From my Book "Peasants Betrayed

Chapter 9

Big Business and the Peasantry

The struggle for India’s freedom fromthe 1920s onwards was closely interlinkedwith the perceptions, hopes and aspirationsof different social classes or interestgroups. These were related not only tocontemporary social reality but also towhat place these classes or groups wouldhave in an independent India. It was notmerely a question of nationalism vis-à-vis theBritish but also nationalism in relation toclass group interests – class perception ofnationalism.1

It was this class perception whichgoverned and determined the attitude ofIndia capitalists towards the British, theCongress, Gandhi, the working class and thepeasantry. In this attitude, at times,there appeared to be variations orambiguities due to differinginterpretations and projections but in theultimate analysis, it was the class

1See Kapil Kumar (ed.) Congress and Classes, (New Delhi,1988), Introduction.

222 Peasants Betrayed

perception that guided the capitalist’reactions to events, institutions, andpersonalities. For example G.D. Birla wouldinform the British that he only financedthe Gandhi Seva Sangh, All India SpinnersAssociation or the Harijan Sewak Sangh andhad nothing to do with the politicalactivities of the Congress. He took painsto assure the Secretary of State for IndiaSir Samuel Hoare that he had never takenpart or financed the Civil Disobediencemovement; he had only been and was a‘severe critic of the financial policy ofthe government’.2 And his closeness toGandhi was because of his belief that ‘menof his [Gandhi’s] type are not only friendsof India but also of Great Britain’ (emphasisadded).3 He further stressed that thegovernment ‘will find us always ready towork for the economic interest, leavingaside sentiments and politics’.4 Note thewords sentiments and politics.

Birla was not an exception to this brandof nationalism pursued by capitalists. Lala

2G.D. Birla to Samuel Hoare, 14 March 1932, G.D. Birla, Bapu : A Unique Association, (Bombay, 1977) Vol. 1, p. 181.

3Ibid. In the same letter Birla also wrote that “Gandhiji is the greatest force on the side of peace and order. He alone is responsible for keeping the left wing in India under check”.

4Ibid.

Big Business and the Peasantry 223

Shri Ram was worried in 1940 about thetroops being posted at the frontiers, whichmight give an impression to the people thatthe government did not have adequate forceto control the interior. Hence he pleadedwith Purshotamdas Thakurdas, anotherleading capitalist, that ‘we could ask theViceroy . . . that the government shouldevery now and then pass some troops with tanks,cars, lorries, guns etc. near or through different towns,so that people may not think that there are no troops leftin the country, or that they are allconcentrated either at frontier or at porttowns’5 (emphasis added). The Lala’ssuggestion obviously was to demoralizepeople from taking recourse to any kind ofagitation or revolt against the government.Almost at the same time Birla wrote toThakurdas: ‘In the name of warindustrialization, we should not allowgovernment to do anything to put up newindustries under the control of Britishinterests’.6

Similarly, during the Quit Indiamovement a delegation of the Federation ofIndian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

5Shri Ram to Purshotamdas, 6 June 1940, Purshotamdas Thakurdas Papers, hereinafter PT Papers,File No. 239/I Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi.

6G.D. Birla to Purshotamdas, 25 June 1940, ibid.


(FICCI) requested the Viceroy to releaseGandhi immediately as he alone could checkattacks on government property. Members ofthe delegation felt that if these attackswere not stopped, very soon there would beattacks on private property. And their pleafor Gandhi’s release was not motivated bynationalism but was due to the ‘long-terminterests of the British in the country.’7

Referring to Churchill’s assertion that hehad not become ‘the King’s First Ministerto preside over the liquidation of theBritish Empire’, Thakurdas said at ameeting of the East India CottonAssociation in 1942:If it was a warning given to the people ofIndia, I think it necessary to say on behalf ofthe Indian commercial community that the variousdemands put forward by the commercial community did not andcould not aim at the liquidation of British Empire. In fact,that is the last thing that any commercial man inthe British commonwealth would desire [emphasisadded].8

The plea for the growth of nativeindustry in a colony was no doubt againstthe imperialist interests but the primeconcern of the Indian capitalists was tosafeguard their own interests not onlyduring the national movement but in a free

7Ibid., File No. 239/V.8Ibid.


