia.Theseattitudesreflectednotonlythepresenceofastrongpro-laborsentimentamongTorontoresidents,butalsotheabilityofboycottworkerstocommunicatethestakesinthegrapestriketakingplaceinthefieldsofCalifornia. That both boycott house workers and residents of Toronto spoke English wassignificant, allowing them to speak a common language—literally and figuratively—when itcametodiscussionsaboutworkers’rights.Duringthe1969season,GoveaworkedwithGanztoorganizetheentireCanadiancampaign

from the Toronto office.16 Born in Bakersfield, California, into a farm-working family, shespenteverysummerfromtheageoffourtofifteenpickingcotton,grapes,andplumsintheSanJoaquinValley.HerfatherroutinelydemonstratedagainstgrowerinjusticetowardworkersandinspiredtheyoungGoveatoorganizefarmworkerchildrentopetitionandprotestforchange.In1966, she left college towork for theUFWinDelano, thenacceptedanassignment fromChavez in July1968 to joinGanz inToronto.The twoworkedwell together andover timedevelopedapersonalandprofessionalrelationshipboundbytheirservicetolacausa.In addition toGovea andGanz, theToronto staff includedMarkDay,HubSegur, and Jim

BrophyfromtheUnitedStates,andLindaGerardandKeithPatinson,bothnativesofCanada.Gerard came byway of a “donation” from theUAW regional office inWindsor,where thetwenty-one-year-old secretary had served the union for the previous two years. The UAWcontinuedtopayherfull-timesalary,whiletheunioncoveredthecostofherfoodandpaidhertheusual$5perweekallottedtoeveryvolunteer.PatinsonalsoservedtheboycottfulltimeatthewilloftheUAW,whichcoveredallofhisexpenses.Inaddition,theDelanoofficeassignedMikeMilotoworkoutofWindsor,toorganize“secondaryOntariocities,”althougheventuallyGanzincorporatedhimintotheTorontohousetocentralizehisstaff.17

FIGURE8.SupportersofthegrapeboycottdemonstrateinToronto,December1968.JessicaGoveaisinthecenter,frontrow(wearingponcho).ALUA,UFWCollection,303.

ThegrowthoftheCanadiancampaignthroughthesummerandfallof1969requiredtheunionto split upGovea andGanz for strategic purposes, placingGovea inMontreal whileGanzremainedinTorontotobuildonhissuccess.Attheendof1969,ChavezexpressedadesiretohaveGanzandGoveareturntoDelanoincasegrowersagainshowedinterestinnegotiatingasettlement with the union. Ganz’s success in convincing all but one of the presidents ofToronto’s grocery chains (Leon Weinstein of Loblaw’s) to discontinue sales of Californiagrapesdistinguishedhimasatalentednegotiator;ChavezvaluedGoveaforherauthenticvoicethatlentcredibilitytoanypotentialnegotiatingteam.TheimportanceoftheCanadianboycott,however,forcedChaveztodelaytheirreturnuntiltheirpresencewasabsolutelynecessary.18

Throughout1969,GoveaandGanzconcentratedoncreatinganationalcampaign,organizingvolunteers, arranging conferences, and reportingon theprogress of theboycottwell beyondtheirbaseinOntario(Toronto,Windsor,andOttawa)andQuebec(Montreal)tothenortheast,and cities to the west in the provinces ofManitoba (Winnipeg), Saskatchewan (Saskatoon,Regina),Alberta (Calgary,Edmonton),andBritishColumbia (Vancouver). In thecentralandwestern provinces, Ganz relied on volunteers to staff boycott houses, while he and GoveacoordinatedwithalliesfromtheCanadianlabormovementtogeneratesupportfortheboycott.One of the union’s staunchest foes, Safeway, dominated the grocery store landscape in theWest, making the fight even more difficult. Still, Ganz reported progress in Winnipeg andManitoba,where strong boycott committees picketed stores and the provincial governmentsagreedtohaltthepurchaseoftablegrapes.19

GanzandGoveafocusedmostoftheirattentiononWindsor,Toronto,andOttawainOntarioandMontreal inQuebec, but the distance and cultural differences between the two regions

madeoperationsdifficult.WhenthetwoattemptedtobringtogethervolunteersfromToronto,Ottawa,andMontrealforanannualweekendplanningconferenceinacentrallocation,Ganzfoundit“notreallypracticalbecauseoftremendousdifferencesinOntarioandQuébecandthedistancesinvolved.”Aseven-hourdriveseparatedTorontoandMontreal,adistancenoteasilybridgeduntiltheboycotthousepurchasedasecondcar,a1966FordGalaxy,for$1,000withthe help of a dealer inDetroit andmoney donated from theCanadianLabourCongress, theUAW,andthesteelworkersunion.The expense of maintaining contact over such great distances perpetually challenged the

boycotthouseandmademoneyaconstantconcernfortheorganizers.“Ourbudgetof$590.00,”Ganzwrote JuanitaBrown in January1970, “waspredicatedon two full-timepeopleat thetimeitwasdrawnup.”Althoughtheamountconstitutedasignificantsumfor theunion, theiroverwhelmingsuccessat recruiting localvolunteersgeneratednewexpenses, including foodandaweeklystipendof$5pervolunteerthatstretchedtheannualbudgetbeyonditslimits.Thehousealsohadtopayforrentincreases,phonebills,andofficeexpenses,includinggas,oftenon one union credit card passed from volunteer to volunteer. Although these problemsconfrontedeveryboycotthouse,theexchangerateandthemilestheTorontohousevolunteershad to cover and the cost of long-distance and international phone calls complicated theirsituation. “Jessicawrote repeatedly asking that a budget adjustment bemade,”Ganzwrote,“[but]itwasnevermade.”Asaconsequence,thehouselostvolunteerswhenGanz,Segur,andGoveareturned toDelanobetweenseasons.20Ganz recommended thecreationofa full-timestaffinTorontoandsuggestedmovingGoveatoMontreallongenoughtoremedythesituation.HealsorecommendedfundstosupportaseparateofficeinOttawa,aboutfivehoursaway,buttherequestexceededthecapacityoftheuniontopayforit.“ThewholeCanadian[boycott]isaboutayearbehindthemajorAmericancities,”Ganzreported,buthebelievedsuchchangeswouldproduceacampaign“strongerthaneverthisyear.”21

In spite of their late start, Ganz’s work with Steinberg’s and Dominion in 1969 laid animportantfoundationforthehousetobuildoninthewinterof1969andthespringandsummerof1970.Loblaw’sremainedtheonlyholdout,whichallowedvolunteerstoconcentrateonit.GanzandGoveamadeaconcertedefforttostrengthentheirrelationshipwithsupportersintheCanadian labormovement and the Canadian government. The endorsement of the CanadianLabour Congress contributed not only good publicity to the boycott, but also local unionmemberswhostaffedpicketlinesinthetoughestofconditions.BeginningonDecember20,inthemidstofa typicalTorontowinterwith temperaturesfallingto2degrees,morethanthreehundredvolunteersparticipatedinafive-day,110-hourcontinuousvigil infrontofLoblaw’slargest downtown location. Volunteers, local aldermen, and members of the provincialparliament sang Christmas carols, staged candlelight processions, and held an ecumenicalmidnight Christmas mass while Ganz and five others fasted in solidarity with strikers inCalifornia.Boycottorganizersalsotargetedprofessionalathletesandsportingevents,suchastheTorontoMapleLeafs’hockeygames,whichdrew16,000people twonightsaweek.Thehouseprinted thousandsof leafletswitha lineupof the teamsandspecialcommendations tothosestarswhoendorsed theboycott.“Passedout6,000leaflets inabout35minutes,”Ganzreported to Delano. At the games, volunteers collected signatures on a petition asking

Loblaw’stostopsellinggrapes.The effectiveness of the boycott through the 1969–70 winter produced concern among

Coachellagrowerswho,once again, desired to settle the strike in advanceof theupcomingtablegrapeseason. Inanticipationofnegotiations,Ganzmovedback toDelano.Meanwhile,JerryandJuanitaBrowns’movetoTorontosuppliedtheCanadiancampaignwithtwoprovenleaderstosustainthemomentumwhileGanzwasaway.22

Upontheirarrival,MannyRiveraandtheBrownsmadecontactwithLoblaw’sowner,LeonWeinstein,whoinvitedtheleadersandManny’swifeandthreechildrentohisoffice.Borninthebackofhisfather’sneighborhoodgrocerystore inToronto,Weinsteinhad takenover thefamily business as an adult and expanded it into a successful chain built primarily on goodcustomer relations. Although politically conservative, Weinstein prided himself as a fair-mindedentrepreneurwith thepower todisarm thosewhoquestionedhisbusinesspractices.Jerry Brown recalled, “He [told] us how he would not have grapes in his home, how hesupportsthefarmworkers’cause,butheisthepresidentofalargechain,andtheconsumershave tohave freechoice, sohecannotpubliclysupport theboycott.”WeinsteinalsomadeapeaceofferingofCubancigarstoRivera,whoacceptedthegiftandcamereadytoreciprocate.“He hand[ed] Leon a farm worker calendar,” Brown remembered, “every month of whichha[d] a picture of the travails in the fields—you know, hungry children, child labor, tiredworkers.”“I’mgoingtogiveyou…ourcalendar,”RiveratoldWeinstein,“andIhopeyou’llputitonthewall,sothateverydayyoulookatit,you’llberemindedofthesufferingyou’recausingourpeoplebycarryinggrapesinyourstore.”23

A few days after the meeting, Mrs. Rivera found out about a Loblaw’s party at whichWeinsteinwould be honored for his leadership of the company.Typically, the housewouldpicketsuchanevent,butthistimeMrs.Riveraproposedsomethingdifferent:“We’regoingtoturn this intoa funeralprocession.”For thenightof thecelebration, theunioncreatedcardsthat,atfirstglance,appearedtobeaprogramfortheevening.Onceguestsopenedthecards,however, theydiscovered informationabout theunfair laborpracticesofgrapegrowersandtheiruseofpesticidesinthefields.Volunteersalsobroughttotheeventmakeshiftcasketsmadeofusedgrapecartonscoveredinblackpaperandphotosoffarmworkerstoilinginthefields.Theunionrecruitedseveralpriestsandnunstoaccompanythemtotheevent,creatingapublicrelationsnightmareforWeinstein.Brownremembered,“Healmostbrokeoutintotearsatthecelebration.”Twoweekslater,Weinsteinannouncedhisdecisiontoremovetablegrapesfromalltwenty-sixLoblaw’slocationsandresignedfromthecompany.24

InMontreal, JessicaGoveaworked to replicate the success in Toronto. In January,GanzwroteofMontreal,“Wehavenothadaparticularlyeffectiveboycotthere.”Heattributedtheproblems to three causes: “1) lackof effectiveorganizingwork;2) lackofFrench-speakingstaff;3)thenatureofQuebecitself.”Govea’smovetothecityonafull-timebasishelpedturnthe situation around. She began by recruiting a staff with some capacity to speak French,including Peter Standish, a twenty-somethingwho had served in the highly successful NewYorkCityboycotthouseduringthe1969season.25AvisitbyCesarChavezinlate1969lentlegitimacytothemovementintheprovinceandgaveGoveaafoundationforcoordinatingwithlocal unions. She cultivated a relationship with Louis LaBerge, president of the Québec

FederationofLabour,andworkedwiththefarmersunioninQuebec,L’uniondeCultivateursCatolique,whichpubliclyendorsedtheboycott.26

Yetforallherefforts,thecreationofaneffectiveboycottequivalenttothoseinothercitieseludedGovea. The union’s appeal to a society embroiled in a secessionist crisismade theboycott,atbest,asecondaryconsideration.FormanyQuébécois,theembraceoftheboycottbyEnglish-speakingOntariomadethemovementsuspect.“Notonlyistheboycottan‘Americanissue,’”GanzwroteLarry Itliong, “butwe have to dealwith a foreign country in a foreignlanguage,whichmakestheboycottdoublydistant.”ThedifferenceinreceptionfromEnglish-speakingandFrench-speakingCanadianswasmanifestedmostacutelyinthevaryinglevelofsupporttheunionreceivedfromorganizedlabor.“Weareparticularlyconcernedaboutthefactthat we are not getting the kind of co-operation that we need from the two Quebec labourmovements,”Ganzwrote.“ItisabitasiftheQuebecapplepickerswereonstrikeandsentarepresentativetoDelanoandexpectedustogoallout[on]behalfoftheirproblem.”InspiteofGovea’s relations with LaBerge, he withheld his endorsement of the boycott until Chavezrequestedit.27

Govea appreciatedChavez’s assistance, but the need for “man-to-man” communication togaintherespectofafellowunionistmusthaverankledher.InadditiontoherfrustrationwithLaBerge, she tussled with the younger Standish, who challenged her authority within theMontreal boycott house.AlthoughStandish hadworked underDoloresHuerta inNewYorkCityandlaudedherleadership,hedemonstratedalackofrespectforGoveaandunderminedherleadershipbyquestioningherstrategies,maligningherorganizationalskills,andengagingin tonterías (stupidbehavior) that influenced themoraleof thehouse. In a letter toChavez,GoveaexplainedthatStandishhadcometoMontrealwiththeexpectationthathewouldbeputinchargeof thehouse.When thatdidnothappen,hebegan toworkbehindGovea’sback toundermine her credibility with the staff. Govea’s meetings with Standish confirmed herimpressions but also revealed a level of disrespect reserved especially for her. “He alsobelievesthatIamextremelyincompetent,”GoveadisclosedtoChavez,“[and]thatifhecouldgotoacitywheretherewassomeonelikeGilbertPadillaorsomeoneimportantlikethat,thenhe would.” Standish gave Govea the impression he was telling her, “You go, or I go,” asentiment she deeply resented and equated to blackmail. Ultimately, she recommended thatChaveznotgiveintoStandish’swishes:“Eitherhestaysherewhereheisneededandworkswellwiththisgroup,orhegoes[leavestheunion]altogether.”28

Standish, in fact, did circumvent the chain of command by writing to Chavez directly,requestinga transfer and tellinghis sideof the story.Forhim, thequestioncamedown toapersonality conflict and contrasting philosophies of organizing. He objected to Govea’sattitude towardhim,whichhesawas“increasinglydefensiveandcombative.”Undoubtedly,Standish’sorganizingagainstGovea influenced the tenorofhercommunicationwithhim,yethisown“ghastlyfeeling”thathewasbeing“horriblyunder-used”smackedofarroganceandeven insubordination. Moreover, Standish openly expressed hostility toward the “shop-in”usedtogreateffectbyHuertainNewYorkCityandGanzinTorontobecauseitpromoted“anelementofplay-actingorpretense,whichisrepugnanttome.”Heobjectedtotheinsincerityoftheactandworriedthatiftheboycotthouseeverfacedsevereinternalcrisis,memberswould

nottrusteachotherintheirattemptstoresolvedifferences.Oddly,Standishadvocateda“topdown”approachinwhichthehouseleaderinstructedvolunteerstostayfocusedonrecruitingcustomersoneshopperatatime,askingthemtokeeptheirreceiptsfrommarketsnotcarryingtable grapes, and sending them to managers of stores that did. Although Standish creditedGoveawithinventingthe“receipt-savingcampaign,”hefaultedherfornotfollowingthroughonit.“Ifwellcarriedout,”hewroteChavez,“itcouldenabletheboycotttosinkitsrootsquitedeeply into thepopulationof a city, andcouldget thousandsofpeoplemoreconcretely anddirectlyinvolvedthaniftheysimplysignedapledgenottobuyscabgrapesandnottoshopinstoreswhichsellthem.”29HeaskedChaveztoconsidermovinghimtoClevelandtoreplaceDixieLeeFisher,who,itwasrumored,wantedtoreturntoschoolfulltime.30

ThelackofresultsinMontrealpointedtoweaknessesinthecampaignthatStandishsensedand both Ganz and Govea admitted. Standish’s observations, however, discounted thecomplexitiesoforganizinginaforeigncountryandmissedthetrial-and-errorprocessusedbyeventhemostsuccessfulleaders.InLosAngeles,forexample,LeRoyChatfieldhadtoemployboth raucous demonstrations and painstaking appeals to customers before learning that thelatterworkedbetter in a conservative climate.Anunderlying conservativism and anti-unionsentimentdidnotshapetheattitudesofMontrealshoppers;indeed,Quebec,likeCanadaasawhole,wasmorepro-union thanmostof theUnitedStates in1970.Rather, theunionhad toovercomenotonlylanguagebarriersbutalsoculturaldifferencesinflamedbytheUFW’searlycoordinationwithEnglish-speakingunionistsinOntario.GoveaemployedarangeoftacticsinMontreal and worked to build personal relationships with labor leaders, an approach thatStandishneither appreciatednor excelledat.Ganz, inhis assessmentofStandish’s strengthsandweaknesses,characterizedhisapproachas“verysystematicandorganized”andcreditedhimwithspeakingexcellentFrench,butfaultedhimforhis“lackofexperience[in]workingwith organized groups, especially labour.” Standish’s proposed solution to Montreal’sproblemsmirrored the disciplined and patient approach taken in LosAngeles; however, by1970,theunionfeltthepressuretoproduceresultsmorequicklyasexpensesmountedonbothsides,andsomegrowersagainsoughtresolutiontotheconflict.Standish’s impatience with Govea also signaled the unique difficulties women faced as

leaders during late 1960s and 1970s. For example, Govea took exception to Standish’spreferencetoworkwithothermenoronhisown.ShetoldChavez,“Feelingswithrespecttotitlesandimportancearehis,notmine.”31StandishmadeknowntobothGoveaandChavezhisambition to pursue community organizing as a career.Hewrote toChavez, “Iwas initiallyattractedtothestrugglebymydesiretolearntoorganizeunderyourleadershipsothatIcouldpreparemyself to participate in other non-violent struggleswhich I believewill have to beorganized inAmerica.”32 That these skills could be acquired only throughmentorship fromChavezandPadilla,or thathisbreakasa leaderwouldcomeat theexpenseofawoman—eitherGoveainMontrealorDixieLeeFisherinCleveland—apparentlydidnottroublehim.Govearefusedtoaccepthisbehavior,firstcallinghimtoaface-to-facemeetingtoreprimandhim.Whenthisfailed,sheusedhercloutwithChavezandherauthorityasthehouseleadertorecommenddrawingStandishintolineorcuttinghimloose.Althoughtherecorddoesnotshowhow Chavez responded, Govea’s insistence that Standish remain in the boycott house as a

dutifulmemberunderherdemonstratedherdeterminationtoreceiverespectonaparwithmaleleadersinthemovement.Nostorybetterillustratesthechallengesandtriumphsthatwomenintheboycottexperienced

than Elaine Elinson’s. As an undergraduate student at Cornell University in themid-1960s,ElinsonservedontheboycottinNewYorkCityduringsummersbetweenherjobattheNaturalHistoryMuseumandacting in“off-off-Broadway”plays. In time,herserviceexpandedwellbeyond a part-time commitment in Manhattan to a consequential piece of the worldwideboycottpuzzle.Elinson’sbackgroundasthegranddaughterofRussianJewishimmigrantspredisposedherto

serveamovementonbehalfofimmigrantworkers.“Iwastoldnevertocrossapicketline,”sheremembered,“andthatallpeopleareequal.”HergrandmothercametotheUnitedStatesin1905, but returned to Russia in 1911 to participate in the Russian Revolution. ElinsonrememberedhergrandmotherasaverypoliticalpersonwhosegrandparentsshippedherbacktotheUnitedStatesin1916tosaveherlife.AccordingtoElinson,hergrandmotherneverfullygot over leavingRussia before the 1917Revolution: “She said, ‘Allmy friends had gottenkilled,Iwassodepressed…Icouldhavekilledmyself.’”Elinson’sfatherreinforcedthesepoliticsasaprofessorofpublichealthwholookedbeyondmedicinetosocialfactorssuchasracismandpovertyasreasonsforillnessamongpeopleofcolor.Her familycultivateda strong senseof social justice,whichmanifested itself early inher

life.Duringatripacrosscountryattheageoftwelve,sherememberedbeingkickedoutoftheAlamoforobjectingtothesaleofConfederateflagsinthegiftshop.“Thewomansaid,‘Ifyoudon’tlikeit,youcanjustleave.’AndIsaid,‘Well,I’mtryingtoleave,butthisstateissobig,Ican’tgetoutofit!’”AftergraduatingfromhighschoolinNewJerseyin1964,ElinsonattendedSmithCollege,buttheelitismoftheschooltroubledherfamily.Inaquestionnairedistributedtoallincomingfreshman,thecollegewantedtoknow,“Willyouneedaplaceforyourhorse?”Elinsonrecalled,“Mydad[said],‘OhmyGod,wherearewesendingyou?’”Whensomeofher classmates took exception to her dating an African American student from Amherst,ElinsonsoughtatransfertoCornell,abiggerschoolwithamorediversestudentbodyandawiderrangeofstudies.AtCornell,shestudiedabroadinthePhilippinesandpursuedamajorinAsianstudiesand

Chinese,butalsotraveledtoHondurastoteachliteracyandbuildschools.Ingeneral,Cornellprovided a broad spectrum of opinions and experiences, including those from the antiwarmovement. She consideredmembership inStudents for aDemocraticSociety, but ultimatelyfound the organization too “white male dominated.” The UFW had much greater appealbecauseoftheboldleadershipofDoloresHuerta,whosesuccessinNewYorkshediscoveredwhile serving onUFW picket lines and participating in the successful boycott campaign of1967.Duringherfirstyearinthemovement,ElinsonnevermetHuertabutsawthereverencefellowvolunteershadforher:“DoloreswaslikethegreatmotherofthathouseonEighty-sixthStreet.”33Whenshegraduatedin1968,Elinsonconsideredbecomingafull-timeorganizerfortheunion,but she remainedconflictedaboutpursuinga career as aprofessoror committingherselftoactivism.SheultimatelydecidedtoservetheboycotthouseinNewYorkduringthesummerof1968beforemovingtoLondontostartagraduateprogramattheSchoolofOriental

andAfricanStudiesinthefall.34

The contrasts between the two experiences could not have been more decisive indetermining the course of Elinson’s life. The solitude of research in Londonmade her feelsomewhat removed from themajor conflicts of the day. “I’m sitting in the basement of theBritish Museum copying characters off Ming dynasty vases,” she recalled, “and [I was]thinking, the VietnamWar is raging, andwhat am I doing this for?”When shewrote JerryBrown inDelano to see if she could comeback to theUnitedStates towork for theunion,Brown instructed her to remain in England. By 1968 the growers had begun to transfershipmentsoverseasinanattempttocircumventtheboycottinNorthAmerica.“Ifnecessaryyoucouldcomebackrightaway,”Browntoldher,butadded,“InasmuchasyouareinLondonandwearetryingtointernationalizetheboycott,Cesaraskedifyoucouldn’tholdontoyourmeansofexistenceanddosomegroundworkforusthere.”35Althoughheknewitwouldbea longshot,Brown realized that keepingElinsonoverseas gave the union a chance to establish itspresenceinEuropeandputthegrowers’onnoticethattheUFWcouldmovewiththegrapes.Giventhesizeoftheboycotteffort,ElinsondidnotinitiallystandoutforBrownuntilhesaw

aphotoofherinafileofpotentialvolunteersinDelano.Herememberedhisreaction:“Isawthatshewasthiscutegirlinamini-skirtwiththosebigglassesthatweresopopular,kindofJimiHendrixglasses…andIsaid,‘Thisgirlisperfectforthelongshoremen.’”InalettertoElinsoninstructingherofherduties,Brownremindedher,“Nolaborleadercanresistaprettygirl,”andofferedherthefollowing“sidenote”:“Sorrytomentionthistactic,and[Iam]fullyawarethatliberationbegins[at]home,butlet’sfaceit[,]whenwomenwanttobecompletelyequal they lose their most powerful advantage over men.”36 European and Americanjournalistsalsotooknoteofherattire,especially theminiskirt,whichElinsondescribed:“Itwasachartreusemini-skirtdresswithabigwhitepointedcollar…andbigwhitebuttons.”37Sheoftenwore longwhitestockingsandflat loafers,andaccessorizedwitha redandblackUFWbadgeandaUFWscarfwiththeunioneagleonit.Duringthewintermonths,shedonnedanorangecoat.

FIGURE9.ElaineElinsondistributesflyersontheLondondocks,ca.1969.Privatecollection.

Elinson’s dress sharply contrastedwith thework clothes of dockworkers and the black andgray tweeds of unionofficials.Brownbelieved she cultivated this look to her “advantage,”although,asElinsonremembered,shehadlittlechoiceinthematter:“Iliterallyhadnomoneytobuyasuit,orsomethingtolooksortofpresentable.”Moreover,whatappearedalluringtoBrowndidnotseemexcessivelysototheaverageBriton,whohadgrownaccustomedtosuchshortdressesinshopsalongPortobelloRoad,thefashiondistrictofLondon.38

Fashiondecisionsaside,theproblemofsexismconfrontedeverywomanactivistwhodaredto become a leader in the United States or Europe. In a period when women’s liberationoccupiedaplacealongsidetheantiwarmovementandcivilrightsmovements,womensuchasJessicaGoveaandElaineElinsonhadtomanagemen’sperceptionsofthemasmerelysexualobjects.Govea,forexample,wroteofherdiscomfortduringa trip toShreveport,Louisiana,wheresheencountered the twinchallengesof racismandsexism.“Personally, itwasaverybadexperienceasracismstillhastheupperhandinthatarea,”shewroteChavez,“andifyouthinkthatthingsarebadforblackmeninthatareatheyareevenworseforblackwomenand,inthe South, I am a black woman.” She reported receiving “all kinds of invasions andpropositions” from men in the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper MillWorkers until she rose to speak on behalf of the grape boycott. “I was really scared,” sheadmitted,“butIplayedit‘carapalocool’”(coolfaced)andintheenddecidedthathertripwas“agoodexperience,Isuppose.”39Similarly,ElinsonrememberedBritainas“averysexistsociety” and theproblemofdiscriminatorybehavior towardwomen“rife in the tradeunionmovement.”Elinson did not struggle with the problem of racism; however, as Brown’s comments

signaled,herageandgenderpresentedbothchallengesandopportunities.WhatBrownlabeled

her“powerfuladvantage”madeheranoveltyforreadersofunionnewspapersbutalsoplacedherinapotentiallyprecariouspositionwithtradeunionmembers.“Theseguys,infact,wereinsomeof the roughest trades,”Elinson recalled. “Theywerepeoplewhohadgrownupwithverysetideasaboutthewoman’sroles.”Yet,inspiteoftheirbackgrounds,tradeunionistsinEnglandtreatedElinson“veryrespectfully”andhelpedherwheneversheaskedforassistance.She theorized that her outsider status as anAmericanmade her nonthreatening to the unionbossesandingratiatedhertotherankandfileintheUnitedKingdom.AsElinsonestablishedherselfinEngland,BritishandAmericanunionofficialsintroduced

hertomaleunionleaderswhoshowedlessrespecttowardwomen.InSweden,forexample,she attended conferences and communicated with unionists who paid more attention to herhemline thanhermessage.Sherecalled,“Therewerea lotofguyswhothought, ‘Okay, let’sjustlethergivehertalk,andthentakeherhome’Ididn’tfeelthatcomfortablesometimesgoingto weekend conferences.”40 When Elinson requested Brown’s recommendation on how tohandlesuchadvances,hesoughtthehelpofChavezandofferedhisownremedy.Chavezhad“nowordsonthesubject,”whereasBrownrepliedwithpractical,ifnotsympatheticadvice:“Ithinkitrequiresacombinationofgoodhumorandfirmwill—wedon’texpecttotalsacrificeforthecause.”41

Elinsondrewonherfamilyexperienceandtheexampleofotherwomeninthemovementtoovercomesuchawkwardmoments.Thesisterof threebrothers, she felt comfortabledealingwith men and believed herself their equal. Her parents had instilled this confidence andrejected the idea prevalent among some of their generation that women went to collegeprimarily to find a man to marry. “There were a lot of my contemporaries like the brightwomenwhowenttoSmith,”Elinsonremembered,“whoreallyweretaughtbytheirparentsortheir culturalmilieu [to] study art history, and then you’re going tomarry a nice guywho’sgoingtobeadoctor,orsomething,fromHarvard.”Herparents,ontheotherhand,raisedhertobe self-sufficient and empowered her to think that she could achieve the same level ofindependenceasherbrothers.TheexampleofDoloresHuertaweighedheavilyonhermindasshebegantoworkwithleaderswhoviewedherpresencewithajaundicedeye.Huerta,whonegotiated the first labor contracts with Schenley, gave Elinson a powerful role model toemulate:“IwasdrawnlikeamagnettoDolores.…Shewasonewomaninthemidstofallofthesemen.Andshewaswaygorgeous…butshe just forgedaheadwithallofherpoliticalpassionsandcommitment and smarts, andyouknow, the fact that shemayhavebeen totallyattractivetohalfofthepeoplearoundherwasnotwhatgothergoing,youknow?”42

JerryBrownalsotreatedElinsonasanequal—commentsaboutherlooksnotwithstanding—anddispensedadvice, support, andcontact informationwithout equivocation.Their frequentcorrespondenceprovidesan impressive recordof theevolutionof theEuropeanboycottandevidenceofElinson’sintuitionandindependence.Brown’searlyadvicetoElinsondemonstratedafaithintheconsumerboycottthatwasbased

on theunion’s success inNorthAmerica.BecauseEnglandwas the fifth largest importer ofgrapesandamarketwheregrowerscouldmoveunusedshipments,BrownfeltanurgencytoeducatetheBritishpublicthrough“aone-shotprovo[cative]publicitystuntagainst importingUS grapes on the theme of helping the poor in America (which ought to appeal to British

students).” In addition to students, Brown advised Elinson to target union members andgovernment workers, who “might move to either stop grape imports (unlikely) or make apublic display of displeas[ure] (likely).”43 Among his many suggestions for action, BrownamusinglyadvisedElinsontounfurla“don’tbuygrapesbanner”fromBigBenorconvincetheBeatles to write a protest song, going so far as to suggest the title “Sour Grapes” beforeconcluding,“ThisIleaveentirelyuptolocalimagination.”44

Elinson had to overcome a lack of resources to educate herself and the union on whichstrategy shouldbe used inEngland.She felt the union’s notorious lackof funds andmeagerweeklystipendof$5pervolunteermoreacutelythanmostleaders,giventheexchangerateandthecostof communication.AlthoughChavezpermittedamodest increase inher stipendandallowedBrowntosendabitmoremoneyasneeded, theUFWreliedonher toraisemoney,securedonations, andbudgetwisely—includingusingmuchof her ownmoney set aside foreducation—tofundheractivities.Elinsonlivedinlessthanidealconditions,sharingaflatonthethirdfloorofanoldrowhousewiththreeothergraduatestudents.Sheremembered,“Theplacewasrundownanddamp;whenitrained,thekitchenfloorwascrowdedwithbucketsandbowlstocatchtheleaks,andthewholeflatwasheatedbyaricketygasstovethathadtobeconstantly fedshillings.”Whensheneeded touse thephone,shehad to relyonapayphonesharedamongalltheresidentsofthehouseinthehallwayofthebottomfloor.45Attheheightofthe British campaign, one phone bill between Brown and Elinson reached $40, promptingBrowntocaution,“Don’tworryaboutit;butlet’strytoavoidthatkindofthing.”46

CutofffromimmediatecontactwithDelano,Elinsonreliedprimarilyonherowninstinctstobuild a campaign in London and beyond. In talking to her peers at school, she found asympathetic group of English students and community activists steeped in the politics ofanticolonialism in the former European colonies of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Namibia,Mozambique, andAngola. In addition,British peace activists demonstrated against theU.S.war in Vietnam and endorsed boycotts against products that supported apartheid in SouthAfrica. All of these friends served as allies at a time of great upheaval, providing herencouragement and occasional resources in an otherwise foreign land.Yet in spite of theseefforts, Elinson recognized the limitations of building an effective consumer boycott.47Althoughher fellowstudentsand friends in thepeacemovementandexpatriatecommunitiesunderstoodthestakesinthefarmworkers’struggle,theaverageEnglishconsumerhadarathersteeplearningcurvewhenitcametoU.S.domesticpolitics,makingitvirtuallyimpossibletogenerate the kind of mass support for a boycott that had been achieved in North America.Moreover,theabsenceofaBritishbillofrightswithanamendmentprotectingfreespeechforindividualsmadeElinsonandotherpotentialvolunteersvulnerabletoprosecution(andinhercasedeportation)fortellingcustomersnottobuygrapes.48

Elinson quickly figured out that social justice for farm workers could flow more easilythroughthecollectiveactionofunionizedlaborers.UnlikeinNorthAmerica,wherelaborlawsrestricted allied unions fromhelping theUFWexecute a blockade of shipments, inEnglandunionshadgreater freedomtoassistotherworkers.British labor leadersandunionofficialswereparticularlyscandalizedbythedenialofcollectivebargainingrightstofarmworkers,arightguaranteedanddefendedbyU.S. lawformostotherAmericanworkers. In this regard,

BritainresembledCanada,whereMarshallGanzandJessicaGoveahadcultivatedallianceswith leaders of organized labor who expressed their objections to the exclusion of farmworkersfromtheNationalLaborRelationsAct.Elinson’sgoalsdifferedfromthoseofGanzandGovea,however,inthatsheappealedtoBritishdockworkerstocreateablockadeagainstgrapesreachingEnglishshoresratherthantoparticipateinstorefrontpicketlines.49

Elinsonmade it her business to become familiarwith theTransport andGeneralWorkersUnion(TGWU),theunionrepresentingdockworkersresponsibleforunloadingshipscarryingCalifornia table grapes. Given the presence in Delano of AFL-CIO representative, BillKircher, Elinson assumed she could obtain introductions to TGWU members through theEuropeanofficeoftheAFL-CIO,theofficialsponsoroftheUFW.InEurope,however,Elinsonfound the AFL-CIO icy; her attempts to contact either Irving Brown, the Europeanrepresentative,orJayLovestone, the international labordirector,werefutile.“Myfeeling isthattheAFL-CIOmighttrytokeepyoufromworkingwiththeradicalanti-certain-aspects-of-American-policy-elements,” Brown explained, “[because the] foreign AFL-CIO is lined upwithalltheconservativerightwingforcesandnotwiththepeoplewhoaregoingtohelpus.”50

BrownrecommendedworkingwithVictorReuther,WalterReuther’sbrother,becauseoftheUAW’shistoric support of theUFW.Reuther’s frequent trips toEurope also gave theUAWcredibilitywithboththeTGWUandthemoreradicalmembersof theTradeUnionCongress(TUC), the umbrellaBritish labor organization towhich theTGWUbelonged. “Our goal inLondon,”BrownwroteElinson,“istohavethedockersortheTransportWorkers(TGWU)orthe entire TUC refuse to handle a major shipment of U.S. grapes bound for England.”51Postwar increases in U.S. imports, combined with consumers’ growing rejection of SouthAfricangrapesinprotestagainstapartheid,madeU.S.grapesprevalentinBritishmarketsandanappealingtargetfortheunion.52Afteracoupleweeks,BrownsecuredChavez’sapprovalforElinsontocontactTGWUofficialsdirectlytocircumventthestickylaborpoliticsthatwereholdingupherprogress.Elinson’s own initiative in contacting members of the TGWU proved to be the most

importantactinestablishingrelationswithEnglishdockworkers.Ratherthanstartatthetopoftheorganizationwiththegeneralsecretary,FrankCousins,sheappealedtoFreddySilbermanandReaganScott, twowriters in theCommunicationsDepartmentofTGWUresponsible forreportinglaborstruggleswithintheunionandbeyond.Silbermanwrotemostofthestoriesfortheunionnewspaper,TheRecord, andScott servedaseditor.Elinson remembered,“Freddywasthefirstpersontoinvitemeintothatbuilding,whichtomewaslikethefortressthatIhadtogetinto.”SilbermanwasaHolocaustsurvivor,makinghiswaytoEnglandwithhisfamilybywayofSouthAfrica.Asayoungadult,hehadattendedCornellUniversity,givinghimaninstantconnectiontoElinson.SilbermanandScottinterviewedElinsonforafeaturearticleontheUFW—thefirstofitskindtoappearintheBritishpress—thatledtoothersaboutherandthefarmworkermovementintheLondonTimes,ManchesterGuardian,andTelegraph.53

Elinson simultaneously worked with fellow graduate students on labor issues, eventuallymakingcontactwithTerryBarrett,adockworkerfromtheIsleofDogsontheRiverThamesand a member of the Socialist Workers Party who organized demonstrations committed toachievingpeaceinIrelandandanendtotheU.S.warinVietnam.BarrettinvitedElinsondown

tothedockstosharethestoryofthefarmworkersandintroducedhertofellowdockworkersatWestIndia,Millwall,andTilbury.Afieryspeaker,heconcludedeverymeetingwithapledgetoElinson:“ThescabCaliforniagrapeswouldbeblacked[blocked]bytheBritishunions—andwe’regoingtostarthereandnow!”54

Eventually,thesedockappearancesledtoaformalinvitationfromWilliamA.Punt,thefruitandvegetablemarketssectionofficeroftheTGWU,toaddressagatheringofdockworkersatthemain union hall in CoventGardenMarket in the center of London.At ameeting of thegeneralmembership,Elinsonstoodbeforehundredsofdockworkerson“lunch”breakat7A.M.astheycradledsteaminghotcupsofteaonacoldfallmorning.Elinson’sstoriesofchildlabor,poverty, and high rates of tuberculosis among farm workers evoked comparisons to TheGrapesofWrathfamiliartosomeofthemembers.ThattheNationalLaborRelationsBoardintheUnitedStatesdidnotrecognizefarmworkersespeciallyshockedthemembership,whosawgovernment recognition and the right to collective bargaining as fundamental to their ownhealth andwell-being. In response, Punt secured a unanimous vote from the floor to send aresolution to the TGWU and the TUC headquarters endorsing the strike and boycott, and aletter to the U.S. Embassy announcing their intention of cooperating with the UFW. ThedockworkersalsomadeacollectionoffundstosupportElinsonandofferedtotakeheroutfora pint when the meeting concluded, but she graciously declined.55 Elinson carried thismomentumwell beyond theLondon docks to other ports inEngland, including those run bylongshoremenrepresentedbytheglobalunionfederation,theInternationalTransportWorkersFederation(ITWF).Ineverycase,dockworkersexpressedadeepsenseofsolidaritywiththefarm workers and their intention to help Elinson enforce a blockade of California grapesthroughoutEngland.Media coverage of Elinson’s organizing and the TGWU’s actions finally grabbed the

attention of both AFL-CIO leaders and the U.S. government. Her growing influence overBritish transporters compelled U.S. Labor Attaché Thomas Byrne to contact AFL-CIOpresident,GeorgeMeany, to findoutmoreabout the twenty-one-year-oldorganizerworkingout of a dreary cold-water flat in North London. Given the European office’s neglect ofElinson, however, JayLovestone could not attest to her character, forcingMeany to contactBillKircher inDelano.“Thedayyour letter regarding the ITWF[support] arrived,”BrownwrotetoElinson,“BillKircherreceivedacallfromGeorgeMeanyaskingwhothehellyouare.” Brown’s report to Kircher that Elinson was “a ‘solid citizen’ (read: not new-left)”allayedsomeofKircher’sfearsandpermittedhimtocommunicateElinson’sgoodintentionstoMeany.Thomas Byrne conducted his own investigation, eventually inviting Elinson to the U.S.

Embassyforachat.Althoughaneutralpartytotheconflict,theembassyhadtippeditspoliticalhand byworkingwith theU.S.Department ofAgriculture to distribute bulletins advertisingCalifornia grape sales in Britain. TGWU porters responsible for work onboard shipsrespondedtoElinson’sappealforcooperationbyrefusingtoappearinpublicityphotostiedtothe USDA campaign. Although the porters showed greater caution than the dockworkers intheir endorsement of the boycott, their unwillingness to appear in the advertisement causedByrneandUSDAofficialstoworryabouttheextentofElinson’sorganizing.56Attheirmeeting,

Byrne revealed the contents of a letter from Punt on behalf of Covent Garden transportersregardingElinson’sinvolvementinBritishaffairs.Punt’sstatementof“hopethatthemembersofourorganizationarenotobliged touse their industrial strength toassist theirAmericanbrothersandsisters”alarmedByrne;heheldElinsonaccountableforthisthinlyveiledthreatoflaboractionnotsanctionedbyPunt’ssuperiors.57AlthoughthemeetingwithByrneindicatedalevelofsurveillancebytheU.S.governmentthatmadeElinsonuncomfortable,themeetingalsodemonstratedprogressinhereffortsandgaveherconfidencethatthe“blacking”ofallgrapesfromEnglandwasanachievablegoal.58

Byrne’smessageofdoubtregardingtheTGWU’sofficialpositionontheboycottsignaledtoElinsonandBrowntheimportanceofsecuringaformalresolutionfromtheunion’sgoverningcouncil. Although porters and dockers demonstrated an inclination to cooperate, a contactwithintheunion,identifiedonlyas“Willis,”informedElinsonthattheTGWU,bylaw,couldnot call for a blockade directly. Rather, he advised Elinson to push for the TGWUgeneralcouncilto“passaresolutionstronglyendorsingthe[UFW]strikeandmakingthemembershipawareofit.”Thisapproachworked.ByearlyDecember,Elinson’sworkwithunionofficials,backed by formal appeals from Chavez and Reuther, produced an agreement by PresidentFrankCousinsoftheTGWUtobringtheissuebeforethefullbody.“Thejobyouaredoing,”BrowntoldElinson,“reallyneedsa20-yeardiplomat,onlyyou’redoingbetterthanthat.”59OnDecember22,1968,CousinsreleasedtheofficialpositionoftheTGWU:“TheTransportandGeneralWorkersUnionisadvisingits11⁄2millionmemberstooperateaconsumerboycottofCaliforniagrapes,andhaswrittentotheTUCsuggestingthataffiliatedunionsbeencouragedtodolikewise.”AccordingtoJackJones,theexecutivesecretaryoftheunion,theTGWUchosetosupporttheUFWbecause“theywerenotincludedwithinthelegalprotectionthatrequiresAmericanemployerstorecognizearepresentativeunion,andwecertainlywanttodowhatwecantohelpthem.”60

News of the resolution thrilled the UFW back home and inspired collaboration withmembers of the International Longshoremen Workers Union (ILWU) in the United States.AlthoughILWUpresident,HarryBridges,refusedtoendorsethestrikeandtheboycott,manyrank-and-file longshoremenshowedtheirallegianceto thefarmworkersbydeductingmoneyfromtheirmonthlypaycheckstosupporttheUFWandconductingfoodandclothingdrivesforunemployedworkerswalking thepicket lines.TwoILWUclerks,LouPerlin inLosAngelesandDonWatsonintheBayArea,wentastepfurtherbysharinginformationfrommanifestsofshipsthatwereleavingtheWestCoast.“Wearenowworkingcloselywiththeshipsclerks,”Brown wrote Elinson, “who are systematically checking at both San Francisco and LosAngeles[forthelocationofgrapes].”61BrownalsoclarifiedtheobjectivesforElinson:“Ourfriendsintheshippingindustryhereinformusthatifwecanstoponeshipment(andcauseallthe legal, international, political problems that would involve), these shipping lines wouldsimplyrefusetotakegrapestoanyEuropeanports—it’sassimpleasthat.”62

InBritain, the resolutiondidnotmake theblockadea fait accompli,but it gaveElinsonapowerful tool for organizing one. Resolutions and public speeches notwithstanding, theexecutionoftheblockadedependedonreliabledocksideleadershipandaccurateinformationregardingthewhereaboutsofgrapeslocatedinladingsontheship.Onceagain,Elinsonturned

toherrank-and-filealliesalongthedockstomaketheblockadeareality.AtCoventGarden,shemetBrianNicholson,theheadoftheLondondocksandamemberoftheexecutiveboardofthe TGWU. A veteran of the docks, Nicholson used his authority and imposing physicalpresencetobringthehustleandbustletoascreechinghaltforElinsontodoherwork.Elinsondescribedthetypicalscene:

Withthebillofladinginhand,IwentdowntotheLondondockswithBrian.Wewouldapproachthe teamofdockworkersworkingon thatparticularshipand thatparticularhold.Theworkerswouldputdown theirominous lookingdockers’hooks (apointedpiece of iron attached to a strongwooden grip, used to pull cargo off ships beforecontainerization),andgatherroundthisoddpair.Brian,athird-generationdockworker,6’3”,inathicksheepskincoatandclothcap,orangesideburns,andaboomingCockneyvoice, would introduceme. I came up to his shoulder, had a ponytail and bigmodglasses. They could hardly understandmyAmerican accent.We bothwore red-and-blackUFWbuttonsonourjackets.63

Holding thebill of ladingBrownhadacquired fromWatsonandPerlin inOakland,Elinsonscoured the contents of ships with the “walking boss” of the dock to determine the exactlocation of the grapes. Such transatlantic solidarity between ILWU and TGWU memberstranscendedthepoliticalposturingofunionleadersandcompletedanetworkthateffectivelyblacked95percentofthegrapesfromreachingBritishshores.64

Inresponse,growersreactedastheyhadbefore:movingthegrapestoanothermarket, thistimetoScandinavia.Theunionhadanticipated thismove,givenBrown’sextensiveresearchonthequantityandlocationofexports,whichshowedthatamajorityofthe15millionpoundsof U.S. grapes going to Europe went to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden,Norway,Denmark,andFinlandin1966.65ThelineofcommunicationwithWestCoastclerkshelpedupdatethedestinationandlocationofgrapesnotonlyforshipsgoingtoLiverpoolandLondon,but also thoseheadeddirectly toScandinavia. In January,Brown learned that threeships—the Brasilia, Aconcagua Valley, and San Joaquin Valley—were now bound forStockholm, Goteborg, and Malmo in Sweden, and another, the Bolinas, was en route toNorway.BrownpromptlydispatchedElinsontoSweden.Sherecountedtheharrowingtripacrossthe

NorthSeaandherarrivalinStockholmduringthedeadofwinter:“Ithrewmywarmestsocksandsweatersinabag,bundledupabigbatchofUFWliterature,andboughtapocketSwedishdictionary and a second-class ticket to Stockholm. The trip by bus, train and ferry took 48hours.ItwasJanuary,andaheavysnowblanketedtheSwedishlandscape.IwasinvitedtostayinthehomeofanAmericanwarresisterandhisSwedishgirlfriendwhotaughtlaborhistoryattheuniversity.Isleptonthecouchintheirlivingroom,andafloor-to-ceilingceramicfurnacekept us warmwhen the daily temperatures outside fell way below zero.”66 Elinson’s host,VictorPestoff,whohadfledtheUnitedStatestoavoidthedraft,nowworkedparttimewiththe International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural, and Allied Workers (IFPAAW), aglobalagriculturalworkers’unioninwhichtheUFWmaintainedmembership.WithPestoff’shelp,BrownmanagedtohavehisalliesintheILWUtelextheships’manifestsindicatingthe

location of the grapes to the IFPAAW office in the Netherlands, which then forwarded theinformationtoSweden.67

TheunionpreparedforElinson’sarrivalbycallinginfavorsfromnewandoldlaborfriendsathomeandabroad.Chavezsenta letter toVictorReuther, requestinghishelp insecuringaproperwelcomeforElinsonfromSwedish laborofficials.“Oneof theproblemsweface inEurope,” Chavez explained to Reuther, “is being recognized as a legitimate union that issupportedbythemajorunionsliketheUAWandtheAFL-CIOintheUnitedStates.”Chavez’smessage,ofcourse,alludedtotheongoingtroublewiththeAFL-CIOEuropeanofficeanditsfailuretorecognizeElinsonasarepresentativefortheunion.TheUAW’sdeparturefromtheAFL-CIOoverpoliticaldifferencesbetweenWalterReutherandGeorgeMeanyin1968hadgiven Reuther an opportunity to accentuate the union’s leftist credentials among Europeanunions that tended toward socialism, especially inSweden.Although JayLovestonecourtedmoreconservativeleadersinEuropeonbehalfoftheAFL-CIO,noteveryonewithintheunionagreedwithhim,especiallyBillKircher,whoincreasinglyinfluencedMeany’sthinkingaboutthefarmworkersasthepopularityoftheboycottswelledonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.FortheUFW,UAWassistanceinEuropecouldpromptamorecommittedresponsefromtheAFL-CIO,which had to worry about its public image and protecting its turf. At worst, the AFL-CIOwouldcontinuetoneglectElinsonandofferonlylacklustersupportfortheboycottabroad.Chavez’s gambleworked.VictorReuther respondedby sending cables to his allies in the

InternationalTransportWorkersUnioninSwedentorequesttheircooperationinanextensionof the blockade.68 Reuther also directed Virger Viklund, a representative for the SwedishMetalworkersUnionattendingaUAWmeetinginLosAngeles,tovisitDelanoduringhistrip.BrownreportedtoElinson,“ViklundwasveryinterestedinthestrikeandboycottandtoldmehowSwedenhadmadea100%effectiveboycottofSouthAfricangrapes[toputpressureontheapartheidgovernment].”Before leavingCalifornia,Viklundcommunicatedhis interest insupportingtheUFWtoLarsC.Carlsson,viceconsultotheSwedishConsulateinLosAngeles,whocalledtheDelanoofficetoofferhishelp.CarlssonhonoredBrown’srequesttosecureaformal invitation from the Swedish Trade Union Federation for Elinson and gave Browncontact information for transport workers responsible for unloading grapes throughoutScandinavia.Elinsonreceivedahero’swelcomeinSweden.“TheSwedishunions,”sherecalled,“were

even more anxious to help—if that is possible—than the British ones.”69 The success oforganizedlaborinSwedentosecurehealthcare,pensions,educationalfunds,andjobsecurityproduced a pro-labor public that was open to the appeals of the UFW. A burgeoning oilindustry in theNorthSeaaccounted formuchofSweden’scollectivewealth,andaspiritofgenerosity pervaded Swedish society that was manifested in a general willingness toparticipateinmovementsforsocialjustice.“Inacountryashomogenous,liberal,andtight-knitas Sweden,” Brown advised, “I don’t think that we should discount the possibility of aneffective consumer boycott.”70 The leading role Swedish consumers played in the boycottsagainstSouthAfricanproductstoprotestapartheidandpeacedemonstrationsinthestreetsofStockholm against the war in Vietnam informed Brown’s advice. Chavez and Brownmadeovertures to the Swedish Food Cooperative, Kooperative Foerbundet, where 30 percent of

Swedesdidtheirshopping.TheysentstoriesregardingtheunsanitaryconditionsunderwhichfieldworkerslaboredtotheSwedishConsumerCooperativejournalandmagazineeditorsinhopesofspurringaboycottofCaliforniagrapes.71

Yet for all the potential of a consumer boycott inSweden,Elinsondiscouraged such talk,focusingprimarilyonworkwiththeunions.Theabsenceofareadyarmyofvolunteersandtheneed for Elinson to manage several fronts from a foreign location made pursuing such astrategyimpossible.AlthoughElinsonspokeEnglish,Spanish,Russian,Chinese,andFrench,she had little grasp of the Swedish language and depended on sympathetic journalists tocommunicatehermessage.Whengiventheopportunity,sheusednewspaperstocommunicatedirectlytodockworkers.“Twoboats,theAconcaguaValleyandtheSanJoaquinValley,havejust been forced to change course and are now en route to Sweden,” she told one reporter.Placingafinerpointonhermessage,sheadded,“YoumustdothesamethingastheEnglishhavedone;otherwise thingswillnevergetstraightenedupbackhome.”72ElinsonreinforcedhermessagebyfocusingheractivitiesonconvincingtheSwedishtransporters tosupport theblockade of grapes. She immediately made contact with Reuther’s friends in the SwedishTradeUnionsandtheTransportWorkersUnion,securinganofficialtourofthemainportsandtheassistanceofatranslator.Inresponse,theSwedishTradeUnionshostedapressconferencetoannouncetheirsupportfortheboycott,andthetransportersdirectedhertoMalmo,Sweden,inanticipationofthearrivalofthegrapes.Everconsciousofbothpracticalityandstyle,Elinsonboardedthetrainforthesouthernport

ofMalmo,dressedinabrand-newpairofreindeer-skinboots—courtesyoftheSwedishfarmworkers’ union—heavy stockings, and a long wool skirt covered by a floor-length shawl.Whenshearrived,tradeunionists,portofficials,reporters,andTVcamerascoveredthedocks.TheladingcrewhadalreadytakenthepositionthattheywouldnotunloadcargountilElinsoncouldboardtheshiptoensurethatthedockworkersdidnotremoveboxesofgrapeswiththerestofthefreight.Thecaptainstoodatthebowoftheship,arguingwiththeshopstewardthatallofthegrapeshadbeenunloadedinLondon.“Wellthen,”thestewardresponded,“wearegoing on the ship, and you are going to show us there are no grapes in there.” By unioncontract,thecaptaincouldnotrefusetheshopstewardentrytothevessel,butheinsistedthatElinsonnotcomeonboard.Neithersidewouldbudgefromitsposition.Asthestandoffgrewincreasingly tense,snowbegantofallontheportandfamiliesof the

dockworkersrefreshedthecrowdwithhotcoffeeandbread.Nationaltelevisioncapturedthedrama for all of Scandinavia to see, dividing time between scenes of the dock and adocumentary filmabout the farmworkermovementmadebyaSwedish filmmaker,ChristianStannow, twoyearsearlier.Finally,withfewoptions leftandothercargoin jeopardyofnotbeing unloaded, the captain conceded to Elinson’s inspection of the refrigerated container.With the ILWU manifest in hand, she quickly located the grapes and set them aside fortransporterstoworkaroundastheywentabouttheirbusinessunloadingtherestoftheship.The events in England and Sweden had a ripple effect through northern Europe. True to

ILWUpredictions, the hard-fought victories on the docks ofLiverpool andLondon led to aquickerpublicdefeatof thegrowers inSweden.NewsofElinson’s triumphspreadaheadtothe next potential ports of disembarkation for the grapes. Trade unions in both Finland and

Norwayissuedpublicstatementsoftheirintentionstoenforcetheblockadetoo,whilestronguniontiesintheNetherlandsandDenmarksuggestedthefutilityofredirectingtherottingcargoto those countries. Finally, the ship sailed on to Hamburg, Germany, in late January in anattempt to salvage any profit from themuch diminished shipment. Victor Reuther, who hadplayedaroleinhersuccess,marveledatElinson’sabilitytomakethemostofhiscontactsandinvitedhertomeetwithhimduringaninternationallaborconferenceinDenmark.HehonoredElinsonbyflyinghertotheconferencefromSweden,araretreat,givenhermeagerbudgetandhumble living quarters throughout the campaign. Elinson remembered her short time withReutherfondly:“Hewasawonderfulteacher.White-hairedandbearded,hehadapatchoveroneeye,aneyehehadlosttoapoliceman’sgunshotatthegreatGeneralMotorsstrikeatFlint,Michigan in 1936. He tutored me in American labor history and introduced me to unionrepresentativesfromallovertheworld.”73

Elinson’s success impressed union members back home, perhaps none more than JerryBrownandCesarChavez,whoused thenewsof theblockade tomotivate strikerspicketingCaliforniafarmsandboycottvolunteersdemonstratinginfrontofNorthAmericanstores.“Wecan’tbegintotellyouhowbigwhatyouaredoingis,”BrownreportedtoElinson,“andhowimportantitisatthistime.Youaresingle-handedlymakingamajorcontributiontowinningthisstrike.”74

ForElaineElinson,suchwordsofencouragementmatteredinthedarkesthours,whenAFL-CIOleadersrefusedtheirassistance.Shecomplainedofthe“sadandlonelybusiness”ofunionpolitics andwondered out loudwhether her timewould be better spent back home.Brownempathized with Elinson, noting his own frustrations with AFL-CIO bosses: “Sometimes Iwonderwhoourrealenemyis.”InthemidstoftheSwedishcampaign,forexample,theAFL-CIO refused to vouch for the validity of the farm workers union or its boycott, even afterElinson’ssuccessinachievingtheblockadeinBritain,precipitatinglettersfromReutherandChavez to Arne Geijer, president of the Swedish Trade Union Federation. “It is better inDelano,”Brownadmitted,“moresupportiveandfriendlyandwarm,sowarmattimesthatyoucould cry to see how the strikers have sacrificed.”Brown balanced such depictionswith asoberingnotetoElinson:“Itisfrustratingtoo,torealizethattheyarealljustpeoplewithmanyselfishgoalsandpettyjealousies.”Brownmayhaveusedsuch“grassisnotalwaysgreener”messagestopersuadeElinsonto

stayandfightinEurope.FollowingatumultuousyearinwhichthemurdersofMartinLutherKing Jr. and Robert Kennedy and the police riot against demonstrators at the DemocraticNationalConvention inChicagochallengedsomeactivists’ faith innonviolence,Brownmayhavereachedhisownexistentialcrisis.HewrotetoElinson,“Civilrightsandthedecenniumof non-violence and brotherlymarchers fade into the dusty song books of camp history andAmericaiscomingfacetofacewiththehypocrisyofitsownmythsanduntoldrealities.”Forhim,servicetotheunionwashissmallattemptto“actoutalifewithsomedignity,”althoughhewonderedaloudhowconsequential,ultimately, theirworkmightbe.“Herewesitmakingthemostanachronisticrevolutionofall,”heconfidedtoElinson,“unionizingfarmworkersinthequicksandofadisappearingruraldreamthatwillbegonetomorrow.”75

SuccessinEuropeshowedorganizersthatvictorywaswithintheirreach.Elinsonreturnedto

Delanointhespringof1969,buttheTGWUremainedloyaltotheUFWandtheblockadethefollowingyear.FreddySilbermanmaintaineda filecabinetdedicated to theblockade in theTGWUoffice,allowingElinson’sreplacements,VivianLevineandDonnaHaber, topickupwheresheleftoff.76HabercultivatedarelationshipwithDanGallin,thegeneralsecretaryoftheInternationalUnionofFoodandAlliedWorkers’AssociationinGeneva,Switzerland,whohelpedextendtheblockadeinEuropeduringthewinterof1969and1970.77Elinsonremainedclose tohercontacts inEngland,eventuallymovingback toLondon in1974 toworkfor theUFWonanotherboycott.HerserviceonthefrontlinesoftheboycottchangedElinson’slife.“It definitelywas pivotal forme in terms ofmypolitical outlook, in terms ofmy ability toorganizearoundissuesthatIreallycareabout,”shestated.78

WINNINGBATTLES,BUTNOTTHEWAR

Thesuccessoftheboycottchallengedthegrowers’strategyofamoveablefeast,demonstratingthat grapes could not be marketed beyond the reach of the union and the consciousness ofconsumers and allied workers. Jerry and Juanita Brown’s new system, backed by Jerry’sextensive research and the on-the-ground intuition of boycott house leaders, surprised theindustryandcatapultedthemovementintoaninternationalspotlight.AstheEuropeancampaignwound down for the season, Jerry prepared Elaine Elinson for a possible assignment toVenezuela,whiletheunionmadeattemptstoexpandtoPuertoRicoandHawai’i.79Theunionalsobegantocollect recordsof internationalsales inanticipationof thegrowers’attempt toreachbeyonduntappedmarketsinLatinAmericanandthePacificforthe1970season.Boycott workers also received important assistance from Jerry Cohen, who continued to

pursuethenamesofpesticidesusedbygrowers.Heappealedtotwovolunteers,aProtestantminister,ReverendBoutitier, andMarkVasquez, to purchase grapes at Safeway and submitthemtoC.W.EnglandLaboratories, thesameoneusedbythesupermarketchainfor testing.During the boycott campaign in 1969,Cohen revealed the findings as part of aU.S. SenatehearingledbySenatorWalterMondalefromMinnesota.Thelabfoundevidenceofaldrin,atoxicsubstanceknowntocausecancerinmiceatlevelsexceedingthelimitspermittedbythegovernment.Growersarguedthatsulfur,anontoxicsubstanceusedinthefields,hadtriggeredthe positive reading. The ambiguity of the findings, however, raised suspicions amongconsumers,asdidthegrowers’refusaltocooperatewiththetestinginthefirstplace.Whenapro-growersenator,GeorgeMurphy(R-California),accusedCohenofintentionallysubmittingfalse evidence,Mondale backed the union by sharing a letter from Safeway confirming thesourceof thetest.Althoughthequestionofpesticidesremainedacontentiousissuefromthatpointforward,theunionwonthepublicrelationsbattlein1969andboostedtheconfidenceofthoseworkingonthefrontlinesoftheboycott.80

Thestressoftheboycottin1969and1970finallyrupturedrelationsbetweenCoachellaandSan Joaquin Valley growers. Once again, Lionel Steinberg took the lead, appealing toMonsignorHigginstoactasamediatorintalkswiththeunion.InApril,thetwosidessignedacontract covering allworkers atSteinberg’sDavidFreedmanRanch, the largest tablegrape

farmingoperationinCoachella.Steinberg’sneighborK.K.LarsonemployedmanyofthesameworkersandaskedthelocalPresbyterianminister,ReverendLloydSaatjian,tooverseeavotetounionizeonhisranch.TheresultswereoverwhelminglyinfavoroftheUFW:seventy-eightto two. “Had the workers voted ‘no’ and the boycott been continued,” Larson commented,“we’dhavebeenoutofbusiness,andIthinktheworkersknewthat.”81

Theideaofendingtheboycottforaselectfewwhilemaintainingitforthevastmajorityofgrapegrowersinitiatedariskyshiftinstrategythatthreatenedtounderminetotalunionizationof the industry. The absence of labels on most table grapes made it difficult to enforce aselectiveboycott.Inaddition,themixedmessageofcontinuingaboycottforsomeandnotforotherscouldpotentiallyconfuseconsumers,whohadaneasiertimeobservingaboycottofalltablegrapes.InEurope,Elinson’sdifficultyinlocatinggrapesonshipsamongadiversecargoprovedtaxingenough;addingthetaskofsegregatingunionfromnonuniongrapescomplicatedthings even further. “We were very nervous about signing with Steinberg,” Ganz recalled,“becauseitwasn’tclearthatyoucouldboycottsomegrapesandnotothers.”82

ThesechallengesrequiredthenowexperiencedhandofMarshallGanz,whoreturnedfromToronto to work with Steinberg and Larson’s salesman, Steve Volpey, in the refrigeratedwarehouses run by Tenneco Corporation in Coachella. Rather than sort union from thenonunion grapes at the point of reception, as Elinson had done, theymanaged storeowners’demandsforuniongrapesfromthepointofdistribution.GanzworkedcloselywithSteinbergandVolpey, learningthegrapemarketfromthepointofviewof thegrower.“Weunderstoodwhowasorderinggrapes[and]wepickedupinformationaboutwhowasorderingnonuniongrapes[through]thegrapevine,sotospeak.”ThisknowledgeallowedtheUFWtocontroltheboycottthroughitsnetworkbypunishingmarketsthatcarriednonuniongrapeswithpicketlineswhileencouragingconsumers toshopat storessellinguniongrapes.Steinbergand theunioncollaboratedtothepointofrentingaroomandaddingaphonebankat theStardustMotel inCoachellatoserveastheirheadquarters.Thesestrangebedfellowseffectivelysplitthemarketinto union and nonunion grapes, producing a price differential that rewarded Steinberg andLarson,whilepunishingtheholdoutsinDelano.“Intheunionmarket,”Ganzremembered,“itwas like $1.50 or $2 a boxmore than in the nonunionmarket.”83 This distinctionwas alsomanifested in inventory, as Ganz recalled in vivid detail: “It was one of themost excitingmoments in the union forme because I remember going into the Tenneco cold storage andTennecowasshippingforacoupleof thegrowerswhohadsigned,but thenotherswhohadnot.…Andthenonunion[grapeswere]stackedtothefuckingceiling,andtheunion[side]wasempty.Anditwaslike,‘Holyshit, thissucker’sreallyworking!’”84Alongwithhisworkontheboycott,Ganzservedasanegotiatorfornewcontracts,asCoachellagrowers,onebyone,came to the bargaining table. Bymid-July, the UFW had signed contracts withmost of theCoachellagrowers,allowingtheuniontoshiftitseffortstothenorth.85

IntheSanJoaquinValley,Ganzandtheunionworkedtheethnicandclassdivisionsamongthegrowerstosecurenewcontracts.AsGanzbecamemoreinvolvedonthenegotiationteam,hebegan to recognize“both thegrowers’endand theworkers’end; thewhole industrywasethnicized.”Theunionexploitedthisself-segmentation,asGanzexplained:“Youreallyhavetounderstandthatabouttheindustrytoappreciatealotofthedynamics,becauseonthegrowers’

side,whatitmeantwasthereweretheseverytightlyknitclumps,andtheywereveryclosedoffandinsulatedfromalotof theworld,whichturnedout tobeahugeadvantageforus.”86Theseclumpsalsotendedtobeinsulatedfromoneanother,aconditionthatbecamemuchmorepronouncedasthenegotiationteamsmovedupthevalley.ArmenianAmericanspredominatedinthesouth,aroundArvin,andalsosharedtheregionaroundFresnowithItalianAmericans.TheSlavicAmericangrowerscontrolledmuchofDelano,althoughoneItalianAmerican,JohnGiumarra, owned the largest andmost profitable ranch in the area. Other Italian Americangrowers,suchasBrunoDispoto,maintainedsemiautonomousranches,whereasmostJapaneseAmerican farmers had small, independent farms thought to be inconsequential to theoverallindustry.A team of union negotiators, includingDoloresHuerta, JerryCohen,Gilbert Padilla, and

MarshallGanz,eachassumedresponsibilityforatileofthisethnicmosaic.Ganzfollowedtheharvest,moving toArvin first and securing contractswith theArmenianAmericangrowers.When theharvest started inDelano, theunionusedacombinedapproachofappealing toanoutsiderwhilerespectingtheimportanceofethnicdifference.“InDelano,”Ganzremembered,“it was a Slavic deal.” Yet Giumarra’s success commanded the respect of the SlavicAmericansandmadehim“sobig,nobodycouldignorehim.”AfterfailednegotiationswithallDelanogrowersinmid-July,theunionignoredthetight-knitSlavicAmericangrowersinfavorofworkingoutamodelcontractwithGiumarrathatwouldbringmostoftheindustryinline.“The deal with Giumarra,” Ganz recalled, “was that we wouldn’t sign with him unless hebroughtthewholeindustry.”87

Theunion’sstrategyworked.InapredawnnegotiationsessionataDelanomoteloneweekafter thebreakdown in talks,CesarChavez, JerryCohen, andDoloresHuertaworkedout afinalagreementwithJohnGiumarraSr.andJohnGiumarraJr.,whoquicklycalledaspecialmeetingatSt.Mary’sSchoolinDelanotosharethenewswiththeirpeers.Alltwenty-sixofthegrowerssignedthehistoricpactonJuly29,1970,endingthefive-year-longDelanograpestrike.The contract increasedwages from$1.40 to $1.80 an hour and set field-packed boxratesat20cents,downfrom25cents in1965.Theunionsecured thecreationof theRobertKennedyHealthandWelfareFundbyextracting10centsanhourfromthegrowers;theyalsodeductedanother2centsanhourforanewsocialserviceprogram.Finally,theunionassumedcontrol of the hiring process by establishing a hiring hall located at UFW headquarters inDelano;theyalsoaddedprotectionagainstpesticidesthroughnewsafetyregulations.Workersandalliesofthefarmworkersunioncelebratedallovertheworld,thanks,inpart,

tothestrongnetworkthattheBrownsandthevolunteersbuilt.“AllIcansay,”Jerryproudlyremembered,“isthatIthinkJuanitaandIbroughtsystematicsupport,research,andwhatturnedout to be a winning boycott strategy.” The strain of this work sent Jerry and Juanita intoretirement from the union and Jerry back to graduate school,where he completed his Ph.D.dissertation. But the success of the boycott was a welcome departure from assassinations,policeriots,andaturntowardviolencebysomeactiviststhatdrainedmuchofthehopeawayfromthecountercultureofthe1960s.Inthisrespect,theboycottrestoredsomefaithinpeacefulcollectiveactionandtheviabilityofasocialjusticemovementthatbroughtruralworkersandurbanconsumerstogether.

Yetforallitssuccess,whattheunionhadwonwasnotentirelyclearatthestartofthenewdecade.Thecontinuedhiringofnonunionworkersbysmallindependentgrowersoperatinginthe shadows of the table grape industry prevented the union from covering all workers ongrapefarmsinCalifornia.Capturingtheremaining15percentof the industrynotcoveredbythecontractswouldhavetowait,however,giventhechallengesofservicingthecontracts.Intruth, by 1970 the United FarmWorkers Organizing Committee more closely resembled an“organization” rather than the “union” it now declared itself to be. The contracts requiredleaders to institutionalize themovement, establishing systems formanaging the hiring halls,health clinics, and social services that members relied upon. With the acceptance ofunionization,growersexpecteda levelofprofessionalism thatmirrored theirown.Growersalsolearnedthattheyneededtogetbeyondtheethnicandregionalcliquesthathaddefinedtheindustry prior to the boycott. This new consciousness led to an expanded role for theCaliforniaTableGrapeCommission. It also led to new strategies in labormanagement thatdependedonunionsbutavoidedcompletesubserviencetothem.Finally,althoughthecontractsdidmuchtoinspireworkersinothercrops—mostnotablylettuceworkersintheImperialandSalinas Valleys—they also attracted greater scrutiny from disapproving politicians andcompetitionfromtheTeamsters.ThesewouldbethechallengesthatawaitedtheUnitedFarmWorkersinthe1970sasthegroundbeneaththeindustrycontinuedtoshift.

FOUR

StuckintheMiddle

ON MARCH 30, 1972, the president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Frank E.Fitzsimmons, entered the Oval Office to meet with President Richard Nixon. In a meetingarrangedbytheWhiteHouseassistantCharlesColson,whowouldlaterdotimeinprisonforhispart in theWatergate scandal, the twomen fellquickly intoa freewheelingconversationlastingmorethananhour.CapturedonNixon’snowfamousrunningrecorder,theconversationincludeddiscussionsofthepresident’spardonofFitzsimmons’spredecessor,James“Jimmy”Hoffa, theeconomy,anda sharedphilosophyofgovernance.Offeringhisvisionofeffectiveleadership,FitzsimmonsconfidedinNixon,“Onlyoneprinciple[has]carriedmethroughalltheseyears.…Ineverwonanargumentstandingontheoutsidethrowingabrick[and]IneverrepresentedmypeopleproperlybybeingontheoutsidewhenIcouldn’tbe[on]theinside.”Nixon, experiencing a raremoment of trust in a labor leader, expressed gratitude toward

“Fitz”forhiscandorandassuredhimthatheunderstoodhow“[Fitzsimmons]musthavecaughthellfromalotof[his]colleagues”forhisdecisiontomeet.“Yourdecision[will]provetobeagoodone,”NixonpromisedtheTeamsterboss.“I’mgoingtodomyverybestinourshoptosee that this comes true.”1 Through the remaining months of Nixon’s troubled presidency,Fitzsimmons enjoyed an open line of communication, which afforded him unparalleledinfluenceonlaborandeconomicpolicy.Suchaccessproveddecisivenotonlyindeterminingthefortunesof theTeamsters,butalsoinshapingthedirectionof thefarmworkermovementandtheneweconomyofthe1970s.At first glance, Fitzsimmons’s presence in the Oval Office seems unusual, given Nixon’s

notoriousrantsagainstorganizedlabor.Thespringof1972,however,wasnoordinarytimeforeitherman.TheVietnamWarhadseverelycompromisedU.S.credibilityintheworld,whiledomestic protests had placed Nixon in a precarious position going into his reelectioncampaign.Tomakemattersworse,Nixonhadenteredofficeatamomentofmountingeconomicturmoilthathadreachedapeakin1971,withU.S.exportsshrinking,unemploymentclimbing,andpricesoffoodanddurablegoodsatanall-timehigh.Economistsusedthetermstagflationto describe the dilemma: price inflation without continued growth in the economy. Theweakenedstateofthenationseeminglyplayedintothehandsoforganizedlaborleaders,wholooked for ways to mobilize the righteous indignation of the working class against a pro-businessRepublicanpresident.NoonewantedtounseathimmorethanCesarChavezandtheUnitedFarmWorkers,whohadfoughtNixonduringthe1968campaignandtussledwithhimthroughouthisfirstterm.

Frank Fitzsimmons, however, felt no solidarity with his labor compatriots, least of allChavez.AlthoughthefarmworkerscountedtheTeamstersasearlyalliesofthemovement,therelationship had turned progressively sour the more success the farm workers enjoyed. Asearlyasthefallof1970,theTeamstersattemptedtoexpandtheircontractscoveringemployeesin food processing and warehouses to include field workers in Salinas, California. Theseactions preempted theUFW’s plans tomove from grapeworkers inCoachella and the SanJoaquinValleytothenewchallengeoforganizinglettuceworkersinthesaladbowlofSalinas.GeorgeMeany,presidentoftheAFL-CIO,successfullyavertedall-outwarbetweenthetwobyconvincingFitzsimmonstoleavefieldworkerstoChavez.Fitzsimmons,however,floutedtheagreementin1972andinvitedgrapegrowerstosignwiththeTeamsters,effectivelyreplacingUFWcontractssettoexpirethefollowingyear.TakingadvicefromNixon’sundersecretaryoflabor, Laurence Sibelman, Fitzsimmons addressed growers at the annual convention of theAmerican FarmBureau Federation onDecember 12, 1972. In a speech inwhich he chidedChavezforleadinga“revolutionarymovement[that]isperpetratingafraudontheAmericanpublic,”FitzsimmonscalledforanalliancebetweentheTeamstersandthefarmers.2Duringthe1973springharvest,Fitzsimmonsfollowedthrough,signingcontractswithgrapegrowersandinitiatingafightthatplungedCaliforniaruralcommunitiesintotwoyearsofbloodyconflict.The Teamsters’ actions illustrate one of the major ironies of agricultural unionism in

California: the union that proves it can organize farm workers invites more, not lesscompetitionfromcompetingunions.3TheriseoftheNationalFarmWorkersAssociationontheheelsoftheAWOCstrikerepresentedasimilarphenomenon,butwithamuchmoreamicablesolution that produced the UFW. Unlike AWOC and NFWA, however, inequality in size,wealth, and experience distinguished theTeamsters from the fledglingUFW.TheTeamstersrepresentedthelargestnumberofemployeesinthecountryduringtheearly1970s,whereastheUnited FarmWorkers confronted the daunting task of converting a protestmovement into abonafideunion.Chavezandhisyoungorganizersalsohadtomanagetheexpectationsoffieldworkers inothercropsandother stateswhoappealed to them toorganize theirworkplaces.Forawell-oiledmachineliketheTeamsters,addingsuchtasksconstitutedarelativelyminorchallengethatpromisedtopaydividendsintheformofmoredues-payingmembers.Ironically,bysigninggrapecontractsin1970,theUFWbecameavictimofitsownsuccess.4

Labortheoriesandunrealizedunionduesnotwithstanding,Fitzsimmons’smoveontheUFWat such a crucial moment in the history of California farm labor organizing represents anespeciallydivisiveactthatdefieseasyexplanation.ThelevelofviolencealonethatTeamsterrepresentatives committed against UFW organizers signaled Fitzsimmons’s extraordinarydedication to destroying the United Farm Workers at any cost. Through outright physicalintimidation,theTeamstersattemptedtoquiteliterallybeattheUFWintosubmission.ThatwastheexperienceofAliciaUribe,acommittedChavista(UFWsupporter)whopicketedagainstthehiringofscabworkersinCoachellaValleyduringthe1973season.ReportingforRollingStonemagazine,journalistDavidHarrissharedUribe’sstory:“‘LosTeamsters,’thewomannext to [Alicia] said. As the word jumped from ear to ear, the pickets began shouting andwavingtheirredandblackflags.…Makingasuddenskipontheloosedirt,thecarswervedright andoneof the [men] in thebackwindow leanedout and laidapairofbrassknuckles

alongthesideofAliciaUribe’shead.Eversince,herfacehashadalittledenttoit.TheblowfracturedAlicia’scheek,brokehernoseanddugascratchacrossherrighteyeball.”5Assuchviolencebecamethenorm,CesarChavezusedhisnowfamoushungerstrikestoquelltheurgefor retaliation among his followers, although nothing and no one seemed to quell theTeamsters’ rage. As Chavez fasted, solidifying his reputation as a paragon of nonviolentprotest,localfamiliesenduredadecadeoftrauma.Meanwhile,withintheunion,debateragedabouthowbesttorepeltheTeamstersandcapitalizeonthemomentumofthegrapeboycott.Therootsofsuchchaosresideintheseeminglycosmicconvergenceofeventsthatworked

againstthefarmworkersduringthefirsthalfofthe1970sfromforceswithinandoutsideoftheunion.Theuniqueeconomiccircumstances inheritedbyNixon inspiredaFaustianpactwithFitzsimmons thatmade theUFW’s goal of organizing allCalifornia fieldworkers under thebanneroftheblackeaglemoredifficult,ifnotimpossible.Yettosaythattheactionsdonetotheunion,notbytheunion,precipitatedsuchstruggleignoresimportanterrorsinjudgmentbyUFW leaders, especially Cesar Chavez. Chavez grew increasingly frustrated with thedissonant advice coming from all corners of the union, as some of the most seasonedorganizerscamehomefromthefrontlinesoftheboycotttonegotiatecontracts,managehiringhalls, and organize new workers. Rather than draw valuable lessons from the learningcommunitythattheunionhadbecome,Chavezbegantoshowsignsofaddictiontotheboycottandhisownpower.

