The Commemoration of the Gallipoli Victory in Turkey
ÖZÜM ARZIK
İstanbul Bilgi University
The commemorations in Turkey have evolved in parallel with the
international and national events and developments and the
commemoration ceremonies of the victory at the Battle of
Çanakkale has also been influenced by the developments in the
national arena. As the major events of different periods have
influenced the way commemorations are held and the interest in
commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale, theses
ceremonies have evolved through time. Hence, since 1916 the
commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale, the way
they are held and the discourse of ceremonies have changed
greatly.
The multiple images of the ceremonies of the Çanakkale
Victory and the proliferated discourse around the ceremonies
are vastly different from that in the 1930s. Whereas the
commemorations were mostly local and moderate in the 1920s and
30s, this dominant situation has changed in 80 years. As it is
clear from the example of 2011, now the main commemoration
ceremonies are held around the huge Çanakkale Martyrs’ Memorial
and various cities and embassies hold a great number of
commemorative events both officially and non-officially. So
how come a victory that was originally Ottoman came to be
deemed Turkish? Secondly, how did the government officials
embark upon commemorating an Ottoman military victory not only
locally, but nationally, even internationally? Given the
ceremonies in 2011, it seems as if there are different
commemoration styles and different types of identities. So, how
did the identities built around the commemoration ceremonies of
Çanakkale victory come to be disrupted instead of being united?
Did the ceremonies serve to create a unique and unifying
identity or multiplying and broken identities? The paper will
attempt to answer these questions.
In this sense, I argue that the framework and the
participatory level of the commemoration ceremonies have
altered. Moreover, the authorities or the ruling elite have
tried to make ceremonies more international. Secondly, the
commemoration ceremonies or the activities held to commemorate
the victory at the Battle of Çanakkale have evolved into a
stage of political conflict and have been a stage for a clash
of different political opinions or opinions as to the way the
ceremonies should be held. To provide a theoretical framework
for these discussions around the Çannakale victory, the
relationship between commemorations and making of citizenry and
the general approach of the Turkish Republic towards
commemoration ceremonies will be elaborated. The time period
starts from 1916, the year the first commemoration was held
until 2011, the year the paper was written.
The Framework of Commemoration Ceremonies
The term commemoration comes from commemorate which means bring
to remembrance.1 As its name suggests, commemorations are
directly related to memory. They mainly serve to make the
people remember the past by providing a representative picture
of the history;2 hence, they constitute a major element of
“collective memory”. Moreover, they maintain uniformity of the
calendar and order the calendar accordingly. By regulating
time, the commemorations make large masses of people converge
around the same experiences. Given the importance of “national
time” for the interests of a state, it is obvious that when a
new regime is constructed or re-constructed, the first thing it
1http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=commemorate (Online EtymologyDictionary; accessed 06.03.2012)2Paul Connerton. 1989: How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, p. 113.
does is to make up a history of its own and reformulate the
history in the making of citizenry. In this sense, by creating
a collective memory for its citizens, the states have the power
to determine what is important for its people and to carve out
the parts that it deems “unnecessary”. Thus, he holiday cycle
determines which aspects of the past are to be added to the
collective memory and which are left out to be forgotten and it
usually happens in line with the state’s current interest and
ideology.
These statements hold true for the Turkish Republic, as
well. The Turkish Republic seems to have tried to define and
formulate a national identity for its citizens and subsequently
tried to impose it since its foundation in 1923. Moreover, with
the establishment of the Turkish History Institution, the
collective memory was endeavoured to be re-created and
manipulated. Commemorations were not seperated from these
efforts. The Turkish Republic seems to have tackled with the
remnants of the Ottoman Empire to build and legitimize itself
in the eyes of the public and has carved the history for its
citizens by rewriting it based on main events of Turkish
Republic. Hence, the governing elite made up a national
calendar for its citizens.
