Commemoration of the Gallipoli Victory

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The Commemoration of the Gallipoli Victory in Turkey ÖZÜM ARZIK İstanbul Bilgi University The commemorations in Turkey have evolved in parallel with the international and national events and developments and the commemoration ceremonies of the victory at the Battle of Çanakkale has also been influenced by the developments in the national arena. As the major events of different periods have influenced the way commemorations are held and the interest in commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale, theses ceremonies have evolved through time. Hence, since 1916 the commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale, the way they are held and the discourse of ceremonies have changed greatly. The multiple images of the ceremonies of the Çanakkale Victory and the proliferated discourse around the ceremonies are vastly different from that in the 1930s. Whereas the commemorations were mostly local and moderate in the 1920s and 30s, this dominant situation has changed in 80 years. As it is clear from the example of 2011, now the main commemoration ceremonies are held around the huge Çanakkale Martyrs’ Memorial

Transcript of Commemoration of the Gallipoli Victory

The Commemoration of the Gallipoli Victory in Turkey

ÖZÜM ARZIK

İstanbul Bilgi University

The commemorations in Turkey have evolved in parallel with the

international and national events and developments and the

commemoration ceremonies of the victory at the Battle of

Çanakkale has also been influenced by the developments in the

national arena. As the major events of different periods have

influenced the way commemorations are held and the interest in

commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale, theses

ceremonies have evolved through time. Hence, since 1916 the

commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale, the way

they are held and the discourse of ceremonies have changed

greatly.

The multiple images of the ceremonies of the Çanakkale

Victory and the proliferated discourse around the ceremonies

are vastly different from that in the 1930s. Whereas the

commemorations were mostly local and moderate in the 1920s and

30s, this dominant situation has changed in 80 years. As it is

clear from the example of 2011, now the main commemoration

ceremonies are held around the huge Çanakkale Martyrs’ Memorial

and various cities and embassies hold a great number of

commemorative events both officially and non-officially. So

how come a victory that was originally Ottoman came to be

deemed Turkish? Secondly, how did the government officials

embark upon commemorating an Ottoman military victory not only

locally, but nationally, even internationally? Given the

ceremonies in 2011, it seems as if there are different

commemoration styles and different types of identities. So, how

did the identities built around the commemoration ceremonies of

Çanakkale victory come to be disrupted instead of being united?

Did the ceremonies serve to create a unique and unifying

identity or multiplying and broken identities? The paper will

attempt to answer these questions.

In this sense, I argue that the framework and the

participatory level of the commemoration ceremonies have

altered. Moreover, the authorities or the ruling elite have

tried to make ceremonies more international. Secondly, the

commemoration ceremonies or the activities held to commemorate

the victory at the Battle of Çanakkale have evolved into a

stage of political conflict and have been a stage for a clash

of different political opinions or opinions as to the way the

ceremonies should be held. To provide a theoretical framework

for these discussions around the Çannakale victory, the

relationship between commemorations and making of citizenry and

the general approach of the Turkish Republic towards

commemoration ceremonies will be elaborated. The time period

starts from 1916, the year the first commemoration was held

until 2011, the year the paper was written.

The Framework of Commemoration Ceremonies

The term commemoration comes from commemorate which means bring

to remembrance.1 As its name suggests, commemorations are

directly related to memory. They mainly serve to make the

people remember the past by providing a representative picture

of the history;2 hence, they constitute a major element of

“collective memory”. Moreover, they maintain uniformity of the

calendar and order the calendar accordingly. By regulating

time, the commemorations make large masses of people converge

around the same experiences. Given the importance of “national

time” for the interests of a state, it is obvious that when a

new regime is constructed or re-constructed, the first thing it

1http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=commemorate (Online EtymologyDictionary; accessed 06.03.2012)2Paul Connerton. 1989: How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, p. 113.

does is to make up a history of its own and reformulate the

history in the making of citizenry. In this sense, by creating

a collective memory for its citizens, the states have the power

to determine what is important for its people and to carve out

the parts that it deems “unnecessary”. Thus, he holiday cycle

determines which aspects of the past are to be added to the

collective memory and which are left out to be forgotten and it

usually happens in line with the state’s current interest and

ideology.