THEGREATTREASON

Intheyearspriortothegrapecontracts,theTeamstershadshownfaintinterestinorganizingfieldworkers.TheironesuccessstorycamebeforethefoundingoftheUFWin1961,whentheunion included fieldworkers in contracts covering packers and haulersworking for lettucegrower,BudAntle.Ananomalousarrangement,thecontractsturnedouttobeanexcusefortheTeamsters to invade Salinas in 1970. Before the ink had dried on the grape contracts inDelano,theTeamstersbuiltonthisunlikelybeachheadbyarrangingcontractswithsixtyothergrowers. Themove by the Teamsters put a damper on the UFW celebrations and requiredChavezandotherunionofficialstorelocatetoSalinasimmediately.Speakingtoaseaofangrylettuceworkers,ChavezcalledtheTeamsters’moves“agreattreasonagainsttheaspirationsofmen and women who have sacrificed their lives for so many years to make a few men(growers)richinthisvalley.”6Chavezpunishedthegrowersbyreprogrammingthenetworkofforty-twoboycotthousestowageanewcampaignagainstlettuce.The Teamsters’ decision to move into the fields after 1970 grew out of a number of

circumstances,nottheleastofwhichwasthattheUnitedFarmWorkershadproventhatfarmworkerswereworththetimeandeffortittooktoorganizethem.ByAugust1970,theUnitedFarmWorkersclaimed12,000grapepickers in itsmembershipandgarneredaconsiderablenumberofdonationsandpositivepublicityfromthesuccessofthegrapeboycott.Still,thesizeof the membership paled in comparison to the Teamsters’ 1.9 millionmembers. TheWest,however,constitutedanimportantareaofgrowthintheUnitedStatesaspeopleandindustry

continuedtorelocatefromtheindustrialNortheasttothewarmweatherandtheright-to-workstatesoftheSouthwest.TheriseoftheSunbeltpromisedashiftinthebalanceofpowerintheTeamsters’ empire. Not a union to miss out on any opportunity, no matter howmeager thespoils, the Teamsters’ representative Bill Grami eventually negotiated contracts covering9,000 lettuceworkerswith 170 growers fromSantaMaria toSalinaswithout surveying thewishesofemployees.7

The campaign by the Teamsters to usurp the farm workers’ momentum failed as aconsequence of poor planning and ill-tempered behavior on the part of TeamstersrepresentativesandskillfulpoliticalmaneuversonthepartofChavezandtheUFWleadership.TheTeamsterstriedtobullytheirwayintothelettucefields,atonepointbeatingJerryCohenunconsciousandattackingJacquesLevy,awriterwhowouldlaterdocumentthefarmworkers’struggleinhisbookCesarChavez:TheAutobiographyofLaCausa.8Newspaperscapturedthe brutal act on camera, creating a public relations nightmare for the Teamsters andestablishingtheirreputationforviolence.EvenwhentheUFWlost incourt,Chavezstillmanaged tofindawaytocapitalizeonhis

popularity.InDecember1970,BudAntlewonaninjunctionagainsttheboycott,whichforcedChavez to appear before Judge Gordon Campbell to answer how he intended to end theboycott.At the hearing, Chavez defiantly refused to call off the picket lines and inspired alocalcrowdof3,000supportersto“boycottthehelloutofthem”asauthoritiestookhimawayin handcuffs. His incarceration touched off several days of continuous protest inMontereyCounty, including a twenty-four-hour vigil in front of the jail, prayers and a mass held indowntownSalinas, andpublicvisits toChavezby the recentlywidowedCorettaScottKingandEthelKennedy.Thebarrageofnegativepublicityandthechaoticconditionsinthecountyfinally persuaded Judge Campbell to release Chavez on Christmas Eve, twenty days afterputtinghimbehindbars.9

ThestruggleinSalinasprovedtobeapreluderatherthananapogeeinthefightagainsttheTeamsters. Cohen succeeded in convincing the courts that the Teamsters had created a“companyunion”topreempttheUFWfromorganizinglettuceworkers.Intheirdecision, thesixCaliforniaSupremeCourt justices acknowledged that aprecisenumberorpercentageoffieldworkersfavoringtheUFWcouldnotbereached,butagreedthatamajoritypreferredtheUnited FarmWorkers to theTeamsters.10 The court order cleared the injunction against theboycott,andpublicopinionswayedFitzsimmonsinmid-March1971toleavetheorganizationof fieldworkers to theUFW.GeorgeMeany,whohadbeen lukewarm in his support of theSalinas campaign, brokered the deal inWashington, far from the front lines of the battle. InCalifornia,however, theUFW’sdifficulty inbuildinganeffective infrastructurecontinued tofuelTeamsterhopesofonedayreplacingthefarmworkersunion.Inthedaysfollowingthegrapecontracts,thetaskoffendingofftheTeamsterscompetedwith

theUFW’sneedtoestablishcontroloverthehiringprocessoffieldworkers,aresponsibilitythat the young union now assumed. During the grape strike and boycott, Chavez frequentlyinspiredfarmworkersandactiviststothinkbeyondtheconstraintsoftheseasons,encouragingthemtoorganizeforsocialchangebecause“thewheelsofjusticedonotmoveasfastasnaturegrowsgrapes.”11 Chavez’s observation is useful for understandingwhy the union placed so

much importance on establishing hiring halls in the 1970 contracts. By the time pickersorganized inagiven location, thegrapeharvesthadmovedon toanother location,allowinggrowers(andtheirforemen)todictatewhowouldworkandunderwhatconditions.TheUnitedFarm Workers created hiring halls with the belief that a network of union-controlledclearinghouses for selectingworkerswould lead to amore just systemof employment. TheUFWattemptedtoendthecycleofmigrationthatchallengedworkers’abilitytosinkrootsintolocal communities and develop year-round networks that union officials presumed wouldstrengthenthehandoflaboratharvesttimeacrossmultiplegrowingregionsofthestate.Undersuchasystem,grapescouldgrowatanyratenatureandmodernagriculturalsciencedictated;in theory, theworkerswould be organized and ready to dealwith the harvest on their ownterms.This typeof labororganizing,however,buttedupagainstdeep-rootedand, in somecases,

culturally bound practices among a significant portion of the workforce. Many workersadaptedtheirlivestoacycleofmigrationthatnotonlyspannedtheareaofthegrapeharvestinCalifornia but, in some cases, extended across state and national boundaries. In addition tofieldworkerswhofollowedthegrapeharvestfromCoachellathroughtheSanJoaquinValley,some workers came from surrounding states. Filipino workers, in particular, establishedmigratorypatternsthatinvolvedworkinthefishingindustryinAlaska,travelingdownthroughPugetSoundandintoWashington,thentakingfieldworkinappleorchardsinWashington,andeventuallyharvestingavarietyofcropsinCaliforniaduringthesummerandfall.Forexample,beforeservingasthefirstvicepresidentoftheUFW,LarryItliongtraveledupanddownthePacificCoast,working on ships and in docks in the fisheries ofAlaska and in a variety ofcrops, including asparagus, lettuce, andgrapes inWashington,Oregon, andCalifornia. Suchmigrations were common among Filipino migrants, many of whom came from Luzon, innorthernPhilippines.Frequently referred toas Ilocano,basedon their ethnolinguisticgroup,thesemigrantscamefromaheavilyagriculturalregionthathelpeddefinetheiridentity.AsinmuchoftheearlyMexicanandChinesemigrations,singlemendominatedtheinitialFilipinomigration to the agricultural districts of California.12 Similarly, Mexican immigrants withexperienceinagriculturetraveledacrosstheU.S.-Mexicanborder;somehadevenparticipatedin the bracero program from 1942 to 1964. Joining these populations were a sprinkling ofYemeniimmigrants,PuertoRicanmigrants,andTexasMexicans(Tejanos),whoseexpertiseinagriculturecameinhandyinthefieldsofCalifornia.Allofthesemigrationscomplemented—andattimescompetedwith—thesettledMexicanAmerican,black,andpoorwhitepopulationsthatdominatedtheinlandvalleysofCalifornia.In the wake of the 1970 contracts, the United FarmWorkers confronted the challenge of

managingthisheterogeneousandfar-flungpopulationofworkers.Therhythmsof theharvestand the entrenched practices of acquiring labor assignments complicated social relations,producing tension among workers who sought solidarity across cultural divides. AlthoughFilipinos andMexicans found themselves in a similar position in terms of the hierarchy ofclassandraceinCaliforniasociety,theymaintaineddifferentapproachestoorganizinglaborandmigration.Astheunionsettledontheformationofhiringhallstoactasclearinghousesforlaboron thegrapeplantations, itencountereddifficulties that threatened itsability tosustainthemovement.

PhilipVeraCruz, vice president of theUFW from 1966 to 1977, later acknowledged thestruggleovertheheartsandmindsoftheFilipinoworkers:“TheFilipinoshavebeenusedandpulledbackandforthbytheUFW,theTeamsters,andthegrowersformanyyears.”13Tohisdismay,VeraCruzwitnessedthedepartureofseveralFilipinoleadersfromtheorganization,including Ben Gines, who belonged to AWOC in 1966 when it merged with the mostlyMexicanNationalFarmWorkersAssociation to create theUnitedFarmWorkersOrganizingCommittee.VeraCruz recalled: “At the timeof themerger, I counted about sevenFilipinoswhowentwithBen[Gines]overtotheTeamsters.Ofcourse,itwaslikethetipofaniceberg.Yousee,lateron,whentheUFWmademistakesintheHiringHallaboutdispatchingjobs,andsome Filipinos felt they weren’t being treated fairly, many of them switched over to theTeamsters.”14 Gines ultimately found the Teamsters equally incompatible and left unionorganizingaltogethertopursueacareerinwatchrepair.TheresignationofLarryItliongonOctober15,1971,was themostpainfuldefectionfrom

theUFW,giventhetimingandhispositionintheunion.Itlionghadservedastheleaderoftheoriginal1965AWOCstrike inDelanoandmaintained theclosestcontactwith theAFL-CIOrepresentativeatthetime,AlGreen.Perhapsthemostexperiencedandradicallabororganizeramong the leaders, Itliong conceded the leadership of theUnited FarmWorkersOrganizingCommitteetoChavezlargelybecausethemajorityofthefarmworkerswereMexican.ItliongassumedthepositionofassistantdirectorofUFWbutneversettledcomfortablyintohisrole.Duringhistenure,heofferedhisresignationorthreatenedtoresignseveraltimesoverdisputesconcerningtheunion’sfailuretoreimbursehisexpenses,thegrowingdistancebetweenUFWleaders and the rank and file, and the union’s unwillingness to address issues related toFilipinos,especiallythelackofsupportforagingFilipinofarmworkers.15Inthewakeofhisresignation,ItliongexplainedhisdecisiontohisfriendBillKircher:“Ileftatmyownaccordbecauseofmanyreasons.ButmybiggestdisappointmentisthattheOrganizationIparticipatedintofightforJusticeandDignityisnotturning[out]asplanned.SoIhadtogoinordertosavemy reputation (insignificant as itmay [be]) andmy conscience.Doyouknow that sincemyleaving[,]theDelanoofficehaslostitsappeal…itslivelinessandthatpeopleworkingintheofficesseemtobedoingtheirworkonlybecausetheyaretoldthat’swhattheyshoulddoandnotbecausetheywantedtodoit.…Manyoftheworkersaroundhere,FilipinosandChicanos,areveryunhappyonhowtheUnionisbeingoperated.”16

VeraCruzandItliongdisagreedprivatelyontheissueofstrategy,andthetwomaintainedatense relationship throughout theiryears together in theunion.17Yet for all their differences,theysharedmanyof thesameconcerns.Bothworriedabout theagingpopulationofFilipinoworkersandwhere thesemenwould liveonce their timeasfarmworkershadpassed.Theyboth vigorously advocated for the construction ofAgabayaniVillage, a retirement home forUFW workers; Itliong worked on behalf of this population through the Filipino AmericanPoliticalAssociation,abipartisanorganizationcreatedtolobbyonbehalfofFilipinosamonglawmakers inSacramento andWashington,D.C.Both also felt the sting of being aminoritywithinaunionrunbyminorities.18

FIGURE10.DoloresHuertaandLarryItliong,ca.1970s.ALUA,UFWCollection,197.

The complaints ofMexican dominance, however, constituted just one ofmany factors thatshapedtheFilipinodefections.Foraworkerinterestedintheabilitytofeedhimselfandsendmoney back home to his family, the issues of contract management and fairness in workassignments loomed even larger. Vera Cruz, Itliong, and Gines understood this, and allcommentedonproblemsofmanagingthecontracts,withVeraCruzspecificallycitingproblemswith the hiring halls. These complaints resulted less from ethnic rivalries than frommanagement concerns that skewed the hiring process in favor of settled, mostly MexicanAmericanfarmworkerslivingintheSanJoaquinValley.Thesebiasesdevelopedinpartoutofadesiretocurbitinerancyinfarmwork,buttheyalsoreflectedadegreeofinexperiencethatplaguedtheunioninthemonthsimmediatelyfollowingthesigningofthegrapecontracts.Cesar Chavez had little experience running a union, and themismanagement of the hiring

halls, inparticular,becameanissuenotonlyamonggrowerswhoscrutinizedeverymoveofthe young union, but also among some of the rank and file who expected fairness in workassignments. Doug Adair, a longtime UFW farm worker and a veteran of the Philadelphiaboycott,workedattheFreedmanandTennecoplantationsinCoachellaatthebeginningofthecontracts. Adair recalled the difficulty in getting the halls started: “The first contracts, wedidn’tknowwhatweweredoing.We’dneverbeentherebefore.Wehadnoidea.”19Althougha seeminglymundane issue, how the hiring halls operated became theAchilles’ heel of theUFWwhenitcametofendingofftheTeamsters.TheUFWorganizerReymundoHuertaarrivedinCoachellain1971fromthefrontlinesof

the grape boycott in Los Angeles amid disputes regarding work assignments and themanagementofthelocalgrapecontracts.Asmallbutvocalminoritysoughttoestablishlocal

control over the new hiring system, whereby workers showed up at the tiny hiring hall inCoachellatoreceivetheirworkdispatches.ChavezreassignedHuertatoassistMarshallGanz,whowastryingunsuccessfullytoquashtherebellionandshoreuplocalsupportfortheunion.AlthoughHuertaarrivedthinkinghewouldserveGanzfora“fewdays,”hesoondiscoveredthathe,notGanz,wouldremaininCoachellatomanagethehiringhalls.20

ConflictdevelopedwhentheworkersthemselvesresistedtheUFWorganizers.AccordingtoHuerta, “We had to enforce the contracts not only with the companies, but also with theworkers because they didn’t know toomuch about contracts either.” These efforts includedtutorials on the requirements of the contract and translation of documents into Spanish.AlthoughthishelpedallaytheconcernsofmanyMexicanworkers,Filipinoworkerscontinuedto show resistance to the new system. Referring to these workers as “disgruntled,” Huertaexplained the Filipino reaction: “In the process of us enforcing the contracts, a lot of theFilipino workers were offended because they didn’t hold any seats of power in the union,although there were Filipinos in the union. There was a whole bunch of them. These guysdidn’twanttoacceptthat,alotofthem.Sotheykindofresisted.”21AccordingtoAdair, theunionelections,whicheventuallytookplacein1973,provedtheFilipinodissatisfactionwiththeUFW:“TheFilipinosbeganpeelingoff.AndthenIthinkintheelectionshere,probably70to80percentoftheFilipinosvotedagainst[theUFW].”22ThefeelingoflosinggroundwithinauniondominatedbyMexicanworkerscontributedtotheirdiscord.InHuerta’sopinion,theseconditionspredisposed theFilipinos tosupportingTeamsterovertures,which, in turn, led totheirdefectionsfromtheUFW.A coworker of many Filipino farm workers, Doug Adair believed that the radical

transformationintheFilipinos’workingandlivingconditionsunderUFWcontractsaccountedformuchofthediscordamongthem.UnderAWOCinthe1960s,priortotheformationoftheUFW, foremencontrolled thehiringof theirpickers, and some, especiallyFilipino foremen,managedtheircrewslikeafamily.Adairrecallstheconditionsunderthefirstcontracts:“Inthefirstcontracts,theFilipinoforemanwaspartoftheunit.Manyofthesecrewswereverytightaround the foreman.Theywere relatives.Theywere fromhis province.Theywere likehisfamily.Theymovedfromthegrapestotheasparagusandfromheretothereasaunit.Andtheforeman would loan them money.”23 Prior to 1970, workers had to pay dues year-roundbecause the union paid insurance annually. Consequently, workers accumulated substantialdebts in the off-season as a result of unpaid dues that some foremen covered for theiremployeeswhenworkerstraveledbackhomeormovedontoworkinotherregions.FilipinoworkersestablishedsignificanttiestotheNorthwest,whereasMexicanworkerstraveledinalldirections,includingeasttoTexasandsouthtoMexico,forworkortovisitfamily.Ineithercase, a good relationship with the foreman allowed for a degree of job security, as Adairrecalls: “The foreman, ifhewasagood foreman,gave thema littlebitofbenefits that theycouldbesureof.Ifthey’dgonetoSeattleorsomewhereandtheygotbackalittlelate,hemadesuretherewasabedinthecampforthem.Hegotthemintothecrew.”24

TheUFW,however, insistedon the formationof hiringhalls as an equitable solution to asystemthatfrequentlyfavoredgrowersoverworkers.FortheFilipinos,anaging,mostlymaleminority population in a labor pool dominated byMexicans, the loss of power among the

foremengavethemsomecauseforconcern.Underthisnewsystem,Filipinoforemencouldnolongerholdjobsforco-ethnicworkerswhocametoexpectsuchprivileges.Adairobserved,“Togettheirjobs,insteadofgoingto…whoeverhadgiventhemajobbefore,theyhadtogototheunionandstandinlinewithalltheMexicansandtheyfinallygettothewindowandtherearen’t any jobs, or not at that company.” Their disappointment drove many to support theTeamsters.AccordingtoAdair,“Therewerereasons—goodreasons—whytheypreferredtheTeamsters’system.”25

The Teamsters exploited this tension by imposing a system that returned power to theforemen.Therestorationofhiringandfiringprivilegestotheforemenreestablishedasenseofcontinuityformobileworkersfromoneseasontothenext.Thehiringhalls,ontheotherhand,tendedtobenefitthelocal,sedentarypopulationsofworkers,whichdidnotsitwellwithmoreitinerant laborers. Adair explained how the system worked: “You had a friend of yourneighbor, a cousinofyourcompadre, and thewordwouldget around: ‘There’s going to bedispatchestomorrow.’Youarehere.Youarelocal.Youarethereinline;yougetthem.AndtheguysfromTexascomeinand[thehiringhallworkerwouldsay]:‘No,you’readaylate.Wegavethattothedispatchesyesterday.’”26

Formanymigrantworkerswho lived hand-to-mouth and often traveledwith a family, theirregularityof thedispatchesmadeit impossible towaitaroundfor thenextassignment.Thegrowers and foremen complained because they had grown accustomed to hiringworkers asthey needed them, with no regard for the structure of a union. Foremen demonstrated animmediate preference for the Teamsters’ approach and shared this sentiment with migrantworkers dissatisfiedwith the new system.Adair again: “Theworkerwouldgo in and if hedidn’tgetthejob,thentheforemanwouldsay:‘Iwouldhavehiredyoubuttheuniondoesn’t[allow it].’” Inaddition toFilipinos,asignificantnumberofMexicans traveling fromTexasopposed the system, because they too found it difficult to negotiate work assignments inCaliforniafromadistance.27Theseproblemscutacrossraciallines,although,becauseoftheunique relationship many Filipinos had with Filipino foremen and because Filipinosconstitutedaminoritywithintheunion,theirdefectionsdrewmoreattentionfromgrowerswhowantedtopointoutthewaningsupportfortheUFW.28MexicanswhotraveledfromTexasand,increasingly,MexicoalsoexpressedfrustrationwiththeUFW’ssystemofhiring.29

ThisdisgruntledminoritycontinuedtogivetheTeamstersareasontoplotagainsttheUnitedFarm Workers. Although in 1971 Fitzsimmons agreed to leave these workers alone, theTeamsters held contracts with warehouse workers, packers, and haulers in Californiaagriculture,placingthemincloseproximitytofarmworkers.Asaconsequence,theTeamsterscontinued toagitateagainst theUFW, flaunting thebenefitsofbelonging to the strongest andrichestunioninthenation.Inappealingtopotentialmembers,Teamsterofficialslikedtopointoutthattheunion’sbenefitspackagerivaledthatofferedbythefarmworkersunion,includingfewerlimitsandcostsrelatedtomedicalprocedures,agreaterrangeofservices,andnoageoramount limits inpayments tosurvivorsof fallenworkers.30Forsome, theTeamsters offeredsuperiorservicesthatservedasareminderthatalternativesexisted.CesarChavezalsocontendedwithseriouscomplaintsfromwithinthemovement,including

criticism of his decision to relocate union headquarters to a mountain resort in Keene,

California.AlthoughinitiallyChaveztreatedtheformertuberculosissanitariumrentedtohimbyawealthymovieproducerasaplaceofrespite,by1971adealwasstrucktopurchasethe280-acreplotand itsbuildingsandrenamethesiteLaNuestraSeñorade laPaz,orLaPaz.Soonafter,Chavezmovedmostunionoperationsoff thevalley floorand into theTehachapiMountains, where former farmworkers and volunteers alike could learn to become “unionprofessionals.” Chavez converted the decrepit facilities into the nerve center and traininggroundfortheunionandreduced“FortyAcres”inDelanotoafieldoffice.Chavezcultivatedacommune-likeatmosphereatLaPaz,whichappealedtomanyvolunteers

invested in the counterculture, although it did not sit well with some union stalwarts. ThepopulationatLaPazfluctuatedbetween100and150mostlywhiteorMexicanresidentswhocame for a month to a year to be a part of the experience. Residents lived in drafty andoccasionally cramped living quarters, but few felt they could complain given the terribleconditionsfarmworkershadtoendure.31ForwhitevolunteerslikeMelanieCoonsworkingthepicket lines inLosAngeles,going toLaPazwas likea“journey toMecca”andproducedareverenceforChavezthatovershadowedother leaders:“Theminuteyoumeet[Chavez],youjustknowhe’sspecial,he’ssopatientandforcefulatthesametime.”32ForthoselikeItliong,whopreferredthattheunionstayintouchwithfarmworkerfamiliesintheircommunities,LaPaz placed unnecessary distance between the leaders and the rank and file in and aroundDelano.AswhiteboycottersmovedtoLaPaztoworkandlive,thechangingethniccompositionof

the movement fueled additional anger. For Itliong, the aging of the mostly male FilipinopopulationwithintheUFW,coupledwithhisyearsofservicetoamostlyMexicanandFilipinomembership,accentuatedhisfeelingsofbetrayal.HepubliclyquestionedChavez’srelianceonwhat hederisively referred to as “theAngloBrainTrust,” particularly the serviceof youngwhite(andJewish)volunteerssuchasMarshallGanzandJerryCohen.Althoughthesepeoplehad no connection to the corporate world, their participation in the union as managers ofcontracts and service centers signaled for some a move away from the grassroots. Thepresence of the Teamsters, who employed salaried, professional organizers, introduced amodel that contrasted sharplywith aUFWvolunteer systemdependent on the dedication ofmanyyoung activists.The increased relianceon attorneys anddoctors also ignited a debatewithintheUFWaboutwhetherthissystemcouldadequatelycompensatethosewhohadmorelucrative, “professional” opportunities outside of the union. Regardless of the NationalExecutive Board’s decision to pay some and not others, competition from the highlyexperienced Teamsters required the UFW to become more organized in their delivery ofservices.

FIGURE 11. Jerry Cohen, head of the legal department for the United Farm Workers, testifies before the U.S. SenateSubcommitteeonLabor,Washington,DC,dateunknown.ALUA,UFWCollection,3365.

AstheUFWmovedtowardgreaterprofessionalism,Chavezmadenoexcusesforthetrendawayfrom“aminority-orientedunion.”Hispositionremainedconstant,evenwhenquestionedabouthisloyaltytotheethnicMexicanbaseofthemovement.“NowtheunionhasaChicanothrust,”Chavezadmittedtoareporter,“butthatwillchangeaswespreadtootherareas.”Forhim,thestruggleconstituted“aneconomicmovementbypoorworkers”thattranscendedissuesofraceandethnicity.Inmakingthispoint,Chavez,perhapsunwittingly,promotedaclass-first,color-blindphilosophy,proclaiming,“ApoorblackworkerinFloridahurtsmeasmuchasapoor Chicano worker in Texas.” His inclusion of and dependence on middle-class whitevolunteers,however,complicatedhisclaimsofleadingamovement“bypoorworkers,”afacthiscriticswereonlytoohappytopointout.33

Conflicts over boycott strategy signaled a more immediate danger to unity within themovement.The firstwranglingabout strategyoccurredbetween theUFWand theAFL-CIO,over a campaign against Heublein Inc., a wine and liquor company based in Hartford,Connecticut. From the UFW’s point of view, Heublein’s incorporation of United Vinters, asubsidiary invested in smaller California grape growers not under contract with the farmworkers,madethemfairgameforatargetedboycott.GeorgeMeanydisagreed.Thenumberoffarmworkers working for Heublein subsidiaries paled in comparison to the overwhelmingnumberofunionizeddistributorsintheAFL-CIO–affiliatedBreweryWorkersUnionemployedby the company. As a consequence, Meany refused to back the boycott and made hisdispleasurewiththeUFWwellknowninthemedia.AlthoughittooktheunionandHeublein

less than two weeks to reach an agreement, the conflict over the use of the boycottdemonstratedthatnotallintheUFW’scorneragreedwiththestrategy.34

Chavez’s commitment to the boycott also altered the union’s philosophy regarding theinclusion of workers under the National Labor Relations Act (also known as “theWagnerAct”). In the years leading up to the 1970 contracts, advocates forUFW, includingChavez,used the exclusion of field labor from the NLRA as evidence of the federal government’sneglect of farm workers. This argument more than any other compelled dock workers inEuropetoexecutetheblockaderequestedbyElaineElinson.AsChavezrealizedthepoweroftheboycott,heprivatelyshiftedhispositionregardingfarmworkers’inclusionintheNLRA.Hewasparticularlyconcernedabout the restrictionsagainst secondaryboycotts forworkerscovered by the NLRA as a result of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. For these reasons, hepubliclylamentedtheexclusionoffarmworkersfromcollectivebargainingrightsbutprivatelyrelished the freedom to use the boycott whenever and wherever he saw fit. Chavez’s truefeelings became public once the UFW had gained legitimacy and growers, legislators, andcompeting unions had become much more serious about extending the act to cover farmworkers after 1970. As growers and politicians began to warm to the idea of extendingcollective bargaining rights to farmworkers, in part to limit theUFW’s use of the boycott,Chavezbecameprotectiveofthetacticandmoreskepticalthatrecognitionfromemployersandthestatewouldbethepanaceaeveryoneimagined.Lettucefarmerswerethefirstgrowerstoadvocatefortheinclusionoffarmworkersinthe

NLRA. They had watched with horror how the boycott had devastated the grape growers’profits and feared that the newboycott against lettucewould have the same effects on theirproduct.MikeSchultz,anElCentrolettucegrowerandvicepresidentoftheWesternGrowersAssociation,offeredthefirstsignsofchangeamonggrowerswhohadfamouslyfoughtagainsttheWagnerAct during the 1930s. In 1971, Schultz secured a commitment fromhis peers toseek federal legislation tobring farmworkersunder federal labor lawsandadded that theywould also support a state-level “littleWagnerAct.” “We have just decided to be realisticaboutthesituation,”Schultzannounced,“and[will]trytobringourindustryintothe1970s.”35In truth,growersunderstood that the lawsgoverning labororganizations, ifextended to farmworkers,woulddenyChaveztheboycott,thetactictheyfearedmost.TheTeamsters,whohadlearnedtothrivewithintheparameterssetbytheTaft-HartleyAct that includedarestrictionagainstsecondaryboycotts,alsoendorsedtheinclusionoffarmworkersundernationalorstatelabor legislation and went to great lengths to highlight Chavez’s change of heart on thismatter.36

Growers and the Teamsters demonstrated that they had become wise to what fueled themovementbyadoptingastrategythatwouldpotentiallyshort-circuittheUFW’sgrowth.ThesetacticsincludedtheTeamsters’useoftheboycottagainsttheUFWduringtheirfailedstrugglein1971tosignlettuceworkersinSalinastoTeamsterscontracts.Aswiththelargecorporategrapegrowers (likeDiGiorgioandSchenley)whohadagreed tocontracts longbefore theirfamily-owed peers, United Fruit Company’s Inter-Harvest division and S. S. PierceCompany’sPicN’PacsuedforpeacewiththeUFWbyagreeingtocontractsontheirlettucefarms in Imperial Valley during the 1970–71 season.37 The deal with InterHarvest, in

particular, precipitated the Teamster boycott, as Ganz remembered: “We were striking inSalinas,andwewereboycottingChiquita[anothersubsidiaryofUnitedFruitCompany],andafter aweek, [InterHarvest] signed.”United Fruit’s president, EliBlack, the liberal Jewishmogulwhowouldbecome famous forhis1975suicideplunge fromaManhattan skyscraperafterbeingexposedforcorruptionandbriberyinHonduras,becameasupporteroftheunion,attractingtheireoftheTeamstersandgrowersalike.GanzrecalledthatBlack’sagreementinthemidstofthelettuceboycott“blewthegrowersawayinSalinas”andproduced,inGanz’swords,“anti-Semiticshitthatcameoutforalongtime.”38TopunishbothBlackandtheUFW,the Teamsters appealed to wholesalers in Los Angeles and San Francisco not to unload“boycotted” lettuce coming from InterHarvest farms in an attempt to sway the company tocancel its contracts with the UFW. Although the Teamsters had limited success, the actcontributed to a growing confusion among consumers aboutwhich products to boycott. TheUFW’sdecisiontostartandstopboycottsingrapesandlettuceanditsmanythreatsofboycottsagainstmelons,grapes,lettuce,andcitrusgrowers,nottomentionwineandliquorproducers,begantoconfuseconsumers.39

Growing tension with Governor Ronald Reagan and President Richard Nixon, bothRepublicans, posed perhaps the most serious check against the UFW’s strength. AlthoughReaganandNixonhadacompetitiverelationship,theysharedapro-growerpositionwhenitcame to farm labor politics.During their election campaigns, both politicians took a strongpositionagainst theUFWandopenlyadvocated forgrowers’ rights tomarket theirproductsfreefromtheconstraintsofasecondaryboycott.40

ReagancampaignedagainsttheboycottinNewYorkCityduringthedevelopmentofDoloresHuerta’s“hostagestore”strategyandusedthepowerofthepodiumtodenytheexistenceofaboycotteven in the faceof substantial evidence to thecontrary.41When theboycott’s realitycouldnotbedenied,Reaganfamouslytooktothetelevisionairwavestoeatgrapesinashowof solidaritywith growers.42As the clock ran downon the industry after Steinberg and hisCoachella peers agreed to sign contracts in 1970, Reagan reversed his opposition tounionization by advocating for secret ballot elections on each farm in hopes of stalling themovement. The governor failed in this and his advocacy for California Senate bill SB40,which,ifpassed,wouldhaveinstitutedsecretballotelectionsandrestrictedunionsfromusingthe secondary boycott. Reagan repeated this act in 1972 by supporting Proposition 22, aninitiativeheavily fundedby thegrowers toplace limitson thesecondaryboycott.Theunioncampaignedagainst the initiative,andvotersrespondedbysoundlydefeating it,57.9 to42.1percent.43

Reaganalsousedthepowerofthepursetopunishfarmworkerfamiliesbyscalingbackonsocialprograms,suchasCaliforniaRuralLegalAssistance(CRLA),anorganizationdesignedto alleviate inequalities within the countryside. Founded in 1965 as part of Lyndon B.Johnson’sWaronPoverty,CRLAprovidedpoorfarmworkersfree legalassistance in labordisputes.Althoughthenonprofitagencywasnonpartisan,thecasesitacceptedskewedtowardsupportofafarmworkerunion.Infact,JerryCohen,theheadoftheUFW’slegaldepartmentinSalinas,lefttheagencyin1967,ironicallybecausehefoundittootepidinitssupportforthedowntrodden.44WhenImperialValleygrowerscriticizedCRLAforgivingtheUFWanunfair

advantageinlabordisputes,Reaganpulledtheplugontheagency’sfunding,vetoingits$1.8millionbudgetin1971.Forthemostpart,however,Reagandistinguishedhimselfbynotinterveningduringmoments

ofconflict in thewarbetweentheUFWandtheTeamsters.TheCaliforniasecretaryofstateand Reagan’s Democratic successor, Edmund “Jerry” Brown, criticized him for allowing a“bloody civilwar” to rage in rural communities bynot resolving the legal “noman’s land”farmlaborersfoundthemselvesin:exemptfromfederalandstatelaborlawsregulatinglaborrelations.Reagan’s inaction in ruralCaliforniacontrastedsharplywithhiscampaigns toendantiwar demonstrations and violent rebellions in urban California, most vividly illustratedduringhis termsasgovernorby thekidnappingofPattyHearst and thebank robberyby theSymbionese Liberation Army in Berkeley, the bombings by the antiwar group WeatherUndergroundinSanFrancisco,andthegunbattlesbetweentheBlackPantherPartyandpoliceonthestreetsofOakland.Reaganfailedtotakeasimilarinterestinprotectingtheruralpoorfromviolence,evenwhenitresultedinthedeathoffarmworkers.However,hismessage“tocleanupthemessinBerkeley”and“sendthewelfarebumsbacktowork”struckachordwithasuburban,whiteelectorateworriedabouttheviolentturninthecountercultureandthecostofurbansocialprograms.45

AspresidentoftheUnitedStates,RichardNixonfoundhimselfdealingwithagreaterrangeofeconomicproblemsthatdeniedhimtheluxuryofseekingrefugeinissues-orientedpoliticsthat fed Reagan’s popularity. Unlike his California Republican contemporary, to remain inofficeNixoncouldnotdependsolelyonwhitehomeowners’resentmentoftheurbanpoorandanger toward radical youth. Amember of a national Republican Party still committed to adegree of bipartisanship,Nixon had not fully embraced an emerging, conservative ideologypromotedbythoseontherightwholaidtheproblemsoftheUnitedStatesprimarilyatthefeetofthosewhoadvocatedforgovernmentprograms.Thevagariesofaslowingeconomy,nottomentionthecontinuationoftheVietnamWar,requiredNixontoengagelabororganizationsandexperimentwitheconomicpoliciesinanattempttosolvethegrowingtradeimbalancebetweentheUnited States and theworldwhile creating a foundation for his reelection in 1972.Hismaneuvers to dismantle theUnitedFarmWorkers and empower agribusiness in the nameofeconomicrecoverydemonstratedhowfarhewouldgotoachievehisgoals.

TAKINGCAREOFBUSINESS

NixonassumedofficeduringaperiodinwhichU.S.economicstabilityhadbeguntofalterforthe first timesince theGreatDepression.During the immediatepostwarperiod, the relativestrengthoftheU.S.economyhelpedtheworldeconomybacktohealth.Bythe1960s,however,U.S. consumers’ taste for imports diminished a balance of trade surplus enjoyed by U.S.manufacturers, eventually leading to a trade deficit in 1971, the first time in the twentiethcentury.Thetradeimbalanceputlessmoneyintothefederalbudgetasmanufacturers’profitsstagnatedordeclinedevenaspricesongoodscontinuedtorise.The new trade imbalance and the failures of U.S. manufacturers to improve efficiency

tempered the Nixon administration’s expectations for an economic recovery completely, orevenprimarily,basedonmanufacturedgoods.By1971theUnitedStatesneededtogeneratea$13billion turnaround in thebalanceof payments to eliminate the tradedeficit.The riseofJapan andWestGermany, however, augured a newworld order inwhich theUnited Stateswouldhavetoexploitallof itsadvantages inorder toreignite itseconomyandmaintain thevalueofitscurrency.Agricultureconstitutedanareaofnearlyunparalleledstrengthinglobalmarketsandasectorof theeconomythatcouldbeexpanded throughexports.Althoughnotanewidea,thecontextandpurposeofagriculturalexportschangedinthe1970s.Inthepast,theUnitedStatesshareditsbountywiththeworldtohelpwinwarsandnursealliesandconquerednationsbacktohealth.NowagriculturewouldbeusedtoreturntheUnitedStatestoeconomicsupremacy.AsthefirstpresidentfromCalifornia,wherefoodproductionplayedaprominentroleinthe

state’s economy, Nixon understood the profit-making potential of agriculture. In 1973,agricultureaccountedforone-thirdofthejobsinCaliforniaandbetterthanhalfoftheGoldenState’saccumulatedwealth.46NixonconfirmedtheimportanceofagriculturenationallyintheFlaniganReport,a1973CouncilonInternationalEconomicPolicytaskforcestudyheadedbyhisfriendandtrustedadvisorPeterFlanigan.47Inthereport,Flaniganvigorouslyarguedforasignificant expansion of farm exports by lowering government subsidies forwheat and feedgrains,allowingthefreemarkettodictatetrade.HebelievedthatsuchapolicywouldlowerthecostoftheseitemsandincreasetheirexporttocountriessuchastheSovietUnion,China,andJapan.Thereductionintradebarriers,Flaniganargued,wouldpressuretradingnationstoimport more U.S. agricultural goods, raising U.S. farmers’ incomes by approximately $4billion. In negotiations of new trade policies with Europe, Japan, and Canada in 1973,Flanigan’sreportfiguredprominentlyinthepositionadvancedbytheUnitedStates.“Fromourpoint of view,”Flanigan reported, “it is especially important that thesenegotiations includetrade inagriculture.Ourgoalneeds tobe the fullestpossible liberalizationofpolicieswithregardtoagriculturaltrade.”48

Nixon sought to achieve his goals under a New Economic Policy (NEP) that included agovernmentfreezeonpricesandwagesandtaxcutsforbusinessesandindividuals.49Forbigagriculture,NEPexemptedunprocessedagriculturalcommoditiesandinputsintheproductionoffarmproductsfrompriceregulation.Suchconditionsallowedprofitmarginstoriseonrawagriculturalgoodsandledtotheadministration’sgoalofexpandingagriculturaloutputfasterthan domestic consumption of food.The new surplus in agricultural products could nowbetraded internationally. As an incentive, food processors and retailers were restricted frompassingalongpriceincreasestoAmericanconsumers,buttheydidnothavetoabidebythesesameregulationsonexports.Consequently,NEPencourageddomesticfoodproducerstosellinforeignmarketswherehigherprofitmarginscouldberealized.U.S.agribusinessquicklytookadvantage of these favorable terms by sellingmore of their products abroad, improving thetradesurplusonagriculturalgoodsfrom$1.56billionin1972to$10.53billionin1974.50

The administration’s plans depended on the containment of labor unions. Some advisorswithinNixon’sadministrationpredictedthatthefreezeonwageswouldinvitecriticismfromlabor groups and precipitate organized demonstrations.George Shultz, one ofNixon’s chief

economicadvisorsandsecretaryoflaborin1971,predicted,“Afreezewillstopwhenlaborblowsitupwithastrike.”NixontriedtoheadoffsuchcriticismbyestablishingthePayBoardand inviting labor leaders such as AFL-CIO president, George Meany, and Teamsterspresident, Frank Fitzsimmons, to participate. Meany declined the invitation, although heinitiallyaccededtothepopularityoftheprice-and-wagefreeze.Theadministration’sdecisionto deny raises negotiated before implementation of NEP to 1.3 million workers eventuallymoved Meany and two other prominent labor leaders, Harry Bridges of the InternationalLongshore and Warehouse Union and Leonard Woodcock of the United Auto Workers, topubliclyopposethepresident’swage-and-price-controlprogram.Nixon took an especially aggressive posture toward theUnitedFarmWorkers.During his

first term in office, as the boycott began to gain strength and inspire new legislation inCongress,Nixonstymiedliberalreformsin1969at thelastminutebyworkingwiththepro-growersenatorfromCalifornia,GeorgeMurphy,tosubmitanalternativeproposalthatwouldhavelimitedharvest-timestrikes,prohibitedsecondaryboycotts,andinstitutedathree-personfarm labor relations agency to oversee union representation elections and monitor laborrelationsgenerally.51Nixon accompanied thesemaneuverswith a dramatic increase inU.S.military purchases of table grapes for soldiers fighting the war in Vietnam. The DefenseDepartment’spurchaseofgrapesrosefrom7.5millionpoundsin1966and1967to16millionpoundsinthefirstyearofNixon’spresidency.ThefederalgovernmentalsoencouragedSouthVietnamto importmorefreshgrapes, increasing theirconsumptionfrom350,000poundsperyearin1967to2.8millionpoundsin1969.SuchpurchaseselevatedVietnamtotheworld’sthirdlargestimporterofgrapesandinspiredunioncriticismofNixonforartificiallycreating“amarketoflastresort”forstruckgrapes.52

In 1972, at a timewhen theUFW threatened to go national, it signed a contractwith theCoca-Cola Company to represent Florida citrusworkers picking fruit for use in itsMinuteMaidorangejuice.TheNixonadministrationrespondedbysuingtoplacetheunionundertherestrictionsof federal labor statutes, including restrictions against secondaryboycotts.UFWsupporters respondedby flooding theNationalRepublicanCommitteeofficewithmore thanonemillionprotestletters.Althoughtheadministrationeventuallybackeddowninresponsetonegative press, Nixon’s actions secured his reputation with farm worker advocates as anenemyofthefarmworkermovement.Nixonattemptedtocounterthenegativepressandneutralizelabor’soppositionbycourting

thefavorofTeamsters’presidentFrankFitzsimmons.Astheunionrepresentingmoreworkersthananyotherinthenation,theTeamstersconstitutedaprimarytargetforNixon’sdivide-and-conquer strategy.He began by commuting the jail sentence of ex-Teamster president, James“Jimmy” Hoffa, on December 23, 1971. Nixon assuaged Fitzsimmons’s concern that Hoffawouldtrytoregainthepresidencyof theunionbymakingHoffa’sreleaseconditionalonhisagreement not to participate in the union for ten years. Fitzsimmons benefited from theperceptionthathehadnegotiatedHoffa’srelease,whiletherestrictiononHoffa’sinvolvementin the Teamsters strengthened Fitzsimmons’s hand in the fight to maintain control. Nixon’spreferentialtreatmentofFitzsimmonssolidifiedhisloyaltytotheadministrationandforgedamutuallybeneficialrelationship.ThefrequentmeetingswiththepresidentearnedFitzsimmons

the reputation among Nixon’s advisors as “our man” on matters pertaining to labor. Theirrelationship enabled Fitzsimmons to contain the farm worker movement that threatened toderailNixon’splantoincreaseagriculturalprofits.53

Fitzsimmons’sinvestmentinNixonwasbothpoliticalandself-serving.HehadrisentotheTeamsters’presidencywiththeapprovalofHoffa,who,accordingtounioninsiders,“treated[Fitzsimmons]likeagopheroraservant.”54SixyearsHoffa’selder,Fitzsimmonshadalliedhimselfwith the charismatic labor leaderwhileworking as a truck driver and serving as ashop steward for twodozen fellowworkers atCCCTruckingCompany inDetroit. In1937,Hoffa,recentlyelectedpresidentofTeamsterslocal299inDetroit,embracedFitzsimmonsasamemberofhiscadreofloyalsupporters.Fitzsimmons’sdeferentialnaturemayexplainwhyHoffa chose Fitzsimmons to replace him when he went to federal prison in 1967. Hoffaapparently confused stylewith substance and assumed that his old friendwoulddohiswilluntilhecompletedhissentenceandreturned to theunionpresidency.Fitzsimmons,however,surprised many by choosing to ignore Hoffa’s instructions from behind bars. Instead, heconsolidatedhispoweraspresidentoftheTeamstersbyassigningmoreautonomytohisvicepresidents,hiringstaffonthebasisofnepotismandpoliticalpatronage,andcooperatingwiththepresidentoftheUnitedStatesinexchangeforinfluenceandfavors.ThesefavorsincludednotonlytherestrictionagainstHoffa’sinvolvementintheunion,butalsoapullbackonfederalinvestigationsofTeamster-mobschemesunderFitzsimmons’swatch.TheinvestmentinNixonpaiditsgreatestdividendsduringanFBIinvestigationintopossible

relationsbetweenthemafiaandFitzsimmons.ThecontroversybecameknowntothepubliconApril29,1973,whentheJusticeDepartmentrejectedanaffidavitbyFBIdirector,L.PatrickGray, tocontinueelectronic surveillanceofPeople’s IndustrialConsultants, a shellbusinessformafiaoperationsinLosAngeles.TheFBIbelievedthatmembersoftheLosAngelesandChicagocrimesyndicatehadnegotiatedadealwithFitzsimmonstosiphon$10millionayearfrom the union’s pension fund. Between golf tournaments in Palm Springs and La Costa,California,Fitzsimmonsmetwithmafia figures, includingChicagomobster,Lou(theTailor)Rosanova, on February 12, 1972. According to an anonymous FBI agent, Fitzsimmonsapprovedof the schemeduring thismeeting.The followingmorning,Fitzsimmonsdrove theshortdistancefromtheTeamsters-supportedLaCostaCountryClubinCarlsbad,California,toEl Toro Marine Air Station near San Clemente, where he boarded Air Force One andaccompaniedNixononthesix-hourcross-countryflightbacktoWashington.NorecordofwhatFitzsimmonsandNixondiscussedexists.Withinmonths,however,theFBIsurveillanceoftheTeamsters-mafia relationship ended, and on July 17, 1972, Fitzsimmons announced theTeamsters’endorsementofNixonforreelection.55

ThesuspensionofwiretappingdemoralizedtheFBIandendedaninvestigationofthemafiaandFitzsimmons,allowingFitzsimmonstoescapeprosecutionandleavingunansweredmanyquestionsregardingtheschemeandthemotivationoftheJusticeDepartment.56ThedecisionofAttorneyGeneralRichardKleindienstsoangeredFBIagentsworkingonthecasethatsomeonein theBureau leaked thecontentsof the investigation to theNewYorkTimes reporterDennyWalsh.AlthoughWalshandotherreporterspursuedthecase, thenation’spreoccupationwiththe events of Watergate forced the story from the headlines and eventually out of public

consciousness. Walsh labeled the scandal “the lost story of Watergate,” but media andgovernmentattentionbecamesooverwhelmedbytheWatergatebreak-insthatneitherpursuedaninvestigationoftheaffair.57

Fitzsimmons also contributed gifts of cash to Nixon and his aides, both directly andindirectly.Alongwiththe1972endorsement,FitzsimmonsaskedallTeamstersvicepresidentsand organizers to give $1,000 to Nixon’s campaign, while he personally gave $4,000.AccordingtoStevenBrill,authorofTheTeamsters,sourcesclosetoAllenDorfmanandTonyProvenzano,bothTeamstersofficials convictedofcorruption, revealeda scheme in1973 tohave approximately $1 million siphoned off from Las Vegas casinos—a growing area ofinfluence for the Teamsters—and redirected to Charles Colson, Fitzsimmons’s primarysponsorwithintheWhiteHouse.ColsonallegedlyapproachedFitzsimmonsfirstin1971aboutthe transaction in hopes of securing funds for the 1972 campaign.58Time estimated that theTeamstersultimatelycontributed$1milliondollarstowardNixon’sreelectioncampaign.59 In1974,astheWatergatescandalintensified,Fitzsimmonscontributed$25,000fromTeamsters’cofferstoananti-impeachmentgroup.Bythatpoint,ColsonhadlefttheWhiteHousebuthadnotyetbeenindictedforhisroleinthecover-upinvolvingtheWatergatebreak-ins.Thatyear,Fitzsimmonsmoved the legal business of theTeamsters,worth approximately $100,000 peryear, from the law firmofEdwardBennettWilliams, theprosecutingattorney in the lawsuitagainsttheWatergateburglars,tooneemployingColson.60

NixonandFitzsimmons’scollaborationcameattheexpenseoftheTeamsters’rankandfile,whoseduesnotonlyfinancedtheextravagant lifestylesofunionofficialsbutalsofundedthethirdandmostseriousbreachofanagreementtoleavetheorganizationoffieldworkerstotheUFW. The replacement of UFW grape contracts in 1973 initiated a bloody war in ruralCalifornia, as farmworker volunteers attempted to defend their turfwith picket lines in thefields. Although Coachella growers, Steinberg and Larson, chose to renew their contracts,mostoftheothergrapegrowersdefectedtotheTeamsters.TheTeamsterspreparedforUFWchallengesbyfundingamercenaryarmythatcarriedbaseballbats,knives,andwhateverelsetheycouldputtheirhandsontodriveChavistasfromthefield.The “Battle ofCoachella” opened perhaps themost tumultuous season in ruralCalifornia

since the 1933 cotton strike in the San JoaquinValley and the 1913wheatland hop riots inNorthernCalifornia.TheassaultonAliciaUribeonApril16,1973,wasfollowedbyscoresofviolentattacks that traveledwith theharvest. InCoachella,growerssuchas theGimmianbrothersandMiltonKarahadianaidedtheTeamstersbysupplyinggrapestakes,clubs,baseballbats, and pieces of irrigation pipe to use againstUFWpicketers. These attacks spilled intoplaces of business,whereTeamsters encounteredpicketers such asFather JohnBanks,whohadcometothedeserttoshowhissupportforthefarmworkersunion.Teamster,MikeFalco,recognized the Catholic priest and punched him in the face, breaking his nose. In nearbyMecca,anotherTeamster,JohnnyMacias,recognizedfarmworker,SilverioTorresMadrid,ina localmarket, followed him out, and beat himwith a two-by-four. Throughout the valley,Teamsters patrolled the lonely rural highways, looking for familiar UFW faces. On oneparticularlyviolentday,June26,1973,TeamstersfoundandbeatMarshallGanzunconscious,randownUFWrepresentatives,BillEncinasandAlfredoGonzález,andpunchedthemthrough

theircarwindow,forcedacarloadofpicketersdrivenbyUFWvolunteer,MichaelDrake,offtheroad,andattackedaUFWpicketlineatagraperanch,sendingseveralUFWvolunteerstothehospital.Atonepoint, theTeamstersbecamesoindiscriminateintheirviolencethattheymistook allies for enemies. Riverside County sheriff’s deputies arrested two Teamsters,GuadalupeTamezofSantaAnaandGuadalupeSausedoofSalinas,whentheymistookIsraelGuajardo,aforemanatMaagCitrusCompany,foraUFWmember.TamezandSausedowerechargedwithattemptedmurderandkidnappingforrunningGuajardoofftheroadnearMecca,pullinghimfromhiscar,andstabbinghimsixtimeswithanicepick.Inanotherembarrassingcase, Teamsters accosted Murray Westgate, a Las Vegas publicist who had been hired toimprovetheimageoftheTeamsters.TheTeamstersphysicallyremovedhimfromtheMoroccoMotelinIndio,kickedhimintotheparkinglot,andtoldhimto“getoutoftown.”61

Violenceoccurredonbothsides,withUFWsupportersburningdownstoragefacilitiesandcarsand,atonepoint,strikingWesternConferenceTeamsterrepresentative,BillGrami,intheheadwitha rockduringoneofhisvisits to Indio.ManuelChavez,Cesar’s cousinwhohaddonehardtimeinprison,encouragedaggressivebehaviorbyUFWaffiliatesbyorderingthemtoworkwith INSagents to stopundocumented immigrants fromentering the laborpool andblock the flow of scab laborers into the fields. Yet the occasional acts of arson or theapprehension of undocumented immigrants did not compare with the daily incidents ofviolence committed by the Teamsters. To ensure that UFW actions did not escalate, CesarChavez fasted and encouraged volunteers to participate in civil disobedience by resisting anewgrower injunctionagainstpicketing. “Wehadover3,000peoplearrested that summer,”Jerry Cohen recalled, “because you could get arrested in this state by violating anunconstitutionalinjunction.”62Althoughtheseactsplayedwellinthemedia,theydidnothingtodetertheTeamsters.Neither did the UFW’s actions please the AFL-CIO, whose leader, George Meany, had

grown cold towardChavez. In addition to his opposition to the campaign againstHeublein,Meany questioned directing the boycott at supermarkets that employed AFL-CIO–affiliatedmeatcuttersandretailclerkswhoselivelihoodssufferedasaconsequenceoftheUFWpicketlines.Chavez’s shiftingpositionon the inclusionof farmworkers in theNLRAalsobaffledMeany,leadingtoadeafeningsilencefromthenationallaborleaderasthebattleragedoninthedesert.WhenaskedbythemediawhethertheAFL-CIOwouldsupporttheUFWinitstimeof need, Bill Kircher, a longtime farm worker supporter and liaison for the AFL-CIO,responded,“No.Wecanonlysubsidizeorganizingcommittees.”63

Thecostofmaintainingthestrikeandboycottduringthefirsttwomonthsofthe1973grapeharvestforcedChaveztoseekaninfusionofcashfromtheAFL-CIO,anorganizationthathadgrantedtheUFWanindependentcharter theyearbefore. Inanticipationof theharvest in theSan Joaquin Valley, Chavez made an overture to Meany that was followed by a formalinvitation to Washington, D.C. to discuss the role of the AFL-CIO in the battle with theTeamsters.Atthemeeting,ChavezdefendedhiscommitmenttothehiringhallsandtheboycottbutfocusedhisattentiononsecuringstrikefundsfortheongoingstruggleagainsttheTeamsters.Meany tookumbragewithChavez’sgo-it-alone approach, but ultimatelydecided toprovidemonetarysupportforthefarmworkers.Atanewsconference,Meanyannounced,“TheCouncil

voted in thenext threemonths togiveMr.Chavez$1,600,000 to try tohelphimconduct aneffectivestrikeagainst themostvicious,strikebreaking,union-bustingeffort that I’veseen inmylifetimeonthepartoftheTeamsters.”Forthissupport,MeanyexpectedChaveztoacceptalegislativesolutiononcethestrugglehadended.64

ThecontinuedthreatofviolenceandtheAFL-CIO’srenewedsupportbroughtChavezbackto thenegotiating tablewithgrapegrowers inanattempt toavertabloodbathas theseasonmovednorth.Thenewboycottofgrapesdid little toshametheTeamsters,but it remainedapowerfultoolagainstgrowers.AlthoughtheAFL-CIOremaineddubiousaboutthetacticandtheunionnowjuggledseveral tasksalongwithmaintaininganetworkofboycotthouses, theboycott managed to force wholesale prices down and move more table grapes into coldstorageortoraisinandwineproduction.Thelettuceboycottneverreallysucceededingettingoff theground;however, theexperienceofboycottinggrapesand thepublic’smemoryof thefirstgrapeboycottallowedtheuniontoachieveadegreeofsuccess.65Forexample,thenewgrapeboycottdidnotquiteachievethelowpriceof$3.19perlugofgrapesin1969,butitdidsucceed in knocking it down from $7.44 in 1972 to $4.60 in 1973. Coachella growers notcarryingtheunionlabeltookthebruntofthelosses,fromatotalprofitof$3,705,000forallvarieties in 1972 to a deficit of $3,322,000 in 1973.66 Both the losses and the violence inCoachellaforetoldapossiblescenariointheSanJoaquinValley,onegrowerswishedtoavoidifatallpossible.OnceagainJohnGiumarraJr.becametheprimarynegotiatoronbehalfofgrowersinanew

round of talkswith theUFW.Giumarra had become extremely disenchantedwith the hiringhalls, at onepoint bringinghis own crewdown toDelano, jumpingbehind the counter, anddispatching his own workers to his farm.67 His frustration with the process led him to thecontractswiththeTeamsters,buttheviolencebroughthimbacktothebargainingtablewiththeUFW.Jerry Cohen, who oversaw the negotiations with Giumarra, believed that, despite his

problemswiththehiringhalls,“Giumarrawasreadytosignwith[theUFW].”68AccordingtoCohen,thegrowers—especiallythosewhohadlearnedfromthefirstboycottexperience—sawtheunionas“aneconomicproblem”thattheywantedtoremoveasquicklyandefficientlyaspossible.Giumarraenterednegotiationsin1973lookingfortwothings: toresolvethehiringhallproblemseffectivelyandtoavoidarepeatofthe1969–70publicrelationsnightmare.Onthehiringhalls,Chavezandhisteamnegotiatedingoodfaith,admittingthatthestruggleswiththeTeamstersinlettuceandthenewnessofbeingaunionhadcausedthemtomakemistakes.Privately,theunionacknowledgedthattheirdependenceononestaffmember,RichardChavez,to administer the contracts had been “a huge factor” in creating disorder in Delano anddispleasure among grape growers in the San Joaquin Valley. “When you look at theadministrationofthegrapecontracts,”Cohenexplained,“you’vegottolookatwherethetalentwent.”ChavezshiftedthemostskilledorganizerstoSalinas,leavingavacuumofleadershipinthe grape fields of Coachella and the San Joaquin Valley. As a consequence, most of thenegotiating team offered convincing remedies to the hiring halls and reached a tentativeagreement on reform of the system without scrapping it. As Cohen remembered, however,“Cesarneverboughtinto[theagreement]”forgedbyhisnegotiatingteam.69

Chavez’s doubts about the agreement crystallized into open hostility when he introducedanother issue: sexual relationships between Filipino male workers and prostitutes. On thevergeofasettlement,ChavezsurprisedhiscolleaguesandGiumarrabybreaking intoa rantagainst“whoresinthecamps”thatderailedthenegotiations.Chavezhadheardofprostitutesfrequenting Filipino men in their off hours and demanded that Giumarra do something toprevent it as a prerequisite for signing a deal.Giumarra pleaded ignorance,which enragedChavez,whobecameintransigentdespiteappealsfromhisnegotiating teamtorelax.“That’soneofthefirststrangethingsCesardoes,”Cohenremembered,“whenhejump[ed]aroundandsaid, ‘we have to deal with whores in the camps!’” Cohen called for a break in thenegotiations to calmChavezdownandget him to refocuson the issues at hand, butChavezrefused to listen to reason.Cohen recounted the conversation: “[I said] ‘What the hellwasthat?!’And,youknow,[he]startedbitching,‘Youdon’tunderstandthis,Jerry.Ido.Wehavetodealwithwhoresinthecamps.’Isaid,‘Thesearesingle,oldFilipinoguys;leavethemalone.Leave them alone!What the hell does it have to do with us?’”70 Chavez never offered anexplanationforhis tiradebeyondthecrypticassertionthatheknewbest,andothers,suchasCohen,didnot.Perhapshe thought thenewstrike funds from theAFL-CIOwould lead toabetterdealwiththegrowersifheprolongedthestrike.PerhapshehadbecomeobsessedwiththetroubleofretainingandcontrollingFilipinofarmworkerswithintheunion.Regardless,hisposition sank thedealwithGiumarra, extended the strike, and led toa long,hot,murderoussummerintheCentralValley.

UNIONSUBSTITUTION

Thegrapecontractsof the1970swereawake-upcall for lettucegrowers,whobecame thefirst growers to switch from union-busting tactics to a new strategy of “union substitution,”replacing the United Farm Workers with the Teamsters as the union representing theiremployees.71Althoughthenegativeproductidentificationwithlettucewasahardersaletothepublic,theUFW’ssuccessinpopularizingunionsasasolutiontoinjusticeonCaliforniafarmsneutralizedtheoldtacticsofaggressionagainstlabororganizinginthefields.Lettucegrowersdealtwith the stigmaofbeinganti-unionbyembracing aunion thatwoulddobusinesswiththem: the Teamsters. Unlike theUFW, the Teamsters looked at fieldworkers as new dues-payingmemberswhowouldcontributetothewealthoftheunion.TheTeamsters’rejectionofhiring halls appealed to growers weary of turning over such responsibilities to a unionbureaucracy.UnionsubstitutionsucceededinshiftingthestrugglefromtheUFWversusthegrowerstoa

battle between two unions. In this context, the growers appeared to the public as haplessvictimsofaninternecinelaborwarthathadlittletodowiththem.Tothegeneralpublicwhohad participated in the early boycotts, the announcement of victory in 1970, coupled withgrowers’ acceptance of unions, made it appear as though the farm workers had won theirbattle.Fewconsumersdistinguishedoneunionfromanother,evenwiththenegativepublicitygenerated by the Teamsters. With Hoffa out as president, the problems of the Teamsters

appeared to be behind them. The new boss, Fitzsimmons, had been embraced by Nixon, apresidentwho,in1972,wonanelectioninalandslideandstillhadcredibilitywiththepublicprior to fullexposureof theWatergatescandal.Moreover, thepublicunderstood littleaboutthevirtuesofhiringhallsversusforemanselectioninthehiringprocess,nordidtheyseethepurposeofboycottsthatseemedtostartandstopwithinaperiodofseveralmonthsin1972.Like the StealersWheel’s hit song of that year, growers seemed to be stuck in the middlebetween theUFWand theTeamsters,whowereunable toworkout theirdifferences for thebenefitoftheworkers.72

Thesuccessoftheunionsubstitutionstrategyamonglettucegrowersquicklyspreadtograpegrowers,especially in thewakeof thefailednegotiationswithGiumarra.Rather thanrenewthecontracts,grapegrowerssubstitutedtheTeamstersfortheUnitedFarmWorkersjustasthelettucegrowershaddoneearlierintheseason.73By1973,theUnitedFarmWorkers,despiteitssuccessin1970,hadlostamajorityofitscontractsandteeteredonthebrinkofcollapse.For theirpart,Fitzsimmonsand theTeamsters saw the successof the farmworkersasyet

anotheropportunitytousurpthemomentumofthegrapeboycottandtakeoverrepresentationoffarmworkers.ThisapproachtolabororganizingwasnotaberrantbehaviorfortheTeamsters,butratheralongstandingorganizationalstrategyforgrowth.Fromthe1930sthroughtheperiodofHoffa’sleadershipinthe1960s,theTeamstershaddemonstratedacommitmenttoexpansionintosectorsof theeconomy thatadjoined theirbaseofshort-hauldrivers. In the1930s, theyexpanded from organizing drivers in the cities to cross-country haulers. Under Hoffa, theTeamsters branched out to cover warehouse workers, forklift operators, and packing shedemployees, whom Teamster drivers encountered in storage facilities. The contact betweenTeamster packers and warehouse workers and nonunion field workers encouraged the nextphaseof their expansion.Similarly, employers, although resistant tounions ingeneral,werepartialtotheTeamsterswhenpushcametoshoveovertheunionizationoftheirfieldworkersbecausetheyknewtheTeamstersthroughtheirpresenceinpackingsheds.74

Why Fitzsimmons broke his pact with the UFW can best be explained by the changingeconomicconditions,hisfriendshipwithNixon,andthepoliticswithintheTeamsters.Nixon’sNew Economic Policy, with an emphasis on increasing agricultural exports, signaled theexpansionoftheagriculturalworkforce.TheTeamsterssawinthesedevelopmentsanincreaseinthenumberofpossibledues-payingmembers,afactthatwasnotlostonEinarMohn,headof theWesternConference of Teamsters,who infamously commented in 1973, “We have tohave themin theunionforawhile. Itwillbeacoupleofyearsbefore theycanstarthavingmembershipmeetings,beforewecanuse the farmworkers’ ideas in theunion. I’mnot surehow effective a union can be when it is composed of Mexican-Americans and Mexicannationals with temporary visas. Maybe as agriculture becomes more sophisticated, moremechanized,withfewertransients,fewergreencarders,andasjobsbecomemoreattractivetowhites,thenwecanbuildaunionthatcanhavestructuresandthatcannegotiatefromstrengthandhavemembershipparticipation.”75Mohn’scommentsrevealthecoldbusinesslogicoftheTeamsters.Themeritsofthefarmworkersunionasasocialmovementwereminimal;therealvalueintheirsuccesswasthepotentialforanorganized(andwhite)workforceasagriculturematuredwithNEP. In the short term, themostlyMexicanworkforce underTeamster control

wouldcost theunion little in thewayof services,whilebringing in$8permember indueseachmonth.SuchduescontributedtothewealthoftheTeamstersunderFitzsimmons.Theverypublic drive to organize new workers and contributions to the Western Conference ofTeamsters promised to shore up Fitzsimmons’s strength in theWest and counter any threatsamongloyalfollowersofHoffaintheCentralandEasternConferences.Chavez’srefusaltoreachasettlementwithGiumarraplayedintothehandsoftheTeamsters.

When the fight camenorth, theviolence escalated, given theheavy-handed approachof lawenforcement officials in the Central Valley compared to Riverside County sheriffs inCoachella.OnJune28,KernCountysheriffsarrestedtwentytotwenty-fiveTeamstermembersfor attacking a UFW picket line at the Kovacavich Ranch. The assault sent four UFWvolunteers and farm workers to Kern General Hospital, including sixty-two-year-old JuanHernández,whosufferedafracturedskull.Suchoccurrenceshappenedwithgreaterfrequencyandinvolvedfirearms,asgrowersbegantofeeltheeffectsofthestrikeandboycott.OnAugust1, an unidentified assailant shot UFW striker, Joe Moncon, in the right shoulder at TudorVineyardinDelano.Justtendayslater,anotherunknowngunmanopenedfireonaUFWpicketlineatMissakianRanchinKernCounty,woundingtwo.KernCountysheriffsdidnotmakeanarrest in either case. Finally, the conflict turned deadly onAugust 14,when a striker,NagiDaifullah,animmigrantfromYemenandaUFWmember,sufferedafatalbeatingatthehandsofKernCountysheriffsaslawenforcementofficialsscuffledwithUFWprotestersonapicketlineinLamont.Twodayslater,onAugust16,anarmedstrikebreakershotandkilledJuanDeLa Cruz, a sixty-year-old veteran of the movement from Arvin who was picketing atGiumarra’svineyard.ThecarnageofthesummerspurredtheNationalExecutiveBoardoftheuniontocallahalttothestrikewhileChavezengagedinanotherfasttodrawunionmembers’attentionawayfromactsofretaliation.Themurdersalsotriggeredanimpromptufuneralmarchby7,500UFWmembersandsupporters,whichwascoveredbyreportersandfilmmakersfromacrossthenation.76

Althoughthemarchinspirednewvolunteerstojoinlacausaandgarneredpublicsympathyatacriticaltimefortheunion,themissedopportunitytoachieveanewcontractwithGiumarraearlier in the seasonmust haveweighed heavily on the conscience of those involved in thefailednegotiations.IfChavezhadusedtheexcuseof“whoresinthecamp”tosquelchadealwiththegrapegrowersinanattempttocapitalizeontheeconomicpressureofthestrikeandboycott,thedeathoftwofarmworkersandnumerousinjuriessufferedbyscoresofvolunteersmusthaveledhimtodoubthisowntactics.WhetherChavezacknowledgedtheselinks,otherswithintheuniondid,promptingsometoquestionhisexecutiveabilities.AsthefightwiththeTeamsterswore on and the decision to accept a legislative solution to achieving collectivebargainingrightsforfarmworkersloomedinthenearfuture,suchquestionscontinuedtogrow.

In1974 theTeamstersengaged in theirmostaggressiveandexpensiveassaulton theUnitedFarmWorkers.Fitzsimmons set asidemore than$100,000amonth to fight theUFWandanadditional$1million for theestablishmentof anew local inSalinasValley.On theground,coordinators from theWestern Conference of Teamsters in Burlingame, California, workedwith farm workers in Salinas to organize lettuce workers. In typical Teamster fashion, the

unionusurpedthenameofasuccessfulbutshort-livedmovementoflocalworkersassociatedwiththeAFL-CIOin1965:theAgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommittee.ThenewAWOChopedtoattractthesupportofworkersforcontractsalreadynegotiatedbytheTeamsters.Evenbeforethecampaignbegan,theunionhad308contractswithgrowerswhohiredabout50,000workers in the peak season.Conversely, at the beginning of the 1974 season, theUFWhadfewerthanadozengrowersstillundercontractandfewerthan10,000members.77

Thetumultuousyearsof1973and1974broughtresultsinthefarmlaborbattlethatneithergroup expected or perhaps wanted. The Teamsters’ naked aggression against the UFW inCoachelladiscreditedtheorganizationintheeyesofbothworkersandthepublic.Moreover,theirattempttochangetheirimagefromaunionthathadcontemptforMexicanworkerstoonethatvaluedthemprovedtobetoosteepacurve.Withinayear,manyoftheoriginalMexicanAmericanorganizershiredbytheTeamsterswerefired,andtheunionlostcredibilitywiththerankandfile,nevertoberegained.78FortheUnitedFarmWorkers,theconflictstretchedtheirbudgetbeyonditslimitsandconfusedconsumersaboutthepurposeandtargetoftheboycott.That the Teamsters never fully succeeded in organizing field workers mattered little to

FitzsimmonsorNixon. In spite of their personal failures as leaders, bothmen succeeded inachievingthegoalseachsetforhimselfatthebeginningoftheirrelationship.NixonsucceededinstrengtheningthehandofagribusinessoverlaborersandwinningFitzsimmons’ssupportforhiseconomicpolicy.AlthoughNixon’sforcedresignationduetotheWatergatescandaldeniedhim an opportunity to see the full implementation of his policies, the decade witnessed adecisiveexpansioninagriculturalexports.In1983,theCongressionalBudgetOfficereported,“Today, twoofeveryfive[U.S.]acresproduceforworldmarkets,makingexportsacriticalpartofU.S. agricultural sales.”79 For his part, Fitzsimmons successfully neutralizedHoffa’schallenge to his presidency, avoided prosecution for schemes to rob the pension fund, andconsolidatedhispowerintheunionthroughexpansionintheWest.For Cesar Chavez and otherUFW leaders, the conflictwith the Teamsters precipitated a

reevaluation of strategy that would make the union less dependent on the boycott. Withmembershipinprecipitousdeclineandvolunteersdyinginthelineofduty,Chavezwasforcedtoconsiderworkingwithfriendsingovernmentwhomightbeabletodeliveranagriculturallabor lawworthy of their sacrifices. Such a change in strategywould, of course, require areversalofChavez’soppositiontogovernmentregulationsoflabordisputes.Italsodemandedhisacceptanceofamuchmorebureaucraticapproachtosolvingtheproblemsthatconfrontedfarm laborers. In a world dependent on lawyers and union field organizers to win unionelections,Chavezwouldhavetolearnhowtosharethespotlightanddecision-makingpowers,somethingthathadbecomeforeigntohimby1975.

FIVE

ABitterHarvest

THE REGIONAL OFFICE of the new Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) in Salinas,California,openedonatypicallycoolmorning,September2,1975.Theunionhadplannedforthis day for months, collecting membership cards and preparing petitions for elections onfarms. The Salinas office covered farms over a wide swath of the state, from the coastalgrowing regions just north of Los Angeles to the fertile lands of Monterey County. Unionorganizer,Jesus“Chui”Villegas,andalawstudentinterningforthefarmworkershaddrivenallnightfromOxnard,nearly300milesaway,carryingsevenpetitionstofilewiththeALRBonitsfirstdayofoperations.SandyNathan,ayoungcauselawyerwhohadjoinedtheUFWteamin1973,metVillegasatthefarmworkers’officebeforedawntogooverthepetitionsandcombinethemwithcardscollectedfromlocalranchesandfourteenpetitionspreparedovertheprevioushours.1Nathanembracedthenewlawasanopportunitytoprovethattheunioncouldachieve justice through the system. Many rank-and-file members of the union shared thisoptimism,congregatinginfrontoftheofficeadaybefore,onLaborDay,toholdamassat5o’clockintheafternoon,followedbyanall-nightvigiltoprayforthesuccessofthenewlaw.AtaquartertoeightonthemorningofSeptember2,NathanandVillegasarrivedattheboard

office,metbythrongsoffarmworkersandtelevisionreporterswaitingwithgreatanticipation.Theofficedirector,NormanGreer,andmembersofhisnewstaffbegantomovesupplies inandoutofthebuildinginanticipationofthebigday.Nathan,Villegas,MarshallGanz,andtherestoftheworkersremainedclosetothefrontdoor,thougheachtimeastaffmemberneededtopass,thecourteousbutanxiouscrowdmadewayforhim.“Wewerekindofstandingofftothesideofthedoor,”Nathanremembered,“andpresumablytheyweregoingtosay,atsomepoint,thattheywerereadytogo.”Thatmomentnevercame.Instead,asNathanandVillegaslookedon,Greerandhisregionalattorney,RalphPérez,cutapathtotheparkinglot.Nathanrecalledwhathewitnessednext:“Whathadhappened,itturnedout,acoupleoftheSalinascopstoldme that José Charles [a Teamsters representative] and one of his companions from theTeamsterswereoutintheparkinglotandtheyaskedthecoptogoinsideandtellGreertheywantedtotalktohim.Theydidn’twanttowalkthroughtheUFWline,soGreerandPérezwentout[tothem].Thenextthingwesee,here’sGreerleadingtheTeamstersintotheofficeaheadofus.SoIsaid,‘Let’sgo!’Andallthepeoplewentin,andIwentin.”2

Withinminutes the scene turned chaotic, as Villegas insisted that he be the first to file apetitionaftertravelingallnightandhavingfellowfarmworkersholdhisplace.WithtelevisioncamerasrollingandVillegas,Ganz,Nathan,theTeamstersrepresentatives,andabouttenfarm

workers crowded into the small office, Greer began shouting, “This is a mob! There’s anunrulymobinhere!I’mnotgoingtotakethesepetitionsuntilyougetthemoutofhere!”GreerdirectedmostofhisireatNathanandGanz,whomheassumedhadstagedapublicitystunt.Intheheatoftheargument,Greeralsoutteredaraciallytingedconcernaboutgettinghis“pocketpicked,” inflamingtensionsevenmore.Nathanopinedlater,“Itwasjust incredible thatafterallthis—Imeanitwaslikeafestiveoccasion—suddenlythisguywashittinghishandonthecounter,sayingthey’renotgoingtotakeanypetitionsuntilthismobgetsoutofhere.”3

Thisinauspiciousbeginningtothelaborboardtemperedunionmembers’expectationsand,inmanyways,confirmed theirworst fears. In themonths that followed, insensitivity towardfarm workers, internal rivalries between young and old government agents, and generalmismanagementfromthetopdownplaguedtheboardandinspiredchallengestothenewlawfromthosemostconcernedaboutdeliveringjusticetofarmworkersinCalifornia.IntheyearsleadinguptothepassageoftheAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct,CesarChavezhadresistedalegislativesolutiontofarmworkertroubles.AfterreceivingfundsfromtheAFL-CIOin1973,however, Chavez shifted his position, asking JerryCohen to propose themost liberal, pro-union labor relations act that would extend collective bargaining rights to farm workerswithout compromising the union’s most coveted strategy: the secondary boycott. The timeseemedrightgiventhat thestaunchlyanti-uniongovernor,RonaldReagan,hadconcludedhissecondandlasttermin1974andCalifornia’selectoratehadreplacedhimwiththeyoung,ex-Jesuit seminarian,EdmundG.“Jerry”Brown.As theattorneygeneralunderReagan,Brownhadwatchedhispredecessor’swillfulneglectofthefarmworkers,frequentlyentreatinghimtotakeamoreactiverole in theresolutionof theconflict.Now,as thegovernorofCalifornia,Brownpromised“toextendtheruleoflawtotheagriculturesectorandestablishtherightofsecret ballot elections for farm workers.”4 These were the circumstances under which theALRAwasborn;however, theresultsonSeptember2,1975,lookedfardifferentfromthosethatCohenhadnegotiatedorBrownandhislegislativepartnershadintended.The failure of theALRB to live up to its expectations surprised union officialswho had

workeddiligentlyintheyearsandmonthssincethebattleofCoachellatogeta“goodlaw.”5ChavezsentCohenandNathantothestatecapitolduringtheprecedingmonthstoworkcloselywithsympatheticlawmakers,California’ssecretaryofagricultureandservicesRoseBird,andGovernorJerryBrownonlegislationthat theythoughtgavethemthebestchancetosucceed.TheUFWlobbyinggroupinSacramentosucceededinimprovinguponalltherightsaffordedtoindustrial workers in the NLRA for agricultural workers, including securing the right to asecondaryboycottwith limited restrictions.Although the law remained irritatinglyvagueoneligibility to vote and how to recognize workers’ interest in an election, the final version,passedonMay29,1975,requiredelectionstobeheldatthepeakoftheseasonalharvests.Thelaw’s promise to “[ensure] peace in the agricultural fields by… [bringing] certainty and asense of fair play to a presently unstable and potentially volatile condition in the state,”simultaneously acknowledged a tumultuous past and present while casting a hopeful eyetowardthefuture.6Indescribingthelawtotheunionmembersafteritspassage,Cohenassuredthem of their right to boycott, but reminded everyone that the bill’s implementation stillrequiredtheirhardwork.“Wehavethesolution,”Cohenproudlyreported,“nowallweneed

istoworkoutthedetails.”7

The difficult first months of implementation, however, produced new doubts about theefficacy of a legislative solution and renewed suspicions that the state governmentwas ill-equippedtomanagethefightinthefields.Althoughjournalistshailedthepassageofthelawasthe“dawnofaneweraforfarmworkers,”andJerryBrownlaterproclaimedit“thegreatestaccomplishment of my administration,” those who struggled to make it work found it lesseffectiveasatoolforjustice.8Indeed,Chavezstrainedtodefendthelawaftertwomonthsoffrustration,whilemembersoftheUFWlegalteamdebatedwhetherthelawwas,infact,trulygood for theworkers. JerryGoldman,aveteranUAWattorneyworkingon loan to theUFWlegal team, renderedhisverdict after just threeweekson the job: “I think this isoneof themostanti-unionlawsIhaveeverseen.”9Nathanbelieveditwas“theadministrationofthelaw,notthelaw”itselfthatproducedtheanti-unionbias.10

Chavez,Nathan,andCohenhadlittlechoicebuttobeoptimistic.InadditiontothepromiseChavez had made to George Meany to pursue such a solution, the UFW approached theformationofALRAinitsweakeststatesinceitsfounding,withonlytwentyunioncontractsand15,000membersduring thepeakharvestseason.11 In thiscontext, theunionhad fewoptionsotherthantoenterintoaFaustianpactwithBrownandthestateforitssurvival.Inembracingthe challenge toworkwithin the confines of the new law, the union set out, once again, toprovethatitcouldadapttothechangingdynamicsofthestruggleandstayonestepaheadofitsrivals.

THEY’REFORTHESTATE

TheAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct, at leastonpaper, gaveUFWorganizers reason tobehopeful, although it also offered the Teamsters and the growers a chance to win in unionelections.At a basic level, theALRA recognized farmworkers’ rights to organize and joinlaborunions.Thelawalsosetupprovisionsforfilingunfairlaborpracticesagainstgrowersandcompetingunionswhointerferedwiththisprocessorimpingedonthefreewillofworkersto determine their own fate. In cases where the board affirmed claims involving unfairterminationofemployment,thelawinstituteda“make-whole”remedy,wherebytheemployerwouldhave topay theworker thedifferencebetweenwhat he received andwhat hewouldhavebeenpaidiftheemployerhadbargainedingoodfaith.AlthoughTeamstersofficialsopposedthesenewregulationsduringthelegislativeprocess,

theysoftenedtheirpositionovertime.TheALRAallowedtheTeamsterstoretaintheirexistingcontracts, which totaled some 467 farm labor contracts and covered approximately 65,000membersatthetimeofitssigning.12TheTeamstersstoodtoloseintheupcomingelections,buttheheadoftheWesternConferenceofTeamsters,M.E.(Andy)Anderson,remainedconfidentthat theycouldholdon to theiradvantage,given thepresumedsuperiorityof theircontracts.The legislation applied strictly to agricultural field workers only, thereby protecting theemployeescoveredbytheTeamstersinwarehouseandhaulingfromUFWinfringements.