When it comes to the Battle of Çanakkale, a battle that
was fought within the territory of the Turkish Republic with
the exception of Sarıkamış Battle by the Ottoman forces, it
signifies a connection with the Ottoman past for the Turkish
Republic. Against this backdrop, it seems as if the Battle is a
very clear and sharp deviation from the history of the Turkish
Republic that was started by the state authorities with Mustafa
Kemal’s arrival in Samsun on 19 May 1919. Hence, the
commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale emerge as a
disruptive injection in time, instead of a celebration of
national time, concentrated on the major events of the two
decades 1919-1938, an Ottoman military victory starts to be
commemorated not locally, but nationally.
The first initiatives to commemorate the lives lost on 18
March started in 1916, even before the Battle of Çanakkale had
ended.3 The first commemorations seem to have started with a
view to responding to the needs and requirements of those who
3Burhan Sayılır. 2010: “Şehitlerimizi 94 Yıldır Çanakale ile Anıyoruz”, inÇanakkale 1915, 18 March 2010 Özel Sayısı. Ankara: Korza Basım Ltd, pp. 110-113.
have sacrificed their beloved ones in the Battle of Çanakkale.
In the letters sent to Çanakkale stronghold commander Nihat
Pasha on 12 March 1916, he was asked to make a suggestion
regarding the commemoration ceremonies of 18 March. In the end,
it was decided that there would be a military ceremony and
prayers would be held for the dead.4
An analysis of the first commemorations make one suggest
that the first commemorations of the Çanakkale victory were
held in a modest manner and the importance ascribed to the
ceremonies increased as the years went by. One indication of
this modesty is recorded by T. J Pemberton. In 1926, Pemberton
notes that Turkish soldiers held a moderate ceremony to
commemorate their dead and there was no systematic or regular
commemoration at that time.5 Although Pemberton maintained that
the commemorations were held in a moderate fashion, the
commemorations came to be altered in time, the first landmark
being 1934.
4Sayılır 2010 pp. 111-112. 5T. J Pemberton. 1926. Gallipoli To-day. London: Ernest Benn cited in George Fredrick Davis. 2008: “Anzac Day: Meaning and Memories: New Zealand, Australian and Turkish Perspectives On a Day of Commemoration in the Twentieth Century”. (unpublished PhD thesis) New Zealand: University of Otago, pp. 205-206.
The official indifference, almost immediately, appears to
have been replaced by an increasing sensitivity in 1934. The
way the 1934 commemorations were organized seems to highlight
the official perspective to perceive and represent the
commemorations, in that, the Çanakkale victory was elevated to
a level of a national day to be celebrated in the upcoming
years. Firstly, the importance attributed to the commemoration
ceremonies seems to have given rise to the newspaper coverage
of the event. Secondly, the most significant event marking the
change in 1934 towards Çanakkale and the commemorations of the
Battle of Çanakkale is the famous statement of Atatürk read on
the Anzac Day:
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives… Youare now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore restin peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and theMehmets to us where they lie side by side in this country ofours. You, the mothers who sent their sons from far- awaycountries, wipe away your tears. Your sons are now lying in ourbosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on thisland, they have become our sons as well. It is our hope andbelief that the respect we learned to feel for the men of yourrace in this tragic conflict will pave the way for such anunderstanding as will render impossible another conflict ofthis sort. Could your dead speak they would say that they shareour hope, and in their name we ask you to do what you can toco- operate with us in ensuring future peace between ourrespective races. 6
6İbrahim Artuç. 1992: 1915 Çanakkale Savaşı.İstanbul: Kastaş.
It seems as if by calling on ANZACs to cooperate for future
peace, Mustafa Kemal uses the Battle of Çanakkale to reach his
or the state’s own goals. Although it is not clear what these
goals are for certain, one of the underlying targets might be
to utilize these “friendship words” to underline the fact that
Turkey is a peaceful country that has the right to take the
control of the Straits. Secondly, Mustafa Kemal’s aim may have
been to provide an image of a peaceful country to the world and
these words might simply be a public relations tool to this
end.7 No matter what the grounds of these lines are, it seems
as if these words are considered a watershed in the evolution
of the commemoration of the Çanakkale victory.