India as well. How were these interests tothe guarded? By deriving more and moreconcessions from the colonial state; bymustering support from nationalistleadership and parties in the name ofestablishing and encouraging indigenousindustry; by increasing the number of theirfriends and sympathizers within theCongress, and by seeking the umbrella ofboth nationalists’ right wing and thecolonial government to crust peasants andworking-class movements.

A number of works analyzing thecapitalist development and the politicalattitude of Indian capitalists have comeout in recent years. Their attitude to thepeasantry and peasant organizations has,however, received less scholarly attentionthan it deserves. A balanced understandingdemands a proper enquiry into this aspect,and this is what this paper intends to do.It must, however, be admitted at the outsetthat the theme is too vast to be exploredin a short paper and what is beingpresented here is only a tentative effort.

I

Before going further into the subject,it is necessary to note that many leadingcapitalists had landed interests. One may


cite here the zamindaris of the Tatas andthe Birlas.9 Many big businessmen not onlygave donations and contribution to Gandhiand his various sanghas and associations;they also indulged in money lending on alarge scale and loaned vast sums topolitical leaders. C. Rajagopalachari usedto get hundis of huge amounts from theBirlas10 but the most telling case is thatof Rajendra Prasad. In July 1936,Chiranjilal Bardjatia, manager of theBachraj Jamnalal firm at Wardha and afounder pillar of the Bharat JainMahamandal, on a query from Jamnalal Bajajregarding Rajendra Prasad’s estate andaccounts, informed him:Birlaji gave Rs. 45,000 to Rajendra Babu and inlieu of this Birlaji’s instructions mortagepossession of the estate was taken in yourname. He will return the money in 9 years. Ifit is not returned in 9 years the estate willbe ours. Since we have mortgage possession, theinterest will keep coming from estate’s incomeevery year. If we don’t get the money infuture, there will be no need to file a suitbecause the entire estate is in our control due

9Birla has purchased a big estate in Chotanagpur for Rs.8 lakhs. G.D. Birla to Mirabehn, 7 July 1939, Birla, op. cit. Vol. 3, p. 343.

10There are references to this in C. Rajgopalachari Papers available in Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi.


to mortgage possession. We have given Rs.27,000/- and have got the pronote signed in thename of our shop.11

In another letter Bardjatia wrote: After coming from Chapra I had a talk withBirlaji which was as follows: (A) Some land isto be settled. If the settlement takes place15000 to 20000 rupees can come soon. (B) Thesum invested by Babuji [Rajendra Prasad] inElectricity company is being settled with BiharBank. If the settlement comes through we getshares on debentures and our invested moneywon’t suffer (would be safe.) We have writtento Rajendra Prasad a number of times aboutsettling the estate but he could fond no timeout of Congress work; hence no sale.12

It is to be noted here that RejendraPrasad was to be the prime architect of theCongress-Zamindar pact in Bihar inopposition to the Kisan Sabha in 1937.13

If the capitalist were owning land orindulging in moneylending many politicalleaders bought shares and debentures intheir companies. For example, Indira Gandhiafter consulting her father asked Jamanlal

11Jamnalal Bajaj, Patravyavahar, (New Delhi 1969), Vol.VII, pp. 131-32

12Ibid., p. 132.13See Kapil Kuma, “Congress Peasant Relationship in

the late 1930’s” in D.N. Panigrahi (ed.), Aspects of Economy, society and Politics in Modern India, New Delhi,1984, p. 242.


Bajaj to buy shares on their behalf: ‘Ihave heard there is great profit in Tatasshares these days’, she added.14 Althoughour evidence on politicians’ corporateinvestments is scanty at the moment, thereis no doubt that this reflects on themental attitude of the nationalistleadership towards the capitalists and thatthe financial interests of both wereinterlinked to a large extent.

The capitalist reaction to the BardoliSatyagraha must be viewed in this light.When Thakurdas and Birla acted asintermediaries between the government andVallabhbhai Patel to bring about asettlement, Thakurdas wrote to Patel: ‘Ihad no doubt that you will always beprepared to settle this question withouthumiliation to government [emphasis added] and atthe same time without humiliation to thepeople whose cause you have espoused’.15

Thakurdas believed that Patel’s leadershipand firm stand had ‘been successful in sofar as it has attracted public notice allover India’.16 On the other had Birla

14Indira Gandhi to Jamnalal Bajaj, 30 October 1941, Jamnalal Bajaj, Patravyavahar, (New Delhi 1958), Vol. I, p. 13.