For the growers, the law implemented stricter guidelines for picketing and boycotts;specifically, it forbade the “hardboycott” (alsoknownas a “traditionalboycott”), inwhichunionsaskedemployeesnottohandleaparticularproduct,andrestrictedtherighttoboycotttolabor organizations currently certified as the representatives of the primary employer’semployees.13 The law restricted use of the secondary boycott if the union lost an election,thoughloopholesremainedfortheUFWtocontinueitscampaignsagainstgrapes,lettuce,andGallo wine. The grower newspaper, the Packer, initially declare an end to the boycott;however,within aweek it published a retraction.14 The growers successfully petitioned forrestrictionsontheuseofrecognitionalstrikes,whichwouldhaveallowedemployeestoselectaunionastheirbargainingrepresentativebyhavingamajorityoftheunitwalkoffthejob.15Instead, the lawprovidedfor theexpeditiouscreationofsecretballotelections todeterminerepresentation—orno representation—byaunion for those rancheswhere50percentof theemployees exhibited a “showing of interest.” In short, the law gave something to everyone,althoughmostregardedtheALRAasmorefavorabletounionsthanthefederalNLRA.16

AweekafterBrownsignedtheALRAintolawonJune5,1975,CesarChavezannouncedtoagroupof union fieldofficers, staff, and the full executiveboard, “Thedecisionswemaketoday—or fail to make today—will have a profound effect on the future of the union.”17Membersdiscussedwhatapproachtheywouldtaketosecureelectionsonranchesacrossthestateandtackledthethornyissueofwhethertoorganizeundocumentedworkers,whomChavezreferredtoas“illegals”inthecommonparlanceoftheday.Cesar’scousinManuelupheldtheimportanceofillegalaliensas“economicstrikers”whoseeligibilityshouldnotbechallengedandexpressed thesincerebelief“that illegalscanbeorganized just likeallotherworkers.”JerryCohen,whotriedtoremainagnosticonthequestion,admittedthatthenewlawdidnotdeal with the issue, but he offered his legal opinion that “it would be unconstitutional toprohibitillegals[fromvoting].”18Seeinganopportunitytostrengthenhispoint,ManuelChavezobserved, “Illegals [were] no longer afraid of the migra [federal immigration officials]”largelybecauseenforcementhadgrownlaxandmostmembersoftheunionhadundocumentedrelatives in their families.BenMaddock, aDelano organizerworking in theCentralValleytownofLostHills,sharedthatalthoughmostofthememberswithwhomhehadspokendidnotwant undocumentedworkers to vote, he agreed that “some of themembers have illegals athome, so there’s a contradiction.” The Fresno area organizer agreed withManuel Chavez,adding,“[We]willlosewithoutthem.”Inresponse,ManuelofferedtotraveltotheFresnoareatohaveundocumentedworkers signcards and topush for residency for thosewhochose toworkwiththeunionandlaborinthefields.DisplayingMachiavellianreasoning,however,healso suggested that such actions could be used to the benefit of the union: “[Wewon’t] askwhethertheworker[is]illegalornot,butif[we]lose[the]election,then[wewill]blow[the]whistleonhim!”19

Cesar Chavez and Gilbert Padilla took the opposite position. Chavez offered a responseconsistentwith thestandardindustrialunionline:“Meatcutters,UAWandSteelWorkersallhavelostelectionsbecauseoftheillegals.”Padilla,whohadworkedcloselywithmembersofestablished unions in building the boycott, shared the position that “unions areweakened ifillegalsareallowedtobemembers.”Mostunionleadersbelievedthatthelackofcitizenship

madeundocumentedworkersvulnerabletoexpulsionandthereforemuchmorepliableandlessinclinedtospeakoutagainstinjusticewhenithappened.Theuseofundocumentedworkersasscab laborers to replace striking workers during the early days of the union suggested toChavezandPadillathatundocumentedworkerscouldneverbecomeequalmembersandwouldultimatelyonlyhurttheunionifincluded.BothrejectedtheideathattheALRAandthefilialloyalties among unionmembers gave the union cover to organize among the undocumented.Chavezcited theupswing ingrowers’hiringofundocumentedworkersasevidence that theywould“use[the]sameworkforcetobreakelectionsastheydidtobreakstrikes.”“Wedon’twantchattelsasmembers,”heannouncedatthemeeting.“Evenifwewinelectionswiththem,we don’twin.” In hismost extreme interpretation of the problem,Chavez saw the flood ofundocumented laborers into the fields as a “CIA operation” designed to serve multiplepolitical objectives, including the restoration of the bracero program and an attempt toalleviateMexicoofradicalfarmworkerswho,ifallowedtostayintheUnitedStates,wouldfomentacommunistrevolutionsouthoftheborder.20

Chavez’sdesiretoexcludeundocumentedworkersfromtheunionsharplycontrastedwiththeunion’s advocacy for a state labor relations act that accounted for the unique conditions ofagricultural workers. That the new law accounted for their vulnerabilities—for example,insisting on elections during the peak of harvests—opened the door for the UFW to makeenormous gains among this mostly Spanish-speaking group of laborers. Chavez, however,rejected the advice of some of his field organizers, including his cousin’s, in favor of atraditional union philosophy that held the line between documented and undocumentedworkers.Hesuggestedthatthestateshouldaddresstheproblembystoppingthe“coyote”fromtransporting theworkers in the first place rather than focusing on the labor contractorwhohiredtheworkersattheworksite.Cohenfoundthispositiondisingenuousgiventhatthelawnowheldgrowersaccountable for thecontractor’sactions.But this toohadbecomeanotherunenforced provision within the law that would grow in significance as growers tried toincreasetheirdistancefromthehiringprocessthroughoutthelate1970s.Onthisday,however,thememberscouldnotreachanagreementonanapproachandultimatelyagreedtoreturntoitafter two weeks of study.21 When Manuel returned from Fresno with news of progress inorganizing undocumentedworkers to vote for the union,Cesar remained doubtful, claiming,“Illegals,notTeamsters,areourbiggestproblem.”22

Theunionupheldtherelevanceoftheboycott,butthemajorityoftheunion’seffortswouldnow go toward confirming the desire of documented workers to have ALRB-sanctionedelections.Theunion’slawyersalsotookonanewwatchdogrole,filingunfairlaborpracticechargesagainstgrowerswhosoughttocurbtheinfluenceoftheUnitedFarmWorkersbyfiringemployees who demonstrated an inclination to vote for the union. The union remainedcommitted to a range of activities, including managing the boycott and a number of socialservices,althoughduringthesummerof1975theUFWredirectedmostofitsresourcestowardmakingthemostoftheALRB.The unfortunate incidents in Salinas, however, represented just the beginning of problems

withintheboardthatkeptitfrombecomingafullpartnerforjustice.IntheweeksthatfollowedtheopeningoftheALRBoffice,lawyersworkingfortheunioncomplainedthatformerNLRB

operativesdominatedthestaffofthenewagenciesandfailedtoimplementthelaw.AccordingtoSandyNathan,“They[brought]alltheNLRBnotionswiththemandundertheNLRB,afteryoufileforanelectionittakesanumberofmonthsbeforeitactuallyhappens.”23TheALRAstipulatedthatelectionsmustbeheldwithinsevendaysofavalidshowingofinterest,andtheUFWinsistedonsuchaprovisionbecauseoftheitinerantstatusoffieldlaborers.Butcomingmostly from industrial sites, many of the ALRB agents did not appreciate the need fortimeliness.Theagentsdraggedtheirfeetonenforcingtheprovisiontoholdelectionsduringthepeak harvest, and the board ultimately failed to offer an acceptable remedy when UFWlawyerscomplained.24

Boardagents tended tobe too trustingof theemployers,acceptingat facevalue the listofemployeessubmittedtotheoffice.AccordingtoNathan,employersoften“inflatedthenumberof people,” which had a detrimental effect on the union’s ability to prove that at least 50percentoftheemployeeswantedanelection.Nathanexplained,“Ifweclaimthere’s200andthegrowersclaimthere’s300,[and]ifwehave140cardsthinkingwe’rewelloverwhatweneed,weinfactareshort.”25Whenthelawyerschallengedthelist,agentsrefusedtoexaminethe grower’s payroll, arguing that they either had “no time” or “no reason” to doubt thegrower’sclaims.Inonecase,wheretheunioncompelledasympatheticagenttoevaluatethepayroll in Calexico, the grower submitted an address on Airport Boulevard for 300 men,women, and children who worked on the ranch. When the union conducted its owninvestigationatthesite,theyfoundasinglemen’scamphousingapproximatelyfortymen,buttheboardoffice in theregionrefused toverify their findings.“It’scommon,”Nathanshared,“that the lists contain twenty-five per cent inflations in most of the big places.”26 In somecases, UFW lawyers found evidence not only of blind trust in the employers, but of actualcommunications between board agents and growers in which the two worked out the finalversionofthelist.27AccordingtoNathan,“Thefirstweekwespentfightingbecausetheykepttryingtothrowusoutofelections.…Iwasinthatofficedayandnight,justscreamingallthetime.”28

Whentheboardfinallyheldelections,theyoftenfailedtoprovideatransparentprocessthatassuagedworkers’fearsofemployerandTeamsterretributionforsupportingtheUFW.Sinceelectionswerenewtomostworkers,theboardheldpreelectionconferenceswithemployeesto explain the process. Such conferences, however, occurred at the whim of the employer,usuallyafterhoursat the ranch,making it inconvenient formostworkers toattend.AlthoughUFW lawyers insisted that board members conduct the conferences in both Spanish andEnglish and translate all documents into Tagalog, Spanish, and English, the agency refused.Nathanrecalled,“[Theagentswould]say, ‘whydon’t [you] translate the importantstuff intoSpanish?,’” and he would respond, “ ‘We’ll conduct the thing in Spanish and translate theimportantstuffintoEnglishfortheemployer.’”29Needlesstosay,theagentsdeclined.Ontheday of elections, growers often provided transportation to the polls only for workers whosupportedtheirposition.Growersalsocoveredtheairtravelofboardagentschargedwiththetaskofmonitoringelectionsandoftentreatedboardagentstoextravagantlunchesandluxurioustransportationwhileinthefield.During the counting of the ballots, myriad problems arose. Often, non-Spanish-speaking

agents threwout ballots of voterswhose last names they couldnot read. In other instances,agents assumed Spanish surnames that appeared to be similar were repeat voters andinvalidated those ballots without consulting with the union.30 Growers and Teamsters alsoengaged in downright intimidation of workers who they knew preferred the UFW. Nathanrecalled, “People are getting fired, threatened, pushed around in all kinds of ways, and ifthey’donlygoneoutafteronegrower,maybe taught somebodya lesson,maybe therewouldhavebeena fairatmosphere in thoseelections.”During the first threeweeksof the law, theUFWfiledtwenty-twounfairlaborpractices;theboardneglectedtoactonasingleone.31

ConfidentialreportsfromwithintheSalinasALRBofficeconfirmedthebiasesthattheunionlawyersperceived from theoutside.During the first fewweeksof theagency’soperation,ayoungSalinasagent,EllenGreenstone,disclosedherfrustrationswiththemanagementoftheoffice. “Probably the most characteristic thing about our office,” she explained to Chavezbiographer Jacques E. Levy, “is how racist it is.” Greenstone worked with thirty-ninecolleagues inSalinas andnine field agents inVentura. “A lotof agentswon’t even listen toUFWpeople,”shereported.“Theydiscountthemtotally.”Greenstoneattributedsuchtreatmenttoa lackof familiaritywithworkersandaprevailingattitudeofnoblesseobligeamonghercolleagues. According to Greenstone, many of the agents assumed a significant level ofignorance among the farm workers and rejected the importance of talking to them. WhenGreer’sactionsonthefirstdayelicitedstrongreactionsfromthefarmworkers,manyagentswere“takenaback”and“shocked”atthestridencyoftheUFWrepresentatives.“Partofitwas[the agents] thought they were being involved in a paternalistic, benevolent helping ofworkers,”Greenstoneopined,“andtheydidn’trealizethatallofthesepeoplewereinatotaluproarandhadbeenbattlingitoutforyears.”WhenfarmworkersandUFWrepresentativeschallengedtheagents,mostofGreenstone’scolleaguesbecameincredulous,asking,“Howcanthesepeopleactthisway?”and“Whydon’ttheytakeourhelp?”“Inreality,”sheadded,“theboardagentsdidn’tknowanythingaboutwhatwasgoingon.”32

Toconvey the levelofdanger,UFWrepresentatives invitedwitnesses toaccompany theminto the fields. Esther Padilla, a longtimemember of the UFW and the wife of the union’scofounderGilbert Padilla, likened the conditions in rural California to Selma,Alabama, in1965,duringtheheightofthecivilrightsmovement.Sheremembered,“[Thegrowers]hadthedogs,andthebats,andeverythingelsewaitingtobeatthehelloutofus…andintimidatingtheworkers.”AlthoughtheALRAincludedaprovisionforunionaccesstofarmsduringelections,this was honored more in the breach than in the observance. The union tested the law bysending representatives to the farms during lunch hour and afterwork. During one of thesetrips,EstherPadillaandthreeothermembersenteredtheMetzlerfarminthesmalltownofDelRey,justoutsideofFresno.Anticipatingviolence,theUFWteaminvitedthelocaltelevisionstation, Channel 30, to accompany them. “The growers were absolutely livid,” Padillarecalled,butthepresenceofthemediaforcedthemtotempertheirresponse.Whenthesamegroupwentbackattheendoftheday,thistimewithoutthetelevisioncameras,agrowerpulleda rifleonPadilla.At thenearbyGuerrero farm, another teamofunionofficials encounteredsimilar hostility from gun-toting growers.33 Elsewhere in San Joaquin and Tulare counties,ranchers formedacitizens“posse” that threatened toplunge ruralcommunitiesback into the

violenceof theprevious twoyears.34When the union reported these incidents to theALRBoffice,agentstendednottobelievethem.Muchof theagents’ ignorancestemmedfrom theirpoor trainingon farm labor issues.The

Sacramentooffice,runbyWalterKintz,hiredretiredmembersoftheNLRBtostaffthetrainingsessions in the state capital before dispersing the agents to the field offices. The NLRBveterans imparted useful knowledge about how to run a union election, but demonstrated aprofoundlackofappreciationforthelikelihoodofviolenceinthefields.GreenstonefoundthatretiredNLRBmembers“couldn’tatallanticipatereality”andfailedtoprepareALRBagentsfortheintensityoftheconflict.WhentheSacramentoofficearrangedafieldtripforthewould-be agents to get acquainted with the work, members of the grower-oriented Farm Bureauescorted the group aboard National Guard buses. The Bureau used the visit as a publicrelations opportunity, allowing agents to speak only to labor contractors and giving whatGreenstone regarded as a “false picture of what it was like in the field.”When the agentsrelocated to their field office, the local office manager maintained distance from the farmworkers.According toGreenstone,Greer andher colleagues“never sawworkersuntil theyshoweduptofilepetitionsinouroffice.”35

Kintz’s decision to hire mostly veteran state bureaucrats as agents rankled UFWrepresentativesandproducedtensionwithsomeoftheyoungerALRBstaffmembers,manyofwhom had come straight out of law school. Several older agents had served in state civilservice agencies prior to joining theALRB and assumed a balance of power in agriculturebetweenworkersandemployersthatexistedinindustrialsettings.Themediacoverageofthestrikes and boycotts in the years leading to the passage of theALRA created an illusion ofpowerfortheUFW.JerryGoldman,forexample,complainedabouta“lackofsensitivity…andnotknowinganythingaboutagriculture”amongagents,and“thepresumptionthatUFWisaradical,trouble-makingorganizationandtheemployersaregoodandhonestandtheTeamstersaregoodandhonest.”36AccordingtoGreenstone,theunfamiliaritywith“thesophisticationofallofthisstruggleandthefightthathasbeengoingon”ledmanyofherseniorcolleaguestounderestimatethepotentialforchicaneryonthepartofgrowersandTeamstersandangeronthepartoftheUFW.“Theattitude,‘well,I’mtheboardagentandIdecide’isreallydisturbing,”GreenstonetoldLevy,“becausetheydon’thaveanyfeelingforwhatgoesonoutthere.”37

Greenstoneattributedmuchoftheinsensitivityto“olderpeople”withintheoffice,revealingagenerationalandgenderdivideamonggovernmentagents.Whereasmanyoftheolderagentsjoinedtheofficeaspermanentmembersoftheteam,giventheiryearsofexperience,youngeragents like Greenstone received “temporary” jobs and inferior assignments. In the Salinasoffice, for example, Greer broke the agents into teams of three to conduct elections andselected team leaders based on seniority. As a consequence, older members stymied theopinions of younger agents who spoke Spanish and possessed a fresh interpretation of theconflict untainted by biases developed over years of bureaucratic work in state agenciesdealingwithmostlywhite,English-speakingindustriallaborers.Insomelocaloffices,youngermembers included former farm workers whose experience and concerns older colleaguesdiscredited.Greenstonerecalledoneincidentinwhichaformerfarmworkerwasbrandedaspro-UFW simply for arguing that agents should take migration patterns into account when

scheduling elections.38 Greenstone also found most of the leaders resistant to translatingdocuments and holding bilingual meetings. When younger agents complained, the heads ofteamsassigned them to secretarialduties.Thedisproportionatenumberofmen towomen insenior leadershippositionsaddedagenderdimension to this tension.Greenstone,ayoungerbilingualagent,felt“alotofsexism”withintheboardofficeandbelievedher“downgraded”assignmentstobeaconsequenceof“morementhanwomenin[the]office.”39

AfterweeksofUFWcomplaintsandinternaldiscord,KintzfinallyreplacedNormanGreerwithPaulaPailyintheSalinasoffice,butonlyonatemporarybasis.Greenstonehadamuchhigher regard for Paily’s leadership, especially because Paily paid greater attention tocomplaints fromwomenandyoungeragents.Pailyputan immediateend toagentsacceptingcharteredflightsfromgrowersandstoppedemployersfrombussinginworkerstoparticipatein union elections. Her reasons for ending these practices, however, had more to do withrestoringa“senseoffairplay”andlesstodowithacknowledgingacultureofdisregardforfarmworkersamongherownstaff.ShetoldtheSalinasagents,“Theseelectionsarenotforthegrowers,they’renotfortheUFW,they’renotfortheTeamsters;they’reforthestate.”40

Thisnewapproachstoppedthemostegregiousmanipulationsofthenewlaw,butPailyandthe majority of her staff remained ignorant of the intensity of the battle and did nothing toaddress attitudes favorable to thegrowers and theTeamsters.Her reasoning also conflictedwith the sentiments among amajority of governor-appointedboardmembers inSacramento,who saw the law as an opportunity to bring social justice to the fields. Governor Brownappointed LeRoyChatfield to theALRB and tappedCatholic bishopRogerMahoney to bechair. Another pro-labor appointee, Jerome Waldie, articulated the sentiment among theboard’smajority:“Imakenobonesaboutmybeliefthatthelawwasenactedtoprotectfarmworkers in their effort to organize for collective bargaining.”41 Yet the prevailing attitudeamongagents in thefieldunderminedthis interpretation.42ForGreenstone,whocameofageduring theboycott andhad joined theALRBwith the intent of becomingan agentof justiceratherthanacareerbureaucrat,suchinterpretationsdidnotsitwell.Withintheyearshelefttheboard,decidingtoworkfortheUFWbeforemovingtoprivatepractice.43

The failures contributed toagrowing skepticismamongUFWlawyers that the lawwouldbecomeasolutiontofarmworkerproblems.JerryGoldmanbecameutterlyexasperatedwiththeprocess:“Iamsototallyfrustrated.Becausetheseactscanwork,andallmylifeI’vebeensayingthat,intheprivatesector.Ifyouengageinobfuscation,ifyouarenotempathetic,ifyouarenotunderstanding,ifyoudonotcommunicate,ifyoudonottreateverybodyonafairbasis,thesefuckingactsaren’tgoingtowork,andifthatiswhattheywant,foritnottowork,they’resureashelldoingadamngoodfuckingjobofdoingit.AndIwanttotellyoumyfeelingisthatthey don’t want it to work.”44Most union lawyers shared Goldman’s frustration, if not hispessimism.NathanandCohen,however,insistedthatiftheunioncouldenforcesectionsofthelawthatrequiredelectionswithinsevendaysofashowingofinterestbyworkers,theycouldturnthetideintheirfavor.45

UFWlawyersalsodemandedbetteraccesstoworkers.DuringtheALRA’screationgrowershadvehementlybutunsuccessfully resistedaprovision toallowunions tocampaignon theirpropertyonehourbeforeworkbeganandonehourattheendoftheday.Oncethelegislation

became law, growers tested the ALRB by impeding the UFW. For example, when UFWrepresentativesattemptedtoenterfieldsandlaborcamps,grower-paidsecurityguardschasedthemofftheproperty,forcingboardagentstoweighinonthematter.TheUFWfilednumerousunfairlaborpracticestoaddressthesituation,yetoftentheregionaldirectorsclaimedtohavetheir hands full with staging elections. In some regional offices, directors did not regardprovidingequalaccessapartoftheirjobdescription.AccordingtoGreenstone,GreertoldtheagentsinSalinas“itwasnot[their]businesstoenforce”theaccessrule, invitinggrowerstoviolatethelawatwill.46

In the courts, the South Central Farmers Committee successfully obtained an injunctionagainsttheUFW,blockinglaborunionrepresentativesfromenteringthefieldswithoutgrowerpermission.47CohenandtheUFWlawyersappealedtoahighercourttosuspendtheruling,buttheproblemofenforcementoftheaccessrulecontinuedtoplaguetheUFW.Accordingtoonereport, theUFWcouldhavewon15 to20percentmorevotes inelections if theALRBhadenforcedthelawandpoliceddistortionsinlistsofeligiblevoters.48

Duringtheelections,theUFWkeptgrowershonestandconsumersinformedbymaintainingastrongboycottofGallowine,Californiagrapes,andlettuce.Giventhevolunteernatureoftheboycott,manyof theactivistswhomade the firstboycott successfulhadmovedon,althoughsomeveteransremainedtoshownewdevoteeshowtobuildacampaign.Amongthem,EliseoMedina excelled as he had inChicago.Besides organizingworkers in theCalifornia fieldsduringelections,Medinamanageda staffof twenty-eightvolunteers inChicagowho, at onepoint,drewacrowdof1,100peopletomarchonJewellMarket.TheChicagoboycotthousegarnered20,000signaturesaskingJewell’sownershiptodivestfromGalloandraised$26,000at a screening of the filmFight forOur Lives, documenting the 1973 battle for Coachella.Some of themoneywent toward a campaign started bymembers of the community to electMedina chairmanof Jewell’s boardof trustees. Inhis reports toLaPaz,Medinawrote thatsupportinChicagowas“farstrongerthanbefore.”49

ElsewhereoldhandssuchasGilbertPadilla,JessicaGovea,andPeteVelascocontributedtheir experience. LikeMedina, they balanced service on the National Executive Board andworkonelectionsinCaliforniawithorchestratingboycotthousesfarfromLaPaz.GilbertandEstherPadillamanagedastaffof fourteenvolunteers inWashington,D.C.andVirginia.PeteVelasco,oneoftwoFilipinosontheexecutiveboard,traveledtoBaltimoretoleadtheboycottand succeeded in securing support from the city’s mayor andMaryland’s governor. Goveareturned to Canada, now charged with managing a staff of forty-one volunteers spreadthroughout Ottawa, Toronto,Montreal, and other cities. Although the infrastructure she andGanzhadputinplaceduringtherun-uptothe1970contractsallowedhertoplugbackinandmanage thehouses fromToronto, her value as a credible voice among farmworkers duringelectionsrequiredhertodividehertimebetweenCaliforniaandCanada.Chavez and members of the executive board recognized that these assignments removed

effectivelabororganizersfromtheelectionsatacriticalmoment,yetattachmenttotheboycottmade backing away from the campaign unacceptable. Chavez held firm to the belief thatcontracts could be attained only in tandem with an effective boycott, and he continued tochannelfundstowardareducedstaffofvolunteersin150citiesacrossthecountry,including

five inDenver, thirteen inDetroit, three inMinneapolis, seven inPittsburgh, fourteen inSt.Louis,fifteeninPhiladelphia,fourinSeattle,threeinHouston,twoinPortland,Oregon,andtwo inAtlanta.Thesenumberswere farsmaller than theboycott in itsheyday;however, theexistenceofaboycotthousekeptgrowersontheirtoes.The network also includedmore boycott houses abroad.Victor Pestoff,who had assisted

Elinsonduring the1969–70season,becametheEuropeandirectorof theboycottandmovedbetweenNorway and Switzerland securing the support of Scandinavian labor organizationsandcooperativemarkets.TheCouncilofNordicTradeUnionsgave$7,500tothecause,andtwo Danish and one Swedish co-op voted not to carry California grapes on their shelves.Elinson,who had gone back to graduate school in theUnited States after 1970, once againfound academicwork tedious and contacted Chavez’s brother, Richard, to see if she couldassist.HertimingturnedouttobeperfectsincetheTeamstershadbeguntocountertheUFWcampaignin1975byputtingpressureontheirfellowtransportersinEnglandnottocooperate.As members of the International Transport Workers Federation, the Teamsters and theTransportandGeneralWorkersUnionbelongedtoacommoninternationalunion,whichmadesupportoftheUFWmuchmoredifficult.RichardChavezsentElinsontoEnglandinhopesthatherconnectionswiththeTGWUcould

break through Teamster opposition and again forge a strong alliance with the Englishdockworkers. In spite of the Teamsters’ activities, Elinson found the work much easiercomparedto1969.“Thistime,”sherecalled,“theunionhadmuchmoreofanameandmuchmoreofapresence.”TheBBCaireddocumentaryfilmsabouttheUFWinBritain,andunionjournalistsknewofElinsonfromherpreviousstint,makingherafamiliarfaceinbothEnglandand Ireland.The successof theunion andElinson’smodest celebrity also earnedherofficespaceattheWorldPeaceCouncilincentralLondon,afarcryfromthetenementapartmentshehadworkedoutofin1969and1970.ElinsonalsoquicklyreestablishedrelationswithFreddySilbermanandBrianNicholson in theTGWU, the latterhavingadvanced topresidentof theunionbetweenthetwoboycotts.Nicholsonhadrecentlydivorced,andheandElinsonfellinloveandmarried.HerfamiliaritywiththeBritishpublic,thetradeunions,andoldfriendslikeSilbermanandNicholsonhelpedherovercometheTeamsters’resistance.Ofthework,Elinsonrecalled,“Weweredoinga lotmorekindsofnewspaperarticles,meetings,andspeakingatconferences, and speaking at the Labour Party conferences and things like that rather thantrompingaroundonthedocks,lookingforgrapes.”50

The international component of the boycott also included Asia. In Japan, the UFWmadecontactswithdockworkerstosupportablockade,whileinHongKongacommitteeoffifteen,includingGIsstationedinthearea,workedonbehalfoftheuniontoboycottGallowine.Thegreatdistancefromthecenteroftheboycott,however,createdthepotentialfordeviationsfromthe nonviolent strategy advocated by Chavez. In Hong Kong, for example, three organizerswerefoundguiltyonelevencountsofarsonforburningdownastoragefacilityholdinggrapes.Thejudgesentencedthethreetoelevenmonthsinjail,andtheimageoftheunionoverseaswastemporarilytarnished.51

Closertohome,theuniondiversifieditsuseoftheboycottinCaliforniabythreateningtouseitagainstthestateifeitherthegeneralcounselorthegovernordidnotenforcethenewlabor

law. Although most observers saw Governor Brown and the ALRB as allies to the farmworkers, union officials worked hard to bend the governor and the board their way bythreatening to withdraw from the legislative solution in which both had become deeplyinvested.Brown,forexample,hadstakedhispoliticalfutureonthesuccessoftheAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct(ALRA)earlyinhisfirstterm,andALRBdirectorsandagentshadjobsonlyaslongastheunionagreedtouseitasatoolforachievingtheirobjectives.“ThesituationisalreadybadandgettingworseasthegrowersandTeamstersseetheycangetawaywiththeircoercive tactics,”DoloresHuerta toldareporter.Turning to thefamiliar toolof theboycott,Huertathreatened,“Ifthosetacticsarenotstopped,wewillhavenochoicebuttoboycottthewholeelectionprocess.”52AlthoughtheunionrefrainedfromevercallingaformalboycottoftheALRB,itpicketedbothregionalofficesandthemainSacramentoofficetobringattentiontotheagency’sdeficiencies.In response, the governor appealed to Sam Cohen, a respected attorney with a lucrative

private practice in San Francisco, to head a special task force to dealwith the backlog ofunfairlaborpracticecomplaintsandorganizethefieldoperationsofthestateagency.Cohen’sguidance had an immediate effect in the Imperial Valley, turning what had been seen as aregionalofficeincrisisinto“awhirlwindofefficiency.”53TheregionalboarddirectorinElCentro,Maurice Jourdane, pulled back from the brink of quitting when Cohen came to theoffice and imposed a “senseof dedication anddetermination tomake the lawwork.”As inotherregionalboardoffices,theworkloadoverwhelmedthestaff,turningtheofficeintoa“sit-back-and-waitagency”thatusuallyreactedtoviolationsofthelawlongaftertheworkershadgivenuphopeintheprocess.“WhenIfirstbeganworkingwiththeagency,”Jourdanetoldareporter,“IwasappalledbywhatIsawinthefields.…Workerswerefrightened.”AfterCohenarrived,agentstookaproactiveapproach,fanningoutintotheImperialValley

toinformemployeesoftheirrightsandensuringtheirabilitytovotewithoutfearofreprisal.UnlikeGreerorPailyinSalinas,Jourdane,athirty-three-year-oldattorney,embracedthelawas an opportunity to bring justice to the farm workers. Growers and Teamsters routinelyattacked Jourdane, accusing him of being pro-UFW whenever he tried to enforce the law.ContrarytoPaily’sposition,Jourdanebelievedthe“specificintentofthelaw…wastogiveworkersthefree,un-coercedrighttochooseaunion,ornounion,bysecretballot.”Thankstothereforms institutedbyBrownand implementedbyCohen,Jourdanenowfelt“that iswhatwearedoingatlast.”54

ThethreatofaboycottandtheaggressiveactionbyCohenandtheUFWlegalteamhelpedthe union win far more elections than it lost. By the end of December 1975, the state hadmanagedtoholdaremarkable354electionswithoutonestrikeorthedefectionsoftheunionfrom the process. Of these 354 elections, the UFW scored victories in 189 of them,representing26,956workers,or50.2percentofvoters.TheTeamsters,ontheotherhand,won101 elections representing 12,284 workers, or 23 percent. Among these totals, fifty-eightranches involving8,228workers switched from theTeamsters to theUFW. In the contest towinelectionswhereeither theUFWor theTeamstersheldcontractsalready, theUFWfaredmuchbetterthanitsrival.TheUFWwonallofitselectionswhereitheldcontracts,whereastheTeamsterslost58percentoftheworkerstheyhadheldundercontracton177ranchesprior

to the elections in 1975. Finally, in spite of the growers’ vigorous campaign against unionsamongemployees,onlysixranchesinvolving938workersswitchedfromeithertheUFWortheTeamsterstonounionatall.Infact,growerssucceededinconvincingonly4percentoftheworkerstovotefornorepresentationintwentyelections.55

Union officials had their hopes tempered, however, by a number of ominous trends thatcontinuedtothreatenthenewlaw.Avictoryinanelectionwontheuniontheexclusiverighttonegotiate a contract but did not ensure one. The difficult work of negotiating with theiradversaries lay ahead. Growers, Teamsters, and UFW officials continued to challenge theresults ofmore than 75 percent of the elections, which delayed certification of the results.Indeed, the UFW legal team led all parties in the submission of unfair labor practices,triggering a series of hearings to settle thematter against eighty-five growers. The level ofactivityfarexceededtheexpectationsofthestate,forcingtheboardtospenditsentirebudgetofapproximately$1.3millionwithinthefirsttwomonthsofoperation.Bytheendof1975,theALRB had spent $5,268,571, requiring the state to consider a special appropriation of$3,795,034 just to keep the board’s doors open for business. The appropriation needed theapprovaloftwo-thirdsofthestatelegislatureandthesignatureofthegovernor.Inaddition,theboardpredictedasimilarvolumeofactivityinthe1976–77seasonandrequestedabudgetof$6.6million,approximatelyfivetimesthetotalapprovedforitsinitialoperation.56

The success of the union and the cost of operation placed the ALRB in jeopardy as thelegislature approached a February 1 deadline to approve the funding.57 Growers used thecrisisasanopportunitytoeitherpushforreformsthatwouldtipthescalesbackintheirfavorordismantletheboardaltogether.Amongtheircomplaints,growersdemandedtheremovalofWalterKintz,whomtheybelievedworked“inconspiratorialfashionwiththeUFWtoassurevictories for Chavez’s union.” Growers insisted on amendments to the law that mirroredconditionspresent in theNationalLaborRelationsAct.DonCurlee, a spokesperson for theSouthCentralGrowersAssociation,petitionedforaprovisionavailable toemployersunderthe federal law that allowed a company to seek decertification of a union when companyofficialsbelievedtheemployeesnolongerwantedtoberepresentedbyaunionforwhichtheyhadvotedinapreviouselection.Curleealsoopposedtherequirementunderstatelawtoholdanelectionwithinsevendays.JoeHerman,attorneyfortheassociation,addedtheobjectionsofmostgrowerstothe“make-wholeremedy,”whichrequiredtheagencytodeterminethepayforaworkerwhentheemployerwasfoundtohavebargainedinbadfaith.AnImperialValleygrower, Jon Vessey, voiced the common complaint among growers that the law failed todistinguish year-round employees from temporary workers in determining the eligibility ofvotersinunionelections.Vesseycomplained,“Thatmeansthatafewhundredpeople,workingformeforjustafewweeks,can,bymajorityvote,decidewhichunion,ifany,myyear-roundworkerswant,eventhoughtheyear-roundpeoplearethoseonwhomwearemostdependent.”Although the association demanded that such procedures be changed, the majority of theireffortswenttowardlobbyingstatesenatorstoblockfundingfortheALRBratherthantoreformit.58

InspiteofappealsbyboardchairmanRogerMahoneyandgeneralcounselWalterKintztopass an emergency appropriation to keep the agency open until the next legislative cycle, a

coalitionofRepublicansandfarm-areaDemocratsvotedagainstit.Atthetimeofthevote,theUFWhadwon55percentoftheALRBelections,comparedto34percentfortheTeamsters,5percentforotherunions,and6percentfornounionatall.Inaddition,astheharvestandvotingmovedtotheImperialValley,theUFWhadbuiltmomentum,puttingtogetherastringofelevenvictories compared to just one for theTeamsters sinceDecember 1.The failure to pass theappropriationbillstoppedtheUFWfromaccumulatingmorevictoriesandforcedtheagencytolayoffallbutthirtyofits175-memberstaff.59ByFebruary6,theALRBhadallbutceasedtoexist.CesarChavezrespondedtothecrisisbyturningtothetrustedstrategyofpicketlinesinthe

fieldsandinfrontofmarkets.“[Thisisa]dayofinfamyforfarmworkers,”hedeclared.“Ouronly recourse is to take our cause to the people of California and return to strikes andboycotts.”60 As the reality of the agency’s closure hit rural California, the labor situationreturned“tothelawofthejungle.”Predictingthattheviolencehadjustbegun,Chavezmadethe tacticalmoveofexporting thestruggle to theurbanmarketplace,announcingaboycottofSunMaid raisins,Sunsweetnuts andprocessed fruits, andproducts backed by eight Fresnopackinghouses thathadplayeda significant role indefunding theALRB.61 “We’ll beat themwiththeboycottandpinthemtothewall,”Chavezangrilytoldreporters,predicting,“They’llcome back to Sacramento crying for the money (to reactivate the board).”62 This time,however,thegrowersstoodfirm,awarethattheunionhaddirectedmanyofitsresourcesawayfromtheboycotttowardelections.WhetherChavezandtheunionadmittedit,thehard-foughtvictoriesinsecretballotelectionshadshiftedtheirprioritiesfrompressuringgrowersinthemarketplace toachievingcollectivebargaining through the farm labor law.As thedefundingcrisispreventedtheUFWfrommakinggainsduringthe1976harvest,theunionfocusedonanewstrategy:revivingtheALRBthroughtheCaliforniainitiativesystem.

ATOUGHGAMEOFCHICKEN

AtthesametimeChavezannouncedtherenewaloftheboycott,theUFWalsofiledaninitiativeproposal for the fall ballot in California. During the early twentieth century, progressivereformersintheGoldenStatehadaddedthreerevolutionaryelectoralprocedures—therecall,thereferendum,andtheinitiative—thatprovidedadegreeofdirectdemocracytovoters.Byamajority vote, the electorate could recall an elected official, invalidate an established law(referendum),andcircumvent thestate legislativeprocessandcreateanew law(initiative).Thesemeasureshad comeabout as a reaction to the excessive influenceof railroadmogulsduringtheGildedAge.Bythemid-twentiethcentury,however,theseprogressivereformshadbecome the tool of powerful interest groups who achieved a variety of goals, especiallythrough the use of the initiative (more commonly known as the proposition). By the 1970s,conservative groups had gained the upper hand in controlling an initiative system inwhichqualifying a proposition became more challenging.63 Between 1970 and 1976, only fifteeninitiativesoutofninety-sixproposalsreceivedenoughsignaturestomakeitontheballot.Ofthose fifteen, only four passed, with only two considered by the UFW executive board as

consistentwiththeirpoliticalbeliefs.Duringtheboardmeetingtodiscussthedecision,Chavezacknowledged,“Manypeoplevotenoonanissuebecausetheyfeelthatisthesafethingtodo.”Unfortunatelyfortheunion,theywouldbeaskingthepublictosayyeswhenstatisticsshowedthat a no vote had an 8 percent advantage among voters. Such history and statisticsnotwithstanding,theinitiativesystemprovidedawell-organizedunionsuchastheUnitedFarmWorkersthepossibilitytoachieveitslegislativegoalsthroughpopularvote.Chavezexpressedconfidenceintheirabilitytoobtainatleasta60percentmarginofvictoryiftheyappealedtotheCaliforniaelectoratetocreateanew,improvedfarmlaborlawmoretotheunion’sliking.64

Thesituationinthefieldsandontheboardwentfrombadtoworse,asnewdisputesbrokeouton ImperialValley farmsand threeof the fivememberson theALRBresigned. InApril1976,LeRoyChatfieldquit theboard toworkonGovernorBrown’spresidential campaign.Twootherboardmembers,JosephGrodinandJosephOrtega,bothseenasappointeesfavoringthe UFW, resigned, leaving its chairman, Bishop Roger Mahoney, and the growers’representative,RichardJohnsenJr.WithinALRBoffices,askeletoncrewheldonwithoutpayinhopes that legislatorswouldreachacompromisetofundtheiroperations.AsthegrowersduginandtheUFWadoptedtheinitiativestrategy,hopesofalegislativesolutiondimmed,andgovernment agents began to peal off. By mid-April, the embattled general counsel, WalterKintz, announced his resignation, calling the ability of a small minority of senators to killfundingfortheALRBa“travestyofjustice.”“Emotionallyandprofessionally,”Kintzreported,“I could not tolerate sitting around any longerwhile the Legislature debates all over againwhetherornot itwantsa farm laborbill.”He threwhis supportbehind theUFWinitiative,whichgarneredenoughsignaturesbyMaytomakeitontotheNovemberballotasProposition14.65

Proposition14dealtwiththeimmediateproblemoffunding,althoughtheunionalsosoughtto change the farm labor law in ways that strengthened its ability to win more elections.Advocatesoftheoriginallawcomplainedabouttheabilityofone-thirdofthesenatetoblockfunding; as a consequence, the initiative proposed to mandate that the legislature provideappropriationsnecessarytocarryoutthepurposeoftheactwithoutinterruption.Theinitiativewould replace the current law with another that mirrored the ALRA by setting up agovernment-supervised election system that would allow farmworkers to decide by secretballotwhichunion,ifany,theywantedtorepresentthem.Theinitiativealsoaddedafewkeychanges, which drew the ire of the growers and support from labor unions, including theTeamsters. Under the ALRA, unions and employers frequently disputed the number ofemployeeseligibletotakepartinanelectionlargelybecausetheemployerdictatedwhenandhow a list of employees would be submitted to the agency. Surprises in the size of theworkforceandchallengestothelistfromunionsoftenresultedinunfairlaborpracticeclaimsthatdelayedtheresultsofelections.TheinitiativewouldempowerthenewALRBtodecideunderwhatcircumstancesaunioncouldreceivealistofworkersfromtheemployers.Thenewlawwould increase thepunitivepowersof theALRB,allowing theagency to impose tripledamages against a grower or a union found guilty of unfair labor practices. It would alsorequire thoseopposed toanalreadycertifiedunion toget50percentof theworkers to signcards saying they no longer wanted such representation before an election could be held.

Finally, the initiative addressed the thorny issue of union access to workers on Californiafarmsduringelections.Theinitiativesoughttowriteintothelawan“accessrule”thatrequiredgrowerstopermitunionrepresentativesontheirpropertyonehourbeforework,onehourafterwork, and at lunch time.66 The director of the “Yes on 14” campaign, Marshall Ganz,simplifiedtheunion’sargumentfortherulechangeas“anaccesstoinformation”issue.“Ifyouaregoingtohavefreeunionelections,”heexplained,“theworkersmustbefullyinformed.”

FIGURE 12. Cesar Chavez at an unidentified United Farm Workers rally, 1971. Behind him stands a man in a UnitedSteelworkersofAmericajacket.ALUA,UFWCollection,3223.

Chavezbelieved theboycott and thepositivepressduringunionelectionswould translateinto support for the UFW at the ballot box. Although somemembers had doubts about theALRA’seffectiveness,Chavez,unionorganizers,andtheUFWlegaldepartmenthadsucceededinturningthefarmlaborlawintoapoliticalcoup.BythetimetheALRBshuttereditsdoors,the United Farm Workers had won a majority of elections and enjoyed momentum in theImperialValley in anticipation of the 1976harvest.Negative stories in themedia regardinglabor strife in the fields once again focused on Teamsters’ acts of treachery or growers’

resistance to farm worker justice. The continued observance of the boycott by consumersshowedtheUFW’sappealtothegeneralpublicandthepotentialfortheunion’surbannetworktodelivera“Yeson14”messagetoCaliforniavoters.Somemembersquestionedthestrategy.EstherPadilla remembered, “Therehadbeen a lot of discussionwithin the executiveboard[aboutnotpursuingtheproposition]becauseyou’retalkingaboutmakingpeopleinthecitiesthinkwe’regoingtoinvadetheirprivateproperty.”67Chavez,however,insistedthattheycouldwinandorderedallresourcestobedirectedtowardthe“Yeson14”campaign.In his announcement of the union’s initiative strategy,Chavez anticipated the considerable

costof thecampaign forboth sides. “TheFarmWorker Initiativecampaignwillbedifficultandexpensive,”heanticipated,forcingthegrowerstospendmillionstodefeatitandrequiringfarmworkersto“sacrificethemselvesandtheirtime”toachievevictory.“Wewillmatchtheirmillions,”hepromised, “withourbodies,our spirits and thegoodwillof thepeopleof thisstate.”68Withinaweekofhisannouncement,Chavezhad redirectedmostof the fundingandstaff from the boycott houses to an all-out effort to pass the initiative.Walter Kintz, in hisassessmentof thestrategy,called thedecisiona“toughgameofchicken,”suggesting that theinitiativedrivechallengedgrowers,theUFW,andultimatelythevoterstoresolvethefundingof the ALRB once and for all.69 In the interim between exhausting the ALRB budget inFebruaryandthestartofanewfiscalyearinJuly,thegovernorreplacedKintzwithHarryJ.Delizonnaandnamedthreenewmemberstotheboard,butcoulddonothingtoprovidelong-termfunding.UFWleadersmaintainedahighlevelofconfidenceintheirabilitytopersuadevoterstoresolvethematterbysupportingtheinitiative.The union’s position underestimated the growers’ ability to adapt. Growers had become

wiseintheirpreviousbattlesandmadeanumberofkeydecisionstostrengthentheirappealtovoters,perhapsthemostimportantofwhichwastomobilizeandunifytheircommunityintoanorganization of thirty-two farm groups representing both large corporate farms and smallfamilyfarmers.Chairedbyafifty-three-year-oldJapaneseAmericanfarmer,HarryKubo,theAdHocCommitteediscussedthebestwaytocombatthefarmworkers’initiativeandbeganafundraising effort.70 Don Curlee, spokesperson for the South Central Farmers Association,spoke glowingly of the ability of the agricultural community to raise money for the newgrowers’ organization, commenting, “I am flabbergasted at [their] eagerness to respondfinancially.”FredHeringer,presidentoftheCaliforniaFarmBureau,sharedhisgoalofraisingbetween$2and$2.5million,andLesHubbardoftheWesternGrowersAssociationusedhisorganization’snewslettertogatheraminimumof$100toamaximumof$10,000fromeachofhis readers. In addition, the Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of L.A. Inc. and theCouncilofCaliforniaGrowersbroadcasttheirappealforcontributionstothecommittee’swarchest through theirmembers-onlymonthly newsletters. In the end, Kubo and his colleaguesgarnered donations from awho’swho of theCalifornia businessworld, including SouthernCaliforniaPacific,SuperiorOilCompany,PanAmericanInsuranceCompany,CaliforniaFarmBureau, Irvine Land Company, Newhall Land Company,Weyerhaeuser Paper Company, theWestern Growers Association, and Tenneco. This coalition gave growers the resources tochallengethe“Yeson14”campaignwithabarrageoftelevisionandradioads.71

AtthefirstfewmeetingsoftheAdHocCommittee,Kubodistinguishedhimselfasacredible

voice on farm labor issues. “[Kubo’s] not polished and he’s not a professional,” oneunidentifiedleaderofastatewidefarmgrouptoldareporter,“butheknowswhathe’stalkingaboutandheknowshow to tell it to thepeople.”The localnewspaper tooknoteofKubo’srags-to-richesstory,deeminghim“theineloquentspeaker-turned-spokesman”forallfarmers.72Hishandleonlaborissuesthatconfrontedawidespectrumoftheagriculturalcommunity,fromlarge-scale farmers to small family farmers likehimself,providedusefulcover tocorporateentitieswhohadbecomeeasytargetsforderisionintheDavid-and-Goliathstruggle.Seekinggreaterorganizationandamoresustainedcampaign, theAdHocCommitteechose to forma“Noon14”organization,CitizensforaFairFarmLaborLaw,andnamedHarryKuboastheirpresident.Growers’organizationsunderstoodthateconomicsuperiorityconstitutedonlyhalfthebattle,

giventheirdefeatsduringthe1970boycott.TheabilityofCitizensforaFairFarmLaborLawtocraftanappealthatresonatedwithvotersbehindacrediblespokespersonshowedadegreeof savvy in a decade-long struggle to control labor conditions in rural California. At firstblush, Kubo was an unlikely representative for growers. Like many Japanese Americanfarmers, he had spent much of his life in rural California as an outsider to the EuropeanAmerican–dominated grower networks.TheKubos’ family farm inParlier in factwas theirsecondafterHarry,hisparents,andhissiblingswereplacedinaninternmentcampatTulareLakeinModocCounty,California.Afterleavingthecamp,theKubofamilyworkedinSanger,California, as fieldworkers for 75 cents per hour. In 1949, they pooled their earnings andpurchased a forty-acre grape and tree fruit ranch.While the family worked the homestead,Kuboandhisbrotherscontinuedasfarmworkerstopayoffthemortgageandraisemoneytobuyanadditionalsixtyacres.Bythemid-1950s,theKuboshadaccumulated110acresintheParlier-SangersectionoftheSanJoaquinValleyandeventuallyacquired210acresby1976.73

Kubo’sentryintothebattleowedasmuchtoUFWtacticsasitdidtothevisionofwealthygrowers.AftertheUFWhadsignedcontractswithmostSanJoaquinValleygrapegrowersin1970,asmallgroupofindependentfamilyfarmsconstituting15percentofthemarketremainedoutsideof thegrower-unionaccord.Inaninitialeffort tocorral thesefarmers intocontracts,theUnitedFarmWorkerspicketedeightpackinghouseshandlingtheirfruitandapproximatelyseventeenfarmsthroughoutTulareandFresnoCounty.JapaneseAmericansownedfourteenoftheseventeenfieldspicketed, including theKubos’small farm.74During theconflict, tensioneruptedintooccasionalactsofvandalism,includingslashedtractor tires,nailsandspikesindriveways,arson-causedfires,andyearlingtreescutdownatthetrunks.LarryKubo,Harry’sson, rememberedone incident inwhichanumberofyoungUFWpicketersentered theKubofarmatnight:“Iwasfourteen,andtheyranontoourpropertyandstartedscreamingandyellingatus, and theywerenotmucholder thanme.” In their exuberance, thegroupvandalized theKubotractor.Throughitall,Harrykepthisfamilyinsideandtoldhissonto“staywhereyou’reat”untilthegrouppassed.75

Suchencroachmentson theirproperty inspiredHarryKubo toaction.“In1971,”he toldareporter,“Isawfearinthefarmworkers’eyesandIthoughtitwasunjust.”Whenhesharedhisconcerns with workers and fellow Japanese American farmers, both gave him the samemessage:“Whydon’tyoudosomethingaboutit?”Reflectingonthemoment,Kuborecounted

theimpetusforhisactivism:“Thegeneralthinkingwasthattheentiregovernmentisbuiltonequality, yet weweren’t doing anything to preserve these basic rights for ourselves or ourworkers.Wefelt somethingshouldbedoneandsomeoneshouldhelp theunassuming farmerand thosewhodon’t like to speakout.”76Togetherwith fellowJapaneseAmericangrowersAbeMasaru and FrankKimura,Kubo organized theNisei Farmers League and became theorganization’s first chairman.The league beganwith twenty-five neighboring farmers; underKubo’sleadership,itgrewto250memberswithinayear.By1976theleaguehadswelledtomorethan1,400members,ofwhich,surprisingly,only43percentwereofJapanesedescent.77

Chavez and the “Yes on 14” advocates viewedKubo’s involvement as a cynical ploy bywealthygrowers.Throughoutthecampaign,Chavezemphasizedthe$2.5millionbudgetofhisopponents,whichtheyusedtohire“experiencedmanipulatorsofpublicopinion”whotriedto“persuadealotofpeoplethatpassageofProposition14willgivetherighttoMexicanfarmworkers to enter their homeswithout permission.”Such allusions to fears of home invasionneverdirectlyenteredintoKubo’svocabulary,butgrowersemployedJaniceGentle,presidentof the Central Valley Chapter of California Women for Agriculture, to make them. Gentlearticulated the familiar concern of “allowing union organizers uninvited entry onto farmpropertythreetimesaday”withoutexplainingthecontextoftheirvisits.Shewentfurtherbyasking thequestion“Whyis it thatapersonwhogrowsour foodshouldbedenied thesamerightstohispropertythatyouandIcurrentlyhavesimplybecauseweorourspousesworkinconstruction, in a financial institution, or in a factory?”78 Gentle’s conflation of ruralagriculturewith industries thatemploymostlywhiteworkersconveniently ignored theracialfault lines in ruralCalifornia thatwerewell known to the public. Such a conflation invitedurbanand suburbanvoters to imagine theirhomesorworkplacesbeingoverrunbyMexicanworkers,aspecterthatbenefitedtheanti-14forces.79

Kubo,however, remained focusedon theconsequencesof the ruleschange to farmersandfarmworkers.Heworried,“Youkickanorganizeroffthefarmforbeingdisruptive…andthenextdaytheguyisbackonyourfarmandyouhavetolethimenterandhecandisruptthingsalloveragain.”Kubobelieved,“Under‘14’theworkerwouldjustaboutlosehisrighttoworkornotworkunderaunioncontract.Theunioncouldbringsuchpressureonhim…he’dhave tojoin even if he didn’t want to.”80 In his rebuttal, Chavez ignored nuances in the anti-14position,insertinganotsosubtlejibeatKubo’scredibilitybyassertingthatagribusinesshad“alreadystartedaslickcampaign…usingasmallgrowerasafront,presentingProposition14asaviolationofpropertyrights.”81KuborarelyifevercriticizedChavez’scharacterinpublic,but inhisoralhistory,he sharedhis impressionsof the labor leaderafter theymet in1974.“Myfirstimpressionofhim,”hetoldhisinterviewer,“wasapersonthatwasveryarrogant…butIalsofoundthathewasaveryintelligentman,apersonwithtotaldedicationtothecausethat hewas pursuing.”Kubomaintained an abiding respect forChavez, acknowledging thattheir “roots are the same” and that they shared a commitment to improving farm workers’lives.82

Although advocates for Proposition 14 refused to acknowledge it, Kubo’s concern forprivate property rights stemmed from his experience inWorldWar II. Like other JapaneseAmericans,Kubosawtheinternmentas“ablackmarkinthehistoryoftheUnitedStates”and

vowedto“doeverythingin[his]powertodisseminateandtell thepeoplewhathappenedin1942”sothat“itwillneverberepeated.”83ForKubo,allowingtheALRBtodictatethetermsof workers’ access to private property harkened back to a dark period for him, one thatincludedtheinterruptionofhiseducationatacommunitycollege,theundoingofeighteenyearsofhardworkasasharecropper,andultimatelythedispossessionofprivatepropertythat thefamily hadworkedhard to acquire. In his 1978oral history,Kubopainfully recounted howlocal whites whom he referred to as “vultures” offered to buy appliances at severelydiscountedpricesfromhisfamilywhentheywereevacuatedtoanAssemblycenterinArboga,California.“It tookalifetimetobuythosethings,”heexplained,“andtheywereofferingmyparents for the refrigerator and the washingmachine two dollars, a dollar and a half, fivedollars, andmy father said, ‘well, even ifwehad to throw it away,wewouldn’t give it tothem.’”84 Fortunately for the Kubos, the Leak family, which owned the property theysharecropped, safeguarded most of their possessions and sent the family’s portion of theirearnings to them at the Tulare Lake in Modoc County, California where they spent theremainderofthewarinaninternmentcamp.The kindness of the Leak family notwithstanding, the traumatic experience made Kubo

distrustful of the government and vigilant about protecting his rights. ForKubo, the loss ofappliances symbolized a loss of freedom associated with a life of farming, an occupationcommonamongmanyJapaneseAmericanslivingintheCentralValleyandtheprimaryvehiclefor achieving economic success for Nisei in California.85 The position of “Yes on 14”advocateswhosawtheprivatepropertyrightsargumentasdisingenuousfailedtoappreciatehow,forKuboatleast,suchconcernswerebasedinanexperienceofstateoppression.ThecitiesbecamethebattlegroundforProposition14,withboththeUFWandCitizensfora

FairFarmLaborLaw investingmuch time andmoney intowinning thewar of ideas amongthese large blocks of voters. Kubo traveled more than 30,000 miles and organized highlyvisible“Noon14”ralliesinLosAngeles,theSanFranciscoBayArea,andSanDiegointheweek prior to the election, drawing as many as 4,000 participants at each event.86 Heorchestrated successful door-to-door campaigns that rivaled the UFW’s supremacy ingrassroots outreach and conducted media events, complete with a country-western musicconcertthatinspiredsupporterstoattendralliesthroughoutthestate.Hehonedthepositionofthegrowerstoaneasilydigestedmessage,“ProtectPrivateProperty—Noon14Committee,”thatthepublicunderstoodandeditorialboardsofseveralurbannewspapersandtelevisionandradio stationspickedup and incorporated into their opinionson the subject.87 These effortsgavethegrowersanunprecedentedvoiceinthecitiesandhelpedraisepoliticalcontributionsthatsupportedanincreasedpresenceofcampaignadsontheairwaves.88

Theunioncounteredtheseeventswithanaggressivegrassrootscampaignofitsown.InLosAngeles,forexample,thecommunityorganizationCoalitionforEconomicSurvivalworkedonbehalfoftheuniontochallengetheprivatepropertyargumentas“theold‘biglie’campaign.”“They have poured millions into a demagogic ‘vote no’ campaign,” its steering committeewrote to itsmembers,“using thephony‘privateproperty’ slogan.”89As theelectionneared,Chavez’s attack on the validity of the private property argument became more urgent. In aspeechto800supportersinNationalCity,heimploredthepartisancrowdnottotakevictory

for granted and urged everyone to assume individual responsibility for challenging thegrowers’ attempt to confuse voters. “We’ve got to tell the people that [the private propertyargument] is aphony issue,”hewarned, “orwe’re in trouble.”90 Inmanyposters and fliersthroughoutthemonthsleadinguptotheelection,theUFWroutinelydrewattentiontoKubo’sprivate property argument as “theBig Lie” and republished articles identifying thewealthygrowerswhohadcontributed toCitizensforaFairLaborLaw.91Theunionalsohighlightedthemanypoliticianswhomtheycountedasallies,includingPresidentJimmyCarter,GovernorJerry Brown, Mayor George Moscone of San Francisco, and Mayor Tom Bradley of LosAngeles. In return, the UFW endorsed the candidacy of any politician who supportedProposition14,includingaverypublicendorsementofJerryBrownforpresidentwhenCesarChavez introduced him as a candidate at theDemocraticNationalConvention inNewYorkCity.92

FIGURE 13.Governor Jerry Brown of California visits with Cesar Chavez and members of the United FarmWorkers atLaPaz,Keene,California,1976.ALUA,UFWCollection,292.

Intheendnoneoftheseendorsementshelpedtheunion.VotershandedtheUFWacrushingdefeat, rejectingProposition14by abetter than three-to-twomarginonNovember2, 1976.The “No on 14” forces garnered more than 2 million more votes than advocates for theinitiative and carried fifty-six of the fifty-eight counties in the state,withAlameda and SanFranciscotheonlytwocountiesvotinginfavor.93Althoughthegrowers’newsletterinterpretedtheoutcomeas“arepudiationofthenakedpowergrabofCesarChavez”and“amajordefeatfor Governor Gerald Brown,” Kubo offered a more sanguine evaluation, highlighting theimportance of the organizing drive: “[It was] amazing to see the grassroots response fromagriculture.Peoplewedidn’tknowwereouttherecametothefrontandpitchedintotheeffort

todefeatthisbadinitiative.Itwasthisall-outsupportthatmadethevictorypossible.…Everygrower—allofagriculture—canbeproudofthisaccomplishment.”94Unionorganizerstriedtoattributetheoutcometothegrowers’$2.5millionbudget,butintheendtheUFWspent$1.3millionof its own.To add insult to injury, the “Noon14” campaign ended theyearwith asurplusof$29,750,whereastheUnitedFarmWorkersshowedadeficitof$218,448.95

ThedefeatforcedChavezandtheuniontoreevaluatetheirassumedinfluenceonthepublic.Theappealoftheboycotttocitizenshadbuiltanexpectationthattheunioncouldalwayspaintitsoppositionasexploitativeand thatconsumerswouldalways sidewith the farmworkers.Indeed, thedecisionof theexecutiveboard to redirect theboycottnetwork in the serviceofpromoting Proposition 14 signaled such faith. Their defeat might be explained by thesubstantialmediabudgetraisedbygrowers,althoughthemagnitudeofthelosssuggestsotherreasonsfortheone-sidedvictorybythe“Noon14”campaign.Support for Kubo’s message manifested common ground between him and voters on the

sanctity of private property in California. The electorate’s decisionwas consistent with anentrenchedpreoccupationwiththerightsofpropertyowners,clearlyarticulatedintherepealin1964ofthefairhousinglawknownastheRumfordFairHousingAct.Duringthecivilrightsmovement,theCaliforniaAssemblyhadpassedthelawnamedforWilliamByronRumford,thefirstAfricanAmericanelectedofficialinnorthernCalifornia,thatprohibiteddiscriminationinmost privately financed housing and outlawed racial discrimination by home lenders. Inresponse, a coalition of the California Real Estate Association, the Home BuildersAssociation, and the Apartment Owners Association organized a successful campaign tooverturnthelawbywayofaninitiative—coincidentally,alsoProposition14—thatpassedbyatwo-to-onemargin.Racismclearlyplayedaroleinthevote,butmanyvotersalsoexpressedtheiropposition towhat theyperceivedas the state interfering in themanagementofprivateproperty.96

Kubo’srolealsosignaledanimportantturninthepoliticalstrategyofthegrowers.Priortotheirvictory,theyhadattemptedtodiscreditChavezasafalseprophet, theUFWasasocialmovementratherthanaunion,andtheTeamstersasthesuperiorchoiceforworkers.Noneofthesestrategiesworked.InKubo,however,theyfoundasympatheticcharacterwhoselifestorysuccessfully countered the appeals of the UFW. By 1976 much of the public accepted theinternment of JapaneseAmericans duringWorldWar II as an injustice and sawKubo as avictimofthemisguidedExecutiveOrder9066,whichinitiatedthegovernmentaction.Indeed,within two years, the Japanese American Citizens League believed it had enough of thepublic’s sympathy to launch a reparations movement.97 Kubo’s history gave him increasedcredibilitywiththepublicandenabledhimtoarticulateapoliticalpositionthatquestionedthestate’srighttodeterminewhocouldenterprivateproperty.Oneofthemosteffectiveimagesofthe “No on 14” campaign was a poster of Kubo standing in front of his home with thefollowingmessageinboldletters:“Thirty-fouryearsago,Igaveupmypersonalrightswithouta fight … IT WILL NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN.”98 This evocation of internment paidtremendousdividendsforgrowerswho,ironically,nowreliedonanactofracialinjusticetostemtheUFW’smomentum.UFW officials tried to draw attention to the inconsistencies betweenKubo’s life and the

growers’position;however,thefactthatvotersboughtKubo’sstorymadeallthedifferenceinthedefeatofProposition14.Thefailureoftheinitiativeendedtheunion’sdreamofrewritingthe labor lawandsecuringfull funding for theALRB,even though theCalifornia legislaturecontinued to earmark funds for it. Indeed,workers continue to clamor for elections, and thegrowersbracedforanothercontentiousyearin1977.Inresponse,someUFWorganizersandexecutiveboardmemberspreparedforelections.EliseoMedina,forexample,sethissightsonaddressingcitrusworkers’desiresforanelectioninVentura,whileMarshallGanzandJessicaGoveastrategizedonhowtoorganizelettuceworkersintheImperialValleywhoweredeniedelectionsasaresultofthefundingcrisis.Therealcostoftheballotmeasure’sdefeatlayinthechangesthecampaignwroughtonUFW

strategyandCesarChavez’spsyche.Chavez’sdecisiontosuspendtheboycottintheserviceofthe“Yeson14”driveinterruptedwhathadbeenaneffectivetoolfortheunion.Inthewakeofthe defeat, the union confronted a morale problem that rippled throughout its ranks, fromChaveztothemanyvolunteerswhocampaignedforProposition14.Inanticipationofthevote,Chavez characteristically started an eight-day fast to influence voters. When the news ofProposition14’sdefeatbroke,heendedhisfastabruptly,eatingsomuchatanelection-nightpartythathemadehimselfsick.Onthedrivehome,heaskedhisassistant,BenMaddock, tostopthecar,gotout,andsobbedonthesideoftheroadformorethananhour.“Itwasamostawful time,” Maddock recalled. “We were not used to having an election and losing likethat.”99

ThoseclosesttoChavezrememberedthathetookthedefeatpersonallyandbegantodescendintoerraticbehavior.EstherPadillabelievedthat“CesarlostitafterProp14”:“Ithinkhehadabreakdown.He just couldn’t believe thatCesarChavez, this iconhehadbecome,wouldloseanelection.”Ganz,whohadbeeninthefieldscampaigningforProposition14,camebackto findChavez “really shaken up about [the loss]” and beginning to get “into some strangestuff.”Ganz remembered, “He’sdoingmind control, he’s doinghealing, he’s starting to talkabout conspiracies.”100 During the “Yes on 14” campaign, Chavezmademany trips to LosAngeles,strikingupfriendshipswithanumberofHollywoodactors,includingValerieHarperfrom The Mary Tyler Moore Show and Rhoda. According to Gilbert Padilla, HarperintroducedChaveztomind-controlexperts,including“mentalist,”BruceBernstein,andTejanoparapsychologistandauthor,JoséSilva,whoespousedabeliefinextrasensoryperception,theabilitytocommunicatewithoutspeechorphysicalgestures.PadillawitnessedChavez’s“shiftinpersonality”andraisedtheissuequietlyamongfriends,butatthetimeunionmembersandvolunteerswereso involved in theirowntasks that fewnoticed thechange.101According toEsther Padilla, Chavez had a difficult time owning his decision to channel the union’sresourcesintoalosingbattle.Sheremembered,“HehadtoblamesomebodyforthefailureofProposition14.”

FIGURE14.The“Noon14”poster,featuringHarryKubo,1976.UCLAPoliticalCollection.

Inthepast, theunionhadapproachedsetbacksasanopportunitytolearnfromitsmistakesandimproveitsstrategy.Thistime,however,Chavezchosenottoconvenehisusualmeetingofthe executiveboard tomake recommendationsonhow tomove forward. Instead, he left thepostmortem to youthful volunteers,whom he summoned to La Paz.A crestfallen seventeen-year-old,SharonDelugash,recalledhowsheandherfellowvolunteers“look[ed]forwardtothatseriesofmeetingssothatwecouldcommiserateandlickourwoundstogether.”Whentheyarrivedat theNorthUnit for themeetings,volunteerswere toldbyLaPaz staff thatChavezwouldnotattendinordertogivethemtheirprivacytobecompletelyhonest.Delugashandherfellowattendees,however,resentedhisabsenceandsawitasChavez“notwant[ing]tohearany criticism aboutwhat had gonewrong.”Or so the group thought.As themeeting began,volunteers shared their opinions, including criticism of the leadership. Delugash recountedwhat happened next: “Suddenly Cesar climbed in through the window and was yelling,‘Bullshit!’Wewerestunnedathowangryhewas,anddefensive.Maybewewhowerenotinleadershipwereterriblynaïve,butthisseemedcompletelyincontradictionwithhowtheunion

ran.Wewere used to singing everymorning and talking about highlights and lowlights, notblamingourselvesforthings,manyofwhichwerecompletelyoutofourcontrol.”102Chavez’sactions and abusivewords in thismomentmanifest alterations in his personality familiar toGilbertandEstherPadilla,MarshallGanz,andthefewpeoplewhohadwitnessedhiscollapseinthedaysfollowingthelossofProposition14.TomDalzell,amemberofthelegalteamwhohelpedpulltheALRBoutofthefire,offeredhisinterpretationofChavez’sstateofmindattheendof1976:“Prop14wasnotourfirstdefeat(thesummerof1973comestomind),butitwasapublicandpoliticaldefeat,whichcouldnotbeturnedtogood.Cesar’sfaithinhisabilitytotake his case to the voterswas shaken, adding to his growing lack of confidence in a newworld.”103Althoughthatnewworldstill includedafunctioningALRB,negotiationswith theTeamsters,aneffectivelegalteam,andanarmyofexperiencedlabororganizersreadytoreachouttoeagerfarmworkersinImperialValley,Ventura,andSalinas,Chavez,forthefirsttime,turnedinwardanddark,focusingonhowhehadlostcontrolandobsessingabouthowtogetitback.

SIX

BusyDying

ONJULY24,1976,NickJonessatdownwithhisoldfriendBillTaylortoreminisceabouttheearlydaysofthemovementandreflectonthefutureaheadfortheUnitedFarmWorkers.Taylorhadworkedfortheunionin1967and1968,participatingwithJonesintheestablishmentoftheboycotthouseinPortland,Oregon,untilpersonalissuesanddifferenceswithJerryandJuanitaBrowncompelledhimto leave.“Iwouldhaveplayed itawholehellofa lotdifferent[ly],”Tayloradmitted.“Iwastired,frankly,andIusedtorunoffatthefuckingmouthandcallpeoplenames.”1TayloradmiredJonesforseeingitthroughandwantedtorecordforposterityhowhisfriendhadenduredtenyearsinthemovement.Thetwoacknowledgedfrustrations,atonepointhitting“pause”on the recorder to talkoff the record.Now the future lookedbright forbothJones and the union. In February, Cesar Chavez honored Jones’s service by naming himnationalboycottdirectorandentrustedhimwithmoreresponsibilityatLaPaz.Jonesembracedthepromotionandengagedinarestructuringofthenetworkthatbroughtmorevolunteersandmoneytotheunion.BySeptember Jonescouldbragofaboycottdepartmentwithmore than300volunteers in

thirty-fourcitiesaroundthecountry.TheincreaseinstaffstrengthenedboycottsagainstDole,Sunsweet, Sun-Maid, and Diamond companies and helped produce a contract with Dole’ssubsidiary, West Food’s mushroom plant in Ventura, California.2 The promotion had beengratifyingtoJones,who,alongwithhiswife,Virginia,livedandbreathedtheunion.“Wemadeour life out of it,” Jones toldTaylor, adding, “Iwill live anddie in themovement.”Taylorremarkedonthepotentialinthesummerof1976,giventhepresenceofasympatheticgovernorinoffice,alikelyDemocraticpresidentontheway,andtheadditionofnewrecruits.“It’slikeanearthquakewaiting to go off,” Jones predicted. “We’re going tomake that leap andverysoon.”3LittledidheknowthatthetremorshefeltbeneathhisfeetcamefromadramaticshiftinChavez’s thinking andpersonality, one thatwould soonopenup the ground, swallowing thenewboycottchiefandthefutureoftheunion.Over the next fourmonthsmuch of the goodwill betweenChavez and Jones disappeared.

Tension between the two began when Jones questioned the diversion of his staff from theboycott tothe“Yeson14”campaigninCalifornia.Joneshadplacedanenormousamountoffaith in the efficacy of the boycott and lamented a break in the action.Worse, the shift instrategyunderminedhisnewfoundauthorityandforcedhimtoworkunderMarshallGanz,the“Yeson14”director.SinceJoneshadrecruitedmuchofthenewblood,especiallythoseinthe

all-importantNewYorkCityandBostonhouses,recruitssidedwithJonesand,accordingtosome, took their time getting across country. Years later, in an essay documenting hisexperience,Jonesrecalledhearing“rumblings[amongthe leadership]about theboycottstafftaking too long to leave their cities.”4 In spite of his misgivings, Jones honored Chavez’sinstructions to “clear the decks in the boycott dept.,” relocating a total of 262 staff toCaliforniaandleavingbehindaskeletoncrewofthirty-ninevolunteersinboycottcitiesaroundthenation.5Still,theslownessofJones’sresponseandtheallegedleftistorientationofsomeofhis recruits unsettled Chavez, who became increasingly manic as the union’s tremendousadvantageinthefighttopassProposition14begantoevaporate.Adisputeoverthereintroductionof theunionnewspaperElMalcriadoamid the initiative

campaign in September exacerbated tension between Jones and Chavez after the reluctanteditor and Jones recruit, JoeSmith, ran afoul of the labor leader and somemembers of theNational Executive Board. Chavez hired Smith on Jones’s recommendation to oversee therevival of thepaper following ahiatus frompublishing formore than ayear.Smithheld anEnglishdegreefromSt.AmbroseCollegeandexhibitedconsiderabletalentasawriterbuthadnoexperienceasaneditor.Tocompensate,ChavezalsohiredBobNeff,aveteranofStudentsfor a Democratic Society and an experienced editor. Although Chavez assured the two hewouldexerciseonlyalighttouchinoverseeingthenewspaper,hisresponsetothefirsteditiononSeptember15betrayedhispromise.AtthenextmeetingoftheNationalExecutiveBoard,Chavez used the forum to attack Smith and Neff for seemingly minor transgressions: theomission of an article about boardmember,MackLyons; the inclusion of a story about theInternational Longshore andWarehouse Union rather than one concerning fellow AFL-CIOunionworkersatarubberplant;andtheabsenceofChavez’snameonthemasthead.Althoughthese were relatively small offenses, Chavez excoriated the two for deliberatelymisrepresentingtheunionandlaterfiredSmith.During themeeting, Chavez redirected his ire at Jones for bringing Smith into the union.

WhenJonesagreedtomeetwithChavezabouttheincidentinOctober,Chavezsurprisedhimwith an expletive-laden assault on his character, accusing him of being a communistconspiratorandrecruitingseveral“spiesintoLaPaz”tosabotagetheunion.6“Fortenyears,”Jonessorrowfullyrecounted,“therehadnotbeenahintofmistrusttowardsmebecauseofmypolitics.”7Now,onNovember14,1976,NickandVirginiaJonessawnootherchoicebuttoresignfromtheUnitedFarmWorkers.The Joneses’ resignation alarmedUFW volunteers and devotees and confirmed fears that

Chavez had initiated a purge of people perceived as being disloyal. The recriminations,accusations,andterrorinflictedbyChavezandhisfollowersmarkedthebeginningoftheendofaperiodinwhichfeelingsofcollegialitydominatedrelationsamongUFWvolunteers, theexecutiveboard,and farmworkers. In themonths followingJones’sacking,Chavezaccusedmembers of the extended network of betraying his orders, losing Proposition 14, andintentionally “fucking up” the union in the name of communism. Such charges, of course,obfuscatedhisresponsibilityforpursuingariskyinitiativestrategy.Inthepast,thesefailureswouldhavebeenusedaslessonstolearnfrom;nowChavezsoughttoholdothersaccountablefor their mistakes and look for ways to remove them. Rather than embrace a diversity of

viewpoints, hewidened hiswitch-hunt over the next two years to include targetswithinLaPaz,thelegaldepartment,andtheNationalExecutiveBoarditself,atonepointturningtothemethods of a drug-rehabilitation expert cum cult leader, Charles Dietrich, to ferret out the“assholes.”WhyChavezengagedinsuchdestructivebehaviorbecamethesubjectofmuchdebateamong

UFWvolunteersinlateryears.8Formanywhodedicatedasubstantialportionoftheiryouthtothe union, respect for their collective success has temperedmuch of the criticism, as haveongoing attempts by members within what remains of the union to control the narrative ofChavez’slife.Duringthepurges,volunteersandUFWsympathizerstemperedtheirobjectionstoChavez’sdecisionswithahealthyappreciationforthewaysenemiesmightusesuchinternaldiscordtotheiradvantage.Thefewwhowitnessedthemadnessfromtheinsiderealizedtoolatewhatwasbeinglostinthesemoments,asquestionsofloyalty,sacrifice,andtheidentityoftruebelieverscowedthosewhomighthavestoppedtheorganizationaltailspin.