To start with the evolution of ceremonies, one of the
first commemoration ceremonies are Nihal Atsız’s trips to
Çanakkale. In 1933, Nihal Atsız, a teacher in Edirne, walked in
Çanakkale with a group from National Turkish Union of
Students.8 Atsız, calling upon the youth to visit Çanakkale
seems to have changed the tradition of commemorating the
Çanakale victory from the ship called Gülcemal with some jazz
7Ahmet Mete Tunçoku. 2005: “Mustafa Kemal, Çanakkale ve Atatürk”, in Çanakkale 1915: Buzdağının Altı. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, pp. 144-145. 8Nihal Atsız. 1933: Çanakkale’ye Yürüyüş. İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, p. 5.
music.9 Since then the youth trips have continued under the
banner of MTTB and Turkishness and nationalism have become
focal points of these ceremonies.
It is with the Menderes government that the commemoration
ceremonies of the Battle of Çananakkale gained a more
nationalistic character. In 1955, the commemoration ceremonies
were held in Çanakkale, İstanbul, Adana, Ankara and İzmir.10
Hence, the commemorations that were locally held acquired a
national status. Secondly, the participatory level in the
ceremonies hiked in Menderes era. In 1958, a number of
ministers, and the Prime Minister joined the ceremonies that
were held in Çanakkale.11 Thus, the importance attached to the
ceremonies on the state level further increased in the course
of time.
The efforts to take hold of and control the commemoration
ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale seem to have gained pace
after the coup d’etat in 1960. The army, considering itself
“the protector of the state” seems to have used Çanakkale to
display its power, establishing a line between the Ottoman army
9Atsız, 1933 pp. 37-38. 10Cumhuriyet. 19 Mart 1955. “Çanakkale Zaferi Dün Törenle Kutlandı”.11Cumhuriyet. 19 March 1958. “Şehrimizde Yapılan Törenler”.
and the Turkish armed forces. One significant example of this
is the fact that the military government unveiled the Çanakkale
Martyrs’ Memorial in 1962 in a very hasty manner even though
incomplete despite the serious warnings and opposition of
architects.
The interest in Çanakkale increased so much that in the
50th anniversary, 20 thousand people joined the ceremonies in
Çanakkale.12 Yet, as the ceremonies changed so did the
discourses built around them. After the coup d’etat in 1980,
the main concepts consistently underlined in the ceremonies
came out to be “the role of Mustafa Kemal in the Battle of
Çanakkale, strong state, and liberty, invincibility of the
state, courage, independence and freedom”. In the 90s, as the
era was primarily marked by internal conflict and the attacks
of the PKK, the ceremonies were centered around a discourse of
“unity, solidarity, territorial integrity and ethnic unity”.13
The period after 1997 ought to be considered apart from
the previous years since with the establishment of the Refah- Yol
government, the threats to secularism had increased according
12Hurriyet. 19 March 1965. “Çanakkale Zaferi Dün Heyecanla Kutlandı”.13Cumhuriyet. 19 March 1996. “Çanakkale’den Uzanan Dostluk Eli” (Aynur Narler).
to some circles. Considering this background, the statements
made at the commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale
seem to have reflected the fear of TSK that REFAHYOL and the
deeds of Erbakan posed a great threat to the well being of
secularism in Turkey. To cite an example, the Chief of Staff
Full general İsmail Hakkı Kabadayı, stated that the TAF is a
warranty of democratic and secular republic against all threats
and dangers in the commemoration ceremony in 1997.14
It seems as if after the AKP won the elections for the
first time, the importance attached to the commemoration
ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale has surged and more
attraction has been drawn to these commemorations. The Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has participated in the
commemoration ceremonies of the Battle of Çanakkale since
2003.15 During the term of AKP, the law on 18 March Veterans’s
Day, which sets the methods of commemorating the victory, and
sets the roles, duties and responsibilities of the local
authorities, passed on 24 August 2003. The venue of ceremonies
14 Cumhuriyet. 19 March 1997. “Trene Geciken Çiller’e Protesto” (Turhan Narler, Emine Kaplan).15http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20897&P5=H&PAGE1=28&PAGE2=&web_user_id=8762394 (Türkiye Büyük Millet MeclisiGenel Kurul Tutanağı 23. Dönem 5. Yasama Yılı 80. Birleşim 22/Mart /2011 Salı accessed on 02.05 2011)
in other cities, the order of the ceremonies (singing the
Turkish National Anthem, hoisting the flag, a minutes silence,
honorary shooting), who will deliver the speeches are all set
with this law. Hence, it can be concluded that the law has
created a monopoly in terms of the official Çanakkale
commemorations, yet this is far from the reality on the ground
as August 10 is a more “sacred” day to commemorate for some
circles. Moreover, with this law, the spontaneity of the
commemorations comes to a halt. Last but not least, the
question of whether this law stems from meeting the needs or
whether this is a new and systematic exploitation carefully
planned by AKP to revive and reclaim the Ottoman past in the
present is a question that is hard to answer. Lastly, one
paramount deed of the AKP appeared to be the completion of the
construction of the Çanakkale Martyrs’ Memorial in 2004. AKP,
namely the Prime Minister Erdoğan, honoured the architect of
the memorial Doğan Erginbaş, who wasn’t invited to the
unveiling ceremony in 1962, by providing him with a plaque in
2010.