These statements hold true for the Turkish Republic, as

well. The Turkish Republic seems to have tried to define and

formulate a national identity for its citizens and subsequently

tried to impose it since its foundation in 1923. Moreover, with

the establishment of the Turkish History Institution, the

collective memory was endeavoured to be re-created and

manipulated. Commemorations were not seperated from these

efforts. The Turkish Republic seems to have tackled with the

remnants of the Ottoman Empire to build and legitimize itself

in the eyes of the public and has carved the history for its

citizens by rewriting it based on main events of Turkish

Republic. Hence, the governing elite made up a national

calendar for its citizens.

When it comes to the Battle of Çanakkale, a battle that

was fought within the territory of the Turkish Republic with

the exception of Sarıkamış Battle by the Ottoman forces, it

signifies a connection with the Ottoman past for the Turkish

Republic. Against this backdrop, it seems as if the Battle is a

very clear and sharp deviation from the history of the Turkish

Republic that was started by the state authorities with Mustafa

Kemal’s arrival in Samsun on 19 May 1919. Hence, the

commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale emerge as a

disruptive injection in time, instead of a celebration of

national time, concentrated on the major events of the two

decades 1919-1938, an Ottoman military victory starts to be

commemorated not locally, but nationally.

The first initiatives to commemorate the lives lost on 18

March started in 1916, even before the Battle of Çanakkale had

ended.3 The first commemorations seem to have started with a

view to responding to the needs and requirements of those who

3Burhan Sayılır. 2010: “Şehitlerimizi 94 Yıldır Çanakale ile Anıyoruz”, inÇanakkale 1915, 18 March 2010 Özel Sayısı. Ankara: Korza Basım Ltd, pp. 110-113.

have sacrificed their beloved ones in the Battle of Çanakkale.

In the letters sent to Çanakkale stronghold commander Nihat

Pasha on 12 March 1916, he was asked to make a suggestion

regarding the commemoration ceremonies of 18 March. In the end,

it was decided that there would be a military ceremony and

prayers would be held for the dead.4

An analysis of the first commemorations make one suggest

that the first commemorations of the Çanakkale victory were

held in a modest manner and the importance ascribed to the

ceremonies increased as the years went by. One indication of

this modesty is recorded by T. J Pemberton. In 1926, Pemberton

notes that Turkish soldiers held a moderate ceremony to

commemorate their dead and there was no systematic or regular

commemoration at that time.5 Although Pemberton maintained that

the commemorations were held in a moderate fashion, the

commemorations came to be altered in time, the first landmark

being 1934.

4Sayılır 2010 pp. 111-112. 5T. J Pemberton. 1926. Gallipoli To-day. London: Ernest Benn cited in George Fredrick Davis. 2008: “Anzac Day: Meaning and Memories: New Zealand, Australian and Turkish Perspectives On a Day of Commemoration in the Twentieth Century”. (unpublished PhD thesis) New Zealand: University of Otago, pp. 205-206.

The official indifference, almost immediately, appears to

have been replaced by an increasing sensitivity in 1934. The

way the 1934 commemorations were organized seems to highlight

the official perspective to perceive and represent the

commemorations, in that, the Çanakkale victory was elevated to

a level of a national day to be celebrated in the upcoming

years. Firstly, the importance attributed to the commemoration

ceremonies seems to have given rise to the newspaper coverage

of the event. Secondly, the most significant event marking the

change in 1934 towards Çanakkale and the commemorations of the

Battle of Çanakkale is the famous statement of Atatürk read on

the Anzac Day:

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives… Youare now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore restin peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and theMehmets to us where they lie side by side in this country ofours. You, the mothers who sent their sons from far- awaycountries, wipe away your tears. Your sons are now lying in ourbosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on thisland, they have become our sons as well. It is our hope andbelief that the respect we learned to feel for the men of yourrace in this tragic conflict will pave the way for such anunderstanding as will render impossible another conflict ofthis sort. Could your dead speak they would say that they shareour hope, and in their name we ask you to do what you can toco- operate with us in ensuring future peace between ourrespective races. 6

6İbrahim Artuç. 1992: 1915 Çanakkale Savaşı.İstanbul: Kastaş.