PURGINGTHEBOYCOTT

InspiteofthelossofProposition14,theunionstillhadamplereasonstobeoptimisticas1976cametoacloseandtheunionpreparedforanewyear.Thefailureoftheinitiativeendedthedream of revising the labor law and continued to ensure only a shoestring budget for theAgricultural LaborRelationsBoard, but the campaign laid the groundwork for a permanentpeacebetweentheTeamstersandtheUFW.TheTeamsters’endorsementoftheinitiativeendedupbeingmore than justanolivebranch.ThedayafterProposition14’sdefeat, JerryCohenreceivedacallfromTeamsterslawyer,JackOrmes,onbehalfofthewesternregionaldirectorM.E.Anderson,offeringtoworkoutanagreementtoendhostilitiesbetweentheunions.OnDecember1,1976,thetwosidesagreedtoamoratoriumonfilingsuitsagainsteachother,andonMarch 10, 1977,Cohen andOrmes brought togetherChavez andFrankFitzsimmons, theTeamsters president, to sign a formal agreement to leave field workers to the UFWwhilegranting the Teamsters primacy in organizing truck drivers, cannery workers, and othernonfieldworkers.Thejurisdictionalpactendedthesix-yearwarbetweenthetwounionsandcreatedaclearpathfortheUFWtoorganizeallCaliforniafarmworkers.9

Anticipatingthisagreementandthere-fundingofALRB,Chavezcalledaspecialorganizingmeetingofkeystaffmembers,executiveboardofficials,andveteranorganizersatLaPazonNovember24,1977,todiscussthefuturedirectionoftheunion.Themeetingcameatacriticaltime as workers prepared for the vegetable harvest in the Imperial Valley, with the grapeharvest to follow in Coachella in the spring. Opportunities to capitalize on the union’smomentum in elections the previous year had been lost amid theALRB funding crisis, andChavez hoped to regain some of theUFW’s luster by claiming victory in these two criticalareas.Unfortunately, the union faced a funding crisis of its own, having accumulated a debtduring the Proposition 14 campaign while trying to maintain full service in a number ofprograms,includingtheRobertF.KennedyMedicalPlan,theJuanDeLaCruzPensionPlan,and the Martin Luther King Service Center. Although UFW organizers had convinced

approximately28,000workers tovotefor theunionduring thefirstyearofALRBelections,UFW negotiators had secured contracts covering only 6,000 new dues-paying members.Failure to follow up on these victories meant dues constituted less than 22 percent of theunion’s income, a total that made the union dependent on donations and contributions fromoutside sources. Eliseo Medina, who headed the contract administration department,responsible for convertingALRBvictories intounioncontracts, acknowledged theproblem,complaining that his staff had been overextended during the previous year by the union’sinability to concentrate resources on winning elections and securing contracts on largerranches. Chavez agreed, noting that, although the union enjoyed great popularity, “it is amovementwithoutmembers.”10

Themeeting produced a new plan of action that included threemajor changes. First, theunion would concentrate its efforts to increase revenues by converting certified electionvictoriesintocontracts.Thisstrategywouldrequiretheuniontostreamlineitsproceduresfornegotiations, including giving more autonomy to field negotiators to sign contracts withoutconstantlyseekingfinalapprovalfromChavez.Second,theunionhadtocutbackonservicesatcampesinocentersandclinics thatgeneratedfilial-like loyaltybutdraftedaway importantresourcesfromtheunion.Chavezarguedpointedly,“Thebestservicewecangiveworkersisacontract.”11 By downplaying services, the union hoped to shift volunteers from centers andclinicstothefrontlinesoforganizingworkersandnegotiatingmorecontracts.Third,Chavezreorganized leadership around regions rather than functions and identified six key locationsthroughout thestate.AlthoughChavezdetestedtheformationof locals, theunionhadalreadyinvested heavily in the creation of ranch committees,which generated ameaningful base ofpowerinsomeareasaroundthestate.Chavez thought it worthwhile to risk facilitating greater autonomy at the ranch committee

level formoreeffectiveorganizingat thegrassroots.Thenew regional structureencouragedcompetitionamongorganizers, imposingadegreeof accountabilityon staffmembers.WhileskilledorganizerslikeGanzwelcomedthechallenge,healsoacknowledgedthatcompetitionthreatened“tocreatecertainkindsofdivisionsintheleadership”thatfesteredjustbelowthesurface.12Forthetimebeing,however,thenewstructureallowedthemoreaccomplishedUFWorganizers to sink deep roots into the local culture and develop a passion for the union.Medina, for example, could now be freed from the tyranny of bureaucracy in the contractadministration department to focus on organizing workers in Coachella and Oxnard, areasfamiliartohim.Chavezalsoestablishedthegoalofhaving100,000workersundercontractbyDecember1,1978,tomotivatehisteam.13

Byandlarge,unionofficialsagreedwithChavez’srecommitmenttowinningnewmembers,especiallyGanz,whohadspentsubstantialtimewithvegetableworkersintheImperialValleyand Salinas, studying the potential for securing a permanent presence in the industry. GanzwelcomedChavez’sseriousnessaboutorganizing,inlargepartbecauseitsignaledareversalin the leader’sbehavior thathadgivenGanzcause forconcern.During theALRBbattles in1976, Chavez had inexplicably withdrawn from the weekly brain-storming that took placeamongtheactiveleadershipandinsteaddriftedacrossthestateinwhathecalledacaminata(longwalk).“Itwasweird,”Ganzrecalled,“becausethecaminatawassortoflikehisown

sortofactofsacrificeonhispart,but itwascuriouslydisconnectedfromtheorganizing.”14GanzdidnotpausetopsychoanalyzeChavez,choosinginsteadtoworkwiththirty-sevenlocalfarmworkersandmembersfromotheralliedunionstoputtogetherastringofvictoriesoverthe Teamsters in Salinas. OccasionallyGanz became sternwith Chavez in order to initiatedeploymentofexperiencedcoordinatorstothefrontlinesofthebattle.“He[eventually]agreed[tosend]ateamandthenwewereabletokickass,”Ganzremembered,“butitwaslikehewason another wavelength.”15 For 1977, Ganz anticipated between fifteen and twenty morecontractsinthevegetableindustryandtheadditionof4,000newworkersinCalexico.Chavez’splansalsoincludedamajorreorganizationoftheboycottnetworkatatimewhen

volunteerswerestillsettlingbackintotheirhousesacrossthecountry.Theorderprovedtobeyet another challenge for the boycott department, even without the controversy of Jones’sforcedresignation,giventhatithadundergoneanumberofchangesthroughout1976,includingamajor reorganization in thespringand thehaltingof theboycottduring the fall inorder tocampaign forProposition14. In spite of thesedisruptions, theboycott network continued toraisemoney, bringing in approximately $258,000 during themonths ofMay, June, and Julybeforemostvolunteerscame toCalifornia.Whenmembersof the southeast teamreturned toFlorida andAtlanta, they picked upwhere they had left off, raising an average of $80 perday.16

Many in theEasthadgrowncomfortableworking inadepartmental structurewherehouseleadersinaparticularsectionofthecountryreportedtodivisiondirectorsontheiroperationsinagivencity.Forexample,althoughseparatehousesexistedinBoston,NewYorkCity,andNewJersey,eachreportedtothedivisiondirectorCharlesMarch,aveteranboycotterlocatedinNewYork.Similarly,intheSoutheast,housesinMiami,Tampa,andAtlantareportedtothesoutheastdivisiondirector,JonHeller,alsoaveteranoftheboycott,whohadservedtimeinBoston and Providence, Rhode Island, during the previous three years before relocating toAtlanta.Likemostvolunteers,bothMarchandHeller identifiedaspolitically left, andeachhadarelationshipwithNickandVirginiaJones.InHeller’scase,duringaconflictwithalocallaborleaderinRhodeIsland,NickJonesinquiredaboutHeller’spoliticalaffiliationstoruleoutrumors thathemaintained ties to theCommunistParty.“Wewatchedhimclosely,”Jonesreported toChavez in 1975, “and never caught himpromoting any ideology in hiswork.”17Jones’sprivatecorrespondencewithChavezdemonstratesthescrutinytheunionappliedtoitsdirectors;italsosuggeststheimportanceofeachone’sjob,givenhisinfluenceovernumerousvolunteers. The new emphasis on organizing workers in California now threatened todismantlethisstructure,becauseChavezdemandedtheconsolidationandregroupingofhousesthatremoveddivisionleadersandrequiredthoseremaininginpositionsofauthoritytoreportdirectlytoLaPaz.18

Chavezassignedthereorganizationofthenetworktoanewnationalboycottdirector,LarryTramutt. Tramuttmet FredRoss Sr. in Salinas in 1971while pursuing a graduate degree atStanfordUniversityandwasinspiredtofollowtheveteranorganizerintocommunityservice.RosstookTramuttunderhiswing,offeringtypicallybluntadvice.“Tobesuccessful,”hetoldTramutt, “you have to sting people into action.”19 Tramutt got his first opportunity to applythese lessons as the director of the boycott in Santa Clara County, California. Chavez

appreciatedhisdedicationtotheunionandsawTramuttastheantithesisofNickJones:aloyalsoldierwhohadcomebywayofhisownmentorandwhohadperformedhisdutieswithoutincident.As the national boycott director,Tramutt received a number of delicate tasks fromChavez, including relocating staff to California to fortify organizing efforts in the fields,removingleaderswhomhesuspectedofconspiringwithJones,andconsolidatingtheAtlantaandFloridaboycotthousesintoonehouseinTampa.Chavez, however, underestimated the response from volunteers to the Joneses’ forced

resignations, nor did he account for Tramutt’s lack of subtlety in handling the emotions ofpeople deeply affected by their departure. Virginia and Nick Jones had not gone quietly,choosinginsteadtowritealettertotheNationalExecutiveBoardthat,inDecember,circulatedwidely across the boycott network. In it, they expressed their deep sadness at Chavez’saccusationsandoffereddetailsof theone-on-onemeetingbetweenhimandNick.The letterdepictedChavezathismostparanoid,exposinghisclaimthatNickhadmisledhimbysharinginformation about “splinter” groups but intentionally failing to report infiltration by“mainliners”(communists).TheJonesesalsoprotestedthedismissalofJoeSmithandstoodupforanumberofvolunteerssuspectedofdisruptivebehaviorintheboycottnetwork,especiallyCharlesMarch,thenortheastdivisiondirector,whomChavezclaimedhadsentfivevolunteerstounderminetheProposition14campaign.TheJonesessingledoutLarryTramuttasapossiblesourceforsuchrumorsandchallengedtheboardtoassesseachvolunteer’svaluebasedonhisorherwork,noton“chisme(gossip)andcheapaccusations.”20

LetterssoonflowedintoLaPazfromboycotthousesinNewYork,Boston,Miami,Atlanta,Tampa,andSeattle,protestingtherelocationandconsolidationordersandexpressingadeepconcernaboutthered-baitingofvaluablemembersoftheboycottnetwork.ThestrongestandearliestletterstoarrivecamefromtheSoutheast,wherethechangespromisedtodismantletheAtlanta house and overburden Tampa. Members of the three houses influenced by theconsolidationvigorouslyprotestedtheorders,citingtheirbeliefthat“politicalmotives”lurkedbehind several staff changes, most prominently the proposed transfer of Jon Heller fromAtlantatotheCoachellaValley.AtlantamemberspraisedHeller’sleadershipandappealedtoChavez to reconsider themove on the practical grounds ofmaintaining strength in growingmarkets. Offering Chavez a lesson in the geography of the new U.S. economy, volunteersargued,“Atlantaistheundisputednewcommercialcenterofthenation.”Inproposingtomoveall operations to Florida, the union, they believed, had not taken “into account the criticalimportance ofAtlanta as a grocerymarket, population center, and regional headquarters forlabor, church, and civil rights organizations.” These observations conformed to shifts inmanufacturing and demography that placed a new emphasis on urban centers in the South.Holdingontothedreamofcreatinganationalfarmworkersunion,thevolunteersargued,“Toattempt toorganizefarmworkers inFloridawill requirefar-flungurbansupport,notonly inFlorida,butintheentireSoutheast.”21

JonHellerwrotetoChavezonhisownbehalf.Heobjectedtothedecisiononthreegrounds:his transfer was politically motivated because of his friendship with the Joneses and theirsharedleft-wingpoliticalviews;itwaspartofawiderand,tohismind,misguidedmovebytheuniontodismantletheboycott;andhehadneithertheSpanish-languageskillsnorthesame

levelofpersonalcommitmenttoworkinginCoachellaashedidtoservingtheboycott.Likemanyvolunteersserving inhousesacross thecountry,Hellerhaddeveloped an appreciationforthe“delicatewebofrelationships”amongchurches,organizedlabor,andthegrocers.Tohimandothervolunteers,thestrategicdecisiontodismantletheboycotthadbeen“madeinavacuum,”withoutanyconsultationsfromthose,likehimself,whohadbuiltandmaintainedthenetwork and knew its power. “My experience over the past four years on the Boycott inBoston,Providence,andtheSouth,”Hellerpleaded,“hasenabledmetobeofusetotheunioninthecities.”CitingtherelocationoffellowdivisiondirectorsSueSachenandCharlesMarchintheSouthwestandNortheast,respectively,Hellerargued,“Theleadershiphasmadeaseriesofdecisionswhich threaten all of theprogressour [boycott]Dept. hasmade in thepast sixmonths.”22

Heller also strongly objected to the manner in which Tramutt communicated hisreassignment.According toHeller, when Tramutt called him to share the order, he showedlittlerespectforfellowdivisiondirectors,whomhedisparaged.Tramuttalsogavenotice toHeller’s replacement, Richard Cook in Tampa, before consulting Heller. Adding insult toinjury,whenTramuttlearnedofHeller’sromanticrelationshipwithanaccomplishedboycottvolunteerandcolleague,ClaudiaShacter,heinstructedHellertotelltheothermemberofhis“pair” that “the assignment goes for her too.”23 Tramutt, anticipating trouble after hisconversation, wrote Heller a letter reasserting his position without giving any ground.Embracing Ross’s advice “to repeatedly prod [volunteers] to get off their butts,” TramuttacknowledgedHeller’s reservations andmisgivings but coldly listed a timetable for him tocarryouthisorders.24 In closing,Tramutt ignoredHeller’s request for amoratoriumon therestructuring of the boycott and told him that having “first hand contact with workers [inCoachella]will…give[Heller]anaddeddimension.”25

The callous nature of Tramutt’s communication did not go over well with volunteers,especiallyShacter,whohadbeenintheunionfortwoandahalfyears,includingattheTampahousesinceearly1976.Shewrote toTramuttandcopiedit toChavez,expressingherbeliefthat “the persecution of staffmembers in the union” hadoccurred “for no real reason at allexceptchisme,conjecture,andfantasy.”InherrecountingandjudgmentofTramutt’smethodofreassigning her, Shacter pointed out that such behavior signaled a serious weakness in theunion on the issue of the treatment ofwomen. Chastising Tramutt for treating her as a “tagalong”toHeller“withnoconsiderationofherownwork,”shestatedherbeliefthattheunionneeded“tofightfortheequalityofwomenaswellasthefightagainstracism.”26

SusanSachen,afive-yearveteranoftheboycottandtheformersouthwestdivisiondirector,sharedsimilarcomplaints.Sachenhadparticipatedinthespringreorganizationoftheboycottin 1976 and weathered most of the tumultuous changes associated with the Proposition 14campaign.Intherunuptotheelection,sheworkedtothepointofexhaustion.Afterthedefeatoftheinitiative,shetookatwo-weekleaveandmovedbacktoherhomeinKansasCitytoseeherdoctorandconvalescenearherfamily.Whenshereturned,SachenexpectedtoserveastheLosAngelesdirector;instead,shefoundherpositiongivenawaytoamalestaffmemberwithconsiderably less experience.27 Like Shacter, she found Tramutt to be dismissive of heropinions and uninterested in her contributions. Prior to Tramutt’s promotion, Sachen had

playedaleadershiproleinshapingstrategy;now“atthistimewhentheneedisthegreatest,”she wrote Chavez, “I find myself more excluded than I have ever been from offering andimplementingaprogram.”SheattributedthischangeprimarilytothebehaviorofTramutt,whomalignedherinanaddresstotheLosAngeleshouseandaccusedheroforganizingtosabotagetheunion.LiketheJoneses,Sachenresignedfromtheunion.28

CollectiveletterschallengingTramutt’sleadershipandChavez’sdecisioncameintoLaPaz,especiallyfromNewYorkCityandSeattle,whereNickandVirginiaJoneshadspentyearsinthe struggle and recruited many volunteers. Both houses expressed outrage at the rash oftransfersanddismissalsasacts“reminiscentofMcCarthyism.”FromSeattle,volunteersfoundthe Joneses’ letter “too believable … to dismiss” and alluded to Tramutt as one of the“individualsintheunionwhowouldnotbeaboveusingunfoundedcharges,inbadfaith,asameansofrealizing[his]ownambitionsforpowerwithintheunion.”29FromNewYork,staffmembers expressed similar dismay over the apparent purge of leaders in the boycott,commenting,“Nowmanyofusnolongerfeel trusted,nolongerfeelrespected;weseemanybrothersandsistersbeing‘relieved’fromtheirpositions,andweareaskingforastraightandpersonal explanation from you for what has happened in recent weeks.” Echoing a requestmadebyotherhouses,theNewYorkCitystaffrespondedtoTramutt’scoldorderswiththreesharplyworded,bulleteddemandsoftheirown:ameetingwithTramuttandChavezintheEastto explain the dismantling of the boycott; evaluation guidelines for staff hires, transfers, ordismissals;andanendtopoliticallymotivateddemotionsandtransfers.30

Several individual members from these houses wrote letters to Tramutt and Chavezseparately. In his letter to Tramutt, CharlesMarch acknowledged that the staff letter “mostlikelyhasnotsettoowellwithyouorCesar,”butreassuredhim,“Wearenotouthereplanningan overthrow of the union.”31 Dale Van Pelt, a volunteer and leader in the Seattle house,assumedasimilartactwithChavez,reminiscingaboutNickandVirginia’sserviceinSeattlebeforeexpressingregretat“thepart[theJoneses]perceived[Chavez]tohaveplayedin[theirforcedresignation].”Otherstookamuchmoreaggressiveapproach,suchasMaryDynesandDaveShapiro, formermembersof theNewYorkCity andNewJerseyboycotthouses,whoquestionedChavez’scommitmenttononviolence,givenhisattackonNickJones.Stillothers,such as Bill Ferguson of the Seattle house, told Chavez bluntly, “I do possess enoughinformation to determine that something is terribly amiss within the union.” Susan SachenwroteChavez toconveyherbelief that aboycott conferenceamongdivisiondirectorswhenTramuttfirsttookoverthedepartmentwouldhavesmoothedtheleadershiptransitionandmadeall thevolunteers less anxious. Inwondering aloudwhy this didnot occur,Sachenqueried,“Didyoutrustourcommitmentsolittle?”32

Chavez refused to answer any of the letters and allowedTramutt to handle the rebellion.Tramutt upheld the orders from his office and accepted the resignations from numerousdisgruntledvolunteerswhotooktheunion’ssilenceasasignofdisrespect.WhennewsoftheJoneses’ resignation became the subject of a Los Angeles Times article, the media-savvyChavez uncharacteristically offered, “No comment,” and directed all inquiries to a newlyappointed public relations director, Marc Grossman, who answered questions from theconfinesofLaPaz. Inhis response,Grossmancorrected the impression that theJoneseshad

been fired and deflected allegations of red-baiting by suggesting that Chavez haddisagreements with them on the basis “of incompetence, not ideology.”33 Suchcharacterizations of the Joneses deepened feelings of resentment among boycott volunteerswhoknewthemtobethehardestworkingmembersofthenetwork.The airing of differences exacerbated a moment of crisis for Chavez. The public’s

abandonmentduringtheProposition14campaignhadbeenthefirstblow;nowvolunteerswhohad been the foot soldiers in the boycott appeared to be rejecting his leadership. Chavez’sdecisiontosurroundhimselfwithloyalistscreatedabarrierbetweenhimandanetworkhehadcountedonovertheprevioustenyears.Volunteers’reactionsagainsttransfersmayhavecomefrom a fear of the unknown in their new jobs inCalifornia or unease about the prospect ofleavingatight-knitcommunityofyoungpeoplewhosharedsimilarpoliticsandbackgrounds.Yettheabsenceoftransparencyinthedecision-makingprocessandtheassertionthat“spies”lurked among the ranks of volunteers undermined whatever credibility Chavez and hislieutenantsmight have hadwith boycott staff. Although Chavez never offered an answer toSachen’s question, “Did you trust our commitment so little?,” his silence spoke louder thanwords. In their collective letter toChavez,Seattleboycott staffmembersacknowledged thatorganizationsoftendealwithsuchproblemswithsilenceandencouragedhimnottotakethatroute. “Wewould have to interpret [the] failure [to respond] as an invitation to accept theJoneses’letterasaccurate.”Totheirchagrin,Chavezneverresponded.Privately,Chavezfumed,seekingaffirmationandloyaltyfromfriendsandstaffclosetohim

andenforcingorderoverthedepartmentsintheunionwherehebelievedhestillhadcontrol.Among the few people to whom he listened, the advice of his longtime friend and donorCharles “Chuck” Dederich figured prominently during these critical months of transition.Dederich,aportly,white,formerGulfOilsalesexecutivefromToledo,Ohio,foundedthedrugrehabilitationcenterSynanon,which,by1977,hadtreatedthousandsofaddictsanddevelopedretreat locations throughout California. The organization had evolved fromDederich’s ownbattles with alcoholism and drug addiction and his dissatisfaction with AlcoholicsAnonymous’s restriction against admitting drug users into the group’s fellowship meetings.BelievingAA’spublicconfessionalapproachtorehabilitationcouldhelpalladdicts,in1958Dederichbrokefromthegroup,rentedastorefrontofficeinVenice,California,andconvenedacadreoftwentydrugworldmissionariesthatgrewintoSynanon.Dederich’semphasisondevelopingself-reliancecaughton,especiallywithmembersofthe

jazz andperforming artsworld in and aroundLosAngeles.According to one contemporaryobserver,Dederich“achievedsuccessatcontrollingaddictionthroughhabituatingnewwaysoftalking inorder tochannelnewwaysof thinking.”34During the1960s and early1970s, thisnewwayof thinking includedanembraceofprogressive ideas, suchas interracialmarriageand a practice Dederich called “hustling”: encouraging the donation of products, food, andclothingtosustainthefoundation.Synanon’ssuccessinattractinggiftsledtosurplusesthathesharedwith allied organizations, a process he deemed “anti-hustling.”He saw thework ofChavezandtheUFWasworthyofhelpanddirectedmuchofthegroup’s“anti-hustling”totheunion in timesofneed.35Thedonations createdanenduringbondbetween the twomenandopenedChavez to the possibility of incorporating some of Synanon’smanagement practices

intotheunion.ChavezsawSynanonasanunqualifiedsuccessstory for the financial independence ithad

achieved and the strict obedience Dederich inspired from his followers, who lived onresidential communes located across California. Dederich and his African American wife,Betty, livedwithseveralother“lifestylers”onasprawling360-acreranchhecalled“HomePlace”inBadger,intheSierraNevadafoothills.36Althoughresidential treatmenthadbeenafeatureatotherSynanonlocations,includinginSantaMonicaandTomalesBay,HomePlacemarked an important departure for Dederich, from the open-door policy he extended to alladdictsandawillingness toacceptwhatever theycouldpay, towardamaterialistic lifestyleamongaselectgroup thatemphasizedcomfortat thepriceof residents’personalwealthandprivacy. In 1974 Synanon dramatically expanded beyond drug rehabilitation in favor ofpromoting an alternative, “intentional” community based on communal living.37 DederichencouragedseveralSynanitestoabandontheircareers,donatealloftheirworldlypossessionsand money, and work as staff.38 To avoid paying business taxes, he declared Synanon areligionandbegantopromotespecificdietsforresidents.Healsoplayedtapesofhimreading“scriptures” over an FM transmitter called “the Wire” that was broadcast throughout thecompound.39

At theheart ofSynanon’s practiceswas “theGame,” a group encounter that oneobservercommented“istotheirreligionastheMassistotheCatholic.”40InspiredbyAA’sfellowshipmeetingsandDederich’sreadingofRalphWaldoEmerson’sessay“Self-Reliance,”theGameinvolvedeighttofifteenpeopleengagedinanaggressiveencounterinwhichparticipantswereencouraged to publicly indict, or “game,” one another for behavior detrimental to themaintenanceofthegroupanddestructivetotheindividual.Dederichbelievedthataddicts,andindeedmostpeople,wastedtheirenergybytryingtocoverupcharactertraitsthattheyshouldconfront and abandon.TheGame relied on the power of peer pressure.By confronting oneanother, Dederich argued, participants would confront their weaknesses and empower eachindividual to “detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind fromwithin.”41

In practice, theGamewas very confrontational.Dederich encouraged participants to yell,curse,andscreamateachother,andevensuggestedthatpeoplelieaboutanother’sbehaviorjusttoprovokeanargument.42Healsoencouragedtheuseofobscenityandblasphemy,whichhebelievedmadesessionsmoreengagingandentertaining.43

Initially,DederichappliedtheGametothetreatmentofaddicts,buteventuallyhedevelopedabeliefinitspowerstoamelioratetensionandaddressdestructivebehavioramongpeopleinanygroup,beitanorganization,ateam,oracommunesuchasHomePlace.Dederichneveradequately explained how or why theGameworked in a communal setting, but swore thatrelationshipsbecamemoreharmoniousandworkersbecamemoreefficientintheexecutionoftheirduties.HediagrammedtheplaceoftheGameincommunallife,depictingthecommunityas a triangle and the Game as a circle.44 The triangle represented the work organizationstructure thatplaced the leaderaloneat the top,adecidedlynondemocraticsystemthatgavehimcompleteauthorityoverHomePlace.ThecirclerepresentingtheGame,ontheotherhand,was a place where, in theory, everyone was equal and ordinarymembers could offer new

ideasanddisagreewithhim.AlthoughSynanonhadsuccesswiththeGameamongdrugaddictsandrecoveringalcoholics,

itsabilitytoexportitsbenefitstootherorganizationshappenedinfitsandstartsovereighteenyears, until Chavez tried to incorporate it at La Paz in 1977.45 Chavez maintained a closerelationshipwithDederichandconsidered“theoldman”(ashewasoftenreferredto)brilliantfor his ability to realize his dream of a communal living environment where he enjoyedcompletepowertopursuewhatevercourseofactionhethoughtbest.DederichmaintainedtheillusionofdemocracyatHomePlace,whereresidentsresidedintwoworldssimultaneously:theeverydaycommunityof followerswho livedandworked together tomaintain successfuldrugandalcoholrehabilitationcenters,andthespacewithintheGamewherepeoplecouldsayjustaboutanythingtoanyoneaslongasitdidnotresultinphysicalviolence.46

AtHomePlace,Gameroomsresidedinaprominentplaceonthecommune’sgrounds,andresidents were expected to respect the separation of conversations within and outside theGame.Indeed,onceinsidetheGame,anoutsideobservercouldbetakenabackbythelevelofvitriol expressed among residents who, in their daily lives, asserted their love for theirbrothersandsisters.AjudgeinDetroitwhowitnessedoneoftheGamestodeterminewhethertosendjuveniledelinquentstoSynanonfortreatmentwonderedifhe“hadbeentransportedtoDante’sInfernowhereitsinhabitantswerehalf-humanandhalf-demons.”Althoughhewalkedawaywithseriousreservationsaboutsubjectingyouthstosuchmethods,herecognizedintheexperience“arenewalprocessformanyofthosewhoplayit.”47DuringavisittoHomePlacein1966totakeadvantageofSynanon’sdentalcareforhischildren,ChavezexposedhisownfamilytotheGame.Hiswifedetestedthepractice,andoneofhischildrentoldhim,“Daddy,I’veneverseenanythinglikeit.…They’resomean!”48

Chavezshowednosuchambivalence.Duringtherestructuringoftheunionandtherebellionofboycottvolunteers,hemaintainedanopen lineofcommunicationwithDederich,althoughthecontentandextentoftheirconversationsremainamystery.GilbertPadilla,whodistrustedDederich, believed “the old man” had advised Chavez to work toward the removal ofmovementveteranswhochallengedhisauthority.“Ifyourpeopledon’t followyou,”PadillarecalledDederich saying toChavez, “get somenewpeople.”49Dederich advisedChavez touse theGame among unionmembers to expose thosewho disagreedwith his authority andcultivateanewgenerationofloyalunionofficialsamongtheyouthatLaPaz,includinghissonPaul (“Babo”) and Dolores Huerta’s daughter, Lori. Chavez’s focus on youth mirroredDederich’sownemphasisonshapingyoungmindsatHomePlace,whereSynanites’averageagewasbetweentwenty-twoandtwenty-three.50

While away from La Paz, Gilbert Padilla began to openly question whether Chavez had“gone crazy.” He prepared for an intervention, but no one wanted to believe him. EstherPadillainitiallycountedherselfamongthedisbelievers,althougheventuallyshecamearoundtoherhusband’sposition.“[Chavez]wantedagroupthathecoulddominate,”Estherrecalled,“[one] that would [convey] one message.” According to the Padillas, Chavez privatelyadvocated for a new philosophy—“one policy, one mind”—and shared his belief that“anybodywho differedwith thatwas out to fuck the union.”51 Thempered by loyalty to theunion and his responsibility as amember of theNational Executive Board, Gilbert Padilla

withheldjudgment,whileDederichmovedmoreaggressivelytoestablishaformalrelationshipwithChavezandLaPaz.InearlyFebruary1977,Dederichsentaforty-foottractor-trailerfulloffood,clothing,and

buildingmaterialstoLaPaztoimproveconditionsamongresidents.Duringthissameperiod,heofferedhis helicopter and eventually sent his limousine todriveChavez theninetymilesfromLaPaztoBadger.52AtHomePlace,Dederichimpresseduponhisfriendthebenefitsthatcamewithcommunalliving,whereresidentspooledresources,regularlyplayedtheGame,andrespected theauthorityof the leader.Obedience included the“containment”of residents thatsealed them off from the outside world from time to time. Male residents voluntarily hadvasectomies en masse in accordance with Dederich’s teachings on the need to addressoverpopulationintheworld.Womenvoluntarilybeganshavingtheirheadsin1975toeffectamessageofequality,but thecustomquicklyevolved intoa symbolicactofallegiance to theSynanonlifestyle.53

Although these practices signaled an increasingly authoritarian bent to Dederich’s rule,Chavez saw only harmony between the leader and his followers.At one point,Chavez andDederich brought a handful of Synanites together with unionmembers for a meeting in theNorthUnitofLaPaz.Dederichinstructedhisfollowerstosetupthestageinpreparationfortheevent,whileChavezandanumberofstafferslookedon.OneLaPazresident,CynthiaBell,recounted what she saw: “All of the sudden these bald-headed people (men and women)poured inwith theirwhiteoutfits.Theyworked insilenceand inunionismsettingupwithinminutesthesoundsystem/stage.Cesarwassmilingandalsoobservinginsilence;thentheyleftasquick[ly]astheycame.Iwasjustsittingthereandallthesemixedemotionsgoingthroughmymind trying to figureoutwhat thiswas leading to.Notoncedid thesepeoplemakeeye-contactwithus.”54AfterDederichandhisgroupdeparted,ChavezinformedLaPazresidents,“This is how Iwantyouall tobe!”Privately,Bell andothers expressed reservations aboutSynanonbutdidnotmaketheirconcernspublic.InthemeantimeChavezmadeplanstoworkmore closelywithDederich’s team, invitingoneofSynanon’sGamemasters,MattRand, toprepareforexperimentationwiththeGameatLaPaz.55

Most leaders on the National Executive Board chose to ignore the changes in Chavez’scharacterandpriorities.Thereassignmentoforganizers toregionsmeant thatMarshallGanzstayed focused on organizing vegetable workers in the Imperial Valley and Salinas; EliseoMedinaconcentratedonmakinggainsamonggrapeworkersinCoachellaandcitrusworkersinOxnard; andDoloresHuerta,RichardChavez, andGilbertPadillaworked in the traditionalstronghold of grapes up and down the Central Valley. Others, like Mack Lyons, remainedfocused on their particular projects with farm workers outside of the state, whereas PeterVelasco and Philip Vera Cruz continued their work with farm worker retirees in Delano.JessicaGovea, theyoungestmemberof theboard, struggled tomaintainhealthclinics in thefield, including across the border in northernMexico.Among organizers,Ganz andMedinamadethegreatestgains throughout thewintermonthsof1976and1977andbegantosee thepromiseoffurtherorganizingintheirrespectiveregions,ifonlytheunioncoulddecidewheretodirectitscollectiveenergies.

FIGURE15.MembersoftheNationalExecutiveBoard,June10,1976.Standing,lefttoright:MarshallGanz,PhilipVeraCruz,RichardChavez,PeteVelasco.Sitting,lefttoright:MackLyons,CesarChavez,GilbertPadilla,EliseoMedina,DoloresHuerta.ALUA,UFWCollection,252.

Ganz dedicated himself to total victory in the vegetable fields of the ImperialValley andtouched base with Chavez only when necessary. Chavez’s son-in-law, Arturo Rodríguez,workedwithGanztoeducateeighteeninexperiencedorganizerstransferredfromtheboycotttoEl Centro to pursue victories in a dozen ranches across the Imperial Valley involvingapproximately 2,100 workers. Under Ganz, the UFW team managed to achieve significantgainsindues-payingmembersoutsideofCalexico,maintainingafavorabilitymarginofnine-to-one among workers in asparagus crops, and a 97 percent approval rating from all farmemployeesintheImperialValley.AstheUFWteamrampedupitsoffensive,growersstruggledtocountertheirmomentum.The retreat of the Teamsters as a viable alternative to the UFW led one grower to the

familiaroptionofcreatingacompanyunion.AttheRoyalPackingCompany,ownersconvertedtheemployeesassociation into theAgrupacion IndependientedeTrabajadoresandentered iton the ballot. When the new general counsel for the ALRB, Henry Delizonna, refused toremovethecompanyinresponsetodemandsfromtheUnitedFarmWorkers,Ganzandateamofpicketersdescendedon theALRBoffice inElCentro,where theyallegedlyrippedpaperfromtypewriters,tookovertelephones,andpreventedacarcontainingfiveagentsfromgettingtoapreelectionconference.PolicearrestedGanzand twenty-sevenpicketers, touchingoffapublicshowdownwiththenewgeneralcounsel,whomGanzreferredtoas“DirtyHarry.”56

Althoughhepubliclychallengedtheowner’sactionsthatlaterresultedinthedecertificationof the company’s victory, privately, Chavez questionedGanz’s aggressive behavior. ChavezfeltcompelledbyGanz’sactionstounleashaviciousattackonDelizonna,callinghima“liar,racist, andunionbuster,”butheadmitted to theboard, “Ididn’t feel toogoodafterward.”57The assault on the ALRB office generated bad press, especially at a time when the union

enjoyed an advantage in elections as long as itworkedwith the general counsel.58 EquallyannoyingtoChavez,thedisturbancehaddrawnhimoutofhiscocoonatLaPaz,wherehehadbeen dealingwith the fallout from the Joneses’ resignations and the news of rebellion fromacross theboycottnetwork.59Chavez’sdecision to call ameetingof theNationalExecutiveBoard in late February at Synanon’sHomePlace cheeredMedina andGanz, both ofwhomanticipated a serious discussion about strategy and establishing a set of priorities fororganizing.60

The distractions in the ImperialValley also troubledMedina,whowantedmore attentionpaidtoCoachellaandOxnard.Betweentryingtoquelltherebellionintheboycottdepartmentand forging closer relations with Dederich, Chavez tried to put pressure on Delizonna toresolve the ImperialValley conflict atRoyal PackingCompany.Medina disapproved of theideaofhavingChavezfastandlabeledhisdecisiontoconductavigilwith2,000farmworkersin front ofDelizonna’s office inSacramento a “mistake.” “Howcan it be that our job is toorganizeworkersandI’vegottobepicketingtheALRB?”Medinacomplained.61

Ganz, of course, believed the attention on the Imperial Valley worthwhile, although hewelcomedaclarificationofprioritiesandbelieved,alongwithMedina,thattoomuchtimeandmoneyhadbeendirectedatwhathad increasinglybecomea losingcause in thegrapefieldsaroundDelano.62Although thenew regional structurepitted the twoorganizers against eachotherinastruggleforresources,GanzandMedinaagreedontheneedtoorganizewherethelikelihoodofaddingmoreworkerstotheunionshowedthemostpromise.“Organizationsareeithergrowingordying,”Ganzbelieved,and theunionhad reachedaperiodof stasis. “It’sliketheBobDylansong[It’sAlright,Ma(I’mOnlyBleeding)],”Ganzrecalled,“you’reeitherbusybeingbornoryou’rebusydying.”“And,”headded,“wehadawholelotmorebeingborntodo.”63

PHILOSOPHY

Mostmembersof theexecutiveboardarrivedatBadgerwithhighhopes. JerryCohen,whohad delayed his arrival to work on the Teamsters pact, anticipated a productive few days.AlthoughhehadtogiveupanantitrustsuitagainsttheTeamstersandlettucegrowersinSalinastogettheagreement,Cohenbelievedhehadputtheunioninaposition“tocleanthetable”inthenextfewmonthsbyremovingthemainimpedimenttoUFWorganizers.HesidedwithGanzinmovingmoreaggressivelyintovegetables,recalling,“Ifyoulook[ed]attheelectionstatstounderstand… the strength of the union, you’d see that after the law passed, [Salinas andImperialwere]thebase.”64Hewelcomedtheopportunitytodebatetheunion’sprioritiesandfavoredashiftawayfromorganizingamonggrapeworkers.OfficiallyCohenwasnotamemberoftheboard,butheattendedmostmeetingsasthehead

ofthelegaldepartment,especiallywhendecisionsrelatedtothedepartmenthadtobedecided.Forthismeeting,hepreparedtodiscussaproposalsubmittedtotheboardbymembersofhisparalegalteamrequestingthattheymovefromavolunteersystemtoawage-basedstaff.The

teamproposedthatstaffreceiveabasesalaryof$450amonthinadditiontobenefitsandthatapersonnel review board to hear grievances be established. In the lead-up to the meeting,ChavezhaddismissedtheproposalandinsteadencouragedCohentomovetoLaPaz.“Cesaroffered me to come here and stay,” Cohen recalled, “but [he said] ‘I can’t afford Sandy[Nathan]andallthesepeople.’”CohendeclinedChavez’s invitation and argued forpayingunion lawyersbasedon simple

economicterms.“IfyouhaveSandyat12or10grandayear,”heargued,“andtheTeamsters’andgrowers’ lawyersweregoing at $300or $400 anhour, it’s economicpressure.”CohenknewthatitwasthispressurethathadbroughttheTeamstersandthegrowerstothebargainingtableandthoughtthatChavezwouldbe“whacko”togivethatuptosaveafewdollars.HealsoarguedthathavingthelegalteaminSalinas,closertothebaseofpowerinvegetables,madesense.65Likeothers,CohenhadheardrumorsofChavez’squirkybehavioratLaPazandwasloathtorelinquishtheautonomythatdistanceafforded.By1977LaPaz,infact,hadbecomearunningjokeamongboardmembers,areputationaboutwhichChavezhadgrownincreasinglysensitive.Earlyon,themeetingproducedconflictsbetweenChavezandboardmembers,startingwith

differencesovertheagenda.Tobegin,thegroupconstructedalistofdiscussiontopics.EliseoMedinawantedtotalkaboutorganizingprioritiesandstrategy;MackLyonsraisedthequestionofpaidstaffversusvolunteers;MarshallGanzwanted toaddresshowtheywoulddealwith“Dirty Harry” and the ALRB; someone else mentioned the need for planning outside ofCalifornia and inquired about the future of the boycott. Chavez, however, channeled allsuggestions into the broad and amorphous topic of “philosophy.” “I think we are at acrossroads of our philosophy,” he announced. “I think we’re confused.” “Where are wegoing?” he asked themembers.Ganz,who sought tomake sense of his direction, offered anumberofinterpretationsuntilhelandedonanideathatChavezapprovedof:“[Theissueofphilosophy]isthewholequestionofcommunityandwherethatfitsininthewholeschemeofthingsandwhetherwe’reseriousaboutitornotseriousaboutit.”The comment enlivened Chavez. “Exactly right, exactly,” he told the group, “that’s the

word,” referring to community. Yet the exchange proved to be a foreshadowing of futuredisagreement rather thanamomentofcommonunderstanding.Chavez leapt todefineGanz’sthought,offering,“We’regrowingtwoheadsat thesametime.”ForChavez,whohadgrownincreasinglycommitted tocultivatingacommunity in the likenessofSynanon’sHomePlace,theunionthreatenedtoformalizerelationshipsinawaythatwoulddenyhisdreamsforLaPaz.Ganzstoodontheotherside,butfornowherespondedwiththevaguecomment,“Alotofusfeeltwodifferentwaysaboutit.”Chavezavoidedconflictandsimplyrepeatedhisbeliefthattheywouldworkitoutinadiscussionof“philosophy”throughouttheday.As the meeting dragged on, Ganz and Medina, both frustrated, joked among themselves,

needlingChavezforhisfailuretorebuildtheboycottandhisaversiontostrikes.66AtonepointGanzencouragedtheboardtoconsiderthefinancialhealthoftheunionandidentifysourcesoffunding,butChavezignoredhim,choosinginsteadtoclarifythetermsofthediscussion:“Thecrossroadsrightnowis,isitamovementorisitaunion?”“We’reatthestage,”heelaborated,“whereweneed tomakeadecisionbecauseweareneither rightnow.”CrosbyMilne,who

hadbeenhiredasamanagementconsultant tocreatestructure for theboard,agreed,adding,“We’rebeingmanagedbythelaw.”ThewordsrangtrueforChavez,whoworriedaloudabouthowALRAhadchangedtheunionfortheworse.Hetoldtheboard,“Thelawhaschangeduscompletely.”Whereastheactofstrikinghaddefinedthemovementbefore1975,“thestrikeisnow the fight with the [Agricultural Labor Relations] Board.” The law, he lamented, “hasbecomethecenterofpower.”GanzandMedinaseemedreadytoengagethatreality,butChavezredirectedthediscussion

towardmoreexistentialquestions, includingwhoshouldbelong to theunion,onwhat terms,andwhat should be theirmotivation for belonging. The questions reflected concerns on themindsofmanyboardmembersregardingrecentresignationsandthelegalteam’sproposaltopaystaffratherthantocontinuethevolunteersystem.Severalmembersofthelegalteamhadcomestraight fromlawschool toworkfor theunion insteadofpursuing lucrativecareers inprivatepractice.Chavez,however,measuredtheircommitmentsolelybytheirwillingnesstoadheretothevolunteersystem.IntheabsenceofCohen,whohadyettoarrive,Chavezstatedhispreferenceagainstpayingpeopleanddeclared“community”asthe“nextthing.”“Wetrytobuildcommunity,”heasserted,“butwedon’t reallyhavecommunity.”Addressing therecentdepartures,hestated,“We’renotaskingthemtoleave,butweshouldhave.”Forhim,theonlypeopleofvaluewerethosewhocameseekingcommunityandwhowerewillingtoadheretothevolunteer system.Given these “facts,”he saw the taskofdefining community as thekeyworkoftheboardoverthethreedaysinBadger.Takenontheirownmerit,noneofChavez’sconcernswereconsideredfrivolousbythosein

attendance.Mostagreedthattheunionhadtoreestablishanunderlyingphilosophy,giventhatthelawhadforcedadegreeofinstitutionalizationunfamiliartomostveteranmembers.Manyontheboardworriedabouttheinadequacyofthecurrentstaff—intermsofquantityandquality—tomeetthechallengesbeforethem.Medinacomplainedthattheunionhadnotmade“arealefforttoattractthepeople,”bywhichhemeantfarmworkers.Others,suchasPeterVelasco,sharedtheopinionthattheunionhadforcedoutvolunteersunfairly,whichhadproducedfearamong thosewho remained.Velascowaxed nostalgic about the early days, when a generalfeelingof“love”hadpervadedtheentiremovementandpeople joined,wentaway,andthenbroughtback their friends,offeringfood,money,clothing,and their time.“I thinkwe’ve lostthatlove,”helamented.BothVelascoandPhilipVeraCruzweretroubledbythepurgesintheboycottnetworkafterProposition14andwantedtocorrectwhatappearedtobeanarbitraryprocessoffiringstaff.VeraCruzrecommendedthatvolunteers“haveequalrights toexpressthemselves”similartothosegiventoworkersintheranchcommittees.VelascofocusedmoreonthepoorconditionsatLaPaz,citingalackofhotwater, the“shaggy”mattresses,and thedeteriorating facilities as reasons for low morale among volunteers living at the union’sheadquarters. “When it comes to our volunteers, we don’t give a fuck,” he stated bluntly.VelascoandVeraCruzexpressedadesiretoincreasestipendstoaddresssomeoftheseills,butbothstoppedshortofrecommendingthattheunionpayitsstaff.Thequestionofabandoningthevolunteersystemforsalarieswasaseriousone,giventhat

mostof theirAFL-CIOpeer institutionspaidwages.Manyconfessedhaving trouble feedingthemselves, let alone organizing workers on $10 per week, the stipend for NEBmembers.

“Let’s be honest here today,”RichardChavez complained, “you can’t fucking eat on $10 aweekanymore!”Clearlyaffectedbyhisdeprivation,headded,“Itwouldclearmygoddamnedmindif Icouldget$10 toeat!”Throughout themeeting,heexhibitedflashesofangeron thesubject,atonepointpushingthegrouptothinkabouttheirfutureandwonderingaloudaboutthevalueof their lives. “What’sgoing tohappen tomewhen Iam65?!”Heurged thegroup tothink about their worth to the movement if for no other reason than that it shaped theconsciousness of staffwhowould later take over the union. “Someonemight come into theadministrationandtakeover,”heworried,“andsay,‘ah,youoldfucks…You’vedoneyourthingsforfree…[now]get thefuckoutofhere,andwe’regoingtotakeoveranddothingsdifferent[ly!]’”Whenhisbrothertoldhimtostopworrying,Richardpressedthepoint:“IhavetoknowhowmuchIamworthtothismovement…eachoneofus!”Hisconcernshedlightonjust how alienated from the staff some members of the leadership had become. SeveralmembersexpressedagreementwithRichard,andsomeevenbegantocalculatehowtheirlaborwouldtranslateintowages,butthemajorityrefusedtoletgoofthevolunteersystem.Medinareturnedrepeatedlythroughoutthemeetingtohisdesiretorecruitfarmworkersand

peopleofcolorasananswertotheproblemofadwindlingstaff.“Thefactthatwedon’tpayisour strength,” he shared, “but also our weakness because we attract every Twinkylanderaround.” His comments revealed his discomfort with the predominance of young, whiteidealistswhohadcometoLaPazoftenwithverylittleconnectiontolifeinthefields.Alludingtotheneedtofireunwantedstaff,hetoldthegroup,“Weknowwhattodowiththem,butwedon’tdo it.”Yet inmaking thesuggestion toget ridofmorepeopleandaggressivelyrecruitfarmworkersforservice,heacknowledgedaconundrum:themoretheyimprovedwagesinthefields,thelessincentivetheycreatedforfarmworkerstobecomepartofthevolunteerstaff.“Igoout thereandtalktoaworker,”heshared,“andIsay: ‘You’remaking$3.40perhour…comeandworkforcincopesos[por]lacausa [fivedollars for themovement].’ [Theysay]‘Ay,Chingada!You’reloco,Cabrón[Oh,fuck!You’recrazy,asshole]!’”“We’remakingfarmworksogoddamnedattractive,”Medinaalleged,thattheworkershadnointerestinsacrificingtheiremerging“middle-class”existenceforthepovertyassociatedwithunionwork.67

Medina’sfrustrationwithrecruitmenttappedintoagrowingresentmentamongmanyontheboard toward farmworkerswho reaped thebenefitsof theunionbutcontributed little to itsmaintenance. The disparities between their well-being and the struggles of union officialsgrated onmembers, producing a litany of complaints.According to Chavez, because of theunion,“fiftypercentofthefarmworkersaregettingunemploymentinsurance,andanothertenpercent are getting welfare… food stamps… shit, they qualify for all the goodie-goodieprograms!” Jim Drake reminded everyone that the union supplied farm workers with taxpreparationservices freeofchargeandsuggested that theycut themoff.Medinacomplainedthat irrigators represented by theUFWmade $15,000 a year while he earned just $10 perweek. Mack Lyons half-seriously joked, “Let’s consider California liberated and movesomewhereelse!”GilbertPadillarecommendedFlorida,whereLyonshadhopedsomedaytoorganize black farmworkers.When CrosbyMilne tried to refocus the discussion on goalsrather thancomplaints,byaskingwhat theoriginal intentof themovementhadbeen,Chavezanswered,“We’vebeensosuccessful[inthefields],thatwe’rehavingproblemshere[intheunion].”Medinaagreed,remindingeveryonethatwageshadtripledintheelevenyearssince

hehadjoinedtheunion.Velasco,whohadalongerviewofthesetrendsthanMedina,sharedthathehadentertained the thoughtof returning to thefields rather thancontinuing to take thevowofpovertythatworkingintheunionrequired.Chavezseizedonthesimmeringresentmentasanopportunitytodirecttheboard’sattention

toward building a disciplined community.He admiredDederich for his ability to turn dopefiends, alcoholics, and criminals into productive members of a community that revered itsleader. By encouraging the board to dwell on their material deprivation relative to farmworkersandbycastingrecipientsofunionlargesseasungrateful,Chavezpreparedtheboardtoaccepthisnewtargetfororganizing:thepeopletowhomhereferredas“thereallypoor”:“Ithinksecretlyallofusarereally[feeling]alotofpullinruralareasstillwithpeoplewhoarenotfarmworkers.Theydon’thavejobs.AndIthinkthat,probably,that’soneofthethingsthatbothersusbecauseweknowthatwe’renotreaching[the]otherpeoplewhoareunemployable.They’rewretched.Theygotoneeyethisway,andoneleg.They’reold,theyhaven’tgotajob.Nobody likes them.” His willingness to turn away from farm workers revealed his trueintentionofpursuingavisionsimilartoSynanon’s.WhilemostponderedChavez’ssuggestion,Ganzchallengedit,askingChavezandhisfellow

boardmemberstoconsiderwhatwasatstake.“IamnotsurewhereIcameinonthis,”Ganzexploded. “You’re talking likewehave80percentof the farmworkersorganized.Wehavemaybe5percent?”TryingtopacifyGanz,Chavezrespondedinaquiet,condescendingvoice,“Marshall[longpause].It’sjustamatteroftime.”WhenGanzprovednottobepersuadedbyhis entreaty,Chavez added, “It justmeans doing it.”As the first day came to an end,Ganzresponded, “That seems tobepresenting aprettybigproblem.”Hewanted toget into “thatproblem,”butjustashebegan,MattRandinterruptedthemeetingtoinvitetheboardtodinewithChuckDederichandobserveasessionoftheGameinanotherbuilding.Thefollowingday,Ganzgrewmoreinsistentondealingwiththeproblemsofmanagingthe

uniontoitsmaximumpotential.WhenChavezattemptedtochannel theboardalongthesamefalsedichotomyofpayingwagesversusbuildingcommunity,Ganzpounced.“Ithinktherearemuchmoreoptionsthantheextremes,”hetoldtheboard.NotkeenonChavez’sintenttoimitateSynanon at La Paz, he tried to nip the discussion in the bud by highlighting the differencesbetween the twoorganizations.Reflectingon theboard’s communalmealwithDederich thenightbefore,Ganzsetupthescenario:“Whenitisvitallyimportanttobeatthemealtimeatthatplaceandtime,sothatyoucansharewitheverybodyinthecommunity,orthegaming,orwhateveritis,andthenoverhereyou’vegotsomeonewhohasbeenthrowninjailthatyougottogetoutof jail…areyougoing to chooseyourselfor areyougoing to choose theguy injail?” Chavez refused to answer the question and insisted that Synanon’s model was moresimilar to theUFW thanGanz recognized. “Yeah, but they’re not involvedwith people outthere,” Ganz retorted, hoping to draw attention to the insular nature of Synanon. Chavezresortedtoclaimingthatheknewbetterthaneveryone.“Iknowmorethanmostofyou,”hetoldtheboard,“becauseIamattheeyeofthestormatLaPaz.”RichardChavezdisagreedwithhisbrother,arguingthatLaPazhadbecomenonrepresentativeoflifeintheunion.“It’sisolated,”hecomplained.“Youcan’tworkupthere.”RichardrecommendedthattheyconvertLaPazintoatrainingcenterratherthanmaintainingitastheheadquarterswherepeoplelivedandworked.

TheideaprecipitatedanangryresponsefromCesar,andthetwodescendedintoanargumentuniquetosiblings.Realizing that the board was on to him, Cesar Chavez dispensed with all pretense of

impartiality and launched into a defense of his community-building idea. “Thewaywe aregoing,”heintoned,“we’renotgoingtomakeit.”Theboard,heargued,coulddecidetostartpayingwages,butthenumerousfinancialobligationsoftheunionmadesuchanoptionnearlyimpossible. The existing resources would require a much leaner staff and a reduction ofservicestowhich,hepredicted,mostboardmemberswouldnotagree.TothisChavezaddedaprophesyofobsolescenceforfarmworkersand,byextension,theunion:“Nosoonerthanwewill have it built than we’re going to be faced with other forms of poverty … withmechanizationandthingscomingup,it’sgoingtobeasmallpercentageofworkersworking,verywellpaid,alargemajorityofpeopleintheruralareasstillpoor,youknow,formerfarmworkers,theruralpoor.”Undersuchascenario,thedetritusofamechanizedworld—includingbothfarmworkersandtheirunionrepresentatives—wouldbecomethesocialoutcastsforthenewUFWtoorganize.Ratherthanwaittobecomeobsolete,Chavezsuggestedthattheboardanticipatethischangebyorganizingintocollectivesaheadoftheapocalypse.“Thewayformetogo,”hefinallyadmitted,“istohaveacommunitylikeSynanonorclosetothatandstarttrulycooperativeventures.”“Inotherwords,”headded,“westarttakingovertheland.”68

Chavezrevealedthedepthsofhisconvictionsbyacknowledgingthathehadgiventhisplandeepthought.InadditiontohisvisitstoSynanon,heexpressedhisadmirationforSunburst,acommuneestablishedin1969byNormanPaulsen,adiscipleofParamahansaYogananda,thearchetypalself-helpguruwhohademigratedfromIndiatoLosAngelesin1920tospreadhismessage of “self-realization” in the West. Although Chavez remained loyal to Dederich,Paulsen impressedhimasamanofvisionwhoespoused theprinciplesofhigh thinkingandsimple, natural living. “They used to live in wigwams, tepees, and abandoned cars, reallypoor,” he told the board.Yet in spite of these humble beginnings, Paulsen inspired a smallgroup of followers, some of them quitewealthy, to give up theirworldly possessions, livecommunally,andbeginfarming300acresoutsideofSantaBarbara.Paulsen“hadavisioninadreamtoownamillionacres.”Withinashorttime,Sunbursthadayachtandairplanesattheirdisposal and had built a compound and cultivated an organic farm on 50,000 acres thatprovided for all the needs of the spiritual community. In addition to Sunburst and Synanon,ChavezhadpersonallyresearchedtheHutterites,anotherreligiousgrouplivingcommunallyinNorthDakota, and had askedChrisHartmire, the head of theNationalMigrantMinistry, toresearchsimilargroupsinEurope.69

Chavezsharedhissincerebeliefthatsuch“landcooperativesaregoingtocome.”Theriseofother religious groups, such as Jim Jones’s Peoples Temple and the Reverend SunMyungMoon’s Unification Church, yet to be discredited by homicidal tendencies and bizarrebehavior,provedthepopularityofcommunallivingorganizedaroundoneleaderandinspiredChaveztoseesuchmodelsasviableoptions.“Allthepressurethatwehaveofgettingoutofthecity,”hetoldtheboard,“arepressuringpeopletogobacktothemiddleages.”“Goingbacktothe land,”sharingresources,andproducingtheirownfood,hepredicted,wouldmaketheUFWself-sufficientand“solvetheproblemofmachinesbymakingthemachinesworkforus.”

Forhim,unionssuchastheUnitedAutoWorkersmissedanopportunityinthe1930sand1940sto take over the factories and own them cooperatively, retainingmost of the profits for theunion.RealizingthathisargumentswerebeginningtoslidetowardtheMarxisttheoryhehadaccusedtroublemakersofespousingintheboycottnetwork,Chavezasserted,“IamnottalkingaboutCommunism;Iamtalkingaboutcooperativism.”70

AsboardmembersstruggledtomakesenseofthesenewideasandClydeMilneencouragedChaveztoexplainSynanon’srelevancetotheUFW,Ganzseethed.WhenChavezdismissedtheworkof theunionassecondary to thenewchallengesoforganizingacommune,heerupted:“Butthere’salotofrealstruggleaheadinCalifornia!Weshouldn’tbecountingthosechickenssodamneasy.Irememberwedidthatoncebefore.”ChavezrejectedGanz’simplicationthattheywerefallingintothesamemistakestheyhadcommittedaftersigningthe1970contracts,when the mismanagement of hiring halls led to widespread trouble maintaining members.Instead,hechastisedGanzforseeingthingsthroughhis“personalexperience”intheImperialValleyandencouragedhimto“lookatthewholeunion.”WhenChavezsuggestedthatthereal“missionary”workfortheunionexistedinbuildingcommunityatLaPaz,Ganzshotback,“Butmost ofCalifornia is stillmissionary,” suggesting that the aimof organizing and negotiatingcontractshadtotakeprecedentinordertoreachtheirgoalof100,000newmembersbeforetheendoftheyear.Admittingjusthowmuchhehadshiftedhispriorities,Chavezresponded,“Butwe’re not doing that anymore.” “No kidding,”Ganz sarcastically retorted. “Let’s dealwiththat!Mostoftheworkersaren’torganized!”Ratherthanmovethemeetingtowardadiscussionofhowbesttoadddues-payingmembers,

Chavez and Ganz’s confrontation descended into a debate over the exact meaning of“missionarywork,”aconceptbanteredaboutamongboardmembersthatharkenedbacktotheharrowingdaysofbuildingtheunion.WhenChavezarguedthatwinningelectionswasthetrue“high”andsuggestedthatnegotiatingcontractsdidnotinteresthim,Ganzresponded,“Thenweshouldmakeitlikemissionarywork.”Ganztriedtoputinperspectivetheworkofconvertingelections into dues-payingmembers: “We have a couple thousandworkers organized in thestate, and we’re talking as if we had 200,000 workers organized here and [in] the wholecountry,andnowwe’rereadyforacaseofthehardeningofthearteries.…Imean,shit!”WhenGanz explained that negotiating contractswith those farmworkers not covered by theUFWconstituted“90percentofwhat’slefttodo,”ChavezaccusedhimofbeingtooabsorbedinhisworkinCalexico.“Butthat’swheretheactionis!”Ganzprotested.Asthemeetingworeon,itbecameclearthatChavezwantedtheunconditionalapprovalof

the board to rebuild La Paz in the likeness of Synanon and other communes. “The road isopen,”hetoldthemembers,“andweranoutofgas.”Hesawthecurrentworkoftheunionasadeadend.Hecomplained,“Ifwehad100moreorganizers,wecouldgooutthereandgetthegoddamned job done, but we don’t, see?” He explained that organizing for more victorieswouldjustproducetheneedformorenegotiatorsofcontracts; in turn,morecontractswouldrequire new people to administer to the new members. Inexplicably, Chavez attributed thefailure to climb this ladder of tasks on “a very badly construed plan for a community” thatdatedbackto1962,whentheybegantothinkaboutformingaunion.“We’retryingtomakeitwork,butitdoesn’tworkbecauseit’sgottoberemodeled.”

The board returned to a discussion of paying or not paying staff, once again without aconclusiveresult.MedinaagreedwithGanzthatgreaterfocushadtobeplacedonorganizingratherthanonretreatingtoLaPaz.Hepreferredgoingafter“moreandmorecontracts,”hetoldtheboard,sothattheunionwould“attractlessandlessoftheidealisticyoungpeoplefromthecities.” He admitted, however, that such a scenario would earn farm workers “so muchgoddamned money” that they would not be attracted to volunteer service. Medina worriedaloud, “We’regoing to shrink.”AlthoughPhilipVeraCruzandRichardChavezexpressedadesire to provide some form of material compensation for people’s service to the union,includingtheirown,noonecouldbringhimselftoendorsethepaymentofwages.MostdidnotunderstandhowSynanon’smodelofcommunallivingwasrelevanttotheunion,buteveryoneacknowledged that a common purpose and a shared community had drawn them to themovementinthefirstplace.AsChavezrandownthelistofboardmembersinattendancefortheirvote,eachhesitatedtogivehisfinalanswerandeachexpressedtrepidationaboutpayingwages.MackLyonswarned,“Ifwestartpaying,wecan’tcomeback[toavolunteersystem],”asentimentwithwhicheveryoneintheroomagreed.JustasChaveztookthestrawpollonwhethertopaymembers,JerryCohensteppedintothe

room,crackingwiseaboutthebizarrebehavioroftheSynanitesandrequestingarundownoftheboard’s business up to that point.Medina,who seemed to harbor resentment toward thelegaldepartment for itsproposal,deliveredanearlyshotacrossCohen’sbow.“Whydowepaylawyers$600bucks,asopposedtootherpeople?”heasked.“Thatseemstomearadicaldeparturefromwhatwe’redoing.”WhenChavezrespondedthattheyhadmadeanexceptionforlawyersanddoctorsinthebeginningbecausetheboarddidnotthinktheycouldattractthemwithout wages, Medina smugly joked, “I thought lawyers were coming because of Jerry’smagneticpersonality.”Chavezreturnedthehumor,confirming,“Well,thatand$600.”Medinafeignedignoranceaboutthepolicy,pointingout,“Youhavepeoplewhoaregettingasalarythatisconsiderablyaboveandbeyondwhatotherpeoplearegetting.”AsthestrawpollcamearoundtoCohen,hedeliveredthestrongestpositiononthematter.

RatherthanshrinkfromMedina’schallenge,Cohenaddressedwhatwasoneveryone’smind:“Iwanttotakeaclearposition,andmypositionisthatwe’regoingtohavetopaypeople.”Acagey tactician,Cohencoylyadmitted, “I’mhaving troubleunderstanding someof the thingsthatarebeingsaid,”butstillheofferedanunambiguousanswertoeveryissueraisedtothatpoint. Cohenworried aloud about the danger of experiencing turnover in staff at amomentwhen the union needed stability. In addition to the recruitmentwork of the field offices, hewarnedthattheupcomingcertificationofcontractsintheirthirdandrenewableyearrequiredmemberswithexperience insuchnegotiationsor theunionstoodto losehard-foughtground.Heexplainedwhatwouldhappeniftheydecidednottopaywages:“Idon’tthinkwe’dhavethecontinuityand…thecompetenceandI thinkit isaquestionofsurvival,at leastwhenitcomestosomejobs.”TurninghisattentiontoMedina,heconfirmedthatthelawyers“do liketheunion”and“thereisanelementoftheloveforthefightbut,withoutsalariesthere’sgoingtobe turnover.”Citing a recent example inwhich several resignations in the legal departmentmadefordifficultiesduringanantitrustcase,Cohenopined,“Ithinkwewastedalotoftimebynot paying people.” For these reasons, Cohen told the board, he supported the paralegals’proposal,whichheregardedas“well-thoughtout”and“reasonable.”Ultimately,Cohenlanded

squarelyon the sideofpayingpeopleacross theboard for the simple reason that it ensured“competenceandcontinuity.”WhenChrisHartmiresuggestedthatthe“continuityof[Cohen’s]leadership”wouldproducethesamesecurityinthelegaldepartmentthathishadcreatedintheMigrant Ministry, Cohen strongly disagreed. Echoing the earlier points made by Ganz andMedina,Cohenretorted,“Ithinkitcomestofeelingpeople’sproblemsoutthereinthefields.Itcomestoservicingcontracts.Itcomestoadministeringcontracts.There’saproblemthere.”Although Medina disagreed with Cohen’s position on wages, he appreciated his

acknowledgmentoftheproblemofattritionamongthestaffandusedtheopeningtomakehispoint. “In my opinion,” he told the board, “we’re overextended. We’re doing too manygoddamned thingswithoutenoughpeople.”He reciteda listofdepartments thathebelievedneededtobecut,includingthehealthclinics,thecampesinocenters,andtheretirementvillage.Taken together with the requirements of operating the boycott, field offices, the legaldepartment,andadministeringcontracts, these tasksprevented theunion fromdoinganythingwell. “Goddamnit,we should close thegoddamnedclinics,”he angrily advised, adding thatthey should force the workers to go “to whatever doctor they want to go to in town.”Sharpening his position,Medina argued that the union needed to concentrate on organizingworkers.Todo this, theunion should“closeeverything that isnot related toorganizingandadministeringcontracts.”Chavezagreedwiththecalltoreducestaffcostsbutgrewfrustratedwiththeboard’srefusal

toembracehissolutions.HeseizedonMedina’sideaforcuttingstaff,announcingthatlessthan20percentoftheunion’smoneycamefromduesandwarningofmassivelayoffsiftheboarddidnotmakeadecisionaboutpayingwages.Whendirepredictionsfailedtospur theboardintoagreeingwithhisplantoconcentrateonLaPaz,helashedout,“Ican’tmanagetheunionunlessIgetsomedirectionfromyou.”“Formanyyears,”heinsisted,“Ididn’tasktheboard,Ijustdidit.”Althoughclearproposalshademergedduringthemeeting—Cohen’sideaofpayingpeople; Medina’s plan to cut departments; Ganz’s proposal to shift resources towardorganizingandincreasingdues-payingmembers;andVelascoandVeraCruz’splantoimprovelivingconditionsforvolunteers—Chavezrefusedtoworkoutscenarioswherebyanyoftheseideascouldgivetheunionsomerelieffromitsstaffingwoesandfinancialburdens.Instead,hepushedharderforhissolutionofcommunitybuildingatLaPaz.“Ithinkthereisanotherwayofgettingpeopleintotheunion,”heannounced,“butweneedtohaverealdiscipline.Weneedtohaveacommunity.”Unconvinced, board members continued to discuss alternatives to Chavez’s plan. Milne

soughtamiddlegroundbetweenCohen’spositiononpayingsalariesandMedina’spreferencefor remaining an all-volunteer organization by suggesting that they determine which jobsconstituted“missionarywork”andpaysomeaccordingtotheirvalueintheunion.“You’renotgoing to pay them and not pay others,” Chavez sternly answered.WhenMilne asked why,Chavez upped the stakes. “Why not? Because I won’t be here and be a part of that,” hethreatened.Assertingavetopowerthatmostontheboardneverknewhehad,Chavezadded,“NowayintheworldIwouldletthathappen.”Chavez’s brinksmanship did not sit well with members, least of all Jerry Cohen, who

challengedChaveztoseriouslyconsiderMilne’sidea.WhenChavezrefused,Cohenscolded

him, “Whydoyouprejudge it and say ‘notgonna?’…That’s abigweapon to trot out, youknow.”HeparaphrasedChavezmockingly:“’Ifyoudoit thatway,you’renotgoingtohavemearound.’”Cohenwarnedthatsuchanapproachhadadampeningeffectonboardmembers’willingness to try new ideas. When Chavez tried to redirect Cohen’s challenges to“philosophy,” the way he had with Ganz a day earlier, Cohen stood up to him. “Well …philosophy,”Cohengroanedindisgust.“Ialwayshatedphilosophyincollegebecauseitwasnever relevant to the facts.” The confrontation invited other challenges, including one fromRichardChavez,whoworriedaloudabouthisownvaluetotheunionandaccusedhisbrotherofnotcaringaboutthewell-beingofhisorothervolunteer’sfamilies.ThechargesirritatedCesarChavez,precipitatinganothersiblingsquabble.“I’mgonnatell

you something,” he asserted. “It’s not threatening; it’s just plain fucking facts. If this uniondoesn’t turn around and become amovement, I don’twant no part of it!”Moments later heaccusedeveryoneofignoringhis“specialneeds.”“Myneedsarenotbeingmet,”heclaimed,“sowhenyoudon’tmeetmyneeds,thenwhatdoIdotodefendmyself?Isay,‘fuckyou!’”Thetirade was a thinly veiled threat to withhold union resources when members in the fieldrequestedthem.Heplacedtheonusoftheunion’sfailuresontheboard,complaining,“Weneedto really stop all the crap and make some goddamned, hard-ass decisions.” According toChavez, their “farting around” and obsessions with negotiations—ironically, the work of aunion—hadmadehimanineffectiveleader.“PrettysoonIbecomeagoddamnedfuckinglittleclown. I don’t do anything. I just bounce from one to the other.” “Nah,” he half-heartedlyconcluded,“Ican’tdoit.”71

ThecontentiousnatureoftheconversationworriedChrisHartmire,who,unbeknowntomostboardmembers,hadbeendraftedintoservicebyChaveztoresearchcommunesandpromotesimilar development at La Paz. Seeking to get his friend back on track, Hartmire invitedChaveztospelloutwhathemeantbyacommunity.WhenChavezemphasizedthatitbeganwithrestrictingaccesstothekitchenatLaPazandforcingpeopletoeatcommunallyastheydoatHome Place, Ganz expressed skepticism, arguing that Synanon did not fit the UFWmodel.“Mostof thesecommunities spendahellofa lotof timeoneachother,”heargued.ChaveztriedtodefendSynanonbyassertingthattheyspenttime“onpeople,”butGanzcorrectedhimforcefully,“On each other.” The two went back and forth like this before Chavez finallyerupted,“Ifwedon’tshapeupwe’regoingtohaveagoddamneduniononourhands!”72

Sensing opposition from a majority of the board, Chavez finally just asked for theirpermission to try the Game at La Paz. Cohen, a skeptic, advised Chavez to first focus ondelegatingmoreduties,butChavezwouldnothaveit.“No,Jerry,”heresponded,“Ican’tdothatuntilwefindsomethingelsetodo…andthatisTheGame.”Chavezinformedtheboardthatnoneofthemwouldbeexpectedtoparticipate;rather,hehadidentifiedagroupatLaPazwillingtoplay.Ganzstillobjected,arguing,“Ihaveahardtimebelievingthat’sthebestuseofyourtime.Whataboutallthosefarmworkersoutthere,whoneedyoutogooutthereandtalktothem?”Inresponse,ChavezofferedtoleaveLaPazfournightseachmonthtoministertothegrassroots.Hisplanrevealedthedepthsofhiswithdrawalfromthefarmworkercommunitiesand the degree towhich he had committed to turningLaPaz into his ownversion ofHomePlace.

Chavez launched into a defense of theGame, arguing that the practicewould help people“develop muscle” in confronting their wasteful behavior and anti-authority tendencies. HepromisedtotakeeighttotenpeopletoSynanoneveryweektostartandeventuallyexpandtoincludeeveryonelivingatLaPazwithintwoyears.Tohelpconvincetheboard,ChavezcalledinGamemasterMattRandtodescribehowthepracticehadbegunatSynanonandtoanswerany questions the boardmight have. Cohenworried aloud about the intensity of the insultsexchangedwithin theGame, and suggested that somememberswould “carry theirwounds”intodailylife.BothRandandChaveztriedtoreassurehimthattheboundariesbetweenwhathappened insideandoutsideof theGamewouldbe strictlymonitored,butCohen refused toacceptit,basedonhisexperienceinthelegaldepartment.Henotedthatalthoughsomeofhisstaff could “fight andwork” at some level, thereweremembers, “if I jump them, itwouldreallyfuckthingsup.”WhenChavezsuggestedthatthisproblemwouldbeavoidedbecausehewould invite people to “game” him, Cohen retorted, “The problem is, they wouldn’t say‘screw you.’” Both Hartmire and Milne warned Chavez that staff members regarded himdifferentlythantheirfellowvolunteers.Notrecognizingtheweightoftheirconcerns,Chavezpromised to “deal with my ego first” and “ritualize” the Game to mitigate any potentialconflicts.Milne asked Chavez to describe how the community at La Paz had received the news.

Chaveznotedthatthevastmajority“wereafraidbutinaninquisitivesortofway,”althoughasmall, vocal contingent worried that the Game would destroy relationships. Labeling thesepeople“politicals,”heattributed their reactions to theirhavingaproblemwithhisauthorityratherthanlegitimateconcerns.OneresidentwhohadbeenrecalledfromtheboycotttoliveatLaPazchosetoquitinreactiontotheannouncement,butChavezstated,“Hewasjustlookingfor an excuse to leave.”Unwittingly going back on his promise to separatewhat happenedwithin theGame fromwhat happenedoutsideof it,Chavez added, “[If] I [got] the sonof abitchinTheGameImightfindoutwhyhereallyisleaving.”73

Manyboardmembersacknowledgedthattherewouldbefewamongthemwhocouldbeasforthcoming in the Game as Chavez hoped, and many doubted it would be the “equalizer”ChavezandRandpromised.CohenpredictedthattheGamewouldnotbeparticularlyhelpfulinmakingdecisionsthathadpoliticalramificationsforboardmembers.Hearguedthatsomematterswere better handled through a subtle process of indirect communication rather thanconfrontation.“TheGamemayallowyoutobehonest,”headmitted,“butthere’sapricethatmightbepaidbecauseIamnotsuresomeofthepeopleinthisroomwouldbehonestback.”74Tellingly,noonequestionedCohen’sassertion.Thatnight,theunionattendedanotherdemonstrationoftheGame,thistimewithaninvitation

fromDederichtoparticipate.Cohenshowedhiswillingnesstomixitupwith“theoldman”whenDederich charged himwith disloyalty toChavez for his insistence onmaintaining thelegaldepartment inSalinasrather thanmovingit toLaPaz.Cohenlaugheditoff,dismissingDederichas“ChucktheShmuck”;however,theaccusationsignaledthatChavezhadconfidedprivateconcernstoDederich.At the start of themorningmeeting the next day,many joked about the incident, andmost

people seemed energized by the evening. Medina enthused about the communal meal

experience,whileDoloresHuerta,who had arrived just in time to partake in the evening’sevents,marveledatSynanonfortaking“people[who]arebrokenand[making]themwhole.”EvenCohen,whohadbeenskeptical,softenedhisopposition,seeingsomevalueintheGame.Ganz, however, persisted in challenging Chavez, pleading with him to acknowledge the

differencesbetweenSynanon’smissionandtheworkoftheunion.“There’sapointwherethe[UFW]staffbecomesoimportanttoitself,”heargued,“thatthatbecomesmoreimportantthantheworkouttherewiththepeople.”Chavezignoredhisconcerns,allowingthemeetingtodriftinto personal grievances amongmembers until ChuckDederich arrived for a question-and-answersession.OnlyChavezandHartmireshowedrealinterestinengagingDederich,whileGanzwriggledinhisseat,anxioustosalvagesomeresultsfromtheweekend.Asthemeetingwoundtoaclose,MedinaandGanztriedtopushtheiragendaeventhoughthe

time formaking critical decisionshad long sincepassed. In the closing tenminutesMedinaappealed formore support in Coachella for the upcoming harvest.WhenChavez instructedGanz to transfer his staff from the Imperial Valley to Coachella to help Medina at theconclusionoftheelections,Ganzprotested,arguingthatorganizersworkingwithhimneededatleastatwo-weekbreak,andtheboardneededtimetothinkthroughthestrategymorecarefully.Irritated,ChavezpermittedtheImperialValleystaffaone-weekbreak,butGanzrespondedthathehadalreadypromisedthemtwo.“Why’dyougivethemmycommitmentwithoutmeknowingit?”Chavezangrilyasked.Ganzofferedanapology,butChavezcuthimoff.“No,no,don’tbesorry,”hetoldGanz.“JustfollowtherulessoIknowwhatthehellyou’redoing.”Ganztriedtorespond,butChavezwouldnotbeconsoled.“Remindmetoscrewyounexttime,okay?AllIwantisalittlerespect.”ThesituationremainedtenseasMedinatriedagaintoworkinarequestformoresupport,but

neither Ganz nor Chavez would let it go. Finally, when Chavez quipped sarcastically thatGanz’s “guilt” would eventually free up “troops” for the ensuing fight in Coachella, Ganzerupted. “What troops?!” he demanded. “You’re imagining troops, too? See that’s what Ithought we were going to talk about at this meeting, you know, instead of, well.…,” Ganzcaught himself. Chavez, however, continued the fight, now asserting that he would “decidewherethefuckingstaffgoes.”Ganzrespondedmockingly,“Besureyouhaveallthefactstoo.”Chavez retorted thathedidnotneedfacts,andpromised todo thingsaccording tohis“ownlittle whims… from now on.” He added, “I get fucked every time I start trying to pleaseeverybodyandwewindupdoingshit.”Chavez quickly ordered Ganz, Richard Chavez, and Jim Drake to ride back to Delano

together andwork out strategy on theway.Worried about themagnitude of the undertaking,Richardcomplained that the taskwould takemore thanacar ride toplan.Ganz, still angry,added,“That’swhatweshouldadonefortwodays.”“No,”Chavezrepliedangrily,“thisismymeeting.”Endingtheconflictonanoteofpersonalbitterness,headded,“Youguysjustthinkaboutyourneeds.Ialsohaveneeds.Thisismymeeting,soIcantakecareofwhatIneedtodo.”75

In the end, themeeting failed to liveup to anyone’s expectations. In thepast,Chavezhadrecognized the challenges facing the union at critical moments and leaned on his staff ofadvisors to achieve solutions to their problems. This time, however, Chavez repeatedly

resistedthecounselofthoseinthefieldwhocouldgivehimadifferentperspective.Ganz,whohad earlier circulated awhitepaper arguing for the redeploymentof personnel tovegetablefarms,walkedawayfromthemeetingfrustratedandconfusedbyChavez’sbehavior.“Itwasreallybizarre,”hecommentedinretrospect.“Healwayswasalittleweird.…Imean,weirdingoodways.”Ganz and the board had become accustomed toChavez’s eccentricity and hadevencometoaccepthisprofane,oftencombativestyleinboardmeetings.PriortotheHomePlacemeeting,GanzhadseenthesequalitiesasevidenceofwhathecalledChavez’s“strategiccreativity,” inwhichhearguedwithboardmembers tocome tosomepolicydecisions.Thishadbeen“thejoyofthewholemovement”forChavez,Ganzbelieved,inwhichhefedoffthegive-and-takewithhiscomrades.AttheHomePlacemeeting,however,heseemedtotakeoneveryone,accusingthemofholdinghimback,resistinghisauthority,andultimatelysabotagingthefutureof theunion.Ganzrecalled,“Itwaslikeallofasudden,wewerelikeanegative.Thesenseofhumorwentoutofthings.”76

Whatmotivated this shift is open to conjecture, althoughmany acknowledge the defeat ofProposition14 as amomentwhenChavez experienced feelings of vulnerability for the firsttime. The purge ofNick andVirginia Joneswas his attempt to place blame for the loss atsomeone’s feet other than his own. The refusal of volunteers to accept that storylineaccentuated his sense of responsibility for the debacle. Their rebellion also highlighted hisfallibilityasa leaderandsuggested tomany that somethingwasawrywithin the leadership.Thatmostoftheserebelshadbeenwhitegavetheconflictracialovertonesthatthreatenedthemulticulturalunderpinningsofthemovement.Unwittingly,Medina’sinsistencethatmorefarmworkers—bywhichhemeantMexicansandFilipinos—moveintostaffpositionshadfueledagrowingresentmenttowardwhitevolunteerswhoincreasinglyquestionedthedirectionoftheunion.Oddly,theseworriesalsofacilitatedbitternesstowardtheverypeoplewhoselivestheyaimedtoimprove:farmworkers.Theunion’ssuccessinraisingwagesmadevolunteeringlessappealingtoapopulationwhommanyontheboardnowsawastoodependentonthem.Boardmembers’indignationstemmedfromfeelingsofinsecurityanddeprivationassociatedwiththestruggletomakeendsmeetunderanoutdatedvolunteersystem.Theboard’sunwillingnesstograpple with the compensation question delayed reckoning with the institutionalresponsibilities of a union that now, for better or worse, functioned as the primaryspokespersonforworkersinCaliforniafields.Theseobservations,ofcourse,assumethattheNationalExecutiveBoardwasademocratic

organization. Itwas not. In spite of his appeals to the board tomake “hard-ass decisions,”Chavezencumberedtheprocessofcollectivedecisionmakingbynarrowingtheoptionstofithisowndesiredoutcomes.Whenhedidnotgethisway,heaskedboardmemberstostepasidewhileheconductedhis“experiment”attheunion’sheadquarters.Chavez increasingly reliedona smallerandsmallercircleofadvisorswhosupportedhis

beliefs and facilitated his dream of achieving the control he perceived Dederich had atSynanon.Hisobsessionswith“philosophy”and“community”onlypartiallyrevealedhistrueintent to consolidate power at La Paz andweed out disloyalmemberswhose resistance heattributedtoanattachmenttocommunismortheirunwillingnesstoacquiescetohisauthority.UpuntiltheHomePlacemeeting,mostboardmembershadignoredChavez’sabuseofpower.

Some, such asDoloresHuerta andChrisHartmire, even justifiedhis actions.Their supportnotwithstanding, it was Chavez who demanded the power to hire, fire, and redeploy staffmembersashesawfit.Healsoinsistedonhavingallexecutivedecisionsregardingresourcesandcontractnegotiationspassbyhisdeskforapproval.Suchrequirementsmadehimprimarilyresponsibleforthedirectionoftheunionatthiscriticaltime.Historiansusuallyavoidanalyzingthepsychologicalstateoftheirsubjects,largelybecause

suchananalysisassumeswecanachieveaconclusiontantamounttoamedicaldiagnosiswhenoneisimpossible.Certainly,inmyencounterswithveteransofthemovement,thewordcrazyhas been uttered bymore than one person, but I believe such an interpretation of Chavez’sthoughtsandactionsbetraythecomplexitiesofthemomentandtheman.Forexample,nooneontheboardthoughtChavez’sconcernsabouttheeffectsofmechanizationunfounded,andevenGanzadmittedduringthemeetingthatthecomingofmachinesthreatenedthefutureofvegetableworkersintheImperialValleyandSalinas(adevelopment,incidentally,thathasyettooccur).Chavez’s interest in purchasing land and moving toward what he misguidedly called

“cooperativism”—to avoid the label of communism—offered a solution that, in retrospect,appears peculiar. His obsession with Synanon seems particularly troubling; however, it isworthrememberingthatthedemiseofurbanlivinghadbecomeatopicfordiscussionby1977.Hisback-to-the-land ideascoheredwithagrowingrejectionof thecityandawillingness toexplore alternative solutions to participating in white flight to the suburbs. One can eveninterprethisyearningforcommunityatLaPazasperhapsanunconsciousdesiretoretrievethelostparadiseofhisfamily’sfarmthathadbeentakenfromhimduringtheGreatDepression.Chavez’sturningawayfromalegislativesolutionishardertoexplain.Forhim,thepassage

oftheAgriculturalLaborRelationsActin1975hadimposedaprocessofprofessionalizationthatheneitheranticipatednorultimatelyfavored,largelybecauseitinvolvedashiftfromtheactofmaintainingamovementtobuildingaunion.Hewasnotaloneinhisconcern.Medinaatonepointquipped,“WeoughttogototheLegislatureandget’emtorepealtheALRAandgobacktotheboycott!”77 Indeed, thedemandselectionsplacedon theunion,evenandperhapsespeciallywhenitwon,madetheworkoftheunionmuchmoreofficiousandless“missionary”thanChavezremembereditinthebeginning.Ratherthanembracethatreality,asCohen,Ganz,andevenMedinahad,ChavezconjurednewobjectivesinprivateconsultationwithDederichandHartmire that he thoughtwould lead the organization back to the glory days of the firststrikes and the boycott. Dederich’s advice to focus on the youth of the union encouragedChaveztoplacelessstockinthecounselofoldfriendsandadvisorssuchasGilbertPadillaand Jerry Cohen. By the time everyone had arrived at Home Place, Chavez had clearlyfashionedhimself a reality thatheanticipatedwouldbeembracedas another product of his“strategiccreativity.”Whenthisdidnothappen,hesawtheiroppositionasaconsequenceoftheirfailuretoseerealityfromhisuniqueandsingularviewpoint.Worse,hebegantoseetheoppositionofboardmembers in the same light ashehad seen thecriticism fromvolunteerswhomhehadlabeled“communists,”“politicals,”orsimply“assholes”overthepastseveralmonths.

SEVEN

RottingfromtheInsideOut

THEUNITEDFARMWORKERS’DEFEATinProposition14camelargelybywayofurbanvoterswhounderstoodthequestionofaccesstoprivatepropertyinmuchdifferent termsthanthosewhoearned their living harvesting crops. While the campaign produced the regretful tactic ofwithdrawing the boycott from cities, it also enabled organizers like Eliseo Medina andMarshallGanz to investmore timeand resources intobuilding strong ranchcommittees thatformed the foundation ofwhat the union referred to as “RanchNation.”Ganz described theconcept:“TheRanchNationwaslikealittlemetaphorfordescribingthesituationwherethegrower and the foreman, through their control over employment, exercise power overeverybody in theranch,namely theworkers.Sonow,howdo theworkersget justice?Well,they have to develop their own power.Well, so how do they do that?Well, they have todeveloptheirownleaders[asa]ranchcommitteeintheunion,andtakethepowerawayfromthe foreman. So it’s… a power struggle.… In order to free theRanchNation,we have tocreatethisparallelpowerstructure.”1By1977Ganzhadbuiltaverysecure“nation”amongvegetableworkers in theImperialValleyandSalinas,whileMedinahaddevelopedasturdyoneofhisownamongthecitrusworkersinOxnardandVentura.Ganzbelieved that the future of the union lay in organizing localworkers involved in the

ranch committees. “Thatwas going to be the source of strength for the union,” he reflectedyearslater.Onthefaceofit,suchastrategyseemedtoaddressthegrowingconcernarticulatedbyMedina thatyoung,whitevolunteerswerenowrunning theunion.Thecompositionof theUFW’sstaff,however, indicatedanoppositetrend:about50percentof theunion’sdirectorycontainedSpanishsurnamesin1977,comparedtojust30percentin1974.2Still,mostpeopleontheboardappearedtohaveagreedwithMedina’scallformorefarmworkervolunteers.Inresponsetothisconcern,heandGanzdevotedmuchoftheirtimetodevelopingtheleadershipcapacityoftheworkersandavoidingthemadnessthatwaspercolatingatLaPaz.Theloosegovernancestructureoftheunionpermittedsuchretreatsfromthenervecenterof

theunion,butthelackofconnectionhaditsconsequences.Chavez’sharshreactionattheHomePlacemeetinginFebruary1977toGanz’sgrantingatwo-weekvacationtovolunteerswasjustone example. According to Ganz, the executive board had talked about a more coherentstructure leadingupto the1973convention,but theconfrontationwith theTeamstersandthelossofvirtuallyallthecontractsthatseasoncreateda“meetingofthegovernmentinexile”thatputoffsuchadiscussion.Initsabsence,Chavezruledbyfiatoveravast,unwieldypoliticalterrainthatproducedmoreautonomythanobediencetotheunionleader.Ratherthanembrace

the diversity of opinions and conditions extant among organizers, workers, and volunteers,Chaveztriedtosuppressexpression.“Cesarwasvery,verysuspicious,”Ganzrecalled.“[He]didn’twanttohavelocals[because]localsdeveloptheirownpolitics.”3

As a consequence, the distance between the ranch committees and theNationalExecutiveBoardwas greater than it should have been. “Therewas the national board and therewereranch committees,” Ganz remembered, “but there were no elected bodies [and] no electedofficersinbetween.”Atmost,workersreliedprimarilyonfieldorganizerssuchasGanzandMedina to carry their concerns to the board. The lack of a democratic process placedenormous pressure on the field organizers to achieve results on behalf of theworkers. Thepent-updemandfordemocracyledtotheelectionoflocalleadersinthefield,butsuchactionsonlydelayeddemandsformoredemocracy.“Thestructurethatemerged,”Ganzremembered,“wasoneinwhichtherewasnopoliticalaccountability.”4

The arrangement suited Chavez, given his new obsession with creating a commune-likesettingatLaPaz.At theFebruarymeetingof theexecutiveboard,heexpressedcontemptfortherankandfileandfacilitateda“they’lltakewhateverwegivethem”attitudeamongsomeofthe leaders.Ganz,who thought thispositionwasbothpoliticallyandmorally reprehensible,founditnearlyimpossibletoreachChavezbecauseofaninnercircleoffollowerswhonowsurroundedhim.“Cesarwassortoffloatingup[atLaPaz],beingapotheosizedinthisdomain,havingsomerealpersonalchallengeswithnooneabletoreallyhelphimwithit.”5DuringtheFebruarymeeting,Chavezdisclosedtotheboardthathiswife,Helen,hadseparatedfromhimandwasnowlivinginDelano.HisfamilyalsosplitontheideaofplayingtheGame;hisson,Paul“Babo”Chavez,wastheonlyenthusiastfortheexperiment.Chavez’sclosestfriendandconfidantoutsideofLaPaz,ChrisHartmire,tookontheresponsibilityofansweringquestionsfromskeptics.AccordingtoGanz,Hartmire’strainingasaministershouldhavegivenhimtheabilitytohelpChavez;instead,heendedup“amplifying”theproblemsbyfacilitatingtheGameandcoveringuphisfriend’seccentricbehavior.Withoutanyonetocheckhim,Chavezembarkedonamissionthatdeviateddramaticallyfrom

theeffortsofthosemostengagedwiththeworkersinthefieldandfromthelegalbattleswagedby JerryCohenandhis teamofyoung lawyers inSalinas.At the time,Cohenworried littleabouttheseparatetrackonwhichhislegalteammoved.HehadacquittedhimselfquitewellintheGame at Badger, putting ChuckDederich in his place and averting a showdown on thequestion of raising the pay of the lawyers ormoving the legal department toLaPaz.Thesequestions,however,weresecondary;asCohenlateradmitted,“I[was]notapoliticalthreat[toChavez]. I [was] talking inEnglish to judgesandgrowersand[Governor]Brown,”whereasGanzandMedina“weretalkinginSpanishtoworkers,”organizingandempoweringthemtothinkoftheunionastheirown.CohenbelievedthatChavezrecommittedtowinningthebattleinthegrapefieldsnotbecause

hebelievedstronglyinthemission,butbecauseitpreventedGanzandMedinafrombuildingupabaseinareasoutsideofhisinfluence.“Ithinkhelostasenseofcontrol,”Cohenreflected.“Ithinkthatthat’spartofwhyhefeltmorecomfortableinthegrapes,becausewhenitcomestograpes, he knew the gamewas boycott.”6AlthoughChavez had significantly diminished thepoweroftheboycott,thenervecenterremainedatLaPaz.Themovemaintainedhispositionof

authorityand,forthetimebeing,keptthelocusofpowerwithhim.7

What emerged in this crucial year of 1977was an unnecessary showdown between “twodifferentcultures”:oneinthefieldsamongtheorganizersandthelegalteam,andanotheronefestering in the home place of the United Farm Workers, La Paz.8 Given Chavez’soverwhelming influence, the fightwould not be a fair one. Such struggles, of course, cameaboutnotbecauseGanzorMedinahopedtowrestcontroloftheunionawayfromthemantheybothrespected.Rather,intheabsenceofademocraticstructure,Chavezhadtoemployskillsofself-restraint,diplomacy,andpowersharingthatbythistimewerebeyondhim.