15Thakurdas to Patel, 14 June 1928, PT Papers, File No. 74/II

16Ibid.


strongly argued with Gandhi in favour of asettlement saying ‘. . . if the only issuebe the question of deposit of revenues, Ifor one would favour the ideas of someindependent individual making the necessarydeposits. This will help the governmentsave face and will also keep Vallabhbhaifree from the tangle’.17 Birla told Gandhithat the government would ‘assume anaggressive posture’ and symptoms werewholly favourable for an agreement. Thoughwell aware that he Bardoli struggle waslikely to be of great help in our workrelating to the Simon Commission’, Birlaurged Gandhi that ‘the struggle should bekept apart from the wider issue ofpolitical struggle’.18 The question here iswhy did Birla want it so? Nothing is speltout clearly but the inference is clear i.e.the economic interest of the peasantry wasto be kept apart from national issues andthe peasantry movement was not to beallowed to go beyond a point. After thesettlement, however, Birla was glad thatthe Bardoli affairs were ‘after all settledand the triumph has been for the people’.He regarded this ‘as an eye opener to all

17Birla to Gandhi, 25 July 1928, Birla, Bapu (n. 2), Vol. 1, p. 103.

18Ibid.


the concerned’ which would ‘put new lifeinto the dwindling forces of nationalism’.19

It would be useful for our analysis hereto have some idea about Birla’sunderstanding of the peasants’ condition.In a letter of W.D. Croft in 1932 he wrote:‘In connection with my business, I hadrecently to travel in a number of villagesand I found that although there was a greateconomic distress, the agriculturist so farhas been able to maintain nearly the samestandard of living.’20 Birla had concludedthis on the basis of information receivedby him that in most cases the zamindarswere not getting more than 50 per centrent, the moneylenders were not receivinginterest on loans advanced, and thepeasants were selling gold. He felt thatthe agriculturist was not left with ‘muchsurplus gold’ and in case prices did notrise, there would be a total ‘refusal topay rent and interest’.21 Three months laterhe averred that ‘stabilization of prices ata higher level can undoubtedly reduce theburden of agriculturist, as he is a debtorand has to pay a fixed revenue for his

19Birla to Thakurdasl, 7 August 1928, PT Papers, File No. 74/I.

20Birla to Croft, 30 April 1932, Birla, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 181-2.

21Ibid.


land’.22 This he wrote to Gandhi, but theaccent in his argument to Lord Lothian wasslightly different:A rise in price of food stuff alone will helpthe cultivator only partially, as thecultivator is both a producer as well as asubstantial consumer. The cultivator can,therefore, largely gain only if there is a risein the prices of those articles which areexported, and jute and cotton stand first inthe list of such produce.23

In these arguments taken together,Birla’s concerns are clear. He was worriedabout the exports of cotton and jute inwhich he himself traded, and he lamentedthe lost of rent and interest by zamindarsand moneylenders. His reference to the goldstocks to the peasants betrayed hisignorance of the ground realities, and heseems to have overlooked the fact that therise in prices helped the middlemen and notthe cultivator, except in extremely limitedcases.

During the period the Congress ministerswere in power in most of the provinces,Birla played a crucial role in guiding theCongress right wing and determining itsattitude towards working-class and peasantstruggles. This was a period when the

22Birla to Gandhi, 22 July 1932, Ibid., p. 201.23Birla to Lothian, 4 August 1932, ibid., p. 213.


peasant movement was gaining strength allover the country and the Kisan Sabhas faceda lot of problems with the Congress rightwing. I have discussed these issueselsewhere.24 Here I would attempt toestablish the links between the actions ofthe colonial government, Congressministers, Congress right wing and Birla inrelation to the Kisan Sabha’s activities.