In parallel to the surge of interest in the commemoration
ceremonies, the efforts to make the commemorations
international have come to the fore. In 2003, came a travel
project to Çanakkale initiated by Başaran Ulusoy, the head of
the Association of Turkish Travel Agencies. Ulusoy initiated a
project to make Çanakkale a venue visited by thousands of
citizens and foreigners on 18 March Çanakkale Victory and
Martyrs’ Day,16 which is in line with what the government would
like to do as stated by Bülent Arınç “turning Çanakkale into an
open air museum”. The project, realized in a very short span
of time with the initiative and follow up of Başaran Ulusoy,
was supported by governors, mukhtars, and presidents of the
universities, the students, employers and employees. A protocol
was signed between Başaran Ulusoy and the Ministry of Education
to take 24 thousand students to the Çanakkale monuments.17
An analysis of the commemoration indicates that just like
the other national and local commemorations in Turkey, 18 March
is also highly organized by the state and it is dominated by
the governing forces. The importance of the ceremonies, which
start locally, surges over time and the ceremonies start to be
held in many provinces besides Çanakkale. The state uses the
16 http://www.gazeten.com/250-bin-sehit-sizi-bekliyor (accessed on 06.04.2011)17http://www.canakkaletravel.com/haber/meb-ile-tursab-arasinda-18-March-canakkale-ve-cumhuriyet-egitim-gezileri-protokolu-imzalandi-.html ( accessed on 06.04. 2011)
commemorations to underline the power of the state or the
Turkish armed forces, as a sign of resistance to imperialism,
to focus on the deeds of Atatürk or to ignore him, to emphasize
the ethnic unity of the state. Yet, which goal it chooses
differs from one government to the next in line with the
agendas of the political party or parties in power. Thus, the
focus of the commemorations and the goals of the commemorations
change from one decade to another depending on the internal and
external politics, and the agenda or the hidden or clear goal
of the governing group or party.
Commemorations as a Venue for Political Conflict
The commemorations, in general, are assumed to boost national
identity. Thus, identity is easily shaped by the commemorations
and the state, if state is the determinant power in organizing
the commemorative activities. Yet it seems as if the identity
built around the commemoration ceremonies of the Çanakkale
victory is not a unifying one.
In the sixties, the commemorations seem to have been taken
and exploited by different groups jostling for better political
positions. In other words, different groups tried to carve a
legitimate space for themselves by utilizing the commemorations
to their end.