SOURGRAPES

OnthetripbackfromBadgerinFebruary1977,RichardChavez,JimDrake,EliseoMedina,andMarshallGanztriedtomakeupforlosttimebyplanningtheircampaigninthegrapefieldsofCoachella.Ganzquestionedthestrategy,giventhatCoachellahadbeenagraveyardfortheunion in 1973. “We had thiswhole history inCoachella,” he recalled, “especiallywith themigrants.”Theunion’ssenioritysysteminthehiringhallsfavoredworkerswholivedincloseproximity to the fieldsandcouldsignup for jobplacementsmuchearlier thanworkerswhomigrated.SuchasystemappealedtoworkersinDelanowhoseresidencyintheCentralValleypermittedthemtobuildstable,permanentcommunities.InCoachella,wherethegrowingseasonwasmuchshorterandworkerresidencywasmuch

lower,thesenioritysystemgratedonworkers.Coachella’slocationneartheborderalsomeantthatMexicanimmigrantsconstitutedamuchhigherpercentageoftheworkforce,addingtotheunion’s challenge. Although Chavez had reversed himself on the question of support forrestrictive immigration policy, theUFW’s track record of cooperationwith the Immigrationand Naturalization Service in reporting undocumented immigrants made many migrantssuspiciousoftheunion.AsGanzrecalled,“Themigrantsweresortoftheleastsecureandthemosthostile[totheunion].”9

Ganzquestionedwhy theunionhadbegun its first campaign forALRBelectoralvictoriesamong a workforce as transient and undependable as the one in Coachella. Seeing thingsthrough the more familiar point of view of the vegetable industry, he analogized, “Youwouldn’ttrytoorganizethevegetableindustrybygoingtoHuron[WestCentralValley],wheretheseasonlastsforlikethreeweeks,andeverybody’spassingthrough.You’dgotoSalinasoryou’dgotoImperialValley, thehomebase; that’swhereyouorganize.”Previously,althoughtheunionhadsecuredthefirstcontractsingrapeswithSteinbergandLarsoninCoachella,thepressure for those victories had begun by organizingworkers inDelano. “The logic,”Ganzexplained,“isthatyouwouldstartandendinDelano,becauseDelanoistheheartofthegrapeindustry, and if you could organizeDelano, you could easily organizeCoachella andArvin[SouthCentralValley].”10

GanzhadalreadylostthebattleoverstrategywheneveryoneontheexecutiveboardexceptJerryCohenignoredhisadmonitionaboutorganizinginCoachellafirst.Againsthisadvice,his

peerscommittedtheuniontowinningbackwhathadbeenlostingrapes.ThedecisionprovedtobefatefulnotonlyforthestrategicpointsraisedbyGanz,butbecauseChavezhadwastedvaluableplanningtimeatthemeetingwithhisfailedattempttoconvincetheboardofthevalueof the Game. As a consequence, the union was not prepared to take on the challenges inCoachella.AlthoughtheUFWretainedcontrolofSteinberg’sDavidFreedmanRanch,theylostmostoftheothers,includingK.K.Larson,withwhomtheyhadheldcontractssince1969.AsGanzlatersawit,“We[went]toCoachellaand[got]ourasseskicked.”11

As these challenges unfolded in the field, Chavez remained obsessed with La Paz.Throughoutthespring,hefocusedoninstitutingreformsthatdrewtheunionintolinewithhisvision of building a community.He beganwith the implementation of “high holy days” thatcelebratedtheunion’saccomplishmentsinthetraditionof“feastdays”commonintheCatholicChurch.Amongthefirstofthesewas“MartyrDays,”inwhichhehostedelaboratedinnersatLa Paz in honor of Juan de la Cruz and Nagi Daifallah, two farm workers killed in thetumultuous summerof1973.Chavezassumed that theunionwouldevolve into a religionasSynanonhadandthatonedaythecommunitywould“canonizethem.”Increatingthedays,heexplainedtotheexecutiveboard,“Thefirststepis[to]beatifyourmartyrs…andthenabout150yearsfromnow,200yearsfromnow,wemakethemsaints.”12

ThemostpeculiarhighholydaywasFoundingDay,acelebration tobeheldeachyearonMarch31.Thedate supposedlymarked thedayChavezofficially resigned from theCSO tostart the Farm Workers Association, although coincidentally, it also fell on his birthday.13Chavez created a new community life department run by Chris Hartmire, who tookresponsibilityfororganizingtheevents.OnFoundingDay,staffwereencouragedtoreflectonthe achievements of everyone in the movement, but the actual execution of the celebrationinvolved La Paz children drawing pictures of the leader and residents repainting Chavez’shouse inpreparation forhisbirthdayparty.On thedayof theevent,mariachisand residentsserenadedChavezwith theMexicanbirthdaysong“LasMananitas”outsidehiswindowat6a.m.,followedbyamenudobreakfast,mass,andaday-longcelebrationinvolvinglivemusic,abarbeque,anddancingintotheevening.14

ThemerrimentoftheseeventsbeliedagrowingdistrustthatsimmeredjustbelowthesurfacebetweenChavez and some in themovement.Chavez continued to purge volunteers from theboycott whom he believed were organizing against the union. In Denver, he targetedMikeWilzoch, a popular but radical young director who had been under surveillance since theProposition 14 vote for his decision to reassign “unauthorized non-staff”members from histeamtoLosAngelestoworkonthecampaign.Manyofthesevolunteerswerelatersackedinthehousecleaningaftertheelection.Labeled“theMikeWilzochaffair”withintheinnercircleof the union, Chavez asked Ganz and Chavez’s future son-in-law, Arturo Rodríguez, tointerviewWilzochoncharges thathehadattendedameetingofMaoists.Wilzochconfirmedthathehadbeenrecruitedbythegroupandunfairlyimplicatedafelloworganizer,JerryRyan,in themeeting.His actionsandmisstatements earnedhim the ireof theexecutiveboardandexpulsionfromtheunion.15

Closertohome,suspicionswirledasmoraledeterioratedamongresidentsatLaPaz.Chavezhad long blamed the executive board for “running down” the community and creating the

perceptionthattheunionheadquarterswasadifficultplacetoliveandwork.InMarch1977,heorderedmailroomstafftoopenallmailpriortoitsdistribution,anill-advisedpolicythathadbeeninplacesincethefoundingofLaPazbuthadrarelybeenenforced.Whenanumberofchecksfromcontributorsturneduplostinthemail,Chavezbecameenraged,declaringthattheprivacyofresidentshadsupersededtheeconomicviabilityoftheunionanddemandedthatthepractice be restored. Although Kent Winterrowd instructed volunteers to have their mailmarked“personal”andpromisednottoopenpackagesorenvelopesthatappearedtobelongtosomeone, the order upset many volunteers. Privately, some members began to question thesurveillancenowbeingpracticedintheircommunity.16

Thedeterioratingphysical conditionsatLaPazalsomade theunion’sheadquartersnearlyintolerable. During the February 1977 meeting, a number of executive board members,especially Pete Velasco and Philip Vera Cruz, pointed out that many volunteers slept onbroken-down mattresses or the floor, and unsanitary conditions prevailed in most of theheadquarters’eightkitchens.17Ratherthanaddresstheirconcerns,Chavezblamedtheresidentsfor a lack of discipline, especially in the main kitchen in a building everyone called “theHospital.”Hecomplainedthatthesituationhadbecomechaotic:cookingdutiesrotatedamongfifty-four individuals, and residentswerepermitted to eat at any timeof theday.Theopen-kitchenpolicyexistedasaconsequenceof thevariousdietsatLaPaz, includingvegetarian,andthedesiretogivepeopleaccesstofoodastheywished.Ratherthandiscussthesituationwith the community, Chavez ordered the kitchens closed except to a handful of cooks whowould prepare communal meals served three times a day. “We’re going to force thecommunity,” he told the board and predicted that half of the residents would resign as aconsequenceofhisdecision.“Let ’em leave,”headded,hoping that themovewould ridLaPazoftroublemakersand“savealittlemoney.”Chavezalsobelievedthattheritualofeatingtogether would have the added benefit of creating a “church community” that mirrored themealsatHomePlace.18

Theproposaltoreduceaccesstothekitchenespeciallytroubledagroupofvolunteerswhoused theHospital forwhat theycalled the“VeggieKitchen” topreparevegetarianmeals.Atgatherings,participantsoccasionallydiscussedtheirfrustrationsandcomparedexperiencesintheirrespectivejobs.Twomembersofthegroup,DeirdreGodfreyandJudyKahn,hadworkedintheunionforfouryears,thepasteighteenmonthsofwhichhadbeensharedintheaccountingdepartment.Themonotonyoftheirwork,locatedfarfromtherestofthefinancialmanagementdepartment, had produced feelings of alienation. For Godfrey, the job was a dramaticdeparturefromhowshebeganintheunion,workingontheboycottinTorontounderGanz.InCanada,Godfreyhadlearnedvaluablelessonsabouthowtotranscendwhatshedescribedasher“privilegedmiddle-classAnglo”backgroundandconnectwith farmworkersandpeoplefromallwalksof life. InLaPaz, shehad lost that senseof camaraderie and eventuallyherpassionfor lacausa.Whenshe tried to take thematterupwithGilbertPadillaandChavez,both lackedthesensitivityshownbyGanz.Bythespringof1977,shehaddecidedto takeabreak from the union at the end of June, although she continued to participate in theVeggieKitchenuntilherdeparture.Chavez’sirritationwiththestateofthekitchenraisedhissuspicionsaboutthegroup.Since

the February meeting he had played on the sympathies of allies and family members,encouraging them to become informants on anyone suspected of oppositional behavior. ThegroupofloyalistsincludedhissonBabo,aswellasDoloresHuerta’ssonanddaughter,EmilioandLoriHuerta,Gilbert andEstherPadilla,KentWinterrowd,LarryTramutt, andChavez’sbodyguardandson-in-law,DavidVillareno.19Godfrey’sfailedattempttoresolveherconcernsinaprivatemeetingwithChavezmadeheratargetforsurveillance,andsomeonewithinthisgroup began reporting on her every move and the actions of those with whom she keptcompany.When Chavez believed he had enough evidence to indict members of the VeggieKitchen on charges of conspiracy, he met with his loyal group of followers to plan acommunitymeetingdesignedtopurgethemfromtheunion.Knownas“theMondayNightMassacre,”thecommunitymeetingonApril4,1977,quickly

devolvedintoaGame-likeatmosphere,withtheVeggieKitchenoccupyingcenterstage.Duringthemeeting,Chavezallowedhisteamofloyaliststoaccusemembersofholding“chickenshitlittlemeetings”inprivatetoplottheoverthrowoftheunion.BeforeapackedhallintheNorthUnit,LarryTramuttreportedthathehadheardmembersof theVeggieKitchencallChaveza“fascist”andchargedthemwiththecrimeofcounterorganizing.Oneofthenewestvolunteers,DavidMcClure,hadrecentlyrelocatedfromtheSouthtoworkonthefailingheatingsystematLa Paz.When Tramutt accused him of being “an agent for the growers,”McClure rose todefendhimselfbutwasquicklysurroundedbyChavezloyalists.ChavezinterruptedtheattacktowageanaccusationofhisownagainstMcClure.According

to one of his informants, McClure had been reporting on union activities to Senator S. I.Hayakawa,anultraconservativeCaliforniaRepublicanopposedtotheUnitedFarmWorkers.Thechargeturnedouttobefalse.McClureconfirmedthathehadindeedmadecallstoa“Mr.Hayakawa,”althoughnotthesenator.InhisattempttofixthefurnaceatLaPaz,hehadcalledalocalcompany,Ayers&HayakawaEnergyManagement.20

Undeterred by the error, Chavez and the loyalists continued their expletive-laden assault,forcing McClure to leave the building. Next they turned their attention to other allegedconspirators, including Kahn and Godfrey. Godfrey was shocked by the viciousness of theattack. Although she admitted to being worn down by her job, she believed that she hadconfinedher“grumbling to thosepeoplewhoweresimilarlydisillusioned.”Sheadmitted tocomplainingabout theunion’s failure to rotatevolunteers from job to jobaftera reasonableamountoftime,butnothingapproachingcounterorganizinghadevertakenplaceintheircasualconversationsduringtheirpreparationofmeals.KahnandMcClureofferedsimilartestimony,butChavezandhissupportersrejectedsuchdefenses.Anyonewhodaredtodefendtheallegedconspirators also came under suspicion. Godfrey later recalled, “I shall never forget thefrenzied,hate-filledfacesandvoicesofpeoplewhohadbeenwarmandfriendlywithmerightthroughtothehourofthemeeting.”21Intheend,ChavezorderedsevenoftheeightmembersoftheVeggieKitchenoutoftheunionandoffthepremises.That night the terror continued as expelled members packed their belongings and made

arrangements with family and friends outside of La Paz. Organizers of the forum assumedMcClure would not go quietly, given his resistance at the meeting, and called local lawenforcementofficialstohavehimarrestedontrespassingcharges.Inalettertotheexecutive

board later, McClure once again defended himself and reminded them that the union hadabrogatedhisrightsasalegaltenantbyevictinghimwithoutdueprocess.Othersexperiencedharassment from Chavez’s bodyguards. In a letter following her departure, Godfrey toldChavezandmembersoftheexecutiveboard,“Ihaveneverspentsuchafearfulnightastheonefollowingthatmeeting.”Thesecurityteamrestrictedaccesstopaytelephonesandforcedtheexpelledmembers towalk to the nearby town ofKeene tomake their calls.WhenGodfreycouldnotarrangeforapickupimmediately,shereturnedtoherroomatLaPaz,whereguards“march[ed]throughthehallseverytwominutes”inanattempttoflushheroutprematurely.22

TheeventsofApril4didnotproducetheharmonyChavezsought.Becauseofhissingularauthoritywithin the union to hire and fire anyone hewished, his decision to hold a publicwitch-huntinsteadofprivatemeetingsseemedcurious.Whyhadn’thejustcalledtheaccusedintohisofficetofirethem?HehadusedthismoredirectmethodinMarch,whenmembersofthe day care center inDelano had questioned his reduction in staff.Although farmworkersregarded the child care service as essential, Chavez and Dolores Huerta suspectedcounterorganizingamongsomeemployeesanddecidedtoeliminatethemfromtheunion.DavidTrainandEdyScripps, twopurgedmembersof thecenter,wrote lettersofprotestbutwereignored.23 Inanothercase,Chavez firedavolunteer,RogerBrooks, forquestioning themailpolicyandreportedlycomparinghimtoRichardNixon.Inallofthesemeetings,Chavezexhibitedhisinfamousflashesofanger,shoutingobscenities

at the volunteers and berating them for having a poor work ethic and a bad attitude. Suchprivate encounters, however, allowed residents to offer unsolicited criticism that furtherinfuriatedChavezandremindedhimthatnoteveryoneagreedwithhisvisionforLaPaz.Inthiscontext, theMondayNightMassacre served an additional purpose: it scared residents intoobedience and extracted the kind of loyalty enjoyed by Dederich at Home Place. The“communitymeeting,”asitwasknownatLaPaz,polarizedthecommunity,forcingresidentstotakesides.AsDavidTrainlaterwrote,thepublicpursuitofconspirators“put[volunteers]inapositionofeithercompleteloyalistsorcompletetraitors.”24InthewakeoftheMondayNightMassacre,anestimatedfifteentotwentypeopleeitherwerefiredorlefttheunionvoluntarily,manyofwhomhadcommittedtheirlivestothefarmworkers’struggle.Loyalty to themovementcompelledcriticsof theMondayNightMassacre to restrict their

complaintstoChavezandthemembersoftheexecutiveboardratherthangopublic.McClure,for example, reminded the board of his restraint in writing a private letter, given that theextreme nature of the meeting would “damage liberal support and build the morale of theUnion’srealenemies”ifwordgotout.Inspiteofhistroubles,heheldontothebeliefthat“theunion[would]remainanexampletounorganizedworkingpeopleeverywhere.”Godfreyalsoavoidedcirculatingherconcernswidelybycarefullynumberingeachofherresponseletterssoastokeeptrackoftowhomshewrote.MostvolunteerswhoseexperiencewiththeunionhadrecentlybecomenegativeavoidedbringingdisfavorontheUFWatallcost.Withinthesecircumscribedboundaries,purgedmembersandcriticsexpressedtheirearnest

desire to save theunionbyoffering constructive criticism.McClure andGodfrey expresseddisappointmentmorethananger,andeachaddressedthe“tremendouschasm”thathadopenedbetween “long-time core members of the Union and the recruited volunteers.”25 McClure

opined,“Anairofcontempttowardsvolunteers”prevailedamongtheleadershipandservedas“thelargestsinglecauseoflowmorale”atLaPaz.26AcknowledgingthesignificantnumberofdeparturessincetheProposition14loss,bothencouragedtheuniontogettothesourceofthe problem. Godfrey echoed what had become Chavez’s common berating of volunteers,asking, “Isn’t the answer likely to be more complex than that these people were not quiteselfless,dedicated,andhard-workingenough?”CitingtheabsenceofthesamerightsforUFWemployeesthattheunionsupportedforfarmworkers,shepointedouttheglaring“contradictionbetweentheUnion’sexpressedgoalsforfarmworkersandthewaysinwhichitoftentreatsitsownstaff.”Sheconcluded,“Thedivergenceofprinciplesandpractice regarding therespectanddignityofallpeople isbound toweakenandsicken theUnionat itsveryheart.”27 Bothofferedavigorousdefenseoftheroleofthevolunteerandstronglydenouncedtheaccusationsofcounterorganizingas“theverygreatestviolence” thatcouldbedone to thememberswhohadservedtheunionfaithfully.Chavezandhisalliesrespondedbydismissingtheircritics’claimsastheopinionsofpeople

hell-bentondestroyingtheunion.AninternaldocumentthatcirculatedamongtheleadershipatLaPazaftertheMondayNightMassacrerevealsahardeningoftheirposition,arguingthattheexpulsion of thesemembers coheredwith the “desire [of]CesarChavez and [the]NationalExecutiveBoard thatmore farmworkers bemoved up into leadership positions.”Althoughduringthespringmeetingstheboardhadcomplainedofadwindlingworkforceandtheneedformorerank-and-filememberstoparticipateintheexecutionofpolicy,Chavezchosetodealwith only the latter concern. “In [the] past [the] UFW tried to recruit people for specificneeds,” thedocument reads. “Now[we]want to recruit and train farmworkers for someofthose jobs.” The position implicitly conveyed that their initial approach had led to theunfortunate consequence of bringing representatives into the union who did not reflect theinterestsof thefarmworkers.Repeatedly, thedocument labels theconspiratorsas“non-farmworkers” in an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and insists that the “small group” hadpushedthe“overwhelmingmajorityof[the]LaPazcommunity”totheactionstakenonApril4.Thedocumentdefendsthemailpolicyandreiteratesthegoalof“buildingacommunityatLaPaz,” adding without irony, “We want it to be the showcase of discipline, cooperation,friendliness,andproductionfor[the]entiremovement.”28

Asformermembersoftheunionsharedtheirexperienceswithfriendswhohadhadsimilarencounters with Chavez, many began to formulate a critical response. Roger Brooks, forexample,becameincreasinglytroubledbythecircumstancessurroundinghisfiring.Afterwardhemoved toSanFrancisco,wheremanyveteransof themovement remained incontactwithvolunteersatLaPazandreceivedearlywordoftheeventssurroundingApril4.Herecognizedthe“vengeanceandhatred”reportedlydisplayedinthemeeting,havingsufferedsimilarthreatsofviolencefromChavez’ssecurityguards,DavidVillarenoandCarlosRodriguez,duringhislastnightatLaPaz.InaseriesoflettersfromMay1977toOctober1978,Brooksrecountedtheoffensescommittedagainsthimandtried toset therecordstraight.Ofparticularconcernwasthechargeof“racism”leveledbyChavezforspeakingoutonthemailpolicy.“Itwasbothshockingandagrievousdisappointmenttome,”Brookswrote,“toseeyou,anespousedleaderofthenonviolentmovementshoutingobscenities…andcallingme‘agoddamnracist.’”29He

foundthechargeparticularlypreposterousgiventhenatureoftherecentpurges:notonlyhadthemembersbeencommitted,hardworkingvolunteers,buttheywerewhite.Ifanything,itwasChavez who seemed to use race as a reason for purging volunteers. “You must resist thetemptation,”BrooksscoldedChavez,“tocategorizeuswhitesasliberaldo-gooders,studentsand the like.Therearemanypeoplewhowill support andwork for theunion regardlessofskin color.”30 In a later correspondence, Brooks, having time to research thematter for anarticlehetitled“SourGrapes,”foundthatofthethirtypeoplewholefttheunioninMarchandApril1977,onlyonepersonwasMexicanAmerican.31

Whether Chavez and the executive board had intended it or not, the call for more farmworkersintheadministrationcombinedwiththepurgesofmostlywhiteindividualsproducedthe appearance that theUFWhad begun to spurn the help of some due to their background.Unquestionably, cliques had formed at La Paz, with many whites forming friendships andaffinitygroups that invitedanarrowingof theirperspectives. Indeed, inherprescriptionsofremedies,Godfrey offered the somewhat condescending recommendation thatChavez spendmoretimegettingtoknowwhothevolunteerswereandwhytheyhadcometotheunion.Thather solutions began with Chavez acquiring a deeper understanding of the whites and theirsacrifices might have struck UFW leaders and Mexican American staff as self-centered,signalingadriftawayfromtheintegratedworkforcethathadalwaysbeenthehallmarkoftheunion. Insomeways,Godfrey’sopinionsmanifestedarealneedforcommunitybuilding thathadbecomeChavez’sagenda,butnotinthewaysheframedit.Ratherthanbreakdownculturalbarriers,ChavezusedschismswithinLaPazandtheanxietyoverthelackoffarmworkersinthe leadership as a pretext to reach formore control.By framing the issue as a problemofauthenticityandrepresentationin theunion,Chavezandtheboardfedtheperceptionthat theUFWnowdependedonthelaborofMexicanandFilipinovolunteersfirstandeveryoneelsesecond.Thestruggle tostaffallof thedepartmentsof theunionsuggested thatChavezcouldhardly afford to be so particular, yet he and some leaders pursued the policy anyway,regardlessoftheconsequencestotheunion’smulticulturalimage.Chavez anticipated these charges by surrounding himself with whitemembers who either

spokeforhimorcarriedouthisorders.Hereliedontwowhitevolunteers,KentWinterrowdand Terry Carruthers, to enforce many of his demands at La Paz, and Larry Tramutt oftenhandled themostdifficult tasksof removingpeoplewhomChavezdeemed“troublemakers.”Marc Grossman also served as the official spokesperson for the union, often handlingquestions from the media about the purges. To be sure, non-Anglos played a role in thecrackdown, such as Esther Padilla, who functioned as the unofficial “mayor” of La Paz,although Gilbert’s doubts about Chavez’s sanity began to creep into her consciousness.32FamilymemberssuchasBaboChavezandDavidVillarenoofferedfilialloyaltytotheirfatherand father-in-law, respectively, and Lori and Joaquin Huerta obeyed Chavez like a father.HelenChavez’s absence from the headquarters, however,made it evident that not all in thefamilycondonedtheworldChavezhadcreated.33

Among those who spoke for Chavez, Chris Hartmire figured prominently. Amid thecontroversies surrounding the purges and the implementation of the Game, Hartmire’sendorsementofChavez’svisionforanewcommunityprovidedlegitimacythatseemedtobe

slippingawayfromtheleader.AsaPresbyterianministerHartmirebroughtamoralforcetohiswork.Healsohadcredibilitywithvolunteers,rank-and-filemembers,andtheleadershipbecauseof his involvementwith themovement from the beginning.As the head of the newdepartment of community life, Hartmire had accepted the responsibility of harmonizingrelationshipsacrossthewiderunioncommunity,includingthoseoutsidetheheadquarterswhoheardrumorsaboutstrangebehaviorandmassfirings.AlthoughChavezwantedhimtoliveattheheadquarters,Hartmire’slivingarrangementoutsideofLaPazenabledhimtomovemuchmore easily among the various constituencies that made up the union. An articulate andpassionatedefenderofChavez,hetookhispositionseriouslyanddidmuchresearchon“bestpractices”incommunallivingsettings.Infact,Hartmireandhiswife,Pudge,hadbeenoutofthecountryduringtheMondayNightMassacre,spendingtimeonakibbutzinIsraelandinaHutteritesettlementinFrance.

FIGURE16.CesarandHelenChavezwiththeirsixchildren,California,1969.ALUA,UFWCollection,215.

WhenHartmirereturned,heencounteredataskfargreaterthananyhehadpreviouslytakenon:cleaningupthemesscreatedbythenewroundofpurges.Inadditiontothelettersthatcameto him from former volunteers, he received inquiries from fellow workers, friends,contributors,andconcernedmemberswhohadlearnedofthefiringsandforcedresignations.Hartmire tried to strikea sympathetic tone inhis responses,buthis roleasa self-professed“truebeliever”biasedhisopinion.HesharedhisdelicateletterswithChavezbeforeputtingtheminthemailtoensurethathismessagestayedwithinboundariesacceptabletohisfriend.Hartmire’s response to Sister Mary Catherine Rabbit, a volunteer in the Denver boycott

houseandamemberofHartmire’sNationalFarmWorkerMinistryboard,servedasamodelforthemanylettershewasforcedtoanswerthroughout1977.RabbitknewMikeWilzochwelland wanted Hartmire to explain his firing and the alarming rumors of a “witch-hunt” forconspirators in the union. Although he had not been around during Wilzoch’s sacking and

promisedtogettothebottomofthecase,Hartmiredefendedthegeneralcutsinstaffaspartofaplandesignedtomaketheboycottamoreeffectivetoolfortheunion.“Thatprocess,”hetoldher,“willbeslowanddeliberate,”especiallybecausetheunionhadtoplaceanemphasisonorganizinginthefieldsinthecomingmonths.Aswithmostofthepolicydecisionsintheunionin1977,therewaslittlelogictohisargumentsincetheunionneededmorevolunteerstocoverthewidearrayoftasksitcouldnothandlewiththeworkforceitcurrentlyhad.Only concerns about formermembers’ political beliefs and intentions could explain their

firingsandforcedresignations,butHartmireworkedhardtoconvinceRabbitthatsuchworrieshad not been behind the union’s recent actions. “It is unfair to conclude that the unionwasterminating people only or primarily because of political affiliations or ideas,” he told her,although he knew better. Aware of the thinness of his argument, Hartmire admitted, “Noteverything that happens within the movement is wise, right or just.” The statement was ashocking admission of the leadership’s fallibility, and still he asked her to accept theirdecisions. His and Rabbit’s own experiences within the church, he explained, should haveremindedher of thedifficultyof running a largeorganization andgivenher reason topausebeforecriticizingtheUFW.Headded,“Idon’tknowaboutand/orunderstandeverythingthathappenswithin theunionand I ama lot closer thanmost supporters. I can’t imaginemyselfmaking judgmentsabout theheartandsoulof themovementbasedonwhathappens tosomevolunteers, even to some of the best and most dedicated volunteers. The UFW is a farmworkers’movement!”34

Hartmire’smessageofvolunteerexpendabilityconfirmedthefeelingsofmanypurgevictims,whosensedthatunionleadersdidnotvaluetheirservice.Moreover,hisallusiontothefarmworkersbeing“theheartandsoulofthemovement”conflatedtheinspirationfortheunionwithwhatsomewerenowprojectingastheidealorganization:aunionbyandforthefarmworkers.This position, of course, ignored that the union had always depended on the labor andcontributionsofpeoplefromvariousbackgrounds.Hartmire’sdutiesalsoextendedtothepromotionanddefenseoftheGame.Hiswillingness

to embraceChavez’s plan to forgemore formal relationswithSynanon endearedhim to theleaderandmadehimavaluableassetinmanagingthetransferenceofideasfromHomePlaceto La Paz. Following Dederich’s lead, Chavez wanted to move more aggressively towardbuyingproperty,butHartmirechanneledhisenergyinsteadtowardtheGame.HehadvisitedSynanon’s headquarters in Santa Monica during the early 1960s and respected some ofDederich’smethods.HeespeciallyenjoyedtheGame,althoughheadmittedthatitwasnotforeveryone.“TheGameissensitivitytrainingforthestreet,”heexplained.“Imeanit’srough.”HartmirelearnedthisfirsthandwhenChavezcalledhimuptoHomePlaceforanintroduction.InhisinitialGamewithSynanonparticipants,theyverballyassaultedhimforchoosingtoliveinLosAngeles,farfromLaPazwhereChavezneededhim.“ItwasaferociousGame”andan“unpleasantexperience,”buthegrewtoappreciatehowittaughthimself-defense.Theranksofthosewillingtoaskquestionsaboutthedirectionoftheuniongrewaswordof

the purges and the Game spread. Fred Ross Jr. and Richard Chavez, two of Cesar’s mosttrustedconfidantes,struggledtoextinguishrumorsabouta“culturalrevolution”atLaPazandcontacted Hartmire for help. Hartmire defended Chavez’s “strong, determined, persistent

leadership”andrebuffedclaims thathewascultivatinga“cultofpersonality.”“Thesesamepeople,”hewrote,“areveryrespectfulofCastro,HoChiMinh,JohnL.Lewis,MaoTseTung,Mahatma Gandhi, etc.” He advised the two to answer critics by pointing out “the blatantcontradiction”intheirpositions.HartmirecomparedChaveztoChairmanMao,confirmingthathehad initiated“amini-cultural revolutionwithin theUFW”worthyof theirsupport.“Heisdeterminedtocarryitthroughandheiscertainthatitwillhelpthemovement.”Healsotriedtoallay their fearsabout theGame,citinghisownexperiencesatSynanonasa testament to itsvalue.WhetherhewascoveringforitsfailingsorhadbeenblindedbyhisloyaltytoChavez,Hartmire asserted that theGameconjured“genuine tenderness, loveandaffirmation”amongearlyparticipants and that such feelingshad alreadybecome“themost powerful part of theGame.”35

The growing questions about theGame and the endless streamof letters from former andcurrentvolunteers to the leadershipcompelledChavez to takeastandagainsthiscritics.HetargetedasetofmeetingsscheduledforlateJuneandJuly1977tomakehisstrongestpitchyettotheboard.Inpreparation,hetoldthefirstGamegroupthattheywouldplayduringasessionformembersoftheexecutiveboardtoobserveandcommenton.Heexplainedthathewouldparticipate too,butalsoreminded themthat thisGamehadapurpose: toconvince theboardthattheunionandLaPazwouldbebetteroffwiththeGamethanwithoutit.Theseinstructions,ofcourse,violatedthe“sayanything”rule,althoughthestakesweremuchtoohightoallowafreeflowofindictmentsandriskcreatinganegativeimpression.Executiveboardmemberscametothemeetingpreparedtodiscussstrategiesfororganizing

workers and winning elections. The failures in the grape fields had caused a crisis ofconfidenceamongsomeorganizers,whilethepersistentproblemswiththegeneralcounselfortheALRB,HenryDelizonna,andtheantitrustlawsuitagainstthegrowersoccupiedamajorityofthelegaldepartment’sattention.FewontheboardhadthoughtdeeplyabouttheproblemsatLa Paz since the meeting in Badger in February, preferring to avoid discussions about therumorsofpurges,hostilityamongLaPazresidents,andsurveillanceofmembers.Ganz lateradmitted,“Ijusttriedtokindofignoreit,youknow,looktheotherway.”36Instead,hesawthegrowingdebacleingrapesasevidencethathehadbeenrightabouttheneedtoshiftresourcestovegetablesandspenttheweeksleadinguptothemeetingpreparingasixty-pagetreatiseonthepotentialforgainsintheImperialValleyandSalinas.JerryCohenalsosawthefailureingrapesasapainfulyetpositiveindicationthattheunion

needed to shift its base of power from the external pressure of the boycott to an energizedgroupofnewmemberswillingtoseizecontrolofthevegetablefields.“Whenyoulookatthegrapeboycott,”Cohenobserved,“youdon’thavethesamekindoforganizationalpunchinthefields.” The boycott, he argued, functioned like “an economic gun to [the grower’s] head,”bringingaboutcontractsthatrequiredrelativelylittlenegotiation.WiththeimplementationoftheALRBandtheincreasedsavvyofgrowersregardingmarketing,theunioncouldnotrelyasmuch on these tactics. Under these new conditions, Cohen, like Ganz, placed stock in theferventsupportgrowingamongSalinasvegetableworkerswhoweredevelopinga“separatesourceofpower”thattheunionshouldhavebeencultivating.“TheseguysinSalinaswantedtobe in the fields,”Cohen remembered. “Therewas realpowergenerated there.”BothCohen

andGanzbelieved in thispower, inpart,because theyhadwitnessed itsdevelopmentwhilelivingamongtheworkersandwatchingthecultureofthefieldstakeonalifeofitsown.37

BotharrivedattheexecutiveboardmeetinghopefulthatChavezsharedtheirinterpretationofevents,butneitherreallyhadanyexpectations,giventheirdistancefromLaPaz.AccordingtoGanz, “[La Paz] was a problem to the extent that it facilitated Cesar’s withdrawal.” TheconstantpresenceofpeoplefeedingChavez’segoinaremotecommunityfosteredwhatGanzcalled“theworstkindoflonelinessandisolation.”38Theseconditions,Ganzbelieved,causedChavez to lose his connection to the rank and file, butmost on the executive board did notdetect the extent of his alienation.Themeeting, however,would prove just howwithdrawnChavezhadbecomebythesummerof1977.

INSIDEISREVULSION

TheJune-Julyboardmeetingin1977beganasusual,withtherequisitedepartmentalreportsontheunion’sbusiness.At thestart,Chavez tried to impose theunusualpracticeof referring tofellowboardmembersas“prophets” tocasta religious toneover theproceedings,butmosttookitasajokeandrevertedbacktothecommonunionreferentsof“brother”and“sister.”During the first two days, the question of how to increase the number of dues-paying

membersdominateddiscussion.Thecuts inboycottstaffandthestreamliningofdepartmentsthroughfiringshadbroughtdownexpenditures,notedSisterFlorenceZweber,theheadofthefinancedepartment,buttheuniondrewonly2percentofitsoperatingbudgetfrommembershipdues. The situation, Chavez noted, was untenable, not only because the dependence ondonationsplacedtheunioninaprecariousposition,butalsobecausehewasgettingtiredoffundraising. Ganz recommended that the union take organizing more seriously, but Chavezchosetotablethediscussion.AlthoughChavezwaffledonanumberofimportantmattersoffinancialimportance,heonce

againexhibitedadeterminationtogaintheboard’sapprovaloftheGame.HeclosedthefirstdayofthemeetingforasessionoftheGamefortheboardtoobserve.Hetappedaloyalgroupof staff and family members to participate, including Babo Chavez, David Villareno, LoriHuerta,MarcGrossman, andKent andEstherWinterrowd.Chavez inserted himself into thesessioninanattempttoconveythemessagethathewasopentobeingindictedforhisbehaviortooandthatanyone,regardlessofoffice,couldbegamed.Somemoments of tension surfaced, but on this day theGame came across as staged and

heavily orchestrated byChavez. Showing signs of having been coached,Villareno used theopportunitytogameChavezforhisinadequaciesasaboss.“Yougetonmyassaboutnotbeingtough on the guys,” he complained; however, when he attempted to arrange security for anupcoming trip to thePhilippines,Chavezdeclined inorder to savemoney.Villarenoyelled,“You’reinconsistent[and]chickenshit!”LoriHuertaaccusedChavezof“tryingtoprovehowmachoheis”bytravelingwithoutunionprotection.WhenChavezassuredthemthatPresidentFerdinandMarcosofthePhilippineswouldprovidetwopresidentialguardsassecurity,KentWinterrowd responded, “That’s what Kennedy thought.… Money should never be a

considerationwhenitcomestoyoursafety.”39

The contrivance fooled fewon theboard.When it ended,Chavez attempted to defend theauthenticityofthesessionbyobserving,“Iwasgamed;nothard,butIwasgamed.”Skepticalboard members groaned at the claim. When Chavez solicited feedback from the boardmembers,mostwere critical of thepractice.RichardChavez,EliseoMedina,PeteVelasco,PhilipVeraCruz,JessicaGovea,andMarshallGanzallvoicedtheirdisapprovalwhenaskedtheiropinion.VeraCruzoffered the firstcriticalcomments,calling theGame“indefensible”and “aggressive.”Chavez assured him that the indictmentswere not true and that theGameencouragedpeople to“saywhatyou fear,”butVeraCruz sawnovalue in suchanexercise.Goveaofferedher own indictment of theGameas inauthentic to the cultureof farmworkerfamilies. “This is not the way I grew up,” she commented, adding that her parents wouldstronglydisapproveofthepractice.“TheotherthingIdidn’tlike,”shetoldChavez,“wasthatyoudidn’tgetgamed.Theydeferredtoyoualot.”40

Govea’scomment struckanervewithbothChavezand theparticipantswhohadhoped tosellthisparticularGameasanhonestexchangeamongequals.WhenChavezandLoriHuertatried to defend the session as authentic, an incredulous Cohen expanded onGovea’s point.“We’ve always had fights with Cesar about security,” he told the group, recounting howManuelChaveznearlycametofisticuffswithhiscousinovertheissuewhenhemanagedthebodyguardsfortheunion.Cohencontinued,“Cesarknowsthey’refightingaboutitbecausetheycareabouthim.That’snotarealgameonCesar.”CohenhadnotbeenastrongopponentoftheGame,havingplayediteffectivelyhimself,buthehatedthatthegrouphadtriedtofakesomeofthe exchanges towin the approval of theboard.AlthoughChrisHartmire,MackLyons, andDoloresHuertatriedtodefendthepractice,itwasevidentbytheendofthenightthatChavezhadfailedtoconvincemostboardmembersoftheGame’susefulnesstotheunion.41

Chavez’sinclinationtotablediscussionscametoahaltasthemeetingenteredtheweekendand tensions came to a head.Manyhad grown frustratedwithChavez’s failure to assume aleadership role in guiding the board on anything other than changes at La Paz.He had alsopermittedtensionstosimmeramongboardmembers,andinsomecasespittedoneagainsttheothertomaintainhisauthorityovertheunion.GanzandDoloresHuerta,forexample,hadnotseriouslyspokentoeachothersincenegotiationsduringtheGiumarraagreementin1970hadstrained relationsbetween them.Huerta resented theclose relationshipbetweenChavezandGanzandregardedGanzasa“spoiledbrat”and“Cesar’slittleboy.”42Chavezalsofacilitatedconflict betweenGanz andMedina, two of themost vociferous advocates for rank-and-fileempowerment, by tacitly favoring Medina’s work with citrus and grape workers whileignoringGanz’sconstantappealstostepuporganizingeffortsinvegetablefields.Virtually everyone had conflicts with Dolores Huerta, whose esteem in the union had

diminishedsincetheearly1970s.Hertendencytopickfightswithyoungerstaffhadearnedhertheireofmanyvolunteers,especiallythoseintheHuelgaSchool,aneducationalprogramforthechildrenoffarmworkersinDelanofundedbytheMigrantMinistry,whomshesuspectedofcounterorganizing.“Noneofthemcanfuckmeupwiththemembers,”shetoldtheboardinafitof insecurity,“becausemyrootsgobackmanyyears.”43 Indeed, someveteran farmworkerschosetorememberherinherbetterdays,buthercirculationofrumorsthatconspiratorswere

trying“tofuckher,fuckCesar,andfucktheunion”generatedanunhealthyairofsuspicioninthecommunityand, in thecaseof theHuelgaSchool,contributed to thepurgingof theentirestaff. Her inclination to question Richard Chavez, with whom she lived in a common-lawrelationshipandwhomCesarhadplacedasdirectorofoperationsinDelano,ledthebrotherstosecretlydiscussmovinghertoLaPazwithoutherconsultation.Atboardmeetings,however,Chavez openly used (and abused) Huerta as either his one-woman cheering section or apunching bag, depending on the circumstances. His dependence on her sycophancy and histendencytomakeherthebuttofhisjokesdidlittletoimproveherconfidenceatatimewhenshemostneededit.AttheweekendChavezpromisedtotacklethebigissueofhowtodeploydwindlingstaffin

theserviceofexpandingmembership.Hesawtwooptions:eitherfinishnegotiatingcontractsat rancheswhere theunionhadwonelections, ororganizeworkers for electionvictories atranches that had not yet been tapped by the union.Gilbert Padilla, the head of the contractadministrationdepartmentandthepersonmostresponsiblefortrainingnegotiators,sharedhisdismal report on the status of contract negotiations. Since the beginning of the year onlyfourteen new contracts had been signed, bringing the total number to seventy-one contractscovering 13,475 workers. Although the union had rights to negotiate with 109 certifiedcompanies, they engaged only forty-six because the union maintained just six full-timenegotiators.“It’snotaveryprettypicture,”Padillasadlyreported.44

Thedearthofresourcesforcedtheuniontoconcentrateononefunctionortheother,Chavezargued,butGanzobjectedtosuchaManichaeanframingoftheissue.“Concentrationdoesnothave to mean organizing or negotiations,” Ganz challenged. “Concentration can mean[concentratingresources]oncertainareas.”HeofferedDelanoasanexampleofaplacewhereboth organizing and negotiating contracts would be beneficial to the union, but Chavezdismissed his suggestion, insisting without evidence, “We know what would happen.” Heencouragedtheboardto“makeaballsydecision,”repeatedlysteeringthediscussiontowardanarrow consideration of one option or the other. Ganz saw Chavez’s set of hypotheticalquestionsascontrived,givenhisunwillingnesstoengageSalinasworkers.WhenGanzpushedforawiderdiscussionofoptions,Chavezlosthiscool.“Yourmindissofuckingclosedthismorning,”hetoldGanzwithoutirony.“Ican’tpenetrateit.”OnlyFredRoss Jr.demonstratedany sympathy forGanz’sposition.Heattempted tobring

honestytothebrainstormingsession.“We’rehavingthisdiscussionbecauseofthegrapes,”hetoldtheboard.Rosscautionedhiscolleaguesnottointerpretthefailedstruggleagainstgrapegrowersasasignthattheycouldnotbesuccessfulrecruitingnewworkers.Heacknowledgedthattheboardmightfeelsometrepidationaboutorganizingafterthebeatingtheunionhadtakenin Coachella; however, he warned against seeing that experience as representative of theircapacitytowinelections.“Wecouldn’tcontroltheconditions,”hetoldtheboard,referringtothehighnumberofmigratoryworkersintheareaandtheshortamountoftimetheunionhadtoprepareforthecampaign.“Weshouldn’thavegonein,”heargued.“Wediditbecausewefeltwe had to do it to save what we had invested.” Ross contended that the lettuce and fruitindustrieswouldbedifferent,apositionthatsupportedGanz’scontentionthattheunioncoulddeployitsresourcestoindividualcropsratherthanlimitthemtoonefunctionoranother.

Ultimately,however,Rossagreedwiththerestoftheboard’ssupportforconcentratingunionresources in negotiations. The union had the greatest control over the boycott, he argued,because “it is our ballgame,” yet the boycott department was in no condition to lead acampaign of any consequence now or in the near future. Ross diagrammed the options andrankedthestrategythatbestservedtheunion.“Themostcontrolisenforcingthecontracts,”headmitted, but thatwouldmerely retainwhat the union had already negotiated. To addmoremembers,theunionhadtodecidebetweennegotiationsororganizing.InCoachella,Rosshadwitnessedtheconditionoforganizerswhohadrecentlysufferedcrushingdefeats.“Theboardhastofacethatstaffinthesecampaignsarebeingchewedup,”hereported.HeacknowledgedtheheroiceffortsbyGanzandMedina to rally the troops,but thecurvehadbeen toosteep.Ross found theorganizers ill-prepared, lacking“solid judgmentabouthuman relations,”andnot having the basic understanding or respect for the concept of “the ranch nation” and thepeoplewithin it.45Mistakes had beenmade that could be overcome with training, but thatwould take time that the union did not have.Ross argued, “Weowe it to thoseworkers [toconcentrateonnegotiations].Nooneshouldbedefensive.”46

Theboard’spreferencecameasanincredibledisappointmenttoGanz,whorejectedcallsto“consolidate” resources to survive. “How can we talk about consolidating?” he asked.“There’snothingtoconsolidatethere.Itstillhastobeorganized.Ithastobenegotiated.We’vegot to win more elections. There needs to be an overall strategy of attack which involveselections,negotiating,bargaining,whereyouwindupwithsignedcontracts.”Heworried,“Ifthere isn’t a big election campaign, it’s going to simply give credibility to the companypropaganda that theuniongot its asskicked inCoachella and therefore isnotgoing tohavetheseelectionsuphere[referringtoDelano].”Tappingintohisbeliefthatanorganizationmustcontinuetogrowordie,headded,“Eitheryougoforwardoryouwindupgoingback.”47

ChavezshowednointerestinengagingGanz’sideas,nordidGanz’spositionevokesupportfromhispeers.Althoughthefinalresolutionwouldnotcomeuntilthelastdayofthemeeting,theboardhaddecidedtogoalloutonnegotiations.Predictably,Ganzwassilentformostofthe remainder of the day, lamenting the missed opportunity to convince his fellow boardmembersoftheopportunitytheTeamsters’evacuationofthefieldshadaffordedtheunion.Cohen’srelativesilenceonthematterwasthemostcurious,givenhisbeliefthat theunion

shouldmovemoreaggressively towardorganizingvegetableworkers inSalinas.Likemany,however, he had grown tired of Ganz’s self-righteous behavior and his tendency to blameanyonebut himself for the failuresof theunion.WhenGanz accusedonenegotiator on loanfromtheUAW,ErnieMoran,offailingtosecurecontracts,Cohenerupted.“YoucansitinthisroomandshitonErnie,”hetoldGanz,“butErniedidn’thavealottoworkwith.”HeremindedGanzthattheboardhadgivenMoranhisinstructionsandthatGanzsharedintheresponsibilityasaboardmemberforwhathappened.48

Cohen’sreactiontoGanzrevealedhisgeneraldissatisfactionwithhispeers,whichhadbeengrowingforsometime.HeespeciallyresentedChavez’srecenttamperingwiththelegalteam,includinghisattemptedfiringofBobThompson,aneffectivebutopinionatedattorneywhomCohenhadrefusedtodismissjustbecauseChavezdidnotlikehim.Cohenhadneverbeenoneto wallow in self-pity, nor did he appreciate passive-aggressive leadership, two traits that

Chavezhadincreasinglyincorporatedintohisstyleandencouragedinothersbyexample.Thelong,tediousmeetingsthathadbecomethestandardpracticeoftheNationalExecutiveBoardalsobotheredCohen,especiallytheepisodicfightsbetweenHuertaandChavezthatpreventedtheboardfrommakingprogress.AlthoughChavezbelievedtheconflictsproduceduseful,frankdiscussions,Cohensawthemasannoying,counterproductive,andunnecessary.WhenHuertatookexceptiontoChavez’squestioningwhethershehaddoneenoughinDelano

to get contracts, Cohen decided he had had enough. He interrupted and announced that hewouldbe“goingtothemountainsforsixweeks”tothinkaboutwhetherhewantedtocontinueintheunion.“Youknow,whatmakesmetiredisn’tfightingwiththe[ALRB]orgrowers,”hetoldtheboard.“Thisiswhatmakesmetired,reallytired.Themostdishonestyisrighthereattheboardlevel.”HeaccusedGanzofbeinga“fuckingperfectionist”whenitcametocontractnegotiations,whereasVeraCruzwasguiltyoftheoppositesinofnotcontributinganythingatall.“Philip,youdon’tsayagoddamnwordatboardmeetings,”hetoldhim,“anditmakesmesick!”TurningtoHuerta,heyelled,“Dolores,don’tbesofuckingdefensive!”“Webettergetouracttogether,”hewarned.“It’sdisgustingtositbackhereandwatchit.”49

Cohen’soutbursttriggeredstrongreactionsfromthemembersandsetinmotionalandslideofaccusationsandconfrontations.RichardChavezshared,“IagreewitheverygoddamnwordJerrysaid.Wearenotfuckinghonestinthiscirclehere.Peoplearenotfreetosaywhattheywant to say because they’ll get in trouble.” He revealed that, in the past, when he saidsomething controversial at board meetings, his brother appeared at his house soon after todraw him back in line. Vera Cruz accused his peers of discriminating against Filipinomembers. Jim Drake claimed that they had lost a sense of trust among themselves. WhenPadilladisputedDrake’sassertion,HuertaconfrontedPadilla forconspiringagainstChavez.“Wehaven’tgottenalongsinceyouwerebadmouthingwhatwas[goingon]uphereatLaPaz,”shesaid,“makingfunofCesar,makingfunof theGame,makingfunofeveryonehere,andIdon’tthinkthat’sawayforagoddamnleadertoact.You’vebeengoingaroundbehindCesar’sback,andyou’vebeenunderminingwhathe’sdoingandyouhaven’tgotthegoddamngutstofacehimandtellhimfacetoface.”WhenPadillaaskedher,“Howdoyouknowwehaven’thadafacetoface?,”Huertastumbledandstammered,promptingPadilla’sangryorder“Shutup.”Huerta shot back that she should have been named secretary of the union, not Padilla,revealingyetanotherlayerofinsecuritynowconsumingher.Ratherthanintervene,Chavezletthemalevolenceconsumetheboard.Hisfailuretochannel

theuglyexchanges intoaproductivedialoguehadbecomepartofhismanagement style.Hehadlearnedhowtouseconfrontationsamongvolunteersandunionofficialsasamechanismfordealingwithpeoplewhomhedeemedtroublemakers,allowinghimtoimposedisciplineandorderwithoutsacrificinghisownimageasabenevolentleader.Hetoldtheboard,“Iusemyauratorun[theunion],”buthiscontentionranghollowinlightoftheexpletive-ladenfiringsofsomeindividualsoverthepastyear.Still,ChavezhadgrownfondofthepressurehewitnessedintheGame,achievingconformitythroughacombinationofpeerpressureandintimidationthatcamefrommultipledirectionsbut rarelycamedirectly fromhim.The tacticputanyonewhohad the slightestdoubtsabout thedirectionof theuniononedge,yet fewfelt empowered tochallengetheleaderforfearofbeinglabeleda traitor to theunion.IfChavezcaredwhether

expressionsofloyaltycamebywayoffearorrespect,hedidnotshowit,butmanyloyalistsbegantoquestionwhytheywerefollowingapaththatmanyinthefieldsawasunproductiveandself-indulgent.Members of the board began to penetrate Chavez’s self-proclaimed aura of piety and

questionedtheillusionofdemocracy.MackLyonsaccusedChavezofbeingdishonestwhenhechallengedboardmemberstobemoreresponsible.AccordingtoLyons,Chavezpossessedtheultimateresponsibilitytoleadtheboard.“You’retryingtogivepeopletheopportunitytopopupanddosomething,”hetoldChavez,butadded,“That’sbullshit.”HeinformedChavezthathehadanobligationaspresidenttolead,buthehadabdicatedthatresponsibilityforsometimenow. Jim Drake agreed, going so far as to call the board “a charade.” Drake challengedChavez,“Yougot thepower.Noweitheryou’regoing touse itor let itgo,butyoucan’tbehalfwayinbetween.”WhenChavezusedHuerta’stempertantrumsasanexcusefornotbeingmore assertive,Lyonsobjected. “Wecan’t thinkof [losing somebody] as a fuckingdisaster.You’retalkingaboutthesurvivalofthemovement!”Chaveztriedtoevokesympathybytellingtheboardheknewassassinswerelurkinginthe

shadowsreadytokillhimatanymoment.Noonetookthebait.FindingthecouragetoconfrontChavez,Drakereplied,“That’s…theultimateargumentbecausewecan’targuewithyou.…Idon’tthinkyoucanpull that.That’safuckingcop-out.”Lyonsadded,“You’reworriedaboutthefuture.Youshouldworryifyoudon’tdoyourjob.”Surprisedbytheirchallenges,Chavezattemptedtocommandloyaltybyarguingthathehad

comeunderextremepressurefromsubversiveforces.“Ithasbecomefashionabletocriticizeme,”hetoldthem.Heclaimedthatan“Anglovolunteersyndrome”permeatedtheunionstaff,conditioning them to judge any strong actions onhis part as evidence that he hadbecome adictator. Chavez complained that the attitude encumbered his ability to act decisively andpreventedhimfromenactingavision thatwould lead theunionoutof itscurrentmorass.“IknowtherearesmarterpeoplethanIam,”hedemurred,butadded,“notfuckingcagier…I’mthecagiest.”Suchatrait,heargued,hadcomeinhandyindealingwithmostboardmemberswho had been too quick to sidewith his critics. “It’s there,” he told them. “I need to feelcomfortablethatIcangetinafightandnothingisgoingtostaythere.”ExceptforGanz,Huerta,and Cohen, Chavez explained, he worried that most on the board would “bring out theskeletonsin[his]closet”orlabelhima“fuckingdictator”ifhepushedtoohard.“Ithurts,”hecomplained.“Itreallydoes.”Chavez’s depiction of himself as an embattled but patient leader belied the reality of his

exerciseofpowerduringthepastyear.Themovesoughttocircumventpersonalaccountabilityandavoidconfrontinghisshortcomings.Inspiteofhiscomplaints,Chavezhadfoundthemeansto do the things hewanted to do: pursuing Proposition 14, contracting the boycott network,implementingtheGame,andpurging“assholes”fromLaPaz.Whentheunionfailed—thelossofProposition14,thefailuretocapitalizeonthepactwiththeTeamsters,andtherecentlossesinCoachella—hesought todeflect theblameonto theboard.Even the rumorsofdissensionamongstaffatLaPazheattributedtotheactionsofboardmembers.TheirfailuretobegoodrolemodelsbynotacceptingtheGameandtheirhabitof“runningdown”LaPazwhiletalkingabouttheunionwithworkersinthefieldofficessetabadexampleformembersthroughoutthe

union. Regardless of the problem,Chavez seemed to always place blame at the feet of theboard.Chavez’scomplaintsquicklycoalesced intohis familiarappeal forbuildingcommunity.“I

amconvincedifwedon’tformacommunity…we’llnevergettoapointwherewewillactasone.”Herecognized theneed toconsideralternativeviewpoints,yetaccommodationhad itslimits. “Unlesswe release someof those individual rights for thegoodofone,”hewarned,“we’renevergoingtomakeit.”Heaskedthemembersforthefreedomtofollowhisinstincts,nomattertheconsequences.Heacknowledgedthepresenceofskepticswithinthewiderorbitoftheunionandagainofferedtheself-servingpredictionthathisvisioncouldbeinterruptedbyassassination. His greatest fear, however, was not being “bumped off.” “What I am reallyafraidof,”hetoldtheboard,“ishavingaschisminthismovement.”Heexpanded:“Because,onceitstarts,thenyou’reintrouble.See,thenyouhavenochoice.…Idon’thavetotellyou.Idon’tliketofightinside.There’ssomethinginsideofme.I’llfighttheoutsideforcesdayandnight.Insideisrevulsion.I’mafraid.Idon’tlikeit.Theonlythingthatwouldmakemewalkoutis…asplitontheboard.…Iwouldn’tbeabletodealwithit.I’mnotbuiltthatway.”Chavez’s airing of concerns served to articulate a fear of disunity shared bymost, if not

everyone, in the room. Since Proposition 14,most boardmembers had privately expressedanxietyaboutthedirectionoftheunion,andsomeopenlyquestionedtheimplementationoftheGame.Few,however,plottedagainstChavez.OnlyPadillahadseriouslyquestionedChavez’sfitnessasaleader,althoughhisconversationswithotherboardmembershadcomeduringfieldvisits rather than in any well-orchestrated plan to overthrow his friend. Indeed, Padilla’sprimaryconcernwastogetChavezintopsychologicalcounselingratherthanremovehimfrompower.MostfeltburnedoutbyastringoflossesdatingbacktoProposition14,andsomeevenwonderedwhether the union had lost itswaywhen it had agreed to theAgricultural LaborRelationsAct.Others,suchasMedina,felttheburdenofnotbecomingaself-sustainingfarmworkersunion.Medinaimaginedhearingdonorssay,“We’vebeensupportingyoufor13years,why don’t you get your act together?” Whatever the source or the starting point of eachmember’sindividualdoubts,thegroupnowfeltastrongurgetofleeratherthantofight.Thefirstboardmembertoactuallybroachthesubjectofleavingwasperhapstheonewith

the least amount invested in the union. PhilipVeraCruz had come to the board as one of ahandfulofFilipinoleaderswhohadparticipatedinthe1965grapestrike.Sincethen,however,hehadgentlyeasedintoinactivity,marryingaformerlegalvolunteerandspendingmostofhistimemaintaining their home inDelano rather than tending to his duties as a boardmember.Seventy-twoatthetimeoftheboardmeetingin1977,VeraCruzwaswellpasthisprime,buthealwaysfoundthetimetospeaktoFilipinocollegestudentsandradicallabororganizationseager tohear storiesof theunion’s founding.Hismostcaptivatedaudienceshadbeen in theSan Francisco Bay Area, a location of first retreat for many of the union’s recent exiles.Chavez and Huerta had heard rumors that Vera Cruz criticized the union leadership in hisspeeches.Morerecently,duringthespringof1977,VeraCruzhadsharedhisplanswithKentWinterrowdtowriteatell-allbookabouttheunionwiththehelpofhiswife,DebbieVollmer,thatpromisedtoputChavezandsomemembersoftheboardinanegativelight.NowinstrongdisagreementwithChavez’spositiontakenduringthemeeting,VeraCruzsaw

anopeningtoannouncehisresignation.“Ithinkthereisagreatproblemwiththeuniontoday,”heannounced.Heobjectedtotheprevailingassumptionthatanyonewhodaredtocriticizetheleadership was “speaking against the union,” and accused Chavez of extracting conformitythrough intimidation and fear. “I hate authoritywhen I am not given the freedom to expressmyself,”hetoldhim.“Ifoundout that thepowerstrugglehereintheunionisakindofdirtypoliticsandIhate that.”HeknewhisspeecheshadrankledChavez,admitting,“WhenI findmyself very controversial I think I should keepmymouth shut because I wouldn’t want todisrupttheoperationsoftheunion.”Knowinghecouldnolongerabidebysuchsilence,VeraCruzconcluded,“AndsoIhavedecidedthatmystayintheunionwillnolongerbeuseful.Iamleaving.”Thereactionfromboardmemberswasswiftandferocious.“Iamsickandtiredofthatguy,”

Lyonsresponded.“He’sfullofshit.”MedinacomplainedthatVeraCruzhadnotsaidanythingfor four years but nowhad the temerity to complain about howhe had been treated.Cohenagreed,informingVeraCruzthathehadanobligationasaboardmembertotellthemwhathewas feeling. Huerta recounted an incident in Delano when Vera Cruz missed an importantstrikemeeting to stay home and cook supper for hiswife. “You canmake a speech in SanFrancisco,”sheobserved,“butyoucan’tgototheFridaynightmeeting?”PadillaandDrakeaccusedhimofshirkinghisresponsibilitiesinthefield,whileRichardChavezchastisedhimforgivingalacklustereulogyatLarryItliong’sfuneral.“TheFilipinobrothershaveahardtimeholding on to their dignity,”Huerta shouted, adding, “Theywant you to domore.” RichardChaveznotedthatthetensionoverVeraCruz’sreputationasaleaderhadrecentlyprovokedanastyfightinDelanobetweentwoFilipinofarmworkersthatnearlyendedinagunbattle.

FIGURE17.PhilipVeraCruz(center),vicepresidentoftheUnitedFarmWorkers,andunidentifiedmenataboycottmeeting,ca.1970s.ALUA,UFWCollection,3361.

VeraCruzevokednearuniversalcondemnationfromhispeerswithhisannouncement.Somemay have resented his ability to find the courage to say what they had not dared to utter.Judging by the level of vitriol in the room, however, most had legitimate gripes, becauseeveryoneatonepointoranotherhadcarriedVeraCruz’sloadofworkforhim.Somemayhavebeen thinking of their own shortcomings as board members and worried about how theirservice might look between the covers of his forthcoming book. Whatever the motivation,virtuallyeveryoneintheroomtookaturnlambastingVeraCruz.EventuallyChavezweighedin.“Wefuckedup,”hetoldtheboard.Hereportedthatheknew

ofVeraCruz’splansforabook.ChavezhadreceivedadetailedreportfromKentWinterrowdaboutitandsuspectedthatthecopiousnotesVeraCruzwroteinsilenceduringeverymeetingwouldbepartofhissourcematerial.Still,Chaveztoldtheboard,hehadnottakenitseriouslyenough to do something about it.He then launched into an insult of his own followed by athreat:“Philipisthemostrevolutionaryguyhere…inhismind.Hecouldn’tgetarevolutionbecausehewon’tdothework.Hethinksaboutitandhetalksaboutit.Iknowhisspeeches.He’sveryinternational.It’sasyndromethatwe’vehadintheunionforsometime.Hedoesn’tlikeauthority.That’snumberone.HesaiditandIknowit.Heresentsit.It’sthekindofpeoplewhowouldn’tmindpraisingMao,whowasoutandoutthegreatestdictatortheworldhaseverknown, but shits on Cesar Chavez because I’m a little dictator.” He chastised himself foraccommodatingVeraCruz instead of ordering him to “shape up, asshole.”He admitted thatVeraCruzhadtherighttocriticizetheunionbutalsonotedthathisactionsgavetheboardtherightto“fuckhimupifwecan.”“Youwanttostruggleinsidetheunion?”Chavezaskedhimmenacingly.“Okay,butIalsohavearighttostruggleback.”Severalmembers followedChavez’s threat by insisting thatVeraCruz air his differences

thenand there rather thansave themfor thebook.VeraCruz respondedwithevasion,whichstoked Cohen’s anger. “I’ll domy best to fuck it up,” he told Vera Cruz, promising to usewhateverlegalmeansathisdisposaltoblockthebook.“I’vebeenheretenfuckingyearsandno one is going to fuck me without getting fucked back. Especially a friend.” Feeling thepressure, Vera Cruz finally admitted that he had serious differences with Chavez over therecent firings. “I didn’t think toomany of themwere conspiring against the union,” he toldChavez.“Ithinkthereweresomemistakes.”VeraCruz’squestioningofthefiringsupsetChavez,wholaunchedintoalongexplanationof

whyeachpersonhadbeenletgo.Heclaimedthathehadfiredonly twopeopleandthat themajorityhadbeenforcedoutbythecollectivewillofthecommunity.Asalways,Chaveztriedto have it both ways, depicting himself as strong and decisive while at the same timebenevolentanddemocratic.Inonecase,hebraggedabouthowhehadconfrontedonevolunteerfor pushing marijuana on the children of La Paz. “There’s three things that can fuck up amovement,”hetoldtheboard,“money,pussy,anddope.”Heconfrontedthe“dirtyasshole,”heexplained,toprotectthechildrenofLaPazfrombeingcorrupted.Chavezthenintroducedalaundrylistofotherfirings,includingmanyinDelanothathehad

notnecessarilyinitiatedbutcondonedintheinterestofpurgingconspiratorsfromtheunion.Inabriefmomentofintrospection,headmitted,“Thereweresomegoodpeoplethatgotfuckedinthe process… [mainly because] they got emotional.” He saw thesemistakes as necessary,

however, since theactsproved theexistenceof a loyalgroupof staff atLaPazwhowouldprotectthecommunityatallcosts.“WhenIgiveyouanorderinLaPaz,”hesaidwithpride,“you’re going to carry it out.” Backing away from his direct culpability in the affairs, heconcluded,“Igave thempermission tostandupanddowhat they thoughtneeded tobedoneandI’mreallyproudofthat.”Amongtheboardmembers,noonehadbeenmoreloyaltoChavezthanDoloresHuerta,who

usedthediscussionofconspiratorstomakeunsubstantiatedchargesofherown.Addressingtheboardwithanurgent,evenmaniccadence inherspeech,shedescribedhowshehadmovedfromdoubttocertaintythat“theassholesaretryingtosabotageus.”Sherecountedanumberofincidentsthathintedataconspiracybutofferednoconcreteevidence.Inonecase,shelatchedontoChavez’scrudeassertionthat“money,pussy,anddope”couldbeusedtocorrupttheunionbysuggestingthatoneyoungvolunteerandfriendofNickJones,MarkSilverman,hadpledgedhisundyinglovetoherinanattempttoinfiltratetheunionanddisruptitsaffairsintheserviceofasocialistorganization.“They’regoingtomarrypeoplejusttogetus,”shecautionedboardmembers.Forher, the repeated fights among the leadershiphad little todowith substantivedifferences about the direction of the union; rather, they were the result of a divide-and-conquerstrategybyallegedsaboteurs.Shewarned,“IfanyonetellsmeanythingaboutCesarrightnow,man, Igotmyantennaup!Before I’d just listen to it.…Fromnowon, I’vegot awholegoddamndifferentattitude.Ifsomebodystartsgivingmeabadtime,man,I’mgoingtostartnoticing.BeforeIthoughtitwasbecauseIwasn’tpopular,thatpeopledidn’tlikeme.ButnowIknowthat’snotitatall.It’sthatpeoplearetryingtofuckmeandtheyarefuckingme!”Huerta’s emotional tirade revealedmoreaboutherdeteriorated stateofmind than it did theexistence of awell-planned conspiracy against the union during the summer of 1977.WhenDrakeandGoveachallengedthefactsofherstories,sheshotbackangrily,“Ifsomeonefucksme, theyassume it ismy fault.”She complained, “I can’t go toonepersonon thisboard todefendme.”Chavez showed his appreciation for Huerta’s loyalty by indulging her fantasies of a

conspiracyandaddingsomeofhisown.“Doloresisgettingalotofattacks,”hepointedout,butadmitted,“Itisveryhardtoprove[heraccusationofaconspiracy].”AccordingtoChavez,thiswasexactly theplanof thecommunistconspirators,whohadahistoryof infiltrating thelabormovementandwerenowbreeding“likeflies”withintheorganization.“Weknowthey’redoingthiswiththesteelworkersandtheautoworkers.Weknowforsure.Weknowthisistheplan.Weknowthatwithagriculturethey’vebeensalivatingatthemouthforus.”Chavezsharedanumberofsuspicionshehadaboutcounterorganizersinthemovementbased

onhearsayrather thansolidevidence,andhisopposition tovolunteers’valuesand lifestyle.One included a member of Cohen’s legal team, Steve Hopcraft, whom he wanted to firebecause Huerta reported that hemight be gay. In another case Chavez alleged that a UFWvolunteer,KathyMcCarthy,usedacombinationofsexandliestoentanglekeymembersoftheunionincontroversy.Chavezhadfiredalong-timeUFWboycottorganizerinChicago,MarcosMuñoz,foranattemptedrapeofMcCarthy.Nowhequestionedhisdecision,tellingtheboard,“I’ll be a son of a bitch if I didn’t blame him.”WhenPadilla tried to defend the decision,Chavez admitted that Muñoz “wasn’t the most perfect guy,” but still clung to McCarthy’s

culpabilityintheaffairandsuggestedthatotherwomenwereouttogettheleadersoftheunion.Chavezcountedhimselfasthenumberonetargetfortheseallegedfemmesfatales.Extending

thediscussiontohispersonallife,heannounced,“Theyfuckedupmymarriage.Well,maybe.”During the late spring of 1977, Helen Chavez had received several anonymous letters “inperfect Spanish” revealing the details of a love affair between her husband and a youngMexicanAmericanwoman.BeforeleavingonatripChavezhadsoughttoblunttheimpactofhisaccuser’stestimonialsbytellingHelenthathehadbeensetupbyconspiratorsangryabouttherecentpurges.Thedetailsintheletterconvincedherotherwise.“Shepicked[theletter]up,andwhen I cameback, she [was] justgoingoutofhermind.” In spiteofhisbest efforts toexplain,HelenmovedoutofLaPaztoDelano.Still,theletterskeptcoming.“Twoweekslater,another fucking letter,”Chavezgroused to the board.She also received several phone callsfromwomenwhileherhusbandwastraveling.AlthoughsomeamongthemknewofChavez’sinfidelities,noonechallengedhisassertionsforfearoftheirownindiscretionsbeingrevealed.Indeed,ChaveztriedtodrawsympathybyalludingtoskeletonsintheclosetsofLarryTramutt,JerryCohen, and FredRoss. Few took the bait, exceptHuerta,who returned to her lamentaboutnearlygivingintoSilverman’sromanticovertures.Most in the room remained silent throughout Chavez’s and Huerta’s dizzying rants about

vague plots to overthrow the union and moments of personal weakness. Although Cohen,Govea,andDraketriedtointerjectsomesanitybysuggestingthatnotallthemistakesbystaffhadbeenpartofapatternofconspiracy,theirchallengesonlyproducedmoreunsubstantiatedchargesfromChavezandHuerta.Finally,ChrisHartmire,whoseconsciencehadgrownwearyfromtryingtodefendthepurgesofinnocentstaff,hadhadenough.“Howfardoyouwanttogointothistoday?”heaskedChavez.“BecauseDoloresandIarecomingapartattheseamsoverShelley [Speigel].” Speigel had been an effective director of the Huelga School. Althoughmembers of the community deeply appreciated the services and trusted Speigel, HuertadislikedherandtoldChavezthatshehadbeenfomentingrevolutionamongherstaffduringthefirsthalfof1977.Hartmireknewthistobeuntrue,butChavezhadmovedaheadanywaywiththefiringsofthestaffandthedismantlingoftheprogram.Asalways,hehadleftthefallouttobe handled by Hartmire, who, in this case, refused to excuse the behavior of his boss orHuerta.Now,infrontoftheboardonJuly3,1977,HartmirefoundthecouragetoconfrontHuerta.

“You’resoemotionallyinvolvedwiththeattackonyouatDelano,”hetoldher,“[that]youareouttogetcertainpeople,evenifyouhavetoexaggerateandlie.”TheaccusationstungHuerta,whoangrilythreatenedHartmire,“WhereIcomefrom,wekillpeopleforcallingsomeonealiar.”Not cowed by her,Hartmire pressed on: “The first time I talked to you about it, youaccusedmeofdefendingthewholegoddamnconspiracy.ThesecondtimeItalkedtoyouaboutit,yousaid‘Iguessyou’recallingmealiar.’”Thetwofellintoanargumentaboutthedetails,in which Hartmire challenged Huerta to back up her claims that Speigel had been holdingmeetings at her home to conspire against the union.Her suspicions of Speigel amounted toholdingabirthdaypartyonthesamedayasamarchinCoachella,andanothersocialgatheringto which Huerta had not been invited. “I saw the party and went by,” Huerta complained,adding, “I wasn’t invited.” In the end, Huerta failed to substantiate anythingmore than her

exclusionfromtheparties,anactthathadearnedSpeigelherire.“Ithinkthatshe’safantasticteacher,”Huertafinallyadmitted,butadded,“Atthispoint, ifIcan’tstandtobeinthesamefuckingroomwith[theHuelgaSchoolstaff],I’llbegoddamnedifI’mgoingtosendmykidstobe taught by them.… It’s nothing about her ability, man. But I just think she’s fucked uppolitically.”Rather thanacknowledge the shaky foundationofherconspiracy theory,Chavezdefended Huerta, and called on Tramutt, who offered the unsubstantiated allegation thatSpeigelhadencouragedherroommatetoseducehimwhiletheyworkedinLosAngelesontheboycott.Hartmire’schallengeinvitedanincredulousboardtopounceontheabsurdityofthemoment.

ThemutinybeganwithChavez’sbrother,Richard,whohadgrowntiredofthewholeaffairandoffered to tender his resignation. As the director of operations in Delano, it was hisresponsibility to followupon any charges ofmisconduct, but he foundnothingonwhich toindictSpeigel.Huertaandhisbrother,however,hadgoneoverhisheadtopurgeSpeigelandtheHuelgaSchool.“ForGod’ssake,”Cesardesperatelypleadedwithhisbrother,“openyourfuckingeyesandseewhat’shappening.”Hesuggestedthattheirfightinghadbeencausedbythesame“assholes”whohaddisruptedhismarriage,hadstrainedhisrelationswithhisdaughter,andwere trying to break up the union.Unmoved,Richard sarcastically retorted, “So, okay,lookateverybody.”Padilla also doubted the conspiracy, including the involvement of those purgedduring the

MondayNightMassacre.Since1965hehadtoleratedthevarious“goofies”andcastoffswhohad come to theunion, someofwhomhehadprofounddisdain for becauseof their lackofdecorumorseriousnessabouttheirwork.HehadparticipatedinthepurgeonApril4,1977,onlytogetridofsomeofthesepeople,butinitsaftermathherecognizedthatthefiringshadgonetoofarandhadfedChavez’sparanoia.50“YouandDoloresaretheonlyoneswhofollowthepatterns,”hetoldChavez,andaddedthathecouldnolongergoalongwithwhathedidnotsee.Ratherthanfighthim,ChaveztriedtoguiltPadillaintosubmittingtohiswillbyremindinghim thathehad trustedPadilla’s request inearlierdays to sackmembers inFresnobecausePadillaaskedhimto.HenowexpectedPadillatogivehimthesamebenefitofthedoubt,butPadilla’sconsciencewouldnotallowit.Hartmire also objected to Chavez’s position and increased the urgency of his original

message.“AllIampleadingfor,”hetoldChavez,“isthatwelistentootherinterpretationssowe don’t screw good people.” It had taken all of the courage he couldmuster tomake hisrequest.“Cesar,letmetellyou,we’reafraid.Allofusareafraid,fromtimetotime,toraisethoseotherinterpretationsfromwithin.…Ithinkalotofotherpeopleareafraidtofightwithyou on this issue… [but] we’ve got to do that because you also are capable ofmaking agoddamnbadmistakeaboutaperson.”WhenChavezinsistedthathehadconsultedtheboardonthefiringsbutgot“deadsilence,”

JimDrake found thecourage toweigh in. “The reason there isdead silence sometimes,”hetoldChavez,“isbecauseit’satypeoffrighteningthingtotakeyouon.”Drakeadmittedbeingashamedofhisroleinallowingthemadnesstocontinueoverthefirsthalfof1977;however,now,hebelieved,itwastimetospeakthetruthaboutChavez’suncheckedpower.HesharedthatHartmirehadcometohimrecentlytotalkabouthisdisagreementwiththepurges.During

thoseconversations,HartmirehadtoldDrakeofhisreluctancetochallengeChavezoutoffearofbeingaccusedofconspiracytoo.“MyGod,whatarewe,then?”Drakeasked.“Whathavewe become? Chris Hartmire is afraid to express things openly because he is afraid to beaccusedofbeingpartofaconspiracy.Whatmoreistheretosay?Ifhe’safraid,I’mgoingtobealittleafraid.”“I’mafraidtoo,”RichardChavezimmediatelyadded.“Everybody’safraid,butwe’retoogoddamnchickenshittosayanything.”The admission of fear should have been sobering for Chavez, but he failed to grasp the

gravity of the moment. Instead, he denied their right to their feelings by arguing that theyencumberedhisability to lead.Hechastised theboard,“Ifevery timeI firesomeoneyou’regoingtobefearful,thenIcan’tdomyjob.IgottohavetherighttofirepeopleandIgottohavetherighttomakemistakesindoingthat.…Ifyousayyou’reafraid,thenyou’rereallyfuckingmeup!”Heargued that theirunreasonable fears alsopreventedhim from tackling themajorissues confronting theunion in1977, foremost inhismind the expulsionof subversives.Hetoldtheboard,“Wearefuckedtodayintheunion.Because,youknowwhy?Wehaven’tgottheballstofacereality.”Hartmire refused to backdown. “I get a lot of shit from the outsideworld over all that’s

happenedinthelastfivemonths,”hesaidangrily.“IdefendtheunionandIthinkIinterpretitbetter than anybody else probably does.” This period of the union’s history had “not beenexactlynormal,”heopined,andhenowfoundit toodifficult tooffer theexplanation“Cesarsimplywantstocomedownandfuckpeoplewhoweknow.”Hebelievedotherssittingintheroom agreed with him, though they were too “chicken shit” to join in his condemnation ofChavez’sactions.Nowconfrontinghis friendandbossashe’dneverdonebefore,Hartmireoffered a different interpretation of “asshole” than the one Chavez had so often promoted:“Therearealsootherkindsofassholesintheunionbesidesagentswhoaretryingtofuckus.Theyaremechanisticassholeswhodoeverygoddamnthingyousay justbecauseyousay it,whetherornottheybelieveinit, justbecausetheyarekissingass.Andthey’regoingtokissass,andkissass,andkissass,andkissassandthey’regoingtoscrewsomerealgoodpeoplethatyoudon’tintendtoscrew.Becausetheirwayoflivinglifeisjusttokissyourass.”A shocked Chavez rejected Hartmire’s message and moved to quash what he saw as

insubordination. “Chris, let me tell you, I think it’s a total bunch of fucking horseshit,” hereplied angrily. When Hartmire tried to stand up to him, Chavez grew more insistent andmoved into lecturemode. “Letme tell youwhat happens. Fucking people do things formebecauseIdofuckingthingsforthem!Don’tyoueverfuckingforgetthat!Ifyoukeepthatfuckingperspective thenyou shouldn’tbeafraidof anything!”Not seeinghow this changedwhathehadjustsaid,Hartmirerestatedhisposition.“Therearesomepeoplewhoseexistenceinlifeismademeaningfulbykissingyourass,”heclarified.HispointclearlyalludedtoHuerta,withwhomhehadrecentlysparred,buthealsotookaimatmanyotherstaffmembersintheroom,includingtheWinterrowdsandTramutt,whohadtriedfutilelytosupportChavez’sconspiracytheories throughout the day. Hartmire added, “They’re dangerous people also. And they’regoing togo aroundhurtinggoodpeople in theunion just because they’rekissingyour ass. Ithinkwehavetowatchforthemtoo.Now,doesnooneagreewithme?AmItheonlyonewhothinksthat?”