In August 1937 the Bihar Kisan Sabhaorganized a peasants’ march to theassembly. The aim was to remind theCongress ministry of the promises made tothe peasantry during the electioncampaigns. The Viceroy believed that thiswas a movement which ‘needed carefulwatching’25 whereas the governor of Biharconsidered it a ‘harmless demonstration’ –the peasants ‘were well-behaved and goodhumoured . . . rather like a body oftourists on a sight seeing tour’. TheViceroy, fearing that in future ‘suchdemonstrations might degenerate intoassemblies which might be rather a menaceto the public peace’,26 advised the Congress

24See Kumar (Ed.), Congress and Classes, pp. 238-251.25Linlithgow, 25 August 1937, Linlithgow Papers

(LP), S. No. 113, Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi.

26Hallet to Linlithgow, 3 September 1937, ibid.


premier of the province to take sternaction.

Birla at this time was in England andwas being regularly informed about eventsin India. Feeling that ‘indiscipline asgetting rampant’ he wrote to Mahadev Desai:

I very much disliked the peasants inBihar marching to the Assembly house andoccupying all the seats of the Assemblyand refusing to vacate them and toldthem all sorts of sweet things withouttelling them that they were wrong inoccupying the Assembly seats andrefusing to vacate them.27

Birla feared that ‘in course of timeindiscipline will grow more and more unlessstrict measures are taken’. He hoped thatthe ‘Congress authorities are fully aliveto the situation and they will take allnecessary measures’. The rank and file,according to him, was ‘confusing freedomwith indiscipline’.28 He also discussed atgreat length with the Viceroy the growingpeasant movement in Bihar and the UnitedProvinces (UP, now Uttar Pradesh). TheViceroy asked him to ‘convey it to properquarters that it would be very bad for theministers, if the Governor had to use his

27Birla to Desai, 4 September 1937, Birla, op. cit.,Vol. 3, pp. 76-7.

28Ibid.


own responsibility for maintenance of lawand order’.29 Birla assured the Viceroy that‘Pant [Govind Ballabh, the Prime Ministerof UP] was fully conscious of hisresponsibility’. He told him that ‘all bigleaders of the Gandhi Sewa Sangh werestrenuously working to fight out violence’.The Viceroy ‘was very happy to hear this’.Nevertheless, Birla made it clear toMahadev Desai that his own fear was thatthe Congress ministries in these twoprovinces had not fully realized the‘seriousness of the growing danger to non-violence’.30

Birla was of the view that ‘perhaps forthe next few months the most important taskof the ministers would be to suppress allincitement to violence’. But this was to bedone ‘partly through prosecution and partlythrough redressing the grievances of thepeople’. The root cause of the troubles,according to him, was the ‘exaggeratedexpectations’.31 Birla believed that thediscontent would not subside ‘unless theCongress tells the peasants clearly thattheir position could be improved ultimatelythrough their own hard work alone and not

29Birla to Desai, 4 December 1937, ibid., pp. 105-6.30Ibid.31For details of these expectations, see Kumar (ed.)

Congress and Classes (n.1), pp. 235-36.


by any stroke of wand’.32 In his opinion,abolishing the zamindari or nationalizationof accumulated wealth would ‘hardly addmuch to the existing income of themasses’.33 ‘Bread is not going to come outof confiscation of zamindaries’, he wrote.‘Our ministers’, he further added, ‘willhave to decide from this very moment as towhat they are going to do for amelioratingthe condition of the people. If they thinkthat the amelioration depends on theconfiscation of the properties, then Ithink they are deceiving themselves’.34 Andthen he presented a frightening scenario:The question of discontent just now is linkedup with economics and unless steps are taken tomake the peasants realize what is possible andwhat is not, I fear the ferment will grow tosuch an extent that it will become impossibleafter a certain stage for the ministers tomaintain discipline. And as Bapu has said somany time, inviting the help of the Militarywill be the death knell of the provincialgovernment.35

Thus, what Birla was basically demandinghere was total check on peasant’s actions;

32Birla to Desai, 4 December 1937, Birla, op. cit.,Vol. 3, pp. 106.

33Ibid.34Ibid.35Ibid.


strict measures by ministers and an end tothe talk of confiscation of zamindaris orprivate property. Here was a case of directsupport to zamindars by a capitalist.