The way the commemorations were organized and the themes
that the commemorations brought to the fore highlighted the
role that the chief of staff played in the victory. Yet, there
were others contending to benefit from the victory. As an
outcome of political diversification among the youth after
1960, new political forces gained momentum and each claimed its
own version of interpretation of what happened in 1915. On one
hand, the Islamist right wing groups emphasized that the
soldiers fought on religious motivation and claimed that the
Battle of Çanakkale is a war of jehad. On the other hand, the
left wing groups tried to portray the victory as a resistance
against Western Imperialism. To cite an example, İsmail
Kahraman, the head of MTTB in 1967, makes reference to the
internal enemy in his words: “The enemy who could not pass
Çanakkale yesterday is now among us/ within us. Yet, we are
expecting another Çanakkale victory in a real sense. We are
bearing this soul and awareness, it will happen indeed.”18
18 Milli Türk Talebe Birliği 53. Dönem Faaliyet Raporu. 1976. Ankara: Milli Türk TalebeBirliği, p. 27.
As each party pushed its own version, the commemorations
that were geared to foster national identity became a source
and venue of confrontation. The parties carefully worded their
announcements counting for each expression to consolidate their
own political positions and/or undermine the rival group’s
political stance. Publications, public statements issued by
either group meticulously dealt with the problem of how to
define the victory in the light of political problems and
foreign policy issues that Turkey had been facing in the
sixties.
Other key issue was about the way the commemorations had
to be carried out. The leftist groups, simply disregarding the
Islamists’ calls that the commemorations should be done in
compliance with religious rituals, commemorated the victory in
the form of a political demonstration.
With the surge of interest in Çanakkale, the battle and
ceremonies have been exploited by different groups in the
parliament for their own cause, as well. Kamer Genç, the
Tunceli MP, uses Çanakkale commemorations to bash the
government and criticize them in 2011. He criticizes the
government for taking 350 buses to Çanakkale and for bashing
the head of CHP as he delivers his speech.19 Sırrı Sakık, Muş,
deputy of BDP, uses the commemorations to make to support the
case of his party and to make a focus on ethnic identity. To
him, Çanakkale has cheated the soul and identities of the dead
and the AKP has not heard the voice of millions who have been
craving for democracy and freedom and who have wanted to create
a land that is in suitable for the soul of Çanakkale. He
alleges that their ancestors did not die to provide a stick to
the Turkish and allow them to beat the other nations.20 Lastly,
the Niğde deputy from MHP, Mümin İnan, makes use of Çanakkale
commemorations to fight with imperialism and claims that the
global power that could not pass Çanakkale is now consuming all
the richness of the country.21
As a corollary, the commemorations are mainly geared to
serve primarily to national unity and this principle has been
lacking in the ceremonies mostly since 1960s. On the contrary,
it seems as if the ceremonies have resulted in deeper political
cleavages between different political groups. According to
19http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic? P4=20897&P5=H&PAGE1=26&PAGE2=&web_user_id=8762394, (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı 23. Dönem 5. Yasama Yılı 80. Birleşim 22/March/2011 Salı ; accessed on 02.05 2011 ) 20Ibid.21Ibid.
Tekeli, if ceremonies turn into a venue of political
confrontation, they become a part of political public
establishment and lack in quality.22 Hence, the 18 March
commemorations seem to have turned into a political public
establishment.
Conclusion
To put it in a nutshell, the paper analyses the construction
and progression of national collective memory and identity
around the commemoration ceremonies of 18 March until 2000. An
analysis of the commemoration indicates that just like the
other national and local commemorations in Turkey, 18 March is
also highly organized by the state and it is dominated by the
governing forces and the youth groups of those governing
forces. The commemoration ceremonies of 18 March, the
importance of which gradually increases in time, are analyzed
as a device of the ruing elite, whether it be the army or the
government of particular period. It seems that rather than
creating unity and maintaining common memory by using the22 İlhan Tekeli, “Bir Toplumsal Anlatım ve Katılım Biçimi Olarak KutlamaŞenlikleri”, 13.Şenlik bir siyasal çatışma alanı haline getirilirse, siyasal kamu alanınınbir parçası haline gelir. Niteliğini yitirir. Şenlik içinde eleştiri,değişik sanat formları içinde, sembolik ifade biçimleriyle ortayakonulduğunda, şenlikle tutarlı bir eleştiri haline gelir. Şenliğin hoşgörütalebi ancak bu halde karşı çıkılamaz bir nitelik kazanır.
commemoration of the Battle of Çanakkale, each group has tried
to make use of Çanakkale to its own end and it has become a
platform for identity politics. So it can be concluded that
collective memory has been manipulated in line with the goals
of different groups.
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