Initiallynoonespokeup,likelyoutoffearofChavez’smenacinganger.Chavezcontinuedtodefend the few firings forwhich he personally took credit,most notably that of Joe Smith,whichheknewseveralpeopleontheboardquestioned.“What’ssofuckingstrangethatIfireonefuckingsonofabitchthatdidn’tagreewithme?”heasked.“Now,justassumingthatit’struethatImademistakes,whyshoulditbesofuckingdisastrousandyougetaffectedbecauseIfireJoe[Smith]?”Regaininghiscourage,Drakeonceagainchimedin.“That’sthequestionyouhave toanswer,”he toldChavez.“It’snot thequestion toask, it is thequestion toanswer.”Drake’squestion,however, requiredChavez toengage ina levelof reflection thathisangerandself-righteousnesscouldnotpermit.Herefusedtoacceptthathisactions,ill temper,andfalseaccusationshadcreatedanairofsuspicionintheunionthatturnedofficialsagainstoneanotherandparalyzedsomewithfear.Chavezinsistedthathispositionaspresidentgavehimaunique,bird’s-eyeviewoftheunion

that permitted him to see things hidden from plain sight. The argument constituted anotherdesperateattempttomarkoutanexclusiveperspectiveandaspecialsetofpowersthatnoonecouldchallenge.Hetoldtheboard,“IfIsayyouhavetohaveafuckingclean-upandI’vegottomakeitmyunionandfuckit,I’vegottobeafuckingkingorIleave.”Thesuggestionthathemightresignwasathreatthathehopedwoulddrawpeoplebackinto

line. Sounding defeated and exhausted, he launched into a self-pitying speech. “I’ve beenused,”hesaiddejectedly.“I’vebeenusedbythepeople.I’vebeenusedbymyownideas.AndI’vebeenusedbyeveryoneinthisroomtogettoagoal.Wemadeadeal.Andsoyouwearout.Youwearoutyour friendship.YouwearoutyourBlueChipstamps.”Chaveznowstrove tomakethepointinawaythathehopedwouldcreateshame.“IseecertainthingsintheunionthatIthinkhavetobedealtwith.Butmostpeopledon’tagreewithme.Theydon’t.Let’sfaceit.TheGame,theydon’tagreewithme.Thisideathatwe’rebeinghad,theydon’t.”Thingshadchangedintwelveyears,headmitted.Hewaxednostalgicforatimewhenhe“hadtotalandabsolutepower,”butthosedaysweregone.Ratherthanstayaroundtobedragged“outlikeafucking dog,” it was time to prepare for a smooth transition in which he would become a“president emeritus” at La Paz, left to pursue his vision of a community separate from theunion.“There’s thewholenakedtruth,”Chaveztoldtheboard.“Nowit’scomeout.I thinkIshouldleave.”Althoughmostknewhewouldnevergiveuppower,predictablyDoloresHuertatookthebait

andbeggedhimtostay.Huertarecountedherownmomentsofgrandeur,tellingthegrouphowshestoodnexttoBobbyKennedyattheAmbassadorHotelinLosAngelesjustminutesbeforehisassassination.Theexperience,sheargued,madehercontemplatelifewithoutChavezeitherbyhisvoluntarydepartureor,worse,bymurder.“Icouldn’ttakeovertheunion,”sheadmitted.“Whocould?”Thequestionwasmeanttoberhetoricalandservedtolaunchanappealtotheboard.“Wedon’t reallycare thatmuchabout theunion tomake itsurvive.Basically,weallcareabouthim.Icareabouthimbecauseofhisgreatgenius,andwhatwehaveinhistalentasanorganizerandasaleader.Butnoneofusreallycarethatmuchtoreallyfollowandtrytokeep theorganization together.We’re all just fighting eachother.We’re all just cutting eachother’sthroats.”Amongtheboardmembers,onlyRichardChavezagreedwithHuerta.“We’resofuckingdumb,”hetoldtheboard.“He’swayoutthere,wayoutthereinfront,andwecan’t

follow.”Perhapsregrettinghisearlierchallengestohisbrother,helamented,“Ifeelashamedsittingrightheretoday.”Fewsharedhisembarrassment,includingGilbertPadilla,whoaddedhisnametothelistof

peoplewhohadlostconfidenceinChavez.“Idon’tknowwherewearegoing,”headmitted,addingthathehadbecomeprofoundlyunhappyinhisjobandunsureofwhatthemissionoftheunionhadbecome.HedisagreedwithChavez andbelievedhehad exhaustedhisoptions insavingtheunionfromself-destruction.“ThedayIdisagreewithyou,”hetoldChavez,“IthinkIbetter leave.” Several people tried to convince him to reconsider, but Padilla identifiedChavez’splanstocreateacommunityinthelikenessofHomePlaceasthemainreasonwhyhecould not stay. Rather than create controversy before the upcoming convention, he wouldchoosenottorunforoffice,takealeaveofabsence,andquietlymoveon.51

AlthoughsilentformuchofthemeetingonJuly3,1977,MarshallGanzwasnowrousedtolife, criticizing Chavez for his lack of leadership since the spring of 1975. “It’s sort ofsurprisingthatmorepeoplehaven’tlefttheuniongiventhedegreeoffrustrationthatobviouslyexistsamongtheleadership,”hetoldeveryone.Likemanyonthisday,hereflectedonhisownlifeand the impactof theunionon it.The lackofdirection, the isolation fromfellowboardmembers, and,most important, the failureofChavez’s leadershiphadproduced a feelingof“drift” that he arguedwas almost universal. “I don’t thinkwehave the time to drift [and] Idon’twanttodriftwithmylife.Iwanttouseittodosomething.”Hecomplainedthattheyhadbeen“back-doored”intodoingProposition14andhadwastedvaluabletimewiththe“TwinkyLand”ofSynanon.ReflectingontheboardmeetinginBadger,Ganzadmitted,“Iwaspissedoffby thewhole thing.”No longerholdingbackhisopinionofDederich, theGame, andHomePlace,hetoldChavezthathethought“itwasphony”and“abunchofbullshit.”Ganzexpanded:“Itwasabigdiversionfromwhatweoughttobedoing,whichisdealingwithwherewe’regoing to organize. How are we going to recruit more people? How are we going to trainorganizers?Whatarewegoingtodoaboutnegotiations?Whenarewegoingtogettothecitrusindustry?HowarewegoingtogettoFlorida?Allofthesethingsthat,inmythinking,waslikewhere theunionhad togo.”LikePadilla,heobjected toconcentratingenergyand resourcesinto formingGamegroupsand reconstructingLaPazasanewHomePlace for theunion.“Ididn’t find that idea [and] I stilldon’t find that ideaparticularlyappealing.”Headmitted tothoughtsofleavingatleastthreetimesduringthepastyearandwasnotconvincednowthatheshouldstay.“Arewereallybuildingaworkers’union?”Ganzasked,notcertainoftheanswerChavezwouldgivehim.Chavez circumvented the question and indeed avoided engaging virtually every serious

challenge to his leadership at themeeting. Perhaps he hadgrownweary, having entered thefifteenthdayofoneofhisroutinefasts.Morelikely,however,hehadbeguntoapproachboardmeetings ashe approached theGame, exercisinghis “caginess,” thinkingofhow to “get theGame off him[self] and onto some else,” and initiating indictments and “carom” attacks onindividuals about whom he had suspicions. The meeting had revealed signs of all theseelements,yetChavezhaddonehisbesttoupholdthedistinctionsbetweeninsideandoutsideoftheGame.Forexample,whenLyonsandothersidentifiedtheindictmentofVeraCruzearlierinthemeetingasaGame-likemaneuverandsuggestedthat theyhad, infact,enteredadefacto

Game,Chavezinsistedotherwise.Thedistinctionbetweenthetwohadbecomeblurrytomanyon the board and perhaps to Chavez too, though he failed to acknowledge it. The meetingprovided more evidence of his failure to facilitate true democracy; rather, he encouragedconfrontations to prove his point that conspirators had infiltrated the union and caused theconflicts among them.Henowmanagedmeetings as hedid theGame, letting attacks amongboardmembersbecomenastyandpersonal.Althoughsomevaluedthehonestyexpressedinthemeeting, the indictments, challenges, and testimonies failed to produce confidence in thedirectionoftheunion,inChavez,orinoneanother.Chavezsavedthelastandmostviciousattackfortheendoftheday.Priortothemeeting,he

haddiscussedVeraCruz’sbookwithasmallcadreofboardmembers, includingCohenandPadilla.Togethertheyhatchedaplantocirculateaconfidentialityagreementamongtheboardinwhicheachmemberwouldpromisenot todisclose thecontentsofmeetingsafter thefact.Chavez believed the move would reveal Vera Cruz and Debbie Vollmer as “spies.” HeespeciallydistrustedVollmer, althoughPadillahaddiscountedbothof themas threats to theunion.“Shewasa littledingy,”PadillaadmittedofVollmer,but shewasnoconspirator.OfVeraCruz,Padillaopined,“Philipwasaveryhonesthumanbeing, Imean reallyhonest,upstraight[and]verydemocratic.”HerecognizedthatVeraCruzhadMarxistideas,buthefailedtoseethisasevidenceoftreason.PadillawentalongwiththeschemeifonlytoseeChavez’sfar-fetchedclaimsofaconspiracyblowupinhisface.52

The results turned out far worse than Padilla or Cohen expected. Before adjourning themeeting on July 3, 1977, for the evening, Chavez announced that Cohen had drawn up theagreementtowhich,heasserted,theyhadalreadyagreedverballyearlierintheday.Heaskedeveryonetosignit,thoughpredictablyVeraCruzrefused.Stillshakenfromtheearlierattackonhim,VeraCruzadmittedtohavingambitionsofpublishingbutdeniedevercallingtheunioncorrupt.“Idon’twanttowaivemyrights,”hetoldhispeers,“becauseyoupeoplehavebeenverymadatmetoday.”Heworriedthatifhesignedawayhisrights,hewouldnotbeabletodefendhimselfinanuncertainfuturethatcouldproducemorehatredandpersonalattacks.Truetotheplan,boardmembersweighedinagainstVeraCruz.“Legally,itdoesn’tmakea

goddamnbitofdifferencewhetheryousignitornot,”CohentoldVeraCruz.“Icangetyourass under federal law. I can get your asswith the oral agreement.Onewayor another,” hepromised,“I’llgetyourass.”CohensawVeraCruz’srefusaltosignasbothapersonalaffronttotheirfriendshipandabetrayalofhisresponsibilitytotheworkerswhohadelectedhim.“Itmakesmesicktomystomach,”headdedindisgust.“Iamgoingtocrankupthepropagandamachineandgetyourass,”HartmiretoothreatenedVeraCruz.MedinaremindedVeraCruzthathehadcommittedhislifetoworkforthefarmworkersandpoorpeople.NowMedinadoubtedthe truthofhis statements. “You’regoing togiveaweapon to the imperialists [bywritingabook],”Medinaalleged. “Everyone in this statewillknow that thisPhilipVeraCruzwasapileofshit,”hepredicted,andaccusedhimofsellingout.Drakewentfurther,announcing,“Idon’tthinkthemeetingshouldcontinueinthepresenceofthisfilth.”WhenChavezremindedDrakethatVeraCruzhadbeenelectedbythemembership,hetoldhim,“[Then]whydon’tyou[VeraCruz]dierightnowsowecanhaveourdecentmeetingwithoutyoulisteningwithyourbigfatears?”Chavezalsoinvitedstaffmembers—mostthemmorethanhalfVeraCruz’sage—

toberatetheelderboardmember,accusinghimoflyinganddeceivingthemembership.Chavezhungbackas the indictmentsflewatVeraCruzfromallangles,diminishingaman

whohadservedtheunionsinceitsfoundingtwelveyearsearlier.Padilla laterrecalledwithregret,“WhatwedidtoPhilipwasugly,ugly.…That’sallIcansay…justplainugly.”PadillarememberedVeraCruztryingtostandhisground,butbythispointthelongdayhadturnedintoa seemingly interminablenight, andhehadnowbegun to feelhis age.Headmitted tobeing“confused”andpleadedwiththegrouptolethimleave, tellingthem,“Icannot thinkstraightnow.Allofyouaretryingtoscareme!”Buttheinsultsandaccusationskeptcoming.WhenHartmire paused the attack to ask Chavezwhat hewas thinking, Chavez broke his

silence.“TheyworkedonPhilipalongtimeago,”Chavezcontemplatedaloud.“Philipwasn’tlikethiswhenwestarted.Iknowexactlywhenitstarted.”HeclaimedthatheandVeraCruzhadbeenthetargetsof“commie”conspiratorsyearsago,thoughonlyVeraCruzhadgivenin.“They fucked him up,” he alleged. Chavez bragged, “I used them asmuch as I could,” butadmittedthathepaidforhissubterfugebymakingtheunionatarget.HeknewthatVeraCruztraveled toSanFrancisco to“palaround”with theunion’senemies,who lavishedpraiseonhimtogethimtodotheirdirtywork.“Philipmadefriendsoutsideoftheunion,”hetoldtheboard,“[and]thedayofreckoninghascome.”ChavezgaveVeraCruzthecoupdegrace,butthedamagehadalreadybeendone.WhenVera

Cruz reiteratedhis innocenceandhisdesire to leave inpeace,Chavezcalled forabreak toallow him to collect his things and leave the board meeting for good. When the meetingresumed,aconfidentChavezsmirkedthathedidnotfeelasbadastheyapparentlyfeltabouttheattackbecause,inhismind,itprovedtheexistenceofaconspiracyhehadbeentellingthemaboutallalong.“Itshouldbefuckingcleartoyou,”hechastisedthegroup.Hespentthenextthreehoursdeepintothenightreviewinganumberofpossiblesuspectsthroughouttheunion,fromDelanotoSalinastoCoachella.HereturnedtohisproblemswithHelenasevidencethataconspiracywasafoot,lamenting,“IhavetohaveameetingwithmyfamilytonighttoseeifIamstillmarried.…It’sreallyfuckingridiculous.”Themaritalproblemsofothersalsopassedas evidence thatwhitewomen conspiratorswere out to sabotage the union. Every conflict,fromafighthehadwithGanzin1968,tooppositioninthemedicalclinicsandquestionsabouttheupcomingconventionwasproofthatconspiratorshadinfiltratedtheunion.“There’sothersthataregoingtocomeup,”Chavezpredictedwithoutevidence.“Ican’ttellyounowbecauseifIdidtellyounow,Ican’tproveit.”Tooexhausted to challengehis circular arguments, theboardmostly relented.Chavez told

themhewouldcontinuetopurgesuspiciouscharactersfromtheunion,concentratingonwhitevolunteersbecauseheknew“theygotsomemoremembers,”andbecause“gettingaChicanoand a farmworker out is a different story.” “We’llmake somemistakes,” he predicted, butassuredthegroupthathewoulddoit“withclass”andavoidtakingthem“bystorm”astheyhaddone inApril 1977.Hewoulduse specialpowers to runpatterns inhismind todetectsuspiciousbehaviorand“findaniceway”toexpelthem.Eitherway,hetoldtheboard,“wegottacleanthem”orelsetheywoulddestroytheunion.Intheend,theexecutiveboardmeetingofJune30throughJuly4,1977,didlittletoliftthe

unionoutof itscurrentmalaise.Thedecision toconcentrateonnegotiationsoverorganizing

constituted amajor retreat fromALRA elections and a forfeiture of the advantage they hadgainedbyreachingatrucewiththeTeamsters.Inretrospect,Cohensuggestedthatthedecisiontoconcentrateononeor theotherhadbeena falsechoicecreatedbyChavez tocounter thegrowingpowerofvegetableworkersinSalinas.Helaterexplained,“It’safalsechoiceinthatthese guys in the vegetables were willing not only to organize their own companies; theywanted to go organize the competition.”53 One Salinas worker close to Ganz, MarioBustamante, had begun to talk aboutmoving aheadwith orwithoutChavez’s approval. ThemovefedChavez’salreadywell-developedparanoiaaboutconspiratorsinSalinas,promptinghim to doubt Ganz’s intentions in 1977. Although Cohen agreed with Ganz, he found itimpossible to support him, given his stubbornness and his tendency to rebel by refusing torespond tophonecalls.Cohen later remembered thatGanz’sbehavior “sort ofpoisoned theatmosphere,”makingithardforanyonetosupporthim.Ingeneral,thedeepfeelingsofdistruststoppedtheboardfrommakingdecisionsinJuneand

July 1977. Such conditions could be interpreted as a collective failure, but the lack ofdemocracy either in the union or on the boardmeant thatmuch of the responsibility for theunion’sditheringfellonCesarChavez.Hemaintainedtheultimateauthoritytohireandfire.Inaddition, theboard functionedonlyaseffectivelyashemanaged it.Consumedby fearsof aconspiracy, and with no one in his inner circle to check his anxieties, Chavez let hisimagination runwild.His embraceof theGamecoloredhis dealingswith theboard, as hisbehavior,especiallyonJuly3,1977,revealed.HisattackonVeraCruzbaredthetelltalesignsof theGame:acontrived,mean-spirited indictment, inwhichChavez reliedonothers in theroom to lead the attack. The verbal assault came at a moment when board members hadlaunched theirmost critical challenge to his leadership,withmany expressing an interest inquitting. The attack on Vera Cruz effectively “got the Game off of him” and served totemporarilyunifymembers,butthedeepdivisionsremained.TheindictmentofVeraCruzalsoplaced board members on notice that anyone who dared to question Chavez’s fitness as aleader—even veterans of the movement—would be subject to community scrutiny andcondemnation.Chavez,whonowruledthroughamysteriouscombinationoffear,intimidation,andself-pity

inanimaginaryworldofconspiratorsanddoubleagents,consideredthemeetingatremendoussuccess.JustthreedayslaterheconvenedaGamesessionatLaPazinwhichhebeganthedaybyreflectingonthepastweekend.HeproudlyrecountedthedetailsofVeraCruz’spurgeandannounced that it had produced “probably the best debatewe ever had in the history of theboard.”Hesawatransformationintheboardmembers,who,heasserted,nowunderstoodthethreattheunionfaced.“I’veknownforawhileandtheboarddidn’tbelieveme,”heexplained.“Now,Ithinktheyallbelieve.Theyallbelievenow.…So,we’regoingtobealsotryingtogetmoreassholesoutoftheunion.”54Inthisway,Chavezofferedaself-servinginterpretationoftheUFW’shealthin1977,onethatdeniedhisslowstrangulationoftheunionhehadonceledsoskillfully.

EIGHT

SomeWereMoreEqualThanOthers

AMONGTHEMANYTOPICS thatdivideformermembersof theUnitedFarmWorkers, theGameandtheinfluenceofSynanonremainthemostcontroversial.AlthoughitisdifficulttopinpointthemomentatwhichChavezbecameconvincedofitsvaluetotheunion,bymid-1977hehadcommitted to the Game’s integration into La Paz and made plans to extend it to the legaldepartment in Salinas and the field offices throughout California. At the executive boardmeetinginJune–July1977,herevealedthattheGameconstitutedthecornerstoneofhis“littlecultural revolution” and speculated, “It may lead us to heaven.”1 Within the span of fourmonths,fromMarchtoJuly1977,ChavezhadmovedaggressivelyfrominauguratingthefirstGame groups at Home Place to playing the Game three times a week at the union’sheadquarterswith two separate groups, composedmostly of young residents.By July 1978,unionrecordsindicate,morethanahundredpeoplehadplayedtheGameasfrequentlyasninetimes a month. As someone partly responsible for monitoring its growth, Chris Hartmirewatched the Game unfold before his eyes. Like many who came to regret the union’sexperimentation with the Game, he reached a new understanding of its purpose over time.AlthoughHartmire initially believedChavezwhen he said that hewanted to implement thepractice to inspire greater honesty among staff, he later realized Chavez’s true intent. “Inretrospect,”Hartmirereflected,“IthinkCesarwaslookingfordisloyalstaff.”Headded,“TheGamecametoLaPazforcontrol.”2

HowmuchtheGamecontributedtoconflictamongUFWleadersandhastenedtheretreatofthe union from the fields is a matter of debate. Some, such as Jerry Cohen, saw the oddbehavior atLaPaz as anunfortunatedistraction that tookChavez awayat a timewhen theymostneededhim.OthersremaincommittedtoChavezandhislegacy,refusingtoadmitthattheGamehadany influence in thedeclineofelectionvictoriesorcontributed to thedifferencesthat emerged between Chavez and field representatives in the late 1970s.3 Indeed, when IspoketoMarcGrossmanin2006,hedeclinedtobeinterviewedforthisbookbutassuredmethatChavezhadmaintainedonlyafleetinginterestintheGameandthattheexperimentendedwithout having any influence on the union.4 The discussion amongmovement veterans on alistservcreatedbyLeRoyChatfieldin2004beliessuchaninterpretation.Forexample,GlennRothner,aformermemberof theUFWlegaldepartment,wrote,“I’mnotsurewhy[SynanonandtheGame]warrantssomanypostings(includingmyown),butsurelywecanagreethatthealliancewithSynanon,particularlyatatimewhenthatorganizationhadproveninternallytoxic

(andexternallyvenomous)wasnotoneofCesar’sfinermoments.”5Thatnoteveryonecouldagreetohisinterpretationisatestamenttothegulfbetweenmosthistoriesofthemovementandthememoryofthosewhoparticipatedinit.6

The relationshipwithSynanonand the integrationof theGame introducedawayofdoingbusiness that dramatically deviated from what had been the norm. The union began as amultiethnic and multigenerational movement in which volunteers applied their passion andskills according to their strength; most were welcome to participate regardless of theirbackground.Althoughattimesthismadeforsomeawkwardexchangesandaclashofcultures,the principles of nonviolence—most dramaticallymodeled byChavez in his fasts,marches,andspeeches—smoothedoverthesedifferencesandfacilitatedafeelingofbeneficenceamongstaff.Thedecisiontoprivilegetherecruitmentofthoseperceivedasbeingclosertofarmworkbeganaslideawayfromtheseprinciples,establishingahierarchythatfedChavez’ssuspicionofnon-Mexicansintheunion.Dederich’srecommendationthattheyouthconstitutedthefuturealsosetinmotionagrowingirreverencetowardseniormembers,mostviciouslydemonstratedinthepurgingofPhilipVeraCruz.TheGamebecamethevehicleforthistransition,introducingtomembers aggressiveness heretofore unknown to themovement. In the numerous letters ofprotestthatcameintoLaPazduringthistime,manyformermembersandalliesoutsideofLaPaztriedtopointouttheviolenceinherentinthewordsandthreatsthatflowedfromtheGame.Chavez dismissed the concerns as further evidence of agents conspiring to bring down theunion,creatinggreaterdistancebetweenthetwoculturesthathademerged:apermissivenessandobediencetoChavezatLaPazandresistanceandnonconformityawayfromit.Thisclashofculturescreatedapoisonousenvironmentthathadalreadyafflictedmostboard

membersandcausedmanyinsideandoutsideoftheheadquarterstocontemplatealifewithoutthe movement. Throughout the end of the decade, those who opposed Chavez’s directionstruggled over priorities and goals in an attempt to pull the union out of the tailspin it hadbegunduringthefatefulcampaignforProposition14.Theresultwouldnotremedywhatailedthe union; however, it would prevent La Paz from becoming another failed intentionalcommunityandremindmanythattherewasstillimportantworktobedone.

NOONEISREALLYALEADER

According toChrisHartmire,CesarChavezclaimed tohavebrought theGame toLaPaz to“manage the union better.”7Most UFW volunteers, however, came to loathe the Game andlikenedittothekindofdemocracypracticedinGeorgeOrwell’sAnimalFarm, inwhichthegovernanceof the farmby theanimalsprovidedonly the illusionofdemocracyandactuallyaccentuated inequality.MarcColeman,who livedatLaPaz from1975 to1977, recalled,“Ithink everyone at La Paz who played The Game (and we were all required to do so)understood…‘someweremoreequalthanothers.’”He,likeotherswhoplayedaGamewithChavez,“neverheardanyoneattemptto‘game’him.”8

At La Paz, Game participants went after each other with a vengeance, an approach thatthrilledChavez.Hehadgrowntiredofthelegalmaneuveringsandpoliticaldealingshehadto

engage inwith thestateandappreciated the rawnessof theconflicts in theGame.“Wedealwith[oldquestions]intellectuallybutnotfromthegut,”hecomplained.TheGame,hetoldtheboard, allowed the group “to go to the innards.”9 Chavez believed that the confrontationsamongGameparticipantswouldencouragethemtoreflectmoredeeplyonthequalityoftheirservicetotheunionandrenewtheircommitmentstohim.ButtheGameoftenhadtheoppositeeffect,producingdistrustandenmityamongpeoplewho

had formerly trusted one another. Players routinely criticized their peers for their sexualpractices, their age, their relationship to their parents, their limited intellect, or their poorhygiene. Issues spoken in private between members would frequently make their way intosessions,creatingsuspicionaboutwhocouldbetrustedwithpersonalinformation.Similarly,indictments voiced within sessions infected relations in the day-to-day lives of members,violatingoneof thekeyrulesof theGame: themaintenanceofafirewallbetweenthe insideandoutsideof theGame.TheviolationalsobrokeoneofChavez’spromises topolice suchtransgressions,althoughultimatelytheyhelpedinstillfearamongmembersandcontributedtohisdesiretocontrolthebehaviorofLaPazresidents.ChavezofficiallybeganhisexperimentonMarch15,1977,whenheaskedChrisHartmire

andKentWinterrowd to take a small groupof twelvevolunteers toBadgeronce aweek tolearn.“IselectedtheoneswhoIthoughthadmorepossibilitynottofailon[the]firsttry,”hetold the executive board.10 Esther Padilla, who had been slated to be in the group butpostponedherparticipationduetopregnancy,thoughtthattherewasmoretoChavez’schoiceofparticipants.“When[Chavez]cameback[fromHomePlaceinFebruary],”sherecalled,“hedecidedhewasgoingtogetalltheyoungminds,theyoungvirginminds,andstartwiththem.”The group included Cesar’s son, Babo, as well as Dolores Huerta’s daughter, Lori, and anumberofotheryoungpeoplewhoseparentsparticipatedintheunion.11

AccordingtoGilbertandEstherPadilla,Chavezselectedyoungpeoplewhomheplannedtomoveintoleadershiprolesasthenewcommunitymatured.ThePadillassawtheemphasisonyouth as apeculiar and cynical approach to addressing a lackof farmworkers in theunionsincefewofthempossessedexperienceeitherasfieldlaborersorasorganizers.InthecaseofChavez’s children,HelenChavez had been very protective of her childrenwhile theyweregrowingup,avoidingthelimelightandrestrictingthemfromparticipatinginstrikesorservingon boycott picket lines.12 Nevertheless, Chavez invested hope in them as the future of theunion.Chavez occasionally accompanied the youth to Badger but entrusted much of the early

responsibility of teaching theGame andmonitoring the group toHartmire andWinterrowd,whereas Matt Rand imparted lessons on how to play at Synanon. Among this first group,Hartmire remembered,“mostpeoplegotakickoutof it,”butGilbert andEsther receivedaverydifferentreportfromBaboChavez.Estherremembered,“Babocametoourhouseintearsto talk toGilbert.Thosekidswerescaredshitless.”BaboconfidedinGilbert that theGamewasdifficultforhim,butheapparentlyfelthecouldnotchallengehisfather.13

TheGames inBadger took a physical toll on the participants since sessionswent until 1a.m.,andthegroupoftendidnotarrivehomeuntil4a.m.priortoabusydayofwork.Someparticipants also began to avoid the trips altogether due to the unpleasant nature of the

encounters. Chavez’s son-in-law and head of security, David Villareno, received harshtreatment throughoutMarch and April 1977, prompting him to skip out on the Game whenChavezdidnotaccompany thegroup.Consequently,Chavezmoved theGame toLaPazandinvitedmembersofSynanontofacilitatesessionsthere.ThefirstGameatLaPaztookplaceonMay3,1977,andinvolvedmembersofthefirsttwo

Gamegroups,thoughonlyahandfulparticipatedinthegaming.RandbroughtfourexperiencedgamersfromtheSynanoncommunitywhohadparticipatedinthetrainingatHomePlace.IftheshifttoLaPazwasmeanttoproducemoreconstructiveexchanges,theplannersmostlyfailedintheirattempts.Villarenowasthefirsttobechastisedbythegroup.Randinitiatedtheattack,takingnoteof

his absences from theGame atHome Place and scolding him formissing an assignment toprovidesecurityatarallyinSantaBarbara.AfterChavezaccusedhimofderelictionofduties,Villarenohad skipped theeventandheaded toSanDiego,wherehis carbrokedown.“Youmakealotaboutlayingdownyourlifeandtakingseveralbullets inyourkeister,”Randtoldhim,“[but]thefact[is]thatyougotyourfeelingshurtandsoyouwentawaytoSanDiegoandyougotstuck there.”RandderidedVillarenoforbeinga“fuckingkid,”acharge that invitedotherstocallhima“liar”and“adamnsissy.”FewrelentedwhenVillarenofinallyadmittedhismistakes.“David,”GerrifromSynanontoldhim,“Idon’tknowyouverywell,butIthinkyou’realiar.…Idon’tthinkyou’reveryhonestatall.Ithinkmostofthepeoplefeelthatwayaboutyou.”Followingacascadeof insults,Chavez finallyweighed in, stating thathedidn’tthinktalkingtoVillarenowouldmakethesituationbetter,andconcluded,“I’llgethimthehelloutandfindsomegoddamnorganizedcompanyorsomething[forhimtoworkat].”14

LoriHuertaalsoreceivedharshtreatment.MarcGrossmanbegantheindictment,sharingthatHuertahadrefusedtoreadstoriescriticaloftheunioninthenewspapersbecauseitmadeherdepressed.Instead,hetoldthegroup,shespenthertimereadingadvicecolumns,thecomics,and thehoroscope.“Wementioned thenameof theWallStreetJournal,”Grossman toldhisfellowgamers, “and [she] didn’t even knowwhat itwas!”WhenHuerta confirmed that thenews did depress her, Grossman shouted her down, asking her, “Does that mean you havelicensetobeanignoramusallyourlife?”Randasked,“Whydoyoucrackyourgumlikesomekind of fucking broad?” From there, the indictment descended rapidly into an attack on herhygiene,dress,andgeneral lackofdecorumbeforemembersof theSynanon teamredirectedthediscussion toward strategies forher self-improvement.AlthoughHuertaclaimed that shehadmadeeffortssincethefirstGamesessionstocleanup,GerrifromSynanonoffered,“Youkindagotabigmouth.You’rekindafeisty,likeme.Butyou’rekindadumb.AndIdon’tthinkyou’redoinganythingattwenty-fivetoimprove.…Ifyouwereeighteen,youwouldbecute.But,you’renotcuteatthisage.”15

TheGamesparednoone;eventhosethoughttobemakingpositivecontributionscameinforpetty,oftenpersonalcriticism.Whereas inonemoment, theSynanongroupusedGrossman’sattack on Huerta to question her behavior, in another they turned the focus on Grossman,pointing out that he had failed by not correcting Huerta when she misspoke or actedinappropriately. Gerri of Synanon mocked Grossman’s “skills with the free press” andultimatelydeterminedthathelacked“anyvaluetothisgroup.”BabotookhisturnatGrossman,

makingtheattackpersonal.“Whatwasthemostexcitingthingthatheeverdidinhislife?”theyoungChavezaskedthegroup.Answeringhisownquestion,hesaid,“[Marc]toldustheotherday[he]losthisvirginityatnineteenorsomethinglikethat.”Aspeopleintheroomgiggled,Randaddedtheinsult,“Ittookaboutfourhourstogethimtocometothefactthatthefirsttimehegotlaid…hewastwenty-fourandhediditthroughtheholeinhispajamas!”Althoughsomeofthediscussiondealtwithon-the-jobissues,moreoftentheGameinvited

people to exploit character flaws of individuals for laughs or self-promotion.Rand and hisSynanon team stoked the fires of conflict in an attempt to initiate indictments, a goal hebelievedheachieved.“Fromourstandpoint,”RandwroteChavezinMay1977,“noonehasapproached theproposition [of incorporating theGame]withasmuchenthusiasmand initialsuccessasourfriendsfromUFW.”16Unquestionably,theGamehadbeguntotransformpeopleformerlyuncomfortablewith theexercise into expertgamerswhoexhibitedawillingness toconfrontothermembers.BaboChavez, for example, seemed tobecomemoreaggressive themoreheplayed,andhedevelopedaknackforstrikingatpeople’sgreatestvulnerabilities.Equallytelling,however,werethenumberofpeoplewhosatquietlyintheroom,refusingto

participate for fear of becoming the target of an attack or because they disapproved of theexercise.Theirsilencebetrayed“thetheory”thateveryonefeltthefreedomtoindictanyoneinthe Game, including those higher up on the organizational food chain. As their ultimatesupervisorandthepersonwhohadsolepowertohireandfireindividuals,Chavezproducedanxietybyhispresenceandencouragedcompetitivenessattheexpenseofpeers.Althoughheinvitedeveryonetoindicthimandpromisedthat“nooneisreallyaleader”insidetheGame,inpracticemostpeoplerespectedhispowerandlefthimalone.Randrevealedmorethanheintended when he told the group, “One of the things that we were afraid of… in gettingtogetheragroupofyoungerpeopleandhavingthemplaytheGameisthatsomehowtheywouldthinkthatthey’reanythingotherthanwhattheyare…dumbfuckin’kid[s].”Suchapositionnotonlydenigratedthe“futureoftheunion”butalsodemandedobediencetoChavez.Moreover,neither Chavez nor anyone charged with implementing the Game saw the contradiction inachievingmorehonestyandrespectthroughtellingliesandridiculingoneanother.Several people living beyond La Paz began to challenge the practice as absurd and

inconsistentwiththeprinciplesoftheunion.Hartmire,whoreceivedmanylettersduring1977and1978,remembered,“Thepeopleoutthereinthefieldofficesandthelegaldepartment,theyjustthought,‘What’sgoingon?!’”Atatimewhentheunionshouldhavebeenorganizingforthefirstelectionssince theProposition14debacle, theGameproduceddistractionsandsappedtheenergyofvolunteers. Inhis travels throughoutCaliforniaduring the1977springharvest,Hartmireheardmutteringsamongincredulousmembers:“Wehaveawarouthereinthefields,[and]they’replayingtheGamethreetimesaweek?!Cesar’scallingusbacktoLaPaztolearnandplaytheGame?!Whatintheworldisgoingon?!”17

Hartmire began to see the ill effects of theGame in July 1977, after a particularly brutalsessionthatforcedonemembertoconfideherdistasteforthepractice.18AnnMcGregor,ashy,middle-agedwhitewoman,hadbeena reluctantparticipant in the firstGamegroup.Chavezhad selected her, in part, because of her role as the head of the department that managedretirement benefits for members. During Games, her tendency to remain quiet only invited

participantstoattackhermore.TheGameonJuly7,1977,hadbeenparticularlydifficultforherbecauseshehadallowedunauthorizedmembersworkingbeneathhertositinontherecentJune–Julyexecutiveboardmeeting.OnceinsidetheGame,herpeersattackedhermercilesslyfornotshowingmoreassertivenesswithherstaff.BaboChavez,nowquitecomfortableintheGame,angrilycriticizedherforallowingtheunauthorizedmemberstoremainuntilhisfatherfinallyhadtoplaytheheavyandremovethemfromthemeeting.“Thisman’sgotanimage,”heshoutedatMcGregor,“andhe’snotgonnahaveaverygoodimageifhekeepsontellingpeopletheycannotcometoboardmeetings.That’syourfuckingjob!”McGregorrefusedtoengagetheindictment,whichonlyfueledtheiranger.LoriHuertaobjectedtohersilence,tellingherthather“glassy-eyed”lookremindedherofhermentallyillsister.“That’sjusthowmysisteractswhen she’s getting sick… the same fucking way.” “She’s not getting sick,” Cesar Chavezadded,“she’sbeensickforalongtime.”

FIGURE18.ChrisHartmire,directorofCaliforniaMigrantMinistryandheadoftheUFWdepartmentofcommunitylife,andCesarChavezpreparetotapeanadvertisementinfavorofProposition14,1976.CourtesyofChrisHartmire.

The personal attack only forcedMcGregormore deeply into a shell, precipitating nastierobservations about her from her peers.KentWinterrowd faulted her for takingmore of hershareoffoodduringcommunalmeals.“[Thecooks]havetocountheadssotheycanknowhowmuch[toserve]…andherecomesthatgreatbigcow,”hetoldthegroup.Asheaccusedherofeatingfortwo,LoriHuertascreamed,“Fatbitch,”buttheinsultdidlittletopromptaresponsefrom McGregor. When the group criticized her management of her department, McGregoradmitted to having difficultywith some employees, especiallymenwhodid not respect herauthority.Therevelationdidnotgarnersympathy.Grossmanaccusedherofdestroyingherowncredibility, while others suggested that she needed to give her staff more “haircuts,” aeuphemismfordiscipline.McGregor’sclaimsthatshehaddisciplinedthemonlyinvitedmorederision. Another gamer responded sarcastically, “Yeah, you combed and styled their hair[too].”19AfterwardMcGregoraskedHartmiretoexcuseherfromanyfurtherparticipation.20

TheexchangesbetweenLoriHuertaandBaboChavezwereespeciallymaliciousgiventhecontentious relationship of their parents, in which Cesar frequently insulted Dolores, andDoloresoftencriedandstormedoutofmeetings.IntheJuly7,1977,Game,BabochargedLoriwith sharingdetailsofwhathappenedwithin theGame tounionstaffmembers.He recalledhow someone had reported her complaining about him picking on her and replicating hisfather’streatmentofhermotherduringGamesessions.“You’respreadingfuckingrumorsandplaying the Game outside of the Game,” he angrily asserted. When Lori protested, Babopepperedherwithinsults,callingher“afuckinghypocrite,”“afuckingbitch,”and“agoddamncunt,”whileothersjoinedintheverbalassault.AnnMcGregorandKentWinterrowdaccusedHuerta of gamingMcGregor in front ofMcGregor’s mother. Someone else opined that shespokeand looked like“a fuckingchimp,”andVillarenocomparedher toadog thatmustbepunishedrepeatedlybeforeshelearnstobehave.“Fuckyouall!”Lorishouted,butthebarragecontinued.Finally,CesarChavezintervened.“Lori,”hetoldher,“you’retoofuckingdefensiveforyourownfuckinggood.Thisisafuckingbigproblem.Ifyoudon’tstartdoingsomethingabout that defensiveness, you’re gonna end up in a fuckingmental institution or something.”“Likeherfuckingcrazysister,”Baboadded.“Fuckingbitch.She’slikeagoddamnparrot,justlikehercrazymother.”Loritriedtodefendherself,buttheindictmentbyCesarandBabobecamemoreintenseand

invitedamoreaggressivegameagainsther,pushinghertoherlimits.WhenCesaraccusedherofbeing“fuckingneurotic,”Lori confessed that shedidnotunderstandhis insult. “Ifyou’regonnacallmesomething,callmesomethingIunderstand.”“Cunt!”Baboyelled.Cesaraskedforsubstantivecriticismofher,precipitatingadelugeofcomplaints:shehadbeenaggressivewithstaff;shespreadliesaboutothers;shemadeimpetuousdecisionsinherjob;andshewasdefensive whenever someone gave her feedback on her performance. Babo admitted hisresentmentthatLorihadbeenassignedtoanadvisorypositioninthepresident’soffice.“Theonlyreasonyou’rethere,”hecomplained,“isbecause[myfatheris]playingfavorites.”Loriofferedherresignationsothathecouldtakethejob,butitdidlittletosalveBabo’soranyoneelse’s anger. Some reminded her ofwhat happenedwhen she had previously left the union.“You fucking went and got laid,” several people yelled. Babo observed that Lori and hermother had made a mistake by having children, given how poorly they performed theirmaternal duties. Dolores, he opined, at least showed more responsibility by having herfallopiantubestiedratherthanbreakunionpolicyasLorihaddonebytakingthepill.21CesarthrewfuelonthefirebyrecitingLori’slongtrackrecordoffailure:“ShefuckingleftStockton.ShefuckingleftDelano.Sheleftteatrocampesino.ShefuckingleftOakland.Shefuckingleftschool.”Intheend,Cesarsawherasa“fuckingsorrymess”thatevokedmorepitythanangerfromhim.“Ifeelverysorryforher,”heconcluded.22

Ultimately, Lori decided against leaving the union, but her decision to quit the Gameencouragedagrowingnumberofindividualstorefusetoplay.Severalveteransoftheunion,suchasPeteVelascoandhiswifeandDavidBurciaga,understoodthedestructivenatureoftheGameand resistedplaying.Those less secure about their place in theunionorwith shortertenurefeltcompelledtotryit,eventhoughChavezinitiallyindicatedthatparticipationwouldbevoluntary.Inthesesituations,Chavezusedpeerpressure,relyingonloyalmembersinthe

pilot group to cajole, harass, and even threaten thosewhowere not playing to change theirminds.CynthiaBell, forexample, recalledhow loyalists forcedher toparticipateby tellinghershewouldbefiredifshedidnotplay.Shejoined,buttheexperiencedidnotgowell.“IwasaccusedofbeingabadmotherandpimpingmydaughterswiththeFilipinobrothers,”sheremembered.Shewalkedout.Within fifteenminutesofherdeparture, angrymembersof thegroupdescendeduponhertrailer,shoutingathertoreturn.AlthoughshefearedshewouldbeexpelledfromLaPazforherdecision,sheturnedupherstereotodrownouttheprotest thatcontinuedoutsideherdoorforaboutanhour.Tohersurprise,shewasnotaskedtoleavetheunion,butsheneverplayedtheGameagain.23

Duringthesummerof1977,membersoftheLaPazGamegroupexportedthepracticetostaffoffices inDelano,withmore tragic consequences.Severalveteransof theunionbelieve theGameplayedaroleinpurgingaunionparalegal,SteveHopcraft,onthebasisofhisallegedhomosexuality. JerryCohenhadassignedHopcraft toduties inDelano,wherehehadbuttedheadswithDoloresHuerta.AlthoughaccordingtoCohen,“[Steve]wasdoingalotofreallygood work,” Huerta objected to him purely for personal reasons. She began spreading therumor thathewasa jota (faggot) among farmworkersandconvincedChavez thathewasathreattotheunion.WhenCohencaughtwindoftheattack,hedefendedHopcraftandhisstaffinno uncertain terms. “I said [to Chavez], ‘I don’t want you fucking around with the legaldepartment.’”24 In their rant against suspectedconspiratorsduring the June–July1977boardmeeting,bothChavezandHuertaexpressedtheir“strongdoubts”aboutHopcraft,althoughtheywaiteduntilCohenhadleftfortheRockiestoformallyaccusehimofbeingahomosexualandaconspirator.MarkSharwood,aveteranofthemovementfrom1976to1982,rememberedthattheyusedtheGametoforceHopcraftout.Sharwoodrecalled,“Hewas[accusedof]causingproblems(whichwereneverspecified)fortheunionjustbecauseofwhohewas.”25Hopcraftdenied all charges; however, Chavez used Huerta’s testimony and evidence supposedlyunearthedduringtheGametofirehim.TheincidentangeredCohen,whosawChavez’sactionsasabetrayaloftheirtrustandasignthatCohenneededtobeginhisdeparturefromtheunion.26

Inanothercase,LorraineAgtang(Mascarinas)Greer,aMexicanFilipinavolunteerandthedaughteroffarmworkers,experiencedthewrathofDoloresHuertainsideandoutsideoftheGame. Born and raised in Delano, Agtang joined the union during the 1973 Delano grapestrike. During the mid-1970s, she worked closely with Chavez’s long-time assistant, BenMaddock, and served as the first manager of the Agbayani Retirement Village for agingFilipinoworkers.Sheleftforashortbreakin1975,butreturnedtofindtheunioncommunityinDelanobesiegedbyHuerta’sfitsofinsecurityandexplosiveanger.In1977,theunionstruggledtomaintainitsinfluenceoverFilipinoworkers,manyofwhom

hadtroublegainingafoothold in thenewhiringhallsafter1970.SeveralFilipinoshadalsorecentlybecomeirritatedwithChavezoverhisacceptanceofFerdinandMarcos’sinvitationtovisit thePhilippines,anact thatdefied thewishesexpressedby themembershipat the1973convention in Fresno.27 Huerta asked Agtang to move to SantaMaria for an undeterminedamount time to shore up support among theseworkers, butAgtang declined because of herresponsibilitiesasasinglemotherofthree.Althoughamotherherself,HuertatookexceptiontoAgtang’sdecision.Agtangremembered,“SheproceededtotellmethatmaybeIshouldleave

the union since I had so many personal problems.” After that, Huerta reported her as atroublemakertoChavezandvowednottospeaktoheragain.28

HuertareversedhervowofsilencewhentheGamecametoDelano.Agtangrememberedthedayvividly:“SeveralmonthslaterwhileinastaffmeetingatFortyAcres,allofasuddenthedoors opened, and in came a number of La Paz staff. Everyone got quiet because we allrecognizedtheprized‘game’team.”IntheGame,HuertaangrilyindictedAgtangforherlackof respectandquestionedherdatingchoices.“Itwasrealugly,”Agtangremembered.“Thensystematically others joined in.” Like Bell, Agtang stood up and left the room, but sheeventuallysuccumbedtopeerpressurebasedonthepromisethatshewouldnotbefiredifshereturned.Once she rejoined the group she quickly agreed to reform her behavior to get theGameawayfromherandontothenextvictim.Shelatersaid,“Ishouldhaveknownthatthiswasnottheend.”DispleasedbyherinabilitytoforceAgtangfromtheunion,Huertaproceededtointimidate

her by staking out her house at night for hours on end.AlthoughAgtang tried to ignore her,Huertabecamemore insistent, eventuallyconfrontingherathome in themiddleof thenight.Sheremembered,“Aweekorsolateritwas1:30a.m.whenIheardmyroommatecallingmyname.Iwasasleepinbedwithmythreechildren.ThenextIknewmyroommateopenedthedoorandDoloresbargedinbehindher.BeforeIcouldwipethesleepfrommyeyesshestartedtellingmehowIhadnotfollowedthroughwiththeagreementsfromTheGame.…SheagainbegantotellmehowIhadtoomanyproblemsandsomaybenowwasnotagoodtimeformeto work with the union and so I should not go to work the next day.” Shaken by theconfrontation,Agtangaskedforadvicefromtrustedmembersintheunion,butnoonedaredtocrossHuerta.“ThatwasmylastdaywiththeUFW,”Agtangsadlyrecalled.29

ThepurgesofHopcraftandAgtangwere just twoexamplesamongmany inwhichChavezandHuertausedtheGametomakegoodontheirthreatstoremoveallegedtroublemakersfromtheunion.AlthoughsomemightseethisasanabuseoftheGame,forthosefamiliarwithitsuchoutcomeswere consistentwithChavez’s intent.30 TomDalzell, amember of the legal team,opposedtheGamefromthestart.“WhenCesarturnedtoSynanonasarolemodelfortheUnionand embraced The Game,” Dalzell commented years later, “it was pretty clear what histhinkingwasonfreespeechzones.”31Likemanyinthelegaldepartment,DalzellsawtheGameas a mechanism for creating conformity through fear. Another member of the legal team,Charlie Atilano, recalled how effective the Game had become at La Paz: “We (the legaldepartment)wereindividualsthatprotestedbeingsubjectedtodraconiantreatment,andwhenwespokeagainsthavingtoparticipate[intheGame]alltheLaPazianswerelikeinsulted.Itwasliketheywereinsomehypnotictrance;likezombies.IremembergoingbacktovisitLaPazand,man,itwaslikegoingtoStepfordandseeingeveryoneactinglikethewives.”32

Fewvolunteers atLaPaz found the courage to leave given the influenceChavezwieldedoverresidents’lives.Insomeinstances,peopleplayedtheGameoutofasenseofobligationtothemovement,especiallythosewhodidnotcomefromafarmworkerbackground.TheclaimsthattheGamemadeeveryoneequalappealedtosomewhoharboredguiltabouttheirprivilege.Onelegalvolunteer,MaryMocine,admitted,“Insomeoddway,TheGamewasliberating.IfoundIhadsurviveditandfeltthatsomeofmy‘liberal,legaldept’guiltwaswashedaway.”33

Like others, however, she came to regret her participation. More often, people subjectedthemselves to theGameoutofmisplaced loyalty to the farmworkers, disbelief thatChavezcouldwelcomesuchacancerintotheunion,orarealfearofbeingputoutonthestreetatatimewhentheyhadbecomedependentontheunionforfood,shelter,andajob.ManyveteransoftheunionstilldebatethesignificanceandtheconsequencesoftheGameto

theUFW in 1977 and 1978.KathyMurguia, for example, began playing theGame after theMondayNightMassacre in 1977with the hope that it would quiet the conflict and chisme(gossip) floating within the community. “I had rationalized it as a method of managinginterpersonalconflict,”sheremembered,butadded,“IwaswrongasIcametoseethatattimesit intensified conflict.” In her experience, she sawparticipants strugglewith the indictmentsoutside of the Game and believed that “it had the potential to become psychologicallydamaging.”34AbbyFloresRivera,however,dismissed theGameas“a speck in time”: “[It]didnotteachmeanythingIdidnotalreadyknow.”ShebelievedthatthecommunitycompelledChavez to experiment with the Game by “creat[ing] such a negative atmosphere that webecamemoreofaburdenthananassettotheunion.”35Yetshepredicted,“Whentheyreadourhistory[some]willfind[theGame]acceptableandwillwonderwhatallthefussisabout.”36

RESISTINGCHAVEZ

BeyondLaPaz,staffmembersandformervolunteerssawtheGame,thepurges,andthetriptothePhilippinesasareasontoconfrontChavezinordertosavetheunionfromself-destruction.Chavez succeeded in extending the Game to the offices in Delano but met with resistanceelsewhere.Stafffartherout,inCoachella,theImperialValley,Salinas,andSantaMaria,heardrumors about its practice and received some encouragement to participate; however, thedifficultieswithsustaininginterestatLaPazandinDelanomeantthatChavezhadnoabilitytoenforcethepracticeintheseoffices.Forvolunteersintheboycottnetworkwhonowhadbeenmostly inactive since the Proposition 14 debacle, questions arose as to the direction andpurpose of the union. The purges sent several disgruntled members into the stream ofprogressive networks, where they began to speak about red-baiting, abusive treatment, andcultish behavior within the inner sanctum of the union’s headquarters. These revelationsproducedastrongreactionfromboycotters,whowroteprotestletterstoChavezandmembersof the executive board, and challenged some of the new priorities and policies now beingimplemented.Thefirstsignsofresistanceappearedat theUnitedFarmWorkersConventioninFresnoat

theendofAugust1977.ChavezanticipatedhiscriticsbyannouncingthattheunionhadmadetheimportantdecisionoverthepastseveralmonthstofirestaffwhoheallegedweredisruptingoperationsatLaPaz.Beforeagiantmuralofhimselfholdingachildaloftonhisshoulders,Chavez spoke of the expelledmembers: “Instead of helping the farmworkers to build theirownunion, somevolunteershave comewith thenotion that theywoulddo thework for thefarmworkers.Somecomewiththeideaofsavingthefarmworkerfromtheunion.Somehavecomewiththeirownpoliticalandsocialvaluesandhaveattemptedtoconvincetheworkersto

adoptthem.”Chavezarticulated,forthefirsttimepublicly,agrowinganimositytowardnon–farm workers, by which most understood him to mean white, educated, middle-classvolunteers. The position cast aside concerns about the shrinking number of volunteers andprivilegedamovementbuiltontheelusiveserviceofpeoplewithfieldexperience.Speakingto journalist, Sam Kuschner, Larry Tramutt emphasized that the union would now look for“quality rather than quantity” in staffing positions. Marc Grossman offered a cruderexplanation, stating, “Manypeople [in thepast] joined in supportof theUFWfor theirownpurposes.”SharingtheparanoiaofChavezandotherswithinhis innercircle,GrossmantoldKuschner,“Wenowsay ifanyS.O.B.comes inwithhisownpoliticalor socialagendaandtriestoimposethatagendaontheunion,wewillkickhimout.”37

ChavezalsosoughttoheadoffdebateabouthisunpopulartriptothePhilippinesasaguestof dictator, FerdinandMarcos, just prior to the convention. He had ignored the counsel ofGilbertPadilla,whohadprivatelywithdrawnfromthetripinprotestandadvisedChaveznottogo.Chavezstubbornlywentanyway,basedonadvicefromAndyImutan,aformermemberandFilipinoactivistwho,accordingtomanywithintheFilipinoandfarmworkercommunities,was an apologist forMarcos.38 Imutan led Chavez to believe that the trip would shore upflaggingsupportamongPinoyfieldworkersandstemtheflowofFilipinomembersfromtheunion.Whenthetripdidtheopposite,ChavezrefusedtoadmithismistakeandinsteadpushedhispositionharderbyinvitingBlasOple,secretaryoflaborforMarcos,andRomanArguelles,consulgeneralof thePhilippines, toaddress the farmworkersat theconvention.TheactionupsetmanyFilipinoswithintheunion,includingRudyReyes,avolunteerandformerboycottworker in Philadelphia, who seized the floor immediately after their speeches to denouncemartiallawinthePhilippines.39Followingtheconvention,ReyesorganizedwiththeinterfaithcommunitytodemandanapologyfromChavezforhisblunder.40

The protest grew so intense that Chavez finally agreed to a publicmeetingwith an anti–martial lawcollective in theBayArea thathad itsownnewspaper,AngKatipunan, and thebackingofmanyreligiousleaders.RatherthanusetheeventasanopportunitytohealwoundsanddrawattentiontotheplightoffarmworkersinthePhilippines,Chavezunilaterallyinvitedrepresentatives from the Philippines Consulate in Los Angeles to provide a pro-Marcosposition just three days before themeeting. Pinoys reacted angrily, picketing the Consulateoffice in protest and denouncing the UFW as antidemocratic and Chavez as a friend todictators.PhilipVeraCruz,whonowtalkedopenlyabouthisdifferenceswithChavez,joinedthefraybygrantinganinterviewtoElCuhamil,anewspaperassociatedwithTonyOrendain,aformerUFWmemberwhohadbrokenwithChaveztocreatetheTexasFarmWorkersUnion.“Byacceptingtheinvitation[fromMarcos],”VeraCruztoldhis interviewer,“Cesarshowedthathedoesnotbelievein[a]democraticprocess.”HepointedoutthatChavez’sembraceofMarcos stood in stark contrast to the union’s resolution to condemn theNicaraguan dictatorAnastacioSomozaandoffendedmanyPinoyswhohadcommittedtheirlivestotheunion.Healso called his former colleagues on the board “figureheads” who acquiesced to Chavez’s“dominatingpower.”Thesituation,VeraCruzopined,hadfacilitatedthecreationofanidolintheformofCesarChavezwhosewordnowwasacceptedasgospelbymany.“Thedanger,”heconcluded,“isthatCesarismisleadingthepeople.”41

ProtestsfromFilipinoleadersandopponentsofMarcosintheUnitedStatesbegantoswaypublic opinion against Chavez. His high-handed attempt to counter the Filipino protestbackfiredterribly,especiallyamongreligiousleaderswhohadtheirownissueswithMarcosandnowquestionedwhethertheunionhadabandoneditsprinciplesofnonviolence.Abevyofreligiousorganizations,includingtheNationalCouncilofChurchesandtheU.S.ConferenceofCatholicBishops,wrotetoHartmireandChavezexpressingtheirdeepconcernandregretforChavez’s decision to visit the Philippines. In response, Chavez held a community meeting,whichmanyconcernedreligiousleadersandcommunitygroupsattended.OneobservernotedthatChaveztoldthegroup“howfuckingpissedoff”hewasatthemediaforobsessingaboutMarcos’s political prisoners and ignoring the Philippine leader’s great strides in landreform.42Over thecourseof thenextseveralmonths, thecontroversypersisted,grabbingtheattentionofmainstreamnewspapersandtelevisionandradiooutlets.Asaconsequence,protestletters continued to flow toHartmire,whoheard from several clergyman, religious leaders,andnunsregardingtheirobjectionstotheunion’sposition.43

Although several radical organizations counted themselves critics of Chavez, it was theresistancefromformerfriendsoftheunionandthosewithintheCatholicChurchthatstungthemost.ChavezhaddrawnonthesymbolsoftheVirginMaryandChristtoshowhisaffinitywiththeprinciplesofsacrificeandnonviolencepresentinthemostprogressivewingoftheChurch.Duringtheheydayoftheboycott,hehaddependedonmanyCatholicorganizationstomanthepicket lines. He relied heavily on Catholic clergy and lay leaders to persuade congregantsacross thenation and inCanada toparticipate in themovement andcountedamonghisownstaff formernunsandpriestswhoservedhimfaithfully throughout themostdifficultyearsofstruggle.Hartmiremaintained a cadre ofCatholic allies and contacts on hisNational FarmWorkerMinistry boardwho, in times of solidarity, helped convey amessage of peace andbrotherhoodthatlentcredibilitytotheUnitedFarmWorkers.Chavez’s support forMarcos, his experimentationswithSynanon, andnewsof aggressive

behaviorandthreatsofviolenceagainstvolunteersin1977compelledsomeCatholicstospeakout,mostnotablymembersofthePaxCenterinErie,Pennsylvania,aleadingCatholicpeaceorganization.JuliLoeschbelongedtotheCenterandservedasawriterandeditorfortheErieChristianWitness,alocalnewsletterthatcoveredtheactivitiesofmembersandotheralliedorganizations.LoeschhadvolunteeredontheUFWboycottsinDelano,Detroit,Cleveland,andelsewhere dating back to 1969 and knewmany of the volunteers recently purged from theunion. The stories she had heard from at least a dozen ex-volunteers compelled her to askHartmire to explain Synanon’s role in the union and to justify the reduction of the boycottnetwork and the firing of people whom she knew to be trustworthy and committed staffmembers.StillenthralledbySynanonandthepotentialoftheGame,Hartmireofferedhisusuallabored

defense of Chavez and his practices. “The union is doing something about the status ofvolunteers,”heassuredLoesch.“Theendproductwillbegoodforthestaffandforthefarmworkers’cause.”Heconfessedthat“gettingthereisrocky”andpredictedthat“plentyofroughtimesinternallyandexternally”layaheadfortheunion,buthefeltconfidentthatall thenewdevelopments, including the Game, were helping the union mature. He acknowledged that

“people who are down on the union and the leadership” had been asked to leave, but thisdecisionhadcontributedtotheimprovementofstaffmorale.HartmireremindedLoeschofherobligation todefend theunionagainstcriticsandaskedher to takeanactive role in fightingbackagainst“thosepeoplewhoattackCesarortheUFW.”“TellthemthatanattackonCesarisanattackonthemovement,”heinstructed.“Ifyoucan’tdothat,Juli,thenIdon’tknowwhattotellyou.”44

Hartmire’s words of advice rang hollow to Loesch, given the news of the purges andChavez’sincreasinglyauthoritarianbehavior.LoeschaccusedHartmireofbeing“defensive”inhis reply to her and dismissive of her concerns. Feeling the stress of the situation andoverwhelmedbythenumberofcriticalletters,HartmirelashedoutatLoesch,explaining,“Idonothavetimetocarryonacontinuingcorrespondencewithyouorotherswhohavewrittenme.The union’s future shapewill be determined by thosewho havemade it their life,with noconsiderationofalternativewaysoflivingandstruggling.”Unwittingly,hisresponsetoLoeschconfirmed the insular, “us against them”mentality that had taken root within the union andarticulatedthekindofblindloyaltyChavezexpectedofhisstaff.Endinghisletterwithabitterpostscript, Hartmire lectured Loesch on the true meaning of being an ally. “You are a‘supporter,’Juli.Thatdoesnotmeanyour ideashavenomerit.But itdoesmeanyouendupsupporting what others have given their lives to do.” Amid Hartmire’s condescension, hemissedtheironyofthemoment,neglectingtoseehowtheunion’srecentbehaviorhadforcedoutthepeoplewhohad, infact,committedtheir livestotheUFWonlytobebetrayedbyitsleader.45

LoeschrespondedbytakingherchallengedirectlytoChavez.InalettertohimonJune22,1977,sheprofessedherlovefortheUFW,butworriedthatthreegeneralproblemshad“grownfrombadtasteintosomethingconsiderablyworse.”CitingthepurgessincetheProposition14campaignand the stiflingof internalcriticismatLaPaz, sheclaimed thatan“intoleranceofdissent”hadproducedanunhealthyparanoiaintheunionthatturnedstaffmembersagainstoneanother.“IdomeanthateventhemildestprivatecriticismoftheUnion’saffairsistreatedasobjective treason,” she told Chavez. She accused him of cultivating an unhealthy “cult ofpersonality”thathadbeen“fosteredasamatterofpolicy.”Suchacondition,sheargued,hadmadetheunionanextensionofhiswillratherthananorganizationcommittedtofarmworkers’self-determination. Finally, she criticizedChavez for his exploitation of volunteers, orwhatshecalledthe“burn’emupandthrow’emout”approach.“PeoplecometotheUFWwillingtoworklonghours,toacceptstrictuniondiscipline,andtoliveinpoverty,”shecontended,“butnobodywantstobeasheerinstrument, tobedrainedtothemaxandthendiscardedwiththecomment,‘Well,there’smorewhereYOUcamefrom!’”46SheexplainedthatshehadlearnedoftheseproblemsthroughformervolunteerswhobegantoappearatchurchesandcollegesintheMidwestwhere she had intended to rally support for the union. “I could hardly… talkabouttheFarmworkers,”shetoldChavez,“withoutsomebodypoppingupandsaying,‘Well,I’manex-UFWvolunteer(ormywifeormyolderbrotheris)and…Iwasmanipulated,Iwasintimidated, I was used to the max and then kicked in the head!’” The shear number ofencounterscompelledhertotalktothesepeople,whoconvincedherthatsomethingwasamiss.“That’swhyIwantedyoutoknow,”sheconcluded,“thatmanyofusoutherecanseealarge

andgrowingproblemintheUFWinrelationtoitstreatmentofvolunteers.”47

Chavez tookwhathadbecome theunion’sacceptedapproach tocritics, ignoringLoesch’sletterandherconcerns.Hissilence,however,onlypropelledLoeschtomoveforwardwithherinvestigation, reaching out to former members through a network of religious leaders andformerboycottvolunteerstoobtaingreaterfamiliaritywiththeproblems.Herinquiriesturnedup a number of old and new complaints from people who had firsthand experience orknowledgeofthenewculturenowdominatingatLaPaz,aswellasoutsideobserverswhohadheardsimilarstoriesofdysfunction.MonsignorGeorgeHiggins,whohadbeencountedasanearlyallyof theunion,wroteLoesch,expressinghope“foragreaterdegreeof internalself-criticism” in the union. Jim Forest wrote Loesch fromHolland, where he had encounteredrumorsofpurgesandcultishbehaviorfromtwoformermembersof thePhiladelphiaboycotthouse.Closer to home, Mike Yates, an economics professor at the University of Pittsburgh at

Johnstown,hadrecentlytakenasix-monthsabbaticaltoworkatLaPazbutendedhisserviceprematurelyinresponsetoChavez’srevolution.“Iwasshocked[and]shakenbytheturntakenatLaPaz,”heconfessedtoLoesch.YateshadbeenpresentfortheMondayNightMassacreandthe implementation of theGame, developments that disturbed him profoundly.According toYates,whenstaff resisted theGame,Chavezusedhisrawpower to thwartdissent.“There’snowoutrightrepressiongoingonatLaPaz,towhichIamaneyewitness,”hetoldLoesch.Inonecase,hewatchedasChavezverballyaccostedavolunteerwhoquestionedthemailpolicy.“Cesar,inarage,summonedthevolunteerintohisoffice,screamedathiminthemostvulgarandabusiveway,[telling]himto‘shovehiscivillibertiesuphisass’andfiredhim.”48

Several others responded to Loesch, recounting the firings and the growing paranoia ofDoloresHuertaandChavez.BrunoHicks,apriestandanti–martiallawcommunityactivistinSan Francisco, reported that Huerta routinely espoused the belief that “infiltrators withrevolutionary, radical ideology [were] urging armed struggle” to overthrow the currentleadershipintheunion.Otherscomplainedabouttheseverereductionintheboycottnetworkwithoutanadequateexplanation,anda fewexpresseddisapprovalofLarryTramutt’s“rigidandfairlyruthless”approachtocreatinga“new,lean,loyal”boycott.TherecentexperiencesofonevolunteerassociatedwiththenewspaperCatholicWorkermadeherquestionwhetheritwastimetoexposetheunionforitsowngood.Ratherthanwriteaboutthefesteringproblems,however,shechosetomoveontothewomen’smovement.49JeffAmes,alegalvolunteerwholeftCaliforniaandtheunion,objectedtothe“heavycollectivistLaPazSynanonMonastictrip”Chavez had imposed on residents living at the headquarters. As a member of the legaldepartment, he opposed playing theGame, a position that earned himChavez’s ire. “Cesarcalled the LegalDepartment ‘a cancer on the union,’” he reported to Loesch, an insult thatcompelledhimtoleavetheunionforgood.50

Ultimately,LoeschdecidedtowriteabouttheproblemsfortheErieChristianWitness.51Inanticipationofherarticle,shewroteherinformantsexpressinghergratitudefortheir“strong,honest,correctivecriticism.”“Ifwe’reloyalUFWsupportersandwebelieveinjustice,”shetoldthem,“themostloyalsupportwecangiveistolookintotheallegationsofinjustice,askprobingquestions,andcriticizedirectlythepeoplewhoaremostresponsible.”Respondingto

Hartmire’s private admonishment, she added, “Uncritical, unquestioning, unprincipled‘support’ isnot support at all; it’s akindofpatronizing sentimentality.”Thearticle, entitled“Trouble in theUFW,” appeared in theChristmas edition and contained the contents of herletter toChavez and a number of testimonials frompeoplewithin her network.To this, sheaddedthejudgment“WhattheTeamstersandthegrowersandpovertyandrepressioncouldnotdo, theUFWcould do to itself; suicide bymoral suffocation.” She encouraged sympatheticreaderstocriticizetheunionleadershipandtojoinherinprayingfortheunion.ManyalliesinLoesch’snetworkassociatedwithnewspapersheededheradvice,publishingcriticalarticlesinreligious,leftist,andcommunitynewspapers.52Inaddition,severalindividualsandgroupssent letters to Hartmire and Chavez well into 1978, expressing disapproval of the union’sdirection.53Chavez,Hartmire,andthosevestedinthechangesatLaPazdismissedthechargesas the product of disgruntled idealists and radicals who had little idea of how the unionworked.Chavez had a much more difficult time ignoring criticism coming from the UFW legal

department.Thelawyers,whohadalreadybecomethetargetofsuspiciongiventheirrequestfor pay, resisted the Game. One of Loesch’s informants, Jeff Ames, privately testified thatCohen“[couldn’t]standtheSynanonshit,”althoughtheverdictonwhetherthelawyerswouldplay remained unsettled at the beginning of 1978.54 The Hopcraft affair proved that somelawyers working in places like Delano had already become ensnarled in the practice, andChavezhadmadeoverturestoCohenaboutdrawingthelegalstafffromSalinastoLaPaztoparticipate.Theattorneysanticipatedtheseplansandbegantoorganizeagainstit,callingita“wasteoftime”andadiversionfromthe“realwork”“outthere.”Manyinthelegaldepartmentsaw the La Paz staff as “brown-nosing moonies” (a reference to Reverend Moon and theUnificationChurch)andtookissuewithCohenoverhisbeliefthattheyshouldplaytheGametoappeaseChavez.CohenbelievedtheirtrainingtodefendthemselvesinacourtoflawwouldgivethemtheabilitytoholdtheirownintheGame.Forabriefmoment,healsosawthevalueofusingtheGametochecksomeofthestrongpersonalitiesonhisstaff.Inanticipationofthelegal department’s arrival, Hartmire and Cohen had some hard words about what hadtranspiredwith theGametodate,but theyalsoworkedoutsomecombinationsforasessionthat would check “legal staff who clearly jump over the net” when it came to respectingCohen’s authority. Cohen encouraged Hartmire “to take off the gloves” with theseindividuals.55

ThemattercametoaheadonApril15,1978,whentheattorneysboardedfourrentedwhitevansboundforLaPaz.CohenhadcalledameetingearlierintheweektoannouncethatChavezwasmaking their participation in the Game for six consecutive weeks a condition of theircontinuedemployment.CharlieAtilanonotedtheironyof“beingfiredasavolunteer”iftheydid not agree to play.56 According to Tom Dalzell, Cohen also saw the absurdity of thesituationbutpleadedwith thegroup toparticipate sincehewasnot ready to quit theunion.“Nobody-nobody-nobodywanted toplayTheGame,”Dalzell remembered,but theattorneyshad too much respect for Cohen to let him down.57 Rather than resist the visit, the groupdevisedaplantomocktheGameandexposeSynanon’sbeliefsasinconsistentwiththestatedphilosophyofChavezandtheUnitedFarmWorkers.Dalzellremembered,“Wedecidedtogo

[toLaPaz]buttodosoinawaythatnobodywouldmissourresistance.”58

Aminorityamongthetwenty-fivetothirtymembersofthelegalteaminitiallysuggestedthatthey take direct aim at Synanon, given the increasingly negative press the organization hadrecentlyreceived.InOctober1977,SynanonhadcomeunderinvestigationbythestatehealthdepartmentandaMarinCountygrandjuryfortheabuseofchildrenattheTomalesBayfacility.Dederich had responded with self-righteous incredulity, threatening to surround theinvestigatorswith“10guys twice their sizewithin1 footof them.”Hedid little tohidehisbeliefincorporalpunishmentandrevealedadegreeofmegalomaniawhenheboasted,“Ihavedoneexactlyliketherestoftheguysthatruntheworld.Icouldrunastate,acountry,acity;itdoesn’tmakeanydifference.I’moneofthoseguys.Iknowthatmagic.”59Initsinvestigation,thecountydiscoveredastockpileofrecentlypurchasedweaponsthatpromptedsupervisorstothreatenSynanonwithexpulsionfromMarinCounty.60

InDecember1977,Timemagazine responded to a growing chorus of formerHomePlaceresidents who had broken ranks with Dederich over his “changing partners” policy, whichrequiredcouplestodissolvetheirmarriagesandtakeanotherpartner.Dederichrespondedinhistypicalbombasticfashion,denouncingthemagazineandinstructinghisfollowersandalliesto harassTime shareholders. Taking a page out of the union playbook,Dederich ordered aboycottofthemagazineandothermediaoutletsthatdaredtopaintSynanoninanegativelight.Unlike the UFW boycott, however, Synanon’s campaigns bordered on violence. In oneinstance,SynanitespicketedastockholdersmeetingoftheAmericanBroadcastingCorporationinNewYorkCity for airingnegative stories aboutSynanonon theSanFranciscoBayAreaaffiliate,KGO-TV.Inthecourseoftheprotest,MattRandthreatenedABCexecutivesandtheirfamilieswithviolenceontheirwayhomefromworkandattheirresidences.AnotherSynanitespoke of the “irrational” rage among members and warned that the organization could notpromise to control it. Meanwhile, news leaked that Dederich had assembled a smallparamilitaryforceatHomePlaceknownasthe“ImperialMarines”todoanythingheaskedtoprotecttheorganization.61

UFWattorneysrecognizedsimilaritiesbetweentheblindallegianceofSynanitestoDederichandthecultureofobedienceChavezwas trying to imposeon thevolunteers.Someattorneyswantedtodrawout thecontradictionsbetweenChavez’sespousedbelief innonviolenceandDederich’s turn towardarmedstruggle.“Therewasasmallbutvocal faction thatadvocatedshowingupatLaPazdressedandactinglikeSynanon’sImperialMarines,”recalledDalzell.Somewanted todoa full-scaleprotestbyarrivingwith“shavedheads, coveralls, shotguns,and chants ofDederich’s to-the-point [message]: ‘Don’t Fuckwith Synanon!’”Although theattorneyshada laugh—including themenonstaffwho joked that theywouldallhave togetvasectomies to carryout the ruse faithfully—themajority settledon amilderdemonstration.Thegrouparrivedwearingshort-sleevedwhiteshirtsandskinnydarkties,alookthatDalzelldescribedasan“approximationofMormonmissionariesorLaRouchedroidsattheairport.”62TheappearancecapturedtheuniformityofbehaviorthatderivedfromSynanonbuthadcometodominatetheactionsandthoughtsofpeoplelivingwithinLaPazaswell.Upontheirarrival,CharlieAtilano,aformerU.S.Marine,startedabootcamp–stylemarch

aroundthegroundsoftheheadquarters,leadingthegroupinacall-and-responsechant(“Idon’t

knowbut I’ve been told / I don’t knowbut I’ve been told”).The display drew incredulousresidents to thewindows as the group broke into a loud rendition of “When the SaintsGoMarchingIn.”Perhapsabit tamerthantheir initialplans, theproteststillconveyedthepointthe attorneys were hoping to make. Dalzell remembered, “We were suggesting a certaincultishness in the embrace of Synanon while at the same time mocking ourselves as self-anointedsaints.”Thelatterreferenceacknowledgedtheresentmentofsomeorganizerswithintheunion,suchasEliseoMedina,whogrousedthatmembersofthelegaldepartmentpulledinlargerstipends than theaveragevolunteer,or that theyhad thebenefitof jobs thatmanystillconsidered“missionary”work.LarryTramutt,whohadprepared to receive thegroup in theNorth Unit, embraced the challenge by attempting to take the edge off the protest with ademonstrationofhisown.Callinghisresponsea“strokeofgenius,”Dalzellrememberedwhatcamenext:“[Tramutt]stoodup,joinedusinsinging,andformedacongalinebehinduswithLaPazvolunteers,weavingthroughtheroom,singingalongwithus.”63

Tramutt’sactionsnotwithstanding,theattorneys’performanceshatteredanyexpectationsthatthelegaldepartmentwouldgoalongwiththenewculturethatwasdominatingatLaPaz.Noone could remember if Chavezwitnessed their display of insolence, but the news traveledquicklythroughouttheunion,promptinghimto takeactionagainst the lawyers.“Wehad twomeetingsbetween the legal department andCesar that summer inwhich [Cesar] fired all ofus,”Dalzelllamented.64MarshallGanzandJessicaGovea tried tostandupfor the lawyers,refusingtogoalongwith thedecision.In theend,however,Chavezcobbledtogetherenoughvotesontheexecutiveboardtosupporthisproposal.65AlthoughDalzelljokedthatthepurgeearnedthedepartmentthedistinctionofbeing“thebiggestgroupfiredatonce,”herememberedthemeetingswithChavezas“civil,respectful,andsad.”Notallshedatearfortheattorneys.“Youguysdancedyourselvesrightoutofgoodstandingandoutofajob,”AbbyFloresRiveratoldDalzellyearslater.66HerfeelingcapturedtheopinionsofsomewithinLaPazwhorefusedtoseetheattorneys’workasessentialtothecontinuedsuccessoftheunionorresistancetotheGameasaworthwhilefight.In the wake of the firings, Chavez transferred the legal operations to La Paz, as he had

always wanted to do. He instituted a program to train young, mostly Mexican Americanlawyerstoserveasthenew,all-volunteerlegaldepartment,amovethatseverelydiminishedthelegal-organizingcollaborationthathadbeensosuccessfulupuntilthatpoint.Overthenextthreeyears,theuniondramaticallywithdrewfrompursuingALRBelectionsandconcentratedalmostexclusivelyonnegotiatingthecontractstheyhadwonin1975and1976.67Withoutanexperienced legal team, however, moving union election victories to bona fide contractsbecamemoredifficultandleftmanyfrustratedworkerswonderingwhen, ifever, theywouldhaverepresentation.68During that time, growers had begun a new strategy of bringing civilsuits against the union for damages related to strikes, thereby circumventing theALRB andlimitingthestate’sinfluenceoverlabor-employerrelations.Theabsenceofaneffectivelegalteamonlyhastenedtheunion’sdeclineandpermanentlyimperiledthegoalofreaching100,000membersby1978.69

In1979asenseofurgencycompelledvegetableworkersintheImperialValleyandSalinastomake a final push forALRB electoral victories through the use of strikes, but the effort

happened without the approval of Chavez. “I worked with those workers,” Ganz recalled.“Therewastremendouspotentialthere.Wethoughtwecouldaccomplishalot,andeventuallywedid.Wegotgreatcontractsoutof that thing.ButtherewasnocommitmentfromCesartoturningthatbaseintoasuccess.”70Asworkerscelebratedtheirachievements,Chavezsatoutthefestivities,wonderinghowhemightreinintheautonomousvegetableworkers.Ganz,whohadencouragedtheworkers,nowcameundersuspicion,asdidJessicaGovea,whojoinedhiminadvocatingfortheirrighttostrike.Throughtheendofthedecade,Chavezsoughttocurbtheinfluenceofthetwo,targetingthemforinternal investigationsregardingtheirallegedtreasonagainst theunion.Undertheweightof thispressure,GanzandGovearesignedin1981.Thatsame year, Chavez unilaterally reinterpreted union rules to block the candidacy of threevegetableworkersforaspotontheexecutiveboardattheUFWconvention,allbutendingachanceforanythingresemblingrepresentativedemocracyintheunion.71

Thedismantlingof thebaseofpower inSalinasalsocorruptedwhathadbeena tensebutrespectfulrelationshipbetweenCesarChavezandJerryCohen.Afterfiringhisstaff,ChavezinvitedCohen to join thenew teamatLaPaz,butCohendeclined. “I toldhim ‘no,’ and…resignedasgeneralcounsel,but Iwanted to stayandnegotiate [contracts]andhewanted tokeepme around on any terms,”Cohen remembered.Cohen continued towork for the unionfromSalinas,wherehiswifeinheritedlandandtheybuiltahome.Heenjoyedthebreakfrombeing surrounded by other lawyers, but the honeymoon did not last long. “Finally, it wassometimein’80[whenChavez]begantosortofswitchupthesignals.”Cohenhadworkedouta deal with a big grower, SamAndrews, to adjust the controversial hiring hall process toinvolve only newworkers. They alsomutually agreed on a seniority list for thoseworkersalreadyinthesystem.AlthoughChavezhadagreedtotheterms,hechangedhismindatthelastminute,embarrassingCohenandthwarting thewillofmanySalinasworkerswhohadfoughthardtowinunionrepresentation.RatherthanfightwithChavez,Cohenresigned,bringingtoanendhislongdistinguishedcareerwiththeUFW.72

Chavez’sattemptstomaintaintheGamethroughtheendofthedecadedidnotfareanybetterthanhisattemptstofendoffcriticismfromthoseoutsideofLaPaz.Chavezmusthavenoticedthat the Game had become controversial and instructed the union spokesperson, MarcGrossman,nottotalkaboutittothepress.AccordingtoTomDalzell,throughoutthesummerandfallof1977,ChavezwentsofarastodenytheexistenceoftheGametotheoutsideworld,evenasheaddedaSpanish-languagegamegroupandextendedittoDelano.73

Thedecisionofsomememberstoquit theGameandothers tooutrightrefuseparticipationsignaled that not allwaswell.Hartmire,who evaluated the emotional state of participants,grewincreasinglypessimisticabouttheprospectsofcontinuingthepractice.Throughout1977and 1978, numerous volunteers expressed significant reservations about playing, includingGrossman,who now toldHartmire hewas “having serious problems.”74 Chavezworked toassuage Grossman’s concerns, but he could not do the same for others, who statedunequivocallythattheywantedout.HartmirereportedthattheSpanish-languageversionoftheGame, known as La Broma (the Joke), was in “wobbly shape.” Given the dire situation,Hartmire advised Chavez to “forget the Spanish game” or perhaps salvage some of theSpanish-dominantmembers’participation through the inclusionof“somebilingualaction” in

othersessions.75

ThenewsfromEnglish-dominantGamegroupsdidnotlookmuchbetter.Hartmirereportedat the beginning of 1978, “Lots of absenteeism recently. Sickness, kids sick and ‘maybesickness.’Ihavesentforpeople the last twogames.”Whenheconfrontedindividuals,manyeitherrefusedtoplayorofferedexcuseswhytheywerenotready.“JudyScheckelplayedone(1)gameand thenexercisedheroption tostop,”Hartmire reported.Anothervolunteer,ToniBarela, also expressed her desire to withdraw from the Game, but Hartmire attempted todiscourageherfromdoingso.HereportedtoChavez,“Itoldhershedidnothavethatoption.She did not show up Wed nite.” Another resident of La Paz, Bobby Reyes, asked for anexemption.“[He]says‘hedoesn’tfeellikeplayinguntilheiscleareronhiscommitmenttotheunion.’” In spiteofhis trepidations,Hartmire convincedReyes to remain in theGame for alittlewhilelonger.Hartmire’spowersofpersuasiondidnotworkwitheveryone.BettyWolcottobjectedtothe