Barely six days after Birla had writtenthe above letter to Mahadev Desai, theCongress leadership put a ban on the BiharKisan Sabha on 10 December 1937. This waslater ratified by the Congress WorkingCommittee. The speeches of kisan leaderwere reported by the Central IntelligenceDepartment and their mail intercepted. Itwas during this period that the Congressunder the guidance of Rajendra Prasad,Patel and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad enteredinto an agreement with the landlords inBihar, and kisan workers were prosecuted.36

When all this was going on Mahadev Desaiinformed Birla that the ‘situation hasdecidedly improved in Bihar’.37 Similarly,Pant send a ‘very reassuring’ letter toBirla saying that ‘there was nothing toworry about agrarian trouble and he waskeeping his fingers on the pulse’. TheViceroy hearing this reassuring news fromBirla was ‘quite pleased’.38 But both Birlaand Desai were quite upset over Rafi Ahmed

36See Kumar (ed.), Congress and Classes, pp. 242-43.37Desai to Birla, 22 December 1937 Birla, op. cit.,

Vol. 3, p.127.38Birla to Desai, 21 December 1937, ibid., p. 124.


Kidwai’s declaration at a kisan meeting atPratapgarh on 20 December that ‘theCongress Government would either be forcedto adopt coercive measures or get out ofoffice if the peasants did not abide by thelaws in force today’.39 Kidwai was aCongress minister in UP but instead ofchanging the tenancy laws enacted by analien government, he was asking thepeasants to follow them. But the British,Birla and Desai felt that ‘a responsibleminister cannot run away from hisresponsibility by offering to resign’.40

Gandhi agreed with Birla that ‘anarchicaltendencies are striking roots in theCongress’ and assured him that ‘I have beenexerting my utmost to check thisdevelopment’.41 He was not referring to thepeasants or workers alone. During thisperiod any kind of mass action, includinginnocent public welcome of releasedpolitical prisoners, was condemned byGandhi, the right wing and Birla.42

II

An important development from 1936onwards was the coming closer of the All-

39Modern Review, LXII (1938), p. 119.40Birla, Bapu, Vol. 3, pp. 132, 141.41Gandhi to Birla, 26 August 1938, ibid., p. 187.42See Kumar (ed.), Congress and Classes, p. 249.


India Trade Union Congress (AITUS) and theAll-India Kisan Sabha (AIKS). The latterappealed to peasants to celebrate May Dayand cooperate with city workers in theirstruggles against capitalists. As aprominent kisan leader Sahajanand Saraswatipointed out:Till recently it [May Day] had been theinternational day of only factory workersthroughout the world and agrarian workers andpeasantry had very little, if at all, realizedits significance. Gradually came the turn ofthe European and American peasants and theybegan to observe it and thus showed theirsolidarity with factory comrades. Only lastyear, the Kisans throughout our countryobserved the Kisan day on 1 May and thusexpressed their solidarity with the workers allover the world.43

All affiliates of the AIKS celebratedMay Day and by 1938 the slogan ‘Kisan mazdurraj Kayam ho’ (Let the worker-peasant regimeemerge) had gained momentum. The AIKS wasattempting to make the peasants aware oftheir responsibility towards otherexploited classes.44 It also organized thesweepers in Gaya who went on strike forhigher wages. In certain pockets unitedactions were taken. For example, in

43All India Kisan Bulletin (AIKB), 16 April 1937.44Ibid., 22 April 1938


December 1937 the Textile Workers Union ofNagpur organized a march to the assembly inassociation with kisan, demanding that theCongress ministry should outline its labourpolicy and give immediate relief from wagecuts to textile workers.45

When the Congress imposed a ban on theBihar Kisan Sabha in December 1937, anAITUC session held in January 1938condemned it in strong language and assuredthe AIKS of its full support in the fightagainst landlordism and vested interests.The session also passed resolutionsfavouring abolition of zamindars and allother intermediaries.46 The Bihar KisanSabha expressed its gratitude to the AITUCfor supporting the peasants’ cause.47 In thespeeches of virtually all AIKS leaders aswell as the peasant leaders operating atlocal levels, feudalism and capitalism weredescribed the zamindars and capitalists assynonyms of peasant exploitation.48 InNovember 1938, the Kanpur factory workersexpressed solidarity with peasants and