It seems as if by calling on ANZACs to cooperate for future

peace, Mustafa Kemal uses the Battle of Çanakkale to reach his

or the state’s own goals. Although it is not clear what these

goals are for certain, one of the underlying targets might be

to utilize these “friendship words” to underline the fact that

Turkey is a peaceful country that has the right to take the

control of the Straits. Secondly, Mustafa Kemal’s aim may have

been to provide an image of a peaceful country to the world and

these words might simply be a public relations tool to this

end.7 No matter what the grounds of these lines are, it seems

as if these words are considered a watershed in the evolution

of the commemoration of the Çanakkale victory.

To start with the evolution of ceremonies, one of the

first commemoration ceremonies are Nihal Atsız’s trips to

Çanakkale. In 1933, Nihal Atsız, a teacher in Edirne, walked in

Çanakkale with a group from National Turkish Union of

Students.8 Atsız, calling upon the youth to visit Çanakkale

seems to have changed the tradition of commemorating the

Çanakale victory from the ship called Gülcemal with some jazz

7Ahmet Mete Tunçoku. 2005: “Mustafa Kemal, Çanakkale ve Atatürk”, in Çanakkale 1915: Buzdağının Altı. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, pp. 144-145. 8Nihal Atsız. 1933: Çanakkale’ye Yürüyüş. İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, p. 5.

music.9 Since then the youth trips have continued under the

banner of MTTB and Turkishness and nationalism have become

focal points of these ceremonies.

It is with the Menderes government that the commemoration

ceremonies of the Battle of Çananakkale gained a more

nationalistic character. In 1955, the commemoration ceremonies

were held in Çanakkale, İstanbul, Adana, Ankara and İzmir.10

Hence, the commemorations that were locally held acquired a

national status. Secondly, the participatory level in the

ceremonies hiked in Menderes era. In 1958, a number of

ministers, and the Prime Minister joined the ceremonies that

were held in Çanakkale.11 Thus, the importance attached to the

ceremonies on the state level further increased in the course

of time.

The efforts to take hold of and control the commemoration

ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale seem to have gained pace

after the coup d’etat in 1960. The army, considering itself

“the protector of the state” seems to have used Çanakkale to

display its power, establishing a line between the Ottoman army

9Atsız, 1933 pp. 37-38. 10Cumhuriyet. 19 Mart 1955. “Çanakkale Zaferi Dün Törenle Kutlandı”.11Cumhuriyet. 19 March 1958. “Şehrimizde Yapılan Törenler”.

and the Turkish armed forces. One significant example of this

is the fact that the military government unveiled the Çanakkale

Martyrs’ Memorial in 1962 in a very hasty manner even though

incomplete despite the serious warnings and opposition of

architects.

The interest in Çanakkale increased so much that in the

50th anniversary, 20 thousand people joined the ceremonies in

Çanakkale.12 Yet, as the ceremonies changed so did the

discourses built around them. After the coup d’etat in 1980,

the main concepts consistently underlined in the ceremonies

came out to be “the role of Mustafa Kemal in the Battle of

Çanakkale, strong state, and liberty, invincibility of the

state, courage, independence and freedom”. In the 90s, as the

era was primarily marked by internal conflict and the attacks

of the PKK, the ceremonies were centered around a discourse of

“unity, solidarity, territorial integrity and ethnic unity”.13

The period after 1997 ought to be considered apart from

the previous years since with the establishment of the Refah- Yol

government, the threats to secularism had increased according

12Hurriyet. 19 March 1965. “Çanakkale Zaferi Dün Heyecanla Kutlandı”.13Cumhuriyet. 19 March 1996. “Çanakkale’den Uzanan Dostluk Eli” (Aynur Narler).

to some circles. Considering this background, the statements

made at the commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale

seem to have reflected the fear of TSK that REFAHYOL and the

deeds of Erbakan posed a great threat to the well being of

secularism in Turkey. To cite an example, the Chief of Staff

Full general İsmail Hakkı Kabadayı, stated that the TAF is a

warranty of democratic and secular republic against all threats

and dangers in the commemoration ceremony in 1997.14

It seems as if after the AKP won the elections for the

first time, the importance attached to the commemoration

ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale has surged and more

attraction has been drawn to these commemorations. The Prime

Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has participated in the

commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale since

2003.15 During the term of AKP, the law on 18 March Veterans’s

Day, which sets the methods of commemorating the victory, and

sets the roles, duties and responsibilities of the local

authorities, passed on 24 August 2003. The venue of ceremonies

14 Cumhuriyet. 19 March 1997. “Trene Geciken Çiller’e Protesto” (Turhan Narler, Emine Kaplan).15http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20897&P5=H&PAGE1=28&PAGE2=&web_user_id=8762394 (Türkiye Büyük Millet MeclisiGenel Kurul Tutanağı 23. Dönem 5. Yasama Yılı 80. Birleşim 22/Mart /2011 Salı accessed on 02.05 2011)