Gameon thegrounds that she felt hesitation inwaging indictments andharboredunresolvedangeragainstthosewhomalignedher.Hartmirehopedthathehadpersuadedhertocontinue,althoughhecouldnotbesureshehadchangedhermind.“Sheknows[missing]isseriousandwill talktoyou ifshecomestoafinaldecisiononnotplaying,”hetoldChavez.76Aformerpriest,KenDoyle,refusedtoplayandchallengedtheGameasinconsistentwiththenonviolenttenetsoftheunion.“HecameonwithalotofintellectualquestioningofTheGame,”HartmirereportedtoChavez.“Itoldhimthatwasacheapcop-out.Ifhewantstomakethegamebetter,joinusandhelp.”InspiteofHartmire’saccusationthat“itwasscrewingotherpeopleuptohavehimabsent,”Doylecontinued tostayaway.“Hesaidhewould leaveLaPaz ifhisnotplaying was such a huge problem,” Hartmire told Chavez.77 When Hartmire and KentWinterrowdconductedasurveytoassessthepopularityoftheGameinJune1978,theyfoundthat Doyle was not alone in his negative opinions. “The pioneering, enthusiastic spirit thatprevailedwithgroups1&2isfalteringorweakening,”theywroteChavez.Whenpeopledidplay,theyfound“apreferencefordiscussions[ratherthanthe]roughandtumblegaming”thatChavezbelievedwasmoreproductive.78

TheavoidanceoftheGameandcomplaintsfromalliesoutsideeventuallycompelledChaveztoadmit,“[The]GameisgoodforuspersonallybutnotsogoodfortheUnion.”79Ratherthandispense with it, however, he chose to reform the practice during the summer of 1978 bybringing in Synanon advisors and discussing alterations to the practicewith the first Gamegroup.Theuglinessof indictments, includingfalseaccusationsandcommentsaboutpeople’ssexualbehavior,ledChaveztochangetherulesregardingpersonalattacksandlying.80Inthe“new, new Game,” as they called it, those doing the gaming were expected to draw on a“kerneloftruth”intheirindictments,whilethosebeingindictedwereencouragedtoremember“it’snotyoupersonally,it’sthefuck-up”thatwasatissue.KathyMurguia,whoplayedthroughthese transitions, remembered, “TheGamewas only supposed to relate towork issues andNOTpersonalissues.”81Participantscouldnowremainsilentinsessions.Gamegroupswereinstructed“totakethetimeneededtoputapersonbacktogetherafterahardgame.”Coupleswerenowofflimitsforindictmentsbecause,leadersrecognized,“itishardforthematetositthereandwatchwhiletheotheristakenapart.”82

Thesechanges,however,didlittletoassuagetheconcernsofskepticswhohadalreadymadeuptheirmindthattheGamedidnotbelongintheunion.ForHartmire,whotriedtonavigatebetweenChavez’swishestomaintainandexpandthepracticeandhisownneedtomanagetheoutcryfromformerandcurrentmemberstoendit,theprotestsfromoutsidetheunionpushedthemattertoabreakingpoint.“Weweresavedfrombecomingacultbecauseoftheboycott,”Hartmirelateradmitted.AlthoughChavezandtheboardhaddonemuchtodisablethenetworkintheinterveningmonthssincetheProposition14campaign,enoughpeopleaffiliatedwiththeboycotthadstayedintouchwiththeunion,waitingandhopingfordirection.ThefiringofNickJones followedby the consolidation of houses and changes in leadership piqued awarenessamongcriticswhoquestionedwhatChavezandtheunionweredoingwiththemomentumtheyfelttheyhadcreatedthroughtheircollectiveactions.“Wehadtoconstantlybecommunicatingwith the people out there in the world,” Hartmire remembered. “If we hadn’t had to, godknowswherewewouldhavegone.”83

NoonecanquiterecallwhentheGameofficiallyended.AccordingtoHartmire,“Atsomepoint, theoutsideworldwasraisingsomanyquestions,andsomeof themwerepeoplewhohadgivenusmoneyandsupport,Cesarjustcalleditoff.”RecordsshowJuly1978asthelastmonth inwhichChavez attempted to salvage theGameon a communitywide level, althoughsomerecall thatheheldsmallerGamesessionswell into1979.84 In theend, theexperimentwiththeGamehadlastedasolidfourteenmonthsatLaPaz,fromMay1977toJuly1978,longenough to sow distrust among the leaders and divert attention from the work of building aunion.85

On January 31, 1978, Chavez and the executive board called off the boycott of grapes,lettuce,andGallowine,bringingtoanendanerainwhichtheUnitedFarmWorkershadmadeitspresencefeltthroughouttheUnitedStatesandbeyond.86Chavez’spromisetodownsizethedepartment at the union convention the previous summer anticipated this move, and theannouncementconfirmedwhatnumerousformervolunteershadfeltsincethedemobilizationoftheboycott for theProposition14campaign in1976.Throughout the turmoilof1977,LarryTramutt had presented a positive outlook in his monthly reports while quietly carrying outChavez’swishestopurgeboycottstaffandconsolidatehouses.AtChavez’srequest,Tramutthadcompiledamonth-by-monthtallyofvolunteersintheboycottwhohadbeenfiredorforcedtoresignandabriefexplanationofhowtheindividualhadarrivedathisorherfate.SubmittedtoChavezonAugust31,1977, thefive-pagelistcontaineda totalof109individualssackedbetweenJanuaryandJulythatyear,mostidentifiedasvictimsoftheProposition14campaignorthe“NickJonesFallout.”Theliststandsasarecordoftheremarkableefficiencyofaunionmotivatedbyfearandparanoia.Italsomarkedtheendformanyyoung,dedicatedpeople,mostofwhomhadlittlepersonalconnectiontothefarmworkersbuthadfoughttenaciouslyontheirbehalfnonetheless.Bythetimetheofficialannouncementcame,Tramutthadmovedontootherbusiness in theunion.Hewas replacedby formerNewYorkvolunteer,MikeLacinak,whofunctioned primarily as a caretaker for the transfer of resources from the boycott to otherdepartmentsintheunion.87

The list did not account for one of the boycott’s most beloved figures, Elaine Elinson,althoughiteasilycouldhave.Elinsonhadcontinuedtoworkfortheuniononavolunteerbasis,

functioningastheboycottcoordinatorforallofBritain,oblivioustothechangesgoingonatLaPaz.In1977,shetraveledtoIreland,wheresheshowedtransportworkersthefilmFightingforOurLivesandraisedapproximately500Britishpounds.WhenElinsonsentthemoneywithherreporttoNickJones,however,sheheardnothinginreturn.AfterseveralattemptstomakecontactwithLaPaz,shefinallyreceivedanangryletterfromTramutt,whodemandedthatsheexplainheractions.Sherecalleditscontents:“Theletter[said],‘whotheheckareyou?WhodoyouthinkyouarerepresentingtheUnitedFarmWorkers?Whotoldyouyoucouldgoshowthismovie?Whatdidyou tell theseunionsso thatyoucould raise thismoney?’”AshockedElinson wrote directly to Chavez, who promptly replied with a letter of gratitude for herservice, but the experience ledher to askquestions.Eventually, during avisit to theUnitedStatesthefollowingyear,shemetNickandVirginiaJones,whotoldherwhathadhappenedtothemandmanyothersintheunion.Asaconsequence,ElinsonpulledbackonherfundraisingfortheUFWandfocusedonherjobinLondon.In1980,ElinsonhadonefinalencounterwithTramutt.ShehadreturnedtotheUnitedStates

tobeginwhatturnedouttobealongcareerworkingfortheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion.She remained sympathetic to la causa, and, although the Jones affair troubled her, she stillwantedtohelptheunionnowthatshewaslivingintheBayArea.WhenshecalledtheOaklandofficetovolunteer,afamiliarvoiceansweredthephone.“Oh,well,thisisLarryTramutola,”theperson identifiedhimself.Elinsonhadheard thatTramutthadchangedhisname,andshetook the opportunity to communicate her displeasure with him after all these years. Sherecalledher response:“I’m like, ‘Youknowwhat?Screwyou!Yousentme theworst letterthatI’veeverreceivedinmylife.…YoumademefeelworsethanI’veeverfelt.AndIwillneverwork inanyboycottofficewithyou.Goodbye.’” In theyears that followed,Elinson,likemanyotherformervolunteers,foundotherwaystohelpfarmworkers,butsheneveragaingavehertimetotheunionthathadbeensuchanimportantpartofherlife.88

AQUESTIONOFSTRATEGY

The decision to dismantle the boycott was not well received by the radical left, who hadtroubleunderstandingwhytheunionwouldforfeitwhathadbeenasuccessfulstrategy.Mostbelievedthattheboycottstillheldswayoverthepublicinthebattlefortheheartsandmindsofconsumers,madeevidentbyapoll in1975showing that12percentof theAmericanpeoplewereboycottinggrapes,11percentwereboycottinglettuce,and8percentrefusedtopurchaseGallowines.89Indeed,anevaluationfromtheLosAngelesTimesproclaimedthattheUFWhadconstructed“themosteffectiveunionboycottofanyproductinthehistoryofthenation.”90Whythen,askedonewriter,wouldtheuniongiveupthistoolforsocialchangesoeasily?Most outside of theUnitedFarmWorkers believed thatChavez andmembers of his inner

circlehad turned their backson themovement in favorof amoreordinaryunionconcernedwith the nonmissionary work of winning ALRB elections and litigating labor disputes.Promisesat theunionconventionin1977toprofessionalizethestaffandinvolvemorerank-and-fileworkersintheday-to-dayoperationssignaledthisturntowardamodelthatresembled

theUAWmore than itdidCOREorSNCC.Theantiradicalpurgeswereconsistentwith thepoliticsoforganizedlaborduringthecoldwar,apositionthatdiscouragedmanysocialjusticeactivists from seeking solutionsbywayof unions.Moreover,Chavez’s apparent faith in thegovernmentseemedinconsistentwitheitherthecharacterofthemovementduringitsheydayinthelate1960sandtheearly1970sortherecordofsuccessunderthenewlaw.Althoughtheunionwonmoreelectionsthanitlost,criticswerequicktopointoutthatmanyofthevictoriesfailedtotranslateintorealgainsforworkersbecausetheprocessofappealsandratificationofvotes often delayed the achievement of a contract. “The UFW now has 100 contracts inCalifornia,”oneobserverwrote, “but there are100other rancheswhere theunionhaswonrepresentationelectionsbutstillhasn’tobtainedacontract.”91 In thefinalanalysis,Chavez’sdecisiontodismantletheboycottwas“aquestionofstrategy,”onethatneithertheradicalleftnorvolunteersintheboycottagreedwith.92

As the audiotapes of the executive boardmeetings show, Chavez and the union struggledmore than anyone in thepublicknewwith thequestionofhow tomerge a socialmovementwith therequirementsofbecomingastate-recognizedunion.Theboycott, forall itsvalue indrawinggrowerstothebargainingtableandgainingpublicsympathy,hadtakenabackseattotheelectionsafterthepassageoftheALRAin1975.“[Thelaw]changedeverything,”Chavezoften lamented, an acknowledgment that he too missed the missionary work of building amovementthatcountedamongitsgoalsmorethanjustearningcollectivebargainingrightsforfarmworkers.Hartmire,whohadafront-rowseattothechangesinhisfriend,laterreflected,“I think theAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct threwCesaroff course.”He sawChavezas amaster tactician in what he called “a guerilla movement,” of which the secondary boycottservedastheultimateweapon.“Butnow,”Hartmireremembered,“thelawandlawyers,andthegovernment,whichhenevermuchtrusted…threwhimoffhisnaturalcourse.”93

Whatthat“naturalcourse”mayhavebeenisupforinterpretation,althoughChaveztriedtoindicate, in bothword and deed,what he intended during the tumultuous years immediatelyafter the ALRA was signed into law. In an interview in October 1977 with the CatholicpublicationSojourner,Chavezlaidoutthechallengesbeforetheunion,thefirstofwhichwastoconsolidate thegainsmadebynegotiatingcontractswhere theyhadwonelections.Suchatask, he contended, depended on the stabilization of a long-term staff that he believed hadeludedtheunionduetoalackofcommonunderstandingandcommitmentamongvolunteers.“Iamconvinced,”hetoldhisinterviewer,“thatwehavetodosomethingtoreplacewhatwelost.Wehad a kind of community.”94Chavezwanted to turn back the clock to a time before theALRA,when volunteers flocked to themovement out of awillingness “to give up some ofthoseindividualrights…forthegoodofthegroup.”“We’reatacrossroadsnowastowhetherwe’rea9-to-5grouporamoredisciplined,more religiouscommunity,”heexplained.Onlythose on the inside and those who had been alerted to the transformation in the unionunderstoodthatChavez’scommunityhadmoreofanaffinitywithDederich’sSynanonthanwiththeCatholicChurch.“Ifwechoosethiscommunitystyle,”hesaid,“wewillhavesomekindofreligion—eitherweinventoneorwekeepwhatwehave,butwecannotbewithoutone.”95Forthose who opposed Chavez and his plans, such a public admission must have beendemoralizing.

Ultimately, Chavez’s vision for a new community died under the combined weight ofvolunteer opposition and the discrediting of the commune model. As current and formervolunteers resisted the influence of Synanon on the union, Dederich and Synanon itselfimploded.Dederichbecame increasinglycombativeas the state investigatedclaimsofchildabuseandSynanondissidentsandrelativestriedtoextractlovedonesfromthecommunity.Thesuccessofoneattorney,PaulMorantz,towina$300,000lawsuitagainstSynanonprecipitatedan act of bizarre retribution fromDederich. Angered by the settlement, Dederich allegedlyorderedtwomembersofhisImperialMarinestokillMorantzbyplantingarattlesnakeinhismailbox. Morantz survived the bite; however, the failed plot all but ended Synanon whenauthoritiesarrested the twosuspects.Dederich fled into theArizonadesert,wherehebegandrinkingandtakingdrugsagain.Throughoutthespectacle,Chavezdefendedhisfriend,atonepointaskingGovernorJerryBrownnot toextraditeDederich toCalifornia to stand trial forattemptedmurder.Chavez’sactionsendearedhimtoDederich’sfamilyandSynanonloyalists,butthedefenseofhisfriendconfirmedcritics’beliefthatChavezhadlosthisway.96

Intruth,Chavezhadnotabandonedhisprinciplesasmuchashiscriticsbelieved.AlthoughhisexperimentswiththeGameandhisrelationshipwithDederichcertainlyraisedeyebrows,his“oneman,onevision”approachhadbeenthehallmarkofhisleadershipsincebeforethefoundingoftheunion.AsanorganizerintheCommunityServiceOrganization,heresentedthegrowing influence of professionals and their refusal to take up advocacywork on behalf offarmworkers.Rather thancompromiseandworkwithinthestricturesofanorganizationthatresisted becoming a union,Chavez issued an ultimatum that resulted in his resignation. Theactiondemonstratedhissincerecommitment tohelpapeopleandanoccupation towhichhefelt intimately attached; it also revealed stubbornness and autocratic tendencies that wouldflourishwithin a farmworkermovement closely identifiedwith his charismatic leadership.The years of struggle to build the movement—not yet a union—had been incrediblychallenging, yet his ability to draw people inwithmarches, rallies, and fasts validated hisapproach.Throughthisprocess,healienatedallies—mostnotablyFilipinoleadersandsomerank-and-file members—but the continued appeal of the boycott and the initial success inwinningALRBelectionsjustifiedhischoices,helpinghimtoovercomeanymomentsofself-doubt.Thesesuccesses,however,hadmuchmoretodowiththeworkofvolunteersandorganizers

thanChavezcaredtoadmit.Theboycotthadmaterializedasastrategyforsocialchangeduelargelytoexperimentationbydiversegroupsofpeoplewhointerpretedtheconditionsonthegroundandmobilizedcitizensandalliedunionists.Theembraceof theboycott—andnot thestrike—asthecriticaltoolthatputtheunionoverthetopinthestruggletogetgrowerstothebargaining table demonstrated a flexibility in Chavez that seemed to disappear as themovementevolvedintoaunion.TheUFWinitiallyexperiencedmorevictoriesthandefeatsinthisnewrole, thanks in largepart toJerryCohenandhis teamofattorneys,whooutsmartedexpensiveTeamsterandgrowerlawyersandmaneuveredtheirwayintothepoliticalprocesstocraftalawthatfavoredtheUFW.In the aftermath of the ALRA, the UFW legal team and union organizers, such as Eliseo

Medina and Marshall Ganz, adapted to the new realities of state-sponsored farm worker

justiceandits limitsundertheALRB,but theprocessfrustratedChavez.Interactionwiththestatechangedtherulesofthegamefromwinningheartsandmindsinthefields,onthedocks,andinfrontofsupermarketstowinningvotesinunionelectionsandunfairlaborpracticesuitsin Sacramento. As a consequence, the union’s tactics shifted from the missionary work ofmarches, fasts, and boycotts to the bureaucratic work of lawyers and contract negotiators.Theserequirementsalsoempoweredvolunteerswithintheuniontodemandagreatersayoverthefutureoftheorganization.SuchchallengesthreatenedthetightcontroltowhichChavezhadgrownaccustomed,leadingtoacontestofwillsthatservednoone.Intheend,Chavez’sgreatestfailuremaynothavebeenhisflirtationswithcommunalliving,

creatinganewreligion,orattemptingtocontrolthemindsofhisfollowersthroughabevyofdevicesborrowedfromself-madeprophets.Rather,hisfailureswerequitefamiliartosocialmovements that have harbored a dream of institutionalizing social justice: Chavez failed toadapthisstrategytofitthedemandsofadynamicsituation.97Theabilitytomovethelocusofpowerfromthestriketotheboycottintheearlierdayswasnotmatchedinthelate1970sbyanequalabilitytomovefromtheboycotttoafightforvictoriesinALRBelectionsandarbitrationand,ifnecessary,Californiacourtrooms.ThatChavezandhislieutenantsfailedtohandlewithgrace the transition from the boycott tomore state-sponsored solutionswas only part of theproblem.Heandtheexecutiveboardrecognizedtheneedforgreaterskillandspecializationamongtheirteamoforganizersandlawyersbutresistedaprocessofprofessionalizationoutoffear of becoming like the unions, state bureaucracies, and political parties they distrusted.Social theorists who have studied the relationship between socialmovements and the statewould suggest that they had much to be fearful of, given the ability of state institutions,especially political parties, to absorb and diffuse much of the enthusiasm and agenda forreform present in social movements. In the most pessimistic readings of this relationship,movementsthatconcedetopursuingjusticeonthestate’stermsusuallyendupperpetuatingthe“injuries”inflicteduponthembyextendingthecoerciveinfluenceofthestateandreplicatingitsoppressivefeaturesintheirowngovernance.Ultimately,sometheoristsargue,itshouldbetheobjectiveofthepoorandthedispossessedtoavoidbeinggovernedaltogether.98

With the United Farm Workers, the answer to whether the state would have helped orhinderedtheirpursuitofsocialjusticeisincomplete.Chavezandtheexecutiveboardchosetogohalfwayinworkingwithin thenewrealityof theALRA.Inspiteof theirgreatfrustrationwith theAgricultural LaborRelationsBoard, the exhaustion of state funds in 1976, and thefailureofProposition14,therecordstillshowsthattheunionwaswinningmoreelectionsthanitwaslosing,andgrowersdislikedtheALRBforitstendencytofavortheUFW.99Inessence,ChavezhadchosentoworkwiththestatebyaccedingtotheALRAyetfailedtofollowthroughwith this strategybywithdrawing fromorganizing in1977anddismantling the legal team in1978.The lackofdemocracyand the relianceonChavez’scharismatic leadershippermittedhimtopursueapaththatdoomedtheuniontofailure.

Meanwhilethegrowersadaptedtheirstrategiestomeetthechallengesconfrontingthem.Priorto 1970, the failure of industry leaders to anticipate the power of the boycott and toacknowledgedifferencesamongthemledtoCoachellagrowers’splitfromSanJoaquinValley

growersandabreakdowninindustrysolidarity.Throughthisexperience,grapegrowerslikeMartinZaninovichneverbecamereconciledtotherealityofaunionizedworkforce;however,likemostofthem,helearnedthattheycouldnotrunabusinessandapublicitycampaignatthesame time. “Although I still managed to handle sales and make contracts and arrange forbrokersanddealerstohandleourproduct,”Zaninovichrecalled,“IdidnotspendasmuchtimeintheofficeorontheranchasIhadpreviously.”Heandotherslongedtoreturntomanagingfarmoperationsandleavetheworkofpublicrelationstothosewithmoreskillandknowledge.As a consequence, the growers embraced a degree of collectivity that, unbeknown to them,made the industry stronger and more cohesive. Zaninovich said, “The Table GrapeCommissionwasapprovedduring this time,andhasbeen tremendously important tousasamarketingtoolforourproducts.”Headded,“Tablegrapegrowersapproveditandfinanciallysupported it probably becausewewere, as an industry, in trouble. It is highly questionablewhetherwewouldhaveapprovedthecommissionotherwise.”100

Asthepresidentof theCaliforniaTableGrapeCommissionand themainforcebehind thegrowers’oppositiontotheboycott,BruceObbinkwitnessedtheUnitedFarmWorkersattheirmostpotentaswellastheirmostvulnerable.Obbinkbeganatatimewhenothergrapegrowerorganizations, such as the Grape & Tree Fruit League and the South Central GrowersAssociation,failedtostemthetideoflossesassociatedwiththegrapeboycottthatculminatedinthe1970contracts.“Onethingledtoanother,”Obbinkrecalled,“soin1967,[thegrowers]wenttoSacramentoandsaid,‘Weneedtoorganizeourselves.’”TheCaliforniastatelegislatorsanctionedthecreationofthecommission,whichfunctionedasaquasi-publicagencysimilartoachamberofcommercechargedwithbolsteringtheimageoftheindustry.Oncethemajorityof growers voted for it, everyone had to contribute dues. According to Obbink, growerspreferredthenoninvasivestructureof thecommissionthatallowedthemtomarket theirownproductswhilegettingsupportfromthestateforthepromotionoftheentireindustry.101

Bythelate1970s,asgrowersbecamemoresavvyaboutarticulatinganidentitythatappealedtoconsumers,theTableGrapeCommissionwasthriving.LikeHarryKuboandtheCitizensforaFairLaborLaw,Obbinkandthecommissionavoidedtakingareactionarypositionvis-à-vistheUFWandChavez,andinsteadengagedinmediacampaignsdesignedtoadvanceanimagesure to resonatewith thepublic.Thecommission functionedprimarilyasanadvertisingandpublic relations organ for the industry, focused exclusively on raising the esteem of tablegrapes regardlessofwhere theyweregrown.UnderObbink, thecommissioncultivatednewsalespitches.Althoughsomeresisted,themajorityofgrowersvotedtofundtheenterprisebydeducting.0005percentperboxofgrapessold.TheorganizationalstructuregaveObbinkandhisemployeestheincentivetosucceedintheirmediacampaignstomaintaingrowers’faithinthecommission.Theboycottalsohelpeddefineandcultivatetheirmissionandgavepurposetothecommission.Inessence,thelongertheboycottranandthewideritspread,thestrongerandmoredefinedthecommission’sworkbecame.The collapse of the boycott and the internal strife in 1977 and 1978 made the union

vulnerableatatimewhenitneededtobestrong.Obbinkrememberedtheyearasawatershedmoment,notforwhatthecommissiondid,butforthefailuresoftheuniontocapitalizeonitsmomentum after the pact with the Teamsters. Like Kubo, Obbink respected Chavez and

anticipated a vigorous offensive in the fields following a year of struggle to improve theALRB. “There’s just no doubt in [my]mind,”Obbink asserted, “thatCesarChavezwas anincrediblycharismaticguy…whetherhewasmarchingorfastingorwhateverthehellhewasdoing.” Yet for reasons that are still inexplicable to Obbink, Chavez lost his focus andwithdrew from the fight. In thatmoment,Chavezmanaged to snatchdefeat from the jawsofvictory,layingtheconditionsfortheexpansionofthegrapemarketandtheascendancyof thecommission.Obbink opined, “Had [Chavez] not got off sideways here, somehow,with thatSynanonbunchandthenstartedfiringallthesecompetentpeople…youneverknow.”Theformationofastate-sanctioned,quasi-publiccommissionpaiddividendsastimewore

on.AccordingtoObbink,thecommissionbeganwithamodestbudgetof$600,000duringthe1967–68 harvest. Once growers had settled the conflict and returned to profit in 1970, thecommission’s budget rose due to the per box deductions. “When I left [in 1996],” Obbinkexplained,“[mybudget]was12milliondollars.”Withthatmoney,heandhisteamexpandedtheir operations beyond fighting the United FarmWorkers to developing slogans like “Thenaturalsnack”and“Onebiteatatime,”whichdramaticallyincreasedthepopularityoftablegrapesdespiteintermittentboycottsthroughoutthe1980sand1990s.Obbinkexplained,“[Wewent] from20million boxes [sold in 1967–68] to 90million [in 2008].”During that sameperiod,Obbinkobservedadramaticchangeinboththenumberofgrowersandthepercapitaconsumption: “When I startedwith theTableGrapeCommission, therewere 1,500 farmersproducing20millionboxes of grapes.Per capita consumptionwas1.2 pounds in 1967–68.Today, there are 500 farmers producing 90 million boxes of grapes, and the per capitaconsumption is over eight pounds.” These changes signaled that the boycott had eliminatedsmaller,lessprofitablegrowersfromthebusiness,whilegrowerswithmorecapitalandlandsurvivedandultimatelythrived.The increase in profits also tells another important story. Such changes came as a

consequence of the expanded sales of table grapes in markets in which growers had anegligible presence prior to the UFW boycott. The boycott forced growers to developmarketing campaigns innontraditionaldomesticmarkets such as theSouth and theMountainWest, and in internationalmarkets suchasCanada,England,Scandinavia, andAsia to try tobeattheboycott.Whentheboycottended,thetraditionalurbanmarketsreturnedtothegrowers,but so did these newmarkets that had been cultivated in the heat of the battle. In the yearsfollowingthegrapeboycott,thecommissionsucceededinincorporatingMexicanandChileangrapesintotheirpromotions,enablingtheindustrytocoordinateseasonsnorthandsouthoftheborderandexpandtoatwelve-month,oryear-round,consumermarketforgrapesintheUnitedStates.Obbink attributed these successes to expansion andorganization required to fight theboycott.Until hisdeathonApril 23,1993,Chavezoccasionally appealed to consumersnot tobuy

grapes, but the boycott never was the same. Without the extensive network of volunteers,organizers, and lawyers toback it up, theUFWreliedonmailing lists to generate financialsupport for a union that had little contact with workers in the field. Regrettably for farmworkers, such “hi-tech boycotts” transformed theUFW into a farmworker advocacy groupmoreconcernedwithmaintainingthelegacyofChavezthanaddressingthepersistentproblem

ofruralpovertythatinspiredthemovementinthefirstplace.102Despitetheeffortsofthisoncemightyunion,thesearchforfarmworkerjusticecontinues.

Epilogue

BEYONDTHELEGEND

Wemust ask of our historians and of thosewhowrite about us to bemore thorough,morededicatedtoseekthefulltruthandtobemoredisciplinedandrigorousabouttheirevaluatingandcharacterizingofourpeoples’struggles,of therolesplayedbyourorganizationsandbyour significant leaders.Wedemand that our history be analyzed from the perspective of thefundamentalcontradictionspresentinthesocietyasawholeduringitsmaking.Wedemandthatthemostimportantconsiderationbegiventotheroleofourworkersindeterminingourhistoryandthatthislastbethemeasuringstickforgivingsignificancetothisorthatevent,thisorthatorganizationorleader.

BERTCORONA“AnalyzingtheWritingofOurHistoryandItsImportance,”unpublishedmanuscript,StanfordUniversityLibrary

Plastersaintsarenotreal.Wedon’tlearnanythingfromplastersaints;wedon’twriteplaysabout themoverandover.Wewriteplaysabout tragicheroes,becausewecanidentifywiththem.

MARSHALLGANZinterviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008

ThisistheWest,sir.Whenthelegendbecomesfact,printthelegend.

MR.SCOTTinJohnFord’sTheManWhoShotLibertyValance,1962

IN JOHN FORD’S CLASSIC WESTERN FILM,TheManWho Shot Liberty Valance, audiences arechallenged to reconsider the meaning and importance of heroes in the development of theAmerican West. Although Jimmy Stewart’s character, Ransom Stoddard, did not kill thefearsomeLibertyValance,amanwhohadterrorizedthetownspeopleofShinbone,Arizona,inthenameofprotectingthelandandinterestofcattlebarons,hereceivedcreditforit,risingtothe level ofU.S. senator for his supposed act of courage.Years later, whenValance’s realmurderer,JohnWayne’sTomDoniphon,dies,Stoddardtriestosettherecordstraightwiththelocalnewspaper.Theeditor,however,willnothaveit.Beleagueredfromcarryingtheburdenof this lie forso long,an incredulousStoddardasks,“You’renotgoing touse thestory,Mr.Scott?” For Scott and his readers, however, the lie had become a convenient myth thatprovidedShinboneandthestateofArizonawithausefulcreationstorythatnoonewantedtoabandoninthenameoftruth.“ThisistheWest,sir,”Scottreplied.“Whenthelegendbecomes

fact,printthelegend.”ReleasedthesameyearastheNationalFarmWorkersAssociationbegan,Ford’scautionary

film about the superficiality of heroes has surprising resonancewith the history of the farmworkermovement and thewayhistorians and the public have remembered itsArizona-bornleader, Cesar Chavez. Although Chavez has always had his critics, most historians, bothpopularandprofessional,havecelebratedhimasavisionary,pious,andvirtuousleaderwhowouldhaveachievedanationalfarmworkersunionifnotfortheforcesmountedagainsthim.1This literary approbation has precipitated a surfeit of publicmemorials in Chavez’s honor,rangingfromthe renamingofpublicstreetsandschools, tostatuesandapostal stamp.Mostrecently,U.S.SecretaryoftheInteriorKenSalazardesignatedthebirthplaceofthemovement,Forty Acres, a National Historic Landmark for the purpose of remembering the “nationalsignificanceofthelifeandworkofCesarE.Chavez.”2ThestudentsandprofessorsofChicanoand Latino academic programs have been among the most vested in the Chavez legend,celebrating his birthday and offering scholarships in his name to those whose humblebackground or commitment to social justicemirrors those of the late labor and civil rightsleader.Although these are all laudatory actions, theydrawapictureofChavez’s leadershipthatisfarremovedfromthecomplexhistorythatIhavetoldinthisbook.From theJawsofVictory contributes to a critical reassessmentofChavez and theUnited

FarmWorkersunion.Intheprocessofsharingmyfindings,Ihaveencounteredconcernedtruebelieversof theChavezlegendwhohavequestionedthevalueandintentof thisproject.Mypurposehasbeen tohold theUFWleadershipaccountable to the thousandsof farmworkerswhowereletdownbytheunion’sretreatfromthefieldsandtoproduceausablepastforthosewho wish to advance the cause of farm worker justice today. This has been the commonsentiment among many veterans of the movement whom I have consulted for this book,especiallythedesiretoreconsiderthedecisionsChavezmadefromthemid-1970stotheendof that decade. To be sure, a consensus does not exist on the significance and meaning ofChavez’s leadershipamongallwhodedicated their lives to thestruggle.Yet, thedebate thatraged among275 formerUFWvolunteers onLeRoyChatfield’s online listserv in 2004 and2005 suggests that neither thepublicnor those close to theUFWhavebeenwell servedbymore than fortyyearsofhagiography.Oralhistories, the listserv, andanevaluationofmanyhoursofrecordedexecutiveboardmeetingshaveledmetoanewinterpretationthataccountsfor themix of pride and disappointment experienced by themen andwomenwho investeddeeply in theprojectof farmworker justice.Suchanaccounting isnecessary ifwehope tolearnfromChavez’smistakesaswellashissuccesses.AlthoughIbeganthisprojectwiththezealofalaborhistorianintentontellingthestoryof

theUnitedFarmWorkersfromthepointofviewofthevolunteers,Ibecameconvincedthatnoaccuratepictureof theunionduring its heyday is possiblewithout confronting the legacyofCesarChavez.ThecontrolChavezexercisedovertheunionmeantthatmostdecisionspassedacross his desk. There were exceptions to this rule, which I have explored in vivid andsometimesharrowingdetail.Inthefield,volunteersandstaffmembersadaptedtheirstrategytotheparticularconditionsofthefight,whetheritwasJerryCohennegotiatingasettlementwiththeTeamsters,GilbertPadillaandMarshallGanzorganizingfieldworkers,orJessicaGovea

andElaineElinsonappealingtoconsumers,storeowners,ordockworkersnottobuy,sell,orunload grapes.Yet the lack of democracy in the unionmeant thatChavezmore than anyonedetermined the net impact of these people’s efforts. In the end, I found it impossible todownplayorexplainawayhisroleinfavorofprivilegingthestoryoftherankandfileandthestaff.NorshouldIhave.Intellingthisstory,IhavetriedtoavoidpresentingChavezasthefake

thatStoddardturnsouttobe.AsGanzhasadmitted,Chavezwasno“plastersaint”—colorfuland noble on the outside, hollow and devoid of substance on the inside.Chavez possessedmanyvaluablequalitiesthatinspiredhundredsofvolunteerstodedicatetheirlivestotheunionand millions of people around the world to rally behind la causa. His “single-mindeddoggedness,” as Fred Ross put it, may have been his most important quality, encouragingpeoplenottogiveupwhenprospectsforsuccesslookedgrim.3Chavez’sleadershipprovedtobe especially important in the early years, when someone needed to show the couragenecessary towalkawayfromasecurepaycheckand trustedorganization inorder tobuildamovementthataddressedthespecificneedsoffarmworkers.Thatthissameimpulseledhimtoignore warning signs and reject the counsel of close friends in favor of pursuing what hebelievedtobetherightcourseofactionmakeshisfailuresandthedeteriorationoftheunionall themorepainful.Rather thancontinue toseeChavez in thenarrowlightofcelebration, Ihavewidenedthelenstoshowhimasthetragicherohewas.Suchaperspectiveallowsustohonor his tremendous virtues as a leader while not forgetting the perils that come withautocraticleadership.Mymeasureofthemanhasbeenthehealthandsecurityofthefarmworkershepurportedto

serve. Such a perspective conforms to the prescription for responsible history offered byMexican American leader, Bert Corona. As Corona suggests, fundamental contradictionsbetween employees’ rights to fair and humane treatment in theworkplace and the desire ofwealthyandmorepowerfulentitiestoflourishinoursocietywereatplayinthistragicdrama.Thefailureof farmworkers’collectivebargainingrights tokeeppacewith theexpansionofgrowers’profitsrevealsthedegreetowhichthissystemprivilegesownersoverworkers.Thecontinuedsufferingoffarmlaborers,evenasCaliforniagrapesaresoldworldwideandgrapesalesflout theoldconventionsofseasonalmarkets,offersanimportantreminderof theneedformore advocacy on their behalf. The dilemmaofH2-Aguestworkers and undocumentedfood producers today sadly resembles the experience of braceros and farmworkers in the1950sandearly1960sthatprecipitatedthefarmworkermovementinthefirstplace.If theirlives constitute themeasuring stick bywhichwe determine the success or failure of CesarChavezandtheUnitedFarmWorkers,thenthestorywouldbeadepressingoneindeed.Thevalueofhistory,however,isnotsimplytodeterminewinnersandlosers.Ihavefocused

equally on issues of strategy, particularly how the poor, the young, and the disfranchisedovercame tremendous odds to win more battles than they lost. The story of the boycott inparticularoffersavisionofhopeforhumanitybydemonstratingthecapacityforconsumersandvolunteers to takeaction in the interestofpeoplefar removedfromthemand theirstation inlife.Althoughthecurrentorientationoffoodconsumeractivismsignalsadisturbingdriftawayfromthewelfareoffarmworkers,thegrapeboycottlivesinthememoryofmanypeoplewho

either volunteered on the picket lines or refused to buy grapes. Recent campaigns by theCoalition of Immokalee Workers to add a penny-per-pound to fast-food meals in order toincreasefarmworkerpayinFloridaechotheactivismofUFWboycottvolunteersbegunmorethan four decades ago.4 The language and strategy of the boycott is also ubiquitous in thepursuitofjusticeforimmigrants,fromthethreatofLatinoresidentsboycottingtheU.S.censusin response to federal neglect of immigration reform to a national boycott of the state ofArizona to protest harassment of ethnicMexicans under the 2010 law SB1070. The grapeboycott,whetheracknowledgedornot,informsthesenewconflictsandshapesthestrategyofcurrent laborandcivil rightsorganizations.For thosewhowishtoemployboycotts today, itbehoovesthemtostudythegrapeboycottandseethatitsucceededduetoconstantorganizingandadaptingofstrategiesthatpropelledthemovementforward.Thehistoryoftheboycottalsoremindsusofthecapacityofpeopletoovercomedifferences

toworktogether.Attheheightoftheboycott,volunteersfromdiversebackgroundslivedandworkedinboycotthousesfarfromtheirhomesandcomfortzonestobuildeffectivenetworksthatshutdownthegrapemarketsandforcedgrowerstoseekastrategyofmovingsalesbeyondtheirtraditionalstrongholds.Thesemovementsprecipitatednewcoalitionsamongfarmworkeradvocates,includingcooperationwithlaborunionsabroad.Itisworthnotingthatmanyofthekey volunteers in the grape boycott network came from Jewish families, including ElaineElinson,MarshallGanz,andJerryBrown,tonamejustafew.Theiridentitiesoccasionallyhadmeaninginthestruggle.Elinson,forexample,citedhergrandmother’sradicalpoliticalbeliefsas amotivating forcebehindher activism,whileGanzandBrowncited their affinitieswithJewishstoreownersas levers forchange in theTorontomarkets.Whenviewed in thewidercontextoftheunion’shistory,weseethepresenceofJewsinimportantstaffpositions,suchasJerryCohen and SandyNathan,whowere essential to the advancement of the union. Theirability to see affinities with nonwhite and poor workers demonstrates the elasticity of a“familyofresemblance”amongpeoplewhostoodoutsidetheWASPmajorityinthe1960sand1970s.5ViewedfromtheperspectiveofMexicanandFilipinofarmworkers, theembraceofyoungcollege students andwhite religiousvolunteersdemonstratesa similar inclusivityandwillingnesstoadapttodifferenceinpursuitofasharedgoal.TheUnitedFarmWorkerssurvivedtheendoftheboycott,butthepoliticalupheavalsofthe

late 1970s still reverberate through the union and the lives of veterans today. In the yearsimmediately following 1978, Chavez’s refusal to decentralize power and welcomecontributions fromorganizedworkers in Salinas led to an unfortunate standoff between himand the rank and file. By 1981 he was working with a small cadre of loyalists to expelrebelliousmembers at thenational convention, forever closing thepossibilityof democraticreformintheunion.Bythen,however,mostofthecriticsfromwithintheunionleadershiphadeitherresignedorbecomesuspectedoftreasonthemselves.Sadly,thevitriolanddistrustthatpervadedtheunioninthefinalyearsofthe1970scontinuetoshapeexchangesamongveteransofthemovement.6Suchangerandsuspicionseemanunfittingway to rememberanyonewhoparticipatedintheunion’sheyday.TheUnitedFarmWorkerscontinuestopursuefarmworkerjustice,butitsstrategieshavenot

produced the kind of results that the boycott achieved in 1970. In 2005, the United Farm

WorkersbrokefromtheAFL-CIOtojointhelaborcoalitionChangetoWin,whichincluded,amongotherunions, theirold rival, the InternationalBrotherhoodofTeamsters.Thechange,however, did them little good, as they failed to gain the support fromworkers atGiumarraVineyardstorepresentthemincontractnegotiationswiththesonofthegrowerwhosignedthefirst historic grape contracts in the San Joaquin Valley.7 More recently, in 2010, UFWpresidentandChavez’sson-in-law,ArturoRodríguez,joinedwithcomedian,StephenColbert,in the “Take Our Jobs” campaign that invites average Americans to do field work andeliminate the need for foreign nationals to do this labor. The strategy has attracted muchpublicity,althoughtheunion’sobjectivesremainsomewhatmurky.ColbertandRodríguezhavedrawnattentiontothehypocrisyofpoliticianswhoharangueagainstundocumentedimmigrants,but their joke rests inparton thepremise that farmwork isanundesirable job.Thisuneasyinterpretationhasnotescapedeveryone,leastofallDougAdair,aveteranofthegrapeboycottandthegrapefieldsofCoachellaValley.“Thetruthis,”Adairwrites,“iftheverythoughtofdoingfarmworkdidn’tmakesomanyAmericanslaugh,we’dallbebetteroff.”8Forhim,theunionwouldbetruertoitsmissionifithonoredtheoccupationthatfeedsthenationbyworkingforcontractsratherthanchuckles.Today not one fieldworker laboring on grape farms in California is covered by a labor

contract. Gone are the days of “double minimum wage,” paid vacations, unemploymentinsurance,andthemodestpensionplanthattheUnitedFarmWorkersfoughtforandwoninthe1970s. Today most farm workers in California are indigenous migrants from Mexico orGuatemala making $5 an hour, far below the state’s minimum wage of $8.9 Few have thecouragetochallengeinhumanetreatmentbecauseoftheirundocumentedstatusandthelackoffaithintheUnitedFarmWorkers.Infact,thenameofCesarChavezhasslippedsofarfromtheconsciousnessofthoseinthefieldthatworkersaremoreinclinedtoassociatehisnamewiththeretiredMexicanboxerJulioCesarChavezthanthelaborleaderwholedthecampaignfortheir rights.10 Meanwhile, the California Table Grape Commission campaigns to sell tablegrapes worldwide, producing record profits for growers who now worry more aboutescalating land values than the cost of labor.11 This is not the result anyone could haveimaginedattheheightofthegrapeboycott.IfthestoryoftheUnitedFarmWorkersteachesusanything,itisthatthegainsmadeonbehalf

ofworkerscannotbetakenforgrantedaspermanentandimmutable.ContrarytoMartinLutherKingJr.’sfamousstatement,thearcofhistorydoesnotbendtowardjusticeforfarmworkers.The rights won for farm workers in the 1960s and 1970s were not a moveable feast—sustainablegainsthatcouldbeextendedacrosstimeandplace.Rather,thishistoryprovesthatit takes constant and accountable engagement with workers and consumers to defend theinterestsoffoodproducerswhoserightshavebeenandremainthemosttenuousamongus.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. The United FarmWorkers is the most popular name of the organization. The unionbecametheUnitedFarmWorkersOrganizingCommitteeinAugust1966,afteramergingoftheNational Farm Workers Association (NFWA) and the Agricultural Workers OrganizingCommittee (AWOC). The AFL-CIO granted UFWOC an independent charter as the UnitedFarmWorkers in February 1972, and the name was formally adopted at the constitutionalconventioninFresno,California,inSeptember1973.Tosimplifythenarrative,IrefertotheunionastheUnitedFarmWorkers(UFW)unlessitisnecessarytodistinguishitfromitsotheriterations.

2.MarshallGanz,interviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008.3. García, The Gospel of César Chávez, 1. In addition to the books produced during

Chavez’s life, all ofwhicharemostly celebratory, see recentbooks suchasStavans,CesarChavez,anOrganizer’sTale;FerrissandSandoval,TheFight in theFields;GriswolddelCastilloandGarcía,CésarChávez.

4.Thetermboycottwasnotcoineduntil the1880s,inIreland,buttheactofpreferentialpurchasingextendsbacktotheantislaverymovement.SeeGlickman,BuyingPower,2.

5.Foradiscussionofcontemporaryusesoftheboycott,seeFrank,BuyAmerican.6.Glickman contends, “Consumer activism lacks the signature victory thatwe associate

withsuchsocialmovementsasabolitionism,organizer labor,women’ssuffrage, temperance,and Civil Rights” (Buying Power, 2). The labor contracts signed by the UFW in 1970,however,areonesuch“signaturevictory”achievedbymeansofaboycott.

7. For a discussion of early consumer boycotts, see Sklar, Florence Kelley and theNation’sWork.

8.An exception to this rule is theUFW’s predecessor, theNational FarmLaborUnion(NFLU). In 1948, they pursued a secondary boycott ofDiGiorgio products to accompany astrikeinthefields.IdiscusstheNFLUboycottbrieflyinchapter1,butforathoroughhistoryoftheunionanditsboycott,seeStreet,“PovertyintheValleyofPlenty.”

9.FriedlandandThomas,“ParadoxesofAgriculturalUnionisminCalifornia,”57;Fletcherand Gapasin, SolidarityDivided, 32–33. For a definition of social movement unionism inanothercontext,seeJohnston,SuccessWhileOthersFail,28–30.

10.Newton-Matza,“Boycott,”171–74.11. Consumers considered lettuce much more important to their diets and chose not to

conform to boycotts of that product as much. Wine was also boycotted; however, wineproducerstendedtobelessresistanttonegotiationswiththeUFW.

12.Growerssawtheirprofits thesamewayChristiansregardholydayssetbytheever-shiftingEasterSunday:nomatterwhenorwhereitoccurs,afeastwouldnotbedenied.ErnestHemingwayalsocalledhisglorious timeasayoungmaninParis in the1920s“amoveablefeast,”bywhichhemeant that theexperiencewouldalways staywithhim regardlessofhisage.ErnestHemingway,AMoveableFeast(NewYork:Scribner’s,1964).

13.MichaelPollan,forexample,hasraisedawarenessabouttheillsofanindustrializedandglobalizedfoodsystem,yet,oddly,farmworkersfigureasminorcharactersinhiscrisis.His book titles alone—Food Rules: An Eater’s Manual; In Defense of Food: An Eater’sManifesto;and,ofcourse,TheOmnivore’sDilemma:ANaturalHistoryofFourMeals(andthe“YoungReadersEdition”withthesubtitleTheSecretsbehindWhatYouEat)—signalhisprimaryinterestinappealingtoconsumersforthebenefitofconsumers.Fortunately,scholarshave begun to deepen the study of food politics to include farm workers. Similarly, somestudents have connected with farm labor organizations to build support for labor andimmigration reform.Fornewstudieson theUnitedFarmWorkers, seeBardacke,TramplingOut theVintage; Pawel,TheUnion of TheirDreams; Ganz,WhyDavid SometimesWins;Shaw,BeyondtheFields.Ontheturntowardagreaterconsciousnessofworkerrightsinfoodpolitics,seeDuPuisandGoodman,“ShouldWeGo‘Home’toEat?”Studentshaveembracedthe Coalition of ImmokaleeWorkers’ “Campaign for Fair Food” to bring justice to tomatopickers in Florida, see www.ciw-online.org. Similar student-worker coalitions have beencreated since the heyday of the UFW with Pineros y Campesinos Unidos Noroeste(TreeplantersandFarmWorkersNorthwestUnited,orPCUN)inthePacificNorthwestandtheFarm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) throughout theMidwest and the Southeast. SeeGarcia and Sifuentez, “Social Movement Unionism and the ‘Sin Fronteras’ Philosophy inPCUN.” Finally, the Southern Poverty Law Center has released two studies that havecontributedtoafocusonfarmworkerjustice:InjusticeonOurPlatesandClosetoSlavery.

14. Insubsequentyears,ChavezandUFWadvocatesexpanded theappeal to include theharmfuleffectsofpesticidesonconsumers,buttheoverallgoalremainedfocusedonachievingjusticeforfarmworkers.Here,Iusethetermproducerasareferencetothefarmworkerswholiterallyproducedthefoodweeat.

15. JeremyVaron,Bringing Home theWar: TheWeather Underground, the Red ArmyFaction, andRevolutionaryViolence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley:University ofCaliforniaPress,2004).

16.ClayborneCarson,IntheStruggle:SNCCandtheBlackAwakeningofthe1960s,2ndedition(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1995);ManningMarable,Race,ReformandRebellion:TheSecondReconstructionandBeyond inBlackAmerica,1945–2006, 3rdedition(Jackson:UniversityofMississippi,2007).

17. Laura Pulido, Black, Brown, Yellow and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Ian Haney López, Racism on Trial: TheChicano Fight for Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,2004).

18. Special OrganizingMeeting, November 24, 1976,MiscellaneousUFWAudiovisual

Boxes,Tape8,ALUA.19.Here,IamthinkingofthemodelcreatedbytheBraceroArchiveHistoryProject.See

www.braceroarchive.org.Thisbookalso touchesonChavez’s relationshipwith theChicanomovement, although David Gutiérrez’sWalls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, MexicanImmigrants,andthePoliticsofEthnicity remains theauthoritative treatmentof thatsubject.MyfocusisontherelationshipbetweenChavezandthevolunteersonthegrapeboycott.

CHAPTERONE

1.InternationalDirectoryofCompanyHistories,vol.12.2.Street,“PovertyintheValleyofPlenty.”3.Ibid.,30–31.4.Ibid.,36–37.5.Andres,“PowerandControlinImperialValley,California,”202.6.Smith,“AStudyofSocialStratificationin theAgriculturalSectionsof theU.S.,”498,

508–9.7.Garcia,AWorldof ItsOwn, 174–77;García yGriego, “The Importation ofMexican

ContractLaborerstotheUnitedStates,”45–85.Seealsobraceroarchive.org.8.Garcia,AWorldofItsOwn,174–88;Vargas,LaborRightsAreCivilRights,278;Ngai,

ImpossibleSubjects,127–66.9.“ContractMexicanNationalsinCaliforniaAgriculture,1964,”SanJoaquinValleyFarm

LaborCollection,FresnoStateUniversity,SpecialCollections.10.Ibid.,17–20.11.Ibid.,23–24.Oneemployer,Gillian’s,maintainedacampforbracerosbutabandoned

thisoptiondue to thecostofhousing(29). JackWolff,ownerofGiffenRanch,operated tenlabor campshousing10,000people four to fiveyearsprior to the study, thoughhedivestedfromitinfavorofmechanization(49).Theauthorsofthereportconcluded,“Growersprefercontractstolargescalelaborcamps”(54).

12.Ibid.,30.13.Ibid.,44.14.Ibid.,12.15.Ibid.,62.16.Ibid.,13.17.Garcia,“CaincontraAbel.”18.MiguelFigueroa,interviewedbytheauthor,Riverside,California,March25,2008.19.Ibid.;U.S.CommissiononCivilRights,MexicanAmericansand theAdministration

ofJusticeintheSouthwest,3.

20.MiguelFigueroainterviewedbytheauthor.21.Galarza,StrangersinOurFields.ForreactiontoStrangersinOurFields,seeGarcía

yGriego,“TheImportationofMexicanContractLaborerstotheUnitedStates,”69.22. Galarza, Strangers in Our Fields, and Merchants of Labor. For perspective on

Galarza’scareerasanactivist,seePitti,TheDevilinSiliconValley,136–47;Loza,“BracerosontheBoundaries.”Forthebestdiscussionontheterminationoftheprogramanditslegacy,seeGarcía yGriego, “The ImportationofMexicanContractLaborers to theUnitedStates,”69–75;Gutiérrez,WallsandMirrors,152–60.

23. “WesternWater,”MacNeil/Lehrer Report, January 3, 1978; “The Imperial Gadfly,”UplandCourier, February 2, 1978; “DoggedDoctor Refuses to GiveUp Case against BigFarmers,”LosAngelesTimes,June22,1980;60Minutes,CBS,January14,1973,transcript,BenYellen Papers (MSS 193),Mandeville SpecialCollections,UCSD. For information onhowPaulTaylorsupportedYellen, seeTaylor,“MexicanMigrationand the160-AcreWaterLimitation,”734–35.

24.GilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,January11,2010.25.Garza,OrganizingtheChicanoMovement,149–50.26.Padillainterview.27.Ibid.28.Garza,Organizing theChicanoMovement, 146–48. “Gilbert Padilla, 1962–1980,”

FarmWorkerMovementDocumentationProject(FMDP).29.DoloresHuerta,interviewedbyMargaretRose,41.30.Ibid.,44.31.Ibid.,8,23.32.Ibid.,24–26,29.33.Ibid.,21.34.Padillainterview.35.Ibid.36.Ibid.37.Ibid.38.Ibid.39.Garza,OrganizingtheChicanoMovement,153;Padillainterview.40.Garza,OrganizingtheChicanoMovement,154–55.41.LetterfromFredRoss[to“Carl”]abouthiringGilbertPadilla,July16,1963,FMDP.42.“GilbertPadilla1962–1980,”FMDP;Padillainterview.43.“Wayne‘Chris’Hartmire,1962–1989,”FMDP.44.“GilbertPadilla,1962–1980,”FMDP;GilbertPadilla toArtieRodriguez,president,

UFW, AFL-CIO, July 23, 2008, Padilla’s private collection (also reprinted in Garza,

OrganizingtheChicanoMovement,174).45.“Wayne‘Chris’Hartmire,1962–1989,”FMDP.46.“JimDrake,1962–1978,”FMDP.47.Garza,Organizing theChicanoMovement, 170. As a member of the CSO staff in

Stockton, Padilla hadwitnessed two IrishCatholic priests, FatherThomasMcCullough andFather JohnDuggan,organize farmworkersunder theAgriculturalWorkersAssociation,butbacked away from the enterprise when their efforts ran afoul of the archdiocese in SanFrancisco.

48.Padillainterview.49. Letter from Fred Ross [to “Carl”] about hiring Gilbert Padilla, January 16, 1963,

FMDP.50.Padillainterview.51.Ibid.52.“JimDrake,1962–1978,”FMDP;Garza,OrganizingtheChicanoMovement,188.53.Padillainterview.54.“LeRoyChatfield1963–1973”;“RentStrike,”FMDP.55.LouisKrainocktoLarryItliong,February13,1961,UFWLarryItliongCollection,Box

2-4,ALUA;“CeilingontheEmploymentofForeignWorkers,”A.J.NortontoU.S.DepartmentofLabor,June1,1962,LarryItliongCollection,Box2-4,ALUA.

56.GilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,August19,2009.57.CesarChavez,“EulogyforFredRoss,”October17,1992,inStavans,CesarChavez,

anOrganizer’sTale,xiv.58.FerrissandSandoval,TheFightintheFields,82.59.AlexA.Esclamado,obituaryofLarryDulayItliong,PhilippineNews,February12–18,

1977,UFWLarryItliongCollection,Box1,Folder12,ALUA.60.FerrissandSandoval,TheFightintheFields,86.61.Padillainterview,January11,2010.62.Ibid.63.FerrissandSandoval,TheFightintheFields,86;Padillainterview,January11,2010.64.Padillainterview,January11,2010;FerrissandSandoval,FightintheFields,88.65.Padillainterview,January11,2010.66.Ibid.67.Pawel,TheUnionofTheirDreams,27.

CHAPTERTWO

1.JerryBrown,interviewedbytheauthor,January16,2009.2.Ibid.3.JimDrake,“TwoUnpublishedManuscripts,”FMDP,6.4.RudyReyestoLeroyChatfield,June4,2003,inFMDP.5.GilbertPadilla,interviewedbyauthor,August19,2008,Fresno,California.6.HijinioRangel,untitledessay,FMDP,1–2.7.Payne,I’veGottheLightofFreedom.8.MarshallGanz,interviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008.9. Ibid.;MikeMiller, “The Farmworkers and TheirAllies in the Early toMid-1960s,”

FMDP,3.10. “Some Facts on the New Grape Boycott, September, 1973,” UFW Office of the

President,Part2,Box33-10,ALUA.11.Letter toBoycottCommittees fromMikeMillerandJimDrake,December17,1965,

NationalFarmWorkersMinistryCollection,PartI,Box25-9,ALUA.12.MeisterandLoftis,ALongTimeComing,143–44.13. James Woolsey, “Statement of Schenley Industries, Inc.,” California Senate Fact

FindingCommitteeonAgriculture,Delano,July20,1966,7inGanz,WhyDavidSometimesWins,303n166.

14.Ganz,WhyDavidSometimesWins,158.15.Ibid.,159.16.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,190–95.17. TheUnited FarmWorkersOrganizingCommitteewas shortened to theUnited Farm

WorkerswhentheAFL-CIOgranteditanindependentcharterin1972andtheunionratifieditin February 1973. For the sake of continuity, I use the acronymUFW before and after thechangeintitle.

18.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,197.19.Ibid.;ChrisHartmire,interviewedbytheauthor,September2,2008.20.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,208.Dunne,TheStoryoftheCaliforniaGrape

Strike,171–73;Ganz,WhyDavidSometimesWins,226.21.QuotedinGanz,WhyDavidSometimesWins,159–60.22.ZaninovichandThomas,TurmoilintheVineyards,4–7.23.Ibid.,8.24.Ibid.;BruceObbink,interviewedbytheauthor,August21,2008.25.QuotedinZaninovichandThomas,TurmoilintheVineyards,9.26.Street,PhotographingFarmworkersinCalifornia,196–237.FormoreonSCFCand

Zaninovich, see Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 151; Taylor, Chavez and the Farm

Workers,159.27.MarshallGanzinterview.28.Brown, “TheUnited FarmWorkersGrape Strike andBoycott,” 136.MarshallGanz

explainsthat theunion,nowundertheAFL-CIO,spenthoursdeliberatingonthedirectionofthemovementafterthedefeatofPerelli-Minetti.BillKircherfavoredfurtherorganizingamongwineryworkers to consolidate their victoryover allCaliforniavintners, but themajorityofUFW leaders favored a campaign against table grape growers, becausemany workers hadcomefromthoseplantationsandhadseenlittleinthewayofprogresssincethebeginningofthestruggle.Ganz,WhyDavidSometimesWins,227–28.

29.Oftheir12,170acres,Giumarraowned6,430intheDelanodistrict,dedicatedtotablegrapecultivation(Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”136).

30.Ibid.,143.31.Ibid.,34.32.Ibid.,128–29.33.Drake,FMDP,14.34.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”183.35. Jessica Govea, interviewed by William Taylor, July 21, 1976, William Taylor

Collection,OralHistoryTape211(AudioVisual),ALUA.36.JerryBrowninterview.37.Ibid.38.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”204–5.39.DoloresHuerta,quotedinibid.,205.40.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”207.41.NoéG.Garcia,whoworkedforSafewayasabutcherformorethanthirty-fiveyears,

said that the reference to “Slave-way” was common within his family and used frequentlyamongfellowworkers.Interviewedbyauthor,May24,2008.

42.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”206.Brownfoundthatsix ofSafeway’s directors sat on executiveboards for twelvemajor agricultural producers,including threewhoservedasboardmembers forJ.G.BoswellCompanyandKernCountyLandCompany,bothofwhichweretargetsofUFWstrikes.

43. Nick Jones, interviewed by William Taylor, July 24, 1976, 22, William TaylorCollection,Box1,Folder1,ALUA.

44.JerryBrowninterview.45.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”210.46.NickJonesinterview,19,21,WilliamTaylor,Box1,Folder1,ALUA.47.ChrisHartmire,interviewedbytheauthor,September2,2008.48. “CaliforniaTableGrape Industry,StudyofBoycottEffect—1968&1969Seasons,”

March1970,Chapter6,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box34,Folder32,ALUA.49.JerryBrowninterview.50. Brown, “The United FarmWorkers Grape Strike and Boycott,” 218–19. Because a

poor crop in 1967 had reduced total shipments well below the norm for the table grapeindustry, 1966 became the benchmark. Therefore, 1966 shipment totals represented a muchtruerconditionofthemarket.

51.JerryBrowninterview.52.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”198.53.Ibid.,201.54.JerryBrowninterview.

CHAPTERTHREE

1.ElaineElinson,“UFWMemoir:TheUFWGrapeBoycottinEurope,”FMDP,n.d.,10.2.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”214–15.Brownreported

thattablegrapegrowerssent65percentoftheirharvest,or10percentmoretablegrapesfrom1966to1968,tobecrushedforwineandjuiceproduction.

3.“SalesatRecordHigh,GrapeGrowersClaim,”LosAngelesTimes,June25,19694.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,235.Growerspaidthepublicrelationsfirm$1

millionperyear.5.Ibid.,236–38.6. Chavez to Ganz, March 9, 1969, UFW Administration Files Collection, Box 26-25,

ALUA.7.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”202.8.Ibid.9.Ibid.,211.10.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August18,2008,30;Cohen,“GringoJustice.”11.HijinioRangeltestimonial,FMDP,2.12.Ibid.,3.13.“GrowerQuitsGrapeGroup,HitsReports,”LosAngelesTimes,June27,1969.14.MarshallGanz,interviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008;JerryBrown,interviewed

bytheauthor,January16,2009.15.Brown,“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,”217.16. JessicaGovea to Chavez, February 4, 1969, UFWAdministration Files Collection,

Box26-28,ALUA.17.Shaw,BeyondtheFields,30;MarkDayessay,FMDP,5.

18.JuanitaBrowntoMarshallGanz,December31,1969,UFWMarshallGanzCollection,Box6,Folder8,ALUA.

19. Jessica Govea to Cesar Chavez, February 4, 1969, UFW Administration FilesCollection, Box 26-28, ALUA; Marshall Ganz to Juanita Brown, January 7, 1970, UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-28,ALUA;MarshallGanz toLarry Itliong,January27,1970,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-28,ALUA.

20. Marshall Ganz to Juanita Brown, January 7, 1970, UFW Administration FilesCollection,Box26-28,ALUA,3.

21.Ibid.,4.22.JerryBrowninterview.23.Ibid.24.Ibid.25.MarkSilvermanessay,FWDP,2.26. Jessica Govea to Larry Itliong, February 10 and February 13, 1970, UFW

AdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-28,ALUA;MarshallGanztoJuanitaBrown,January7,1970,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-28,ALUA.

27. Ganz to Itliong, February 10, 1970; Govea to Itliong, February 13, 1970, UFWMontrealBoycottOffice,Box3,File“DelanoCorrespondence#5,”ALUA.

28.JessicaGoveatoCesarChavez,June4,1970,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-25,ALUA.

29.PeterStandishtoCesarChavez,June4,1970,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-25,ALUA.

30.Ibid.31. Govea to Chavez, June 4, 1970, UFWAdministration Files Collection, Box 26-25,

ALUA.32.Standish toChavez,June4,1970,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-25,

ALUA.33.ElaineElinson,interviewedbytheauthor,December8,2009.34.Ibid.35.BrowntoElinson,October8,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-33,

ALUA.36.Ibid.37.ThePort,December19,1968;“GrapeBoycottReachesEuropewithGirl’sAid,”Los

Angeles Times, January 20, 1969; “Hon vädjar i Sverige: Bojkotta USA—druvor!,”Aftonbladet(Sweden),1969,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-33,ALUA.

38.ElaineElinsoninterview.39. Govea to Chavez, December 3, 1969, UFWMarshall Ganz Collection, Box 6-17,

ALUA;GoveatoChavez,March4,1970,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-25,

ALUA.40.ElaineElinsoninterview.41.BrowntoElinson,January21,1969,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.42.ElaineElinsoninterview.43.BrowntoElinson,October8,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-33,

ALUA.44.Ibid.45.Elinsonessay,FMDP,2.46.BrowntoElinson,December7,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.47.Elinsonessay,FMDP,4.48.BrowntoElinson,December24,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.49.BrowntoElinson,October19,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA;BrowntoElinson,October31,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-33,ALUA.

50.BrowntoElinson,October31,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-33,ALUA.

51.Ibid.;Elinsonessay,FMDP,3.52.BrowntoElinson,October31,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.Historically,Britainhad imported tablegrapesfromSpainandSouthAfrica,butafterWorldWarII,U.S.importsoffreshproducedramaticallycutintothisbusiness.

53.Elinsonessay,FMDP,3.54.Ibid.,5.55.Ibid.,2.56.BrowntoElinson,November18,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.57.Elinsonessay,FMDP,6–7.58.ChaveztoVictorReuther,January5,1969,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box

26-33,ALUA.59.BrowntoElinson,December7,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.60.TGWU,“Resolution,SupportofGrapeWorkersStrike,”UFWOfficeofthePresident,

PartI,Box75-9,ALUA.61.BrowntoElinson,December17,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA;DonWatson,interviewedbytheauthor,June15,2009.

62.BrowntoElinson,December17,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-33,ALUA.

63.Elinsonessay,FMDP,5.64.DonWatsoninterview;ElaineElinsoninterview.65.ChaveztoVictorReuther,January5,1969,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box

26-33,ALUA.66.ElaineElinsonessay,FMDP,7.67.ElaineElinsoninterview.68.BrowntoElinson,November20,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.69.Elinsonessay,FMDP,7.70.BrowntoElinson,January10,1969,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.71.BrowntoElinson,January14,1969,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.72. Aftonbladet, January 12, 1969, UFW Administration Files Collection, Box 26-33,

ALUA.73. Elinson essay, FMDP, 9. Svenska Lantarbetareforbundet is the farmers union in

Sweden.74.BrowntoElinson,January21,1969,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.75.BrowntoElinson,December17,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.76.Elinsonessay,FMDP,9.77. Haber to Chavez, June 9, 1970, UFWAdministration Files Collection, Box 26-28,

ALUA.78.ElaineElinsoninterview.79.BrowntoElinson,December7,1968,UFWAdministrationFilesCollection,Box26-

33,ALUA.80. Senator Walter Mondale, U.S. Senate Hearings (pesticides), August 1, 1969,

“StatementofJeromeCohen,”CohenPapers,AmherstCollege;Cohen,“GringoJustice,”19.81.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,243–44.82.MarshallGanzinterview.83.Ibid.84.Ibid.85.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,246.86.MarshallGanzinterview.

87.Ibid.;Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,246–48.

CHAPTERFOUR

1. Nixon White House Tapes, March 1972, audiotape 698-2, National Archives,Washington,DC.Transcribedbytheauthor.

2. “Teamsters President Proposes Alliance with Growers Group,” Los Angeles Times,December13,1972.

3. Friedland and Thomas, “Paradoxes of Agricultural Unionism in California,” 57.FriedlandandThomascallita“paradox”when,infact,itisanirony.

4. Marshall Ganz, interviewed by the author, March 26, 2008. Ganz explained, “Ourmomentsofgreatestvulnerabilitywereourmomentsofgreatestsuccess.”

5.DavidHarris,“TheBattleofCoachellaValley,”RollingStone,September13,1973.6. “Chavez’ Union ScoresMajor FarmVictory,”Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1970 and

“BattlebetweenTeamstersandChavezLooms,”LosAngelesTimes,August5,1970.7. “Battle betweenTeamsters andChavezLooms,”LosAngelesTimes, August 5, 1970;

Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,257–59.8.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,259–60.9.Ibid.,261.10.Ibid.,262.11.Harris,“TheBattleofCoachellaValley,”6.12.Fujita-Rony,AmericanWorkers,ColonialPower.13.ScharlinandVillanueva,PhilipVeraCruz,31.14.Ibid.,49.15.RonTaylor,“ChavezAideQuits,Raps‘BrainTrust,’”FresnoBee,October15,1971;

LarryItliongPapers,Box1-12;LettertoLarryItliongfromBillKircher,November15,1971,LarryItliongPapers,Box1-12,ALUA.

16.Letter toBillKircher fromLarry Itliong,March30,1972, ItliongPapers,Box1-12,ALUA.

17.LettertoSidValledorfromLarryItliong,December20,1971,ItliongPapers,Box1-2,ALUA.Itliongwrote,“BrotherPhilipandIhaveneverhititrightalthoughGodknowsItrymybest to adjust myself to gain his trust and confidence.…When I said I will quit UFWOC,becauseIfeltthatourcababayans[Filipinocountrymen]werenotbeinggivenafairshakeintheUnion, do you know that brother Philip, said in thatmeeting ‘good riddance.’” Itliong’sdefectiondidnotsitwellwithVeraCruz,nordidItliong’ssupportoftheTeamstersduringthemid-1970snorhissupportfortheMarcosregimeinthePhilippines.

18.VeraCruzcommented,“TheunionwantedtheFilipinosthere—theirmembership,their

presence, looked good for the union.…ButCesar and the othersweren’twilling to put thesame timeandmoney intoorganizing theFilipinosas theydidwith theMexicans.”ScharlinandVillanueva,PhilipVeraCruz,91–92.

19.DougAdair,interviewedbytheauthor,January10,2006.20.ReyHuerta,interviewedbytheauthor,January6,2006.21.Ibid.22.DougAdairinterview.23.Ibid.24.Ibid.25.Ibid.26.Ibid.27.Ibid.28.“TheAngloArmybehindCesarChavez,”LosAngelesTimes,April6,1972;Fujita-

Rony, “Coalitions, Race, and Labor.” For growers’ perspective on Filipino defections, seeZaninovichandThomas,TurmoilintheVineyards,71–73.

29.ManyFilipinoswhoexpresseddiscontentwiththeUFWalsovoicedtheiroppositionto the Teamsters. In 1974 Lemuel F. Ignacio, a Filipino farm worker organizer, wrote toReverendPhilPark,whohadreiteratedthepopularperceptionthattheFilipinospreferredtheTeamstersover theUFW.Copyingthe letter tohisfriendLarryItliong,Ignaciowrote,“Yourstatement[that]‘mostofthePilipinofarmworkersarenowapartof[the]teamsters’isgravelywrong. Pilipino farm workers believe in the union but are presently lukewarm to both theUFWAandtheteamsters.Theconceptoforganizingisveryrealandrichintheirhistoryinthiscountry.Inthe1930stherewasanindependentunionofPilipinoagriculturalworkers.”LettertoReverendPhilPark fromLemuelF. Ignacio (Larry Itliongcc’d),October31,1974,LarryItliongPapers,Box1-4,ALUA.

30.“ComparisonofHealthandWelfarePlansofTeamstersandUnitedFarmWorkersofAmerica,”n.d.,UFWInformationandResearch,PartI,Box31-1,ALUA.

31.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,26–28.32.“TheAngloArmybehindCesarChavez,”LosAngelesTimes,April6,1972.33. “Cesar Chavez—Out of Sight but Still in Fight,” Los Angeles Times, February 14,

1972;“TheAngloArmybehindCesarChavez,”LosAngelesTimes,April6,1972.34. “Chavez Union Starts New Boycott,” Los Angeles Times, July 3, 1971; “Heublein

Offer to Acquire 80% of United Vinters Approved,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1968;“ChavezUnionOpensWorldwideBoycottagainstWineFirm,”LosAngelesTimes,August10,1971;“Chavez,WineFirmSetUpCompanyHiringHallinPact,”LosAngelesTimes,August19,1971.

35.“GrowersWillOKFarmUnionsinPolicyChange,OfficialSays,”LosAngelesTimes,January20,1971.

36.Ibid.37. “Two Salinas ValleyGrowers Prepared to Signwith Chavez,”Los Angeles Times,

August30,1970;“ChavezSigns3rdBigSalinasGrower:PicN’PacContractEndsNationalBoycottActivities,”LosAngelesTimes,October10,1970.

38.MarshallGanzinterview.39. “Teamster Boycott Hits Lettuce Picked by Chavez’ Union,” Los Angeles Times,

February9,1971;“ChavezSignsNation’sLargestIndependentLettuceProducer,”LosAngelesTimes,April24,1971.

40.“TheNewRulesofPlay,”Time,March8,1968.41. “Reagan Acts in N.Y. Grape Boycott Threat,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1968;

“BoycottofGrapesHasFailed,ReaganSays,”LosAngelesTimes,October5,1968.42.AlistairCooke,“HarvestingtheGrapesofWrath,”TheGuardian,December28,1967.43. “Voters Hand Stern Rebuttal to Costly Proposition Drives,” Los Angeles Times,

November9,1972.44.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August18,2008.Cohenexplained,“I’mright

outoflawschool.Idon’tknowagoddamnthing,right,andItold[Cesar]thatwhenhesaid,quit.You know, Iwas griping aboutCRLAnot being able to do a damn thing and he said,‘Well,justcomeandworkforus.’AndIsaid,‘Idon’tknowanything.’…Andhesaid,‘Idon’tknowanythingeither.We’lllearnittogether.’”

45.JeffreyKahn,“RonaldReaganLaunchedPoliticalCareerUsingBerkeleyCampusasaTarget,”UCBerkeleyNews,June8,2004.

46.Harris,“TheBattleofCoachellaValley,”35.47. Peter M. Flanigan organized New Yorkers for Nixon and directed Volunteers for

Nixon-Lodge during Nixon’s unsuccessful 1960 presidential campaign. In 1968, Flaniganserved as Nixon’s deputy campaign manager and initially served as an assistant to thepresident in1969.InJanuary1972,hebecametheassistant to thepresidentfor internationaleconomicaffairs.Thefollowingmonth,NixonnamedhimexecutivedirectoroftheCouncilonInternationalEconomicPolicy.NARA,WhiteHouseSpecialFiles,StaffMemberOfficeFiles,“PeterM.Flanigan.”

48.“Agriculture:BiggestGrowthIndustryintheU.S.,”BusinessWeek,April28,1973,71.49.AnnouncedonAugust15,1971,NEPleanedheavilytowardanactivist,interventionist

governmentthatappropriatedmanyofthepolicyrecommendationsoftheDemocratsandmadepossibleNixon’svictoryin1972.Matusow,Nixon’sEconomy,14–16.

50.SamuelRosenberg,AmericanEconomicDevelopmentsince1945,198–9951. “Nixon Proposal Slows Action on Farm Legislation,” Los Angeles Times, May 8,

1969.ChavezchargedthatNixonhad“enteredintoanunholyalliancewithReaganandSenatorMurphy to destroy ourmovement.”During his election campaign,Nixon opposed the grapeboycott and theUFWOC.Hemistakenlycalled it “illegal,” claiming, “Wehave lawson thebookstoprotectworkerswhowishtoorganize.WehaveaNationalLaborRelationsBoardto

impartiallysupervisetheelectionofcollectivebargainingagentsandtosafeguardtherightsoforganizers.…The lawmust be applied equally to all.” TheUFWOC pointed out that farmworkers were, in fact, excluded from the NLRA. “Nixon’s Stance on Grape Boycott,”LosAngeles Times, September 20, 1968; “Nixon’s Opposition to Grape Boycott May HelpChavez,”LosAngelesTimes,September25,1968.

52. “FarmUnionDiscloses SoaringGrape Purchases forVietnam,”Los Angeles Times,June6,1969.

53.MemorandumfromCharlesColson toPresidentNixon regardingmeetingwithFrank(Fitz)Fitzsimmons,March30,1972.NixonFiles,CharlesW.Colson,Box24,ConversationNo.698-2,NARA.

54.Unidentified“Teamsterleader,”quotedinBrill,TheTeamsters,82.55.“Teamsters’TiestoMafia—andtoWhiteHouse,”LosAngelesTimes,May31,1973;

Brill,TheTeamsters,101.56.“Teamsters’TiestoMafia—andtoWhiteHouse,”LosAngelesTimes,May31,1973.

AccordingtooneanonymousFBIagent,“ThiswholethingoftheTeamstersandthemobandtheWhiteHouseisoneofthescariestthingsI’veeverseen.Ithasdemoralizedthebureau.Wedon’tknowwhattoexpectoutoftheJusticeDepartment.”

57.“PossibleMafia-TeamstersLinkGotLostinWatergateShuffle,”SacramentoBee,June22,1975;“U.S.Said toBarBuggingonTeamsters-MafiaLink,”NewYorkTimes,April 29,1973;Brill,TheTeamsters,104.

58.Brill,TheTeamsters,105.AnotherversionofthisschemeisrecountedinSummersandSwan,TheArroganceofPower,398–99.Quotinga1981Timemagazinearticle,SummersandSwanwrite, “[In a purported 1972]meeting betweenNixon and Fitzsimmons in one of theprivateroomsoftheWhiteHouse,[AttorneyGeneral]Kleindiensthadbeensummonedtothesession andordered to reviewall investigationspending against theTeamsters and tomakesure that Fitzsimmons and his allies were not hurt. The meeting supposedly occurred afterNixon’s 1972 re-election campaign, to which the Teamsters contributed an estimated $1million.” Summers interviewed Harry Hall, an IRS agent tracking Fitzsimmons’s nefariousinvestments, in1997.According toHall,Fitzsimmonsarrangedfor$500,000 togo toNixonthroughhisformercampaignadvisor,MurrayChotiner.

59.SummersandSwan,TheArroganceofPower,399;“Teamsters’TiestoMafia—andtoWhiteHouse,”LosAngelesTimes,May31,1973;Harris,“TheBattleofCoachellaValley,”33.

60.Brill,101.FresnoBee,December8,1972,A1,A4.61.Westgate,June18,1973.62.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August18,2008.63.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,294.64.“LaborVotesFundforChavezUnion,”NewYorkTimes,May10,1973;JerryCohen,

interviewedbytheauthor,September14,2009.

65.JerryCoheninterview,September14,2009.Hementionedthatthelettuceboycott“wasneverreallysuccessful.”

66. “Some Facts on the New Grape Boycott, September, 1973,” UFW Office of thePresident,Part2,Box33-10,ALUA.

67.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,275.68.JerryCoheninterview,August18,2008.69.Ibid.70.Ibid.71.FriedlandandThomas,“ParadoxesofAgriculturalUnionisminCalifornia,”59.72.Ibid.73.ZaninovichandThomas,TurmoilintheVineyards,76–78.74.Ibid.,61.FriedlandandThomas,“ParadoxesofAgriculturalUnionisminCalifornia,”

arguethatthisorganizationalstrategywasthelegacyofaTrotskyitefactionamongMinnesotaTeamstersthattookovertheunionduringthe1930sandwascarriedthroughtotheeraofthefarmworkermovementbyJimmyHoffa.

75.HarryBernstein,“DuelintheSun:UnionBusting,TeamsterStyle,”Progressive, July1973,20.AlsoquotedinTaylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,326.

76.“FarmUnionHaltsPicketing;RitesHeldforStriker,”LosAngelesTimes,August18,1973;FightforOurLives(documentaryfilm,TheUnitedFarmWorkers,1974).

77. “Teamsters Open Massive Drive to Eliminate Chavez Farm Union,” Los AngelesTimes,March29,1974.

78.Taylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,327.79.CongressionalBudgetOffice,“AgriculturalExportMarketsandthePotentialEffectsof

Export Subsidies,” June 1983, www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/50xx/doc5024/doc03-Entire.pdf(accessedSeptember26,2011).

CHAPTERFIVE

1.SaratandScheingold,CauseLawyersandSocialMovements,2.Forhistoryrelatedtocause lawyers in the UFW, see specifically Gordon, “AMovement in theWake of a NewLaw.”

2. SandyNathan, quoted in an interviewwith JacquesLevy, September 25, 1975, LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577.

3.Ibid.4. Inaugural Address, Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown, January 6, 1975,

http://governors.library.ca.gov/addresses/34-Jbrown01.html.5.CesarChavez,“WhytheFarmLaborActIsn’tWorking,”LosAngelesTimes,November

17, 1975. Chavez declared the ALRA a “good law,” but explained that collusion betweengrowersandTeamsterswasunderminingit.

6.Sec.1140,ALRA,LevyPapers,Box28,Folder538.7. Ibid. Formore on the creation and impact ofALRA, seeWells andVillarejo, “State

StructuresandSocialMovementStrategies.”8.“AssemblySendsFarmBilltoBrownforSigning:Brown’sFarmLaborBillWinsFinal

Approval,”LosAngelesTimes,May30,1975;Brown,quotedinWellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”296.

9. JerryGoldman,quoted inan interviewwithJacquesLevy,September25,1975,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,35.

10.Ibid.11.“DawnofaNewEraforFarmWorkers,”LosAngelesTimes,May30,1975.12.Ibid.;WellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”297.13.LevyPapers,ALRA,Box28,Folder538.14.Cohen,June13,1975,LevyPapers,Box28,Folder553.15.NotesonALRA,Burton-AlatorreBill,LevyPapers,Box28,Folder536;ALRA,Levy

Papers,Box28,Folder538.16.WellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”298.17.Chavez,June13,1975,Levytranscription,LevyPapers,Box28,Folder553.18.Ibid.,5–6.19.Ibid.,6–7.20.Ibid.,6.21.Ibid.,5–7.22.Ibid.,16.23.InterviewtranscriptwithSandyNathan,LevyPapers,Box28,Folder577.24.Ibid.25.Ibid.26.Ibid.,57.27.JerryGoldman,LevyPapers,Box28,Folder577,29–30.28.Ibid.,46.29.Ibid.,49.30.Ibid.31.LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,55.32.EllenGreenstonetoLevy,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,17–18.33.EstherPadilla,interviewedbyauthor,January11,2010,inFresno,California,75.