45Ibid., 10 December 193746Ibid., 14 January 193847Ibid., 4 February 1938.48During the late 1930s, Baba Ram Chandra was very

critical of capitalist domination. Baba Ram Chandra Papers, SF No.3, NMML, New Delhi. For his work amongst peasants, see Kapil Kumar, Peasants in Revolt, New Delhi, 1984.


denounced the pro-landlord attitude of theCongress ministry in relation to theTenancy Bill.49 Sahajanand believed that theentire socio-economic problem revolvedaround the peasant. This was because asignificant proportion of the urbanproletariat consisted of those who migratedin search of some relief from sufferingconfronted in rural areas, and keptalternating between fields and mills.50

Interestingly, this rural-urban link wasdescribed by Birla to Chruchill: ‘Notownsman is a pure townsman in India.Everyone maintains touch with the villages.Twenty-five thousand’.51 Gandhi wasconscious of the growing unrest among thepeasants as he admitted in a letter to GuyWint in 1939:The agrarian unrest is a much greater danger,but if the Congress retains non-violence it isbound to be disciplined. We who believe in non-violence are trying to cope with it, but we mayfail. And yet we are not going the way ofChina. In China peasants can be soldiers atwill but not here in India. In India we cannotmake soldiers so easily. But I agree that youhave spotted the real danger. However, it will

49AIKB, 11 November 1938.50Congress Socialist, 26 December 1936.51Birla to Churchill, August 1935, Birla, , op.

cit.,Vol. 2, p. 141.


cease if the Congress can produce real type ofworkers for the villages.52

The Mahatma ‘did not dread’ the labourunrest much ‘for factory labourers were notmore than 20 lakhs ‘who lived ‘only inartificial cities’. Discarding the‘psychological importance’ of labour unrestand confident that ‘those bent on mischiefcannot spread red ruin in the villages’Gandhi advised Wint to ‘hook his mind tothe villages and not the towns’.53

A number of Gandhi Sewa Sangh volunteerswere moved into Bihar villages to counterthe Kisan Sabha propaganda. Significantlyenough, what these volunteers preached wasnot class adjustment or classcollaborations but class submission.54 Andwe must take note of the fact that theSangh was financed by G.D. Birla. Thecoming together of the working class andthe peasants was alarming for the Congressright wing and capitalist who worked handin hand. For example Ramkrishna Dalmia, anemerging industrialist, had financed theCongress in Bihar during the elections of

52Ibid., Vol. 3 p. 224.53Ibid.54See Kapil Kumar, “Ideology Congress and Peasants

in 1930s: Class Adjustment or Submission?” Social Scientist, XIV-89 (August-September 1986), pp. 40-55.


1937.55The same year Rajendra Prasadadvocated the candidature of Dalmia for aby-election to the central assembly as anindependent candidate, supported by theCongress. He wrote to Patel:As I told you Dalmia would like to have theseat but on account of his many business connections he doesnot like to take the Congress ticket. As youknown he has been always helpful and there is afeeling in some of our workers that it isworth-while leaving this seat uncontested.Personally I have confidence that he willsupport the Congress in most matters [emphasisadded].56

Prasad also brought to Patel’s noticethat ‘there may be some among Congressmanparticularly those connected with KisanSabha who may disapprove of this action’.57

In the earlier election Dalmia had lost tothe Congress candidate supported by theKisan Sabh. Patel turned down Prasad’sproposal perhaps because of his fears thatsupport to Dalmia would further aggravatethe political challenge to the right wingleadership and its alliance with thecapitalist, but this does not detract fromthe significance of Prasad’s suggestion.

55There are many letters exchanged between Dalmia, Bajaj and Rejendra Prasad in this regard.

56Rajendra Prasad to Patel, 5 May 1937, Rajendra Prasad Papers, NMML, New Delhi.

57Ibid.