in other cities, the order of the ceremonies (singing the

Turkish National Anthem, hoisting the flag, a minutes silence,

honorary shooting), who will deliver the speeches are all set

with this law. Hence, it can be concluded that the law has

created a monopoly in terms of the official Çanakkale

commemorations, yet this is far from the reality on the ground

as August 10 is a more “sacred” day to commemorate for some

circles. Moreover, with this law, the spontaneity of the

commemorations comes to a halt. Last but not least, the

question of whether this law stems from meeting the needs or

whether this is a new and systematic exploitation carefully

planned by AKP to revive and reclaim the Ottoman past in the

present is a question that is hard to answer. Lastly, one

paramount deed of the AKP appeared to be the completion of the

construction of the Çanakkale Martyrs’ Memorial in 2004. AKP,

namely the Prime Minister Erdoğan, honoured the architect of

the memorial Doğan Erginbaş, who wasn’t invited to the

unveiling ceremony in 1962, by providing him with a plaque in

2010.

In parallel to the surge of interest in the commemoration

ceremonies, the efforts to make the commemorations

international have come to the fore. In 2003, came a travel

project to Çanakkale initiated by Başaran Ulusoy, the head of

the Association of Turkish Travel Agencies. Ulusoy initiated a

project to make Çanakkale a venue visited by thousands of

citizens and foreigners on 18 March Çanakkale Victory and

Martyrs’ Day,16 which is in line with what the government would

like to do as stated by Bülent Arınç “turning Çanakkale into an

open air museum”. The project, realized in a very short span

of time with the initiative and follow up of Başaran Ulusoy,

was supported by governors, mukhtars, and presidents of the

universities, the students, employers and employees. A protocol

was signed between Başaran Ulusoy and the Ministry of Education

to take 24 thousand students to the Çanakkale monuments.17

An analysis of the commemoration indicates that just like

the other national and local commemorations in Turkey, 18 March

is also highly organized by the state and it is dominated by

the governing forces. The importance of the ceremonies, which

start locally, surges over time and the ceremonies start to be

held in many provinces besides Çanakkale. The state uses the

16 http://www.gazeten.com/250-bin-sehit-sizi-bekliyor (accessed on 06.04.2011)17http://www.canakkaletravel.com/haber/meb-ile-tursab-arasinda-18-March-canakkale-ve-cumhuriyet-egitim-gezileri-protokolu-imzalandi-.html ( accessed on 06.04. 2011)

commemorations to underline the power of the state or the

Turkish armed forces, as a sign of resistance to imperialism,

to focus on the deeds of Atatürk or to ignore him, to emphasize

the ethnic unity of the state. Yet, which goal it chooses

differs from one government to the next in line with the

agendas of the political party or parties in power. Thus, the

focus of the commemorations and the goals of the commemorations

change from one decade to another depending on the internal and

external politics, and the agenda or the hidden or clear goal

of the governing group or party.

Commemorations as a Venue for Political Conflict

The commemorations, in general, are assumed to boost national

identity. Thus, identity is easily shaped by the commemorations

and the state, if state is the determinant power in organizing

the commemorative activities. Yet it seems as if the identity

built around the commemoration ceremonies of the Çanakkale

victory is not a unifying one.

In the sixties, the commemorations seem to have been taken

and exploited by different groups jostling for better political

positions. In other words, different groups tried to carve a

legitimate space for themselves by utilizing the commemorations

to their end.