34.“TerroramidtheTomatoes,”LosAngelesTimes,September4,1975.35.Ibid.36.JerryGoldmantoLevy,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,29.37.EllenGreenstonetoLevy,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,17.38.Ibid.,19.Greenstonereported,“Forexample,ononeteamofthreewasawomanwho

hasworkedfortheUFW.Sheworkedin’73andwasafarmworkeratonetimeandgrewupinthevalleyandherteamlabeledherastotallybiased.…Iheardthetwoother[agents]talkingonenightandonewomansaying,‘Well,Ijustcan’tbelievethateveryoneinSalinasgoesdowntoMexicalieveryweekend.That’sjustimpossibleformetobelieve.Noonecoulddothat.’”

39.Ibid.,13.40.Ibid.,19.41. Rick Rodriguez, “ALRB to Bear Duke’s Stamp,” Sacramento Bee, December 25,

1985.AlsoseeWellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”312.42.WellsandVillarejorefer to the lawas“socialreformpolicy,”whichIbelieveaptly

describesboththenatureandtheintentoftheALRA(“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”300).Ifweacknowledgethatthelegislationisanattemptatsocialreform,thenitrequires thatwe recognize the disorder that the legislation is addressing. I contend that theintentofthelawwastorectifyyearsofinjusticetowardfarmworkersinCalifornia.

43.EllenGreenstonetoLevy,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,19;UFWDocumentationProject,onlinediscussion,GlenRothner,May24,2004,FWDP,66;CaseNo.77-CL-7-C,4ALRBNo.42,UnitedFarmWorkersofAmerica,AFL-CIOandKelvinKeeneLarson,akaK.K. Larson, July 7, 1978, www.alrb.ca.gov/legal_searches/decisions/4_42(1978)ocr.pdf(accessedApril9,2012).

44.JerryGoldmantoLevy,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,31.45.SandyNathantoLevy,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,45.46.GreenstonetoLevy,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder577,20.47.“UnionAccesstoFieldsCurbed,”LosAngelesTimes,September4,1975.48. Ibid.; “Teamsters Win Major Victory,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 1975;

“UFWA Wins State High Court Ruling,” Los Angeles Times, September 19, 1975;“Enforcement of Farm Law to Be Tightened,” Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1975;“Brown, HighOfficialsMeet on Farm Labor Complaints,”Los Angeles Times, October 2,1975.

49. June 17, 1975,meeting, Levy Papers, Box 28, Folder 553, CaliforniaALRA, 1975Notes,29–33.

50.ElaineElinsoninterviewedbytheauthor,December8,2009.51.LevyTranscript,LevyPapers,Box28,Folder553,CaliforniaALRA,1975Notes,15.52.“UFWALeadsinVotingonUnionsDespiteSetbacks,”LosAngelesTimes,September

17,1975.

53.“Brown,OfficialsMeetonFarmLaborComplaints,”LosAngelesTimes,October2,1975;“FarmLaborPicture:WillDemocracyBlossom?,”LosAngelesTimes,December26,1975.

54.“FarmLaborPicture:WillDemocracyBlossom?,”LosAngelesTimes,December26,1975.

55. Election Analysis, January 1976, Levy Papers, Box 29, Folder 561. In the finalanalysis,accordingitsAnnualReportfor1975,theboardreceived604electionpetitionsandheld423electionsinvolving47,812votingfarmworkers.

56.ElectionAnalysis,January1976,LevyPapers,Box29,Folder561.57. The board began canceling hearings “due to budgetary considerations” as early as

January 23, 1976. California Agricultural Labor Relations Board Press Release, 1975–76,LevyPapers.

58.“FarmLaborPicture:WillDemocracyBlossom?,”LosAngelesTimes,December26,1975.

59.“EmergencyAidforFarmBoardDenied,”LosAngelesTimes,January28,1976.60.“FarmBoardClosesUpasFundingEnds,”LosAngelesTimes,February7,1976.61. “FarmViolenceEruptsAgain in ImperialCounty,”LosAngelesTimes, February14,

1976.62.“ChavezPlansBoycottagainstBigGrowers,”LosAngelesTimes,February12,1976.63.DanielMartinezHoSang,RacialPropositions:Ballot Initiativesand theMakingof

PostwarCalifornia(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2010),2–3,91–93.64.Ibid.;NEB,June13,1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,PartII,Box1-19,5.65.“GeneralCounselofStateFarmLaborBoardQuits,”LosAngelesTimes,April17,20,

1976; “Third Member of Farm Board Quits,” Los Angeles Times, April 20, 1976; “FarmInitiativeQualifiesforNov.2Ballot,”LosAngelesTimes,May29,1976.Theunionacquired729,965 signatures—more than the 312,000 required under state law. “Report to theU.F.W.Executive Board on the Farm Worker Initiative,” uncatalogued materials, Wayne StateUniversity.

66.“UFWInitiativeDrivePastHalfwayMark,”LosAngelesTimes,April15,1976.67.EstherPadillainterview.68. “Chavez: FarmWorker Initiative IsNeeded toGuard againstAbuses,”Los Angeles

Times,April8,1976.69.“UFWInitiativeDrivePastHalfwayMark,”LosAngelesTimes,April15,1976.70.“WhoIsHarryKubo?,”FresnoBee,February22,1976.71. Susan Sward, “California Agriculture: Campaigns Gear Up on Farm Initiative,”

AssociatedPress, September 15, 1976; “Yes on 14” poster, n.d.,UCLAPolitical LiteratureCollection.

72.“WhoIsHarryKubo?”FresnoBee,February22,1976.

73.CitizensforaFairFarmLaborLawpressrelease,August6,1976,ScrapbookApril16, 1975–August 20, 1976, Table Grape Negotiating Committee Papers, Fresno StateUniversity;HarryKubo,interviewedbySamSuhler,FresnoCountyLibrary,October13,1978.

74.KubointerviewedbySamSuhler,29.GilbertPadillanowjokinglysayshe“organizedKubo” by sending picketers to his property and forcingKubo to become organized.GilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,January11,2010.

75.LarryKubo,interviewedbytheauthor,January6,2010;“WhoIsHarryKubo?”FresnoBee.

76.“WhoIsHarryKubo?,”FresnoBee.77. Ibid.; Kubo interviewed by Sam Suhler, 32–33.With additional satellite groups in

Stockton, LosAngeles, and SanDiegoCounty, the totalmembership topped out at 2,200 in1976.

78.“DebateGrowsoverFarmLaborProposition:NO,”LosAngelesTimes,October24,1976.

79.Ibid.80.Ibid.81. Cesar Chavez letter to supporters, September 1976, UCLA Political Literature

Collection.82.KubointerviewedbySamSuhler,33,36.83.Ibid.,16.84.Ibid.,10.85.ForahistoryoffarmingandJapaneseAmericansintheCentralValley,seeMatsumoto,

FarmingtheHomePlace.86.KubointerviewedbySamSuhler,36.87.CouncilofCaliforniaGrowersNewsletter,September20,1976andOctober4,1976,

Scrapbook April 16, 1975–August 20, 1976, Table Grape Negotiating Committee Papers,FresnoStateUniversity.

88. Council of California Growers Newsletter, September 13, 1976 and November 1,1976, Scrapbook April 16, 1975–August 20, 1976, Table Grape Negotiating CommitteePapers,FresnoStateUniversity.

89.CoalitionforEconomicSurvival letter toCoalitionforEconomicSurvivalMembersandFriends,November2,1976,UCLAPoliticalLiteratureCollection.

90.NationalCityStar-News,September19,1976,UCLAPoliticalLiteratureCollection.91.Flyers,n.d.,UCLAPoliticalLiteratureCollection.92. “Carter’s ForcesMove to SmoothConvention Path:Carter ForcesMove to Smooth

Convention,” Washington Post, July 14, 1976; “Brown, Tunney Endorse Farm LaborInitiative,”LosAngelesTimes,September4,1976.

93.“ChavezVowsFarmWorkersWillContinueTheirFight,”FresnoBee,November3,

1976, Office of the President, Box 55, Folder 20, ALUA; Council of California GrowersNewsletter,November8,1976,FresnoStateUniversity.

94. Council of California Growers Newsletter, November 8, 1976, Fresno StateUniversity.

95.“Proposition14FoesEndwithaDeficit,”FresnoBee,January19,1977.96.Lipsitz,The Possessive Investment inWhiteness, 114; Elinson andYogi,Wherever

There’saFight,148–49.HoSang,RacialPropositions,70–71.97. In 1983, a congressional committee issued the report Personal Justice Denied,

recommendingcompensationtothevictims,andin1988,PresidentRonaldReagansignedtheCivilLibertiesAct,offering$20,000inredresstosurvivingdetainees.

98.Poster,n.d.,UCLAPoliticalLiteratureCollection.99.FerrissandSandoval,TheFightintheFields,208–9;President’sReport,December

1976,ALUA.100.MarshallGanz,interviewwiththeauthor,March28,2008.101.GilbertandEstherPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,January11,2010.102.SharonDelugach,May10, 2004,Listserv entry, “RE:PROPOSITION14,”FWDP,

11–12.103.TomDalzell,May9,2004,Listerventry,“RE:PROPOSITION14,”FWDP,6.

CHAPTERSIX

1.NickJonesinterviewedbyWilliamTaylor,July24,1976,LaPaz,California,WilliamTaylorCollection,ALUA.

2.Tramutt’sReport,December15,1976,OfficeofthePresident,PartII,Box18-9,ALUA;“Farm Labor Erupts Again in Imperial Valley,”Los Angeles Times, February 14, 1976;ElMalcriado,September17,1976,ALUA.

3.NickJonesinterviewedbyWilliamTaylor,30,35–36.4.“NickJones1966–1976,”FWDP,1.5.Boycottminutes,August24,1976,Jonesfolder,ALUA;NickJones toNEBofUnited

FarmWorkersofAmerica,September14,1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,PartII,Box18-9.

6.ResignationLetter,NickandVirginiaJonestoNationalExecutiveBoard,November14,1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Box3-22,ALUA.

7.“NickJones1966–1976,”FWDP,1.8.Pawel,TheUnionofTheirDreams;Shaw,Beyond theFields;Bardacke,Trampling

Out the Vintage; Wells and Villarejo, “State Structures and Social Movement Strategies”;Gordon,“AMovementintheWakeofaNewLaw.”

9.“TeamsterstoWithdraw,LeaveFieldtoChavez,”LosAngelesTimes,March11,1977;National Executive Board Meeting audiotapes (henceforth referred to as “NEBMeeting”),June30,1977,UFWCollections,ALUA.

10. Special OrganizingMeeting, November 24, 1976,MiscellaneousUFWAudiovisualBoxes,Tape8,ALUA.

11. Ibid.; MLK. report, March 14, 1977, on Calexico, audio recording, ALUA; MLKReporttoUFWBoardofDirectors,March15,1977,OfficeofthePresident,PartII,Box18-10;SpecialOrganizingMeeting,November24,1976,UFWInformationandResearch,Box11-10,ALUA.

12.MarshallGanz,interviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008.13. Ibid.; Special Organizing Meeting, November 24, 1976, UFW Information and

Research,Box11-10,ALUA.14.MarshallGanzinterview.15.Ibid.16. Miami Boycott Staff to Cesar Chavez, December 13, 1976, and Claudia Shacter,

December14,1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.17.NickJonestoCesarChavez,October28,1975,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,

Box3-22,ALUA.18. JonHeller toCesarChavez,December 11, 1976, andLarry Tramutt to JohnHeller

[sic],SoutheastDivisionDirector,December11,1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.

19.“LarryTramutola1971–1981,”FWDP.20. Nick and Virginia Jones to National Executive Board, United Farm Workers of

America,November14,1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Box3-22,ALUA.21. Atlanta Branch Staff to Cesar Chavez, December 10, 1976, UFW Office of the

President, Part 2, Box 3-22, ALUA. For transformations in the southern economy andlandscape toward urban development, see Shulman,FromCottonBelt to Sunbelt; Lassiter,TheSilentMajority.

22.JonHellertoCesarChavez,December11,1976,ALUA.23.Ibid.24.LarryTramutolaquotingFredRossSr.in“LarryTramutola1971–1981,”FWDP.25.LarryTramutttoJohn[sic]Heller,December11,1976,ALUA.26. Claudia Shacter to Larry Tramutt, ca. December 14, 1976, UFW Office of the

President,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.27.SusanSachentoCesarChavez,January10,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,

Box3-22,ALUA.28.SusanSachentoCesarChavezandMembersoftheNationalExecutiveBoard,January

8,1977,andSusanSachentoCesarChavez,January10,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,

Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.29. Seattle UFW Staff to Cesar Chavez and Executive BoardMembers, December 13,

1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.30. Staff Members, New York City Boycott, to Cesar Chavez, “Re: Demoralization

ResultedfromDe-organizationofBoycott,”December12,1976,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.TheBostonandNewJerseyhousesalso sent letters in supportofNewYork;however,laterNewJerseymemberssentaseparateletterapologizingforsigningtheNewYorkletter.NewJerseystaffneverexplainedtheirapology.IrvHershenbaum,DianeCohen, and March Johnson (Boston) to Cesar Chavez, December 14, 1976, and NorbertHerold,RobinBrownfield,EugeneDougherty(NewJersey)toCesarE.Chavez,January12,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.

31.CharlieMarch toLarryTramutt,December 19, 1976,UFWOffice of the President,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.

32.DaleVanPelttoCesarChavez,December8,1976,andMaryDynesandDaveShapirotoCesarChavez,November29,1976,andBillFerguson toCesarChavez,January5,1977,andSusanSachentoCesar,January10,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.

33.“UFWAideQuits,AllegesChavezAntileftistBias,”LosAngelesTimes,December22,1976.

34.Janzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon,11.35.Kent(Winterowd)toCesarChavez,n.d.,UFWOfficeofthePresidentCollection,Part

2,Box3-24,ALUA.36.Synanon’sresidentialpopulationwas1,301in1977,althoughnotallof thesepeople

livedinBadger.AtHomePlace,Dederichmaintainedaselectgroupofadultsminus“17and18and25yearoldkids,”whomhedescribedas“dumb,ignorant,poormanners,ass-kissing.”Janzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon,162,172.

37. Synanon most resembled a utopic or “intentional” community. The Fellowship forIntentional Communities defines an intentional community as “ecovillages, cohousingcommunities, residential land trusts, communes, student co-ops, urban housing cooperatives,intentional living, alternative communities, cooperative living, and other projects wherepeoplestrive togetherwithacommonvision” (www.ic.org/, accessedDecember11, 2011).Foranearlystudyof thesecommunitiesandhowtheyfunctionedinthelate1960sandearly1970s,seeKanter,CommitmentandCommunity.

38.Janzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon,47.39.“NotesofMeetingwithCharlesDederichatSynanonHomePlace,”February27,1977,

UFW Office of the President Collection, Part 2, Box 9-18; Janzen, The Rise and Fall ofSynanon,64.

40. JudgeJamesH.Lincoln,ProbateCourt, JuvenileDivision,WayneCounty,Michigan,UFWOfficeofthePresidentCollection,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.

41. Janzen,TheRiseandFall of Synanon, 13;RalphWaldoEmerson, “Self-Reliance,”

www.emersoncentral.com/selfreliance.htm; NEB meeting, February 27, 1977, Badger,California,UFW7of8side1,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.

42.NEBaudiotape,UFWCollections,ALUA.43.Janzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon,14.44.MattRand,NEBMeeting,February,1977,UFW4of8side1,audiorecording,UFW

Collections,ALUA.45.In1966,Synanonbeganitsfirst“gameclubs”foruseamongnon-Synanitesandbythe

mid-1970shadfacilitateditspracticeamonganumberofgroups,includingajointsessionwithOaklandpoliceofficers,theBlackPanthers,andplayersontheOaklandRaiders.Janzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon, 47–48.WhenChavezbeganplanning for theuseof theGameatUFW is unclear, but formal conversations began in the spring of 1977.MattRand toCesarChavez,May6,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.

46.Janzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon,14–16.47.JudgeJamesH.Lincoln,ProbateCourt, JuvenileDivision,WayneCounty,Michigan,

UFWOfficeofthePresidentCollection,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.48. NEB meeting, February 26, 1977, UFW 5 of 8 side 2, audio recording, UFW

Collections,ALUA.OnHelen’sopinion,NEBmeeting,February26,1977,UFW4of8side1,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.

49.AsquotedinJanzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon,174.50.Ibid.,141.51.GilbertandEstherPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,January11,2010.52. Mary Mocine, June 14, 2004, Listserv, (2) “RE: EVEN-HANDED SCHMEVEN-

HANDED,”FWDP.53.RodJanzen,aSynanonhistorian,holdsthatmembers,especiallywomen,beganshaving

their heads on their own accord as a joke in order to fit under a beam in theTomalesBayfacility. The practice, however, eventually became “a policy” imposed on the members byDederich.Janzen,TheRiseandFallofSynanon,125–28.

54.CynthiaBell,June10,2004,“Re:Synanon,”FWDP.55.KenttoCesar,n.d.;handwrittennotes,“2-27-77Synanon,”authornotidentified;Matt

Rand toCesarChavez,May6,1977,all atUFWOfficeof thePresidentCollection,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.

56. Boycott Dept, April 1, 1977, ALUA;NEB 3.14.77, audiotape 1, UFWCollections,ALUA;LosAngelesTimesMarch2,1977;“IndependentUnionWinsinLettuceWorkerVote,”LosAngelesTimes,March4,1977.

57.NEBaudiotape,UFWBox04,Tape12-3/3.14.77,UFWCollections,ALUA.58.“TeamsterstoWithdaw,LeaveFieldtoChavez,”LosAngelesTimes,March11,1977.59. “Patience…Patience…”LosAngelesTimes,March 4, 1977; “UFWNames Farm

BoardCounselin$2MillionSuit,”LosAngelesTimes,March8,1977.

60.MarshallGanzinterview.61.NEBaudiotape,3.14.77,UFWCollections,ALUA.62.For this reason,Ganz alsodisagreedwithMedina’sdesire todirectmore resources

intoorganizingamonggrapeworkersinCoachella,buthesupportedhisworkinOxnard.Theunion had suffered from poor management of grape contracts in the Central Valley, whereworkershadresidedthelongestbuthadtheleastamountofconfidenceinUFWmanagementofcontracts.Ganz explained, “The logic of grapes is that youwould start and end inDelano,becauseDelanoistheheartofthegrapeindustry,andifyoucouldorganizeDelano,youcouldeasilyorganizeCoachella”(MarshallGanzinterview).

63.Ibid.64.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August18,2008.65.Ibid.66. NEB meeting, February 25, 1977, UFW 1 of 8 side 1, audio recording, UFW

Collections,ALUA.Allquotes,henceforth,comefromthissourceunlessotherwiseindicated.67. NEB meeting, February 25, 1977, audio recording, UFW 1 of 8 side 2, UFW

Collections,ALUA.Allquotes,henceforth,comefromthissourceunlessotherwiseindicated.68.UFW2of8side1,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.69. Ibid. For the Hutterites and Hartmire, NEB audiotape, 3.14.77, UFW Collections,

ALUA.70.UFW2of8side1,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.Allquotes,henceforth,

comefromthissourceunlessotherwiseindicated.71.Ibid.;UFW3of8side2,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.72.Ibid.73.Ibid.74.Ibid.75.UFW8of8side1,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.76.MarshallGanzinterview.77.UFW6of8side1,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.

CHAPTERSEVEN

1.MarshallGanz,interviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008.2.RonTaylor,ChavezandtheFarmWorkers,26–27.3.MarshallGanzinterview.4.Ibid.5.Ibid.

6.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August18,2008.7.Ibid.8.Ibid.9.MarshallGanzinterview.10.Ibid.11.Ibid.12.NEBaudiotape,November24,1976,cassettes5and6,UFWCollection,ALUA.13. His official resignation was April 12, 1962. Garza, Organizing the Chicano

Movement,153;GilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,August15,2010.14. President’s newsletter, April 15, 1977, UFW Collections, ALUA; NEB 3.21.77,

audiotape3,UFWCollections,ALUA.15.“Wilzoch”Document,n.d.,“VictimofaPurge?,”UFWOfficeofthePresident,Box3-

22,ALUA;JuliLoesch,Box1-8,ALUA.16.KentWinterrowdto theLaPazCommunity,“PersonalMail,”March22,1977,UFW

OfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.17.NEB,February25–27,1977,UFW3of8side1,audio recording,UFWCollection,

ALUA.18.NEB,February25–27,1977,UFW3of8side2,audio recording,UFWCollection,

ALUA.19.Ibid.20.DavidMcCluretoMembersoftheExecutiveBoard,May5,1977,UFWOfficeofthe

President,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.21.GodfreytoChavez,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.22.Ibid.23.DavidTraintoCesarChavez,March29,1977;EdyScrippstoCesarChavez,March

30,1977.Theirfiringalsoprovokedafriendandfellowvolunteer,DeniHowley,totenderhisresignation.DeniHowleytoCesarE.Chavez,March30,1977.AlldocumentsinUFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.

24.TraintoChavez,March29,1977,2,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.

25.GodfreytoChavez,ALUA.26.McCluretoNEB,OfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.27.GodfreytoChavez,ALUA.28.Untitled,undateddocument,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.29.RogerBrooks toCesarChavez,May10,1977,UFWOfficeof thePresident,Part2,

Box3-22,ALUA.30. Brooks to Chavez,May 10, 1977, UFWOffice of the President, Part 2, Box 3-22,

ALUA.31.RogerBrooks toCesarChavez,October 31, 1978, 3;RogerBrooks, “SourGrapes:

TheRevolutionIsRevolting.InsideCesarChavezandtheUFW,”unpublishedmanuscript,ca.October20,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.

32.EstherandGilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,January11,2010.33.Ibid.34.ChrisHartmire to SisterMaryCatherineRabbit,May 16, 1977,UFWOffice of the

President,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.35.ChrisHartmiretoFred[Ross]andRichard[Chavez],“Subject:CulturalRevolution,”

May31,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.36.MarshallGanzinterview.37.JerryCoheninterview.38.MarshallGanzinterview.39.UFWTape6A,UFWCollection,ALUA.40.UFWTape6B,UFWCollection,ALUA.41.JerryCohen,UFWTape6B,UFWCollection,ALUA.42.UFWTape10A,UFWCollection,ALUA.43.Ibid.;Pawel,UnionofTheirDreams,220.44.UFWTape8B,UFWCollection,ALUA.45.FredRossJr.,UFWTape9A,UFWCollection,ALUA.46.Ibid.;Meetinglog,July4,1977,forpage24,reel8,side1,UFWCollections,ALUA.47.MarshallGanz,UFWTape9A,audiorecordings,UFWCollections,ALUA.48.UFWTape9A,audiorecordings,UFWCollections,ALUA;JerryCohen,interviewed

bytheauthor,August12,2010.49.UFWTape9A, audio recordings,UFWCollections,ALUA.Allquotes,henceforth,

comefromthissourceunlessotherwiseindicated.50. Padilla later recalled, “There was no conspiracy… none of them. Nobody was a

conspirator.”GilbertPadillainterview.51.UFWTape10A,audiorecordings,UFWCollections,ALUA.Allquotes,henceforth,

comefromthissourceunlessotherwiseindicated.52.GilbertPadillainterview.53.JerryCoheninterview,August12,2010.54.TheGame, July7,1977,LaPaz, tape1, audio recording,UFWCollections,ALUA;

GilbertPadillainterview.

CHAPTEREIGHT

1.“NEBJune.July1977,”audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.2.ChrisHartmire,interviewedbytheauthor,September2,2008.3. Wells and Villarejo, “State Structures and Social Movement Strategies.” Wells and

Villarejowrite,“Insum,whatismoststrikingabouttheALRAelectiondataisthesharpdropinelectionactivityandunionwinsafter1977–1978(withtheexceptionofthe1980upswing),coupledwithariseintheproportionofdecertificationand‘nounion’-wonelections”(302).

4.WhenIapproachedMarcGrossmantoarrangeforameetingwithunionofficialsfororalhistories,herefusedaccessandwouldnotgoontherecord.In1977,Grossmanalsoreportedto the press that residents were not playing the Game when, in fact, they were playingfrequently and, internally, Chavez was celebrating its success in his newsletters. See TomDazell,July12,2004,FWDP,88–89.

5.GlennRothner,June10,2004,“RE:1966SantaMonicaSynanon,”FWDP.6.Forexample,AbbyFloresRiveradisagreedwiththosewhocriticizedtheGameonthe

listserv.Hercommentsarepartofalongerdialoguethathadnumerousentries,criticizinganddefendingCesarChavezandtheGame.AbbyFloresRivera,June1,2004(3),5,FWDP.

7.ChrisHartmireinterview.8.MarcColeman,May13,2004,FWDP.Orwell’sfullquote:“Allanimalsareequal,but

someanimalsaremoreequalthanothers.”AnimalFarm(NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,1946),chapter10.

9. “NEBJune. July1977,” audio recording,UFWCollections,ALUA; Janzen,The RiseandFallofSynanon,14.

10.UFW,Box 4, Tape 12-3/3.14.77, audio recording,UFWCollections;NEBMeeting,March14–16,21,1977,23–28,UFWVicePresidentPeteVelasco,Box4-43,ALUA.

11.EstherandGilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,January11,2010.AccordingtothePadillas, thisgroupalso included JoaquinMurguia,TerryVasquez, andKent andEstherWinterrowd,tonameafew.

12.Ibid.13.Ibid.;ChrisHartmireinterview.14. Game Tape, 5.3.77, Synanon Game at La Paz, audio recording, UFW Collections,

ALUA.15.Ibid.,250.16.RandtoChavez,May6,1977,OfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.17.ChrisHartmireinterview.18.Ibid.19.TheGame,July7,1977,LaPaz1,audiorecording,UFWCollections,ALUA.20.ChrisHartmireinterview.21.ChavezeliminatedabortionandrestrictedaccesstobirthcontrolasaserviceinUFW

healthclinicsattheendof1976.“EthicalDirectivesforHealthFacilitiesfortheUnitedFarm

Workers of America,” UFW, Information and Research Department Collection, Box 21-9,ALUA.

22.TheGame,July7,1977,audiotape2,UFWCollections,ALUA.23.CynthiaBell,June10,2004,75,FWDP.24.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August12,2010.25.MarkSharwoodessay,FWDP.26.MarcColeman,May13,2004,31,FWDP;SteveHopcraft,May10,2004,14,FWDP;

JerryCoheninterview.27. At the 1973 UFW convention, the membership passed a resolution condemning the

dictatorshipsofAnastasioSomozainNicaraguaandFerdinandMarcosinthePhilippines.TomDalzell,June8,2004,“Re:FerdinandMarcos,”65,FWDP.

28.LorraineAgtang(Mascarinas)Greer,June2,2004,13,FWDP.29.Ibid.30.ChrisHartmireinterview.31.TomDalzell,May,2004,61,FWDP.32.CharlieAtilano,June23,2004,187,FWDP.Atilanoismakingreferencetothe1975

filmTheStepfordWives, based on the novel by IraLevin published in 1972.The StepfordWivesisasatiricalthrillerinwhichanewwifeintheidyllicsettingofStepford,Connecticut,discoversthathusbandsinthecommunityhaveturnedtheirwivesintosubmissiverobotswhocatertotheireverywhim.

33.MaryMocine,May11,2005,23,FWDP.34.KathyMurguia,June10,2004(2),81,FWDP.Murguia’sson,Joaquin,wasforcedto

leave the union when he became critical of the Game and stopped playing. See JoaquinMurguia,listerv,June14,2004(2),103,FWDP.

35.AbbyFloresRivera,June22,2004(1),173,FWDP.36.AbbyFloresRivera,June25,2004(3),200–201,FWDP.37.“FarmworkerConventionMarkedbyControversy,”InTheseTimes,September7–13,

1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.38.PhilipVeraCruzdidnotrefertoImutanbynameinthepress,butreferredtohimas“a

Filipinoex-memberwhoispro–martial law.”Padillawentfurther inhis interviewwithme,naming Imutan as the advisor and calling him a “whore.” Philip Vera Cruz quoted in ElCuhamil,November20,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA;GilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,August15,2010.

39.“FarmworkerConventionMarkedbyControversy,”5.40.BerniertoLoesch,telephoneconversation,September14,1977,4;EdKinanetoCesar

E.Chavez,August 19, 1977;DougBarnhisel to “Friends,” February 23, 1978, all inUFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA;GilbertPadillainterview.

41.ElCuhamil,November 5, 1977, 4,UFWOffice of the President, Part 2,Box 3-22,

ALUA.42.EdKinanetoCesarE.Chavez,August19,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,

Box3-23,ALUA;“ChavezTripUpsetsKeyChurchBackers,”LosAngelesTimes,October22,1977.

43.BreniertoLoesch,November1977;EdKinanetoCesarE.Chavez,August19,1977;Sister Carol Dougherty to Cesar, July 11, 1977; Father RobertMurray, Erie, Pennsylvania,January6,1978,allinUFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.

44.HartmiretoJuliLoesch,May24,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.

45.HartmiretoJuliLoesch,June13,1977,JuliLoeschCollections,Box1-1,ALUA.46.JuliLoeschtoCesarChavez,June22,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box

3-23,ALUA.47.Ibid.48.Loesch’snotesonMikeYatestoJuliLoesch,telephoneconversationtranscript,April

20,1977, JuliLoeschCollections,Box1-4,ALUA.On theGame,Yateswrote, “I think theGame(akindofmutual-criticismencounterteam)isaploytocontainandde-politicizedissentbymakingit‘private’—what’sdiscussedbythegroupintheGameisnottobediscussedonthe‘outside’—kindofasealofconfessional.”

49.Loesch’snotes,AdamstoLoesch,August24,1977,SanFrancisco;RobertEllsbergtoLoesch,August30,1977,NewYork,bothinUFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.

50.Loesch’snotesonphoneconversationwithJeffAmes,Roanoke,Virginia,June1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.

51. TheErnieChristianWitness was a publication associatedwith the Catholic peacemovementandthePaxCenter.

52. Newspapers that published stories include theDenver Post, theNational CatholicReporter,InTheseTimes,theCatholicAgitator,Crisis,TheMilitant,TheNation,andAngKatipunan.

53. Juli Loesch, “Trouble in the UFW,” Erie Christian Witness 5, no. 7, November-December 1977, 4, 8; Farmworker Support Committee, Iowa City, Iowa, to the UnitedFarmworkersUnion,January23,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.Yateswas also quoted inTheNation on November 19, 1977, and was cited again inTheMilitant.YatestoldTheNation,“Inthepastyeartherehavebeenatleasttwomassfirings.…Dedicated,hard-workingmenandwomen…wereaccused,onlittleornoevidence,ofbeingradicals,spiesfortheemployers,troublemakers,complainers.…Theunion’scentralstaffhadbeenreducedbymorethanathird.”TheMilitant,n.d.,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,3-22,ALUA.

54.JeffAmestoJuliLoesch,June1977,Loesch’snotes,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.

55.ChrisHartmiretoEstherWinterrowd,May8,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,9-18,ALUA.

56.CharlieAtilano,June23,2004,187,FWDP.57.TomDalzell,June23,2004,184–85,FWDP.58.Ibid.59.LosAngelesTimes,October6,1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-24,

ALUA.60.FresnoBee,April13,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA.61.Mailgram,March16,1978;WashingtonPost,May18,1978,both inUFWOfficeof

thePresident,Box3-24,ALUA.62.Dalzell,June23,2004,184–85,FWDP.LyndonLaRouchewasanAmericanpolitical

cultleader.63.Ibid.64.Ibid.65.WellsandVillarejofoundthatthedecisiontodismantlethelegaldepartmentcameby

wayofanexecutiveboardvoteheavilymanipulatedbyChavez.Likethedecisiontoabandonorganizingforcontractnegotiations,Chavezworedownoppositiononthenine-memberboardbyholdinga lengthydebateonadecisionhehadalreadymade.Basedonconsultationwithhistorian,PaulHenggeler,WellsandVillarejowrite,“Fourofthenineboardmembersvoicedtheirstrongoppositiontotheproposal,includingEliseoMedina,JessicaGovea,MackLyons,andMarshallGanz.Once it was clear that Chavez’s proposalwas going to get amajority,LyonsandMedinaswitchedtheirvotes,sothatthefinalformalvotewasseventotwo”(“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”307,323n36).

66.AbbyFloresRivera,June22,2004(1),173–74,FWDP.67.WellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”302.68.“WhereIsUFWHeaded?EndoftheBoycottReflectsShiftinStrategy,”TheMilitant,

1978,UFWOfficeof thePresident,Part2,Box3-22,ALUA.SeealsoWellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”307.

69.WellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”308–9.70.MarshallGanz,interviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008.71.WellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”307.72.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August18,2008.73.TomDalzell, June12,2004,88–89,FWDP.AbbyFloresRiverabelieved therewas

nothing out of the ordinary in denying the press access: “They are extremely good at takingthingsoutofcontext.Itisnotaquestionofhidinganything.”ShedefendedGrossman,callinghima“professional”and“anexpertatdealingwiththemedia.”AbbyFloresRivera,June13,2004 (2), 92, FWDP. In the fall of 1977, Chavez proposed to play an especially intenseversionoftheGamecalledDissipation.Participantswerethoughttolose,or“dissipate,”their

individuality within a Game lasting between thirty-six and seventy-two hours. Dederichclaimedthathisfollowersexperiencedquasi-hallucinationsduringDissipationandsawhimastheSavior.Chavezchosenot tofollowthroughwithhisplansafterprivatelyconsultingwithpossible participants. ForDissipation, seeOfshe, “TheSocialDevelopment of theSynanonCult,”118;KathyLynchMurguia,June10,2004(2),81–82,FWDP.

74.ChrisHartmire toCesarChavez,December22,1977,UFWOfficeof thePresident,Part 2,Box 9-18,ALUA. In a survey regarding theGame,Grossmanwrote, “99% of [the]time, I DO NOT enjoy the Game.” “Marc Grossman,” Memorandum, 6-78-9, UFWunprocessedmaterial,11-30,ALUA.

75.ChrisHartmiretoCesarChavez,n.d.,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box9-18,ALUA.

76.ChrisHartmiretoCesarChavez,February13,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,9-18,ALUA.

77.Ibid.78. Chris Hartmire and Kent Winterrowd to Cesar Chavez, n.d., UFW Office of the

President,Part2,9-18,ALUA.79.“Problems—Cesar,”n.d.,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,9-18,ALUA.80.“EmphasesfortheNew,NewGame,July1978”;ChrisHartmiretoEsterWinterrowd,

handwrittennote,“Subject:RulesforNew,NewGame,”July28,1978,bothinUFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,9-18,ALUA.

81.KathyLynchMurguia,June10,2004(2),81–82,FWDP.82.NotesofSylvester’sTalktoGame1,July5,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part

2,9-18,ALUA.83.ChrisHartmireinterview.84.“Cesar’sNotesfromSaturday,7/5/78”;ChrisHartmiretoEsterWinterrowd,July28,

1978,bothinUFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,9-18,ALUA.85.“TheGame4/29/78,”UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,9-18,ALUA.86.“UFWAnnouncesEndofGrape,LettuceBoycott,”TheMilitant,February17,1978,7,

UFWOfficeofthePresident,Box3-23,ALUA;LosAngelesTimes,February1,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,15-9,ALUA.

87. Larry Tramutt to Cesar Chavez, “Boycott Staff List of Terminations (January–September1977),”August31,1977,UFWInformationandResearchDepartment,Box3-36,ALUA; Mike Lacinak to Cesar Chavez, January 9, 1978, UFW Information and ResearchDepartment,Box3-37,ALUA.

88.ElaineElinsoninterviewedbytheauthor,December8,2009.89. “Chavez Favored 6 to 1 by Public in FarmDispute,”Long Beach Press Telegram,

October 20, 1975;Wendy Batson to Cesar Chavez, October 30, 1975, UFWOffice of thePresident,Part 2, 15-9;HarryRing, “Where IsUFWHeaded?,”TheMilitant, ca. February1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.

90.AscitedinTheMilitant,OfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-23,ALUA.91.TheMilitant,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,3-23,ALUA.92.Ibid.93.ChrisHartmireinterview;PatHoffman,“AnInterviewwithCesarChavez,”Sojourner,

October1977,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,36-26,ALUA.94.Hoffman,“AnInterviewwithCesarChavez,”22.95. Ibid.,23.This interpretation is somewhatatoddswithMarioT.García’sbelief that

Chavez was an “organic theologian” whose spirituality derived mostly from a distinctlyMexicanAmericanbrandofCatholicisminfluencedheavilybywomen(TheGospelofCésarChávez,12,18–23).García’sperspectivedoesnotconsidertheinfluenceofDederichandthecountercultureofthe1970sinthecreationofhis“religious”beliefs.SeeGarcía,TheGospelofCésarChávez.

96.LosAngelesTimes,October31,1978,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-24,ALUA;“FriendsofCharlesE.Dederich,HumanRightsandJusticeHoldaPressConference,”January13,1979,UFWOfficeofthePresident,Part2,Box3-25,ALUA.

97.PivenandCloward,“MovementsandDissensusPolitics.”WellsandVillarejoarguethatthestateandthefarmworkermovementachieved“symbiosis”between1975and1977–78.TheyattributetheUFW’swithdrawalof“pressurenecessarytopreserveandcapitalizeonexistinggainsandconsolidatenewones”astheprimaryreasonforachangeinthiscondition(“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”318,319).

98.FoxPivenandClowardwrite,“Therecordoftheseeffortsinthepastarguesthatthehopeforasynthesisofpartyandmovementislikelytobedisappointed”(ibid.,248).Onthequestion of extending the power of the state and replicating its oppressive features in themovement,seeBrown,StatesofInjury.Onresistancetogovernancealtogether,seeScott,TheArtofNotBeingGoverned.

99.WellsandVillarejo,“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies,”316–18.100.ZaninovichandThomas,TurmoilintheVineyards,112–14.101. Obbink explained the formation of the commission this way: “The grape farmers

didn’twant it tobequite that structured.So theyconvinced the legislature togive them thisCommission, which took them about one-half of a step away from where the marketing[cooperatives]were.Itgavealittlebitmoreautonomy,thoughthestatestillmaintainedcontrolofit.Theyappointedtheboardmembers;youhadtodoallthatthroughthestatestructure.Butnotquiteastightasthemarketingorderstructure.”BruceObbink,interviewedbytheauthor,August21,2008.Allquotes,henceforth,comefromthissourceunlessotherwiseindicated.

102.Bardacke,TramplingOuttheVintage,732.

EPILOGUE

1.García,TheGospel of César Chávez; Stavans,Cesar Chavez, an Organizer's Tale;FerrissandSandoval,TheFightintheFields;andGriswolddelCastilloandGarcía,CésarChávez.

2. U.S. Department of the Interior, “Dedication Ceremony for the Forty Acres NationalHistoricLandmark,”February21,2011,Delano,California.

3.Ross,ConqueringGoliath,144.4. “The Campaign for Fair Food,” Coalition of Immokalee Workers, www.ciw-

online.org/101.html.5.Formoreontheconceptof“familiesofresemblance,”seeLipsitz,TimePassages,136.6. This has been especially true in the listserv exchanges among veterans on Leroy

Chatfield’swebsite, theFarmWorkerDocumentationProject.See theListservarchive,May2004–January2005,www.farmworkermovement.us/.

7.MiriamPawelandMarkArax,“Vineyard’sWorkersAppear toReject JoiningUFW,”LosAngelesTimes,September2,2005.

8.DouglassAdair,“WhattheFieldsTaughtMe,”LosAngelesTimes,July10,2010.9.Ibid.;SouthernPovertyLawCenter,InjusticeonOurPlates,13.10.FletcherandGapasin,SolidarityDivided,74.11.TheSouthernPovertyLawCenterwrites,“Today,theU.S.grapeindustrygenerates$3

billion in sales each year.” This, while “harvesters earn 1 to 5 cents per pound for grapeclustersthatsellingrocerystoresfor$1.40”(InjusticeonOurPlates,13).

SELECTEDBIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVES

AmherstCollege,SpecialCollections,Amherst,Massachusetts(AC)ArchiveofUrbanandLaborAffairs,WayneStateUniversity,Detroit,Michigan(ALUA)BeineckeLibrary,YaleUniversity,NewHaven,Connecticut(BL)BraceroHistoryArchive,www.braceroarchive.org(BHA)DavidHarrisPapers,SanFrancisco,CaliforniaFarmWorkerMovementDocumentationProject,www.farmworkermovement.org(FMDP)FresnoCountyPublicLibrary,Fresno,California(FCPL)FresnoStateUniversity,MaddenLibrary,SpecialCollections,Fresno,California(FSU)HuntingtonLibrary,SanMarino,California(HL)MandevilleLibrary,SpecialCollections,UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego(UCSD)NationalArchivesandRecordsAdministration,Washington,DC(NARA)StanfordUniversityLibrary,DepartmentofSpecialCollections,PaloAlto,California(SUL)UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles(UCLA)U.S.DepartmentofAgricultureLibrary,CollegePark,Maryland(USDA)

ORALHISTORIES

DebbieAdair,interviewedbytheauthor,January6,2006,Coachella,California.DougAdair,interviewedbytheauthor,January6,2006,Coachella,California.Jerald“Jerry”Brown,interviewedbytheauthor,January16,2009,telephone.JerryCohen,interviewedbytheauthor,August18,2008,Carmel,California.ElaineElinson,interviewedbytheauthor,December8,2009,andJune15,2009,SanFrancisco,California.

MiguelFigueroa,interviewedbytheauthor,March25,2008,Riverside,California.MarshallGanz,interviewedbytheauthor,March26,2008,Cambridge,Massachusetts.NoéG.García,interviewedbytheauthor,2009,SouthHadley,Massachusetts.JessicaGovea,interviewedbyWilliamTaylor,July21,1976.WilliamTaylorCollection,ALUA.

Wayne“Chris”Hartmire,interviewedbytheauthor,September2,2008,Claremont,California.

DoloresHuertainterviewedbyMargaretRose,March16,1984,TranscribedbyPaulaOwen,CaliforniaAgriculturalOralHistoryProject,CaliforniaStateCollege,Bakersfield,“WomenUnionistsoftheUnitedFarmWorkersofAmerica,”OralHistoryCollection,ALUA.

ReyHuerta,interviewedbytheauthor,January6,2006,Coachella,California.NickJones,interviewedbyWilliamTaylor,July24,1976.WilliamTaylorCollection,ALUA.

HarryKubo,interviewedbySamSuhler,FresnoCountyLibrary,October13,1978.LarryKubo,interviewedbytheauthor,January6,2010,Fresno,California.SandyNathan,interviewedbyJacquesLevy,September25,1975,LevyPapers,BL.BruceObbink,interviewedbytheauthor,August21,2008,PacificGrove,California.EstherPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,March28,2008,January11,2010,andAugust15,2010,Fresno,California.

GilbertPadilla,interviewedbytheauthor,March28,2008,August19,2008,January11,2010,andAugust15,2010,Fresno,California.

DonWatson,interviewedbytheauthor,June15,2009,Oakland,California.

NEWSPAPERS/NEWSLETTERS

AftonbladetAngKatipunanCatholicAgitatorCouncilofCaliforniaGrowersNewsletterElCuhamilCrisisDenverPostErnieChristianWitnessFresnoBeeGuardianInTheseTimesLongBeachPressTelegramLosAngelesTimesElMalcriadoTheMilitantTheNationNationalCatholicReporterNationalCityStar-NewsNewYorkTimesThePackerPhilippineNewsTheProgressiveRollingStoneSacramentoBeeSanFranciscoChronicleSojournerUCBerkeleyNewsWashingtonPostWestgate

OTHERSOURCES

Andres,Benny,Jr.“PowerandControl in ImperialValley,California:Nature,Agribusiness,Labor and Race Relations, 1900–1940.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of NewMexico,2003.

Bardacke,Frank.TramplingOuttheVintage:CésarChávezandtheTwoSoulsoftheUnitedFarmWorkers.NewYork:Verso,2011.

Brill,Steven.TheTeamsters.NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1978.Brown, JeraldBarry.“TheUnitedFarmWorkersGrapeStrikeandBoycott,1965–1970:AnEvaluationoftheCultureofPovertyTheory.”Ph.D.dissertation,CornellUniversity,1972.

Brown, Wendy. States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton, NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1995.

CoalitionofImmokaleeWorkers.“CampaignforFairFood.”www.ciw-online.org(accessedSeptember10,2011).

Cohen, Jerry. “Gringo Justice: The United FarmWorkers Union, 1967–1981.” Unpublishedpaper,2008,CohenPapers,AmherstCollege.

Dunne,JohnGregory.TheStoryoftheCaliforniaGrapeStrike.NewYork:Farrar,Straus&Giroux,1967.

DuPuis,E.Melanie,andDavidGoodman.“ShouldWeGo‘Home’toEat?TowardaReflexivePoliticsofLocalism.”JournalofRuralStudies21(2005):359–71.

Elinson,Elaine,andStanYogi.WhereverThere’saFight:HowRunawaySlaves,Suffragists,Immigrants, Strikers, and Poets Shaped Civil Liberties in California. Berkeley, CA:HeydayBooks,2009.

Ferriss, Susan, and Ricardo Sandoval. The Fight in the Fields: Cesar Chavez and theFarmworkersMovement.NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1997.

Fletcher,Bill,Jr.,andFernandoGapasin.SolidarityDivided:TheCrisisinOrganizedLaborandaNewPathtowardSocialJustice.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2008.

Frank,Dana.Buy American: TheUntold Story of Economic Nationalism. Boston: BeaconPress,1999.

Friedland, William H., and Robert J. Thomas. “Paradoxes of Agricultural Unionism inCalifornia.”Society,May/June1974.

Fujita-Rony, Dorothy. American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and theTranspacificWest,1919–1941.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2003.

———. “Coalitions, Race, and Labor: Rereading Philip Vera Cruz.” Journal of AsianAmericanStudies3.2(June2000):139–62.

Galarza,Ernesto.MerchantsofLabor:TheMexicanBraceroStory.Charlotte,CA:McNallyandLoftin,1964.

———.StrangersinOurFields.Washington,DC:FundfortheRepublic,1956.Ganz,Marshall.WhyDavidSometimesWins:Leadership,OrganizationandStrategyintheCaliforniaFarmWorkersMovement.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2009.

García,MarioT.,ed.TheGospelofCésarChávez:MyFaithinAction.Lanham,MD:Sheed&Ward,2007.

Garcia, Matt. “Cain contra Abel: Courtship, Masculinities, and Citizenship in Southern

California, 1942–1964.” In Race, Nation, and Empire in AmericanHistory, edited byJames Campbell, Matthew Guterl, and Robert Lee. Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolinaPress,2007.

———.AWorldofItsOwn:Race,LaborandCitrusintheMakingofGreaterLosAngeles,1900–1970.ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2001.

Garcia, Matt, and Mario Sifuentez. “Social Movement Unionism and the ‘Sin Fronteras’Philosophy in PCUN: A New Paradigm for American Labor.” In Labor’s New World:Essays on the Future of Working-Class America, edited by Daniel Katz and RichardGreenwald.NewYork:NewPress,forthcoming.

GarcíayGriego,Manuel.“TheImportationofMexicanContractLaborerstotheUnitedStates,1942–1964.”InBetweenTwoWorlds:MexicanImmigrantsintheUnitedStates,editedbyDavidG.Gutiérrez.Wilmington,DE:Jaguar/SRBooks,1996.

Garza,Humberto.OrganizingtheChicanoMovement:TheStoryofCSO.SanJosé,CA:SunHousePublishing,2009.

Glickman,Lawrence.BuyingPower:AHistoryofConsumerActivisminAmerica.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2009.

Gordon,Jennifer.“AMovementintheWakeofaNewLaw:TheUnitedFarmWorkersandtheCaliforniaAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct.” InCause Lawyers and SocialMovements,editedbyAustinSaratandStuartA.Scheingold.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2006.

Griswold del Castillo, Richard, and Richard García.César Chávez: A Triumph of Spirit.Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,1995.

Gutiérrez,DavidG.WallsandMirrors:MexicanAmericans,MexicanImmigrants,andthePoliticsofEthnicity.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1995.

Hahamovitch,Cindy.The Fruits of Their Labor:Making ofMigrant Poverty, 1870–1945.ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1997.

InternationalDirectoryofCompanyHistories.Vol.12.Jefferson,MO:St.JamesPress,1996.Janzen,Rod.TheRiseandFallofSynanon:ACaliforniaUtopia.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001.

Johnston, Paul. Success While Others Fail: Social Movement Unionism and the PublicWorkplace.Ithaca,NY:ILRPress/CornellUniversityPress,1994.

Kanter,RosaMoss.CommitmentandCommunity:CommunesandUtopias inSociologicalPerspective.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1972.

Lassiter,Matthew.TheSilentMajority:SuburbanPolitics in theSunbeltSouth. Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007.

Lipsitz, George. The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: HowWhite People Profit fromIdentityPolitics.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,2006.

———.TimePassages:CollectiveMemory andAmericanPopularCulture.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1990.

Loza,Mireya.“BracerosontheBoundaries:Activism,Race,Masculinity,andtheLegaciesoftheBraceroProgram.”Ph.D.dissertation,BrownUniversity,2010.

Majka, Linda C., and Theo J. Majka. Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1982.

Majka,Theo J., andLindaC.Majka. “Decline of the FarmLaborMovement inCalifornia:OrganizationalCrisisandPoliticalChange.”CriticalSociology19.3(1992):3–36.

Matsumoto, Valerie. Farming the Home Place: A Japanese American Community inCalifornia,1918–1982.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1994.

Matusow,AllenJ.Nixon’sEconomy:Booms,Busts,DollarsandVotes.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,1998.

Meister,Dick,andAnneLoftis.ALongTimeComing:TheStruggle toUnionizeAmerica’sFarmWorkers.NewYork:Macmillan,1977.

Mooney,Patrick,andTheoJ.Majka.Farmers’andFarmworkers’Movements:SocialProtestinAmericanAgriculture.NewYork:Twayne,1995.

Newton-Matza, Mitchell. “Boycott.” In Encyclopedia of U.S. Labor and Working-ClassHistory,vol.1,editedbyEricArnesen.NewYork:Routledge,2007.

Ngai, Mae. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004.

Ofshe,Richard. “TheSocialDevelopment of theSynanonCult: TheManagerial Strategy ofOrganizationalTransformation.”SociologicalAnalysis41.2(1980):109–27.

Orwell,George.AnimalFarm.NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,1946.Pawel,Mariam.TheUnionofTheirDreams:Power,HopeandStruggleinCésarChávez’sFarmWorkersMovement.NewYork:BloomsburyPress,2009.

Payne, Charles. I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and theMississippiFreedomStruggle.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1995.

Pitti, Stephen J. The Devil in Silicon Valley: Northern California, Race, and MexicanAmericans.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2003.

Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. “Movements and Dissensus Politics.” InCulturalPoliticsandSocialMovements,editedbyMarcyDarnovsky,BarbaraEpstein,andRichardFlacks.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1995.

Pollan,Michael.“FarmerinChief.”NewYorkTimesMagazine,October12,2008.———.TheOmnivore’sDilemma:ANaturalHistoryofFourMeals.NewYork: Penguin,2007.

Rosenberg, Samuel. American Economic Development since 1945: Growth, Decline andRejuvenation.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillian,2003.

Ross, Fred.Conquering Goliath: Cesar Chavez at the Beginning. Keene, CA: El TallerGraficoPress,1989.

Sarat,Austin,andStuartA.Scheingold,eds.CauseLawyersandSocialMovements.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2006.

Scharlin,Craig, andLiliaV.Villanueva.PhilipVeraCruz:APersonalHistory ofFilipinoImmigrantsandtheFarmWorkersMovement.LosAngeles:UCLALaborCenter,InstituteofIndustrialRelations,andUCLAAsianAmericanStudiesCenter,1994.

Schlosser, Eric.Fast Food Nation: TheDark Side of the All-AmericanMeal. New York:HarperPerennial,2005.

Scott,JamesC.TheArtofNotBeingGoverned:AnAnarchistHistoryofUplandSoutheastAsia.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2009.

Shaw,Randy.BeyondtheFields:CesarChavez,theUFW,andtheStruggleforJusticeinthe

21stCentury.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2008.Shulman,Bruce.FromCottonBelttoSunbelt:FederalPolicy,EconomicDevelopment,andtheTransformationoftheSouth,1938–1980.Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress,1994.

Sinclair,Upton.TheJungle.NewYork:Doubleday,Jabber,1906.Sklar,KathrynKish.FlorenceKelleyandtheNation’sWork:TheRiseofWomen’sPoliticalCulture,1830–1900.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1995.

Smith,T.L.“AStudyofSocialStratificationintheAgriculturalSectionsoftheU.S.:Nature,Data,Procedures,andPreliminaryResults.”RuralSociology34.4(1969):498–509.

SouthernPovertyLawCenter.ClosetoSlavery:GuestWorkerProgramsintheUnitedStates.Montgomery,Alabama,2007.

———.InjusticeonOurPlates:ImmigrantWomenintheU.S.FoodIndustry.Montgomery,Alabama,2010.

Stavans,Ilan,ed.CesarChavez,anOrganizer’sTale:Speeches.NewYork:Penguin,2008.Street,RichardSteven.PhotographingFarmworkers inCalifornia. Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2004.

———.“PovertyintheValleyofPlenty:TheNationalFarmLaborUnion,DiGiorgioFarms,and Suppression ofDocumentary Photography in California, 1947–1966.”LaborHistory48.1(2007):25–48.

Summers,Anthony,withRobynSwan.TheArroganceofPower:TheSecretWorldofRichardNixon.NewYork:PenguinPutnam,2000.

Taylor, Paul. “Mexican Migration and the 160-Acre Water Limitation.” California LawReview63.3(1975):732–50.

Taylor,RonaldB.ChavezandtheFarmWorkers.Boston:BeaconPress,1975.U.S.CommissiononCivilRights.MexicanAmericansand theAdministrationofJustice intheSouthwest.Report.March1970.

Vargas,Zaragosa.LaborRightsAreCivilRights:MexicanAmericanWorkersinTwentieth-CenturyAmerica.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007.

Wells,MiriamJ.,andDonVillarejo.“StateStructuresandSocialMovementStrategies:TheShapingofFarmLaborProtectionsinCalifornia.”Politics&Society32(2004):291–326.

Zaninovich,MartinJohn,withEdwardH.Thomas.TurmoilintheVineyards.Self-published,n.d.

INDEX

TheindexthatappearedintheprintversionofthistitlewasintentionallyremovedfromtheeBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device to search for terms ofinterest.Foryourreference,thetermsthatappearintheprintindexarelistedbelow.

abortionAdair,DougAdHocCommitteeAFL-CIO:AgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommitteeand;assistancefrom;breakwith;

Chavezand;Elinsonand;grapeboycottand;Greenand;Heubleinand;ImperialValleylettucestrikeand;Nixonand;Swedishcampaignand

AgabayaniVillageAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct(ALRA):boycottsin;Brownand;Chavezbenefitsfrom;

effectsof;electionsand;Ganzand;implementationof;NationalLaborRelationsActvs.;Proposition14and;retreatfrom;skepticismabout;associalreform;strikesand;Teamstersand;undocumentedworkersand;UnitedFarmWorkersand

AgriculturalLaborRelationsBoard(ALRB);costsof;defundingof;LaPazandAgriculturalWorkersFreedomtoWorkAssociation(AWFWA)AgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommittee(AWOC):AFL-CIOand;bracerosand;

CommunityServiceOrganizationand;Filipinosand;inImperialValley;mergerwithNationalFarmWorkersAssociation;NationalFarmWorkersAssociationvs.;RanchoBlancoand;inSanJoaquinValley;startof

AgrupacionIndependientedeTrabajadoresAgtang(Mascarinas)Greer,LorrainealdrinAlinsky,SaulALRA.SeeAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct(ALRA)ALRB.SeeAgriculturalLaborRelationsBoard(ALRB)AmalgamatedMeatCuttersUnionAmericanFederationofLabor.SeeAFL-CIOAmes,JeffAM-PMAnaya,GilAnderson,M.E.“Andy,”Andrews,“Mr.,”“AngloBrainTrust,”Anguiano,SisterLupéanti-SemitismAntle,BudA&P

ApartmentOwnersAssociationArden-MayfairArguelles,Roman“aristocrats,”Asher,BillAssociationofProduceDealersandBrokersofL.A.,Inc.Atilano,CharlieAtlantaAWFWA.SeeAgriculturalWorkersFreedomtoWorkAssociation(AWFWA)AWOC.SeeAgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommittee(AWOC)

Banks,JohnBarrera,YolandaBarrett,Terry“BattleofCoachella,”Bell,CynthiabirthcontrolBishops’CommitteeonMigratoryLaborBlack,EliBlackPanthers“blackpower,”BohackBooth,HeatherBorregoSpringsRanchBoston“BostonGrapeParty,”Boutitier,Reverend,boycott:inAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct;grape(Seegrapeboycott)braceros:AgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommitteeand;CommunityServiceOrganization

and;criticismof;dependenceon;atDiGiorgioFruitCompany;Figueroaand;ingrapeindustry;Kennedyand;programfor;PublicLaw78and;Yellenand

Bradley,TomBreweryWorkersUnionBridges,HarryBrill,StevenBritainBritishColumbiaBrooks,RogerBrophy,JimBrotherGilbert.SeeChatfield,LeRoyBrown,Edmund“Jerry,”Governor;AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;electionof;Reagan

andBrown,Jerry;AFL-CIOand;inCanada;Chatfieldand;asdataanalyst;Elinsonand;ingrape

boycott;Huertaand;Rossand;strategyof;Swedishinitiativeand

Brown,JuanitaBrown,PatBrownBeretsBurciaga,DavidBustamante,MarioButchersUnionByrne,Thomas

CalgaryCalifornia;idyllicimpressionsof;ImperialValleyinCaliforniaCouncilofGrowersCaliforniaFarmBureauCaliforniaMigrantMinistryCaliforniaRealEstateAssociationCaliforniaRuralLegalAssociation(CRLA)CaliforniaTableGrapeCommissionCaliforniaWomenforAgricultureCamacho,EpifaniocaminataCampbell,Gordoncamps,laborCanadaCanadianLabourCongressCarlsson,LarsC.Carmichael,StokelyCarruthers,TerryCarter,JimmyCatholicChurchCCCTruckingCompanyCentralLaborCouncilCesarChavez:TheAutobiographyofLaCausa(Levy)Chaney,JamesChangetoWinChatfield,LeRoy;AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;inboycott;Brownand;Ganzand;

grocerystorepicketingand;inLosAngeles;inTularerentstrike;inUnitedFarmWorkersformation

Chavez,AliciaMargaretSt.JohnChavez,Cesar;AFL-CIOand;AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;AWOC-NFWAmerger

and;backgroundof;Brown,Jerryand;caminataof;CatholicChurchand;inCommunityServiceOrganization;CommunityServiceOrganizationand;declineof;Dederichand;Drakeand;earlysuccessof;erraticbehaviorof;onEurope;“theGame”and;Ganzchallenges;García,MarioT.on;García,Peteand;Goveaand;ongrapeboycott;Harper,Valerieand;Hartmireand;Hartmireconfronts;Hellerand;Huertaand;imprisonmentof;

isolationof;Jones,Nickand;Kingand;Kuboon;leadershipof;Loeschand;Lyonsand;marriageof;McClureand;“MondayNightMassacre”and;inNationalFarmWorkersAssociationinception;onorganizingphilosophy;overviewof;Padillaand;Padilla’sconcernsabout;inPhilippines;Proposition14and;racialaccusationsagainst;recruitmentof,byRoss;Smith,Joeand;onTeamsters;VeraCruzand

Chavez,HelenFavelaChavez,ManuelChavez,Paul“Babo,”Chavez,Richard;Cohenand;conspiracyideasand;“theGame”and;ingrapeboycott;hiring

hallsand;Huertaand;LaPazand;Teamstersand;VeraCruzand;onvolunteersystemChicagoChicagoWomen’sLiberationUnionchildcare,atLaPazCitizensforaFairFarmLaborLawCivilLibertiesActclasssystem:inImperialValleyClevelandCoachellaValley;“BattleofCoachella,”;bracerosin;grapesandAWOCin;SanJoaquin

Valleyand;strategyinCoalitionforEconomicSurvivalCoalitionforImmokaleeWorkersCoca-ColaCompanyCohen,Jerry;AFL-CIOand;AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;AgriculturalLabor

RelationsBoardand;in“AngloBrainTrust,”;inCaliforniaRuralLegalAssociation;onChavez;Chavez,Richardand;confidentialityagreementsand;“theGame”and;Ganzand;onGiumarra;grapeboycottfailureand;hiringof;Huertaand;inlegalteam;inpaydebate;pesticideuseand;inphilosophyofmovement;resignationof;onTeamsterfeud;inTeamsterlegalbattle;inTeamsternegotiations;Teamsterviolenceagainst;onundocumentedworkers;inunionnegotiations;VeraCruzand

Cohen,SamColbert,StephenColemna,Marccollegestudents,grapeboycottandColson,CharlesCommunistParty“communitymeeting,”atLaPazCommunityServiceOrganization(CSO);AgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommitteeand;

bracerosand;Chavezin;Chavez’searlysuccessand;Chavez’sresignationfrom;expansionof;leadershipin;Padillaand;ruralchaptersin

confidentialityagreementsCongressofIndustrialOrganizations.SeeAFL-CIOCongressofRacialEquality(CORE)conspiracy

contractors,laborCook,RichardCoons,MelanieCorona,BertCouncilofCaliforniaGrowersCouncilofNordicTradeUnionsCouncilonInternationalEconomicPolicyCousins,Frank“coyotes,”CRLA.SeeCaliforniaRuralLegalAssociation(CRLA)CSO.SeeCommunityServiceOrganization(CSO)Curlee,Don

Daifullah,NagiDaley,RichardDalzell,TomDavidFreedmanRanchDay,Mark“day-haul”laborersDederich,Charles“Chuck,”DeLaCruz,JuanDelanostrike.SeealsograpeboycottDelizonna,HarryJ.Delugash,SharonDemocraticNationalConventionDemocraticPartyDenmarkDetroitDiamondDietrich,CharlesDiGiorgio,Giuseppe“Joseph,”DiGiorgio,RobertDiGiorgioFruitCompanyDoleDominionDorfman,AllenDouglas,HelenGahaganDoyle,KenDrake,Jim;Chavezand;inCoachella;conspiracyideasand;ingrapeboycott;Hartmireand;

laborcampsand;MigrantMinistryand;inorganizing;recruitmentof;inUFWDrake,Michaeldrugs

Edmontonelections:AgriculturalLaborRelationsActandElectricalUnionElinson,ElaineElPlandeDelanoEmerson,RalphWaldoEncinas,BillEnglandErieChristianWitness(newspaper)Espinosa,PaulEuropeexports

Falco,MikeFarmerJohn’sFarmLaborBureau(FresnoCounty)FarmWorkerDocumentationProjectFightforOurLives(film)Figueroa,AlfredoFigueroa,MiguelFilipinoAmericanPoliticalAssociationFilipinoHallFilipinos:AWOCand;oppositionof;RanchoBlancoand;Teamstersand;UFWandFinastFinlandFisher,DixieLeeFitzsimmons,FrankE.Flanigan,PeterFlaniganReportFlores,GilFlowers,DickiefoodjusticeFord,JohnFoundingDayFreedomSummerFresno:bracerosinFresnoStateCollegeFresnoStateUniversity

Galarza,ErnestoGallin,DanGalloWinesGallyen,LeRoy

“Game,the”:Agtangand;backgroundof;inBadger;boardand;Chavezdefends;Chavez’sfamilyand;Cohenon;comestoLaPaz;ascontributortoconflict;Dederichand;Dissipationversionof;first;Ganzand;Grossmanand;growthof;Hartmireand;atHomePlace;Huerta,Loriand;inspirationfor;McGregor,Annand;meetingsas;negativeeffectsof;resistanceto;spreadof;VeraCruzon;withdrawalfrom

Ganz,Marshall;AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;in“AngloBrainTrust,”;backgroundof;Black,Eliand;challengesChavez;Chavezand;onCoachellastrategy;Cohenand;Delizonnaand;“theGame”and;ingrapeboycott;ongrapeboycott;Greerand;Huertaand;Jewishgrowersand;onLaPaz;inMississippiFreedomSummer;inMontreal;onorganization;ranchcommitteesand;Rossand;inSanJoaquinValley;onStandish;onSteinberg;inStudentNonviolentCoordinatingCommittee;Teamsterassaultof;Teamsterboycottand;inToronto;onUFWhierarchy

García,MarioT.Garcia,NoéG.García,PeteGeijer,ArneGentle,JaniceGerard,LindaGiffenRanchGilbert,Brother.SeeChatfield,LeRoyGillian’sGines,BenGiumarra,John,Jr.GiumarraVineyardsCorporationGodfrey,DeirdreGoldman,JerryGonzález,AlfredoGoodman,AndrewGovea,JessicaGrami,Billgrapeboycott;AFL-CIOand;inBoston;Brown,Jerryand;buildingsupportfor;Catholic

Churchand;Chavezon;inChicago;circumventionof;civilrightsmovementand;inCleveland;Cohenon;collegestudentsand;inDetroit;DiGiorgioFruitCompanyand;dismantlingof;Drakeand;easeof;Elinsonand;inEngland;inEurope;evolutionof;expansionof;asfailure;Ganzand;GiumarraVineyardsCorporationand;grocerystorepicketingin;Heubleinand;Huertaand;ininternationalarena;Kennedy,Robertand;Korchakand;logicof;longshoremenand;long-termimpactof;inLosAngeles;middlemenin;inMontreal;inNewYork;inNorthAmerica;Obbinkand;Padillaand;Perelli-Minettiand;inPortland,Ore.;ProtestantChurchesand;Rangeland;Safewayand;inSanFrancisco;SchenleyIndustriesand;SouthCentralFarmersCommitteeand;successof;inSweden;tablegrapesin;Teamstersand;inToronto;UnitedFarmWorkersand;volunteersin

grapeindustry:bracerosin

Grape&TreeFruitLeagueGray,L.PatrickGreen,Al:AFL-CIOand;AWOCand;Itliongand;longshoremenand;TeamstersandGreenstone,EllenGreer,NormanGristedesgrocerystorepicketingGrodin,JosephGrossman,MarcGuajardo,Israel

Haber,DonnaHarper,ValerieHarris,DavidHartmire,Wayne“Chris,”;Chavezand;Cohenand;communallivinggroupsand;confronts

Chavez;conspiracyideasand;CSOand;Dederichand;defendsChavez;Drakeand;“theGame”and;ingrapeboycott;Huertaand;LaPazand;Loeschand;inMigrantMinistry;UFWand;VeraCruzand

HarvestofShame(televisionprogram)Havens,DavidHawai’iHayakawa,S.I.health,ofworkersHearst,PattyHeller,JohnHemingway,ErnestHerman,JoeHernandez,FinaHernandez,JulioHeubleinInc.Hicks,BrunoHiggins,GeorgeHill,JoeHillshiringhallsHoffa,James“Jimmy,”HomeBuildersAssociationHomePlace.Seealso“theGame”HongKongHopcraft,SteveHubbard,LesHuelgaSchoolHuerta,Dolores;onAgriculturalLaborRelationsAct;Agtangand;backgroundof;Chavez,

Richardand;Chavezand;Cohenand;comestoNFWA;atCommunityServiceOrganization;familyof;“theGame”and;Ganzand;ingrapeboycott;Hartmireand;Itliongand;Kennedy,Robertand;loyaltyof;asmanic;inNewYork;Padillaand;Reaganand;inSanJoaquinValley;inUFW;VeraCruzand

Huerta,EmilioHuerta,JoaquinHuerta,LoriHuerta,ReymundoHutterites

IAF.SeeIndustrialAreasFoundation(IAF)IFPAAW.SeeInternationalFederationofPlantation,Agricultural,andAlliedWorkers

(IFPAAW)Ignacio,LemuelF.Ilocano.SeealsoFilipinosILWU.SeeInternationalLongshoremenWorkersUnion(ILWU)immigrantsImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)ImmokaleeImperialValley;AgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommitteein;Fiugeruoasin;lettucestrikeinImutan,AndyIndustrialAreasFoundation(IAF)INS.SeeImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)InterHarvestInternationalBrotherhoodofPulp,SulphiteandPaperMillWorkersInternationalBrotherhoodofTeamsters;AFL-CIOand;AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;

cooperationof;defectionsto;Filipinoworkersand;Greenand;Nixonand;violencebyInternationalFederationofPlantation,Agricultural,andAlliedWorkers(IFPAAW)InternationalLongshoreandWarehouseUnionInternationalLongshoremenWorkersUnion(ILWU)InternationalTransportWorkersFederation(ITWF)InternationalTransportWorkersUnionInternationalUnionofFoodandAlliedWorkers’AssociationIrvineLandCompanyItliong,Larry;backgroundof;asbetrayed;Chavezand;FilipinoAmericanPolitical

Associationand;funeralof;ingrapeboycott;Greenand;Mexicandominationand;NFWAand;resignationof;inUFW;VeraCruzand

ITWF.SeeInternationalTransportWorkersFederation(ITWF)

JapanJapaneseAmericanCitizensLeagueJapaneseinternmentJewellMarket

Jewishfarmowners“jobbers,”Johnsen,Richard,Jr.Johnson,LyndonJones,JackJones,JimJones,NickJones,VirginiaJourdane,MauriceJungle,The(Sinclair)justice,food

Kahn,JudyKarahadian,MiltonKennedy,EthelKennedy,JohnF.Kennedy,RobertF.KernCountyKimura,FrankKing,CorettaScottKing,MartinLuther,Jr.Kintz,WalterKircher,Billkitchens,atLaPazKleindienst,Richard.SeealsoInternationalBrotherhoodofTeamstersKnowles,ClydeKooperativeFoerbunderKorchak,SidneyKoreanWarKovacavichRanchKroger’sKubo,HarryKubo,LarryKuschner,Sam

LaBerge,LouislaborcampslaborcontractorsLaborManagementReportingandDisclosureActLange,DorotheaLaPazLaredo,ErnestoLarson,K.K.

leadership:Chavez’searlylemonindustry:bracerosinlettuceindustry:NationalLaborRelationsActand;strikein;Teamsterboycottand;union

substitutionandLevine,IrvingLevine,VivianLevitt,Herman“Blackey,”Levy,JacquesLoader,CliffordLoblaw’sLoesch,JuliLondonLosAngelesLovestone,JayL’uniondeCultivateursCatoliqueLyons,Mack

MaagCitrusCompanyMacias,JohnnyMaddock,BenMadrid,SilverioTorresmafiaMahoney,Rogermailprivacy,atLaPazMalcriado,El(newspaper)Manitobamanongs.SeealsoFilipinosManWhoShotLibertyValance,The(film)March,CharlesMarcos,FerdinandmarijuanaMartin,J.D.Martínez,JesusMasaru,AbeMcCarthy,KathyMcClure,DavidMcGregor,AnnMeany,George:AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;Elinsonand;grapeboycottand;

Heubleinand;inPayBoard;Reutherand;TeamstersandMeatInspectionActMedina,Eliseo;AgriculturalLaborRelationsBoardand;inChicago;inelections;“theGame”

and;inpaydebatemelons

MemphisMerchantsofLabor:TheMexicanBraceroStory(Galarza)MexicanAmericanPoliticalAssociationMexicanRevolutionMeyer,FredMiamimiddlemen,ingrapeboycottMigrantMinistry“MikeWilzochaffair,”Miller,MikeMilne,CrosbyMilo,MikeMinuteMaidMissakianRanch“Mr.Andrews,”Mitchell,JamesF.Mocine,MaryMohn,EinarMoncon,JoeMondale,Walter“MondayNightMassacre,”MontrealMoon,SunMyungMoran,ErnieMorantz,PaulMorely,C.SeldonMoscone,GeorgeMuñoz,MarcomurdersMurguia,JoaquinMurguia,KathyMurphy,GeorgeMurrow,EdwardR.

Nathan,SandyNationalAgriculturalWorkersUnion(NAWU)NationalCatholicConferenceNationalFarmLaborUnion(NFLU):AgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommitteevs.;Chavez

ininceptionof;DiGiorgioFruitCompanyand;Hartmirein;mergerwithAgriculturalWorkersOrganizingCommittee;Padillain;SchenleyIndustriesand;Tularerentstrikeand

NationalFarmWorkersAssociation(NFWA):laborcampsand;RanchoBlancoand;startofNationalLaborRelationsAct(NLRA);AgriculturalLaborRelationsActvs.;passageof;Taft-

HartleyActand

NationalLaborRelationsBoardNationalReclamationActNAWU.SeeNationalAgriculturalWorkersUnion(NAWU)Neff,BobNEP.SeeNewEconomicPolicy(NEP)NetherlandsNewEconomicPolicy(NEP)NewhallLandCompanyNewJerseyNewOrleansNewYorkNFLU.SeeNationalFarmLaborUnion(NFLU)NFWA.SeeNationalFarmWorkersAssociation(NFWA)Nicholson,BrianNiseiFarmersLeagueNixon,RichardNLRA.SeeNationalLaborRelationsAct(NLRA)Norway

Obbink,BruceOntarioOple,Blasorangeindustry:bracerosinOrendain,RachelOrendain,Tonyorganizedcrime.SeealsoInternationalBrotherhoodofTeamstersOrmes,JackOrtega,JosephOttawa

PackinghouseWorkersofAmericaPadilla,EstherPadilla,Gilbert;AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;Chavezand;conspiracyideasand;

Dederichand;Godfreyand;Harper,Valerieand;Huertaand;inSanJoaquinValley;VeraCruzand;waningcontractsand

Paily,PaulaPaloVerdeValley:bracerosinPanAmericanInsuranceCompanyPandol,JackPatinson,KeithPaulMassonPaulsen,NormanPaxCenterPayBoard

peacefulprotestPeople’sIndustrialConsultantsPeople’sTemplePerelli-MinettiPérez,RalphPerlin,LoupesticidesPestoff,VictorPhiladelphiaPhilippines,Chavezinpicketing,ingrapeboycottPicN’Pac“pinkhouse,”Pollan,MichaelPortland,OregonPovertyintheValleyofPlenty(film)privacy,atLaPazPropositionprostitutionProtestantchurchesProvenzano,TonyPublicLawPuertoRicoPunt,WilliamA.PureFoodandDrugActpurges

QuebecQuebecFederationofLabour

Rabbit,SisterMaryCatherineracism,atLaPazRadioBilingueranchcommitteesranchesRanchoBlancoRand,MattRangel,HijinioRangel,ManuelReagan,Ronaldrentstrike,TulareReuther,VictorReuther,Walter

Reyes,RudyRichards,JamesRios,TonyRivera,AbbyFloresRivera,ManuelRodríguez,ArturoRodriguez,CarlosRodriguez,JayRosanova,Lou“TheTailor,”Rosensteil,LewisRoss,Fred;onAWOC-NFWAmerger;backgroundof;CommunityServiceOrganizationand;

Ganzand;LaPazproblemsand;organizingeducationby;organizingphilosophyof;principlesof;recruitmentofChavezby;UnityLeaguesand

Rothner,GlennRoyalPackingCompanyRoybal,EdwardRumford,WilliamByronRumfordFairHousingActRussianRevolutionRyan,JerryS.S.PierceCompanySaatjian,LloydSachen,SusanSafewaySalinasSalinasValleySanFranciscoSanJoaquinValley;AWOCin;bracerosin;CoachellaValleyand;DiGiorgioFruitCompany

in;Ganzin;SchenleyIndustriesinSausedo,GuadalupeSavio,MarioScandinaviaSchenleyIndustriesSchulte,EleanorSchultz,GeorgeSchultz,MikeSchwartzhauptFoundationSchwerner,MichaelScott,ReaganScripps,EdySeafarersUnionSegur,Hub“Self-Reliance”(Emerson)

Serda,JoséShacter,ClaudiaSharwood,MarkSibelman,LaurenceSilberman,FreddySilva,JoséSilva,Juan“Fernando,”Silverman,MarkSinclair,UptonSmith,JoeSmith,NormaSocialistWorkersPartySouthCentralFarmersCommittee(SCFC)SouthCentralGrowersAssociationSouthernCaliforniaPacificSouthernChristianLeadershipConferenceSpeigel,ShellystagflationStandish,PeterStannow,ChristianSteelworkersUnionSteinbeck,JohnSteinberg,LionelSteinberg,SamSteinberg’sStockholmStokes,CarlBurtonStrangersinOurFields(Galarza)strike(s):AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;grape(Seegrapeboycott);lettuce,inImperial

Valley;TularerentStudentNonviolentCoordinatingCommittee(SNCC);blackpowerandstudents,grapeboycottandStudentsforaDemocraticSocietysulfurSunburstSun-MaidSunsweetSuperiorOilCompanySwedenSwedishConsumerCooperativeSwedishFoodCooperativeSwedishMeatworkersUnionSwedishTradeFederation

S&WFineFoodsSynanon.Seealso“Game,the”

tablegrapes.SeealsograpeboycottTaft-HartleyLaborAct“TakeOurJobs,”Tamez,GuadalupeTaylor,BillTaylor,PaulTaylor,RonTeamsters.SeeInternationalBrotherhoodofTeamstersTennecoCorporationTerronez,RogerTGWU.SeeTransportandGeneralWorkersUnion(TGWU)ThreeRocksTKIFW.SeeTulare-KernIndependentFarmWorkers(TKIFW)TorontoTradeUnionCongress(TUC)Train,DavidTramutt,LarryTransportandGeneralWorkersUnion(TGWU)TreesweetTUC.SeeTradeUnionCongress(TUC)TulareHousingAuthorityTulare-KernIndependentFarmWorkers(TKIFW)Tularerentstrike

UAW.SeeUnitedAutoWorkers(UAW)UFW.SeeUnitedFarmWorkers(UFW)undocumentedworkersUnificationChurch“unionsubstitution,”UnitedAutoWorkers(UAW)UnitedCannery,Agricultural,PackingandAlliedWorkersofAmericaUnitedFarmWorkersOrganizingCommittee:Brown,Jerryand;formationof;nameofUnitedFarmWorkers(UFW):AgriculturalLaborRelationsActand;compositionof;Filipino

oppositionto;fundingcrisisof;grapeboycottand;Heubleinand;immigrantsand;ImmigrationandNaturalizationServiceand;Loeschcriticizes;nameof;Nixonand;aspeaceful;Proposition14and;restructuringof;startof;Teamstersand;Teamstersvs.;TGWUand

UnitedFruitCompanyUnitedKingdomUnitedMineWorkers

UnitedVintnersUnityLeaguesUribe,Alicia

Valdez,LuisVancouverVanPelt,DaleVasquez,Mark“VeggieKitchen,”Velasco,PeterVenezuelaVeraCruz,PhilipVietnamViklund,VictorVillareno,DavidVillegas,Jesus“Chui,”“VivaKennedy!”campaignsVollmer,DebbieVolpey,Steve

wages:ofday-haullaborers;atranches;atWeethRanchWagnerAct.SeeNationalLaborRelationsAct(NLRA)Walbaum’sWaldie,JeromeWalsh,DennyWaltherReutherLibraryofLaborandUrbanAffairsWatergateWatson,DonWayneStateUniversityWeatherUndergroundWeethRanchWeinstein,LeonWesternGrowersAssociationWestFoodWestgate,MurrayWeyerhaeuserPaperCompanyWilzoch,MikeWindsor,OntarioWinterrowd,KentWolcott,BettyWolff,JackWoodcock,LeonardWoolsey,James

WorldPeaceCouncil

Yates,MikeYellen,Ben“yellowsheet,”YippiesYoungLordsYouthInternationalParty

Zaninovich,Martin

Matt Garcia is Professor of History and Transborder Studies at Arizona State University,wherehealsodirects theSchoolofHistorical,PhilosophicalandReligiousStudies,and thePrograminComparativeBorderStudies.HeistheauthorofAWorldofItsOwn:Race,Labor,andCitrusintheMakingofGreaterLosAngeles,1900–1970.

Mattgarcia.org

TEXT11/14AdobeGaramondPremierPro

DISPLAYAdobeGaramondPremierPro

COMPOSITORWestchesterPublishingServices

PRINTERANDBINDERMaple-VailBookManufacturingGroup