The growing unity of the peasants andthe working class served them well asseveral agitations succeeded only becauseof their mutual support. In this regard thelabour strike in sugar mill at Bihta inBihar is noteworthy. Promoted by Dalmia in1932 the mill had been established inresponse to the protection granted to thesugar industry 58 which encouraged virtuallyall leading capitalist to invest in thisindustry. To establish his mill Dalmiasought the help of Rajendra Prasad andSwami Sahajanand Saraswati who, thoughworking for the peasants, was during thisphase a staunch Gandhian. The Swami wouldlater regret his association with Dalmiabut conceded: It was only through this mill that how shrewdlythe rich selfish capitalists exploit thepeople. How big leaders and the Mahatmaentrapped in their grip, help them in this andare unable to realize for people’s welfare. Butin reality it is the capitalist who used themto exploit the poor.59

Dalmis faced problems with zamindars ofBihta in buying land for the mill. The

58See Sanjay Baru, “State and Industrialization: ThePolitical Economy of Sugar Policy, 1932-1947”, in Panigrahi (ed.), op. cit., p. 105.

59Sahajanand Saraswati, Mera Jiwan Sangharsh, Patna, 1952, p. 455.


vice-chairman of the Danapur local boardapproached Sahajanand and sought to assurehim: ‘He should not be worried aboutdonations for his Ashram. Once he helps themilwalas in getting land, money would be noproblem’.60 Sahajanand took strong exceptionto this offer saying: I piss on such moneyas it will enslave me to the millwalas’. 61Yethe did help Dalmia in acquiring landbecause he thought, to quote his own words,‘that since a tax of Rs.6 and 5 annas hasbeen imposed on imported sugar, sugar millswill open in this region. So instead of aforeigner opening it this Dalmia would bemuch better because he wears a Gandhi capand calls himself a Congressman. Peoplealso consider him so.’62

Soon the industrialist’s family startedvisiting the Swami’s ashram. Damilaproposed that his sister’s son be allowedto stay in the ashram. The young man’smother and grandmother also supported thisrequest. They wanted to construct a housefor their ward in the asharam butSahajanand refused to go along, saying thathe could not break the rules and noservants could be provided in the asharam.The family continued its visits and no

60Ibid.61Ibid.62Ibid.


various pretexts, like puja, birthday, etc.,would leave small amounts of money duringthese visits for sweets to be distributedamong the ashramites. Sahajanand put a stopto this also, realizing that Dalmia’sgenerous gestures might his hands if hehand to stand up against he mil managementto espouse the peasant cause in future. Toquote his won picturesque language: ‘It issaid when a thief goes to commit burglaryhe takes some jiggery for the dogs. Whenthey bark, it is fed to them and this stops their barking. The same is done bycapitalist. Knowing that we are going tobark, they offer us jiggery in advance.’63

Significantly, Rajendra Prasad wasincluded as a director of the mill andMadan Mohan Malviya was to come for itsinauguration. On the occasion of theopening of the mill, a number of promisewere made. The workers were promised modelhouses for themselves and schools for theirchildren; and the peasants were assuredhigh prices for cane. It was stated that anexisting rival company in the vicinity, theBeg Sutherland Mills owned by Englishmen,incurred a great deal of avoidableexpenditure because of which it paid lowerwages to the worker and less price to thegrower for his cane. The Dalmia factory

63Ibid, p. 456.


would husband its resources carefully;henece the peasants would get high pricesfor cane, and workers higher wages. And yetthe sugar produced here would be cheaperthan in the English company.64 It is quiteclear that the management wished to takefull advantage of the rising swadeshisentiments.

But what actually happened in relationto peasants and workers was worse that whatwas happening in the English mill. Theprice offered by the Dalmias for cane was 3annas per maund as against 6 annas by theSuthreland Mills. When this was brought tothe promoter’s notice by Sahajanand,Dalmia’s reply was that ‘he has to see theprinciple of demand and supply’. Now thetug of war started. Sahajanand warned thepeasants not to give up jiggery-making orelse they would become the slaves of themill. The mill management wanted thepeasants to stop producing jiggery toensure supply of raw material to the mill.Dalmia even accused Sahajanand of opposingthe mill out of dudgeon because the latterhad asked Dalmia for Rs.2,000/-, which hadbeen refused. But did not carry any weightwith the peasants and the mill wasultimately forced to abide by its promisesand pay 7 to 8 annas per maund- about one

64Ibid.


anna more than paid by other mills.65

Sahajanand informed Nehru of Dalmia’spromises and what he was doing now. Hebelieved that Dalmia had trapped RajendraPrasad into accepting the directorship ofthe mill. At this time Prasad wasimprisoned and Sahajanand believed thatPrasad ‘realizes everything . . . and isready to resign from the directorship ofthe Mills. . . . only his confidential is agreat obstacle’.66 But Sahajanand was notaware of the actual relationship betweenPrasad and Dalmia to which we have referredearlier.