The way the commemorations were organized and the themes

that the commemorations brought to the fore highlighted the

role that the chief of staff played in the victory. Yet, there

were others contending to benefit from the victory. As an

outcome of political diversification among the youth after

1960, new political forces gained momentum and each claimed its

own version of interpretation of what happened in 1915. On one

hand, the Islamist right wing groups emphasized that the

soldiers fought on religious motivation and claimed that the

Battle of Çanakkale is a war of jehad. On the other hand, the

left wing groups tried to portray the victory as a resistance

against Western Imperialism. To cite an example, İsmail

Kahraman, the head of MTTB in 1967, makes reference to the

internal enemy in his words: “The enemy who could not pass

Çanakkale yesterday is now among us/ within us. Yet, we are

expecting another Çanakkale victory in a real sense. We are

bearing this soul and awareness, it will happen indeed.”18

18 Milli Türk Talebe Birliği 53. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu. 1976. Ankara: Milli Türk TalebeBirliği, p. 27.

As each party pushed its own version, the commemorations

that were geared to foster national identity became a source

and venue of confrontation. The parties carefully worded their

announcements counting for each expression to consolidate their

own political positions and/or undermine the rival group’s

political stance. Publications, public statements issued by

either group meticulously dealt with the problem of how to

define the victory in the light of political problems and

foreign policy issues that Turkey had been facing in the

sixties.

Other key issue was about the way the commemorations had

to be carried out. The leftist groups, simply disregarding the

Islamists’ calls that the commemorations should be done in

compliance with religious rituals, commemorated the victory in

the form of a political demonstration.

With the surge of interest in Çanakkale, the battle and

ceremonies have been exploited by different groups in the

parliament for their own cause, as well. Kamer Genç, the

Tunceli MP, uses Çanakkale commemorations to bash the

government and criticize them in 2011. He criticizes the

government for taking 350 buses to Çanakkale and for bashing

the head of CHP as he delivers his speech.19 Sırrı Sakık, Muş,

deputy of BDP, uses the commemorations to make to support the

case of his party and to make a focus on ethnic identity. To

him, Çanakkale has cheated the soul and identities of the dead

and the AKP has not heard the voice of millions who have been

craving for democracy and freedom and who have wanted to create

a land that is in suitable for the soul of Çanakkale. He

alleges that their ancestors did not die to provide a stick to

the Turkish and allow them to beat the other nations.20 Lastly,

the Niğde deputy from MHP, Mümin İnan, makes use of Çanakkale

commemorations to fight with imperialism and claims that the

global power that could not pass Çanakkale is now consuming all

the richness of the country.21

As a corollary, the commemorations are mainly geared to

serve primarily to national unity and this principle has been

lacking in the ceremonies mostly since 1960s. On the contrary,

it seems as if the ceremonies have resulted in deeper political

cleavages between different political groups. According to

19http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic? P4=20897&P5=H&PAGE1=26&PAGE2=&web_user_id=8762394, (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı 23. Dönem 5. Yasama Yılı 80. Birleşim 22/March/2011 Salı ; accessed on 02.05 2011 ) 20Ibid.21Ibid.

Tekeli, if ceremonies turn into a venue of political

confrontation, they become a part of political public

establishment and lack in quality.22 Hence, the 18 March

commemorations seem to have turned into a political public

establishment.

Conclusion

To put it in a nutshell, the paper analyses the construction

and progression of national collective memory and identity

around the commemoration ceremonies of 18 March until 2000. An

analysis of the commemoration indicates that just like the

other national and local commemorations in Turkey, 18 March is

also highly organized by the state and it is dominated by the

governing forces and the youth groups of those governing

forces. The commemoration ceremonies of 18 March, the

importance of which gradually increases in time, are analyzed

as a device of the ruing elite, whether it be the army or the

government of particular period. It seems that rather than

creating unity and maintaining common memory by using the22 İlhan Tekeli, “Bir Toplumsal Anlatım ve Katılım Biçimi Olarak KutlamaŞenlikleri”, 13.Şenlik bir siyasal çatışma alanı haline getirilirse, siyasal kamu alanınınbir parçası haline gelir. Niteliğini yitirir. Şenlik içinde eleştiri,değişik sanat formları içinde, sembolik ifade biçimleriyle ortayakonulduğunda, şenlikle tutarlı bir eleştiri haline gelir. Şenliğin hoşgörütalebi ancak bu halde karşı çıkılamaz bir nitelik kazanır.

commemoration of the Battle of Çanakkale, each group has tried

to make use of Çanakkale to its own end and it has become a

platform for identity politics. So it can be concluded that

collective memory has been manipulated in line with the goals

of different groups.

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