The cane growers were not fullysatisfied with the value they received fortheir produce and the worker’s discontentin the meantime was also mounting. Theresult was Dalmia mill witnessed as many asthree strikes within a brief period of twoyears between 1936 and 1938. The firststrike was in 1936, the issue being sugarcane prices. For months the peasantsstopped the supply of sugar cane to thefactory. The mill procured it fromdifferent places at 12 to 14 annas permaund but was not prepared to offer thesame prices to local cultivators. The

65Ibid.66Sahajanand to J. Nehru, 2 November 1933, J. Nehru

Papers, Vol. 91, NMML, New Delhi


peasants picketed the bullock-carts thatcarried cane to the mill and many werearrested. Though the mill suffered heavylosses the strike failed.67 Yet the successlay elsewhere. The peasants had learnttheir first lesson in strike against acapitalist and were better prepared nexttime.

In January 1937 the mill-workers went onstrike for higher wages. In support ofworkers the peasants stopped supplyingsugar cane to the mill. This forced themill to accept the workers’ demands withinforty-eight hours of the commencement ofthe strike. Towards the end of 1938, theworkers again went on strike on the groundof non-implementation of the agreement. Butonly 250 workers could hold on due tothreats and repression by the management.Again the peasants came to their rescue andrefused to supply cane. About 250 of themwere jailed within a brief span of twodays. This time the management approachedSahajanand with a lump sum donation ofRs.10,200/- per month for the ashram. Theemissary who came with this offer had toflee the ashram for his life and ultimatelythe mill had to concede the demands.68

67Sahajanand Saraswati, op. cit., p. 459.68Ibid. Such struggles continued in future also

against retrenchment of workers.


The peasant-worker joint actionperturbed the capitalist and alarmed thesugar syndicate. Besides Dalmia, Birla,Shri Ram and Jamanlal Bajaj owned sugarfactories in UP and Bihar.69 The Congressdepended on the sugar lobby for funds. Aspant wrote to Bajaj: ‘There are many sugarfactories in Gorakhpur. In case you cantake paints to go there, I firmly believe,you will be able to get a good amount ofmoney. . . It will create inconvenience toyou but . . . it is for you to save us fromfinancial difficulties.’70 This perhapsexplains why even Jawaharlal Nehru those tosilence Shibhanlal Saxena in Gorakhpur.Saxena was mobilizing the sugarcane growersand other peasants in the 1930s. The sugarlobby complained against him to the viceroyand Gandhi. Jawaharlal wrote the Viceroy:‘I must confess he [Saxena] is crude ofspeech and occasionally his tongue runsaway with him when he discussed the plightof the peasantry. We have warned him privatelyseveral times and our advice has had effect onhim’71 (emphasis added).

These instances demonstrate that by thelate 1930s the kisan sabhas and the pro-

69Sanjay Baru, op. cit., p. 108.70Bajaj, Patravyavhar, op. cit., p. 42.71J. Nehru to Viceroy, 6 October 1939, J. Nehru

Papers, Vol. 42.


peasant leadership were not only advocatingthe peasants’ cause nut also opposing boththe zamindars and capitalist. This stanceis reflected not only in their position oneconomic demands but the way these demandswere related to the political struggleagainst the British. All this added to thecoming closer of the right wing Congressmenand the capitalist. The capitalist left nostone unturned to guide and strengthen theright wing in checking not only the workingclass but the awakening among the peasantsalso. Birla’s condemnation of peasantsmarches and stress on discipline is oneamongst the many cases that can be cited inthis context. The friendly relationship ofthe capitalist with the British on the onehand and their growing influence in theCongress on the other remained a constantfactor in the freedom struggle. A uniquefeature of the Indian transition towardscapitalism has been not the conflictbetween capitalism and feudalism, but theirmutual cooperation, support and a policy ofaccommodating each other. Devising methodsto crush the peasants struggle was a partof this mutual understanding duly supportedby the Congress Right Wing.

From my Book "Peasants Betrayed

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Transcript of From my Book "Peasants Betrayed